



# Kent Academic Repository

**Wilson, Katherine (2014) *Sometimes, it's not Right to go Left: The perceived consequences of endorsing political ideologies*. Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) thesis, University of Kent,.**

## Downloaded from

<https://kar.kent.ac.uk/48564/> The University of Kent's Academic Repository KAR

## The version of record is available from

## This document version

UNSPECIFIED

## DOI for this version

## Licence for this version

UNSPECIFIED

## Additional information

## Versions of research works

### Versions of Record

If this version is the version of record, it is the same as the published version available on the publisher's web site. Cite as the published version.

### Author Accepted Manuscripts

If this document is identified as the Author Accepted Manuscript it is the version after peer review but before type setting, copy editing or publisher branding. Cite as Surname, Initial. (Year) 'Title of article'. To be published in *Title of Journal*, Volume and issue numbers [peer-reviewed accepted version]. Available at: DOI or URL (Accessed: date).

## Enquiries

If you have questions about this document contact [ResearchSupport@kent.ac.uk](mailto:ResearchSupport@kent.ac.uk). Please include the URL of the record in KAR. If you believe that your, or a third party's rights have been compromised through this document please see our [Take Down policy](https://www.kent.ac.uk/guides/kar-the-kent-academic-repository#policies) (available from <https://www.kent.ac.uk/guides/kar-the-kent-academic-repository#policies>).

**Sometimes, it's not Right to go Left: The perceived  
consequences of endorsing political ideologies**

Katherine Wilson

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of  
Social Sciences at the University of Kent

School of Psychology

University of Kent

July 2014

## **Declaration**

The research reported in this thesis was conducted while the author was a full-time postgraduate student in the School of Psychology at the University of Kent (September, 2010- July 2014) on school scholarship. The theoretical and empirical work herein is the independent work of the author. The author has not been awarded a degree by this or any other university for the work included in the thesis.

## Acknowledgements

First, I would like to thank my supervisor, Robbie Sutton, for his consistent support and guidance throughout my PhD. His enthusiasm and unwavering encouragement has helped to develop my skills as a researcher and ensured that the PhD process has been a positive and enriching experience.

I would also like to thank my family for their support throughout my studies. My parents, Ian and Dawn Wilson, have supported me unconditionally. Additionally my brother, Nick Wilson, despite being busy with his own studies, has always offered words of encouragement which have been an invaluable source of motivation. I'd like to give warm thanks to my office mate and friend, Jumana Ahmad, without whom the last four years of late night writing sessions would have been a far less enjoyable experience! I would also like to thank some of my oldest and closest friends, Jack Outred, Jemma Johnson, Jodie Margerum and Ellie Andrews for their support and their interest in my research.

Finally, I would like to thank my three amazing grandparents, Ivy and Sidney Wilson, and Betty Fowler, who along with my parents, instilled in me a strong work ethic and the belief that hard work always pays off in the end!

## Table of Contents

<b>Declaration of authorship.....</b>	<b>II</b>
<b>Acknowledgements .....</b>	<b>III</b>
<b>List of figures.....</b>	<b>X</b>
<b>List of tables.....</b>	<b>X</b>
<b>Abstract.....</b>	<b>XII</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS .....	4
<b>CHAPTER 2: SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION AND ITS APPLICATION TO INTERGROUP CONFLICT .....</b>	<b>7</b>
2.1 AN INTRODUCTION .....	7
2.2 SOCIAL DOMINANCE THEORY AND SDO .....	10
2.3 SDO AND OTHER IDEOLOGIES .....	19
2.3.1 <i>Social dominance theory and system justification theory</i> .....	19
2.3.2 <i>SDO and right wing authoritarianism</i> .....	21
2.3.3 <i>SDO and conservatism</i> .....	24
2.4 SDO AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS.....	26
2.5 SDO AND CONTEXT .....	30
2.5.1 <i>Status</i> .....	31
2.5.2 <i>Competition</i> .....	32
2.5.3 <i>Zero-sum Competition</i> .....	34
2.5.4 <i>Threat</i> .....	36
2.6 SDO AND THE PROMOTION OF COMPETITION AND CONFLICT .....	39

2.6.1 <i>Competition</i> .....	39
2.6.2 <i>Support for conflict</i> .....	41
2.7 SDO AND WAR: THE SPECIFIC FACTORS THAT MIGHT PROMOTE SDO .....	42
2.7.1 <i>Tit for tat strategy</i> .....	43
2.7.2 <i>Suspension of moral scruples</i> .....	45
2.7.3 <i>Affective forecasting and sunk costs</i> .....	47
2.7.4 <i>Tacit theory that SDO is advantageous</i> .....	49
2.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS .....	49
<b>CHAPTER 3: LAY THEORIES AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO IDEOLOGICAL VARIABLES AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS.....</b>	<b>51</b>
3.1 AN INTRODUCTION .....	51
3.2 RECONCILING SCIENTIFIC THEORIES AND LAY THEORIES .....	52
3.3 ATTRIBUTION THEORIES .....	54
3.4 RESEARCHING INTENTIONALITY .....	58
3.5 THE SHARED NATURE OF LAY THEORIES AND THEIR APPLICATION TO POLITICAL IDEOLOGY .....	59
3.6 LAY THEORIES AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS .....	63
3.7 APPLICATION TO RESEARCH.....	66
3.7.1 <i>Chapter 4</i> .....	66
3.7.2 <i>Chapter 5</i> .....	67
3.7.3 <i>Chapters 6 &amp; 7</i> .....	67
<b>CHAPTER 4: OUT-GROUP DEFECTION, SUNK COSTS AND HIGH STAKES: THREE CUES THAT TRIGGER ENDORSEMENT OF SDO AND COMPETITIVE INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR.....</b>	<b>69</b>

STUDY 1: OUTGROUP DEFECTION .....	75
<i>Method</i> .....	76
<i>Results</i> .....	79
<i>Discussion</i> .....	83
STUDY 2: SUNK COSTS.....	84
<i>Method</i> .....	85
<i>Results</i> .....	89
<i>Discussion</i> .....	90
STUDY 3: WHEN THE STAKES ARE HIGH .....	91
<i>Method</i> .....	92
<i>Results</i> .....	95
<i>Discussion</i> .....	97
GENERAL DISCUSSION .....	98
<b>CHAPTER 5: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE LAY THEORIES HELD IN</b>	
<b>RELATION TO THE PERCEIVED FUNCTIONS OF IDEOLOGICAL</b>	
<b>VARIABLES (SDO, CONSERVATISM AND SYSTEM</b>	
<b>JUSTIFICATION) FOR GROUPS.....</b>	<b>103</b>
STUDY 4: THE PERCEIVED UTILITY OF SDO IN CONFLICT .....	113
<i>Method</i> .....	114
<i>Results</i> .....	118
<i>Discussion</i> .....	122
STUDY 5: EXPLICIT VIEWS .....	123
<i>Method</i> .....	125
<i>Results</i> .....	130
<i>Discussion</i> .....	130





8.1 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS .....	209
8.2 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS .....	212
8.2.1: <i>Ideology and intergroup conflicts</i> .....	212
8.2.2: <i>Ideology, system justification and inequality</i> .....	214
8.2.3: <i>Ideology as motivated social cognition</i> .....	217
8.2.4: <i>Reconciling lay theories with scientific theories</i> .....	220
8.3 LIMITATIONS .....	221
8.4 FUTURE DIRECTIONS .....	229
8.4.1: <i>Implementing qualitative research</i> .....	229
8.4.2: <i>What are the behavioral consequences?</i> .....	230
8.4.3: <i>Considering other types of ideology</i> .....	231
8.5 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS .....	236
<b>REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>239</b>
APPENDIX A: Anticipation questions used in Studies 2 and 3 .....	275
APPENDIX B: Factor loadings of DVs in Study 5 .....	277
APPENDIX C: Correlations between the perceived normality of each ideological variable and participants' SES and estimated of inequality for Study 6 .....	278
APPENDIX D: Correlations between participants' SES, perceptions of inequality, the perceived normality or ideologies and their perceived consequences in Study 6 .....	279
APPENDIX E: Correlations between participants' own endorsement of each ideological variable, the perceived normality of each ideological variable and participants' SES and estimated of inequality for Study 7 .....	282

APPENDIX F: Correlations between participants' SES, perceptions of inequality, own ideologies, the perceived normality or ideologies and their perceived consequences in Study 7 .....	283
APPENDIX G: Factor loadings for dependent variables in Study 8 .....	287
APPENDIX H: Correlations between participants' SES, perceptions of inequality, own ideology, the perceived normality of conservatism and its perceived consequences in Study 8 .....	288
APPENDIX I: Factor loadings for dependent variables in Study 9 .....	289
APPENDIX J: Correlations between participants' SES, perception of inequality, own political ideology and the perceived consequences of their political ideology in Study 9	290

## List of Figures

<i>Figure 1:</i> Prisoner's dilemma matrix used in Study 1 .....	79
<i>Figure 2:</i> Path model showing an indirect effect between sunk costs and future investment within the conflict, through SDO in Study 2.....	90
<i>Figure 3:</i> Path model showing a stakes-investment relationship in Study 3 .....	97
<i>Figure 4:</i> Figure 4: Path model showing an indirect effect from SDO to participants' preferred choice for victory in the conflict. (Study 4).....	118
<i>Figure 5:</i> Path diagram showing an indirect effect from the groups' SDO to the perceived likelihood of their winning, through the perceived likelihood that the group will more likely to be the aggressors. (Study 4). .....	122
<i>Figure 6:</i> Path diagram showing an indirect effect from the groups' SDO to the perceived likelihood of their winning, through the perceived likelihood that the group will more likely to be committed to the conflict. (Study 4) .....	122

## List of Tables

<i>Table 1:</i> Means (and standard deviations) of SDO endorsement, and proportions of participant decision making within each experimental condition of Study 1.....	80
<i>Table 2:</i> Means (and standard deviations) of the endorsement of SDO and the commitment to conflict across all conditions in Study 3.....	96
<i>Table 3:</i> Means (and standard deviations) and <i>t</i> test analysis pertaining to dependent variables in Study 4.....	120
<i>Table 4:</i> Zero-order correlations among commitment DVs, investment items and likelihood of Audaz winning in Study 4.....	121
<i>Table 5:</i> Alphas and zero-order correlation coefficients indicating scale reliability for each outcome variable in response to each ideological variable in Study 5.....	129

*Table 6:* Means (and standard deviations) and *t* test analysis for outcome variables in Study 5 ..... 132

*Table 7:* Zero-order correlations of participants’ endorsement of each ideological variable with its perceived utility for intragroup and intergroup relations pertaining to that same ideological variable in Study 5 ..... 133

*Table 8:* The functions of ideological variables as perceived by low and high endorsing participants in Study 5 ..... 136

*Table 9:* Means (and standard deviations) and *t* test analysis of life satisfaction derived from conservatism, system justification and SDO in Study 6..... 167

*Table 10:* Alphas and zero-order correlation analyses for outcome variable scales in response to each ideological variable in Study 7..... 171

*Table 11:* Means (and standard deviations) and *t* test analysis for each outcome variable associated with each ideological variable in Study 7 ..... 174

*Table 12:* Inferential tests of each outcome variable relating to perceptions of the utility of conservatism in Study 8..... 193

*Table 13:* Means (and standard deviations), *t* test analysis and ANOVA results pertaining to the perceived consequences of rejecting or endorsing conservatism in Study 9 200

## ABSTRACT:

The aim of the research within this thesis was to investigate lay people's beliefs about political ideologies and related constructs. Specifically, I researched whether people recognise the functions of ideologies and recognise when strategically, it makes the most sense to endorse them. In nine studies, participants' knowledge of ideological constructs was assessed. To begin with, participants' knowledge was assessed indirectly by asking them about their own endorsement of variables, such as social dominance orientation, while imagining themselves embroiled within an international conflict. As the research progressed, more direct methods were used in which participants were asked whether endorsing left or right wing ideological constructs would promote inequality within society and palliative outcomes for individuals.

In my first empirical chapter, I present three studies which assess under what specific conditions people will endorse SDO. These studies demonstrate how people endorse SDO strategically in response to specific contextual features of intergroup conflicts. Study 1 showed that people endorse SDO more when locked in an intergroup dilemma with a group which defects (vs. cooperates). In Study 2, the presence (vs. absence) of sunk costs – previous investments by the ingroup in a conflict – increased SDO. In Study 3, high stakes (compared to none) increased the endorsement of SDO. In Studies 2 and 3, increases in SDO elicited indirect effects of contextual factors on participants' willingness to make further investments in the conflict.

In my second empirical chapter, I consider whether this strategic adoption of ideological positions may be based on knowledge of their consequences for intergroup relations. In Study 4, participants evaluated a group described as being high (compared to low) in SDO as more likely to be committed to a conflict, more likely to invest in that

conflict, and as a result, more likely to emerge successfully from that conflict. These results were replicated in Study 5, where I began to utilise more direct measures in order to explore lay theories of ideological variables. Participants were explicitly asked whether they thought endorsing ideological variables (SDO, conservatism and system justification) would promote outcomes including success in conflicts and maintaining inequality along with social cohesion within societies. Participants attributed both SDO and conservatism with promoting inequality and success within conflict whereas system justification was evaluated as likely to promote social cohesion. Chapter 5 provided compelling evidence that lay people have accurate knowledge of the functions of ideological constructs.

In my third and fourth empirical chapters, I empirically examine the folk beliefs about political ideologies that may draw people to them. Across four studies, participants attributed both left and right wing ideologies as likely to promote aspects of hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing for others and themselves. Furthermore, participants recognised, with a compelling degree of accuracy, that there are marked differences between left and right wing political ideologies in terms of closed-mindedness and the attitudes they promote towards inequality, just world beliefs and concern for others.

Taken together, these findings suggest that lay individuals have accurate knowledge of the consequences of endorsing ideological variables and recognise when it makes strategic sense to do so. Although people's ideological positions are determined by many factors, the present research suggests that one of these factors may be informed, strategic choice. That is, people may select or modify their ideological positions based on shared and surprisingly sophisticated understandings of their consequences. In the final chapter, I discuss how further research may explore the interplay between lay beliefs about political ideology and their consequences for political choice.

## CHAPTER ONE

Political ideologies help people bring order to, and make sense of, their lives. They guide people's decisions on right and wrong, shape emotional responses to moral violations, and shape their aspirations and fears for the future. They guide people's political party affiliation, voting, protest, and a range of other political behaviours. The sense-making function of political ideology is much researched, but this thesis addresses a question to which researchers have paid much less attention. It is about the sense that people make of political ideologies. Whereas researchers generally examine how people view reality through the lens of ideology, in the following chapters I will examine how people view the ideologies themselves. In so doing, I conceptualise ideologies as an aspect of social reality about which people form beliefs and about which they make strategic decisions.

In forming this conceptualisation of ideology, I build on recent developments in social and political psychology that concern the functions that ideologies serve. Jost, Glaser, et al. (2003) provide an account of political ideology which suggests that political ideologies are adopted strategically. In particular, Jost et al. contend that individuals are drawn to ideologies, such as political conservatism, based upon personality characteristics, existential, epistemic and relational needs. In Jost et al.'s model, epistemic needs, referring to individuals' desire to make sense of their environment to reduce aversive feelings of uncertainty, are particularly important. "*Ideological rationalization*" (Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003, p. 339) is an important facet of this process. So, for Jost et al. people adopt ideologies that help them explain and legitimize the social and economic status quo of the societies in which they live.

In so doing, Jost, Glaser, et al. (2003) argue, people are engaging in a set of processes known collectively as motivated social cognition (Kunda, 1990; Tetlock, 2002). Motivated social cognition describes how people come to believe what they want to believe – that is, to adopt and defend beliefs that serve psychological needs (such as self-esteem or feelings of certainty). Contemporary models of motivated social cognition suggest that this process of reducing uncertainty depends on knowledge, whether conscious or not, of the psychological consequences of adopting beliefs (Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007; Kruglanski, 1989, 1996, 1999). Thus, if people are adopting ideological positions for strategic reasons, they should have some knowledge regarding their functions and consequences.

One way to assess the content and accuracy of lay theories of political constructs is to examine people's knowledge of the roles these constructs play within intergroup conflicts. When George Bush announced that the US would be embarking upon an invasion of Iraq in 2003, few would have expected that the conflict would last for over ten years and cost hundreds of billions of dollars (Nowicki, 2013). Like many other before it, the Iraq conflict became intractable. Deutsch and Coleman (2000) describe an intractable conflict as one that is deeply important to people and rooted in conflicting ideologies. As a result they tend to escalate and remain unresolved for very long periods of time. In the end, these conflicts lead to high levels of intensity and destructiveness (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000).

Rather than attributing intractable conflicts to a clash of ideologies, Bar-Tal (2000) suggests that these conflicts are usually centred on competition over resources between groups, and are usually perceived as zero-sum in nature. Within Realistic Group Conflict Theory, Campbell (1965) asserts that when involved in zero-sum conflicts, groups become more aware of ingroup and outgroup identities, resulting in the intergroup boundaries becoming stable and impermeable. Consequently, it is not surprising that zero-sum conflicts which therefore make intergroup boundaries more salient, produce more competitive and



aggressive group behaviours, leading to vicious cycles of conflict escalation to the point where they become intractable. Taken together, these models of conflict – appealing to ideology (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000) and to competition for resources (Bar-Tal, 2000; Campbell, 1965) - suggest that research should consider the perceived contributing factor of ideological variables to conflicts where there are symbolic (e.g., status) or material resources at stake.

In addition to international conflict, another social-political issue which can be used to assess lay knowledge of political ideologies is the presence of social unrest within societies as a result of inequality. The prevalence of unrest due to inequality is not surprising given that individuals report that they would prefer less inequality within their society (Norton & Ariely, 2011; Rawls, 2001). In the US, Occupy Wall Street is a movement in which large groups of people publicly protest against the rising levels of inequality prevalent within society. Similarly, rising levels of inequality in the UK have provoked collective action involving protests. In the summer of 2011, riots broke out across London and surrounding areas which were described as a consequence of the widening gap between richer and poorer sectors of society (Till, 2013).

Within western cultures particularly, inequality has risen steadily (Milanovic, 2002; Piketty & Saez, 2006; Pickett, 2012). In the midst of this rising inequality within the UK, a right wing political party was elected into government. It could be argued that this result was surprising given that individuals generally favour equality and would prefer society to be more equal (Norton & Ariely, 2011; Rawls, 2001). In Western society, liberals are often surprised when conservative governments are elected despite the prevalence of social injustices such as inequality (Haidt & Graham, 2007).

Why would the British electorate choose to elect a party whose political ideology traditionally conflicts with the redistribution of wealth? One possibility is that the level of inequality is actually underestimated (Norton & Ariely, 2011) or that individuals think, over-optimistically, that social mobility is readily achievable (Benabou & Ok, 2001; Keister, 2005). Another possibility is that people are drawn to ideologies which are thought to offer personal benefits in the short term, without appreciating that in the long term they perpetuate social problems such as inequality and escalate conflicts. In order to gain a better understanding of this issue, further research is needed to assess the perceived functions of different political ideologies within intergroup and intragroup contexts. Furthermore, as yet research has not assessed lay theories of the benefits people think they will experience from their own ideological choices. Such research is needed in order to fully understand the conditions under which people endorse different ideological constructs.

### **1.1: Overview of the chapters**

In Chapter 2, I provide a literature review of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). I begin by reviewing the literature surrounding the original conception of SDO, from social dominance theory, as an ideology which promotes support for inequality and social cohesion in addition to legitimising the position of higher status groups (Pratto et al., 1994). I also review research which supports the contention that in addition to a personality variable, SDO is responsive to the social context. For example, I review studies which support the idea that the endorsement of SDO is promoted through increasing the status of the ingroup relative to outgroups (Liu et al., 1999) and perceived threat (Rios Morison & Ybarra, 2008). Crucially, I also look at the research which highlights the uniqueness of SDO, separating it from other measures such as Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA). Furthermore, I report study findings

which demonstrate that the endorsement of SDO can be linked to support for conflicts such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (McFarland, 2005).

In Chapter 3, I offer a literature review of the research surrounding folk knowledge and lay theories within psychology. Within this chapter, I argue that lay individuals (i.e. those individuals not familiar with empirical research) are motivated to make sense of behaviours and ideologies in much the same way as social scientists. Furthermore, I argue that much of the time individuals do this rather accurately leading to culturally shared ideas about, for example, what constitutes intentionality. Within the chapter, I also discuss how lay theories can be reconciled with scientific research and discuss the prominence of lay theories pertinent to both individual and intergroup behaviours as well as those surrounding political ideology.

The purpose of these two chapters is to provide a rationale for research into the specific characteristics of intergroup conflict which might be recognised as being responsible for promoting increased endorsement of SDO (Chapter 4). In three subsequent empirical chapters I aim to provide evidence that individuals have an appreciation of the functions of SDO, such as promoting inequality and support for an ingroup's efforts when embroiled in international conflicts (Chapters 5). The ideas discussed in Chapter 3 informed the research questions and methodologies employed within Chapters 6 and 7 where lay theories of the functions and consequences of endorsing ideological variables are investigated.

In Chapter 6, I consider what perceptions are held regarding the consequences of endorsing right wing ideological variables for individuals. Specifically, I aim to research whether participants recognise that endorsing a right wing ideology fulfils existential, epistemic and relational needs, as suggested by Jost, Glaser, et al. (2003). In Chapter 7, two studies research whether participants associate psychological benefits with left as well as

right wing ideology, and what factors are perceived to attract people to the a left versus right wing political orientation.

In the final chapter, I provide a general discussion which outlines my research findings and how they relate to the literature introduced in my two theoretical chapters. Most importantly, I discuss whether the findings of studies within Chapters 5-7 support the contention that lay theories of the purpose of political ideologies are compatible with scientific theories. Furthermore, I discuss to what extent the findings in this thesis suggest that ideologies are endorsed, at least in part, for strategic reasons, despite their ability to perpetuate social and political problems that people claim to dislike. I also outline the limitations of my research and potential future research based on these limitations.

## CHAPTER TWO

### SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION AND ITS APPLICATION TO INTERGROUP CONFLICT

#### 2.1: An introduction to intergroup relations

Many social psychologists have attempted to explain what motivates individuals to join groups or, in other words, what the benefits of group membership are. In their social identity theory, Tajfel and Turner (1979) postulate that in addition to personal identity, group membership is an essential component of an individual's sense of self. Tajfel and Turner suggest that individuals will form groups with similar others (ingroups) which provide us with rules for how to behave (social norms). Other groups (outgroups) are perceived as being different to the ingroup which allows individuals to evaluate their own groups as being distinct. This social categorisation reduces subjective uncertainty (Hogg, 2007; Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis et al., 2007) and fulfils other psychological needs such as increasing self-esteem (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon et al., 2004).

Given that self-esteem is in part derived from our group membership, it is not surprising that individuals are motivated to engage in ingroup favouritism: in other words, to evaluate their ingroup more favourably than outgroups (Brewer, 1979; Messick & Mackie, 1989; Tajfel, 1982; Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979). Brewer (1979, 1999) distinguishes 'ingroup love' and 'outgroup hate' as two distinct processes, and contends that ingroup bias is achieved through ingroup love more than outgroup hate.

Despite this differentiation, research has shown that one way to achieve ingroup favouritism is to discriminate against outgroups (Levin & Sidanius, 1999; Tajfel & Turner,

1986). Indeed, Lemyre and Smith (1985) demonstrated that self-esteem can be increased by providing opportunities for individuals to discriminate against outgroup members.

Despite the advantages for groups which can be derived from ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination, a negative consequence of these processes is the promotion of negative intergroup relations, such as intergroup conflict (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Within the context of conflict, groups are generally more prone to aggression and violence than individuals (Halevy, Bornstein & Sagiv, 2008). Within intergroup conflicts, individuals have often demonstrated personal sacrifice in order to support their group's cause (Campbell, 1965; Halevy et al.). Halevy et al. contend that this motivation is driven by 'ingroup love' rather than 'outgroup hate'. However, if achieving the best possible outcome for the ingroup is only obtainable through harming an outgroup, ingroup members will commit to this course of action without hesitation (Halevy et al.).

Another distinction between ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation is that the former has been shown to be an implicit, automatic process (Otten & Moskowitz, 2000; Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990; Roth & Steffens, in press). In their study, Perdue et al. (1990) found that participants evaluated pronouns pertaining to the ingroup (e.g., us) as being more favourable than those relating to an outgroup (e.g., them). Similarly, Perdue et al. found that when participants had been primed with ingroup pronouns they were faster to rate positive traits compared to negative traits. When participants had been primed with outgroup pronouns the reverse was found. These results were taken to be a demonstration of the implicit nature of ingroup favouritism (Perdue et al., 1990).

In addition to social identity theory, *Realistic Group Conflict Theory* (Sherif, 1966) offers another account of the processes leading to groups becoming embroiled in conflict. Sherif contends that when groups perceive themselves to be involved in zero-sum

competitions over resources, that is when one group's loss is another group's gain, its members experience increased awareness of ingroup versus outgroup identities. This in turn leads to increased commitment to their ingroup and negative stereotyping of the outgroup. These psychological responses result in prejudice and conflict (Campbell, 1965; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Both social identity theory and realistic group conflict theory (RGCT) are concerned with how group processes lead to prejudice and conflict. However, the theories differ on the specific processes that lead to these outcomes. Social identity theory contends that groups are motivated to feel positively about the ingroup (e.g., Brewer, 1979). As a result, groups are primarily concerned with procuring symbolic resources and fulfilling psychological needs such as security, esteem, and reduced uncertainty (e.g., Hogg, 2007; Lemyre & Smith, 1985). The desire to hold one's ingroup in higher regard than outgroups leads to prejudice. In contrast, RGCT contends that groups are concerned with the procurement of tangible and scarce resources (Sherif, 1966). The direct competition for these resources with an outgroup is what promotes prejudice and conflict.

In addition to competition over status and resources, ideological differences motivate hostile intergroup relations. For example, individuals have been found to be motivated to develop high levels of ingroup favouritism for ideological groups, such as political or religious groups (Hogg, Hohman, & Rivera, 2008). One example of an ideological variable which has been studied extensively within the context of intergroup relations is Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). SDO is rooted in the competition for both status and resources between groups (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). As a result, SDO can be seen as influenced by processes specified by both SIT and RGCT, rendering it a theoretically interesting variable for consideration in the promotion of intergroup conflict.

Within this thesis, I research what factors motivate the endorsement of SDO within the context of intergroup conflict and whether this increased endorsement motivates further commitment to conflicts. Furthermore, I research what the perceived consequences of endorsing ideological variables such as SDO are for individuals and groups. In doing so, I aim to establish that individuals have an appreciation for the functions of ideologies including SDO. If this is indeed the case, one can conclude that individuals may be drawn to their ideological choices, at least in part, for strategic reasons.

Within this first chapter, I will provide a literature review of social dominance theory and social dominance orientation (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar, & Levin, 2004) and experimental evidence which will support my contention that SDO is important for consideration within intergroup relations. I will focus on research which has demonstrated that SDO responds to intergroup threat and competition, and motivates support for conflict. Although such research exists, there are also reasons to believe that it has not fully explained the importance of SDO in motivating intergroup conflicts. This potential for future research is highlighted in this chapter and informs study designs reported in this thesis.

## **2.2: Social dominance theory and SDO**

Social identity theory and RGCT focus on how competition for symbolic or material resources for one's ingroup promotes prejudice towards outgroups. In contrast, *social dominance theory* (Sidanius & Pratto, 1996, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, & Mitchell, 1994; Sidanius et al., 2004) is concerned with understanding how an individual's personality, group membership, and cultural ideologies all combine to formulate their support for unequal group relations (Sidanius et al., 2004) According to Sidanius et al., social dominance theory considers processes such as prejudice, discrimination and derogation as examples of "group-



based oppression” (p. 846). Social dominance theory focusses on providing an explanation for this general preference for groups to be structured hierarchically, rather than focussing on the promotion of single processes such as prejudice (Sidanius et al.). This focus highlights that while social identity theory is concerned with groups’ desire for social status, social dominance theory is additionally concerned with groups’ motivations to achieve greater social power (Sidanius et al.). Both social status and social power are acquired through securing a position at the top of the social hierarchy (Sidanius et al.).

Sidanius et al. (2004) note that group based hierarchy is often achieved through the unequal distribution of resources, such as healthcare, employment opportunities and housing. Often, these resources are directed towards high status groups further perpetuating social inequalities (Sidanius et al.). According to social dominance theory, there are three categorisations which determine relative group statuses within economically stable societies (Pratto, Sidanius & Levin, 2006). Two of these categorisations are based upon age and gender. A third categorisation is based upon a set of arbitrary factors such as race or nationality. These categorisations are arbitrary in the sense that they are not a determined aspect of a person’s life (Pratto et al.). Pratto et al. assert that within economically stable societies, adults have more social, political and military power compared to children. Similarly, men have disproportionately more power compared to women. In the case of arbitrary groups, ethnic minorities tend to possess disproportionately less power than ethnic majority groups (Pratto et al.).

Social dominance theory asserts that one way to achieve harmony in the face of inequality is to legitimize status differences between these groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Legitimization can be achieved through the implementation of *hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths* (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). These myths provide individuals with norms as to how society should be structured and how to behave in response

to this structure. Examples of hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths include support for meritocracy, ethnic prejudice and the negative stereotyping of low status groups (Pratto et al.).

A result of these hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths is that individuals begin to support institutions which distribute resources unequally (Sidanius et al., 2004). Furthermore, Sidanius et al report that when given the opportunity to decide how resources should be distributed, individuals will allocate resources unequally. This behaviour suggests that individuals have endorsed ideologies which legitimise the actions of institutions that favour high status groups and promote social inequality (Sidanius et al.).

However, social dominance theory asserts that the legitimization of inequality has different consequences for high and low status groups (Sidanius et al., 2004). According to social dominance theory, members of high status groups who both legitimise and favour inequality will experience increased ingroup favouritism. In contrast, members of low status groups who legitimise inequality will experience reduced ingroup favouritism. In extreme cases, this can even lead to outgroup favouritism for higher status outgroups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius et al.). This difference in process between high and low status groups is termed the asymmetry hypothesis (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius et al.).

Social dominance theory has also been able to account for *behavioural asymmetry* which refers to the tendency for high status groups to act in their own self-interest to a higher degree than low status groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). According to Sidanius et al., behavioural asymmetry will become more apparent when society as a whole has legitimised the unequal distribution of resources. The fact that social dominance theory accounts for both different behavioural processes and levels of ingroup favouritism within different status groups is another feature which distinguishes it from social identity theory (Sidanius et al.).

*Social Dominance Orientation* (SDO) is a variable which measures the extent of individuals' preference for inequality among social groups (Sidanius, Levin, Federico, & Pratto, 2001). This is achieved through the measurement of two components: a desire for dominance and opposition to equality (Ho et al., 2012; Jost & Thompson, 2000; Kugler, Cooper, & Nosek, 2010). Individuals who are higher (vs. lower) in SDO are more likely to hold beliefs such as, "*sometimes it is necessary to step on other groups*" and are less likely to endorse hierarchy attenuating ideals such as, "*increased social equality*" (Pratto et al., 1994). SDO has been linked to support for hierarchy legitimizing policies including military policies and a disengagement with hierarchy attenuating policies including women's rights programmes (Pratto et al., 1994; Pratto, Stallworth, & Conway-Lanz, 1998; Sidanius, Levin, & Pratto, 1996). In addition to being linked to a general preference for hierarchy, SDO has been found to predict individuals' desire for their own ingroup to dominate outgroups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Put differently, SDO captures the extent to which individuals endorse outgroup oppression, offering another distinction from SIT (Sidanius et al., 2004).

Levin and Sidanius (1999) sought to reconcile social identity theory (SIT) and social dominance theory (SDT). Levin and Sidanius researched how ingroup identification and the endorsement of SDO promoted positive and negative affect towards high and low status ingroups and outgroups, drawing upon Brewer's (1979, 1999) distinction between ingroup love and outgroup hate. Sidanius and Levin postulated that the difference between SDO and SIT is that according to SIT, ingroup bias stems from positive evaluations of the ingroup rather than outgroup derogation. Thus, ingroup identification should not be strongly associated with outgroup affect. According to SDT, if individuals are truly motivated to establish and legitimise hierarchy within society then it follows that individuals will hold higher status outgroups, compared to lower status outgroups, in more positive regard thereby legitimising their dominant position (Levin & Sidanius).

In order to test this contention, Levin and Sidanius (1999) carried out a study with groups of American and Israeli students. There were four samples of participants. One sample of American students was asked to consider their feelings towards European-Americans and Latin-Americans. One group of Jewish students was asked to consider feelings towards Ashkenazim and Mizrachim. A second sample of Jewish students and a group of Arab students were asked to consider feelings towards Jewish and Arab citizens in Israel. Groups were identified based on pre-existing status differences. Participants were asked to complete measures of SDO, ingroup identification, perceptions of group status and group affect.

Levin and Sidanius (1999) found that within all groups, stronger ingroup identification promoted positive ingroup affect. For most groups, higher SDO was positively related to negative outgroup affect towards lower status groups, but did not always predict positive affect towards ingroup members. Instead, positive ingroup affect was related to stronger ingroup identification. Crucially, Levin and Sidanius also found differences between the relationships among variables within high compared to low status groups. While SDO was negatively associated with ingroup identification for most low status groups, it was positively related to ingroup identification for high status groups. The results are consistent with the idea that positive ingroup affect and negative outgroup affect are explained by SIT and SDT respectively. Crucially, the effects within higher status groups did not vary in line with the extent to which the status between groups differed. Thus, Levin and Sidanius concluded that even small levels of differences in social status make hierarchies, and the desire to remain at the top of that hierarchy, salient. Levin and Sidanius' results point to the likely contribution that SDT can make in explaining the processes which motivate the escalation of intergroup conflicts. In other words, the desire for group based dominance, even

where intergroup status differences are small, may play a crucial role in the maintenance of intergroup conflict.

Given that research has linked SDO with negative outgroup affect, researchers have sought to determine whether SDO is relatively stable or promoted through particular contextual features. Some researchers suggest that SDO is a relatively stable personality trait which can be traced back to childhood experiences. In keeping with the suggestion, work by Duckitt has demonstrated a link between SDO and unaffectionate socialization, low empathy and low agreeableness during childhood (Duckitt, 2001; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). Pratto et al. (1994) also researched the consistency of SDO. Pratto et al. measured participant's SDO scores at three month intervals. The two sets of scores were found to correlate significantly ( $r = .81$ ), showing stability in the measurement of SDO as a personality variable over time.

More recently, Sibley and Liu (2010) carried out two studies in order to establish whether SDO reflects a stable personality trait or is a factor which generally motivates prejudicial attitudes towards outgroups. Sibley and Liu used Sidanius and Pratto's (1999) SDO scale, both in the original form as a measure of general support for group dominance and in three adapted forms which applied to inequality between specific types of groups (different gender, age and ethnicity groups). Participants were asked to complete these four scales. Each of the SDO scales was measured across five one-month time intervals. Sibley and Liu demonstrated that attitudes towards inequality with regards to different types of groups (i.e., based upon age, gender and ethnicity) all predicted participants' endorsement of SDO. Crucially, each sub-scale contributed unique variance to the prediction of participants' overall endorsement of SDO. As a result of this finding, Sibley and Liu concluded that SDO does not simply reflect attitudes towards a given specific type of inequality. Instead, SDO reflects a general predisposition towards favouring social inequality. Sibley and Liu also report that there was evidence found for top-down and bottom-up processes operating

simultaneously. SDO, once established, predicted prejudicial attitudes towards outgroups and, in turn, these attitudes reinforced individuals' endorsement of SDO.

Cumulatively, Pratto et al.'s (1994) and Sibley and Liu's (2010) findings provide evidence that SDO reflects individuals' general favourable predisposition towards inequality and group based dominance. Another implication of Sibley and Liu's work is that the relationship between SDO and negative outgroup affect is bidirectional. As a result, one can infer that if endorsed as a result of intergroup conflicts, SDO is then likely to further perpetuate the desire for dominance over the outgroup.

In addition to considering SDO a personality variable which predicts desire for hierarchy and prejudice towards outgroups, research has also considered the contributory factor of group membership to individuals' endorsement of SDO. One example of the relationship between group membership and the endorsement of SDO concerns gender differences. Men are reliably shown to be higher in SDO than women (Levin, 2004; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius et al., 2004; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002). Typically men have held a higher status within society (Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006; Sidanius et al., 2004). Thus, it would make sense that men would be more agreeable to producing and promoting ideologies which maintain status differences based on group membership and categories within society.

In addition to gender group membership, SDO has also been studied within different status groups. Sidanius et al. (2004) report that individuals who find themselves in higher status groups are more likely to support a hierarchical structure to society compared to those in low status groups. Members of groups which can be considered dominant in terms of their enjoyed higher status, such as White Americans, have consistently been found to possess a higher level of SDO than those with lower in status such as African Americans (Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz, & Federico, 1998; Pratto et al., 1994; Pratto et al., 2000; Sidanius et

al., 2000; Sidanius et al., 2004). Thus, these findings lend support for the idea that SDO is adopted as a means of maintaining status differences within societies.

Batalha, Reynolds and Newbiggin (2011) considered whether status differences could explain gender differences in SDO. They reasoned that men's higher SDO is a product of their higher social status, rather than any innate tendency toward dominance orientation. This implies that where social status differentials between men and women are small, gender differences in SDO should also be small. In their first study, Batalha et al. compared SDO in two samples of students from Sweden (a relatively gender-egalitarian society according to the World Value Survey), and Australia (a less gender-egalitarian society). Results showed that while men in Australia scored higher on SDO than women, no gender differences were found in the Swedish sample. This effect was conceptually replicated when comparing men and women within hierarchy enhancing and attenuating academic majors, and in a third study where status was manipulated between groups of students. This led Batalha et al. to conclude that the differences in SDO between gender groups are more likely a product of an interaction between gender and contextual features which make status differences salient:

the relationship between gender and SDO was not inevitable or straightforward, having been affected by socio-structural features of a society, ideological beliefs embedded in academic majors and reactions to status change (p. 805).

Another form of group membership associated with SDO concerns people's career choices. Pratto et al. (1994) looked for links between individuals' SDO and their career choices. Within the study, hierarchy-enhancing careers were defined as jobs which were *“primarily aimed at protecting, serving, or benefiting elite members of society more than oppressed members...”* (Pratto et al., p. 747). In comparison, hierarchy-attenuating jobs were

defined as jobs which favoured oppressed members of society rather than elite members. Pratto et al. found that individuals higher in SDO were more likely to seek jobs which were hierarchy-enhancing, whereas those with low SDO scores sought employment in roles which were hierarchy-attenuating (also see Sidanius, van Laar, Levin, & Sinclair, 2003). Pratto et al. controlled for gender differences since it would be expected that women would be more likely to strive for jobs which were hierarchy-attenuating whereas men would favour jobs which were hierarchy-enhancing (e.g., Pratto, Stallworth, Sidanius, & Siers, 1997).

These results have been replicated by several researchers. For example, Sidanius et al. (1994) compared individuals who fell into one of four categories in Los Angeles: police officers, public defenders, students and citizens who were all called for jury duty. These represented a hierarchy-enhancing role, a hierarchy-attenuating role, individuals with mixed intentions for the future, and individuals in a variety of social roles at the present time, respectively. As predicted, after controlling for demographic variables such as age, race and gender, police officers were found to be highest in SDO followed by students, jurors and public defenders.

