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DOCTORAL THESIS SUBMITTED

TO THE

UNIVERSITY OF KENT AT CANTERBURY

BY

PIERRE FILION B.A. M.A.

TRANSPORT POLICIES IN LONDON 1965 - 1980 ;

A STUDY OF POLITICAL CONFLICT AND SOCIAL INJUSTICE

MAY 1983

Abstract: Transport Policies in London 1965-1980; a study of political conflict and social injustice .

Ph D thesis submitted by Pierre Filion

This thesis is a study of political decision-making processes related to transport matters. It explores the factors underlying these decisions and their social impact. The thesis is divided into three parts. Part One constitutes a theoretical discussion of themes related to the study of urban transport policies: the urban phenomenon, the state, and transport planning. In Part Two, the history of transport policies in London is related. The period between 1965 and 1980 is studied in detail while the decades before 1965 are briefly examined to provide a background. Finally in Part Three, the history of the period under consideration is discussed in the light of the theoretical developments of Part One. One of the main points raised by this discussion is that elected members repond to pressures from non-state organisations which are likely to yield electoral and economic impacts. It also appeared that the discrepancy between large scale plans and modest implementations which characterises the period under study was the result of the behaviour of members of organational group, i.e. planners and elected members, working within the state and each pursuing their own interests. The major point raised in the thesis is that low income groups in London suffered disproportionally from negative consequences of transport policies and trends. This was accounted for by the fact that these groups have less political strength than other groups and that their limited means do not allow them to escape deteriorating modes of transport by using other ones.

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I do not intend to present a long list of everyone I am grateful to and without whom this work would have been impossible. Many have spent hours discussing their ideas or explaining the positions adopted by their organisation. Certain persons have requested that they would prefer not to have their name mentioned and I am sure that others would not have been pleased to see their name associated to a work which defends ideas running counter to their own.

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ABBREVIATIONS

BR	:	British Rail
BRB	:	British Railways Board
BRF	:	British Road Federation
BTC	:	British Transport Commission
CSO	:	Central Statistical Office
DOE	:	Department of the Environment
DOT	:	Department of Transport
DUS	:	daily urban system
GDP	:	gross domestic product
GL	:	Greater London
GLA	:	Greater London area
GLC	:	Greater London Council
GLDP	:	Greater London Development Plan
LATA	:	London Amenity and Transport Association
LBA	:	London Boroughs Association
LCC	:	London County Council
LCN	:	London Commuter Network
LGOC	:	London General Omnibus Company
LHCTAC	:	London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee
LMA	:	London Motorists' Association
LMAG	:	London Motorway Action Group
LPTB	:	London Passenger Transport Board
LT	:	London Transport
LTB	:	London Transport Board
LTE	:	London Transport Executive
LTS	:	London Traffic Survey (and later) London Transportation Study

MHLG	:	Ministry of Housing and Local Government
MOT	:	Ministry of Transport
OECD	:	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OMA	:	outer metropolitan area
OMO	:	one man operation
OSE	:	outer South East
PRN	:	Primary Road Network
RATP	:	Régie autonome des transports parisiens
RER	:	Réseau express régional
RSG	:	Rate Supplementary Grant
SEPR	:	South East periphery
SMLA	:	Standard Metropolitan Labour Area
SNCF	:	Société nationale des chemins de fer
TPP	:	Transport Policies and Programme
TSG	:	Transport Supplementary Grant
TSSD	:	technical and social space division
UBE	:	urban built environment
ULM	:	urban land model
ULN	:	urban land nexus
UTPP	:	urban transport planning procedure
VOT	:	value of time (studies)

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Introduction

My interest in the study of urban transport policies was awakened in a previous research project which focused on urban redevelopment (Filion 1979). This study revealed the importance of transport infrastructure in stimulating the redevelopment of urban areas. In the area under study, the first step in redevelopment consisted of the construction of new urban motorways and principal roads focusing on the designated area. The increased accessibility of the area under study, then stimulated new public and private investment projects. While the study concentrated on the land use impacts of transport infrastructure and did not pay much attention to their other consequences, it made me conscious of the social impact of changes in transport systems. It became clear to me that in spite of their stated intention of responding to objectively defined needs, political decisions concerning transport matters in fact favoured the interests of some social groups at the expense of others. It thus appeared that transport policies could be considered from the standpoint of their social impacts and that the interests they favour could be deduced from the nature of their effects on different social groups.

My interest in transport in London can be traced back to my first visit to the British capital in 1971. At that time my image of London was that it was endowed with a comprehensive, efficient and affordable public transport system which should be the envy of most North American major cities. And over the years which followed this visit, I usually referred to London

as an example of what could and should be done in terms of transport in major cities. The main concern underlying the present study resulted to a large extent from a comparison of transport conditions in London in 1979 with that prevailing eight years earlier. This perception of the difference between the two situations was probably biased as a result of an idealisation of my initial perception of transport in London. It appeared to me that in comparison with 1971, levels of service had decreased seriously, that fares had increased steeply and that the attitude of the public towards politicians and public transport operators had become increasingly resentful.

The main concern of this thesis is with the manner in which different social groups are affected by transport policies and transport trends, with how the nature of the "urban life" of different social groups is largely shaped by the characteristics of transport systems. More specifically, I shall attempt to examine the extent to which the potential accessibility of different social groups to urban activities was influenced by the rise in car use and the consequent fall in public transport patronage as well as by political decisions concerning urban transport. The area under consideration is London: while to a large extent London reflects tendencies present throughout the Western world, eg. increases in car use and reductions in levels of public transport patronage, the policies implemented in the British capital diverged in many respects from the orientation of those pursued in other Western European and North American cities. Relatively few new roads were built in London compared with other major Western cities and public transport fares increased at a steeper rate in the British capital than elsewhere as a result of the low level of subsidy paid to

London's public transport operators. This study will attempt to throw light on the reasons underlying these differences.

The period chosen, 1965 to 1980, like any delimitation of time, is largely arbitrary. The historical background to this period is presented in a separate chapter in order to avoid some of the problems of focusing on such a restricted period. The starting point of the period chosen corresponds roughly to the start of the planning process leading to the proposal of a primary road network consisting of motorways for London in the late 1960's. One of the major aims of this thesis is to cover the totality of the motorway debate in order to analyse both the factors which led to the planning and promotion of the Primary Road Network and those which led to its rejection. 1980 marks the end of the period under consideration. It is unfortunate that significant recent developments affecting public transport (eg. the legal battle over low fares) could not be included, but it appeared that it would be difficult to give these events more than a journalistic treatment because of their proximity in time.

Another concern of this thesis is with the motives shaping transport policies, and particularily with the political aspect of decision-making and the social effects of transport policies and trends. In this respect the thesis diverges considerably from the majority of research by planners or academics on transport matters. These studies deal with the so-called technical aspects of transport problem definitions and related transport solutions without paying attention to the political processes.

Such studies typically put forward transport proposals devised on the basis of projected increases in the level of demand. The non-political tradition of transport sudies contrasts with the numerous political studies of other aspects of urban reality, eg. the local political process, land use, housing etc... The present study attempts to "detechnicise" the treatment of urban transport matters and to "politicise" it by, inter alia, relating the technical arguments put forward in planning documents to the specific interests of groups of agents involved in transport matters. We see political decision-making as reflecting social conflicts and consequently argue that the technical arguments in terms of which transport policy is debated, in fact conceal the conflicting interests of specific groups in transport matters. The present study of transport policies in London over the fifteen years between 1965 to 1980, is intended to be a case study of these political considerations. The main considerations covered in this study are, the impact of transport policies on different social groups and the effect of pressures exerted by these groups on political decision-making, and the motivations of agents associated with the state apparatus, ie. politicians and officials.

The core of the present study consists of a description and analysis of political decisions related to transport matters in London. Changes in the use of different modes of transport and in levels of services, and the effect of these trends on different social groups, are also considered. The choice of the material presented in the history of the period between 1965 and 1980 is determined by the interests outlined above. Our analysis of this material will be used to validate our

perspective on the political process which underlies the study. Primary emphasis in studying the political process is placed upon the Greater London Council. Our theoretical perspective gives priority to organisations and structured forms rather than to individuals in shaping transport policy. For example we see the main agent in debates relating to transport matters as being social groups pursuing their own interests in a given organisational structure rather than individuals. This is not to deny that a study of individuals is worthwhile. But, apart from demanding far more time in order to be comprehensive, or, if not, leading to a highly selective coverage of transport issues such a study would need to show the relation between the structural context in which individuals evolve and individual actions. For both theoretical and practical reasons the present study is therefore restricted to the behaviour of groups and organisations rather than individuals.

This theoretical position influenced the orientation of the research underlying this study in that, in the collection of material on transport policies and situations, much emphasis was placed on documents originating from the major organisations involved in the debate and responsible for decision-making. The thesis is in fact primarily based on an analysis of documents. These documents were given importance because they stated the standpoint of organisations with competence in transport matters. Particular attention was given to documents originating from the Greater London Council, the Ministry of Transport, the Department of the Environment, the Department of Transport and from the Treasury. Annual reports of the London Transport

Board, the subsequent London Transport Executive, and of the British Railways Board were also considered as were other documents emanating from these sources. Different types of documents such as reports, leaflets, press releases, etc., issued by non-governmental organsiations were reviewed. In order to deepen our understanding of the process underlying the adoption of stands by different organisations on London transport matters, a number of officials in public bodies and active members of movements involved in transport debates were interviewed. I also spoke to academics whose field of interest was related to transport in London. In order to gain a full picture of the major events relevant to transport in London, two dailies, The Times and The Guardian, and two weeklies, The Economist and New Society, were consulted. The choice of these publications was governed by a desire to avoid reliance on any single source or political viewpoint.

The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part consists of a theoretical discussion of themes relevant to the analysis of urban transport policies. The purpose of this part is to set out the perspective which structures the research which follows, and which determines the aspects of transport matters which will be seen as relevant. This part comprises three chapters. The first chapter focuses on definitions of the "urban" present in sociological, economic and political studies referring to urban questions. After a discussion of these definitions, I offer an alternative definition which is particularly useful when transport is the main object of study. Chapter Two consists of a review of recent literature on the state and focuses on the relation between state and society.

I attempt to base my explanation of the nature of state interventions on the motivation of agents associated with governmental agencies (politicians and officials) in response to political pressure. This leads to a discussion of the conditions which these pressures must fulfill in order to have an impact on the state. In Chapter Three, I outline the main trends in the definition of transport problems and in the solutions proposed over the period under consideration. The main methodologies relied upon by transport planners are also discussed. In this chapter, I shall attempt to arrive at an understanding of the impact of changes in the provision of transport services in order to be able to follow up later, the social consequences of transport policies.

Part One therefore outlines the major arguments which underly the choice and presentation of the historical material in Part Two, and the interpretation put forward in Part Three. In brief, it stresses that the importance of transport systems in an urban setting stems from their role in determining physical accessibility to given ranges of activities. I also argue that, in the formulation of policies, agents associated with the state are governed by motivations which follow from the maximisation of their interests. Thus elected members are seen as responding to external pressures when to do so is likely to yield electoral benefits and to the needs of the private economy because of their interest in the maintenance of the fiscal stability of the state. It will become apparent that pressures with high potential economic and political impacts are more likely to influence political decision-making than other pressures. On the other hand, bureaucrats will be

seen as having an interest in the expansion of the agencies with which they are associated. Finally it is shown that the nature and cost of transport systems and services determine ranges of physical accessibility which agents enjoy within given time and cost limits. This will allow the measurement of the social impact of changes in transport services in terms of their effect on the number of urban activities agents of different social groups can reach at what to them is an acceptable cost in terms of time and money.

The second part of the study consists of an account of events related to transport matters in London. The choice of the material included in this part and the manner in which it is presented are largely determined by the conclusions reached in Part One. It is also the result of the central place in understanding the shaping of transport services in London given to the Greater London Council and the context in which transport decisions were taken by the Council, viz. government policies and more specifically, macro-economic policies. The positions of the various non-governmental organisations participating in the London transport debate between 1965 and 1980 is also described, as is the transport situation seen in terms of the use and the cost of the different systems. Part Two comprises three chapters. Chapter Four relates the history of transport in London from the 19th century to the early 1960's in order to provide a background to the period under consideration. Emphasis is placed on the organisational evolution of public transport and on levels of investment on rail and underground infrastructures as well as on major roads. The two next chapters cover the period 1965 - 1980. Chapter Five is chiefly concerned with the formulation,

promotion and defeat of the primary road network proposals. This chapter covers the three Greater London Council mandates from 1965 to 1973. It also outlines the other transport developments which took place in London over this period. Chapter Six covers the Labour GLC administration from 1973 to 1977 and the first three years of the subsequent Conservative administration. It focuses mainly on the readjustment of transport proposals and implementations in London to the economic and social context of the mid and the late 1970's. This period was characterised by reductions in transport expenditure by the government and by an intense mobilisation around transport issues in London.

In this second part of the study, the historical account of events is accompanied by analyses linking empirical evidence with the theoretical argument of the first part. In this way I have tried to avoid complete separation between description and analysis which might have resulted in a somewhat monotonous account of facts. However it is in Part Three that the main theoretical analysis of the historical material is provided. Some of the events described in Part Two are thus referred to in Part Three and analysed in the light of the theoretical framework presented in the beginning of the study. It should be noted however that not every event is submitted to an analysis in Part Three. This is because this study is at once a history and a political analysis of transport decisions and debates in London. Some events of no immediate relevance to the political analysis have therefore to be related in order to provide an adequate historical account.

The third part, consisting of Chapter Seven, constitutes the link between the first and second parts of the study in that it offers a substantiation of the theoretical perspective set out in Part One by reference to certain of the facts presented in Part Two. Stress is placed on the conditions in which political decisions related to transport are taken, the potentiality for non-governmental organisations to influence these decisions, and the impact of transport policies and trends over the period on land use and on social groups.

PART ONE

Chapter I

THE CITY AS A MARKET OF FREQUENTLY REPEATED EXCHANGES

Introduction

The main purpose of this chapter is to attempt to arrive at a definition of the urban phenomenon which will, in subsequent chapters, allow us to picture the impact of transport on the urban structure and emphasise what is at stake in conflicts taking place around transport-related issues in the city. This definition will then have to pay special attention to the role of the transport system vis-a-vis the other urban elements. The present chapter will nevertheless focus on the urban phenomenon as a whole. (Considerations about transport will thus be perceived through the determination of features concerning the city).

The first step towards such a definition will be to review several types of approaches to the urban phenomenon. The choice of these approaches has been conditioned by a desire to cover a wide range of perspectives having the urban, or one of its aspects, as an area of study. This explains why the authors considered originate from three countries - the United States, France and the United Kingdom - and why the work they produce belongs to various disciplines and take place within various paradigms. Nevertheless, as their treatment will be restricted to their potential contribution towards a definition of the urban phenomenon, such differences will not have a major impact on the discussion.

The authors will be grouped into categories according to whether they picture the city as a collection of institutional arrangements and services, as a spatial process, as a specific field of social struggles, or as a land-related phenomenon. The comparison of the respective contribution of these approaches will bring out the need for a definition that is inclusive of every social agent in the city and that establishes the urban specificity of a segment of every type of behaviour taking place in the city. The most fertile ground for the development of such a definition will appear to be that offered by the land-related perspective.

It will be demonstrated, that while devoid of significance if described as a uniform entity underlying urban activities, urban space takes a different dimension when considered as a patchwork of advantages related to specific locations. Because these locational features can influence the social position of agents, urban space becomes the focus of competing strategies. It is then, as a link to these advantages that the relevance of urban transport inside this view of the city, becomes clear.

1.1 Characteristics of the urban field of study (1)

Castells has commented that "urban sociology is characterised by the lack of precise delimitation of its theoretical object" (Castells 1969: 182). What is termed urban studies often limits its definition of the city as a theoretical object to one type of behaviour or activity observable in the urban setting (Castells 1969: 174), or to a collection of institutions and services designated by

the authors as urban. In some cases, the patterns of behaviour perceived are referred to paradigms concerned with the explanation of the evolution of society. The problem of the specificity of the urban as an object of study emerges as a result of this. The studies involving such a level of theorisation are in fact a minority. The majority are empirical studies and apply to unrelated matters "from architectural symbolism of built forms, through the dynamism of street gangs, to the land-use impacts of public investments..." (Scott 1980: 8).

Zukin (1980: 579) describes the content of sociological treatises on the city as a "miscellaneous assortment of disconnected information". The evolution of the urban field of study does not appear to arise from a theoretical explosion into many branches (Castells 1968: 73) because this would imply that, at a given moment, the field was unified. It seems more appropriate to see it as a juxtaposition of studies concerned with different objects. As Harloe (1975: 10) puts it:

> In one sense therefore urban sociology scarcely exists, it has little more than an institutional existence, i.e. a set of persons who label themselves as 'urban sociologists'.

In the field of urban economics, extensive discussions centering on methodology have a unifying impact which is absent in the case of urban sociology. But a shared methodology does not necessarily entail a shared definition of a field.

The discussion to follow will cover bodies of literature having their roots in different disciplines (sociology, economics and political science) and belonging to incompatible paradigms (neo-

classical economics and marxism). The consequences of this heterogeneity will be alleviated because these writings will be considered only from the point of view of their respective contribution towards a definition of the urban theoretical object. For this reason the approaches are gathered under three specific headings in the sections which follow. The definition we are aiming at will have to conform to the following criteria:

(1) Provide an explanation of the urban phenomenon irrespective of the nation or of the historical period

(2) Illustrate how urban characteristics affect the totality of the social agents and every type of behaviour taking place in the city

(3) Portray the actualisation of general social processes in the city as mediated by urban characteristics.

In other words, such a definition will have to draw attention to, on the one hand, the derivative character of the city and, on the other hand, to its specificity related to what characterises the urban phenomenon as such.

1.2 The urban as a collection of institutional arrangements and services

This section includes a variety of approaches which define their field of study as consisting of institutions and services which are organised at a local level. Unlike other approaches that are concerned with processes involving patterns of behaviour, those presented here focus on objects that are easily delineated. Such approaches

are limiting because they exclude many aspects of urban behaviour. It must be underlined that, while these approaches share common features related to their consideration of the nature of an urban object, they differ in other respects. For instance, they consider different institutions and services and entail contradictory political views.

The first approach to be considered, *community studies*, reveals a central preoccupation with the distribution of power among competing groups. The origin of this American school can be traced back to the publication in 1929 of a study by Robert S. and Helen M. Lynd (1929). The conclusion reached by these authors was that the middle size city they investigated was controlled, in various aspects of its life, by the members of a single family.[2] This study was followed by a series of others which arrived at broadly similar conclusions, describing situations where there is no separation between the economic and political power scenes. The most influential among these studies has been Hunter's (1963) in which he identifies leaders in Atlanta who are the "decision makers for the total community" (Hunter 1963: 246).

Reacting against these findings, Dahl (1961) and Polsby (1963) restricted their field of study to the political process and adopted a different methodology from the earlier community studies. While Hunter relied on the judgment of individuals occupying important positions to determine the membership of the most powerful groups of the city associated with business, government, civic associations and 'high society', Dahl focuses , in his study on New Haven,

specifically on political decisions. His conclusion is that there is no identifiable power elite as such because "... individuals who are influential in one sector of public activity tend not to be influential in other sectors" (Dahl 1961: 169).

Urban reality, as pictured in community studies, takes the implicit form of the institutional vectors through which power is traditionally seen as being exercised. In the case of Dahl and Polsby, this reality shrinks to the dimension of the local political system.

Because most of the community studies were primarily concerned with questions referring to the distribution of power in society in general, they did not pay much attention to the delimitation of characteristics of the city as a semi-autonomous entity in society. For many of the authors of these studies, the local community is considered as a convenient microcosm of society, in which the study of social trends is easier than at other levels due to the relative ease of direct observation and direct access to officials (Stedman 1975: 215). The city thus appears as one among many arenas for the identification of power processes whose advantage is ease of access.

Unlike the authors of the community studies, Pahl focusses his attention on the role of the urban managers who occupy in this approach a central position on the urban scene. They are described as 'local gatekeepers' controlling to a high degree the access to goods and services qualified as 'urban'. "The urban managers of the urban system" are seen as distributing "scarce urban resources and facilities" (Pahl 1975: 192). They include local government officials and local private sector managers.

Borrowing from D. Harvey's perspective (1973), Pahl considers that individual cities derive their reputation and significance to a large extent from their location with respect to the geographic circulation of the surplus. In this context, "the urban managers remain the allocators of this surplus; they must remain therefore, as central to the urban problematic" (Pahl 1975: 285). Urban managers are thus seen as regulators of services and of the built environment in the city, in both the private and the public sectors. However, this approach privileges the local bureaucracy.

Pahl's perception of the urban reality takes the form of a built environment in which services are dispensed by local authorities. It is difficult to discern how urban behaviours are connected to the generality of social processes in this view, because the managers are presented as omnipotent and greatly autonomous. Little reference is made to the nature of their contacts with elected politicians whether at the national or local level. Furthermore, the notion of surplus distribution borrowed from Harvey which could suggest possible theoretical linkages between the urban and society in general, is not developed by Pahl.

While in the case of the approaches presented up to this point the definition of the urban phenomenon had to be deduced from the treatment of their respective themes, Castells is very explicit about this matter. He considers that the urban units in advanced capitalist society are units of simple and expanded reproduction of the labour force. The collective consumption processes, essential to this reproduction, therefore occupy the foreground of this definition.

> "Fundamentally the urban question refers to the organisation of the means of collective consumption at the basis of the daily life of all social groups: housing, education, health, culture, commerce, transport, etc." (Castells 1978: 3).

Castells places great emphasis upon the intervention of the state in the domain of collective consumption. However, he excludes units of production from the urban reality on the grounds that they operate at a regional level, and thus transcend the boundaries of urban agglomerations (Castells 1975: 297).

In his early papers, M. Castells mentioned the need to work out side by side a sociology of space (Castells 1968: 84) and a sociology of collective consumption (Castells 1969). But in his later and more important works, he abandons all preoccupation with space, claiming that spatial theories are in fact theories about epiphenomena of industrial society. I agree with Roweis (1979: 536) who considers that rejecting spatial theories because of this, is like throwing the baby out with the bath water.

In Castells' approach, the link between the city and society in general is total. This is because the urban is not given any geographical or institutional essence, being defined as a moment of the general social process, i.e. the reproduction of labour. Furthermore, according to Castells, this moment takes on an increasing importance because it is becoming the scene of major social confrontations. The monopoly sector of the economy relies increasingly on the state for the reproduction, at an adequate cost, of a disciplined labour pool (Castells 1974: 460). This situation triggers off social movements which resist the state organisation of collective

consumption. Castells considers that this confrontation is related to a secondary contradiction. The capacity of these movements to bring about structural social change is thus dependent on their articulation with other social contradictions (Castells 1974: 453). He nevertheless sees confrontations around collective consumption issues as favourable grounds for the formation of class alliances opposing the monopolistic sector and the state.

The total absence of geographical or institutional specificity attributed to the 'urban' by M. Castells is emphasised by the fact that, on the one hand, he deals with state urban interventions in terms of general social processes and that, on the other, he considers the reactions against these interventions as yielding a potential for change only when associated with other social movements.

While offering an outline of the urban object that is, in the main, similar to that of Castells, Dunleavy (1980: 54-5) discards his neo-marxism. According to Dunleavy (1980: 50), urban politics are solely concerned with decision making directed at collective consumption related issues. He describes his own view of urban politics as a "content definition" because it deliberately pursues a coherent explanation of urban politics without regard to spatial areas or institutions. Because of the central importance given to decisions having an impact on collective consumption, Dunleavy transcends jurisdictional boundaries in order to encompass all such decisions. He thus considers decisions emanating from the civil society as well as from any relevant governmental agency. Consequently, according to Dunleavy (1980: 51), the urban political field embraces

decision-making on collective consumption by national, regional and local state institutions, as well as private sector organisations. To be included in the collective consumption process, public services must be collectively organised and managed along non-market criteria i.e. access must be at least partly paid from taxes (Dunleavy 1980: 53). As such forms of public services are organised and delivered throughout society and not only in cities, Dunleavy rejects the geographical urban/rural dichotomy as irrelevant. Hence, he sees his definition of urban politics as applicable to society as a whole irrespective of the urban or rural geographical character of specific areas.

For Dunleavy (1980: 73), political contexts connected with collective consumption situations lead to the emergence of adversary positions in local party politics and these may be echoed in national party programmes. According to Dunleavy, the independent effects of consumption locations on voting appear to be comparable to, if not slightly greater than, those resulting from social class (Dunleavy 1980: 79).

All the authors presented in this section share a common interest in urban politics and a restrictive definition, whether implicit or explicit, of the urban phenomenon. The community studies and the urban managerialist approach adhere to an institutional definition of the urban process. Whatever is relevant to a study of the city is then circumscribed by institutional jurisdictions. Such definitions are hard to justify as anything more than arbitrary because the jurisdictional delimitations of the urban institutions

in terms of the territories they cover and the services they include, are the result of historical contingencies. Because of this restriction of their object of inquiry, these studies leave out many sources of influence on urban life. For instance, Dahl's emphasis on local politics leads to an underestimation of the importance of factors that, while having an impact on the urban scene, are not related to the local political level. Likewise, Pahl's central preoccupation with urban bureaucracy underplays the significance of decisions originating from the local and national political levels as well as from the civil society. For example, he ignores the possibility of organisations competing for power arising from the urban population itself (Harloe 1978: 12). Consequently, the institutional perspective, because of the restrictive representation of the urban reality it entails, does not appear to lead the way to an adequate definition of the urban according to our criteria.

The content studies, by contrast, reverse the institutional approach in that they derive their field of study from all the instances having an impact on a designated collection of services. As such, they solve the problem of the somewhat contingent institutional limits of jurisdictions. But the choice by Castells and Dunleavy of a part of the general social process as the urban object, i.e. collective consumption, necessarily leaves out many facets of urban reality. Thus, seen through a spatial prism, Castells reduces the urban to a sum of places which have as a function, the reproduction of the labour force, judging therefore that the remainder of what constitutes a city is irrelevant (Lefebvre 1978: 268-9). The choice of collective consumption as the essence of the urban phenomenon is

arbitrary because, on the one hand, it does not establish a distinction between the urban and the rural and because, on the other hand, it excludes the production process which by any account is present and influential on the urban scene.

1.3 The urban as spatial processes

In this section we shall discuss approaches which share an interest in practices related to urban space. Their ambition is not to define the specificity of the urban object but rather to study a general social process in its spatial manifestations. In the case of the first approach presented here, the human ecological school, the social process studied is the social integration of immigrants into industrial society as seen through spatial patterns. As to the second approach, the urban land models, the topic is a space-related aspect of the choice of consumer goods conditioned by a utility maximising attitude on the part of the consumer, the choice of a residential location.

The human ecological school is included here because it represents the first steps towards a self-defined urban sociology. Furthermore, even if this school of thought is a dead branch in the genealogical tree of sociological currents, many authors still comment on its positions.

The human ecological school's first manifestation was a 1915 article (Park 1915). While the purpose of the school has been set, in broad

terms, as the study of the relation between the human being and the urban environment (McKenzie 1967: 63-4), its effective field of observation has been the unplanned growth patterns of the city (Janowitz 1967: 64) and the mosaic of ethnic and social groups inhabiting it (Alihan 1964: 6). The context in which research adopting the principles of this school was carried out is Chicago, a city that experienced a high rate of growth during the first decades of the century, resulting mainly from a massive influx of immigrants.

The human ecologists perceived the urban process as the result of the competition for space of social groups defined in terms of income and ethnicity (McKenzie 1967: 64). Urban space was conceived of as a series of concentric zones, the level of wealth and 'stability' of whose occupants increased from the centre to the periphery.

Two main avenues of criticism of this school of thought can be identified. Firstly, the urban is treated by its authors primarily as a cultural phenomenon, or more precisely, as a set of values shared or, if not, to be acquired, by the individuals implanted in the city (Park 1967: 1). The human ecologists described the relation between social groups and urban space as underlined by a tendential drift away from the social disorganisation of the central zones towards the stability and wealth of the outer ones (Wirth 1964: 187). This spatial process appears to be, in fact, a cultural one, because the drift towards the outer zones exposes people to a gradual acceptance of 'urban values' (Park 1967: 56). Castells (1968; 1969) argues that the human ecologists do not offer a study of an urban process but rather of the spatial manifestations of a general social

phenomenon, viz. the social integration of immigrants. What is designated as 'urban culture' in fact refers to the cultural consequences of the capitalist industrialisation. So it is the integration of immigrants in industrial society that is projected onto urban space as a process consisting of a movement from the central to the outer zones (Alihan 1964: 195).

Secondly, the school offers a theoretical interpretation of the behaviour of social agents in the urban environment based on analogies between this behaviour and natural processes - though it is not always clear whether the explanations they offer are actual or merely theoretical assertions. The origins of the human ecology school lie in the works of Malthus and Darwin (Wirth 1964: 178), and in plant and animal ecology. Human ecologists have made use of the aspects of this theory which stress the competition for space and struggle for life between individuals and between species (Burgess 1967: 50), and applied them to the practice of social groups in the urban context. It is thus impossible to determine the motivation of the social agents and social groups engaged in spatial competition. The reason for this is that, while these groups are defined in terms of income and ethnicity which link them to definite social processes (the distribution of resources and immigration), their behaviour in the urban context is interpreted as the result of some natural instinctive behavioural pattern (Alihan 1964: 182). It seems that considerations of the relative advantages of the respective zones might have had a greater heuristic value in explaining the motivations of social agents engaged in urban spatial competition. Hence the interest of the human ecologists in the competition of groups for

urban space falls short of leading to a definition of the urban phenomenon, focussed on the characteristics of the various sectors of the city as stakes in the competition among social agents.

Unlike the human ecological school which is now extinct, urban land use models have occupied the foreground in the literature related to the urban for the last twenty years. In this short discussion, when I refer to the urban land models (ULMs) without further specification, I in fact refer to the authors that are considered as the initiators of this theoretical current, Wingo (1961) and Alonso (1964), and to more recent works grouped under the heading 'New Urban Economics'[3]. The treatment of this relatively wide area in just a few paragraphs implies that attention will be paid only to the general principles of the ULMs that transcend the differences between the various authors related to this field.

ULMs are theoretically at the junction of the neo-classical economic perspective for which it is tributary for the explanation of the behaviour of social agents seen in this case as consumers in terms of utility maximising choices, and of the geographical central place theory (Hall 1966; Losch 1967) from which the characteristics attributed to the context in which this behaviour is performed are at least partially derived. The city is thus sketched by the ULMs as a single-centred unit where all the jobs are clustered at the centre and where the residential areas occupying the remaining space are serviced by an homogeneous radial transport system.

ULMs are intended to help answer questions about the distribution of

activities within the city. In fact, however, the urban processes they focus on are mainly residential patterns and their distribution around the central business district (Richardson 1976: 139). Accordingly, ULMs primarily attempt to decipher the decision-making process involved in urban residential locational decisions (Scott 1980: 73).

The major flaw of the ULMs is their oversimplifation in the modelling of the city and of the behaviour of the social agents. Their representation of urban processes does not therefore survive the 'reality shock'. The ULMs' perception of the city is constrained by two assumptions: the centrality of job locations and the homogeneity of transport services.[4] The oversimplification of this view makes it impossible to perceive actual social processes in the city. The ULMs suffer from what Sayer (1976: 245) calls "spatial separatism" by which he means that spatially defined phenomena are presented as disjointed from more general social processes. The structuring of the city results, in the ULM view, from the choice of residential locations by individuals which is assumed to be a trade-off between density of space occupation in residential areas and commuting costs (Richardson 1976: 138). The central importance attributed to the choices of individuals obscures the fact that these choices are in fact made in response to an existing urban built environment and thus reflect its features (Scott 1980: 54). Choices, then, are conditioned by what is on offer. The influence of consumers over the production of the urban built environment is indirect in that it becomes relevant only when taken into consideration by the producers of this environment (developers, speculators,

local authorities, etc.). If the conditions of production of the urban built environment were considered this would be likely to lead to a concretisation or a rejection of the assumptions used in ULMs concerning the urban structure and individuals' residential choices. This would also necessarily introduce general social processes into debates related to ULMs.

The absence of any concern with social processes on the part of ULMs is particularly obvious in their presentation of social agents as individuals detached from any position in the social structure. The ULMs cannot then consider the impact of the social position of the agents on their residential choices. This position, because it sets the resources available to the agents, determines the limits within which such choices will take place. The ULMs also fail to examine the effects of residential choices on the social position of the agents performing them (Juillet 1976: 237).

Because of the limited scope of the object of research of the ULMs - the process of residential location choice centred on distance to the central job area - it is difficult to derive a viable definition of the urban phenomenon from their assumptions. The ULMs nevertheless carry positive insights into elements of such a definition since their treatment of the urban structure as resulting largely from choices gives great importance to the distance between home and workplace. This implies that these choices are made paying attention to the accessibility potential of the residential locations. This further supposes that these locations are valued differently according to their respective accessibility potential. We shall

return to this topic in section 1.8.

1.4 The urban as a specific arena of social struggles

In this section we shall examine the contributions of two writers who see the city as a mirror which reflects and specifies the relations between the forces of history, of class structure and culture (Glass 1967: 48). New issues arise from the interaction between urban characteristics and the relations which prevail between the social forces, and these writers are interested in whether the struggles taking place around these issues simply reproduce oppositions that are found throughout the social structure or if they lead to original reconfigurations of forces.

Lojkine and Lefebvre share a central concern with these questions. They both picture urban reality as being primarily a substantiation of social struggles, and define the urban phenomenon not in institutional or content terms, but as a principle inclusive of all elements located in the city. These definitions establish the foundation of the urban specificity and therefore enable the identification of distinctive urban bases of conflict.

According to Lojkine (1977: 123), the city is a consequence of the division of labour. He sees the urban form primarily as an outcome of social and territorial concentrations of labour resulting from agglomeration advantages to units of production. The city as described by J. Lojkine (1977: 148 and 169) is a field in which is

manifested the principal contradiction between the needs of living labour, i.e. simple and extended reproduction, and those of dead labour, i.e. the accumulation logic of capital implying a restriction of the resources available for the reproduction of labour. Concretely, this contradiction takes the form of conflicts over the provision of public facilities, the possibilities of access to them, or, seen from another angle, of struggles for locations differentially valorised according to the proximity and nature of collective facilities.[5] The role given to public facilities brings to the forefront the relation between the state and social groups in urban conflicts. Lojkine adopts the state monopoly capitalism view of this relation, and argues that the state through its urban interventions exacerbates urban contradictions, primarily by selecting the types of public facilities according to their use for capital and, more specifically, for its monopolistic fraction (Lojkine 1977: 180 and 182).

Urban politics is seen by Lojkine (1972: 8) as "an active reflection of the relation between the different classes and fractions of classes" *(my translation - P.F.)*. This 'reflection' is considered 'active' because the relation between classes and fractions of classes in the city is modified by their involvement in struggles over urban issues, viz. those related to the nature and distribution of public facilities in a spatial context. But if Lojkine attributes a specificity to urban issues, he denies any particularity to the configuration of forces in conflicts taking place around these issues.

Lojkine's view emphasises the role of collective facilities as supports for production and consumption activities. This implies

that his perspective reaches potentially every agent and every type of behaviour taking place in the city because all are affected in some respect by the political decisions made in relation to the choice of these facilities. Moreover, the presentation of the urban phenomenon in its generality, as an outcome of the division of labour, is universal in its application, referring as it does to the conflict between town and country since the dawn of civilisation (Lojkine 1977: 124).

Unlike Lojkine and the other authors introduced earlier in this chapter, Lefebvre approaches the city through a theoretical mode which is closer to a philosophical discourse than to a sociological or economic one. He does not, in fact, present in his works any systematically organised empirical data. Giving a short account of Lefebvre's work, even if one limits oneself to his definition of the urban reality, is therefore an arduous task.

Lefebvre (1970:117) sees the urban process as a projection on the land of social relations. But this reflection is specified according to the traits that define the urban phenomenon as an object of study. Firstly, urban reality is viewed as emerging from a motive underlying its existence: the proximity principle.(Lefebvre 1972: 90). This results from the desire of social agents and organisations to ease exchanges between themselves by minimising time and distance obstacles to these exchanges. Accordingly, the urban form, as a virtual negation of the distance and time separating institutions and groups (Lefebvre 1970: 158) appears to 'condense' social relations. The utopian meaning sometimes given by Lefebvre (1970: 8) to the urban,

consists of the projection of the simultaneity principle in an environment free of hindrances.

Secondly, each mode of production is considered to produce its own space (Lefebvre 1978: 265), i.e. an urban form which is compatible with its functioning. But as an urban form is quite likely to survive a mode of production (or at least a stage of a mode of production), the correspondence between the two might well be imperfect. This is because modes of production and urban forms exist on two different time scales. Consequently, the adaptation of the urban form to the successive modes of production, far from being automatic, is the object of confrontations between antagonistic strategies (Lefebvre 1970: 117). This confrontation usually takes place between the users of space struggling in order to maintain their urban advantages related to the proximity principle seen as the use-value of the city, and the dominant economic forces plus the state. The economic forces' strategy consists of the gradual imposition of exchange value on urban space, thus destroying prevailing use values, in order to reap maximum profits. With regard to the state, it is seen as erecting, throughout the city, monuments testifying to its power (Lefebvre 1978: 274). The economic powers and the state thus colonise the city, shaping it according to their own interests.

Lefebvre's definition of the urban phenomenon as founded on the proximity principle and the persistence of the urban form, stresses the actualisation within the city of the social struggles centering around urban issues. Moreover, unlike Lojkine, he perceives the configuration of forces around these issues as influenced by the

urban context. This definition is also universal in its application because it has relevance for all the agents and the types of behaviour in the city and also because the urban processes it describes are not restricted to the urban form of one particular mode of production.

1.5 The criteria of a definition of the urban

Having reviewed several bodies of urban literature, I will now return to the question of the definition of the urban. The criteria for such a definition are that it should cover the ensemble of the activities taking place in the city, delineate general characteristics applicable to any city no matter the location or the historical period and, through these characteristics, specify the urban from the general social processes.

First of all, the urban must appear as more than the mere reflection of social processes and conflicts as pictured by the human ecologists who see in the urban process an aspect of the integration of social groups into the social order of industrial society. In order for the urban to be circumscribed as an object of study, there must not only be specific urban issues but these issues must give rise to specific arrangements of social forces as acknowledged by Castells, Dunleavy and Lefebvre. Conversely, the urban phenomenon must not only be considered in its specificity; one must also be able to see how the impact of the social processes manifest themselves through this specificity - a point which urban land models ignore since they divorce the limited urban phenomenon they have under consideration

from external influences. The motivations underlying the practice of the social agents establish a link between determinations originating from a position in the social structure and urban issues which resolutions convey impacts on this position.

Another criterion that a definition must fulfill is that the features that specify the urban as a theoretical object should apply to every agent present in the city, unlike the institutional studies which, because of the delimitation of their field of study, are only concerned with a minority of these agents. These features must also emphasise the urban angle of every type of behaviour taking place in the city as implied in the work of Lojkine and Lefebvre. The content studies and the urban land models, on the other hand, while including all the agents in their frameworks, single out specific types of behaviour that they treat as urban: in the first case, behaviours related to the production process are excluded and in the second case, only residential location choices are considered. Furthermore, the urban characteristics outlined for the purpose of a definition cannot specify the city if, as in Dunleavy's approach, they apply to rural as well as urban geographical areas. In such a case, the characteristics necessarily delineate another social process than the urban phenomenon. In order to avoid such a mistake, one must verify that the characteristics included are relevant for urban areas under various modes of production.

In our view, a spatial perspective is capable of meeting the criteria of an urban definition. Such a perspective would be very close to the one adopted by Lefebvre because his central principle of proximity

is in fact a consequence of space-related agglomerations. The relevance of the spatial perspective derives from the fact that urban space is shared by all social agents and supports all types of behaviour in the city. This perspective defines the distinctiveness of urban issues as their land-related character. Furthermore, obvious dissimilarities in the use of space clearly mark the distinction between the urban and the rural as theoretical objects.

The arguments for a spatial approach may appear abstract. In the next sections, I will show how this approach can be used to understand concrete issues.

1.6 The urban land nexus

In this section, I will investigate the treatment of the urban phenomenon in studies which focus upon urban space.

Scott introduces what I consider to be the most explicit definition of the urban phenomenon to place land considerations at its centre. The purpose of this approach is

> to set up a broad theoretical framework that identifies the location of the urbanization process within society as a whole and that reveals the origins, dynamics and internal order of urban spaces and systems.
> (Scott 1980: 2)

The core of the inquiry into the urban question lies in this approach, in what is called the urban land nexus (ULN). The ULN is seen as a composite system of differential locational advantages (Scott 1980: 4) resulting from the dynamic of private firms and households developing,

exchanging and utilising land in conformity with their particular motives and from the state provision of infrastructures (Scott 1980: 136). The ULN brings out the specific urban logic and the urban effects of any single social event taking place in the city.

The interactions between private decisions and the state in the city constitute the dynamic of the ULN (Scott 1980: 135). This interaction is central to Scott's argument. He sees state interventions as a response to the aggregate effects (negative external ties) of private firms and household decision-making with regard to the use of an urban space, structured by the social and property relations of capitalist society (Scott 1980: 135). Capitalist cities are thus prevented from falling into disarray only by continuous state interventions (Scott 1980: 165).

Scott considers the ULN as highly derivative, being "a sort of by-product of an analysis of the structure of the capitalist society generally" (Scott 1980: 3). But he also stresses the specificity of the characteristics of urban land phenomena which lead to "potential and actual conflicts in cities that cannot be directly read off from class relationships determined in the domain of production" (Scott 1980: 165). Related to these conflicts are mobilisations perceived as "intermediations of fundamental social dynamics emanating out of class relationships" (Scott 1980: 165). More concretely, it seems that, on the one hand, the prevalence of the general social processes in the ULN is actualised through the behaviour of the social agents assumed to be in accordance with their interests as determined by the position in the social structure while, on the other hand, the

unintended aggregate effects of the land-related behaviour of agents illustrate the specific nature of the urban. These effects are the setting for mobilisations, but Scott sees them mainly as inducements to state intervention.

A positive aspect of Scott's work, according to the criteria adopted here, is that he develops an approach which embodies every agent and every form of behaviour, as determined by a web of connections, as land related factors. But I see two major problems in relation to Scott's approach. Firstly, he overlooks the existence of conflicts between social agents around spatial issues and as a corrollary of this, he presents the state as reacting only to the conglomerate effects of their behaviour. This perception of state interventions makes it appear to be a neutral body in its relations with the social agents. Secondly, he does not seem to elaborate sufficiently the notion of differential locational advantages that appear to have an important impact on the interconnections between the urban elements. The question which must be raised concerning these locational advantages are: what brings them into existence and what are their influence on the urban activities?

To help answer the first problem, I introduce the works of Juillet (1971) and Lipietz (1974) which depict a process of spatial segregation: the technical and social space division (TSSD). The TSSD is perceived by these authors as the spatial effect of the confrontation of classes in capitalist society (Juillet 1971: 240). Unlike Scott, they then give a central significance to the clashes between groups and agents set in the civil society. Moreover, according to these

authors, the state's land based interventions are basically concerned with the differential distribution of public facilities and with the zoning of the urban space (Juillet 1971: 241; Lipietz 1974: 25). Far from mitigating some unwanted side effect of agents' decisions, these interventions aggravate the spatial segregation resulting from the unequal distribution of power among social agents and social groups.

In the opinion of Juillet and Lipietz, the differential valuation of space is of focal importance because it is seen as the issue at stake in the conflicts opposing agents, groups and classes on the urban scene. This introduces the second criticism of Scott's approach: that he grants too little consideration to locational differences. In the light of what has already been said, it emerges that this is due to his emphasis on the aggregate effects of the agents' land-related behaviours. This emphasis in his perspective reduces the attention given to the struggles among agents working out strategies aimed at reaping the advantages emanating from differentially valued urban locations. Scott nevertheless views the locational advantages as a consequence of the spatial variation in access to the "useful effects of urban agglomeration" (Scott 1980: 136), or, in other words, of access to the beneficial aspects of the agglomeration of activities. Lipietz explains the centrality of spatial issues as objects of conflict in the city as related to the effect which access to urban locations can have on the position of an agent in the social structure (Lipietz 1974: 99).

In the final two sections, I shall follow up this line of thought by investigating the process by which differential locational values can

influence the situation held by agents in the social structure. I shall then discuss how locational values result from, while affecting, the behaviour of social agents in the urban environment.

1.7 Urban exchanges

At the outset of any discussion of the urban phenomenon, attention must be focussed on the underlying reasons for concentration of activities in the city, or more precisely, on the favourable aspects of urban agglomerations that give rise to such concentrations. Questions about the nature of this agglomeration are given many humanistic answers. For example, Lewis Mumford (1961) sees, in the grouping of activities in cities, the hub of civilisation while R.L. Meier (1962: 40 and 44) considers that the numerous transactions taking place in the city increase the cohesion among individuals. More basically, for O.P. Williams (1971: 12),[6] the city is an instrument facilitating human interactions.

In terms that are closer to an economic discourse, J. Remy (1966: 55) defines the urban unit "as juxtapositions creating scale economies" *(my translation - P.F.)* which take the form of agglomeration benefits for firms, i.e. improved conditions of production (Remy 1966: 109), and for consumers, i.e. a greater choice of workplaces, goods and services (Remy 1966: 175). This emphasis on agglomeration advantages in the definition of the urban phenomenon stresses the possibility of easily and frequently repeated exchanges in the city, in the absence of which these advantages would vanish. This is because agglomeration

advantages are not the result of the mere juxtaposition of activities in the city but, rather, of the interconnections that take place between them. The concentration of activities reduces the costs of carrying out exchanges in terms of infrastructures, facilities, energy and time, within urban areas. In rural areas the larger distances to be overcome make the frequent repetition of certain exchanges uneconomical. The need for proximity between activities in urban areas deriving from the need for frequently repeated exchanges and the price paid for this proximity explains why land-consuming activities such as farming, are usually absent from cities.

Cities can thus be visualised as comprising units of activities (households, firms, shops, government agencies, etc.) conglomerating in order to reap the benefits of mutual interdependence made possible by their proximity to each other. The pre-condition of this inter-dependence is the system of exchanges which interconnects the units.

Any exchange forms part of a market, that is, comes about in a nexus of anticipated and adaptive patterns of interaction. At first sight the city appears to be made up of a multitude of markets centred on specific objects such as land, jobs, ideas (Lefebvre 1970, 66-7), social encounters, etc. But a closer look reveals that all these markets are in fact subordinated to the patterns established through the interactions between households and workplaces.[7] This is because the other markets owe their existence to conditions set at the pro-duction level. Accordingly, the structure of the city is greatly influenced by the locational decisions of production units. The creation of residential and consumption units is conditioned by such

decisions. Similarly, state intervention in the organisation of transport systems which are shared by all exchanges, usually follows the daily rhythm of exchanges between households and workplaces.

The different extent of the markets in the city implies an unstable balance between local and metropolitan markets. According to land use and transport characteristics, this balance can be seen in the case of retail trade where some goods tend to be acquired locally and others at the centre of the agglomeration. However, job markets tend to be metropolitan in scope especially in the case of employment located at the centre of agglomerations. This is why patterns of employment and commuting have proved useful in attempts to arrive at a definition of the boundaries of urban agglomerations for research purposes. Coombes et al (1978; 1979), Hall (1971), Hall et al (1973) and Drewett et al (1976), dissatisfied with the non-functional character of agglomeration delimitations based on administrative boundaries, advocate for census purposes the use of Standard Metropolitan Labour Areas to define agglomerations. The SMLAs are inspired from the American Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas used in censuses. The SMLA would tie to an urban centre, an inner ring in which at least fifteen per cent of the workforce commute to the centre (Coombes et al 1979: 568). The maximum extension of a metropolitan area - termed Daily Urban System by Coombes et al (1978: 1182) - is a function of the stretching of the interconnections between households and workplaces. As he puts it,

> The individual household may change residential location within a DUS without any of its members changing employment, and conversely job changes may take place within the DUS without a need for residential mobility.

The transport system fills a crucial role in determining the size of metropolitan markets in that it sets, by its characteristics, i.e. speed and cost, the extent to which, according to their respective nature, frequently repeatable exchanges are acceptable to social agents.[8] The possibility of frequently repeated exchanges between the units located in the city defines the scope of urban markets. Seen from the national level, they appear as sub-markets belonging to a national system of exchanges enclosed by formal boundaries and usually protected by tariffs.

If it is assumed that social agents are acting in accordance with their interests, we can infer that they will constantly attempt to improve the conditions in which they perform the exchanges related to their activities. Put simply, social agents will try to minimise their transport time and costs (Broadbent 1977: 120). It may also be inferred that they will aim at maintaining as large as possible an accessible territory. This is because a large accessible territory represents for an agent in the urban context, more opportunities for realising exchanges, or in other words, greater life chances.

It therefore appears that the city can primarily be defined as a market of frequently repeated exchanges entailing a clustering of activities necessary to ease the realisation of these exchanges.

1.8 The differential valorisation of space

The value of urban space is not uniform over its whole area but rather

takes the shape of peaks and troughs. The concrete manifestation of these differences in value are the patterns of land uses and densities in the city. This patchwork of uses is at once a cause and a consequence of the rents fixed by landowners which take into account the profitability of a piece of land in comparison to other locations. The factors underlying this profitability are the object of study of the present section.

The agglomeration is perceived here as made up of sectors[9] differentially valorised according to:

(a) their respective accessibility to other zones within the agglomeration. This accessibility determines for the agents settled in a sector, the degree of ease with which they can perform exchanges. As Williams puts it so succinctly, "... a location defines a possible network of interactions" (1971: 28). Urban sectors can thus be ranked hierarchically according to the opportunities they allow for access to other specified sectors (Williams 1971: 37). The accessibility opportunities of a sector thus depend on the characteristics of the urban structure of a particular agglomeration in whose determination the organisation of the transport system plays a crucial role.

(b) their inherent characteristics, which necessarily depend upon the character of the urban built environment (UBE) within their boundaries. The UBE can be seen as the crystallisation (Santos 1977: 3) of past decisions (Whitehand 1977: 3; Cozen 1966; William 1975: 111) made according to sector accessibility opportunities, the prevailing UBE and the social relations of power of the time. The social agents can derive benefits from the presence and nature of the

collective and private facilities of the sector (Lojkine 1977; Remy 1966: 39) as well as from the symbolic value associated with its UBE (Bailly 1975: 137-8).

Accessibility to highly valued sectors in terms of accessibility, amenity and symbolic characteristics, is crucial because of the range of exchanges it allows (Williams 1971: 28) and the conditions of reproduction (housing, public facilities) it permits. It can thus be said that the position of an agent within the urban spatial structure in which opportunities are unevenly distributed, influences his position in social competition (Lipietz 1977: 16) and is thus likely to modify his situation in the social structure. Competition for space and location can thus be perceived as proceeding from the behaviour of each agent aspiring to reap the benefits of favourable urban locations in order to ultimately improve his social position.[10]

Competition for urban space through the market process leads to the attachment of higher value to the most desired pieces of land.[11] Topalov (1973), in a study of the conflictual relation between landowners and capital around urban land issues, argues that landowners, in order to reap maximum returns from the useful agglomeration effects, are likely to transfer their monopoly over land use to the capitalists who are able to promote the largest developments which therefore yield the highest rent (Topalov 1973: 253). Similarly, in order to benefit from higher rates, local authorities often adopt the landowners' logic.

But concrete manifestations of the competition for space are not restricted to market processes. They can also take the form of

political struggles as in the case of the resistance of residents to market trends threatening their local environment. These struggles may also be aimed at public services related to any one of the two valorisation factors: transport services and community facilities.

The combined effects of the operation of the land market and of state urban interventions provoke a segregated pattern of land use. When perceived from the level of the totality of the agglomeration, this pattern consists of concentrations of activities distributed in accordance with their locational purchasing power. The composition of the city has a tendency to reflect the relations of power prevailing in a given society through a technical and social spatial division which implies the concentration of activities into unifunctional zones and the delimitation of residential areas segregated by income (Broadbent 1977: 122-3 and 127).

To recapitulate briefly, the differential valorisation of urban space is the outcome of previous locational decisions. These decisions, "locked" (Harvey 1975: 23) in the built environment, determine at any given time the valorsiation of sectors of urban land. Social agents compete among each other in order to secure access to the most highly valued zones and the use of their built environment. This is because their location in the city can affect their social position according to the position in the socio-spatial hierarchy of the sector which they are able to afford. This process of competition further widens the differential valorisation of urban land, thus accentuating its technical and social division.

Conclusion

This review of approaches to the urban phenomenon has revealed that most of them are unsatisfactory according to our criteria of an adequate urban definition. The reasons for this seem to be that the phenomena studied are either feebly anchored in the urban reality as we conceive it, or are too fragmentary to lead to an inclusive view of the city. The most satisfactory approaches in this respect appear to be those that emphasise land-related processes. In order to assume a theoretical meaning, urban space must be accounted for in a way that explains how it becomes an object of competition between social agents. This means that it must be seen as a mixture of advantages and disadvantages related to specific locations. These locations determine opportunities for accessibility to ranges of urban activities, and thus have an influence on the social position of the agents. The city can thus be seen as the materialisation of institutionalised patterns of competition focusing on a spatially segregated pattern of advantages with impacts on the social position of agents, groups and classes.

A preoccupation with accessibility in the city must include *ipso facto* a consideration of the features of the urban built environment in which all activities nest. Accessibility and the built environment are in fact two facets of the same phenomenon. This is so because, put more concretely, activities are located according to their accessibility potential while the notion of accessibility simply refers to possibilities of interconnections between activities.

In the light of what has been said with regard to social agents, urban issues originate from the conditions of physical access to features of the urban built environment which have beneficial effects. The nature of this accessibility depends on the uneven distribution of these advantages and on the organisation of public and private transport. The principal urban issues are therefore those linked to behaviours having a structuring impact on the city. This includes private and public decision-making concerning the use of urban space and the organisation of transport . But the spatial aspect of any form of behaviour taking place in the city can also lead to urban issues. However, the studies of non-spatially related aspects of social phenomena could not qualify as urban by our criteria.

Chapter II

THE NATURE OF STATE INTERVENTIONS

Introduction

The discussion of the theory of the state presented in this chapter is intended to provide a framework for the analysis of urban transport policies in the chapters which follow. The reason for its length is that a general discussion of the state theoretical debate is necessary to enable the formulation of general principles concerning the scope and limits of the mode of operation of the state. Once such principles are arrived at, arguments more directly relevant to the object of study of this work will be raised.

Nevertheless, even in this general discussion, the viewpoint from which the state is seen will be coloured by this ultimate purpose. For instance, the central concept underlying, whether implicitly or explicitly, any theory of the state, change, will refer to successions of administrations and shifts of policies. This is because the greatest changes in transport policies during the period under study were shifts of priorities resulting partly from changes of administrations facing different economic situations. Another reason for emphasising this aspect of change is that, with a few exceptions, e.g. local government reorganisation, the period investigated (1965-1980) has been exempt from major institutional transformations. The aspects of change we focus on thus reflect the object of investigation and the characteristics of the period surveyed. The theory developed in the

following pages, because of its focus on the functioning of the state and on the impact its mode of operation has on policies, departs from many state approaches basing their definition of change on the potentiality for radical institutional change.

Furthermore, unlike most theories which consider essentially the external relations of the state, the one adopted here focuses on its form, thus keeping the discussion at a less abstract level. Hence, the links between the state and civil society are mainly studied as internalised within the state machinery. These links are then seen as formal institutional channels. Such a perspective does away with the dichotomy form/function. Form is perceived as conveying function and vice versa. This focus on the form of the state allows one to stress the role of occupational groups in its mode of operation. The motivations of the state in its interventions in civil society goals are seen as deriving from the interests of the various occupational groups involved in the working of agencies.

In the first section, the debate on the state theory will be partly reviewed. But, in contrast to most contributions to this debate based primarily on functions fulfilled by the state in society, a genetic approach focussing on how the state, its agencies and its mode of operation came into being, is developed. This approach presents the form of the state as the result of the accumulation of past conflicts. Attention is directed particularly to the institutional channels through which influences of the civil society on the state are transmitted: the fiscal dependence of the state on resources produced in the private sector, and the electoral system.

In order to examine the process of state intervention, the conditions under which issues leading to demands take place, are discussed in the next section. Emphasis is placed on the obstacles groups and individuals have to overcome in order to formulate and exert pressures on the state. These pressures are then treated as resulting from the resolution of a conflict between the rewards expected to stem from an action and the efforts needed to execute it as perceived by individuals and groups. The object of the third section will be the modality of state responses to these actions. It will be demonstrated that, because of the nature of the relation between state and civil society, these interventions must be articulated in complex ways so that configurations of social forces linked to specific issues can be grasped. Planning, defined in terms of organised sequences of action, will be seen as the means adopted to carry out interventions.

In the last section, the limits of state intervention will be discussed. More specifically, emphasis will be placed on the difficulties of pursuing long-term policies in a coherent way. Along with changes of potential regimes and of priorities within a regime, the succession of macro-economic policies will appear to be a central factor underlying these difficulties.

2.1 The form and function of the state

In this section I will start with a brief review of the current theoretical debate on the state. This will lead to the elaboration of an alternative model of the state. Functionalist, systemist, as well

as most marxist perspectives on the state define it in terms of its relations with civil society, often treating it as an abstract entity. The objects of enquiry are then the functions that the state fulfils in civil society and how they contribute to the survival of a definite order between the instances of civil society. To remedy the shortcomings of such views, the model developed here stresses the historical conditions underlying the various moments of the formation of the state as well as the concrete operation of its institutional framework.

After the Second World War, two main theoretical views of the state were developed in the United States: the functionalist and the systemist. In the former, concepts originating in anthropology are applied to the study of the state in modern society. In the latter, the conceptual source is systems theory. Both views focus on processes related to the mutual adaptation of the political system and of its social environment (Merton 1957: 51; Easton 1965: 132; Parsons 1969: 343). This is done by delineating the political system and singling out the types of pressure originating from the social environment that reach it. It also involves a consideration of the reactions of the political system in response to these pressures. This process is usually presented in terms of inputs and outputs. The shortcomings of such schematic descriptions are related to their theoretical roots. Neither the functionalists nor the systemists can account for conflicting interests among social groups and for the state's reaction in the face of irreconcilable demands emanating from different groups. The authors following these approaches have usually neglected the question of the inequality of access to the state and of the discriminatory aspects of state intervention. Their focus on the mutual

adjustment of the state and its environment prevents any consideration of the potentiality for radical change likely to manifest itself in certain situations.

The most coherent of the responses to these deficiencies has been provided by the marxist oriented state theories elaborated in the 1960s and 1970s. According to the character of the relationship between the state and economic processes, these theories can be grouped under the headings 'closely linked' or 'loosely linked'. In the first case, it is assumed that the state reacts in a straightforward manner to economic processes, while in the second case, it is seen as responding mainly to social struggles (Pickvance 1978: 18-19). Miliband and Poulantzas' perspectives can be fitted in this second category. According to R. Miliband (1969: 49), the state system consists of "a number of particular institutions" in interaction. The link between the state and the dominant classes passes largely through "a state elite" (Miliband 1969: 59) originating from these classes and which controls the dominant positions of these institutions. Poulantzas rejects the central importance accorded to the empirical evidence of class membership of the state elite.[1] For him, "state power is not a machine or a simple object concocted by the various classes; nor is it divided into parts which if not in the hands of some, must automatically be in the hands of others" (Poulantzas 1973: 288). He considers that the bureaucracy's operation, far from being determined by the class membership of its agents, depends rather "on the concrete functioning of the state apparatus, i.e. on the place of the state in the ensemble of a formation and on its complex relations with the various classes and

fractions" (Poulantzas 1973: 335). The state is seen by this author as relatively autonomous as a consequence of its position in the social structure and of the specific political functions it fulfils. These functions derive from the state's role as a "factor of political organisation of the dominant class" and, as a corollary, "as a factor of political disorganisation" of the dominated classes while securing the support of classes of subordinated modes of production to the dominant class (Poulantzas 1973: 287-288).

Both authors emphasise the autonomy of the state in capitalist society while simultaneously showing how the autonomy is relativised by the fact that the state in its interventions favours the dominant classes. This bias is caused in Miliband's perspective chiefly by the class determination of the agents steering state institutions, while for Poulantzas, this bias stems from the structural relation of the state to the other social instances.

The so-called German derivationists (Holloway and Picciotto 1978) reject the autonomy and the specificity attributed to the political process by Miliband and Poulantzas (Fay 1978: 138). The derivationists view of the state as fulfilling needs of the economic processes thus qualifies as a close link state definitions. While there are important variations among the authors within this current about this, the 'functional need' for state intervention is generally seen as sufficient to explain its occurrence (Pickvance 1978: 18) - hence the use of the term 'derivationist'. This current pays little attention to the effects of social struggles directed towards the state.

The derivationists base their theory of the state on categories extracted from Marx's Das Kapital. These categories, devised originally to explain the functioning of the capitalist economic system, are applied by these authors to an analysis of the political form (Holloway and Picciotto 1978: 17). The chief question answered by the derivationists is "what is it about social relations in bourgeois society that makes them appear in separate forms as economic relations and political relations?" (Holloway and Picciotto 1978: 18).

The derivationist current can be divided into two main perspectives. The first one advocated chiefly by Alvater (1978) and by Muller and Neusüs (1978), presents the state as a solution to problematic situations which individual capitalists are not able to resolve individually. This means that the state ensures the survival of the capitalist economic system. The second perspective, developed by J. Hirsch (1976; 1978), presents the state as a derivation from the social relations of domination that prevail in a capitalist society. More concretely, the absence of legitimate use of physical violence in the process of production is necessary for the maintenance of the exchange processes among owners of production units and between them and the labour force typical of the capitalist system. This requires that the monopoly of the use of violence be given to an entity external to the production process, i.e. the state. The state also safeguards the general rules of commodity and monetary intercourse while ensuring the 'external' conditions of social reproduction. Hirsch's definition of the state implies that it must at any time, clash with the working class or sections of it as well as with the interest of individual capitalists or groups of capitalists.

Because the state as an entity is separate from the immediate process of production, while fulfilling roles essential to its survival, its activities develop through a process of mediated reactions to the evolution of the accumulation process or, more specifically, to the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. The role of the state in devising countertendencies to this fall is, according to Hirsch (1976: 116-117), the key to its analysis. This role leads the state to attempt, in a necessarily crisis-ridden manner, reorganisations of the historical complex of the general social conditions of production and of exploitation (Hirsch 1976: 117; Hirsch 1978: 74). Thus the state is understood by this author, through its concrete functions, as fundamentally a reaction to the class struggle basis of economic and social processes.

The views of the state presented here, particularly the derivationist one, share a somewhat functionalist perspective in that they deduce its form and existence from needs emerging from civil society. In other words, they see the state as originating from the requirements of specific functions essential to the maintenance of civil society's processes. All the authors mentioned here depict a complementary relation between the state and its social environment, assuring the maintenance, through a process described differently by each of them, of fundamental features of society (Saunders 1979: 186). This type of model reflects the synchronic perspective adopted by these authors. They see the state as a given entity set in a given society at a given moment. They thus fail to pay attention to the multitude of historical events underlying the development of the form of the state. Another feature of these theories is that they all focus,

though each in their own manner, on the state/civil society relationship.

The two broad characteristics shared by these approaches explain why they have not primarily directed their attention to the state envisaged as a definable entity characterised by a form, i.e. a specific organisational arrangement, and modes of operation of its own. They thus usually fail to answer the following questions: How at any given time, does the state come to adopt the specific form and the specific working principle it has? How does the state arrive at the fulfilment of certain roles in society? Whence does it derive the capacity for doing so? And how are the boundaries of the state delimited?

In order to give answers to these questions, it seems important to adopt a view of the state that permits its perception as the result of its history (Pickvance 1978: 12; Blanke et al., 1978: 119). According to this view, its institutional configuration as well as its mode of operation are the outcome of political decisions of unequal importance reflecting relations of power betwen social classes and social groups prevailing at different moments in history.[2] The existing state structures in their turn are determining factors in the orientation of subsequent political struggles. The outcomes of past political conflicts embodied in the structure of the state thus condition future conflicts. The importance given to political struggles can be explained by the influence of their effect on the concrete entity of the state, and by the influence this entity bears on the configuration of future struggles.[3] The state then constitutes a specific arena of conflicts.

State agencies, like civil society instances but to a higher degree, are ruled by formal decisions taken at the governmental level. The organisation of the state, its mode of operation and its relation with civil society at a given moment, are therefore set by a legal corpus which consists of decisions taken by a government in various historical contexts. This corpus can be modified by the reinterpretation of existing laws, the addition of new ones or the reformulation of sectors and indeed of the foundations of the whole legal edifice when the configuration of political power requires it.

The state form can thus be described as the crystallisation of the settlement of political conflicts of varying magnitudes each involving a specific relation of power between individuals, groups or classes confronting each other. The evolution of the state can metaphorically be seen as a 'sedimentation' process in which agencies, laws and modes of operation are superimposed according to decisions reflecting changes in political relations of power. Every regime therefore is held back by the weight of past decisions. This collection of agencies, laws and working habits tends to moderate the impact a new regime can have. This is because of the resistance inscribed in the form of the state itself to transformations in the type of policies and to attempts at reorganisation. Secondly, state agencies tend to create conglomerations of interests, i.e. groups that become dependent on their operations. These include the personnel of the organisation, and external groups benefitting from the agencies' intervention. These groups are likely to defend the agency to which they are tied, even when it has outlived its purpose. This might be the concrete meaning of 'social inertia' referred to by Duverger (1968: 115): "One

aspect of the autonomy of institutions is that they survive the factors which gave rise to them because of some kind of social inertia" *(my translation - P.F.)*.

The type of approach proposed here, because of the importance it attributes to the form of the state, bears some similarity to Weber's (1947: 156) view of the state and to the works of traditional sociologists and political scientists studying the anatomy of the state: Lapiere (1946), Malinowski (1944) and Duverger (1955). These authors often, explicitly or implicitly, deduce the functions of the state and the orientation of policies from the arrangement of its agencies such as the relation between types of decisions and the characteristics of different parliamentary systems. It seems that, in fact, the functions fulfilled by the state can be derived from its institutional arrangement, its legal framework and the working procedures, themselves the product of the accumulation of conflicting decisions. Any modification of the form of the state necessarily implies changes in its roles. From this standpoint, the state as an organisation becomes the main object of study.[4] Its function and more generally, the nature of its relation with civil society, can be studied through its form.

As a result of one of major compromises between social forces that make a society a capitalist one, the state is prevented from embracing the production sector. Depending on the balance of power in specific situations, it can, nevertheless, incorporate more or less significant parts of it without affecting the essence of the capitalist process.[5] This is so because the state does not

possess the means of paying a compensation to the majority of private sector interests and because an administration could not, in most cases, survive the opposition raised by large-scale expropriations. This compromise inhibits the blooming of a "state mode of production" (Lefebvre 1977) in which the state would expropriate the capitalist class. The history of the development of the state in the industrialised Western world, has been intertwined with the development of the capitalist mode of production. The state has gradually set the basic conditions necessary for the expansion of capitalism[6] (Blanke et al., 1978: 124; Lefebvre 1977; Poggi 1978: 78). Meanwhile, this mode of production was unbalancing the social structure and leading to a new organisation of social forces which have forced the transformation of the absolutist state. The compromise circumscribing the scope of the state, has historically determined formal channels connecting it to the civil society. These can concretely be related to two links carrying binding influences through the totality of state agencies. Firstly, state revenues depend ultimately on the accumulation process which is mostly in the hands of private producers. By means of taxation it taps part of the surplus generated by the accumulation process and part of the resources allocated to private consumption (Mattick 1976: 206). Secondly, the representation system has gradually been enlarged through struggles leading to the present electoral process (Murphy and Wolfe 1980: 11). This process permits, within the limits set by the production of surplus by the economy, and depending on the architecture of a specific state apparatus implying different levels of representation, periodic changes of policies according to changes in political alliances.

The introduction of these bridges between the state and civil society gives a concrete form to what is stated in a more abstract language by Wright (1978: 16-17), namely, that "economic structures set limits on the possible forms of political and ideological structures" and that within these limits, there is room for 'selections' of possibilities. It also echoes the approaches to the state which stress the contradiction between the sources of taxation and the expenditure required by the legitimation process (Habermas 1976; O'Connor 1973a; Offe 1975). This process refers in the present perspective to the representative system.

The view of the state adopted here attests to the importance of economic determinants while, on the other hand, stressing the impact of social struggles. It is therefore half way between the close link and loose link models. This view, by giving priority to the study of the form of the state seen as underlying the scope and nature of its function, opens the way to a concrete alternative to the approaches based primarily on the relation between state and civil society.

Thus, as a result of the relations of power prevailing in capitalist societies, these two basic links (fiscal and political) between the state and civil society are inscribed in the organisational pattern of the state. In the next sections of this chapter, I will try to demonstrate how this pattern affects the state's selectivity in its response to pressures as well as in the devising of interventions and how this selectivity affects the emergence of demands in civil society.

2.2 The emergence of issues

In this section and the next I examine the process by which issues take form in civil society. The first question that will be asked is why in certain circumstances, protest actions emerge while in others they seem to be inhibited. In other words, what are the factors affecting the origin of such actions? In order to formulate answers to these questions, I shall follow the steps taken by Lukes (1974) in his critique of the various contributors to the so-called power debate. This will lead to a criticism of Lukes' perspective. This criticism will be based on his definition of power and on the absence of significant treatment of social agents' interests by him. I will conclude by focusing on differential patterns of access to the state.

Lukes, in his discussion of the power debate, shows how there has been a gradual widening of the definition given to political power through the successive works of the three authors he introduces. He nevertheless concludes that the object of study remains limited and introduces his own perspective as a further step in the widening of the definition of the object.

The first approach Lukes considers is that of Dahl (1961) and Polsby (1963). For them power is observed by studying the outcome of formal political decisions. S. Lukes describes this as one-dimensional. In contrast to this perspective, he believes that Bachrach and Baratz (1970) lay the foundations for a two-dimensional one by adding to the study of formal political decisions the consideration of what they term 'non-decisions'. Non-decisions are understood as the consequence

of the rejection of an issue through a system of ideological, administrative, procedural and institutional barriers erected at various stages of the political decision-making process (Bachrach and Baratz 1970: 54). Unlike the pluralists whose findings lend support to the view that equality of access exists for every individual to the decision-making levels of government, Bachrach and Baratz' work reflects a preoccupation with how the utilisation of power "tends to perpetuate 'unfair shares' in the allocation of values" (Bachrach and Baratz 1970: 50).

According to Lukes, both approaches in spite of their marked differences, share a common shortcoming in that they limit themselves to "actual observable conflict, overt or covert" (Lukes 1974: 19). The pluralists as well as Bachrach and Baratz only consider observable individual decisions.

In what he labels the three-dimensional view, however, Lukes sees an opportunity of going beyond the study of political decisions in order to grasp the distribution of power in society. According to him, such a view offers the prospect of explaining how political systems prevent demands entering the political scene in terms other than the "personalised explanations" (Lukes 1974: 38), centred on observable decisions taken by determined agents, provided by the previous approaches. In developing this perspective, Lukes acknowledges his indebtedness to Crenson (1971) whose work comes close to adopting the three-dimensional view. The reason for this is that, unlike the authors following the one- and two-dimensional views, Crenson does not equate decision-making solely with the observation of decisions.

In addition, he considers how the power of groups and institutions, rather than individuals, can prevent demands from being raised (Lukes 1974: 44-45).

Lukes recognises the difficulties involved in identifying exercises of power that cannot be observed. To overcome these difficulties, he suggests that "one can take steps to find out what it is that people would have done otherwise" (Lukes 1974: 50). He nevertheless admits that this means that no evidence is likely to prove conclusive. His method can be compared to that of astronomers who deduced the existence of Pluto from its influence on the course of Uranus. This is because this course did not correspond to what it should have been according to calculations related to laws of gravity. In the present discussion, the laws of gravity could, metaphorically, stand for the interests of individuals and groups. Exercise of power that is not directly observable, could be detected from a deviation between interests and behaviours. Lukes, through his contribution to the power debate, opens a door, but his reluctance to use the concept of interest prevents him from going any further.

Swanton (1980: 84) identifies two conceptions of interest. The first pictures the individual as the ultimate arbiter of his interest, therefore confounding interests and preferences. The determination of interests is thus a question of the individual's psychology. This perspective is the one adopted by classical economists for example.

In the second conception, the interest of an individual is seen to derive from a social situation or position in the social structure. In this case, interest is an objective datum. In this second con-

ception, it is possible that, because of an unawareness of his interest, caused by the interference of ideological influences, an individual's actions may run counter to his interest.

Although it belongs, fundamentally, to the first perspective, the approach adopted here combines aspects of both. This is because it locates the motivation of agents' behaviour in the will to satisfy personal choices. However, these choices and the means used to attempt to realise them, are influenced by social position. The basic interest of an individual (or group) is assumed to be to maximise the amount of resources at his disposal. The term resource is given a wide meaning: besides its monetary aspect, it includes leisure time available, usage of public facilities, etc. An increase in resources represents for the individual greater opportunities to fulfil his preferences (Barry 1967). Access to social resources, which results partly from deliberate strategies, differs according to the class membership of the group or individual.[7]

A further problem with Lukes' contribution to the power debate is that it carries, according to Bradshaw (1976: 123), remnants of the interpersonal conception of power central to the works he criticises. Even though he extends this conception to include non-individual influences, Lukes fails to connect the practice of power with the institutional framework of society. He is thus unable to see the decisive power relations between individuals as an extension of roles founded in the organisational structure of society. But power must be seen as vested in organisations and reflecting the hierarchy that prevails between them. As we have seen previously, organisations

are themselves concrete resolutions of past conflicts. Their respective power gives them the capacity to shape future conflicts and have an impact on their outcome.

In order to prepare the way for a discussion of state intervention in the next section, the remainder of this section will deal with actions directed towards the state. The response of the state to demands originating from civil society is largely conditioned by the interests of the groups associated to it as an entity, which revolve around the maintenance and the expansion of its level of initiative. This presupposes that the state respects and stimulates the accumulation process. This is so because it is from the surplus generated at this level that the state derives the resources that determine its room for manoeuvre. As O'Connor (1973b: 74) puts it,

> "... a state that ignores the means and varied problems involving accumulation and profit is self-destructive in the sense it threatens its own material foundations - it risks drying up the source of its own power, the surplus production capacity of the economic system and the taxes that are drawn from this surplus (as well as from other forms of Capital)".

What is presented as the specific interests of the state actually refers to the combination of the institutionally related interests of the state agents. Because of the duration of their association with state agencies, civil servants have at stake its maintenance and its expansion in that it might yield career benefits (Hirsch 1976: 122; Schumpeter 1976: 269-283). The interests of the elected members, on the other hand, are more closely related to the political regime than to the state as such. They tend to pursue electoral actions

likely to prolong the life of the regime with which they are associated.

If the electoral impact of a demand is primarily a matter of the number of people mobilised by it, and thus of its potential threat to the electoral basis of a regime, the situation is different for actions affecting the accumulation process. In relation to this, two groups, firstly, organised labour, because of its ability to cause short-term disruptions through strikes, and secondly and more powerfully, capitalists because of their ability to cause long-term disruptions through investment strikes, have a decisive influence. Consequently, the state is likely to respond favourably to issues with a high electoral mobilisation potential - the responsiveness of elected members being inversely proportional to the length of time before the next election. The state is also likely to react to issues affecting the accumulation process and hence the amount of resources available to it. These preoccupations with resources and elections are the factors underlying the differential response of the state to pressures. The degree to which social protest action has an impact on the accumulation process and/or on the electoral alliance supporting a regime determines the likelihood of a favourable state response. Because of the longer measurable effect of large-scale actions, organised movements yield, other things being equal, better rates of responsiveness from the state.[8]

Individuals who share common designs whether general or partial, constitute what has been called quasi-groups (Ginsberg 1934). On this basis, interest groups (groups for themselves) can arise and implement

in accordance with the social design shared by their members, strategies that are often directed towards state agencies. With this in mind, the question we shall raise is why, in certain situations where problems exist, are there no actions directed at the state? In order to answer this question, the arguments developed by Bachrach and Baratz (1970), Crenson (1971), and Lukes (1974) will be turned upside down. Instead of defining the obstacles to pressures directed at the state in terms of observable or invisible barriers inherent to the political system, attention will be paid to features associated with the responsiveness of the state as integrated by individuals or groups according to their respective social characteristics.[9]

The basic factors which influence the triggering of protest actions revolve around trade-offs made before and in the course of such actions between the perceived probability of rewards and the effort involved in pursuing them.[10] These trade-offs imply some kind of embodiment of the political system in that they necessarily involve assumptions about the likelihood of a favourable response of the state according to the level of demands being made. The anticipation of the constraints to be encountered in dealings with the state, may to a large extent be the outcome of biassed perceptions. But individuals and groups will tend to adjust, through a trial and error process, to the reactions of state agencies to different types of demands. Past state reactions will thus have a major influence on whether protest action develops, as well as on the form it takes.

The success of an action depends partly on whether it is formulated in a format which is compatible with the specific arrangement of state agencies.[11] Organised groups constitute the most adequate

means of formalising world views related to interests of individuals in similar situations. These groups are also instrumental in devising actions to defend these interests.[12] But the organisation of such groups is the result of a struggle against an 'inertia principle'. This inertia can be explained by the fact that, in the case of non-divisible rewards, which are the object of most pressures on the state, a common individual attitude is to try to reap the rewards without expending any effort (Olson 1971). For some individuals, however, there may be benefits associated with participation in organised protest action as an end in itself (Weissman 1970).

The present perspective stresses the role of social agents in the analysis of protest actions. It is only when assimilated by the agents and coloured by their respective social characteristics that characteristics of the state influence these actions.[13] Because of the importance given to agents, our perspective departs from the structuralist marxist view where a direct relation is assumed to exist between contradictions and social movements.

In sum, two main factors appear to affect the emergence of protest action. There is firstly the conflict as it is lived by each individual or group between a desire to maximise his rewards according to his basic interest and his perception of the differential state responsiveness. In other words, it is a matter of deciding whether it is worthwhile to invest time, effort and maybe money in a protest action in the light of the anticipated likelihood of a favourable state response. Secondly, because it affects the reactions of the state, the ability to carry out such actions and the types of demands

put forward which vary with the social position of individuals and groups, influence their perception of the likelihood of a positive response. This in turn has an impact on the expectation of rewards in the balance between the effort involved and the anticipation of a positive response. By putting the emphasis on individuals' perceptions, this perspective differs from the ones which rely on the existence of visible and invisible organisational barriers to explain the non-appearance of demands made on the state by certain social groups.