More recent studies by Guimond (2000) and Dambrun, Guimond and Duarte (2002) also provided support for the link between individuals' SDO and their job preferences. Students studying social psychology were found to be lower in SDO than those studying law (Guimond, 2000). Psychology and law can be interpreted as being hierarchy-attenuating and enhancing respectively. Those pursuing hierarchy enhancing roles would need to be able to legitimise status differences, and therefore benefit from the endorsement of SDO. The relationship between the endorsement of SDO and variables such as career choice can be considered cyclical. The research carried out by Pratto et al., Sidanius et al., and Guimond et al. has demonstrated links between individuals' endorsement of SDO and their subsequent career choices. Once in a hierarchy-enhancing role, individuals are likely to have their desire



for hierarchy reinforced, further perpetuating the desire for group-based dominance. The results from the studies presented thus far provide support for the contention that SDT offers a better explanation for the promotion of outgroup oppression compared to SIT or RGCT alone. Furthermore, SDO has also been shown to be augmented by aspects of intergroup relations that reinforce the desire to maintain social inequality between high and low status groups.

### **2.3: SDO and other ideologies**

In addition to distinguishing SDT from SIT and RGCT, it is also important to note distinctions between SDT and system justification theory (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). Furthermore, SDO can be distinguished from related ideological variables including right wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996) and political conservatism (Sidanius, Pratto & Bobo, 1996; van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002).

**2.3.1: Social dominance theory and system justification theory.** System justification theory asserts that individuals are dependent on institutions (or social systems) for access to resources and security which motivates them to legitimise those institutions (Jost & Banaji, 1994). In order to legitimise social systems, individuals are motivated to perceive them as fair and efficient (Jost & Banaji). When there is a danger of these social systems being perceived as unfair, for example due to the unequal distribution of resources, groups (particularly low status groups) are likely to experience cognitive dissonance.

In an attempt to resolve these feelings of dissonance, low status groups have been shown to internalize negative group stereotypes and engage in outgroup favouritism (Jost,

Pelham, Sheldon & Sullivan, 2003). In doing so, low status groups perceive any injustice they experience as deserved and therefore maintain trust in the social systems. For example, legitimising economic inequality by engaging in derogation of the ingroup allows low status groups to maintain trust in their government (Kay & Jost, 2003; Jost et al. 2003).

Based upon these functions of system justification, it is clear that there are similarities with social dominance theory. Both theories serve to legitimate hierarchical intergroup relations within society (Sidanius et al., 2004). Furthermore, both theories suggest that high and low status groups are motivated to support the status quo and maintain social hierarchies (Sidanius et al.). Both theories also agree that low status groups face difficulties reconciling their experience of social injustice and low status with the desire to maintain positive feelings towards their society (Jost & Burgess, 2000; Sidanius et al.).

However, Sidanius et al. (2004) also contend that there are important distinguishing features of system justification theory and social dominance theory. Unlike system justification theory, social dominance theory acknowledges that there are hierarchy-attenuating ideologies which are endorsed along with those which are hierarchy-enhancing. It is the balance between these two conflicting ideologies which maintains the status quo within society (Sidanius et al.).

Jost et al. (2004) offer further support for the contention that system justification and social dominance theories are distinct. Jost et al. draw upon Jost and Banaji's (1994) identification of three motivations within higher and lower status groups concerning the legitimisation of social inequality. The three factors identified by Jost and Banaji were ego justification, group justification and system justification. Ego justification refers to the motivations for an individual to maintain a positive self-image despite belonging to a low status group. Group justification refers to the need for individuals in lower status groups to

maintain favourable evaluations of their group, despite their relatively low social standing. System justification refers to the motivation to view one's society as fair and therefore attribute status differences between groups as legitimate and inevitable (Jost et al., 2004). According to Jost et al., SIT can account for ego and group justification since according to SIT, maintaining a positive image of the ingroup produces and maintains a positive self-image (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). SDT is able to explain the motivation to justify the group and system, since doing so inevitably maintains social hierarchy (Jost et al.). However, according to Jost et al., neither SIT nor SDT can account for all three motivations. This account is provided by system justification theory which provides a distinction between each of the three theories.

**2.3.2: SDO and right wing authoritarianism.** Right Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981) is another ideological variable which promotes prejudice towards outgroups, in particular minorities (Altemeyer, 1996; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2005). Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) is characterised as an adherence to traditional values and norms, a tendency to respect and obey authority figures and the motivation to punish anyone who threatens authority figures or flouts traditional norms (Altemeyer, 1981, 1996).

McFarland and Adelson (1996) tested to what extent SDO and RWA promote prejudice towards African-Americans, women and homosexuals. These three measures of prejudice (racism, sexism and homophobia) were used to generate a single variable for analysis. When RWA and SDO were simultaneously analysed via a regression analysis they accounted for 50% of the variance in prejudice. Thus, McFarland and Adelson concluded that SDO and RWA combined was a strong predictor of prejudice.

Despite the ability of both ideological variables to predict prejudice, Kreindler (2005) proposed a dual process model which suggested the SDO and RWA promote prejudice towards outgroups and within ingroups, respectively. Kreindler (2005) contends that SDO will promote negative affect towards outgroups who are perceived to pose competition with the ingroup. In contrast, RWA is concerned with the promotion of negative relations within the ingroup (Kreindler). According to the model, RWA promotes negative affect towards ingroup members who threaten the societal norms of the group. Thus, whereas SDO is concerned with group differentiation, RWA motivates prejudice within intragroup contexts (Kreindler).

Duckitt (2001, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007, 2010a, 2010b; Sibley & Duckitt, 2013) also contend that there is a dual process model which accounts for differences between SDO and RWA in the promotion of prejudice. However, in contrast to Kreindler's (2005) model, Duckitt and Sibley contend that both ideological variables predict prejudice towards outgroups. The distinction within this model is between different types of outgroups.

Duckitt (2006) provided experimental support for his proposed dual process model. In this study, Duckitt measured participants' SDO, RWA and attitudes towards deviant and subordinate groups. Two groups which were defined as threatening to the social order (or deviant) were drug dealers and rock stars. Three groups which were considered to be socially subordinate were housewives, the unemployed and physically disabled individuals. The extent to which participants felt that each group posed a threat to the safety and functioning within society, or posed competition for resources within society was also measured. Two mediation models were found. Perceived threat, but not competitiveness, mediated the effect of RWA upon attitudes towards deviant groups. In contrast, competitiveness but not threat mediated the relationship between SDO and socially subordinate groups (Duckitt, 2006).

Duckitt and Sibley (2007) provided further support for Duckitt's dual process model of prejudice. Duckitt and Sibley researched the extent to which RWA and SDO were able to predict prejudice towards a range of social groups including immigrants, violent criminals and obese individuals. Factor analysis revealed three distinct types of groups: dangerous groups, derogated groups and dissident groups. Dangerous groups were categorised as those which posed a threat to the safety and wellbeing of society as a whole (e.g., criminals). Derogated groups were categorised as those which are traditionally stigmatised and perceived as subordinate within society (e.g., obese individuals). Dissident groups were categorised as those which challenged the norms within society, such as those who criticise authority figures. Subsequent hierarchical linear modelling revealed that RWA significantly predicted negative attitudes towards dangerous and dissident groups. In contrast, SDO was found to significantly predict negative attitudes towards derogated and dissident groups (Duckitt & Sibley).

Together, Duckitt (2006) and Duckitt and Sibley (2007) show that SDO responds to perceived competition and, within a competitive context, promotes negative attitudes towards outgroups. They also demonstrate that although they are similar constructs, SDO and RWA promote negative intergroup relations via distinct causal processes.

**2.3.3: SDO and conservatism.** Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo (1996) contend that political conservatism predicts a rejection of policies designed to reduce inequality. For example, conservatives tend to be anti-affirmative action when it comes to employment. According to Sidanius et al. (1996), conservatives report that this view is not a demonstration of racist attitudes, but instead stems from the fear that better candidates will be looked over in favour of candidates from minority groups. As a result, conservatives feel that affirmative

action is unfair, and argue that instead people should be rewarded based upon their own hard work and success (Sidanius et al.). This perspective has been termed the *principled conservatism model*.

However, Sidanius et al. (1996) argue that the motivation for conservatives to reject affirmative action can also be explained from a *general group dominance perspective* (for example, SDT), in which political ideologies are used to rationalise the unequal distribution of resources. Sidanius et al. assert that,

...the ideology of political conservatism can be considered a central and general legitimizing ideology. One function of this ideology is to provide moral and intellectual legitimacy to the unequal distribution of value to different groups in the social system and to thereby give support to continued hierarchical group relations (p. 478).

A crucial difference between the two perspectives is that according to the principled conservatism model, the relationship between conservatism and racism should be weaker among highly educated individuals. In comparison, according to the general group dominance perspective, the relationship between conservatism and racism should be stronger among highly educated individuals (Sidanius et al.).

In order to provide support for the general group dominance approach, Sidanius et al. (1996) measured participants' political orientation and SDO. Racism was operationalised by a measure of classical racism and "anti-Black affect" (p. 482). A significant correlation was found between SDO and political conservatism ( $r = .30$ ). However, this effect was only apparent among well-educated participants. A significant correlation was also observed between political conservatism and racist attitudes, however this effect was accounted for through participants' SDO (Sidanius et al.). Crucially, the relationship between conservatism,

SDO, and racism upon anti-affirmative action was stronger among high (compared to low) educated participants.

These results suggest that at their core, both political conservatism and SDO legitimise social inequality and promote support for policies which maintain hierarchy. Despite the fact that SDO accounted for the relationship between conservatism and racism, the principled conservatism model could not be fully supported due to the fact that the effects of conservatism, SDO, and racism upon anti-affirmative action increased with ‘intellectual sophistication’ (Sidanius et al., 1996). Although they are seemingly similar constructs, political conservatism promotes SDO which in turn accounts for negative intergroup relations, such as racism and prejudice, which maintain social inequalities. An implication of this work is that it provides further evidence that SDO is an important ideological variable to consider within the context of hostile intergroup relations.

In addition to finding an association between conservatism and SDO, some researchers have suggested that SDO is a predictor of individuals’ political attitudes (Christopher, Zabel, Jones & Marek, 2008; Jetten & Iyer, 2010; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002). Jetten and Iyer (2010) studied this proposed relationship within a student sample. Jetten and Iyer measured students’ endorsement of SDO and their political orientations two months before attending university and again eight months later. Jetten and Iyer found that participants’ initial endorsement of SDO did not predict their political orientations after they had attended university for six months, even when controlling for their original political orientations. Jetten and Iyer also report that, on average, students tend to become more liberal after attending university. However, the researchers found that students from high social-class backgrounds, compared to those from lower class backgrounds, were less likely to shift their political orientations to become more left wing. This effect was mediated by shifts in SDO. Furthermore, students higher in SDO were more likely to increase

their endorsement of SDO when in a hierarchy attenuating environment, characterised by studying a hierarchy attenuating subject. This effect, in turn, predicted changes in political attitudes. These findings are indicative of the stronger relationship between SDO and political attitudes among individuals in higher relative to lower social-classes.

In addition to distinguishing the effects of SDO upon political orientation between different social classes, some researchers have found that the different components of SDO identified by Ho et al (2012) and Jost and Thompson (2000) do not predict political orientation to the same extent. Ho et al. provided evidence that the desire for group based dominance is a better predictor of political conservatism and negative outgroup affect compared to the second component of SDO (opposition to equality).

Taken together, these findings provide evidence that there is indeed a bidirectional relationship between SDO and political conservatism. SDO, specifically the desire for dominance, has been found to predict conservative attitudes and mediate the relationship between conservatism and negative intergroup relations. This relationship is stronger within high status groups.

#### **2.4: SDO and intergroup relations**

Having argued that SDO is distinct from other ideological variables and that social dominance theory is best suited to explain the promotion of outgroup oppression, it is important to further explore the evidence that SDO promotes negative intergroup relations.

Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov and Duarte (2003) researched whether SDO promotes prejudice within both dominant and subordinate groups. They carried out their research with university students and found that law students' (categorised as a dominant group) SDO



increased, while psychology students' (categorised as a subordinate group) SDO decreased as they progressed through their degree studies year on year. Furthermore, Guimond et al. found evidence that SDO mediated the relationship between a dominant social position and prejudice once intergroup boundaries and group dominance was well established. Thus, an important implication of Guimond et al.'s results is that the more pervasive and the longer the group boundaries have been established, the greater the role that SDO plays in promoting intergroup prejudice.

Some research has suggested that rather than reflecting a general preference for outgroup derogation, SDO promotes negative attitudes towards specific groups when that particular group categorisation is made salient. Schmitt, Branscombe and Kaplin (2003) theorised that when individuals are asked about their attitudes towards social inequality, they likely have specific groups in mind. Schmitt et al. tested whether SDO predicted a preference for unequal group relations between groups defined by race or gender, rather than a predisposition towards endorsing inequality in general. During a pre-test, participants were asked to fill in a survey measuring racism. In the first study participants were asked to complete a SDO scale and provide a list of the groups they had in mind when completing the scale. Additionally they were provided with a list of social groups and asked to identify the percentage of time they thought about each whilst completing the scale. The majority of participants indicated that they answered the SDO scales with race in mind as the specific type of group categorisation. Additionally, the less time that participants thought about race whilst filling in the scale, the weaker the relationship between SDO and racism (as determined by the pre-test) was. This led to the conclusion that SDO and racism correlate under specific conditions where race is the salient categorisation cue (Schmitt et al.).

In their second study, Schmitt et al. (2003) manipulated whether participants thought about gender or race while filling in a SDO scale. Participants had previously completed a

measure of sexism which was used for analysis in this study. Using regression analysis, the researchers indicated that when race was salient, SDO was related to racism but not sexism. Similarly, when gender was salient, SDO was related to measures of sexism but not racism. As a result, Schmitt et al. concluded that the specific attitudes (e.g. racism or sexism) reflected within an individuals' endorsement of SDO can be partly attributed to specific types of inequality made salient by the social context. The implication of this finding is that SDO is able to promote negative intergroup relations within a specific context. For example, if the endorsement of SDO is increased during intergroup conflicts it will likely increase commitment to that specific conflict, not a more general increased desire to fight all groups for dominance.

Kteily, Sidanius and Levin (2011) aimed to find evidence that contrary to Schmitt et al.'s (2003) conclusions, SDO is a causal predictor of generalised outgroup derogation. Kteily et al. employed the use of cross lagged designs with Caucasian participants who were asked to complete measures of SDO, attitudes towards ethnic outgroups and friendship preferences. Measures were taken twice, with a four year interval. In order to assess participants' attitudes towards ethnic outgroups, Kteily et al. asked participants how positively they felt towards Latinos, Asian Americans and African Americans. Participants were also asked to indicate how many of their closest friends belonged to each of these ethnic groups and how many were Caucasian. Kteily et al. found that participants' SDO in 1996 significantly predicted their SDO ( $r = .58$ ), negative outgroup affect ( $r = .25$ ) and ingroup friendship preferences ( $r = .21$ ) in 2000. The implications of Kteily et al.'s findings are that SDO is a stable personality trait and predicts a general preference for ingroups along with negative affect towards outgroups.

This contention was further supported by Kteily, Ho and Sidanius (2012) who also demonstrated that SDO reflects a preference for group-based hierarchy. In Kteily et al.'s

study this preference extended to groups generally rather than groups based on specific and salient types of categorisation. Furthermore, it was not necessary to give an instruction to think about groups generally (rather than specific groups) when completing measures of SDO and outgroup affect in order to produce this result (Kteily et al.). Taken together, the findings obtained by Kteily et al. (2011) and Kteily et al. (2012) suggest that while asking participants to think about specific groups while completing SDO scales may produce a stronger relationship between SDO and specific examples of outgroup derogation (e.g., Schmitt et al., 2003), SDO is a variable which represents a general orientation towards hierarchical and negative intergroup relations. As a result, SDO is a crucial variable for consideration within the promotion of hostile intergroup relations, which one would expect to escalate during times of international conflicts.

In addition to these experiments which have demonstrated effects with realistic group memberships, studies which have employed the use of the *minimal group paradigm* (Tajfel, 1971) have replicated these findings. Studies which are designed using the minimal group paradigm test the effects of categorisation alone upon behaviour by aggregating individuals into groups based upon trivial criteria (e.g., Sherif 1966).

One such study was carried out by Sidanius, Pratto and Mitchell (1994). Participants were allocated to groups based on a trivial task. They were categorised as over or under estimators based on a counting task and put into two groups corresponding to this categorisation. Unbeknown to the participants, group allocation was random. Participants were then asked to fill out scales which measured intergroup evaluations, desire for social distance and intergroup cooperation. Intergroup evaluations measured how competent each group was perceived as being. Social distance was measured in terms of whether participants considered the minimal group categorisations to be relevant in real professional and social contexts. Finally, intergroup cooperation was measured in terms of how willing participants

were to work collectively on a task. Combined, these three measured were referred to as *differential intergroup social allocations* (Sidanius et al.).

As Sidanius et al. (1994) expected, individuals higher in SDO showed more ingroup favouritism, operationalised by positive evaluations. Furthermore, participants higher in SDO showed a greater desire for social distance from the outgroup and were less willing to cooperate with them on a task. While the researchers did not refer to this as prejudice per se, the desire to maintain distance from outgroups in addition to the desire to maintain dominance over them has clear negative connotations. These findings demonstrate how powerful the effects of group membership are in conjunction with SDO. Even temporary and trivial group memberships have been found to elicit effects consistent with those experienced in real group dynamics (e.g. Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz, & Federico, 1998; Pratto et al., 1994; Pratto et al., 2000; Sidanius et al., 2000; Sidanius et al., 2004). These findings establish grounds for the use of minimal group paradigms in experimental contexts designed to look at SDO and its role in group dynamics.

## **2.5: SDO and context**

Much research has been carried out into the specific contextual features of intergroup relations which, if made salient, promote greater endorsement of SDO. Research which examines the relationships between status, threat and competition with SDO will now be reviewed.

**2.5.1: Status.** Much of the research previously outlined established a clear link between SDO and the relative statuses of groups (e.g., Levin & Sidanius, 1999). Seemingly, the status of the ingroup compared to the outgroup effects the extent to which social

inequality is evaluated positively. Indeed, in a second study, Schmitt et al. (2003) found that inequality was perceived as being more favourable when the ingroup was high compared to low in status.

Along with research which has shown that SDO tends to be higher among high status groups, Liu and Huang (2008) researched whether the endorsement of right wing ideologies is affected by changes to the ingroup's status. Liu and Huang were interested in assessing the effect of both gaining and losing status upon the endorsement of SDO and RWA. Three measures of RWA and SDO were collected leading up to and following the 2004 presidential election in Taiwan. The analyses concerned two groups: supporters of the traditionally dominant political party (KMT supporters) and supporters of the historically more liberal and subordinate party (DPP supporters). After the election, the DPP was elected into power increasing their group's status. Conversely, the KMT lost their superiority and therefore experienced reduced status. From a purely personality-psychological perspective, in which the endorsement of ideological variables such as RWA and SDO are thought of as traits, one would expect the groups' endorsement of each ideology to remain unchanged.

An alternative perspective was offered by Liu and Huang (2008) who argued, from a functionalist perspective, that one would expect the change in social context to produce changes in the endorsement of these ideologies. Namely, in accordance with this model, one would expect followers of the KMT to experience reduced endorsement of SDO and RWA while followers of the DPP should increase their endorsement of the ideologies. The findings were in fact mixed. DPP followers did indeed demonstrate increased endorsement of SDO and RWA following their group's victory and associated higher status. However, followers of the KMT did not significantly reduce their endorsement of the ideologies. Interestingly, SDO was seen to become less connected to political identity following the regime change among KMT supporters. Perhaps then, group members are able to reduce their identification with the

group when faced with losing status in order to act as a buffer against losing personal status. Nevertheless, Liu and Huang concluded that it seems groups are more able to acquire a pro dominance mind-set rather than to lose one. If SDO is indeed involved in the motivation to commit to conflict, the fact that it is difficult to reduce the endorsement of SDO may in part explain why these conflicts escalate.

**2.5.2: Competition.** Dru (2007) conducted research which was designed to test the contextual features which promote the relationships between two right wing ideological variables (SDO and RWA) and subsequent prejudice towards an outgroup. Two conditions were designed to categorize group relations in terms of identification with ingroup norms and competition over status, respectively. Dru draws upon Duckitt's conceptualisations of RWA (1989) and SDO (2001) in order to rationalise his predictions for two distinct models of prejudice, one stemming from each ideology.

Duckitt (1989) postulated that RWA reflected a group's strong adherence to norms and identification with ingroup authority. Individuals, or groups, which threaten the ingroup's norms are met with authoritarian aggression. Additionally, Duckitt (2001) demonstrated links between SDO and a competitive-jungle worldview. This world view results in individuals perceiving the social environment as 'dog-eat-dog' in nature. As a result of this perception, any intergroup interaction is more likely to trigger competitive instincts.

Based upon Duckitt's conceptualisations of RWA and SDO, Dru (2007) tested whether priming ingroup identification would promote prejudice as a result of RWA while priming competitive intergroup relations would lead to prejudice as a result of SDO. Initially, participants completed measures of RWA, SDO and identification with their national

ingroup. Following this, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. In a “group-based values and norms” condition, participants read:

People belong to different social groups depending on the importance given to their social lifestyle, their cultural values and norms or to their patriotic view of their country. These persons share with each other a strong attachment and devotion to their country, and to their ingroup norms, values and customs. For example, a person belonging to an ethnic group will need to meet other group members to share some common cultural conditions. A religious person will need to meet other religious members to share their faith and beliefs. The next few questions are about this kind of groups to which you would belong. (p. 880)

Following this, and in order to strengthen the within group relationship formation prime, these participants were asked to fill in a scale which measured collectivism. Participants in the “competitive group membership” condition read,

People belong to different social groups like sport clubs or political parties. These persons share with each other a strong need to defeat an opponent belonging to another competing group and have nationalistic aims for their country to become a superior nation. More precisely, a sport team is involved with competition to search the win and to become superior to the other opponent team. A political party is in conflict with other parties to win the elections. The next few questions are about this kind of groups to which you would belong. (p. 880).

Following this, in order to strengthen the competitive prime, participants were asked to complete a scale which measured autonomy. In the control condition, participants were not

given a scenario to read. Instead, they responded to each scale as part of a large questionnaire. Finally, all participants completed a questionnaire which was a measure of prejudice towards Arab people, Black people and Asian people. Prejudice measures were taken from a study by Duckitt, Callaghan and Wagner (2005).

Dru (2007) reports two important findings. First, RWA and SDO were found to correlate across conditions, supporting the idea that the two constructs are related. Second, when group categorisation had been primed in terms of identity alone (first condition prime), RWA and ingroup identification were significant predictors of prejudice. In this condition SDO did not predict prejudice. In contrast, when group categorisation had been primed based on competition (second condition prime), only SDO correlated with prejudice. In this condition neither RWA nor ingroup identification was a significant predictor. The findings supported Dru's hypothesis that the two constructs (RWA and SDO) operate under different contexts. The implication of this finding is that when intergroup relations are competitive, which would certainly be the case within conflict, SDO is an important ideological variable for consideration.

**2.5.3: Zero-sum competition.** Esses, Dovidio, Jackson and Armstrong (2001) researched the role of zero-sum competition in promoting negative intergroup attitudes. Esses et al. drew upon the *Instrumental model of group conflict (IMGC)* which is derived from both RGCT and social dominance theory. The IMGC contends that a combination of limited resources and an outgroup that is perceived to be a potential competitor for those resources lead to perceived intergroup competition (Esses et al.). As a result, the ingroup becomes motivated to derogate, and, ultimately, remove the threat from the outgroup. In extreme



cases, the motivation to eradicate the threat to the ingroup leads to the desire to remove the outgroup itself (Esses et al.).

Esses et al. (2001) also postulate that the perception of being in competition with an outgroup over desirable and limited resources leads individuals to feel that they are engaged in zero-sum situations. That is to say those individuals begin to feel that the more a resource is acquired by an outgroup, the less of that resource is available to the ingroup. In their study, Esses et al. found that SDO increased the perception that competition for jobs between immigrant and non-immigrant Americans was zero-sum. As a result of these zero-sum perceptions, non-immigrant Americans held more negative attitudes towards immigrants.

Zarate, Garcia, Garza and Hitlan (2004) extended these findings by determining that in order for competition between two groups to elicit threat and in turn prejudice, there needs to be a perceived similarity between the two groups. Furthermore, this perceived similarity needs to relate to a dimension which is relevant to the social context. For example, when competing for jobs, groups who have similar skills will be perceived as more threatening than those who differ in skill sets. Groups who offer a different set of skills would be more likely to pursue different employment opportunities and are therefore considered to be less threatening. The study used the same context of immigrants competing with national citizens for employment. Zarate et al. tested the hypothesis that when the ingroup perceives similarities opposed to differences with the outgroup in terms of their employment skills, they would experience prejudice towards the outgroup.

In the study, participants were asked to complete measures of perceived competition and prejudice. In a manipulation of perceived similarity (or differentiation), participants were asked to rate either how similar or different they perceived their ingroup and the outgroup to be on traits pertaining to employment. In this study group membership was defined by

nationality. Participants who were primed to think about similarities (compared to differences) between their group and the outgroup experienced a higher level of perceived threat which was positively associated with a higher level of prejudice. Jackson and Esses (2000) also found that individuals who were higher in SDO were less likely to support the empowerment of immigrants. Seemingly, the negative affect towards lower status outgroups promoted through SDO extends beyond promoting prejudicial attitudes and can also promote hostile behaviour designed to preserve the social hierarchy.

**2.5.4: Threat.** Pratto and Shih (2000) investigated the relationship between SDO and discrimination when the status of the ingroup was threatened. While symbolic threat signifies a threat to groups' identities and norms, realistic threat signifies a threat towards a group's tangible resources such as housing or employment opportunities (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Pratto and Shih primed students from Stanford University with an essay which either threatened the status of their university (by discussing recent scandal within the university which led to a dramatic decline in its rankings) or was neutral. The participants then completed a task which involved the rating of traits after being subliminally primed with pronouns pertaining to the ingroup and outgroup. If participants felt more prejudiced towards the outgroup, they should be quicker to evaluate positive traits after being primed with the ingroup pronoun (our) and quicker to evaluate negative traits after being primed with the outgroup pronoun (them). This task formed an implicit measure of prejudice. As a result of introducing symbolic threat, Pratto and Shih found that individuals who were high in SDO were more likely to discriminate against outgroup members, using their implicit measure of prejudice. In contrast, individuals low in SDO did not display any form of discrimination.

The implications of these results are particularly important. Theories such as SIT and RGCT postulate that there is a general tendency for individuals to favour the ingroup leading to prejudice towards the outgroup. These findings highlight SDO as an important factor in predicting discrimination under more specific contextual cues, namely status, threat and competition (Pratto & Shih).

More recently, Rios Morrison and Ybarra (2008) tested the effects of perceived realistic threat (Bobo, 1988; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan et al., 1999) upon endorsement of SDO. Given that research has established that SDO responds to competition over resources (Dru, 2007), Rios Morrison and Ybarra contended that this type of threat would be likely to promote higher endorsement of SDO. Across three studies, one correlational and two experimental, Rios Morrison and Ybarra tested whether the effect of threat upon SDO was stronger among individuals who identified strongly with their group.

In their first study, Rios Morrison and Ybarra (2008) manipulated threat between White Americans (ingroup) and Asian Americans (outgroup) who supposedly posed a threat to the high status group. Participants were asked to identify the extent to which they agreed with items such as, “*Asian Americans make it harder for non-Asian Americans to get good jobs*” and “*Asian Americans make it harder for non-Asian Americans to have a good quality of life*” (Rios Morrison & Ybarra, 2008, p.158). These items were used to operationalise perceived realistic threat.

Rios Morrison and Ybarra (2008) found that the extent to which European Americans identified with their racial ingroup moderated the effects of realistic threat upon SDO. When participants highly identified with their ingroup, realistic threat positively correlated with SDO. However, when participants weakly identified with their ingroup, realistic threat was not correlated with SDO. Rios Morrison and Ybarra replicated this effect in two subsequent

studies with different group categorisations and using experimental designs. In their second study, the researchers found that the effect of realistic threat upon SDO was only present among European Americans who were highly racially identified. Finally, in their third study, Rios Morrison and Ybarra found that students who identified highly with their academic cohort responded to threat from another academic group by increasing their SDO.

In addition to racial groups, the effect of threat upon SDO was studied in the context of identification with political groups by Rios Morrison, Fast and Ybarra (2009). Within a pre-test Rios Morrison et al. had established that showing participants a photograph of the Presidential candidates from their opposed political party elicited feelings of threat towards their own party's power, resources, status and goals. Within the 2009 study, which took place during the run up to the Presidential elections, American participants were asked to rate the extent to which they identified with their chosen political group (Republican versus Democrats) and how high in status they believed their political party to be. Following this, participants were shown a photograph of either the Republican or Democrat candidate and asked to answer three filler questions. Immediately after being exposed to the threat (opposition candidate) or no threat (own candidate) condition, participants were asked to fill in a SDO scale.

Rios Morrison et al. found an interaction between the effects of perceived ingroup status and ingroup identification upon SDO under conditions of intergroup threat. Furthermore, among participants who were in the high intergroup threat condition, and who identified strongly with their political group, perceived high ingroup status was positively associated with SDO. Group identification was positively associated with SDO for groups in the threat condition who perceived their group to be high in status. For participants in the threat condition who perceived their group to be low in status, ingroup identification was negatively associated with SDO. The implication of these results is that the previously

observed effects of realistic threat upon SDO (Rios Morrison & Ybarra, 2008) are likely to exist within high status groups. A second implication of these results is that ideological conflict appears to promote the same endorsement of SDO as international conflict. As a result of this, one can conclude that the role of SDO in motivating support for conflicts should be studied within a range of different conflicts, not just those where financial resources are at stake.

## **2.6: SDO and the promotion of competition and conflict**

Having reviewed antecedents of the endorsement of SDO, I will now review the literature pertaining to two consequences of endorsing SDO: increased competition and support for conflicts.

**2.6.1: Competition.** Studies which have been carried out using resource allocation tasks have demonstrated that even when groups have been formed trivially (i.e., using the minimal group paradigm) and are not involved in zero-sum situations, ingroup bias and ethnocentrism are reliably observed (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Furthermore, this bias has been shown to lead to economically senseless decision making. For example, groups have been shown to adopt *Vladimir's choice* (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Pratto & Sidanius, 2006) in these resource allocation tasks. Vladimir's choice refers to the pursuit of relative gains over an outgroup rather than the highest possible absolute gain for the ingroup. In other words, groups have been shown to favour a reduction in the overall amount of a resource rewarded to their group if it means they are relatively better off than the outgroup. An example of this

would be the decision to favour a split of money where the ingroup and outgroup receive £60 and £30 respectively, compared to one where they receive £80 and £100 respectively.

Sidanius, Haley, Molina and Pratto (2007) tested whether a high status groups' desire to both endorse and maintain their status could be linked to behaviours such as Vladimir's choice. The researchers argue:

...the greater one's desire to maintain and establish group-based social hierarchy, the more likely one should be to endorse the relative advantage of dominant groups over subordinate groups, even if that advantage comes at the cost of reduced absolute gains for the dominant group (Sidanius et al., 2007, p. 259).

In Sidanius et al.'s study, White students were asked to complete scales measuring ethnicity, perceived group competition, SDO, economic conservatism and gender. For the resource allocation task, participants were told they could decide how funding would be split between themselves and groups of ethnic minority students. Within the task, participants were given options of how to split a sum of money between the two groups which incorporated varying levels of absolute and relative advantages to the ingroup. The decision to commit Vladimir's choice was correlated with economic conservatism ( $r = .16$ ), male gender ( $r = .17$ ), perceived intergroup competition ( $r = .23$ ) and SDO ( $r = .31$ ). There was no significant correlation between ethnic identity and the decision to commit Vladimir's choice.

Following these correlational results, Sidanius et al. carried out a hierarchical regression analysis. Gender and economic conservatism were entered within step one of the model Ethnic identity, perceived intergroup competition and SDO were entered within step two. Sidanius et al., found that step one of the model made a marginally significant contribution to predicting participants' decision to commit Vladimir's choice. The largest

contribution was provided by step two, where perceived intergroup competition and SDO significantly predicted Vladimir's choice. This study demonstrates behavioural consequences of possessing high levels of SDO in addition to attitudinal measures outlined previously. Furthermore, the results provide evidence that SDO motivated economically senseless decision making whereby groups are prepared to pay for dominance.

**2.6.2: Support for conflict.** In addition to intergroup competition in the context of resource allocation, SDO has also been linked to much more severe types of conflicts, particularly those which incorporate status concerns (Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005; Crowson, 2009; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009; Heaven, Organ, Supavadeeprasit, & Leeson, 2006).

Many studies investigating the role of SDO in motivating support for conflict have focussed on the Iraq war (e.g., Lehmler & Schmitt, 2007; McFarland, 2003). McFarland (2003) carried out a study with American students in the week leading up to the invasion of Iraq. McFarland found that SDO was correlated with support for the imminent invasion. A possible limitation of the study is that while SDO promoted an initial support for the conflict, it is not possible to determine whether these effects were sustained throughout the duration of the conflict. This highlights an opportunity for future research to examine the role of SDO in maintaining support and financial commitment throughout intergroup conflicts.

Henry, Sidanius, Levin and Pratto (2005) also researched the association between SDO and support for conflict. Henry et al. tested whether SDO is endorsed more strongly by high compared to low status groups. According to Henry et al., low status groups at the bottom of the hierarchy who also endorse SDO would be in favour of the dominant group maintaining their high status position. In contrast, low status groups who wish to overthrow

the dominance of the higher status groups should be low in SDO. Furthermore, Henry et al. tested whether higher endorsement of SDO leads to greater support for conflict. Henry et al. tested this assumption within a US and Lebanese sample of participants. Henry et al. measured participants' SDO, support for anti-western violence (i.e. anti-violence towards the historically dominant group) and support for anti-Arab violence (the historically subordinate group).

Results showed that US participants who were higher in SDO supported violence towards the Middle East. In contrast, within the Lebanese sample, those who were lower in SDO supported violence towards the West. In other words, support for violence towards the higher status outgroup was consistent with anti-dominance attitudes within the ingroup. As a result, Henry et al. (2005) concluded that SDO reflects a motivation to maintain the social hierarchy between groups. Thus, SDO reflects different intergroup attitudes depending upon the relative status of the groups involved in a conflict. Given these findings, studies relating to the role of SDO in motivating conflict should endeavour to consider the relative status of the two groups involved in the conflict.

## **2.7: SDO and war: The specific factors that might promote endorsement of SDO**

The studies reviewed up to this point have shown that SDO is responsive to threat (e.g. Rios Morrison & Ybarra, 2008), competition (Dru, 2007) and may be correlated with general support for military policies (Pratto et al., 1994) and war itself (McFarland, 2003). Individuals high in SDO have also been shown to be more likely to perceive intergroup competition as zero-sum (Esses et al., 2001). In turn, this perception renders intergroup boundaries more salient (Esses et al.) which leads to greater ingroup favouritism and more competitiveness towards outgroups (Henry et al., 2005; McFarland, 2005; Sidanius et al.,



2007). Crucially, if SDO is indeed able to promote increased commitment to conflicts through an escalation from negative outgroup affect to aggressive acts towards outgroups, it is important to determine the specific cues which promote the endorsement of SDO. This question represents an area of research which thus far has been under-investigated.

**2.7.1: Why might SDO increase: Tit for tat strategy?** Within this chapter, studies which have employed the use of resource allocation tasks to examine the role of SDO in producing competitive decision making have been reviewed. These tasks are designed to draw upon the principles of social dilemmas. Social dilemmas refer to a situation in which the best interests of opposing individuals, or groups, are at odds with doing what is best for everyone overall (Dawes, 1980). One non zero-sum experimental game which is often used to depict a social dilemma is the prisoner's dilemma (Insko et al., 1994). Typically, this task is based upon the idea that if two individuals are arrested for a crime, they can each be offered a deal to gain a reduced punishment by confessing and testifying against the other. In this situation, if neither individual accepts the deal, there is no strong evidence which can be used to convict either suspect which means both will receive a minimal punishment (e.g. 6 months in prison). In contrast, an individual who decides to accept the deal will be better off (no prison time) while the individual who refuses the deal will be worse off (e.g. 5 years in prison), compared to if neither accepts. However, if both individuals accept the deal by confessing and agreeing to testify both will receive a short prison sentence (e.g. 1 year in prison), though not as short as if neither had confessed. The matrix can be altered in order to reflect different divisions of a resource such as money using these same four strategies. If everyone cooperates they will be better off compared to if everyone defects. However, if one individual decides to cooperate and other defects, the co-operator will be worse off than the defector.

Research has been carried out in order to identify factors which promote the likelihood of adopting cooperative or competitive strategies within resource allocation tasks. One factor which has been identified is that when engaged in resource allocation or prisoner's dilemma tasks, groups have been shown to be more combative than individuals. This phenomenon is known as the *interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect* (Insko & Schopler, 1993; Insko et al., 1994). The trend of groups being more likely to defect rather than cooperate compared to individuals has been linked to an ability to dissolve individual responsibility by hiding within a collective action, and distrust of outgroups (Insko & Schopler, 1993). Drawing upon SDO, this trend could also be a result of the likelihood that when groups are involved in a resource allocation task, the desire to protect the ingroup's status becomes salient. This renders SDO a variable worthy of consideration within such tasks.

The optimal and most likely endorsed strategies that participants can employ when involved in a social dilemma have also been well established. One of the more successful strategies has proven to be the *tit-for-tat* strategy (Andreoni & Miller, 1993; Van Lange & Visser, 1999; Wedekind & Milinski, 1996) which is similar to the idea of reciprocity (Kramer, 1999; Mulder, Van Dijk, de Cramer & Wilke, 2006). By mimicking an opponent's decisions (i.e. cooperate following cooperation or defect following defection), individuals have been able to elicit increased cooperation from that opponent (Wedekind & Milinski, 1996). As a result, any research which aims to assess the role of SDO in promoting defection should also consider the role of groups simply 'fighting fire with fire' by responding to defection from the outgroup with further defection. This strategy may, in part, be reinforced by the endorsement of SDO which has been shown to respond to competition (Dru, 2007).

**2.7.2: Why might SDO increase: Suspension of moral scruples?** In addition to outgroup competition being used to legitimise aggression towards outgroups, there has been experimental evidence to suggest that ideological variables such as SDO and RWA reduce justice concerns for outgroups and legitimise violence within conflicts (Asbrock, Nieuwoudt, Duckitt, & Sibley, 2011; Liu, Hanke, Fischer, Huang, Adams, Wang, Atsumi, & Lonner, 2009). When individuals anticipate having to engage in aggression or acts of oppression that offends normative egalitarian values, they are likely to increase their endorsement of ideologies which legitimise outgroup oppression. There is some research to support this contention. Opatow (1995) has already concluded that justice concerns differ when thinking about the ingroup compared to the outgroup, with greater concerns being attributed to the former. Alarming, Opatow (1990) contends that excluding outgroup members from moral concern legitimises subjecting them to harm. In contrast to SDO, Humanitarianism–egalitarianism (Katz & Hass, 1988) is an orientation towards having concern for others and an understanding of the need for both equality and social justice. Thus, one would expect people to increase their endorsement of SDO as a means of justifying behaviours that would normally violate social norms concerned with morality.

Liu, Hanke, Fischer, Huang, Adams, Wang, Atsumi and Lonner (2009) contend that Opatow's (1990, 1995) ideas are consistent with social dominance theory. Liu et al. draw upon Sidanius, Liu, Shaw and Pratto's (2001) contention that justice concerns are derivative of the desire to maintain the order of the social hierarchy.

Liu et al. (2009) measured attitudes towards the Iraq war and the relationship between China and Taiwan. Participants completed measures of justice concerns towards ingroups and outgroups, SDO and RWA. Attitudes were measured across countries which were considered as being high and low powered societies. These included countries such as America, New Zealand, Japan, China and Taiwan. America and China were categorised as the powerful

nations who were involved in conflicts. Taiwan was considered a low status (low power) nation involved in one of the conflicts. New Zealand and Japan were regarded as neutral countries.

Liu et al (2009). found that both SDO and RWA were predictors of reduced justice concerns which led them to conclude that SDO and RWA legitimises military action for the ingroup when engaged in international conflict. Furthermore, Liu et al. found that,

Rather than excluding others involved in conflict with them from the scope of justice, Americans and mainland Chinese appeared to enhance the justice of their own cause, their own actions, and their nation's right to use might on others. Taiwan, though just as involved in the Cross Straits Relationship as China but in a low-power position, was much closer to non-involved countries (p. 157).

These findings led Liu et al. to conclude that high status and ingroup favouritism both predict a preference for justice for the ingroup and legitimise acts of aggression against outgroups.

These conclusions are consistent with SDT where groups legitimise their dominance and greater access to resources through SDO and ingroup favouritism (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Jackson and Gaertner (2010) also researched the relationship between SDO (and RWA) and reduced justice concerns with support for conflict. Jackson and Gaertner tested whether higher endorsement of RWA and SDO would motivate increased support for wars, mediated by reduced feelings of responsibility, minimized consequences and increased victim blame. Participants responded to questionnaires measuring RWA, SDO, moral disengagement and support for war. Jackson and Gaertner found that both RWA and SDO correlated with each of the mediators which in turn correlated with support for war. However, in this study the correlations were stronger with RWA than with SDO. This may be due to the

fact that this study measured support for wars being fought on political grounds. In line with findings from Dru (2007), a more competitive context such as a war over resources may have prompted stronger effects with SDO.

Given that this study was correlational, it is not possible to infer whether SDO caused a reduction of moral concern or whether SDO was increased as a result of reduced moral concern. Nonetheless, Jackson and Gaertner's (2010) findings provide further evidence that ideological variables such as SDO have a role to play in motivating intergroup conflicts. Another important implication of these results is that SDO appears to be involved in the legitimization of actions such as harming outgroups which will further escalate these conflicts to the point that they become intractable (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000).

**2.7.3: Why might SDO increase: Affective forecasting and sunk costs?** According to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), people are motivated to pursue positive outcomes (promotion focus) and avoid negative outcome (prevention focus). However, individual differences have been observed in the extent to which individuals adopt a promotion or prevention focussed orientation. For example, research by Choma et al. (2009) found that right wing individuals are more likely to be orientated towards prevention focus. Individuals who endorse SDO, and who are therefore might likely to be right wing orientated, would be more strongly motivated to avoid losing a conflict which threatens the status of the ingroup. Additionally, groups high in SDO would be more motivated to pursue, and ultimately pay for, dominance as demonstrated experimentally by Sidanius et al. (2007). As a result, one would expect that individuals, or indeed groups, who endorse SDO more strongly would be more motivated to invest in the conflict to avoid losing to the outgroup.

Affective forecasting (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002) involves the process of predicting the anticipated emotions (Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall & Zhang, 2007) associated with possible future outcomes. One would expect that individuals will associate positive emotions and outcomes with winning, and negative emotions and outcomes with losing. SDO has already been shown to be motivated by competition (Dru, 2007) and threat (e.g. Rios Morrison & Ybarra, 2008). The expectation is that this consideration of potential feelings and outcomes alongside a salient threat and the presence of competition from an outgroup would motivate an increase in SDO which, in turn, would strengthen the commitment to the conflict in order to avoid a loss.

In addition to considering the effects of ruminating on the possible outcomes at the beginning of a conflict, Gunia, Sivathan and Galinsky (2009) consider the role of sunk costs in motivating further commitment to conflict. Sunk costs refer to those resources which have already been invested into a conflict (Gunia et al.). The threat of losing these resources could have a knock on effect in threatening the groups' financial wellbeing. Once resources have been pooled into the conflict there is a greater chance of the conflict being perceived as intractable (Bar-Tal, 2009). That is to say that once groups have invested heavily in conflicts they will be less inclined to withdraw from the conflict. Instead they will be more likely to commit to pursuing the conflict until they have assured a victory. Losing invested resources would have a negative impact on the group's status. This chapter has already discussed that SDO is primarily concerned with maintaining an in-group's higher status and therefore dominance. As a result one would expect the presence of sunk costs to motivate increases in SDO. Sunk costs become a factor once the conflict has already become established and is under way. Therefore if sunk costs are found to motivate increases in SDO, one could rationalise that this process might have a role in conflict escalation. In addition to motivating

support for the conflict at the outset (McFarland, 2005), SDO could be seen as being involved in vicious cycles of conflict escalation.

**2.7.4: Why might SDO increase: Tacit theory that SDO is advantageous?** I have also considered the possibility that SDO might be increased because people see it as strategically advantageous to do so, particularly in times of conflict. The rationale for this assertion is based on the idea that groups who are high in SDO, and therefore are sensitive to threat (Rios Morrison et al., 2009; Rios Morrison & Ybarra, 2008), competition (Dru, 2007) and hold reduced justice concerns towards outgroups (Liu et al., 2009), would be more willing to fight aggressively than groups who do not hold these views. If this idea is widely recognised, then individuals should perceive SDO as useful in promoting groups' commitment to conflicts and their efficiency once engaged in the conflict. The legitimacy of this hypothesis is addressed in Chapter 3 where I review the literature surrounding lay theories of psychological and ideological constructs such as SDO.

## **2.8: Concluding remarks**

Within this chapter, I have established that SDO is an ideological variable which plays a pivotal role in the maintenance of negative intergroup relations and the promotion of intergroup competition. I have also provided a rationale for the need for further research which will assess the role of SDO in motivating support for, and perpetuating vicious cycles of conflict escalation. This research, which will be reported in Chapter 4, will provide an account as to how conflicts become so pervasive and long lasting despite losing economic rationality. Furthermore, the research presented in this thesis will aim to highlight under what

specific conditions people adopt SDO, whether variations in the endorsement of SDO can account for subsequent commitment to conflicts and crucially, do people understand the potential utility of SDO.



## CHAPTER THREE

### LAY THEORIES AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO IDEOLOGICAL VARIABLES AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS

#### 3.1: An introduction

For the most part, psychologists build and draw upon scientific theories in order to understand human behaviour (Fletcher, 1995). Whether behaviour occurs at individual, intragroup or intergroup levels, social psychological research has informed theories which have been used to explain it and to predict which contextual variables are likely to promote it. In Chapter 2 we encountered several theories, including social identity theory, RGCT, social dominance theory and system justification theory, which each attempt to explain intergroup behaviour. These scientific theories are valuable because in addition to explaining behaviours, they can inform interventions. For example, many interventions designed to reduce intergroup prejudice have drawn upon social identity theory and found that increasing contact between groups helps to break down intergroup boundaries and in turn, reduce prejudice. Examples of these interventions are Allport's (1954) contact theory and the contact hypothesis (e.g., Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).

Much evidence has suggested that lay individuals (i.e., individuals who are not familiar with scientific theories of psychology) are similarly motivated to understand human behaviour (Fletcher, 1995; Hong, Levy, & Chiu, 2001). One way to achieve this is to utilise folk theories, that is, "*fundamental assumptions about the nature of the self and the social world*" (Molden & Dweck, 2006, p. 193). Folk knowledge is theorised as providing epistemic benefits for individuals (Fletcher, 1995; Wegner & Petty, 1998) by providing

outcomes such as feelings of understanding, control, protection and accuracy in interpretations of social events (Hong, Levy, & Chiu, 2001; Levy, Chiu, & Hong, 2006).

In addition to the benefits of these theories for individuals, these theories are thought to be culturally shared and often reflect similar ideas as scientific theories (Hong et al. 2001). In this chapter I will review research which supports the contention that lay theories can be reconciled with scientific theories and therefore are a valuable source of information. Furthermore, I will discuss the idea that lay individuals construct these theories in order to enable them to explain and, crucially, predict behaviours. I will also provide evidence that these theories are shared within ideological groups, for example political or religious groups, and are applicable to both the individual and intergroup context. In doing so, I will provide rationale for the methodology used in my subsequent studies by arguing that lay individuals are likely to be intuitively aware of the consequences of adopting right wing ideologies such as SDO and political conservatism.

### **3.2: Reconciling scientific theories and lay theories**

In contrast to theorists who have concentrated on the differences between scientific and lay theories, Levy, Chiu, et al. (2006) have highlighted three ways in which folk knowledge can be seen as comparable to scientific theory. First, lay theories are perceived as advantageous to individuals. Lay theories are recognised as reducing uncertainty while increasing control and understanding. This allows individuals to explain current events, and predict how individuals and groups will behave in the future, much like scientific theories (Levy, Chiu, et al., 2006). Second, Levy et al. highlight that both types of theory are similar in structure in so far as they both represent organised belief systems drawing upon social norms and widely understood rules and conventions. Finally, Levy et al. reason that scientific

theories inform lay theories and vice versa; as a result, there is similarity and overlap in the content belonging to each type of theory. Levy et al. agree with Fletcher's (1995) contention that social psychologists often utilise participants' lay theories in their research to inform subsequent tests of their theories.

An example of the overlap between scientific theory and folk knowledge is the idea that some stereotypes hold a grain of truth (Berry, 1990; Terracciano & McCrae, 2007). Allport (1994) contends that the foundation for stereotypes can often be found in legitimate intergroup differences which become distorted and exaggerated due to an agenda to portray outgroups negatively. Allport's theory sits well with Levy, Chiu, et al.'s (2006) view that while both lay and scientific theories are similar in structure, lay theories will often be skewed by group members' motivation to view their own ingroup more favourably compared to outgroups, and to explain behaviours which cast ingroup members in a favourable light.

Despite the view that lay theories are reconcilable with scientific theories, there are clear and notable differences between scientific and lay theories. Scientific theories are designed to formulate universal truths, whereas lay theories are implemented by individuals to make sense of their own environment. As a result of this, individuals' lay theories are more susceptible to self-serving biases and are more likely to vary with the social context (Levy, Chiu, et al., 2006; Molden & Dweck, 2006).

The view that lay theories are vulnerable to inaccuracies is also adopted by Churchland (1991). Churchland offered a damning view of folk psychology purporting it unscientific to rely on principles such as common sense to inform theories. Churchland compares folk psychology to folk physics or folk biology, arguing that just as a lay person would not be able to accurately describe biological processes, it is unlikely that lay individuals should be able to explain psychological behaviours with any greater accuracy

(Fletcher, 1995). Lay individuals' inaccuracies in social perception, for example the fundamental attribution error (Jones, 1979), provided support for those who refuted the idea that folk psychology offered by lay individuals could be useful to scientists (e.g. Fiske & Taylor 1984). However, Fletcher (1995) assert that common sense and the use of heuristics can be made more scientific by reducing the likelihood that participants will fall foul of errors or bias. Lay theories surrounding attributions of behaviour will be discussed in the following section of this chapter.

### **3.3: Attribution theory**

The appreciation of the existence of folk knowledge and lay theories is not new. Social psychologists, such as Heider (1958), have credited individuals with the ability to draw upon universal truths and intuition to attribute meaning to behaviour (Molden & Dweck, 2006). The motivation to make sense of the social environment is thought, by some, to be innate and to begin in early childhood with more simple theories which develop in their complexity relative to cognitive abilities (Hong, Levy, & Chiu, 2001). More commonly, the ability to attribute meaning to behaviour is associated with attribution theory (e.g., Shaver, 1975). The ability of individuals to construct causal attributions for events is important because it provides a sense of control and an ability to predict the future thereby reducing uncertainty (Försterling & Rudolph, 1988). Theories of attribution have been proposed by Heider (1958), Jones and Davis (1965), and Kelley (1967).

Heider (1958) contends that people make causal attributions for events. In doing so, they are able to guide their own behaviour and make sense of seemingly unrelated pieces of information which when considered holistically, are turned into meaningful representations of every day events (Heider). According to Heider, people are lay scientists in that they

construct meaningful explanations for events and behaviour which resemble scientific theories. These explanations, or causes, are either based upon an actor's personality (dispositional cause) or the environment in which the event occurred (situational cause). Heider's work is well known for introducing the distinction between situational and dispositional causes (Malle, 2004).

Malle (2004) refutes the traditionally held view of Heider's work that suggests individuals seek to explain behaviour by attributing it to either situational or dispositional causes. Instead, Malle (2004) argues that a more accurate depiction of Heider's theory centres on the perceived intentionality of a behaviour. According to this distinction, individuals perceive behaviours to be a consequence of either intentional action (personal causality) associated with clear reasons and motivations or unintentional actions (impersonal causality) with no clear motivation or desired outcome. According to Malle, Heider left a great deal more research to be carried out in relation to people's understanding of the motivations behind intentional behaviours.

The issue of intentionality is addressed by Jones and Davis' (1965) correspondent inference theory. There are three factors which influence whether events are attributed to situational or dispositional causes. In making this attribution, people are thought to consider whether an individual had a choice whether to engage in a behaviour or event, and whether the behaviour could be expected based upon the social context and the intended consequences of the behaviour. When behaviour is perceived to be chosen freely, is not a result of the social context and the consequences are thought to be intentional, then a dispositional attribution is most likely to be made (Jones & Davis). Thus, Jones and Davis provided further evidence that individuals are motivated to construct lay theories which explain behaviour.

Kelley (1967) also reinforced Heider's (1958) contention that individuals are lay scientists who are motivated to make causal attributions. Kelley's covariation model suggests that causal attributions made in social situations. Causality will most likely be attributed to factors which coincide with behaviour and which are absent when the behaviour is not observed. Kelley suggested that individuals draw on past experiences to derive explanations for behaviour based upon three factors; consensus (i.e., to what extent others would act in the same way), distinctiveness (i.e., to what extent the individual will behave in a similar way across similar situations) and consistency (i.e., the extent to which the individual will replicate the behaviour every time the same situation occurs). According to Kelley, low levels of consensus and distinctiveness along with high levels of consistency will lead to an internal (dispositional) attribution for the behaviour.

Since Kelley (1976) introduced the covariation principle, studies have provided evidence that lay individuals are able to use covariation information to make meaningful and accurate attributions regarding behaviour (e.g., Orvis, Cunningham & Kelley, 1975). The processes that underlie attributions within Kelley's (1976) covariation model are similar to the process of carrying out an ANOVA (Cheng & Novick, 1990; Förserling, 1989; Orvis et al.). The three potential factors; consensus, distinctiveness and consistency (or independent variables) are considered and compared in terms of their ability to predict the observed behaviour (dependent variable). The fact that naive individuals are able to perform processes which can be considered an analogue of statistical analysis of behaviours is further evidence that lay theories are constructed by similar processes as scientific theories (Cheng & Novick).

However, in some instances, individuals are overly prone to attribute behaviours to a person's personality rather than external factors, known as the fundamental attribution error (e.g., Jones & Harris, 1967; Jones, 1979). Cheng and Novick (1990) postulated that errors in attribution were likely a result of missing information which was not available from Kelley's

(1976) original conception of covariation. For example, if someone (Person A) was observed pushing another person (Person B) over, distinctiveness information pertains to whether Person A is more aggressive towards Person B than other individuals. However, distinctiveness information does not account for whether other individuals are also more likely to be aggressive towards Person B. This information is likely to affect whether the behaviour is attributed to the personality of Person A or B.

Research has demonstrated that by ensuring that observers have all of the necessary information in order to form attributions, covariation processes promote accurate assessments of behaviour (Chen & Novick, 1990; Försterling, 1989; Sutton & McClure, 2001). For example, Sutton and McClure provided evidence that an integrative approach which combined covariation processes with goal-based approaches, which consider the motivations and abilities of an actor, promoted accurate attributions of behaviour.

The most important implication of Kelley's (1967), Jones and Davis' (1965) and Heider's (1958) theories is the contention that lay people follow similar epistemic and ontological processes as social scientists. These theories of attribution contend that individuals have rather accurate understandings of their social environments which in turn allow them to predict future events. This contention is also consistent with Kruglanski's (1989) theory of lay epistemics. Within his theory, Kruglanski contends that people form their knowledge as a result of the motivation to seek out information in order to reduce aversive feelings of uncertainty. This motivation leads people to form and test hypotheses in order to best explain behaviours and events (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). In addition to establishing that lay individuals construct theories which resemble scientific theories, it is also important to establish that the content of these theories is culturally shared. This issue has been researched within the study of intentionality.

### 3.4: Researching intentionality

In addition to demonstrating that individuals are able to make accurate attributions of behaviours, it is important to consider the extent to which these attributions are shared. Malle and Knobe (1997) carried out four studies to investigate whether there is a shared understanding of intentionality and, if so, what factors are understood as characterising intent. Malle and Knobe highlighted that while social perceptions of intentionality have influenced research in other areas such as conflict, blame and punishment, the constructs surrounding the very foundations of intentionality had yet to be researched. In their first study, Malle and Knobe asked participants from San Jose State University and Stanford University to rate a list of twenty verbally described behaviours on a scale of intentionality. Half of the participants were given a definition of intentionality. The researchers reasoned that if participants drew upon a folk understanding of intentionality then agreement among the ratings should be high in both conditions. Correlation analyses revealed significant results between any given two participants ( $r = .64$ ) and between any one participant and the rest of the group ( $r = .80$ ) resulting in a high reliability score ( $\alpha = .99$ ).

In their second study, Malle and Knobe (1997) explicitly asked participants how they would define an intentional act. Malle and Knobe identified four key components; a desired outcome, beliefs about the outcome achieved through a specific action, an awareness of carrying out the action and the intention to carry out the action. According to Malle and Knobe, these four components, “*accounted for 96% of the definitions*” offered by participants (p. 107). Malle and Knobe acknowledge that a limitation of the study is that it was carried out within an undergraduate student sample. A more diverse sample is needed in order to assess the extent to which perceptions of intentionality are universally shared.



Nonetheless, an important implication of this research is that individuals have shared ideas about constructs used to determine attributions for behaviours and events.

### **3.5: The shared nature of lay theories and their application to political ideology**

Durkheim (1974) introduced the idea of collective representations, referring to beliefs and attitudes which are shared within society. This idea is consistent with Moscovici's (1963, 1983) social representations theory. Social representations refer to beliefs and attitudes which are shared among groups and provide meaning to ideologies such as religious and political beliefs. Corbetta, Cavazza and Roccato (2009) applied social representations to the field of political ideology.

According to Corbetta et al. (2009), social representations are sophisticated forms of social knowledge. These representations reflect people's ability to create lay theories by communicating and creating shared ideas which draw upon common sense to give meaning to behaviours and events. Corbetta et al. credit Moscovici's theory with inspiring research which demonstrated that people have shared attitudes towards many constructs, including political ideology.

Corbetta et al. (2009) considered how the content of the left/right wing political divide could be best characterised. Corbetta et al. outlined four theses concerning the content of the left/right political dimension. The first thesis suggests that the content of this definition is both intrinsic and stable over time. For example left wingers typically endorse equality more than right wingers. The second thesis suggests that the content of the left/right definition is intrinsic but adaptable over time depending upon the social context. For example, there should be less of a focus upon class division given that this classification is less prominent

within more modern society (Corbetta et al.). The third thesis contends that the left/right divide is simply used to label differing policies and agendas. Individuals characterise a party along the political spectrum. Once they have decided which political party they support, individuals will characterise themselves as left or right wing congruently with their chosen party. The fourth thesis contends that left and right wing definitions are not intrinsic or stable. Instead, these labels are void of any real meaning and simply represent conflicting ideas about social issues as they arise. Corbetta et al. offered a fifth contention that political ideology is a social representation. Corbetta et al. argued that the endorsement of a political ideology allows individuals to coordinate with similar others and make sense of social issues. Given that social representations are both stable and flexible, individuals are likely to hold core values which are central to their political ideology, but also consider political issues within context in order to form opinions which might vary over time (Corbetta et al.).

In order to test which contention was most accurate, Corbetta et al. (2009) looked at data from two European social surveys taken 30 years apart. Within the survey, people were asked two questions, “*What do you mean by left [right] in politics?*” (p. 630). Corbetta et al. recorded responses from the 1976 and 2006 surveys. The answers were recoded into semantic areas based upon whether definitions suggested that left and right wing political orientations were understood as general ideologies, based upon knowledge of members of political parties, measures of the preference for equality/inequality, measures of the preference for social change/maintenance of status quo, or based upon class cleavages and democracy.

Once organised into these semantic fields, Corbetta et al. (2009) evaluated where the content of these definitions fell on a scale of four levels ranging from concrete to abstract. At the first level, which Corbetta et al. identified as, “*maximum concreteness*” (p. 630), the difference between left and right wing ideology was based upon knowledge of current members of those parties. At the second level, definitions were based upon what social

groups each party was most interested in. At the third level, definitions were based upon understandings of how each party thought society should be organised. Finally, at the fourth level, which Corbetta et al. defined as, “*maximum abstractness*” (p. 631), definitions were based on the guiding ideologies (or values, such as pro or anti inequality) which motivate each party’s political policies.

Corbetta et al. found that between the two surveys, definition of the left/right wing political divide became less reliant on concrete factors such as political figures, and became more reliant on abstract information such as understanding of differing core values. Based on these results, Corbetta et al. argue that,

“The strong increase in references to abstract elements could not be attributed entirely to the development of more sophisticated cognitive abilities due to mass education, rather than to the evolution of social representations of left and right in politics.” (p. 635)

Thus, Corbetta et al. (2009) concluded that the left/right political divide was best characterised as a social representation which enables individuals to achieve both, “*social and individual orientation*” (p. 638). For individuals, the endorsement of a left or right wing ideology reduces cognitive load when making decisions within a political context (Corbetta et al.). By placing political parties on the left or right of the political spectrum, the process of reaching the decision to support party’s policies is reduced in complexity. Individuals can simply chose to support policies which are advocated by their chosen ideological group and reject the policies supported by the opposing group. This reduces the need to acquire more information pertaining to each policy in order to make more informed decisions which is considered by most to be too cognitively taxing (Corbetta et al.).

At the group level, political ideologies allow political groups to define their own position in relation to other groups. Furthermore, according to Corbetta et al. (2009), these shared representations of political ideologies allow groups to make sense of political conflicts and make judgements about the position of groups on any given issue. For example, people can make an educated judgement that right wing groups will be more opposed to equality compared to left wing groups based upon the shared representations held regarding what it means to be right or left wing (Corbetta et al.).

One criticism of Corbetta et al.'s (2009) research is that the survey data was from an Italian sample. Given the turmoil within Italian politics during the 30 year period, Corbetta et al. acknowledged that their research should be replicated within other samples. Despite this concern, Corbetta et al.'s contention, that political ideology is a social representation which enables ideological groups to make sense of events, was also supported by research carried out by Rafiq, Jobanuptra and Muncer (2006).

Rafiq et al. (2006) measured UK participants' attitudes towards the war in Iraq. Participants were either Christian or Muslim which meant the sample of participants shared the same society but belonged to two well-defined ideological groups within that society. Both groups held predominantly negative attitudes towards the war. However, a clear difference between the groups was that Muslim participants were less likely to associate the war in Iraq with the 'war upon terror' (Rafiq et al.). Thus, the results support the contention that meaningful representations are likely to be most consistently shared at the ideological group rather than societal level. Thus, political ideology offers individuals the opportunity to collectively construct meanings for events, rendering political ideology a shared representation. As well as lay theories pertaining to the content to political ideology, people have also been shown to construct lay theories which help them to make sense of intergroup relations (Levy, Chiu, et al., 2006).

### **3.6: Lay theories and intergroup relations**

According to Levy, Chiu, et al. (2006), lay theories serve several epistemic, social and psychological functions. These functions include the ability to simplify and understand everyday events and relationships. In other words, lay theories promote sense-making (Levy et al.). As a result of reducing uncertainty surrounding social events, people are likely to experience increased feelings of control (Levy et al.).

Levy et al. also contend that lay theories serve social functions. Jetten, Postmes and Mcauliffe (2002) postulate that lay theories are often shared among group members and promote relationships and a shared, common identity within the group (as cited by Levy et al.). Levy et al. cite Sidanius and Pratto's (2009) research with SDT as evidence that groups employ shared lay theories in order to justify their pre-existing high status and negative feelings towards outgroups. In the previous chapter, research which suggested that SDO is endorsed in order to legitimise a group's relative higher status (e.g., Pratto, Sidanius & Levin, 2006) and is more likely to be endorsed when the group's status is threatened (Rios Morrison & Ybarra, 2008) was reviewed. If indeed group members have a shared understanding of constructs such as SDO, one can contend that such constructs are endorsed for strategic reasons.

In a review of social psychological literature, Levy, Chiu, et al. (2006) identify several lay theories indicative of individuals' desire and, more importantly, their ability to discern explanations for intergroup behaviours and events. For example, Levy, Chiu, et al. (2006) contend that there are shared lay theories (in other words, a common understanding) concerned with the fundamental characteristics of a group (Hong et al., 2001).

Lay individuals have also been found to generate definitions of what it means to belong to a group, otherwise known as entitativity beliefs (Hong et al.). Hong et al. postulate when a collection of individuals are perceived to be highly similar they will be more likely to be perceived as a well-defined group. Groups are more likely to be credited with high entitativity when they are recognised as featuring frequent interactions between group members, common goals and, therefore, shared outcomes (Lickel et al., 2000). Furthermore, when the entitativity of a group is perceived to be high, individuals are more likely to attribute responsibility for any one group member's actions to the whole group (Lickel et al., 2000). Lickel et al. assert that this attribution is a consequence of the lay belief that groups, as a whole, are able to both facilitate actions and dissuade group members from behaviours. In order to discern the responsibility of groups for these behaviours, individuals formulate lay legal theories (Bell & Tetlock, 1989; Hong et al., 2001) suggesting that it is likely that lay theories are prevalent in all contexts where individuals are motivated to attribute meaning to a given attitude, behaviour or event.

Within groups, another function of lay theories is to promote increased self-esteem among group members who are relatively successful. Increased self-esteem can be achieved through the endorsement of constructs such as just world beliefs and a protestant work ethic (Levy et al.). Just world beliefs (Lerner, 1970) assert that people receive only as much or as little as they deserve. The protestant work ethic (PWE) is a similar construct which asserts that success is a product of hard work and dedication (Crandall, 1994). As a result of endorsing these constructs, individuals who experience success will feel that they have earned that success thereby increasing feelings of self-efficacy and self-esteem (Levy et al.). Both just world beliefs and the protestant work ethic are associated with the endorsement of right wing, conservative political ideology (Furnham & Gunter, 1984), suggesting that these constructs are more likely to be endorsed among members of right wing (compared to left

wing) ideological groups. If lay theories of political ideology are accurate, people should be able to appreciate that constructs such as just world beliefs will be more likely endorsed by right wing, compared to left wing, groups.

In addition to serving functions within groups, these same constructs (i.e., just world beliefs and PWE) legitimise high status groups' relative advantages over low status groups. Levy, West et al. (2006) suggest that most lay theories have been concerned with explaining the promotion of bias *or* tolerance between groups. Levy et al. provide the example of SDO as a construct which, if endorsed, promotes intolerance towards outgroups. Individuals who endorse the lay theory that hierarchies and meritocracy are beneficial to society are more likely to hold more prejudiced attitudes towards members of lower status minority groups and are less likely to support policies designed to promote equality (Pratto et al., 1994).

However, in addition to promoting hostility between groups, Levy, West, et al. (2006) suggest that some lay theories are responsible for promoting both intergroup tolerance *and* intolerance. Levy et al. tested this contention with the PWE. Levy et al. experimentally manipulated participants' interpretations of the PWE. Participants were either led to focus on simple definitions of the PWE (definition condition), or on how PWE was used as a justification for unequal group relations (associated meaning condition). Levy et al. demonstrated that PWE was associated with greater support for egalitarianism within the definition condition compared to the associated meaning condition.

An important conclusion which can be drawn from Levy, Chiu, et al. (2006) and Levy, West, et al. (2006) is that within groups, people construct shared lay theories to explain how their society functions, which are similar in content to constructs such as SDO, just world beliefs and PWE. These lay theories help them understand intergroup relations and the state of their society. Crucially, these lay theories help people to legitimise and accept the

status of their own group relative to outgroups. As a result, these constructs help to inform their theories of intergroup relations. Furthermore, groups who appreciate the functions of SDO, just world beliefs and the PWE may endorse these constructs, at least in part, for strategic reasons. In the previous chapter, I reviewed research which demonstrated that SDO promotes support for conflict and responds to threat and competition (Dru, 2007; Henry et al., 2005; Rios Morrioso & Ybarra, 2008). If groups have an appreciation for the differing functions of ideological variables such as SDO, and whether implicitly or explicitly endorse them for strategic reasons, it is not surprising that the endorsement of these ideological variables varies depending on the group's immediate goals which can be achieved through the endorsement of different ideologies.

### **3.7: Application to the current research**

**3.7.1: Chapter 4.** In Chapter 2, I reviewed the literature which found that SDO is endorsed in response to competition and threat (Dru, 2007; Rios Morrison & Ybarra, 2008) and, promotes support for international conflict (Henry et al., 2005; McFarland, 2005). In the first empirical chapter, I use experimental methods to establish whether three specific characteristics of intergroup conflict (outgroup defection, sunk costs and high financial stakes) elicit increased endorsement of SDO. Furthermore, I research whether these three factors, in addition to the increased endorsement of SDO, will promote increased willingness to invest financially in conflicts. Drawing upon the findings of Sidanius et al. (2007), who established a link between SDO and economically senseless competitive behaviour, I consider whether SDO makes a unique contribution to promoting investment within economically senseless conflicts or whether SDO also promotes investment within conflicts which make economic sense to pursue. The main aim of this chapter is to investigate whether



SDO plays a role in maintaining vicious cycles of conflict escalation resulting in intractable conflicts.

**3.7.2: Chapter 5.** In Chapter 5, I begin to consider whether lay individuals recognise the potential benefits for groups who endorse SDO during conflicts. Furthermore, I extend the research to assess whether lay participants have theories concerning the role of right wing ideological variables (SDO and conservatism) and system justification in maintaining social cohesion in the face of social inequality.

Within Chapter 3, we have seen that theorists suggest that lay theories surrounding intergroup relations can be reconciled with scientific theories (Levy, Chiu, et al., 2006). Drawing upon the proposed theories and research carried out by Pratto et al. (1994), Sidanius and Pratto (1999), Jost, Glaser, et al. (2003) and Kay and Jost (2003), I research whether lay theories held concerning the functions of ideological variables resemble the functions identified by scientific research. Both experimental and correlational methods are used. Participants' own endorsement of each ideological variable (conservatism, SDO and system justification) is also measured in order to ascertain whether lay theories surrounding the functions of these ideological variables are held regardless of an individual's own endorsement of them.

**3.7.3: Chapters 6 and 7.** In these final two empirical chapters, I assess whether participants recognise that endorsing a political ideology promotes wellbeing and life satisfaction for individuals. Research by Napier and Jost (2008) along with Jetten, Haslam and Barlow (2012) has found evidence that people who endorse right wing political ideologies are happier than those who endorse left wing alternatives. In Chapters 6 and 7 I

research whether this relationship is appreciated within participants' lay theories (Chapter 6), or alternatively whether endorsing any ideology is perceived as beneficial, irrespective of orientation (Chapter 7). Furthermore, studies in Chapter 7 examine whether participants lay theories resemble scientific theories which assert that constructs such as just world beliefs are more readily endorsed by right wingers. A more detailed review of this literature is offered within Chapter 6.

## CHAPTER 4

### OUTGROUP DEFECTION, SUNK COSTS AND HIGH STAKES: THREE CUES THAT TRIGGER ENDORSEMENT OF SDO AND COMPETITIVE INTERGROUP BEHAVIOUR

“When a war breaks out, people say: "It's too stupid; it can't last long." But though a war may well be "too stupid," that doesn't prevent its lasting.” Albert Camus (1947), ‘The Plague’.

#### Chapter summary

Chapter 4 explores the role of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) in the context of intergroup competition and conflict. Previous research has demonstrated that SDO mobilizes support for intergroup competition and violence (Henry et al., 2005; Lehmler & Schmitt, 2007; McFarland, 2003; Pratto & Sidanius, 2006; Sidanius et al., 2007), but relatively little research has examined the specific cues within conflicts that mobilize SDO itself. Building on previous research linking SDO to the desire to secure resources for the ingroup relative to outgroups, the present studies identify three specific contextual cues that trigger increases in SDO. In Study 1, participants playing an intergroup social dilemma endorsed SDO more when told the outgroup had defected. In Studies 2 and 3, participants imagined themselves as citizens of a nation embroiled in an international territorial dispute. Their endorsement of SDO increased when they were told that their group had already sunk major (vs. minor) costs into the conflict (Study 2), and the economic value of the disputed territory was of major (vs.

no) economic value (Study 3). The present studies also produce some evidence that these increases in SDO mediate further commitment to competitive actions by the ingroup.

## Introduction

Intergroup conflict has long shaped, and been shaped by, human psychology. Several psychological processes facilitate and motivate aggression in conflicts with outgroups. One such process is the loss of individuality and strong adherence to group norms among aggressive crowds. Another is the derogation and dehumanization of outgroup members – especially those who have been victims of atrocities by the ingroup (Opatow, 1990, 1995). Collective as well as individual-level processes help to facilitate intergroup conflict, which depends on a high degree of social coordination. For example, cultural practices such as combative sports and hero-worship are associated with intergroup violence and enshrine a community's endorsement of aggression and competition. Racist and other ethnocentric ideologies have underpinned aggression in wars and colonization and have been shown to be linked with the variable Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto et al., 1994).

Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) is a construct encompassing personality, situational, group-based and ideological factors that contribute to intergroup conflict. SDO comprises two constructs: support for group based dominance and opposition to equality (Jost & Thompson, 2000). These two constructs are measured with scale items such as *“it's ok if some groups have more of a chance in life than others”* and *“it would be good if groups could be equal”* respectively. SDO is associated with support for social policies that entrench inequality between groups within nations, and opposition to policies designed to mitigate

inequality (e.g., Lee, Pratto, & Johnson, 2011; Levin, Federico, Sidanius, & Rabinowitz, 2002; Pratto et al., 1994; Sibley, Robertson, & Wilson, 2006; Sidanius et al., 1996). It is also associated with support for military action at the international level, at least when the military action is designed to achieve dominance (e.g., Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005; Crowson, 2009; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009; Heaven, Organ, Supavadeeprasit, & Leeson, 2006; Henry et al., 2005; McFarland, 2003).

The majority of research on SDO has treated it as a stable individual difference variable that predicts intergroup attitudes and behaviors. However, according to social dominance theory (SDT), SDO is not only an individual difference variable. An SDO score reflects not just individual dispositions but endorsement of prevailing ideological myths that justify competitive, hierarchical relations between groups, and rejection of ideological myths that advocate equality. Thus, members of groups that are characterized by hierarchy-enhancing norms and values endorse SDO more strongly (Sidanius, Liu, Shaw & Pratto, 1994).

According to SDT, SDO is also sensitive to contextual features of relationships between groups. For dominant groups, SDO has the adaptive function of justifying and perpetuating their privilege (Lee, Pratto & Johnson, 2011). Thus SDT predicts that SDO should be adopted more strongly by members of dominant (vs. subdominant or disadvantaged) groups (Liu, Huang, & McFedries 2008; Schmitt, Branscombe & Kappen, 2003). This prediction was tested by Schmitt et al. (2003) who manipulated the perceived status of the ingroup, and found that indeed participants favored inequality more when their ingroup was perceived as higher in status compared to when the ingroup was perceived as being disadvantaged.

As well as being more strongly endorsed when one's group is higher in status, SDO also predicts prejudice to lower status groups more strongly when specific types of inequality are made salient by contextual cues. In two studies, Schmitt et al. found that asking participants to spend time thinking specifically about race when filling in a SDO scale produced a stronger relationship between SDO and racism compared to SDO and sexism.

The effects of ingroup status on SDO have also been tested in non-western cultures and with real groups. Liu and Huang (2008) conducted a longitudinal study measuring changes in SDO and RWA surrounding political elections in Taiwan. They found that supporters of the historically dominant political party endorsed SDO and Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) significantly more than supporters of the subordinate party at a baseline measure. The researchers predicted that upon an electoral victory for the previously subordinate group, supporters should experience an increased level of SDO and RWA. Conversely, supporters of the previously dominant party would experience a decreased level of SDO and RWA upon seeing their party losing power. While the first of these predictions was supported, there was no change in SDO or RWA for supporters of the previously dominant group. The researchers note "*It appears easier to acquire the mind-set associated with power than to lose it*" (Liu & Huang, 2008, p. 116).

Dru (2007) also provided evidence that SDO and RWA respond to distinct social contexts. Dru compared how both constructs related to in-group members' prejudice towards out-groups when different contextual cues were made salient. When participants were primed to think about their *identity* RWA was found to correlate more strongly with prejudice. Comparatively when participants were primed to think about *competition*, SDO was found to correlate more strongly with prejudice. It is clear, then, that SDO can be considered as an outcome as well as a predictor variable which operates distinctly from other right wing measures such as RWA.

In contrast to Liu et al. (2008), Dru's studies concerned minimal groups who were not previously defined in terms of levels of relative dominance. This suggests that SDO may also have an attraction for groups that are not in an established dominance hierarchy but which are vying for resources and dominance with other groups. Thus, one can expect SDO to become more potent when intergroup competition is salient in order to legitimize competition through ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. As a result of this legitimization, one can expect commitment to the conflict to increase. In keeping with this prediction, Rios Morrison and Ybarra (2008) had members of social groups (e.g., White Americans) complete survey items that did (vs. did not) refer to realistic threats posed by out-group members (e.g., "Asian Americans are gradually taking over the United States"). This manipulation of realistic intergroup threat caused highly-identified participants to endorse SDO more strongly.

This research shows that SDO is not determined only by personality factors, nor only by groups' status and dominance. In particular, it shows that SDO is strengthened when realistic threat is salient (Rios Morrison & Ybarra, 2008). In such conditions, SDO may have instrumental value insofar as it legitimizes and motivates competitive and even aggressive actions by the ingroup. This contention is supported by McFarland (2003) who found that SDO was linked to greater support for the Iraq war. This increased support was achieved through an increased perception of Iraq as a threat to America, and a reduced concern for the war's cost in terms of human life.

The present research seeks to address a major gap in our understanding of the lability of SDO. Previous studies show that SDO is higher among people who have a dispositional worldview in which competition is seen to characterize human life (Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002), that it predicts prejudice more strongly when salient intergroup contexts are competitive (Dru, 2007), and that it is endorsed more strongly when individuals are reminded of realistic threat by completing survey items (Rios Morrison & Ybarra, 2008).