2.3 State planning

In this section, I intend to explain why a study of state intervention must give priority to a consideration of planning. After a definition of planning that stresses both its intrinsic features and the need to view them in a specific organisational framework, attention will be paid to the role given to planning in state agencies. We will show how state interventions are structured through planning methods and techniques and how there is a divergence of interests between elected members and bureaucrats in relation to the conception and implementation of state intervention. Planning will be seen in this section from a perspective akin to the one developed by Hart (1976) which presents it as a process transcending institutional boundaries and including as one of its moments, albeit the most important one, political decision-making.

State interventions as perceived here[14] are political responses to

demands emerging from instances of the civil society (Kirk 1980: 32; Broadbent 1977: 77-170). Such responses are given to demands which are likely to affect the maintenance of a level of state initiative and/or the survival of a regime through the institutionalised channels linking the state to the civil society, i.e. taxation and the electoral system. State interventions, then, consist of means directed towards ends related to aspects of civil society. This implies that because of the specificity of the state as an entity in society, its interventions must involve planning in order to structure complex sequences of action. These sequences include a delimitation of the object of intervention, the organisation of a series of actions and the monitoring of their consequences for the maintenance of the state and the survival of a regime.

One can place planning definitions in two categories according to the importance they give to the institutional framework of planning.[15] The first category comprises definitions of planning that make no reference to the agencies in which it is carried out: These definitions often consist of normative statements which describe what planning ought to be in order to please planners.[16] The second category gathers the definitions which describe planning as a process taking place in the framework of the state. This is, for instance, the case of Castells (1977a: 263) who calls urban planning the bulk of state interventions directed towards the sectors of social life he identifies as urban. Others locate the planning process within the delicate relation between the state and civil society. In their view, planning refers to a type of state intervention that makes good failures of processes based in the civil

society including discontinuities and side-effects of market practices (Harrison 1977; Scott 1980). This treatment of the planning process comes close to the approach to state intervention developed here. The major difference between the two last positions is that, while in the former case the state appears to react somewhat automatically to bottlenecks of civil society processes, in the latter one, it is seen as responding to demands emanating from individuals and groups.

The conception of planning presented here borrows from both the basic principles used to group the definitions into two categories. This is because it considers planning both as having generic characteristics whatever its setting or its sphere of use, and as being necessarily integrated into an organisation from which it derives its concrete purposes as well as its form.

1. Planning in its essence is a systematic organisation of action which subordinates sequences of individual actions to an aim. As put by Habermas (1971: 81), "Planning can be regarded as purposive-rational action (instrumental action or rational choice or their conjunction) of the second order. It aims at the establishment, improvement or expansion of systems of purposive-rational action themselves". Such an organisation implies a temporal arrangement of actions and a precise inscription of each intervening party into the process. It also implies that attention be given to the object of intervention so the interventions can be adapted to it.

2. While the essence of planning refers to generic characteristics present in whatever contexts it is used in, its substance refers to its adaptation to various settings and functions. Planning can only take a concrete form in an institutional framework where it shares the aim of the organisation and defines its discourse and methods in accordance with the essential features of this organisation. Planning can be said to be moulded by the institutional setting in which it takes place. This adaptation happens whatever the institutional framework, whether it be private enterprise or state apparatus. The study will here be limited to planning in the latter setting.

If it is said that the arrangement of political agencies and their procedures give rise to a first delimitation of the objects of state intervention in civil society, then the planning process can be seen as the source of a second delimitation. This is because, within the areas of intervention defined by the jurisdiction of each agency, planning-related techniques single out the elements to be taken into consideration in a political decision and allocate a specific weight to each of them. In other words, planning techniques determine what is to be relevant and to what degree, to a political decision. For instance, critics of cost-benefit analysis[17] which is the main planning tool underlying decision-making, point out that only factors with a market value, either actual, or estimated as in the case of social cost-benefit analysis (Beesley, chapters 1 & 4), can be assigned a utility value, thus excluding many aspects of reality. They deplore the fact that all groups are given a similar treatment in cost-benefit

analysis in spite of marked differences in needs and incomes (Dodgson 1978: 3). These critics also mention the inevitable bias in the choice of factors under consideration in cost-benefit analysis because of the impossibility of following all the ripples of an action. This bias applies as well to the value awarded to chosen factors. More generally, Dreyfus (1975) argues that what is of chief importance in people's life is often left out of the definition of objects of intervention through planning techniques.

The delineation of objects by means of the planning process are active reflections of prevailing balances of power between forces involved around specific issues. As a modality of the organisation of action involved in planning, intervening parties (governmental agencies, different levels of elected officials, civil servants, constituted bodies, individual participants, etc.) are given specific positions in a hierarchy of sequences leading to interventions (Levin 1976: 33-34)[18] according to their relative political power. Such arrangements reflect the inequality of influence of the parties on the definition of the object of intervention as well as on the extent and form of the intervention. The planning process supplements the competitiveness between those involved with a forced complementarity towards the attainment of a final result. This is the case for instance of urban planning where through competing pressures, public regulation and mainly private developments lead to the production of the urban built environment.

This formal arrangement contributes to the protection of the organisation of extensive sequences of actions from minor changes in relations

of power thus potentially easing the implementation of long-term projects. But disturbances erupting from major shifts in relations of power are likely to perturb the current implementation of interventions and have an electoral and/or fiscal impact on the state itself. These disturbances can cause, depending on their power, changes in the arrangement of state agencies. But they usually lead to new patterns of positions of agencies involved in the planning process.

For example, in Britain, the increase in the number and intensity of organised protests at a local level in the 1960s (Lowe 1977: 37) has impaired the realisation of large scale land use projects and has challenged the nature and the use of planning (Royal Town Planning Institute 1976). This has led to a widening of the definition of the objects of intervention and of the scope of land-use planning models which now include certain issues initially brought forward by protest movements. The Committee on Public Participation in Planning (1969), which was set up to provide proposals on ways to deal with the growing importance of local protest movements, recommended in 1969 that the public should be integrated into the planning process. Subsequently statutory public consultation was introduced into British planning through the Town and Country Planning Acts of 1971 and 1972. This has in fact led to opportunities for protest movements to take part in the planning process though usually in non-decisive and somewhat indistinct sequences limiting their influence in practice.

In the light of the foregoing, it would appear that planning, as a state practice, is a mode of action devised to protect the interests

of the state as an entity and of particular political regimes. It can thus be characterised as a "cautious mode of action". Therefore, while political intervention is in itself a response to a demand, it must be designed so as to yield maximum electoral and/or fiscal benefit while causing as little pressure as possible on the budget. This explains the application of cost-benefit analysis and the integration into the planning machinery of the interests related to the object of intervention thought to be relevant. This integration helps the state to detect at a sectoral level the impact of interventions on the accumulation process and on electoral alliances.

Political interventions are the result of the behaviour of social agents according to their interests in given situations. These interventions take place within a primary delimitation of the objects of intervention according to the jurisdictional boundaries of state agencies. This delimitation is itself the outcome of fundamental power relations compelling respect for balance between public involvement and the private sector.[19] The mode of operation of the state involves the presence in its apparatus of two main groups fulfilling different roles (Gershuny 1978: 301) and having their own set of attitudes resulting from distinct interests (Poggi 1978: 136): the bureaucracy and the elected members. The interaction of both groups behaving according to their self-interest within specific institutional frameworks underlies what we have referred to as "state motivations as an entity".

The pre-eminence of the elected members comes from their role as the decision-makers in the last instance. Because of this, their behaviour

is likely to be coloured by a will to maintain themselves in power by trying to appeal to the electorate. This may even be done at the expense of the state apparatus. For example, they may advocate measures aimed at reducing its size. Their allegiance is, therefore, primarily to a regime instead of to the state as such. By contrast, the interests of the bureaucrats, seen mainly in terms of jobs, incomes and prestige (Selznick 1966: 65) coincide with the fate of the state apparatus. In this situation of convergence between individual and organisational aims (Grant 1977: 32), bureaucrats will tend to favour this apparatus. The coincidence of bureaucratic and state interests is largely a consequence of the length of time civil servants work in state agencies, often amounting to their whole working life, while the mandate of an elected member varies around four years.

Each of the various sectors of bureaucracy will be inclined to put forward demands for an expansion of its own role at the expense of those of other sectors, of the elected members and of civil society instances. The aim of such expansion is to achieve a greater 'freedom of movement' in the form of an "enlargement of ... discretionary powers" (Selznick 1966: 65). To bring about such a result, the upper ranks of the bureaucracy and particularly the planners, resort to a strategy which emphasises their 'professional' character.[20] The most commonly emphasised professional traits are skills based on theoretical knowledge. A focus on these traits can be used with the intention of giving them superiority over the elected members who are unable to make such a claim. But unlike those professions where the body of knowledge allows members to practise outside specific organisations, i.e. law and medicine, many of the 'bureaucratic' professions and particul-

arly town planning, tie their members to state agencies (Eversley 1973: 320-21). Another strategy used by some officials to assert their role is to establish contacts with sectoral interests so they can claim to represent these interests within political agencies. This is the case, for example, of town planners who, in a context of public participation, adopt the role vis-a-vis a council, of bearers of public demands (Collins 1978: 45).

Planning has been defined as the device by which the state intervenes in civil society. This is because it allows interventions to be articulated in accordance with the character of the relation between the state and civil society. Finally, the mode of operation of the state entity engaged in intervention is conceived as the outcome of the interaction of elected members and the bureaucracy.

In the next section, I intend to formulate an explanation of why long-term projects, as devised by planners, often fail to be realised.

2.4 The limits of state intervention

To refer to the existence of limits to state intervention implies comparison with an alternative to the prevailing situation. The preliminary question which must be asked is: in comparison with what are state interventions limited? As has been seen in section 2 of this chapter, individuals and groups hold a more or less elaborate social project which enables them to maximise their perceived interests. Each of these projects can be used as a standard by which

to evaluate state intervention, whether at a sectoral or at a more comprehensive level. The starting point we shall use to reveal the limits of state intervention is the almost constant frustration of implementation of coherent long-term policies (Batty 1978: 1). These policies are usually conceived by bureaucrats in order to solve problems defined by individuals and groups according to a will to maximise their interests. Through these conceptions, bureaucrats pursue their own institutional interests within boundaries set by the degree of freedom of action they enjoy in state agencies.

As mentioned earlier, state interventions are actions aimed at specific objects in civil society, and constitute a response to demands emerging from civil society. Governments thus recognise needs as defined by civil society instances and introduce measures accordingly. There are two inherent limits to this action. On the one hand governments bear in mind the electoral impact of their actions, and hence the political strength of the particular groups formulation needs.[21] On the other hand, governments acknowledge the requirements of the accumulation process through demands presented by capitalists. In so doing, the state is motivated by the need to maintain and widen its fiscal base and looks forward to the reaping of electoral returns resulting from improvements in the economic situation.

Three main approaches to the relation between state intervention and the private economic sector arise in recent state theory debates. In the first perspective, the interventions of the state are viewed as mainly functional to the private sector. Emphasis is placed upon the

state expenditures required to support the private accumulation process in terms of infrastructures, education of the labour force, etc. (O'Connor 1973a: 6-7 ; Holloway and Picciotto 1978). In the same line of thought, Baran and Sweezy (1966) focus on the role of the state in the provision of markets for goods produced by private firms.

The second approach sees the relation between the state and the private economy as one in which both entities compete for a limited amount of resources. For example, Bacon and Eltis (1976: 93) consider that "market" and "non-market" sectors conflict with one another over access to the labour force and to investment funds. The conclusion that stems from this view is that an expansion of the public sector which occurs without a parallel expansion in the private one will cause decreasing profits and thus lower the growth rate of the economy.

The third approach results to a certain degree from a fusion of the two previous ones. It presents state activity as a drain on the accumulation process while at the same time seeing it as essential for its survival largely through its setting up of countertendencies to the falling tendency of the rate of profit (Yaffe 1972; Yaffe 1973; Fine 1976). Gough (1979: 105), while agreeing with those authors who see state expenditure as an unproductive burden for capital, rejects descriptions of state interventions as "a functional response to the profitability crisis of late capitalism" (Gough 1975: 57). He proposes, as an alternative, that class struggle be placed in the foreground of explanations of state responsiveness (Gough 1979: 126).

The dual character of the relation between state and accumulation process described by Gough opens the way to a somewhat more concrete view based on the contradictory relation between two types of political demands. On the one hand, sectoral demands emerging from every group in civil society impose pressures on the state for all kinds of services. Groups in control of the accumulation process, in particular, formulate demands for measures contributing to the maintenance or the increase of rates of profit. On the other hand, conflicts over the relative proportion of social surplus under public and private control involve the setting of limits on state expenditure. One form these conflicts can adopt is investment strikes resulting partly from what capitalists consider as too large a share of their profits being taken by the state.[22] Organised protest action about levels of taxes or rates constitute another form these conflicts can take.[23]

What is at stake, then, is the proportion of the gross domestic product under the direct control of the state. Changing political alliances advocate strategies involving modifications of the level of state expenditure in accordance with fluctuations of economic output. State expenditure then becomes, along with the setting of interest rates and other measures, a major tool used in policies aimed at regulating the accumulation process. Doctrines related to the role of the state and its capacity to steer the economy are embodied in macro-economic theories. While both of the main contending views since the Second World War agree on the purpose of improving levels of profits (de Brunhoff 1976: 138-9), namely, to promote investment and thus achieve economic growth, they diverge over the means by

which this result can be achieved, and especially over whether state expenditure is useful for this purpose. The Keynesian view focuses on imperfections of the market. The economists who adopt this perspective consider that these imperfections can be corrected by state action (in accordance with the first approach outlined above to the relation between the state and the accumulation process). They identify unemployment as the most serious of the problems caused by these imperfections and advocate increases in public expenditure in order to alleviate it and stimulate the economy. In contrast, the neo-liberal view advocates contractions of public spending on the basis of its belief in the equilibriating capacity of the market. Those economists who share this view see inflation as the main economic problem and consider it as a sequel to high levels of public expenditure. They advocate (in accordance with the second approach to the relation between the state and the private economic sector) an allocation of resources favourable to the private economy.[24]

Because they primarily focus on the impact of aggregate state expenditure on the economy, macro-economic doctrines tend not to consider the distribution of state spending between different sectors. Sectoral interventions are seen as subordinate in importance to macro-economic policies. State interventions taken in their entirety and more specifically, public works, thus become instruments of economic policy (Folin 1979: 334). It is within the total level of expenditure set by macro-economic policies that sectoral interventions are given an importance in relation one to another. As put by Folin (1979: 335):

"In 'dynamic' theories of economic growth, it is only when

> the amount of public expenditure has been defined (and decided) that notice is again taken of the use values of particular undertakings involved in the investment options".

It is important to stress that the state does not react automatically to fluctuations in the economic situation. Its responses are not triggered by economic indicators passing through threshold levels. They are responses rather to problems as defined by various groups and reflect the relative political strength of such groups which varies according to the economic situation, e.g. organised labour is weaker in periods of recession. The economic indicators considered important are themselves the reflexion of this process of problem definition.

Political regimes must navigate between what appear to them as contradictory types of pressure. On the one hand, they are confronted with an accumulation of demands for sectoral interventions while, on the other hand, they are urged by capitalists and taxpayers to set a limit to the resources used for the implementation of public undertakings. This situation is reflected in the relation of power between state agencies. The Treasury, the "key state institution for managing the economy" (Broadbent 1977: 48), by determining the amount of resources available, has a central influence over the existence and operation of other agencies. While sectoral policies are often organised on a medium or long-term basis, macro-economic policies are usually subject to short-term change. This is a result of economic fluctuations and/or modifications in the interpretation of economic problems and choice of remedy following changes in political alliances. As Broadbent (1977: 30) writes:

> "Within the public sector itself the separation between 'plans' and 'power' remains complete, with all the major executive powers and resources of the state harnessed within the Treasury to a short-term response to immediate difficulties - steering the economy".

For example, in Great Britain, the power of the Treasury over the spending of state agencies has been refined by the introduction, between 1974 and 1976, of the cash limit procedure. This new system of control was adopted to tackle the tendency of state expenditure to creep upwards in excess of the limits set by White Papers. This tendency was particularly marked in the years preceding the adoption of the cash limits procedure.

It seems that in the absence of any limit to public expenditure, state programmes would simply accumulate as responses to demands originating from civil society. But the existence of a spending ceiling forces the state to adopt an order of priorities in the implementation of policies. This implies the rejection of some of the demands made on the state. The contraction of spending levels is likely to improve the functionality of the organisation of the state apparatus by bringing about a reorganisation of agencies in accordance with the priorities of a regime and with the level of political support each programme is able to exhibit (Murphy 1980: 14; O'Connor 1973a: 65).

The implementation of organised plans of action spread over significant periods of time as devised by officials will in all probability, then, suffer from the effects on sectoral interventions of variations of the budgetary ceilings. Similarly, other factors will interfere with the political stability required for the adoption of coherent

long-term policies. Changes of regime or shifts of priorities within a regime affect the likelihood of long-term interventions. Also, at a sectoral level, the state may modify its policies in response to a change in the configuration of forces among the interest groups involved in specific issues.

Thus it can be said that the economic and political context largely determines the potential for long-term policies.[25] The more stable is this context, the greater the chances that the original aims of such policies will be realised. As a corollary, the longer the time span covered by an intervention, the greater the chances of it being interfered with. It seems that the economic and political context has in many respects been unstable in Great Britain since the mid-1960s. Authors such as Brittan (1971) and Broadbent (1977) have emphasised the erratic nature of the state management of the British economy, seeing it as reflecting short-term considerations and frequent shifts. Also, McKay and Cox (1979: 264) argue that the opposed views between parties about housing and land values coupled with regular changes of regime, have led to considerable change in these areas.

This section has focussed on the factors that limit the capacity of the state to implement long-term sequences of action in response to problems defined by civil society instances. These factors are inherent to the form of the state and to the type of relation between it and the civil society proceding from this form. They stem from two areas of conflict, both of which have electoral and fiscal impacts, and place contradictory pressures on the state: pressures

for more intervention and concerns about the level of public expenditure which often reflect a desire to limit its role to one of economic steering. The resulting variations in the size of the budgetary ceiling, as well as changes in electoral alliances, cause shifts of priorities which impair the realisation of long-term policies.

Conclusion

The fundamental perspective adopted in this chapter has been to see the state not as a mere response to functional economic and social needs, but as an entity with a form resulting from the outcome of struggles. These struggles centre around the use of state institutions for the benefit of particular social groups and have led to compromises which have moulded the institutional arrangement and consequently, the role of the state. The state in advanced capitalist societies is linked by two formal institutionalised channels to the civil society: fiscal dependence and the electoral process. The existence and the features of these channels are the result of political conflicts. The differences in these features in the various advanced capitalist social formations are thus due to their respective historical load of political conflicts, while the similarities between them are due to common elements in their historical experience, e.g. their class structures. These links constitute constraints on the freedom of manoeuvre of the state. But the political relations of power, as they manifest themselves through these channels, prevent the emancipation of the state from these constraints and thus preserve a dynamic rooted in civil society

processes.

The state considers and reacts to needs as defined by individuals or groups according to their likely impact on the two institutional channels, i.e. their fiscal consequences for the accumulation process, and their repercussions on electoral alliances. Furthermore, governments organise their interventions so as to reap maximum benefits from them for themselves. The motivations of the state underlying its interventions refer to the interaction between occupational interests in the institutional framework of the state. The divergence between occupational interests explains, on the one hand, the fact that plans as devised by bureaucrats often imply an expansion of the agencies to which they belong through long-term incremental policies, while, on the other hand, the fact that the elected members responding to changing political and economic contexts are likely to disrupt these policies. It can be said that the same institutional arrangements that underlie state responses to demands emanating from civil society instances, set limits on the likelihood of the implementation of such responses. Because of the mutually contradictory nature of pressures transmitted by the electoral system and emanating from the accumulation process, in favour of sectoral interventions or of limiting public expenditure, it is difficult for the state to implement coherent long-term policies.

Finally, the impact of these considerations will become apparent in the subsequent chapters because they will supply the theoretical tools to enable the following questions to be answered: How are transport problems defined? Why does the state respond to some of these

problems and not others? In what context are solutions to these problems elaborated? And, why are these solutions only partly, if at all, implemented?

Chapter III

URBAN TRANSPORT PLANNING: THE NON-EMERGENCE OF ACCESSIBILITY AS A POLICY ISSUE

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is two-fold: to develop an approach to transport issues that focusses on the variation in potential accessibility to activities in the urban environment, and to consider the assumptions embedded in mainstream transport theory and in planning practices. The evolution of this theory and of these practices is considered in relation to the context in which they developed and to their impact on political decision-making. Their evolution will be presented as the result of the relation between the civil society and the state around a specific set of issues and of the interaction of occupational groups within the state apparatus each motivated by their own interests. Our discussion of the different currents of transport theory will take into account the context of their development as well as their role in obstructing or facilitating the emergence of an approach to transport issues which stresses equality of accessibility.

In the first section of the chapter the discussion will focus on the context in which the urban transport planning process has developed and on the purposes it has fulfilled, e.g. pro-road lobby etc. We shall also consider the interplay of forces that has led to its by-pass in many cases more recently. In the remaining sections the main emphasis will be placed on the extent to which urban transport

planning methods have paid attention to the impact on individuals of transport policies. Such a preoccupation will be shown to be virtually absent in the first procedures considered, while it will be all-pervasive in the last ones considered.

In the second section, it will be shown that the urban transport planning procedure in use from the mid 1960's through the early 1970's is in fact a machinery geared to proposing and justifying large scale road expenditures and embodies little consideration of the effects of such expenditures on individuals. However, we will see that the recent disaggregated models potentially allow more consideration of the effects on individuals than the earlier aggregate models. In the third section, two methodologies specifically designed for the purpose of monitoring the effects of transport on individuals and their reactions to them are introduced: value of time studies and elasticity studies. But it will be seen that their concern with individual behaviour is limited to those aspects of it that are relevant to the political decision-making process. The third section also considers the studies of how people use their time, known as activity studies. Unlike the procedures and models introduced up to this point, activity studies do not form part of the planning and decision-making process. Their object of analysis is not therefore defined in terms of the exigencies of political decision-making.

In section four, I attempt to develop a definition of accessibility that will allow an investigation of the effects of changes of transport situations on individuals and groups. This notion of accessibility will refer to the range of activities located in the territory

available to an individual through the modes of transport he can use. Equity issues in matters of accessibility will be considered. After the observation that conditions of accessbility have been deteriorating for a large proportion of the population during recent decades, an attempt is made to explain why there have been so few protest movements around accessibility-related issues.

The theoretical arguments which are presented in this chapter with little empirical evidence will be substantiated in the remaining chapters which deal with the evolution of the transport situation in London and its consequences for the population. The theoretical arguments of the present chapter will serve as the backbone for the organisation of the empirical material in later chapters.

3.1 The political context of the decline of large scale urban transport plans

In accordance with our analysis in Chapter II, the framing of urban transport policies will be related to the specific economic and political interests governing state intervention and which motivate the groups operating within it. More specifically, we shall focus on the 'conditions of production' of the urban transport planning procedure (UTPP), viz. the methodology leading to large scale transport proposals. The UTPP is analysed by referring to the position in the political decision-making process of the planners who conceive it: the UTPP is seen as a way of defining needs and policy proposals in accordance with transport planners' organisational interests. One conclusion of our analysis will be to show how transport planners

have attempted to maintain the models of the earlier period when elected members were initiating policies. This is because elected members reacted more rapidly to pressures for new approaches to urban transport problems, arising from environmental groups, which contradicted the models' assumptions. The reactions of elected members are motivated by their interest within the state apparatus which is to maintain the fiscal base on which the operation of state agencies depends and to get re-elected. From 1957 onwards the government decided to make large increases in spending on roads. This was partly a response to demands originating from road transport spokesmen representing automobile clubs, road builders, petrol industries, car manufacturers, etc. who called for major road investments (Plowden 1971: 327) and took into account the potential electoral impact of the increasing number of motorists (Wilson et al., 1971: 306) using a road network which had remained largely unmodified for many years. This change can be seen mainly as a reaction by elected members to a problem formulated at national or metropolitan levels rather than to an accumulation of localised pressures. Accordingly the original terms of the road policy were conceived in terms of amounts of funds to be spent on roads. This in itself met with the approval of the road lobbies. But elected members relied largely on planners to devise transport strategies to determine how and where the money should be spent. (This illustrates how the state responds to pressures from civil society and how elected members rely on planners for definitions of problems and formulation of solutions).

The planners added their own assumptions to the embryonic notions embodied in the directives of the elected members (Adams 1981: 50).

The planners' assumptions were formalised in the UTPP developed between 1955 and 1964 and which continued in use with little change until the 1970's - when it was displaced by smaller-scale models. This procedure originated in the United States where, following the enactment of the National Interstate Defence Highways Act releasing "tremendous forces for urban reorganisation" (Wingo 1961: 1), methodological principles related to the field of 'social physics' developed in the military sector were applied to transport matters (Hensher 1979: 97; Gakenheimer and Wheaton 1976: 76). In Britain, as prospects of large sums of money being made available for road investment arose, consultants from America were hired in order to implant this planning technique (Steiger 1969: 158). The purpose was to replace the "one shot design situations" (Starkie 1976: 16) then prevailing in Britain by procedures which recognised the effects on the transport network of the totality of activities within an agglomeration (Stopher and Meyburg 1975: 15). The UTPP was applied and further developed within local and central government with frequent contributions from academics and consultants. From this time on, the importance given to transport planning and the large size of the funds allocated to road building induced the rise of a new nexus of occupational interests. As noted by Starkie (1974: 323), "a new profession, transport planning, has subsumed many, and expanded upon all the previously fragmented responsibilities of the surveyor, highway engineer, traffic engineer and public transport operator".

The UTPP is used to forecast the aggregate travel demands on a network, and then to formulate proposals for state expenditure in response to what are presented as needs. This constitutes an attempt

to formalise the process of state response to civil society needs in a specific field of intervention. In the UTPP, planners attempt to attribute a major role for themselves in the political decision-making process. In this procedure, they define the needs to be considered, forecast their evolution by using mathematical models - a consequence of the fact that those involved in transport planning are usually economists and engineers (Hensher 1979: 95; Heggie 1977: 34) - and on the basis of these predictions, formulate proposals. They thus reduce greatly the area in which political decisions can be taken.

The assumptions embedded in the form of the UTPP reflect the demands formulated by groups and organisations about the need to cater for increases in the level of road traffic, demands which themselves are formalised into planning procedures, models and techniques. As stated by Wilson et al.(1971: 267) "a model is a formal representation of the planner's understanding of the system of interest". In other words, planners adopt approaches which are related to the interests of certain groups in their handling of transport matters. They thus choose among the many expressions of needs originating from civil society those which they consider to be transport problems in need of a solution. Transport planners, like bureaucrats in general, have a stake in important state interventions because of the career benefits they may give rise to. In view of the split between the state and civil society, the programmes likely to be approved by the elected members are those which appear to ensure the support of major economic interests as well as having a favourable electoral impact. By producing proposals for large increases in road expenditure on the basis of forecasts of increasing transport demand, the UTPP incorporates

the demands of the most influential transport lobbies of the 1950's and 1960's comprising the motor, petrol and road building industries (Goodman 1972) as well as of automobile associations. All of these groups shared an interest in the expansion of road transport, and advocated greater road capacity in order to ease congestion (Hamer 1974: 33). Until the spread of anti-motorway movements, the proposals stemming from the UTPP had widespread public support in view of the increased mobility and economic benefits they brought about. This public approval could then be interpreted by elected members as leading to electoral support, while the fulfilment of the demands of the major economic instances could be seen by them as yielding a favourable economic impact. It therefore appears that the UTPP embodies a specific urban transport problematic which is compatible with the organisational interests of those who have conceived these procedures. In spite of a neutral and technical appearance, these considerations underlie the constitution of the UTPP.

The UTPP implicitly assumes a harmony between its underlying principles and major economic interests as well as public support, and takes on the appearance of a self-contained process in which transport infrastructure proposals are 'automatic' responses to needs as forecast by models. Thus, starting from predictions arrived at by technical means, comprehensive networks of new infrastructures to be implemented in stages over sometimes more than twenty years are proposed. But this reveals a divergence between the time scales of bureaucrats and elected members. While the former devise long-term projects based on what are referred to as technical considerations,

themselves guided by specific perceptions of civil society needs considered at any one time as given, elected members react to the electoral and fiscal pressures they consider relevant by making relatively short-term responses. The UTPP suffers from a lack of flexibility in that by regarding transport expenditure as an answer to needs determined through models reproducing the priorities of the planners, it eliminates the political process from consideration. The UTPP does not recognise the fact that the actual conditions of implementation of state projects are an outcome of the political decision-making process which involves shifts of priorities according to modifications of electoral alliances as well as fiscal and budgetary considerations (Stopher and Meyburg 1975: 220).

From the mid 1960's and especially from the early 1970's, changes in the political context related to transport occasioned a decline in the trust elected members had in the UTPP. It no longer appeared as likely to yield favourable impacts for them in terms of electoral support and economic activity. Mainly as a result of reactions to the actual or anticipated impacts of projects proposed by planners, popular support for the projects had crumbled. Furthermore, the preoccupation with energy conservation from the early 1970's onwards has partly undermined the credibility of the arguments put forward by the road lobby that more roads were an unquestionable economic good. Finally, tight budget policies, in reaction to a deteriorating economic situation, have resulted in large cuts in capital expenditure, thereby making the notion of large-scale road plans such as those produced by the UTPP, largely redundant.

Since the early 1970's, on both sides of the Atlantic, the perception of politically relevant transport problems mainly in terms of traffic congestion has given way to the consideration of a wider range of issues. The priority given to the accommodation of traffic growth by new infrastructure provision has largely disappeared. There has been a transition from a period of large scale capital expenditure on roads to less "heroic structural changes" (Bayliss 1977: 7), such as measures to bring about a fuller use of existing facilities and policies promoting transport equity (Hutchinson 1981: 1968). The emphasis has shifted towards the use of plans which are smaller in scale, shorter in time-span, and more localised in their application than the UTPP. This is what Hensher (1979: 99) refers to as the 'timid' approach. In order to avoid as many electorally damaging conflicts as possible, a place is given to the consultation of groups with an interest in the question (Bayliss 1977: 6). In this new context the provision of major infrastructure to accommodate forecast growth in traffic, loses much of its significance.

This change of context can be used to explain a paradox related by Starkie (1976: 91-8). He points to the discrepancy in the early 1970's between the responsiveness of transport policies to pressures from civil society, and the planning procedure and models on offer which have remained largely unaltered. I would explain this paradox by the desire of the planners to preserve their former privileged position in the decision-making process and, at least implicitly, safeguard the civil society interests the proposals of the UTPP favoured. By doing so in a changing political environment, they "have tended to disregard instead of serve the decision-makers"

(Starkie 1974: 324) who have to react promptly to changing economic situations and movements of electoral opinion to preserve their position. But each planner eventually had to compromise by accepting a diluted voice in the decision-making process to avoid being totally by-passed by it as elected members paid less and less attention to transport planners. As the original UTPP becomes of less use in the politico-economic circumstances of the 1970's, planners devise new methodologies often related to what can be referred to as 'soft planning' (Hensher 1979: 96). These methodologies use relatively direct and low-cost techniques. Furthermore, the number of factors taken into consideration in transport models has increased particularly through the contribution of academics. However, these models are often considered as badly adapted to the needs and definition of problems of the agencies involved in transport matters (Silcock and Taylor 1981; Bonnet 1981).

The purpose of this section has been to explore the context in which the UTPP emerged and how it was shaped by planners to embody their interests in specific circumstances. Attention has also been given to the evolution of the political and economic environment and the subsequent, though delayed, adaptation of planning methods and models. Having considered the conditions of production of the UTPP, the next section will focus on the assumptions it contains and on the way in which it relates to questions of accessibility.

3.2 The Urban Transport Planning Procedure: the legitimation of road-building

In the present section our emphasis will be on the relationship between the assumptions, forecasts and proposals (Adams 1981: 164) embedded in the organisation of the sequences of the UTPP.[1] From our standpoint, there are three reasons for including such a discussion in this chapter. Firstly, to bring out the absence of importance the UTPP gives to the accessibility of individuals. Secondly, because the UTPP has for many years embodied the mainstream approach to urban transport planning and, thirdly, because it has provided the justification and has determined the form of most of the important road transport projects of the last two decades. We shall focus on the skeleton of the UTPP, i.e. its stages and their sequences - the models used in each of these stages are given a secondary import ance.

As an organised succession of sequences the UTPP appears as a complex of forecasting techniques leading to clear recommendations for transport investment schemes. The goal of this planning procedure is to provide a plan for a transport network at the metropolitan level in order to satisfy a forecast demand at a given date. As put by Stopher and Meyburg (1975: 220), "it is assumed that this demand may be predicted accurately, and it is assumed that the desirable end-product is to meet that predicted demand". The planning practice is to estimate future unrestrained traffic flows and then propose schemes which would cater for these flows. This explains the bias towards large scale road investment projects (Button 1977: 115).

This predilection for large road investment projects is a result of the nature of the steps, their order and of features of the models used for forecasting purposes. In the application of the UTPP, planners formulate proposals which respond favourably to the interests of firms and segments of the population (motor industries, automobile users, etc.), while being detrimental to others (public transport users, people suffering from the negative environmental impacts of motorways, etc.)(Adams 1981: 195).

The prediction of the number of trips that are to be made by different modes of transport, between determined origins and destinations and using given routes at a target date (Lane et al., 1971: 21; Paaswell 1973: 353), as well as the proposal made on this basis, are organised in a series of steps common to most applications of the procedure. The nature and sequence of steps have remained relatively unchanged over the years while the models used in the different steps have varied considerably. The first step consists of the establishment of a data base in order to measure the prevailing travel demand and evaluate the existing transport system performance as well as to serve as a basis for forecasting future demand. The five next steps are grouped into the forecasting phase. Firstly, the land use forecast attempts to determine how residential areas, places of work and shops will be distributed through a metropolitan area. Secondly, the trip generation step predicts the number of trips made by households according to the projected evolution of factors considered as having an impact on the number of trips made and on their extent. Some of the factors most commonly referred to are income, car ownership, residential density, distance from the centre, rateable value,

household size, etc. (Button 1977: 116-7; Stopher and Meyburg 1975: 110-1). The other steps in this phase are trip distribution, modal split and network assignment predicting the destinations to which trips will be directed, the proportion of trips made by the different modes of transport and the routes which will be taken. In the final step of the UTPP, proposals are made in order to provide facilities intended to satisfy the level of demand estimated by the models used in the forecasting phase, even if some degree of restraint of the demand is sometimes suggested (Button 1977: 113; Stopher and Meyburg 1975: 61-7).

As was shown in section 1, due to the organisational interests of the planners that prevailed when the guiding principles of the UTPP were laid down and over the period when its major applications occurred, the procedure was constructed so as to lead to schemes involving high levels of road expenditure. The forecasting models therefore focus primarily on road traffic at peak hours thereby measuring the maximum strain placed on the road network. In some cases attention is also given to the use of public transport with the same emphasis on the highest pressures on existing capacity. It is on the basis of these considerations that new infrastructures are systematically proposed by the UTPP. The constitution of the UTPP implies an absence of consideration of modes of transport that do not entail large expenditures. For instance, it gives little importance to walking in spite of the fact that it accounts for one third of all journeys door to door (Mitchell 1973: 1; Hillman 1979; Hillman & Whalley 1981).

Most of the forecasting underlying the proposals for higher road

expenditure consists of extrapolations from periods of economic expansion and of increasing car ownership and use, projected in spite of uncertainties, to some time point usually twenty years ahead (Lamb 1981: 1210). In its predictions of traffic growth, the UTPP does not attribute any restrictive effect to congestion constraints (Adams 1981: 165; Starkie 1974: 326). The division of the forecasting procedure into steps and the order in which they are placed involves the assumption that the number of trips can be determined on the basis of the predicted evolution of chosen factors referring mainly to household characteristics. The number of trips is presented as unaffected by the cost of travelling, by the conditions under which they are made as well as by the nature of the activities they lead to (Plowden 1972: 51-2; Harris & Tanner 1974: 2; Stopher & Meyburg 1975: 221; Sayer 1976: 205-6).

In a situation in which the proposed investments are realised, the level of use forecast in the UTPP is very likely to be attained or even surpassed. This is not so much because of the soundness of the prediction techniques used but because of the impact of new capacity in reducing the overall cost of road transport especially in terms of time (Plowden 1972: 15). Individuals then take advantage of this situation by adjusting their life patterns to this decrease in transport costs in ways that lead to more and longer motor car trips.

The data used in the forecasting process is aggregated at a zonal level. Survey areas are usually divided into hundreds of zones. While not allowing a detailed representation of what is expected to happen within a given network (Lane et al., 1971: 146), the informa-

tion is aggregated at a sufficient level to be compatible with the goals of the UTPP. Zonal aggregations, by revealing trip patterns, allow the location of important road expenditure to be determined. This planning procedure is not concerned with minor traffic flows such as, for example, in residential streets (Starkie 1974: 330).

The UTPP, for over a decade the chief urban transport planning tool, neglects many aspects of transport that do not fit within the narrow definition of transport problems and related solutions it proposes (Button 1977: 121). For instance, it does not take into account any of the effects of the expenditures envisaged except for those related to the accommodation of the demand for trips. It therefore does not pay any attention to its impact on the mobility of different social groups (Wilson et al., 1971: 239; Paaswell 1973: 353) nor to its effects on non-users, e.g. through environmental consequences (Stopher & Meyburg 1975: 220; Wilson et al., 1971: 239). The only reference to categories of population is made in the trip forecasting steps. Similarly, land use is conceived as an independent variable underlying travel demand. No consideration is given to the impact of new transport infrastructures on the spatial distribution of urban activities (Wilson et al., 1971: 239). The UTPP thus fails to consider interaction between transport facilities, land use and trip-making (Perloff & Flaming 1976: 158-9; Echenique et al., 1981: 1911) in which features of the transport system affect land use patterns by influencing the choice of residential and work place locations, locations which themselves give rise to new sources of transport demand. It is the totality of this interaction which determines the degree of usage of the transport system and consequently, its performance



(Sayer 1976: 206-7).

The aggregation of data in forecasting models at the zonal level is based on assumptions of a certain homogeneity of behaviour within set boundaries (Wilson et al, 1971: 266; Stopher & Meyburg 1975: 173) but it appears that there can be as much variation within zones as between zones (Hensher 1976: 258). The problem about spatially-based aggregations is that the units must be small enough to release a maximum of information and be large enough for a convenient treatment of the information. In the late 1960s and during the 1970s, the changed politico-economic context triggered a change of transport policies. Instead of spending large sums on massive new infrastructures, the emphasis shifted towards a fuller use of the existing facilities and minor improvements. But the information contained in zonal forecasting models was inadequate to provide relevant guidelines in the implementation of the new type of transport policies (Hutchinson 1981: 1970-1). It is in the wake of these changes that the behavioural models were developed. These models replaced the zonal level of aggregation found in the models used in the UTPP by the idenfitication of significant relationships between travel patterns and socio-economic characteristics of travellers (Hensher 1976: 258-9). They also have greater predictive accuracy (Liou & Hartgen 1976: 58) and have a wider range of applications whether within the framework of the UTPP or for other uses.

The fundamental difference between behavioural models and those commonly used in the UTPP is explained by Echenique (1981: 1917) in terms of a shift from macro-models to micro-models. The former are

described as planning tools concentrating, in the tradition of social physics, on the outcome of processes without giving any explanation of individual behaviour, while the latter, in the economic theory tradition, focus on individual behaviour conceived as a relation between producers and consumers within a market. The theoretical roots of behavioural transport models are therefore to be found in the economics of consumer behaviour and in the psychology of choice behaviour (Stopher & Meyburg 1976: 3). The methodology adopted resembles that used in consumer choice studies but is adapted to the peculiarities of transport infrastructures and services, i.e. the fixity of the location of routes (Louvriere et al., 1976: 261). As expressed by Hutchinson (1981: 1980)

> "[they] attempt to capture the preference structure of urban residents with respect to a variety of choice decisions including transport mode, trip frequency, automobile ownership, destination and so on".

Unlike the models commonly used in the UTPP, the behavioural models concentrate on the household as the basic unit of study. In a second phase, aggregations by socio-economic characteristics become possible because it becomes assumed that socio-economic components convey an impact on choices made by households (Louvriere et al., 1976: 260). The behavioural models nevertheless fail to consider the concrete constraints faced by individuals in making decisions involving trip-making, e.g. the number of activities that can be fitted in a limited amount of time.

This section has underlined the predetermined outcomes of the UTPP. It is seen as a machinery designed to essentially produce and justify

important transport projects. It has also been observed that because the level of aggregation characteristic of the models commonly used in the UTPP does not meet the requirements of the type of transport policies being put forward more recently, the behavioural models have been given an increasing role. These models base their forecast on the monitoring of trip-related decision-making by households but fail to look into the conditions in which this occurs.

3.3 Elasticity studies, value of time studies and activity studies: towards a concern with the impact of transport

In this section we shall focus on ways of measuring the consequences of transport policies on individuals. Two categories of approach will be introduced. Firstly, we shall examine the tools used in the decision-making processes of transport agencies themselves to monitor the reactions of travellers to changes in transport conditions and justify expenditure on the basis of benefits obtained by their users. The discussion will focus on those aspects of official planning concerned with the effect on individuals of changes in transport services and with their reaction to these modifications: elasticity and value of time (VOT) studies. In this section, the interest in these aspects of planning stems not so much from methodological preoccupations as from the delimitation of their object of study. Secondly, we turn to 'activity studies' which analyse how individuals arrange their activities within constraints, primarily of time. The reason for the inclusion of activity studies in this section is that they provide a starting point for a consideration of the effects of changes in transport facilities on individual activity

patterns. Unlike elasticity and VOT studies, activity studies are usually conducted by academics and are rarely used as a tool in the political decision-making process. Their methodology also differs; while the former relies mainly on deductions from the demand for transport services in past situations, the latter apply interview and questionnaire techniques.

3.3.1 Elasticity and value of time studies

While forecasting methods incorporating some characteristics of elasticity studies are used in the modal split step of the UTPP, the preoccupation of this procedure with the justification of large scale investment projects based on forecasts of increases in the aggregate demand for travel, relegates elasticity studies to a secondary role (Daly & Gale 1974: 8). Elasticity studies are mainly used to monitor reactions in the form of variations in levels of demand to changes in transport services. Elasticity is defined by Daly and Gale (1974: 4) as the "ratio of the proportional change in demand to the proportional change in the determining variables". Because the most common application of these studies is to measure changes in public transport ridership resulting from fare increases and variations of the quality of services, they usually focus on the proportional relationship between user costs and levels of patronage. In the case of those who have the possibility of choosing between different modes of transport, the elasticity in the use of one mode depends, according to Quarmby (1967: 278), on a comparison between its disutility in terms of time and costs and the disutility of the

alternative modes.

More recent literature expresses a dissatisfaction with the limited number of factors taken into consideration as determinants of elasticity (Cooke 1976: 3-4). Lewis (1977) and Roueche (1978) consider that measures of cross-elasticities between the use of cars and public transport should include, in addition to cost, time and service levels, demographic and macro-economic factors as well as levels of road congestion. Among the other factors whose inclusion in elasticity studies is suggested are the levels of comfort and reliability of the different modes (Neumann et al., 1978; Knight 1974), the nature of interchanges between modes (Webster 1977: 20-22), awareness of the different modes available (Hartgen 1974: 378) and travellers' values (Reichman 1976: 148-9).

The value of the time saved by users of transport facilities as a result of improvements in services is sometimes included in cost-benefit analyses. In this context VOT studies can contribute to the estimation of future travel volumes according to changes in transport services (Stopher & Meyburg 1976: 38-9; Williams 1975: 6). By giving a monetary value to travel times saved, this factor can be integrated into the cost-benefit assessment of the alternatives proposed. This might appear to indicate a concern with the impact of transport projects on their users in the planning and decision-making process. But it must be remembered that VOT is a crude tool for the measurement of the ways transport expenditures affect individuals, because for instance, while the value of travel time may vary significantly among different segments of population, VOT studies usually

provide aggregated time values (Searle & Clark 1976: 189).

VOT studies can be seen as assisting the influence of planners in the decision-making process in that they justify projects in terms of the needs and desires of the population as presented by planners. For this reason, elected members are likely to be made to recognise a positive electoral and economic impact of the projects under consideration. But under these circumstances, the problem for planners is to arrive at credible valuations of time taking into account the assessment by individuals themselves of the time they spend travelling. One method suggested for this purpose involves the observation of the behaviour of travellers in situations in which a choice exists between two routes or two modes, one of which is cheaper and slower while the other is faster and dearer. Another method is to use questionnaires to find out what value individuals place upon their travelling time (Stopher & Meyburg 1976: 60-3). Quarmby (1967) and Goodwin (1976) mention the necessity when using time values to take account of the conditions of travel and the effort involved in the different stages of a trip.

VOT and elasticity studies are aimed at measuring reactions to changes in transport facilities but as tools used in the decision-making process they suffer from tunnel vision in that they focus only on the reactions that are relevant to this process. While elasticity calculations reveal information of paramount importance especially to public transport operators, VOT studies are used by planners as a means of justifying expenditures in which elected members are likely to have confidence.

3.3.2 Activity studies

According to Damm (1981: 1883) activity studies "allow accounting of a broader variety of policies and impacts than is possible with trip-oriented approaches". They allow a more comprehensive assessment of the impact of transport policies when compared with the planning models commonly used (Chapin 1974: 9) and in particular with the value of time and elasticity studies. This is because activity studies focus on the ways in which individuals organise their activities given the temporal and spatial constraints they are subject to. Activity studies allow one to visualise the consequences of transport policies on activity patterns. Changes in transport policies are seen as altering the number of possible activities in a given time (Stone 1972). But activity studies go a step further than behavioural models. While in the latter case attention is focused on household decision-making irrespective of the conditions in which it occurs, in the former, emphasis is placed on the motives and constraints underlying decisions to engage in travel. The decision to engage in travel is conceived by activity studies as usually subordinated to the desire to reach another activity. It is these other activities which are the centre of interest (Damm 1981: 1892). From this point of view, the use of travel facilities is subordinated to the need, opportunity, and desire to take part in activities and to the spatial distribution of these activities (Town 1981: 1741-2). The difference in approach between activity studies and the models commonly used in the planning process stems from the fact that the latter measures the impacts of changes in transport facilities in terms that are relevant to political

decision-making while the former usually confine their concerns to aspects of individuals' behaviour. This is because they are mainly conducted outside state institutions.

The methodology adopted to measure the constraints to which people are subjected in their activity-related behaviour is the time budget (Janeau 1972: 424).[2] Models developed on the basis of time study principles are used to forecast the travel behaviour of individuals within time and monetary constraints (Bullock et al., 1974: 59). One of these models also includes a consideration of the inter-relation between the members of a household (Jones 1979).

Most of the studies associated with this strand of thought do not tackle the question of the effect of transport services on individuals as such. Rather, they are more general studies within which such questions can be posed. We consider activity studies as defined by four authors. Chapin relates in a broad manner the preoccupations underlying activity studies as well as their orientation. He advocates an extension of the use of time studies applied in industry and in institutional settings to the investigation of household time allocations (Chapin 1974: 6). He identifies his object of study as "urban activity systems" which refer to patterns in which individuals, households, institutions and firms pursue "day-in and day-out" affairs in the city and to their interaction in time and space (Chapin 1974: 23). He sees activity patterns as the result of a reciprocal influence of, on the one hand, personal factors of psychological and social origin from which emerges the propensity to engage in action and, on the other hand, factors related to facilities which determine opportunities of engaging in action (Chapin 1974: 33). Chapin (1974: 207)

sees these factors as varying with ethnicity, socio-economic status and life cycle (Chapin 1974: 198).

Hagerstrand and his team at the University of Lund direct their attention more specifically to the time and space constraints faced by an individual and which limit the extent of his activities (Hagerstrand 1977: 10). They define the primary restriction as the length of the day. Within this, a person's 'path' is structured by the fact that at given times he must be at certain places. The range of chosen activities is thus temporally and spatially limited to the intervals between compulsory activities (Cullen & Godson 1975: 6). Hagerstrand's perspective consequently manifests a preoccupation with the influence institutions have on individuals' lives by contributing seriously to the orientation of their activity patterns or put otherwise, of their life-paths (Hagerstrand 1977: 18).

Cullen and Godson blur Hagerstrand's distinction between compulsory and chosen activities by introducing the notion of degree of commitment to activities (Cullen 1972: 465; Cullen & Godson 1975: 6). In their view, individuals choose among alternatives in orders of priority within time and space constraints.

Some of the academics who conduct activity studies recommend their application in the planning process. But at present little use is made of them in this context even if time budgets are sometimes made use of in order to provide information on the reaction of customers to communal facilities (Von Rosenbladt 1972: 335). Chapin puts forward the idea that a knowledge of how and why people organise

their activities in the city on a day-to-day basis would lead to a different emphasis from the one prevailing at the moment in the planning of facilities and services. He proposes the development of an approach to planning that could eventually relate the spatial organisation of the city, its services and facilities, more closely to the living patterns of residents (Chapin 1974: 195). In addition, considerations of time-use could be employed to measure the social impact of projects. Fedheim (1972: 409) and Janeau (1972: 425), for example, present a definition of social efficiency based on the reduction of time constraints on individuals and consequently, on the increase of the time fund available for freely chosen activities.

The idea underlying the promotion of the application of activity studies in planning is that, since planners devise projects that transform the city, they should be made conscious of the effect they have on individuals (Cullen 1972: 466). But such a position ignores the fact that the views underlying the plans and interventions adopted by planners and elected members are coloured by their organisational interests. Accordingly, planners, whose interest is in widening the scope of state intervention and, more precisely, of their own sphere of operation, are likely to promote projects by using arguments to which elected members will respond favourably, e.g. arguments which emphasise the positive economic impacts and high electoral benefits of the proposed projects. The preoccupations of planners and elected members with the welfare of the population are therefore shaped by their organisational interests. Issues are considered and projects are devised according to anticipated electoral and economic consequences.

Activity studies, which offer a methodology for measuring the impact of changes in transport facilities on the life patterns of individuals, are not directly compatible with the general direction of the planning process. This is because they ignore the electoral and economic aspects of potential projects. This explains why in current planning procedures the assessment of the impact of changes in the availability of transport facilities tends to focus narrowly on those aspects of relevance to service operators, such as elasticity measures and value of time studies. Such evaluations of time saved are used by planners to justify transport projects to elected members.

In this section we have shown that the attention given to the evaluation of the consequences of transport policies reflects the purpose for which the studies are devised. Studies prepared in a planning and political decision-making context consider only those transport effects on individuals which are compatible with the requirements of planners and elected members and which meet their organisational interests. On the other hand, the activity studies devised by academics usually working outside state agencies focus more specifically on the analysis of the constraints within which individuals organise their lives. This latter perspective will provide a significant contribution to the development of the theoretical discussion on accessibility developed in the next section.

3.4 The study of accessibility and of its impact

In the first section of this chapter, we discussed the context of

production of urban transport planning methods and the assumptions underlying them. In the second and third sections, we examined the various methods and techniques used in urban transport studies. In particular we have stressed the economic, political, and professional/ organisational interests that have underlain their use and influenced the extent to which they consider the impact of policies on individuals and groups. In the present section, I intend to argue for the view that the primary effect of transport policies is to influence accessibility, and that this effect varies between individuals according to their socio-economic and personal characteristics. A brief review of the trends in transport provision over the last thirty years in Britain will suggest that they have contributed to an accentuation of inequality in accessibility between social groups. And finally, an analysis of the modalities of organisation of protest movements focusing on matters of accessibility will be developed.

3.4.1 The accessibility constraint on opportunities

The literature on accessibility can be divided into two main categories. In the first category, accessibility is treated as a direct explanatory factor of land-related phenomena. In contrast to the UTPP in which transport demand is derived partly from land use, the spatial economic theories originally developed by Wingo (1961), Lowry (1964) and Alonso (1966), focus on the role of transport and hence accessibility in shaping land uses. On this view, urban spatial differentiation is explained in terms of the cost of transporting labour to sites of production. This first approach, which treats accessibility through

transport provision as a major determinant of land use, obscures the fact that this determination depends on the reaction of individuals to changes in the provision of transport facilities. It does not therefore recognise the extent of the subsequent effects such changes have on individuals' activity patterns. While some of the reactions of individuals might lead to changes of land use patterns, others may have no such impact.[3]

The second approach to accessibility focuses on the number and location of activities an individual can reach. It therefore rejects the emphasis on mobility of the UTPP because it concentrates "on movement rather than the purpose of movement" (Hamer & Potter 1979: 5). Compared with activity studies, the emphasis is on spatial rather than temporal factors. The focus of the studies within this approach is on the way in which the provision of transport, the density of land use and the distribution of facilities determine patterns of activities (Hamer & Potter 1979: 8). Most of these studies contain a critique of the present state of affairs. They are usually conducted by academics but may sometimes be used by pressure groups in defence of their case. Their conclusions usually advocate greater equality of accessibility to urban facilities between social groups (Independent Commission on Transport 1974; Hillman et al., 1976; Hamer 1976; Webster 1977). These studies also raise objections to other aspects of the present transport situation: pollution, congestion, etc.

The approach developed below belongs to this second category. It is concerned with matters of spatial accessibility. The view adopted is that each mode of transport, including walking, creates its own

catchment area (Hillman 1979: 103) while characteristics of land use patterns determine the quantity and the nature of activities accessible within an area. The land use pattern is itself the result of past decisions in which accessibility was taken into account and which led to the present state of the urban structure (Parkes & Thrift 1978; Glickman & White 1979).

More specifically, emphasis is placed on the impact of transport facilities in influencing the spatial extent of activities in an urban context. Elasticity studies have demonstrated that changes in the cost and the level of service of a mode of transport occasion adjustments in the travel behaviour of individuals (Mackett 1981; Bly and Webster 1981). These changes can either be induced by policies or be the outcome of the aggregate evolution of individual patterns of behaviour. In fact, due to their degree of interaction, two sources of these changes cannot be isolated from each other: policies are largely responses to pressures that are reactions to bottlenecks in the accommodation of the private demand by public facilities, while individual choices are made in terms of available opportunities.

The modes of transport available to an individual define the territory he can cover on a regular basis. Such spatial ranges of accessibility are meaningful for individuals in that they set the number and nature of activities they can reach (work, shopping, leisure, etc.). One study of the range of accessibility for basic needs shows that it determines knowledge (Golledge 1978: 78-82) and consequently utilisation of the city.

Unlike most definitions of accessibility and, in particular, the one on which activity studies are founded, spatial accessibility is only one of two factors determining the availability of activities. The other factor, social accessibility (Pahl 1965: 9), can be defined in terms of regulations or monetary conditions limiting the admission to activities to specific groups. Being in the right location is not enough to take part in an activity, one also has to meet the conditions of the exchange it involves. While focusing on physical accessibility, its interaction with social accessibility in influencing which activities situated in the city are available to an individual, must be taken into consideration.

As some activity studies have stressed, time allocated to a purpose is determined within the limits of an overall daily pattern of occupations. In the case of transport there is evidence of consistency between socio-economic groups in what is considered to be an acceptable daily sum of travel time (Mitchell & Town 1977a). But the ease of paying for transport varies according to socio-economic group and this, in conjunction with personal characteristics such as position in the household, age, handicaps, sets limits within which a person chooses to rely on one mode rather than another and sets the extent to which he can use it (Town 1981: 1749; Hillman et al., 1976: 154). Each mode of transport available within given time and money restrictions imposes specific constraints on travel behaviour (Fairhurst 1978) in that it delineates an accessible area of its own. For instance, the average length of a car journey is 12.7km while it is 6.9km for a bus journey and 1.2km on foot (Town 1981: 1791).

The amount of money spent on transport varies according to income: the resources available for travel in absolute terms and the percentage devoted to transport decreases with income (Paaswell 1973: 356). It appears that, as the sum spent on transport increases, there is a growth in the use of mechanised modes, enabling a higher degree of productivity of travel time. Time savings are then exchanged for increases in the number of potential destinations (Webster 1977: 14). Accordingly, when an increment of money becomes available for transport purposes, the result usually is not a global minimisation of travel time per day but rather an extension of the range of the accessible territory (Zahavi 1974; 1976; Goodwin 1976; Hautzinger & Kessel 1981: 1794-1800). As a person's range of accessibility is largely related to his income, members of higher socio-economic groups enjoy better access to urban activities than members of other groups. They are in a position to obtain a favourable balance between accessibility and amenity usually seen in terms of high private consumption of space, e.g. larger houses and larger gardens (Hillman et al., 1976: 171).

Two assumptions are made here about transport-related individual behaviour:

(1) It is in the interest of an individual to maximise his spatial range of accessibility so that it can yield as large as possible of a choice of activities. It is thus in an individual's interest, *ceteris paribus*, to support the introduction of faster and cheaper modes.

(2) Travel decisions are in reality trade-offs between the expected benefits of an activity - benefits are conceived here

> in wider than strictly economic terms (Hamer 1976: 2-3; Evans 1972) - and the time and cost involved in reaching it[4] as well as the time and cost prescribed by the nature of the activity itself. The decision to engage in trip-making can thus be explained in terms of consumer surpluses. The surplus derived from an activity can be reduced by an increase of the journey time and/or a rise of transport monetary cost factors up to a point where it becomes hardly worthwhile to make the journey towards the activity any more. The differences in the accessible territories of different groups can be explained by the fact that individuals perform this trade-off in the face of different conditions: different incomes, different social roles and interests, different levels of physical capacity, etc.

The notion of an accessible territory refers to the area someone can reach on a regular basis, and depends on socio-economic as well as personal characteristics. In other words, it refers to the distance one can afford, or is physically able, to travel in order to reach the activities which structure his daily life: work, shopping, social encounters, recreation, etc. This notion of accessibility diverges from Chapin's (1974: 137) definition of a person's activity space. In his view such a space is the average straight-line distance from home to the various out-of-home activities. While his definition refers to an *actual* territory, the focus here emphasises *potential* spatial ranges of accessibility. Because of this emphasis, problems of operationalisation related to the definition of a latent demand used as a measure of transport deprivation (Altshuler 1979: 257) can be

avoided. Similarly, references to values and preferences become superfluous. We shall now go on to consider how social groups were affected in their accessibility potential by recent transport trends.

3.4.2 Questions of equity

The features and evolution of the transport situation are of primary importance in an individual's life in that they influence the ease with which he can perform essential activities and the extent of opportunities available during periods in between these activities. The transport situation thus has a major impact on the "life-chances" of individuals. The great differences in mobility opportunities between groups of individuals and therefore in spatial ranges of accessibility raises questions of equity. As Hautzinger and Kessel (1981: 1779) emphasise,

> "... mobility opportunities which may be defined as the individual's access to transport modes together with his or her economic and physical ability to engage in non-home activities are distributed rather unequally among different society groups".

Since the mid 1950's an increase in car use has been accompanied by a fall in bus patronage.[5] Bates et al (1981: 138) perceive a linear trend between the drop in the number of trips made by public transport and the increase in number of driving licences awarded. The background of these trends has been, on the one hand, falling relative capital costs of cars due to above average productivity improvements in the motor industry coupled with, in some cases, lower running costs in terms of time because of improved road facilities. On the other hand,

users of public transport have experienced globally higher fares due generally to the above-average labour intensity of bus and rail passenger transport (Bates et al., 1981: 137) and lower levels of services because of decreasing patronage (Webster 1977: 3). These users have thus had to suffer from a growth of transport costs in temporal (longer waiting time, more road congestion) as well as in monetary terms.

As transport becomes cheaper and quicker for a significant segment of the population as a consequence of the spread of car use, the cost of movement loses some of its influence on locational decisions (Hamer 1976: 9; Hamer 1978: 5). This contributes to the production of land-use patterns characterised by lower residential densities in the cities and fewer and larger facilities than in the past. In some new suburbs, densities are often too low and reliance on the car too important to support an adequate level of public transport.[6] Hillman et al (1976: 163) have observed that in the London outer metropolitan area housing built after 1960 offers a lower level of access to public facilities than sectors built previously. Similarly, Hillman and Whalley (1977) note that many recent large-scale recreational facilities were planned by councils on the assumption of universal car availability. They are therefore often difficult to reach by other modes of transport.

The transport trends of the last twenty-five years, themselves the result of a specific interaction between private and public choices, have been oriented by a state policy of accommodating increases in road traffic. This set prupose further influenced private decision-

making about transport by catering for certain needs while neglecting others. For instance in terms other than safety, the needs of walkers have been given very little attention (Hillman 1979: chapter 3). Likewise in the planning of private and public facilities, because of the assumption of a quasi-universality of car-use, organisational factors become more important in the choice of sizes and locations, e.g. it often happens that large-scale facilities such as schools and hospitals are constructed on green field sites (Town 1981: 1753).

Urban transport trends since the mid 1950's have entailed an improvement of mobility for car users while, because of the new patterns of land use (involving lower densities) and the reduction of public transport services caused by the increasing use of the car, this evolution has left non-car users with lower mobility and accessibility levels (Hamer 1978: 5). It appears sociologically significant that a marked improvement in transport conditions for an important minority has involved a worsening of these conditions for the majority. A survey of 50,000 people in London's outer metropolitan area, where about three quarters of the households own at least one car - among the highest proportions in the country - has revealed that at any one time, well under one-third of individuals had a car at their disposal (Hillman et al, 1976: 156 and 158).[7] While public transport was patronised by all, within the distances that could be afforded by the different groups, its use is in many circumstances now restricted to those who cannot afford a car (Mitchell 1977: 2). Consequently there is a deepening mobility and accessibility gap between those who enjoy the availability of a car and the others (Mitchell & Town 1977: 2).

Some categories of population, because of socio-economic, locational and personal characteristics, face acute mobility deprivations. They can be seen as imprisoned in "accessibility ghettoes" (Muller 1976). Consideration has been given in studies to the specific difficulties of accessibility of old people (Hopkins et al., 1978), of the handicapped (Feeney et al., 1979), of low income groups (Falcocchio 1974) and of members of households owning a car but who themselves do not have access to it (Hillman et al., 1976: 156 and 158). Considerable attention has also been given to problems of access by the unemployed to areas of the agglomeration where jobs are available (Oakshott 1969; Ornati 1969; Kain & Meyer 1975). The characteristics of urban transport systems in major urban areas give rise to a multiplicity of labour markets of different scales according to the modes of transport individuals can afford and the distances they can use them for. It is therefore quite possible for the cost of transport in terms of time and money, to be an obstacle preventing job vacancies from being filled by unemployed workers.

Thus, patterns of accessibility to the transport system, in which each mode is available at different prices and brings different time benefits, and where there are significant differences in costs and benefits between modes, can be a factor which accentuates the disparities originating in the social system (Feldman 1977: 38). However, improvements in transport accessibility would provide only a partial reduction in differences in access to activities because, while improving the spatial accessibility by bringing more people within the reach of a larger number of activities, such improvements would not alleviate the differentiation inherent in the social

conditions of access.

We have seen in this section how the recent transport trends have affected the accessibility potential of different social groups and more specifically how the accessibility conditions faced by non-car owners have deteriorated.

3.4.3 Urban transport related movements as a response to inequalities of access

In the light of the inequality in the usage of modes of transport and consequent variations in the ranges of accessibility which have such an important impact on people's life patterns, it might appear puzzling that transport is relatively rarely a political issue. In this sub-section we will present some reasons for this. One explanation of this situation might be the relative absence of long-term organised pressures, particularly at the grass-roots level, focusing specifically on accessibility-related issues such as cost and conditions of transport. But while the absence of such pressures is a correct observation, the question is why, since it is in the interest of individuals and of groups to maintain and expand their range of accessibility, there has not been more reaction to constraints placed on this range in the form of impositions of higher fares, of lower services and of congestion? By paying attention to transport-related conflicts, the purpose is not to delimit 'transport' or 'accessibility classes'. It is rather to link the conditions of development of transport-associated movements to situations faced in the consumption sector. It must then be kept in mind that these situations derive

from other factors such as the position in the production process, in the household, etc.[8]

Most public mobilisations about transport are around environmental issues. Those which centre on questions of accessibility are fewer and achieve lower levels of mobilisation. This can be accounted for by two sets of factors. On the one hand, the environmental impact of transport can have a blighting effect on the home and neighbourhood. The important capital and emotional investment at stake is likely to lead to considerable efforts on the part of those who see themselves as affected, to improve the situation or at least to preserve it as it is in the face of what is perceived as an intrusion (Altshuler 1979: 42). On the other hand, a concern with accessibility usually involves a relatively limited amount of time each day on the part of a commuter and a monetary sum which bears no comparison with the cost of a house. Accessibility issues are thus less central to people's lives than environmental issues. As participation is "an activity which competes for resources of time, money and with other social objects" (Pickvance 1975: 210), when there is participation, it is likely to occur around the issues which have the highest priority for a group. This does not rule out that some accessibility-related movements do occur but explains why movements focusing on environmental issues are more common.

Furthermore, while a neighbourhood can constitute an efficient mobilisation ground for individuals confronting a common threat, the anonymity of transport systems inhibits the recruitment of protest organisations members (Ross 1972: 20). Apart from lobby organisations

such as the British Road Federation and Transport 2000, set up and supported by transport-based interests but both advocating irreconcilable alternatives for the improvement of accessibility, and the occasional involvement of trade unions, there is little impulse from existing organisations to assist the formation of accessibility-related movements. In addition, because it is generally accepted that transport policies are very blunt and inefficient redistribution weapons (Buchanan & Lewis 1981: 1059; Pucher 1981), organisations dedicated to the promotion of social equality and the defence of the interests of the poor only give a marginal importance to transport issues (Altshuler 1979: 39). On the other hand, middle class elements, the most capable of formulating articulate political demands, while playing a primordial role in the environmental reaction to transport policies, are aloof about accessibility issues. This is partly because they do not, unlike low income groups, suffer from severe forms of inequality in this respect.

Another factor hampering the rise of protest movements centred on accessibility questions is the opportunity one usually has to choose between several modes of transport and different locations to perform essential activities. Moreover, there is complete latitude of choice about non-essential activities which can be substituted one for another or even abandoned completely. Dissatisfaction with transport matters is therefore usually dealt with at an individual level by adjustments of behaviour. Consequently changes in conditions of transport are likely to lead to a switch of mode, a change of destination and of activity pattern[9] or, simply, to the acceptance of increases in costs.

The relative weakness and the ad-hoc nature of movements related to matters of accessibility can, at least to a certain extent, account for the absence of a given level of transport from the services universally distributed within the 'welfare' state such as education, health and housing. This does not exclude the possibility that subsidies are allocated to transport operators with the stated purpose of giving assistance to the 'transport-deprived'. But the degree of commitment to ensuring equality of accessibility has constantly fallen short of that prevailing with regard to the sectors of intervention given priority by the welfare state.

We have emphasised in this section the manner in which the interaction between transport systems and land use patterns determines the number of activities one can reach within a given generalised cost (in terms of time and money). We have also seen that consequently, differences in the amount of resources available to social groups lead to differences in the range of activities physically accessible and that, in recent years, the gap between the territory accessible to high and low income groups has widened.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have tried to combine the discussion of chapters I and II in order to address the specific question of urban transport theory. This theory has been approached in the above pages from the standpoint of the context of its production and of its explanatory power. In the first respect, the position in the political decision-making

process of the various transport theories and the interests they represent are seen as guiding their development. The UTPP, for instance, has been devised and applied by planners to assert their position vis-a-vis elected members. This has been done with the explicit support of road-related lobbies and, for a long time, of a large share of the electorate. Meanwhile, conclusions from activity studies, mainly conducted by academics outside the realm of planning and of political decision-making, have been used by movements pressing for increasing levels of equality of accessibility. In the second respect, the performance of different transport theories and assumptions embedded in planning tools in accounting for the impact of transport systems on different groups of individuals, has been assessed.

The importance of transport policies as argued in this chapter derives primarily from the effect they have in influencing the extent of accessibility in the urban environment for different segments of population. Such a concern stems from the fact that the range of activities an individual can reach has a central influence on his life-chances or, as Meier (1962) puts it, on the richness of his life. This approach differs from the dominant trend within urban transport planning where the aim is to maximise aggregate mobility - which is seen as a major policy goal. The definition of accessibility developed in this chapter refers to the individuals' opportunities of reaching activities. This is because the significance of a journey from the point of view of an individual derives from its purpose. Transport is therefore only one aspect of physical accessibility, though the one emphasised in this chapter. The other aspect is the

pattern of distribution of activities in the urban space. Consequently, in this chapter, the treatment of transport-related questions is secondary to a consideration of their impact on the lives of individuals and groups.

In the 1970s, the UTPP was rejected because it ceased to correspond to the emerging political and economic context of transport decision-making. Any simple adjustment of transport expenditures to forecast increases in demand became increasingly unlikely. Transport investment projects were hereafter of a smaller scale. In a situation of scarce resources and of intense political activity around environmental issues, a wider range of factors started to be taken into account in the decision-making process. But this range failed to include the problematic of accessibility as defined in these pages. This is because decision-makers did not share our concern with the impact of transport systems on individuals and groups even if, in some cases, some consideration of accessibility factors was included by decision-makers. Since the state responds on the basis of the occupational interests of bureaucratic groups and elected members in formulating interventions, it is attentive to their economic impact so it can maintain or expand itself on a sound fiscal base and in electoral safety. The professionals and elected members operating within state agencies therefore have tunnel vision with respect to the consequences of transport policies on individuals and groups, being concerned only with those aspects relevant to their own interests.

PART TWO

Chapter IV

TRANSPORT IN LONDON UP TO 1965: AN OVERVIEW.

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present a short account of the transport history of London in order to provide a background to the chapters which follow. The intention is to determine the reasons behind the situation which prevailed at the outset of the period under study in this work. More specifically we shall focus on the circumstances underlying the elaboration of the transport networks. This is particularily relevant because, between 1965 and 1980, relatively few modifications were made to the transport infrastructure in London, most of the measures being directed at making the best use of existing assets. Significant consideration will also be given to organisational changes. The major reorganisation of London government in the mid 1960's will thus be placed in perspective. In addition, the conditions underlying the slow process of bringing public transport in London under the control of government, will be traced.

In the first section of this chapter, the evolution of public transport in London from the mid-nineteenth century will be considered. The main trends in the development of commuter rail networks, the underground, tram and bus services will be presented. The gradual growth of government involvement in public transport in London leading to the transitions from

private ventures subject of few regulations, to more severe regulation, to forced coordination, and finally, to public ownership, will be outlined. Stress will be placed on the conditions of investment in public transport infrastructures under these varying conditions. In the second section, we shall review the level of investment on roads in London from the 1920's to the 1960's. We shall show that while ownership and car use increased, the level of funds devoted to new and improved roads remained relatively low. Stress will be placed on the characteristics of the main highway plans devised during this period, and more specifically, on wartime and post-war plans. In the final section, the transport situation in London in the mid 1960's will be described. The level of patronage of public transport and the economic performance of public transport authorities will be presented, as well as the level of expenditure on roads. Some of the forecasts relating to the trends in transport matters issued at that time will be included in this section.

4.1. The evolution of public transport in London: from private enterprise to public ownership

The earliest London railway, the first section of the London and Greenwich, was opened in 1863. By 1845, five radial main-line railways served the capital and short suburban routes to Blackwall and Greenwich were being introduced. Fifteen years later, there were nine major radial routes. In 1846, the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Termini prevented the intrusion of surface railways into the main built up areas to the north of central London but allowed the crossing of the Thames from the south. This led, during the late 1850's and early 1860's, to the opening of four stations on the north side of the Thames catering for services on the south side of the river: Victoria, Charing Cross, Ludgate Hill and Cannon Street.

Because of this prohibition against the penetration of the built-up areas to the north, the Great Western Railway, eager to acquire a link to the city, promoted the construction of an underground railway between Paddington and Moorgate. The Great Western Railway provided one fifth of the capital necessary for the underground railway (such a railway was not affected by the 1846 decision). The construction proceeded from 1859 to 1863. The scheme proved successful and won traffic from omnibuses. Between 1864 and 1868, it paid 7% yearly on the shares but due to less profitable extensions, the return on the shares had dropped to 2¾% by 1871 (Barker and

Robbins: 125-6 and 159). In the wake of these early financial successes, the first stretch of the District Line opened in 1868.

In 1820, horse-drawn trams began to operate in London. Regulations permitted a local authority or a private company with a twenty one year franchise from an authority, to open tramway lines. The consequence of this regulation was a fragmentary development of trams in London. This prompted the newly formed London County Council to acquire gradually all London tramway undertakings between 1892 and 1903 (Jackson 1965: 14). In 1900, electrification was introduced. At that time, because they had been banned from the centre of London and because of the existence of independently operated tramway systems outside the county, tramway services in London remained poorly integrated.

In the 1890's, a second wave of underground railway development took shape. Schemes were put forward which brought into being the core of what are known today as the Central, Northern, Bakerloo and Picadilly lines. This led to intense activity in the following decade. Between 1903 and 1907, twenty six and a half miles of new tube railways were built while the Metropolitan and District lines were being electrified (Barker and Robbins 1974: 113). However, largely because of intense competition from the trams which forced the underground companies to maintain low fares, thus hampering their chances of achieving a high return on capital investment, they ran into difficulties in attracting investers. By 1907, the Underground Railways Company of London found itself in a precarious economic position because of its electrification of the District line and its

building of three new tubes.

Over the same period London buses also ran into economic difficulties largely because of excess capacity resulting from the new undergrounds, and because of competition between bus companies (Morris 1953: 48). In 1908, the London General Omnibus Company (LGOC) absorbed its two biggest challengers in the bus operation business, thereby moderating intra-modal competition. By 1911, the LGOC had made a financial recovery (Morris 1953: 71). From 1909, the tramway concerns similarily ran into economic difficulties mainly because of competition from the buses which charged cheaper fares. This competitive situation was exacerbated in the early 1920's by the appearance of independent bus operators plying along the routes of established services. By 1924, four hundred and fifty-nine such operators were enumerated. The passage of the London Traffic Act in 1924, by promulgating the regulation of buses allowed on certain routes, named "restricted streets", proved to be advantageous to the established bus operators and to the tramways. From 1926 to 1932, the LGOC bought forty-eight independent bus companies (Jones 1953: 95-6). By the early 1930's, few independents were left. Because of aggravating competition from the buses, from 1920 onwards the tramways repeatedly experienced serious deficits. This led to their subsidisation by the LCC and the boroughs (Barker and Robbins: 1974: 235-6).

Commuter train services were also vulnerable to competition from other modes of transport. The loss of traffic from the suburban

railway commuting services to the tramways, especially from 1903 onwards, and to the buses from 1906 onwards, led to the closure of stations close to the centre. In order to safeguard their markets, agreements were made between the Undergrounds and the Railways allocating areas to be serviced by one or other type of concern; for instance, an agreement was signed by the London and South Western Railways and the District Underground Railways by which the latter agreed not to extend their services beyond Hounslow, Richmond and Wimbledon without the consent of the former (Klapper 1973: 148).

Between the turn of the century and the early 1920's, a succession of recommendations from public authorities and commissions in favour of greater control and coordination of the railways in London, were made. The point put forward was that, since all new railways expenditure needed parliamentary approval, more consideration should be given to matters of coordination. Parliamentary approval could thus contribute to an easing of the financial hardship of the railway companies which resulted from the intense competition between transport concerns in London. For example, in 1901, a joint select committee on the London underground railways recommended that, in awarding permissions for underground expenditure, Parliament should make recommendations as to the inter-relation between the new lines and the existing ones. They also recommended that the Board of Trade should report to Parliament every five or ten years on the functioning of railways in London and on the relations between them. The Committee also generally agreed with the

LCC and the City of London Corporation that there should be closer control and supervision (Barker and Robbins 1974: 66-7). The London County Council was in fact hoping for the creation of an authority with powers to plan and control all London underground railways. The Royal Commission on London Traffic which reported in 1905, deplored the lack of coordination between train services. The Commission went further than the Joint Committee in recommending the setting up of a Traffic Board which would submit an annual report to Parliament on all transport and traffic matters in London. The responsibilities of the proposed Traffic Board would also include the scrutiny of every bill relevant to transport matters in London before submission to Parliament. However no action was taken on this recommendation.

Meanwhile, the private concerns, on their own initiative, entered a number of agreements in order to reduce the competition between them. For example, in 1908, competition from motor buses drove the underground railway concerns considerably closer together in defense of their common interests. The managers of the underground companies decided to publicise their respective railway lines as parts of "a complete underground system of railways". A common logo and map of the system was adopted, and through booking was introduced. The companies nevertheless retained their separate identities but collaborated closely through a statutory body which became known as the Underground Group. The 1915 London Electric Railway Companies Facility Act enabled the four underground companies and the London General Omnibus Company to make agreements with one another and more

specifically to pool their receipts (Ponsonby 1932: 2).

In 1919, a select committee was set up to investigate both congestion in London and fare levels. They came to the conclusion that fares on Underground Group services and on tramways were too high and they considered that competition on the streets was "senseless and costly". The Select Committee reiterated the need for a supreme traffic authority for London. The responsibilities of such an authority would be, in the view of the Committee, to coordinate all routes and services, to administer acts of Parliament, to carry out research and to prepare a plan (Barker and Robbins 1964: 203-4).

The London Traffic Act of 1924, as well as regulating bus traffic on certain routes, established the London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee, the purpose of which was to give assistance to the Minister of Transport in his decisions concerning London and its region. On this committee sat representatives from local authorities, the police, labour, and management of transport concerns. At the request of the Minister, the Advisory Committee organised public inquiries in 1925 and 1926 on transport services in east, north east and south London. At these inquiries statements were received from representatives of town boroughs, county councils, ratepayers associations, chambers of commerce, tenants' leagues and Members of Parliament. The chief complaints made referred to the inadequacy of bus and tram services at peak periods, the congestion of streets caused by the slow movement of traffic, and the long

waiting periods before passangers were able to board a tram or bus (Ponsonby 1932: 58-9). These complaints paint a picture of the transport situation in these areas of London in the mid 1920's. The solution most often advanced for these problems was the introduction of underground railways in the areas not already served by them. For instance, in an inquiry into traffic facilities in south east London, delegates from seven borough councils expressed their feeling that the area should be serviced by underground railways (Klapper 1973: 157). In 1927, the Advisory Committee underlined the need for new underground facilities in north, north east and south London but made it clear that they considered it unlikely that any would be forthcoming until the prevailing competitive situation could be ended. Along with the proposals made in 1905 and 1919, they advocated the setting up of a single transport authority. According to the Advisory Committee, such an authority should bring public transport undertakings under single management with a common fund of earnings. Private ownership would remain but ultimate control would be in the hands of the Minister (Barker and Robbins: 1974: 212-3). In 1929, the London County Council, the Underground Group and the London General Omnibus Company were promoting a private bill seeking to coordinate London's public transport system. Herbert Morrison, Minister of Transport of the new Labour government, had in mind to bring all London Transport undertakings under state control. However, the Government fell as the bill was about to be passed.