These studies have not examined which specific, objective contextual features of intergroup relations make SDO attractive. Identifying the specific economic and historical triggers of SDO is essential for understanding the dynamic role it plays in conflicts between groups. In particular, I examine the effect of three specific cues that are each likely to heighten the motivation for the ingroup to compete for power and resources with a relevant outgroup.

In the first study, I examine the role of the outgroup's behavior in an intergroup social dilemma. When the outgroup defects (vs. co-operates), they are likely to trigger the competitive motivation to gain resources over the outgroup, and so elicit SDO among the ingroup. In Study 2, I examine the effect of the investments that the ingroup has sunk into a conflict. Previous research suggests that sunk costs tend to loom large in people's minds and cause them to invest further resources into the pursuit of objectives, including the securing of resources for their group, even when doing so makes little sense from a cost-benefit point of view (Gunia, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009; Sidanius, Haley, Molina, & Pratto, 2007). Thus, we expect that people who are retrospectively aware that their group has made major (vs. minor) sacrifices in a conflict will be more likely to endorse SDO. In Study 3, I examine the effect of the magnitude of the resources at stake in a conflict on the endorsement of SDO. I propose that at the outset of intergroup conflict, people's prospective evaluation of the resources at stake affects their endorsement of SDO. Specifically, when groups are in conflict over a large (vs. small) resource, I expect SDO to be endorsed more strongly.

In all studies, I tentatively predicted that the increased endorsement of SDO would, in turn, predict support for increasingly competitive behavior. As we have seen, existing research clearly establishes that individual differences in SDO robustly predict favorable attitudes toward competitive intergroup behavior (except where the aim of such behavior is to counter the dominance of a particular group). However, the consequences of situational variation in the endorsement of SDO are yet to be established. Research has yet to examine



whether, once triggered, endorsement of SDO is associated with immediate increases in competitive attitudes and behaviors. In the present studies, I address this unanswered question by examining the mediating role of SDO in the effects of outgroup defection, sunk costs, and high stakes, on endorsement of competitive behavior by the ingroup.

## **Study 1**

### **When the out-group defects**

This study was designed to build upon the findings of Sidanius et al. (2007) who demonstrated that participants higher in SDO were more likely to be most competitive, to the point that they were economically irrational, in a resource allocation task. In order to achieve this, I employed the use of a social dilemma in the form of a prisoner's dilemma matrix (PDM). A PDM is one example of a task used to depict a social dilemma (Insko et al., 1994). It offers two individuals or groups the choice to either cooperate or compete (defect) with one another, possibly concerning the distribution of resources. The sum of both parties' choices determines how much of the resource both parties receive. While the values within the matrix differ, it always remains true that if everyone cooperates everyone will receive the largest payoff. If everyone defects everyone will receive the smallest payoff. Crucially, if one party cooperates and the other defects the co-operator receives a smaller payoff than the defector. Thus, participants need to decide whether they would rather pursue an absolute gain (aim to receive the highest payoff overall) or a relative gain (aim to receive a higher payoff than the other party, even if this means reducing one's own payoff). The latter choice represents economically senseless decision making, and instead is possibly concerned with defining a

dominant status over the other party. Therefore, the motivation to pursue relative gains may be expected from people who strongly endorse SDO (Sidanius et al., 2007).

Using this methodology allowed me to measure what happened to participants' endorsement of SDO over three iterations of a prisoner's dilemma where real resources were at stake. In addition, this methodology allowed for the comparison of effects on SDO when involved in dilemmas against outgroups who were either described as cooperative or competitive. The hypothesis was that an outgroup that defected would elicit higher endorsement of SDO than an outgroup who cooperated. Furthermore, I hypothesised that SDO would mediate the effects of the outgroups' defection on participants' decision to compete vs. cooperate.

## **Method**

### **Participants and Design**

Participants were 83 undergraduate psychology students (65 female, 18 male,  $M = 19.14$  years,  $SD = 1.84$ ) who participated for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (prime: cooperate or compete) x 2 (out-group behaviour: cooperate or compete) between-groups design. Participants were recruited for a "group study". However, even though three participants were scheduled to take part in the study at the same time to form each "group" they were instructed not to communicate with one another. As a result, their data were independent observations.

## **Materials and Procedure**

Within each “group”, participants were in a room with two other members of the psychology department. They were told they would be partaking in a prisoner’s dilemma trial with three members of the economics department who were in second room. It was made very clear to participants that they were not permitted to discuss their own individual responses with their group members. They were told that they would each provide their own individual responses, and that the sum of these choices would represent their groups’ decision. They were also told that this would also be the case for the other group.

There was in fact no other group. However, in order to make the intergroup setting as believable as possible the experimenter consistently went between two rooms, and vocalised the same set of instructions on entering and exiting both rooms. This meant that participants could hear the experimenter talking to “the out-group” upon leaving the second room. Also, the experimenter was able to hear that no discussion took place between group members. Furthermore, each participant sat at an individual desk facing away from one another so responses could not be seen by other group members. The purpose of utilising this methodology was twofold. First, the study was designed to make participants feel that they were acting on behalf of their ingroup. Given that SDO is a measure of group-based desire for dominance, this was an important aspect of the design. Second, by ensuring that participants did not discuss their responses at any point it meant that each participant’s data could still be treated as a single unit for analysis. At the end of the study participants were thanked and fully debriefed.

**SDO and decision making.** To begin with participants were primed with a cooperative or competitive manipulation.<sup>1</sup> Participants were provided with an eight item SDO scale ( $\alpha = .82$ ). Participants were asked to answer based on how they felt “*right now, at the present moment*”. This was to make explicit to participants that they should answer each scale honestly based on their feelings at that time, and not worry about trying to remain consistent across trials. Items, taken from Pratto and Sidanius (1997) included, “*some groups are simply inferior to others*” and, “*group equality should be our ideal*” (measured on scales 1= “*Completely disagree*” to 8= “*Completely agree*”).

Participants were then provided with a 3x3 *prisoner’s dilemma matrix* (PDM) constructed for the experiment (Figure 1). They were instructed to, “*Please take a few minutes to decide which option you would like to take. This must be an independent decision, and you may not discuss this with your other group members.*” Following this, they were asked to indicate their own individual choice. This reflected a cooperative choice (option x), or the choice to compete for an absolute (option z), or relative (option y) gain. The matrix was accompanied by a paragraph explaining what each possible combination of choices would mean for each group. They were also asked to highlight which out of four choices of strategies best reflected their own decision.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> In order to prime either cooperative or competitive behaviour participants were given a typed letter to read detailing cooperative or competitive relations between the psychology and economics departments. The priming condition was not found to significantly affect participants’ SDO or decisions to compete in the PDM.

<sup>2</sup> Strategies were adapted from Parks et al. (1996) to suit a group scenario. These were; “Get the most money that I can, and not worry about how much the other group is earning.” “Try to get more points than the other group on every trial.” “Work with the other group so that we all get a lot of money in the long run.” “Earn a lot of money for the other group, and not worry about my own payoff”. These four measure the concepts of individualism, competition, cooperation and altruism. Participants were asked to select which best described their own strategy. This measured their SVO (Parks, Henager, & Scamahorn, 1996) but in this case was utilised as a comprehension check ensuring that participants understood what strategy their decisions reflected.

		Group A (your group)		
		X	Y	Z
Group B (the other group)	X	Group A receives: £8 Group B receives: £8	Group A receives: £3 Group B receives: £3	Group A receives: £9 Group B receives: £4.50
	Y	Group A receives: £3 Group B receives: £3	Group A receives: £3 Group B receives: £3	Group A receives: £3 Group B receives: £3
	Z	Group A receives: £4.50 Group B receives: £9	Group A receives: £3 Group B receives: £3	Group A receives: £5 Group B receives: £5

Figure 1: PDM used in Study 1

The study was comprised of three iterations of the PDM. Participants' SDO was measured before making their decisions, and after receiving feedback on the other groups' decision again at time two ( $\alpha = .81$ ) and time three ( $\alpha = .80$ ) using different combinations of eight out of the sixteen item SDO scale. The experimenter left the room while participants filled out each scale or PDM choice, telling participants that they were going to check on the other group<sup>3</sup>.

## Results

Hayes' (2013) PROCESS model 6 was used to assess whether participants' endorsement of SDO was affected by outgroup defection and, conversely, whether participants' own decision to defect was predicted by outgroup defection alone. For means of

<sup>3</sup> At the end of the study, participants were asked how useful they thought SDO is within these types of decision making tasks. The utility of SDO was measured with a 16 item scale ( $\alpha = .92$ ). Outgroup behaviour did not have an effect upon SDO,  $F(1, 82) = 2.77, p = .100$ . Utility of SDO correlated with SDO at time 2,  $r(83) = .76, p = .001$  and 3,  $r(83) = .79, p = .001$ . Since utility of SDO was measured last, it was not factored into analyses of decision making.

SDO and the proportion of cooperative and competitive decisions within each condition see Table 1.

Table 1  
*Means (and standard deviations) of SDO endorsement, and proportions of participant decision making within each experimental condition of Study 1.*

	Endorsement of SDO/ % Decision								
	Time 1			Time 2			Time 3		
	Cooperate	Compete	Punish	Cooperate	Compete	Punish	Cooperate	Compete	Punish
Out-group Cooperation ( <i>n</i> = 43)		2.62 (0.86)			2.84 (1.00)			2.78 (0.86)	
	79.10	20.90	-	81.40	18.60	-	74.40	23.30	2.30
Out-group Competition ( <i>n</i> = 40)		2.53 (1.36)			3.20 (1.35)			3.12 (1.35)	
	65.00	35.00	5.00	37.50	60.00	2.50	42.50	55.00	2.50

The mediation model tested whether SDO would mediate the out-group defection-participant defection relationship within a sequential model of mediation. For the overall model, the independent variable was the outgroup’s decision. Mediators (in sequence) were: SDO at time two, decision at time two and SDO at time three. The dependent variable was decision at time three. SDO at time one was used as a covariate within the model which was run with 10,000 resamples.<sup>4</sup> Each stage of the sequential model will be reported below which outlines the relationships among SDO, outgroup defection and participants’ decision making during each iteration of the PDM.

<sup>4</sup>I also ran multiple ANCOVAs to test each stage of the model. Results from the PROCESS model were consistent with data obtained from the ANCOVA.

### **Predictors of SDO at time two**

In the initial step of the sequential mediation model, outgroup behaviour was tested as a predictor of SDO at time two. SDO at time one was tested as a covariate. The model was significant overall,  $F(2, 80) = 35.17, p = .001$  (*Adjusted R*<sup>2</sup> = .47). As predicted, SDO at time two was affected by outgroup behaviour (point estimate = .43, (*SE* = .19), 95% bias-corrected and accelerate confidence interval (BCa CI) [.04, .81]). SDO at time one was a significant covariate (point estimate = .70 (*SE* = .09) 95% BCa CI [.53, .88]).

### **Predictors of decision at time two**

In the next step of the sequential mediation model, SDO at time two and outgroup behaviour were tested as predictors of participants' decisions at time two. The overall model was significant,  $F(3, 79) = 7.74, p = .001$  (*Adjusted R*<sup>2</sup> = .23). Outgroup behaviour was a significant predictor (point estimate = .47, (*SE* = .11), 95% BCa CI [.26, .68]). However, SDO at time two was not a significant predictor (point estimate = -.00, (*SE* = .06), 95% BCa CI [-.12, .12]). SDO at time one was not a significant covariate (point estimate = .07, (*SE* = .06), 95% BCa CI [-.05, .20]).

### **Predictors of SDO at time three**

In the next step of the sequential mediation model, SDO at time two, decision at time two and outgroup defection were tested as predictors of SDO at time three. The overall model was significant,  $F(4, 78) = 76.48, p = .001$  (*Adjusted R*<sup>2</sup> = .80). SDO at time two

was a significant predictor (point estimate = .57, ( $SE = .07$ ), 95% BCa CI [.44, .71]). Decision at time two was not a significant predictor (point estimate = .01, ( $SE = .13$ ), 95% BCa CI [- .24, .26]). Outgroup behaviour was also not a significant predictor (point estimate = .16, ( $SE = .13$ ), BCa CI [-.10, .42]). SDO at time one was a significant covariate (point estimate = .36, ( $SE = .07$ ), 95% BCa CI [.22, .50]).

### **Predictors of decision at time three**

In the final step of the sequential mediation model, SDO at time two, decision at time two, SDO at time three and outgroup behaviour were tested as predictors of participants' decision at time three. The overall model was significant,  $F(5, 77) = 10.03$ ,  $p = .001$  (*Adjusted  $R^2 = .39$* ). SDO at time two was not a significant predictor (point estimate = .09, ( $SE = .08$ ), 95% BCa CI [-.06, .25]). Decision at time two was a significant predictor (point estimate = .63, ( $SE = .11$ ), 95% BCa CI [.42, .84]). SDO at time three was not a significant predictor (point estimate = -.13, ( $SE = .10$ ), 95% BCa CI [-.32, .05]). Outgroup behaviour was also not a significant predictor (point estimate = .04, ( $SE = .11$ ), 95% BCa CI [-.18, .27]). SDO at time one was not a significant covariate (point estimate = .05, ( $SE = .07$ ), 95% BCa CI [-.09, .18]).

### **Indirect effects**

The only significant causal path identified within the model was between the independent variable; outgroup behaviour and dependent variable; decision at time three. This path was mediated by participants' decision at time two (point estimate = .30, ( $SE = .10$ ), 95% BCa CI [.14, .53]).

## **Discussion**



The results supported the hypothesis that participants engaged in a competitive versus cooperative situation would experience increased endorsement of SDO. Analysis revealed that outgroup defection increased endorsement of SDO at time two, which also significantly co-varied with prior SDO endorsement. Outgroup defection did not further predict SDO endorsement at time three. These results suggest that SDO can be seen as a stable measure (Pratto et al., 1994), while also being contextually driven by competition (Dru, 2007; Liu et al., 2008; Schmitt et al., 2003). It is also of interest that SDO was not significantly lowered from baseline when the outgroup cooperated. This result is congruent with Liu et al.'s contention that while increasing a desire for power and dominance is achievable, reducing that mind-set is more challenging.

Study 1 also showed that individuals would compete when faced with defection from an outgroup. At trial two, participants' own decision to compete was significantly predicted by outgroup defection. However, endorsement of SDO did not significantly covary with participants' decision to compete. One possible reason for this is that there may have been a "tit-for-tat" strategy employed in the decision making process (e.g., Andreoni, & Miller 1993; Van Lange, & Visser, 1999). Additionally, participants who had experienced outgroup defection during the first iteration of the study may have developed a mistrust of the outgroup rendering them more likely to choose to defect or punish the outgroup. In contrast, those who had experienced outgroup cooperation may have felt pressure to conform to norms of reciprocity and offer their own cooperation in subsequent trials (Kramer, 1999; Mulder, Van Dijk, De Cremer, & Wilke, 2006). At trial three, the only significant predictor of participants' decisions was the decision in the previous iteration of the PDM. This suggests that participants relied on previous heuristics in making their decision or that participants were motivated to remain consistent.

In conclusion, it is apparent that defection had an immediate effect on the endorsement of SDO. However, ultimately the rational choice in this task is to follow the outgroup's behaviour and remain consistent. It is possible, as a result of making the logical choice to follow the outgroup's behaviour, that SDO did not significantly predict subsequent decision making. Studies 2 and 3 aimed to replicate and extend these findings. Specifically, I hoped to find clear results demonstrating that increasing endorsement of SDO will lead to increased commitment to defection/competition with an outgroup. By using hypothetical war scenarios, I was able to highlight where these processes might be applicable to real life intergroup conflicts.

## **Study 2**

### **Sunk costs**

In subsequent studies, I aimed to replicate and extend the findings of Study 1 by utilising a more severe example of intergroup conflict. In this study, I consider the role of sunk costs (Gunia et al., 2009) in eliciting increased SDO and consequently, commitment to the conflict. Sunk costs refer to resources which have already been invested into a conflict (Gunia, Sivathan & Galinsky, 2009). The threat of losing these resources could have a knock on effect in threatening the group's status, both in terms of fiscal wealth and losing face in the light of losing such resources. As a result of the threat to ingroup status, I expected the presence of sunk costs to increase SDO. Furthermore once resources have been pooled into the conflict there is a greater chance of the conflict being perceived as intractable (Bar-Tal, 2007). That is to say, groups will reject the idea of any other option than pursuing the conflict for as long as it takes to ensure a victory.

Additionally, I aimed to draw upon findings from Sidanius et al. (2007) who demonstrated that SDO can be linked to economically senseless decision making. Sidanius et al. (2007) used a resource allocation task to demonstrate that individuals higher in SDO endorsement would be more likely to pursue relative gains rather than absolute gains over an outgroup. The motivation to sacrifice absolute gains in favour of maximising the difference between groups has been well established (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). Sidanius et al. term this strategy Vladimir's choice. There were two hypotheses relating to Study 2. First, SDO will be increased by sunk costs and second, SDO would promote further investment in the conflict.

## **Method**

### **Participants and Design**

The study was carried out with 100 participants (64 female, 23 male<sup>5</sup>,  $M = 25.74$  years,  $SD = 9.49$ ). Participants were approached on campus and asked if they would like to participate in the study. In return they were entered into a raffle for a financial reward of £25. Originally 118 participants were recruited, but 18 of these failed a comprehension check that was included to test their understanding of the scenario, and therefore their data were removed. The study adopted a single factor between groups design. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions, in which sunk costs were either present or absent.

### **Materials**

---

<sup>5</sup> Thirteen participants did not identify their gender.

Participants were given a scenario to read about two countries fighting to secure ownership of an island.

In the sunk costs condition participants read the following scenario:

For this task we would like you to imagine that you are a citizen of Audaz, one of two countries separated by some 100 miles of sea. Your country's population, level of economic wealth, economic development and military strength are all roughly equal to those of the other country, Lindo. Historically, the relationship between your country and Lindo has been very difficult. It has been marked by diplomatic, military and cultural struggle.

Between your two countries lies the small, barren, uninhabited and rocky Loucura Island. The island has no economic value. However, your country has traditionally viewed Loucura as belonging to it. In prehistoric times, people from your country built ceremonial buildings, the ruins of which remain on Loucura to this day. There are folk legends in which Loucura was the original homeland of your people. For the last few decades, the flag of your country has been hoisted on Loucura.

A few weeks ago, Lindo sent military personnel to Loucura and occupied the Island. All diplomatic efforts to encourage Lindo to withdraw these troops have failed. The only way to recover possession of Loucura is to take military action. Audaz has taken military action, investing substantial resources to recover possession of Loucura.

In contrast, in the no sunk costs condition the last line of the scenario read: "Audaz has just commenced military action to recover possession of Loucura." Across both conditions we counterbalanced which island participants belonged to.

After reading the scenario participants were asked to answer a questionnaire which started with four questions which formed the basis of a manipulation check. These questions focussed on what the two countries were fighting over, what type of battle it was, how much Loucura was worth in economic terms, and finally which country participants belonged to. Participants who answered one of these questions incorrectly were removed from the sample and their data was not included in the analysis.

Across both conditions, participants were told that Loucura Island had no direct economic value. This was in order to ensure there was no other monetary consideration which could interfere with the sunk costs variable. Any effects found in relation to the endorsement of SDO were a clear consequence of sunk costs alone, and not an effect of possible fiscal rewards obtainable through winning the conflict being used to offset resources already invested. Participants were told that the island had symbolic value to their country. Given that I was interested in SDO as a unique variable (distinct from other competitive schemas and right wing ideologies) I aimed to ensure that the conflict was a salient threat to the groups' identity and status relative to the outgroup. As a result the scenario depicted an example of Vladimir's Choice (Sidanius, et al., 2007) and rendered SDO an appropriate and unique variable for consideration.

Before completing dependent measures, participants completed a range of questions about the conflict, that were not directly pertinent to the hypotheses of the study and which served in part to reduce demand characteristics as well as providing participants with an opportunity to ruminate on the consequences of winning or losing the conflict<sup>6</sup>.

---

<sup>6</sup> Anticipation questions including the likelihood of achieving status, securing economic benefit and belief in a just world from winning versus losing the conflict were measured in both studies one and two (for a list of questions used, see Appendix A). No positive correlations were found with SDO in either Study 1 or 2.

**Social Dominance Orientation.** Participants' SDO ( $\alpha = .90$ ) was measured as per Study 1.

**Commitment to the conflict.** Participants were asked to what extent they would commit to the conflict ( $\alpha = .86$ ) as the leader and a citizen of Audaz. Leadership commitment was measured with four items including, "*Would you authorise spending on the war effort?*" and "How much would you be willing to spend to secure ownership of Loucura Island?" This last question was measured on a scale ranging from, '*0= nothing*' to, '*10= \$10 billion*'. Citizen commitment was measured with two items including, "*How much more tax would you be willing to pay to support the war effort?*" The scale ranged from, '*0 = no increase*' to, '*10 = a 10% increase*' in tax. The mean of these six items was taken to measure investment in the conflict.

## **Procedure**

Participants were provided with the questionnaire and asked to work their way through the questions in the order in which they were written. The questionnaire was filled out in the presence of the researcher, and participants were not able to discuss their answers with one another. Participants were thanked and debriefed at the end of the study.

## **Results**


### **Effect of sunk costs on SDO**

A between subjects one way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) revealed that there was a significant difference in endorsement of SDO between experimental conditions,  $F(1, 98) = 5.24, p = .024, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .05$ . Participants endorsed SDO more strongly in the sunk costs ( $M = 2.93, SD = 1.38$ ) compared to no sunk costs ( $M = 2.35, SD = 1.17$ ) condition.

### **Support for conflict**

A between subjects ANOVA was carried out to determine whether investment in the conflict was affected by the presence of sunk costs. No significant effect of sunk costs was observed,  $F(1, 98) = 1.34, p = .241$ . Means for investment were 3.37 ( $SD = 1.77$ ) and 2.92 ( $SD = 1.93$ ) in the sunk costs and no sunk costs conditions respectively. A significant correlation was found between SDO and investment in the conflict,  $r(98) = .31, p = .002$ .

The null effect of sunk costs upon investment may be attributed to the idea that individuals high in SDO (dominators) will support conflict, but presumably not when it will lead to defeat. Supporting a conflict which would likely end in defeat would be at odds with the desire for dominance. Sunk costs may indicate to dominators that there is a higher risk of losing the conflict and, therefore, deter these individuals from further investment. As a result, any effects of sunk costs motivating support for the conflict may have been masked. Hayes' (2013) PROCESS model 4 was used to test the hypothesis that SDO would mediate an effect between sunk costs and subsequent investment. Using 10,000 resamples, the analysis revealed a significant indirect effect upon investment (point estimate = .27 ( $SE = .16$ ), 95% BCa CI [.04, .64]).



*Figure 2:* Path model showing an indirect effect between sunk costs and future investment within the conflict, through SDO.

## Discussion

As expected, the presence of sunk costs increased participants' willingness to endorse SDO. Though sunk costs did not elicit a significantly higher willingness to invest in the conflict directly, a significant indirect effect of sunk costs upon investment was found through participants' increased SDO. These results highlight the important consequences derived from increasing endorsement of SDO, given that this increased endorsement lead to further commitment to the conflict. The results from Study 2 tentatively provide support for the contention that SDO may play a motivational role in vicious cycles of conflict escalation. Presently, due to the manipulation used, these results can only be attributed to conflicts where there are no direct financial resources to be procured and denote economically irrational decision making (e.g., Sidanius et al., 2007). Study 3 was designed to assess whether the effects found with SDO in Study 2 could be replicated with conflicts where such financial resources were obtainable.



### **Study 3**

#### **When the stakes are high**

The present study examined whether the endorsement SDO is affected by the magnitude of the resources at stake in conflicts with an outgroup. Participants imagined themselves as a citizen of a nation embroiled in a territorial dispute with another country, and learned that the disputed territory was of immense, or no, economic value. SDO was subsequently measured, along with participants' willingness to make significant investments in the conflict as either a citizen of their country (e.g., by paying more taxes to support militarization), or its leader (e.g., by levying more taxes for the same purpose). I expected that increasing the stakes involved in the conflict would increase commitment to that conflict. The purpose of this manipulation was to show that SDO motivates commitment to different types of conflicts, not just when the decision making appears economically senseless, or when the outgroup had previously defected. I predicted that participants would endorse SDO more strongly when the stakes were high (vs. low), and that SDO would mediate the effect of stakes on support for investment in the conflict.

A secondary aim of the study was to examine whether this effect held regardless of whether the outgroup was seen as responsible for the conflict. SDO as an ideology should justify subsequent commitment to conflict. Groups who assert that they are deserving of a more dominant status, and therefore endorse SDO more, would not need to blame subordinate outgroups for the conflict in order to commit to it financially. As shown by Rios Morrison and Ybarra (2008) SDO responds to realistic threat. As a result, the very nature of competition being made salient through high stakes should elicit increased endorsement of

SDO. This competition remains salient with or without blame being attributed to the outgroup. As a result, I did not expect to find any interaction effects between stakes and blame. Furthermore, I predicted that SDO should mediate the high stakes- commitment to conflict relationship with or without other justifications for the conflict.

## **Method**

### **Participants and Design**

Participants were 111 undergraduate psychology students (81 female, 30 male,  $M = 20.40$  years,  $SD = 3.87$ ) who participated for course credit and were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (stakes: high or low) x 2 (responsibility for conflict: yes or no) between-groups design.

### **Materials and procedure**

Participants were asked to imagine themselves in an international territorial dispute. In each condition participants read:

Two countries; Audaz and Lindo, each feel that they have a legitimate claim of ownership to an island that lies between them, named Loucura.

For the current study we would like you to imagine yourself as a citizen of Audaz. Your country's population, level of economic wealth, economic development and military strength are all roughly equal to those of the other country, Lindo.

To manipulate the stakes of the conflict, participants read either (low stakes):

Economists agree that Loucura has no economic value. The land is barren, the climate severe and so the island cannot support agriculture. There are no valuable mineral resources on Loucura. Ownership of Loucura would make no difference to the material wellbeing of either country.

or (high stakes):

Economists agree that Loucura has immense economic value. The land is fertile, the climate mild and so the island supports agriculture. There are many valuable mineral resources on Loucura. Ownership of Loucura would make a major difference to the material wellbeing of either country.

To manipulate whether the outgroup was blamed for the conflict, participants read either (outgroup blame):

A few weeks ago, Lindo sent military personnel to Loucura and occupied the Island. All diplomatic efforts to encourage Lindo to withdraw these troops have failed. The only way to secure possession of Loucura is to take military action. Experts agree that the odds of your country succeeding in the military conflict are approximately 50:50.

Or (no blame):

A few weeks ago, a military conflict over possession of Loucura broke out between Audaz and Lindo. Experts agree that the odds of your country succeeding in the military conflict are approximately 50:50.

Across all conditions, participants were told that either group was equally likely to emerge successfully from the conflict. This design was utilised in order to assess the role of SDO when two seemingly equal groups competed for dominance, rather than in contexts where intergroup dominance had already been established. At the end of the study participants were thanked and debriefed.<sup>7</sup>

**Social Dominance Orientation.** ( $\alpha = .90$ ) was measured as per Studies 1 and 2.<sup>8</sup>

**Commitment to the conflict.** Two scales were designed to assess participants' willingness to invest in the conflict. As part of each scale, participants were asked to imagine themselves as the leader and a citizen of Audaz. Both scales were adapted from Study 2 and constructed for the experiment. Leadership commitment was measured with seven items including, "*Would you authorise spending on the military action?*" and, "*Would you increase tax to raise funds for the military action?*" Citizen commitment used these same seven items, but each statement started with, "*Would you support the decision to...*" Items were measured on eight point scales ranging from "*definitely no*" to "*definitely yes*". The mean of the 14 items was used as a measure of investment in the conflict ( $\alpha = .95$ ).

## Results

---

<sup>7</sup> As with the previous study, participants were given questions which were designed to engage participants in considerations of the consequences of winning or losing the conflict.

<sup>8</sup> Competitive world view (Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002) was also measured ( $\alpha = .77$ ). Results showed differences between manipulations and the effects upon SDO versus Competitive world view. As a result, only data utilising SDO is reported.

### **The effect of the independent variables on SDO**

Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. Key hypotheses were tested with a 2 (Stakes: high or low) x 2 (Responsibility for the conflict: Lingo or no blame) between-groups Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). In this analysis endorsement of SDO was the dependent variable. There was a marginal main effect of stakes in which high financial stakes caused endorsement of SDO to increase,  $F(1, 110) = 3.62, p = .062, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .031$ . There was no main effect of responsibility for conflict,  $F(1, 110) = 0.62, p = .433, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .006$  and neither did responsibility for conflict interact with stakes,  $F(1, 110) = 0.22, p = .638, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .002$ .

Table 2

*Mean (and standard deviation) of the endorsement of SDO and the commitment to conflict across all conditions in Study 3.*

	Condition			
	High stakes		Low stakes	
	Lindo blamed	No Blame	Lindo blamed	No blame
N	27	31	23	30
SDO endorsement	2.86	3.16	2.54	2.61
	(1.12)	(1.25)	(1.20)	(1.33)
	3.02		2.58	
	(1.19)		(1.26)	
Investment in conflict	4.87	4.27	3.91	3.52
	(1.63)	(1.76)	(1.47)	(1.40)
	4.55		3.69	
	(1.71)		(1.43)	

### Effects on support for conflict

A positive correlation was observed between SDO and investment in the conflict,  $r(109) = .23, p = .014$ .

A between subjects analysis of variance was carried out to assess whether increasing the stakes attached to the conflict and blaming the conflict on the outgroup motivated

investment in the conflict. A significant main effect of stakes was found,  $F(1, 107) = 8.21, p = .005$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .070$ . However, there was no significant main effect of blame,  $F(1, 107) = 2.70, p = .103$ , and no significant interaction,  $F(1, 107) = 0.11, p = .741$ . Means for investment within each condition are shown in Table 3.

As with Study 2, Hayes' (2013) PROCESS model 4 was used to test the hypothesis that SDO would mediate the high stakes- investment relationship. Using 10,000 resamples, the analysis revealed that there was not a significant indirect path to investment (point estimate =  $-.11$  ( $SE = .09$ ), 95% BCa CI  $[-.37, .00]$ ). A significant model was found in which there was significant direct effects of both high stakes and SDO upon investment across both blame and no blame conditions (Figure 2).




Figure 3: Path model showing a direct, stakes--investment relationship.

## Discussion

A marginal main effect of stakes upon endorsement of SDO was found. However, responsibility had no effect on SDO. These findings suggest that SDO is driven by factors which make competition itself salient and not by factors which serve to legitimize the

conflict. Additionally SDO was not found to mediate the stakes-investment relationship since there was a direct effect of stakes upon investment.

This would suggest that factors that make competition salient will drive endorsement of SDO. Indeed, SDO was found to consistently correlate with an increased willingness to invest in conflicts within Studies 2 and 3. From these results, I conclude that endorsement of SDO is increased through characteristics of war which make competition salient and continues to encourage investment throughout the conflict. Therefore, one can infer that endorsement of SDO is in some way involved in cycles of conflict escalation.

Further, upon comparing the two models it is clear that there is a unique contribution of SDO within economically senseless conflicts. When it makes sense to invest (i.e., when the stakes are high) stakes themselves drive commitment to the conflict along with SDO. When it does not make sense to invest (i.e., when there are no resources at stake and money has already been invested) it is the increased endorsement of SDO that overrides logical economic decision making and motivates commitment to the conflict. Since SDO is increased by sunk costs, there is an indirect path running through it from sunk costs to commitment to the conflict – even though there is no direct path from sunk costs to commitment to the conflict, and even though ANOVA revealed no significant effect of sunk costs on stakes.

## **General Discussion**

### **Summary of findings**

Thus far, I have extended demonstrations that SDO, as a personality measure, is relatively stable over time, supporting Pratto et al.'s (1994) contention. Additionally, the results presented in this chapter have provided support for the idea that SDO responds to



contextual cues which make competition and threat to the ingroup's status salient. This supports claims made by Dru (2007) and Rios Morrison and Ybarra (2008).

Study 1 was carried out with a real intergroup resource allocation task rather than a hypothetical context. Study 1 highlighted that endorsement of SDO, while remaining partially consistent, is increased through experiences with a competitive outgroup. Conversely, SDO endorsement was not reduced by experiences with a cooperative outgroup. In sum these findings suggest that the endorsement of SDO can be reliably triggered through engagement with competition. However, reducing endorsement of SDO is not so readily achieved in keeping with results found by Liu et al. (2008).

Studies 2 and 3 were designed to replicate and extend the findings from Study 1 by providing evidence that the endorsement of SDO would be promoted by specific factors within intergroup conflicts which make competition salient. In this case salience was achieved with financial cues (sunk costs and financial stakes). Studies 2 and 3 provided evidence that sunk costs and high financial stakes promote increased endorsement of SDO, which provided further support for Dru's (2007) findings. It was also hypothesised that SDO would mediate the financial cue—future investment in conflict relationship. Analyses provided evidence that while SDO did not mediate the high stakes-investment relationship in Study 3, there was no direct path from sunk costs to investment in Study 2. Instead, increased SDO promoted increased investment within the conflict.

While financial cues were found to promote SDO, blaming the outgroup for the conflict did not significantly increase investment within the conflict in Study 3. Perhaps, in line with Opatow's (1990, 1995) and Liu et al.'s (2009) findings, moral disengagement with the outgroup is already strong enough as a result of intergroup processes and endorsement of

SDO. As a result, no blame need be attributed for groups to commit to conflicts with one another.

Upon considering the findings of all three studies, it becomes apparent that when the decision to compete is the economically rational choice (Studies 1 and 3), the independent variables (defection and high stakes) directly helped to promote further competition. In Study 1, where participants appeared to converge on the tit-for-tat strategy very quickly, SDO appeared to play no causal role in resource allocation decisions. However, in Studies 2 and 3, SDO mediated the effects of sunk costs and high stakes on willingness to commit further resources to the conflict. Taken together, these results suggest that SDO plays a role in a positive feedback loop in which intergroup conflicts become more and more expensive, and fuel the fires of dominance ideology, which in turn facilitates the stakes being raised still higher in the conflict. As a result, SDO may, in part, explain why some conflicts become intractable and span such long periods of time despite their irrational appearance.

### **Limitations and future directions**

The effects of SDO leading to increased commitment to conflict have been consistent, but effect sizes have been small. SDO may well play a small role in motivating support for conflicts, or it might be that any subsequent stronger effects need both time and support from other group members to develop. Across all of these studies participants were acting on behalf of a group, but with no endorsement of their own decision making by other group members. Social dilemma research has suggested that one reason for groups being more competitive than individuals is that groups can diffuse individual responsibility for actions, while of course individuals are held solely responsible for their decisions (Insko, Schopler, Drigotas, & Graetz, 1993). Future research should aim to build upon these findings with

“real” interacting groups in order to assess whether increasing endorsement of SDO is significantly more attainable, and whether this leads to subsequent more aggressive intergroup competition.

An additional limitation within this research is that both groups have always been described as sharing equal status. Given Liu et al.’s (2009) finding that high powered groups are more likely to legitimize their actions during conflict along with research which has established that SDO is more likely endorsed by high status groups in order to legitimize their status (E.g., Levin & Sidanius, 1999; Liu & Huang, 2008; Schmitt et al., 2003), future studies should look to manipulate the status of the ingroup relative to the outgroup in order to see if the results presented in this chapter hold true. Finally, in addition to manipulating the status of the ingroup relative to the outgroup, future research should manipulate the prospects of the ingroup winning. SDO should be a better predictor of investment when people expect the investment to pay off thereby not posing a threat to the ingroup’s resources.

## **Conclusions**

The research outlined in this first empirical chapter highlights that the motivation to achieve group dominance can promote commitments to conflicts, including those which seem economically senseless. Factors which make competition, particularly for status, salient produce an increased endorsement of SDO. Sequentially, this increased endorsement motivates increased engagement with competitive behaviours towards the outgroup. To conclude, the data suggest that SDO serves as an antecedent to subsequent competitive behaviour in vicious cycles of conflict escalation. The next question for examination within

this thesis is whether individuals recognise the potential function of SDO in promoting commitment to conflicts. Furthermore, I wanted to assess whether individuals perceive that endorsing SDO during conflict will render groups more likely to emerge successfully from those conflicts as a result of this increased commitment.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **AN INVESTIGATION OF THE LAY THEORIES HELD IN RELATION TO THE PERCEIVED FUNCTIONS OF IDEOLOGICAL VARIABLES (SDO, CONSERVATISM AND SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION) FOR GROUPS**

#### **Chapter summary**

In the previous empirical chapter, Studies 2 and 3 provided evidence that SDO is endorsed more strongly during conflicts where there has been greater investment into the conflict and there are higher financial stakes associated with winning. Furthermore, SDO was positively correlated with further financial investment into conflicts. In Chapter 4, I begin to consider what, if any, lay knowledge individuals might possess in relation to the functions of ideologies such as SDO, conservatism and system justifying beliefs. Study 4 was designed to research what knowledge participants have regarding the utility of SDO during intergroup conflicts. Namely, I wanted to see if participants would attribute the endorsement of SDO with the promotion of commitment to conflicts, which has been shown experimentally by McFarland (2003) and Henry et al. (2005). In Study 5, I move away from indirect methods and ask participants explicitly what functions they associate with ideological variables in the contexts of conflict and society.

#### **Introduction**

As outlined in Chapter 2, SDO has been linked with other political ideologies such as conservatism (Ho et al., 2012; Jetten & Iyer, 2010; Sidanius, Bobo, & Pratto, 1996) and system justification (Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007). Similar to SDO, these ideologies have been found to have clear functions such as maintaining inequality alongside maintaining a positive regard for one's ingroup within high status groups (Jost, Pelham, et al., 2003, 2005). System justification theory also contends that low status groups will legitimate inequality by engaging in derogation of their own group (Jost, Pelham, et al., 2003, 2005). These processes ensure that inequality can coincide with peaceful and cohesive intergroup relations within societies (Jost, Pelham, et al., 2003, 2005; Pratto et al., 1994). In subsequent studies, I wanted to continue to focus on SDO, in addition to examining lay knowledge surrounding other associated ideologies.

In this second empirical chapter, two studies investigated what lay knowledge participants held regarding the functions of conservatism, SDO and system justification. In particular, I wanted to assess their perceived functions within intergroup conflicts and within society. The focus of this research was not on personality characteristics which may draw individuals to ideologies. Instead, I wanted to investigate whether individuals recognised the various consequences of adopting ideology and, in turn, under what conditions they would be more likely to be endorsed. I also wanted to see if these lay ideas were adopted independently of participants' own endorsement of each ideology. In other words, the studies were designed to assess whether there was a general appreciation for the potential utility of each ideology, not just a desire to evaluate one's own ideology in a positive regard. In order to provide rationale for the studies reported in this chapter, I will discuss research and theory pertaining to the utilities of conservatism, SDO and system justification.

## **The functions of political conservatism**

Jost, Glaser, et al. (2003) describe conservatism as based upon a resistance to change and preference for inequality. However, as Jost et al. acknowledge, depending upon the social context these two motivations can be largely interrelated. In societies which have been established as hierarchical, resisting change amounts to preserving inequality. In contrast, when a society is recognised as egalitarian, then one would expect conservative ideology to be linked to a great desire for change (Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003; Muller, 2001). Adherence to social norms, demonising and punishment of individuals who violate those norms, a preference for strict law and order, and holding authority figures in high regard are identified by Jost et al. as more “peripheral” characteristics of conservatism (p. 343).

Other factors which have been identified as promoting conservatism include motivations to avoid uncertainty and ambiguity along with a sensitivity to threat (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003; Jost, Napier, Thorisdottir, Gosling, Palfai, & Ostafin, 2007). For example, research has demonstrated links between conservative ideology and fear (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009), the perception of a dangerous world (Duckitt, 2011; Jost et al., 2007) and mortality salience (Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003, 2007). The contention that the endorsement of conservatism is motivated by these factors suggests that individuals might endorse conservatism for strategic reasons. Indeed, Jost, Glaser, et al. (2003) postulate that political conservatism is endorsed as a result of ‘motivated social cognition’.

Research has suggested that the motivation to avoid uncertainty is largely universal (Jost et al., 2007; Kagan, 1972). However, this motivation has been shown to be held more strongly by individuals who adopt conservative ideologies, ranging from the original

definition of the Authoritarian personality type to more recently understood features of political conservatism (Adorno et al., 1950; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003, 2005).

Jost et al. (2007) carried out three experiments to ascertain whether the endorsement of conservatism fulfils psychological needs such as the motivation to manage threat and uncertainty. In their first study, Jost et al. operationalised threat in terms of death anxiety and perceptions of terrorism. Uncertainty avoidance was operationalised as the need for order, compared to openness to new experiences. In their second study, Jost et al. (2007) carried out the research in a more liberally orientated sample. Within this study, uncertainty avoidance was operationalised as need for order, closed mindedness and decisiveness. Threat anxiety was measured with fear of death and death avoidance. Both factors predicted political conservatism independently. In the third study, resistance to change was found to mediate the uncertainty avoidance- conservatism relationship, and opposition to equality was identified as a partial mediator in the threat avoidance- conservatism relationship. Jost et al. report that both threat and uncertainty avoidance were found to predict political conservatism rather than predicting ideological extremism (such as RWA) only, as predicted by Crowson et al. (2009).

Conservatism has also been linked to internal control beliefs (Furnham, 1987). Original conceptions of internal versus external locus of control (e.g., Rotter, 1966) focussed on the extent to which individuals feel like they have control over what happens to them rather than attributing control to external factors. An internal locus of control has been shown to moderate stress and promote health (Wallston & Wallston, 1978) as well as being thought by lay people to promote success in life (Dubois & Beauvois, 2008). Dubois and Beauvois found that individuals who engage in more internal attributions are evaluated as more likely to be successful based upon their personality.



Subsequent research focussed on the conceptualisation of a social judgement norm of internality (Beauvois & Dubois, 1988; Dubois & Beauvois, 2008; Jellison & Green, 1981; Stern & Manifold, 1977). Jellison and Green demonstrated that individuals who were described as making more internal attributions compared to external attributions were evaluated more positively. Furthermore, participants who were asked to provide positive self-evaluations described themselves as more likely to attribute internal causes for behaviour. In comparison, participants who were asked to provide negative self-evaluations described themselves as more likely to be biased towards external attributions. Dubois and Beauvois contend that the norm of internality means that individuals who are more likely to engage in internal attributions are evaluated more positively because they are more likely to adhere to social norms and social functioning. As a result, internal control beliefs can be thought of as providing social utility in terms of adherence to the status quo. In unequal societies this would mean an adherence to social hierarchy. Taken together, these findings suggest that lay theories of conservatism are similar to those offered by psychologists such as Jost, Glaser, et al. (2003). If this is the case, then peoples' lay theories of conservatism should recognise its ability to maintain inequality through motivations to avoid change and uncertainty and a stronger adherence to social norms.

### **The functions of SDO**

As outlined in Chapter 2, social dominance theory suggests that people adopt ideologies which legitimise the existence of social hierarchies. As a result of these hierarchies, more dominant groups will enjoy higher status and access to resources relative to lower groups (Pratto et al., 1994). These ideologies, often referred to as "*hierarchy enhancing legitimising myths*" (Pratto et al., 1994) fall into three categories; "paternalistic myths",

“reciprocal myths”, and “sacred myths” (Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003). These three categories of myths serve to legitimize inequality through asserting that: dominant groups take care of subordinate groups; both groups have important roles to play in the functioning of society; or that higher groups acquired their status through divine right, respectively (Jost et al.). In each case, these ideologies aim to promote inequality and curb any attempts at challenging the status quo, and in this respect are similar to conservatism (Jost et al.).

SDO offers a set of beliefs which promote dominance and resistance to equality (Ho et al., 2012; Jost & Thompson, 2000; Pratto et al., 2004, Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Crucially, SDO encourages all members of society to embrace inequality regardless of their own social standing. As a result, SDO can be seen to encourage social cohesion congruently with inequality (Sidanius & Pratto, 1993). Particularly within unequal societies, the desire for dominance would coincide with the resistance to change and preference for inequality attributed to conservatives (Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003).

In addition to responding to status and inequality, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, SDO responds to realistic threat (Rios Morrison & Ybarra, 2008) and competition (Dru, 2007) from outgroups. Increased endorsement of SDO renders individuals more likely to see competition with outgroups such as immigrants, as zero-sum (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001). Esses et al. report that individuals high in SDO were less likely to support policies designed to empower immigrants due to the perception that there would be fewer job opportunities for the ingroup. Individuals who endorse political conservatism and authoritarianism have also been shown to be more prejudiced towards minority groups such as immigrants who are perceived to pose a threat to the ingroup’s resources (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Taken together, research findings presented thus far suggest that right wing ideologies such as SDO and conservatism are similarly concerned with the preservation of resources for higher status ingroups.

Within Chapters 2 and 4, I also reviewed the literature which demonstrated that SDO promotes support for intergroup conflict (e.g., Henry et al., 2005; McFarland, 2005). Henry et al. also provided evidence that RWA predicted support for intergroup violence. As a result, one can conclude that in addition to maintaining unequal group relations within societies, right wing ideologies promote support for competition in the context of intergroup conflicts, particularly those over tangible resources. If peoples' lay theories of ideologies are accurate, they should be able to recognise that right wing ideological variables promote support for social inequality and intergroup conflicts.

### **The function of system justification**

Within just world theory, Lerner (1980) postulated that individuals strive to see the world as a just, fair place and ultimately people will receive what they are entitled to. The idea that members of low status groups might endorse ideologies which promote inequality, thereby conflicting with their own self-interest, is particularly pertinent to system justification theory (Jost, Pelham, et al., 2003; Jost & Hunyady, 2005).

While SDO serves to legitimize the relative statuses of different groups, system justification theory suggests that individuals are motivated to legitimise their system or society as a whole (Jost, Pelham, et al., 2003). As a result of this, individuals in lower social classes with limited access to resources are expected to experience cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1954). These individuals are faced with the antithetical ideals of striving to improve conditions for their ingroup versus legitimizing their unequal society. Jost et al. suggest that in an attempt to mollify this dissonance, low status groups might seek to justify the status quo more so than members of advantaged groups. Indeed, Jost et al., found that within the US, members of low-income groups were more likely to trust their government

compared to members of high-income groups. In this sense, endorsing system justifying beliefs is different to the endorsement of SDO which is higher among high status groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001).

Brandt (2013) terms Jost et al.'s (2003) theory, that low status groups will be motivated to justify the system more so than high status groups, the *status-legitimacy hypothesis*. Brandt refutes this hypothesis and sought to offer contradictory findings that high status groups are more likely to legitimise their societies and trust their governments. Brandt analysed three large data sets, two from the US and once multinational survey, in order to test the robustness of the status-legitimacy hypothesis. Measures of trust in the government and confidence with the social system were used to operationalise legitimacy. Social status was measured based upon gender, income, level of education, race and social class. The majority of Brandt's results were null. The only significant finding was small, negative effect of education upon confidence in the social system was observed.

Brandt (2013) also tested whether levels of inequality or freedom to protest would moderate the effect of group status upon endorsement of system justification. Again, these findings were predominantly not significant. However, Brandt acknowledges that there were limitations with his analyses, including a lack of variation in differing inequality levels used for comparison. Brandt contends that his findings suggest that the status legitimacy hypothesis is "not robust" (p. 775).

Another criticism of Brandt's (2013) research is that he focusses only on system justification as a single process. Jost and Hunyady (2003) identify two conflicting motivations within system justification theory. First, *group justification* reflects the motivation to defend one's ingroup. Second, *system justification* reflects the motivation to legitimise one's society. For low status groups within an unequal society these two

motivations would be at odds with one another (Jost & Hunyady, 2003). As a result, in order to reliably refute Jost, Pelham, et al.'s (2003) hypothesis, Brandt (2013) would need to replicate his findings while controlling for group justification.

Earlier research carried out by Brandt and Reyna (2012) questioned the extent to which the functions of system justification are relevant to different societies. Specifically, Brandt and Reyna contended that the functions of system justification vary according to levels of inequality within society. The researchers considered the role of both resistance to change and the acceptance of inequality, within the larger concept of system legitimization. Using the European Social Survey (EES), Brandt and Reyna identified societies which were either high or low in inequality (depicted by the Gini index). Brandt and Reyna operationalised resistance to change as traditionalism and used a single item to measure attitudes towards inequality. System legitimization was computed using items from the EES which pertained to satisfaction with the economy, government, and the extent to which democracy is functional. Brandt and Reyna acknowledge that the use of these items rather than established measures such as SDO to measure attitudes towards inequality is a limitation of the methodology. Nonetheless, they found that within unequal societies, resistance to change and acceptance of inequality predicted system legitimization. In contrast, in equal societies the effect of the acceptance of inequality was null and/or in the opposite direction thereby reducing system legitimization.

Brandt and Reyna (2012) contend that where there is equality, this acceptance becomes "system challenging" (p. 10). Brandt and Reyna's conclusion, therefore, is that the valence of attitudes towards society produced via system justification varies with the social context. This conclusion is similar to Jost, Pelham, et al.'s (2003) contention that conservatism predicts a resistance to change only when inequality is high.

However, the traditional view within system justification theory is that acceptance of inequality is thought to universally promote favourable feelings towards the system (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). As with conservatism, individuals who are more adverse to uncertainty and change are more likely to endorse system justifying beliefs (Jost & Hunyady). In their paper, Jost and Hunyady contend that individuals in lower status groups who legitimise their society have been found to experience reduced frustration, while members of higher status groups have been shown to experience reduced guilt. Furthermore, members of low status groups have also been shown to experience outgroup favouritism and ingroup derogation (Jost & Burgess, 2000; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). The presence of negative ingroup attitudes suggests that the strongest function of system justification is to encourage all groups to legitimate the system rather than focus on preserving positive ingroup evaluations. Reduced feelings of frustration in lower status groups and reduced guilt in higher status groups demonstrates that in justifying society, positive palliative functions can be achieved for all groups. If lay people's theories of system justification are accurate, they should acknowledge that system justification promotes contentment within all groups in unequal societies and, similarly to conservatism, promotes resistance to change.

### **The current research:**

As outlined in Chapter 3, there is evidence to suggest that lay individuals have an accurate understanding of the functions of ideology (Corbetta et al., 2009). Study 4 was designed to test whether individuals perceive SDO as likely to motivate support for intergroup conflicts and, as a result, render these groups more likely to succeed within conflict. Study 5 was designed to see whether participants recognised other functions of SDO, including the maintenance of social hierarchy within society. Additionally, Study 5

included two other ideological variables. Participants' perceptions of the functions of political conservatism and system justification were also assessed in order to see if their lay theories were accurate (to the extent they are consistent with scientific theories). Furthermore, providing evidence that lay individuals appreciate the functions of ideologies provides support for the contention that ideologies might be endorsed for strategic reasons.

## **Study 4**

### **The perceived utility of SDO in conflict**

Study 4 was designed to test the idea that SDO could be recognised as an ideology, which if endorsed, would better equip groups for conflict. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, SDO has been shown to respond to realistic threat experimentally (Rios Morrison & Ybarra, 2008). Furthermore, as outlined earlier in this chapter, McFarland (2003) and Henry et al. (2005) provided evidence that SDO promotes support for conflict. This study was designed to test whether lay individuals would recognise SDO as possessing the same characteristics which researchers have found empirically.

Study 4 had three hypotheses. Hypothesis one was that groups described as being high in SDO would be perceived as possessing less warmth than groups described as being low in SDO. This would lead participants to have a preference for groups lower in SDO to win the conflict. Hypothesis two was that despite this preference, groups higher in SDO would be perceived as being associated with commitment to the conflict. Hypothesis three was that the effect of groups' SDO on the perceived likelihood of their winning the conflict would be mediated by their greater willingness to invest in and commit to the conflict.

## Method

### Participants and Design

Participants were fifty-seven undergraduate psychology students from the University of Kent participating for course credit (37 females and 20 males). The mean age of the participants was 19.37 ( $SD = 2.51$ ). In the study, there was a single independent variable. Participants were randomly allocated to one of two conditions in which they read about a country which was high or low in SDO.

### Materials and procedure

The study was conducted as an online questionnaire. Descriptions of the groups within the intergroup conflict scenario were written using the '*desire for group based dominance*' items of the traditional eight item scale (Pratto & Sidanius, 1997). In the high SDO condition participants read:

Two countries, Audaz and Lindo, each feel that they have a legitimate claim of ownership of an island called Loucura. As yet no military action has commenced. However both countries are equally well prepared for such an event in terms of their financial recourses and military personnel. Each country has a military budget of \$5 billion, with the ability to increase this when needed. In terms of military personnel each country has a military force of around 100 000 servicemen and women. The citizens of Audaz have a worldview that is shared to some extent by other groups



around the world. In their view, some groups of people are simply inferior to others. They believe that groups who are inferior should stay in their place. They also believe that it is OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others. Another feature of their worldview is that they believe that to get ahead, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. The people of Lindo do not share this worldview.

In the alternative low SDO scenario participants read largely the same material, apart from the section detailing the world view held by the people of Audaz which read

The citizens of Audaz have a worldview that is shared to some extent by other groups around the world. In their view, it does not make sense to say that some groups of people are simply inferior to others, or that those who are inferior should stay in their place. They believe that it is unacceptable for some groups to have more of a chance in life than others. Another feature of their worldview is that they believe that to get ahead, it is not necessary to step on other groups. The people of Lindo do not share this worldview.

Participants were kept as neutral observers of the conflict in order to get an impartial view of how likely groups described as being high versus low in SDO would be perceived to emerge victorious from the conflict.

After reading their scenario participants were asked to complete a questionnaire. Each question was answered on an eight point scale. Each scale was designed to explore the hypothesis that groups higher in SDO would be perceived as more likely to secure a victory. Questions participants answered will be outlined under four headings; participant preferences, perceived group actions during the conflict, consequences of winning the

conflict, likelihood of possible outcomes. All questions were answered on eight point scales (1= the country low in SDO, 8= the country high in SDO).

**Participant preferences.** Initially, participants were asked to indicate their preferences as to who they would prefer to win the conflict. Three questions ( $\alpha = .96$ ) asked participants, “*which country would you consider to be most likeable*” and, “*which country would you prefer to win the conflict and which country do you feel is most deserving of a victory?*” Additionally perceptions of each groups’ warmth (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002) were measured. Participants were asked to identify which group they felt was more warm, good natured, sincere and tolerant ( $\alpha = .96$ ). The purpose of this was to test Hypothesis 1, that participants would identify groups higher in SDO as less warm and the group less desired to emerge successful from the conflict.

**Perceived group actions during the conflict.** Participants were asked which country was most likely to be the aggressors and start the war ( $\alpha = .97$ ). This scale was constructed using four items including which country would be most likely to, “*launch the first military strike*”. ‘Country commitment’ was measured with nine items ( $\alpha = .88$ ) including, “*which country would be most likely to seek to end the war in favour of diplomatic solutions?*”

Additionally, soldier ( $\alpha = .83$ ) and citizen ( $\alpha = .93$ ) commitment were measured. ‘Soldier Commitment’ was measured with ten items which asked which country’s soldiers would be most likely to, “*fight ruthlessly*”, for example. ‘Citizen Commitment’ was measured with fourteen items. Items included asking which country’s citizens would be most likely to, “*unite behind the war effort*”. Inspiration for these questions was taken from Pratto

and Sidanius (2006) where groups high in SDO were found to value the lives of opposing group members less in war than those low in SDO.

**Consequences of winning and losing.** The next set of questions assessed which group would be perceived as associating winning the conflict with the promotion of gaining higher status ( $\alpha = .94$ ), security ( $\alpha = .79$ ) and respect ( $r = .81, p = .001$ ). Each DV was measured in response to the question, “*Which country will most likely believe that a victory will lead to the following outcomes*”. Status was assessed with four items including, “...give them power over other nations”. Safety was measured with four items including, “...make them safer as a country”. Respect was measured with two items including, “...the admiration of the international community”.

**Financial commitment to the conflict.** Participants were asked to consider the likelihood that the leader ( $\alpha = .92$ ) and citizens ( $\alpha = .70$ ) of Audaz would be prepared to invest substantially within the conflict. Leader investment was measured with four items including “*To what degree would the leader of Audaz be willing to commit their country to debt in order to increase spending on the war effort?*” Citizen investment was measured with three items including, “*Would citizens be prepared to commit to an increase in taxes to contribute to the fund?*” Questions were answered on eight point scales (1= *very unlikely*, 8= *very likely*).

**Likelihood of possible outcomes.** Finally, participants were asked five questions relating to the outcome of the conflict ( $\alpha = .54$ , or  $.81$  without the compromise option). Participants were

asked to indicate: how likely it was for Audaz to succeed or fail in the military conflict, how likely the conflict was to end in diplomatic compromise, and how likely it was for Lindo to succeed or fail in the military conflict (1= *very unlikely*, 8= *very likely*).

## Results

In order to test the first hypothesis, that a country described as high in SDO would be perceived as less warm resulting in them not being participants' preference to win the conflict, Hayes' (2013) PROCESS model 4 was used (see Figure 4). Using 10,000 resamples, analysis revealed a significant indirect path to participants' preferences (point estimate = -3.38 (SE= .45), 95% BCa CI [-4.38, -2.59]). The analysis revealed that when perceived warmth was included in the model, there was no significant direct effect of SDO on participants' preferred victor (Figure 4).




Figure 4: Path model showing an indirect effect from SDO to participants' preferred choice for victory in the conflict.

To test Hypothesis 2, that the group described as being high in SDO would be more likely to be perceived as being associated with each of the remaining dependent variables, one-sample *t* tests were carried out. Mean values of each dependent variable were compared to the scale midpoint (4.5). Means found to be significantly higher than 4.5 meant that, on

average, the outcome variable was significantly more likely to be attributed to the country high in SDO (Audaz). In contrast, mean values significantly below 4.5 were significantly more likely to be attributed to the country low in SDO (Lindo). For means and *t* values, see Table 3.

Table 3:  
Means (and *Standard Deviations*) and *t* test analysis pertaining to dependent variables.

	Dependent Variables												
	Preference	Warmth	Aggressor	Country commitment	Soldier commitment	Citizen commitment	Status	Safety	Respect	Leader investment	Citizen investment	Likelihood that Audaz wins	Likelihood that Lindo wins
N= 57	2.66	2.66	6.23	5.62	5.23	5.55	5.66	3.81	4.35	5.47	4.69	5.07	3.67
Mean	(1.63)	(1.56)	(1.46)	(1.07)	(0.92)	(1.07)	(1.36)	(1.46)	(1.82)	(1.63)	(1.23)	(1.51)	(1.31)
<i>t</i>	-8.56	-8.94	8.93	7.91	5.97	7.37	6.45	-3.56	-6.17	4.51	1.17	2.85	-4.79
	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	**		***		**	***

Means higher than 4.5 denote the DV is associated with the country high in SDO where *t* is significant, \*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$   
 Note: For the analysis of outcomes, the single variables which measured the perceived likelihood that Audaz (high in SDO) and Lindo (low in SDO) would win the conflict were used for analyses

In order to test hypothesis three, that the SDO-likelihood of winning the conflict would be mediated by each of the other dependent variables, I initially looked for correlations among dependent variables. See Table 4 for correlations.

Table 4:  
*Zero-order Correlations among commitment DVs, investment items and likelihood of Audaz winning*

	Dependent Variables											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Preference (1)	.878***	-.679***	-.574***	-.528***	-.512***	-.407**	.359**	.198	-.386**	.125	-.28*	
Warmth (2)		-.761***	-.664***	-.554***	-.525***	-.436**	.412**	.141	-.388**	.144	-.33*	
Aggressor (3)			.801***	.642***	.636***	.564***	-.237	-.014	.488***	.111	.36**	
Country commitment (4)				.750***	.751***	.686***	-.332*	-.113	.565***	.054	.37**	
Soldier commitment (5)					.715***	.591***	-.100	-.121	.548***	.082	.29*	
Citizen commitment (6)						.687***	-.143	-.066	.577***	.180	.31*	
Status (7)							.087	.214	.651***	.187	.21	
Safety (8)								.286*	-.090	.046	-.19	
Respect (9)									.137	.177	.09	
Leader investment (10)										.393**	.15	
Citizen investment (11)												.23
Likelihood of winning (12)												

Correlations are significant where \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \* $p < .05$

Note: 'Likelihood of winning' was analysed with the composite variable for these analyses

Following these results, I carried out tests for mediation using Hayes' (2013) PROCESS model 4 (using 10,000 resamples) to test the hypothesis that each of the DVs would mediate the SDO-likelihood of winning relationship. Two variables (aggressors and

country commitment) were each found to significantly mediate this relationship (see Figures 5 and 6). Analysis of the role of the aggressors variable revealed a significant indirect path to the likelihood of Audaz winning the conflict (point estimate = 3.22 (SE= 1.55), 95% BCa CI [.66, 6.88]). Analysis of the role of the country commitment variable revealed a significant indirect path to the likelihood of Audaz winning the conflict (point estimate = 2.99 (SE= 1.44), 95% BCa CI [.35, 6.09]).<sup>9</sup> The analyses revealed that when either variable; aggressors or country commitment was included in the model, there was no significant direct effect of SDO upon who participants' perceived as being more likely to win the conflict.




Figure 5. Path diagram showing an indirect effect from the groups' SDO to the perceived likelihood of their winning, through the perceived likelihood that the group will more likely to be the aggressors.




Figure 6. Path diagram showing an indirect effect from the groups' SDO to the perceived likelihood of their winning, through the perceived likelihood that the group will more likely to be committed to the conflict.

## Discussion

<sup>9</sup> No other DVs were found to significantly mediate the SDO-likelihood of winning relationship. Due to the small sample size and strong correlations between variables, a multiple mediation analysis was not appropriate for this data. When all of the variables were combined to form a single mediator variable, the model was not significant. Furthermore, the small sample size meant that there was not sufficient power to carry out factor analysis of the dependent variables.



The results obtained provided support for the three experimental hypotheses. When citizens of Audaz were described as being high in SDO, participants perceived them as possessing less warmth and were not the preferred group for winning the conflict. However, despite participants' own preferences they indicated that the country described as higher in SDO would be most likely to win the conflict mediated by their willingness to be the aggressors in the conflict and be more committed to the conflict. Furthermore, that same country was perceived as being more willing to invest financially in the conflict. The relationship between these variables was demonstrated using a bootstrapping approach to mediation. However, given the small sample size, it was not appropriate to test for a multiple mediation model which is a limitation of Study 4.

Overall, the results from Study 4 suggest that lay individuals hold knowledge regarding the function of SDO which have been experimentally validated. For example, McFarland (2003) and Henry et al. (2005) provided evidence that SDO promotes support for conflicts. Participants' perceptions of the functions of SDO are consistent with this empirical work which suggest that lay individuals have advanced and accurate knowledge pertaining to ideological variables and their functions within intergroup conflict.

## **Study 5**

### **Explicit views**

The initial aim of this study was to replicate the findings from Study 4 that SDO is perceived as being useful to groups engaged in conflicts. The second aim of this study was to expand the research by uncovering participants' folk knowledge regarding the perceived

utility of conservatism (Napier & Jost, 2008) and system justification (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Kay & Jost, 2003) in addition to SDO. In assessing this perceived utility I was interested in two main areas. First, I was interested in whether participants perceived these ideological variables as likely to promote social cohesion, contentment and inequality within society. Second, I was interested in whether participants perceived that the ideological variables would promote support for conflicts between groups and render the group more likely to emerge successfully from conflicts. In order to test what, if any, perceptions participants held regarding the consequences of adopting these ideological variables, participants were asked to think about a society which endorsed conservatism, system justification and SDO.

In contrast to Study 4, participants were asked about their views regarding each ideological variable explicitly and without using any hypothetical scenarios. In doing so, Study 5 measured the lay theories participants held regarding ideological variables and their function within everyday society. Additionally, I did not need to infer how participants had interpreted each dependent variable. For example, in Study 4 commitment to the conflict was measured with a number of scale items which could have been interpreted as possessing subtly different meanings by different participants. In Study 5, participants were asked directly whether each ideological variable would be likely to promote outcomes such as increasing social inequality. In doing so, I can be confident that each participant considered the outcome being addressed by the dependent variables.

With regards to the consideration of intragroup variables, I hypothesised that participants would perceive all three ideological variables as promoting inequality, social cohesion and contentment in high status groups. I also hypothesised that participants would only perceive system justification as promoting contentment in low status groups. With regards to the consideration of intergroup variables, and replicating the results of Study 4, I

hypothesised that SDO would be perceived as promoting support for conflicts and an increased efficiency and likelihood that the group would be victorious in conflict. Given the similarities between SDO and conservatism and the research carried out by Henry et al. (2005), I hypothesised that conservatism would also be perceived as promoting support for, and success within, conflicts. If participants recognise that system justification promotes legitimization and trust within one's society, endorsement should legitimise an ingroup's decision to commit to conflicts. As a result, I hypothesised that participants would perceive system justification as promoting support for conflict.

## **Method**

### **Participants and Design**

One hundred and thirty-one Internet users living in the USA (62 males and 69 females) were recruited via M-Turk. The mean age of participants was 36.26 ( $SD = 12.47$ ), and with the exception of seven participants, identified their nationality as American. The study was correlational.

### **Materials and Procedure**

Participants were recruited through M-Turk and were directed to an online questionnaire. Participants were asked to identify their political orientation before answering questions about the utility of three right wing ideological variables. Participants were asked if adopting these three ideologies would lead to less or more of fifteen possible outcomes, and whether these outcomes would be more likely in societies characterised by low or high levels

of inequality. The three ideologies were operationalized with scale items usually used to measure participants' endorsement of the ideology. Participants were asked, "*If society as a whole were to adopt the following views:*" and conversely, "*And reject these views.*" Scale items were arranged under these two headings in terms of their valence.

**Conservatism.** Conservatism was operationalized using Napier and Jost's (2008) scale items.

Participants read:

If society as a whole were to adopt the following views:

"I consider my political orientation to be very right wing.

I see myself as having strongly conservative views.

I see myself as a strong Republican supporter."

And reject these views:

"I consider my political orientation to be very left wing.

I see myself as having strongly liberal views.

I see myself as a strong Democrat supporter."

Following this, participants identified on scales the consequences of adopting Conservatism before moving on to answer questions regarding the next two ideologies.

**System Justification.** Using the same format participants read:

If society as a whole were to adopt the following views:

"In general, society is fair."

"In general, the US political system operates as it should."

"The US is the best country in the world to live in."

"Most policies serve the greater good."

"Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness."

"Society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve."

And reject these views:

“US society needs to be radically restructured.”

“Our society is getting worse every year.”

**Social Dominance Orientation.** For the final ideology participants read:

If society as a whole were to adopt the following views:

“Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.”

“It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.”

“To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.”

“Inferior groups should stay in their place.”

And reject these views:

“Group equality should be our ideal.

“We should do what we can to equalise conditions for different groups.”

“Increased social equality is beneficial to society.”

“We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.”

**Outcomes of adopting ideologies.** After reading the description of each ideology participants were asked:

As a direct result, would you expect there to be lower or higher levels of the following:

Participants were then asked to identify on scales ranging from “1 (lower levels)” to “8 (higher levels)” the consequences of adopting each ideology for society regarding each dependent variable. These consequences fell under two headings; intragroup consequences and intergroup consequences. Finally two questions assessed the effect of high compared to low levels of inequality upon the extent to which participants thought each ideological variable would be endorsed.

**Intragroup consequences.** First, participants identified whether endorsing these beliefs would lead to lower or higher levels of; social inequality, a gap between the rich and the poor, harmony, civil unrest, cohesion, contentment within lower classes, contentment within upper classes, desire for change within lower classes and desire for change within upper classes. ‘Social inequality’ and ‘a gap between the rich and poor’ were correlated to form one measure of inequality. ‘Harmony’, ‘civil unrest’ (reverse coded) and ‘cohesion’ formed one measure of social cohesion. ‘Contentment within lower classes’ and ‘desire for change within the lower classes’ (reverse coded) formed one measure of lower class contentment. ‘Contentment within upper classes’ and ‘desire for change within the upper classes’ (reverse coded) formed one measure of upper class contentment. For scale reliability coefficients pertaining to each ideological variable, see Table 5.

**Intergroup consequences.** Second, participants identified whether endorsing these beliefs would lead to lower or higher levels of; popular support for war or conflicts with other nations for resources, popular support for war or conflicts with other nations for status, popular support for war or conflicts with other nations irrespective of costs incurred, effective military action in the event of conflict with other nations, victory in the event of conflict with other nations. Factor analysis was carried out using a Varimax rotation. Two factors were found in response to each ideological variable: the first four variables formed one measure of support for conflict. The second two variables formed one measure of success in conflict<sup>10</sup>. In response to conservatism, factor one had an eigenvalue of 3.21 (system justification = 3.36, SDO = 3.33) and explained 53.50% of variance (system justification = 55.94%, SDO = 55.56%). Factor two had an eigenvalue of 1.60 (system justification = 1.71, SDO = 1.80) and

---

<sup>10</sup> For factor loadings, see Appendix B.

explained 26.60% of variance (system justification = 28.44%, SDO = 29.93%). For scale reliability coefficients, see Table 5.

Table 5:  
*Alphas and correlation coefficients indicating scale reliability for each outcome variable in response to each ideological variable.*

	Dependent Variables					
	Intragroup consequences				Intergroup consequences	
	Inequality <i>r</i>	Cohesion $\alpha$	Contentment in upper classes <i>r</i>	Contentment in lower classes <i>r</i>	Support for conflict $\alpha$	Success in conflict <i>r</i>
Conservatism	.66***	.80	.32***	.29**	.91	.59***
System justification	.51***	.82	.48***	.52**	.94	.64***
SDO	.64***	.78	.34***	.27**	.94	.74***

For correlation coefficients, \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$

*Context.* Third, participants answered two questions:

“Under which conditions would these views be more likely to lead to greater social disorder?”

“If social inequality were to increase, would you expect people to agree less or more with these views?”

These questions were answered on eight point scales labelled “*lower inequality to higher inequality*” and “*less agreement to more agreement*” respectively. Right wing ideologies and

system justification are each thought to curtail social unrest in the face of inequality (Pratto et al., 1994; Kay & Jost, 2003). SDO in particular has been theorised as being a hierarchy enhancing legitimizing myth (Pratto et al., 1994). If indeed this is widely accepted, participants should identify each ideology as being more likely to be endorsed when there is more inequality. If instead participants perceive right wing and system justifying ideological variables as problematic in unequal societies, then participants will identify each as being more likely to produce social disorder under conditions of high inequality.

### **Participants' own endorsement of ideologies**

Participants completed measures of their political orientation, system justification ( $\alpha = .86$ ) and SDO ( $\alpha = .92$ ). Participants were asked to indicate their agreement to scale items on eight point scales (1= "*completely disagree*", 8= "*completely agree*"). Participants identified their own political orientation on a ten point scale (1 = *left wing* to 10 = *right wing*) at the start of the study. In measuring participants' own endorsement of ideological variables, Study 5 demonstrated whether perceived consequences of these variables were moderated by participants' own ideological choices. In other words, this measure checked whether participants were evaluating the effects of their own ideologies positively.

## **Results and Discussion**

### **Intragroup and intergroup outcomes**

Each of the possible outcomes of endorsing conservatism, system justification and SDO were subjected to a one sample *t* test against the scale midpoint (4.5). Means which were significantly above 4.5 mean that, on average, participants perceived the endorsement of the



ideological variables as promoting higher levels of the dependent variable. Conservatism and SDO were perceived as promoting very similar functions, namely promoting inequality, social unrest, contentment within upper classes, support for and success within conflicts. Additionally, participants thought that both conservatism and SDO would be endorsed under the same conditions. System justification was the only ideological variable perceived to promote cohesion and was not perceived to promote inequality. Similar to conservatism and SDO, system justification was perceived to promote success in conflict. However, unlike conservatism and SDO, system justification was not thought to promote support for conflicts. Results can be seen in Table 6.

Table 6:  
Means (standard deviations) and *t* test data for outcome variables.

	Dependent Variables							
	Intragroup consequences			Intergroup consequences			Contextual DVs	
	Inequality	Cohesion	Contentment in upper classes	Contentment in lower classes	Support for conflict	Success in conflict	Endorsement leads to disorder based on inequality	Likely to be endorsed when inequality is high
<b>(N= 131)</b>								
<b>Conservatism</b>								
Mean	5.87	3.88	5.86	4.65	5.30	5.26	5.54	3.09
(SD)	(1.72)	(1.61)	(1.53)	(1.12)	(1.60)	(1.42)	(2.25)	(1.82)
<i>t</i>	9.16***	-4.42***	10.18***	1.48	5.72***	6.12***	5.30***	-8.85***
<b>System justification</b>								
Mean	4.45	5.15	5.05	4.71	4.28	4.92	4.54	3.75
(SD)	(1.88)	(1.58)	(1.64)	(1.70)	(1.63)	(1.47)	(2.22)	(2.04)
<i>t</i>	-2.6	4.74***	3.80***	1.44	-1.54	3.29**	0.22	-4.22***
<b>SDO</b>								
Mean	6.48	2.79	5.77	2.73	5.39	4.90	5.64	3.12
(SD)	(1.66)	(1.51)	(1.60)	(1.53)	(1.58)	(1.55)	(2.24)	(2.08)
<i>t</i>	13.65***	-12.92***	9.10***	-13.23***	6.45***	2.92**	5.83***	-7.57***

Mean is significantly different from scale mid-point (4.5); \*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .005$ , \*  $p < .05$ . Positive values of *t* indicate that ideological variable in question is perceived to lead to increases in the outcome variable.

## Participants' endorsement of ideologies

Correlation analyses were carried out in order to determine whether the extent to which participants themselves endorsed these ideologies determined how useful they perceived them to be. As expected, significant correlations were found between participants' endorsement of conservatism and system justification,  $r(131) = .36, p = .001$ , conservatism and SDO,  $r(131) = .45, p = .001$ , and system justification and SDO,  $r(131) = .22, p = .013$ . Table 7 shows the results of correlation analysis between participants' endorsement of each ideology and its perceived utility.

Table 7:  
*Correlations of participants' endorsement of each ideological variable with its perceived utility for intragroup and intergroup relations pertaining to that same ideological variable.*

	Dependent variables					
	Intragroup consequences				Intergroup consequences	
	Social Inequality	Social Cohesion	Contentment within lower classes	Contentment within upper classes	Support for conflict	Success in conflict
Participant endorsement of Conservatism	-.58***	.61***	.04	-.26**	-.32***	.29**
Participant endorsement of System Justification	-.27**	.29**	.15	-.05	-.16	.13
Participant endorsement of SDO	-.42***	.39***	.27**	-.21*	-.21*	.05

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .005$  \*  $p < .05$

The fewest significant correlations were observed between participants' own endorsement of system justification and the extent to which they felt the ideology would

promote each of the intra and intergroup outcomes. Correlations between participants' endorsements of right wing ideologies and the perceived consequences of adopting those ideological variables were predominantly negative. As a result, I can conclude that in the main, participants' attributions of the utility of each ideological variable were made largely independently of the extent to which they themselves endorsed each.

I then examined whether participants scoring high and low on the three ideological predictors (SDO, right wing ideology and system justification) perceived these ideologies to have a significant impact on the criterion variables (e.g., social cohesion and inequality).

To do this, I performed an analogue of simple slopes analysis, in which I tested whether participants scoring at +/- 1 SD of the predictor variable would tend to perceive the ideology in question to have positive or negative effects. This can be achieved by transforming participants' scores – such that their actual score is transformed by the value of each criterion that would be expected were their score on the predictor variable higher or lower by 1 SD. Where the predictor variable is  $x$ , and the criterion variable  $y$ , and the slope of the simple regression line is  $b$ , this can be expressed as follows:

$$\text{Adjusted } y = \text{old } y \pm (bSDx)$$

Mathematically, the effect of doing this is the same as altering the test value of the one-sample  $t$  tests in the opposite direction. For expedience, therefore, I adjusted the test values by the appropriate amounts. Broadly speaking, participants shared the same perceptions of the consequences of endorsing ideological variables, regardless of their own endorsement or rejection. There were however notable exceptions. For example, participants who endorsed conservatism thought that the ideological variable would promote social cohesion. In

contrast, participants who did not endorse conservatism thought that the ideological variable would reduce social cohesion. For  $t$  values see Table 8. <sup>11</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup> Political orientation was also analysed using a dichotomous split where values below the scale midpoint (5.5) corresponded to a liberal political orientation and values above the scale midpoint corresponded to a conservative orientation. The two methods of analyses depict the same pattern of results.

Table 8:

*t* values representing the perceived functions of ideological variables as evaluated by low and high endorsing participants.

	Dependent Variables							
	Intragroup consequences			Intergroup consequences			Contextual DVs	
	Inequality	Cohesion	Contentment in upper classes	Contentment in lower classes	Support for conflict	Success in conflict	Endorsement leads to disorder based on inequality	Likely to be endorsed when inequality is high
SDO								
-1SD	18.51***	-17.33***	11.47***	-16.34***	8.88***	2.30*	7.75***	-11.10***
+1SD	8.79***	-8.50***	6.73***	-10.14***	4.02***	3.55**	3.92***	-4.05***
System justification								
-1SD	2.89**	1.38	4.39***	-0.28	0.29	1.80	0.36	-3.59***
+1SD	-3.40**	8.10**	3.20**	3.17**	-3.37**	4.79***	.01	-4.85***
Conservatism								
-1SD	15.27***	-11.00***	13.17***	1.43	9.07***	2.69**	8.11***	-10.18***
+1SD	3.05**	2.16*	7.20***	1.53	2.37*	9.54***	2.49*	-7.53***
Conservatism <5.5								
<5.5	11.02***	-8.61***	8.76***	0.87	6.71***	3.43**	6.03***	-7.48***
>5.5								
>5.5	0.95	2.80**	5.56***	1.54	0.52	6.52***	-7.48***	-4.75***

Effects are significant from the adjusted scale midpoints where \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \* $p < .05$ . Positive values of  $t$  indicate that ideological variable in question is perceived to lead to increases in the outcome variable.

These analyses revealed that both endorsers and rejecters of SDO think that the ideological variable promotes inequality, contentment within upper classes, support for conflict and success in conflict. However, endorsers perceive these outcomes to a lesser extent with the exception of success in conflict, which endorsers perceive as being more likely. All participants perceived that SDO would reduce social cohesion and contentment within lower classes. Endorsers perceived these outcomes to be likely to a lesser extent compared to rejecters. All participants indicated that they thought SDO would be less likely to be endorsed when inequality is high, with rejecters of SDO holding this belief more strongly. Additionally, all participants felt that endorsement of SDO would be likely to lead to social disorder under conditions of high inequality, which rejecters of SDO also felt more strongly.