The situation in the early 1930's was described in the following

manner by Ponsonby (1932). Ever since 1915, the Underground Group as a whole had been doing well partly as a result of the pooling arrangements with the London General Omnibus Company. However, they were not as successful as they could have been had they not suffered from the competition of the other bus companies. According to Ponsonby "a direct relationship is thus established between such competition while it lasted and the lack of development of tubes". (1932, 55) The absence of underground investment in certain areas and the need for increased levels of coordination of public transport thus appeared as related questions.

The London Passenger Transport Board (LPTB) was set up in April 1933 following the passage of a bill by the Ramsay MacDonald National Government. The LPTB replaced five underground railway companies, fourteen municipal and three private tramway companies, and sixty-one bus companies. The Board constituted a machinery for an altogether greater degree of transport coordination in London (Collins and Pharoah 1974: 35). It followed in many ways a similar purpose as the bodies which emerged from the 1921 Railway Act which merged one hundred rail companies throughout the country into four large units. It also used broadly similar means to achieve this purpose. In both cases, the government was trying to increase efficiency through reorganisation while keeping the new bodies under private ownership, ownership being in the hands of shareholders. Barker and Robbins acknowledged two sets of drawbacks faced by the LPTB from the earliest years of its existence. The Board suffered from a lack of accountability in that the Minister did not appoint

the members of the Board and had limited authority over them. Board members were elected by a panel of trustees drawn from a number of public bodies. Furthermore, the shareholders had restricted power over the management of the board and there was, in addition, an absence of meetings in which they could have pressed their views. Finally, neither local authorities nor trade unions had any formal right of representation. As Barker and Robbins write:

> "all depended on the integrity of the Board and their skill in dealing with the true groups whose interests were likely to be in opposition if a visible conflict was allowed to arise - the travelling public in respect of facilities and fares, the staff in respect of their wages and other conditions of services, and the stockholders in respect of their interest." (1974: 303)

The other set of problems were related to the fact that the financial performance of the Board was not up to expectations. This had a severe effect on the dividends paid to shareholders. Instead of receiving the 5½% "standard" dividend set in 1933, only 1½% was paid in 1938-39 (Barker and Robbins 1974: 284). The establishment of the Board did not, therefore, solve the financial problems of public transport in London, nor, more specifically, did it overcome the difficulties of raising private funds for capital expenditure.

In the conditions prevailing during the 1920's, the underground concerns were not able to raise money on the market to finance extensions to their systems. However, the government made funds available for construction works through the Trade Facilities Act of 1921 which was aimed at counteracting unemploy-

ment. Between 1922 and 1928, the Underground Group spent £15 million in capital expenditure of which £12.5 million was provided by the government under the 1921 Act. Immediately after taking office in 1929, the Labour government passed the Development (Loan Guarantees and Grants) Act 1929 which made available, inter alia, financial support for the extension of the Picadilly Line. Again in the mid 1930's, after the formation of the LPTB, the Treasury used their New Works Programme 1935-40 to give financial support for electrification schemes as well as for the extension of the Northern and Bakerloo (now Jubilee) lines (Barker and Robbins 1974: 289). An exception to this dependence on government funds for large scale public transport capital expenditure schemes in the capital and its region, was the Southern Railway commuter electrification programme from the late 1920's onwards (Klapper 1973). This programme was presented at the time by the Southern Railway as the "world's greatest suburban electrification" (Glover 1981: 5).

During the second World War, the government assumed control of the LPTB and this continued after the war as the nationalisation of much of the country's transport services was part of the newly elected Labour party's programme. The 1947 Transport Act established the British Transport Commission which became the controlling body for the nationalised transport undertakings; the railways and the waterways; and later, road transport and some hotels. On the first of January 1948, the LPTB was dissolved, the stockholders were compensated and the responsibilities of the Board were vested in the BTC. However the admin-

istration of buses and underground trains in London continued to operate with little alteration under the management of the London Transport Executive within the framework of the Commission (LTE 1964: 1). The 1947 Act constituted a step beyond the 1933 Act in the growth of state intervention in transport matters in London, whereas the latter imposed coordination on public transport in London, at the same time retaining private ownership, the 1947 Act introduced public ownership.

Whilst under the control of the BTC, the LTE failed to obtain approval and finance for essential programmes of modernisation and rationalisation which could have improved productivity as well as staff wages. Nor did it manage to launch any new railway scheme. The war damage was nevertheless repaired and railway extensions which had been started before the war were resumed between 1946 and 1949 (Barker and Robbins 1974: 40 ; Collins and Pharoah 1974: 310). In these circumstances, emphasis was placed by the LTE on the modernisation of their existing assets: the replacement of buses, the scrapping of the tramway system, the renewal of garages as well as the replacement and modernisation of underground equipment (Goldrick 1967: 40). This neglect of LTE by the BTC was largely due to the fact that the most troublesome and most important entity within the Commission was the railway system. The nationalisation of the railways was justified by the fact that before the war, the operators had failed to proceed with technical modernisation and, during the war, assets deteriorated further. This meant that, by 1945, the modernisation required was on such a scale that it could only be achieved with the control and financial backing of the govern-

ment (Aldcroft 1975: 71 ; BTC 1956: 4). By comparison, the assets of the LTE were in a relatively good state and the Executive enjoyed a largely healthy financial situation. As Barker and Robbins write:

> "... a body with responsibility for both was in the nature of the case bound to conclude that, broadly, London Transport could get on well enough if it were provided with the necessary replacements and some of its existing extension schemes were completed, while major efforts must be made to re-equip the main-line railways." (1974: 337-8)

However, the efforts directed towards the railways were not concerned solely with main lines. The most important public transport schemes in London and its region during the BTC period were those related to the electrification of the suburban railway lines. This was done with the declared objective of completing the electrification of most of the intensively used urban and suburban services in major centres of population stated by the BTC in 1956 (BTC 1956). The underlying aim of the BTC was to increase railway services in areas likely to be profitable in order to overcome its financial problems. This included the commuter zone of London and in particular Kent, Surrey and Essex (Goldrick 1967: 41). The first electrification scheme after the War was completed in 1949, then from 1955 onwards virtually all the Great Eastern and Tilbury lines were electrified and the third rail electrification was extended over most of Kent.

This period of low investment in LTE's assets coincided with the highest levels of patronage on London's public transport. The peak was reached in 1948 and was followed by a moderate decline on the buses while the use of the underground remained quite

stable. Until the late 1950's, the dominance of public transport as a means of passenger transport in London was unchallenged[1]. In 1956, 71% of all journeys in London (excluding walking) were made by public transport (LTE 1956: Figure 5). This high level of demand accompanied by a virtual absence of expansion of public transport systems caused, as underlined by the Committee of Inquiry into London Transport (1955: 95 para. 397), reductions in the standards of services "as measured by: a) the number of passengers in the tube trains at the peak periods of travel, and b) the average length of queueing for buses at the same periods." For instance in 1959, the London Travel Committee estimated that at peak hours in central London there were between one hundred and twenty-five and one hundred and fifty standing passengers in underground trains per one hundred persons seated (London Travel Committee 1959: 8).

While the LTE was part of the BTC, it made requests to the government for financial support for railway schemes, but the Commission did not actively support these projects because of the low priority they gave to tube schemes. This can be illustrated by the LTE's promotion of the Victoria Line. In February 1944, following a recommendation of the County of London Plan, a Railway (London Plan) Committee was set up. Among the alternatives put forward by this committee in their January 1946 report to improve the railway services in London, Route eight followed a path in many respects similar to the one that was later to be adopted for the Victoria Line (Day 1972: 3). The Victoria Line reappeared in 1948 as Route C in the London Plan

Working Party's report of 1948. From then on, the LTE campaigned to persuade politicians and the public that, although the line would not be self-supporting on its own, the fact that it would help relieve congestion on other railway services as well as on the road, made it worthwhile. In doing so the LTE was then following the same strategy throughout the inter-war period when they had schemes ready for whenever public money became available. This time however the LTE was applying pressures on elected members in order to gain their support for the scheme. In 1954, the Minister approved the LTE's application for parliamentary powers for the construction of the line. This however did not mean that the project could go ahead. In 1955, the Chambers Committee of Inquiry reported in favour of the Victoria Line. Every year, the LTE continued arguing in favour of the proposed line in their annual reports. Many memoranda also advocated this course (Barker and Robbins 1974: 344-6). In 1959, the London Travel Committee in a report to the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation concluded that, in spite of the fact that the Victoria Line was expected to make a loss, the advantages of the new line in terms of improvements in public transport services, outweighed the costs. They recommended that construction should proceed as soon as possible (London Travel Committee 1959: 21 and 30). In 1962, Foster and Beesley (1973) formalised the argument in support of the Victoria Line by giving a monetary value to the social benefits to be derived from the new line. According to this method the sum of benefits was superior to the sum of costs. However, in August 1962, before the publication of this study, the government which was

preoccupied with the level of unemployment, gave the authorisation to go ahead with the scheme. Stretches were opened from September 1968 to March 1969. The cross Thames link to Brixton, under study since 1955, received the approval of the government in August 1967 and was completed in July 1971.

Under the 1962 Transport Act, the British Transport Commission was dissolved into boards, two of which were the London Transport Board and the British Railways Board. In the last year of the Commission's existence, the railways had experienced a deficit of £104 million while London Transport had enjoyed a surplus of £0.5 million over the amount required to meet in full their share of the Commission's central charges mainly made up of interest charges on capital (BTC 1963: 58-62). For public transport in London, the opportunity of achieving a higher degree of coordination between London Transport and British Rail services while the two were under the control of the same agency, had been missed. This could have taken the form of through ticketing between London Transport and British Rail services as recommended by the Committee of Inquiry into London Transport (1955: para. 357-9 and 478).

From the first of January 1963, the ownership and operation of London Transport's undertakings were assigned to the London Transport Board. The members of the Board were appointed directly by the Minister of Transport and were responsible to him. The totality of the financial framework of the Board's operations had to be agreed by the Minister and all money,

with the exception of short loans, had to be borrowed from him. Fares were to be approved by a Transport Tribunal (LTB 1963: 2-3). There was also a statutory requirement for cooperation with the British Railways Board. This requirement was met by the setting up of the Passenger Transport Committee of which the LTB and the BRB were members. The Board started life with a capital debt of £162 million resulting from the division of the BTC's properties, rights and liabilities between the new boards. The financial objective set for the LTB by the Minister of Transport was to earn an average balance revenue of £4 million a year during the years 1963-1967 after providing for depreciation and meeting interest charges (MOT 1961). However in 1963, the Board only managed to earn a revenue of £2.1 million.

This summary of the history of public transport in London has highlighted its institutional evolution. We have seen how the multiplicity of private concerns were forced to coordinate their operations or merge into larger entities in order to offset the effects of competition and how their profitability remained in jeopardy because of the activities of small independent companies. We have also shown how the state first introduced regulations to favour the profitability of the major operators and later instituted a unique body covering all public transport services (except commuter railways) in London. The government's purpose was not to take control of operations but rather to achieve coordination of public transport by bringing the different modes under the aegis of a single body and thereby do away with the competition between companies. The next step taken by the government was to bring public transport into public ownership and to assume control over it. From then on, the study of public

transport in London coincides with the study of state intervention. Questions about decisions relating to public transport in London can thus be pursued through an analysis of the political process.

In spite of their declared purpose of achieving greater levels of coordination, the state intervention in public transport in London failed to integrate the services of the railway commuter network and the London Transport systems. Another shortcoming of the transport policies over this period is that, as emphasised by W.R. Jones (1979: 80), they failed to involve public transport agencies in major land use decisions.

In conclusion, our account of the evolution of public transport in London has focused on investment in large scale projects, mainly underground railways, and on the evolution of organisational arrangements. In the first respect, it has been seen that funds for the construction of underground railways were often difficult to raise. This and the commercial nature of the early operators explains why the expansion of underground lines was determined by criteria of profitability. This accounts for the fact that many areas of London remained unserved by underground lines and that for long periods of time, as long as the low return on capital made investment in such ventures unattractive, no new underground lines were built. It was only when the interest of public transport operators coincided with the interest of the government in the spending of public funds to releive unemployment, that the construction of under-

ground projects resumed. The main organisational developments have been from a situation of largely unregulated private provision of bus, rail and underground services, to the introduction of some coordination, to the final taking of the private ventures into public ownership.

4.2. Road Policies: Slowly increasing levels of investment and the bringing of road expenditure into the political arena

A survey of the major road and traffic policies in London from the 1920's to the early 1960's will be presented in this section. Plans and policies will be considered in a parallel manner and particular attention will be paid to the effects upon them of financial constraints. It should be noted that when we focus on local authority policies, we refer specifically to the London County Council, thus excluding those authorities with jurisdiction over the rest of the Greater London area.

The London Arterial Road Programme which put forward many new roads and road widening schemes in Greater London was launched in the 1920's. This programme was paid for by proceeds of the Road Fund. The programme soon ran into difficulties. From 1927 onwards, its progress slowed down so much that in 1937, as Sir Charles Bressey and Sir Edwin Lutyens (1938: 24 para. 34) pointed out, the Arterial Road Programme was still far from completed. The contraction of the programme was largely associated with the fate of the Road Fund. This fund had been introduced in 1909 by Lloyd George to channel motor taxes to work done in connection with exigences of the motor traffic

of the country. It meant that there was a direct relation between the number of road vehicles and the provision of roads (Plowden 1971: 89-90). The Road Fund operated without any major difficulties until the 1927 budget when Winston Churchill, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, took over the whole £12 million lying in the Fund, thereby breaching the principle underlying its existence. During the following ten years, numerous "raids" from the Treasury took place until Chamberlain announced that from 1937, the Road Fund was to lose its independence. From then on the level of road expenditure would, like any other sector of expenditure, be determined by annual parliamentary votes (Plowden 1971: 295).

During the inter-war years, the London County Council road programme was weakened by a shortage of funds. Until 1919 the Council lacked external sources of finance to support road expenditures. The Transport Act of that year stipulated that assistance from the government would be available in the form of a grant that had to be negotiated for every individual scheme. The amounts spent on new roads and on road widening nevertheless remained very low. For instance, in 1935-36, the level of spending on highway and bridge work per head was less than in 1905, passing from 4/1 d. to 3/2 d. (Gibbon and Bell 1939: 441). Because of this, the Council found it impossible to proceed with schemes which had been authorised as far back as 1900-1910. For example, it was suggested in 1898 that six busy road intersections should be laid out along the flyover principle. But as Gibbon and Bell (1939: 448) point out, by 1939 there were

still no crossings of this type in London. Consequently in the 1920's and 1930's London was suffering from traffic congestion even if the number of cars remained relatively low. In the early 1930's, the operating manager of the London General Omnibus Company assessed that if the vehicles of the company could achieve speeds of 10mph. rather than 8mph., this would represent savings of £300,000 per annum in congested areas alone (Ponsonby 1932: 72).

Shortly after the end of the Second World War, the Labour government announced an ambitious national road programme spread over ten years. The expenditure for the first and second year was planned to run at £80 million per annum. But this proved to be a false start because of post-war economic difficulties leading to drastic cuts in planned levels of public expenditure. In fact the sum devoted by the Ministry of Transport to major improvements and highway constructions during the period 1946-53, was little more than £5 million per annum (Aldcroft 1975: 260). Between 1948 and 1953, the average annual expenditure on the maintenance of highways and minor highways improvements was only 66% of the average annual sum spent between 1936 and 1938. More drastically, between 1948 and 1953, the annual rate of expenditure on major highway improvement and new highway construction was between 1948 and 1953, only 21% of the level between 1936 and 1938 (Plowden 1971: 327). When post-war restrictions on motoring were lifted, the trend towards increased car ownership which had started just before the war, resumed. Traffic problems became increasingly widespread. Because of the divis-

ion of public and private expenditure, it was almost impossible for public authorities to control the increase in car ownership and usage (Wilson et al. 1971: 306-7). Meanwhile, during the early and mid 1950's, the government did not respond to this increase by the provision of more road space because transport was given a relatively low priority during a period when many other serious problems had to be tackled. Public expenditure was, furthermore, on the whole, restricted (McKay and Cox 1979: 165).

Levels in car ownership and traffic increased at such a rate that they were constantly underestimated by transport planners. For example in 1945, the Ministry of Transport estimated that by 1965, traffic levels in urban areas would increase by 75% compared with 1933 figures. In fact by 1950, traffic levels were already almost double those of 1933. Similarily in 1957, the LCC Development Plan predicted an increase in traffic of 50% over the next twenty or thirty years whereas in reality, the growth was 100% in only ten years (Buchanan 1970: 34). And in 1957, the MOT forcast that there would be 8 million motor vehicles in 1960, a figure which was exceeded by 1 million. Finally, in 1959, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport estimated that by 1969, there would be 12½ million vehicles on the roads. This figure was in fact reached before the end of 1964 (Starkie 1975: 31). This increase in trends of car ownership and traffic in a period during which there was little expenditure on new and improved roads contributed to the aggravation of congestion problems.

During the War, Forshaw and Abercrombie were asked by the Minister of Works to devise a plan for post-war London. In their work on transport matters, the authors stressed the problem of congestion in the form of high levels of road traffic and "straphanging" on public transport (Forshaw and Abercrombie 1943: 3). They anticipated that road congestion was likely to worsen due to significant increases in the number of vehicles. As a solution to this problem they proposed the establishment of a road network which would correspond to the principles set by Sir Alker Tripp (1942). These principles involved a classification of roads into three categories according to their purpose:

1. arterial roads: absence of riparian frontages or side street access. Access points to these roads spaced at long intervals from each other. Service roads run parallel to the arterial roads.
2. sub-arterial roads: main roads in built-up areas.
3. local roads.

An important objective of this road hierarchy was to enhance the living and working conditions of Londoners by creating zones sheltered from through traffic referred to as "precincts" (Forshaw and Abercrombie 1943: 50). Forshaw and Abercrombie proposed the establishment of a comprehensive network of new roads for London worked out according to Sir Alker Tripp's principles. The arterial road system was to include a "B" ring road, a North South cross route "X", an East West route "Y" and arterial radial roads. The sub-arterial roads consisted of an "A" ring-road around central London, a "C" ring-road outside the perimeter of the "B" road and sub-arterial radial

roads. The plan also referred to sub-arterial cross-connecting roads and new major local traffic roads in the central area.

This plan was the first one to propose a comprehensive solution to the traffic problems in London taking into consideration environmental and land use objectives. For example, the earlier plan of Bressey and Lutyens (1938) offered a collection of localised improvements according to a survey of needs defined in terms of congestion. Unlike the County of London plan, it lacked any overall concept. Bressey and Lutyens nevertheless introduced the idea of a North and South orbital road outside the built-up area at a distance of eighteen to twenty miles from Charing Cross. This idea was to be repeated, albeit with modifications, in many plans in the decades to follow.

In the Greater London Plan, Abercrombie (1945) repeated the recommendations of the 1943 plan about the type of solutions to be implemented to ease traffic problems. The main new feature of this plan compared to the previous one was the proposal of a "D" ring-road at approximately twelve miles from the centre of London.[2]

The County of London Plan and the Greater London Plan were prepared during a period of uncertainty about the level of future resource availability. Consequently, Forshaw and Abercrombie could expect that more money would become available in the future. The authors' awareness of this situation encouraged them to write comprehensive plans

presenting large-scale schemes in which imagination and intuition fulfilled a major role. These plans did not include cost estimates; the authors of the County of London Plan contented themselves with the following statement:

> "The sum arrived at for the permanent improvement of London might be commensurate with the cost of war for a few weeks." (Forshaw and Abercrombie 1943: 114).

During the years to follow, many aspects of these two plans were adopted by subsequent plans. However, these borrowings were, in most cases, accompanied by serious erosions of the concepts underlying Forshaw and Abercrombie's proposals. This trend can be seen as early as 1946, when the Advisory Committee for London Regional Planning failed to grasp the notion of precinctal planning. Moreover, many attempts to implement some of the major Forshaw-Abercrombie proposals failed for financial reasons. In 1946, the LCC and the MOT were pursuing planning work on the "A" ring-road, but this work was suspended when it became clear that the government was not prepared to provide funding for the scheme. In May 1950, the cancellation of the "A" ring was formally announced by the Ministry of Town and Country Planning. As Goldrick observed, "any remaining hope for the construction of other new highways proposed in the Plan was laid to rest." (1967: 26). Such hopes had to be abandoned for more than a decade because at no time during this period were sufficient funds available. For instance, in the mid 1950's, the cost of the "A" ring was estimated at £120 million. This sum represented the totality of the LCC road budget for one hundred and twenty years (Hart 1976: 107).

This low level of funds available was reflected in planning documents by the downfall of comprehensive road plans including proposals for large scale schemes. Such plans can only be drawn up if their authors either assume high levels of financial support or ignore the problem of funding altogether. This change of attitude is reflected in the Administrative County of London Development Plan (LCC 1951). This plan failed to propose any single improvement of the scale of those presented in earlier plans. Importance was given instead to traffic management measures and to piecemeal improvements of the road network. In particular it proposed a large number of road widening and of intersection improvement schemes primarily in central London. The Development Plan nevertheless retained some aspects of the Forshaw and Abercrombie Plan such as an inner circular road based on the "A" ring-road and two main cross routes meeting at Waterloo Bridge (Buchanan 1970: 34). However, even the most modest proposals of the Development Plan proved too elaborate in the light of the "virtual absence of government grant towards highway improvement" (LCC 1960: 56-7), and of the low level of spending on roads by the LCC. It was intended in the Development Plan that 15% of the LCC budget would be allocated to roads over the twenty years covered by the proposed programme. In fact between 1951 and 1959, the share of LCC expenditure devoted to roads averaged 6% (Goldrick 1967: 31-32). The road programme therefore fell rapidly behind schedule.

While road improvements in London were progressing at a snail's pace, the number of cars and level of traffic in the

capital were increasing rapidly. Between 1951 and 1961, the number of cars in the Greater London area increased 2.17 times. This led to a growth of road traffic levels: while in 1952, the passage of 1,569,504 vehicles was recorded at sixty-four road count points in the County of London, six years later the number had risen to 2,036, 757 (LCC 1965). This increase in road circulation resulted in a drop of traffic speeds. This decline was particularily severe in the central area at peak time. For instance, the average speed in central London during the evening peak fell from 11mph. in 1952 to 8.3mph. in 1958 (GLC 1968: table 4.03). This led to the emergence in many sectors of opinion of a concern over the possibility that traffic in London might finally grind to a halt "with immensely damaging effects for the economic life of the city" (Plowden 1972: 26). As Hart writes "it became fashionable in the late 1950's and early 1960's to speak of the capital suffering from a traffic thrombosis." (1976: 27). It was felt that the experience of the pre-Christmas period in 1958 when road movement at various trouble spots was almost brought to a standstill might soon become everyday experience (Hart 1976: 26).

Nationally, road expenditure increased from 1955 onwards. In 1957, a parliamentary statement was made about the building of a comprehensive network of highways. In contrast to previous occassions when such a policy had been adulterated, the proposed level of spending was not affected by general cuts in public expenditure (Starkie 1976: 15). Road expenditure was thus given a higher priority by the Cabinet. Government expenditure

on major improvements and new road constructions after stagnating until 1955 when it totaled £3.3 million per annum, increased to £42.7 million in 1959 (MOT 1964: table 29a).

In the early phase of this period of increased expenditure, London was disadvantaged because of a reluctance on the part of the government to take account of local conditions and more specifically, because of the higher cost of road improvement in London. The Ministry of Transport was more sympathetic to motorways through fields. As Goldrick writes:

> "... the Ministry's attention apparently was concentrated on constructing as impressive a total mileage as possible. The relatively high cost of urban roads combined with the undoubted appeal of the national motorway programme reduced the funds that London and other urban centres might have received." (1967: 33)

In 1960 however, the government changed their mind on this matter, expanded their classified road fund and approved an expenditure of £150 million over five years on unclassified roads mainly located in urban areas (MOT 1961 b).

In this context of increasing financial support for road improvement and construction, road plans for London were produced which, unlike the County of London Plan of 1944 and the Greater London Plan of 1945, presented programmes adapted to different levels of expectations of availability of funds instead of offering a "rigid 'ultimate' design or plan" (Starkie 1976: 16). In 1957, in the context of growing traffic congestion in London and the likelihood of more resources being made available for road construction, consideration had to be given to the way in which to spend these resources (Jackson 1965:85). The Minister

of Transport consequently formed a committee with representatives from the Ministry and the LCC, and also included the Director of the Road Research Laboratory. The Committee was chaired by G.R. Nugent M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary of the Minsitry of Transport and Civil Aviation. In their report, the Committee on London Roads (1959) put forward two twenty year programmes, involving total expenditures of £120 million and £200 million. These programmes consisted of road widenings and extensions, and other support schemes like parking meters, off-street parking and traffic management measures. No proposal was made by the Committee for a high cost comprehensive new network. The programmes put forward constituted a compromise between a desire to find solutions for problems resulting from the increase in traffic and the moderate level of funds expected to be available. The report of the Nugent Committee was criticised by the British Road Foundation on the ground that even the maximum programme of £200 million would be inadequate to cope with expected increases in traffic. The Foundation advocated the construction of a motorway ring at two to four miles from the centre (British Road Foundation 1960).

In the first review of the Administrative County of London Plan (LCC 1960), the positive impact on road circulation of traffic engineering measures was acknowledged. The Review however, underlined that there is a limit "to the benefit obtainable from inexpensive tuning-up processes of this kind and a real attack on the road problem in London demand a positive programme of construction works " (LCC 1960: 65). It was judged that the

maximum increase in capacity obtainable from improvements such as road widening and the enlargement of intersections was approximately 50%. The cost of accomodating traffic increases over this level would then rise disproportionally. Because of the moderate levels of fund expected to be available for road improvements in the near future, the Review did not include any measure to cater for a traffic growth of more than 50%. The possibility of urban motorways was kept in mind but in its proposals, the Review limited itself largely to measures of improvement of existing all-purpose roads where the need for relief from congestion was the greatest:

> "An average level of expenditure of £6 million a year gives no scope for an ambitious plan of new highways, such as a system of independent motorways, without neglecting urgent improvements of existing roads" (LCC 1960: 68).

The County's programme of road improvement for the period from 1960 to 1972 was based mainly on the cheaper alternative proposed by the Nugent Committee, albeit with a few additions (LCC 1960: 67-72).

From the mid 1950's onwards, two types of action were taken by the London County Council to alleviate congestion problems: traffic management and expenditure on road improvement. In the first case, the aim was to get as much as possible out of the existing road system. One of the first traffic management measures taken was to control on-street parking. The introduction of parking meters was first recommended in 1951 by the London and Home Counties Traffic Act of 1956; they began to be installed in London in 1958 in Mayfair. By 1961 there were 5,379 parking meters in central London. Two years later, this amount had

risen to 12,826 and there were then 2,135 meters in the rest of the Greater London area (MOT 1963 a: 21). The reliance on parking meters proved to be a success as acknowledged by a Ministry of Transport document:

> "The primary purposes of restoring the streets to their proper use as a means of passage and of access to property have undoubtedly been achieved. Traffic flows more freely." (MOT 1963 b: 18).

It was, for instance, considered that on-street parking control measures were considered to have contributed significantly to the 9% increase in the average speed of road traffic in Mayfair (MOT 1961 b: 22). At the same time the LCC was pursuing a policy encouraging the opening of off-street car parks in the central area. Between 1958 and 1963, more than four thousand new public off-street parking places became available (MOT 1963 a: 23).

In February 1960, the Minister of Transport established the London Traffic Management Unit within his Ministry. This followed dissatisfaction with the cumbersome procedure of the London and Home County Traffic Advisory Committee which found it difficult to overcome the divergences among its members (Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater London 1960: 107 para. 401). Unlike the position in other urban areas in the country, the Minister had jurisdiction over traffic matters in the London Traffic Area which covered the area within a radius of approximately twenty-five miles from the centre of London. The objectives given to the London Traffic Management Unit were to improve the flow of traffic through the main streets of

central London and along selected radial and perimeter routes as well as regulating street parking and extending off-street parking in the central area (MOT 1961 b: 3). By 1963, twenty-one one-way schemes in the London Traffic Area, totalling some thirty-one miles, were introduced. They were generally cost effective measures and significant improvements in traffic speed and road capacity were achieved. In one case, the Tottenham Court Road and Gower Street one-way scheme, the cost was £90,000 while benefits in terms of reductions in delays were estimated at £390,000 per annum (MOT 1963 a: 18). The LTMU also proceeded with the introduction of peak-hour clearways i.e. in which all stopping was forbidden along a given route. On the A4 peak-hour clearway between Knightsbridge and Hammersmith, traffic flows increased by between ten and twenty per cent (MOT 1963 a: 19). Other schemes introduced by the LTMU included traffic lights, limits on right turns, etc.

Meanwhile the level of funds for road construction and improvement at the disposal of the LCC was gradually increasing. In 1959, the LCC decided that the road programme contained in the first quinquennial review of the Development Plan should be based on an assumed expenditure of £6 million a year. Following representations by the Council in 1960, the government agreed to raise their financial contribution to £10 million per annum but it was acknowledged that this would take several years. While this level of spending remained insufficient for an ambitious motorway plan, it nevertheless allowed a general speeding up of the road programme, an upgrading of some schemes, e.g. grade separated rather than ground level junctions, and the

construction of stretches of roads at standards approaching that of motorways (Jackson 1965: 85-6). Although the value of government support was eroded because of higher costs, the LCC managed to intervene to help road construction at a number of black spots. Two of the most important road schemes of this period were the Hammersmith flyover which cost £1½ million and was opened to traffic in November 1961, and the Hyde Park Corner/ Marble Arch improvement works which were completed in October 1962 at the cost of £6 million. Hyde Park corner had to cope with the highest flow of traffic in London and Marble Arch ranked four in terms of traffic levels. The scheme consisted of a four lane underpass linking Picadilly and Knightsbridge together with the upgrading of Park Lane, and seventeen pedestrian subways (Jackson 1965: 87-8).

From the end of World War Two onwards, the attitude of planners and elected members was generally that the provision of increased road capacity should be adjusted to increases in the level of traffic. This view was repeatedly stated by bodies with road transport responsibilities and was present in most planning documents. The main principle guiding the provision of new roads was a desire to accomodate the growth in traffic at peak hours (Plowden 1972: 11-2). Little mention was made, in spite of periods of severe financial stringency and little road improvement, of the desirability of applying measures aiming at restraining the level of traffic itself. This attitude of planners and politicians may have been partly due to the energetic action of the motor lobby and its effect on public

opinion. Another factor underlying such an attitude may be that the lifting of the post-war restrictions on car use made it difficult to impose traffic restriction measures again (LHCTAC 1951; Plowden 1971: 327-8). More generally, the policy of accomodating increases in traffic can probably be related to a fear on the part of the politicians of the electoral and economic consequences of road congestion. The motor car was no longer a privilege of the upper classes and consequently, a high proportion of the electorate consisted of car owners and car users. It was thus probably assumed by politicians that schemes aimed at relieving congestion would yield considerable electoral benefits. Economically, congestion was seen as costly and in the long term, if it continued unrelieved, as potentially damaging to the economic life of the capital.

The commitment of a large number of planners and politicians to the need for new road schemes to cater for the rising level of traffic clashed with the low level of funds available for this purpose. The size of the sums allocated nationally to road expenditure is determined in the light of the total size of the government budget, itself the result of policy on public expenditure in general, and of the priority given to roads. During the life of the Road Fund, road expenditure was determined independently of political priorities regarding sectors of expenditure. This independence was challenged by Winston Churchill in the 1920's while Chancellor of the Exchequer because he considered that road expenditure should be governed by priorities determined by Parliament. In his words, "whoever

said that, whatever the yield of these taxes, and whatever the poverty of the country, we were to build roads, and nothing but roads from this yield?" (Plowden 1971: 199-200).

From the 1930's onwards and especially after the war, the conjunction of restrictive budgets and the dominance of other spending priorities led to limited levels of expenditure on new and improved roads in Great Britain. This situation was aggravated by the fact that expenditure on road construction is relatively easy to sacrifice in times of budgetary difficulties. The LCC also gave a low priority to road spending in their budget. They nevertheless repeatedly requested more financial support from the government for their road programme.

However, from the mid 1950's, the arguments put forward by the motor lobby and by planners concerning the need for more road space began to receive public attention. Politicians were becoming increasingly preoccupied with the potential electoral impact of road transport issues because of the increasing proportion of car users. They were also concerned about the potential economic effect of serious road congestion. As Plowden writes (1971: 334-5), from then on, the problem of the motor car merges with the problem of traffic in general. In these circumstances the impact of traffic on the working of society in general and more specifically on economic enterprises and essential services, can all be used to justify new transport infrastructures. Consequently, the sums allocated for road expenditure by the government increased significantly between

the mid and the late 1950's. Greater coordination took place between the LCC and the government leading to a better correspondence between the schemes put forward by the Council and the funds available.

In this period plans were formulated and revised in the light of forecasts of traffic increases and of expected financial support. This reflected a general trend in plans, from the Second World War to the early 1960's, to give explicit consideration of the funds likely to become available. Whereas, largely because of the uncertainty of the war, the Forshaw and Abercrombie plans for comprehensive large scale new road networks had ignored financial issues, the later plans dealt with more limited traffic problems and took into account the likely level of available funds. In this sense the planners operated within a more restricted context than Forshaw and Abercrombie. The plans of the late 1940's, the 1950's and early 1960's were formulated in three steps:

1. The planning problem was defined as the need to accomodate projected future increases in traffic and thereby mitigate the ill effects of congestion.
2. The availability of financial resources for the period covered by the plan was assessed
3. Solutions were then devised so as to cater, as far as possible, for the rise in traffic and ease the worst congestion problems.

Nevertheless the planners tended to ignore partly the restrictions facing them in order to draw up proposals as large as pos-

sible in scale. This can be accounted for by the professional interests of planners in large programmes due to the potential expansion of agencies and therefore career opportunity associated with them. This accounts for the fact that, during the period covered here, plans and even revisions of plans, consistently contained proposals the scale of which went beyond what the available resources would allow. This explains why many of these proposals failed to be implemented.

The formulation and implementation of road transport policies in the Greater London area was made difficult, because, as observed by Hart (1976: 40), there were one hundred and nine different highway authorities with jurisdiction over this territory. Road planning responsibilities were therefore to a large extent fractured like a jigsaw puzzle. The Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater London (1960: 109 para. 406) remarked that:

> "The present system with the exception of the powers of the London County Council inherited from the Metropolitan Board of Works and certain powers of the Metropolitan Police given to them by statute, does not differ in principle from the ancient system of parochial responsibilities which parishes as highway authorities had in the most remote country districts and the most remote recesses of the past."

No attempt was made to alter the system in principle but it was nevertheless modified by a series of ad hoc provisions in response to needs. Among these measures, the LHCTAC was set up to provide a forum in which proposals from various authorities and road users could be debated. But the Committee had only consultative powers and proved unable to reconcile the interests

of the various parties; their membership rose to a maximum of forty-five bodies (Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater London 1960: 115-6 para. 428). It appears that the absence of an elected body with planning jurisdictions and implementation powers over highways in an area of relevant dimensions for transport purposes in London goes some way towards explaining the piecemeal action on these matters in the Greater London area. Such a body could have used its muscle to promote highway schemes to the government and thus assure higher levels of financial support.

In this section we have seen how in the 1920's and the 1930's, road expenditure came to be governed by the politically determined priorities of the government once the Road Fund was abolished and how the level of funds allocated for roads was relatively low. We have also considered the highway plans formulated from the War-time period to the early 1960's and have seen how they gave an increasing recognition to the availability of funds, and became increasingly restricted in scope. Nevertheless the implementation of plans generally fell short of what was proposed even if during the late 1950's and the early 1960's, the level of expenditure on roads in London increased significantly and schemes of a larger scale were realised. After this relation of events related to road and rail transport, we will describe the transport situation in London as it prevailed in the early sixties.

4.3 The Transport situation in London in the early 1960's

In this section I will attempt to offer a brief review of general transport trends in London in the early and mid 1960's.

We shall focus mainly on public transport trends and on levels of government spending on roads. The chief purpose of this section is to provide a background to the chapter following it.

The London Transport Board's financial performance deteriorated markedly from their establishment in 1963. While in 1963 they achieved a surplus of £2.1 million, this figure fell to £1.3 million the following year and in 1965, the Board faced a deficit of £1 million. The Board was never able to reach the objective of a £4 million annual surplus set by the Ministry of Transport in 1961 (LTB 1964; 1965; 1966a). This situation was partly blamed on the poor performance of the buses, "the victim of the new age" (LTB 1964: 9 para. 18). Bus services were in fact suffering from staff shortages and increasing road congestion (LTB 1966: 20-1). But the main problem they had to face was a drop of 37.4% in the number of passengers from 1955 to 1965. Over this period, vehicle mileage also fell by 23% (MOT 1965). This decreasing level of patronage contributed to the Board's difficulties because of their obligation to provide services while having regard to their economic objectives. This led the Board to accept that certain unrenumerative services would be supported by profitable ones. But as this happened more and more, it seriously affected the overall profitability of the organisation. In the Board's 1965 annual report (LTB 1966a: 3 para. 12), the problem was stated in the following terms:

> "... in parts of the area of operation, particularily in the suburbs and the country, and on certain days of the week, the increasing use of private cars is resulting

> in such a diminishing use of public transport, especially outside the peak hours of travel, that the present degree of cross-subsidisation of the non-paying by the paying services is becoming uneconomic to the operations as a whole."

Consequently the Board had to consider dropping certain services.

Meanwhile, the number of passengers carried on the underground remained relatively stable between 1955 and 1965, diminishing slightly from 676 million to 657 million passenger journeys per annum (GLC 1979a: 80, Table 4.20; LCC 1965: 193, Table 158). During the first half of the 1960's, the LTB was proceeding with the construction of the Victoria Line and had presented a submission for parliamentary powers to extend the line to Brixton. They were also pursuing planning work on the Fleet Line and on the Heathrow extension of the Picadilly Line. In addition, with financial support from the government, they were replacing a large proportion of road vehicles and underground rolling stock.

From 1955 to 1966, the number of passengers entering central London on British Railways commuter services during the morning peak time, increased from approximately 400,000 to 455,000 (LCC 1965: 193; GLC 1976a: 94, Table 5.12). However in 1965, the BR commuter services in London and the South East suffered an overall loss of £19 million (BRB 1966: 2 para. 9). They were also affected by problems of saturation on many lines causing extreme discomfort to passengers at peak hour (BRB 1963: 2 para.9). The absence of spare capacity within twenty miles of the London termini made it difficult to tap the lucrative commuter markets of the outer metropolitan area.

The fall in bus patronage in London followed a national trend which can largely be accounted for by a large increase of 152.2% in car ownership from 1955 to 1965. During that period, the number of cars registered increased from 3,526,000 to 8,917,000 (MOT 1964: 11 Table 11; MOT 1967 a: 12 Table 1). Meanwhile the proportion of road trips by public transport services fell from 38.9% to 19.3% (MOT 1967 b: 2 Table 2). A factor contributing to this situation was an absolute decrease in the purchase price of new and second hand cars (and motor cycles) of 6% between 1953 and 1965 accompanied by a small increase in running costs of 27%. Over the same period, prices of consumer goods and expenditure increased by 39%, rail fares by 86% and bus and coach fares by 76% (MOT 1967: 3 Table 4). The growth in car ownership led to an increase in the volume of traffic. In urban areas, on trunk and classified roads, this volume increased by 64% between 1958 and 1965. This trend towards increased car ownership was forecast to continue: in 1963, the Hall Group estimated that there would be between 12 and 13 million cars in the country in 1970 and between 16 to 18 million in 1980 (MOT 1963 c: 10 para. 42).

From the mid 1950's, the government expenditure on highways increased rapidly. While £15.2 million was spent in 1956, by 1964 this sum had grown to £143.6 million representing an average annual increase of 35.5% (MOT 1967: 51 Table 29a). Furthermore, indications were given that in contrast with previous periods, this level of spending would keep on increasing over a significant period in the future. In October 1962, the 1963-1968 programme of major highway constructions and improvements

in England and Wales was based on a total spending of £590 million (£118 million per annum) which constituted an increase of 25.3% over the 1962 level of expenditure. Similarly in October 1963, the sum allocated for the 1964-1969 programme was increased to £775 million (£155 million per annum) which represented a 38.3% increase on the 1963 level of spending (MOT 1963 a: 27-8). Consequently, towards the mid 1960's, it became assumed, against a background of steady increases in the sums allocated to road building and improvement over the ten previous years and of commitments on the part of the government to further growth, that this trend would persist. Meanwhile, the London road plans prepared during the late 1950's and early 1960's did not provide schemes of a scope compatible with large increases anticipated in the level of funding. These plans proposed mainly traffic management and piecemeal improvements even if sometimes on a rather large scale. It could be anticipated that in this new financial context larger and more comprehensive plans would be needed.

This section has provided a brief assessment of transport trends as they appeared in the early and mid 1960's. We have seen that bus patronage dropped significantly contributing to the LTB's financial difficulties, while the number of passengers on the underground decreased only marginally and increased on BR commuter services. During the same period, car ownership and consequently the level of traffic grew significantly. We have also drawn attention to the increase in the level of spending on new and improved highways by the government.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have focused primarily on the development of public transport systems and on the evolution of their form of ownership and of their organisational framework, and on the evolution of spending allocated to new and improved roads. The purpose of this chapter was to investigate the trends in transport policy over the decades preceding the period on which this study focuses. This is important because it helps us to understand the processes which have shaped the transport networks and thus given them the form they took in the mid 1960's, and because it indicates the evolution of the organisational arrangements bearing on transport matters in London. We have also discussed changes in the patterns of use of different modes of transport, trends in spending on transport facilities, and the relation between plans and the conditions of implementation of transport policies. This latter issue will be discussed further in subsequent chapters. The main conclusions to be drawn in the light of this chapter are:

1. Public transport services, before being coordinated by the government, were provided by competing companies each motivated by the desire to become profitable or increase their profit margin. Hence the provision of public transport services was determined by their potential profitability. The predominantly radial nature of the rail system in London is explained by the fact that the most lucrative public transport markets were the suburban commuters. In addition, until coordination agreements were entered between the underground companies, after the completion of most of central London tubes, each scheme was drawn

up according to the narrow interest of a single company. This caused integration difficulties between some of the lines. For instance, in the defence of the case for the building of the Victoria Line, it was stated that one of the purposes of the new line would be to compensate this early absence of coordination (Day 1972: 1).

2. The intense competition between public transport operators had a negative impact on the profitability of the largest concerns, and this meant that they became unable to raise capital for large scale investments. These problems led to agreements between the major operators leading to some degree of coordination. But their profitability remained vulnerable to the activity of independent bus operators. In response to pressures from the major public transport concerns, and in order to improve services and extend the underground railways, the government drew up regulations advantageous to big operators. These regulations were followed by the establishment of a new agency covering all public transport services except for the commuter rail network. This agency under private ownership, remained largely outside the control of government. It was after the Second World War, as part of the policy of bringing transport services throughout the country under the direct influence of the government, that public transport in London was brought into public ownership.

3. Whereas the profitability of public transport was affected by competition between independent companies until the early

1930's, from the mid 1950's, it suffered from the increasing use of the private car. Bus services were mainly affected, their quality deteriorating because of a reduction in demand and increased congestion on the roads. Meanwhile, the patronage of rail services remained constant or, in the case of British Rail commuter services, increased. These trends can be related to the much larger increases in public transport fares than in the cost of living and of running a car.

4. As far as the underground is concerned, from the First World War onwards, it became very difficult to raise private funds for capital expenditure and the companies became dependent from the 1920's onwards, on governmental support for such spending. As the government released funds in an irregular manner with the objective of combating unemployment, the underground operators became accustomed to having schemes in store ready for whenever money was made available In this respect there is a continuity between the strategy of the early private compahies and those of the London Transport Executive and the London Transport Board.

5. From the moment the Road Fund was abolished, road expenditure became subject to government priorities. Until the mid 1950's, highway construction and improvement was given a low priority and no large road schemes were implemented in London. The deteriorating road traffic conditions led to rising pressures on the government for relief measures. The recognition by politicians of the potential electoral impact of schemes favourable to car users and of the negative economic consequences of an increasing level of congestion, contributed to the higher priority given to road expenditure. The dominant transport

problems were defined in terms of road congestion and the solutions put forward were highway schemes and traffic management measures.

6. It would appear that planners tend to propose schemes which exceed the resources they expect to be available. In a period of uncertainity about the future, during and immediately after World War Two, Forshaw and Abercrombie devised transport plans embodying large scale road networks and giving attention to land use considerations. As it became obvious that the economic conditions prevailing in the post-war period would not permit the implementation of such comprehensive road schemes, the planning documents which were prepared over the following fifteen years proposed more limited solutions to transport problems usually defined purely in strict terms of road congestion. While these later plans took into account the level of funds likely to become available, they nevertheless remained, in most cases, unrealistic in their scope.

7. Finally, London suffered from the absence of an authority responsible for transport matters throughout Greater London. While this did not impede the implementation of piecemeal road improvements, it hampered the realisation of a comprehensive scheme at the level of Greater London.

Chapter V

THE FORMULATION OF THE LONDON MOTORWAY PLANS AND THEIR REJECTION

Introduction

In the last chapter we saw that up to the early 1960's, the transport problems of London came to be defined largely in terms of road congestion. The solutions devised and sometimes implemented, were of a piecemeal nature. However, in the early 1960's, in the context of a vast increase in the level of funds becoming available for urban highway construction, what was to appear as the ultimate solution to London's road congestion problems took shape in the form of a plan for a motorway network of a unique scale.

The object of this chapter is to study the conditions underlying the formulation of this motorway scheme as well as the factors which eventually led to its rejection. The period covered begins in 1962 with the political decisions initiating the planning process which led to the motorway proposals. It ends in 1973 with matters referring to the GLC and in 1975 with matters referring to the Department of the Environment. This is because there were two distinct rejections. The first one took place in April 1973 when a new Labour administration took over the Greater London Council, and the second one happ-

ened in October 1975 when the Secretary of State for the Environment waived the scheme.

While the main focus of this chapter is on the motorway proposals and on the debate that followed, it is not the case that during the discussions on these proposals other transport policies were petrified. A short review of the transport policies during this period will show that they were very much in line with those which took place during the previous years.

In the first section of this chapter we shall focus on the institutional context which prevailed during most of the period under consideration. The circumstances which led to the establishment of the GLC will be presented and it will be seen how and why this organisation became the chief protagonist of the motorway scheme. We shall also consider the conditions under which the London Traffic Survey was set up. This will lead us to investigate the type of relationship which prevailed between consultants and elected members and how it was to affect the scope and methodology of the Survey. The second section focuses on the London Traffic Survey (later to become the London Transportation Study) and attempts to demonstrate that the very form of the survey was biased in favour of large scale road proposals. This section will also investigate the introduction of the motorway proposals devised within the context of the LTS, in the Greater London Development Plan. We shall emphasise that, in fact, they had very little relation with the other aspects of the Plan.

In the third section, I shall begin with a critique of the assumptions and methodology of the LTS. After this, I will attempt to assess the effect of the proposed motorway network on accessibility and land use patterns in London, had it been built. I will also try to determine what interests the planners had in pressing for an elaborate planning procedure and in promoting such an imposing scheme. The fourth section examines the debate that took place around the motorway proposals. While the GLC was actively supporting the proposals, a growing opposition, largely triggered by the anticipated environmental impact, took shape. This opposition was organised so as to bear an optimal impact on the authority most imvolved in the defence of the motorway scheme, the GLC. I shall attempt to show how this opposition was instrumental in leading to the rejection of the scheme by the GLC. The financial constraints faced by the government and the reduced priority given to urban motorway spending, will be seen as the factors explaining the decision of the Secretary of State for the Environment to abandon the London motorway scheme. In the final section, I will discuss the road and public transport policies, and plans on issues other than the motorway proposals drawn up between 1962 and 1973.

5.1. The preliminary steps

The purpose of this section is to prepare the ground for an analysis of the planning and promotion of the London motorway proposals. This will be done by discussing the context in which the Greater London Council was created and in which its functions were defined. To start with, I shall outline the central role played by the GLC in the promotion of the motorway plans and relate this to the definition of its responsibilities which took place before 1965. In the second part of the section, I shall show how the consultants hired to conduct the London Traffic Survey managed to impose their own methodology.

5.1.1. The institutional context

The Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater London (1960) chaired by Sir Edwin Savory Herbert, established two criteria for judging the adequacy of a local government system: its administrative effeciency and the health of the representative process (Rhodes 1972: 457-8). They concluded that in Greater London, the services which could be provided at the local level should be the responsibility of the borough (i.e. personal social services, public health, welfare and housing) in the interests of representation. On the other hand, functions which had to be performed over a wider area should be assigned to a metropolitan level of government, named by them the Council for Greater London, for reasons of administrative

efficiency (Ruck 1970: 38). According to the Herbert Commission, among other duties such as fire, ambulance and refuse disposal, the Council for Greater London should have responsibility for the preparation of a strategic plan for the area under its jurisdiction as well as for traffic management and the construction, improvement and maintenance of all major roads in Greater London. The main roads were defined as those which were mainly used by through traffic. The Herbert Commission considered that the Council for Greater London should be in charge of the planning related to the main roads and more specifically, should be able to instigate transport studies. The proposal for such a concentration of functions in the hands of a single authority was a response to the impossibility of solving London's traffic problem through the prevailing machinery mainly because of the multiplicity of authorities involved (Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater London 1960: paras. 442 and 731).

Much Parliamentary debate was to take place over the bill creating a new administrative framework for London: its second reading was on December 1962 and it was given the Royal Assent on 31 July 1963. The proposed Greater London Council came out of these debates as a weaker authority than that envisaged by the Herbert Commission. With reference to its planning powers, Self writes that the government have:

> ".. shifted the emphasis towards equal partenership between Greater London Council and boroughs, plus considerable ministerial supervision, thereby weakening the independant role prescribed for the Greater London Council by the Minister." (1972: 311)

The Council was to produce a plan to be approved by the Minister and the boroughs would then proceed with their local plans along the guidelines set by the approved plan (1963 London Government Act, section 25; Ruck 1970: 57). With reference to transport, the bill as presented to Parliament retained for the Minister of Transport, powers on most aspects of traffic regulation. The Opposition had advocated a Greater London Council with wider powers over roads, traffic and public transport. As a result the Bill was amended so that the intervention of the Minister of Transport would be limited to situations in which the Council was not discharging its duty satisfactorily (1963 London Government Act, section 9, para. 2). This retention of default powers by the Minister, in Goldrick's words (1967: 167), ".. secured for the GLC relative independance and left the Minister with normal reserve powers." The Minister of Transport retained an important role in transport planning in Greater London through its jurisdiction over the two hundred miles of trunk road located in this area. The GLC was made responsible for 60% of the Class I roads which represented five hundred and fifty miles and for 4% of Class II roads. The remainder were devolved to the boroughs. In the formulation of traffic policies the GLC was under an obligation to consult with the boroughs. On parking, jurisdictions were divided: the GLC was given the main responsibility for on-street parking while the boroughs were made responsible for the control of off-street car parks.

The Greater London Council, as established in 1965, was therefore a much weaker authority in transport and planning matters than

advocated by the Herbert Commission: responsibility for the major road network was shared with the Ministry of Transport and for traffic management with the boroughs, while its development plans had to be approved by the government. Furthermore, public transport was operated by two authorities independent from the GLC.

From the outset, the GLC had an influential Highway and Traffic Committee and a large and powerful Highways and Transportation Department. This was partly because of their need to collaborate closely with the Minister of Transport. In 1968, in order to achieve a higher degree of coordination between transport and land use, the Highways and Transportation Department was amalgamated with the Planning Department.

However, a major step was taken to strengthen the GLC's transport powers with the passing of the 1969 (London) Transport Act which led to the GLC assuming control over London Transport in January 1970.

The White paper (MOT 1967c) stated the desire of the government to strengthen the powers of local authorities in relation to transport and traffic matters. In the following year, a White paper concerned more specifically with London

(MOT 1968) expressed the government's keeness to confirm the role of the GLC in transport matters. They considered that the existing distribution of responsibilities was too fragmented (MOT 1968: para. 30) and that urban transport should be a local rather than a national matter (MOT 1968: para. 38). In this document the main problems identified were the absence of a single body responsible for planning transport in London, the lack of coordination between providers of public transport and the authorities in charge of the traffic environment, and the gap between transport planning and land use planning. The solutions put forward were a GLC takeover of control of London Transport, a closer relationship with British Rail, that the GLC should become the highway authority for all principal roads, and that their powers on parking and traffic matters should be enhanced. As Ruck commented:

> "The publication of the White paper on transport in London is a tacit acknowledgement that the changes introduced by the 1963 Act were not sufficient to create an authority capable of dealing effectively with London's traffic and transport problems." (1970: 114)

The Greater London authority which emerged from the 1963 Act was a very different animal from the London County Council. It had fewer housing responsibilities but was much more concerned with transport than the LCC (Self 1972: 324-5). As has been seen in many sectors of activity, including transport, even after the passing of the 1969 Act, the GLC had to share powers with other levels of government. This was likely to cause anxiety about the jurisdiction and purposes of the GLC as an

elected body. In other words, it could have proved difficult in these circumstances for the GLC to justify its existence. We shall now see how the characteristics of the GLC influenced its attitude in transport matters.

5.1.2. The launching of the London Traffic Survey

The Committee on London Roads set up by the Minister of Transport (The Nugent Committee), had recommended in its 1959 report that a survey of traffic in London should be undertaken. This recommendation gained urgency when the government made clear their intention of spending £120 million over twenty years on roads in the Greater London area since it would be necessary to place the possible schemes in order of priority. The LCC's Roads Committee, eager to widen their sphere of influence, piloted the proposal for the London Traffic Survey in its early stages. Meanwhile the Minister of Transport, Ernest Marples, showed personal interest in the matter because he saw in the Survey, the basis for a London road programme as well as a model for such studies in the rest of the country (Goldrick 1967: 60-1).

The initial inclination of the LCC was to proceed, in accordance with prevailing practice, with road counts albeit on a much larger scale than had previously been done. However, the Ministry of Transport insisted that forecasts to 1980 be included in the Survey, given that schemes take seven or eight years to be implemented. But because they lacked the qualified staff to

carry out the Survey, the decision was taken to rely on consultants. The consultants chosen were Freeman Fox (London), Wilbur Smith and Associates (New Haven, Conn.) and the Engineering Service Corporation (Los Angeles). The proposals put forward by the consultants as to the scope and the form of the Survey clashed with the expectations of the clients on the following respects:

1. The consultants thought that the forecasts should be based on the interrelation between land use, social and economic characteristics of the population as well as travel habits.
2. They also considered that attention should not be directed exclusively towards road traffic but should encompass travel by all modes.
3. They proposed that the sampling should be done throughout the area within the green belt.
4. They considered that the Survey should be based on home interviews.

As a result of these proposals there was a large difference between the cost of the Survey as proposed by the consultants and what was anticipated by the clients. While the LCC and the MOT had expected to pay £100,000 each for the Survey, the consultants had in mind a study which would cost £600,000 plus £100,000 to be absorbed by the LCC in direct costs (Goldrick 1967: 88-9). The consultants were in fact trying to sell a package similar to the one developed in the United States and applied in American cities. Such transport studies had been carried out in 1955 in Washington D.C., in 1956 in Chicago, in 1957 in St.-Louis

and in 1959 in Los Angeles. In order to sell this package, the consultants insisted on the need for a global approach to transport planning in London but divided the Survey into three self-contained phases in order to reduce the financial and methodological commitment required initially. (Goldrick 1967: 90-1).

The LCC and MOT eventually accepted the proposed package. This reflected their acknowledgement that for the purpose of assessing the need for motorways in London - an increasingly discussed option - the road count technique was insufficient and a more refined methodology was needed e.g. origin-destination surveys to determine the location of motorways. It was also agreed that the Survey should cover the totality of the area within the green belt. In these circumstances, the MOT agreed to pay over the basic fifty percent accepted earlier, a further third of the remaining half in respect of the part of the study outside the County of London. The London Transport Board and British Railways Board, while invited to contribute to the costs of the first phase of the Survey, declined to do so; later however, London Transport bought space on the home interview questionnaire. During Phase Two, representatives from London Transport and British Rail joined the steering group. But as Goldrick (1967: 127) observes, their contribution was modest. It consisted mainly in the supply of data.

In 1965, the Greater London Council took over the direction of the Survey. The first phase had been completed and the second

phase was well under way. The Council decided to proceed with the third phase, to be renamed the "London Transportation Study" on the grounds that this phase was essential to the determination of the transport proposals to be included in the Greater London Development Plan. The financing of this last phase was shared on a 60/40 basis between the MOT and the GLC.

The launching of the London Traffic Survey illustrates the nature of the relationship between elected members and planners. Elected members first adopt a specific definition of a problem and of the type of solution required. They then rely on planners to quantify the characteristics of the prevailing situation, forecast its evolution and on this basis, devise a transport strategy. Within this framework the planners try to expand their degree of autonomy in the management of the plans and formulation of the schemes. In the case of the London Traffic Survey, the planners managed to sell, largely on the basis of the scientificity of their knowledge of the matter and of their experience, a package which gave them a high degree of autonomy in the conduct of the Survey. They were successful in imposing upon their clients their own definition of the problem with regard to the area to be covered by the Survey and the modes of transport to be considered. Having presented the conditions in which the LTS was initiated, we shall now go on to consider the structure and the proposals of the LTS.

5.2. The procedure and the proposals of the London Traffic Survey / London Transportation Study and of the Greater London Development Plan

In the first part of this section, the different phases of the London Traffic Survey / London Transportation Study will be presented. It will be shown how they related one to another and how they led to the motorway proposals. In the following part, I intend to demonstrate that the organisation of the LTS, the choice of the elements included in the forecasting and the conclusions derived from them, inevitably lead to large scale highway popoosals. The final part will focus on the adoption of the transport proposals of the LTS by the Greater London Development Plan. The poor coordination between these proposals and the other elements of the Plan, in particular the land use aspects, will be underlined.

5.2.1. The structure of the London Traffic Survey / London Transportation Study

The LTS was divided into three semi-autonomous phases which in fact coincide with the three basic steps of the Urban Transport Planning Procedure outlined in Chapter three: an inventory of the prevailing situation, a forecast of how it will evolve to some date in the future and the advancement of schemes to accommodate the forecast changes in demand (Figure 5.1.). What was specific to the LTS was that, as a consequence of the selling strategy of the planners, each phase led to the production

FIGURE 5.1

STAGES OF THE LONDON TRANSPORTATION STUDY.



SOURCE: GLC 1969b: FIGURE 2.1.

of a distinct report.

The report of Phase I which was published in July 1964, contained the results of road-side interviews, of a study of commercial vehicle movements, of consultations with transport undertakings and taxi companies, of traffic counts and measurements of journey times, and in particular of 50,000 home interviews of which 10,000 were with non-car owners. This imbalance in favour of car-owning households in the distribution of home interviews was related to the primary preoccupation of elected members with road traffic. As stated in the report of Phase I of the London Traffic Survey (LCC and MOT 1964: 32 para. 3.27):

> "This imbalance was intended; it was to meet requirements established by the Survey sponsors to give emphasis in Phase I to accurate determination of vehicular traffic patterns for the study of road traffic needs .. ."

This initial focus on road traffic and especially on the private car was to colour the three phases of the LTS in spite of attempts to widen their scope to cover other transport modes. Phase I of the Survey not only painted a quantative picture of the prevailing traffic situation as would any origin-destination study, but also set the ground rules for its forecasts by attempting to determine the factors underlying trip generation (LCC and MOT 1964: chapt. 7). This phase of the Survey also reviewed past trends with the intention of using them to predict the the evolution of traffic levels.

Phase II was published two years later. Its stated aims were:

> ".. to make as careful and detailed a forecast as was possible of the extent and the nature of future travel demands in the Survey Area ... and ... to make a preliminary study of what actual patterns of travel would result if

> these demands were channeled into the routes that could be foreseen." (LCC (GLC) and MOT 1966: n.p.).

The forecast of travel demand for 1971 and 1981 was made with the help of mathematical models expressing the relationship between the demand for travel and socio-economic factors identified in the first phase. Four such factors were considered:

1. The total population and its geopraphical distribution: it was anticipated that, while there would be little change in population and in its distribution over the Survey area, the number of households would increase by five percent by 1981.
2. Employment and its geographical distribution: it was forecast that total emloyment would rise by eleven percent over the Survey area and by thirteen percent in London's central area by 1981.
3. Household income levels: it was assumed that household incomes would grow by 3.25% per annum in real terms representing an increase in purchasing power of 2,8% per annum. This increase was similar to that which had occurred over the previous twenty years.
4. Increase in car ownership: it was predicted that the level of car ownership per household would nearly double, rising from thirty-eight percent to sixty-eight percent between 1962 and 1981 (LCC (GLC) and MOT 1966: 170).

The two main factors affecting traffic growth were increases in household income and increases in car ownership. The logic of the Survey's forecast was that as incomes increased, more households would join the income categories associated with high

levels of car ownership. As car ownership and higher income were related to the number of trips made, this would lead to a significant rise in the level of road traffic. To accommodate these increases in road traffic two motorway proposals were presented, one of 260 and the other of 444 miles. It was forecast in the second phase of the LTS that between 1962 and 1981 the number of daily internal person trips in the Survey area would increase from 12.05 million to 17.51 million (assuming the completion of the maximum motorway network). Whereas only 5.61 million person trips were made using private transport in 1962, it was expected that this figure would rise to 12.28 million in 1981 (GLC 1969b: Table 4.18) (Figure 5.2).

Phase III of what had by then become known as the London Transportation Study, appeared in 1969. It presented a comparison of the impact of three different motorway plans seen in terms of a trade off between their cost and the degree to which they could accommodate the forecast potential travel demand by private transport. These plans were:

1. Plan I which consisted of 150 miles of motorways at a cost of £372 million. Under this plan, it was assumed that 2.89 million of the forecast potential travel demand would have to be cancelled.
2. Plan 9 which consisted of 413 miles of motorways at a cost of £2,063 million. It was considered that such a network could accommodate the totality of the forecast potential travel demand, and
3. finally, the plan advocated by the authors of the LTS, Plan 3, which consisted of 349 miles of motorways which would cost

Figure 5.2 Total internal person trips in London according to the London Traffic Survey and the London Transportation Study (24 hour average weekday millions internal trips)

	1962	1981 (maximum)
Internal car driver	4.12	8.98
Other internal private	1.49	3.30
Total internal private	5.61	12.28
Internal public transport	5.72	4.41
Unreported public transport	0.72	0.82
Total internal public transport	6.44	5.23
Total internal	12.05	17.51

Source: Greater London Council (1969b)

£1,658 million. Such a scheme would nevertheless lead to the elimination of 0.8 million trips made by private cars. Of these trips it was assumed that 0.37 million would be made by public transport while 0.48 million would not be made at all. (GLC 1969b: table B.21) (Figure 5.3)

The model developed for the LTS was more elaborate than those used in most earlier transport studies. In addition to the trip generation, trip distribution, modal choice and traffic assignment procedures common to most contemporary transport studies, it also included speed reduction and restraint considerations as well as economic and operational analyses (GLC 1969b: 53 para. 4.3). Again, unlike most of the studies of that period, phase III of the LTS presented public transport proposals. In fact, however, the authors of the Study contented themselves with the inclusion of the current London Transport and British Rail schemes without much integration with the main aspect of the Study i.e.the motorway proposals.

5.2.2. The London Traffic Survey / London Transportation Study as a machinery leading to the proposal of extensive road schemes

The authors of the LTS justified their proposal for a large scale motorway programme as follows:

1. They argued that the state of congestion they described in Phase I of London was unsatisfactory.
2. Given their forecasts of large increases in car use, they demonstrated in Phase II that the situation would deteriorate

FIGURE 5.3

THE MOTORWAY PLANS TESTED IN THE LONDON TRANSPORTION STUDY.

PLAN 1



PLAN 3



PLAN 9



SOURCE: GLC 1969 b : FIGURE B.1.

significantly if no large scale cure was devised.

3. They presented in Phase III a motorway network as the solution to the problem.

While their forecasts of traffic increases were based mainly on income and level of car ownership growth, the authors of the study referred to the American experience as a guide to what the situation was likely to become in London in the future - this was done especially in the early phase of the LTS. For instance, they argued that, since in 1962 the per capita car ownership in London was only half of that prevailing in major American cities, there was an important potential for growth in car ownership in London (LCC and MOT 1964: 1 para. 1.03, 15 para. 9.07). Similarily, they suggested that the rates of traffic generation in London were likely to increase significantly since only approximately 1.5 journeys per person per day were made in the capital compared with a range of from 1.6 to 2.2 in large American cities (LCC and MOT 1964: 127 para. 7.02) (Figure 5.4).

On the basis of the trends revealed in Phase I showing that journeys to work were decreasing as a proportion of all trips made (LCC and MOT 1964: 160 para. 9.63), the authors of the LTS forecast in the second phase that the greatest increases in transport demand would occur in non-central areas at off-peak times and would consist of trips made by private transport. In the 1981A (maximum) assumption, the authors predicted that work trips would increase by 90% and non-home based trips, by 50.5% (LCC (GLC) and MOT 1966: table 18.1) (See fig. 5.5). A large increase in vehicle miles on the main road networks was also anticipated. Total vehicle miles in London were forecast to grow by 165% between 1962 and 1981, from 24 million miles to 71 million miles (LCC (GLC) and MOT 1966: 163 para. 17. 121).

Figure 5.4 Generation of travel in Greater London and urban areas of the U.S.A.

Urban area	Year of survey	Population in Study area	Persons per Household	Persons per car	Cars per Household	Journeys per person	Journeys per Household
Greater London	1962	8,505,540*	2.87	6.81	0.42	1.54#	4.41#
Chicago, Illinois	1956	5,169,663	3.10	3.85	0.80	1.92	5.96
Detroit, Michigan	1953	2,968,875	3.31	3.51	0.94	1.77	5.88
Baltimore, Maryland	1962	1,607,931	3.35	3.62	0.93	1.68	5.62
Washington, D.C.	1955	1,568,522	3.02	3.75	0.81	1.67	5.05
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania	1958	1,472,099	3.26	3.75	0,87	1.61	5.26
St Louis, Missouri	1957	1,275,457	3.12	3.48	0.90	1.94	6.05
Houston, Texas	1953	878,629	3.22	3.43	0.94	2.22	7.16
Kansas City, Missouri	1957	857,550	3.07	3.26	0.95	2.18	6.69

*Population in households. #Unlinked journeys in typical 24-hour weekday by Survey Area residents of households

Source: GLC (1969b)

Figure 5.5 Estimates of trip purposes in the London Transportation Study area (percentage 24 hour trips)

	1962	1981
Work	26.1	17.8
Other home-based	28.8	33.4
Non-home-based	14.8	12.5
Commercial and taxis	21.1	21.9
External	9.2	14.4
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: GLC (1969b: Table 5.2)

These forecasts led to the conclusions that the congested road system would not be able to accommodate all the increased traffic, that the proportion of it that it would accommodate would be at the expense of residential streets, and that the dominant pattern of transport of London, largely radial in nature, was not adapted to the evolution of the transport needs (GLC 1969b: 9 para. 1.21). The "do nothing" alternative was rejected outright by the authors of the study because it was considered essential that measures should be taken to preserve amenity and personal mobility as well as to allow the maintenance and expansion of economic activities (LCC (GLC) and MOT 1966:n.p.; GLC 1969b: 10 para. 1.26). As stated in the Phase III report, if nothing is done, the result will be increased crowding of the road system leading to congestion costs and causing serious disruption to the economy and social activities, and a further deterioration of the environment (GLC 1969b: 13 para. 157). Once the "do nothing" option was rejected, the Phase III report necessarily had to conclude with proposals for large scale road schemes.

In Phase III, fourteen plans were introduced all of which were variations on the theme of motorways as a means of providing a primary road network. Of these plans, three were evaluated. Plan 3, the plan recommended by the authors for implementation consisted of three orbital and fourteen radial routes (see Fig. 5.6). The public transport plan put forward, referred to as C2/B, advocated electrification schemes and an overall improvement of services for the British Rail commuter network as well as extensions to the underground system. It proposed the extension

FIGURE 5.6
LTS 1981A NETWORK (PHASE II)



SOURCE: GLC 1969 b : FIGUR

of the Victoria Line to Brixton, the construction of the Fleet Line by extending the Stanmore Branch of the Bakerloo Line to Lewisham, the continuation of the Picadilly Line to Heathrow as well as the establishment of a link between Aldwich and Waterloo. It was also assumed in the C2/B plan that new bus routes would run on the motorways (GLC 1969b: 44 para. 4.22). Unlike the motorway scheme, the public transport proposals did not stem from the survey and forecasts of the two first phases of the LTS. They were borrowed from the public transport operator's own plans.

It thus appears that the motorway proposals were already implied in the LTS definition of transport problems and in its forecasts. Because of this definition and of these forecasts, the LTS could only put forward large scale road proposals. We shall now go on to consider the manner in which these proposals were integrated in the Greater London Development Plan.

5.2.3. The Greater London Development Plan

We shall consider in this section how the Greater London Development Plan was set up and what purpose was attributed to it. We shall focus more specifically on its transport proposals. We shall see that the LTS motorway proposals were reproduced in the GLDP and that schemes originating from public transport bodies were added to them.

The Greater London Development Plan, a requirement of the 1963 London Government Act, was the first attempt in Britain to produce a structure plan. However as its preparation took place prior to the publication of the 1968 Town and Country Planning Act, it did not conform in every respect to its definition of a structure plan. The GLDP therefore ended up as neither a structure nor a development plan (W.G. Jones 1979 : 51-2). The purpose of the GLDP was to set out principles for the future of Greater London as regards to transport and land use. It was to be submitted to the Minister and once accepted, the boroughs were to prepare development plans in conformity with the provisions of the GLDP regarding their areas.

The Plan stated its general objective as to the pursuit of a policy of decentralisation in accordance with past trends but at a more moderate pace in order to preserve vital activities and to avoid serious falls in population (GLC 1969c: 10 para. 2.2, 2.3, 2.4). The Council mentioned their intention to assist in the decentralisation of population towards expanding new towns, in the moving out of factories which were not conforming to their present surroundings, and in the moving out of offices following the work done by the Location of Offices Bureau (GLC 1969c: 13 paras 3.10, 3.17; 20 paras 4.13, 4.14, 4.18). After acknowledging that since the 1950's, retail trade had been growing faster in outer London than in the inner and central areas (GLCd 1969: 103 para. 4.42), the Plan proposed the development of six major strategic shopping centres each serving 750,000 persons or more. Their catchement areas put together

would cover all London except the central area. The proposed centres were: Croydon, Ealing Broadway and West Ealing, Ilford, Kingston, Lewisham and Wood Green (GLC 1969c: 42-5 section 8) (see Figure 5.7).

The transport proposals contained in the GLDP were borrowed from the LTS. The need for a primary road network of motorway standard, i.e. Plan 3 of the LTS, was presented largely in the same terms as in the LTS, as catering for the forecast increase in demand for car travel because considered essential to the economic life of London and as necessary for the preservation of the environment in residential neighbourhoods and shopping districts. The GLC Highways and Transportation Department estimated that in 1966, the annual cost of congestion in London was £150 million (GLC 1969d: 172 Table 6.20). The plan therefore argued that if nothing was done to find a solution to problems of traffic in London, movements by car would become increasingly difficult and employment as well as shops would move elsewhere (GLC 1969e: 65). The efficiency of London would thus be impaired and not only business but vital services would also be affected. Because of circulation problems, various services in London would become more costly and their overall level would decrease (GLC 1969c: 22 para. 5.9). According to the GLDP the advantages of the primary road network would be to relieve the existing main roads of longer distance traffic, thus allowing them to function more efficiently as secondary roads, and to make orbital journeys easier thereby relieving central London of through traffic. Furthermore, it was argued that the network would provide good

FIGURE 5.7
SHOPPING CENTRES IN THEIR SECTORS



SOURCE: GLC 1969c : FIGURE 10

access from all parts of London to the national motorway system (GLC 1969c: 23 para. 5.12). Finally, the PRN was seen as a means of improving the environment by channelling traffic away from shopping and residential streets (GLC 1969c: 11 para. 2.10).

In order to function optimally, the motorways would have to be protected from traffic overloading. Since the level of travel demand forecast in Phase II of the LTS for 1982 would have exceeded the capacity of the proposed motorway network, measures were needed to curb the potential use of this network. However the GLDP, like the LTS, gave little consideration to this matter (GLC 1969c: 23 para. 5.13): only parking measures were presented as means of traffic restraint (GLC 1969c: 25 para. 5.33).

Public transport services were primarily seen in the GDLP as means of access to the central area (GLC 1969c: 27 para. 5.50). As no increase was expected in the use of public transport services in the forecasts of the LTS, the purpose of public transport schemes included in the GLDP was to relieve congestion where it prevailed and more generally, "...make travel conditions acceptable to a community whose standard of living is steadily rising" (GLC 1969c: 27 para. 5.51). Unlike the PRN, these schemes, provided by London Transport and by British Rail, were not the outcome of the argumentation of the three phases of the LTS. Public transport services in outer London were seen as residual, devoid of strategic purposes and maintained only to cater for non car users (GLC 1969d: 196 para. 6, 228).

More generally, little consideration was given to the bus in spite of its importance in terms of the number of people it carries. As Rhodes writes:

> "There is a sharp contrast between the precise road proposals in the GLDP and the much more generalised and indefinite proposals for improvements in British Rail and London Transport services." (1972: 275)

A sharp contrast prevailed between the land use and the motorway proposals of the GLDP. While the PRN appeared as the result of extensive research supported by a complex methodology, the land use proposals lacked this type of justification. Also, as observed by Self (1972: 32), land use planning goals cannot be as precise as those of the transport planners. Nurtured within the context of the LTS, the PRN proposals were developed with virtually no concern for land use considerations. When placed within the GLDP they bore no relation to its land use recommendations. For instance, none of the routes of the proposed motorways catered for the major shopping centres defined by the Plan (Self 1972: 313). Furthermore, no attention was given to the likely impact of the PRN on land use due to the effect of the motorways on accessibility patterns in London and its region. This could have led to a conflict between the form of decentralisation advocated by the GLDP which could be described as "focused" because it involves growth in circumscribed areas and the effect of the motorway network which could have encouraged a "diffused decentralisation" in which growth is not concentrated in this way. Thus it is quite clear that the GLDP suffered from a complete lack of integration between its highway and its land use proposals as well

as between highway and public transport schemes it included. Each one of these groups of recommendations was presented independantly from the others. It appears that the GLDP repeated the LTS motorway proposals and accompanied them by public transport schemes formulated by London Transport and British Rail while failing to relate transport proposals to land use proposals.

5.3 The formulation of the transport problem and its solutions

We now turn to a critique of the assumptions and methods of the LTS as well as of its proposals. In the first part, we focus on the planning procedures and forecasting methods used in the LTS. In the second part, we consider the impact the PRN would have had on the distribution of activities in London and how different social groups would have been affected by this. And in the final part, I discuss the likely motivations of the planners in devising such large scale planning procedures and proposals.

5.3.1 The methological features of the London Traffic Survey / London Transportation Study

It could be argued that the LTS has essentially consisted of a justification process for road proposals which had been in the air since the war but needed the seal of a modern "scientific" study in order to make them attractive in the context of the

1960's and early 1970's. One piece of evidence supporting this assertion is that, in the early stages of the LTS, there were already hints of the proposals which were later to be formulated. For instance, the Phase I report contains the statement that "a high proportion of the present traffic in Greater London could be accommodated by a limited mileage of high-capacity routes" (LCC and MOT 1964: 158 para. 9.20) and Plan 3, the one advocated by the planners, bore great similarities with the road proposals put forward by Abercrombie's Greater London Plan devised at the end of the war. As Hart suggests:

> "in an important sense the Geddesian cycle of 'survey, analysis and plan' had been altered so that the survey could be used as an instrument to provide quantitive support for the long-standing plan." (1976: 121-2)

A possible explanation of this similarity between the highway proposals could be that, once they had made a case for large scale road expenditures, consultants and planners, having an interest in seeing their proposals accepted by elected members, borrowed elements from the Abercrombie plan. In the 1950's the Abercrombie plan was often seen as presenting the ultimate solution to London's road congestion problem if only the necessary funds were available. A motorway proposal resembling Abercrombie's plan was thus likely to win the support of elected members because of their familiarity with the concept. However the LTS authors did not share Abercrombie's preoccupation with the relation between transport and land use and more specifically his concern with the establishment of environmental areas free of through traffic referred to as precincts. They also failed to follow his attempts to adapt the network to the land use pattern of London in order to avoid the disruption of

neighbourhoods as much as possible.

The LTS devised the motorway network as an answer to an overall demand for road travel assessed at the level of the agglomeration. An integrated network was planned to cater for the need for road trips defined at the level of Greater London. The needs underlying the configuration of the motorway network, as stated by the LTS were:

1. To by-pass the central area
2. To by-pass the built-up area of London, and
3. To cater for the forecast increase in orbital movements.

With the exception of central London, the network was not geared to any specific pole of attraction. For instance, the orbitals did not link the major suburban centres where a significant amount of traffic is generated (Hart 1976: 144) and where this amount was expected to rise in the future (Ash 1972: 23). A motorway scheme devised to cater for the main poles of traffic generation of Greater London, would have been less symmetrical than the LTS proposal. Furthermore, as Thomson (1969: 51) argued, the orbital motorways could not fulfill the purpose assigned to them i.e. to accommodate the increased demand for inter-suburban journeys. This was because most of these journeys were for shopping or social purposes and therefore covered relatively short distances and did not form broad channels of movement. According to Thomson, to accommodate these trips, many low capacity links between suburbs would have been more appropriate.

As has been seen earlier, it appears that the LTS has been orchestrated to allow the proposal of large scale road schemes. The choice of the information collected might be explained by a desire to conclude that there was a need for large scale road expenditure in London. The criteria for this selection was then the relevance of the data in making such a case. The LTS, for example, excluded trips by foot probably because they had no impact on the need for more road space. Similarily, relatively little importance was given to the use of public transport.

Attention was mainly focused on private transport trips. The number of these trips made was seen as largely determined by household incomes and opportunities for using a car. It was assumed in the LTS that levels of car ownership and trip making would tend towards the situation prevailing in the United States as incomes increased. Such a view obscures the fact that decisions to make a trip take place within a given context. While income and car ownership certainly influence these decisions, the distribution of activities and the generalised cost (in terms of money and time) of travel also have an influence (Jenkins 1973: 261). There are significant differences in land use patterns between London and most American large cities. Therefore, even with similar incomes and car ownership rates, it is likely that many trips would be shorter in London because of an overall higher density and a different distribution of activities. London's land use patterns allows trips to be made easily on foot in circumstances where often a car journey would be necessary in an American city. The assumption that higher incomes and levels of car ownership in London would lead to similar numbers of private transport trips than in American cities must therefore be treated with caution.