The results pertaining to conservatism were largely consistent with those relating to SDO. The only notable exception was that there were no significant effects regarding participants' perceptions of whether SDO would promote or reduce contentment within lower classes. It is noteworthy that despite being perceived to share many of the same functions as SDO, unlike SDO, participants do not recognise that political conservatism does not serve in the interest of lower classes. However, despite the degree to which each dependent variable is perceived to be promoted by each ideological variable, all of the participants were in agreement as to which outcomes were promoted by SDO and conservatism.

This was not the case with regard to the perceived outcomes of endorsing system justifying beliefs. Participants who rejected this ideological variable perceived that it would promote inequality, contentment in upper classes and would be less likely to be endorsed when inequality was high. In contrast, participants who endorsed the ideological variable perceived that it would promote contentment within upper and lower classes, cohesion and success in conflicts. Additionally these same participants felt that the ideological variable

would reduce inequality and support for conflict. The only variable that all participants agreed on was that system justifying beliefs would be less likely to be endorsed when inequality was high.

## **Discussion**

The intragroup and intergroup results will now be discussed in relation to each ideological variable before an overall conclusion is made based on the findings collectively.

### **Conservatism**

In terms of intragroup relations, conservatism was perceived to promote greater social inequality and less social cohesion. As expected, this ideology is perceived to have positive affective consequences for the upper classes. No significant effect was found in relation to perceived contentment within lower classes. However, no significant negative effects were observed. In other words, there was no evidence that participants attributed conservatism to a desire for change or a lack of contentment within lower classes. These results could be interpreted as suggesting that participants have an appreciation for the preferences for inequality along with uncertainty avoidance and resistance to change associated with conservatism both theoretically and empirically (Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003).

The two contextual scale items suggested that endorsement of conservatism is problematic under conditions of higher inequality, and so was thought to be less likely endorsed. This is consistent with empirical evidence that individuals hold preferences for more equal societies (Norton & Ariely, 2011). Given that individuals perceive conservatism as promoting inequality and would prefer less inequality, it follows that individuals believe that conservatism would be less attractive to societies high in inequality.



Both of the intergroup outcome variables (support for conflict and achieving success within conflicts) were above the scale midpoint. This indicated that that endorsement of conservatism was perceived as motivating support for intergroup conflict. This result suggests that lay individuals have formulated theories surrounding ideological choices which are consistent with empirical findings linking right wing ideologies with threat anxiety and support for conflict (Henry et al., 2005; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003).

Additionally, individuals who endorse political conservatism have been found to be more likely to endorse just world beliefs (Christopher et al., 2008). Participants may well hold beliefs which are consistent with this, and perceive that these ideologies would motivate support for conflict. If groups are perceived to be pursuing the “right” course of action, then just world beliefs would produce confidence in a positive outcome as a reward for pursuing the justified course of action (Lerner, 1965). Furthermore, conservatism is perceived to promote success in intergroup conflicts. These results are similar to those obtained with relation to SDO in Study 4.

### **Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)**

Results pertaining to the endorsement of SDO within society were similar to those for political conservatism. SDO was seen to promote inequality and disharmony along with positive affect for higher classes. Participants recognised that these two ideologies share many of the same functions. In contrast to conservatism, SDO was perceived to promote negative affect for lower classes within society. In addition to recognising similarities among right wing ideologies, participants were able to recognise subtle differences between political conservatism and more extreme right wing ideologies such as SDO. Given that these perceptions are consistent with similarities and differences which have been identified within psychological theory and research (e.g., Christopher et al., 2008; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a;

Jetten & Iyer, 2010; Sidanius et al., 1996), one can conclude that individuals do hold lay theories surrounding the functions of different right wing ideologies which are fairly accurate.

Additionally, and similar to perceptions of conservatism, SDO was seen to promote social disorder under conditions of higher inequality, and was thought to be less likely endorsed under these conditions of high inequality. This poses some interesting questions in terms of lay theories concerned with SDO. As discussed in Chapter 2, Social Dominance Theory suggests that SDO is useful for maintaining cohesion within society in the face of high inequality (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Results from Study 5 suggest that participants did not recognise this particular function of SDO.

The perceived intergroup consequences of adopting SDO were also similar to those of adopting conservatism. SDO was seen as useful in promoting support and competence in conflicts. These findings are in line with those connecting increased SDO with the tendency to pursue both relative and absolute gains (Sidanius et al., 2006) and support conflicts (Henry et al., 2005; McFarland, 2003), providing further demonstrations that individuals have an understanding of what SDO does for groups.

### **System Justification**

The perceived utility of endorsing system justification was varied. On the whole system justification was seen to promote social cohesion and contentment within high classes in society which supports the literature pertaining to system justification theory (Jost, Pelham, et al., 2003; Jost & Hunyady, 2005). In contrast to conservatism and SDO, system justification was not seen to significantly affect levels of inequality itself. There was also no perceived effect of endorsing system justification upon contentment within lower classes. As a result, one can contend that individuals do not fully recognise all of the functions of system

justification. However, participants who endorsed (rather than rejected) system justification themselves, did perceive the ideological variable as promoting contentment within the lower classes. Perhaps individuals who are drawn to system justification are those who recognise the palliative functions of legitimising their society.

System justification was also perceived to be different from the two right wing ideological variables in terms of the perceived consequence of endorsement under conditions of high inequality. Higher levels of inequality were not perceived as leading system justification to reduce social disorder. This was true of participants who endorsed or rejected system justification. This result provided further evidence that individuals do not fully recognise all of the functions attributed to system justification.

However, system justification was regarded as similar to SDO and conservatism in that it was perceived as being less likely to be adopted under conditions of higher inequality. Participants believe that all three of the ideological variables are less likely to be endorsed when there is more inequality. This may be a result of the fact that individuals have indicated that they would prefer society to be more equal (Norton & Ariely, 2011). If this is widely acknowledged, then it makes sense for lay individuals to believe that society would be less favourable towards ideologies which maintain social inequality as that inequality increases.

Results pertaining to intergroup consequences were also varied. While there was no significant effect found in terms of promoting support for conflict, endorsing system justification was perceived to make victory in conflict more likely. As a result, Study 5 provides evidence that system justification is perceived as possessing a positive palliative function, but it not perceived to promote support for conflicts in the same way as right wing ideologies.

## **General Discussion**

In Study 4, a hypothetical war scenario was used to assess what functions participants would attribute to SDO during intergroup conflicts. Participants indicated that a country high in SDO would be more likely to be the aggressors in the conflict, be more committed to the conflict, more likely to invest in the conflict and, ultimately, would be more likely to emerge successfully from that conflict. This last effect was found despite participants indicating that their preference would be for the group lower in SDO to win the conflict. Given that empirical findings have shown that SDO promotes support for conflict (Henry et al., 2005; McFarland, 2003), Study 4 provided the first demonstration within this thesis that lay individuals may have accurate knowledge pertaining to the functions of SDO.

In Study 5, participants were not asked to imagine any hypothetical scenarios, nor were there any other experimental manipulations. By measuring participants' explicit views and accounting for their own endorsement of each ideology, I have captured a representation of the lay knowledge surrounding three different ideological variables. In Study 5, the perceived utility of system justification, conservatism and SDO were examined. As expected, system justification was identified as having clear palliative functions including promoting social cohesion between classes, and contentment within upper classes.

Also as expected, conservatism and SDO were regarded as possessing similar functions. Participants indicated that both right wing ideologies would promote inequality, reduce social cohesion and increase contentment within upper classes. Furthermore, both ideologies were seen to promote commitment and attributions of competence in intergroup conflicts.

However, differences were observed between the two right wing ideological variables suggesting that individuals have an appreciation for the difference between political conservatism and right wing extremism. This difference has been experimentally validated

(Crowson, 2009; Jost et al., 2007; Jetten & Iyer, 2010). Furthermore, differences were observed between the functions associated with SDO and conservatism compared to system justifying beliefs. Unlike the attributions made to SDO and conservatism, endorsers and rejecters differed in the functions they perceived to be associated with system justifying beliefs. Additionally, system justification was the only ideological variable which was perceived as able to promote social cohesion, and was not thought to promote social unrest in response to inequality.

Across both studies, SDO has been linked with increased investment and competitive behaviour within intergroup conflicts. Conservatism was perceived as offering similar functions as SDO within the intergroup context. System justifying beliefs were perceived as promoting confidence that a group would emerge successfully from the conflict but were not perceived to mobilize support for the conflict in the same way as the other ideological variables. These results suggest that lay individuals were aware that conservatism performs similar functions as SDO as contended by Jetten and Iyer (2010) and were able to differentiate between right wing ideologies and system justifying beliefs which is consistent with Jost and Banaji's contention (1994).

Results from Study 5 fit with the mediation model in Study 4 where SDO led to greater effectiveness in conflict as mediated by commitment and support for the conflict. Participants appear to have an appreciation for the ability of SDO to motivate support and commitment to conflict which in turn increases the likelihood of securing a victory. One can contend that the fact individuals have an appreciation for the functions of political ideologies may help to explain why people are attracted to their ideological choices. In the previous empirical chapter, participants demonstrated increased endorsement of SDO when imagining themselves embroiled in a conflict. Findings from Studies 4 and 5 suggest that individuals appreciate the functions of ideologies such as SDO within these conflicts which may, in part,

explain why they are drawn to these ideologies when faced with competition and conflict with outgroups.

Perhaps most importantly, results from Studies 4 and 5 highlighted that much of the folk knowledge surrounding these ideologies is not merely a direct result of an individual's own political orientation. This suggests that left wingers can recognise the potential benefits of right wing ideology, and conversely, right wingers can see the potential pitfalls of their own ideology for society as a whole. This finding provides evidence that lay theories are culturally shared. Additionally, this finding supports the contention that other considerations, in addition to the potential utilities of ideologies, explain why individuals make their ideological choices. This would explain why people chose to endorse left wing ideologies despite recognising the benefits of right wing ideologies. It also helps to explain why some individuals might be seen to endorse ideologies which exacerbate social problems they claim to dislike. For example, individuals who do not support group based inequality within their society may still be drawn to SDO during international conflicts because they recognise the utility of the ideology for their country as a whole, within that specific context.

There were limitations within these studies which are important to note. Study 4 was carried out with a small participant sample which meant that factor analysis among all of the scale items and multiple mediation models were not appropriate. However, results were consistent with findings from Study 5 which was carried out with a larger sample. Additionally, Study 4 was designed as a stepping stone towards investigating what lay theories participants held regarding the functions of ideologies. In Study 5 it was difficult to test for significant differences between ideological variables given that they were, and should be, inter-correlated.

In addition to acknowledging the limitations of these studies, potential for future directions needs to also be addressed. System justification was perceived to increase the likelihood of success within conflicts without being perceived to increase commitment to them. As a result, future studies employing the methodologies implemented in Studies 1-4 should be designed to uncover whether system justification is endorsed more readily during conflicts. Additionally, these studies should be designed to uncover the process by which system justification is thought to promote success within conflicts.

For example, positive evaluations of one's group might provide inflated evaluations of the ingroup's competence or be involved in creating justifications of the group's decision to enter conflicts. If groups feel that they have a moral justification for entering the conflict, just world beliefs (Lerner, 1980) may promote the perception that the ingroup is more deserving of victory, and therefore be perceived as more likely to be victorious. If individuals are found to have an appreciation of this process, this would help to explain why participants in Study 5 perceived system justification as likely to promote success in conflicts.

Additionally, future research could investigate perceptions of whether high or low status groups would be more likely to endorse system justification. Furthermore, this research could assess whether levels inequality are thought to affect the extent to which different status groups endorse system justifying beliefs. More research is needed to reconcile the differing views of Jost, Pelham, et al. (2003) and Brandt (2013) with regards to the status-legitimacy hypothesis. Research within this chapter has established that individuals likely make their ideological choices with a degree of knowledge of the potential functions of those ideologies. As a result, lay theories surrounding the extent to which different status groups are thought to justify their society within differing levels of inequality would help inform subsequent research concerning scientific theory pertaining to this issue. Indeed, as discussed

in Chapter 3, Levy, Chiu, et al. (2006) contends that lay theories are useful in informing scientific theories.

## **Conclusions**

Studies 4 and 5 provided the first evidence, within this thesis, that lay individuals have accurate knowledge pertaining to the functions of ideological variables (SDO, conservatism and system justifying beliefs). Regarding intergroup variables, SDO and conservatism were both perceived to motivate support and promote success within conflicts. Regarding intragroup consequences, SDO and conservatism were perceived as promoting inequality and reducing social cohesion. System justifying beliefs were the only beliefs associated with the promotion of social cohesion. The fact that individuals have an appreciation for the functions of ideologies explains in part why they are drawn to their ideological choices.

However, as discussed in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the British electorate voted in a right wing, conservative government at a time when inequality within Britain was high and set to increase. This decision is even more surprising given that participants perceive conservatism to be less likely to be endorsed when inequality is high, and think that within the context of high inequality, conservatism will promote social unrest. In order to try to understand this seemingly surprising result, I wanted to investigate why individuals choose to adopt right wing ideology for themselves. Perhaps individuals perceive that right wing ideology is good for them, despite exacerbating inequality within society in much the same way that SDO is recognised as beneficial to groups in conflict but not beneficial within society. This important question will be investigated in the next empirical chapter.



## **CHAPTER 6**

### **DO PEOPLE THINK CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY FACILITATES INDIVIDUAL HAPPINESS AND WELLBEING?**

#### **Chapter summary**

In Chapter 3, I reviewed the literature surrounding lay theories which highlighted that lay theories are likely to be shared within ideological groups (Corbetta et al., 2009). Political ideology itself has been characterised as a social representation (Corbetta et al.) providing individuals and groups with a sense of social orientation. Furthermore, lay theories have been found to hold similarities with scientific theories (Fletcher, 1995), and allow individuals to make sense of intergroup relations (Levy, Chiu, et al., 2006). Chapters 4 and 5 investigated what the perceived functions of right wing ideological variables such as conservatism, SDO and system justification were within group contexts. The current chapter explores what, if any, benefits are attributed to endorsing these same ideological variables for individuals. Specifically, Chapter 6 explores lay theories of the consequences for individuals who endorse right wing ideology.

#### **Introduction**

Throughout this thesis, I have reviewed the literature which suggests that political ideologies are endorsed as a result of motivated social cognition in order to satisfy existential, relational and epistemic needs (e.g., Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003; Jost, 2006) as well as fulfilling group needs including dominance and greater access to resources relative to outgroups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Additionally I have reviewed literature which suggests that there

are reliable and stable differences between individuals who endorse left compared to right wing ideologies. Namely, right wingers have been found to more strongly support inequality and are more troubled by change and uncertainty (Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003; Jost, 2006). The aim of this chapter is to investigate lay theories of the consequences of endorsing right wing ideological variables. I will begin by presenting an overview of the literature pertaining to the traditionally held views of right wingers before discussing the research which has established links between right wing ideology and wellbeing.

### **Traditional view of right wingers**

The relationships between right wing ideologies with personality and wellbeing stem from original works such as Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford's (1950) research into the authoritarian personality. Since then, many researchers have linked right wing ideology, namely political conservatism, with negative attributes such as intolerance of uncertainty, heightened fear, rigid and dogmatic thinking, lesser cognitive ability, lesser creativity, low self-esteem, and psychopathology (Dollinger, 2007; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003; Jost, Napier, Thorisdottir, Stankov, Gosling, Palfai, & Ostafin, 2007; Onreat, Van Hiel, & Dhont, 2013; Schlenker, Chambers, & Le, 2012). As outlined in the previous chapter, the two key features of conservatism are identified as resistance to change and support for inequality (Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003).

The research referenced thus far supports the contention that specific personality types can be associated with right wing ideologies. In a longitudinal study, Block and Block (2006) aimed to find links between children's personality characteristics at nursery school and their political orientations twenty years later. Three year old children were observed and assessed by three qualified nursery school teachers. Twenty years later, six independent

psychologists assessed the participants' personality types. Male participants who were later identified as liberal, were identified at age three as resourceful, autonomous, confident, and proud of their achievements by their nursery teachers. Female liberal participants were similarly identified as sociable, assertive, curious and competent at age three. In contrast, male participants who were later identified as conservative were identified by nursery teachers as being more readily offended, distrusting of others and anxious in the context of uncertainty at age three. Female conservative participants were identified as indecisive, fearful, anxious, shy, neat and compliant. Block and Block summarise the nursery teachers' representations of the conservative children as "psychologically unflattering" (p. 745) compared to the more positive evaluations made of the liberal children. The attributions made of the conservative children were also more homogenous (Block & Block). Overall, the research supports the contention that the endorsement of different political orientations is related to differences in personality characteristics, with conservative ideology being linked to more negative characteristics such as fear and closed-mindedness.

Given this traditionally negative view of individuals who adopt conservatism, it is perhaps surprising that subsequent research provided evidence that conservatives, compared to liberals, appear to be happier and to experience higher life satisfaction (Jetten, Haslam, & Barlow, 2013; MacInnis, Busseri, Choma, & Hodson, 2013; Napier & Jost, 2008; Onreat et al., 2013; Schlenker et al, 2012; Van Hiel, & De Clercq, 2009; Vigil, 2012). Survey findings published by the PEW Research Centre reported that 47% of conservative Americans identified themselves as happy, whereas only 28% of liberal Americans made that same evaluation. Additionally, the research found that conservatives were consistently happier than liberals, irrespective of income (Taylor, Fuknk, & Craighill, 2006 as cited by Napier & Jost, 2008; Will, 2006).

Will (2006) acknowledges that conservatism is associated with negative traits such as pessimism. However, Will postulates that this pessimism may in itself be advantageous. The argument is made that a '*prepare for the worst*' mentality means that individuals are better equipped to deal with problems by anticipating them before they arise, rather than being caught off guard. Crucially, Will suggests that the very concept of happiness may be perceived differently by conservatives and liberals. Conservatives are described as feeling responsible for their own happiness. Comparatively, liberals are described as more passive, holding expectations that opportunities for happiness should be provided for everyone. Will admits that this definition relies heavily on the caveat that happiness should be achieved through access to resources and material wellbeing. However, it is interesting to note that individuals who hold different political ideologies are perceived as approaching and achieving happiness differently.

### **Political ideology and happiness: The research**

There is some research which suggests that right wing ideology is good for individuals. In their research, Napier and Jost (2008) investigated whether three factors would mediate the relationship between right wing ideology and wellbeing. The factors considered were 'demographic variables, differences in cognitive functioning, and the differing attitudes towards inequality' (Napier & Jost). In terms of demographic variables, one could rationalise that right wing individuals would be more likely to enjoy a higher social status and the greater access to resources associated with that status (Argyle, 1994; Jetten et al., 2012). However, the aforementioned study conducted by the PEW research centre found that higher life satisfaction was associated more with conservative than liberal ideology, irrespective of participants' social status.

Napier and Jost (2008) argue that the two more psychologically relevant factors for consideration are differences in cognitive style and feelings towards inequality. Conservatives and liberals have been shown to differ in preferences for cognitive simplicity versus complexity respectively (Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003). Liberals have also been found to have greater creativity and higher levels of rumination and introspection (Dollinger, 2007; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003; Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & De Grada, 2006; Petty & Jarvis, 1998; Stankov, 2009). These comparisons are reminiscent of the old adage; '*ignorance is bliss*'. While creativity and cognitive complexities serve to promote effective problem solving, there are also clear disadvantages with a predisposition to ruminate and seek out ambiguity (Wilson, Kraft, & Dunn, 1989).

As well as considering conservatives' predisposition towards cognitive simplicity as a mediating factor, Napier and Jost (2008) considered differing attitudes towards inequality as an ideological buffer to promote happiness. Napier and Jost contend that the ability of right wing ideologies to justify social inequalities is the most likely mediating factor in the conservatism- increased life satisfaction relationship. This rationale is rooted in the consideration of system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994), particularly economic system justification (Jost & Thompson, 2000). Napier and Jost postulate that conservatives, compared to liberals, are more likely to endorse system justifying beliefs and therefore experience less negative affect both generally (Lerner 1980) and more specifically in the context of inequality (Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Napier & Jost).

In three studies, Napier and Jost (2008) identified the endorsement of system justifying beliefs as the factor most able to statistically account for the link between conservatism and increased happiness. Crucially, this model was consistent across ten different countries (including America, New Zealand, Switzerland, Germany and Czech Republic), and was significant when controlling for demographic variables. In their third

study, Napier and Jost determine that while inequality has increased, so too has the difference between conservatives' and liberals' levels of life satisfaction. The clear implication here is that right wing ideology is most beneficial when endorsed by individuals in a highly unequal society (Napier & Jost).

Jetten et al. (2012) refute Napier and Jost's (2008) contention that system justifying ideologies mediate the conservatism- happiness relationship. Jetten et al. question the validity of Napier and Jost's proposed model. Instead, Jetten et al. argue that from a theoretical perspective, it does not make sense for conservatives to be motivated to endorse system justifying ideologies more than liberals. The researchers argue that right wing ideologies such as conservatism and SDO are in themselves ideologies which justify meritocracy. As a result, individuals who endorse these ideologies have no further need to legitimize inequality. Jetten et al. argue that liberals who reject inequality would benefit most from endorsing system justifying beliefs as an ideological "buffer" to protect them from existing in a society whose status quo is incongruent with their own beliefs. Nevertheless, an abundance of research has demonstrated links between right wing political orientation and SDO with system justifying ideologies (Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov, & Duarte, 2003; Liu et al., 2009; Pratto et al., 1994; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Furthermore, Jetten et al. highlight that while Napier and Jost controlled for demographic variables in their analyses, their results are still indicative of an association between socio-economic variables and life satisfaction.

Jetten et al., (2012) contend that rather than focussing on motivational factors (e.g. seeking to legitimise inequality), research should explore the role of situational and social-psychological factors as explanations for why conservatives may be happier than liberals. Their theoretical argument is based on their finding that conservatives have greater life satisfaction than liberals and that that conservatives are more likely to experience higher

socio-economic status and consequently, greater access to resources. One example of this is the greater access to multiple group memberships (Jetten et al.). A wealth of social-psychological research has determined that greater feelings of belonging and self-esteem stem from group membership (Haslam, Holme, Haslam, Iyer, & Jetten, 2008; Iyer, Jetten, Tsivrikos, Postmes, & Haslam, 2009; Jetten, Haslam, & Haslam, 2012; Tajfel & Turner, 1971). Iyer et al.'s (2009) findings also supported the contention offered by Jetten et al. that individuals with a higher socio-economic status (SES) are more likely to acquire multiple group memberships.

The finding that higher SES is positively associated with access to group membership has important implications for the relationship between status and wellbeing. Hogg (2000) theorises that individuals can achieve a subjective sense of reduced uncertainty through group memberships, particularly in the case of strong intergroup boundaries. Given the penchant among conservatives to avoid uncertainty, access to strong and multiple group memberships would offer a clear palliative function. This contention is supported by Jost et al. (2007) who demonstrated that conservatives are more prone to seek out uncertainty reduction in response to threat (e.g. death anxiety, threat of change or interruption of the status quo). Furthermore, if Block and Block's (2000) attribution of conservatives as a more homogenous group is accurate then conservatives have a greater likelihood of finding more similar individuals to form groups with. Drawing on all of these empirical and theoretical contributions, it could be argued that conservatives are more motivated to utilise their greater access to a higher number of social groups in order to reduce feelings of uncertainty that are so aversive to them. Thus, conservatives are more likely to experience increased happiness, compared to liberals, through membership within a greater number of social groups.

The differing theoretical perspectives of Jetten et al. (2012) and Napier and Jost (2008) were somewhat reconciled by Schlenker et al. (2012). This reconciliation was

achieved by offering an alternative view of system justification as a measure associated with morality, trust, positive affect and a sense of control, rather than a tendency to simply defend the status quo. In doing so, Schlenker et al. (2012) identified composite variables created from personality attributes such as, “*personal agency, positive outlook, religiosity, moral commitment, tolerance of transgressions and system justification*” as individually significant mediators of the conservatism-life satisfaction relationship (p. 6). If the endorsement of system justification, like increased group membership, is seen as being motivated by the desire for control and agency associated with conservatism, then a compromise can begin to be made between Napier and Jost’s and Jetten et al.’s conclusions.

Furthermore, Schlenker et al. (2012) created a variable of perceived “system satisfaction” by combining Lipkus’s (1991) belief in a just world scale with Kay and Jost’s (2003) system justification scale. The two measures are considered to be theoretically similar by researchers such as Kay and Jost (2003). However, Schlenker et al. acknowledged the alpha for the combined scale was low (.57). Nevertheless, this global measure of perceived fairness was a better mediator of the conservatism-life satisfaction compared to either of its composite parts independently (Schlenker et al.). This finding led Schlenker et al. to suggest that Napier and Jost’s (2008) study was limited as a result of looking to mediate the relationship based on the justification of economic resources alone, rather than a more global measure of perceived fairness and justice (Schlenker et al.)

While Jetten et al. (2012) and Schlenker et al. (2012) question the findings of Napier and Jost (2008) specifically, Onreat et al. (2013) question the link between right wing political ideology and life satisfaction generally. In their meta-analysis, Onreat et al. (2013) found only weak evidence of a link between right wing ideology and life satisfaction. No effects were observed with right wing ideology (authoritarianism and SDO) and positive affect, negative affect, self-esteem or life satisfaction. Intrinsic goal pursuit was correlated



negatively with right wing ideology, however the effect size was small and the relationship was only significant with SDO not authoritarianism.

Jost & Thompson (2000) have also found the relationship between political ideology and life satisfaction to be inconsistent. Jost and Thompson (2000) conceptualised SDO as two measures; the desire for dominance and opposition to equality. The researchers found support for a negative association between opposition to equality and self-esteem within a sample of African Americans. However, this same relationship was not supported in a sample of European Americans. Much like system justification, SDO was found to have different consequences when endorsed by members of low status groups compared to the more positive consequences of endorsement by members of high status groups (Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Jost & Thompson, 2000).

Taken together, studies which have investigated the relationship between right wing ideology and wellbeing agree that conservatives experience greater life satisfaction than liberals (e.g., Jetten, 2012; Napier & Jost, 2008; Schlenker et al., 2012). However, these studies do not agree upon the processes which mediate this conservatism-satisfaction relationship.

### **The current research: ideologies for consideration**

Thus far, studies have researched the conservatism-life satisfaction relationship by drawing upon scientific theory and evidence. As argued in Chapter 3, there are reasons to believe that lay people have well informed theories which they use to explain both individuals' and groups' behaviours (Levy, Chiu, et al., 2006). Furthermore, Corbetta et al. (2009) provided evidence that political ideologies are best categorised as social

representations which help people orientate their own and their ingroup's behaviour. Based on this research, there is reason to believe that lay people have accurate understandings of different ideologies, and the consequences of endorsing them, as demonstrated in Chapter 5. In this chapter, I wanted to uncover this lay knowledge of the consequences of endorsing right wing ideological variables. I wanted to ask participants what they felt the consequence would be of adopting conservatism. I also wanted to investigate participants' perceptions of the potential advantages of endorsing SDO. The rationale for this was twofold. First, having identified the perceived psychological consequences of adopting SDO within intergroup and intragroup contexts in the previous two empirical chapters, I wanted to assess what the perceived utility of SDO was for individuals. Second, I wanted to see whether people have lay theories of right wing ideologies which are consistent with Napier and Jost's (2008) scientific findings. Furthermore, I wanted to test whether similar lay theories are held for SDO or whether the perceived benefits of political conservatism are thought to be unique.

In addition to conservatism and SDO, lay theories of system justification are also researched within this chapter. Rankin, Jost and Wakslak (2009) found that the endorsement of system justification was linked with benefits including increased positive affect, life satisfaction and an increased sense of meaning and mastery. However, these benefits were not experienced to the same degree across all racial groups. The researchers found that these benefits were experienced to a much greater degree by European Americans compared to low earning African Americans. The endorsement of system justification was also found to have detrimental effects to some members of the lower status groups (Rankin et al.). Napier and Jost's (2008) finding that system justification mediated the right wing ideology-happiness relationship provided further scientific evidence that system justification promotes wellbeing and provides a rationale for assessing lay theories of system justification in addition to conservatism and SDO.

## **The current research: the palliative function of ideology**

Given that the aim of this chapter is to establish whether participants believe that right wing ideological variables promote wellbeing, it is important to consider what measures of wellbeing are most appropriate. There has been considerable debate regarding the best conceptualisation of life satisfaction (MacInnis et al., 2013; Ryan & Deci, 2001; Ryff & Keyes, 1995). Diener (1984) proposed that life satisfaction should be equated with individuals' overall evaluation of their life. When a fuller evaluation is combined with the occurrence of positive compared with negative affect, a measure of *subjective wellbeing* (SWB) is created which is considered to be similar to Diener's conceptualisation of happiness (MacInnis et al., 2013). This measure of SWB has been associated with positive functioning at the personal, interpersonal and societal level (Eid & Larsen, 2008 as cited by MacInnis et al., 2013).

Ryan and Deci (2001) conceptualise wellbeing as "*optimal psychological functioning and experience*" (p. 142). With this in mind, Ryan and Deci discuss wellbeing from two perspectives; the hedonic and eudaimonic view. In their review, Ryan and Deci define hedonic wellbeing as the pursuit of pleasure. Specifically, higher positive affect, higher goal attainment and lower negative affect are considered as the three aspects necessary to achieve wellbeing from a hedonic perspective (Ryan & Deci). However, the authors argue from a eudaimonic view, that subjective happiness does not in fact equate to wellbeing. Ryan and Deci point out that not all of an individual's desired goals can necessarily be considered as being good for them. Consequently, an alternative measure of *psychological wellbeing* (PWB) is considered.

Ryan and Deci (2001) consider Ryff and Keyes' (1995) conceptualisation of PWB. Ryff and Keyes (1995) assert that life satisfaction can be positively linked with autonomy, self-acceptance, strong group identification, personal growth, a sense of purpose and environmental mastery. Ryff and Keyes further contend that models which encompass measures of positive affect, negative affect and life satisfaction only, neglect these aforementioned dimensions which are identified as crucial factors within theories of health and wellbeing. This conceptualisation is considered as distinct from SWB by offering an individual opportunity for personal growth and development in addition to simply experiencing more positive affect (Ryan & Deci, 2001).

As an example of an integrative approach, Self-Determination Theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000) offers a conceptualisation of wellbeing as the fulfilment of autonomy, competence and relatedness. Ryan and Deci (2001) amalgamate these two perspectives (hedonic and eudaimonic) by rationalising that an individual who achieves autonomy, competence and relatedness will most likely experience both SWB and PWB. From this perspective, one could argue that SWB and PWB should not be considered as being two unrelated measures.

Based on the research outlined above, positive affect, negative affect, self-esteem, mastery, security, certainty, belonging and prosperity were chosen as measures of life satisfaction. Within these measures, both hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing are captured. The consideration of these outcomes also ensures that aspects of SWB and PWB are considered.

## **Progression of studies**

In two studies, lay theories of the palliative functions of right wing ideological variables are researched. In Study 6, a small student sample was asked whether endorsing conservatism, SDO and system justification would reduce or promote outcomes such as positive affect, negative affect, self-esteem and a sense of mastery, certainty and belonging. This research was replicated in Study 7 with a larger, non-student sample. Within both studies, participants' SES was measured, along with the perceived normality of each ideological variable within society. In Study 7, participants' own endorsement of each ideological variable was also measured. These three factors were tested as moderators of the degree to which ideological variables were thought to promote wellbeing.

## **Study 6**

### **The perceived benefits of right wing ideology within a UK sample**

Napier and Jost (2008), Schlenker et al. (2012) and Jetten et al. (2012) agree that right wing ideologies, namely conservatism, are associated with positive palliative functions. Where these researchers differ is their idea on how this ideology-wellbeing relationship is achieved. Napier and Jost postulate the relationship between right wing ideology and wellbeing is mediated through the endorsement of system justification. In contrast, Jetten et al. suggest that right wing ideology is typically endorsed by individuals belonging to a higher social class compared to those who endorse left wing ideology. They assert that members of these higher social classes should have access to a larger number of resources including membership to more social groups. Jetten et al. suggest that this, rather than the endorsement of system justification, best explains why conservatives should experience greater life satisfaction than liberals. Schlenker et al. (2012) contend that a combination of factors,

including system justification and personality attributes associated with right wing ideology, best explain the link between conservatism and happiness.

In Study 6, I aimed to assess whether people appreciate the palliative function of right wing ideology for individuals. In order to provide consistency with the previous empirical chapter, conservatism, system justification and SDO were chosen as ideological variables for consideration. Drawing inspiration from Jetten et al. (2012), Napier and Jost (2007) and Onreat et al. (2013), three variables were tested as potential moderators of this relationship. These variables were: participants' socio-economic status (SES); the level of inequality they perceived to be in their society; and the extent to which they perceived each ideology as normative of the views held within their society.

Consistent with Ryff and Keyes' (1995) contention that the ability to derive meaning from events and feel a sense of belonging within groups are dimensions of wellbeing, one could postulate that endorsing ideologies which are perceived as shared within society offers individuals a form of epistemic shared reality. This view is consistent with Hardin and Higgins' (1996) shared reality theory which postulates that people are motivated to collectively endorse ideologies in order to fulfil relational needs and feel that their environment is controllable and predictable. As a result, the innate need for social inclusion and an understanding of the social environment can be fulfilled through maintaining a shared reality via collective endorsement of ideologies (Hardin & Conley 2001 as cited by Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2007). Jost et al. (2007) assert that relational motivations are best fulfilled by right (compared to left) wing ideologies, particularly system justification. As a result, the perceived benefits derived from endorsing an ideology could be attributed to benefits of merely fitting in and achieving a sense of shared reality should the ideology be evaluated as highly normative.

The experimental hypothesis for Study 6 was that participants would associate the endorsement of conservatism, system justification and (SDO) with higher levels of wellbeing. The possible moderating role of each of the three variables (participants' SES, perceived levels of inequality and the extent to which each ideological variable was thought to be normative within society) outlined above was exploratory at this stage. However, high normativity would make ideological variables seem more adaptive; perceived inequality should make right wing ideological variables seem more adaptive.

## **Method**

### **Participants and Design**

Forty-four undergraduate psychology students (8 males, 36 females) from the University of Kent took part in the study for course credit. The mean age of participants was 19.42 ( $SD= 1.55$ ). The study was a correlational design in the form of an online questionnaire.

### **Materials and Procedure**

To begin with participants were asked to provide demographic information. Following this, participants were asked about the palliative functions and normative views in their society pertaining to conservatism (Napier & Jost, 2008), system justification (Jost & Hunyady, 2003) and SDO (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994).

**Demographic information.** Participants provided their age, gender, and nationality before answering questions pertaining to their political orientation, social status and their perceptions of inequality in Britain. Consistent with Napier and Jost (2008), participants were asked, “How would you rate your political orientation on a scale of 1-8 where: 1= strong Labour, and 8= strong Conservative?” They then indicated on eight point scales “how likely would you be to vote for each of the following in the next election” (1= very unlikely, 8= very likely). Participants were asked to rate the likelihood that they would vote for the Labour party, Liberal Democrats, or Conservative party in the next election. Following this, participants were asked, “How would you rate your own socio-economic status? Please answer on the scale below where 1= Working class, and 8= Upper class.”<sup>12</sup>

**Palliative functions of ideologies.** This section of the questionnaire was designed to assess the perceived utilities of conservatism, system justification and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). Beginning with conservatism, participants were asked:

If a person were to have views consistent with the following:

"I consider my political orientation to be very right wing.

I see myself as having strongly conservative views.

I see myself as a strong Tory supporter."

And to have views inconsistent with the following:

"I consider my political orientation to be very left wing.

---

<sup>12</sup> Participants were presented with three pie charts depicting different levels of inequality between four quartiles of society. Participants were asked “which pie chart do you think most represents the society that you live in?” and “which quartile of society do you see yourself as belonging to within your society?” These measures of perceived inequality were adapted from Norton and Ariely (2011). Correlation analyses revealed no significant correlations between participants’ demographic backgrounds and perceptions of inequality with the perceived normality of each ideology. Correlation tables can be found in Appendix C and D.



I see myself as having strongly liberal views.

I see myself as a strong Labour supporter."

The description was comprised of scale items within Napier and Jost's (2008) Study 1. Participants were then asked "Are they likely, as a result, to feel more or less:" A list of dependent variables (DVs) were then answered on eight point scales (1= less, 8= more).

Ten items from the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988) were used; enthusiastic, excited, inspired, strong, proud, afraid, upset, ashamed, guilty, and irritable. These were included to assess positive ( $\alpha = .93$ ) and negative ( $\alpha = .89$ ) affect. Self-esteem (Rankin et al., 2009) was assessed with six items: *confident in their own abilities; smarter than others; concerned with being regarded as a success or failure; self-conscious; worried about others' opinions and inferior to others* ( $\alpha = .66$ ). Other items adapted from Rankin et al. (2009) included a sense of mastery: *Able to achieve goals and in control over their future* ( $r = .75, p = .001$ ); and a sense of security: *Like their life is in order and protected from potential dangers* ( $r = .45, p = .001$ ). Measures designed to test different aspects of life satisfaction were adapted from Vigil (2010). A sense of belonging was assessed with five items: *Likely to have ties with several groups; likely to be a member of several groups; likely to feel certain in life; likely to feel safe and secure and likely to feel included in life* ( $\alpha = .87$ ). A sense of certainty was assessed with three items: *Likely to see their existence as meaningless; likely to feel like they have a sense of purpose and likely to view the world as confusing* ( $\alpha = .67$ ). Likelihood of achieving future prosperity was assessed with two items constructed for the experiment: *Likely that they will have faith in achieving wealth in the future and likely to have access to resources* ( $r = .48, p = .005$ ).

The study also aimed to assess the functions of system justification and SDO. These ideological variables were introduced with scale items from Kay and Jost (2003), and Pratto and Sidanius (1997) respectively. When considering the function of System Justification participants read:

If a person were to have views consistent with the following:

“In general, society is fair.”

“In general, the UK political system operates as it should.”

“The UK is the best country in the world to live in.”

“Most policies serve the greater good.”

“Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness.”

“Society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve.”

And to have views inconsistent with the following:

“UK society needs to be radically restructured.”

“Our society is getting worse every year.”

The same DVs: PANAS items which split into two measures of positive ( $\alpha = .94$ ) and negative ( $\alpha = .95$ ) emotions, self-esteem ( $\alpha = .46$ ), sense of mastery ( $r = .81, p < .001$ ), sense of security ( $r = .82, p < .001$ ), sense of belonging ( $\alpha = .87$ ), sense of certainty ( $\alpha = .68$ ) and likelihood of achieving future prosperity ( $r = .60, p < .001$ ) were measured.

When considering the function of SDO participants read:

If a person were to have views consistent with the following:

“Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.”

“It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.”

“To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.”

“Inferior groups should stay in their place.”

And to have views inconsistent with the following:

“Group equality should be our ideal.”

“We should do what we can to equalise conditions for different groups.”

“Increased social equality is beneficial to society.”

“We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.”

Once again, the same DVs: positive affect ( $\alpha = .79$ ), negative affect ( $\alpha = .81$ ), self-esteem ( $\alpha = .59$ ), sense of mastery ( $r = .68, p < .001$ ), sense of security ( $r = .70, p < .001$ ), sense of belonging ( $\alpha = .85$ ), sense of certainty ( $\alpha = .65$ ) and likelihood of achieving future prosperity ( $r = .70, p < .001$ ) were measured.

**Norms of ideologies.** In order to ensure that ideologies were not deemed as more positive as a function of their perceived prevalence within society, we measured “*Which of the following views are more widely shared (or "normal") in British society?*” Each of the scale items used to construct the descriptions of ideologies; conservatism ( $\alpha = .87$ ), System Justification ( $\alpha = .81$ ) and SDO ( $\alpha = .78$ ) outlined above were implemented as DVs. Participants indicated their responses on seven point scales (1= not at all widely shared, 7= very widely shared). At the end of the study participants were debriefed and thanked.

## Results

Measures of life satisfaction (positive affect, negative affect, self-esteem, mastery, security, certainty, belonging and future prosperity), were subjected to a one sample *t* test against the scale midpoint (4.5). Means which were found to be significantly above the scale midpoint meant that on average, participants attributed the endorsement of the ideological variable with promoting higher levels of the outcome variable. Right wing ideological variables were consistently perceived to promote wellbeing in terms of self-esteem, security, belonging, future prosperity, and reduced negative affect. Variation was observed between constructs where system justification was not perceived to promote certainty and SDO was not perceived to promote positive affect of mastery. Conservatism was the only ideological variable that was perceived to have an effect on every dependent variable. Results can be found in Table 9.

Table 9:

*Means (standard deviations) and t test analyses of life satisfaction derived from conservatism, system justification and SDO.*

	Wellbeing measures							
	PANAS +ve	PANAS -ve	Self Esteem	Mastery	Security	Certainty	Belonging	Future prosperity
<b>Conservatism</b>								
Mean	5.05 (1.30)	3.41 (1.28)	4.87 (.97)	5.19 (1.37)	5.11 (1.25)	5.37 (1.26)	5.28 (1.10)	5.30 (1.47)
<i>t</i>	2.79 **	-5.65 ***	2.56 *	3.56 **	3.25 **	4.59 ***	4.68 ***	3.59 **
<b>System justification</b>								
Mean	5.04 (1.56)	3.20 (1.55)	5.36 (1.42)	4.87 (.88)	5.20 (1.44)	4.91 (1.60)	5.36 (1.14)	5.06 (1.29)
<i>t</i>	2.30 *	-5.59 ***	4.05 ***	2.92 **	3.26 **	1.69	4.98 ***	2.91 **
<b>SDO</b>								
Mean	4.53 (1.24)	3.68 (1.23)	5.57 (1.92)	4.79 (.97)	5.38 (1.36)	5.23 (1.24)	5.12 (1.35)	5.52 (1.44)
<i>t</i>	0.18	-4.42 ***	3.69 **	1.95	4.27 ***	3.94 ***	3.04 **	4.70 ***

Mean is significantly different from mid-point; \*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .005$ , \*  $p < .05$ . Positive values of *t* indicate that ideological variable in question is perceived to lead to increases in the outcome variable.

### The perceived normative endorsement of ideologies

Participants were asked to indicate how normative they felt conservatism, system justification and SDO were within British society. Means were computed for each ideology and correlated with life satisfaction items. The purpose of this was to ensure that participants were not evaluating the consequences of ideologies more positively simply because they felt those ideologies would be more normative of beliefs held within their own society. Only two significant correlations were found with the perceived normative endorsement of conservatism. These two significant results were obtained with mastery,  $r(44) = .42, p = .005$

and security,  $r(44) = .37, p = .014$ . Three significant correlations were observed with the perceived normativity of endorsing system justification and mastery,  $r(44) = .37, p = .016$ ; security,  $r(44) = .39, p = .009$  and future wealth,  $r(44) = .34, p = .026$ . Only two significant, though negative correlations were found with the perceived normativity of endorsing SDO and mastery,  $r(44) = -.36, p = .016$  and belonging,  $r(44) = -.36, p = .018$ .<sup>13</sup>

## Discussion

Consistent with the experimental hypothesis, participants perceived that the endorsement of conservatism, system justification and SDO would promote higher levels of positive emotions, self-esteem, security, belonging, future success and reduced negative affect. SDO was not perceived to promote feelings of mastery. System justification was not seen to be associated with feelings of certainty. This provided evidence that each ideological variable is perceived as promoting positive outcomes. Broadly speaking, these attributions were made independently of: the perceived normality of the endorsement of these variables; participants' own socio-economic status and the perceived level of inequality within British society.

These results suggest that right wing ideologies are perceived to promote palliative functions for individuals within society. As a result, it can be argued that individuals hold lay theories regarding the utility of ideology which are consistent with experimental findings which demonstrate that right wing ideology promotes increased wellbeing (e.g. Napier & Jost, 2008; Schlenker et al., 2012). Given that system justification itself was perceived as promoting wellbeing, these results suggest that participants' lay theories may be consistent

---

<sup>13</sup> For full tables of correlations, see Appendix D.

with Napier and Jost's contention that system justification mediates the conservatism-wellbeing relationship rather than Jetten et al.'s contention wellbeing is a product of higher SES.

These results pose some interesting questions. If society as a whole recognises the palliative function of right wing ideology, then why do individuals not all gravitate to the right? However, Study 6 was carried out with a small student sample. Additionally, participants' own endorsement of each ideological variable was not measured. In order to provide more robust support for these findings, I aimed to replicate and extend these findings with a larger, more diverse sample of participants. Once these results are replicated, the wider theoretical concerns posed by these findings, such as whether people endorse ideologies because they recognise the benefits of doing so, can be addressed.

## **Study 7**

### **The perceived benefits of endorsing right wing ideologies within a US sample**

In addition to the consideration of conservatism, system justification and SDO as ideological variables, Right Wing Authoritarianism (Altmeyer, 1981) was included. Evidence that both Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and generalised authoritarianism (RWA and SDO) can be beneficial to individuals has been provided by Van Hiel (2009) and MacInnis et al. (2013) respectively. Additionally, RWA has been compared to both SDO and conservatism as a similar, albeit distinct right wing ideology in the context of a political ideology (Onreat et al., 2013). Onreat et al. (2013) found differences between the promotion of wellbeing achieved through the endorsement of RWA versus SDO and conservatism. The researchers found the strongest association between wellbeing and conservatism.

In addition, within Study 7, participants' own endorsement of each ideology as well as the perceived normality of each ideology within society was measured. As with Study 1, this meant that the moderating role of these variables upon the perceived benefits associated with each ideological variable could be assessed. In Study 7, I aimed to replicate the findings of Study 1 with a larger, non-student sample. That is, I aimed to find an appreciation for the palliative functions associated with right wing ideological variables (Hypothesis 1). I also expected to find this result independently of participants' SES, the perceived level of inequality within society and the perceived normality of each ideological variable.

## **Method**

### **Participants and Design**

The study was carried out with 167 American participants (64 males, 101 females and 1 transgender) recruited through M-Turk. The mean age was 34.71 ( $SD= 12.60$ ). Participants took part in the study for 50¢. The study was conducted using a correlational design which was very similar to Study 6.

### **Materials and Procedure**

Study 7 was carried out using much the same procedure as in the previous study. Demographic data and perceptions of inequality were measured as per Study 6. Participants responded to the same measures for conservatism, system justification and SDO, along with the addition of RWA. Dependent variables were consistent with Study 6. Alphas and



correlation coefficients for scales in relation to each ideological variable are presented within Table 10.

Table 10:  
*Alphas and correlation analyses for outcome variable scales pertaining to each ideological variable.*

	Dependent Variables							
	PANAS Factor 1 (+ve) $\alpha$	PANAS Factor 2 (-ve) $\alpha$	Self- esteem $\alpha$	Mastery $r$	Security $r$	Certainty $\alpha$	Belonging $\alpha$	Future prosperity $r$
Conservatism	.87	.86	.51	.74	.61	.52	.83	.63
System Justification	.91	.93	.60	.74	.63	.72	.88	.73
SDO	.87	.82	.66	.88	.68	.72	.88	.79
RWA	.89	.84	.67	.83	.59	.66	.84	.62

NB: All correlations are significant where  $p < .001$

**RWA.** In Study 7 participants were also asked to consider the role of RWA. Similarly to the other three ideologies, participants were asked:

If a person were to adopt the following views:

“What our country really needs, instead of more "civil rights" is a good stiff dose of law and order.”

“Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fibre and traditional beliefs.”

“In these troubled times laws have to be enforced without mercy, especially when dealing with the agitators and revolutionaries who are stirring things up.”

And to reject these views:

“The sooner we get rid of the traditional family structure, where the father is the head of the family and the children are taught to obey authority automatically, the better. The old fashioned way has a lot wrong with it.”

“There is nothing really wrong with a lot of the things some people call "sins".”

“There is nothing immoral or sick in somebody's being a homosexual.”

“Government, judges and police should never be allowed to censor books.”

“A lot of our rules regarding modesty and sexual behaviour are just customs which are not necessarily any better or holier than those which other people follow.”

Following this, participants’ perceptions of how normative each ideological variable is within society, and their own endorsement of each ideological variable, was measured.

**Norms and participants’ endorsement of ideologies.** As per Study 6, participants were asked the extent to which they felt that conservatism ( $\alpha = .88$ ), system justification ( $\alpha = .79$ ), SDO ( $\alpha = .86$ ) and RWA ( $\alpha = .76$ ) reflected the normative views of society. Participants responded on the same seven point scales as used in Study 1. Additionally, in Study 7, I introduced a measure of participants’ own endorsement of the four ideologies; conservatism ( $\alpha = .94$ ), system justification ( $\alpha = .83$ ), SDO ( $\alpha = .87$ ) and RWA ( $\alpha = .87$ ). Each construct was measured using the scale items introduced as IVs within the previous section. Participants were asked:

*Please indicate your own agreement or disagreement with the following statements.*

*Please answer on the scales provided where 1= strongly disagree, to 7= strongly agree.*

At the end of the study participants were debriefed and thanked.

## Results and Discussion

Each of the scale means for outcome variables were subjected to a one sample *t* test against the scale midpoint (4.5). Values significantly above the midpoint of the scale mean that, on average, participants perceived that endorsing each ideological variable would produce increased levels of each of the outcome variables. Participants perceived that each right wing ideological variable promoted each measure of wellbeing with the exception of one null cell. RWA was not perceived to reduce negative affect. Results can be found in Table 11.

Table 11:  
*Means (Standard Deviations) and t values for each outcome variable associated with each ideological variable.*

	Subjective wellbeing items							
	PANAS Factor 1 (+ve)	PANAS Factor 2 (-ve)	Self- esteem	Mastery	Security	Certainty	Belonging	Future prosperity
<b>Conservatism</b>								
Mean	4.98 (1.51)	3.93 (1.71)	5.52 (1.54)	5.31 (1.59)	5.55 (1.30)	5.47 (1.35)	5.88 (1.52)	5.52 (1.54)
<i>t</i>	4.13 ***	-4.36 ***	8.59 ***	6.62 ***	10.51 ***	9.33 ***	11.77 ***	8.59 ***
<b>System Justification</b>								
Mean	5.71 (1.62)	2.88 (1.55)	5.86 (1.54)	5.86 (1.52)	5.92 (1.46)	5.80 (1.37)	5.86 (1.59)	5.18 (1.03)
<i>t</i>	9.65 ***	-13.58 ***	11.45 ***	11.59 ***	12.59 ***	12.23 ***	11.14 ***	8.61 ***
<b>SDO</b>								
Mean	4.80 (1.65)	4.13 (1.66)	4.83 (1.33)	5.27 (1.89)	5.09 (1.80)	5.26 (1.64)	5.10 (1.69)	5.45 (1.87)
<i>t</i>	2.35 *	-2.89 **	3.20 **	5.30 ***	4.21 ***	5.99 ***	4.59 ***	6.57 ***
<b>RWA</b>								
Mean	4.80 (1.80)	4.56 (1.71)	4.71 (1.25)	4.94 (1.79)	4.86 (1.75)	5.20 (1.57)	4.91 (1.60)	5.07 (1.68)
<i>t</i>	2.14 *	0.47	2.14 *	3.18 **	6.69 **	5.82 ***	3.34 **	4.45 ***

Mean is significantly different from mid-point; \*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .005$ , \*  $p < .05$ . Positive values of *t* indicate that ideological variable in question is perceived to lead to increases in the outcome variable.

### Correlation analysis (demographics, normative and own views)

Initially, zero-order correlations between variables of interest were explored using Pearson's product moment correlation coefficient (*r*). Participants' own socio-economic status (SES), political ideology, the endorsement of ideologies, perceived inequality, and the perceived normality of these ideologies. Participants' SES was positively correlated with

their own endorsement of system justification,  $r(168) = .20, p = .009$  and the perceived normality of conservatism,  $r(168) = .20, p = .004$ . However, participants' SES was not correlated with participant's endorsement of conservatism, SDO or RWA, or the perceived normality of SDO, RWA or system justification or with the level of inequality perceived in society. Higher perceptions of inequality were negatively correlated with endorsement of system justification,  $r(168) = -.22, p < .005$  and RWA,  $r(168) = -.19, p < .016$ . No other significant correlations were found in relation to perceptions of inequality.<sup>14</sup>

Significant correlations were observed between participants' endorsement of conservatism with their endorsement of SDO,  $r(168) = .56, p = .001$  and RWA,  $r(168) = .70, p = .001$ . Similarly, a significant correlation was observed between participants' endorsement of SDO and RWA,  $r(168) = .53, p = .001$ . System justification was only found to correlate with participants' endorsement of SDO,  $r(168) = .29, p = .001$ .

The next set of analyses involved correlation analyses between the perceived normality of endorsement of each ideological variable, or participants' own endorsement of each variable, and the extent to which each variable led to each positive or negative outcome. No significant results were found with regards to system justification. Significant results pertaining to each of the other three ideological variables (conservatism, SDO and RWA) are reported below. For a full table of correlations see Appendix F.

**Conservatism.** The perceived normality of conservatism was found to correlate significantly with the attribution of conservatism promoting feelings of belonging,  $r(168) = .16, p = .036$ . Participants' own endorsement of conservatism was found to correlate significantly with the attribution of conservatism promoting positive emotions,  $r(168) = .32,$

---

<sup>14</sup> For a full table of correlations including null findings see Appendix E.

$p = .001$ ; self-esteem,  $r(168) = .23, p = .003$  and mastery,  $r(168) = .21, p = .008$ . A significant negative correlation was found between endorsement of conservatism and the perceived promotion of negative emotions,  $r(168) = -.22, p = .005$ .

**SDO.** The perceived normality of SDO was not found to correlate significantly with any of the potential positive or negative outcome variables. However, participants' endorsement of SDO was found to correlate negatively with the perception that SDO would promote feelings of mastery,  $r(168) = -.26, p = .003$ ; security,  $r(168) = -.22, p = .004$ ; certainty,  $r(168) = -.19, p = .015$  and prosperity,  $r(168) = -.26, p = .001$ .

**RWA.** The perceived normality of RWA within society was found to correlate negatively with participants' own endorsement of the ideology,  $r(168) = -.27, p = .001$ . No significant correlations were found between the perceived normality of RWA and the perceived outcomes promoted through adopting the ideology. Significant correlations were found between participants' own endorsement of RWA and the perception that RWA would promote self-esteem,  $r(168) = .24, p = .002$ . A negative correlation was observed with the promotion of negative emotions,  $r(168) = -.28, p = .001$ .

## General Discussion

The results from Study 7 largely replicated those from Study 6. Conservatism, system justification and SDO were all found to be perceived as offering a palliative function to

individuals who endorse them. The results from Study 7 indicate that system justification is considered to serve the most consistently palliative function. Conversely there were inconsistencies with the consequences of endorsing RWA leading to both positive and negative outcomes.

Participants' attributions were made largely independently of whether these ideologies were considered to be normative within society. While there was some evidence that participants' own endorsement of each ideology affected the extent to which they were seen to promote positive outcomes, effect sizes were small and inconsistent. Furthermore participants' perceptions of inequality were largely uncorrelated with the perceived palliative function of each ideology. As such, the experimental hypotheses were largely supported.

In addition to assessing the moderating role of participants' endorsements of each ideological variable, their SES was found to correlate significantly with their endorsement of both system justification and SDO. However, participants' endorsement of system justification was negatively correlated with the extent to which they perceived society to be unequal. These results suggest that participants' lay theories do not sit congruently with system justification theory (Kay & Jost, 2003). One would expect that participants would endorse system justification more when society is perceived to be more unequal (Jetten et al., 2012).

## **Conclusions**

Studies in Chapter 6 were designed to test whether participants' lay theories regarding the perceived consequences of endorsing right wing ideology were consistent with the

experimental findings of Napier and Jost (2008), Jetten et al. (2012) and Schlenker et al. (2012). The results obtained from Studies 6 and 7 were consistent with these experimental findings. In both studies, endorsing right wing ideological variables was thought to promote wellbeing. In both studies, the perceived benefits of adopting right wing ideological variables such as conservatism, system justification and SDO were made independently of participants' perceptions of inequality, SES, perceptions of how normative these variables were within society (Studies 6 and 7), and participants own endorsement of each variable (Study 7).

Assessing the findings of Studies 6 and 7 produced three important questions. Firstly, if individuals perceive right wing ideology as promoting wellbeing, why do some individuals still chose to adopt left wing ideologies? More specifically, these results posed questions of whether the benefits associated with right wing ideology are unique, or whether left wing ideology is also perceived to serve palliative functions. Secondly, drawing upon Jetten et al.'s (2012) contention, are the benefits of adopting right wing ideologies perceived as being attributed to all members of society, or merely the upper classes that are typically associated with the endorsement of conservatism? Third, if people recognise the benefits of ideological variables, are they making their ideological choices for strategic reasons? These questions are explored in the final empirical chapter.



## **CHAPTER SEVEN**

### **ARE THE PERCEIVED BENEFITS OF ENDORSING POLITICAL IDEOLOGY EXCLUSIVE TO A RIGHT WING ORIENTATION?**

#### **Chapter Summary**

In the previous empirical chapter, participants were shown to believe that right wing ideological variables such as political conservatism and SDO promote palliative outcomes. In this chapter, lay theories surrounding both left and right wing political ideology are considered. Drawing upon the findings of Choma, Busseri and Sadava (2009), along with meaning maintenance models (Heine et al., 2006), this chapter explores whether left wing ideology may also be perceived as promoting palliative outcomes. Study 8 examines the perceived consequences of both left and right wing ideologies, in addition to considering where the consequences of left and right wing ideologies might be perceived to differ. Specifically, just world beliefs, justice sensitivity and closed-mindedness are tested as perceived differing consequences of left and right wing ideology. Study 9 examines what the perceived consequences of endorsing participants' own ideologies are. Given that studies up to this point have demonstrated that conservatism, SDO and system justification are perceived to share very similar consequences, Chapter 7 focusses specifically on participants' perceptions of political ideologies only.<sup>15</sup>

#### **Introduction**

---

<sup>15</sup> Perceptions of SDO were assessed. A summary of results is provided on p. 192.

In contrast to the research reviewed in the previous chapter (i.e., Jetten et al., 2012; Napier & Jost, 2008), Choma et al. (2009) suggest that the benefits associated with political ideology are not exclusive to a right wing orientation. In order to support their prediction, Choma et al. draw upon the contention laid out by Arendt (1951) that, regardless of orientation, the ability to identify strongly with a political ideology provides individuals with a core set of beliefs from which they can draw explanations and meaning from life events. Similarly, Greenberg and Jonas (2003) suggested that the benefits associated with political conservatism should instead be considered as benefits of holding any salient set of beliefs leading to the ability to identify favourably with others who share those beliefs.

In their paper, Greenberg and Jonas (2003) question Jost, Glaser, et al.'s (2003) contention that motivations to avoid uncertainty are unique to political conservatism. Greenberg and Jonas' main argument was that ideological beliefs reduce uncertainty, regardless of their orientation. Furthermore, Greenberg and Jonas argue that while Jost et al. contend that need for cognitive closure, terror management, uncertainty reduction and system justification are linked to political conservatism, these same motivations are, "*all best served by embracing and rigidly adhering to and defending whatever the prevailing ideology is in one's sociocultural environment*" (p. 378). Greenberg and Jonas also assert that even more extreme ideological concerns, such as the desire for dominance, are best served by adhering to the status quo, even in egalitarian societies, in order to align with authority figures.

In addition to arguing that adversity towards uncertainty should be considered characteristic of both right and left wing individuals, Greenberg and Jonas (2003) also contend that three other characteristics which Jost et al. (2003) associate with political conservatism should also be considered as true of left wingers. Jost et al. contend that political conservatives adopt less complex cognitive styles. However, Greenberg and Jonas cite Tetlock and Boettger (1989) who found that the Soviet Union who pursued capitalism

evidenced more complex thinking styles compared to left wing communists. Similarly, while Jost et al. (2003) suggest that political conservatives are more dogmatic, Greenberg and Jonas suggest that ideological rigidity promotes closed mindedness, irrespective of the orientation of the ideology. Green and Jonas highlight that a problem for research is that there are less extreme left wing ideological groups to sample from. However, as Green and Jonas argue, pre-existing research (e.g., McFarland, Ageyev & Abalakina-Paap, 1992) has provided evidence that dogmatically adhering to one's political conviction is a characteristic of extreme left as well as right wing ideologies. Finally, while Jost et al. contend that the resistance to change is a central component of political conservatism, Green and Jonas report that resistance to change has also been found to be a characteristic of left wing (communist) political ideologies as well as political conservatism.

Drawing upon Green and Jonas' contentions, Choma et al. (2009) suggest that liberals and conservatives experience the same level of life satisfaction. Where these two groups differ is the way in which this palliative function is achieved. Taking inspiration from Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 1997) along with ideo-affective polarity theory (Tomkins, 1965), Choma et al. hypothesised that conservatives, compared to liberals, should achieve higher levels of life satisfaction through greater prevention focus given that they are more sensitive to negative stimuli (Tomkins). Comparatively, liberals were hypothesised to display more promotion focus given that they are more sensitive to positive stimuli (Thomkins). Choma et al. found that conservatism was associated with "infrequent negative affect", with no association with positive affect. Conversely, liberalism was associated with "frequent positive affect", with no association with negative affect (p. 504). Crucially, despite the differing processes, political ideology promoted life-satisfaction irrespective of orientation.

In addition to the theories that Choma et al. (2009) drew upon, the argument that endorsing any political ideology should promote life-satisfaction is supported by models of meaning maintenance. Models of meaning maintenance (Heine et al., 2006) are rooted in the study of 'Western Existentialism' which argues that human beings are on a life-long pursuit of meaning. Camus (1955) contends that aspects of cultural works including art, religion, philosophy and science are "manifestations of the human need to relate all elements of perceived reality into a single, unified, cohesive framework of expected relationships" (as cited by Heine et al., p.89).

Previous psychological theories have been rooted in people's needs to derive meaning and predict and control events. For example Terror Management Theory (e.g., Pyszynski, Greenberg & Solomon, 2004) asserts that due to a fear of death, individuals are driven to achieve symbolic immortality through group membership and endorsing religious ideologies which promote the belief in a life after death. According to Heine et al. (2006), the meaning maintenance model incorporates the motivations within TMT, along with a need to maintain self-esteem, uncertainty reduction and affiliation with others.

There are three central ideas to the meaning maintenance model. Heine et al. (2006) contend that, first, "*meaning is relation*" (p. 89). Deriving meaning allows people to link others, places and objects together in such a way that they can understand and predict future events (Heine et al.). Additionally, Heine et al. contend that people derive meaning through constructing relationships both with the external world, and between themselves and others. An example of this is people's ideas of the self. People like to feel that they are consistent, that despite unavoidable changes which are likely to be experienced through aging and life experiences, in some way they resemble the same person across their whole life (Heine et al.). Heine et al. also assert that this component of the meaning maintenance model is consistent with people's aversity to isolation. According to Heine et al., people are

motivated to feel that they belong by identifying with similar others and endorse the same “cultural worldview” (p. 91).

The second idea that Heine et al. identify is that “*humans are meaning makers*” (p. 90). Heine et al. contend that the ability to derive meaning from events is innate to human beings and a feature which distinguishes us from other species. Heine et al. also suggest that this component of the meaning maintenance model most reflects people’s desire to be able to control and predict events.

The third idea which Heine et al. identify is that when people encounter inconsistencies or “*disruptions to meaning frameworks*” they are motivated to reaffirm new alternative frameworks, which Heine et al. refer to as ‘fluid compensation’ (p. 90). Heine et al. provide the example of people’s need to maintain self-esteem as evidence for fluid compensation, referencing people’s ability to switch between processes such as social comparison and self-serving attributional processes. Additionally, Heine et al. cite Baumeister and Jones (1978), who provided evidence that when participants experienced criticism of one of their personality characteristics, they favoured other, unrelated aspects of their personality. In doing so, participants were able to maintain a positive self-image (Heine et al.).

In Chapter 3, Corbetta et al.’s (2009) research was reviewed. Political ideology was conceptualised and shown to be best characterised as a shared representation. Drawing upon Corbetta et al.’s finding and combining with Green and Jonas’ contentions along with meaning maintenance models, one can argue that any reasonably coherent and socially shared ideology might be seen as psychologically beneficial. Before attempting to extend this contention beyond the scope of political ideology, the first step, which is the purpose of this chapter, is to see if the perceived benefits of endorsing a political ideology are attributed to left as well as right wing options.

This contention was tested in two studies. Study 8 tested whether participants would attribute the same benefits of endorsing right wing ideologies to left wing political ideology. Additionally, Study 8 addressed concerns from the previous chapter that the perceived advantages of political conservatism might be attributed to individuals of a higher SES which is typically associated with the people who endorse the ideology. Contrary to Jetten et al. (2012), and congruent with the contention that shared and well-formed ideologies promote benefits (Choma et al., 2009; Greenberg and Jonas, 2003; Heine et al., 2006), it was hypothesised that the same benefits would be attributed the endorsement of ideologies, irrespective of the SES of the individual thought to be endorsing them. In study 9, participants were asked if they would expect to experience increased life-satisfaction if they strengthened the extent to which they endorsed their own chosen political ideology. Furthermore, Studies 8 and 9 were designed to investigate potential perceived differences between individuals who endorse left compared to right wing ideologies.

## **Study 8**

### **Left versus right wing ideology in others**

Study 8 was designed to test whether participants associate the same benefits of right wing ideology with left wing ideology. Chapter 8 also considered psychological factors which would motivate individuals to adopt left compared to right wing ideologies. Choma et al. (2009) researched this issue, surmising that individuals are drawn to left or right wing ideology due to a greater sensitivity to promotion or prevention focus, respectively.

In Study 8, an alternative factor was considered. Haidt, Graham and Joseph (2009) drew inspiration from moral foundations theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2004) in order to establish if individuals are drawn to the left or right of the political spectrum depending upon differences in moral reasoning. Haidt et al. (2009, p 111-112) identified five moral foundations: 'harm' reflecting a concern for the suffering of others; 'fairness' reflecting concerns pertaining to unfair treatment, for example inequality; 'in-group' reflecting concerns pertaining to obligations to one's group, for example loyalty; 'authority' which reflected concerns pertaining to the social order; and 'purity' concerns pertaining to holistic contagion, for example wholesomeness. Through analysing questionnaire data which comprised questions pertaining to these five foundations, the Big Five factors of personality (Costa & McCrae, 1992), and the endorsement of RWA and SDO, Haidt et al. (2009) identified the foundations and dimensions upon which liberals and conservatives vary. Haidt et al. concluded that liberal participants scored highest on the foundations; harm and fairness, and lowest on the foundations; ingroup, authority and purity. Conservative participants' scores demonstrated the opposite pattern of results. Furthermore, liberal participants scored highly on the personality dimension 'openness to experience' and low on measures of RWA and SDO. Once again, conservative participants' scores reflected the opposite. This difference was replicated by Graham, Haidt and Nosek (2009) who concluded that differences in morality between liberals and conservatives help to explain differences in "*political thought and behaviour*" (p. 1042). As a result, Study 8 was designed to test whether left wingers would be perceived as being more drawn to ideologies which reflect greater moral concern for others, such as justice sensitivity (Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach, 2005), compared to right wingers.

Justice sensitivity is a measure of the extent to which people are intolerant towards moral norm violations and injustice (Schmitt et al., 2005). Schmitt et al. cite previous

contentions (Dar & Resh, 2001; Huseman, Hatfiels , & Miles, 1987; Lovas & Wolt, 2002) that the extent to which individuals are sensitive to injustice is determined by personality differences in addition to situational factors. Haidt and Graham (2007) argue that, typically, conservatives are opposed to social justice, which is reflected by their endorsement of system justification and SDO. As a result, one would expect liberals to be more sensitive to injustice and if lay theories surrounding liberalism are accurate, liberals should be associated with higher justice sensitivity. In this context, justice sensitivity is used to refer to observer justice sensitivity (Schmitt et al., 2005) or in other words, concerns regarding for justice for others.

In contrast to left wingers who favour egalitarianism (Farwell & Weiner, 2000; Haidt & Graham, 2005; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003), Jost et al. provided evidence that right wingers seek to maintain inequality. Both system justification and the protestant work ethic have been shown to legitimise inequality (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; O'Brien & Major, 2005; and Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius et al., 2001, respectively). Similarly, just world beliefs provide a rationalisation for inequality. Endorsement of belief in a just world (BJW) reflects the need to see the world as a fair place in which individuals receive only what they deserve, whether good or bad (Lerner, 1965). Dalbert (2002) states that the endorsement of BJW enables individuals to trust that what they, and others, experience is fair. Consequently, they are likely to experience greater wellbeing.

Pertinent to this research, Christopher, Zabel, Jones and Marek (2008) found correlational evidence of associations between protestant work ethic, which is associated with conservatism (Chrisopher et al., 2008), BJW, SDO and RWA. Regression analyses revealed that different aspects of protestant work ethic predicted BJW, SDO and RWA. Crucially, BJW was found to correlate with SDO ( $r = .40$ ) and RWA ( $r = .48$ ) at the  $p < .01$  level of significance. Once again, applying these findings to the wider social context, one could rationalise that the endorsement of ideologies such as system justification, BJW and SDO



allow right wing individuals to legitimise inequality rather than perceive it to be an injustice. As a result, Study 8 was designed to test whether participants would perceive that right wingers would be likely to endorse BJW whereas left wingers would reject it.

Study 8 was designed to replicate and extend the findings from the previous empirical chapter. Two independent variables were introduced: the orientation of the ideological variables and the SES of the individual perceived to be endorsing the ideological variable. The purpose of the first independent variable was to establish whether right wing ideologies are perceived as promoting life satisfaction (Napier & Jost, 2008; Jetten et al., 2012; Schlenker et al., 2012) or whether, in line with Choma et al's. (2009) assertion, and consistent with models of meaning maintenance (Heine et al., 2006), ideology is seen to promote wellbeing regardless of orientation.

The purpose of the second independent variable was to ascertain whether right wing ideology is typically perceived as being endorsed by individuals of a higher SES. If so, participants' lay theories of political conservatism would be consistent with Jetten et al's. (2012) contention that the benefits associated with right wing ideology are actually benefits associated with a higher SES. Additionally, Study 8 tested whether there was indeed a perception that right wingers were more closed minded in their thinking and hold a preference for certainty (Jost et al., 2003). This may help to explain why left wingers are able to recognise the ability of right wing ideology to promote wellbeing, without the desire to shift their own political orientations to the right.

Study 8 had four hypotheses. First, it was expected that endorsing either left or right wing ideology would be perceived as promoting wellbeing. Secondly, it was expected that these positive outcomes would not be attributed to SES. In other words, political ideology should be thought to promote wellbeing, irrespective of SES. Third, it was hypothesised that

left wing ideology would be associated with justice sensitivity, whereas right wing ideology would be associated with BJW. Finally, it was hypothesised that conservatism would be associated with closed-mindedness and dogmatism, comprising an additional barrier preventing left wingers shifting their political orientation to the right.

## **Method**

### **Participants and Design**

The study was carried out with 294 American participants (125 males and 169 females) recruited through M-Turk. The mean age of participants was 34.81 (*SD* 12.12). The study was conducted with a 2 X 3 between subjects design. Participants read statements endorsing either left or right wing ideological variables (IV 1), and were asked about the effects of endorsing these ideologies within lower, middle or upper classes within society (IV 2).

### **Materials and Procedure**

Despite the change to the study design, Study 8 was carried out using much the same procedure as used in the previous chapter<sup>16</sup>. Participants read about the potential endorsement of conservatism as per Studies 6 and 7. However, in contrast, half of the participants in Study 8 read about the endorsement of a left wing political ideology, in this case, Liberalism. For, participants in the left wing, upper class condition read:

---

<sup>16</sup> The same measures of SES and perceived inequality were used. Correlations with perceived functions of ideology can be found in Appendix H.

If a person within the top third of society's wealth distribution were to have views consistent with the following:

"I consider my political orientation to be very left wing.

I see myself as having strongly liberal views.

I see myself as a strong Democrat supporter."

And to have views inconsistent with the following:

"I consider my political orientation to be very right wing.

I see myself as having strongly conservative views.

I see myself as a strong Republican supporter."

Following this participants were asked to consider the utility of the ideology within that sector of society. Participants were asked, "*Are they likely, as a result, to feel less or more*" of each outcome variable. Items were measured on eight point scale (labelled from "1= less" to "8= more").

The same measures from the PANAS and self-esteem scale used in Studies 6 and 7 were used in Study 8. The other measures of life satisfaction were not included in Study 8 in order to ensure participants were not presented with too many dependent variables. The effects observed with positive affect ( $\alpha = .89$ ), negative affect ( $\alpha = .86$ ) and self-esteem ( $\alpha = .60$ ) were sufficient to look for consistency in results compared with the previous two studies. In this study, participants were also asked to consider whether the ideology would promote BJW and justice sensitivity. BJW (Lerner, 1965) was measured using three items including, "*That the world is a just place in which they get what they deserve*" ( $\alpha = .81$ ). Four items adapted from (Schmitt et al., 2005) measured observer justice sensitivity ( $\alpha = .92$ ). These items included, "*Sorry for other people when they are having problems*".

The next set of dependent variables was designed to test Hypothesis 4. Participants were asked to consider 17 DVs which measured different personality attributes (closed mindedness, possessing a strong work ethic and feelings of certainty in life). These were: *out of touch with reality; delusional about their society; unaware of the problems faced by people in their society; uncaring about the problems faced by people in their society; selfish; closed-minded; rigid and dogmatic; compassionate; curious and critical in their thinking; independently minded; free from doubt and uncertainty; certain about who they are and what their place is in life; hard working; successful in their career or business; productive; in step with the views of their friends and family, and finally, approved of by their friends and family.*

An exploratory Factor Analysis was carried out using a Varimax rotation (for factor loadings see Appendix G). The analysis revealed three components. Factor one, which had an eigenvalue of 7.41 (explaining 43.57% of variance) was labelled, “closed mindedness”. The factor was comprised of the variables: *out of touch with reality; delusional about their society; unaware of the problems faced by people in their society; uncaring about the problems faced by people in their society; selfish, closed-minded; rigid and dogmatic; compassionate; curious and critical in their thinking, and independently minded* ( $\alpha = .96$ ). Factor two, which had an eigenvalue of 3.30 (explaining 19.43% of variance) was labelled, “work ethic and approval”. The factor was comprised of the variables: *hard working; successful in their career or business; productive; in step with the views of their friends and family and approved of by their friends and family* ( $\alpha = .85$ ). Factor three, which has an eigenvalue of 1.49 (explaining 8.78% of variance) was labelled, “certainty”. The factor was comprised of: *free from doubt and uncertainty; and certain about who they are and what their place is in life* ( $r = .46, p = .001$ ).

Following this, participants considered six DVs measuring attitudes towards inequality. Four measures were adapted from Jost and Thompson’s (2000) ‘Economic System

Justification' scale, including "*Equal distribution of resources is unnatural*" and two measures taken from Schlenker et al. (2012) which asked participants whether endorsement of these ideologies would promote beliefs that "*Incomes should be made more equal*" and "*We need larger income differences as incentives*". Factor analysis was carried out using a Varimax rotation which ascertained that these items should all be subsumed under one measure of preference for inequality ( $\alpha = .88$ ). The factor had an eigenvalue of 3.87, accounting for 64.4% of variance. These factor loadings can also be found in Appendix G.

Finally, participants were asked about their own endorsement of conservatism ( $\alpha = .95$ ) and liberalism ( $\alpha = .93$ ). The perceived normality of conservatism and liberalism was also measured using the same methods in Studies 6 and 7 ( $\alpha = .88, .87$ , respectively). Across all scales, negatively phrased items were reverse coded for analysis. At the end of the study participants were thanked and debriefed.

## **Results and Discussion**

Initially, a one sample *t* test analysis was carried out in order to test the hypothesis that right wing ideologies would be perceived as leading to palliative functions, but also possesses negative characteristics (such as closed mindedness). Outcome variables were compared to 4.5 (scale midpoint). Scores significantly above the midpoint meant that, on average, participants attributed the endorsement of the ideological variable as promoting higher levels of that outcome variable. Following this, I conducted a between subjects Analysis of Variance on each outcome variable to establish whether the orientation of the ideology (right versus left) and the class within society presented (bottom, middle or top) had

an effect upon the perceived utility of each ideological variable.<sup>17</sup> Both left and right wing ideologies were perceived to promote wellbeing. The consequences of adopting ideologies in terms of promoting BJW, justice sensitivity, closed mindedness and attitudes towards inequality were perceived to differ. For results see Table 12.

---

<sup>17</sup> The same analyses were carried out with SDO. The endorsement of SDO was perceived to promote positive affect,  $t(147) = 3.76$ ,  $p = .001$  ( $M = 4.98$ ,  $SD = 1.55$ ); self-esteem,  $t(147) = 5.21$ ,  $p = .001$  ( $M = 5.02$ ,  $SD = 1.22$ ); BJW,  $t(147) = 10.60$ ,  $p = .001$  ( $M = 5.94$ ,  $SD = 1.65$ ); closed mindedness,  $t(147) = 12.03$ ,  $p = .001$  ( $M = 5.87$ ,  $SD = 1.39$ ); a good work ethic,  $t(147) = 5.26$ ,  $p = .001$  ( $M = 5.09$ ,  $SD = 1.37$ ); approval from friends and family,  $t(147) = 4.73$ ,  $p = .001$  ( $M = 5.16$ ,  $SD = 1.69$ ) and support for inequality,  $t(147) = 12.46$ ,  $p = .001$  ( $M = 5.92$ ,  $SD = 1.38$ ). Endorsement of SDO was also perceived to reduce negative affect,  $t(147) = -10.84$ ,  $p = .001$  ( $M = 3.20$ ,  $SD = 1.46$ ) and justice sensitivity,  $t(147) = -14.26$ ,  $p = .001$  ( $M = 2.68$ ,  $SD = 1.55$ ).