Decisions to make trips also depend on the conditions of travel often seen in terms of generalised costs. In the case of road transport, it is likely that some trips will stop being made by modes using road space if traffic congestion significantly increases their generalised cost. The level of circulation then stabilises. If improvements were made, this level would rise again because travel conditions would improve. This point was overlooked by the authors of the LTS. As Thomson (1969: 22-3) observes, because they based their forecasts on trends of the recent past, they predicted increases in traffic (and hence a need for more road space) even in cases where the roads were not yet congested. On the other hand, in cases where roads were already congested during the study period, they considered that no increase in traffic levels would take place in the future and that there was therefore no need to cater for non-work suburban orbital trips, as against radial work trips to central London.

A major problem with the LTS was its adoption of the notion of a potential demand for trip making deriving from socio-economic factors. This notion neglects the distribution of activities and the constraints inherent to transport systems themselves and hence ignores the conditions in which trip making decisions take place. If these conditions had been considered, it is likely that the spectre of a London grinding to a halt and of economic doom in the absence of the PRN would not have been taken seriously. The low speeds on the road network and the limited availability of car park spaces would constitute a deterrent to

those for whom the use of a car for a given trip was not essential. They would change mode or readjust their activity patterns. In these circumstances, essential trips would still be made albeit at a somewhat higher cost because of low speed. Even the implementation of the PRN would not have consitituted a guarantee against congestion and its negative impacts. Within the LTS' own logic, the motorway network needed some measure of traffic restriction in order to allow it to operate at maximum efficiency. This was so because the potential forecast demand by private transport was in excess of the network's capacity (GLC 1969b: 12 para. 1.47). However, no adequate traffic restriction measures were offered by the Study. Attention to the conditions of trip making decisions leads to the view that in the medium term, the PRN would have become congested and would have made little contribution to the alleviation of crowding on other roads. As the motorways would have reduced significantly the cost of transport by car, an increase in the use of this mode would possibly have taken place. In the medium term, this could have contributed to an increase of car ownership because of the improvement of private transport conditions relative to public transport conditions. The overall increase in traffic generated by the PRN would probably have impeded the improvements it was assumed that the motorways would bring to the secondary road system.

Among other criticism that can be made of the LTS, doubt can be thrown on the accuracy of the twenty year forecasts which were used to justify the PRN proposals. Between the second and the third phase of the LTS, significant changes had already

happened in the population and employment projections. While in Phase I an increase of 3.6% in the population of the study area and a growth of 11.4% in employment were assumed, in Phase II these projections were dropped and it was assumed that population would fall by 1.5% and employment would rise by a modest 2% (GLC 1969b: 14 para. 1.67 and Table 3.1.3.3). The authors of the study nevertheless considered that these variations would not have enough impact on the demand for private transport to challenge the idea of the proposed PRN. Another objection to the LTS is that the cost/benefit procedure applied in Phase III to the evaluation of three different motorway plans exaggerated the level of benefits. On the one hand, among the sum of benefits, a monetary value was awarded in respect of the advantages to travellers from better travel conditions and the extra tax revenues resulting from increased car use. On the other hand, on grounds of difficulties of quantification (GLC 1969b: 145), the effects of the noise and of the nuisance of traffic to the residents of areas close to the motorways were not included in the cost side.

It seems that to a great extent, the LTS turned out to be a sophisticated justification of road plans which had been in the air for twenty years. The methodology of the LTS necessarily led to the proposal of large scale motorway plans devised at the scale of the Greater London area. The choice of data and the forecast procedures adopted in the LTS could only be relevant to such a proposal. The motorway network put forward was based on the projection of a potential demand for travel at a given date in the future. By adopting such procedures, the authors

of the LTS neglected to give consideration to the actual context in which travel decisions are made. I would thus argue that what appears, in many cases, to be methodological shortcomings of the study in fact acted as major supporting elements in the argument in favour of the motorway network.

5.3.2 The hidden consequences of the Primary Road Network

We shall focus, in this section, on what could have been the effects of the implementation of the Primary Road Network on the distribution of activities in London and on social groups present in the capital. As observed by Buchanan et al (1970: 81 para. 165), the LTS and the GDLP underplayed the likely environmental consequences of the PRN. This was partly justified by the authors of the LTS in terms of the argument that efforts would be made during the implementation of the network to reduce these consequences to a minimum. In the proposed plan, 13.2% of the motorway mileage would be in cuttings and 1.9% tunnelled (GLC 1969b: Table C.1). In the case of Ringway One, where the largest number of residents would experience environmental damage, the proportion of depressed or tunnelled mileage rose to nearly one half (GLC 1969b: Table 4.6). In addition, little reference was made in the Study and in the Plan to the likely impact the PRN would have on the distribution of activities through the turmoil they would have caused in the accessibility pattern in London. As Buchanan et al. write:

"... we think that the Plan may be open to some criticism

> on the grounds that the effect of the development of the primary network on the distribution of uses over time has been underestimated." (1970: 81 para. 165)

In only a few places in the GLDP was there mention of the land use effects the PRN would probably have caused. In one of these cases, in the GLDP Report of Studies (1969d: 194 para. 6.209), it was acknowledged that the PRN " may deter the redevelopment of existing suburban centres by encouraging new development at strategic intersections of new roads." However, the Report went on to suggest that it would be necessary to control the development generated by the motorway network (GLC 1969d: 195 para. 6.217). It is thus clear that the likely impact of the motorways, in terms of environmental effects and of changes in the distribution of activities in London, were played down by the LTS and the GLDP. The PRN was presented as largely innocent of such effects.

The authors of Phase II of the LTS argued that if the constraints on road traffic caused by congestion continued unrelieved, this would lead to increases in transport costs and would encourage the decentralisation of activities in London because of the better road access in the suburbs and outer areas (LCC (GLC) and MOT 1966: 171 para. 18.44). They thus presented the PRN as a contribution to the prevention of such decentralisation and as helping to preserve the then prevailing pattern of activities in London. Thomson (1969: 33-5) adopted a different view. He considered the impact of the PRN on a short, medium and on a long-term basis. In the short term, he predicted that the motorway network

would have encouraged a redistribution of traffic to take advantage of the favourable travel conditions created by the new highways. In the medium term, new trips would have been generated because of new destinations becoming easily accessible. Furthermore, as private transport would have become relatively more advantageous compared to other modes because of the PRN, switches from public transport to private transport as well as an increase in car ownership would have taken place. In the long-term, Thomson forecast that the new patterns of land use adapted to the motorway network and characterised by their accommodation of the car, would have spread. Because of their low density, these land use patterns would have been ill adapted to public transport and would have thereby contributed to increases in the use of private transport, leading to a further need for more roads.

I agree with Thomsom that the PRN would have led to an increase in car use because of the improvement in private travel conditions it would have produced. I also agree that this would have contributed to the promotion of significant changes in land use in and around London. The motorway network would have confirmed the dominance of the car as a mode of transport in London relative to public transport (see Figure 5.8)[1]. This dominance would probably have been accentuated by the downward spiral suffered by public transport services as a result of the loss of passengers due to the diversion towards private transport

FIGURE 5.8
POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE PRIMARY ROAD NETWORK ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVITIES IN LONDON



as a result of the PRN. Consequently, levels of service would have dropped and fares would have increased leading to further decreases in usage (Fairhurst 1975). Locations within easy reach by private transport would have gained in value because they would have become accessible to a greater number of people. Meanwhile, those associated with public transport would have lost their attractiveness because of the lower usage of this mode of transport. In fact locations cannot be related wholly to one mode or another. Rather it is a matter of degree: some locations tend to more adapted to access by car while others are more adapted to access by public transport. Central London would of course have largely maintained its value in most spheres of activity because of the intense concentration and interdependence of activities within this area and because of its exceptional position as the unchallenged focal point of public transport systems. For instance, in New York City, the importance of lower and mid-Manhattan and the dominance of public transport access to these areas have been maintained in spite of the implementation in the agglomeration of a motorway programme of an unprecedented scale from the 1930' to the 1960's.

The PRN itself would have entailed increases in the accessibility of areas along its corridors with "summits" at motorway intersections. These accessibility potentials would have tended to translate themselves into increases in land values. However, in many cases this new accessibility potential would have been lost because of the non adaptation of areas in the vicinity

of the motorways to car use. The main example of this non-adaptation is inner London where the urban built environment cannot in most cases accommodate large increases in the proportion of car use. In other locations however, and more specifically in outer London and in the Outer Metropolitan Area, most locations are adapted to high levels of car use. The activities located in these areas would have enjoyed an increase in their market of potential users as a consequence of the implementation of the PRN and of the increased reliance on the car resulting from it. On the other hand, activities located in areas more closely associated with public transport, would have suffered from a decline in the number of potential users because of lower public transport patronage.

The realisation of the PRN would thus have caused a shock in the distribution of activities in London. This distribution is the result of the interaction between land use and transport through successive transport ages. A transport investment on the scale of a motorway network would have seriously challenged the prevailing equilibrium between transport and land use throughout the Greater London area. If London is schematically presented as the juxtaposition of two different land use patterns, one of which is characterised by a high density of activities and a dominance of access by public transport, while the other is characterised by a more diffused distribution of activities which are more easily reached by car, it can be argued that the PRN would have favoured activities associated with the second land use pattern. The GLDP mentioned the need

for the control of land use in order to minimise what were perceived as negative consequences of the PRN. As stated in a document by an OECD road research group:

> " Transport improvements result in either positive or negative changes in land access. These direct impacts on land access have indirect impacts on the urban environment of various sorts, in varying degrees of desireability. The secondary impacts may be related to new or increased pressures to rezone or redevelop land to intolerable densities and uses, or to localised changes in commercial and industrial activity with consequent impacts upon the economic base and employent opportunities." (OECD 1973: 43).

However, accessibility patterns deriving from the implementation of the PRN would have been of a permanent nature while planning policies are changeable. It would then have been likely that pressures would have led, at least in some cases, to modifications of policies permitting various interests to take advantage of the resulting accessibility potential.

Three social groups would have suffered acutely from the realisation of the PRN and from consequences associated with it.

The first group consists of those who would have suffered from the deterioration of the environment caused by the motorway network. This effect would have been particularily serious for the residents of the inner city. While in many cases this group would benefit from the network because of their low level of car ownership, they would also have suffered more than residents from other sectors from demolitions and environmental impacts associated with the motorways. Indeed, fifty per cent of Ringway I and forty per cent of the inner radials would have been built through residential areas while this figure was only

twenty-eight per cent and eighteen per cent for the outer ringways and the outer radials (GLC 1969b: Table 4.1).

The second group consists of non-car users. This group would have suffered from the effects of a general increase in reliance on private transport causing drops in the patronage of public transport and consequently a worse service and increased fares. This would have restricted the territory accessible to them for a given total outlay. Similarily, non-car users would have had to face a greater dispersal of activities as the distribution of activities became more closely adapted to increasing car use. Therefore not only the size of the accessible area would have undergone a reduction, but the number of activities present within a given zone would also have diminished, reducing further the opportunities for non-car users.

The third group consists of those occupational groups associated with activities dependent on public transport. These activities would have undergone a decrease in their potential users as well as experiencing the competition of activities in locations better adapted to private transport. This situation would particularily affect many inner London activities because of the impossibility of their taking advantage of the increased accessibility resulting from the PRN because of their inability to accommodate large numbers of cars. On the other hand, as a result of the motorway network, car users would have generally benefited from easier accessibility to a wider range of activities but in many cases, at the price of longer trips. Likewise, land owners, developers and groups associated with activities which can easily accommodate cars, would have benefited from the implementation of the PRN.

It appears that the authors of the LTS and of the GLDP were preoccupied with presenting the PRN as a major contribution to the solution of road congestion problems without getting involved in a discussion of its negative environmental impacts and of its effects on land use patterns. We have seen that, in fact, the implementation of the Primary Road Network would probably have brought in significant changes in land use patterns in London and that it would have caused serious inconvenience for certain groups of population.

5.3.3 The interests of the planners

Having explored the LTS and the GLDP in its transport aspect and criticised their assumptions, methodology and proposals, we now ask the question: what motivated the authors of these plans in formulating these proposals and producing the argumentation underlying them?

The elected members were pressed to intervene into what was perceived by groups powerful enough to attract attention to their representations, as a transport problem i.e. traffic congestion. They were motivated to act by the anticipation of political advantages (i.e.votes) and by the economic advantages of reducing congestion. In these circumstances, elected members relied on planners to study the problem in detail, i.e. to formalise the definition of the problem and to formulate solutions on the basis of this definition. Reliance on planners

has two advantages for elected members. On the one hand, while the plans are being prepared, it appears that something is being done by the elected members to solve the problem even if relatively little money is being spent. On the other hand, if they adopt the solution put forward by the planners, the elected members can justify it as being the result of a scientific process and as having been devised independently of political pressures.

The relationship between elected members and planners entails that the former accept that the latter have a greater knowledge of the matter under investigation and of the methods needed to analyse it. Planners therefore enjoy a relative autonomy in the execution of their technical studies as long as they respect the definition of the needs and the limits on the scope of the solution set by the elected members. Within this framework planners are likely to attempt to devise as large a study as possible. This can be explained by the fact that participation in an important study can yield prestige and recognition for planners within their field. Another benefit which planners can derive from large scale technical studies is the availability of more funds. This is likely to be a particularily important motivation for consultants. In order to avoid interferences by elected members and to justify the scale of their technical studies, planners elaborate complex methodologies. The discussions between the consultants and the clients about the scope to be given to the London Traffic Survey, offers an example of this. While consultants are likely to be chiefly preoccupied by the scope of the plan because

their association with it terminates with the end of the planning process, the interests of planners hired by transport agencies will probably be wider. For instance, during the LTS the planners of the GLC Highways and Transportation Department and those working for the Ministry of Transport had an interest in the advancement of large scale schemes because their implementation would have meant an expansion of their agency and consequently the possibility of career benefits. We would suggest therefore that the type of methodology used by the authors of the LTS, and the scale of the proposals put forward by the LTS and adopted by the GLDP, can be explained in terms of planners' occupational interests.

5.4. The motorway debate

Having presented the process by which the motorway proposals were drawn up and considered some of their likely effects, in this section we will see how the proposals caused an intense polarisation of positions, and how a growing opposition led to the abandonment of the scheme. This section will therefore focus on the agents involved in the debate around the PRN proposals and the form taken by the confrontations between them. In the first part, I look at the reasons which led the GLC to become the political promoter of the proposals of the LTS. In the second part, we assess the configuration of forces in the motorway debate. We also review the arguments and methods used by the organisations opposed to the proposals. In the third

part, I attempt to give a short account of the positions taken during the GLDP inquiry. The inquiry is considered at this point because it may be seen as revealing in a vivid way the essence of the motorway debate. Attention is also given to the reactions which followed the statement of the Panel of Inquiry. In the fourth part, we shall look at the factors which underlay the rejection of the motorway plans, and finally in the last part, I shall attempt an analysis of the interests of the agents taking part in the debate.

5.4.1 The promotion of the motorway plans

When in the early 1960's, the consultants defined the area covered by the London Traffic Survey, it included the territory of many different local authorities. However from 1965, this area corresponded largely to the territory under the jurisdiction of the Greater London Council. Furthermore, the responsibility of the Council for principal roads and for the preparation of a transport plan gave it, along with the Ministry of Transport which was responsible for trunk roads, a direct interest in the pursuit of the LTS. In fact the GLC took over the direction of the Survey. The active support of the Council for the motorway proposals of the Phase III which led to their inclusion in the GLDP can be explained by three factors.

Firstly, support for these proposals was seen by the members of the Council as electorally beneficial. Since the Second World War, both parties had agreed on the need for large scale

road construction in London (Goldrick 1967: 212 and 215).
In all GLC elections before 1973, both parties agreed on the need to implement a large scale motorway scheme in the capital. Secondly, while they were planned under the direction of the GLC and were later promoted by this authority, the motorways were to be mainly financed by the Minsitry of Transport. The contribution of the Ministry towards their cost was to vary between 75% and 100%.
Thirdly, support for the PRN proposals helped the GLC to make a case for their existence as an elected body. Given the distribution of functions between the GLC and the boroughs, strategic road planning was among the few issuses within their responsibility which could mobilise the electorate. This may explain why strategic roads became a regular electoral issue at that level of government.
These factors explain the commitment of the GLC elected members to the promotion of the motorway proposals devised by the authors of the London Transportation Study over an eight year period. During this period, members of the Council tried very hard to sell the scheme to the public (Thomson 1977: 65). While the GLC was in the front line of the political defence of the PRN, at the planning level, there was very close collaboration between the GLC and the MOT and later with the Department of the Environment.

The Council's position on the motorways continued unchanged from 1965 to the early 1970's which is surprising considering the changing financial conditions affecting the chances of building them and the growing discontent over this period.
In April 1965, half way through the second phase of the London

Traffic Survey, the GLC announced within twelve hours of the start of their official life that the Survey was likely to reveal the need for a motorway "box" linking the radials converging on London. Steps were taken to safeguard the route of the Motorway Box and of the radials. The following year, on receiving the report of the second phase of the LTS, the GLC accepted the basic concept of three ringways accompanied by connecting radials. In November 1967, still one year before the completion of the London Transportation Study, the Council accepted the recommendations of a report outlying a possible programme of work for the period 1971-1973. At that time the GLC estimated the cost of the road programme at £1,226 million. But it soon appeared that it would be impossible to complete the PRN by the early 1980's. In consulting with the MOT, it became clear that the necessary funds would not become available during the early 1970's. In an agreement between the MOT and the GLC, it was decided that £255 million would be spent by the Ministry on trunk roads and £585 million on the GLC's metropolitan roads over a period of between five and eight years. The Council agreed to spend £146 million (GLC 1967a). On the basis of this level of spending, the Council devised a schedule for the construction of the motorways (Martin and Ridley 1968). In 1968, a recosting of the PRN involving savings of 18% by lowering environmental standards was considered (Stopher and Warren 1968). In the GLDP, the Council considered that by the mid-1980's, sufficient investment funds would have become available to allow the establishment of the complete pattern of the Primary Road Network (GLC 1969c: 24 para. 5.28). It went as far as to

present a road construction programme for 1969-70 and 1970-71 which included inter alia, the commencement of construction work om the East side of Ringway I and on the Southern part of Ringway II by the GLC, and initiation of the work on Ringway III by the MOT (GLC 1969: 24-5 para. 5.29-30). In January 1970, the Council decided to rephase the construction programme by postponing the date of completion of the whole network to the late 1990's. This was done in reaction to a recosting of the network which was now estimated at £1,695 million, and to the decision of the government to limit public expenditure growth to 3% per annum. In the new programme, Ringway I, which was the main target of the opposition movement, was given the lowest priority while Ringway II was given top priority (GLC 1970a: 2). On that occasion, some boroughs expressed their worries that such an extension of the length of the programme would cause planning blight. In November 1970 at the GLDP Inquiry and in March 1972 at the Expenditure Committee Inquiry, the GLC presented a transport programme covering the period stretching from 1971 to 1990 including the PRN and secondary roads, as well as proposals from London Transport and British Rail. The total cost of this programme was put at £2,900 million (proof of evidence E12/1 GLDP Inquiry: GLC 1972a). In 1971, the GLC envisaged the construction of the PRN, then valued at £1,400 million as well as the secondary road network costed at £600 million, in three phases: up to 1981, from 1981 to 1991 and beyond 1991.

It appears through this series of announcements from the GLC concerning the PRN, that the strategy followed on this matter was to attempt to maintain as far as possible the integrity of the

motorway plans as presented by the authors of the LTS. This was done in a climate of reductions in the rate of increase of public expenditure and of mounting opposition towards the schemes. The GLC managed to preserve the integrity of the PRN plans to a large extent by:

1. Extending the realisation over longer periods and by relegating the most unpopular parts of the scheme towards the end of this period, and
2. By diluting the PRN proposals by presenting them in the context of a comprehensive plan including secondary road and public transport schemes.

It appears that the commitment of the GLC to motorway plans which took the form of their promotion and of their defence in fromt of adverse conditions, can be explained by the nature of the Council's functions. Large scale road plans were indeed one of the few schemes that GLC politicians could put forward in order to mobilise public opinion in their favour and thereby justify the existence of the Council.

5.4.2 The support for and the opposition to the motorway scheme

The main support that the PRN proposal received from a non-governmental organisation, was from the British Road Federation. This organisation had at their disposal large sums made available through the affiliation of car, road building, petrol and road

haulage industries. The BRF also claimed to represent millions of car owners because the Automobile Association and the Royal Automobile Club were members of the Federation (Hamer 1974). The BRF, because of their pressures on the central and local governments, were certainly instrumental in the setting up of the LTS and in the adoption by many elected members of the view that urban motorways were the most positive solution to road congestion problems.

The action of the Federation was conducted on two fronts. On the one hand it was directly aimed at decision-makers. The BRF organised a "high class lobby" consisting of lunches and receptions for politicians as well as of glossy reports periodically sent to elected members, film projections on traffic problems and solutions etc. On the other hand, the action of the BRF sought to influence public opinion. On nearly every issue raised in the motorway debate, the Federation presented their point of view in the media. The BRF were also busy counteracting the influence of the anti-motorway movements. In the BRF 1971 Annual Report (1972: 13), it was observed that, " support for the GLC's ringway plan has involved more effort from the Federation than any other single item in 1971". Furthermore, in 1971, more than 500,000 leaflets entitled "Must this always be the Road from Woolwich to Kew?" were distributed through garages and service stations in Greater London. The leaflet advocated the replacement of the existing circular roads. Their distribution was timed to coincide with borough elections. Leaflets were also distributed inviting drivers to appear at public inquiries and to write to their councillor as well as to their local papers to defend the case for the construction of

motorways. In 1972, an advertising campaign around the theme "London can't stand still. London must have new roads." was launched in the Evening News and in suburban weeklies. The BRF was thereby trying to influence politicians directly by an efficient lobby and indirectly, through actions aimed at influencing the public and encouraging them to apply pressure on politicians to defend the motorway proposals.

The kernel of the BRF's case in the motorway debate was that "with the motorways, there will be easier movement and better living; without the motorways, further restrictions on personal mobility and ever rising costs to industry and to the consumer" (BRF 1970: 12). In very much the same way as the authors of the LTS and of the GLDP, the Federation considered that the alternative to the implementation of urban motorways would consist of: a decreasing quality of urban life because of an increasing level of congestion and eventually, the stagnation of the city centres as industry, commerce and even shops moved out of towns. As put in a figurative style by the BRF (1972: 12): "From being the attractive focal centres they are today, city centres could become the "ghost" centres of tomorrow".

Nationally, the BRF advocated the establishment of an estimated 1.000 miles of new primary roads in conurbations. They called for an increase in governmental support for this purpose to avoid the spreading of new road programmes over long periods of time by councils eager to avoid steep rate increases (BRF 1972: 5 and 12). Likewise, the Federation opposed the idea of

an inquiry into transport in London because of the delay it would bring about in the implementation of the PRN. Also, in their evidence to the GLDP Inquiry, the BRF urged a speedier realisation of the motorway proposals in London than allowed for in the GLC programme (Proof of evidence E12.46 GLDP Inquiry).

One strategy adopted by the Federation in the face of attacks from movements opposed to the PRN on the grounds of its anticipated negative environmental impacts, was to accept that there were environmental problems associated with urban motorways. The Federation would then resort to experts to discuss the problems and formulate solutions.[2] For instance in 1969, the Federation organised a conference entitled "Road and environmental planning and the reduction of noise" organised in conjunction with the Institute of Sound and Vibration Research and the Department of Civil Engineering of the University of Southampton. The BRF was active in attempting to present an acceptable face of the urban motorways. An example of this is that in 1972, the BRF supported the North Kensington Amenity Trust in their efforts to develop land adjoining the Westway and to provide facilities for community activities beneath it (BRF 1973: 10). To make urban motorways appear as acceptable, the BRF also produced films, exhibitions and a report (Llewelyn-Davies, Weeks et al. 1971). The purpose of the report was specifically to "investigate the local environmental implications of urban motorway development and to examine the ways in which motorways could be satisfactorily integrated into existing urban areas". The report made wide

use of foreign examples. Its authors saw the construction of urban motorways as providing opportunities for redevelopment including the use of the space under and above the motorway. They considered that by the use of attractive materials and appropriate building techniques, urban motorways could be made attractive (Llewelyn-Davies, Weeks et al. 1971: 55, 131-5). Consequently, unlike the LTS and the GLDP which underplayed the environmental impact of the PRN, the report concentrated on this form of impact of urban motorways and argued that it could be positive if the environment was adapted to the motorways.

The opposition to the motorways in London may well be a unique case because it was organised at the level of Greater London as a whole and directed its objections at the network as a whole. More usually, opposition to urban motorways focuses on a single stretch perhaps because the overall plan is usually played down. The form of the opposition in London was determined largely by the scope of the motorway proposals and by the manner in which they were promoted. As the promotion of the PRN was mainly in the hands of the GLC, many of the actions of the opposition were aimed at changing the attitude of the Council on this matter. The characteristics of the mainstream opposition movements reflected this context.

Firstly, by setting up federations covering Greater London, the opposition movements, though usually initially organised at a local level, gained the possibility of exercising an impact on the GLC. The existence of such federations influenced the nature of the protests and the arguments used. While the tendency

of local level protests is usually to protect a specific area, often at the expense of others, the effect of the federations was to coordinate the local organisations and to formulate demands in more general terms. The opposition of these federations was indeed largely based on arguments directed against the principle of urban motorways. Their existence helped to raise the discussion of local matters to a general level, and to pursue their case within the institutions operating on that level. For instance the federations participated actively in the Greater London Development Plan Inquiry.[3] This inquiry received no less than four hundred and sixty proofs of evidence and support documents on strategic transport matters, and five hundred and sixty on local transport issues (Panel of Inquiry on the GLDP 1973: 268). The federations were largely responsible for the relatively high proportion of objections dealing with strategic matters. The federations were up to a large extent, controlled from the top by bodies of politicians and experts.

Secondly, the opposition movement to the PRN was characterised by its law abiding nature and was thus well adapted to existing political institutions. At the outset of the GLDP Inquiry, Thomson commented:

> "Four years of heated debate, in which no one has resorted to even the mildest form of violence, have educated both the public and the GLC and have resulted in a greatly improved plan. For this we should be grateful." (The Times, 1 March 1973)

The respect of these movements for the institutional channels was underlined by their adherence to the strict procedure of the GLDP Inquiry. Furthermore, more specifically in the case of the federations, the level and nature of arguments to a large extent conformed to the framework of debate and language used

in plans and by GLC officials and elected members. The strategy of the federations was to attempt to outwit the planners and officials in their argumentation about motorways. In other words, they tried to beat them at their own game. This explained the highly technical nature of the motorway debate. As Jenkins commented:

> "... at times it seemed as if the debate had become a private conversation between the two of them (the GLC and the London Amenity and Transport Association). (1973: 260)

These characteristics of the opposition were largely related to the predominant participation of middle class agents even if undeniably[4], many working class agents participated at the local level. The influential position of the politicians and experts in the federations coloured the positions they took and the manner in which they pursued them. Overall, through their knowledge of the planning and political processes, those agents were able to participate through official channels and argue within the same framework as the planners. In addition, the time they had available to them allowed them to participate more intensively in the organisation of the federations.

The nature of the terrain on which the battle about motorways in London took place, while highly advantageous to the participation of upper and middle class agents, discouraged the participation of lower class agents. Because of the more limited time available to them and of their lesser knowledge of political processes, lower class movements would have been more likely to have been triggered by an immediate and local issue and would have led to

a higher degree of spontaneity in their response. Their demands would have been more closely related to their own interests. For instance, in June and July 1970, tenants from Acklam Road and St Ervan Road fought for relocation because of visual intrusion, noise and pollution stemming from the new Westway built at only thirty feet from bedroom windows. Their action included a march on the Town Hall. These tenants were finally rehoused by the GLC (Mason 1970). Furthermore, the crux of the arguments put forward by the federations against urban motorways related to environmental issuses. Lower class agents would on the contrary, have been more active in the defence of issues concerning their more immediate living conditionse.g. housing.[5]

The objections to the motorway proposals originated mainly from: local amneity societies, federations of societies, boroughs and other organisations interested in urban transport matters such as the Town and Country Planning Association, British Rail and London Transport. The British Railways Board and the London Transport Board had planned a series of speeches asking for more money for public transport investment in London before the publication of the Motorway Box plans. They were also to make a railway plan for London public at a press conference in March 1965, a few days before the GLC's Motorway Box announcement. They were, however, prevented from carrying out either of these intentions by the Minister of Transport (Goldrick 1967: 221). Two years later, the London Transport Board stated publicly that the motorway proposals were incompatible with the efficient provision of bus and underground services. While they acknowled-

ged that the new primary roads would take traffic away from ordinary roads, they forecast that this relief would be offset by large increases in car journeys which would necessarily begin and end on the ordinary road system (LTB 1968). While there was little outright opposition to the PRN from the BRB and the LTB, the two authorities nevertheless pressed for a better balance in the allocation of funds between private and public transport. This would have meant a large increase in the level of financial support for public transport.[6]

Some boroughs formulated their opposition to the PRN as proposed by the GLC. For instance, as early as 1966, certain boroughs opposed the Motorway Box plan because it used land needed for housing purposes. The following year, influenced by the Hampstead Motorway Action Group and the impact they were having on public opinion, the borough of Camden opposed the North Cross Route, a part of the Motorway Box (Wistrich 1972: 165-7). A few years later, at the GLDP Inquiry, officials of some boroughs challenged the LTS forecasting techniques and voiced their worries that the boroughs would suffer severe environmental deterioration as a result of the motorways (Proof of evidence E12.29 GLDP Inquiry). At the same inquiry, Greenwich and Croydon also mentioned their worries about the environmental impact of the proposed motorways. They offered traffic restraint measures as an alternative to the PRN (Proof of evidence E12.15 GLDP Inquiry). Similarily on the same occasion, the Borough of Lewisham objected to the proposals of Ringways 1 and II in their territory (Proof of evidence E27.54 GLDP Inquiry). In May 1971, the London Labour Party made public their opposition to Ringways I and II. At that time the Labour Party was in control of twenty two boroughs.

In October the London Boroughs Association, then Labour dominated, approved a motion presented by Wandsworth against Ringways I and II. By mid 1972, the boroughs of Wandsworth, Bexley, Hammersmith, Hackney, Lambeth, Lewisham and Merton had announced their opposition to Ringways I and II (Collins and Pharoah 1974: 126).

The opposition of some of the boroughs to aspects of the motorway proposals can be attributed to three main factors. Firstly, the difference between the functions of the boroughs and the GLC explained the boroughs opposition to motorways on the grounds that the land they would have used could have been allocated for housing. Therefore, while the GLC was defending the PRN because road transport was of central importance among their functions, the boroughs gave prime importance to housing which was the most salient among their functions. Furthermore, the boroughs responsibilities for local planning and local roads meant that they would have had to cope with the negative environmental and traffic consequences of the PRN. Hence, as W. G. Jones writes:"... the boroughs saw themselves as the guardians of the local environment." (1979: 125) Secondly, as a result of strong pressures from local organisations, borough councils, conscious of the potential electoral impact of such movements, adopted positions against aspects of the PRN. Movements may exert an impact on boroughs with less organisations than when they face the GLC where their likely electoral impact is much more diluted. Finally, the position on the motorway proposals of the two main

political parties diverged from 1971 onwards. From then on, the boroughs controlled by a Labour administration voiced their opposition to the motorway proposals. The conflict on this issue between some boroughs and the GLC therefore reflected to some extent the opposition on this matter between the two parties. The boroughs then became instrumental in inter-party opposition.

It would appear that the debate over the motorway proposals was dominated by the public's opposition as organised by the federations. Each federation was the result of a distinctive series of events. In 1965, Douglas Jay, MP for Battersea North, discovered that a housing project in his constituency was held up because of the safeguarding of the route of the Motorway Box. He was then instrumental in forming the Motorway Watchdog Committee of which he became the Chairman. Meanwhile in Hampstead, the first middle-class area to be threatened by motorway proposals, a strong motorway action group emerged. In 1968, the local MP, Ben Whittaker, together with Douglas Jay, called for a meeting of London members of parliament and representatives form the numerous anti-motorway groups which had emerged since 1965. This led to the setting up of the London Motorway Action Group, with Douglas Jay as Chairman. This anti-motorway federation comprised most of the inner London MPs and took a bi-partisan stand. As W.G. Jones writes:

> "Although many of these local groups were led by members of the Labour Party, the Conservatives at grassroots level were as willing to defend their own neighbourhood from the motorways as were anyone else, and they were often supported by their members of parliament." (1979: 62)

Jones also underlines the fact that the more affluent and

Conservative-controlled areas of London were helpful in their financial support and that this support contributed to the quality of the case put forward at the GLDP Inquiry. As local motorway action groups emerged throughout the metropolitan area, they generally joined the LMAG. Among their main actions up to 1970, during the winter of 1968-9, the LMAG voiced their protest at meetings organised by the GLC to present and defend the motorway proposal. And in 1969, they campaigned for an effective public inquiry on this matter.

The London Amenity and Transport Association, the other federation opposed to the motorways, started life in 1965 as the Transport in London Group constituted mainly of planners and experts concerned about the impact on London of transport developments.[7] In 1967, the LATA became a metropolitan wide association. Civic societies, residents' associations and other amenity groups of various scales became part of the Association. The LATA eventually secured for themselves the backing of ninety local groups including practically every important amenity group. However, the direction of the LATA remained largely in the hands of transport and planning professionals, thus achieving in Thomson's words " a technical competence that was seldom possible in small local groups" (1977: 64). Until the publication of their report Motorways in London, in 1969 (Thomson 1969), the Association kept an open mind on motorways. They saw their role as one of cooperation with the GLC and the MOT in defining policies. Furthermore, until 1970, they refused membership to anti-motorway groups. However, after the publication of the

report, the LATA became persona non grata at the GLC and in 1970, they joined forces with the London Motorway Action Group with the purpose of defeating the GLDP motorway proposals.

It is difficult to measure the impact of the motorway debate on public opinion. The British Road Federation sponsored polls which suggested that a slight majority was in favour of motorways in London (BRF 1973). Meanwhile, another poll conducted in 1970, indicated that in a choice among sectors of expenditure including providing more help to old people, controlling air pollution, building new homes, improving railways etc., spending on motorways came last. It also showed that support did not vary widely with incomes except at the extremes: 17% of the managing directors of substantial firms in London gave priority to the building of the motorways while the proportion was 8% for the sample as a whole. On the other hand, priority given to support for improved bus services varied from 5% in the case of directors to 27% among semi and unskilled workers (Willmott and Young 1970). It would seem from these results, that even if a slight majority was favourable to motorways, the priority given to such schemes was low. When motorways were compared with other expenditure priorities, they were placed at the bottom of the list.

The arguments put forward by the different sources of opposition to motorways in London revolved around five themes.
Firstly, they contained a critique of the methodology of the surveys leading to the motorway proposals and of the proposals themselves. The main points put forward were a dissatisfaction

with the mode of data collection by the LTS, with the validity of forecasting, with the range of options considered, and with the use made of cost-benefit techniques in the choice of the proposals put forward. The lack of integration between public transport plans and road proposals was mentioned. Also, the method of restraint proposed (control over car parking) was considered unrealistic (Panel of Inquiry on the GLDP 1973: 274).

A second theme was the likely inefficiency of the proposed Primary Road Network in solving the traffic problem. The argument that the PRN would bring an improvement in congestion and environment because of the reduction of traffic on secondary roads it would lead to, was challenged (Buchanan et al. 1970: 84 para. 171). It was suggested that, following the American example, the motorways would themselves become congested because of the extra travel they would generate. Critics also stressed that their existence would endanger public transport services, thereby leading to switches to private transport and further increases in overall road traffic level (Thomson 1971: 96).

A third theme was the inadequate consideration given to alternative transport solutions. It was often argued that the importance accorded to the motorway proposals obscured an adequate consideration of other urban transport options. Among the alternatives to the motorways put forward by the opponents were improvements to existing roads, extensions of the railway system, subsidies to bus services, a relative dispersal of activities, and traffic restraint (Thomson 1969: 163).

A fourth theme was that of their cost. The point was made that the PRN proposal would constitute the most expensive project pursued by the British Government in peace time, representing a cost of £800 per family in London, and that it could only be realised at the expense of other priorities. For instance, in 1973, Douglas Jay presented the problem in parliament in the following terms: a family income supplement costing £11 million would pay for 700 yards of Ringway I, a national rebate to furnished tenents would cost £8 million and would pay for around 500 yards, the European Economic Community regional aid budget for nine counties of £20 million would represent the cost of 1,100 yards (The Times 21 March 1973).

The final theme was that of environmental impact. This represented the main avenue of criticism followed by the opposition to the motorway proposals (Panel of Inquiry on the GLDP 1973: 383). A major case was made concerning the significant amount of housing which would have to be cleared to make way for the motorways. Much importance was also given to the disturbance that would have been suffered by approximately one million people who would have found themselves within two hundred yards of a motorway (Thomson 1969: 133). This disturbance would have been the consequence of noise, dirt, vibration and visual intrusion caused by urban motorways (DOE 1974). Residents along feeder routes to the motorways would also have been affected. The experience of the environmental impact of the Westway supported the case made by the opposition movements.

It would seem that the form taken by the opposition to motorway proposals was largely determined by the conditions of the debate set by the GLC and the MOT, the authorities with the power to formulate and implement these schemes, e.g. presentation of a comprehensive motorway plan justified by the findings of the London Traffic Survey. As has been seen, the opposition was largely organised at the level of Greater London because the GLC appeared as the central body in the decision-making related to the proposals. In addition, many of the objections against the scheme were counter-arguments to the justifications offered by the GLC and the authors of the LTS. It would therefore appear that the proponents of the proposals retained the initiative in the debate by keeping the discussion on their own ground. The opposition had to adjust their action to the characteristics of the seats of power in order to have an impact on the process.

The motorway debate became an arena opposing supporters and opponents of the motorway plans. The main proponents of the plans were the GLC and the MOT. The motorway plans were also supported by non-governmental bodies and in particular by groups with interests related to the use of the car and the construction of roads. These groups, mostly through the British Road Federation, defended the motorway plans against the stands of opponents and pressed the relevant authorities to proceed promptly with the construction of a motorway network. The opponents, federated in most cases into organisations operating at the level of the Greater London area, based their stand on the anticipated cost, and environmental and transport impacts of the motorway network. They also criticised the methodology underlying the motorway

proposals in the LTS. The anti-motorway federations were largely controlled by politicians and experts: this can account for the nature of the arguments the federations put forward and for their respect of the procedure of the political institutions.

5 4.3 The Greater London Development Plan Inquiry

In the face of twenty thousand objections to the Greater London Development Plan, the Secretary of State for Local Government and Regional Planning announced in December 1968 an inquiry to ease the controversy over the Plan. In order to give credibility as well as an air of neutrality to the inquiry, a quasi-legal procedure was adopted. Frank Layfield Q.C. who had the reputation of being an independant judicial personality was chosen as Chairman. Therefore in the event of the acceptance of the recommendation of the Inquiry by the Secretary of State, his position would appear as apolitical (W.G. Jones 1979: xiii). The effect of this procedure was to hamper the participation in the Inquiry by those who were neither lawyers nor experts or who could not hire them. This was so because the presentation of evidence had to conform to strict requirements in order to be considered by the Panel of Inquiry. This situation was reinforced by a personal deference of the Chairman towards expert witnesses. As commented by Jones (1979: 308), "under such circumstances, the right of the small objector to appear in defence of his own interest was of spurious value."

Two main factors inhibited the Panel from giving serious consideration to the case put by witnesses advocating the rejection of the GLDP's motorway proposals.

Firstly, because of the emphasis placed by the Panel on the justification of arguments by hard data, the GLC was in a position of advantage because the PRN proposal was based on the LTS. They thus benefited from a coherent justification of the plans they were promoting. To receive equal attention from the Panel within such a framework, the opponents of the Plan would have needed a counter survey of the scope of the LTS. Obviously no organisation would have had the resources to carry out such a study. Consequently, the Panel's emphasis on factual evidence advantaged the proponents of the motorway scheme. Secondly, the Panel were determined to improve rather than reject the proposals of the GLDP. As Pahl comments:

> " The aim had to be to produce a workable plan free from errors and wishful thinking which the Minister, or Secretary of State as he became, could approve." (1977: 136)

Radical criticisms of the PRN proposal were nevertheless made at the Inquiry, However, in most cases, little consideration was given to them by the Panel.

After holding two hundred and thirty-seven days of hearings and receiving 28,000 objections, of which 21,000 concerned the road proposals (18,000 objectors signed identical motorway protest forms) and after the spending of over £1 million, the Panel made their recommendations. Their transport proposals were that public transport should be given higher priority than in the GLDP and that there should be more restrictions of car traffic

than were proposed in the Plan (Panel of Inquiry on the GLDP 1973: 346-66). More specifically, with regard to the motorway proposals, the Panel recommended that the southern sections of Ringway 2 and 3 should be deleted. They also recommended that Ringway 1 should be constructed as soon as possible albeit with three instead of four lanes as proposed by the GLDP. The implementation of their motorway proposals was scheduled over twenty years. The Panel rejected the secondary road proposals made in the Plans (Panel of Inquiry on the GLDP 1973: 417-32). At 1970 prices, the cost of the Plan recommended by the Panel was estimated at £1,024 million, compared with £1,592 million for the GLDP road proposals (Panel of Inquiry on the GLDP 1973: 456).

By presenting such a Plan, the Panel was manifesting a desire to adhere to the main principles underlying the GLDP Transport Proposals. In the LTS and the GLDP, one of the main purposes of the motorway proposals was to relieve congestion. The Panel, by giving priority to Ringway I, demonstrated their preoccupation with congestion in central London. Ringway I was seen as a means of relieving this congestion by eliminating through traffic from the central area. As motorways were primarily seen by the Panel as instruments to relieve congestion, Ringway I was given top priority while others with less of an impact in this respect, were dropped.

However, the order of priority of the Panel in the implementation of motorways clashed seriously with the level of opposition generated by each Ringway. Ringway I because of the negative

environmental impact it was expected to have and because of the important demolition of dwellings it would have necessitated, was the Ringway which caused the highest level of opposition.

In December 1972, the Panel's report was submitted to the Secretary of State for the Environment. On 1 February 1973, the Resources and Environment Committee of the Cabinet endorsed the Panel's road proposals with the exception of the one concerning Ringway 3 which they stated should be kept under consideration (DOE 1973: paras 45 and 48). Desmond Plummer, Leader of the GLC announced that he was "delighted" that the conclusions of the Panel were in line with the Council's position on the inner ringway (The Times 20 February 1973). However, the press was, in general, hostile to the recommendations on the grounds of escalating costs, need for housing, the relative neglect of public transport and traffic restraint (Jones 1979: 322-3). For instance, in a Times leader article (20 February 1973), it was commented that: "The main recommendation of the Panel of Inquiry into the GLDP is so unexpected as to seem almost conspicuous" because the less popular motorway, Ringway I, was given priority while the most popular one was effectively dropped.

As could have been expected, the Layfield solution did not ease the opposition to the construction of motorways in London. In a letter to The Times (22 February 1973), representatives of the two anti-motorway federations, of nine local anti-motorway groups, of seven residents' associations, of two local societies, the Chairperson of the Planning and Development Committee of the

Borough of Lambeth as well as four MPs stated their firm opposition to the Panel's motorway recommendations. Thomson presented the reaction of the "Motorway Opposition" to the Inquiry and its report in the following terms:

> "The result of the inquiry may be regarded as a disaster or a farce, according to whether one takes it seriously or not. By the end of the inquiry the GLC appeared to have abandoned the idea of building Ringway I but were pressing strongly for other ringways. LATA and LMAG presented a joint case against Ringway I and 2 and associated radial motorways. Four London boroughs appeared for the opposition. All principal protagonists supported Ringway 3 and 4, with top priority for Ringway 3. The Panel however rejected Ringways 2 and 3 and accepted Ringway I and 4, thus producing a novel solution totally without reason and without support." (1977: 67)

The GLDP Inquiry may be seen as a condensation of the motorway debate in that it brought into a single arena most of the intervening parties, and its procedure reinforced characteristics already present in the debate. For instance, the respect for the institutional framework among opponents of the motorway proposals noted earlier was accentuated in the case of the Inquiry by their acceptance of its quasi-legal rules of procedure. Furthermore, the reliance on expertise to make a case was accentuated by the requirements of the Panel. There was, however, a marked difference between the actions of the opponents of the PRN proposals at the Inquiry and in the debate in general. While the opposition's arguments put forward at the Inquiry deliberately used a considerable amount of technical data in order to influence the opinion of the members of the Panel, in the debate in general outside the Inquiry, they relied more on political arguments. Nevertheless, in many cases, the Inquiry

was used as a stage and the evidence was directed as much towards the elected members as towards the Panel.

The GLDP Inquiry was set up to ease tension on GLDP proposals and more specifically on its transport plans. However, it in fact caused, as a result of the nature of the recommendations of the Panel, a further polarisation of positions. Opposition to the idea of building motorways in London was given little consideration by the Panel in their proposals in spite of the high number of representations advocating such a stand. Consequently, far from easing it, the recommendation of the Panel towards giving priority to Ringway I acted as a catalyst for the mobilisation of the anti-motorway movement. In addition, the recommendations of the Panel became a burden for the Conservative GLC. The Council had been playing down the motorway proposals and had virtually dropped Ringway I because of its unpopularity. The Panel recommendations had brought the motorway debate to the foreground and had forced the Conservative Council to take position on this unpopular issue on the eve of an electoral campaign. Therefore, not only did the Inquiry not ease the debate but it reactivated it because of the solutions the Panel proposed.

5.4.4. Dropping the motorway proposals

We have seen that the GLDP Inquiry did not bring much of an evolution in the motorway debate. The motorway proposals

were abondoned by the GLC a few months after the publication of the GLDP Inquiry Panel's recommendations, as a result of the election of a Labour Council. As it will appear in the following pages, it is likely that the London Motorway Plans would have been dropped, whatever the GLC's attitude in this respect, because of changes of transport priorities on the part of the government and the availability of less money for transport purposes.

In the 1970 GLC elections, while the Conservative party was running under the banner of the PRN, the Labour party also accepted the principle of motorways in London even if they expressed reserves about Ringway I. The Liberals and the newly formed Homes Before Roads party both opposed the motorway proposals. But none of the candidates of these two parties were elected. The Homes Before Roads party received a total of 80,000 votes. However in the 1973 GLC election, the two main parties adopted opposite positions. It was no longer clear if the motorway proposals could yield electoral benefits, but the Conservatives decided to stand by their earlier commitments. The Conservative party again supported the motorway proposals by now redefined by the Layfield Panel, but in the face of a high level of opposition, they downplayed their support for it. For instance, in their 1973 manifesto, Ringway I was presented on the last page, and throughout the campaign they emphasised other issues such as achievements related to the Thames (The Times 4 April 1973). On transport matters, the Conservatives focused on traffic restraint, considering that priority should

be given to buses , taxis and other public vehicles (GLC 1973a: 9 para. 3.2, 10 para. 3.6). In this context, Ringway I was introduced as an essential step towards the establishment of quiet areas devoid of through traffic and of measures like the Oxford Street bus and taxi only scheme. During the campaign, support for the ringway programme proved to be an embarrassment for some Conservative cnadidates especially in Hampstead and Camden, but also in Lewisham, Battersea and St.Pancreas (Jenkins 1973: 265). Meanwhile, the Labour party was putting forward a ringrail instead of a ringroad scheme. As Reginald Goodwin, Leader of the GLC Labour party, declared,"London must use its railway network to the full if we are to clear our roads of the juggernaut and the traffic jam" (The Times 10 April 1973). He also proposed to use " the £2,000 million saved from the ring-ways" to subsidise public transport including British Rail commuter services. On 12 April 1973, the Labour party won control of the Council.

It is difficult to measure the impact of the motorway debate on the outcome of the 1973 Greater London election. One thing is clear, if it did cause a special interest in the election, this was not reflected by a significant increase in the turn-out of voters. The proportion of registered electors who voted increased from 35.2% in 1970 to 36.8% in 1973. However, this percentage was still appreciably lower than in 1967 when the turn-out was 41.1% and even more so than in 1964 when it was 44.2% (GLC 1967b: Table 1.04; 1971: Table 1.05; 1973b: Table 1.05). Furthermore it is difficult to measure the level of support for

the Labour position on motorways compared with the Conservative position at the election. This is so because the boroughs most likely to be affected by the most imminent motorway menace i.e. Ringway I, had already voted Labour at the 1970 election. One exception to this rule was Lambeth where the delegation to the Council changed from one Labour and three Conservative members in 1970 to one Conservative and three Labour members in 1973. It would appear that much of the voting at the local level is determined by the performance of parties at the national level. Consequently, as Jenkins has suggested (1973: 265), the GLC 1973 result could be largely interpreted as a reaction to soaring prices and a dissatisfaction with the Conservative government's economic policy.

In his victory speech, Reginald Goodwin announced that housing would be the first priority of the Council and public transport would be the second one (The Times 13 April 1973). His first official act was to order the Planning and Transportation Department to abandon the planning and the construction of the two inner ringways and associated inner radials. He also announced the lifting of safeguards so land could be put to other uses. In London: the Future and You (GLC 1973c) the transport principles the Labour GLC intended to follow during their term in office, were stated. Stress was given to the need for restraints on private and commercial vehicles where people congregate at peak hours as well as to the improvement of the quality, reliability and extent of public transport services. This document also referred to the ringrail proposal.

Nineteen months later, on the 21 October 1975, the Secretary of State for the Environment, Anthony Crosland, made a statement overruling the Layfield Inquiry recommendations. He scrapped the plans for Ringway I and the southern half of Ringway 2. His stated grounds for this decision were that the motorway proposals " would cause an unacceptable heavy loss of housing and environmental damages; and the cost would be excessive in relation to the resources which it is realistic to assume might be available to London's other transport needs" (A. Crosland reported in The Times 22 October 1975). He also asked the government to concentrate their efforts on public transport.

As has been seen, the factors underlying the change of position of the GLC on the motorway proposal were mainly of a political nature. A well organised and increasingly powerful opposition to the proposals pressured the Greater London parties. This gradually led to an acceptance of their demands by the Labour party. When they took office, the Council abandoned the proposal.

I shall now focus on the change of attitude of the government on these matters. The organisations opposed to urban motorways had an opportunity to present their point of view during the twelve months' sittings of the House of Commons Expenditure Committee on Urban Transport Planning (Session 1972-73). The Committee, without doubt, influenced by their arguments, made two main recommendations in their report:

1. That there should be a major and substantial effort on the part of the government to improve public transport.

2. That the use of private cars for the journey to work should be discouraged where it impedes public transport. (Expenditure Committee 1972: para. 26).

Among other measures of support for public transport, the Committee advocated the introduction of bus lanes and the payment of operating subsidies to public transport (Expenditure Committee 1972: paras 51 and 64). The Expenditure Committee also recommended that " as an urgent priority" all major road schemes which had not reached the exchange of contract stage should be re-examined (Expenditure Committee 1972: para. 107).

In the White paper which followed the Expenditure Committee's report (DOE 1973b), the Department of the Environment agreed that greater priority should be given to public transport but failed to accept the recommendation of the report for an immediate review of all major urban road schemes. The positions presented in the Second Report from the Expenditure Committee were largley reiterated by a subsequent report of the Committee (Expenditure Committee 1974). However, this latter report also introduced the idea that projections of future traffic growth caused by improved facilities should be included in transport plans (Expenditure Committee 1974: para. 39). It can therefore be concluded that, in the years leading to the Secretary of State for the Environment's decision to drop motorway plans for London, there was a reduction in the priority accorded to new urban roads and an increase in that given to public transport.

During the 1960's, road construction programmes withstood

changes in public expenditure policies and even resisted the cuts implemented in 1967. This can be explained by the government's strong commitment towards road building. In this context, in the mid 1960's, the Ministry of Transport encouraged local authorities to prepare plans for long-term road planning and set up transportation studies. By 1966, eighteen studies were in progress (MOT 1966: 13 and 20-1).

We shall now look at the economic context in which the government's spending decisions, relative to transport, were taken. While between 1965 and 1970, the gross domestic product grew in real terms by 15%,between 1970 and 1975 this figure dropped to 10%. In fact the GDP actually fell in real terms in 1974 and 1975 (CSO 1972: Table 14; 1982: Table 14.12). From 1973 onwards, therefore, the government was facing a situation in which, unless there was to be a significant increase of the public spending share of the GDP, the growth of public expenditure had to be contained. Even in earlier years, while there was no actual decline in real public expenditure, from 1965 onwards spending programmes had to be revised because of changes in expenditure forecasts. Road programmes in most cases however resisted drops in government spending. Yet there was a drop in forecast spending on new construction and improvement of major and other roads in the December 1972 public expenditure White paper (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1972). In May 1973, the government announced a reduction in the growth of public expenditure. The trunk road and motorway programme was severely cut suffering both from this reduction and a change in

spending priorities. It was, in fact, decided that some of the funds originally allocated to this programme could be redirected towards housing and public transport. The January 1975 White paper on public expenditure (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1975) mentioned that compared with the December 1972 White paper, as a result of successive cuts, there had been a reduction of nearly 40% in the expenditure forecast for 1976-77 on new road construction and improvement. While the December 1972 White paper proposed an increase of spending on new road construction and improvement by the government of 42% for the five years after 1971-72, the January 1975 White paper proposed an increase of only 9% for the five years following 1973-74 (See Figure 5.9; 5.10)[8].

As the chances of implementation of road projects depend on expected levels of expenditure, the prospects in 1975 for large scale schemes like the motorway proposal in London were not very good. The availability of funds was doubly constricted: on the one hand, the government were stating their intention of limiting the level of overall public expenditure and on the other hand, the priority accorded to the new and improved road programme was falling as funds initially earmarked for this purpose were reallocated. Furthermore, there had been an escalation in the costs of urban road schemes following the implementation of new compensation rules. These new rules came into effect as the result of the Land Commission Act of 1973 which followed the recommendations of the White paper Development and Compensation: Putting People First (DOE 1972).

It would therefore appear that while the initial stop

Figure 5.9 Past expenditure and projected expenditure on the roads and transport programme by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, January 1975.

£ million at 1974 survey prices

	New construction and improvement of motorways and trunk roads	Capital investment by local transport authorities on roads - new construction and improvement	
1969-70	300.4	287.2	
1970-71	364.8	341.0	
1971-72	312.4	347.4	
1972-73	286.7	335.1	
1973-74	324.2	370.7	Actual figures
1974-75	315.9	309.4	Projected Figures
1975-76	319.9	277.6	
1976-77	334.1	279.9	
1977-78	349	276	
1978-79	359	276	

Source: Chancellor of the Exchequer (1975)

FIGURE 5.10

CHANGES IN FIVE YEAR EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION AND IMPROVEMENT (MAJOR AND OTHER ROADS) IN GOVERNMENT'S EXPENDITURE PLANS 1969-1975.



* DOTTED LINE INDICATES EXTRAPOLATION FOR FIVE YEARS FROM THREE YEAR PROJECTION GIVEN IN SOURCE.

† MOTORWAYS AND TRUNK ROADS, NEW CONSTRUCTION AND IMPROVEMENT.

SOURCE: CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER. CMND 4234, 4578, 4829, 5178, 5519, 5879.

to the motorway proposal in London was a result of changes in control of the GLC, the implementation of the proposals would have been made impossible anyway because of a reduction in the funds made available for such a purpose by the government. The discrepancy between London which has virtually no motorway and some provincial conurbations which have elaborate networks, can be partly explained in these terms. Provincial motorway schemes were implemented in a period when funds were being made available by the government for this purpose. In London, however, the long planning process and the debate which followed brought about a situation where even had the GLC been favourable to the implementation of a motorway network after 1973, the government attitude would have been one of lukewarm support. A change of economic climate and of public expenditure policy had occured in addition to a reduction in the priority given to new and improved roads. In these circumstances the allocation of the large sums required for such a scheme would have been quite improbable.

5.4.5 The motives of the agents involved

Having reviewed the conditions of formulation of the Motorway Plans, the debate over this matter and the rejection of the plans, we shall now focus on the motives underlying the attitude of groups which voiced their position. In other words, we shall consider why groups got involved and why they adopted the position they did.

The form of the debate about the PRN proposal within the GLC illustrates the difference between the interests and methods of operation of planners and elected members. The former, largely sheltered from the pressures of the electorate, develop a discourse which tends to lead to the justification of long-term projects on technical grounds. Elected members, on the other hand, need to devise short-term responses to electoral and economic pressures and inter-agency conflicts. Elected members, while usually relying on the so-called scientificity of the discourse of planners, do not respect its form and its context. They, in fact, plunder the work of planners in order to support the political arguments they wish to advance. In doing so, they show a lack of respect for the logical sequence of the plans. In other words, elected members cannot submit themselves to the time scale and to the procedure of the planners because they must constantly react to pressures in order to maintain or consolidate their position, and adapt their arguments to the attacks of their opponents. For instance, especially later in the debate, the Conservative GLC came to defend the motorway proposals not so much on the basis of the case made by the LTS, but by referring mainly to the environmental benefits they would yield in response to the attacks made on this ground by opponents of the scheme.

In the light of the theoretical perspective developed in Chapters One, Two and Three, it appears that the motorway debate in London brings out a number of features of social conflicts relating to urban issues. The conflicts triggered by the motorway proposals revolved mainly around three sets of

issues.

Firstly, they centred upon environmental issues. These issues led to the highest levels of mobilisation because they related to the protection of living conditions and more specifically, to the house and neighbourhood. In other words, these conflicts related to the conditions of simple and extended reproduction of the labour force and more generally, of the social classes in the urban environment. The defence of the environment focused on effects of motorways on physical and mental health e.g. noise and air pollution. It also related to people's investment in their homes and to the protection of the symbolic meaning attached to specific neighbourhoods. These two latter motives which underlie opposition movements seeking to protect the environment, can be seen as explanations of the relatively low level of mobilisation of lower income groups. Agents of these groups have little or no investment in a home to protect and, as their residential areas are of quite low stakes they do not have so much to defend in these respects.

The second type of issue giving rise to conflict concerned accessibility. Changes in the provision of transport services influence the range of activities which can be reached by different groups of agents in an urban setting and thus, have a determining impact on the use they can make of urban opportunities. It would therefore appear reasonable to assume that anticipated changes in transport services would give rise to intense reactions

because of the changes in accessibility patterns they would cause. However these effects of transport services are not as clear-cut as their environmental impacts. Furthermore, individuals can adapt more easily to changes in accessibility patterns than to serious environmental impacts of transport infrastructures. For example, it may be possible to cope with changes of accessibility by a change in mode of transport or changing the location of one's activities. Environmental impacts on the other hand, may only be avoidable by a change of residential area, which may entail a loss on the household's investment in the home and a loss of its emotional attachment to a neighbourhood. Another reason for the lower level of action on accessiblity issues is related to the much greater difficulty of mobilisation around accessibility issues compared with environmental ones. One factor explaining this situation may be that, while the environmental impaat of a transport infrastructure will affect well localised social groups, its accessibility consequences will be more diffused in space in that, at a given moment, they will probably be relevant only to a minority in a given area. The predominance of environmental impacts in the opposition to the motorway compared with accessibility impacts is illustrated by the fact that among the car owning upper and middle classes, the main basis for the rise of movements was a concern over environmental deterioration. Agents of these classes would have benefited from the motorways proposed in terms of improvements of accessibility potentials, but this did not lead to any large scale movement of support for the proposals on these grounds. In

fact the main support movements for the motorway proposals were initiated by those who would have benefited from the building of the motorways and from the resulting increase in car usage. In the debate surrounding the motorway proposal, its negative accessibility impacts were seen as flowing from the reduction in public transport services which would have resulted from an increase in car usage.

The third theme in the conflicts over the motorway proposals concerned the use of resources. The argument that there could be a better use of the resources which would be required by the PRN proposal was put forward by the opponents of the scheme. The determination of expenditure priorities is the result of political decision-making and takes into consideration the economic and electoral consequences of expenditure uses. It was in fact a change of priority resulting from intense pressures and the possiblity of a change in public opinion on these matters which led the government to drop the London motorway scheme. The government operates with a limited amount of resources determined by the prevailing economic situation and allocates these so as to yield as many electoral and economic benefits as possible. The strength of the opposition to urban motorways and the likelihood that the expenditure of large sums would not solve the road congestion problem and therefore yield the anticipated economic benefits, led to a drop in priority of this sector of expenditure by the government. Meanwhile, higher priority was given to public transport, the alternative most often put forward by opponents

of the motorways.

As has been seen in this section, the reaction to the motorway proposal was largely determined by the interests of agents within an institutional framework or by the impact of their social position on their insertion in the urban context. The form taken by the opposition movements was largely determined by the organisational configuration of the seats of power. Therefore, groups with different interests and defending different positions, directed their action towards a single authority, the Greater London Council. Actions were also directed, but to a much smaller extent, towards the Ministry of Transport and the Department of the Environment. The movements which were likely to have some effect were those which were most able to present a convincing case about the electoral and/or economic influence they represented. The motorway proposal was finally dropped as a result of the electoral defeat of the promoters of the scheme, the Conservative GLC, and of the constraints applied on public spending by the government and the reduced priority given to road spending.

5.5 Transport policies during the motorway debate

The purpose of this section is to present an overview of transport planning and policy on matters not directly related to the London primary road network which took place during the discussion over the motorway proposal. This will reveal that far from

adopting a wait and see attitude, the transport authorities pursued policies largely along the lines of those which had been in existence prior to the planning and the discussion of the motorway proposals. To start with we shall introduce the South East regional plans contemporary to the GLDP and to the Inquiry which followed. We shall focus on the difference between the transport proposals they contained and those put forward by the GLDP. We shall then demonstrate that the road schemes implemented in Greater London during this period followed the trends of the early 1960's viz. more and bigger localised schemes. Finally, we shall show how public transport policies were affected by the changes in priority between public and private transport during the planning phase of the PRN and the debate which followed.

5.5.1 The South East regional plans

We shall refer here to three plans having the South East as an area of reference prepared during the 1960's: The South East Study 1961-1981 (MHLG 1964), the First Report by the South East Economic Planning Council (1967) and the Strategic Plan for the South East (South East Joint Planning Team 1970). Attention will be given more specifically to the last of these plans. These plans will be compared with the GLDP.

The Greater London Development Plan was drawn up by the Greater London Council and referred to an area under the jurisdiction of a single authority with the power to implement its proposals. The South East regional plans on the other hand, included proposals relating to more than one ministry, and were not the work of an elected local authority committed to their implementation. Furthermore, the area covered by these plans was not easily identifiable; the 'South East area' being in fact constituted of the counties around London. As a result of the involvement of many organisations and authorities in their preparation and of the composite territory they covered, the regional plans consisted mainly of matters of principle and lacked precision. Moreover they lacked bite because of the absence of an authority committed to their implementation. The regional plans were primarily land use plans and their transport proposals were largely subsidiary.

The Strategic Plan for the South East, prepared and published during the formulation of the GLDP and the debate which followed, was commissioned in May 1968 by the Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Housing and Local Government and the Ministry of Transport. The terms of reference given to the South East Joint Planning Team responsible for the plan were to provide recommendations on the pattern of development in the South East with the object of providing a regional framework for local planning authorities in the preparation of the structure plans as well as for government decisions on investment and on economic and social policies. The Team was composed of civil

servants from the sponsoring Ministries, officers from the Secretariat of the Standing Conference for the South East as well as officers seconded from the staff of Essex, Kent and Surrey County Councils.

The Team did not present a highway plan in detail. This can be explained by the fact that it was not within their jurisdictions to specify the scale and form of transport investments for a given period (South East Joint Planning Team 1971a: 162 para. 8.116). They nevertheless presented a programme of spending of approximately £700 million on highways for the period from 1966 to 1981 for the whole of the South East including Greater London (South East Joint Planning Team 1971a: 54 para. 5.11). They also put forward a programme of capital investment of £340 million from 1969 to 1981 for public transport (South East Joint Planning Team 1971a: 57 para. 5.20).

The highway programme was largely based on a desire to achieve a segregation between inter-urban and urban traffic by the construction of a primary road network. The transport proposals were also largely related to land use objectives. For instance, the Team stated that urban concentrations should be located at an appropriate distance from London so as to reduce loads on radial roads and encourage lateral movements. This recommendation was also in agreement with the Team's main land use objective which consisted of concentrating growth in a few areas of considerable existing development (South East Joint Planning

Team 1971b: para. 4.67). Because of their consultative nature, the relative absence of precise recommendations about road proposals and also perhaps because of the less intrusive nature of new roads outside dense urban areas, the South East regional plans and in particular, the Strategic Plan for the South East, avoided the kind of transport debate which followed the publication of the GLDP.

5.5.2 Road traffic measures

As plans not directly referring to the motorway network were produced during the 1960s road investments not necessarily related to this network were taking place during the 1960's and early 1970s. While the PRN was being planned and later debated, traffic measure implementations and road expenditure in London followed largely the patterns set before the launching of the London Traffic Survey, albeit with increments resulting from the larger amounts of money being made available. In 1965, the Greater London Council assumed control over the London Traffic Management Unit thereby replacing the Ministry of Transport. To use W.G. Jones (1979: 112) terms, the Council pursued the same objectives "with unmitigated zeal". During the first years of GLC control, the Unit mainly continued work on the projects already in the pipeline, but the Council later formulated new projects within the same guidelines. Between 1965 and 1968, the length of urban clearways increased four-fold. The overall number of traffic schemes brought into effect by the GLC increased

from 92 in 1965-66 to 255 in 1966-67 and 352 in 1967-68 (Rhodes and Ruck 1970). In February 1966, the Council expanded the already existing eight square mile zone in central London to a forty square mile zone in which all kerbside parking would be controlled. This zone was referred to as the Inner London Parking Area.

Over the period between 1967-68 and 1972-73, GLC expenditure on highways, bridges and public lighting varied between £15 million and £20 million (GLC 1969a: Tables 11.15 and 11.17; 1973b: Tables 12.20 and 12.22). Most of the highway schemes implemented after 1965 were of a similar nature and of comparable scale to previous ones. Like them, they were devised as improvements in response to specific local problems. These schemes were not integrated into an overall plan. Among the major road schemes realised during the first eight years of existence of the GLC, one can mention the Euston Road underpass, the Finchley Road Scheme, the Bricklayers Arms Junction and the Beckton Road diversion. However schemes of an unprecedented scale were also implemented. For instance the Westway cost approximately £30 million, the M I referred to in Barnet as the Hendon Urban Motorway, cost over £20 million. Unlike the local improvements, these large scale schemes were stretches fitting into the overall motorway plan.

The traffic measures and the expenditure on roads took place against the background of increases in the number of private vehicles. Between 1966 and 1973, the number of vehicles licensed

in London increased by 12% from 2,021,584 to 2,307,040 and within this total, the number of private cars grew by 21% reaching 1,833,031 in 1973 (GLC 1973b: 116 Table 5.17). Meanwhile the level of traffic on the roads was increasing at a much slower pace. Between 1971 and 1974, the increase in traffic throughout London over a 24 hour period was of only 3% (Munt 1975:5 and Table 4)[9]. These figures attest that there is not a direct relationship between the level of car use and the level of car ownership. In some cases, there was already some evidence of self-restraint because of the level of congestion on the roads. For instance, road counts around the central cordon revealed that in spite of an overall increase in the number of vehicles going through it, this volume fell on the most heavily used roads. Between 1968 and 1971, there was a reduction in the number of vehicles using the major access ways, totalling over 40,000 vehicles a day, to reach the central area, from 253,000 to 248,000 (GLC 1969a: Table 4.03; 1972b: Table 5.02).

Thanks to the implementation of traffic management measures and local road improvements, there was an increase in overall traffic speed in the central area in spite of a growth in the level of traffic. Between 1968 and 1971, traffic speeds in central London increased by 7.5% to 12.6mph. at off-peak times, while they rose by 5.5% to 12.7mph during the evening peak (GLC 1973b: Table 5.04). In the case of the inner area, between 1969 and 1971-72, the off-peak speeds increased by 8% to 17.7mph.; however they fell by 7.5% to 13.9mph during the evening peak (GLC 1971: Table 5.03; 1973b: Table 5.04)[10]. It therefore seems that the combination of measures put forward by

the transport authorities and the response of the demand for travel by private transport to high traffic levels have contributed to the prevention of a serious deterioration of road transport conditions. In fact overall road transport conditions have improved in London between the mid 1960's and the early 1970's. Trends in road use over this period have contradicted the prediction made by the LTS that the road transport situation would deteriorate seriously if the motorway proposals were not implemented immediately.

It therefore appears that over the period under consideration, while the motorway plans were formulated and debated, road schemes of an increasing scale proceeded. These schemes remained nevertheless very modest in comparison with the motorway networks put forward in the LTS and in the GLDP.

5.5.3 Public transport policies

Having considered policies affecting road transport implemented from the early 1960's to the early 1970's, we shall now focus more specifically on public transport policies implemented over this period.

The fall in the number of passengers affecting London Transport bus services from the mid 1950's persisted over the ten years between 1963 and 1973. The number of passenger-miles travelled in London by road public transport fell by 27% from 4,623 to 3,373 million. Meanwhile the number of passenger journeys dropped by one third from 2,168 million to 1,439 million. This fall was accompanied by a decrease of 26.4% of the total bus miles run (GLC 1973b: Table 5.19). Over the period between

1962 and 1972, bus fares more than doubled: while the retail price index increased to 165 in 1972 (1962=100) the bus fares index reached 218 (Collins and Pharoah 1974: 41). In terms of bus operation, the two main problems faced by London Transport from the mid 1960's to the early 1970's were staff shortages and traffic congestion (LTB 1966b). The solution to the first problem was largely seen by the London Transport Board as the introduction of one man operation (OMO) on the buses. The number of OMO buses gradually increased from 1966. By 1972, 25% of the fleet consisted of OMO buses. At that time it was expected that by 1980, every London bus would be operated by one man (LTE 1971: 7). However, after a study of bus operations, it was recommended that, because of loading delays on OMO buses, such services should not be introduced on central London bus routes (LTE 1973)[11].

In order to ease the congestion problems their bus services were suffering from, London Transport repeatedly requested that the GLC adopt traffic management and public transport priority measures aimed at improving bus circulation (LTB 1967: 3 para. 19, 24-5 para. 99). From 1970, London Transport placed increasing emphasis on the introduction of bus lanes. While some lanes were implemented, London Transport considered that progress was too slow in relation to the needs (LTE 1971: 9; 1972: 7).

In 1970, the London Transport Board became the London Transport Executive and was placed under the direction of the GLC. The Council was given powers to appoint members of the Executive,

to get involved in the management and to exercise control over finance as well as over the broad lines of the operation. However the day to day management of the Executive was beyond the control of the Council. During the negotiations over the takeover, the Conservative Council, which in principle, was opposed to the payment of revenue subsidies to public transport, were worried about the poor financial performance of London Transport from the mid 1960's onwards. The Board's deficits necessitated the payment of revenue deficit subsidies from the government of £5.9 million in 1966, £10.9 million in 1967, £9.9 million in 1968 and £10.7 million in 1969 (Collins and Pharoah 1974: 189). In order to favour the takeover of London Transport by the GLC, in October 1969 the government wrote off the totality of the debt of the London Transport Board which stood at £269.8 million. To help avoid a deficit, in 1970 the GLC gave a financial target to the London Transport Executive of putting aside £2 million each year as a reserve. However in December 1972, the Council relaxed this target and requested instead that the Executive simply balance their revenue account each year.

In the meantime, the government was making more money available for public transport. Following proposals presented in the 1967 White paper Public Transport and Traffic (MOT 1967b), the government used the 1968 Transport Act to extend the 75% grant paid for approved highway building to public transport infrastructure investments. With the advent of the Conservative government, financial support to public transport was extended.

From 1971 grants of 50% were paid for new buses by the government and they decided to contribute an operation payments subsidy to public transport of 50% of what councils would be willing to pay.

Under the 1967 Road Traffic Regulation Act the GLC had powers to designate bus lanes, and the Council later set up a Bus Unit within the Traffic Branch. Nevertheless until 1972, relatively few bus lanes were introduced although after the take-over of London Transport, the matter was discussed extensively (GLC 1970b: 42 para. 134). Between 1968 and 1971, the number of bus lanes schemes increased from two to five and their total length rose from 0.415km. to 1.805km.. Between 1971 and 1972, twelve bus lanes were introduced raising the total length to 4.995km . In 1972, Horace Cutler the then Chairman of the Policy and Resources Committee of the GLC declared that this would be the year of the bus. This was reflected in a significant increase in the total number of bus lane schemes approved which rose to 53 in 1973 and covered 14.655km (GLC 1973b: Table 5.18).

The growth in the GLC's interest in bus lanes can certainly be explained by their low cost, the 75% grant paid by the government for their implementation, the great savings they led to in London Transport operating costs and the substantial savings in bus journey times they yielded. For instance, the Piccadilly bus lane cost £60,000 while the returns were £38,000

per annum in savings of London Transport operating costs and £47,000 in terms of bus passenger time (Collins and Pharoah 1974: 419-20). It seems that the interest of the Council in bus lanes can also be related to their assumption of responsibility for London Transport in 1970. The Conservative Council were committed to avoiding paying operating subsidies to public transport but remained conscious of the unpopularity of large fare increases and of the negative electoral impact they could have. It appeared, therefore, that it would be in their interest to improve bus services by the introduction of bus lanes. They would reduce operational costs of bus services, and contribute to improvements of these services thus leading to an increase in patronage. The overall impact of these measures would be to improve the financial performance of the London Transport Executive.

The bus lanes were implemented against a background of general public approval. The exceptions consisted of the reaction of residents and shopkeepers along bus lane routes. The City Corporation of London were also opposed to the idea as were the motor lobby and in particular the Royal Automobile Club which considered that they caused considerable delays to traffic (The Times 5 June 1973).

Improvement measures to public transport did not only consist of bus lanes, investments in important infrastructures also took place. During the period under consideration, construction work proceeded on two underground lines even if in one case, the Victoria Line, the decision was made prior to this period,

and in the other case, the Fleet Line, later renamed the Jubilee Line, construction work was completed much later. Over this period the LTB , supported by the GLC, pressured the government for the release of the funds necessary for the extension of the Victoria Line to Brixton. Barbara Castle, the Minister of Transport, approved the scheme in August 1967 although it was generally accepted that it would make a loss. As the Minister stated, the scheme was to proceed because of the "benefit of the line to the public." As a result of the write off of the London Transport Board's debt in 1969, the Victoria Line was paid for by the government, with the exception of 25% of the approximately £2 million spent on the extension to Brixton after the take-over of London Transport by the GLC (Collins and Pharoah 1974: 203-5).

By 1965, the Fleet Line became the chief proposal being put forward by the London Transport Board. The scheme consisted in linking a branch of the Bakerloo Line to New Cross through Bond Street, Green Park, Charing Cross and then along Fleet Street and Fenchurch Street. The Plan was justified on the grounds of the improved transport in the centre it would allow and more specifically, because of its contribution to the relief of overcrowding on the underground. In contrast to the situation on bus services, traffic on London Transport rail services increased between 1963 to 1972 by 10% (GLC 1973b: Table 5.23). In 1970, the load factor remained very high on the underground.

On trains reaching the central area cordon at peak hour, the load factor varied between 155% to 208% (Ginnings 1972: Table 5) i.e. there were between 155 and 208 standees per 100 sitting passengers. Another argument used to support the Fleet Line scheme was that underground services in South East London would encourage development in the Docklands. In March 1970, the London Transport Executive formally asked the GLC the permission to proceed with the new line. The Council approved the scheme and agreed to pay 25% of its cost. In August 1971, the Secretary of State for the Environment annonnced that the government would pay 75% of the £35 million estimated cost for the first stage of the line to the Strand (Collins and Pharoah 1974: 210-1). In July 1972, the Department of the Environment agreed to pay a 25% grant towards the extension of the Piccadilly Line to Heathrow. In 1970, whereas the GLC had agreed to pay a 25% grant to allow the extension, the government had refused to support the scheme because it was anticipated that it would be profit making (Collins and Pharoah 1974: 262).

The condition underlying the realisation of these underground schemes was the higher priority being given by the government to public transport in London which allowed the allocation of funds to new public transport infrastructures. During the period covered by this chapter, London Transport followed the same strategy than London public transport concerns adopted during the inter-war period of having schemes ready for whenever funds became available and having schemes in reserve for different

levels of expenditure. For instance, according to the London Transport Board 1968 Annual Report:

> "Construction of an extension of the Piccadilly Line from Hounslow West to Heathrow Airport could start at very short notice, and all practicable steps have been taken in readiness for a start to be made in building Fleet Line as soon as Parliamentary powers ... have been granted. (LTB 1969: 1 para. 2)

After their takeover of London Transport, the GLC largely left the initiative for formulating and promoting schemes to the Executive. As a consequence of this, there was little change in London Transport's strategy except that before being presented to the government, schemes had to be accepted by the GLC. However this procedure meant that the LTE could count on the active support of the GLC in the promotion of their schemes to the government. After the first stage of the Fleet Line had been authorised, the Executive still had in reserve proposals for further stages of this line and for the extension of the Bakerloo Line to Peckham. And in 1972, they drew up long-term plans for a new cross London tube line on a general South west/ North east alignment between Hainault and Wimbledon (LTE 1973: 24).

Turning now to the railways, in order to understand the policies of the British Railways Board towards the London Commuter Network, one has first to look at the rail situation nationally. By 1968, the deficit grants paid by the government had been ended. However the overall debt of the Board was reduced from £1,562 million to £300 million and grants on unrenumerative services designated as socially necessary were paid. The Board was given a financial directive of covering their expenses

taking one year with another. This reorganisation initially improved the financial health of the BRB. Indeed the Board achieved in 1969 a surplus of £15 million after meeting interest charges (BRB 1970: 1 para. 1.1). Yet the situation rapidly deteriorated largely due to the fact that the BRB's costs were increasing faster than inflation. In 1974, the operating loss of the Board reached £97 million after government grants totalling £154 million (BRB 1975a: 3). The government then acknowledged that the 1968 Railways Act did not enable the BRB to bring revenues and costs into balance. Through the 1974 Act, they therefore dropped the payment of grants for individual passenger services and adopted instead, a passenger service grant covering the totality of passenger services.

On the London Commuter Network, the passenger level on services to central London remained relatively stable. Between 1961 and 1973, a peak of 458,200 passengers was reached in 1970 and a low of 427,500 in 1973, representing a variation of 6,8% (GLC 1973b: Table 5.19). Important shifts however took place in the origin of the trips. Traffic external to Greater London on the radial lines grew by 30% between 1963 and 1970 (Ginnings 1972: 3), while there was a decline in inner suburban journeys. The main reason put forward to explain the deficits of the London Commuter Network was the presence of high peaks with little demand in between. For instance, it was estimated in 1974 that while commuters contributed to 40% of the revenues of the Southern Region, they were responsible for 80% of the costs (The Economist 20 April 1974). Between 1968 and 1971, the govern-

ment paid grants of around £15 million per annum to meet the LCN deficit. In 1973, about 90% of the rail services in the South East of England received grants from the government in spite of the target set by the government in 1971 of making these services pay their way by January 1973. This commitment followed a similar one stated by the Labour government in 1968 (MOT 1968: 14). One reason which can be evoked to explain the LCN's failure to meet this objective is the unpopularity this would have brought among commuters who would have suffered from increasing fares and/or deteriorating services. This could have had an electoral impact in constituencies with a high number of commuters. As The Economist observed (2 February 1971), one third of the seats gained by the Conservative party at the 1971 elections were located in the commuter area.

Because of growing deficits and repeated directives from the government to break even, the BRB in an effort to balance their budget or at least to reduce their deficit, focused their available expenditure on sectors likely to be profitable (Fig. 5.11), namely Inter-City and long-range commuter services. The logic of this was that by improving the performance of services with a potential for profitability, the Board would generate returns to ease its overall financial situation. The nature of the major schemes implemented over the years covered here confirms this. For instance, with the support of government grants, the BRB proceeded with the electrifications of the London Midlands Line and of the North West services which culminated with the inauguration of a new Euston Station in October 1968. Also

FIGURE 5.11

THE INVESTMENT LOGIC FOLLOWED BY THE BRITISH RAILWAYS BOARD



on the Southern Region, the electrification of the services to Bournemouth was completed in July 1967. These electrifications were credited with an improvement of £5 million in passenger receipts. As the BRB commented in their 1968 Annual Report (BRB 1969: 2 para. 9), this was "... proving the strong commercial appeal of electrification on suitable routes". Electrification schemes on commuter lines were also implemented in order to reduce the operational costs of such services as well as to increase the number of passengers. In May 1969, new services were introduced on the Lea Valley Line between Clapton Junction and Cheshunt thus completing the electrification of suburban lines from Liverpool Street station. In August 1971, the government gave their authorisation to the Board's proposals for the electrification of the ex-Great Northern suburban line. This scheme extended from Kings Cross and Moorgate to Royston via Welwyn Garden City, covering a total of seventy miles (Collins and Pharoah 1974: 117).

Another method relied upon by the BRB to reduce their deficit was to promote developments on the land they owned. The potential of this method, particularily in London, was obvious. However, the efforts of the Board were often checked by the regulations of the Office and Industrial Development Act [12], one purpose of which was to limit the construction of offices in central London. In October 1969, the British Rail Property Board was set up. Their purpose was " to control property matters for the whole of the Railway Board's undertakings with

particular regard to commercial development of its property" (BRB press release, 6 October 1970). While some projects like the London Bridge scheme were implemented, others like the Euston scheme which was to include a thirty-four storey office block, an hotel and a multi-storey car park (BRB press release, 25 March 1971), were dropped. In this particular case, the motives for the non-implementation of the scheme were the GLC, the opposition of the Borough concerned and the absence of financial support from the government (Collins and Pharoah 1974: 244).

This emphasis on commercially viable expenditures by the Board meant that services which could not be made profitable were solely maintained with the aid of grants. These services therefore enjoyed little or no improvement and in many cases, because of ageing rolling stock, they actually deteriorated. While investments were made on some of the services of the LCN, much of the remainder of the network was largely starved of investment. This meant that many services had to rely on old equipment. Also, as The Economist stressed (20 April 1974), in a period of staff shortages and increasing labour costs, no funds were available for the implementation of measures of automation.

A condition of the funds made available by the government to the BRB for investment purposes, was that a proposed scheme should yield a return of at least 10%. This had the effect of reinforcing the investment logic followed by the Board, the consequence of which was the deterioration of uncommercial services

which included much of the LCN.

To sum up, it seems that the attitude of agencies in transport matters can mainly be interpreted in terms of their self-interest within a given context determined by their respective jurisdictions, their objectives, their economic position, etc. It therefore appears that in dealing with various transport situations, the tendency of agencies was to devise expansionary schemes i.e. schemes promoting one mode at the expense of others and/or involving much capital investment. This tendency can be accounted for by the fact that expansion of a mode of transport is likely to benefit the agencies responsible for its operation and that investments in transport infrastructures usually lead to the expansion of the agency implementing them. Such investments can also help the agencies meet their performance goals e.g. quality of the service offered, better financial balance, etc. For instance, over the period considered, London Transport actively promoted the introduction of bus lanes and the construction of new underground lines. In the first case, the proposals meant that priority would be given to bus services at the expense of road traffic in general thus improving the efficiency of bus transport relative to other forms of road transport, while in the second case, they represented large scale expenditures likely to bring an expansion of the agency involved with these expenditures. Overall these two sets of proposals were aimed at improving services offered by London Transport. More specifically, for bus lanes, a major anticipated effect was a drop in operation costs, while in the case of the new

underground line proposals, the spending of large sums by London Transport and its responsibility for the new services would lead to an expansion in the agency. Also, until they assumed responsibility for public transport services, the GLC had made little use of their traffic powers in favour of bus services. However, after the London Transport takeover, because of the GLC's new interest in the good performance of public transport now under their jurisdiction, they proceeded with the implementation of numerous bus priority schemes. They also agreed from 1970 onwards, to subsidise 25% of London transport capital investment proposals they ratified and to use their influence in the promotion of these schemes to the government. In the case of the BRB, because their chief objective was to improve their overall financial balance, they concentrated whatever funds were available on services with a potential for profitability. Consequently in terms of infrastructure and equipment, much of the LCN services were neglected.

The trends in public transport services and in the configuration of the agencies responsible for them were to a large extent, determined by government decisions. From the mid 1960's to the early 1970's, public transport was given higher priority in government spending and consequently, more funds were made available. In London and its region, these were mainly directed towards the construction of two underground lines and commuter rail electrification schemes. In addition, the government, to a large extent, shaped the self-interested behaviour of transport

agencies by defining their functions and setting their goals.

We have seen in this section that while the motorway debate occupied the foreground of political debate in London, the implementation of transport policies largely followed trends set in previous years. Traffic measures were being refined and extended, road schemes were, except in a few cases, on a scale comparable to those of the early 1960's. Public transport expenditure on new infrastructures was also proceeding at a rate broadly similar to that prior to the period considered.

Conclusion

It would appear that features of the motorway proposal, namely the definition of transport problems at the level of Greater London as a whole and the formulation of proposals on the basis of forecasts of steep increases in road transport, which turned out to be the major obstacles to its implementation, were present from the initial formulation of the transport problem as one requiring large scale road expenditures. These features were inherent to the mode of devising the plans, and coloured the manner in which they were politically promoted. From the outset, elected members defined transport problems mainly in terms of road congestion. This was largely the result of pressures from the road lobby but also took into account the climate of public opinion of the period and of the antic-

ipated electoral and economic consequences of the prevailing situation. The solutions envisaged were in terms of urban road building. The influence of the road lobby and the awareness of their impact among elected members initially prevented the latter from presenting traffic restraint measures and public transport improvements as principal solutions to road congestion. The elected members then relied on the planners to arrive at a formalisation of their definition of the major transport problem and to present a hierarchy of proposals as solutions. The planners managed to expand greatly the framework of study that was presented to them, increasing its geographical area, extending the period over which it would continue, and using a much more complex methodology than originally envisaged. In accordance with their organisational interests, the consultants, but more specifically the planners and transport engineers of the GLC's Highway and Transportation Department and the Ministry of Transport, proposed large scale motorway plans.

From the outset, the GLC were searching for large scale transport proposals which could bring electoral benefits and could also help them justify their existence as an elected body. Transport was, in fact, the main sphere in which the new authority could launch large scale proposals which would capture the imagination of the electorate, and before the GLC's takeover of London Transport, the Council's main transport responsibility was for road circulation. This explains why, over the first six years of the GLC's existence, both parties supported the motorway

proposal and why the Council promoted the proposals of the LTS and integrated them within the GLDP.

The presentation of the plans as an integrated network for the whole of Greater London explains some features of the opposition to the PRN. The opposition to these proposals was organised both at the local level, where the threat to the environment and to property was felt and at the global level, where experts and politicians objected in principle to having motorways in London. As the opposition evolved, the two levels amalgamated and the experts and politicians largely took over the steering of the movement. It may be hypothesised that if a hierarchy of local motorway projects had been presented, whose adoption would depend on the availability of funds, the opposition to motorways would have taken a very different form.

The opposition by the boroughs to the GLC plans reflected their different functions. Thus they were worried that the PRN would use land allocated for housing purposes as well as about its environmental impact and effects on the secondary road system for which they are responsible. Also, in anticipation of the electoral impact of the opposition to the PRN, some boroughs adopted an anti-motorway stand. As the London Labour party became officially opposed to most of the PRN largely as the result of extensive grass roots pressures, many boroughs under Labour rule rallied to this position. Finally when the Labour party was elected at the GLC, the motorway plans were dropped.

It would therefore appear that the characteristics of the proposal and of its promotion, created the conditions of its rejection. The strength of the opposition to it was mainly a result of the comprehensive nature of the network put forward and of the publicity given to it by the GLC. A large scale comprehensive road plan is thus very vulnerable because it is likely to bring about an intense opposition organised throughout the territory it covers. A piecemeal approach might have led to the implementation of some stretches of motorway even if others would have had to be dropped because of strong opposition.

Because the preparation of the plans and the debate which followed their publication stretched over more than ten years, it is not surprising that the availability of government funds for urban motorway building changed over the period. Planners are relatively sheltered from social and economic pressures, and therefore, the longer the planning process, the more likely there is to be a divergence between the proposals which emerge from it and the prevailing socio-economic conditions. If these proposals are followed by an inquiry before their implementation can be considered, this divergence is likely to be even larger. The London Traffic Survey was carried out at a time when past economic trends, the growth of public expenditure and the higher priority given to highway construction, led people to think that there were virtually no limits to the scope of schemes implementable in the decades to come. In this respect, the London plans of the 1960's bore similarities to the Abercrombie Greater London Plan prepared at the end of the War. In both

cases, it was expected that there would be an increase in the availability of funds for their proposals in the years to come. In the case of the Abercrombie Plan, there was a general feeling at the end of the war that things would improve in the future although there was a great uncertainty about the level of funds likely to be available. Abercrombie therefore chose to base his proposals on the assumption of a very large increase in funds compared with the pre-war years. In the case of the LTS proposals, constant and large increases in expenditure on road transport by the government form the mid 1950's onwards made it seem likely in the early 1960's that astronomical sums would be available in the future for this purpose.[13]

At the outset of the planning procedure and of the debate which followed it, the transport priorities of the relevant levels of government changed. This was partly a result of the strength of the opposition to the PRN. The new Labour GLC immediately dropped the PRN. Meanwhile, in the early 1970's there was a move by the government away from road construction and towards public transport and housing. Furthermore, macro-economic policies in a climate of deteriorating economic performance consisted primarily of restrictions on public expenditure. The steady increase in the availability of funds upon which the London motorway proposals were based was therefore no longer present.

While we have focused on the PRN proposals, the GLC and MOT pursued other road and traffic management schemes using a similar

definition of transport problems to that on which the LTS was based. These schemes were intended to relieve traffic congestion by increasing road capacity as much as possible without calling on extra funds. The road schemes implemented during this period were on a much smaller scale than the motorway proposal although some motorway stretches which were later included within the PRN, were constructed. Much emphasis was also placed on traffic management measures undoubtedly because of the large benefits they yielded for a relatively low cost. Meanwhile, public transport services were suffering from steep fare increases and in the case of buses, from a serious loss of passengers. However important electrification schemes on some commuter railway lines and the construction of new underground lines were either proceeding or being launched over this period.

To conclude this chapter, we shall consider briefly the behaviour of the social groups involved in the motorway debate. Firstly, the different authorities dealing with transport matters were trying to expand either by expanding their jurisdiction or by putting forward large scale programmes. However in the generally favourable economic climate which prevailed over most of the period 1965-73, the emphasis was on devising new programmes. For instance the implementation of the PRN would have resulted in an expansion of the GLC and in particular of their Planning and Highway Department as well as of the MOT. The same can be said of the realisation of the proposals promoted by London Transport and Britiah Rail. This pattern of behaviour

can be accounted for by the interests of agents within an organisation in its expansion, which is likely to yield benefits in terms of prestige and career advancement.

Secondly, the planners have an interest in large scale plans because they entail the availability of important sums of money and allow the use of elaborate methods. The devising and application of such methods can contribute to improve their position within the profession. This explains why, when they were hired, the consultants for the LTS argued for increases in the scope of the Survey. Furthermore, planners associated with transport agencies have an interest in the preparation of large scale proposals. This is so because the implementation of such proposals are likely to lead to an expansion of the agency concerned. In order to produce such proposals, the authors of the LTS relied on a procedure imported from America which they adapted to the London context. The application of this procedure almost necessarily led to large scale road proposals because of: its definition of the transport problem in terms of the availability of limited road space at a time when it is predicted that the traffic level will be rapidly increasing; its assertion that this increase must be accomodated if serious economic and environmental consequences are to be avoided; and its presentation of the implementation of a motorway network at the level of Greater London as the only solution.

Thirdly, while there was well organised and well financed

support from the motor lobby for the PRN proposal, there is no evidence of any significant popular mobilisation in defence of the motorway plans. The reason for this appears to be that while public opinion generally approved the schemes according to opinion polls, they did not receive a high priority among their supporters who did not therefore organise movements or maybe even vote on the basis of this issue. Meanwhile, there was widespread opposition to the principle of motorways in London operating at the global level and sometimes using similar tactics to the motor lobby. However, unlike the motor lobby, this opposition to the PRN proposals was amalgamated with numerous locally based anti-motorway organisations. These organisations were primarily motivated by a will to defend their neighbourhood for the intrusion of motorways. The defence of the neighbourhood and sometimes indeed of the house, proved to have a stronger mobilisation potential than the weakly held favourable attitude towards the PRN proposals among a majority of the population. The protest against the motorway scheme was chiefly aimed towards the GLC because it appeared, as a result of their intense promotional effort, that they were in possession of the decision-making powers to implement or abandon the scheme. Consequently, the wing of the opposition movement operating at the level of Greater London came to the fore. This wing was largely constituted of experts and Members of Parliament. It was the electoral threat of the opposition movement, in some cases anticipated and others actual, stemming from its size and strategies, that succeeded in influencing some boroughs to change their position on the PRN proposals. The movement

contributed to the defeat of the Conservative GLC.

FIGURE 5.12

INFLUENCES ON THE FORMULATION AND ON THE REJECTION OF THE MOTORWAY PROPOSALS.



Chapter VI

1973 - 1980: THE STALEMATE YEARS

Introduction

While the previous chapter focused mainly on one transport issue, the PRN proposal and the debate surrounding it, the present chapter will cover many aspects of transport policies in London. This stems from the fact that once the motorway proposal, presented as the ultimate solution to transport problems was dropped, transport problems were formulated on quite different terms. The solutions put forward were consequently of a different nature. Instead of there being one large scale proposal which monopolised attention, planners and elected members were devising and promoting programmes of relatively modest proposals.

The period covered by this chapter includes the Greater London Council mandate of the Labour party from 1973 to 1977 and the first three years of the Conservative mandate which followed. I shall attempt to identify the general transport principles advocated by each party during the campaign before their election and during their mandate. I shall also look at the extent to which they managed to transform these principles into transport policies. I shall try to explain why, in so many cases, a

gulf appeared over these years between the political discourse related to transport matters and the actual policies which were implemented.

The sectors of transport policy considered in this chapter are divided as follows:

1. Policies related to road and traffic matters.

i) the level of expenditure allocated to highway construction and improvement,

ii) measures of traffic restraint including parking control,

iii) lorry routing.

2. Policies related to public transport.

i) fare policies and revenue subsidies,

ii) bus priority schemes,

iii) the extension of the Fleet Line to the Docklands,

iv) the relation of the GLC with the London Transport Executive and with the British Railways Board.

These sectors are chosen because of the extensiveness of political debate they gave rise to at the level of the GLC over the two mandates considered. The focus of the chapter will be on the GLC, but other levels of government and other agencies which influenced transport policies in London will also be considered.

In the first section of this chapter, the various pledges on transport issues made by the Labour party will be presented. We shall show how Labour placed the accent on the protection of the environment and on questions of equity in the use of

transport. We shall see how successive attempts on the part of the Labour council to translate their objectives into reality, failed. The main reason for this will appear to be the more or less universal opposition of interest groups to the Council's schemes. As the Labour party committed themselves to a policy of consultation, the controversial proposals were dropped. We shall see that at the end of the day, because of this opposition and because of cuts in funds allocated for transport purposes by the government, the Labour council had little to show in terms of transport policies.

In the second section, we shall show how the Conservative council's position on transport issues differed form the one of the Labour party. The central theme of the Conservative programme was to relaunch London's economy, and transport policies were seen mainly as a tool towards this objective. However, I shall try to emphasise that while the Conservative party took power with different transport objectives from those of the Labour administration, they in fact failed to bring about a turn in transport policies in London. This will be explained in some cases by an apprehension on the part of the Conservative council that their transport proposals could in fact cause damage to the economic life of the capital. In other cases it will appear that the funds necessary to implement the schemes put forward were not made available by the government.

In the third section, we shall consider the factors influencing the level of services and fares on the London Commuter Network

as well as the debates around these matters. It will be seen that both commuter organisations and the British Railways Board largely interpreted the LCN problems in terms of insufficient financial support from the government. While in the first three sections, attention will be focused on the ways in which authorities attempt to implement transport schemes, in the fourth section, we shall consider the process underlying the determination by the government of their overall budget. We shall also see how the level of funds allocated to transport varied and how the respective importance of the different transport programmes changed through the period. Finally in the last section, we shall consider how, after a period of government cuts of expenditure in urban transport, private transport was less affected than public transport.

6.1. The Labour administration 1973-77

In this section I shall review the transport discussions and policies of the GLC under Labour control from 1973 to1977. We shall start by outlining the transport objectives put forward by the Council. After considering the policies related to road traffic and road construction as well as those related to public transport services, I shall discuss the arguments put forward by both parties during the electoral campaign prior to the GLC 1977 election. Finally I shall comment on the nature of the policies and on the debates which took place around the schemes advocated by the Council. I shall try to demonstrate that while pushing forward their schemes, the Labour Council

faced serious and well organised movements systematically opposed to them, in addition to severe reductions in the funds made available by the government.

6.1.1 Road and traffic policies

During the electoral campaign preceding their victory, the GLC Labour party stressed their commitment to the revocation of the PRN proposal. They emphasised that it was their intention to shift the support of the Council towards public transport. Their transport principles were to encourage the improvement and development of public transport and to restrict the use of the car. They supported the introduction of flat fares on London Transport and British Rail services in London, as well as in the long term, the implementation of free public transport. In this latter case, they did, however, acknowledge the need for government support. As a substitute for the ring roads, the Labour party introduced the idea of a ring-rail. Yet this scheme was abandoned early in the mandate. The commitment to the support of public transport services was reiterated by the Labour administration throughout their mandate.

Road building on the other hand, was given far less support. An exception to this rule was made where road improvements would reduce the environmental impact of cars. As put by Reginald Goodwin, Leader of the Labour group, " the new Greater London Council was elected on the firm commitment of putting

people before cars" (The Times 21 July 1973). Such a commitment explained the importance given to car use restraint measures.

This attitude was reflected in the definition by the Labour GLC of their major transport objectives:

1. That public transport should be efficient, comfortable and relatively cheap.
2. That the use of cars, particularily by commuters to central London and to major town centres should be restrained during peak hours.
3. That the main road system should be carefully managed and that its main weaknesses should be remedied by limited new construction and other measures.
4. That priority should be given to removing excessive traffic from shopping centres, residential and other amenity areas.
5. That the movement of heavy lorries and their parking should be progressively restricted, and that the means of developing the full potential of rail and water freight systems should be identified and pursued.
6. That an outer orbital route should be constructed along a suitable alignment as soon as possible.
7. That the interchange between every mode of transport should be sufficiently convenient to encourage the best use of the system as a whole (GLC 1975a: 127).

More specifically, the Council presented their traffic policy as revolving around four themes.

1. Traffic restraint: existing techniques would be extended and new methods developed to limit car traffic.
2. Traffic management: measures would be taken to improve the safety and the efficiency of the highway system as well as to safeguard the environment.
3. Highway maintenance: roads would be maintained at a standard sufficient for the use made of them.
4. Highway construction and improvement: a selective approach would be adopted to ensure that new roads would be built and existing ones improved only where overall planning and environmental gains can be demonstrated (GLC 175a: 128).

New roads had therefore to fulfill severe conditions in order to win the approval of the Council. They had to comply with the Council's objectives regarding public transport, the improvement of the environment and the restraint of excessive traffic. A factor favourable to new road schemes was the fact that they facilitated other developments such as housing and town centres. Road projects were considered disadvantageous if they were likely to encourage a growth of traffic as a result of an increase in road capacity. They were also seen as negative if they necessitated a large land or property "take" or were environmentally disruptive (GLC 1975a: 132). In line with their objective of relieving London from traffic, the Council actively supported the construction by the Department of the Environment of the M25/M16 orbital route. They pressured the Department to build it as soon as possible so through traffic, and especially lorries, could be diverted from London.

The attitude of the Labour council towards the construction of roads was illustrated by their reaction to the recommendations of the West London Study published in March 1974. The Study had been conducted by officers from the boroughs of Kensington and Chelsea, Hammersmith, Wandsworth and from the GLC. It focused on the problem area in terms of traffic of the abandoned West Cross Route between Holland Park and the Chelsea Basin. Three options were put forward with the aim of excluding through traffic from the area. The first consisted of environmental improvements and traffic management measures only, the second also included the widening of junctions and other road improvements while in the third option, a new four lane road - in fact a modest West Cross Route with ground level junctions - was put forward. The GLC view on the matter was that much could be done by traffic control and environmental management. They rejected the third option on the grounds that it was not much different from the West Cross Route, that it was expensive and that it would cause severe disturbances for the residents of the area (The Times 7 March 1974).

This attitude of the Council entailed a significant reduction in the level of their spending on construction and improvement of highways. The sum allocated in the budget (capital and revenue) to this sector of expenditure dropped in 1975 prices, from £41.3 million in 1973-74 to £13.3 million in 1977-78. Because of the position of the Council on road spending, reductions in the funds made available by the Secretary of State for the Environment for highway building and improvement were largely anticipated and accepted[1]. For instance in 1976, in order to

determine the schemes to be included in the 1977-1982 Transport Policies and Programme document, the Council prepared a fifteen year highway programme. The programme recognised the economic uncertainty then prevailing. The lowest spending option it presented amounted to £10 million per annum (November 1974 prices) up to 1991 while the highest option consisted of £10 million per annum for the next five years, and then a gradual increase to a maximum of £30 million. Also, in October 1975, it was decided by the Council that the construction of major road schemes would be restricted for the following years. Only projects essential to the progress of housing schemes and to the development of the Docklands would be allowed to go ahead (GLC 1976b: 1 para. 2). The directive given by the Secretary of State for the Environment to secure the compliance of local authorities with the cuts in the amount of funds available for road construction was that they should make a better use of existing road facilities (Secretary of State for the Environment 1976: 3 para. 13). This directive in fact corresponded with the initial Greater London Labour policy concerning major roads. There was thus a high level of congruence between the Council's highway policy and the restriction in spending imposed by the government cuts in funds allocated for this purpose. In other words the Council did not experience them as constraints.

The low priority given by the Labour Council to road construction and improvement contrasted sharply with their commitment towards public transport. This was clearly illustrated by the fact that after the Council's cuts in highway construction

in October 1975, the funds liberated from the road construction programme of the TPP which had been submitted in July 1975, were transferred to the London Transport Executive. As a result of this operation, the totality of the LTE budget was agreed by the Council in December 1975 (GLC minutes 27 January 1976: 34). Similarly, in the 1976-77 budget, the level of spending on public transport was maintained at the expense of a cut in the highway programme.

This low priority given to road construction was accompanied in the Labour Council's discourse by a stress on the importance of restraining the level of traffic. The logic underlying this association was basically that if little new road space was added, measures to control the flow of traffic were needed in order to prevent environmental damages resulting from the impact of intense circulation and the deterioration of bus services hampered by road congestion. The stated objectives pursued by the Council in their traffic restraint proposals were:

1. To control the journeys causing the most environmental and traffic nuisance.
2. To limit the car journeys which can easily be transferred to public transport.
3. To limit the less important car journeys.
4. To protect the local environment from through traffic.
5. To give priority to public transport where necessary.
6. To control lorry routes and thus minimise their environmental impact.
7. To promote road safety as well as the safety of pedestrians.

8. To restrict as few journeys as possible while achieving this effect (GLC 1975b).

Three main groups of traffic restraint measures were put forward during the Labour GLC mandate: central London supplementary licensing, central London parking schemes and local pedestrianisation and traffic restriction schemes.

In order to alleviate the traffic situation in central London, the Council had been considering since 1974 the idea of implementing a supplementary licensing scheme (GLC 1974a)[2]. The purpose of such a scheme was primarily to reduce through traffic in central London because this type of traffic had remained unaffected by parking measures and had, in fact, doubled between 1962 and 1974.

In 1975, after a cost-benefit evaluation of six possible schemes (May 1975), the Council chose to adopt the one which consisted of a charge of £1 per day to vehicles entering central London between 8.00 and 18.00 hours. It was forecast that this would reduce traffic by one third in the central area and generate revenues of £45 million per annum. It was also estimated that it would improve the public transport financial situation by £20 million per annum. Yet in the summer of 1975, the Council decided to drop the plan. The Council had faced an intense protest from the motor lobby as well as many representations from the public against the supplementary licensing proposal. Another factor which influenced this decision was the acknowledgement that approximately 40% of work journeys in London by car were cushioned to some degree by employers

(The Economist 19 September 1974). It followed that many drivers would have been cushioned against supplementary licensing. This raised the social problem associated with the implementation of the scheme. As Enid Wistrich, vice-chairwoman of the Transport Committee during the Labour 1973-77 GLC mandate, stated:

> "... the proposal (of supplementary licensing) was turned down at the political level within the Labour majority (as well as by the Conservatives) because it was felt to penalise essential users and the poorer car owners. In other words, the company director's chauffeur-driven Daimler would still drive unscathed, while the small businessman's delivery van, the doctor's car and above all the poor man's Mini would be uncomfortably hit." (1978:5)

The second group of traffic restraint proposals advocated by the Council involved the control of car-parks mainly in central London. The main purpose of these proposals, as stated in the Green paper entitled Parking (GLC 1975c), was to reduce the overall number of commuters using their car to reach central London. Three methods were put forward to achieve this aim. The first consisted of limiting the amount of car-park spaces under the Council's control. In central London, over 2,500 parking meters were removed while as the result of the non-renewal of permits, the number of spaces in temporary car-parks fell from 12,400 to 5,500 between 1973 and early 1977 (GLC 1977a: 7). Furthermore, from February 1977, the GLC kept five car-parks on the South Bank closed until 11.00 a.m.. The effect of these measures was, however, limited because only a small proportion of the off-street car-parks in central London was under the direct control of the GLC. The second

method of reducing commuting by car, consisted of attempts to decrease the number of private non-residential parking (PNRP) spaces. As Jim Daly stated in February 1976:

> "Our intention is to clamp down on the 30,000 'office perk' spaces where commuters' cars stand idle all day and go on the roads only to and from work. Most of these journeys could be made easily by public transport"(The Times 21 February 1976).

Two techniques were considered to reduce the amount of PNRP spaces. The first one was the issuing of standard reduction orders, i.e. compulsory closure of private parking spaces, but it was estimated that the associated compensation which could be claimed by car-park owners could reach £60 million. It was concluded that this was too high a price to pay. On these grounds the second technique, a special taxation on these spaces, appeared to be much more attractive in that it would bring in revenues to the Council. A report prepared by a joint working party including officers of the Council, the London Boroughs Association and of the Department of the Environment (A Joint Party of the GLC, DOE, LBA: 1971) advocated the application of such a tax but suggested that sites comprising less than ten spaces be exempt for economic reasons. On 9 March 1976, a motion was carried to the Secretary of State for the Environment seeking public legislation to give the GLC powers to levy a tax on PNRP spaces in the next Road Traffic Act or in any other appropriate bill (GLC minutes, 9 March 1976). Labour's term in office ended before they implemented measures affecting PNRP spaces.

The third mode of parking restraint in central London put

forward by the Labour Council consisted of licensing public off-street car-parks. The GLC was empowered to designate areas in which no one but a local authority could operate off-street car-parks of a prescribed description except if under the conditions of a license by a borough council. Two schemes were devised, one for the West End and the other for central Hammersmith, under which long term charges would be higher in hourly terms than short term charges in order to discourage their use by commuters. It was then assumed that the central area scheme would reduce the number of car entering central London at peak hour by approximately 2,000 (GLC minutes, 4 May 1976: 324-5). In March 1977, the Council decided to go ahead with the licensing of public car-parks. This decision was taken in spite of 4,671 representations, the vast majority of which was unsympathetic to the idea and of the absence of direction from the Secretary of State for Transport on the matter. The Borough of Westminister was also opposed to the scheme. They were instead supporting the conclusion of voluntary agreements with the operators. These attempts to limit the number of parking spaces in central London were to be compensated by a programme of 35,000 park and ride spaces at outer London railway stations. By the end of the Labour mandate, approximately 1,000 such new spaces had been opened.

The third group of traffic restraint measures advocated by the Labour administration consisted of pedestrianisation and partial pedestrianisation schemes, and conversions of streets to bus and taxi use only. In May 1974, the Council revealed

their intention of implementing twenty-four pedestrianisation or partial pedestrianisation schemes. Meanwhile they acknowledged that there was a need for investigation before their implementation (The Times 24 May 1974). However in November 1975, Jim Daly announced that because of the limited funds available, the programme would be cut. From 1973 to 1976, only six pedestrianisation and five bus and taxi schemes materialised, and of the former, one lasted only six weeks and of the latter, two were abandoned (GLC minutes 12 October 1976: 648-9).

Along with traffic restraint, concern about the environmental impact of lorries was an important aspect of the transport preoccupations of the GLC. In February 1975, they published a Green paper (GLC 1975d) which stated a desire to reduce the negative impacts of freight movement on the environment and to involve the operators in the devising of solutions. In April 1975 at a conference at the Queen Elizabeth Hall, Martin Foulkes, head of the GLC Freight Unit, launched what was referred to as a lorry routing inquiry. On this occasion, a lorry routing proposal prepared by the Freight Unit, comprising a network of 400 miles making use of existing main routes accompanied by bans on the less suitable roads, was presented. This proposal was accompanied by the stated intention of using rail and waterways more intensively for freight purposes (GLC 1975e). These proposals however caused intense opposition from individuals and organisations worried about the negative environmental impact of the lorry routes on areas adjacent to them, which became coordinated into the London wide Campaign

Against the Lorry Menace (CALM). The London Freight Association was also very active in opposing lorry routing as presented in the Council's document. In addition, many boroughs were against the proposals. This opposition took inter alia, the form of 12,410 letters from individuals and 280 from organisations as well as 40 petitions bearing over 42,000 names. The Council concluded that while 97% of the population was in favour of the principle of lorry routing, there was an intense dissatisfaction about specific routes. Hence they decided to abandon the lorry routing proposal.

Instead they presented an alternative strategy which spread the measures to be adopted over a longer period and which avoided the inclusion of an overall scheme. As Enid Wistrich stated, "we have given up the idea of dealing with the problem all at once and now we shall concentrate on a more empirical approach" (The Economist 22 October 1975). In the short and medium term, the strategy consisted of identifying with the help of the boroughs, areas from which the lorries should be banned, discussing with the boroughs the idea of banning all lorries over forty feet long for the 125 square miles inside the North and the South Circular Roads except for delivery purposes, and exploring the practicality of a ban on all big lorries in London. It was envisaged that in the longer term, policies should be aimed at encouraging the transfer of more goods to rail and waterways, the setting up of depots where large consignments would be broken into more manageable sizes, and the development of quieter lorries. In November 1975,

the Council opened discussions with the boroughs on the second point of the short and medium term strategy, i.e. the ban on large lorries. However because of the anticipated increase in traffic on the routes bordering the area where the ban would apply as well as on the East/West route that was to be maintained, only six out of twenty two boroughs involved turned out to be in favour. Furthermore, the police had doubts as to their ability to enforce the ban. In January 1977, the GLC Transport Committee decided to drop the scheme (GLC minutes, 25 January 1977: 15-6). Finally in February 1977, the GLC Department of Planning and Transportation published a fifteen year programme including short, medium and long term freight related policies (GLC 1977b). The freight programme which the Labour Council failed to implement during their four year mandate was thereby extended over fifteen years.

In conclusion, the road and traffic proposals and policies put forward by the Labour Council during their 1973-77 term in office can be divided into two strands:

1. There was a significant decrease in road construction and improvement in accord with government spending priorities.
2. Proposals for traffic measures were put forward but their implementation was hampered partly by a lack of funds and partly by the scale of the opposition they triggered off. As a result of the Labour Council's sensitivity to public opinion, only a small proportion of the proposals were put into practice. While the proposals put forward by the Labour administration were largely in line with the principles on transport matters

they adopted while in opposition and early in their term in office, there was an important discrepancy between the proposals and the implementations.

6.1.2 Public transport policies

The aspects of the Council's public transport proposals and policies considered in this section are:

1. The Council's position on the matter of the level of revenue subsidy to be paid to London Transport and the debate with the government over this issue.
2. The introduction of bus lanes.
3. The River Underground Line (the extension of the Fleet Line towards the Docklands and Thamesmead).
4. The Council's relation with the transport authorities operating in London: The London Transport Executive and the British Railways Board.

The Greater London Labour party saw in public transport "the corner stone" of their transport strategy (GLC 1975f). This support for public transport was justified by its universality of access and its modest environmental impact compared with private transport. The aim pursued by the Labour administration was to provide a cheap and efficient public transport service. It was in this context that the Council agreed to subsidise London Transport's services. The GLC announced in July 1973 that, from September of that year, the bus concessionary fare scheme for

the elderly would be replaced by free travel. The cost of this measure was estimated at £7.5 million per annum. In December 1973, it became clear that LT was facing a deficit because of large rises in prices, wages and the cost of fuel. The Council, determined to avoid fare increases, agreed to pay £5 million to be credited to the LT's revenue account. In fact because of increased expenses of 26.1% for the operation of buses and of 29.5% for rail services, this sum had to be raised to nearly £25 million for 1974. The following year, the London Transport Executive experienced increases in the working expenses of buses of 50% and of the underground of 43.8% (Buchanan 1980: Table 7.1) (see Fig. 6.1). This was partly due to wage increases which had become necessary to relieve staff shortages. In 1975, the Council paid a revenue subsidy of £93.3 million to the LTE. Of this sum, £53 million originated from the government's Transport Supplementary Grant. Nevertheless, this subsidy proved insufficient to offset public transport fare increases.

These subsidies to London Transport were justified by the GLC's desire to maintain the level of services and patronage. As stated in July 1974 in the GLC's Transport Policies and Programme 1975-80 document (GLC 1974: 14 para. 5.8):

> "The pattern that emerged during the sixties of service trimming, heavy fare increases, falling patronage and failure to achieve commercial viability are testimony of this. For a while capital grants were sufficient but new revenue subsidy is also needed if further deterioration of services is to be prevented." (GLC 1974: 14 para. 5.8)

Again in June 1975, the LTE announced that they would need an extra £15 million the following year, and possibly more, to

Figure 6.1 London Transport working expenses percentage increase over previous year

1972	Bus	8.1
	Rail	17.1
1973	Bus	11.5
	Rail	6.7
1974	Bus	26.1
	Rail	29.5
1975	Bus	50.0
	Rail	43.8
1976	Bus	20.0
	Rail	19.1

Source: Buchanan 1980: Table 7.1

meet the rising wages and other costs. Reginald Goodwin, leader of the majority on the GLC, stressed their determination to honour their pledge of stabilising fares and bringing people back to public transport. In the TPP submitted in July 1975, the GLC stated their intention of allocating £99 million in 1976-77 to the payment of revenue subsidies to public transport services but things were not to happen as the Council wished.

Already in December 1974, the government in a circular on the introduction of the Transport Supplementary Grant, stated that it was their aim to see public transport operations move closer towards a position of commercial viability. They recommended that fare increases should at least match inflation. In 1976-77, in line with a policy of gradually phasing out their contribution to general public transport fare subsidy, the government cut the level of the TSG allocated to revenue subsidies. They also opposed an attempt by the Council to compensate for the fall in this contribution by an increase of rates. The GLC was threatened with cuts in the following year's TSG if they proceeded with such an increase. (In fact the level of the fare relief grant paid by the Council to London Transport diminished from 1975 onwards.) Consequently the amount paid as a revenue subsidy to public transport in London fell to £76.4 million (1975 prices) in 1976. The Council protested vehemently about this on the grounds that it was in contradiction with their commitment to public transport. As a joint report of the GLC's Policy and Resources Committee, and Transport Committee stated in January 1976:

> "We think that the Council should reiterate to the government that a policy which entails drastic and rapid increases in fares is contrary to the Council's aim of encouraging the use of public transport. Already large losses of passenger mileage, reduced mobility and a greater inclination to use the private car have been the results of government's policy." (GLC minutes, 27 January 1976:34).

In the autumn of that year, the Transport Committee of the GLC produced a report which argued that fare increases made necessary by cuts in the government's contribution to the revenue support grant would lead to the following consequences:

1. There would be a loss in revenue from London Transport because of a drop of patronage.
2. There would be a higher demand for wage increases in London.
3. The level of public transport services would diminish, thus causing redundancies.
4. People would turn to private transport thereby causing increases in the level of congestion detrimental to the traffic essential to the economic well-being of London.
5. People on low or fixed incomes who rely on public transport for their mobility would be penalised (GLC minutes 2 November 1976: 715-6).

Through their pressure on the government, the Council managed to limit the reduction of the revenue subsidies between 1976-77 and 1977-78 to £23 million. They also succeeded in securing the approval of the government to the transfer of funds from the road budget to public transport as long as the transport budget ceiling was respected.

In November 1974, when for the first time under this GLC administration, a steep fare increase (to be implemented in March 1975) was approved, eight Labour members objected.

According to David White, Chairman of the South Area committee of councillors and one of the objectors, this decision consisted of " selling principles for the sake of a 2p. rate" (The Times 27 November 1974). However the majority of the Labour members on the Council were trying to strike a balance between the subsidy from the government, the rate payers and the public transport users in the financing of London Transport. As has been seen, the government were cutting their contribution to the subsidy and making severe pronouncements about the use of the Council's own funds for the purpose of public transport revenue subsidy. The GLC were also motivated, especially after 1975, by a determination to limit the demands made on rate payers after two years of steep rate increases. This was given as a reason for abandoning the idea of making public transport free. In March 1976, it was estimated that free London Transport services would cost £250 million to the GLC and lead to an additional rate of just over 13p. in the '£' which would have meant an increase of 80% in the 1976-77 general precept (GLC minutes, 30 March 1976). The GLC Policy and Resources Committee and the GLC Transport Committee stated in a joint report that they did not intend to see any rise in the Council's contribution to public transport revenue subsidy and that it should be maintained at the 1975 level i.e. £40 million (GLC minutes, 20-21 July 1976: 569-70).

As the government were cutting their contribution and the Council were freezing their level of support while LT's operating costs soared, fares were bound to increase. In

fact, during the last full years of the Labour mandate, three steep fare increases took place, and LT fares doubled over this period. From early 1976, the Council stated their intention of trying to maintain the level of fare increases within the limits of inflation. In July 1976, they issued a directive to the LTE stating that they should reduce their net revenue costs over the 1976 calendar year and over the 1976-77 financial year to accomodate a reduction of £1 million in the Council's revenue subsidy payment for that financial year and avoid the deficit of £3 million forecast for 1976 (LTE 1977a: 40).

The favourable attitude of the Council towards public transport was not only reflected in the payment of fare subsidies. It also took the form of the proposal and implementation of bus priority schemes. In July 1973, the LTE submitted to the GLC a proposal for ten fast, limited stop, bus services which would provide direct links between some of the suburbs and Central London using routes where enforced bus lanes would cover most of the distance. The name "speedbus" was given to the proposed services (LTE 1974: 15). In June 1975, eager to emphasise Labour's commitment to public transport in the wake of steep fare increases, the Council adopted one of the speedbus schemes and announced that they would proceed with preliminary studies in the case of another one. The scheme adopted was to run from Parliament Hill to Peckham Rye. It was estimated that its implementation would cut the journey time for a distance of over ten miles from 70 to 50 minutes and that it would save London Transport 28 buses. The scheme under study was the introduction

of a speedbus between Croydon and Oxford Circus.

Jim Daly, the Chairman of the Transport Committee, dreading opposition to the scheme of an intensity comparable to that provoked by the traffic restraint proposals, declared in November 1975 that the scheme would go ahead over the next three years whatever the objections. Nevertheless in the face of widespread opposition to the scheme, the Transport Committee agreed in August 1976 that the bus priority measures would be watered down and that interested parties would be consulted over modifications to the scheme. The major opponents to the Parliament Hill/Peckham Rye speedbus schemes were traders along the route who were worried about being deprived of easy car access to their premises, residents of the areas adjacent to the route who feared increases of traffic and taxi drivers who objected to the long diversions bus priority schemes would cause them. The Freight Transport Association of London also objected to the scheme. They claimed that the disadvantages to vans and lorries alone would be greater than the benefits to bus passengers. Meanwhile the Council went ahead with regular increases in the length of bus lanes even though the number of schemes introduced diminished over the last years of the Labour mandate.

The GLC energetically supported the extension of the Fleet Line to the Docklands at a cost of £180 million. Reginald Goodwin reiterated, on many occasions, his refusal to consider alternatives. He saw the underground extension as an essential

precondition to the commercial development of the Docklands. In April 1976, in the face of the refusal of the government to allocate funds for the scheme, there were talks about how it might be financed by the GLC at a cost of £20 million a year over ten years. This would have led to an 11% increase in the rate bill. It was hoped that with the improvement of the economic situation, the government would have taken over the financing.

The Council's commitment to the underground link was reinforced when in July 1976, the Docklands Joint Committee (1976) came out in favour of such a scheme. After considering several ways of meeting the need for a public transport link between the Docklands and central London, and more specifically after comparing the respective merits of a busway and an underground line, the Committee concluded that the latter constituted the most attractive option. They justified their choice on the grounds that the underground line would relieve the pressure on roads and on the North Kent British Rail Line because it would attract more passengers than the other options. Furthermore, they considered that because it would offer a wide range of job opportunities as well as an important labour catchment area, such a line would constitute an incentive to investments in housing and industry (Docklands Joint Committee 1976: 40 para. 5,6-7). Finally, the Committee underlined the fact that the underground option won the support of business, industry, the residents of the area and of the LTE as well as of the Docklands boroughs (Docklands Joint Committee 1976: 41 para. 58).

Even though they contributed to most of the LT's capital expenditure by the payment of the depreciation and renewal grants as well as by the payment of capital grants (with the support of the government), the GLC relied largely on the Executive to devise investment schemes and to place them in order of priority. The Labour administration also adopted bus priority schemes prepared by the Executive. However, the modified version of the Parliament Hill/Peckham Rye speedbus arrived at by the Council following the opposition of groups caused disappointment on the part of the Executive (LTE 1977a: 13).

The GLC's relation with the British Railways Board over Inner Suburban services was of a different nature. The Council had no control over these services. The Board's only obligation towards the GLC on this matter was to consult the Council before bringing in changes in fare and service levels. In fact the BRB contented themselves with notifications given before the introduction of changes (Wistrich 1978: 8). It was through one of these notifications that the Council learned of the BRB's intention to reduce services on the North London Line (running from Broad Street to Richmond) by between 20% and 50%. In March 1976, the Council decided to contribute £150,000 to the Board to allow the maintenance of the existing level of services. When this decision was taken, Jim Daly mentioned that, because of this subsidy, the Council would like to have an effective say with regard to certain British Rail services (GLC minutes 9 March 1976: 135). In September of the same year, the GLC Transport Committee

accepted a recommendation to pay British Rail £300,000 to maintain the current level of services on the North London Line and the North Woolwich Line.

In June 1976, the GLC asked to take over control of the £60 million subsidy allocated by the government for the running of 40 inner suburban British Rail services operating at a distance of up to twenty miles from central London. The Council suggested that this subsidy could be integrated with the Transport Supplementary Grant paid annually to the GLC by the government. The arguments put forward by the GLC to support their claim were that:

1. Control of the BR Inner Suburban commuter services by the Council would substitute democratic decision-making to the unilateral decisions of the BRB. Under these conditions, the Council would not have to mount last minute rescue operations as in the case of the North London and North Woolwich lines.

2. Control of the LT and BR services by the same authority would encourage a greater level of coordination between them. Better interchanges as well as an integrated fare and ticketing policy could then be more easily introduced. The example of Hamburg and Munich where commuter trains (S Bahn), the U Bahn and bus services are operated by a single authority was quoted (The Times 14 June 1976; The Guardian 11 May 1976).

Basically, the Council was requesting an extension of their transport responsibilities so that they could control the commuter rail services as was happening as a result of Passenger Transport Executive/British Rail agreements in force in provin-

cial conurbations (GLC 1976c: para. 13). This request by the GLC was supported by the LTE on the grounds that there was a need for the coordination and integration of public transport services in London. As observed by the Executive, "since 1970, London Transport and British Rail are more institutionally separate than at any time since before 1933 and the last two or three years have seen a substantial divergence of policies" (LTE 1977b: 334 para. 4.2). The North London Line Committee, a lobby supporting the maintenance and the improvement of services on this line, also advocated that control of the BR Inner Suburban services should be given to the GLC. They considered that the North London Line service should be taken over by the LTE while policy decisions should be made by the GLC. Another argument put forward by the Committee to support their case was that, while LT was proceeding with equipment renewal on their rail services, BR Inner Suburban services were allowed to deteriorate (North London Line Committee 1977: 603 para. 510).

In conclusion, it appears that the Labour Council was not able to maintain low fares on London Transport services because of the combined effects of several factors. The increased costs on these services, the government decision to cut the level of their contribution to revenue support and to discourage the Council from compensating for this drop from their own funds together with the Councils desire to limit rate increases in the middle of their term of office, contributed to fare rises. Unlike the case of principal road construction and improvement where the GLC accepted and even

anticipated reductions in funds made available by the government, the Council actively resisted cuts in public transport revenue subsidies. The Council managed to mitigate the cuts initially announced through negotiations with the government. The objective of the GLC in these discussions was to try to maintain the contribution to the revenue support grant at as high as possible a level. Because of the sensitivity of the Labour administration to pressures, it was decided not to implement the speedbus scheme in its original form. Meanwhile the Council was attempting to extend their control over the BR Inner Suburban commuter services.

During the campaign leading up to the 1977 GLC election, the Labour party made much play of their subsidies to public transport in the face of attacks from the Conservatives who emphasised the usefulness of the car in London. For instance a reserved coach on a train on the North London Line, nicknamed the 'Goodwin express', stopped seventeen times along the line to pick up Labour candidates. The Labour party was thereby bringing to the public's attention the effect of the Council's contribution to the maintenance of services on the line. A joint report presented by the GLC Transport Committee and by the GLC Policy and Resources Committee in March 1977 (GLC minutes, 29 March 1977: 41-55), attributed the responsibility for the failure of the Council's public transport programme to the successive cuts in the government's contributions. The report went on to criticise the degree of dependence of local authorities on the government in their transport policies.

6.1.3. The transport debate during the Labour administration

Having considered the transport proposals put forward by the Labour controlled GLC, we shall now investigate the political and economic context which influenced their implementation. We shall focus more specifically on factors which inhibited the implementation of the Labour proposals: the strength of the opposition to anticipated local effects of these proposals and to the principle advocated by the Council underlying their proposals, cuts in the government financial support for transport in London, and directions from the government preventing the Council from compensating these cuts from their own funds. It will appear that because of their sensitivity to the reaction of the public, the Labour Council refrained from implementing transport policies when they gave rise to intense opposition and that many proposals were dropped because of an absence of adequate funds. It will nevertheless become apparent that in spite of this, the Labour controlled GLC maintained their transport principles throughout their term in office and that the distribution of spending on different forms of transport by the Council reflected these principles. At the end of the section, we shall take into account the effects of the 1973-1977 Labour GLC transport policies on different social groups. We shall firstly turn to the configuration of forces around the Labour administration transport proposals: sources of support and of opposition.

The Labour administration's transport objectives received support from movements devoted to the defence of public

transport services and of the environment from the impact of road traffic. For instance, Transport 2000, a national pro-public transport lobby, stood by the Council on the following objectives: they advocated the establishment of a single passenger transport authority for Greater London, a single ticket system for railways, buses and the underground, the end of motorway construction, suburban park and ride schemes, more priority for buses, and the introduction of express bus services. Transport 2000 also supported, along with the London Amenity and Transport Association, the supplementary licensing proposal for central London (LATA 1975).

Fare Fight and the London Passenger Action Confederation were also among movements supporting public transport. These two London movements advocated cheap and efficient public transport. They both staged protests against the 1975 and 1976 London Transport fare increases. They urged passengers to pay the old fares and to leave an IOU form stating their intention to pay the rest in order to overload the LT's bureaucracy. However in May 1977 this action was declared illegal and an appeal against this decision was rejected in December of the same year. Fare Fight, the London Passenger Action Confederation, public transport trade unions, the London Amenity and Transport Association together with residents and local societies, launched the Save our (Public Transport) Services (SOS) Campaign. This campaign which was aimed at the government was placed under the chairmanship of Jim Daly, Chairman of

the GLC Transport Committee. The main demands they formulated were:

1. That the Department of Transport should allow the GLC to give priority to the support of public transport if they wished to do so.
2. That the DOT should withdraw their directives to the GLC to abandon their subsidy to the London and South East BR commuter services.
3. That the government should make more funds available for LT and BR by way of revenue support. These funds might originate from increased taxation on car owners and drivers or from a reduction in the tax reliefs they enjoy, and
4. that LT and BR investment programmes should be reinstated at a level agreed by the trade unions.

In February 1977, the GLC voted for a motion welcoming the campaign and stating their support to their objectives (GLC minutes, 3/4 February 1977: 74-5).

On the other hand, the opposition to the Labour Council's transport proposals stemmed from two sources: from local residents or other local interests who felt threatened by a particular proposal and from well organised interest groups opposed to the principles advocated by the Council. The first type of opposition the Labour GLC had to cope with consisted largely of representations from residents worried that the introduction of a traffic scheme would lead to a worsening of their environment because of the displacement of traffic it would cause. Retailers also complained about

the possible effect of bus lanes on access to their stores by cars. This type of opposition can, to a large extent, be related to the difficulties of implementing transport policies in built-up areas. This situation stems from the finite amount of road space available. If the aim of a traffic scheme is to improve the environmental conditions of a given area, the chances are, in a situation where circulation levels are close to saturation, that it will cause an environmental deterioration in another area. A case in point is the Oxford Street bus and taxi only scheme. While the implementation of this scheme led to an overall reduction of 15% in traffic levels, a substantial amount of traffic was diverted onto parallel roads which were already heavily used. Many of these roads were partly residential and some were located in conservation areas (Parker and Ebura 1972: 14 and 17). The Barnsbury traffic scheme represents another example of the conflicts that can arise in such situations. Barnsbury was designated in 1970 as an environmental area by the Conservative GLC. One way streets and street barriers were set up to prevent through traffic. A predominantly middle class movement representing the residents of the area - the Barnsbury Association - actively supported the scheme. Meanwhile in the working class neighbourhoods surrounding the area, there was much complaint about the increases in traffic resulting from the scheme. Traffic on the distributor roads had risen by between 50 to 100% while it had dropped by 25% on the internal roads (Buchanan 1980: 277). When the Labour party gained control of the Borough of Islington, they asked the GLC to revoke the scheme but the Conservative

Council refused. However in April 1974, the Labour Council announced their intention to repeal the scheme.

The second type of opposition which the Labour GLC had to face was directed against the transport principles advocated by the Labour administration, rather than their local effects. This form of opposition manifested itself at every move the Council made. It relied heavily on the media and organised political pressures directed at the Labour Council e.g. petitions, sending large numbers of letters to councillors,etc. On several occasions, organisations belonging to this second type of opposition attempted to establish links with sources of local protest in order to carry out joint action against the Labour Council.

The principal organisation in this second category was the Greater London Conservative party. One of the main strands of their critique of the Labour administration was the low priority they gave to the construction of new roads. According to the Conservatives, new major roads brought environmental relief to areas surrounding them. In July 1973, Desmond Plummer, Leader of the Conservative group on the GLC mentioned the example of the Westway: out of every sixteen vehicles which once travelled along the surrounding roads, fifteen now use the Westway (The Times 25 July 1973). The Conservatives also stressed that they considered it was essential to cater for the car to ensure the economic vitality of London. As a result they stood up against the Labour administration policy of parking restraint

(The Times 26 April 1977). Another important stand of the Conservative party's criticism was their lack of sympathy with the payment of revenue subsidies to London Transport. Instead they advocated more efficient operation of the services in order to reduce their cost.

Another major source of opposition to the transport objectives of the Labour Council was the motor lobby. Every major motor lobby organisation became involved in the Greater London Transport debate during the Labour mandate. The British Road Federation, after the rejection of the PRN which they had actively supported, adapted their position to the new situation, and started to endorse less comprehensive road projects. For instance in their 1975 Annual Report (BRF 1976: 14), the Federation defined their programme for action for London in the following terms:

> "In London the British Road Federation will step up the campaign in areas where sections of new roads are needed and where immediate results are likely. Special attention will be given to the Outer Orbital Route, the West Relief Road and expansion in South East London."

The BRF tried to obtain local backing for their road proposals especially in areas where they perceived latent support for traffic relief. The purpose of this tactic was to "harness the full force of local opinion" (BRF 1975: 8) against the GLC's transport strategies.

Some of the organisations belonging to the BRF made independent iniatives in the Greater London transport debate. In June 1973, the Royal Automobile Club stated their opposition to bus-only lanes because of the delays they caused to traffic.

In a joint letter to the GLC in September 1974, the Automobile Association, the Royal Automobile Club and the Royal Scottish Automobile Club, deplored the Council's decision to abandon the motorway scheme, and plans to reduce on-street and off-street parking, to close the Albert Bridge to traffic and to exclude cars from twenty-four shopping streets. More generally, they considered that curbs on private traffic were:

> "... potentially disadvantageous to trading, business and residential interests, especially in central London, by reducing its attraction to visitors for business, social or domestic purposes. Personal mobility is its life blood, which would be drained by excessive restrictions to the use of private transport" (The Times 21 September 1974).

Later, the Royal Automobile Club protested against the supplementary licensing proposal for central London. They also condemned the bus and taxi only scheme on Oxford Street which they saw as a "further curtailment of the rights of the public" (The Times 7 April 1976). And they opposed the plans to increase public parking charges in central London because they feared they would force many workers to seek jobs elsewhere. The Automobile Association went so far as to challenge the Balham High Road no-car lane scheme in Court.

The Council also had to face the opposition of organisations defending the interests of particular industries or occupations. One such case was the Freight Transport Association which campaigned in 1976 against the inner London lorry ban proposal. The London Taxi Drivers Association were also active in their protest. They opposed the Parliament Hill/Peckham speedbus scheme on the grounds that it would disrupt highway traffic,

cause backstreet congestion and damage the environment. In order to press their point, three hundred taxi drivers disrupted the GLC debates on 4 May 1976.

In early 1975, businessmen formed the London Motorists' Association with the support of the Royal Automobile Club, the Automobile Association, the British Road Federation and of the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders. The initial purpose of the Association was to campaign against the supplementary licensing scheme for central London. Six weeks after the formation of the Association, more than 10,000 members had joined (The Times 13 March 1975). In April 1977, the LMA set up an inquiry conducted by Sir Colin Buchanan on traffic in London. The conclusions of the inquiry published in June 1977, criticised the (by then) former Labour administration for their policy of restricting car use in central London. The inquiry argued that these policies had a negative effect on inner city life and more specifically on its industrial and commercial prosperity (LMA 1977).

The Confederation of British Industries, the Automobile Association, the British Road Federation and the Freight Transport Association set up the Movement for London Campaign to protest against the Labour Council's transport policy. The campaign was particularily directed against the proposal to tax office car spaces which was described as "ill researched, hysterical and potentially disastrous for small businesses

in London" (The Times 21 February 1976). The Campaign also opposed the subsidies which were being paid to public transport on the grounds that they represented too large an expenditure for the number of passengers they attracted (The Times 29 October 1976). Before the 1977 GLC elections the Movement for London produced a pamphlet entitled The GLC Doesn't Like Motorists. The pamphlet stressed the fact that London is the only big city in Europe without a viable inner by-pass and that the GLC was proud of its lack of a road programme for the next ten years. It also mentioned that poor access was the main reason why industrialists were leaving inner London and that the GLC policy of limiting car access in central London was in fact increasing congestion and delays. The publication of this pamphlet led Reginald Goodwin to accuse the Movement for London Campaign of being a "thinly disguised attempt to win support for a Tory GLC committed to building new roads through London" (The Times 21 April 1977).

Some of the boroughs constituted another source of opposition to the Labour Council's transport proposals and policies. The Borough of Westminister in particular, was systematically opposed to GLC traffic restraint schemes. They shared with the Westminister Chamber of Commerce the position that easy car access was needed to sustain economic vitality. For instance, the Chamber of Commerce opposed the supplementary licensing plan on the grounds that its implementation could turn Westminister into "some kind of third rate shanty town" (The Times 14 January 1975)

The two types of opposition the Labour Council had to face, the local and the general, are the primary factor explaining the nonimplementation of many of their proposals. The Council

was obliged, for electoral reasons, to be sensitive to implications of an accumulation of localised protests, and to the motor lobby's campaigns. This did not mean however, that the Council maintained a close relationship with the motor lobby. In reply to a question concerning the GLC's participation in a BRF seminar, Jim Daly said that the Council had higher priorities than the attendance of these seminars. He nevertheless added that he had met representatives of the Federation from time to time (GLC minutes 20 July 1976).

The Labour Council's reaction to the opposition must also be explained in the light of their commitment to consultation and to public participation in most issues. This sensitivity to public opinion can probably be explained by their memory of how opposition movements - to which the Labour party was in most cases sympathetic - brought down the previous Conservative administration. The Labour Council had pledged to abandon "visionary planning" and to replace it by "shorter positive programmes" regularily updated (GLC 1975g, Preface by Jim Daly). This opened the door to the greater importance given to public opinion in the shaping of transport policies.[3] For instance in February 1975, the GLC published seven Green papers setting out the principles they intended to pursue in different areas of transport policy, and stating explicitly that the views on these matters of the public and of organisations were welcomed. And in London is for People: Aspects of Transport (GLC 1975h) we read that "the reactions and views of Londoners... are necessary before any decision can be taken." In fact in most of the transport proposals put forward by

the Labour Council, much attention was given to the reaction of the public and of interested organisations. It was only exceptionally that the decision was taken to go ahead with a scheme which had raised a lot of opposition. Paradoxically it therefore appears that it is the Council's commitment to public consultation which prevented the implementation of many of their transport objectives, such as the need to restrain traffic and to give priority to bus services.

Another factor obstructing the Council's transport aspirations was the cutback in financial contributions from the government and the directives they made concerning the usage of the Council's own funds. The GLC supported the macro-economic goals of the government public expenditure policy. For example, in February 1976, Illtyd Harrington, Chairman of the Policy and Resources Committee, acknowledged that because of the large size of the GLC budget, restriction of their expenditure plays " a major role in the 'attack on inflation'" (GLC 1976d, Preface). While the low level of government contributions towards spending on road building and improvement did not cause much discussion because of the low priority given to such expenditure by the Council, the situation was different when these cuts affected public transport. The Council reacted strongly against the reduction in the public transport revenue support grant and against the government's decision not to finance the Fleet Line underground extension. The GLC's transport initiatives were further curtailed by directives from the government concerning the allocation of their own funds.

Especially after 1975, the Council became concerned about the level of rates which had increased sharply in the previous years. Between 1973-74 and 1975-76 the rate level increased by an average of 156%. The decision was then taken to freeze the level of the rates, and from 1975-76 up to the end of the Labour Council's term of office, no rate increase took place. As Illtyd Harrington stated in the preface to the GLC 1975-76 budget (GLC 1975a):

> "Given the serious discrimination which operates against London local government in the rate support grant system, it was inevitable that rate rises in London would be more severe than elsewhere in the country, but the scale of the increase which has in the event, proved to be necessary, indicated that the rating system is now taking as much as it can bear."

Consequently, the Council became obliged to limit the increase in their spending. For instance, the 1975-76 budget did not leave room for any significant growth, and this applied to expenditure on public transport which constituted the single most important demand on the rates.

It is remarkable that, in the face of severe financial constraints which seriously limited their ability to implement the principles stated in their manifesto, the Labour administration did not abandon these principles. In fact they continued to refer to them in their discussions with the government. And when expensive means of indicating their commitment to these principles ceased to be possible, e.g. increasing subsidies to public transport, they relied on cheaper ones, e.g. bus priority measures. Similarily, when it appeared impossible because of their cost and of the opposition they

raised, to implement schemes to which the Council had given a high priority within the period covered by their mandate, they extended the period over which they would be realised. This was the case in particular of the freight programme which was extended over fifteen years. Furthermore, while some schemes were dropped altogether because of public protest, in other cases they were modified e.g. the scaled down speedbus proposals. It would therefore appear that while the implementation of transport policies was affected by the funds available and the strength of the reaction they caused, the Council were reluctant to drop their transport principles or the schemes to which they were particularly committed.

The distribution of spending on transport by the Council largely reflected their priorities. The sums allocated to highway construction and improvement (capital and revenue) dropped in real terms by 67% from 1973-74 to 1977-78. This caused a decrease of 14% between 1974-1977 in the number of staff employed by the Department of Planning and Transportation of the GLC and the near elimination of the hiring of external consultants (GLC 1977a: 2). Meanwhile GLC financial support to London Transport increased by 310% in real terms between 1973 and 1975. After that, because of the lower government contribution to this support, it dropped by 38% between 1975 and 1977. Nevertheless between 1973 and 1977 there was a growth of 149% in real terms in the amount paid by the Council to the Executive.

By pursuing a policy of low public transport fares, the Labour administration was, to a large extent, favouring low wage groups because of their dependence on public transport and more specifically, on the buses[4]. Also, by proposing traffic restraint measures in central London, the Labour Council was seeking to improve bus services. The Transport Committee of the GLC defended the equity of traffic restraint measures for central London by stressing that since 88% of car journeys within this area were made by the richest two thirds of the households, the impact of the restraints would affect relatively few poorer car drivers. Meanwhile, as the Committee emphasised, the bus services, which are used extensively by the lower income groups, would benefit from the restraints (GLC minutes,2 November 1976: 737). Seen in this light, much of the organised opposition defending the rights of the motorists can be seen as a defence of the interests of the upper and middle classes. In objecting to the revenue subsidies paid to public transport, these organisations were in reality objecting to the channelling of funds to low income groups, the least able to afford high fares. Furthermore, by their advocacy of the unrestricted use of the car and of the need to adapt the road structure to this use, they were giving little consideration to conditions of life in inner London neighbourhoods populated mostly by low income groups. Because of their location between the suburbs and central London, where there is a high level of demand for road space, these areas would be most affected by road widening schemes or by the building of new roads. These neighbourhoods would therefore have suff-

ered most from demolitions and from the environmental impact of the increase in traffic.

At the end of the mandate, the Labour Council had little to show in the transport field. They had been unable to maintain low public transport fares which would have been a popular measure, while they had managed to implement, albeit on a much more limited scale than originally intended, traffic restraint measures which proved unpopular. Wistrich observed:

> "The effect of financial constraints on the GLC by 1977 was to prevent it achieving its objectives of low fares and improved services on public transport, while it continued to pursue measures to restrain car traffic. It was not a popular combination" (1978:7).

To sum up, we can attribute the failure of the Labour controlled GLC to implement most of their transport proposals to three main factors:

1. The restrictions in government spending on transport and more specifically on the revenue support allocated to public transport together with central directives on the Council's use of their own funds.
2. The Council's desire to avoid further rises in rates after 1975-76 which led to a strict control of their expenditure, and
3. the fact that most of the traffic scheme proposals sparked off intense opposition either from powerful organistaions or from local residents and shopkeepers. The potential electoral impact of such opposition and their own commitment to public consultation, led the Labour GLC to abandon many of its proposals.

6.2 The GLC under Conservative control from 1977 to 1980

In this section, the general transport principles adopted by the Conservative party before and during most of their 1977-1981 period of control of the GLC will be presented. We shall show how the Conservative party saw transport schemes as part of an overall strategy for the economic revitalisation of London and in particular of inner London. The difference between these principles and the ones advocated by the previous Labour administration will be stressed. Differences in policies will also be considered. We shall see that the Conservatives cancelled some of the traffic restraint schemes implemented by the previous Council and put forward a more active major road construction programme than did the Labour administration. Attention will also be given to the Conservative Council's policy towards public transport. It will be seen how they attempted to follow a strategy of diminishing the revenue support grant paid to London Transport while maintaining the level of service and allowing fare increases to keep pace with inflation. This was to be achieved by more direct interventions into the London Transport Executive in order to increase efficiency in the operation of their services. Finally we consider the support and the opposition faced by the Conservative Council in their implementation of transport policies and the financial context in which these policies were devised.

6.2.1 Road and traffic policies

The political slogan adopted by the Greater London Conservative party during the 1977 election campaign was the revitalisation of London. They stressed the need to bring back industry and commerce to London and to ensure that the firms at present in London would remain there. In pursuing this line, the Conservative party was following the change of direction taken in January 1976 by the Labour GLC. From that date, the decentralisation policy practiced for more than twenty-five years was reversed. The considerations leading to this decision were a serious decline in population and in employment. From 1961 to 1976, the Greater London population had dropped by 800,000 and the number of manufacturing jobs within that area had fallen by 489,000 which meant a decline of 34% while the South East region (excluding Greater London) had experienced a growth of 21%. The effects of this decline were particularily visible in the Docklands and in inner London, South of the river.

Once in power, the Conservatives maintained this preoccupation with the revitalisation of London. They focused their efforts particualrily on inner London. For instance, Richard Brew, Leader of the Policy and Resources Committee stressed in the 1978-79 budget that an increasing proportion of capital expenditure by the Council would be spent in inner London. This proportion was to increase from 58% in 1977-78 to 73% in 1978-79 (GLC 1978a: 3). Transport investment was integrated in the revitalisation strategy, as stated in the 1978-79 GLC budget:

> "The Council's strategy for transport is one element in its overall strategy for the regeneration of London, the essence of which is to create a physical environment and a social and economic framework which will conserve and improve the standard of life in London. To help attain this overall aim, the transport systems of London should cater for traffic essential for its economy, generally service economic and social needs, and cater for London's demand for mobility" (GLC 1978a: 123).

In this context, the Conservative administration stated their intention of reviving road building in order to serve the needs of industry and commerce. In July at an urban freight conference organised by the British Institute of Management, Shelagh Roberts, Leader of the GLC Planning and Communications Policy Committee stressed the determination of the Council to allocate more resources to a road building programme "geared to the needs of industry..." (The Times 8 July 1977).[5] Also, to help stimulate the redevelopment of the Docklands, the Conservative Council advocated the extension of the Fleet Line. As in the case of capital expenditure in general, the Conservative administration insisted on the allocation of an increasing proportion of transport capital expenditure to the areas most in need of revitalisation. In the GLC 1978-79 budget (GLC 1978a: 123) they emphasised that one half of the highway and most of the London Transport capital expenditure was to be invested in inner London. According to the 1979-1984 Transport Policies and Programme document (GLC 1978b: 5 para. 15), two thirds of the transport capital expenditure was to be allocated for schemes located in inner London.

In line with this economic revitalisation strategy, the Council were committed to alter the balance between spending on roads and public transport inherited from the previous administration.

The role of road construction and improvement in an economic regeneration strategy was stressed on many occasions. For instance Ms. Roberts commented in July 1977:

> "You cannot take a finished product out of London on a number eleven bus or by tube. Our policy is designed to restore the economic base of London and that means a proper balance between public transport and roads" (The Times 13 July 1977).

In line with their general support for private transport, the Conservatives made it clear that they would cancel the measures restricting the use of the car initiated by the Labour administration. The public transport proposals of the new Council consisted largely of a package of measures aiming at reducing the cost of the provision of public transport.

In the first months of their mandate, the Conservatives withdrew some of the traffic measures implemented by the Labour Council. This reflected the different position of the two Greater London parties on the usage of private transport. The Labour party advocated traffic restraint for environmental reasons and for the improvement of public transport services it allowed. The Conservative party's objective on the other hand, was to rely partly on traffic management and parking control measures to encourage industry and commerce to remain in or return to London. The Conservatives saw a reduction in traffic congestion and an improvement in the facilities essential for the movement of goods and employees as prerequesites of the economic revitalisation of the capital (GLC 1978a: 130). Given this difference of position, the Conservative administration reviewed the parking policy of the Labour administration, and decided to reopen the South Bank car-parks in the morning.

They also cancelled the car-parking licensing scheme which was to have been introduced in August 1977 and which would have covered 73 car-parks, bringing the cost for parking nine hours in Westminister to £3.43. The Planning and Communications Policy Committee proposed in a report to the Council in November 1977 that the car-parking scheme should be replaced by voluntary control over the use of car-parks by operators along the lines of the policy already followed by the Westminister Borough Council (GLC minutes 29 November 1977: 14). The review of the Labour administration's transport policy also affected bus lanes. The new Council laid down as a criterion for the introduction and preservation of bus lanes that they should improve bus services "without causing a disproportionate disruption to the traffic flow of other essential road users" (GLC minutes 12 July 1977: 322). As a result a few bus lanes which were considered not to fulfill these conditions were reopened to all traffic.

The highway policy of the Conservative Council was formulated in accord with the economic and transport principles they advocated. The main objectives of the highway policy were stated in November 1977 in a report by the Planning and Communications Policy Committee:

1. To provide more effectively for the movement needs of industry, commerce and trade in London.
2. To improve the linking of these activities to the strategic road system, and
3. to encourage economic activity and investment in inner London and to support strategic developments such as the Docklands.

The other objectives of this policy were to provide more effectively for the mobility needs of Londoners and especially to enable them to adapt to the changing patterns of employment, to reduce accidents and to reduce the environmental impact of road traffic (GLC minutes 29 November 1977).

The efforts of the highway programme were to be concentrated on the strategic centres defined by the Greater London Development Plan, the areas of existing intensive industrial use, the areas of potential major industrial development and the areas of future strategic development. The need for the improvement of orbital movement was underlined. Such roads were considered essential if the commercial and industrial decline of inner London was to be reversed in the wake of the completion of the M 25 orbital route by the mid1980's. This improvement of the accessibility potential of the fringes was seen as a factor contributing to an acceleration of the decline of London if nothing was done to reverse it.

In June 1978, the GLC presented a fifteen year road programme (GLC 1978c) to be implemented at a total cost of £855 million. The programme was presented as a necessity in the context of a near standstill in road building in previous years and as a means of attracting industry, commerce and jobs back to London. However in December 1979, it was announced that the level of funds likely to become available for road construction and improvement in London between 1980 and 1988 would be only £170 million. The Conservative Council repeatedly put forward and advocated increases in the level of spending on

roads. In November 1977, the GLC sought government approval for a £145 million road programme until 1982 compared with a plan of £91 million prepared for a similar period by the previous administration. However the funds made available over the first three years of the Conservative mandate by the Department of Transport for road purposes were very limited.

In spite of serious financial constraints, the Conservative Council constantly reiterated that highway construction should have priority among their transport proposals. However it was admitted that there was no question of reviving the motorway proposal because the funds were not available and because they would not be generally acceptable to the public (GLC minutes 12 July 1977: 321). The Council insisted that it was their intention to increase expenditure on highway construction and improvement ".. as fast as circumstances permit". This priority was somewhat reflected in the distribution of transport funds. Unlike the previous Council which shifted funds from the road programme to public transport when faced with cuts in the Transport Supplementary Grant, in the 1981-1984 Transport Policies and Programme document (GLC 1980a: 7 para. 1.8) the Conservative Council decided not to defer the construction of highway schemes but ordered the London Transport Executive to postpone schemes, and in particular, the modernisation of stations. However,relatively small increases in funds for road construction and improvement occurred, largely because of strict limits on government expenditure in this period. From 1977-78 to 1980-81 (capital and revenue, 1975 prices),

these funds increased from £13.3 million to £16 million. This represented a change from the trend under the previous administration for expenditure on road construction and improvement to drop. Yet in 1980-81, the level of spending on roads was still 45% lower in real terms than in 1975-76.

The fundamental difference between the road transport principles adopted by the Conservative Council and the previous Labour Council refers to the treatment of the demand for transport. Whereas Labour had adopted policies which sought to shape the demand for transport in line with equity objectives and the need to preserve the environment, the Conservatives adopted a policy which responded to privately defined needs and particularily to the needs of industry and commerce. Their aim was to adapt transport facilities to the needs of private enterprise so they could contribute to its expansion. For instance, Martin Foulkes, GLC's Assistant Chief Planner (Freight), far from putting forward any initiative to regulate lorry routing, put forward proposals for selective improvements of the road system along major lorry routes. The Conservative Council, however, found it difficult to achieve their aims mainly as a result of the limited availability of funds. The Conservative controlled GLC therefore found it difficult to translate their principles into policies and reverse the trends set by the previous administration.

6.2.2 Public transport policies

After the consideration of the road and traffic aspect of the Conservative administration's transport policies, we shall now focus on their public transport proposals and policies. We shall see how the proposals concerning public transport put forward by the Conservative GLC administration took place within their overall transport perspective. The Conservative Council advocated an improvement in the efficiency of public transport and the phasing out of revenue subsidies paid to London Transport. It will appear that the Conservative administration were unable to translate their proposals into policies and that consequently transport policies during their term in office did not vary all that much from those implemented by the previous Labour administration. During the 1977 election campaign, the Greater London Conservative party advocated an increase in the productivity of public transport. They claimed that the measures they would implement would allow a reduction of 10,000 in London Transport's staff as well as savings of £50 million within four years. These measures consisted mainly in the introduction of automatic and pre-paid ticketing on London Transport buses, the underground and on British Rail commuter services. They also included ticket checks on the vehicles instead of checks at both ends of the journey, and the completion of the introduction of one-man operation on buses and tubes. The Conservative programme also mentioned proposals to improve the reliability of services. These mainly revolved around the shortening of existing bus routes accompan-

ied by the introduction of central London services with interchange points around the centre (Conservative Central Office 1977).

As soon as they gained power, the Conservatives abandoned the speedbus scheme prepared by the previous administration on the grounds that it was ill conceived, opposed by shopkeepers, taxi drivers and residents in the vicinity of the proposed route, and that it would accentuate the decline of the central area. The public transport priority of the Conservative Council was the extension of the Fleet Line to the Docklands because it fitted in well with their economic revitalisation programmes. In the GLC transport budget for 1978-79, the £12.5 million allocated for the initiation of the second stage of the line then estimated at £100 million was deleted by the government. In December 1977, Horace Cutler, Leader of the Conservative majority on the Council, declared that if the government did not help towards the construction of the extension, the Council would find funds for this purpose through savings in the budget to avoid increases in rate levels (The Times 21 December 1977). In spite of government guidelines on stringency in transport spending, in July 1978 the Council included the extension of the Fleet Line past Charing Cross in its minimum programme of capital expenditure. In October 1978, Horace Cutler repeated the Council's intention of going ahead with the construction of the line because of its central importance in the redevelopment of the Docklands. As he commented, "if you take that out, you are left with just bits

and pieces" (The Times 4 October 1978). However, after the Conservative party took power nationally in May 1979, the Council agreed to reappraise the possible types of public transport links to the Docklands. They assessed cheaper variations while deciding to proceed with the development of the existing rail system: the East London Line/North Woolwich Line scheme.

The Council's objective was to hold fare increases to the general level of inflation while phasing out the revenue support grant without significant reductions in services. They planned to close the gap between income and expenditure through economies in operating costs supported in many cases by capital expenditure (See Figure 6.2 and 6.3). To do this they advocated a shift of emphasis in GLC support to the Executive from revenue support to capital works (GLC 1978a: 138). Later, however, the Council moderated their position on the abolition of the revenue support grant. The decision not to discontinue payment of this grant was taken because it was forecast that fare increases would have been needed if it had been cut and employers in central London would have found it more difficult to attract employees. The phasing out of the revenue support grant could have thereby contributed to a speeding up of the migration of firms out of London and consequently, to the economic decline of London and, more specifically, of inner London (GLC 1978b: 11 para. 3.13-4). This measure would thus have clashed with the Council's chief objective, namely, the economic revitalisation of London. The revenue

FIGURE 6.2

LONDON TRANSPORT WORKING EXPENSES 1973-1980.



SOURCE: LONDON TRANSPORT ANNUAL REPORTS 1973-1980.

FIGURE 6.3

LONDON TRANSPORT EXPENSE PER PASSENGER/MILE AND PER CAR/MILE (BUS AND RAIL) 1973-1980.



SOURCE: LONDON TRANSPORT ANNUAL REPORTS 1973-1980.

support grant paid to London Transport was, nevertheless, expected to fall from £53 million for 1978 to £25 million per annum in the early 1980's. It was judged that such a decrease could be achieved without fare increases in excess of the rate of inflation because of investments in labour saving equipment, the greater use of one-man operation on trains and buses, and the introduction of automatic fare collection machines.

The objective of reducing the operational costs of public transport led the Conservative Council to interfere directly with the plans and operation of the London Transport Executive. The Labour Council, on the other hand, had largely left the initiative for the preparation of plans in the hands of the Executive; they had also relied entirely on them for the operation of services. In mid 1977, the Executive submitted to the GLC a plan for improvements in bus services in which the level of services would match current passenger demand and anticipated staff and vehicle availability. The plan was rejected by the Council because they feared that it would involve an increase in the number of staff and the costs involved. A less ambitious plan was submitted in the autumn and approved at the end of the year by the Council (LTE 1978: 3). In April 1978, the LTE initiated the implementation of a short-term bus plan involving the withdrawal of seventeen bus routes and the shortening of nineteen other routes.

In October 1977, the GLC published a consultation document (GLC 1977c) containing most of the recommendations of the

manifesto to improve the efficiency of public transport operations. After discussing the proposals with the LTE, the Council arrived at a firm programme of proposals (GLC 1978d). This programme included, among other points, a number of ways of improving productivity in order to reduce unit costs, a reorganisation of bus schedules and service patterns aimed at improving their reliability and a simplification of the fare structure. The GLC's commitment to improving efficiency caused a tension between them and the Executive.

In 1977, for the purposes of the forecasts to be included in the Transport Policies and Programme document, the LTE estimated that at the current level of costs, they would need £350 million in revenue subsidy over five years to prevent fares increasing faster than inflation. In response to this forecast, the Council decided to limit the revenue subsidy to £164 million over this period while maintaining fare rises in line with inflation. In order to achieve this aim, the Council directed the Executive to make economies without substantial reductions in services (GLC 1977d: 15 para. 3.8-9). Later that year, the GLC rejected the 1978 LTE budget on the grounds that there was still room for economies in operating costs through increases in efficiency. The Executive resubmitted a budget which included £8 million cuts compared with the previous estimates, and this was accepted by the Council. The GLC later asked the Executive to present by the end of June 1978, proposals for reductions in unit costs of service

miles below the 1977 level in real terms. Again in November 1979, the Council rejected the London Transport budget because of the steep increases in the cost of running buses and tubes it allowed. On that occasion, Alan Greengrass, Leader of the GLC's Planning Committee, criticised the cost and level of services offered by the LTE and expressed the Council's attitude on these matters in the following terms:

> "On behalf of Londoners as a whole we are not prepared to accept for much longer excuses and platitudes in place of service and performance"(The Times 15 November 1979).

The management of the LTE was criticised for the lack of emphasis they placed on increases in productivity. This criticism was strengthened by the publication of a report by the auditors Deloitte, Haskins and Sells who had been comissioned to conduct an inquiry into the management of the Executive after allegations of widespread waste. The report concluded that the Executive suffered from overmanning in its offices and in workshops and that their organisation was too bureaucratic. As Horace Cutler stated in June 1980 in reaction to a report from the LTE which forecast deficits of £40 million for 1980 and £90 million for 1981:

> "Productivity is the key issue. London Transport keeps sending us a list of options: putting up fares - we've done that; cutting services - we've done that. The last suggestion is always productivity. That must go to the top of the heap."

He went on to describe the level of productivity gains over the last eight years as "ludicrous" (The Times 28 June 1980). Again in July 1980, in the Transport Policies and Programme 1981-1984 (GLC 1980a: 15 para. 3.8), the Executive was criticised because of their inability to transform the capital investments

financed by the Council into productivity gains. On that occasion the Council set the LTE the task of achieving productivity gains over the next decade of 1½% per annum with higher levels during the early years (GLC 1980a: 16 para. 3.12).

While they were trying to achieve improvements in the efficiency of London Transport operations, the Conservative administration were attempting to increase their control over British Rail inner suburban commuter services. The Conservative Council adopted, with respect to this, a position similar to that of the previous administration. For instance, they voiced their disagreement with the government's desire, as expressed in the 1977 transport White paper, to maintain the existing relation between the GLC and the BRB with respect to London's commuter services. The GLC emphasised that the maintenance of this relation was in contradiction with the government's overall position on greater local control over urban transport and with the prevailing situation in the provincial conurbations. They based their demands for control over commuter services on the need for coordination in the decision-making process concerning public transport. They stressed that existing arrangements were insufficient to achieve the required coordination. The GLC Planning and Communications Policy Committee, in a report presented to the Council, stated the problem in the following manner:

> "While cooperation, consultation and joint working have been successful in the past and should, we feel, be encouraged, too often it is separate and often different objectives, responsibilities and financial circumstances of British Rail and London Transport which determine the decision made. To look to an advisory body to overcome these difficulties is to overlook their fundamental

nature" (GLC agenda paper 2, 26 July 1977: 2).

The Council's position on this matter was shared by the LTE. In 1977 the Executive welcomed the recommendation by the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries that the GLC should be designated as the Passenger Transport Authority for Greater London and that London Transport should become the Passenger Transport Executive (LTE 1978: 5).

In many respects the transport policies of the Conservative administration related to London Transport followed the lines laid down by the previous Council. This happened in spite of the Council's different relationship with the London Transport Executive and above all, the sharp opposition between the discourse of the two parties on transport matters. Some of the measures implemented by the Conservative Council which represented a reversal of the previous administration's policies, were in fact primarily symbolic in meaning, and had little impact on transport, e.g. the reopening to traffic of a few bus lanes by the Conservative Council. The similarities in the policies of the two administrations include support for the Fleet Line extension, support for control over the BRB Inner Suburban commuter services and more signinicantly, the payment of subsidies to London Transport. From 1977 to 1979, although the fare relief grant fell from £49.2 million to £31.6 million (1975 prices), this represented a much slower reduction than over the two last years of the Labour mandate. However the GLC's share in the payment of this grant fell

during the period of Conservative control, while it was maintained constant between 1975 and 1977 during the Labour mandate. Between 1979 and 1980, the level of revenue support actually increased by £10.6 million (1975 prices) (see Figures 6.4 and 6.5). Meanwhile between 1977 and 1980, the depreciation and renewal grants paid to London Transport increased in real terms by 40% and the capital grant increased by 44%. However in this latter case, this represented a drop of 43% compared with 1976. While the total of the grants paid by the GLC to London Transport reached a summit in 1975 and 1976 under Labour rule, the grants paid by the Conservative administration remained higher in real terms than those paid in 1974. Yet the distribution of the sums allocated by the Council between different purposes varied significantly between the two administrations (Figure 6.6).

The level of fare increases remained largely in line with the level of inflation during the Conservative mandate (see Figure 6.7) but between 1977 and 1979, the total car miles (underground carriages and buses) run by London Transport decreased by 6%. This reduction accentuated a decline which began in 1976 after increases from 1974 to 1976. But between 1979 and 1980, the number of car miles grew again, at a rate of 4%.

In conclusion, it appears that while the objective followed by the Conservative GLC administration as regards public transport were diametrically opposed to those of the previous administration, policies implemented and positions adopted by the two administrations had many points in common. This can be explained

FIGURE 6.4

THE LEVEL OF THE GLC FARE RELIEF GRANTS PAID TO LONDON TRANSPORT AND GLC FARE RELIEF GRANTS AS A PROPORTION OF LT'S WORKING EXPENSES.



SOURCE: LONDON TRANSPORT ANNUAL REPORTS 1973 - 1980.

FIGURE 6.5

LONDON TRANSPORT: PROPORTION OF WORKING EXPENSES MET BY TRAFFIC RECEIPTS 1973-1980.



SOURCE: LONDON TRANSPORT ANNUAL REPORTS 1973-1980.

FIGURE 6.6

SUBSIDIES PAID TO LT BY THE GLC AND BY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 1973-1980.



* INTRODUCTION OF THE TRANSPORT SUPPLEMENTARY GRANT.

SOURCE: LONDON TRANSPORT ANNUAL REPORTS 1973-1980.

FIGURE 6.7

LONDON TRANSPORT FARE INCREASES 1973-1980 (1973 = 100).



SOURCE: LONDON TRANSPORT ANNUAL REPORTS 1973-80.

by the fact that both administrations had to moderate their positions because of shortages of funds and to that the Conservatives refrained from phasing out the revenue subsidy to London Transport because of anticipated negative effects of higher public transport fares on the economic life of London. However the Conservative administration did revoke some public transport schemes put forward by the Labour Council, but these schemes were of a relatively minor importance. Having considered road and traffic as well as public transport policies in London during the Conservative term in office, we shall now give attention to positions adopted by different instances during the three first years of this term in office, and more generally, to the context in which transport decisions were taken by the Council.

6.2.3 The transport debate during the Conservative mandate

Having paid attention to the configuration of forces mobilised by transport issues during the Conservative term in office, we shall consider the economic and political factors which prevented the implementation of policies along the transport principles advocated by the Conservatives. It will appear that considerations related to the economic life of the capital, cuts in subsidies from the government and popular opposition, contributed to prevent the implementation of policies along the principles defended by the London Conservative party.

The transport policies implemented by the Conservative admin-

istration and more significantly, the political discourse which supported them led to a different pattern of support and opposition compared with Labour policies. The motor lobby largely avoided confronting the Council directly as they had during the Labour mandate. Instead they aimed their criticism as regards road policies in London mostly at the governement. For instance, in December 1977, the Movement for London requested more aid from the government in order to bring London's main road network up to the standard of other British and European main cities. They made the point that the government should shoulder more financial responsibility for decent major roads in London because of the national importance of the roads (The Times 30 December 1977). The Movement for London did, however, manifest their disagreement with the Council's prediction of an increase in car ownership. Whereas the GLC anticipated an increase of 250,000 cars by 1990, the Movement considered that a growth of up to 1½ million could be expected. And the Movement for London described the Council's fifteen year road plan, published in the Autumn of 1979, as unambitious (Daily Telegraph 1 October 1979).

The opposition directed at the Conservative GLC on transport matters focused on public transport proposals as well as on road policy. For example, in October 1977, the Labour opposition published a minority report stressing the gap between the needs of the LTE and the support the GLC was ready to offer (GLC 1977e). They also criticised the unit of measure of the performance of London Transport being used by the Council

and advocated instead of the cost of a car mile, the measure currently used, an assessment in terms of the cost of a passenger mile. In addition, the report expressed the Labour party's disapproval of the idea of excluding suburban bus routes from the central area, and of the Council's attitude towards London Transport staff. They commented that the Conservative group was antagonising the staff by predicting losses of 10,000 jobs within five years.

A joint action committee of trade unions of London Transport was set up in 1977 to object to the public transport proposals put forward by the Council (GLC 1977c). Specifically, this opposition was sparked off by the planned reduction of the number of staff on London Transport. In February 1978, the Joint Action Committee decided to campaign to fight all cuts affecting public transport. They advocated that the Council and the government contributions towards public transport should be increased and that the provision of the services should be based on social needs instead of profits. Membership of the Joint Action Committee was widened and opened to community groups, other trade unions, etc. They decided to direct their energies towards lobbying the government to press them to reverse the trends in public transport revenue support, lobbying the GLC to get them to increase revenue support grants for London Transport so that services could be maintained and increased, and fighting job losses (Community Action 36 March/April 1978: 10-11). In May 1978, the Joint Action Committee renamed themselves the Campaign to Improve

London Transport. They organised a lobby directed at the GLC attended by transport workers and several community groups to oppose the June 1978 fare rise (Community Action 37 May/June 1978: 11). During the summer of 1978, industrial action by bus and tube workers took place to oppose the planned cuts of staff and services.

Among movements opposed to the Conservative Council transport policies, there were also organisations concerned with negative environmental impacts of road transport. In March 1979 in response to the GLC document Roads in London, the London Amenity and Transport Association opposed the GLC road proposals (LATA 1979). The Association was objecting to the Council's intention to pursue a policy of road building rather than one of traffic restraint, diversion and improvement of public transport. They however approved the GLC's opposition to motorway standard roads within the built-up areas and high-speed orbital roads within the M25 orbital route.

The London Transport Executive also complained about the GLC's traffic policies. In their annual reports they lamented the effect of road congestion on bus services. More specifically, they deplored the cancellation of the Parliament Hill/Peckham Rye speedbus proposal. They also expressed their regret that a number of established bus lanes were withdrawn and that few new ones were introduced by the Council. In 1977, only twelve new bus priority schemes had been implemented compared with twenty-nine in 1976 (LTE 1978: 3). These complaints were reit-

erated throughout the Conservative mandate.

It would seem that, both in the case of public transport policies and in the case of road and traffic policies, the Conservative Council were not able to follow the principles enunciated in their manifesto and repeated early in their mandate. In the case of public transport, they did not go as far as they initially intended in cutting the fare relief grant because they were concerned about the effects such a cut would have on the economic life of London. Because of the potential difficulties steep fare increases could cause for employers in their efforts to recruit their workforce the grant was maintained, albeit at a decreasing level. The Council realised that savings in the operational costs of London Transport of the scale necessary to allow the phasing out of the grant without increasing fares faster than inflation, were impossible in the short term. The Council failed to increase the efficiency of London Transport and cut the cost of operation as initially intended. While working costs per passenger mile and per car mile remained stable in real terms between 1977 and 1978, they increased by 11% in the first case and 6% in the second, between 1978 and 1980 (LTE 1978, 1979, 1981).

In terms of road policy, it would appear that the Conservative administration was caught between an attitude favourable to car use and road building within an overall programme of revitalisation of London's economic life, and the strict limitations

in the availablity of funds from the government as well as the apprehension of popular opposition to large scale schemes. In the latter respect, memories of the fate of the previous Council may have lingered on. A multi-million scheme to improve the South Circular Road by allowing two lanes on each way was rejected by the Council because they anticipated that it would be publicly unacceptable. The initial commitment of the Council towards road building was thus seriously limited by the circumstances they faced during their mandate.

The Council agreed with the need for the restrictive public expenditure policies of the successive governments in power nationally. The Conservative GLC however put forward a case for special treatment for London in the allocation of funds because of needs specific to the capital, e.g. the need for substantial expenditure on the renewal of worn out assets on the underground and the high cost of a road improvement programme essential for the economic regeneration of London made necessary because of the very limited amount of road construction in previous years (GLC 1978b: 6 para. 1.9-10). The Council also complained about the cut of 36% in the level of expenditure which had been accepted in the Transport Policies and Programme between 1975-76 and 1979-80. This meant that the programmes devised by the Council to maintain and modernise infrastructures had, by 1980, "hardly got off the ground " (GLC 1980: 16 para. 1.5). The Conservative administration was particularily concerned about the fact that expenditure on the construction of principal roads in London as part of the national share had dropped from

12% in 1973-74 to less than 5% in 1977-78. The Conservative Council did not attempt to make good the lower government contribution for transport spending by drawing directly on the rates because of their respect for government directives forbidding them to do so and because of a commitment to avoid significant rises in rate levels. This commitment was respected: in 1980-81, the rate level was 19.4 p. in the pound compared with 17p. and 16.8p. under the previous administration (GLC 1980b).

We have seen in this section that in their manifesto, the Conservative party set out transport principles which were largely in conflict with those of the previous administration: the liberalisation of car use, increases in road building, and the phasing out of the revenue relief grant paid to London Transport. However in the main policy sectors considered here, there were no dramatic differences between the two administrations. Nevertheless, especially in areas where the sums involved were small and where proposals were still in an early stage of implementation, there were reversals of policies between the Conservative and Labour administrations. For instance the former lifted some of the restrictions on parking in central London, opened some bus lanes to general traffic and abandoned the speedbus proposal. These reversals and the difference of discourse on transport matters between the two administrations can account for the fact that, to a large extent, organisations supporting the Labour Council's transport initiatives opposed those of the following administration and that Labour opponents became Conservative supporters.

6.3 The British Rail commuter services

In this section we shall discuss debates affecting the British Rail London commuter network between 1973 and 1980. After a study of the organisational framework of these services we shall look at the factors which have affected fares and services. We shall then consider the arguments upon which the BRB made their case for the maintenance and growth in governement grants for commuter services. We shall also investigate the strategy adopted by the Board to increase the effectiveness of their arguments. Finally we shall state the BRB's position in the debate about the control of the Inner Suburban services initiated by the GLC.

The BRB operates under three main financial constraints set by the government:

1. A requirement to break even taking one year with another after the payment of the Public Obligation Grant by the government,
2. a ceiling on capital and revenue investment, and
3. external financial limits introduced by the governement in 1976 in order to control public sector borrowing (Monopolies and Mergers Commission 1980: 2 para. 1.6).

As has been seen in Chapter Five, the main criterion used by the Board for choosing investment projects was whether they would maintain or improve the Boards financial result compared

with doing nothing, Priority was therefore given to investment in the Inter-City network. Improvements on these lines, which were in competition with air services and motorways, led to increases in the number of passengers and consequently to higher revenue. They thus contributed to the Board's success in meeting the government's objectives without increases of fares or reductions in services. This investment strategy was however disturbed by the obligation placed upon the Board by the government in 1974 to maintain passenger services at a level comparable to that prevailing at the end of that year. From then on, investment decisions were largely determined by the need to replace assets reaching the end of their useful life. This was done regardless of the financial benefits they might yield for the Board. This investment strategy was referred to as the "even spread" policy (Monopolies and Mergers Commission 1980: 156 para. 11.14).

During the 1970's, 30% of the funds available for investment on the London Commuter Network were allocated for the installation of continuously welded rails, 20% for signalling, 27% for rolling stock equipment and 13% for the electrification of the Great Northern Line from Moorgate and Kings Cross to Royston via Welwyn Garden City and Hertford (Monopolies and Mergers Commission 1980: 158 para. 11.23-5; 160 para. 11.30). However these improvements did not lead to significant improvements of productivity as advocated by the London Rail Study (GLC and DOE 1974) which suggested that capital expenditure could be used to reduce the need for staff. While significant productivity

gains were achieved by the BRB between 1960 and 1970, progress slowed down during the 1970's. Increases in productivity on the LCN were more modest than over the British Rail system as a whole partly because the decline in traffic was not matched by a corresponding reduction in services (Monopolies and Mergers Commission 1980: 104 para. 7.59-61). The poor productivity level on the London Inner Suburban services was acknowledged by the Board. For instance, according to figures presented in a BRB study published in 1980 (BRB 1980: 10), 149 terminal staff were employed per 1 million train kilometers on these services compared with between fifty-seven and eighty-nine for similar distances travelled on the other BR business sectors and sixty-one on the SNCF Paris commuter services. In the late 1970's, to help alleviate this problem, the Board prepared plans for an automatic collection system compatible with the London Transport system (Modern Railway 1979: 144-52).

The need for and the availability of funds to improve the efficiency of operations and for other investment purposes concerning the LCN were influenced by the following factors:

1. That like other BR business sectors the LCN benefited from 1956 onwards from the Railway Modernisation Plan. Investments were high in the 1950's and early 1960's; consequently, during the late 1970's the Board consisered that they needed more funds to replace rolling stock approaching the end of its life (see Figure 6.8),
2. that between 1971 and 1977, peak period travel in central London declined,

FIGURE 6.8

RAILWAY INVESTMENT LEVELS 1950 - 1979 (£MIO 1979 PRICES)



SOURCE: MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMMISSION 1980; FIGURE II.1.

3. that subsidies were needed to meet normal trading needs as well as investments,

4. that they needed to conform to the governement's financial restrictions. From 1975-76, the level of funds devoted to railway investment dropped (see Figure 6.9) (Monopolies and Mergers Commission 1980, 150 para. 11.1).

The perspective of restrictions in government financial support became very serious in 1976, when the London and South East outer commuter services faced the phasing out of the subsidy paid by the government. In April of that year, the transport Green paper suggested that subsidies paid to these services should be abandoned by 1981 on the grounds that it was wrong for some of the best paid workers in the United Kingdom to benefit from a £70 million per annum subsidy. After intense protest, this position was modified in the transport White paper published the following year (DOT 1977). It was decided

> "to continue a high level of revenue support so that those commuter fare increases that prove necessary can be phased in as carefully as possible" (DOT 1977: 69 para. 305).

Thus between 1975-76 and 1980-81, while the total subsidies allocated by the government to British Rail fell by 30% in real terms, passenger subsidies showed little change after a drop of 30% between 1974-75 and 1975-76. In the meantime, while fare increases on the LCN had been over previous years more or less in line with increases in the average earnings of males working in the Greater London area, as fares jumped from 1974 onwards, a gap developed between the two (Brown 1981: Fig. 3). In real terms, from 1974 to 1978, the average

FIGURE 6.9

CHANGES IN PROJECTED EXPENDITURE OVER FIVE YEARS IN THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPENDITURE PLANS FROM 1973 TO 1980: TOTAL SUBSIDIES TO THE BRITISH RAILWAYS BOARD.



* DOTTED LINES INDICATE THAT FOUR YEAR PROJECTIONS PRESENTED IN THE DOCUMENTS ARE EXTRAPOLATED OVER A FIVE YEAR PERIOD.
† IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE PROPORTION OF SUBSIDIES AWARDED TO THE BRB AMONG THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF SUBSIDIES TO TRANSPORT INDUSTRIES REMAINS THE SAME IN THE PROJECTION TO 1983-4 THAN IN THE PROJECTION TO 1979-80.

fare on the LCN increased by 34.8% (Brown 1981: Table 12).

A substantial opposition was generated by these fare increases and by announcements of the government's intention to drop or cut subsidies to the London commuter services. The size of the membership of the Evening Standard Commuter Club, estimated at 24,000 in 1980, testified to the intensity of the reaction to these issues. The Standing Conference on London and the South East Regional Planning in the Development of the Strategic Plan for the South East published in September 1976, supported the payment of subsidies to commuter services because they encouraged the use of rail thereby preventing an increase in the number of cars on the roads and avoiding congestion and environmental problems. Another reason for supporting subsidies mentioned by the Standing Conference was that they helped to sustain a desirable employment pattern characterised by a strong centre well provided for by efficient public transport services (Standing Conference ... 1976: 133 para. 10.35 and 10.37). In their view, if central London employment decentralised, the car was likely to become the main mode of getting to work to the new locations therefore creating a need for more road space or leading to increased congestion. In June 1977, the Standing Conference reiterated this position and added that large fare increases could cause serious hardship for many low paid commuters residing mainly in North Kent and South Essex where there was little alternative work available (Standing Conference... 1977: 7 para. 25).

Some commuter belt M.P.s objected to fare increases on the commuter network. The debate was thereby taken up in Parliament and within the national political parties. For instance in October 1976, it was announced that train fares would increase by 12½% nationally and by an average of 16% on the LCN. Tony Austin, Vice-Chairman of the (National) Association of Railway Passengers recommended to commuters "to protest in the strongest terms" to their M.P.s (The Guardian 10 November 1976). The issue was adopted by M.P.s who demanded increased subsidies or tax relief for commuters. In January 1978, ten Labour M.P.s, led by Robin Corbett, Member for Hemel Hempstead, met the Secretary of State for Transport to complain about fare increases and poor travelling conditions on commuter services while there were no alternative modes available to their users (The Times 28 January 1978).

When the Conservative party took power at Westminister, the interests of the commuters were defended in particular by Timothy Eggar Conservative M.P. for Enfield North. Mr Eggar had earlier organised a commuter group in his constitutency. In October 1979, he asked Sir Geoffrey Howe, Chancellor of the Exchequer to agree to tax relief measures for commuters. Such measures were turned down by the Inland Revenue because they were judged to be too expensive. On 5 December 1979, Mr. Eggar called for an adjournment debate in Parliament, and asked the Minister of Transport if rail fares were consciously weighted against commuters in the South East.

FIGURE 6.10

AGE DISTRIBUTION OF BRITISH RAIL LONDON COMMUTER NETWORK ROLLING STOCK.



——— AS OF JANUARY 1978.

- - - - - - - - - AFTER THE MIDLAND ELECTRIFICATION AND CURRENT ORDERS FOR SOUTHERN REGION SUBURBAN STOCK FULFILLED.

* WATERLOO AND CITY TUBE.

SOURCE: BUCHANAN ET AL. 1980.

The BRB also argued for the allocation of more funds for the LCN in the form of operating subsidies and capital investment. In their 1976 Annual Report (BRB 1977: 7), the Board reacted to the proposed phasing out of operational subsidies on the London and South East commuter network. They anticipated that these cuts would lead to a displacement of traffic; it was forecast that the servies would lose 60,000 passengers. They stressed that the governement should consider the cost in environmental as well as in financial terms of a switch of passengers away from rail (BRB 1976). They also stressed the need for funds to be allocated for the replacement of assets due for renewal. It was considered that such a need would keep on increasing until it reached a peak in the mid 1980's. As the Board commented, "the longer investment is frozen at its present level, the steeper will be the climb necessary to overtake these arrears". (BRB 1978:7). The Board estimated that, in the late 1970's, the rate of replacement of rolling stock was unsatisfactory even if the life of many trains was extended to forty years by refurbishment (BRB 1979a: 11) (see Figure 6.10).

In order to win popular support for their demands for more funds from the government and in order to deal with pressures from commuters for better and cheaper services, BRB adopted a "pedagogic approach" which consisted of trying to involve commuters in the debate by explaining to them the predicament facing the London and South East commuter services. Peter

Parker, Chairman of the Board, described this as "...the eternal triangle - quality of service, prices and the fixed contract with the government - in which we try to operate" (BRB 1979a: 7). When under attack, the Board did not deny the problems commuters had to face, in particular high fares and poor quality of services, but rather chose to explain from their point of view, why such problems existed. By involving the public in the debate the BRB were thus trying to acquire their support in exerting pressures on the government. For instance, in July 1979, a leaflet was distributed to commuters on the Southern Region. This was described by John Palette, General Manager of the Southern Region as "...a sincere attempt to explain why things are wrong and what improvements are planned" (Daily Telegraph 22 August 1979). The point made in the leaflet was that commuters were to face ten more years of old, dirty and cold rolling stock until modernised equipment would become available. It mentioned that most trains were more than fifteen years old, that no new train had been received since 1974 but that new stock was expected soon. The leaflet concluded that because of low levels of investment,

> "the Southern always has walked something of a knife-edge in the provision of rolling stock for its scheduled 5,000 trains a day. And this knife-edge is becoming more perilous."

This attitude of the Board was confirmed by the publication in December 1979 of a discussion paper entitled Towards a Commuter's Charter (BRB 1979b) and by an associated "rail road

show" touring the South East to publicise positions put forward in the paper. The discussion paper presented the Board's version of the facts concerning the London and South East commuter services and invited individuals and commuter associations to comment on the points it raised. As Peter Parker wrote in the introduction to the discussion paper, "to evolve a Commuters' Charter must mean involving commuters in the debate on the standards that they as citizens and customers, demand and deserve..". He also mentioned his desire to present in a manner stressing the Board's case, the need for more financial support from the government to commuters:

> "I believe we must make more positive moves to involve commuters with the facts. These facts lead to the need for higher public investment in commuter services - and that will only be met if there is understanding of where the present trend of investment will take us." (BRB 1979b).

He went on to forecast that the prevailing contract with the government would not allow the maintenance of the services during the 1980's. The discussion paper mentioned that over the following ten years, the LCN needed £900 million in order to prevent steep increases in fares and deteriorating services but added that the Board did not know where that money could come from. It did, however, consider three potential new sources of financing: a payroll tax on London businesses, tax allowances on commuter fares, and local authority grants for the upkeep of stations.

The Board did not really need to organise such a wide scale consultation to discover what were the needs and wishes of

the commuters. A survey conducted in October 1978 by Martin and Voorhes and Associates identified the main areas of complaint of commuters about the services. However this consultation took place as part of the Board's favoured pedagogic approach which consisted of describing to the public their situation as regards to financial performance, support from the government, levels of services, fare levels and etc. This approach helped to defuse protests directed at the Board by giving the impression that they were being taken into consideration. It also led to their deflection towards the government after the protesters were presented with facts placing the blame for the current problems on the lack of government support. The strategy used by the Board thus consisted to a large extent in acquiring the support of commuters for their own case for increases in the level of financial support from the government. Such support was particularly important for the Board because, unlike an elected body, they could not base their case on an electoral mandate. In short, the BRB presented their case for more financial support from the government and then secured the support of the commuters for their case.

On the other hand, the government placed much of the responsibility for the problems faced by the LCN on the Board. In October 1979, in the wake of a fare rise of 20% on the LCN announced for January 1980, Mrs Oppenheim, Minister for Consumers' Affairs, and Mr. Fowler, Minister of Transport

announced that the commuter services would be investigated by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. The purpose of this investigation was described as follows by Mrs Oppenhein:

> "What we want to know is why the standards are so low, why the costs are so high and above all to what extent this insufficiency exists because the discipline of competition is absent (Daily Telegraph 4 October 1979).

Parliament was, however, divided on the question of the support which should be given to the LCN. The Transport Committee in their Second Report of the 1979-1980 session (Transport Committee 1980) broadly adopted the position advanced by the BRB, commuter associations and commuter belt M.P.s. They criticised the requirement of the public expenditure White paper (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1980) that within the level of investment it stipulated for the London and South East commuter network, services should be maintained or their financial performance increased. The Committee considered that the Treasury had "failed to grasp the nettle of the problem of under-investment and the debilitating consequences which have flowed and will continue to flow from it ." (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1980:xi para. 25; Transport Committee 1980)

While they were trying to preserve or to increase the level of government financial support for LCN services, the BRB were also defending their control over Inner Suburban services against the GLC's intention of taking over. Each time the GLC made a claim for control over the Inner Suburban commuter services, the BRB defended prevailing arrangements. Their case for the retention of their control over these services

was supported by the London Rail Study (GLC and DOE 1974) launched in 1973 by the Minister for Transport Industries and the GLC. The study was conducted by a team drawn from the BRB, the DOE, the GLC and the LTE. Regarding the problems associated with the control of the LCN by the BRB, the Study reached the conclusion that:

> "..most of the defects which we identified resulted not from having two operators, but from the operational problems of having two separate rail systems in London " (GLC and DOE 1974: 39 para. 10.3).

The London Rail Study proposed better coordination of public transport services whilepreserving the prevailing organisational structure (GLC and DOE 1974: 40 para. 10.10).

The BRB defended the maintenance of their control on the Inner Suburban commuter services in their memorandum presented to the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries (BRB 1978b). In this document they argued that if the GLC was to take over the Inner Suburban services, at least six shire counties would also have to be involved in the decision thereby making this arrangement very cumbersome. The Board also commented that the establishment of a Passenger Transport Authority would add a further level of bureaucracy to the administration of public transport in London because the LTE, the BRB, the GLC and the DOT would continue to exist. They argued that control of these services by the GLC would cause difficulties of coordination because the railway lines used by the Inner Suburban services would be used by Outer Suburban services, Inter-City services as well as for the movement of freight.

The Board mentioned that they were pleased with the prevailing level of coordination between public transport services involving among other measures, through tickets on some services. They were also satisfied with the existence of the London Rail Advisory Committee set up in October 1976 with representatives from the GLC, the DOT, the LTE and the BRB to advise on rail services, fares and investment.

We have seen in this section that responsibility for increases in fares and for a deterioration in services on the LCN during the 1970's can be attributed to a drop in the subsidies paid by the government as well as to low productivity increases. We have also considered the nature and intensity of the reactions produced by this situation. It would appear that the pressures from interests related to these services have been mainly directed towards the government. We have observed that the strategy adopted by the BRB to obtain more funds for the commuter services from the government was to channel commuter protest towards this aim. The main case put forward by the Board for an increase in financial support from the government was the need for replacement of rolling equipment. Finally we have seen that the BRB refused to part with a large proportion of their operations and resisted the attempts of the GLC to take control of the Inner Suburban services.

6.4 Governmental proposals and policies

As has been seen in the previous sections, the context created by the financial ceilings set by the government and the directives they issued was the major determining factor in the formulation of transport policies by the GLC and the BRB. In this section, I shall outline some of the major aspects of the government's policies related to urban transport between 1974 and 1980 because of their major impact on transport policies formulated by the GLC. Firstly, I shall briefly describe the debate following the publication in 1976 of the transport Green paper which led to the proposals of the 1977 White paper. Secondly, I shall consider the increased level of disruption of public inquiries set up by the Department of Transport on proposals for the improvement and construction of new highways. This consideration is relevant to London because of the major disruptions which took place at the inquiries on the M25 proposals as well as those into the Archway road widening. It is also relevant because it contributed to a modification of the inquiry procedure. Finally, I shall attempt to identify the macro-economic policies which affected the size of public expenditure and discuss their impact on transport spending. I shall try to explain the reasoning followed by the government in their control of local authority spending.

In April 1976, the Department of the Environment published

a consultation document (DOE 1976) launching a period of discussion leading to the preparation of a transport White paper. The Green paper reflected a concern with non-car owners and suggested that more consideration should be given to the effects of transport on the environment. It also proposed a general re-examination of the subsidies paid by the government for transport purposes to see whether they were in line with the social and environmental objectives it set out.

The discussion which followed was mainly characterised by two contradictory strands of comments: the pro-public transport and the pro-car arguments. As a Guardian leader commented:

> "Considering the variety of bodies making comments on the document it is striking, and perhaps disappointing how regularily the issues are seen as a straightforward argument between public and private transport and in particular between trains and cars."(6 August 1976)

While the camp supporting the use of the car mainly consisted of the motor lobby, on the public transport side, there was a variety of bodies. The GLC for instance, welcomed the document's acceptance of the desirability of certain measures of traffic restraint but were worried about the effects of the cuts on subsidies on public transport suggested in the Green paper (GLC 1976e). The parliamentary Labour party Transport Group criticised the document on the grounds of the public transport revenue subsidy cuts it proposed. Among the bodies advocating the maintenance of fare grants to public transport one could find the Department of Energy, the Fabian Association, the Ramblers Association, the National Consumer Council, the Conser-

vation Society and the National Council of Women. Kenneth Robinson, Chairman of the London Transport Executive, claimed that a squeeze on public transport subsidies would hasten the loss of jobs in central London leading to a dispersal of employment thereby undermining the economic base of public transport. This would cause a heavier reliance on private transport which overall is a more expensive mode of transport than public transport. Mr Robinson also criticised the Green paper for limiting its consideration of public transport to its use by non-car owners. The likely effects of the suggestions of the consultation document on land use patterns were stressed by the Town and Country Planning Association, the Friends of the Earth and the Local Government Operational Research Unit. These bodies deplored the fact that no attention had been given by the authors of the Green paper to the interaction between transport and land use trends. For instance, the Friends of the Earth voiced their fear that as a consequence of lower density developments, everyday journeys could become much longer (The Economist, 12 August 1976; The Guardian 16 August 1976).

The White paper which followed (DOT 1977a) took account of the recommendations of the organisations supporting public transport. The White paper proposed to maintain local authority support for public transport at a level of £150 million per annum for the next few years. It also advocated that priority should be given to the maintenance and improvement of public transport

services (DOT 1977a: 17 para. 80, 18 para. 84). As a declining share of the public expenditure was to be allocated to the transport programme, this meant that the subsidy level to public transport would be maintained at the expense of road construction (DOT 1977a: 67 para. 293). In addition, the concept of a strategic motorway network was abandoned. Highway spending was instead to be concentrated on by-passes and on the improvement of existing roads.

The transport White paper provides an illustration of the formulation of priorities by the government in response to pressures in a period in which the priority for transport spending in the budget was falling; the White paper proposed a decrease of 16% in transport expenditure over three years (DOT 1977a: 61). This period was also characterised by a fall in the total level of public expenditure in real terms (1975 prices) from £46,500 million in 1975-76 to £41,000 million in 1977-78. As the White paper stated:

> "The argument about the right level for transport spending will go on. The government cannot expect its own view to command uncritical support. But those who wish to see a significant increase in transport expenditure have a duty to say where the additional money should come from. Those who want to spend more in one area or another of transport must show where within the budget for transport, compensating savings should be found." (DOT 1977a: 3-4).

The strong commitment of the government towards local public transport only allowed for, in such a period of stringency, the maintenance of the current level of financial support. In fact as £15 million were earmarked for rural public transport, government support for public transport in urban areas was to

decline. The priority given to public transport by the government meant that steep drops in the level of support for it were avoided. Meanwhile, it was proposed that the funds for roads and car-parks should fall by 30% between 1976-77 and 1979-80 and that the money allocated to the construction of motorways and trunk roads should be reduced by 17% over the same period.

Mobilisation around transport matters was not limited to issues raised by the Green paper, another sphere in which there was protest against the government on transport matters was highway construction and improvement where the proposals throughout the country and more specifically in the London region, provoked intense opposition. The protest against the Department of Transport's highway proposals in the London area was mainly directed against the M 25/M 16 orbital road and the widening of the Archway Road (A1) in North London. Until 1975 the opposition to new highway schemes respected in most cases the opposition procedure offered by the relevant public bodies as in the case of the debate around the PRN proposals. However things became very different afterwards: from the mid 1970's onwards, objections to road schemes were often accompanied by total dissatisfaction with the nature and procedures of the road inquiries and led to serious disruptions of these inquiries. These objections were voiced by local organisations which were sometimes federated into wider bodies as in the case of the M 25 Coordinating Committee which comprised twelve action groups, and by national organisations such as the National

Motorways Action Committee, Friends of the Earth and Transport 2,000. In many cases, local groups called upon John Tyme, lecturer in environmental studies at Sheffield University,to put their case at inquiries. Mr. Tyme thereby participated at a great number of the inquiries across the country.

The main arguments against highway construction and improvement put forward at inquiries from the mid 1970's onwards were:

1. That the new schemes would have negative environmental impacts. For instance, the action of the Federation of the North East Metropolitan Green Belt Amenity Societies and the Friends of Epping Forest was mainly aimed at the protection of Epping Forest against the intrusion of the orbital motorways (The Times 30 November 1974).
2. That while there was not enough money spent to maintain local public transport services, rail services and canals, large sums were being spent on new roads.
3. That there was no national highway policy.
4. That there was no effective parliamentary control of highway decisions (before the publication of annual White papers on road policy).

In many cases , the opponents of highway schemes were also expressing their rejection of the nature and the conduct of the highway inquiries. The procedure of these inquiries was governed by the 1971 Highway Act and had restricted the opportunities for objection in order to speed up the processing of road schemes (Levin 1979: 23). The main points raised by highway opponents in this respect were:

1. That the scope of inquiries was restricted so that it was not possible to make a case against the need for a road. It was alleged that the DOE had advised the inspectors conducting the inquiries not to discuss the traffic forecasting methods used (The Economist 11 December 1975) or the need for a new road (Levin 1979: 24)[6].

2. That the Department of the Environment, which set up the inquiries and chose the inspectors were themselves committed to road building. It was therefore held that the inquiries could not be impartial.

(Thus, when Mr Ralph Rolph was nominated as inspector for the Archway Inquiry, opponents complained that he had already been inspector for twelve inquiries and that in each case his recommendations had been favourable to the proposed road schemes.)

3. The amount of information made available to objectors was criticised as inadequate.

Also in many cases, criticisms were voiced about the general conduct of the inquiries.

The form of action adopted by the opponents of highway schemes followed from these objections to the inquiries. At the highway hearings many opponents showed an absence of respect for the procedure: they failed to wait for their turn to speak, repeatedly demanded the recall of inspectors, and insisted that there should be a discussion of the need for the road scheme...When faced with the intransigence of the inspectors over their demands, in many cases the opponents turned to

systematic disruption, boycotting the hearings, arranging sit-ins, etc.., The inspectors were obliged to adjourn the hearing and on many occasions, police were called to expel the protesters.

The anti-road protest movement was instrumental in the decision to drop the Archway road widening scheme. The GLC and the Borough of Haringey who were both initially favourable to the scheme withdrew their support in the face of the intensity of the protest it provoked. In October 1977, the inspector of the Archway Road inquiry acquiesced with the protesters' demands and asked the DOT to revise their figures. The widening of the scheme was indeed justified by the results of forecasts done five years earlier. Finally in March 1978, in a House of Commons written reply the Secretary for Transport announced that the inquiry into the Archway Road widening scheme was to be abandoned. He proposed instead to arrive at a solution with the help of the authorities involved. He stated that the Department of Transport did not wish to promote the scheme against the wishes of those who were elected to represent local residents.

The intensity of the objections to the inquiry procedures led the government to introduce some changes. In January 1978, the Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment chaired by Sir George Leitch (Advisory Committee 1978) presented recommendations largely in line with the demands voiced by

protest groups. They recommended inter alia, that the costs and benefits of the proposed road schemes should be calculated on a wider basis in order to include every group affected directly or indirectly by them. The environmental impacts would then be included in contrast to the case of the COBA, the computerised cost/benefit exercise used by the Department of Transport which focused only on the costs and benefits to road users and financing authorities. The Leitch Committee also recommended that proposals of other transport mode schemes should be compared with road proposals on the same terms. The report was welcomed by the Anti-Motorway Archway Group in a letter to the Prime Minister because they considered it gave way on all their criticism (The Times 11 January 1978).

The White paper on highway inquiry procedures which appeared four months later (DOE and DOT 1978) acknowledged that its publication was largely due to the loss of public confidence in road inquiries:

> "...it is clear that there are many responsible people, with moderate views, who are deeply concerned about the fairness of the highway inquiry system. It is their confidence which needs to be restored"(DOE and DOT 1978: 1 para. 3).

The White paper proposed modifications of the procedures for highway inquiries along the line of the conclusions of the Leitch Committee. The White paper recommended a greater openness at all stages of the planning of a scheme from public consultation to the inquiry, that all those concerned should enjoy an equal availability of information and that inspectors should be nominated by the Lord Chancellor.

However, in spite of the implementation of the recommendations of the White paper which in many respects led to a change in inquiry procedures, serious disruptions took place at inquiries concerning sections of the M 25 orbital motorway. The groups which were causing the disruptions were protesting against the fact that they were not allowed to challenge the government's decision to proceed with the road in the first place (Community Action May/June 1978: 12). The decision to proceed with the M 25 was therefore not submitted to a discussion along the lines of the recommendations of the Leitch Committee and of the White paper which followed even if the inquiries procedure was modified according to these recommendations. For instance in September 1978, John Derham of the Friends of the Earth and Secretary of the M 25 Coordinating Committee declared that it was scandalous that an investment of this size could go ahead without being subjected to an adequate public inquiry. While well organised protest actions contributed to the abandonment of the Archway Road scheme and the modification of the highway inquiry procedure, they failed to obtain the abandonment of the M 25 or substantial changes in its route. This can be explained by the high priority given to this scheme in the national highway strategy. Every year the priority given to the M 25 was reiterated in Roads in England and after 1978 in annual White papers on road policy. For instance the 1980 White paper (DOT 1980: 1 para. 3), stated that the M 25 had been given top priority because it constituted an important tool in promoting economic recovery. The reasons

given for this were that it would link London airports, ports and industrial areas with the Continent, and save time to through traffic which would be able to avoid delays on London's congested roads. The White paper also stressed the environmental contribution of the M 25 in that it would help relieve traffic in towns and villages around London as well as in the capital itself.

After having considered debates which have influenced positions adopted by the government on transport matter, we shall now turn to financial determinants of the transport policies. The main factor influencing the relation between the government and local authorities on transport matters was the level of funding it was ready to make available to them for transport. This was in turn largely influenced by the government's macro-economic policies, and the level of public expenditure these involved. In the December 1973 public expenditure White paper (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1973: 5 para. 2), in line with the trends of the previous White papers, it was decided that public expenditure would be allowed to grow to fight unemployment, albeit at a slower rate than previously, from 1974-75. It was judged that a higher proportion of total resources should be directed towards exports and industrial investment. Because most industrial capacity is privately owned, this meant that public expenditure growth should be limited to free resources for the private sector. In the following White paper published in January 1975 (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1975), the objectives stated were to close the non-oil trade deficit and to

achieve an overall equilibrium in the balance of payments as well as to expand certain key social programmes (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1975: 1 para. 5, 2 para. 6). It was also mentioned that, in order to improve the growth in output, more productive investments should be made (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1975: 2 para. 7). The increase in total public expenditure was set at one half of the GDP increase over the following five years which was estimated at 16.8%. The February 1976 White paper (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1976) presented a change from the public expenditure policy pursued during the previous years. The objective was changed in the face of the high level of inflation and a proportionally higher growth in public spending relative to private expenditure (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1976: 1 para. 1). From 1972 to 1975, public expenditure grew by nearly 20% in volume while the increase of economic output was of less than 2%. The Treasury planned to stabilise the real level of government expenditure after 1976-77 (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1976: 3 para. 6) and to extend from that year, cash controls over a wide range of public spending. Priority in public spending was to be given to the improvement of industrial capacity.

The following White paper (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1977) largely followed the objectives set the previous year. In January 1978, the expenditure White paper (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1978) announced that the government could resume the expansion of many programmes financed by public expenditure because of the improvement in the country's financial situation

(Chancellor of the Exchequer 1978: 1 para. 2). The planned growth rate for public expenditure lay within the prospective growth of the rate of national income. The Treasury however stressed that any renewed expansion in public expenditure should be governed by the government's broad economic objectives of containing inflation, reducing unemployment and promoting industrial efficiency (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1978: 1 para. 3). These objectives were reiterated in the following White paper (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1979).

This trend was reversed by the Conservative government which took office in 1979. In the March 1980 expenditure plans (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1980), the Treasury stressed their intention of gradually reducing the volume of public expenditure over the following four years. The aim of this reduction was to bring down inflation and interest rates by curtailing the growth of the money supply and controlling the government borrowing requirement (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1980: 3 para. 2). Priorities in spending were defence and law and order.

Over the whole period since 1973 public spending experienced an expansion in 1973 and 1974 followed by a slower growth. In 1976 this growth was stopped until it resumed at a moderate pace in 1978 and 1979. In 1980, the government decided to reduce the volume of public expenditure. In fact, the level of public expenditure (including debt interest) grew by 12%

between 1973-74 and 1974-75. It later dropped by 12% between 1975-76 and 1977-78 after which it stabilised until 1979-80 when it increased by 6% to 1980-81. These changes were largely anticipated in the spending projections made in the public expenditure White papers (see Figure 6.11).

These overall trends in government expenditure were reflected in the expenditure projections in the transport programme. While in December 1973, increases in spending of over 30% were projected over five years and in January 1975, a growth of 15% was expected, between 1976 and 1980, in every expenditure White paper, a drop in the planned level of spending on this programme was announced. In February 1977, a drop of 20% over four years was planned and in March 1980, a drop of 12.5% was projected over a similar period (see Figure 6.12).

The level of spending on the transport programme was also influenced by the priority given to transport relative to other programmes. In the December 1973 public expenditure White paper, planned increases in spending on the road and transport programme were larger than the projected growth of expenditure as a whole. However in the White papers which followed, the projected increases of expenditure on the transport programme were lower than the average for all programmes. Similarily, when reductions of expenditure were planned, the reductions in the transport programme were more severe than in programmes as a whole. In fact, between 1974-75 and 1980-81,

FIGURE 6.11

CHANGES IN PROJECTED EXPENDITURE OVER FIVE YEARS IN THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPENDITURE PLANS FROM 1973 TO 1980: TOTAL PROGRAMMES.



* DOTTED LINES INDICATE THAT FOUR YEAR PROJECTIONS PRESENTED IN THE DOCUMENTS ARE EXTRAPOLATED OVER A FIVE YEAR PERIOD.

FIGURE 6.12

CHANGES IN PROJECTED EXPENDITURE OVER FIVE YEARS IN THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPENDITURE PLANS FROM 1973 TO 1980: ROAD AND TRANSPORT.



*DOTTED LINES INDICATE THAT FOUR YEAR PROJECTIONS PRESENTED IN THE DOCUMENTS ARE EXTRAPOLATED OVER A FIVE YEAR PERIOD.

spending on transport diminished in real terms by 31%. Expenditure on transport therefore lost ground in relation to other government spending areas. Whereas in 1975-76, the transport programme accounted for 4.8% of total government expenditure, in 1980-81, this proportion had fallen to 3.5% (see Figure 6.13).

Turning now to the breakdown of expenditure within the transport programme, the rate of increase in the funds over a five year period projected for the construction and improvement of motorways and trunk roads was 45% in December 1973 (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1973) and over 10% in January 1975 (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1975). Afterwards, in each one of the following White papers, cuts were planned with peaks of - 17% and - 15% over five years and - 22% over four years, in February 1977 (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1977), in January 1978 (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1978) and January 1979 (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1979) (See Figure 6.14). In fact, total Department of Transport expenditure on motorways and trunk roads fell from 23.9% to 14.4% of the total transport budget from 1973-74 to 1977-78. This proportion then remained more or less constant up to 1980-81. Overall the amount allocated for motorway and trunk roads dropped by 52.6% in real terms between 1973-74 and 1980-81. Similarly, the total road (and car-park) expenditure fell from 45% of the total transport budget in 1972-73 to 29.8% in 1977-78 and then remained more or less stable. Spending on this sector of expenditure dropped by

Figure 6.13 Actual allocation of public funds to programmes, to the transport programme and to sectors of expenditure within this programme (£ million in 1975 prices)

	Total expenditure on programmes	Total expenditure on the transport programme	As a proportion of the total expenditure on programmes	Total road (and car-park) expenditure	As a proption of the transport programme	Total local public transport expenditure	As a proption of the transport programme
1972-73	43,059	1,848	4.3%	833	45.0%	140	7.6%
1973-74	45,831	1,964	4.2%	863	43.9%	152	7.7%
1974-75	49,254	2,181	4.4%	761	34.8%	276	12.6%
1975-76	42,907	2,086	4.8%	635	30.4%	346	16.5%
1976-77	41,808	1,864	4.4%	590	31.6%	322	17.2%
1977-78	39,260	1,574	4.0%	469	29.8%	288	18.2%
1978-79	41,148	1,539	3.7%	481	31.2%	277	17.9%
1979-80	41,055	1,566	3.8%	481	30.7%	265	16.9%
1980-81	41,183	1,490	3.5%	471	31.6%	259	17.3%

Source: Chancellor of the Exchequer 1976: Table 2.1
Chancellor of the Exchequer 1981: Table 2.1

FIGURE 6.14

CHANGES IN PROJECTED EXPENDITURE OVER FIVE YEARS IN THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPENDITURE PLANS FROM 1973 TO 1980: MOTORWAY AND TRUNK ROADS — NEW CONSTRUCTION AND IMPROVEMENT.



* DOTTED LINES INDICATE THAT FOUR YEAR PROJECTIONS PRESENTED IN THE DOCUMENTS ARE EXTRAPOLATED OVER A FIVE YEAR PERIOD

45.4% in real terms between 1973-74 and 1980-81.

A second category within total government spending on transport is surface public transport excluding British Rail. The projected increases in public spending in this field were of over 50% and over 85% for five year periods in the December 1973 and January 1975 White papers. In the subsequent White papers, a drop was planned in each case except in January 1978, when a modest growth of 7% was projected over four years. In February 1976, February 1977 and in March 1980, reductions of expenditure of 12% and 20% over five years, and of 13% over four years were planned (see Figure 6.15). Spending on local public transport excluding British Rail, grew as a proportion of total transport expenditure from 7.6% in 1972-73 to 18.2% in 1977-78 and then remained stable. Funds allocated for this purpose increased in real terms by 147% between 1972-73 and 1975-76 when a peak in spending was reached, they afterwards dropped by 25% to 1980-81.

Changes in the overall volume of public expenditure and in the priority given to spending on the transport programme therefore entailed a drop in the funds allocated to every sector of transport expenditure from 1975 onwards, though this drop varied according to sector. These changes in levels of expenditure affected the amount of central funds made available to local authorities for transport purposes as well as their allocation to specific purposes. For instance in 1974, in

FIGURE 6.15

CHANGES IN PROJECTED EXPENDITURE OVER FIVE YEARS IN THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPENDITURE PLANS FROM 1973 TO 1980: TOTAL SURFACE PUBLIC TRANSPORT (EXCEPT OVERALL PASSENGER AND INFRASTRUCTURE GRANTS TO THE BRB)



* DOTTED LINES INDICATE THAT FOUR YEAR PROJECTIONS PRESENTED IN THE DOCUMENTS ARE EXTRAPOLATED OVER A FIVE YEAR PERIOD.

† IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE PROPORTION OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT IN LOCAL TRANSPORT EXPENDITURE WILL BE THE SAME IN 1983-84 THAN IN 1979-80.

the wake of an expansion of government expenditure and of an increasing proportion being spent on the transport programme, the Labour government announced their intention of temporarily supporting high levels of fare relief grants paid by local authorities (Department of the Environment 1974b). However very soon afterwards, in January 1975 (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1975), the same government stated their intention that the level of these grants should be first contained and then reduced. In February 1976 (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1976), it was projected that fare relief grants paid to local public transport operators would diminish by more than 50% in three years. The government also issued directives to control local authority expenditure as they did for nationalised enterprises. The purpose of these directives was to prevent local authorities adopting a level of spending which contradicted the aims of government macro-economic policies, e.g. as would be the case if local authorities expanded their spending in a period of public expenditure contraction. As the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated in February 1976, since a large proportion of public expenditure, around 27%, is in the hands of national industries and local authorities, "their cooperation in maintaining a tight control on their expenditure will be essential if this national strategy is to be achieved." (1976: 4 para. 10)

New arrangements for the financing of local transport by the government were introduced from April 1975. Local authorities were asked to establish their priorities for five years in

a document entitled Transport Policies and Programme which they were to submit annually to the Secretary of State. The level and breakdown of the Transport Supplementary Grant was to be decided in terms of these priorities. The TSG replaced a portion of the Rate Support Grant paid annually to local authorities by the government and a number of specific transport grants. While, in theory, local authorities were free to decide their total level of transport expenditure and how they would allocate it, the government in fact influenced both of these. In order to secure the conformity of local authorities to general expenditure and transport priorities, the government threatened authorities which failed to adhere to their directives with cuts in TSG in the following year. Central government influence on local transport expenditure was thus strengthened by the issuing of directives to local authorities to ensure that they complied with macro-economic policies and with government transport priorities.

In this section we have seen that the government initiated a discussion on transport matters by the publication of a consultation document. We have observed that as a consequence of representations concerning the phasing out of the public transport revenue support grant by the government, these grants would be maintained. We have also seen that the intensity of protest at inquiries on the Department of the Environment and later, on the Department of Transport, highway schemes led to the abandoning of proposals and a change in the inquiry procedure. It has been shown how the government reacted to

the economic situation by changing the total level of public expenditure and how this necessarily affected the level of spending on transport. We have observed that this level of spending was also influenced by the priority given to the transport programme in relation to the totality of programmes. I have furthermore tried to show that the level of spending on different forms of local transport was partly determined by changes in the priority given to different sectors of expenditure within the programme.

6.5 The evolution of the transport situation from 1973 to 1980

Having considered transport policies and the political discourse surrounding them during the Labour 1973-1977 GLC administration and the following Conservative administration from 1977 to 1980, we shall now pay attention to the evolution of patronage on different modes of transport. We shall consider the factors influencing these levels of patronage. It will appear that the overall demand for transport in London is primarily determined by the population and the number of jobs of the Greater London area. As the London population and the number of jobs in the capital declined, no increase in transport demand took place. At best, as a result of a growth in the number of trips per capita over the 1973-1980 period and of shifts taking place between modes of transport, patronage remained stable on certain modes. However in the case of each mode, the major factor affecting the level of patronage was its cost compared

to the one of other modes. We shall see that, as costs varied, important shifts of passengers took place between modes of transport. It will also appear that the quality of services, although to a lesser extent, also influenced the demand for a mode of transport.

Transport trends in London from 1973 to 1980 were influenced by a decline in the population of Greater London[7] and in the number of jobs in central London. From 1973 to 1979, the population of Greater London dropped by 5.5% from 7,276,000 to 6,877,000 while the population of the rest of the South East increased by 2.7%. In a study of population and job movements from the mid 1960's to the early 1970's Gilje (1975) discovered that Greater London employees' residences were moving away from central London at a faster rate than work-places. He came to the conclusion that this discrepancy accounted for the increase of the length of the average commuter trip. Subsequently however it would appear that residents in the rest of the South East found jobs closer to home therefore leading to a decline in commuting to central London from that area. In central London the number of jobs dropped by 11.1% between 1971 and 1976. Over the same period there was little change in employment in the rest of Greater London but an increase of 7% in the number of jobs in the rest of the South East region (excluding Greater London).

As we have seen in previous sections, between 1973 and 1980, neither the Labour GLC nor the Conservative administration devoted

large sums to road construction and improvement. In the case of the first administration, extensive road construction went against their pro-public transport and pro-environment stands, while in the case of the Conservative GLC, a commitment to road construction was frustrated by the absence of adequate funding from the government. Consequently, there was only a modest increase in the mileage of new principal roads and motorways opened to traffic over the 1973-1980 period. For instance, between 1971 and 1978, the total length of motorways in London rose from 21.1 to 27.1 miles (GLC 1979: Table E1.09). However, the increased congestion which might have resulted from the small number of new and improved roads was partly offset by a slow increase in the total number of vehicles. Between 1973 and 1979, this number increased by less than 1% in total and the number of private cars and vans grew by 2.5% (GLC 1980a: Table 18). Another factor contributing to low increases in the level of traffic was the dramatic increase in petrol prices from 1973 to 1975, viz. 37.4% in real terms. However overall from 1973 to 1979, petrol prices rose by only 17.5% in real terms. The level of congestion itself also limited increases in the volume of traffic. For instance in the inner and central areas where traffic speeds fell between 1971-73 and 1977-79 by 4.4% (Brown 1981: Table 2 annex 6), traffic level indices varied from 100 in 1972 to 101 in 1978 with a low of 98 in 1975-76 (GLC 1979: Table E1.10). Finally, increases in the volume of traffic were checked to a limited extent by restraint measures introduced mainly in central London by the Labour GLC.

The volume of traffic in central London was the same in 1977 as in 1973 but dropped in 1975. However it is difficult to disentangle the impact of the measures implemented by the Labour administration from other factors such as petrol prices, the recession, the reduction in the number of jobs in the area, etc. After 1977, traffic volumes in central London started to rise again, though at a lower rate than before 1973 (Buchanan 1980: Figure 8.1). Consequently, from 1973 to 1979, the number of cars entering central London at the morning peak time increased by 5% (see Figure 6.16).

Turning to the use of buses, while fares were frozen on London Transport buses from January 1972 to March 1975, the volume of passenger miles carried increased by 2.8% between 1973 and 1975. The small change in passenger miles following the fare increases of 1975 can be explained by a switch of passengers to the buses because of steeper rises on the underground which made buses cheaper on long journeys. This accounts for the fact that there was a slight growth in passenger mileage on buses between 1974 and 1975 while the number of journeys dropped by 1.2%. The increase in the number of passengers occurred between 1973 and 1974 against a background of a decrease in bus miles operated of 3.8% caused by staff recruiting difficulties. In December 1973 there was a shortage of bus drivers and conductors of 15.4% (LTE 1973: 14). As the level of bus miles run improved up to 1976 when it equaled the 1973 level, fare increases in excess of the rate of inflation up to

FIGURE 6.16

CHANGES IN CENTRAL LONDON PEAK PERIOD CAR AND CAR PASSENGER ARRIVALS



SOURCE: BROWN 1981: FIGURE 16

1978, led to a fall in passenger miles. Between 1976 and 1977, a slight drop of 1.6% in bus miles occurred. The situation deteriorated, however, between 1977 and 1979 when the volume of bus miles run fell by 7.8% because of a renewed deterioration of the staff situation on buses. As a result of a fall in London Transport wages relative to wages paid by other London employers, there was a 12.9% shortage of bus drivers in December 1978 (LTE 1979: 6). This situation improved and bus miles ran increased by 4.8% between 1979 and 1980. Meanwhile, the volume of passenger miles carried on London Transport buses dropped steadily from 1975 onwards. Between 1975 and 1980, it fell by 14.7% while between 1974 and 1979, fares on buses increased in real terms by 31.7% (see Figure 6.17).

The underground suffered a slight decline in the volume of passenger miles of 1% between 1973 and 1974 while fares remained steady, but underground services in terms of car miles decreased by 8.1% as a result of staff shortages. Between 1974 and 1976, because of increases in fares in excess of the rate of inflation, and on longer distances, at a higher rate than on buses of up to 45% (over fifteen miles) (Brown 1981: 108 Figure 22), the underground services suffered declines in terms of passenger miles of 15.7%. Over 1978 and 1979, fares were maintained largely in line with inflation. Passenger miles remained steady between 1976 and 1977; they increased slightly during 1978 after which they fell by 8% over the two following years. The level of car miles run by the underground remained stable between 1975 and 1978 then experienced a drop of 3.8%

FIGURE 6.17

LONDON TRANSPORT: CHANGES IN PASSENGER MILES AND CAR MILES (BUSES) BETWEEN 1973 AND 1980



SOURCE: LONDON TRANSPORT ANNUAL REPORTS 1973-1980

in 1979, and in the following year, regained the 1978 level. Between 1974 and 1979, fares on the underground increased by 44.5% in real terms (see Figure 6.18).

Finally we consider the use of British Rail commuter services in London and the South East. The number of commuters on these services increased by 5.4% between 1974 and 1977 and dropped by 3.8% to 1979. The proportion of the total commuting journeys having central London as a destination decreased from 76.1% to 73% between 1974 and 1979 while journeys ending in the Outer Metropolitan Area and the Outer South East grew from 11% to 13% (Brown 1981: Table 14). Commuting by BR services to central London declined by 7.5% between 1971 and 1974, then increased by 4% between 1974 and 1975. The volume of commuting remained steady during the two following years and then fell by 5.1% between 1977 and 1979. The overall volume of commuting by BR services to central London decreased between 1973 and 1979 by 4.1%. Commuting to central London from outside Greater London increased up to 1975 (by 6% between 1973 and 1975). It then fell by 10.6% between 1975 and 1979. Meanwhile commuting to central London from within Greater London followed an existing declining trend and fell by 18.2% between 1971 and 1974. However it grew by 7.8% from 1974 to 1977 and then the decline resumed and commuting fell by 4.3% to 1979 (Brown 1981: 105) (see Figure 6.19). It would appear that, through the 1970's, improvements in commuter rail services brought about increases in passenger traffic which in some

FIGURE 6.18

LONDON TRANSPORT: CHANGES IN PASSENGER MILES AND CAR MILES (UNDERGROUND) BETWEEN 1973 AND 1980



SOURCE: LONDON TRANSPORT ANNUAL REPORTS 1973-1980

Figure 6.19 : Number and proportion of British Rail London and South East journeys which are to central, inner, outer London and to the outer metropolitan area, the outer South East and the periphery of the outer South East.
million journeys/ (percentage)

Commuting to:	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Central London	207.7 (76.1)	216.0 (75.2)	215.3 (74.4)	215.0 (74.0)	206.0 (72.9)	204.0 (73.0)
Rest of inner London	13.5 (4.9)	14.4 (5.0)	14.6 (5.0)	15.0 (5.2)	15.4 (5.5)	15.0 (5.4)
Outer London	21.8 (8.0)	24.1 (8.4)	25.5 (8.8)	24.9 (8.6)	24.5 (8.7)	24.0 (8.6)
OMA	17.5	19.6	20.6	21.7	22.2	22.2
OSE	11.4 (11.0)	12.0 (11.4)	12.5 (11.8)	13.0 (12.3)	13.3 (12.9)	13.1 (13.0)
OSEPR	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1
All Commuting	272.9 (100)	287.1 (100)	289.5 (100)	290.6 (100)	282.4 (100)	279.4(100)

Source: Brown 1981 , Table 14.

cases compensated for the effects of other factors. For instance between 1973 and 1978, while in Hertfordshire the commuter traffic on BR services increased by 0.6%, on the newly electrified Great Northern Line, the growth reached 20.9% (Brown 1981: 52 Table 19, 53 Table 20).

These variations in the volume of commuter traffic on the London and South East network can largely be explained in terms of changes in the level of fares. From 1975, commuter rail fares increased faster than the cost of living. In real terms they grew by 38.4% between 1974 and 1978 (see Figure 6.20). However the effects of these increases were partly mitigated by the fact that underground fares increased at a still faster rate, viz. by 43.9% over a similar period. The difference in fares for similar distances between the two railway services reached 39% (Brown 1981 : 102 Figure 21). Because of this difference, a significant shift of passengers took place from the underground to the British Rail commuter services. This explains this increase in patronage on BR services within Greater London between 1974 and 1977. While changes in the use of public transport modes are somewhat erratic because they are a consequence of an immediate reaction to changes in relative prices and in quality of services, variations in the cost of transport also have more lasting consequences. Locational choices related to residence, to employment as well as to other activities are influenced by that cost. These choices then alter the demand for transport in general as well as for

FIGURE 6.20

BRITISH RAIL FARES RELATIVE TO AVERAGE EARNINGS (MALES WORKING IN THE GREATER LONDON AREA)



SOURCE: BROWN 1981: FIGURE 3

particular modes. Therefore trends on the British Rail London Commuter Network also reflect the long lasting effects of shifts in population and jobs throughout the London area.

We have assessed in this section the performance of private road transport, of the buses, of the underground, and of British Rail commuter services in terms of quality of services, cost for the user, and levels of patronage. It appeared that overall no growth in demand for transport took place in Greater London as a consequence of a decline in population and in the number of jobs. It became, nevertheless, clear that important shifts in passengers between modes of transport took place in response to variations in the respective cost for the user of each mode of transport. Changes in levels of services also influenced the demand for different transport modes. Generally, public transport modes lost passengers while the level of private transport underwent little change over this period. The impact of the trends affecting the various modes of transport on land use and on the different social groups will be considered in the next chapter.

Conclusion

The Labour party took power in London in 1973 with a strong commitment to reduce the volume of road investment and to increase the priority given to public transport. The main form of

support to public transport it envisaged was the payment of revenue subsidies by the council. There was also talk of abolishing fares by recycling the funds which would have been allocated to the realisation of the primary road network abandoned by the Labour administration. Traffic restraint proposals which would have assisted bus services met with intense public opposition. Furthermore, a decline in the government subsidies towards public transport operation accompanied by directives prohibiting the Council from making good the gap by levying higher rates itself brought about the downfall of the Labour public transport fare policy. The Labour administration was therefore unable to implement their objectives related to public transport.

In 1977 the Conservative party took over the control of the Council with a policy of facilitating the use of private transport because this was seen as consistent with their objective of reactivating the economy of London. They also pledged themselves to phase out the payment of public transport revenus subsidies. However they were unable to carry out the road construction and improvement programme they put forward because the government implemented a succession of cuts in their support for new and improved roads. The Conservative administration shied away from abandoning the revenue subsidy grant because they feared that the higher public transport fares which this would have led to would have been detrimental to the inner London economy. The British Railways Board also

encountered difficulties in the maintenance and renewal of their equipment on the London Commuter Network because of a fall in the government financial contribution allocated for this purpose. Meanwhile they had to make significant increases in fares on the London and South East commuter services to compensate for high cost increases and the freeze in government support.

Thus the GLC and the BRB both found themselves, from 1973 onwards, unable to implement the transport objectives they had set, to maintain existing levels of public transport services or to keep fare increases within the rate of inflation. This situation can be largely attributed to the decline in government payments to local authorities for transport purposes and of their financial support of BR. This decline has to be seen against the overall cuts in government expenditure in 1975, 1977 and 1978, together with the reduced priority given to the transport spending programme. There is no doubt that the transport proposals put forward during this period were affected by the economic climate in that they were scaled down in order to appear credible. No proposal of the scale of the PRN was seriously considered from the mid 1970's onwards. In fact it is remarkable that the majority of the proposals made by the political parties which were implemented were those involving cuts in transport expenditure, e.g. the Labour GLC's proposal for cuts in the level of road construction and the Conservative GLC's reduction in the fare relief grant paid to London Transport.

We would summarise our analysis of GLC transport policies during the 1973-1980 period as follows. Firstly we would argue that in spite of the conflicts between them at the level of the political discourse related to transport matters, the two major Greater London parties broadly followed similar lines in their policies. Thus in its manifesto, the Labour party advocated directive transport proposals, i.e. proposals implying the control of transport trends in pursuit of non-transport objectives, with the aim of improving the quality of the environment and improving the equality of access to urban facilities; the Conservative manifesto on the other hand, had as its major objective the promotion of the economic vitality of London, and its transport proposals were consequently directed at the satisfaction of the needs of London's economic concerns. However at the level of policy implementation, in many respects, the two administrations followed the same transport policies or adopted similar positions:

- they both supported the construction of the Docklands underground extension.
- they both sought to takeover the control of the Inner Suburban BR commuter services.
- the Conservative administration maintained the revenue subsidy grant to public transport initiated by the Labour GLC, albeit at a lower level.
- in 1976, the Labour GLC issued a directive to the LTE to reduce their net revenue cost, and similar directives were issued under the subsequent administration.
- both administrations pressed the government for the allocation

of more funds for transport purposes though the specific uses to which they intended to put these funds differed.

These similarities can be partly accounted for by the fact that, in a period of falling government financial support, both parties defended the interests of the GLC in matters relating to transport. They both tried to ensure that the Council would have the capacity to implement the programmes they put forward. Also, by seeking to gain control of the Inner Suburban commuter services, they were attempting a widening of the jurisdiction of the GLC. This common commitment to the organisational interests of the Council helped to moderate party differences on questions related to transport.

Even when there was a difference between the two administrations on transport matters, as in the case of their different priorities over the distribution of transport spending between sectors, they proved unable to significantly alter transport trends because of the shortage of funds and the limit of their control over the relevant bodies (LT and BR). For instance, for two years the Labour Council managed to halt the drop in public transport patronage by subsidising services and achieving a fare freeze. However, after this they were unable to maintain a level of subsidy sufficient to allow this freeze to continue, with the result that fares increased and the trend of falling patronage resumed. The gap between the political discourse of the two Greater London parties and their actual

implementation of policy thus appears to be the result of the difficulties the Council faced in the realisation of their programmes.

Secondly, the major factor limiting the freedom of the GLC in implementing transport policies was clearly the government which by its power over the allocation of funds and the issuing of directives exerted considerable influence on the transport policies of the Council. The government's own transport priorities were set out in its transport Green paper. The level of resources allocated to transport reflected the importance it gave to the transport programme among other governmental programmes and the total size of the budget. Therefore, as the importance given to transport among other programmes declined and as the total level of government expenditure fell, urban public transport which had been given a high priority in the transport White paper of 1977 actually experienced a decreasing level of government support in the years which followed.

Thirdly, we would argue that the various bodies concerned with transport each followed their own priorities. In the case of elected bodies these were set through the electoral process, while in the case of both elected and non-elected bodies, they reflected a desire to expand. These attempts to expand took the form of the implementation of large scale programmes or a widening of their jurisdiction, e.g. the GLC's

attempt to take control of Inner Suburban commuter services. When the priorities of different authorities converged as when the Labour GLC and the government agreed over cuts in road expenditure, or when this same Labour Council and the London Transport Executive agreed over bus priority schemes, no conflicts arose. However when a clash of priorities occurred, the dominant authority in terms of jurisdictions won out. For instance when views of the GLC and the LTE clashed, the GLC tried to resolve the problem by changing the chairman of the LTE which they had power to do. Similarily, the government's will prevailed when it issued directives on the payment of fare relief grants by the GLC to ensure conformity with their macro-economic policy and the priority they gave to transport expenditure .

Fourthly, we would argue that chances of organised protest of having an impact on transport policies were greater when demands conformed to financial restrictions imposed by the government over the 1973-1980 period. For instance movements committed to revoke new road schemes in London contributed to make schemes, which funding was already uncertain because of limited support from the government, politically unacceptable. Another condition of success of protest movements was their degree of organisation and political impact. For example the action of commuters against the announced abandoning of the government subsidy towards London commuter services prevented it from taking place. The commuters led an efficient parliam-

entary lobby under the direction of M.P.s from the commuter belt which included many vital seats for the Conservative party. Along with financial constraints, organised protest prevented the Labour and Conservative GLC administrations from implementing major transport changes as they originally intended to. Protest movements usually failed when they were in conflict with public expenditure policies. Movements which demands involved increases in public spending tended to be unsuccessful. Such was the case for example, of the opposition to rises in bus and underground fares which advocated the payment of a high revenue subsidy grant to London Transport by the GLC and by the government. Protest movements also tended to fail when they opposed schemes which were given a high priority by the government such as the M 25 orbital motorway.

FIGURE 6.21

THE TRANSPORT PROPOSALS AND POLICIES PUT FORWARD BY THE GLC 1973-1980

SECTORS OF TRANSPORT POLICY	LABOUR ADMINISTRATION	OBJECTIONS AND SUPPORT	AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS	CONSERVATIVE ADMINISTRATION
HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION AND IMPROVEMENT	VERY STRICT CRITERIA FOR ROAD CONSTRUCTION; REDUCTIONS IN EXPENDITURE →	SUPPORT FROM ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS, OPPOSITION FROM THE MOTOR LOBBY →	IN ACCORD WITH A REDUCTION IN THE FUNDS MADE AVAILABLE BY THE GOVERNMENT →	INCREASES IN HIGHWAY EXPENDITURE IN SUPPORT OF THE ECONOMIC LIFE
			HIGHWAY PROPOSALS FRUSTRATED BY THE NON-AVAILABILITY OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS ←	
TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND PARKING	PRIVATE TRANSPORT RESTRICTION MEASURES TO IMPROVE PUBLIC TRANSPORT SERVICES AND THE QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT →	ORGANISED AND SYSTEMATIC OBJECTIONS FROM THE MOTOR LOBBY, LOCAL OBJECTIONS FROM RESIDENTS →		REOPENING OF CLOSED CAR PARKS, ABANDONMENT OF PUBLIC OFF-STREET CAR PARKS, CONSERVATIVES PUT FORWARD AND IMPLEMENT TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND CAR PARK SCHEMES AIMING AT FACILITATING THE USE OF PRIVATE TRANSPORT
	MOST PROPOSALS DROPPED BY THE LABOUR COUNCIL ←			

FIGURE 6.21 (CONTIN.)



FIGURE 6.21 (CONTIN.)



PART THREE

Chapter VII

TRANSPORT POLICIES: THEIR FORMULATION, THEIR IMPLEMENTATION, THEIR EFFECTS.

Introduction

Having revised the evolution of transport policies in London between 1965 and 1980, and considered the reactions they triggered off, I shall attempt, in this chapter, to demonstrate how the theoretical discussion of Chapters One, Two and Three can contribute to an explanation of this evolution and of the social movements associated with it. In the light of this discussion, I shall investigate how the prevailing jurisdictional arrangements, the nature of the responsiveness of elected bodies to public pressure, and the division of responsibilities between semi-autonomous groups operating within the state apparatus, have determined the form taken by public involvement in transport matters in London. In short, I shall attempt to explain why, despite the formulation of many comprehensive transport proposals for London, so few schemes were implemented. I shall also try to understand why, in spite of public protest and the adoption on many occasions of pro-public transport stands by the GLC, a major feature of this period was a steep rise in public transport fares. Finally, I shall consider the impact on different social

groups of transport policies and of the trends in transport use they helped produce, and how the different social groups residing in London were affected by them.

This chapter will tackle general questions relating to the theory of the state. These questions will refer to the reaction of the state to pressures emanating from society, to the functioning of the state apparatus, to the capacity of the state to solve problems, and to the impact of policies on different social groups. The treatment of these matters will be illustrated by examples of transport policies and protests in London. On the other hand, hypotheses about the state will suggest explanations of public transport interventions in London while the reference to these interventions will contribute to validate the hypotheses.

An implicit assumption of this chapter is that members of organisations or pressure groups seek to maximise the interest of their organisation or movement. Little importance will therefore be given to an explanation of the behaviour of individuals; rather, the unit of reference will be aggregates of agents with a common interest in a given situation, e.g. class, social group, authority, organisation and etc. The problem of false consciousness will therefore not be considered even if it remains necessary to assume that it can have an impact on the reactions of individuals and organisations. However the possibility of "unintended effects" will be taken

into consideration because of their relevance to the explanation of transport phenomena. It is indeed common knowledge that the collective behaviour of individuals each pursuing their own interest can result in consequences which run counter to this interest.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first three sections deal with factors influencing the formulation and implementation of transport policies while the fourth is concerned with the social effects of these policies. In Section One, we shall confront the paradox that, while being the main arena of debates around transport matters in London, the GLC was very limited in its ability to intervene because of the financial and jurisdictional restrictions it was subject to. As we shall see, the GLC's room for manoeuvre decreased over the period under consideration largely as a result of reductions in the level of public expenditure and thereby in the level of financial support from the government to the GLC.

In Section Two, we shall consider the conditions which pressures on the state had to fulfill in order to have an impact on decision-making. We shall see that such pressures had to be formulated in a manner which made them appear likely to have important electoral and economic impacts. It will be shown that pressures by upper and middle class groups were more likely to meet these conditions and that

consequently, these groups were more influential in policy making than lower class groups. In Section Three, I shall focus on the factors inherent in the organisation of the state which influenced the formulation and implementation of transport policies in London. We shall see that one of the reasons why the proposals put forward by planners were not implemented has to do with the very nature of these proposals. Indeed it will become apparent that in the pursuit of their organisational interests, planners constantly introduced plans which were at odds with the prevailing economic and political context. We shall go on to consider how transport in London became a source of tension between public authorities involved in these matters. We shall see that authorities tried to impose their priorities upon each other by expanding the scope of their responsibilities. I shall also show in Section Three the effect cuts in public expenditure had on the state's ability to respond to pressures from individuals and organisations. Finally in this section we shall tackle the question of the state's capacity to implement solutions to problems as defined by individuals and by organisations external to the state. It will become apparent that few of the subjectively defined transport problems led to pressures on the public authorities and that among them, only a few found their way into the political discourse of elected members, and that only certain elements of this discourse were actually implemented. I shall also stress the fact that the introduction of cuts in public expenditure made the implementation of solutions on the

part of the state even more unlikely than before.

In Section Four, our attention will turn to the impact of transport policies and trends on different social groups. We shall see that over the period under consideration, transport trends and changes in land use patterns accentuated the effects of transport policies on social groups. Our conclusion will be that lower income groups were the most severely affected by transport policies and trends in London between 1965 and 1980. This will mainly be attributed to the fact that members of these groups suffered disproportionaly from a loss of accessibility as a result of major public transport fare increases and from the deterioration of their residential areas as a result of the environmental impact of road traffic.

7.1 The Greater London Council as a transport authority

In this section we shall analyse the nature of state intervention and of the debate on transport matters in London. Our focus will be on the GLC's transport interventions. I intend to explore the paradox that while the GLC was the major arena of the debate on transport matters in London, it found its ability to influence transport trends limited. This has caused a divorce between the locus of discussion and the locus of decision-making because most of the debates over transport matters in London took place on the GLC political

scene while the GLC's capacity to intervene with regard to transport was limited. Two categories of limits to the GLC's transport interventions will be considered: financial and jurisidctional. Firstly we shall consider the reasons why the GLC was the major focus of debates concerning transport in London.

7.1.1 The GLC, the major arena of the transport debate in London

A first reason why the GLC constituted the major arena of the transport debate in London is that the GLC is the only body with transport planning responsibilities for London as a whole (Stott 1980: vi). The GLC therefore formulated transport schemes affecting the totality or sections of London, which triggered off intense reactions. Another reason explaining the importance of the GLC as an arena of the transport debate relates to the character of the electoral process in the case of an authority vested with a limited number of functions. Because the GLC had few responsibilities apart from transport likely to mobilise the population, transport issues became crucial to its electoral process. As parties confront each other in a competition for political support in such a context, they are obliged to emphasise issues linked with functions for which the political institution (i.e. the GLC) is responsible. Among these issues, a privileged position was accorded

to transport because it is a universal concern and because there were active debates about perceived transport problems. The importance given to transport by GLC councillors was illustrated by the fact that the first scheme publicly presented in 1965 by the then newly formed GLC was the Motorway Box.

However we should note an important paradox here, namely that, despite the stress placed on them by politicians, local issues are relatively unimportant in mobilising the local electorate. This is partly reflected in a relatively low turnout for local elections: in the case of the GLC, this turnout varied between a high of 44.2% (in 1964) and a low of 35.2% (in 1970), over the 1964-1980 period. More important is the fact that political scientists agree that local election results largely reflect the level of public support for the parties nationally taking into account variations due to the specificity of local structures, and that local issues are relatively insignificant (Bartley and Gordon 1982; Hepworth 1980: 258; Waller 1980).[1] It thus becomes difficult to identify the effect of local issues in local elections and more specifically transport ones even when they were the major issue in the electoral campaign. This point was made by Thomson about the April 1970 GLC election which was won by the Conservatives:

> "Whether their (the Conservative party) victory in a local election in which most voters evidently voted as if it were a national election, i.e. according to their preference for Harold Wilson or Edward Heath, can be considered as a 'mandate' to build motorways is a debatable point."
>
> (1977:67)

In spite of the generally low impact of local issues on local results, transport matters caused intense political activity in London. Since the large majority of transport proposals for London emanated from the Council's planners and elected members, the reaction against them was directed at that level. For instance the London Amenity and Transport Association and the London Motorway Action Group were organised with the explicit intention of influencing the decisions of the GLC. Later, the Movement for London campaign, which took an opposite stand to that of the LATA and the LMAG, also directed its activities at the Council. Lobbies and movements pressed the Council to adopt their way of defining transport problems which entailed the types of solution they preferred. It would appear therefore that transport pressures were directed towards the GLC because they had jurisdiction over transport at the Greater London level and because most transport proposals for London were formulated at that level. The GLC appeared to have the capacity to change the transport situation in the capital. Another reason for the direction of pressures towards the GLC referred to the anticipated efficiency of actions. Pressures aimed at the GLC on transport matters in London appeared more likely to reach their objective than if aimed at other levels of government because transport held a central importance among the Council's preoccupations and because well organised London-wide movements conveyed the potentiality of important electoral impacts on the GLC (within the limits of the influence of local issues on the outcome of local elections). If these pressures had been aimed at central government, they

would have probably conveyed less of an influence because transport in London is only one preoccupation among many within the Ministry responsible for transport and because the potential electoral impact of London-wide pressures would have been diluted because London is seen by Ministers in a national context.

We have seen the reasons why the GLC became the main arena of debates around transport matters in London. We shall now consider financial and jurisdictional limits of the GLC transport interventions. It will become apparent that while it was the main focus of transport debates in London, the GLC did not have the powers or financial means to modify significantly the transport situation which prevailed in London.

7.1.2 The financial and jurisdictional limits of the GLC's transport interventions

In pursuing its transport interventions, the GLC was subject to financial and jurisdictional limits. Funds available to the Council for transport spending were limited by rate levels considered acceptable and by the amount of support from the government submitted to priorities defined in expenditure White papers. Also, important areas of transport intervention in London escaped the control of the GLC. We shall consider below the limits faced by the GLC in their ability to intervene in transport matters as well as proposals which were made

to ensure a more autonomous financial base for local authorities (by the Layfield Committee) and a reorganisation of the GLC's jurisdiction (the Marshall Inquiry).

The first major limit to the GLC's capacity to intervene in transport matters was its lack of funds. Because of this, the GLC had a limited influence on the evolution of transport in London. Indeed the Council's total transport budget represented only 5% of the sums spent on transport by private and public sources in the Greater London area. Funds available to the GLC for transport spending derived from two main sources (excluding fares from public transport). The first source is income from the rates. While this source is often considered to be the basis of local government autonomy, it is equally often criticised for its unfairness. The rates constitute a regressive tax, a tax on better housing and fail to distribute the burden of local taxation evenly over the community (Hepworth 1980: 109). Moreover, local authorities are limited in their reliance on the rates to finance their spending programmes by the fact that steep rate increases have negative electoral effects. They are also limited by the fact that such increases may cause firms to close or move to areas where rate levels are lower. As we saw earlier, after 1976, the GLC was committed to avoiding steep rises in the level of the rates.

The second main source of the GLC's transport spending was the

government. However the availability of funds from this source was subject to priorities adopted by the government rather than locally defined priorities. Public expenditure surveys were published annually from 1969 as a result of the recommendation of the White paper entitled Public Expenditure; A New Presentation (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1969). These documents set out the government's spending intentions over a four or five year period. They relate the volume of public expenditure to objectives such as the balance between public and private spending, the balance of payment, the level of investment, private consumption, and government borrowing. Economic management measures are adjusted to predicted economic performance. In order to achieve the levels of public expenditure allowed by these macro-economic policies, the spending of every public agency, including nationalised enterprises and local authorities, has to be kept in line (Price 1978: 91). Consequently the government has to ensure the compliance of each of these agencies with national political decisions about public spending. The main toolused by the government to ensure the compliance of local authorities with these national objectives was the setting of the level of the Rate Support Grant. As Hale (1978) observes, when the RSG was introduced in 1967-68, it received a favourable reception from local authorities partly because its main purpose appeared to be to achieve an equalisation of resources among authorities. However this favourable attitude among local elected members and local officials turned sour when the government relied on it to pursue their own priorities in

periods of economic retrenchment. On many occasions the level of the grant was reduced in accordance with objectives set in public expenditure White papers. Not only did local authorities have to face a decline in the share of their revenues originating from the government but they were warned that if they failed to conform to public expenditure policies by increasing significantly their rate level, they would be punished by receiving a reduced amount of Rate Support Grant in the future.

The Transport Policies and Programme procedure was also introduced as a means of increasing local initiative in the allocation of funds to transport purposes. However the effects were the opposite of this. The TPPs forced the local authorities to formulate their priorities in terms compatible with the government's own priorities and more specifically with the Department of Transport's spending categories. Local authorities were obliged to present their transport plans in the TPPs in a way which allowed the government to pinpoint discrepancies between the local authority's priorities and their own.

These discrepancies may concern the overall level of spending on transport or the distribution of funds between transport programmes. When local authorities threatened not to conform to the governemnt's directives about transport priorities, the government threatened, as in the case of the Rate Supplementary Grant, to cut the level of the Transport Supplementary Grant. Such a threat was, for example, made

against the GLC in 1976. Other government financial means of control over local authorities consist of loan sanctions and the need for endorsement of capital expenditure as well as cost controls. It would therefore appear that when there was a clash of priorities between elected authorities, the most powerful level (central government) used all their administrative and financial powers to impose their priorities on the less powerful level (local government). Consequently, local authorities had to devise responses to electoral pressures aimed at them within a very tight financial framework (Figure 7.1). As Hepworth observes:

> "... the response to locally expressed demands is dictated in national terms (and this of course influences the local response) by national economic and political management pressures, rather than expressed local need itself." (1980:305)

The prevailing distribution of powers between local and central government influenced by the dependence of local government on funds made available - with conditions attached to them - by central government, was criticised by the Layfield Committee on local government finance (Committee of Inquiry into local Government Finance 1976). The Committee considered two possible ways of distributing responsibilities between local and central government: one involved the allocation of wider functions to central government while the other entailed an increase of power for local authorities. The Committee considered that the second option was more desirable. They stressed that in order to achieve effective responsibility, local authorities should possess their own sources of finance. This was embod-

FIGURE 7.1

THE GOVERNMENT'S CHANNELS OF INFLUENCE ON LOCAL AUTHORITIES TRANSPORT POLICIES



ied in the principle of accountability defined by the Layfield Committee in the following terms: "whoever is responsible for spending money should also be responsible for raising it so that the amount of expenditure is subject to democratic control" (Committee of Inquiry into Local Government Finance 1976: 283 para. 2). In order to achieve local authority accountability, the Committee proposed the introduction of a local income tax combined with a reduction of government grants (Committee of Inquiry into Local Government Finance 1976: 295 para. 5). Nevertheless they accepted the need for central government to maintain at their disposal instruments designed to exert an influence over the level of local expenditure and the allocation of funds between capital and current expenditure (Committee of Inquiry into Local Government Finance 1976: 295 para. 47; Cheetham 1976; Freeman 1976). In the discussion which followed the publication of the report of the Layfield Committee, other means of raising funds locally were suggested such as the introduction of a local sales tax and the imposition of motor vehicle duties (Thornhill 1979). Meanwhile, the attitude of the government was in favour of a strengthening of their control over local authorities. In a 1977 document (DOE 1977), they rejected the Layfield Committee's proposal to give a wider range of responsibilities to local government. The trend towards a tighter control over local authorities was accentuated after the Conservative party took office in 1979 (Wheen 1979).

Financial constraints were not the only ones limiting the GLC

in their implementation of transport policies since the GLC also had to face jurisdictional constraints. Indeed many aspects of transport in London remained outside its sphere of influence. In particular their road responsibilities were limited to principal roads, while other roads lay outside their jurisdiction. Also, the British Rail London Commuter Network remained excluded from their control over public transport matters. The GLC's capacity for transport intervention was thereby largely limited by its jurisdictions to principal roads and from 1970, to London Transport public transport services.

The report of the Marshall Inquiry published in 1978 (Marshall 1978) criticised the prevailing distribution of responsibilities between the central government, the GLC and the boroughs. The Marshall Inquiry was set up by a Conservative GLC committed to a devolution of powers from the level of the GLC to the level of the boroughs. In fact the Marshall Inquiry in their report adopted a wider perspective, they made proposals aiming at the establishment of a 'viable and efficient' local government in London. These proposals involved a reorganisation of functions between the GLC and the boroughs but the Marshall Inquiry also advocated the devolution of jurisdictions from Whitehall to the GLC. The Marshall Inquiry report criticised the prevailing arrangements which do not allow the GLC to come to terms with transport problems (Marshall 1978: 25 para. 2.3). They considered that the widening of the GLC's responsibilities in the Transport (London) Act 1969 which

allowed the takeover of London Transport had been insufficient. The Marshall Inquiry advocated that the Council should be given responsibility for trunk roads and should control the whole range of suburban services which would be operated by the BRB under contract from the GLC. The Marshall Inquiry also proposed that the GLC should be responsible for the setting of traffic management standards but that the implementation of schemes should be devolved to boroughs.

In addition to the financial and jurisdictional limits on its capacity to implement transport policies, the GLC was also hampered by the long period of time it took to devise and implement transport schemes especially when there was a high level of public participation. Given the variations over time in the availability of funds due to changing government economic policies and transport priorities, it was often the case that when a scheme was ready to go ahead, there was no money available for it to proceed. Also because of the four year term of office of the GLC, schemes initiated by one administration were often incomplete when the other party, with different priorities, took power and abandoned them. FOR INSTANCE between 1973 and 1977, the Labour administration did not have time to implement many of their proposals largely because of the importance they gave to public consultation. While some of their proposals were dropped in reaction to the intensity of the opposition they triggered off, others were revoked by the Conservative party after they took power, e.g. the Labour Council did not have enough time to introduce public off-street car-park licensing.

In conclusion, it would appear that the GLC was limited in its capacity to respond to demands related to transport in London originating from individuals and organisations. This was mainly due to the fact that many aspects of transport in London escaped its jurisdiction and because of the absence of sufficient funds to implement important transport policies. A major difficulty the Council had to face in this respect was the decrease in financial support from the government accompanied by directives preventing this decrease from being made up by funds originating from the rates. We shall now consider more specifically the nature of the government budgetary restrictions which have affected transport policies in London as well as the objectives pursued by the government in the implementation of these restrictions.

7.1. 3 The government budgetary restrictions affecting transport in London

As we have just seen, one of the major obstacles the GLC faced in its attempts to solve transport problems was a lack of sufficient funds. The major cause of the absence of enough funds for the Council to intervene as they would have wished, was a decreasing level of financial support from the government. We shall see that the level of the sums devoted to transport by

the government is determined by macro-economic policies implemented with the purpose of influencing economic cycles and by the prevailing order of priority between spending programmes. We shall also consider the main public expenditure policies put forward between 1965 and 1980 and the economic background against which these policies were implemented. It will appear that, over this period, there was a constant preoccupation on the part of the government with the proportion of the GDP taken by public expenditure and that this preoccupation led on numerous occasions to budgetary cuts. Finally, we shall focus on the manner in which conditions of implementation of transport policies in London were affected by drops in public expenditure and by a decline in the priority given by the government to its transport programme.

The basic compromise between social forces characterising Western societies is that the state is unable to absorb the bulk of the private sector of the economy because of the prevailing political balance of power. One of the effects of this situation is that, as the majority of the productive sector is in private hands, the state largely depends on resources created in the private sector for its operation. The principal mode of economic management adopted by the government in this context, is to determine the distribution of resources between the public and the private sectors. The level of public expenditure is therefore determined initially by the overall level of the gross domestic product and subsequently by the proportion of

the GDP allocated to the public sector which depends on economic management objectives. These objectives may be the promotion of economic growth or an advantageous balance of payments which usually means the allocation of more funds towards the private or 'productive' sector.[2] They may also be the pursuit of full employment which leads to increases in public expenditure and the encouragement of private spending, or a fight against inflation which usually implies a fall in both public and private spending. Decisions about the implementation of macro-economic policies are taken by governments according to the prevailing economic situation and with attention to their electoral impact. (As noted by Stewart (1977: 241-44), from the mid 1960's governments in Britain generally encouraged pre-election economic booms.) The level of public expenditure is thus related to the desired division between the public and private sectors as set through macro-economic policies. The types of macro-economic policy adopted are determined by the goals to which a government is committed which are related to the maximisation of the interests of specific social groups.

Because of the existence of limits on the level of public expenditure available and of the variations in this level with successive macro-economic policies, conflicts have generally existed between the different government programmes, and between spending ministries and the Treasury. This has resulted from the tendency of each programme to expand in response to demands emerging from civil society instances for increased services

and for a redistribution of resources. In addition planners within each programme, by devising large scale plans, were generating requests for the allocation of more funds. In order to be allocated funds, programmes have to fulfill two conditions: firstly, they must be given a high priority by a state agency, which normally depends on pressures originating from outside the state apparatus and secondly, they must comply with macro-economic policy objectives. For instance, from the 1920's onwards, underground line construction was subsidised by governments as part of their anti-unemployment programmes. In such cases the government made funds available and relied on the transport authorities to draw up schemes responding to transport needs on which they could be spent. More recently the opposite situation has occurred. The replacement of track and the renewal of rolling stock on the London Commuter Network was delayed in the late 1970's because, as part of its fight against inflation, government was unwilling to make the necessary funds available. In periods of contraction of public expenditure, the government may abandon some of their existing programmes. As stated in February 1976 by the public expenditure White paper "programmes are not immutable, and must be open to revision in either direction as circumstances permit." (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1976: 3 para. 8). An exception to the rule that individual programmes depend on government spending priorities was the Road Programme which, until 1937, was at least partly sheltered from overall government spending constraints because of the existence of the

Road Fund. But after that year, road construction was treated like any other area in the assessment of spending priorities by the government.

One effect of the dependence of government spending on overall policy objectives is that the implementation of long-term policies in any field is difficult. This applies in particular to transport policies because they often pursue long-term objectives and are frequently implemented over long periods. A transport policy whose formulation takes several years and whose implementation is planned over two decades is based upon the assumption of a given amount of funds being made available. When this assumption is shattered as a result of major changes in macro-economic policy or in government spending priorities, such a transport policy must be revised and adapted to the new financial context. It therefore becomes difficult to implement long-term transport policies as originally defined by planners.

Having considered the factors determining the total amount of public expenditure and seen how long-term policies and in particular, transport policies were affected by variations in this amount, we shall now turn to a description of trends in the level of public spending between 1965 and 1980. We shall also see how transport schemes in London were affected by cuts in public expenditure and by a drop in the priority given to the programme by the government in the 1970's.

The economic background against which public expenditure decisions were taken between 1965 and 1972, was one of a slow but steady economic growth. In real terms the gross national product increased over this period by 15%. Between 1972 and 1973, the GNP increased by 8.5%. However over the following two years, it dropped by 3%. The growth of the GNP resumed between 1975 and 1976 by 4% and then remained stable for one year. It increased by 4.2% between 1977 and 1979. British economic growth over the 1965-1980 period remained slow compared to other industrial countries. The gross rate of return on investment as well as investment ratios were lower in Great Britain than in other developed countries.[3]

Against this background, public expenditure evolved as shown in Figure 7.2. The volume of public expenditure rose steeply by 15.3% in real terms between 1965 and 1967. This expansion at a time of slow economic growth caused an increase in public expenditure as a proportion of the GNP from 44.6% to 49.6%. In the following year, public expenditure grew by 6% reaching 50.8% of the GNP. However while the level of public expenditure remained stable in real terms between 1968 and 1972, the proportion of the GNP it represented dropped to 47.2%. A growth in the level of economic activity triggered a growth in the volume of public expenditure of 18.3% between 1972 and 1974.[4] Then, as GNP fell, public spending increased by 3.4% between 1974 and 1975 reaching 54.2% of the GNP. As public expenditure remained largely stable for one year while the economy was growing, it fell as a proportion of the GNP to 51.7%.

FIGURE 7.2

EVOLUTION OF THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND OF TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE (1965-1979)



SOURCES: CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE 1972: TABLE 48
CSO 1973: TABLE 305, 315.
CSO 1980: TABLE 9.1
CSO 1982: TABLE 14.1, 14.12.

After a drop of public spending of 5.6% between 1976 and 1977, the proportion of the GNP it represented fell to 48.6%. Over the two following years, public expenditure grew by 9%. In short, the volume of public expenditure increased up to 1968, remained stable for the next five years and then grew again to 1975. The level of public expenditure remained stable for one year, dropped between 1976 and 1977 and then resumed its climb.

The effect of these variations in the volume of public expenditure on the formulation of projects can be deduced from the changes in the expected spending in the different programmes. Indeed it is on the basis of such expectations that projects are devised. Two main periods of budgetary cuts occurred between 1965 and 1980. The first period started in 1968 and lasted until 1972, the cuts implemented over this period affected expected levels of expenditure. They did not, however, in most cases, cause falls in real terms in the volume of funds. In London, the impact of these cuts was reflected in the stretching out or scaling down by the GLC of the PRN proposals. After a period of growth in the volume of public expenditure, which for instance led the Department of the Environment to encourage the payment of revenue support subsidies to local public transport, reductions in real terms in public spending took place in the 1970's. The fall in transport expenditure was further accentuated by a fall in priority of the transport programme in relation to government programmes as a whole. For instance the proportion of total public expenditure allocated to road,

public lighting, transport and communication programmes, fell from 6.12% in 1974 to 3.94% in 1978. When the decision was taken by the Secretary of State for the Environment to abandon the London motorway proposal he mentioned that the necessary funds for this purpose were unlikely to become available. The amount of Transport Supplementary Grant paid by the government also fell from 1976. For instance in London, between 1976-77 and 1978-79, the volume of the TSG paid to the GLC fell by 20% in real terms. The government contribution to the public transport revenue support subsidy was reduced in the same period. This illustrates the disdain of the government towards long-term commitments and their preference for easily contractable programmes which are adjustable to changes of priorities (Stott 1980: vi). When increases in the volume of public expenditure resumed, transport cuts were not made good and the growth of the transport programme proved to be slow compared to the average growth of all programmes.

We have seen that governments follow macro-economic objectives determining the distribution of resources between the private and public sectors, and that it is within the level of public expenditure set by these policies that the different governmental programmes are allocated funds. In addition, the level of funds allocated to each programme varies according to the priority given to it by the government at a given moment. It appeared that because of variations in the level of public expenditure resulting from shifts in macro-economic policies and because

of changes in the priority given to programmes, it is difficult to implement long-term policies. A brief review of macro-economic policies implemented between 1965 and 1980 and of changes in the priority given to the transport programme by the government has enabled us to see how transport schemes in London were formulated, modified and in many cases, dropped, according to anticiapted levels of funding from central government.

It seems at the outset of this section that while being the main focus of the transport debate, the GLC was limited in its possibilities of responding to pressures on transport matters by the prevailing jurisdictional and financial frame-work. We have seen that because of the deteriorating economic situation and of the macro-economic policies put forward by the central government in reaction to it, less funds were made available for transport matters in London and consequently, the GLC and the government were less able to respond to pressures for improvements of transport services. It is with this in mind that we shall now turn to a study of the external pressures on the GLC and the government around transport issues in London.

7.2 Transport related pressures on political decision-making

Having considered the transport responsibilities of the GLC and the jurisdictional and financial limits the Council faced

in the implementation of transport policies, we shall now turn to political pressures as a factor of policy implementation. We shall focus on the conditions political pressures must meet in order to influence decision-making. It will become apparent that the ability of a movement to meet these conditions depends to a large extent on the social class of its members. A consideration of these conditions will help to explain why lower income groups did not significantly influence transport decisions in London, and more generally, why they did not hold an important place in transport debates which took place between 1965 and 1980. We shall first discuss how the links between the state and society determine the conditions an action external to the state must fulfill in order to influence political decision-making. After this we shall focus more specifically on pressures related to urban transport. I shall introduce a typology of reasons for engaging in political actions based on urban transport issues. I shall go on to consider the conditions these actions had to fulfill in order to influence the GLC between 1965 and 1980 and show that while upper and middle class movements often fulfilled them, this was rarely the case of lower class movements.

The form of the state at any given moment is the result of successful actions by social groups attempting to shape it to their advantage. This form in turn determines the type of pressure which will have the greatest chance of influence on the state. Consequently it will contribute to the shaping of actions directed at the state because these actions will

seek to meet the conditions necessary to have an impact on political decision-making. However in some cases, pressures are directed at the framework of the state in order to change the conditions under which actions can have an effect on decision-making; in such cases groups attempt to create a context in which their demands are more likely to be effective (i.e. have an effect on the decision-making process). A successful action of this sort was conducted by anti-highway protest groups which were instrumental in changing the inquiry procedures in a way which meant that their participation in these inquiries was more likely to be effective. However in recent years such changes in the framework of the state have been very limited in scope.

The conditions an action must fulfill in order to influence political decision-making derive from the links with civil society which are inscribed in the form of the state itself: the electoral process and the state's dependence on resources created in the private sector of the economy. The effectiveness of a pressure is therefore linked to its potential electoral impact since political administrations seek to remain in power. It is also related to the likely economic consequences of the proposals advocated because these will affect the amounts of funds available to the state and because the economic situation influences the level of electoral support. We shall now turn to the consideration of the manner in which different movements focusing on transport related issues in London have fulfilled these conditions of effectiveness.

One can identify three categories of reasons for external groups (i.e. groups outside the organisation of the state) to exert political pressures on the GLC over transport matters. The first category is due to concern over the level and cost of transport services and their effect on accessibility patterns which in turn affect the possibilities of realising exchanges. Transport services consequently contribute to the determination of the ' life chances' of individuals. The second category of reasons for such pressures is related to the environmental impact transport has on urban activities and in particular on residential areas. The final category of reasons is that groups involved in the provision of transport services and infrastructures initiate actions to protect their own organisational interests. In this category we include the motor lobby constituted of road builders, car manufacturers, the oil companies, trade unions, transport concerns and government agencies.[5]

Individuals' and groups' conceptions of transport problems vary according to their interests in transport. What appears to them as problems are whatever run counter to their interest, and the solutions they propose to these problems seek to maximise their interest.[6] Each social group therefore has a distinctive definition of transport problems. These definitions are related to the groups' position in the social structure or to their association with organisations involved in the formulation and implementation of transport policies. The definitions of transport problems advocated by different social groups reflect contradictions inherent in the social structure and

more specifically the conflicts between organisations defending irreconcilable transport stands. For instance, the motor lobby in general and the British Road Federation in particular, defined problems in terms of road congestion and as they are committed to the unrestricted use of the car, promoted road building as a solution to these problems. The amenity societies on the other hand defined transport problems in terms of the environmental consequences associated with road traffic. Meanwhile the GLC elected members and planners often defined transport problems and solutions at the level of Greater London. This led to multiple objections to the local applications of the schemes they devised. For instance, the proposal for a speedbus scheme caused opposition among residents and traders along its proposed route.

Having identified the main categories of reasons for engaging in political pressures over urban transport issues and the conceptions of the 'transport problem' adopted by different social groups, we now discuss their effects. This will be done by referring firstly to the conditions of response of the state to their action arising from the argument about the selective receptivity of the state, secondly to the compatibility of the pressure groups' views with those of the ruling party and thirdly to the organisational capacity of the groups in question. These considerations will help us understand the reasons why there were relatively few actions by low income groups and why these actions were generally unsuccessful.

As we saw in our discussion of the selective receptivity of the state, elected members have an interest in the maintenance of the fiscal base of the authority with which they are associated and in their re-election. Hence they are likely to respond mainly to pressures which have corresponding characteristics; in other words, those pressures which are formulated so as to emphasise the positive electoral and economic impact of the solutions they propose while stressing the negative consequences of the present situation. For this reason there is an incentive for organisations to conceal their immediate interests in their demands and present themselves as reflecting the view of a large portion of the electorate or of economic interests. The groups which were the most able to formulate their claims in these terms were usually the most successful, whereas those which did not meet these conditions in their pressures, had little impact on the political scene.

As an illustration of this, we shall consider two examples: the road lobby and amenity societies. The road lobby based their case for increased road spending on the electoral impact of the increasing number of car owners and on the economic desirability of the road schemes. Thus the Automobile Association, the Royal Automobile Club and the British Road Federation (because of the affiliation of the motorists organisations to the Federation) consistently claimed to represent the views of millions of members.[7] Furthermore by taking a prominent part in the debate on each transport issue, by

making intensive use of advertising and by the distribution of leaflets, they attempted to influence the electorate and consequently, give more weight to the case they made. The motor lobby also based their argumentation regarding the indispensability of new roads and the need for unrestricted use of private transport on their definition of conditions underlying the functioning of economic concerns. For example in the mid 1970's when the GLC Labour administration put forward proposals for traffic restriction measures in central London, the motor lobby objected on the grounds that these measures would be detrimental to small firms, i.e. the most vulnerable firms.

Amenity societies also formulated their case in terms likely to have a political impact. Lowe emphasises the fact that they avoided projecting an image of small minorities acting purely in their own interest to safeguard their own environment and amenities. As he commented:

> "..the projected concern is also an essentially altruistic and dispassionate commitment to good planning and good design, and to the protection of various environmental features in the public or national interest rather than the preservation of local interests. (1977: 40)

Amenity societies thus widened the scope of their arguments in order to mobilise popular support and achieve a potential electoral impact. Non-elected public bodies with responsibilities for transport services used similar strategies. For example the BRB in their representations to the government for the allocation of more funds for the London Commuter Net-

work stressed its importance for the economy of central London. In addition, in the late 1970's and early 1980's, they attempted to gain the support of commuters for their proposals thereby giving these proposals a more obvious electoral impact.

The second factor explaining the response by elected members to external pressures is the extent of convergence between the demands being voiced and their party position, i.e. the principles underlying their appeal to the electorate.[8] Over the period considered the Greater London Labour party were committed to state expansion and to interventionist transport policies. Their policies particularily favoured social groups which benefited from redistributive measures and those involved in the operation of state agencies. The Conservative party on the other hand, were committed to market principles and to the support of the private sector of the economy. Their policies were more directly advantageous to the dominant groups in the private economy. These differences between the parties were reflected in their respective stands on transport matters between 1973 and 1980. The Labour party, which was preoccupied by the impact of road traffic on the environment, formulated proposals for the restriction of car circulation in central London and for a greater use of public transport. The Conservative party on the other hand, presented measures aimed at facilitating the use of private transport and in particular advocated the construction of new roads. Consequently, between 1973 and 1977, the Labour GLC was sympathetic to demands made by environmental groups while giving

little consideration to demands originating from the motor lobby. The Conservative administration which followed advocated transport principles in opposition in many respects with those of the previous Labour administration and paid attention to the principles asserted by the motor lobby. Hence demands related to transport issues originating from environmental groups were more likely to lead to a positive response from the Labour administration than from the Conservative one while the opposite was true in the case of demands originating from the motor lobby.

However for over five years, both parties had supported the PRN proposal. This can be explained by the fact that, in addition to the generally favourable attitude of the public to the PRN between 1965 and 1970 to which both parties were sensitive, the Labour party saw in the PRN an incentive to expand state agencies. Indeed the size of the agencies involved in the implementation of what would have been the largest scheme ever put forward in Britain, would have increased. On the other hand, the PRN would have constituted an occasion for the Conservatives to illustrate their belief that public expenditure should be used to support private consumption (in this case mainly car use and petrol) as well as to stimulate the economy in London by, in particular, improving accessibility for goods.

The final factor explaining the success of external pressures on the GLC is the pressure group's organisational capacity.

The chance of a 'group in itself' i.e. agents with similar interests in a matter, becoming a group 'for itself', i.e. a movement initiating actions to defend these interests, varies according to the social class of the agents involved. Thus while everyone has a stake in transport matters, not everyone took an important part in the London transport debate between 1965 and 1980. The non-existence of movements therefore has to be explained. The question which has to be asked is why some social agents act in defence of their interests related to transport matters while others fail to do so? And when movements do occur, we need to explain their differential effectiveness.

In the light of our understanding of transport related movements mainly aimed at the GLC during the 1965-1980 period, it would appear that most of the agents involved belonged to upper and middle income groups. This was particularily obvious in the case of amenity societies, of interest groups associated with the provision of transport services, and of the motor lobby and its member organisations. In fact as upper and middle income groups dominated both poles of the transport debate in London, they largely determined its course. It was their perception of transport problems and suggested solutions which confronted each other in the debate (Grant 1977: 33): the need to preserve the environment and limit the level of road traffic, and the need to accommodate the car and allow its free use. The higher level of mobilisation

of these income groups on transport related issues can be explained by their higher interest in environmental matters. This is due to the fact that members of upper and middle income groups choose their residential area and are therefore adamant it its defence. They are committed to maintain or enhance its positive characteristics. As Hindess writes:

> "Those who have made their choice have a right, so they believe, to expect that the various desirable features of the environment will be preserved or improved upon. Thus they have an interest in the general urban environment and in civic amenities." (1971: 74)

They are also motivated by a desire to preserve the symbolic characteristics of their neighbourhood which reflect upon their social status. This explains the major position occupied by environmental issues in the transport debate. Furthermore members of upper and middle income groups have a greater ability to organise political actions than members of lower classes because of their greater knowledge of the functioning of the state. Because of the resources they have at their disposal and because of their political knowledge, members of upper and middle income groups are often skilful at formulating their demands in terms which make them appear as relevant to politicians by transcending the narrow defence of the interests of their own groups. Movements initiated by these agents over the period considered, relied extensively on expert knowledge.

On the other hand, lower income groups show less interest in the defence of their neighbourhood (Lowe 1977: 46-7).

This can be accounted for by the small degree of choice of residential area they enjoy, by the relative absence of neighbourhood status to defend and by their greater concern with problems related to the cost and facilities of the house. In these circumstances amenity issues are less likely to be prominent. It is noticeable that access problems from which many lower income agents suffer because of their low level of car usage in a context of deteriorating public transport services and increasing fares, were not given much importance in the London transport debate. This seems to be attributable to the difficulties of mobilisation around accessibility issues compared to environmental issues. Accessibility issues offer fewer possibilities of meeting the people affected than environmental issues do. Furthermore they have less of an emotional and economic impact than do environmental issues for higher income groups. Lower income group agents also often suffer from an imperfect knowledge of the political system and more specifically of how they are affected by political issues. As Hindness (1971: 30, 61 and 151) emphasises in his study of the Labour party at the municipal level, low income groups participate less in political parties and in local societies. They also vote less.

Lower income groups, because of their poor level of political organisation and of the lack of resources available to them, rely less on experts than upper and middle class groups. The demands they make on the state are usually presented in

the narrowest terms. They therefore fail to emphasise the potential electoral and economic impact of demands they make. The transport demands from these groups, because they usually focused specifically on local issues, had little impact on the GLC. When directed at the Council, they usually took the form of local demonstrations and petitions.[9] A further factor explaining the relative dearth of transport related pressures emanating from low income groups is their past experience of failure in protest action. Indeed, most of their demands were not formulated in terms likely to elicit a positive response from elected members. Besides, the demands put forward by these groups were likely to involve some kind of redistribution which especially after 1975 ran against the principles of government public expenditure policies. (In contrast middle class amenity demands could often be met relatively cheaply.) For these reasons, lower income group demands were mostly rebuffed by state agencies.[10]

In conclusion, it would appear that transport debates in London primarily involved movements whose members belonged to upper and middle classes. This situation can be explained by the greater organisational capacity of these social classes. Movements related to upper and middle classes were the most likely to fulfill the conditions for effective action on the state: they were able to present their demands so they appeared to yield important positive electoral and economic impacts to politicians. These movements were therefore likely to influence political decision-making while those which did not fulfill

these conditions, usually failed to have any impact on such decisions. The selective receptivity of the state to external pressures is the result of successive actions by social groups aimed at making the state attentive to their interests at the expense of those of other social groups. It appears from the study of transport debates and policies in London between 1965 and 1980, that low income groups are largely unable to meet the conditions of an effective action on the state and are thus given relatively little consideration in the formulation of policies.

7.3 Processes internal to the state underlying the formulation and implementation of transport policies

Having considered how external pressures influence political decisions, we shall see how factors inherent in the organisation of the state have shaped transport policies in London. In particular we shall follow the impact of external pressures on different political instances. We shall pay attention to tensions between public authorities over transport issues in London. We shall see that these issues became an arena of conflict between levels of government as well as between elected bodies and other transport agencies. We shall also consider how the intervention capacity in transport matters by different levels of government were constrained as a result of cuts in public expenditure. The ability of levels of government to respond to demands from the public referring to transport

problems, was therefore severely limited. This will open the way to a discussion of the ability of the state to solve transport problems as defined subjectively by the population. I shall focus on the manner in which demands emerging from the population are integrated within the political discourse of elected members and how proposals presented in this discourse are sometimes implemented. But first we shall consider the motives leading planners to formulate large-scale transport proposals and the treatment given to these proposals by elected members. The purpose of this discussion will be to throw light on the reasons why, while many comprehensive transport proposals were formulated, few of them led to implementations.

7.3.1 The production of the planning discourse

A major feature of the transport debate in London during the period under consideration is that the comprehensive transport plans which had been drawn up were not implemented on any significant scale. This can partly be explained by considering the position of planners in the political decision-making process and their specific interests as an organisational group. The perspective adopted here differs from that developed by Hart (1976) in his study of transport planning in London. Hart focuses on the evolution of the form and methodology of planning which he defines in terms of stages. Planning is consequently at the centre of his preoccupations and he analyses how it is affected by influences external to

it: economic constraints and protest movements. He demonstrates how planning adapts to these influences. Hart's view assumes an implicit symbiosis between the planning process and political decision-making. This is so because he does not consider the interests of planners as a group and the nature of their relationship with elected members. While Hart thus examines the circumstances affecting the evolution of planning, because he does not adequately describe the relation between planners and elected members, he cannot throw light on the discrepancy between plans and realisations.

While attempting like Hart to identify the factors affecting the evolution of the methods and the themes of planning, Starkie (1976) adopts a different perspective. He places planning within a political context in which it is dependent upon politically defined objectives and a given availability of funds. He nevertheless acknowledges that a certain margin of autonomy is accorded to planners in that he attributes the evolution of planning methods and themes to the outcome of discussions among planners in response to external pressures. This explains according to Starkie, the imperfect correspondence between the evolution of planning methods and themes, and the evolution of the political context. Starkie therefore takes into account the relation between planners and elected members as well as the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the planners. He does not, however, consider the motivations orienting planners' behaviour within their margin of autonomy; consequently, he does not deal with the specific interests

of planners within organisational structures. I shall now focus on how the defence of these specific interests by planners can account for certain major features of transport plans prepared for London from World War II to the late 1970's. I shall also consider how these features contributed to the non-implementation of most of the proposals advocated by these plans.

Once they have defined a problem, elected members rely on planners to study it in detail and to propose solutions. This involves the use of quantitive models to assess the evolution of needs and the impact of the proposed solutions. For instance during the 1960's, transport problems were mostly defined at the political level in terms of increasing congestion and the solutions envisaged consisted largely of increases in road space. It was at this time that an urban transport planning procedure was adopted from the United States where it had already been applied in major cities' transport studies. This planning procedure consisted of a forecast of the increase in the level of car ownership and of road traffic mainly based on the experience of previous years. Because of the rapid acceleration in the increase of car ownership from the mid 1950's to the mid 1960's, such forecasts systematically underestimated this increase. However when the rate of increase started to fall, they overestimated the growth of car ownership. On the basis of these forecasts, schemes such as the PRN were proposed as solutions to the worsening traffic problems. This planning procedure also included quantitative justific-

ations of schemes by demonstrating the extent to which they would contribute to the relief of congestion. This form of planning procedure necessarily led to large scale highway proposals.

Because they benefit from the expansion of the agency in which they work by enjoying promotion and increased job security, planners will often try to promote their agency. For this reason planners have a tendency to devise large scale plans which are likely to result , if implemented, in an expansion of their agency. They therefore formulate proposals to the limit of the possibilities available within a given context. Thus in an unpredictable financial context or in a situation of economic growth and of an increasing volume of public expenditure, planners present large scale proposals. This was the case of the highway schemes proposed by Forshaw and Abercrombie during World War II and of the PRN proposal devised in the LTS and included in the Greater London Development Plan during the 1960's. Yet during the 1950's, when it became clear that the large sums expected for transport purposes in London during and after the war would not materialise, and during the 1970's, when public expenditure cuts annihilated the prospects of large schemes, plans failed to present proposals of a scale comparable to the ones put forward by Forshaw and Abercrombie or by the Greater London Development Plan. Plans prepared in the 1950's and the 1970's were also drawn up with attention to the likely availability

of funds. It is however notable that their proposals nevertheless constantly overshot the availability of funds.

Whereas planners produce a formalised discourse over relatively long periods of time presenting and justifying in an organised manner specific schemes, elements from this discourse are borrowed by elected members in their responses to public pressures. The commitment of elected members to the proposal of plans is thereby related to the electoral benefits they anticipate from the inclusion of these proposals in their political discourse or from their implementation. Consequently, when they loose faith in their electoral profitability, elected members abandon the proposals they extracted from plans.

Proposals are also dropped because changes in the economic climate no longer allow their implementation. It often happens that plans are out of touch with the economic and political context at the moment of their publication because the overall situation underlying the setting up of the planning process no longer prevails. This can be explained by the often long period of preparation necessary to plans and the fact that planners tend to come up with schemes on as large as possible a scale in relation to the initial directives they received from elected members (see Figure 7.3). For example the PRN proposal was dropped because of a change of administration at the GLC in 1973. The Labour party, largely influenced by the protest movements against the motorway proposals had taken power. The proposals were also abandoned because the availability of funds for their implementation was becoming increasingly unlikely. Because of these changes, the definition of

FIGURE 7.3

THE PLANNING CONTEXT



transport problems by the LTS and the solution it proposed (i.e. the PRN) were no longer relevant in the political and economic context of the 1970's. The GLC Labour party rejected the definition of transport problems in terms leading to the proposal of large scale road schemes, and public expenditure policies made the construction of such schemes seem impossible.

The level of influence of planners on decision-making on matters related to transport in London decreased through the 1970's. The greater role given to public participation was accompanied by a reduced influence of planners. This was particularily obvious during the Labour administration from 1973 to 1977. Instead of relying on an overall transport plan for London the Labour Council brought forward drafts of small scale schemes which they submitted to public consultation.

It would appear that one of the reasons why transport plans in London were not implemented is that, in formulating them, planners were pursuing their own organisational interests. They consequently proposed schemes on as large as possible a scale. These proposals were often abandoned because when published, they did not correspond to political priorities and because, as a result of changing economic conditions the funds necessary for their implementation were lacking.

7.3.2 Conflicts between public authorities over transport issues

Having considered conflictual relations between elected members and planners over transport issues within organisations, we shall now turn to conflicts between authorities over similar issues. Conflicts between authorities tend to occur because agents operating within them favour their expansion because of the career benefits such expansions can yield and because in some cases the expansion of one authority takes place at the expense of another.

Public authorities can pursue two forms of expansion: 'vertical' and 'horizontal'. A vertical expansion consists of the addition of new programmes within a given sphere of competence while a horizontal expansion involves an increase in the number of functions of a given body and therefore the widening of its sphere of competence. Such a widening of spheres of competence necessarily happens at the expense of other authorities which have to sacrifice some of their responsibilities. Redistributions of responsibilities between public authorities rarely take place in a smooth manner; conflicts usually rise between the authority trying to expand and the one (or ones) trying to preserve its jurisdiction.

During the 1965-80 period, the GLC often manifested an eagerness to expand in a vertical manner by actively promoting

large scale transport schemes. Both the Labour and Conservative parties put forward extensive transport programmes such as the Primary Road Network, a new tube line, tube extensions etc. The attempts to achieve a vertical expansion by the GLC through transport proposals constituted a basis for cooperation with other authorities which would also have benefited from the implementation of the proposals. This was true of the joint preparation by the GLC and the Ministry of Transport of the Primary Road Network proposal.

As we have seen, planners tended to promote expansion by devising schemes whose implementation would have been likely to lead to an expansion of the authority with which they were associated. In the case of elected authorities, these schemes were presented to politicians while in the case of non-elected bodies, they were often kept in reserve for whenever money became available. This was particularily true of London Transport and of British Rail which drew up banks of schemes in readiness for a more favourable financial context. Even in the very stringent financial conditions of 1980, the BRB came forward with a £380 million scheme consisting of a six mile tunnel through central London linking Victoria Station to Euston Station. The purpose of this scheme was to allow high speed trains from the North to reach the Continent if the Channel Tunnel were to be built, and to provide new facilities for commuters. The planners of this scheme even suggested possible sources of finance external to the BRB

and to the government.

The second form of expansion, horizontal expansion, occurs when authorities widen their sphere of influence. The expansion of one authority is accompanied by the contraction of another. Such expansions are therefore the source of conflicts because authorities are generally unwilling to undergo restrictions in their sphere of initiative. This was the case when the 1973-1977 Labour GLC were told by the government to diminish the level of the revenue subsidy they paid with their own funds to London Transport. The GLC protested vehemently. However after negotiations it was decided that they could freeze the subsidy instead of reducing it. The GLC were also jealous of their power in their relations with the boroughs. They refused to consult with the London Boroughs Association about the primary road proposals during the preparation of the LTS, preferring to discuss matters with individual boroughs. Meanwhile the GLC tried to expand their transport responsibilities at the expense of the BRB by advocating the takeover of the control of a part of the London Commuter Network. The BRB actively resisted this move.

An authority's will to expand (whether vertically or horizontally) can be accounted for by the desire of individuals to reap the benefits associated with being involved with a growing authority. Horizontal expansion can also be the result of attempts by an authority to pursue its priorities. This

pursuit can lead to conflicts with authorities having other priorities and the resolution of such conflicts can take the form of an expansion of the responsibilities of one authority at the expense of another. Each level of government is likely to adopt their own set of priorities because different parties - each with their own priorities - may hold power at different levels, because of the different functional responsibilities of each level of government, and because of variations in the social characteristics of the population according to the territory under the jurisdiction of an authority. As a result of these three factors, each level of government is subject to different pressures, respond to them in their own way, and therefore, pursue their own set of priorities.

It would appear that agents involved in public bodies with responsibilities for transport in London devised transport schemes in order to favour the expansion of their agency. It also appears that these agents tried to expand or when threatened, maintain, the jurisdiction of their agency over transport matters. The distribution of jurisdictions therefore became an arena of conflict between authorities with responsibilities for transport in London.

7.3.3 The loss of state initiative

Having considered how the relation between occupational groups within public bodies and the relation between public authorit-

ies have affected transport policies, we shall now pay attention to the manner in which these policies were affected by restrictions in funds allocated for transport purposes. We shall see how different instances involved in the formulation and implementation of transport policies as well as users of transport services were affected by these restrictions. In fact as we have seen in section 7.1, one of the main features of public policy in Britain throughout the 1970's was the restrictions imposed on the different spending programmes (and especially on transport programmes) by the Treasury.

Cuts in overall public expenditure aggravate the difficulties elected members face in responding to pressures for increases in services and for the redistribution of resources. Furthermore, in a context of contracting public spending, planners have to revise the schemes they devised directed at expanding the agencies with which they are associated. If they fail to do so, their plans will always be rejected on the grounds that they are impossible to implement. Such a situation necessarily leads to tensions in the state apparatus between the Treasury and the agencies devising and implementing sectoral policies and more specifically, local authorities. The repeated pleas from the GLC for more government funds to be allocated to their transport programmes attest to this tension.

Political discourse, like plans, tends to adapt itself to the state of the economy and to the funds likely to become available.

This is because proposals put forward without regard for economic constraints lack credibility. This is apparent in the case of transport proposals promoted by the GLC. The nature of the schemes advocated by the Council indicate its anticipation of the availability of funds for transport purposes. While in the 1960's and early 1970's, the Council promoted the very costly motorway proposals, between 1973 and 1977, they put forward small scale transport proposals. Even if after this period, the Conservative administration presented large scale road proposals in their fifteen year plan, they were of a far more modest nature than the PRN proposal.

A decline in the volume of public expenditure is likely to cause reductions in the standards of services provided by the state. Meanwhile, sectors of expenditure relying mainly on private spending are left either unaffected or only marginally affected by public expenditure cuts. The standards of the services related to these sectors of expenditure are likely either to maintain or improve their level. Cuts in public spending thus cause a redistribution of resources between the public and private sector in favour of the latter. Therefore it is those who depend on public services because they cannot afford to use private services who suffer most from the effects of cuts in public spending. This is particularily clear in the case of urban transport where state spending cuts affect the balance between public and private transport in a way

which is detrimental to those who rely on public transport. It can be said that the initiative of the different public authorities involved in transport matters contracted as a result of cuts in transport programmes imposed by the Treasury. As we will see in more detail in section 7.4, users were also affected by these restrictions.

7.3.4 The limits of the political response to transport problems

In the light of what has been said about the organisational and financial constraints public authorities had to face in the implementation of policies. I shall now deal with the capacity of public authorities to solve transport problems as defined by the public. I shall begin by discussing how situations related to transport come to be defined as problems by individuals and organisations. Afterwards, I shall consider what conditions such problems must fulfill in order to be given attention by elected members and lead to the implementation of solutions. The purpose of this discussion is to help explain why, while between 1965 and 1980 transport conditions in London deteriorated in many respects and a multiple of demands for improvements were made, relatively few important public authority interventions to improve transport took place.

To follow Collins and Pharoah (1974: 574) and ask whether any organisation could solve London's transport problems is a meaningless question because transport problems are defined according to the interests involved. What is a solution to a transport problem for one group or organisation is the source of a further problem for another. For example, the PRN would have solved transport problems for car users making orbital journeys (at least until such routes became saturated) but would have caused a deterioration of the environment for the residents living close to the motorways. The PRN would also have led to a worsening of the situation for users of public transport because the fall of patronage it would have caused would have resulted in lower levels of services. Thus what is presented as a 'neutral definition' of a transport problem in the political debate in fact refers to specific interests. The reason for putting forward such a neutral definition is often to obscure the specificity of interests underlying a given problem and thereby add weight to a demand by making it appear politically relevant because of potential widespread electoral support for it.

Two main perspectives on London transport problems have confronted each other between 1965 and 1980. Each perspective was presented as offering a 'neutral' definition of transport problems and a 'technical' solution to these problems. It is nevertheless clear that each perspective corresponds to a specific configuration of groups with voiced interests in transport matters in London. The first perspective is that

there is a need to accomodate traffic growth and that this growth is a consequence of economic expansion. The alternative to the accomodation of traffic was presented in terms of negative consequences to the economy, time losses for individuals, and negative environmental impacts. It was repeatedly argued that insufficient road investment could lead to a traffic thrombosis. This perspective was put forward by the motor lobby. It was also largely adopted by the first GLC Labour administration, and the two subsequent Conservative ones as well as by the planners involved in the preparation of the LTS and of the GLDP.

The second perspective is that the demand for transport is largely a function of the infrastructure and services available. Seen in this light, traffic growth is not inevitable but depends largely on the amount of road space available. Because new roads would make private transport cheaper and therefore lead to more and longer trips, they would lead to an overall increase in the level of traffic. New road schemes were opposed on this ground. The alternative to these schemes most often put forward was the promotion of public transport. It was argued that the environmental impact of public transport services was less destructive than the impact of private transport. This perspective was mainly adopted by amenity and environmental organisations as well as by the Greater London Labour party from 1971 onwards. The Conservative administration between 1977 and 1981, adopted

a position between the two perspectives. They were committed to road building mainly to support the economic life of the capital but took account of the actual and potential protest against such schemes.

While political parties respond to public pressures and consequently adapt their discourse to these pressures, this does not mean that trends in the implementation of policies necessarily follow changes in discourse. Political discourse is largely formulated to reap electoral benefits and can be relatively easily adapted to changes in the economic and political climate. On the other hand, the implementation of policies is governed by the availability of funds as well as by the forecast and actual reactions to the consequences of this implementation. Furthermore while political discourse can evolve fairly rapidly, it takes longer to modify policy trends because of the time necessary to devise and implement policies. This explains the gap between political discourse and actual policies. The authors of this discourse adopt definitions of problems and devise solutions which they are unable to implement in a given context. This may be due to changes in the conditions of implementation which take place between the moment the political discourse is formulated and the time when the realisation of schemes is considered. The discrepancy between the political discourse and conditions of implementation can also be attributed to a lack of knowledge of these conditions on the part of the authors of this discourse.

It would therefore seem that the production of political discourse and the implementation of policies are to a large extent different processes each responding to specific constraints. During the period considered, GLC's elected members have adopted definitions of transport problems and devised solutions with the assistance of planners, but implementation was prevented by the prevailing financial conditions and by the intensity of protest over specific schemes.

There appears to be a discrepancy in the scope covered by demands of individuals and non-state organisations in comparison with the scope covered by positions adopted by elected members and included in their political discourse. Only certain of these demands or certain of their aspects find their way into the political discourse. The implementation of transport policies represents a further contraction in scope in that only a few of the issues put forward in the discourse actually lead to the realisation of schemes. In fact if one could place at one end transport policies and at the other end, problems as subjectively experienced by individuals, a wide gap would appear. This is because before it is implemented in a policy, a subjectively defined transport problem must go through several stages. At each of these stages, it runs the risk of being dropped or altered beyond recognition. Such a problem must firstly be formulated in terms likely to appear relevant to elected members and must be advocated by an organisation able to exert pressure on the state effectively.

Secondly, it must be adopted by elected members and thirdly, it must lead to the formulation of solutions with the assistance of planners. Then, if conditions are favourable, a scheme can be implemented in response to the problem (see Figure 7.4). As we have seen, between 1965 and 1980, mainly because of cuts in the funds made available by the government for transport purposes, the conditions of implementation of expensive transport policies in London became increasingly unfavourable.

To conclude, it would appear that in order to lead to the implementation of solutions by a public authority, subjectively defined transport problems must go through a series of stages. At each of these stages the original definition is likely to be dropped or to be altered (i.e. certain of its aspects being preserved and others rejected). As only few of subjectively felt transport problems are embodied in solutions, this raises the question of the ability of public authorities to solve transport problems as experienced by the public. In the case of London, many definitions of problems, each one necessitating major interventions by the public authorities, confronted each other over the 1965-1980 period. However during this period, public authority interventions aimed at solving transport problems remained relatively modest in spite of the adoption of large scale schemes by the GLC. We have seen in this section that demands emerging from the public must be filtered through processes inherent to the organisation of the state and that responses to these problems are subjected to the financial constraints deriving from

FIGURE 7.4

THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN TRANSPORT PROBLEMS AND POLICIES



public expenditure policies. These responses are also subjected to conflicts between public authorities. It appears that the same could be said of proposals formulated by planners.

7.4 The impact of transport policies on social groups

Having considered the factors which underlie the formulation and implementation of transport policies we turn to the study of the effects of these policies. In this section we shall outline the evolution of trends in urban transport and their relation to the policies which were implemented between 1965 and 1980; we shall also consider the impact of these trends on different social groups. We shall see that there were two main kinds of effects: those related to accessibility and those related to the environment. It will be shown that the main trends over the period under consideration and more specifically in the most recent years, were a consequence of a fall in public expenditure on transport. I shall demonstrate that the main effect of this situation was a steep increase in public transport fares which contributed to reductions in patronage and consequently, in services. I shall also consider trends in land use and show that the decentralisation of jobs and population are gradually leading to a distribution of activities favourable to the use of private transport. After this, we shall focus more specifically on the effect of the emerging transport and land use pattern on different social groups. I shall argue that those who suffer the most seriously

from this new pattern are the low income groups who are also those who have least impact on policies.

7.4.1 The nature of the impact of transport policies

I shall now set out the manner in which I shall proceed to study the impacts of transport policies. After considering existing methods of assessing transport policies, I shall present an alternative method focusing on the effect of these policies on accessibility.

The effects of transport policies on social agents in the urban environment are of two kinds: effects on accessibility to activities and environmental effects. Firstly, the principle underlying the existence of cities is agglomeration, which, by improving accessibility facilitates the performance of easily repeatable exchanges. Hence, in this context the size and configuration of urban areas are affected by transport systems. Access to transport services is also a major factor in the determination of the potential activities available to an individual. Consequently, changes in such access and in the nature of transport systems lead to changes in the range and number of activities physically accessible to a given individual. Of course, physical accessibility is only one of the conditions influencing accessibility to activities, the other being social accessibility. The accessibility of an activity is the result of the superimposition of these two conditions.

Secondly, transport systems also influence the pursuit of activities through their environmental impact. Working conditions and especially living conditions can be seriously affected by disturbances caused by transport. The environmental consequences of transport systems affecting residential areas can also affect the social status of neighbourhoods.

In order to measure the impact of transport policy on accessibility we need to go beyond existing methods. The prevailing methods used to assess consequences of transport policies have mostly taken the form of elasticity and value of time studies. Their character is due to the purpose for which they were developed, namely, the desire of public transport operators to predict the impact of changes in levels of fares and services on patronage, and the evaluation of the return on transport infrastructure schemes. On the other hand, another existing method, activity studies, provides a way of assessing the impact of changes in transport services on the accessibility of individuals. These studies start from the limited amount of time available to individuals in their pursuit of daily activities, and demonstrate that the number of activities an individual can engage in and the location of these activities are largely determined by the time spent travelling to them.

However to determine the territory and individual can cover on a regular basis, one must take into account, along with

travelling time, the cost of transport involved. The relation between variations in costs of transport and of the time taken by given journeys, and the finite amount of time and money individuals and social groups have at their disposal, leads the way to a study of the range of accessibility provided by different transport systems. The object of such a perspective, because it deals with the number of activities individuals and social groups can reach, differs from that of elasticity and value of time studies which are mainly concerned with the effects of changes in fares and services on the level of patronage.

The study of the effects of transport policies also involves a consideration of their environmental impact. One manner of assessing this impact can consist of evaluating traffic flows and the capacity of specific areas for accomodating these flows according to the physical characteristics of these areas and the nature of the activities located within their bounds. The consideration of the features of an area is important in the evaluation of the environmental impacts of traffic because important flows will have different consequences according to whether an area is adapted to such flows or not. For example environmental nuisance associated with high levels of traffic is more severe in inner city neighbourhoods than along a motorway surrounded by industrial sites.

I shall now not only consider how changes in costs and time involved in urban transport affect patterns of activities accessible within given amounts of time and money, I shall also focus on how responses to these changes, i.e. variations in levels of patronage and in land use, bear in turn on these patterns of activities.

7.4.2 The relation between transport policies and transport trends

There is a need to assess and forecast the impact of transport policies because they affect the conditions of use of different transport modes and therefore the cost in time and in money terms the traveller has to face. These changes in cost influence the decisions made by individuals about engaging in trip-making as well as about the choice of mode and destination which determine transport trends.

In fact, transport trends are the result of an interaction between policies and responses to them. In turn, individual decisions have an effect on the conditions of travel on the different transport modes by determining the level of their usage. Consequently, given these changes, further political decisions have to be taken to adapt the different modes of transport to changes in their respective level of demand. There is therefore an interaction between transport policies

and transport trends. Furthermore, because of this interaction between transport policies and trends which result from the sum of individual decisions, cases can arise where the initial objectives of a political decision are not attained. In certain cases because of the unrelated decisions of large numbers of individuals in reaction to a policy, its effects may be the opposite of those intended. This process is what Boudon (1979) refers to as 'unintended effects'. This applies, for example, when a road is built to increase traffic speed, relieve congestion and reduce the environmental impact of traffic on parallel routes. As road transport is made cheaper in terms of time by the opening of this road, travellers may switch from public to private transport and choose destinations further along the road. The road then becomes congested, speed falls and the level of traffic on parallel routes may remain unchanged because of the increase in the use of private transport produced by the new road.

It therefore becomes apparent that transport trends are not only a consequence of transport policies but, rather, that there is an interaction between these policies and individual decisions relating to the use of transport. The ability of levels of the state to influence transport trends is thus not automatic since the desired pattern of use may not be met due to the sum of individual decisions. Consequently, it can happen that the results of policies implemented in response to pressures applied by an organisation in defence of specific

interests can contradict these interests. Policies nevertheless have considerable influence on transport trends in that they contribute to the establishment of the context within which individual decisions are taken.

It appears that time and cost involved in transport are influenced by policies as well as by the aggregate impact of individual decisions which lead to trends. These trends are at once a consequence of policies and a context in which individual decisions and further policies are taken. I shall now outline transport trends in London between 1965 and 1980.

7.4.3 Transport trends : 1965-1980

Because of the importance of the effects of transport trends on conditions of transport and therefore on the extent of the territory individuals can reach within a given time and sum of money, I shall review the major transport trends in London between 1965 and 1980. I shall pay special attention to the manner in which the costs and services of different modes varied in order to consider in a subsequent section how users of different modes were affected by these trends and how they reacted to them.

As a result of public expenditure policies and of changes in the priority given to transport programmes, transport policies

were, particularly from the mid 1970's onwards, affected by a decline in the availability of public funds. This affected the level of investment in transport infrastructure in London and the level of the revenue subsidy paid to London Transport. In these circumstances, public transport was placed in a particularly disadvantageous position since throughout the 1970's its labour intensiveness led to steep increases in working expenses. This problem was accentuated by the difficulty of recruiting staff. Thus between 1970 and 1980, London Transport costs per vehicle mile (bus and underground) increased by 52.7% in real terms while the cost per passenger mile grew by 79.4%. It has proved very difficult to improve productivity on these services as the largely unsuccessful attempts of the Conservative Council between 1977 and 1981 have shown (see Figure 7.5). The British Railways Board faced the same problem on the London Commuter Network. In the Board's annex to the 1976-1981 GLC Transport Policies and Programme document (BRB 1975: 82 para. 15), they stressed that commuter services suffered more than other sectors from inflation because they were hit by above average increases in the cost of steel, construction and labour.

These large increases in LT and BR commuter services costs contributed to place public transport in London in an unfavourable position towards private transport as regards costs. The balance between increases in the costs of private and public transport moved in favour of the latter during the 1974 oil crisis. This can be explained by the lower consumption

Figure 7.5 London Transport working expenses (£ million 1975 prices)

	Total	Working expenses/ car mile (£)	Working expenses/ passenger mile (£)
1970	228.1	0.55	0.034
1971	235.3	0.56	0.035
1972	240.4	0.58	0.036
1973	246.0	0.62	0.036
1974	267.2	0.72	0.042
1975	308.4	0.79	0.051
1976	324.2	0.82	0.057
1977	312.5	0.79	0.055
1978	309.8	0.79	0.055
1979	324.3	0.81	0.059
1980	323.2	0.84	0.061
% change over 10 yrs.	+41.7%	+52,7%	+79.4%

Source: London Transport Annual Reports 1970-80

of energy per passenger on public transport. However this greater energy efficiency was soon counteracted by steep increases in the cost of labour. Indeed labour has a greater impact than energy on the running costs of public transport services. The advantage of public over private transport stemming from a more productive use of energy in terms of passenger miles per unit of energy in a period of increasing petrol costs was to be diluted by the overall cost increases on public transport (Hutchinson 1980: 8). The effect of this situation combined with decreasing support from public funds, has been that public transport fares have increased faster than car running costs. For instance, while petrol prices rose in real terms by 11% between 1965 and 1979, London Transport bus fares increased by 35% and underground fares by 62.3% over the same period (Standing Conference on London and South East Regional Planning 1981: Appendix 10) (see Figure 7.6). Also, between 1953 and 1976, the real cost of new and used car purchase dropped by 20% (Tanner 1979: Table 12).

The increasing cost of public transport in London was accompanied by reductions in the level of services. For instance between 1970 and 1980, bus miles run decreased by 13% dropping from 199 million miles to 173 million miles. In addition these services had to run at increasingly slow speeds because of road congestion.

Increases in public transport fares contributed to reduct-

Figure 7.6 Passenger transport consumer cost indices 1975 = 100

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Purchase of motor vehicles	48	48	48	51	53	57	61	64	67	79	100	117	141	164		209
Running cost of motor vehicles																
Petrol and oil	35	36	39	41	45	46	48	50	53	75	100	106	112	106		181
Motor vehicle and driving licences	47	50	50	58	72	72	72	72	72	72	100	114	135	143		162
Expenditure on public transport																
Rail	38	40	41	42	45	49	57	64	68	75	100	131	153	172		237
Bus and coach	38	39.3	41	43	46	52	61	65	68	76	100	125	141	160		198
All public transport				48	50	53	61	63	68	78	100	123	141	154		
All transport and travel	42	49	46	47	50	53	58	60	64	78	100	115	132	143		
All consumer expenditure on goods and services	45	46	47	49	52	55	60	64	69	81	100	116	133	144		188

Source: DOT (1977b, 1979b, 1981)

ions in the level of patronage. The overall elasticity to public transport fare increases in London (i.e. changes in levels of patronage as a consequence of fare increases) has been estimated at approximately -0.3 with a slightly lower figure for peak travel (Daly and Zachary 1977: 22) (see Figure 7.7). Bus services showed a higher elasticity than the underground. Another factor affecting the level of elasticity is the availability of a car. On London Transport buses, the elasticity to fare increases is -0.41 for those who have the use of a car while this level falls to -0.1 for the others (Collins and Lindsay 1972: 181). On the other hand, reductions of fares in real terms have led to an increase in patronage on LT services. During the fare freeze of 1973 and 1974, for each 1% increase in the retail price index, it has been estimated that the number of passengers grew by approximately 0.35%. It therefore seems that the level of elasticity to reductions in fares is broadly similar to the level of elasticity to increases in fares (Fairhurst and Morris 1973). The conditions of public transport services also influence their patronage. In a study of public transport services in seven cities of the United Kingdom reported by the International Collaborative Study of the Factors Affecting Public Transport Patronage (1980: 140 Table 8.7) it was discovered that the elasticity to increases of walking time was -0.14, of waiting time, -0.63 and of in-vehicle time, -0.45. It can therefore be deduced that reductions in services leading to increasing journey times would cause serious reductions in patronage levels. It was even considered that the aspect of underground stations had an

Figure 7.7 Fare elasticities by time period, London Transport

Bus	Weekday	Off-peak*	Peak	Overall*
Direct elasticity+	-0.32	-0.37	-0.27	-0.33
Transfer component‡	-0.11	-0.11	-0.11	-0.11
Rail				
Direct elasticity+	-0.14	-0.25	-0.1	-0.16
Transfer component‡	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2

* including weekend operations
\+ assuming both bus and rail fares are increased in the same proportion
‡ extra effect if absolute costs on other public transport modes remain constant

Source: International Collaborative Study ... (1980: Table 7.7)

effect, though minor, on their level of use (Bradley et al. 1977).

The drop in public transport patronage during the period under consideration took place against a background of rising car ownership and car use. Bly et al.(1980: 2) estimated that about half of the decline in the volume of bus passengers could be attributed to an increase in car ownership while the other half was due to higher fares and poorer services. Not only did car running costs increase from 1965 to 1980, at a slower rate than public transport fares but, it has been estimated that when a monetary value is allocated to time, cars offer better value than buses at short and medium distances even if fares are totally eliminated (see Figure 7.8). Consequently the share of the car (and the van) of the total mileage travelled in London increased between 1965 to 1975-76 from 25% to 44% (DOE 1979: 23 Table 2).

The decreasing level of public transport services is not only due to subsidy and investment policies, it is also a consequence of decisions made by individuals in the light of the state of the services in different modes of transport and the possibility of choosing alternative locations in the pursuit of their activities. The interaction of policies and individual decisions can set off a spiral of decline of public transport. Higher fares lead to a drop in patronage which in turn causes reductions in services and further fare increases. In addition, former public transport users turn to the private car which causes congestion problems, seriously

Figure 7.8 Generalised costs (in terms of time and money) of travel for the journey to work

	Generalised cost of travel (pence) for journeys of:		
	2 km	5 km	15 km
Car (excluding parking)	14	24	57
Bus	44	55	91
Bus (if fares were eliminated)	35	39	53

Source: Bly et al. 80 p.5 Table 1.

hampering bus services. In the longer term, land uses become adapted to increases in car use. A land use characterised by a lower density of activities emerges. Such a pattern, in accordance with the needs of the car, causes serious difficulties for public transport services. Changes of this nature in land use patterns thereby exacerbate the reduction in public transport patronage and lead to further increases in fares and to a further deterioration in services.

As the level of car ownership has increased, albeit at a slower pace in recent years, the car has become in more cases, available as an alternative to public transport. There is a high income elasticity for car ownership, i.e. as incomes increase so does car ownership. The elasticity of car use to increases in the cost of petrol varies according to trip purposes. According to a study by Lewis (1977: 167), the level of this elasticity varies from -0.04 at peak time to -0.36 on Sundays. However real increases in petrol prices have been relatively modest over the period considered. Car use has thus been little affected over the long run by these increases especially since public transport fares were rising at a much faster rate. Also in many cases, car users are sheltered to varying extents from the cost of possessing and running their car by contributions from their employer (Standing Conference on London and South East Regional Planning 1981: 13 para. 60). This applies particularily to the use of the car for trips to work in central London. Cann et al. (1979) have estimated that only 31.2% of such journeys were not subsidised in any

way by employers (see Figure 7.9).

In conclusion, it appears that transport trends in London between 1965 and 1980 have been favourable to car users in relation to public transport users. In spite of big increases in the cost of petrol, costs associated with car use have increased at a slower pace than public transport fares. We shall go on to see how recent land use patterns which are adapted to a growth in car use have themselves contributed to an increase of this growth.

7.4.4 The relation between land use patterns and transport systems

We shall now consider the manner in which land use is influenced by transport trends and how in return, land use has an impact on transport. We shall see how the spread of car use and the higher cost of public transport have contributed to a decline in population and jobs in London. We shall in turn consider how the use of different transport modes was modified as a result of this decline. It will be shown that decentralisation of jobs and drops in population density can be related to a reduction in the use of public transport and an increase in the use of the car.

According to the perspective developed in Chapter One, two

Figure 7.9 Central London terminating journeys - financial and other assistance given

Type of help for work trips - percentage	
Company car provided for own use	24.1
Parking space provided	47.5
Company pool car used	2.9
Parking changes paid	13.9
Mileage allowance given	11.1
Maintenance costs met	11.0
Other	1.8
No help given	31.2

Source: Carr et al. (1979)

Brown (1981: Table 37)

different considerations affect the location of activities in an urban context. Firstly, along with the principle of agglomeration underlying the existence of cities, activities (e.g. work places, households, stores, etc.) need to be able to carry out easily exchanges with other activities with which they are interrelated. Secondly, in the process of residential choice, amenity is usually defined in terms of land consumption. In addition, the availability of large amounts of land can be favourable to other activities such as commerce and industry. Hence in an urban context, a trade-off between a desire to have easy access to other activities and a desire to use as much space as possible necessarily takes place. The conditions in which this trade-off occurs are determined by the characteristics of available transport systems. For instance, if transport is slow and costly, activities will locate close to each other in order to minimise their reliance on transport. In such a situation, space consumption would be reduced to a minimum. On the other hand, if transport is fast and cheap, activities will tend to use more space. The density of land occupation in an urban area is therefore influenced by the range of accessibility provided by transport systems.

The spread of the use of private motorised transport has altered the balance between accessibility and space consumption that had been achieved when public transport was dominant. This is due to the fact that, in terms of generalised costs,

travel by private transport is now cheaper than by public transport, i.e. for a given cost, one can travel further by the former than by the latter. This has contributed to a dispersal of activities and hence to urban sprawl.

One can also trace land use consequences specific to the increase in public transport fares and the reduction in services. These have led many previous public transport users to switch to private transport thereby accentuating the increase in the use of this mode. Meanwhile those who were 'captive' users of public transport because of their low incomes or because their activities were located in areas which were difficult to reach by car have continued to use it. Public transport trends have had an influence on the distribution of activities. Increasing fares led to a shortening of work trips and thus to a greater proximity between jobs and residences or to relocations of activities to areas where private transport can easily be accomodated. The International Collaborative Study on the Factors Affecting Public Transport Patronage (1980: 180-1) described three categories of likely effects of higher transport costs on commuter activity locations.

1. Commuters maintain their activity patterns (i.e. job, home, etc.) and pay higher travel costs. In the other two categories, it is assumed that commuters will offset increases in transport costs by reorganising their activities in a way that allows them to travel shorter distances.
2. As it is usually easier to change jobs than to change

residence, the commuters find employment in the outer suburbs, cutting their travel costs. In relation to this, jobs are relocated following key workers.

3. Finally in cases where jobs are located in areas which are difficult to reach by private transport and where they are not likely to decentralise, commuters may move closer to the centre.

These tendencies were illustrated by a study of the reaction of Hertfordshire commuters to fare increases on the London Commuter Network services (Johnson and Nash 1982). According to preliminary results of this study, some commuters obtain jobs locally and cease to commute and a small number keep jobs in the centre while changing their mode of transport. In an earlier paper the same authors discovered that among those who stopped using rail services, 75% diverted to car or motorcycle, three quarters of whom took jobs out of London (Johnson and Nash 1981: Table 17). These authors anticipated that in the long-run, new commuters are likely to live closer to central London.

Another type of effect of transport on land use occurs through its environmental impacts. Road traffic contributes to the deterioration of the environment. In London, this effect has been especially severe in the inner areas which are often not adapted to high levels of motorisation. Undoubtedly, this has contributed to the decline of inner London and in particular to its loss of population. The deterioration of the environment was quoted along with poor housing conditions

by Vickerman (1980) as the two major factors underlying decisions to move out of inner London.

As a result of the decentralisation of population and employment, which has, as we have just seen, resulted partly from variations in costs and service levels of different modes of transport and from environmental consequences of transport systems, the population and the number of jobs in London has declined. This decline in population and jobs in London is relevant to an understanding of transport trends in the capital because it is to a large extent a consequence of these trends and because at the same time, it has a major influence on them. Between 1961 and 1971, the volume of employment declined by 12.3% in central London and by 25.5% in inner London. The scale of this reduction decreased as the distance from inner London increased. In the remainder of the conurbation, the number of jobs declined by 7.9% while in the Outer Metropolitan area, it grew by 2.5%. This reduction caused a drop in the density of employment in London. For instance between 1966 and 1971, up to a distance of 22 km from the centre, in 2 km radii, drops in density of between 21.5% and 2.2% were registered (except between 12 and 14 km where an increase of 1.6% occurred) (Khaw 1979: 416). More recently, the growth in office space was more accentuated in Greater London (excluding central London) where it grew by 15.2% between 1974 and 1979 than in central London where it increased by 5.8%. Similarily, over the same period, this growth was

greater in the rest of the South East region where it reached 31.9%, than in Greater London (Brown 1981:Table 43). These trends were reflected in the level of the use of transport. For instance, total commuting towards central London dropped by 14.9% between 1966 and 1979 (see Figure 7.10).

The reduction of employment was accompanied by a decline of population. Between 1966 and 1979, the population of Greater London dropped by nearly one million from 7,810,000 to 6,877,000 (see Figure 7.11). This decrease occurred mostly in densely populated areas. Between 1966 and 1976, the inner London boroughs lost 16% of their inhabitants while the drop was of 3.6% for the outer London boroughs (Palmer and Gleave 1981: 178). Consequently the steepest drop in population density occurred in the first 8 km from the centre (Khaw 1979: 416) (see Figure 7.12). However as Gordon et al. observe (1982: 30 Table 2.2) the out migration from London has dropped in recent years from 118,200 in 1973-74 to 41,400 in 1979-80 (see Figure 7.13). These authors attribute this decrease not so much to the economic recession, because other regions of Britain did not follow these trends as to the low rate of house building around London and increases in the cost of commuting since 1974 (Gordon et al. 1982: 34-6). It also appears that in recent years, because of increasing commuting cost by public transport, people working in central London, where the car cannot easily be used as a substitute to public transport, have avoided stretching the length and there-

Figure 7.10 : Central London commuting by mode

'000 people

	1966	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
BRITISH RAIL	463.9			468.1		443.3	432.6	449.9	448.5	447.8	429.2	424.9
of which:												
from inside GLA	302.0			282.1		246.3	230.8	240.9	242.1	248.4	239.3	237.9
from outside GLA	161.9			186.0		197.0	201.8	209.0	206.4	199.4	189.9	187.0
LT RAIL (1)	416.1	405.3	386.7	385.3	381.0	369.8	374.8	343.6	316.0	320.0	324.8	343.1
LT BUS (1)	174.9	156.7	152.4	145.6	143.9	143.9	143.0	148.0	150.7	139.4	133.0	112.3
PRIVATE CAR	42.6	44.2	47.1	48.8	51.6	52.1	50.9	48.6	49.5	51.0	52.8	51.8
MOTOR CYCLE (1)	16.7	10.3	10.2	8.8	10.0	10.7	9.9	13.8	16.4	15.4	17.0	15.1
PEDAL CYCLE (1)	7.0	4.5	4.5	2.9	2.8	3.5	3.3	5.1	5.9	6.4	7.0	7.2
TOTAL	1121.2											954.4

Note : (1) peak period (7.00 - 10.00) arrivals at central London;

Source: Brown 1981, Table 39.

FIGURE 7.11

CHANGES IN DENSITIES OF WORKPLACES AND HOMES IN LONDON : 1966-1971.



SOURCE : KHAW ; TABLE 1 AND 2.

Figure 7.12 : Home population by area

'000

	1966	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Central London Area (1)		1784.9	1737.6	1698.7	1662.3	1633.8	1608.9	1584.0	1559.8	1551.1
Remainder of GLA		5656.1	5615.6	5577.9	5522.4	5479.1	5428.6	5386.1	5358.2	5326.0
GLA	7810	7441.0	7353.2	7276.6	7184.7	7112.9	7037.5	6970.1	6918.0	6877.1
Rest of South East	8908	9551.8	9652.6	9719.7	9746.5	9774.5	9823.0	9863.4	9913.9	9980.4
South East Total	**16719**	**16992.8**	**17005.8**	**16996.3**	**16931.2**	**16887.4**	**16860.5**	**16833.5**	**16831.9**	**16857.5**

Source: Brown 1981, Table 40.

Figure 7.13: Net civilian migration estimates in the GLC area 1971-1980.

	GLC Area	Inner London
1971-2	-117.6	
1972-3	-95.9	
1973-4	-118.2	
1974-5	-75.6	-36.7
1975-6	-71.4	-51.5
1976-7	-67.5	-38.4
1977-8	-54.0	-31.2
1978-9	-56.6	-30.7
1979-80	-41.4	-21.8

Source: OPCS annual estimates of population change, in Gordon et al. 1982, Table 2.2.

fore the cost of their work journey by moving further out. In addition one could mention a lower level of job creation in the outer Metropolitan area and the outer South East than in previous periods causing employees to remain in proximity to their present job. It would thus appear that there is an interrelation between population and employment movements. One follows the other according to the opportunities offered by transport systems.

An understanding of the impact of transport on land use necessarily calls for an analysis of the impact of land use on transport because they mutually influence each other.

Figure 7.14



Source: International Collaborative Study of the Factors Affecting Transport Patronage (1980: 56).

The decentralisation of jobs from central and inner London has led to increases in the use of private transport for trips to work and as a corollary, to reductions in public transport patronage. In one case, the movement of a central London office to Lewisham, caused 50% of its personnel to shift from

public to private transport (Damesick 1982). In studies of traffic generation of central and outer London (Croydon, Ealing and Enfield) offices, it was found that employees of the suburban offices lived closer to work and that 46.8% of them relied on private transport to get there while this proportion was only 8.7% in the case of the staff of central London offices. On the other hand, while 87.7% of the employees of central London offices used public transport to get to work, only 39% of suburban office personnel relied on this mode of transport (Townsley 1973: Table 4.1; Holloway 1974: Table 3.4). The increase in car use for trips to work away from central London in the case of office employment applies to every sector of employment. In 1971, 12.4% of persons employed in central London used a car to get to work while this proportion was 36.9% for those employed in outer London and 48.3% in the case of the outer Metropolitan area workers (see Figure 7.15).

Consequently it would appear that the trend towards employment decentralisation in London and its region was responsible for an increase in the use of the car for trips to work and therefore for a drop in the use of public transport for this purpose. This is due to the fact that public transport services in London are largely radially oriented and focus mainly on central London. This means that they are less adapted for journeys to non-central employment locations. On the other hand the use of the car is much more efficient in non-central

Figure 7.15 Journeys to work by area of workplace and mode

Mode	Central London	rest of GLA	GLA	OMA	OSE	SEPR total
BR	35.4	9.3	17.5	3.2	0.6	10.3
LT tube	29.6	3.9	12.1	0.3	-	6.5
bus	15.7	24.7	21.9	16.8	18.9	19.9
car	12.4	36.9	29.1	48.3	48.2	38.1
motor/pedal cycle	1.3	4.2	3.3	8.3	12.7	6.5
on foot/none	5.6	21.0	16.2	23.1	19.5	18.7
all modes	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Brown (1981)

Note: Journeys made by people living and working in SEPR only. The areas are as defined before the 1974 Local Authority reorganisation. The BR/LT split was estimated using traffic census data and the Long Distance Travel Survey

locations because of lower levels of congestion and a road system catering for large amounts of traffic. The private car has a considerable advantage over public transport in terms of generalised costs (in terms of time and money) for access to non-central employment. In addition the congestion which might result from the increase in the use of the car associated with the decentralisation of employment is alleviated by the very dispersal of this employment.

The density of population in residential areas has an effect on both the choice of modes of transport and on the distance travelled. For instance, in high density areas, because activities are concentrated many of them are accessible within a short distance. Furthermore, such areas usually enjoy a high level of public transport services associated with difficulties in using the car because of road congestion and parking problems due to shortage of space. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the use of public transport services is three times greater in high density than in low density urban areas. This same relationship applies to walking: in residential areas of between 2.5 to 5 persons to an acre, an average of 19.1 minutes per person per day is spent walking while this average is 32.6 minutes in areas of more than 50 persons per acre (Daor and Goodwin 1976: 11 Table 8). The growth in car travel is almost linear with increasing distance from central London. Likewise, the highest proportion of non-car owning households can be found within a radius of 2 km from the centre. In 1971, this proportion was 72% (Khaw 1979: 420

Figure 6). Consequently, the dispersal of employment and the fall in population in Greater London leading to a fall in the density of residential areas, sap some of public transport's markets in London. These trends therefore contribute to poorer services and higher fares (Wagon 1978) (see Figure 7.16).

Thus there is good evidence that the interaction between land use and transport trends in the London region between 1965 and 1980 has led to a fall in the density of employment and an increase in the use of private transport. This increase, in spite of limited investment in new roads in London, has not led to the dangerous increase in congestion that would have resulted if this increase had not been accompanied by a dispersal of activities. In the case of journeys to work, the result of the decentralisation of employment is "a more complex pattern of journeys to smaller and more dispersed employment centres" (OPCS 1976: 12).

London has, however, been less affected by the increase of travel by private transport than if the PRN had been built. It is likley that the existence of the motorways would have encouraged an acceleration of the defection of users of public transport to the car and a decline in the density of employment and population. This decline would have been accentuated by a significant reduction in the attractiveness of areas not adpated to the easy accomodation of the car, and by a proportional increase in the attractiveness of areas adapted to high levels of use of private transport. In other words, the pattern of

FIGURE 7.16
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DECENTRALISATION OF WORKPLACES AND SUBURBANISATION AND PUBLIC TRANSPORT USE



SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATIVE STUDY OF THE FACTORS AFFECTING PUBLIC TRANSPORT PATRONAGE 1980; FIGURE 1.2.

activities would have adjusted to a significant increase in the reliance on the car. Nevertheless a strong concentration of activities in central London related to the dense public transport network would have probably been maintained.

Also, in London and its region, few new commercial centres adapted to a clientele using cars, sprang up compared with large provincial cities. The development of such centres in London would have caused an increase in the use of cars for shopping purposes [11] and could have led to a desertion of high streets. The number of stores on the high streets would have declined and the range of opportunities available to non-car users would therefore have diminished.

I have introduced here two types of effects which changes in transport trends have on land use: effects related to modifications in accessibility and effects related to the environmental impact of transport systems. It became apparent that increases in car use and steep rises in public transport fares contributed to a drop of population density (though at a lower rate in recent years) and a decentralisation of employment. In turn, changes in the distribution of activities in the London area have contributed to increases in the use of private transport at the expense of public transport which has been losing some of its previous markets. We shall see in the next section what has been the impact on different social groups of this increase in the use of private transport which was combined with falls in the density of activities in London and drops

in public transport patronage.

7.4.5 The social effects of transport trends

In order to attempt to measure the social impact of transport policies and trends in London between 1965 and 1980, we shall now try to relate to specific social groups what has been said about changes in transport services and costs and about the environmental effects of transport systems on different areas. We shall see that since the use of transport modes differs between specific social groups, the impact of changes in the level of service and in the cost of a mode also varies according to these groups. We shall see that the main factors influencing the evolution of transport in London over the period under consideration were: a big drop in the availability of public funds, increases in the use of private transport and changes in the distribution of activities. Similarily, since residential areas tend to be socially segregated, once the areas of London which were the most seriously affected by the negative environmental impacts of transport systems have been defined, it will be easy to deduce which social groups suffered the most from these impacts. We shall see that low income groups suffered disproportionately from recent transport trends in London in that, because of steep increases in public transport fares, the territory accessible to them on a regular basis shrank, and because, since they tend to live in inner London, they suffered from high levels of traffic in areas not adapted to

catering for such levels.

The effects of the decline in government spending on urban transport must be considered in the light of the balance between public and private expenditure prevailing for the different modes of transport. As the government implement cuts in public expenditure and especially in spending on urban transport, public transport suffers disproportionately because reductions in levels of subsidy are immediately translated into higher fares and deteriorating services. This in turn leads to reductions in patronage accentuating the need for higher fares and deteriorating services. On the other hand, car travel is little affected by cuts in public expenditure because the initial cost and the running cost of the car are borne privately by individuals and/or by companies. Car travel is thus sheltered from cuts in government spending much more than the use of public transport. This can also be seen in terms of the different areas covered by public spending in the two modes. In the case of public transport, this includes the infrastructure (rail and road), rolling stock and operation, whereas for cars, the equipment and the operation cost is borne privately while the infrastructure is provided by the state. Yet if an increase of car use occurs as a result of private expenditure without a proportional addition of road space because of limits on public expenditure, serious levels

of congestion may occur leading to a deterioration in the conditions of car use. However, as we have seen, because increases in car use in London have been modest in recent years, and as this growth has been accompanied by a dispersal of activities throughout the London region, it has not led to a serious worsening of road congestion.

Not only have public transport services suffered from a starvation from public funds, but they have also experienced a drop in private spending. Between 1965 and 1979, consumer expenditure on bus and coach services in Great Britain fell in real terms by 34.9%. Meanwhile, expenditure on the purchase of new and second hand cars and motorcycles grew by 75.6% (see Figure 7.17). Thus captive public transport users experienced a deterioration of services because less money from public as well as private sources was spent on them. In the mean time, the use of private transport spread as increasing levels of consumer expenditure were directed towards this purpose. Consequently, those who relied on private transport were less affected by the decline of state spending on transport.

Changes in levels of services of different modes have a social significance because there is a high correlation between the use of a mode of transport and socio-economic status. For instance, in 1975-76, 93% of professionals enjoyed the availability of a car while this proportion dropped to 23% for unskilled workers (see Figure 7.18). Similarily, journeys by

Figure 7.17 Consumer expenditure on transport
(1975 prices £ m.)

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Motor cars/motor cycles new and second hand	1,675	1.669	1,804	1,921	1535	1,759	2,345	2,811	2,668	1,820	1,810	2,010	1,856	2,372	2,551	2,942
Petrol and oil	1,202	1,347	1,421	1,577	1,805	1,886	1,952	2,176	2,349	2,277	2,232	2,370	2,392	2,455	2,481	2,430
Running cost Motor vehicle and driving licence	373	415	459	479	312	336	347	362	378	372	400	403	404	424	426	
Rail travel	439	435	431	423	456	475	464	454	471	470	454	424	436	457	473	
Bus and coach travel	1046	1016	986	958	921	863	827	828	840	830	802	761	733	693	680	

Source:(CSO 1973: Table 317; CSO 1980: Table 4.7)

Figure 7.18

Households: percentage with a car or a van available by socio-economic group of head of household in Great Britain 1975-76

	Percentage of households with	
	one or more cars or vans	two or more cars or vans
Employers and managers	85	28
Professional	93	32
Clerical	60	8
Manual		
Supervisors	66	13
Skilled	56	6
Semi-skilled	38	4
Unskilled	23	3
Own account workers and farmers	81	28
Unoccupied and students	16	2
All groups	54	11

Source: Department of Transport (1979A: Table 2.7)

car and by rail increase with income and with status (DOR 1979a: Table 4.7, 4.9). Factors explaining the use of transport such as gender, age, size of household, density of the residential area, etc. are also correlated with the level of use of specific modes of transport. However their causal effect is largely derived from the level of income. For instance, lower incomes are associated with high density living in inner city areas where activities are close to each other and where high levels of public transport services are usually offered. In these circumstances, trips are shorter and rely more on public transport than in other urban areas. Three main groups of factors, often superimposed upon one another, therefore seem to have an effect on the usage of the different modes of transport: demographic, socio-economic and geographical factors (Willmott 1973).

Different styles of urban life prevail which are the result of the inter-relation between income, modes of transport and density of activities. To simplify, two polar patterns can be identified. On the one hand, low income groups residing in high density areas, travel short distances and make extensive use of public transport and more specifically, of the bus. On the other hand, higher income groups living in low density areas, travel longer distances and rely mostly on the car. Because of the relation existing between urban areas, modes of transport and social groups, one can make a rough attempt to determine how specific groups are affected by transport policies and trends.

Overall household expenditure on all modes of transport increases with income. For instance spending on public transport was in 1975-76, 1.8 times higher for households with revenues of £7.500 per annum than for those earning £750. This distribution of expenditure on public transport was often used as an argument against the payment of revenue subsidies on the grounds that they would benefit mostly high income groups. The relationship between income and transport expenditure is however much greater in the case of private transport. In 1975-76, households earning £7,500 spent five times more money on private transport than households earning £750 (Tanner 1979: Table 2). Transport usage, measured in terms of time spent travelling, of each mode of transport also increases with the level of income. While in 1975-76, the variation was modest in the case of walking, cycling and the use of public transport services, there was an increase of 4.5 times in the use of private transport between households earning £750 a year and those earning £7,500 (Tanner 1979: Table 2). Similarily, the overall mileage travelled increased according to income (DOT 1979a: Table 4.10).

Therefore, the higher a household's income, the larger the range of activities among which an individual can choose as a result of the extent of his physical accessibility, consequently, the wider the use of facilities he can enjoy. This applies in particular to car owners who travel on average longer distances to get to work. They can thus achieve a better balance between residential amenity and accessibility to

a chosen job. Car owners also travel longer distances for shopping trips which means they can take advantage of a greater choice of outlets. They perform more active sports, are more involved in recreational and cultural activities, and enjoy more leisure activities such as outings to restaurants and to theatres. They furthermore, meet more often with friends and relatives and travel longer distances than others to do so (Willmott 1973: 11-9; DOT 1979a: Table 9.3) (see Figure 7.19). Overall they make more trips than non-car owners.

Non-car owners and especially those belonging to low income groups, have suffered from increases in public transport fares and poorer services. The adaptation to this situation seems to have taken the form of a drop in the usage of public transport services and on London buses, more specifically, of a decline in the distances travelled. While the elasticity to fare increases in the number of trips on London Transport buses is four times lower for non-car owners than for car owners, the elasticity measured in terms of distances travelled is of -0.38 for non-car owners while it is of only -0.21 for car owners (Collins and Lindsay 1972). One might thus conclude that in response to fare rises, many captive public transport users rearrange their pattern of activities replacing activities located at a certain distance by closer ones. The range of activities among which they can choose is then constricted. They become restricted in their frequently repeated trips to a smaller area. There is also some evidence that increases in fares and deteriorating public transport services have led to more walking. Between

Figure 7.19: Journey purpose by stage mode of transport* in Great Britain 1975/76

(a) Households without cars or vans Percentage

	To and from work	In course of work	Education	Shopping and personal business	Eating and drinking	Social	Entertainment and watching sport	Day trips and sport participation	Holidays	Escort and other	All purposes	Number of stages in sample (000's)
Public transport:												
Rail	4	5	1	1	–	1	1	1	8	1	*2	*3·5*
Local bus	23	14	15	22	12	23	21	10	17	8	20	*37·7*
Works/school bus	2	3	4	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	*1·8*
Other public transport	1	1	–	1	2	2	2	1	8	–	1	*1·8*
All public transport	30	22	20	24	14	26	25	13	32	9	24	*44·7*
Private transport:												
Car or van:												
Driver	1	9	–	–	1	1	–	1	1	4	1	*1·4*
Passenger	8	19	2	5	14	13	12	9	23	4	8	*14·5*
Motor cycle	2	3	–	1	–	1	–	1	1	–	1	*1·8*
Bicycle	7	6	3	3	1	2	2	3	1	1	4	*6·5*
Walk (over 50 yards)	53	42	76	67	69	57	60	73	41	81	62	*115·3*
Other private transport	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	1	1	–	–	*0·7*
All private transport	70	78	80	76	86	74	75	87	68	91	76	*140·1*
All modes	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Number of stages in sample (000's)	*47·1*	*2·5*	*15·7*	*59·5*	*6·0*	*28·4*	*8·7*	*10·5*	*2·7*	*3·9*		*184·9*
Number of persons in sample												*9,769*

* Stage refers to a journey made on one mode of transport. A trip to a given destination may include several stages.

Figure 7.19 (contin.)

(b) Households with car(s) or van(s)

Percentage

Public transport:												
Rail	4	2	1	1	–	–	1	1	3	–	2	*5·8*
Local bus	8	1	10	6	2	5	6	3	4	1	6	*22·8*
Works/school bus	1	–	7	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	1	*4·4*
Other public transport	–	1	–	–	1	–	1	1	2	–	–	*1·4*
All public transport	13	4	18	7	3	5	9	4	10	1	9	*34·3*
Private transport:												
Car or van:												
Driver	44	71	1	29	37	37	27	18	24	66	34	*131·0*
Passenger	10	6	13	20	23	30	32	24	40	10	18	*70·2*
Motor cycle	1	1	–	–	–	1	1	–	1	–	1	*2·7*
Bicycle	3	1	4	2	–	2	2	4	–	1	2	*9·4*
Walk (over 50 yards)	29	17	62	41	35	25	29	49	24	22	35	*135·6*
Other private transport	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	1	–	–	*1·9*
All private transport	87	96	81	93	97	95	91	96	90	99	91	*350·0*
All modes	100	100	99	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Number of stages in sample (000's)	*94·1*	*16·5*	*41·1*	*98·3*	*10·2*	*56·5*	*14·9*	*25·1*	*5·4*	*22·2*		*384·3*
Number of persons in sample												*16,726*

Source: DOT 1979a, Table 4.12.

1965 and 1975-76, for households with no car available, the proportion of the totality of trips which were walk trips of over one mile, grew from 16.5% to 23.5%. In the meantime, this proportion only increased from 8.7% to 9.6% for households with a car available. The effect of the increase in fares and of poorer public transport services was accentuated by a drop in the density of population and of activities in general in urban areas and particularly in inner cities. Thus not only did the range of physical accessibility diminish for many public transport captive users but the number of activities within a given physical range also declined.

Consequently it appears that the gap between the accessibility potential of lower and upper income groups and more generally, between car and non-car users, has widened over the last fifteen years or so. This means that while the number of activities upper income groups can reach within what appears for them an acceptable transport cost mostly remained stable or even in some cases, increased, the number of activities lower income groups can reach, diminished. Therefore one of the major social consequences of transport policies and trends in London between 1965 and 1980 is that, because of increasing costs and difficulties of access, in some cases, activities were dropped by lower income individuals, and that in other cases, lower income individuals had to content themselves with a more limited choice of possibilities in relation to the location of their basic activities such as work and shopping.

Therefore lower income groups were the main victims of transport trends in London; members of these groups often had to reorganise their life in order to avoid having to pay an increasingly high proportion of their income on frequently repeated urban journeys. In fact everyone - but more dramatically low income individuals - suffered from a reduction of their scope of possibilities as a consequence of increasing transport costs: on the one hand, for those who decided to avoid these increases by cutting the length of their trips, the number of activities within their reach shrunk, on the other hand, for those who decided to maintain their accessible territory, they had less money to spend on other items.

As well as effects on accessibility, transport trends also have environmental impacts. The nature and gravity of these impacts is very variable between specific areas. For instance traffic nuisance is worse in densely built areas. In these areas, noise associated with road traffic is intense because of numerous stops and starts caused by a closely knit road pattern, and because of the reverberation of sound caused by the proximity of buildings to roads (Jones 1976: 155-62). Also the level of exhaust emission from vehicles is higher in conditions of congestion. The environmental impact of traffic is thus worse in inner London, especially in the so-called "gluepot" area surrounding central London. The area between one and six miles from the centre of London suffers from the highest level of traffic in the capital. In this area, there is on average on a daily basis, 5,000 car passenger kilometers per kilometer of road (Orrom and Wright 1976: Figure 11).

Meanwhile, the proportion of the totality of trips of the residents of this area which is done by car varies between 11% and 17% which is the lowest in London (Orron and Wright 1976: Table 2). Consequently, residents of inner London and more specifically low income groups living in this area, suffer from environmental consequences of road traffic while themselves enjoying a low level of car use. They thus endure the environmental impact of car users originating mainly from other areas.

Low income groups were more severely affected by the negative consequences of transport policies and trends than other income groups. This was so because they often could not escape from the deterioration of public transport standards and the increases in fares by changing modes and because they could not escape negative environmental effects of road traffic by moving to other residential areas. They were thus not able, in most cases, to compensate for the adverse effects of transport policies and trends on them, through individual decisions. In addition, these groups were less able to influence political decisions than other groups. This can be explained by the fact that it was more difficult for them to claim that the problems they put forward and the solutions they proposed had an economic impact. Low income group agents in fact have little control over decisions made by economic concerns. Their limited influence over political decisions is also due to their relative lack of voting power

and the inadequate formulation and promotion of their position to the relevant levels of government.

Even if they had not suffered from these shortcomings, pressures emanating from low income groups would have had a limited effect on the prevailing transport situation. An authority sympathetic to their view would have had to formulate policies within the available funds and organisational arrangements prevailing between it and the other competent agencies. They would also have had to take into account the likely electoral and economic impact of the action of well organised lobbies objecting to policies favourable to low income groups because they clashed with the interests such lobbies represented. For example, policies and proposals favourable to low-income groups put forward by the Labour GLC administration during their 1973-77 mandate had to be dropped because of the lack of funds and because of the opposition they provoked. The proposal to abolish public transport fares was abandoned because of the absence of the sums necessary to make good the loss in revenue. Later, the freeze on public transport fares had to be lifted because of cuts in the government's contribution to the public transport revenue subsidy and because of specific ministerial directives to do so. The proposals to restrict the use of private transport were abandoned largely because of the well organised opposition of the motor lobby and commercial interests. Even if, in spite of all these obstacles, major transport policies favourable to low income groups had been implemented, their impact on trends could have been seriously

diminished by the effect of the sum of individual decisions relating to transport.

Yet other social groups have proved able to influence transport policies to preserve their interest. The case of the commuters using the British Rail London and South East services and largely consisting of upper income groups (Dodgson 1976) is particularly clear in this respect. By an efficient parliamentary action, they managed to prevent the cancellation of the grant paid by the government towards these services. Different administrations had announced in 1968, 1970, 1971 and 1976 their intention of ending their financial contribution to the London commuter services and in particular, to services in the rest of the South East region (excluding Greater London). Unlike movements related to low income groups, commuters'claims about the economic consequences of their position and to their electoral impacts were taken seriously by the government largely because they were put forward by an efficient lobby. The arguments on which the commuters' representatives based their case for the maintenance of the government subsidy were the negative consequences on the economy of central London and the electoral reaction in the commuter belt, the withdrawal of this subsidy would cause.

As we have seen, the impact of transport policies and trends on different income groups can be deduced from the fact that the level of income determines to a large extent the use of different transport modes and the choice of a residential

area. Hence, consequences of changes in conditions of transport on different modes and the environmental impact of transport on different areas can be related to specific income groups. In addition, it appeared that level of income determined the gravity with which changes in conditions of transport and in particular, in the cost of transport, were felt by individuals. It became obvious that lower income groups were the ones which suffered the most from changes in transport conditions in London. This is due to the fact that most low income individuals depend mainly on public transport and that, unlike the cost of using a motorcar, public transport fares rose steeply. Also because low income groups tend to live in areas which have experienced the biggest increases in traffic levels i.e. inner London neighbourhoods, they suffered a serious environmental deterioration in their residential areas because of the intensity of road traffic. Low income groups were disproportionally affected by the evolution of transport in London because they were largely unable to escape negative transport trends through their own actions and because their political initiatives to obtain interventions from public bodies leading to reorientations of transport trends were relatively few and unsuccessful.

We have focused in section 7.4 on the effects of transport policies on individual transport related decisions and on land use patterns, and more specifically, on how different social groups are affected by these policies. It has become apparent that in order to measure the impact of transport

policies on land use and on social groups, they must be taken into consideration along with transport trends which are the result of a multitude of unrelated individual transport decisions. We have seen that trends are at once a consequence of policies, in that they are influenced by the transport context they create, and a factor influencing policies because when public bodies make decisions on transport matters, they must consider trends. The transport trends which have been considered in this section were the level of patronage of one mode compared to another and the importance of traffic flows. This is because, along with subsidy, traffic control and road building policies, these trends had a major influence upon the cost and the level of service of different modes of transport and upon the environmental impact of road transport.

We have seen that transport trends in London between 1965 and 1980 have largely constituted a reaction to a decline in the availability of public funds for transport purposes. The major effect of this decline was a steep increase in public transport fares and a reduction in levels of services. Individuals responded to this situation by reducing their use of public transport services, thereby placing public transport operators in an even more difficult situation. In the case of public transport, trends therefore accentuated the effect of policies. Meanwhile costs associated with the purchase and use of a car were not affected by this drop of public spending on transport and, partly as a result of this, the

level of car use grew on roads which were not already severely affected by congestion. The increased reliance on the motor-car and higher public transport fares had an influence on the recent evolution of land use patterns characterised by a decline in population and job density. We have observed how, in turn, these changes in land use caused a greater use of the car and consequently, a drop in public transport patronage.

It became obvious in this section, that low income groups suffered the most acutely from transport policies in London between 1965 and 1980 and from the trends associated with these policies. Members of these groups were faced with the choice of undergoing an important loss of purchasing power as a result of having to spend more on public transport or a reduction of the urban territory they can cover on a regular basis if they refused paying an increasing proportion of their income on transport. The gap between the scope of the urban territory accessible to higher and lower income groups increased as a result of transport policies. While the number of activities higher income groups in the London region could reach on a regular basis was either maintained or increased over the fifteen years from 1965 to 1980, the number of activities lower income groups could reach decreased. Thus members of these latter groups had to choose as this period progressed, among fewer commercial outlets, possible jobs, recreational activities, etc.
Lower income groups also suffered disproportionately from the negative environmental impact of transport because their

residential areas cater for large volumes of road transport while not being adapted to such volumes of traffic.

It became clear in this light that a major effect of transport policies in London over the period covered here, has been to worsen in a significant manner, living conditions of lower income groups. These groups were affected disproportionally by transport policies because of the difficulty their members often met in switching modes and because of the fact that fare increases on public transport represented a higher proportion of their income than they did in the case of other groups. It can therefore be said that a concrete effect of public expenditure policies which restrained the government budgetary envelope with the aim of counteracting economic problems was with respect to urban transport in London, to contribute to the worsening of living conditions of low income groups. In this case, public expenditure policies turned out to be socially unjust in that they were an important factor in the widening of the accessibility gap between upper and lower income groups. The same thing can be said of decisions leading to changes of priorities in public expenditure which have meant that, in relation to the totality of public expenditure, relatively less public money was spent on transport, and of planning decisions which have allowed the emergence of a land use pattern adapted more to the car than to public transport.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have attempted to explain the behaviour of the different agents involved in the formulation and implementation of transport policies in London between 1965 and 1980 as well as in the debate which accompanied these policies. This was done by referring to hypotheses presented in the first three chapters. The basic perspective we have adopted is that groups of individuals try to maximise their interests within any institution. They consequently seek to alter the distribution of resources in their favour and this is the cause of conflicts between social groups. The study of the political process underlying the formulation and implementation of transport policies in London has allowed us to conclude that the prevailing institutional structure favoured certain social groups at the expense of others. The analysis of the social impacts of the transport policies in London confirmed this socially segregative effect.

It has become apparent through the pages of this chapter that, in their transport decisions, groups involved in the operation of the state responded in a conflictual manner, i.e. each according to their own organisational interests, to two major factors: to increasingly powerful social pressures against the building of new roads and to reductions in the level of public expenditure. In other words, it was the reaction of elected members to these two factors which to a large extent

shaped transport policies in London. We have also seen that low income groups were disproportionally affected by negative aspects of transport policies. This led to the conclusion that the social groups which were the least able to put effective pressure on elected members and which were the least able to make choices about the mode of transport they use, were the ones which suffered the most from transport policies and trends. The recent history of transport policies in London thereby illustrated the perspective on the state developed in Chapter Two which stressed the dependence of the state on resources generated in the private sector of the economy and on popular support taking the concrete form of a majority of votes at election time.

More precisely, we have seen in this chapter that the distribution of responsibilities and funds between levels of government, made it very difficult to tackle transport problems in London. Indeed, the GLC was the focus of most demands related to transport in London but this authority had neither the jurisdiction nor the funds to allow it to intervene in transport matters in a significant way. This situation deteriorated further as a result of cuts in public expenditure which affected transport spending in a disproportionate manner. We saw how, within these bounds, elected bodies could only respond in a very limited manner to pressures emanating from individuals and non-state organisations. After this, we turned to the manner in which factors related to the organ-

isation of the state influenced public authority responses to transport problems. I showed that conflicts between planners and elected members as well as between different public authorities could account for many features of transport proposals put forward in London over the period under consideration. In addition, we saw that the position of the state in society, the prevailing organisation of public bodies, and tensions between groups within these bodies, made it difficult for the state to solve transport problems as subjectively felt by individuals and groups of individuals. In the last section of this chapter, we focused on the effects of transport policies and trends on different social groups. We saw that the effect of the policies implemented over the period under consideration was in many cases reinforced by the trends which resulted from the adaptation of transport users to the policies. It also became clear that the evolution of land use patterns was largely influenced by these policies and by these trends. I have argued in this last section that low income groups suffered the most from the negative effects of transport policies and trends between 1965 and 1980. I have singled out these effects as the main social consequences of transport policies in London over this fifteen year period.

The main points which can be raised in the light of the considerations of this chapter are that:

Firstly the main factor underlying the relation between

public bodies has been the interest of agents in the expansion of the authority in which they work. This contributed to the proposal of large scale programmes within the respective competence of the different authorities and to attempts to expand their responsibilities at the expense of other authorities. These attempts have caused serious tensions between authorities.

Secondly the public expenditure policies implemented by the government in the face of a deteriorating economic situation represented a major factor limiting the ability of the GLC to implement the transport policies they had wished. The macro-economic policy followed by the government leading to public expenditure cuts, consisted largely of limiting state spending in order to release funds to facilitate the expansion of the private sector which includes most of the productive, i.e. profit making activities. As the state depends largely on resources generated in the private sector, it has at stake to stimulate the expansion of this sector. In order to attain their macro-economic objectives, the government have imposed spending limits on local authorities. This tendency was accentuated towards the end of the 1970's. Consequently, sectors under public jurisdiction have often been starved of funds. This was accompanied by a loss of initiative on the part of the groups associated to the state; because of their very limited opportunities for expansion, the scope of their decision-making contracted. They thus had little possibility of responding to demands emanating from individuals or organ-

isations.

Thirdly the relation between the state and the civil society in industrialised Western countries means that governments respond to pressures formulated in terms which emphasise their economic and electoral impact. This axiom had an important effect on the nature of the transport debate in London. Demands related to transport matters were largely formulated in terms which made them appear relevant to elected members. This had the effect of widening their scope and thereby obscuring the interests of the groups formulating these demands. It was therefore difficult to decipher the specific interests involved because they were veiled by a discourse formulated with the intention of having an impact on the state.

Fourthly the main arena of the debates on transport matters in London was the GLC. This was so because the political parties confronting each other within the Council put forward transport proposals to attract electoral support. As a result of this, pressures were directed towards these parties to change the stands they had taken on transport issues. Greater London parties in consideration of electoral benefits and of their basic orientation, adopted their own set of priorities. These parties however ran into difficulties in the implementation of their priorities because of the limits of the jurisdictions of the GLC and of the government's imposition of their own priorities and more specifically,

of their expenditure policies. The GLC also had to face strong public opposition to many proposals making it electorally hazardous to implement them.

Fifthly, the ability of the GLC to influence the transport situation in London was further limited by the gap between transport policies and transport trends emanating from the multitude of individuals' decisions concerning transport. These decisions taken in the light of transport policies, also depended on the prevailing economic situation and land use patterns. The correspondence between transport policies and trends was far from perfect. Individuals' reactions to transport policies varied according to the mode of transport concerned and the nature of the policy. For instance, the reaction to cuts in transport expenditure was different in the case of public transport than in the case of private transport. Public transport was seriously affected by such cuts. It was plunged into a decline as reductions in the level of subsidies caused an increase in fares and a deterioration of services which led to a decrease of patronage. This decrease in usage further accentuated the effects of the fall in subsidies. Private transport on the other hand was less affected by cuts in state spending on transport. This is due to the fact that expenditure on private transport emanates largely from companies and consumers and is thus not directly affected by such cuts except by increases in congestion if road building is slow in periods of traffic

growth.

Sixthly, the study of transport proposals and policies in London over the period covered here, revealed the existence of a gulf between political discourse and implementations. This can be attributed to the fact that politicians attempted to mobilise the electorate and responded to pressures by adopting transport objectives. Elected members then relied on planners to elaborate along these objectives the definition of transport needs and to devise solutions to them. Planners expanded to the maximum the scope offered to them by elected members and proposed schemes on as large as possible a scale. These schemes whether in line with the political discourse or not, often clashed with the prevailing capacities for implementation which depended on the functional competence of the authority and the financial means available. Another factor frustrating the implementation of proposals put forward in the political discourse was the intensity of local reactions to specific schemes. For instance, in the case of road construction and improvement as well as of traffic measures, London is literally in a stalemate situation. This is because an improvement in one area nearly always means a deterioration in another one and consequently raises local objections.

Seventhly, the gulf between political discourse and implementations is only one in a series of obstacles separating transport

problems as subjectively felt by individuals from transport policies. Such problems first have to be formulated in a way which will attract the attention of elected members. They must then be promoted by organisations able to carry out an efficient action aimed at the government. Elected members will adopt definitions of transport problems raised by individuals and organisations only when they feel that these definitions can advance their economic and electoral interests. Finally, if conditions of implementation are favourable i.e. if enough funds are available and if there is a sufficient level of electoral support, transport policies bringing about a solution to these problems might go ahead. However, not only can the original definition of the problems be abandoned at each stage but it can also be altered so that the definition leading to the formulation of policies might bear very little resemblance with the one at the origin of the process.

Eighthly, it appeared that organisations supported by upper and middle classes have a greater ability than the others to formulate demands and set actions which appear relevant to elected members. They therefore occupied the foreground of the transport debate in London over the period under consideration. The two main positions which confronted each other through the debate could in fact be related to the interests of upper and middle classes. Lower classes did not organise as much and their actions yielded less impact on elected members. Their ability to influence policies in their favour was therefore relatively small.

Ninethly, transport policies were affected throughout the period, but more specifically after the mid 1970's, by a scarcity of funds. The impact of this was especially seriously felt on public transport services. Over a background of rising costs, low levels of subsidies have caused fare increases and poorer services. The impact of this on transport trends has been a fall in public transport usage accompanied by an increase in the volume of travel by car. This increase has had a severe environmental impact especially in areas less adapted to private transport such as inner London. Furthermore, the pattern of land use has gradually adapted to the spread of the use of the car. The density of activities has fallen, causing difficulties in many cases for adequate public transport services. In these circumstances, low income groups, because they enjoy less choice in the use of transport modes or in their residential locations than other groups, suffered the most from these transport policies and trends. They sustained a decline in the number of activities physically accessible to them. This is because the territory which can be covered by repeated journeys within their means has contracted as a result of increases in the generalised cost of transport. This situation can also be attributed to a decline in the number of activities within given areas. In addition, low income groups, because they tend to reside in inner London, suffered disproportionally from the environmental impact of traffic because of the high levels of traffic roaring in their neighbourhoods through streets which were not meant to cater

for such flows.

Tenthly, it has been seen that the groups which suffered the most from the transport policies and the transport trends were also those which had the least impact in shaping policies. The question to be asked is then: if these groups had been able to influence transport policies what would have been the consequences? It is likely that if these groups had directed efficient pressures towards the GLC, this would have led to the payment of higher subsidies to public transport largely from the Council's own funds, and to traffic restraint measures protecting the environment in badly affected areas of inner London. The impact of these pressures would have had to have been great enough to overcome the action of the groups with whose interests these measures would have clashed and to lead the GLC to promote them against government directives. However even in the case of a maximum effort of the GLC in favour of the interest of low income groups, they would still have remained disadvantaged because of the relatively modest impact the GLC's transport policies have on transport trends in London.

Conclusion

In this conclusion we shall review the progression of the arguments of the thesis and underline the main points which have been raised. After this, we shall focus on recent developments, i.e. after 1980, in London transport policies and consider whether they can be explained in the light of the conclusions reached form our our study of transport policies in London between 1965 and 1980, or whether they constitute a modification of previous trends. Attention will mostly be given to the 1981 London Transport fare cut implemented by the Labour GLC and to the decision of the Law Lords which declared this GLC policy ultra vires. Finally, I shall discuss different possible options which could lead to the easing of transport problems in London as defined in the thesis. I shall assess the likelihood of implementation of each of these options in the present political and economic climate.

Overview of the thesis

The thesis was divided into three parts. In Part I, we have reviewed the literature on topics relevant to the object of the thesis and developed the perspective which underlay the choice and the organisation of the emprirical data discussed in Part II. In the third part of the thesis, we applied this perspective to enable us to focus on the interests shaping transport policies and the effect of these policies on the population.

Part One consisted of the first three chapter. In Chapter One, I reviewed the way in which different authors had conceptualised

the city. This led to the elaboration of my definition of the city emphasising the interdependence between activities in urban areas. This definition which bears similarities with definitions put forward by Remy and O.P. Williams centres on the notion of accessibility and thereby emphasises the importance of urban transport systems.

In Chapter Two, I discussed some of the recent developments in the theory of the state focusing on its form and function, and on the process of emergence of political issues. This opened the way to a discussion of the position of the state in society and in particular, of how its position determines its response to pressures from individuals and organisations. We argued that the state responds only to pressures which might cause serious economic and electoral consequences. It was suggested that the overall capacity for intervention of the state in society is restricted by the need to maintain political support from the population and by the limited avilability of resources.

Chapter Three was devoted to a discussion of the major currents in urban transport planning. We saw that in the 1950's and 1960's a planning procedure was developed whose purpose was largely to formulate and justify large scale road schemes. We also observed how this procedure gradually became redundant as, from the late 1960's onwards, the emerging economic and political context made the construction of major road schemes less likely. In contrast to prevailing work in transport planning, I emphasised the need to consider how the accessibility potential of individuals is affected by changes

in transport conditions. This provided a framework in which the impact of transport policy decisions could be assessed primarily in terms of their effects on social equity.

Part Two of the thesis documented changing transport policy in the London region. It comprised three chapters. Chapter Four provided an historical background to the 1965-1980 period. This was necessary in order to show the influence of major past decisions concerning transport in London - especially since most of the transport infrastructures in London date from before 1965. The political decisions in the 1965-1980 period, related to transport in London, were often about the management of existing infrastructures. Thus in Chapter Four we examined the formation of the London rail network which was first used for main line services, and then saw the gradual growth of commuter services and later still, of underground railways. We also focused on the slow growth of road building from the early years of the century onwards.

Chapter Five focused mainly upon what is referred to as the 'London motorway debate'. We followed the formulation process of the Primary Road Network proposal, the promotion of this proposal by the GLC and the actions of movements opposed to this proposal. After this, we discussed the factors which contributed to the abandonment of the motorway proposals. We also considered more briefly other transport issues in London while the motorway debate was taking place.

Transport policies in London in the 'post-motorway era' i.e. between 1973 and 1980, were the subject of Chapter Six. This period covered the

Labour GLC 1973-1977 term in office and the first three years of the following Conservative administration. Unlike the period between 1965 and 1973, there was no single transport issue. Instead we followed a number of issues through these two terms in office such as traffic restraint and the payment of public transport operation subsidies. It appeared that the main feature of these years was a steep increase of public transport fares especially after 1977.

The last part of the thesis consisted of a single long chapter, Chapter Seven. This chapter provided an analysis of the factors determining transport policies and of the effect of these policies in the light of the theoretical perspective introduced in Part One and of the history of transport policy-making in London related in Part Two. As Chapter Seven is the chapter in which the main conclusions of the thesis were discussed, it will be given more consideration here than other chapters.

The formulation and implementation of transport policies was described in Chapter Seven as the outcome of two sets of factors: those related to the functioning of the state which are a consequence of the organisation of the state apparatus and those related to the economic and electoral context prevailing at the time decisions are taken by elected members. While the first set of factors are of a structural nature in that they refer to the form of organisation of the state and its relation to society, the second set are more of a conjunctural nature and refer to the reaction of elected members to the prevailing economic and electoral situation.

In Chapter Seven we saw that conflicts between semi-autonomous organisational groups, i.e. planners and elected members, each defending their own interest within the state apparatus, constituted a major factor of the first type. Differences of interest between these groups were considered to be a major cause of the discrepancy between the transport policies proposed and implemented in London over the 1965-1980 period. The planners with an interest in the expansion of the agencies with which they are associated devised large scale plans such as the Primary Road Network proposals. Meanwhile, elected members who are normally driven by an interest in their re-election were attentive to the political implications of the proposals they were considering implementing. When political opposition was expected, the proposals were dropped; the existence or the apprehension of such opposition is one reason why many transport schemes failed to be implemented. This was the case for example of the Primary Road Network proposals which were dropped by the Labour GLC in 1973 and of numerous traffic restraint measures put forward over the following four years which were abandoned because of hostile reactions by well organised pressure groups.

Another factor related to the functioning of the state which had an impact on transport proposals and policies, was the conflict between authorities each pursuing their own set of priorities often at the expense of other authorities. It became clear that when an authority has the power to do so, it will prevent another one from pursuing policies which could stand as obstacles to its objectives. The room for manoeuvre of a subordinate authority is thereby restricted. For example,

from 1975 onwards, as a result of budgetary restraints implemented by the central government in order to reach macro-economic objectives, the Labour GLC was unable to meet its own objective of subsidising public transport to the extent that the Greater London Labour party had envisaged in its manifesto.

The second set of factors influencing transport proposals and policies discussed in Chapter Seven concerned their economic and political implications. In general elected members make sure that a policy will have beneficial effects for the fiscal base of their authority. Most of the transport schemes advocated by elected members in London were adopted by them with the belief that they would enhance the economic life of the capital. It was also shown that elected members take into account the expected electoral impact of their decisions. They are very responsive to any sign of a dwindling of their political support. Very few road and traffic schemes were implemented in London over the 1965-1980 period because nearly all new road schemes and many traffic schemes led to opposition movements. The large number of opposition movements over such issues can be accounted for by the fact that the Greater London area is almost totally built-up (with the exception of the parks). Consequently, new road schemes nearly always imply demolition, and traffic schemes involving a redirection of traffic, imply increases in traffic flows in some areas. Therefore those likely to be affected by demolition and increases in levels of traffic, protested vehemently against the schemes proposed.

Chapter Seven then turned to a discussion of the effects of transport policies and the trends in the use of modes of transport which have

accompanied them. Major transport trends and policy effects considered in Chapter Seven included an increase in the use of the car in spite of low levels of road investment, a steep rise in public transport fares, and a decline in the quality of public transport services accompanied by a fall in patronage levels. We showed that, as a result of these trends and policy effects, lower income groups suffered from a decline in their ability to reach activities located in London on a regular basis. In many cases, as a result of higher public transport fares, low income individuals had to reduce the number or the length of their motorised journeys. We also considered the negative environmental impacts of transport trends and policies in London over the 1965-1980 period. We saw that the major negative environmental effect of transport policies and trends over this period was a deterioration in living conditions in areas where levels of traffic increased and which were not adapted to catering for such levels. In these circumstances, many inner London areas suffered disproportionally. We stressed that ironically, it was inner London residents, who are those who relied least on the car for their transport needs, who were most seriously affected by the negative environmental consequences caused by high levels of car use.

Two types of response to negative situations created by transport trends and policies were identified: individual initiatives and political actions. Many individual initiatives led to changes in land use patterns in London and the South East. A greater use of the car and deteriorating environmental conditions in London (and particularly in inner London) underlay the multiplicity of individual decisions which

caused a greater dispersal of population and jobs. We saw that this dispersal contributed to a still greater reliance on the private car and consequently led to a fall in public transport usage. In many cases, individual initiatives taken as a reaction to the transport situation in London consisted of a switch of transport mode. This accounted for the decline in public transport patronage and the growth in car use.

In the case of the second type of reaction to the transport situation, i.e. political actions, we concluded in the light of our consideration of such actions over the 1965-1980 period that environmental issues offered a better base for mobilisation than accessibility issues. Movements centred on accessibility issues were of a modest scope compared to those centred on environmental issues. This was presented as one factor explaining the lower level of response of political authorities to accessibility movements than to environmental movements. We saw that intense protest over likely environmental effects of new road construction and traffic management schemes made the implementation of these schemes politically unattractive and thereby influenced the decision of elected members to abandon them. On the other hand, protests against public transport fare increases were less intense and persistent than environment related movements and their influence upon political decision-making was weaker. Furthermore, we saw that demands originating from accessibility movements, unlike demands originating from environmental movements, faced a major handicap because they ran counter to government macro-economic objectives particularly after 1975.

A major conclusion of Chapter Seven was that between 1965 and 1980, low income groups suffered disproportionally from transport policies and trends in London. This was due in particular to the fact that low income individuals could not afford to switch from the increasingly expensive public transport services to other mechanised modes of transport. Consequently, they were tied to the use of public transport and had to endure increasing fares and poorer services. In addition, it appeared to be more difficult for low income households to escape the negative environmental effects of road traffic by 'exiting', because residential areas not suffering from such effects were often beyond their means and because of difficulties of transfer in the case of council housing tenants.

Another reason advanced in Chapter Seven to account for the fact that low income groups suffered disproportionally from transport policies and trends is that they usually had less influence on political decision-making than other groups. This was explained by the fact that they met more difficulties in organising actions, that their knowledge of the political system was imperfect, that the amount of resources at their disposal was very limited, and that they could not claim to have much economic significance.

Recent developments

We now examine a major development in public transport policy in London which took place just after the end of the period under consideration here. We shall examine whether it can be underst-

ood within the perspective adopted here.

The issue concerned the subsidy of London Transport services. A few months after taking power in 1981, the Labour majority at the GLC reduced London Transport fares in line with proposals presented im their manifesto. The reduction exceeded 30 per cent. The loss of fare income was to be made good by a supplementary rate of 6.1p in the pound, yielding £228 million. This policy led to an immediate conflict the Conservative government which was committed to restrain public expenditure and the Conservative-controlled Borough of Bromley which opposed the supplementary rate and went on to challenge the policy in the courts [1]. On the other hand, the Labour GLC was committed to subsidise public transport and thereby favoured increases in public expenditure.

As we have seen throughout the thesis, conflicts between boroughs and the GLC over transport matters, and conflicts between the GLC and government over operation subsidies paid to public transport, were part of a long-standing pattern. What is different about the 1981 conflict is that it took place in a different arena from earlier ones since the courts were brought into the conflict. Consequently the debate was formulated in a different language and obeyed to different rules than in previous cases. Instead of being couched in terms aimed at gaining support from the electorate - as in the case of previous debates between levels of government over transport issues in London - the 1981 debate was stated in judicial terms. Its outcome was a result of a legal judgement and appeared to be external

to conflicts between parties and levels of government.

The GLC policy was declared ultra vires by the Court of Appeal in November 1981 and this judgement was confirmed the following month by the Law Lords. These judgements were partly based on the 1969 Transport (London) Act which sets out London Transport responsibilities and in particular the requirement that it should operate economically i.e. that it balance so far as practicable its own accounts. As stated by Lord Wilberforce in his 17 December judgement:

> "... it appeared clear that neither the LTE in making their proposals, nor the GLC in accepting them, could have power totally to disregard any responsibility for insuring, so far as practicable, that outgoings were met by revenue, and that the LTE ran their business on economic lines". (The Times 18 December 1981)

The case centred around two issues: firstly whether by cutting fares and thereby foregoing part of their transport grant from the government, the GLC was providing an economical service, i.e. whether rising rates to support public transport on this scale was economically acceptable; and secondly, whether the GLC had acted responsibly within the terms of the Act , i.e. whether they had weighed carefully the pros and cons of the decision before reaching it. On both counts the GLC failed to convince the courts.

In effect the Courts argued that the GLC owed a duty to ratepayers not to forego government grants (therefore increasing the burden on them) even if this conflicted with the manifesto on which they were elected, and that in any case, they had rushed into making the decision in an irresponsible way.

The national Labour party reacted in Parliament against the Law Lord judgement and demanded a modification of the 1969 Transport (London) Act permitting the subsidy of London Transport services by the GLC

at any level determined by the Council. However since the effect of the Law Lords' judgement coincides with the objectives of the public expenditure policy followed by the Conservative government, one cam expect that they will show little eagerness to change the law to accomodate a Labour GLC public transport policy which contradicts their expenditure policy. As a result of this judgement, the GLC had to abandon their public transport subsidy policy and in March 1982, London Transport fares were nearly doubled in order to recoup the income lost during the low fare period [2].

The 1973-1977 Labour-controlled GLC decided to avoid facing penalties consisting of reductions in their Transport Supplementary Grant originating from central government, and submitted to government directives for a freeze in the level of the subsidy they paid to the London Transport Executive for revenue support purposes. In 1981, however, the Labour GLC decided to ignore government directives and to go ahead with their public transport subsidy scheme in spite of serious penalties in the form of reductions in government grants paid to the Council. This time, the conflict between levels of government struggling against each other in the pursuit of their respective priorities took place in the judicial system. The outcome was largely the result of an interpretation by the Law Lords of an act passed in Parliament twelve years earlier. In these two cases, high levels of public transport subsidy ran counter to the restrictive public expenditure policies followed by government. It can be hypothesised that if the 1981 judgement would have been favourable to the GLC, because of the high priority awarded to their

public expenditure goals, the government might have gone as far as modifying the 1969 Transport (London) Act to make GLC subsidies to public transport clearly illegal over a certain level. These conflicts between the GLC and central government illustrate the means central government have at their disposal to ensure that local authorities do not obstruct the pursuit of their priorities.

Future transport trends and their social effects

We shall now turn to a consideration of the likely social effects of a continuation of transport trends. I shall in other words, extrapolate the major transport trends of the fifteen years investigated in the thesis and take into consideration some more recent developments. We shall also focus on the various possible options which could be used to modify these trends.

If recent transport trends persist in London, the result is certain to lead to an increasing role for market forces in the shaping of services. This is a consequence of the fact that a growing share of spending on transport in London originates from private sources as a result of the retrenchment in public spending for transport purposes since the mid 1970's. Such a configuration of transport spending places private transport in an increasingly advantageous position compared to public transport. Indeed as less public funds become available to support them, public transport services are likely to become more expensive and less reliable. The increased reliance on the car due to the greater attractiveness of private transport in relation to

public transport is likely to lead to more traffic, and road congestion. The falling use of public transport because of higher fares, lower services, and the possibility many users have of switching to private transport, will in turn cause a further drop in revenue for public transport operators which is likely to lead to further fare increases and service reductions.

The main social effect of a continuation of the transport trends discussed in this thesis since 1965, would be a further drop in the accessibility potential of low income groups which would reinforce the inequity of urban transport service provision in London. This is because an increasing dominance of market forces in the provision of transport services would lead to the reproduction of income inequalities in differences of access to urban transport. Low income groups would thereby be placed in a difficult position as regards the use of any mechanised urban transport mode. Furthermore higher road traffic levels resulting from an increased reliance on the car would accentuate already existing environmental problems. Here again lower income groups would suffer disproportionally because environmental damage caused by high levels of road traffic tends to be most acute in older inner city areas where a high proportion of members of these groups live. It would therefore appear that the maintenance of present transport trends in London would accentuate the loss of accessibility potential and the negative environmental consequences low income groups have suffered from over the period covered by the thesis.

A reversal of these trends could only be brought about by a party which gave a very high priority to transport objectives so that

they would prevail despite political opposition and unfavourable economic situations. The major measures which could trigger such a reversal are the implementation of comprehensive traffic restraint measures and the subsidy of public transport. One result of these measures would be to reduce the gap between the cost of using a car and the cost of using public transport while leading to an improvement in public transport services. The present haemorrhage of public transport users would thereby be stopped and one might even foresee a reduction in the use of the car which would have beneficial environmental effects. The major social effect of such a policy would be to increase equity in accessibility to urban activities since public transport services unlike private transport can be used by everyone (if fares are maintained at a low level) and since low income groups would benefit disproportionally because they rely on buses to a greater extent than other income groups.

This raises a key question: why was urban transport not included among the welfare state package of services made universally available after the war as a matter of right, rather than payment by users? Urban transport could have taken its place alongside other services whose delivery is determined by considerations of social justice rather than ability to pay, as is the case for the National Health Service, education, and to some extent, housing. The inclusion of urban transport among these services could have been justified by the fact that urban transport determines an individual's ability to reach activities in an urban environment including services made universally available by the state. One explanation for the non-inclusion of urban public transport among welf-

are services is that at the time the state was extending its jurisdictions into welfare areas (mainly in the late 1940's and early 1950's) there were no major problems concerning urban public transport. Public transport operators did not suffer from much competition from the private car which was still the prerogative of the rich and maintained high levels of services at relatively low fares. The possibility that public transport might cease to provide adequate access did not therefore occur to people. When public transport services deteriorated and fares increased dramatically in the late 1960's and early 1970's, the government encouraged local authorities to pay operation subsidies to public transport operators. The government committed itself to give local authorities a subsidy covering half the sum they would allocate to the support of public transport operations. However the government contribution was soon curtailed and local authorities were encouraged to phase out their subsidies in line with the implementation of public expenditure cuts.

A second reason for the non-inclusion of urban public transport among services offered as a social right today is the absence of very strong pressures for the improvement of the accessibility level from the social groups which have suffered most from worsening public transport services and higher fares. This is because , as we have seen, mobilisation around accessibility issues is relatively difficult as a result of the absence of meeting grounds and because the groups worst affected, low income groups, are also those which have the most difficulty in organising effective protest movements [4].

The inclusion of public transport among welfare services implies that fares would be minimal so they could be used easily by any income group and that the level of services would be improved so they could respond to most of the transport needs. Such a commitment to public transport would necessitate large subsidies, consequently the chances of implementing policies to meet this objective would be greater in a context of public expenditure expansion. It must be stressed that an increase in public expenditure over a consistent period of time would run against major trends in public spending since the mid 1970's.

Having seen that in our view, the pursuit of equity objectives in transport policies would necessitate a large allocation of state funds in order to subsidise public transport operators, we shall conclude by considering some of the remedies to London's transport problem which have been put forward over the period covered in the thesis as well as since 1980. One of the most popular suggestions has been for a reorganisation of transport responsibilities. For instance the proposal of the (Layfield) Committee of Inquiry into Local Government Finance that local authorities should possess their own source of financing had some relevance for the administration of urban transport. If this source of funds was to be coupled with a greater autonomy for local authorities allowing them to pursue their own budgetary policies, it is likely that urban transport programmes would benefit from a higher level of funds and a greater stability in their allocation. This is because urban transport has a higher priority for local authorities than for central government. This is illustrated by the GLC keen defence of the priority they gave to their transport programmes in the face of cuts in

government contributions. The lower priority given to transport by central government is due to the fact that this level of government is responsible for many other fields of activity such as macro-economic policy and that transport suffers from this competition. One can suppose that if total responsibility for urban transport was placed in the hands of self-financed local authorities, urban transport policies could be pursued with more consistency since they would probably be placed very high in any local authority's order of priorities. In addition, since urban transport responsibilities would be in the hands of one elected body, conflicts between levels of government over transport issues would be avoided. Another advantage of placing urban transport responsibilities in the hands of an authority with its own source of funds is that it would improve accountability for urban transport policies. However it is very unlikely that the British government would relinquish power over such an important sector of expenditure because this would reduce the efficiency of its public expenditure policies.

Another form of institutional reorganisation which has often been mentioned as a way of easing transport problems in London is the creation of an authority responsible for every mode of public transport in the capital on the model of the Passenger Transport Authorities of Hamburg and Munich. The advocates of this proposal argue that public transport would be improved as a result of the greater degree of coordination the existence of such an authority would allow. But as we explain in the Appendix, improvements in public transport services in European cities were the result of the simultaneous reorganisation of the administration of public transp-

ort services and the allocation of large grants and operation subsidies. It would appear that the introduction of new authorities in the absence of increases in government funds for public transport, would have a relatively minor impact on the quality of public transport services. This brings us back to the need for a large scale allocation of government funds for public transport services and low fares.

Among other suggestions put forward to solve public transport problems in London one can mention various proposals aimed at improving productivity. The background to these proposals was the lower productivity of workers on London Transport and on the British Rail London Commuter Network services in comparison with their European counterparts. Evidence that the productivity level was twice as high in some Continental cities than in London was produced. Greater automation of trains and ticketing, and the simplification of the fare structure have been some of the methods most often put forward to achieve increases of productivity. While initially causing a large increase in capital investment, the implementation of measures aiming at improving productivity would reduce public transport operation costs and would consequently make it possible in the long run to achieve more within a given level of financial support on the part of the state. However the scale of these savings would be insufficient to avoid the need for much greater government revenue support in order to reach equity and environmental objectives in the transport sphere.

This short enumeration of proposed solutions makes it clear that any solution capable of bringing about a greater equity in urban transp-

ort and of easing the environmental impact of transport systems necessarily involves the allocation of large amounts of subsidies. None of the solutions to London transport problems which have surfaced in recent years have offered a way of achieving equity and environmental objectives without the allocation of large sums of public funds.

Appendix

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORT POLICIES IN LONDON AND IN OTHER AGGLOMERATIONS

In this appendix I intend to make a short comparison of the public transport situation in London with that prevailing in other cities. The main aspect which will be considered in this comparison is the priority given to public transport in different cities. This priority will be mainly measured in terms of the volume of public funds allocated to this purpose. Attention will also be paid to organisational changes introduced over the last twenty years. We shall see how the level of public transport patronage is influenced by these factors. I shall conclude by discussing the nature of the technical innovations applicable to public transport systems which have taken place in recent decades. While the situation of public transport in western industrialised countries will be considered in general, emphasis will be placed on public transport in Munich and Paris.

Comparative studies are difficult to conduct because a given situation reflects an accumulation of past decisions. Consequently, an adequate comparative study should not only consist of a discussion of the similarities and differences of two situations but should also include a consideration of

the historical patterns which have resulted in these similarities and differences. Thus a comparative study of transport systems should comprise an analysis of the decisions which underlie the development of each system under consideration. Such a study would involve a comparison of the economic situation, the public expenditure policies, the setting of priorities by the cabinet, the pressures applied to the government, the setting of local priorities, the pressures applied on local government, individual decisions related to the use of transport, decisions affecting land use patterns, etc., in each case. It is beyond the scope of this section to cover the background to existing transport situations in the different cases as we have done in the case of London. Rather, I shall content myself with a brief account of public transport characteristics of different cities which appear to be relevant to London.

In some respect, urban transport systems in western industrialised countries have undergone similar trends. While in 1965 some operators were still making a profit, in every country the financial performance of public transport has deteriorated, so that, by 1975, every system required a subsidy (Bly et al. 1980: 17 Table 3 and 4). This may be attributed to increases in the cost of public transport services in the cities of each of seven countries surveyed by the Collaborative Study of the Factors Affecting Public Transport Patronage (1980), between 1970 and 1977 (Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands,

Sweden, United Kingdom, the United States). Large towns of a population of over 400,000 in France and in particular, Paris, constituted an exception to this rule. The highest rate of increases in cost occurred in large towns in the United Kingdom. London with a mean annual increase in the real cost per vehicle/ kilometer of 5.4% surpasses the average of United Kingdom large towns (International Collaborative Study 1980: 29 Table 3.5). However the volume of patronage followed different trends in different countries. While in three countries, patronage increased, in the other four, including the United Kingdom, it suffered a drop. In London the fall was steeper than the average of large cities in any country except the Netherlands. Trends in the level of fares also varied between countries. In four countries, the level of fares dropped in real terms while in the three others, it increased. The increase in public transport vehicle/ kilomoters operated in large cities in the United Kingdom between 1970 and 1977, was the lowest of the countries surveyed except for the United States where a fall took place. London experienced a drop of 0.6% (International Collaborative Study 1980: 29 Table 3.5) (see Figure A.1).

The priority given to urban public transport also varied between countries. This priority can be measured in terms of the volume of subsidy paid to these services and changes in the level of priority can be measured in terms of variations in the arrangements underlying the payment of these subsidies

Figure A.1 : Summary of trends found in data from individual towns

Mean annual change percentage (1970-1977)

	Patronage	Vehicle - KMS	Real Fares	Real cost per passenger
Australia				
Small town *	-0.6	2.0	-2.5	4.9
Large town	-1.3	1.4	-2.2	3.2
Canada				
Small town	6.5	7.6	-2.0	3.4
Large town	3.4	4.5	-2.5	3.2
France				
Small town	4.9	6.6	-5.8	3.1
Large town	2.9	3.0	-3.6	-0.6
Netherlands				
Small town	-2.2	3.5	-2.2	9.3
Large town	-3.1	2.6	1.5	9.4
Sweden				
Small town	1.1	2.7	1.0	4.0
Large town	0.1	3.9	3.1	6.5
United Kingdom				
Small town	-3.3	-0.6	6.3	6.7
Large town	-0.7	0.9	0.6	6.2
USA				
Small town	-0.7	-0.3	-5.8	2.6
Large town	-2.2	-1.8	-4.3	5.3

* Large town and small town refer to whether population is more or less than 400,000.

Source: International Collaborative Study.. (1980: Table 3.5)

as well as in the amount of these subsidies themselves. For instance in West Germany, a fuel tax surcharge, introduced in 1967 to support new roads and public transport infrastructures, was doubled in the 1970's. In 1975 its balance which was of 60:40 in favour of road construction was shifted to 55:45 in favour of public transport (Bly et al. 1980). In West Germany, urban public transport also benefited from operation subsidies paid by the Federal Government as well as by other levels of government.

Another interesting feature of public transport in West Germany is that the first major cities in Western Europe to integrate public transport services i.e. commuter trains, underground and buses, were in West Germany. In Hamburg, the administrative integration took place in November 1965 with the setting up of the Hamburger Verkehrsverbund (HVV). Munich followed in May 1972 with the establishment of the Munchner Verkehrs-und-Tarifverbund (MVV). The new Munich public transport executive has representatives of the Munich City Council, the Federal Railways, the Bavarian lander and the Federal Government unlike in Hamburg where the Federal Government is absent. In 1963 the Munich development plan had set as an objective that public transport should be given priority. The authors of the plan had advocated a shift by 1990 in the proportion of trips by public and private transport bringing this proportion to 65% for public transport. They had recommended a three-fold increase in the speed of public transport links between the suburbs and the centre.

In order to reach these objectives, along with the administrative reorganisation of public transport in Munich, large sums were spent on infrastructure. In particular the U Bahn (the underground rail network) was extended and large investments were allocated to the integration of the S Bahn (the commuter rail network) and the U Bahn. The single most important scheme was the piercing of a tunnel under central Munich allowing a connection between the commuter lines and their interconnection with the U Bahn. A high level of operation subsidies was also allocated to public transport in Munich (Servant 1973). The integration of public transport in Munich has resulted from the combination of a reorganisation of the institutional framework which have permitted inter alia, the unification of fares, and from the allocation of large amounts of funds to new infrastructure which has allowed better interconnections between the systems.

Comparisons between London and Paris stressing how much more funds are allocated to public transport in the latter case than in the former and the effect of this on patronage, are often made. We shall see which were the main investments made in the French capital since the early 1960's. A new rail system, the Réseau Express Régional (RER) was planned in the early 1960's with the objective of providing links to new towns, to a new airport as well as to new employment centres. Another purpose of this new system was to increase the capacity and increase the speeds of public transport in Paris intramuros (Essig and Charles 1978: 10). The realisation of this plan

led to the superimposition in Paris *intramuros* of a wide gauge rail system over the *metro* network. Twenty-seven kilometers of new tunnel lines were built or are being built as well as major interchange stations between the RER and the *métro*, and the RER and commuter lines. In 1978 it was estimated that over twenty years, 35,000 million francs had been or were to be spent on the SNCF and RATP rail services in the Paris area: 13,000 million francs for extensions of the *métro*, 5,000 million francs for the modernisation and the extension of the SNCF commuter network and 17,000 million francs for the RER and interconnections between wide gauge lines (excluding the *métro* which is narrow gauge) (Essig and Charles 1978: 11-2).

The allocation of large amounts of resources has allowed the modernisation of the equipment used on the SNCF commuter network as well as improvements to the commuter services. Between 1960 and 1985, the number of cars on service on the network will have increased by 83.5%. By 1985, none of the rolling stock will be over twenty-five years old. Also, between 1967 and 1980, train kilometers run on the network increased by 69.7% and patronage rose by 30% measured in terms of passenger kilometers. Similarily, between 1970 and 1980, on RATP services, patronage rose by 20% while over the same period, it fell by 16% on London Transport services. This difference between patronage trends on the two services can be attributed to improvements and extensions of the RATP services. Another major factor explaining this situation is

the level of fares. In 1980, the cost of a métro ticket was equivalent to four minutes of an average worker's wage in Paris; meanwhile the average tube fare represented ten minutes of work on a London job (Sunday Times 22 June 1980). While London Transport fares cover 80% of the working costs, on the RATP fares account for only 39% of these costs. In Paris, 25% of the remainder of the working costs is covered by subsidies from the government, 15% by a tax on the total payroll in central Paris, 11% by Paris and other authorities of the region, and 10% by advertising and contracting.[1]

An illustration of the effect of subsidies on public transport patronage is provided by the example of the South Yorkshire and West Yorkshire public transport policies. In 1974, in the new Metropolitan Council of South Yorkshire power was taken by a Labour party strongly committed to the principle that public transport should be considered as a social service and as an instrument of planning policy. The decision was taken to freeze fares and the Council resisted pressures from the government to end the freeze. No rise in fares took place between 1975 and 1980 and over this period, public transport services were improved. Consequently, between 1974 and 1980, patronage increased by 6.7%. Meanwhile in the neighbouring authority of West Yorkshire, public transport fares rose by 79% and the level of patronage fell by 31.4%. In the former case, subsidies of £48 million were paid for public transport services in 1980 and in the latter, the amount of subsidy was £21 million.

It would appear from this brief survey of the situation of public transport in European and British cities, that the major factor affecting patronage on these services is the level of funds allocated to public transport for capital investment or operation subsidies. Other countries, and in particular Germany and France, have allocated more funds than the United Kingdom to urban public transport. This does not however necessarily reflect a higher priority for urban public transport within public expenditure as a whole. To determine this level of priority it would be necessary to take into consideration the overall economic situation and the macro-economic policies followed by the governments of the countries under study. Superficially, it can nevertheless be pointed out that the high level of support given to urban public transport by the French and the German governments took place within a context of higher rates of economic growth than in Britain.

The varied level of support given to urban public transport by different countries yielded diverging consequences. In West Germany for instance, the objective pursued by the allocation of large amounts of government funds to this purpose were, in the context of high levels of car ownership, to encourage people to switch from the use of the car to the use of public transport for energy-saving and environmental reasons. German public transport policies which mostly consisted of large scale infrastructure works and operation subsidies, led to an overall increase in the total number of trips made in urban areas according to a comparison of transport in the major cities

of Britain and Germany. In the mean time, in Britain, higher fares and deteriorating services were causing shifts from public transport to car use where possible and the abandonment or shortening of trips especially by low income groups. Therefore in West Germany, unlike in Britain, the number of public transport trips which take place in cities is little affected by the level of car ownership (International Collaborative Study 1980: 92 Figure 6.1). Similarly in spite of higher levels of car ownership in West Germany, the split of trips between private and public transport according to city size is similar to that in Britain (International Collaborative Study 1980: 31 Figure 3.7).

A feature of the evolution of urban public transport systems over recent decades is the absence of the introduction of any major technical innovations in spite of considerable research aimed at the development of such systems. Thomson (1978) observed that the results of intensive research efforts examining variations of the underground railway and possible hybrids between taxi and bus were very disappointing since they led to very few practical results. Apart from their anticipated cost and environmental disruption the non-implementation of new systems can also be attributed to the fact that:

1. in many cases, where extensive infrastructures already exist, transport authorities were concerned about the maintenance of an integrated system,

2. transport authorities are historically committed to existing modes of transport,

3. new modes often represent high infrastructure costs, so there was an unwillingness on the part of public authorities to experiment with innovations.

In fact, the innovations which have been introduced on public transport systems have taken the form of localised innovations on existing systems such as new forms of train control and fare collection. Significant improvements in public transport services have been brought about by large scale investment in existing forms of transport. Consequently, London does not suffer greatly from the technical obsolescence of its rail systems as a consequence of its age. Because of the absence of major technical innovations on urban rail networks, the early start hypothesis which stresses the obsolescence of facilities in relation to the demands made upon them and to competitiveness from more recent facilities, does not apply to urban public transport.

From this short survey of public transport arrangements in Munich and Paris, it seems clear that organisational transformations alone are not enough to allow significant improvements in services. In both of these cases, the major factor in the improvement to services and thereby in the increase in patronage, was the allocation of large sums for investment and operational support. However, in these cases, because of the integration of the transport systems, new investments had a maximal impact.

Therefore the claim made by the GLC that a takeover by them of the British Rail commuter services in London would bring an improvement of services must be viewed with scepticism. It seems unlikely that such a takeover would change the quality of services in a significant way unless it was accompanied by an increase in the funds available for this purpose.

In the comparison of London with other European cities, the particularities of the British capital must be taken into account. Since the early 1950's, the decrease in the population of London and the increase in the population of the region proceeded at a relatively modest rate relative to European cities. As London was endowed in the 1950's with a comprehensive public transport system with little competition from the car for passenger transport, it was to be expected that a decline in population accompanied by increases in car use would cause a contraction in public transport services. In contrast the population of many European cities and in particular of Munich and Paris, has increased rapidly since the Second World War. Their public transport systems became increasingly inadequate in catering for the needs of a growing population and increases in car use were causing widespread congestion. It was in this context that decisions were taken in the 1960's to invest large sums of money on public transport infrastructure to relieve congestion on the existing services and on the roads, and to provide services to the areas where increases in population had taken place.

NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. The discussion in this chapter will concern urban approaches within the social sciences (sociology, economics and political science). Although it is linked to these approaches in many ways, the theoretical basis of planning will only be discussed in Chapter II.

2. This study was followed by Lynd and Lynd (1937).

3. Richardson (1976) considers that there is enough common ground between the initiators of the urban land models and the numerous contributors to the new urban economics debates to justify their presentation as a single field.

4. Recent new urban economics models try to compensate for this flaw. Richardson (1976) reviews these attempts.

5. Lojkine adopts here the same perspective as Lamarche (1976). Lojkine himself discusses such struggles in the Parisian region in Lojkine (1972).

6. The perspective I propose to develop in the following pages is very close to that presented by Williams (1971) and Williams (1975). Like him, I wish to arrive at a definition of the urban that stresses the relation between physical accessibility in the city and social accessibility. The main divergence between my view and his, apart from a different perception of the social structure, is the importance I place on the urban built environment, which I consider to be the materialisation of accessibility patterns.

7. T.A. Broadbent defines the urban system as primarily "a pool of labour - a relatively self-contained area where a whole community can and does enter into common production and consumption processes on a daily basis" (Broadbent 1977: 91).

8. About the length of journey to work commuters are willing to accept, see the analysis of National Transport Survey (U.K.) data by Goodwin (1976). For a study of data from the National Transportation Survey (U.S.A.) see Zahavi (1974) and for an international view, see Zahavi (1976). These studies come to the conclusion that there is a fairly constant acceptable time

for commuting. Consequently, as transport modes become quicker distances tend to be longer while the time allocated to transport and the number of trips remain approximately stable.

9. By sector, I mean neighbourhood or large-scale multi-functional zone, i.e. industrial estate. The level of aggregation chosen as the basic land use unit considered here is, to a large extent, arbitrary. It is, nevertheless, suited to the demonstration of how urban land becomes differentially valued and how social agents are affected by this.

10. Lipietz sees the spatial competition process both as a means and an effect of class struggle (1974: 147).

11. The incentive for this higher bidding stems partly from the lower transport costs associated with a piece of land which is close to important activities (Balchin & Kieve 1977).

CHAPTER II

1. On the debate between Poulantzas and Miliband on the determination of the state: Laclau (1975), Poulantzas (1969 and 1976), and Miliband (1970 and 1973).

2. P. Anderson (1974a and 1974b) in two historical studies, analyses according to principles close to the ones presented here, the development of the form of the state in the pre-capitalist world as resulting from class struggles.

3. Not unlike the urban built environment as described in Chapter One.

4. In a similar way, Poggi (1978: xi) focuses on the evolution of the state's internal institutional arrangements.

5. As Gamble (1979: 5) puts it, "Where the dividing line comes has often been determined by the political and social struggles".

6. Itself a result of the outcome of class struggles (Balibar 1974: 180).

7. We will see below how the influence of agents and groups on the state varies according to their social position.

8. Piven (1976) and Piven & Cloward (1977) explain the relatively minor impact of protest movements of the poor on the state partly by the fact that they do not affect the accumulation process and by their lack of stable organisation.

9. A first step in this direction has been taken by Crenson (1971) and Lukes (1974) when they state that the mere organisational weight of the state is likely to inhibit actions. They appear to be asserting that the interiorisation of this weight by social groups can have an inhibiting effect.

10. The objective of the perspective adopted here is to arrive at some general principle of explanation applicable to any kind of protest action. It will not lead to a taxonomic approach of such actions based on their impact like the one often present in Castells (1977).

11. To establish a difference between the groups who possess such an ability and others, Grant (1977) on the basis of the nature of contacts with the state and of the knowledge of its functioning, refers to a distinction between insider and outsider groups.

Repo (1977) stresses the importance of middle class agents in protest movements. She relates this to their ability to manipulate political discourses. Their knowledge of state operations and their discoursive capacities might explain why the middle classes are generally more successful in their actions directed at the state than other classes (on the pre-eminence of middle class movements in Britain, McKay & Cox 1979: 272-4).

12. Interests can also be defended by a participation in the decision-making process in some of the state agencies. For a comparison of the respective characteristics of autonomous organisations and participation (Barnard 1975).

13. Along the perspective developed by Touraine (1973) who gives chief importance to the abilities and motivations of social agents.

14. The meaning given to state intervention includes measures of repression but these measures will not be considered here.

15. Some of the definitions presented here apply more specifically to urban planning than to planning in general. But as only some of their general aspects will be introduced, it appears that they can serve as an illustration of the differences between two types of planning definition.

16. Among many planners giving definitions of this nature, Eversley (1973: 5) presents planning as a means of allocation of scarce resources. Hancocks (1978: 315), for his part, considers planning to be a conflict-solving device involving community and special interest groups.

17. See Ekistics, 276, May-June 1979 devoted to this question and containing articles by Oelschlaeger, Murphy, Mulligan and Junger.

18. Steps of the planning process can also be used as a form of 'occupational therapy' contributing to the neutralisation of groups opposed to the dominant view on an issue.

19. As remarked by Poggi (1978: 96):

> "... the state does not claim or attempt to encompass and control the totality of social existence. The latter is contemplated (and served, according to the functional argument above) from a specific viewpoint, with reference to some discrete, abstract, differentiated aspects of it".

20. On the question of the professionalisation of sectors of the bureaucracy, Harrington (1981) and Vollmer & Mills (1966).

21. Gough (1979: 65-6) explains the growth of welfare policies by widescale strike activities, powerful trade unions, electoral victories of the working class parties and revolutionary threats.

22. With an 'accounting logic' (Broadbent 1977: 43), Mattick (1969) demonstrates that since the public sector depends on resources produced in the private one where value is created, it must keep within limits in order to prevent decreases in the profitability of the private economy.

23. King & Nugent (1979) describe ratepayer movements in Great Britain.

24. The view that debates between macro-economic doctrines in fact cover conflicts about the distribution of social resources between groups and classes is hinted in recent articles by Galbraith (1980; 1981; 1982) and by Chonchol (1980).

25. At a more general level, Martin (1975), by comparing the

situation of Great Britain and of Sweden comes to the conclusion that one factor of state control of the economy in Sweden has been that one party has been in power for a very long period.

CHAPTER III

1. We shall use the term 'sequence' to draw attention to the fact that it is the manner in which the stages are arranged which constitutes the essence of the model.

2. For a description and an account of the evolution of time-budget methods see Szalai (1972b).

3. In any discussion of impacts on urban land it must be stressed that the power to act upon the urban structure is unevenly distributed between social groups. On this, see Chapter One.

4. This is a simplified view. In many cases the time spent travelling is not a complete loss because it allows other activities to be carried out, e.g. reading or socialising in public transport, listening to the car radio, etc. (Janeau 1972: 416-7). Similarly, conditions of travel are likely to affect the terms of the trade-off.

5. In the coming chapters we will show in detail how this statement applies to London.

6. Pushkarev and Zupan (1977) study the operational feasibility of different modes of public transport according to land use.

7. Berecham & Paaswell (1977: 122) propose a scale of car availability from 'always' to 'never' to compensate for the inadequacy of measures of household car ownership in assessing individuals' mobility.

8. For a similar argument about housing see Rex (1971).

9. Referring here to the 'exit' category introduced by Hirschman (1973).

CHAPTER IV

1. This has led Collins and Pharoah (1974: 44) to comment that:

> "Control over the operation of and provision for passenger travel in London may be seen to have reached a peak in the early 1950's when all means of travel apart from the relatively small number of private vehicles were wholly within public control."

This is so because before this period public transport was under private ownership, and later, the rapid spread of car use seriously diminished public transport patronage.

2. The urban road concept of Tripp as adapted to a specific metropolitan area by Forshaw and Abercrombie was adopted by a Departmental Committee set up by the Minister of War to make proposals about the design and layout of roads in built-up areas of large cities (Departmental Committee on the Design and Layout of Roads in Built-up Areas 1946: 27-32).

CHAPTER V

1. In the report of the third phase of the LTS (GLC 1969b: Table 4.18) it was forecast that, with the implementation of Plan 3, over 70% of trips in London would be made in a private transport vehicle.

2. In these cases, the BRF came to resort to consultants who had also been hired by the Ministry of Transport. The BRF report, Motorways in the Urban Environment (Llewelyn-Davies, Weeks et al. 1971) was prepared by consultants who had undertaken a study for the Urban Motorways Committee of the MOT.

3. The GLDP Inquiry was set up by the Secretary of State in response to an intense opposition to the recommendations of the Plan and in particular to the transport schemes it put forward. The GLDP Inquiry is the object of the next section.

4. By agent I refer to individuals perceived as members of social classes.

5. For instance, a study of nuisance caused by noise generated by Heathrow Airport, revealed that the middle classes were more likely to voice their annoyance that the lower classes (Office of Population Survey and Censuses 1971).

6. For instance such a demand is present in the BRB evidence presented to the GLDP Inquiry (Proof of evidence E 12.7, GLDP Inquiry).

7. This account of the evolution of the LATA relies largely on Thomson (1977).

8. These figures are not entirely comparable however, since the types of expenditure referred to are not the same in these two public expenditure White papers.

9. In interpreting these figures one must, however, take into account the 1974 oil crisis and the three day week, which undoubtedly had an influence on the level of traffic.

10. Over a longer time span, traffic management measures and local road improvements were seen by Munt (1971: 44-7) as the two major factors explaining why on three cross London routes, the average speed in 1968 averaged 15mph while in 1936 when there was 60% less traffic on the roads it was only 12½mph (Bressey 1937).

11. A study by Which? concluded in 1973 that OMO bus services were less efficient because of longer stops (The Times 1 February 1973).

12. From 1965 to October 1970, no permit was issued to the BRB for central London schemes involving office blocks (BRB press release, 6 October 1970).

13. This reflects the fact that planning necessarily consists of basing assumptions about the future on the experience of the recent past except when the situation is very special and trends are unreliable e.g. during the Second World War. In such cases planners rely on assumptions. The authors of the plans prepared during the Second World War assumed that there would be an important increase in the funds to be made available for road construction in London while the authors of the plans prepared in the 1960's expected an important growth of these funds on the grounds of the experience of recent years. This explains why both the plans prepared during the Second World War and those devised in the 1960's put forward proposals for grand schemes.

CHAPTER VI

1. This was in sharp contrast to the type of reaction the Council repeatedly voiced when cuts in public transport support were announced by the government.

2. The idea of relying on supplementary licensing as a means of traffic restraint had already been considered in 1967 by Thomson (1967).

3. On this characteristic of the 1973-1977 Labour GLC administration, see Kilgannon (1976).

4. The impact on different social groups of the transport policies implemented in London over the period under consideration will be considered in Chapter Seven.

5. The building of new major roads to revitalise depressed areas of London had already been advocated, by, among others, the Standing Conference on London and the South East (1976: 47 para. 3.97).

6. The right to challenge the need for transport schemes at public inquiries was advocated in 1974 by the Expenditure Committee (1974: para. 59).

7. There were debates about the likely demographic decline of London. For a review of the estimates made in the late 1960's and early 1970's, see Thompsnn (1973).

CHAPTER VII

1. However one must take into account that if local politicians believe that local issues have an electoral impact, they will behave according to their belief.

2. As we have seen in Chapter Two, the state in the Western world depends for its operation on resources created for the most part in the private sector of the economy. Consequently, one strategy relied upon to stimulate the economy and to achieve a favourable balance of payments, is to divert funds from the state towards the private sector of the economy in the hope that these funds will be used to create more resources and thus enlarge the economic base of the country.

3. This point was made for the 1960's by Sinclair (1972) and Brown and Sherif (n.d. Table 17 and 26).

4. There is an interaction between public expenditure policies and variations in the level of the GNP. Since the emphasis is here on the factors influencing public expenditure policies we focus on how they responded to economic cycles. It must however be kept in mind that the level of the GNP is itself influenced by public expenditure policies.

5. This section is mainly concerned with actions related to the first and second categories.

6. We are assuming here that individuals and groups have a perfect knowledge of the manner in which they are affected by transport and a clear perception of their interest. In the real world these conditions are in fact rarely met. The definition of transport problems and the formulation of solutions by an individual or a group may sometimes run counter to his or its interest.

7. This does not mean that authorities fell for this bluff, it is nevertheless significant that the British Road Federation relied on this means to attract the attention of public authorities and to give weight to their demands. However the claim of the BRF to represent the views of the millions of car owners which are members of the Automobile Association and of the Royal Automobile Club was not very credible. The vast majority of these members in reality joined the AA or the RAC to take advantage of the services they offer rather than to be part of the motor lobby.

8. Political parties usually adopt positions with the aim of winning or maintaining the support of what they consider to be their potential electoral clientele. They therefore adopt differentiated positions to attract different types of clientele.

9. It is however probable that a study of transport movements starting at local level would have led to a picture of greater activity among low-income groups than the present study which has focused on the GLC and on protests directed at the London level. Because less organisation is required to set up an action at the local level, it can be expected that the extent of low income groups' activity was higher than it appears at the outset of a study focusing on the GLC.

10. The actions of public transport trade unions constitute an exception to this rule.

11. For instance, in the Southampton area, 95% of the shoppers using the new Eastleigh Carrefour relied on the private car to get there while this proportion varied between 36% and 48% for 'traditional' shopping centres (Wood 1976).

CONCLUSION

1. It must be stressed that while Bromley's rate payers would have shared the GLC rate increase , residents of the borough would have benefited less from the GLC public transport subsidy than the residents of most of the other Greater London boroughs. This is due to the fact that Bromley is serviced by British Rail commuter services which did not benefit from the GLC subsidy rather than by the underground which did. In addition, since Bromley is a suburban borough, its residents rely on private transport to a higher degree than inner London residents.

2. But in early 1983, a new GLC policy to reduce public transport fares was approved by the courts. It was smaller in scale, and followed an extensive press campaign which described the policy as a 'balanced' one.

3. The government however did not go this far to ensure South Yorkshire Metropolitan Council's compliance with their public expenditure policy. It can be expected that the government's reaction towards the GLC would have been more severe because the larger sums involved were more likely to contribute to an alteration of expected economic results, and because there was more of a possibility of London becoming a model for other local authorities than South Yorshire.

4. We should note however that the objective of including transport among 'welfare' programmes is advocated by the Trade Union Congress - Labour Party Liaison Committee in their report to the 1982 TUC Congress and Labour Party Conference entitled Transport Policy. The Liaison Committee acknowledged that public transport services should be provided for those who do not enjoy access to a car or who choose to use public transport services.

APPENDIX

1. In 1976 on the RATP, fare receipts represented 41% of the total income while this proportion was 65% for the LTE. The difference between the normal full fare receipts and total expenditure was split between the state (which took 70%) and the local authorities in Paris and its region (30%) (The Price Commission 1978: 72 para. 1 and 73 para. 4).

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