The rejection of SDO was perceived to promote positive affect,  $t(145) = 5.58$ ,  $p = .001$  ( $M = 5.23$ ,  $SD = 1.59$ ); self-esteem,  $t(145) = 5.98$ ,  $p = .001$  ( $M = 4.98$ ,  $SD = 0.96$ ); justice sensitivity,  $t(145) = 11.62$ ,  $p = .001$  ( $M = 6.07$ ,  $SD = 1.63$ ); a good work ethic,  $t(145) = 6.22$ ,  $p = .001$  ( $M = 5.27$ ,  $SD = 1.49$ ) and approval from friends and family,  $t(145) = 5.34$ ,  $p = .001$  ( $M = 5.19$ ,  $SD = 1.56$ ). The rejection of SDO was perceived to reduce negative affect,  $t(145) = -6.27$ ,  $p = .001$  ( $M = 3.72$ ,  $SD = 1.50$ ); BJW,  $t(145) = -9.68$ ,  $p = .001$  ( $M = 3.07$ ,  $SD = 1.79$ ); closed mindedness,  $t(145) = -8.12$ ,  $p = .001$  ( $M = 3.55$ ,  $SD = 1.41$ ) and support for inequality,  $t(145) = -14.09$ ,  $p = .001$  ( $M = 2.84$ ,  $SD = 1.42$ ).

There was a main effect of the ideology presented upon negative affect,  $t(1, 288) = 9.50$ ,  $p = .002$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .032$ ; BJW,  $t(1, 288) = 203.24$ ,  $p = .001$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .414$ ; justice sensitivity,  $t(1, 288) = 333.84$ ,  $p = .001$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .537$ ; closed mindedness,  $t(1, 288) = 199.97$ ,  $p = .001$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .410$  and support for inequality,  $t(1, 288) = 353.76$ ,  $p = .001$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .551$ . Class had a main effect on positive affect,  $t(2, 288) = 6.58$ ,  $p = .002$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .044$ ; negative affect,  $t(1, 288) = 3.01$ ,  $p = .051$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .020$  and approval from friends and family,  $t(1, 288) = 4.79$ ,  $p = .009$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .032$ . There were no interaction effects observed.

Participants' own endorsement of SDO was correlated with their perception of how normative the ideological variable is within society,  $r(294) = .28$ ,  $p = .001$ . The perceived normality of SDO was found to correlate significantly with negative affect,  $r(294) = .23$ ,  $p = .001$ ; and self-esteem,  $r(294) = -.13$ ,  $p = .029$ . Four significant correlations were found between participants' own endorsement of SDO and negative affect,  $r(294) = .15$ ,  $p = .013$ ; self-esteem,  $r(294) = -.31$ ,  $p = .001$ ; good work ethic,  $r(294) = -.23$ ,  $p = .001$  and approval from family,  $r(294) = -.18$ ,  $p = .003$ .

Table 12:  
*Inferential tests of each outcome variable relating to perceptions of the utility of conservatism.*

	Dependent variables								
	PANAS positive	PANAS negative	Self-esteem	Belief in a just world	Justice sensitivity	Closed mindedness	Work ethic and approval	Certainty	Pro inequality
Right wing endorsement (N = 148)									
Mean	4.97	3.59	5.06	5.45	3.80	5.01	5.64	5.01	5.85
(SD)	(1.32)	(1.48)	(1.02)	(1.45)	(1.91)	(1.79)	(1.18)	(1.54)	(1.21)
<i>t</i>	4.30	-7.50	6.64	7.98	-4.46	3.44	11.73	4.00	13.58
	***	***	***	***	***	**	***	***	***
Left wing endorsement (N = 146)									
Mean	5.05	3.48	4.89	3.76	5.68	3.60	5.06	4.30	3.26
(SD)	(1.43)	(1.60)	(1.00)	(1.62)	(1.42)	(1.56)	(1.21)	(1.37)	(1.41)
<i>t</i>	4.64	-7.71	4.74	-5.50	10.06	-6.97	5.56	-1.75	-10.68
	***	***	***	***	***	***	***		***
<i>F</i> ideology presented ( $\eta^2$ )	0.24	0.33	2.02	90.76	89.84	50.50	17.97	17.62	284.76
	(.001)	(.001)	(.007)	***	***	***	***	***	***
				(.240)	(.238)	(.149)	(.059)	(.058)	(.497)
<i>F</i> class presented ( $\eta^2$ )	4.70	3.64	2.86	5.23	0.16	1.68	2.95	2.11	0.32
	*	*		**			*		
	(.032)	(.025)	(.019)	(.035)	(.001)	(.012)	(.020)	(.014)	(.002)
<i>F</i> ideology*class ( $\eta^2$ )	3.23	0.63	1.56	1.18	0.96	0.73	1.06	2.10	0.27
	*								
	(.022)	(.004)	(.011)	(.008)	(.007)	(.005)	(.007)	(.014)	(.002)

Mean is significantly different from mid-point; \*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .005$ , \*  $p < .05$ . Positive values of *t* indicate that ideological variable in question is perceived to lead to increases in the outcome variable.

Both left wing and right wing ideology was thought to promote positive affect, self-esteem and a good work ethic. Similarly, both ideologies were thought to reduce negative affect. The ideologies were thought to differ with regards to the remaining dependent variables. Right wing ideology was thought to promote endorsement of BJW, closed mindedness, certainty and attitudes in favour of inequality, while reducing justice sensitivity.

In contrast, left wing ideology was thought to promote justice sensitivity and reduce closed mindedness, BJW and attitudes favouring inequality. There was no perceived effect of left wing ideology on certainty.

These results provide some insight as to the reasons why left wing individuals are able to recognise the benefits of conservatism, without shifting their own orientation to the right. More liberal individuals, who are opposed to inequality and perceived as holding greater concern for justice (Haidt et al., 2009), may associate right wing ideology with promoting social injustice and, as a result of a more dogmatic and closed minded style of thinking, the endorsement of BJW. BJW would act as a barrier to addressing social inequality through the redistribution of wealth. This conflict in core belief systems (BJW versus justice sensitivity) may well be the driving force behind an individual's decision to adopt a right versus left wing political orientation.

These results suggest that lay theories surrounding political ideologies are congruent with Choma et al.'s (2009) contention that differing underlying processes lead to the endorsement of different political orientations. However, this difference may be perceived as a consequence in the differing ideologies. While individuals who endorse conservatism are perceived as being driven to justify inequality, left wing individuals who oppose inequality would be perceived as striving for the redistribution of wealth and see the widening gap between the wealthier and poorer classes as unjust.

The class of the individual said to be endorsing the ideology had little to no effect on the perceived consequences of conservatism and liberalism. Similarly, there was little evidence of any interactions between political orientation and social class in producing the perceived consequences of adopting or rejecting conservatism. This is an important finding as these results support the idea that the differing outcomes perceived to stem from right versus



left wing political orientation are universally understood, and not driven by an individual's perception of what it means to belong to different social classes. These findings suggest that individuals hold lay theories which are inconsistent with Jetten et al.'s (2012) conclusions.

### **Norms and Participants' endorsement of Ideologies**

Participants' own endorsement of each ideological variable and their perception of how normative each is within society were correlated with their attributions of outcomes resulting from the endorsement of that ideological variable. Significant correlations are reported below. <sup>18</sup>Participants' own endorsement of conservatism was correlated with their perception of how normative the ideology is within society,  $r(294) = .37, p = .001$ . No significant correlations were found between the perceived normality of conservatism and attributions made from endorsing conservatism. Two significant correlations were observed between participants' own endorsement of conservatism and positive affect,  $r(294) = .14, p = .014$  and justice sensitivity,  $r(294) = .21, p = .001$ . Broadly speaking, attributions of the perceived consequences of adopting ideological variables were made largely independently of participants' own orientation pertaining to the ideological variable.

### **Conclusions**

These findings have several important implications. Firstly, there are substantial similarities between the perceived consequences of endorsing (or rejecting) conservatism. In both cases, having a pro or anti stance with regards to both ideologies is perceived to promote positive affect and self-esteem. These findings supported Hypothesis 1. Attributions

---

<sup>18</sup> For a full table of correlations see Appendix H.

regarding the positive consequences of adopting ideological variables were not affected by the SES of the individual thought to be endorsing the ideological variable. This provided support for Hypothesis 2. The attributions of BJW and justice sensitivity differ with regard to orientation of the ideology held. Endorsement of conservatism is perceived to lead to endorsement of BJW and support for inequality. In contrast, rejection of conservatism is perceived as leading to increased justice sensitivity and reduced support for inequality. This important distinction provides insight into the true underlying attributions made with regard to right versus left wing ideologies, supporting Hypothesis 3. While right wing individuals are perceived as being happy but closed minded, left wing individuals are perceived as being happy and open minded, supporting Hypothesis 4.

## **Study 9**

### **The perceived effects of strengthening one's own ideology**

Studies 6, 7 and 8 have consistently yielded results which support the contention that individuals intuitively recognise the consequences of adopting different ideological variables, irrespective of their own ideologies. In Study 9, I aimed to replicate the results which suggest that endorsing a political ideology is in itself beneficial to individuals, irrespective of the orientation of that ideology. To replicate these findings most robustly, I decided to ask participants about their own political ideology in Study 9 and, furthermore, what they perceived the consequences would be of strengthening their own endorsement of ideologies.

The first hypothesis for Study 9 was that participants would associate increasing the intensity of their political orientation with positive outcomes. In essence, this would provide support for the contention that having a strong political ideology is perceived as being

beneficial to individuals regardless of the orientation of the ideology (e.g., Choma et al., 2009). Hypothesis two was that while this effect should be consistent across both left and right wing orientated participants, positive outcomes should be associated with different core beliefs for left versus right wingers (Choma et al., 2009; Haidt et al., 2009). While increased justice sensitivity and open mindedness among left wingers; increased endorsement should be associated with increased BJW and more closed mindedness for right wingers. This would provide support for my contention that while individuals can recognise the potential benefits to differing political ideologies, it is their core belief system, in terms of justice concerns or just world beliefs, which attract an individual to their chosen ideology.

## **Method**

### **Participants and design**

Study 9 was carried out with 202 American participants (127 females, 74 males, 1 transgender), mean age was 40.80 ( $SD = 12.27$ ). The study was a quasi-experimental design. Participants were asked to consider the effects of increasing their endorsement of their own political orientation, rather than being asked to consider another individual's political orientation.

### **Materials and Procedure**

Study 9 was carried out using much the same procedure as Studies 6-8. Participants were asked to indicate whether they “*agreed or disagreed*” (dichotomous variable) with each

item of the conservatism scale (see Study 6). After each scale item participants were asked, “*How strongly do you hold this opinion?*” Participants then indicated the intensity of their endorsement of each statement on eight point scales labelled from “*very weakly*” to “*very strongly*”. Following this, and before answering the questions that followed, participants were instructed,

“Now imagine that your political views became stronger. That is, imagine you held stronger opinions about the political views we've just asked you about.

As a result of holding your political convictions more strongly, would you expect to be less or more: (Please answer on the scales provided where 1= less, 8=more)”

Dependent variables were: positive affect ( $\alpha = .94$ ); negative affect ( $\alpha = .90$ ); self-esteem ( $\alpha = .64$ ); sense of mastery ( $r = .74, p < .001$ ); sense of security ( $r = .63, p < .001$ ); sense of belonging ( $\alpha = .82$ ); chance of achieving future prosperity ( $r = .71, p < .001$ ) BJW ( $\alpha = .84$ ); and justice sensitivity ( $\alpha = .83$ ).

The same 17 personality attributes which were employed in Study 8 were also measured. An exploratory Factor Analysis was carried out using a Varimax rotation (for factor loadings see Appendix D). These variables loaded onto three factors. The first factor was a measure of closed mindedness ( $\alpha = .93$ ) and included items: *out of touch with reality; delusional; unaware of the problems faced by society; uncaring about the problems faced by society; selfish; compassionate; closed-minded; rigid and dogmatic in their thinking; curious and independent in their thinking*. This factor had an eigenvalue of 5.61 and explained 33% of variance. The second factor was a measure of work ethic and approval ( $\alpha = .89$ ) and included items; *hardworking, successful, productive, in-step with friends and family* and

*approved of by friends and family*. This factor had an eigenvalue of 5.60 and explained 32.92% of variance. The final factor was a measure of certainty ( $r = .48, p < .001$ ) and included two items: '*free from doubt and uncertainty* and *certain about whom they are*'. This factor had an eigenvalue of 1.48 and explained 8.73% of variance. At the end of the study participants were thanked and debriefed.

## **Results and Discussion**

Initially, means for each outcome variable (positive and negative affect, self-esteem, belonging, mastery, security, prosperity, justice sensitivity, BJW and the three factors measuring personality attributes) were compared to the scale midpoint (4.5) with a one sample  $t$  test. The data set was split dichotomously so that results could be analysed in terms of both left and right wing orientations. Means which were found to be significantly higher than 4.5 meant that, on average, participants felt that increasing their endorsement of their political orientation would promote the corresponding outcome variable. Likewise, means found to be significantly below 4.5 meant that, on average, participants felt that increasing the endorsement of their chosen political orientation would reduce the corresponding outcome variable. Means and results from the  $t$  test analyses are presented in Table 13. A between subjects Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was carried out in order to establish where the perceived differences between left and right wing ideologies lied in terms of the perceived consequences of increasing endorsement of either ideology. These results are also presented in Table 13.

Table 13:  
*Means (Standard Deviations), t test and ANOVA results pertaining to the perceived consequences of rejecting (left wing) or endorsing (right wing) conservatism.*

	Dependent Variables											
	Positive affect	Negative affect	Self-esteem	Belonging	Mastery	Security	Prosperity	Justice sensitivity	Belief in a Just World	Closed mindedness	Work ethic and approval	Certainty
Right wing N=108												
Mean (SD)	5.31 (1.38)	3.26 (1.71)	5.11 (0.90)	5.11 (1.20)	5.19 (1.47)	5.00 (1.41)	5.07 (1.40)	5.36 (1.46)	4.47 (1.59)	3.92 (1.54)	5.29 (1.37)	5.04 (1.50)
<i>t</i>	6.08 ***	-7.54 ***	6.97 ***	5.23 ***	4.89 ***	3.69 ***	4.27 ***	6.11 ***	-0.18	-3.93 ***	6.02 ***	3.72 ***
Left wing N=90												
Mean (SD)	5.83 (1.51)	3.09 (1.54)	5.43 (1.03)	5.43 (1.35)	5.62 (1.44)	5.15 (1.34)	5.22 (1.54)	6.04 (1.48)	3.77 (1.66)	3.52 (1.50)	5.05 (1.32)	4.82 (1.53)
<i>t</i>	8.37 ***	-8.69 ***	8.63 ***	6.50 ***	7.38 ***	4.61 ***	4.44 ***	9.84 ***	-4.15 ***	-6.20 ***	3.94 ***	1.97 *
<i>F</i>	4.63 *	0.04	3.21	2.64	0.53	0.01	0.04	11.82 **	9.44 **	3.54	1.66	1.04
Partial $\eta^2$	.023	.000	.016	.013	.003	.000	.000	.057	.046	.017	.008	.005

Mean is significantly different from mid-point; \*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .005$ , \*  $p < .05$ . Positive values of *t* indicate that ideological variable in question is perceived to lead to increases in the outcome variable.

Both liberal and conservative participants believed that increasing their endorsement of their ideology would promote positive affect, self-esteem, belonging, mastery, security, prosperity, justice sensitivity, work ethic and certainty. Both groups also agreed that increasing their endorsement of their ideology would reduce negative affect and closed mindedness. Liberals believed that endorsing their ideology more strongly would reduce BJW. However, there was no effect of BJW with conservatives.

## **Correlations between ideology and perceived outcomes**

Correlation analyses were also carried out between participants' endorsement of conservatism and the extent to which they believed conservatism would promote each outcome variable. Significant results were obtained which highlighted that the more participants endorsed conservatism, the more they felt that conservatism would promote a good work ethic (and approval),  $r(198) = .19, p = .008$ ; BJW,  $r(198) = .22, p = .002$ ; and reduce justice sensitivity;  $r(198) = -.17, p = .015$ . Effect sizes were small, and evaluations were made largely independently of participants' own ideologies.<sup>19</sup>

## **Conclusions**

To conclude, the results obtained from Study 9 supported both of the hypotheses and replicated the findings of Studies 6-8. The results obtained from  $t$  tests (Table 13) demonstrated that participants associated increased endorsement of political ideologies with promoting positive outcomes (positive affect, self-esteem, belonging, mastery, security, prosperity, work ethic and approval, and certainty) and reducing negative outcomes (negative affect and closed mindedness), regardless of the orientation of the ideology. Left and right wing ideologies differed, however, in their association BJW.

## **General Discussion**

### **Summary of findings**

---

<sup>19</sup> For a full table of correlations, see Appendix J.

In Study 9, the research was expanded in order to investigate whether the benefits attributed to the endorsement of right wing ideology would also be attributed to left wing alternatives. In order to achieve this, the orientation of the ideology described as being endorsed served as an independent variable (left versus right). Furthermore, I wanted to assess what the perceived different mechanisms underpinning left wing and right wing orientations were. The results obtained in Study 8 demonstrated that both left and right wing ideologies are perceived as promoting wellbeing, consistent with Choma et al.'s (2009) findings. Furthermore, the differing orientations reflected perceived different underpinnings in morality (Haidt et al., 2009). While right wing ideologies were associated with BJW and support for inequality, left wing ideologies were associated with justice sensitivity and opposition to inequality. Study 8 also provided evidence that right wing ideology is perceived to promote closed mindedness. This result highlighted that individuals hold lay theories which are consistent with the findings of Napier and Jost (2008), Jetten et al. (2012) and Schlenker et al. (2012) which contended that right wing ideology promotes wellbeing and is linked to closed mindedness (Jost et al., 2003). Finally, in Study 8 SES was introduced as a second independent variable. SES did not have a significant effect on the perception of ideological variables promoting wellbeing. Participants' lay theories were not compatible with Jetten et al.'s (2012) contention that the benefits of right wing ideology are actually benefits associated with belonging to higher classes within society.

These findings were replicated and extended in Study 9. In this final study, I measured participants' own endorsement of conservatism rather than describing another individual. The results obtained in Study 9 replicated the finding that BJW was not associated with left wing ideology. It is particularly of interest that when considering others' ideological choices (Study 8), there was a clear differentiation whereby conservatism was thought to promote BJW and closed mindedness while reducing justice sensitivity. However, when



asked about their own ideological choices (Study 9), participants did not demonstrate this same differentiation. Instead, both liberals and conservatives thought that their ideology promoted justice sensitivity and open-mindedness. This implication is discussed in greater detail within the General Discussion chapter.

## **Applications**

The main application of my findings is theoretical and reflects the content of lay theories surrounding ideologies. The perceived difference in endorsement of BJW compared to justice sensitivity reflects the content of lay theories surrounding different political groups. Namely, conservatives are viewed as being less concerned with social justice and aim to maintain inequality. In contrast, liberals are perceived as rejecting social inequality.

This perception is accurate when considering the different policies relating to social inequality belonging to right and left wing political parties. In both the US and UK, left wing parties have policies aimed at achieving a redistribution of wealth. Comparatively, right wing parties traditionally have not supported such redistribution or welfare policies to the same degree.

Another point of interest in this research was that when considering others' endorsements of ideologies, conservatism was associated with BJW whereas liberalism was associated with justice sensitivity. However, when asked to consider the effects of endorsing their own ideologies more strongly, participants attributed both left and right wing ideology with justice concerns. This finding is somewhat reconcilable with research carried out by Farwell and Weiner (2000).

Farwell and Weiner (2000) investigated liberal's and conservatives' perceptions of their own and others' generosity towards the needy. In two experiments, participants were asked to consider how generous they would be willing to be towards people who were either responsible or irresponsible for their misfortunes. Three individuals were described in different scenarios. An unemployed person was described as having lost their job due to poor work habits (responsible) or because their employer lost their business (not responsible). An obese person was described as suffering weight-related illness due to poor diet and no exercise (responsible) or because of thyroid condition (not responsible). Finally, a person was described as suffering from AIDS as a result of either promiscuity (responsible) or a contaminated blood transfusion (not responsible).

Across both studies, conservatives (compared to liberals) were less generous towards people deemed responsible for their misfortune. However, there was no difference between conservatives' and liberals' donations towards individuals deemed not responsible for their misfortunes. Crucially, differences were observed when it came to estimations of others' generosity. Conservatives were viewed as 'heartless', being estimated to donate less generously than liberals, irrespective of perceived responsibility of the needy. Conversely, participants over-estimated liberals' generosity. Conservative participants over-estimated liberals' generosity more so than other liberals. Farwell and Weiner (2000) attribute these results as evidence that people endorse the "bleeding heart liberal" stereotype (p. 845).

When considering the results within this chapter, this same stereotype may explain the attribution of higher justice sensitivity to other liberals compared to conservatives. Furthermore, participants attributed conservatives as more likely (compared to liberals) to endorse just world beliefs. In endorsing these beliefs, people are thought to be responsible for their own misfortunes. Taken together, the findings within this chapter along with Farwell and Weiner's (2000) results, suggest that lay theories contain strong stereotypes of 'bleeding

heart liberals' who support overly generous welfare systems, while 'heartless' conservatives blame the needs for their own misfortune and thus reject welfare policies aimed at reducing inequality.

Given that research has shown that inequality has risen over the last three decades (Milanovic, 2002; Piketty & Saez, 2006), these differing attitudes towards social inequality are also becoming more important to consider. It is particularly important for individuals to be aware of and understand the consequences of these attitudes when it comes to voting political parties into government. Seemingly, electing right wing parties into government will achieve a legitimisation of inequality. If individuals want to reduce inequality within their society then they need to be governed by a party who view inequality as unjust; namely a left wing party.

Throughout this thesis, there has been evidence that people adopt ideologies, in part, for strategic reasons. Throughout my research, participants have demonstrated accurate understandings of the differences between ideological variables and their consequences. This point is addressed within the next chapter where all of the research findings within this thesis are integrated.

### **Limitations and future directions**

Despite the significant findings within this chapter, it is important to address the limitations of this research. The majority of these studies were correlational in design. Furthermore, much of the acquired data was based on correlations and *t* test comparisons to scale midpoints. As a result, the majority of my findings were correlational and most likely, bidirectional. Thus far, I have not been able to establish a causal model between variables.

Furthermore, this research was carried out in the UK and US where there are clear divides between left and right political orientations. It is unlikely that my findings could be generalised cross culturally, particularly to societies without this clear divide. Another point of similarity between the UK and US is the high level of inequality within each. It would also be difficult to generalise these findings to societies with low levels of social inequality.

These limitations offer opportunities for future directions of the research which could be carried out in this area. Experimental designs which manipulate the orientation of political ideology and endorsement of variables such as BJW directly should be used in order to establish a model of causation between the ideological variables (conservatism, system justification and SDO), endorsement of BJW and justice sensitivity, and the promotion of wellbeing. Additionally these studies could be replicated in other cultures with a different political system and differing levels of inequality. Longitudinal designs could also be implemented to see if the level of inequality within society affects the perceived utility of different ideological variables. Finally, the research I have carried out in relation to political ideology could be applied to different ideologies. For example, research could look to determine if the same consequences of holding a strong political orientation can be generalised to holding a strong religious belief. In other words, research should look to determine whether political ideology is a unique concept or whether ideology generally is perceived to offer the same palliative function universally.

A review of how the research within thesis fits together along with the wider applications of the research is presented in Chapter 8. Within this chapter, I will also discuss in more detail the future directions proposed after considering the limitations of the research carried out thus far.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### GENERAL DISCUSSION

A long and rich tradition of research has shown that political ideologies, and related constructs such as authoritarianism, system justification and social dominance orientation, help people make sense of their social environments (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2004; Jost et al., 2009; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2007; Jost, Pelham, et al., 2003; Levin et al., 2002; Levin et al., 1998; Pratto et al., 2000; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius et al., 1994). In contrast, little attention has been paid to how people make of these political-psychological constructs. Theorists and researchers have generally treated these constructs as individual difference variables that affect people's responses to stimuli in the social environment (see Duckitt et al., 2002). Such stimuli include economic inequality, outgroups, and sexual behaviours. Less often, researchers have studied these constructs as responses to social stimuli (e.g., Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Dru, 2007; Liu & Huang, 2008; Rios Morrison & Ybarra, 2008). Further, very seldom have political-psychological constructs been treated as stimuli in their own right. In other words, ideologies, orientations, and related phenomena are generally treated as causes, moderators, outputs, but not objects, of social cognition.

In the present dissertation, I have conceptualised political-psychological constructs as things about which people form beliefs and about which they strategize. In the present studies, I have assessed people's theories about political constructs directly, by asking participants about the likely consequences of endorsing them for themselves, for their society, and its relations with other groups (Chapters 5, 6, & 7). This direct approach grew out of my earlier studies (Chapter 4), in which, like previous investigations (e.g., Dru, 2007; Rios

Morrison, Fast, & Ybarra, 2009; Rios Morrison & Ybarra, 2008), I investigated whether people endorse political constructs when it makes strategic sense for them to do so. Thus, inspired by previous investigations of folk psychology, which have often examined lay people's beliefs about constructs in cognitive and social psychology, this doctoral research represents an initial study of what might be called *folk political psychology*.

These studies have revealed that this folk political psychology is accurate and sophisticated. People have intricate and surprisingly accurate mental models of political constructs and their effects. In particular, they endorsed SDO when it made strategic sense to do so (Chapter 4). It made strategic sense to do so both from the perspective of scientific findings concerning the functions of SDO, and from the perspective of the lay beliefs endorsed by participants (Chapter 5). Indeed, considering that very few lay people are likely to have heard the term "social dominance orientation" or even of the discipline of political psychology, there appears to be a remarkably close correspondence between lay beliefs and scientific findings concerning the function of dominance ideology.

The studies reported in Chapter 6 uncovered an even closer correspondence between lay beliefs and scientific findings about the functions of conservative ideology for individuals. These studies produced striking evidence that participants perceive conservatism to be associated with subjective wellbeing; these lay beliefs echoing the findings of Napier and Jost (2008) and other investigations. They also showed that lay people associated conservatism with closed-mindedness, in agreement with theories and findings about the epistemic functions of conservative ideology (e.g., Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003). However, in Chapter 7, I found that people also associate the endorsement of *left* wing ideology with psychological benefits, including both eudaimonic and hedonic aspects of wellbeing. This suggests that like religion and science, people regard political ideologies as psychologically beneficial systems of meaning, and do so largely independent of the specific content of the

ideologies. Nonetheless, participants still recognised important differences between right and left wing ideology, such as their different implications for closed-mindedness, justice sensitivity for others, and the belief in a just world.

Within this chapter, I will provide a summary of the findings within three empirical chapters. Following this, applications of the research will be discussed. These applications apply to the role of ideology in promoting conflict and inequality, the attribution of ideology as motivated social cognition, and reconciling lay theories with political psychological theories of ideology. Finally, I will address the limitations of these studies, and how they have informed ideas for future research.

### **8.1: Summary of key findings**

In Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, I researched the perceived consequences of endorsing ideological variables for groups and individuals. Initially, my research focussed on how SDO is activated in, and may go on to motivate commitment to, conflicts. In Study 5, I broadened my research to include other ideological variables, namely conservatism and system justification. A summary of the key findings within each chapter will be provided before discussing the theoretical implications of my findings, limitations within my research and proposed future directions.

Studies 1-3 were designed to test experimentally whether, once embroiled in conflict, participants would increase their endorsement of SDO and if in turn, increased SDO would promote increased commitment to the conflict. Across the three studies, increased SDO was elicited by making outgroup defection salient within a social dilemma task (Study 1) and introducing sunk costs (Study 2) and high stakes (Study 3) within a hypothetical intergroup

conflict. Crucially, outgroup defection and high financial stakes both increased SDO and had direct effects upon further commitment to the intergroup competition or conflict. In contrast, SDO mediated an indirect effect of sunk costs upon subsequent investment within Study 2.

In the next two empirical chapters, I began to try and reconcile these findings with lay theories of the functions of ideologies. Chapter 5 includes two studies which investigated the content of these lay theories indirectly (Study 4) and directly (Study 5). The results of Study 4 demonstrated that participants felt less favourably towards a group described as high compared to low in SDO. However, despite their preferences, participants indicated that the group high in SDO would be more likely to commit to the conflict and emerge victorious.

Results from Study 4 were replicated in Study 5, where participants were asked explicitly whether endorsing SDO would promote outcomes such as increased commitment to conflicts. In addition, participants were asked about the consequences of endorsing conservatism and system justification within intergroup conflicts and within society. The results demonstrated that participants considered SDO and conservatism to serve many of the same functions. Within the intragroup context, both ideologies were perceived as likely to promote inequality and contentment within upper classes. Both ideologies were also thought to reduce social cohesion and, crucially, SDO alone was perceived as reducing contentment within lower classes. System justification was the only ideological variable which participants attributed with promoting social cohesion. These findings from Studies 4 and 5 were the first demonstration that individuals' lay theories surrounding ideologies such as SDO were well formed, shared, and consistent with empirical findings such as those offered by political psychology regarding the function of ideology (e.g., Jetten & Iyer, 2010; Jost et al., 2004; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2009; Jost et al., 2007; Levin et al., 1998; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius et al., 2001).



Having established that lay theories of the functions of ideological variables within society are accurate and well formed, I decided to investigate whether people had accurate ideas about the consequences of endorsing political ideologies for individuals. In my last two empirical chapters, Studies 6-9 were designed to assess perceptions surrounding the palliative functions of ideology for individuals. Specifically, I wanted to examine whether lay theories of political ideologies were comparable with scientific theory and findings, for example those offered by Napier and Jost (2008) and Jetten et al. (2012) who found evidence that political conservatism promotes wellbeing. In doing so, I also researched whether people are drawn to their political ideological choices, at least in part, as a consequence of recognising the benefits promoted through those ideologies.

In Chapter 6, two studies provided evidence that people associate right wing ideologies with wellbeing, irrespective of their own ideology. This posed the question of why people are drawn to left wing ideologies if they recognise that right wing ideologies are advantageous. The question was investigated in Chapter 7. Two studies provided evidence that despite important differences between left and right wing ideologies, people associate both with wellbeing.

Despite perceptions that both left and right wing ideologies promote wellbeing, participants did see left and right wing ideologies as having somewhat different consequences. In particular, they believed that right wing ideologies are more likely to promote just world beliefs, and left wing ideologies are more likely to promote observer justice sensitivity. In other words, participants perceived that right wingers would be more likely to attempt to legitimise inequality by endorsing the belief that people receive only as much as they are entitled to, whereas left wingers would be more sensitive to others' misfortunes and perceive inequality as an injustice. Participants' attributions were consistent with empirical findings which have demonstrated links between right wing ideology and just

world beliefs (Christopher et al., 2008). Crucially, participants made these attributions largely independently of their own SES, perceptions of inequality and their own chosen ideology, demonstrating that these lay theories are culturally shared.

## **8.2: Theoretical and empirical contributions**

**8.2.1: Ideology and intergroup conflicts.** In Studies 1-5, participants indicated that they thought increased endorsement of SDO would promote commitment to conflicts, both in terms of financial investment and a greater willingness to fight aggressively. In Studies 4 and 5, results showed that participants associated increased SDO with a greater likelihood of emerging successfully from these conflicts. In Study 5, participants attributed these same functions and consequences to conservatism. These findings suggest that lay people appreciate the similar intergroup consequences of political conservatism and SDO which have been researched within political psychology (e.g. Sidanius et al., 1996).

The lay theories of the functions of SDO within conflicts unearthed within Studies 4 and 5 were consistent with experimental findings in the previous empirical chapter. Within the studies reported in Chapter 4, SDO was found to be positively correlated with the decision to invest financially in conflicts which made both economic sense, and a conflict which appeared economically senseless. Crucially, increased SDO mediated the competition-investment relationship within the context of economically senseless decision making (Study 2). In Study 2, participants were told that their group had already invested substantially within a conflict where there were no material (or economic) gains to be made by winning. As a result, investing in a conflict where there were no material gains at stake rendered the conflict itself economically senseless. Sunk costs should not promote nor reduce investment within the conflict as they do not make a victory or loss in the conflict any less or more

likely. Nonetheless, Study 2 demonstrated that sunk costs promoted SDO which motivated increased commitment in the conflict. In contrast, when the rational decision was to compete with the outgroup (i.e., within the dilemma task and when there were financial gains at stake), commitment to compete in the social dilemma task and invest within the conflict was increased by the presence of outgroup defection and high stakes, in addition to being correlated with SDO.

These results suggest that SDO motivates financial commitment to conflicts that appear economically irrational, where status and dominance are the factors at stake, as well as where financial resources are at stake. In other words, and consistent with Dru's (2007) and Rios Morrison and Ybarra's (2008) findings, SDO was increased by factors which made competition with, or threat from, an outgroup salient. Given the roles of increased perceptions of competitive intergroup relations within intractable conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2009), combined with the findings presented within this thesis, SDO can be seen as an important variable for consideration within the formation and endurance of intractable conflicts. Particularly, given the possibility that SDO may promote support and investment in conflicts that do not make economic sense, it is imperative that the pursuit of dominance is not allowed to take priority over pursuing a just and moral end to conflicts. Furthermore, given the results which indicate that political conservatism is perceived to promote many of the same consequences as SDO, the roles of right wing politics in conflict escalation are important to consider. While not all conflicts can be traced back to right wing political parties, there are many examples within US and UK history which can be.

For example, during World War II, Britain had two conservative governments in power led by Neville Chamberlain and Winston Churchill. Margaret Thatcher, in addition to being the only female Prime Minister within British history, is famous for her unwavering support of the Falklands War. While a left wing government was in power when Britain

joined forces with the US in the Iraq war, right wing MPs such as Ian Duncan Smith spoke out in support of the military action, leading some to assert that the Conservative party should share in responsibility for the war (New Statesman, 2010).

Similarly in the US, both George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush, both leaders of the right wing Republican Party, supported wars against Iraq and Afghanistan while in power. Many have questioned the true motivations behind wars such as these. For example, the most recent invasion of Iraq, termed '*The War upon Terror*' led to an inquiry after it was determined that there was in fact no evidence of weapons of mass destruction within Iraq. There were, however, valuable resources such as oil. Given the well-established link between right wing ideologies and dominance concerns (e.g. Jost & Thompson, 2001; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius et al., 2001), it is possible that the justifications for wars led by right wing political parties can become confounded with competition for superiority and dominance through the procurement of valuable resources. It is crucial, therefore, that the motivations for pursuing conflicts are apparent and widely understood before they can be accepted and supported.

**8.2.2: Ideology and inequality.** System justification is an ideological variable able to legitimise inequality, thereby achieving social harmony (e.g., Jost et al., 2004). Jost et al. contend that in order to achieve system legitimisation, individuals would need to engage in justification of both inequality (system justification) and their society (group justification). By engaging in system justification, high status groups are alleviated of guilt over their privileges while low status groups are able to reconcile their group's disadvantages with their desire to maintain a positive view of their society (Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003). Jost, Pelham, et al. (2003; Jost et al., 2004) suggest that in order to maintain a positive evaluation of society,

low status groups should legitimise inequality more compared to high status groups.

Participants in Study 5 thought that system justification would promote contentment in upper classes, but not within lower classes. However, system justification was perceived to promote social cohesion. Results from Study 5 suggest that lay theories are compatible with scientific theories to the extent that in both, system justification is seen to promote social cohesion.

In contrast to system justification, participants perceived that both SDO and conservatism would promote increased inequality, increased contentment within upper classes and reduced social cohesion. Furthermore, participants believed that endorsing SDO and conservatism would promote social disorder under conditions of high inequality (Study 5). Pratto et al. (1994) contend that SDO promotes harmony in the face of inequality by legitimising meritocracy and hierarchy. Similarly, conservatism has been linked to the endorsement of a Protestant work ethic which has similar connotations to just world beliefs. The Protestant work ethic contends that individuals who work harder are more likely to enjoy success (Levy, West, et al., 2006). Similarly, just world beliefs assert that individuals receive only as little or as much as they are entitled to (Lerner, 1980). Individuals who endorse these beliefs are, as a result, likely to perceive the disparity between the rich and the poor as justified. Indeed, in many of his speeches the leader of the Conservative Party, David Cameron, refers to the wealthy as those who have “done the right thing” (Cameron, 2012).

Participants’ perceptions of the functions of conservatism and SDO were compatible with the scientific theory and findings which assert that people who endorse SDO and conservatism favour inequality and hierarchy (Pratto et al., 1994; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003; Sibley & Duckitt, 2010). Additionally, participants’ perceptions that right wing ideologies reduce social cohesion under conditions of high inequality are consistent with events within the UK following the last election. A Conservative government took power following the 2010 British elections when inequality was recognised as high. In a few months following the

election, riots broke out across London and surrounding areas which were reported as a manifestation of the frustration surrounding high levels of inequality within Western cultures such as the US and UK (Till, 2013). This may have informed participants' views within this study or may reflect a high level of accuracy in the lay theories held in relation to right wing ideologies.

One area in which perceptions of SDO and conservatism differed was that while participants perceived SDO as reducing contentment within lower classes, conservatism was not perceived to affect this outcome. This may be a result of the fact that scale items used to describe SDO make inequality salient and, as a result, can be more easily related to unfavourable conditions for lower classes. However, this result does raise an interesting theoretical and applied issue. It could have been considered surprising that a right wing political party was elected into government at a time when inequality was so high, given that generally individuals have reported that they would prefer society to be more equal (Norton & Ariely, 2011). Perhaps the British electorate did not recognise that conservatism would be bad for lower classes in the same way that more extreme political ideologies are thought to be.

In reference to this question, Farwell and Weiner's (2000) drew on previous findings that conservatives favour resource distributions based upon equity rather than equality (e.g., Skitka & Tetlock, 1993). Farwell and Weiner (1996) suggest that since considerations of responsibility are considered within equity distributions, conservatives likely consider the extent to which individuals are responsible for their own shortcomings when deciding how much help they should be given (Farwell & Weiner, 2000).

In testing the extent to which lay individuals recognise the differences between liberal and conservative attitudes, Farwell and Weiner (2000) found evidence that people endorse

the “bleeding heart liberal” stereotype (p. 845). A consequence of endorsing this stereotype is that people over estimate liberals’ generosity towards the needy. This may well help to explain why right wing governments are elected during times of inequality, particularly in the most recent UK election. Much of the rhetoric surrounding the 2010 elections concerned the UK’s financial deficit and the “credit crunch” which occurred as a result of the economic crisis. Quite possibly, the UK electorate felt that in the face of such a large deficit, society could not afford to support a welfare system to the extent that a ‘bleeding heart’ left wing government would be perceived to endorse. As a result of fearing additional costs and budget cuts necessary to support a welfare system in the short term, voters aligned with a right wing government which, in the long run, have been shown to perpetuate the problem of social inequality (Merrick, 2013). The implication here is that lay beliefs provide fertile grounds for politicians to run arguments about their own and others’ ideologies. Left wing ideology is inherently “bleeding heart” for victims whereas right wing ideology is harsh towards victims and promotes victim blame. As a result, left wing ideology is designed to reduce inequality whereas right wing ideology is designed to legitimise it and dissolve responsibility for helping poorer groups within society. These different motivations are crucial in this kind of meta-political discourse.

This consideration leads onto the next implication of the research within this thesis - that ideologies may well be endorsed for strategic reasons.

**8.2.3: Ideology as motivated social cognition.** In Study 5 both left and right wing participants indicated that right wing ideology would be likely to promote inequality, disorder, and reduce social cohesion. Despite this, in Study 6 participants identified right wing ideology as likely to promote positive palliative outcomes for individuals. Additionally,

this effect was perceived to be universal across high and low social classes. Moreover, in Chapter 7, many of the same benefits were perceived to be promoted through left and right wing ideologies. As a result, it can be concluded that individuals hold culturally shared ideas that endorsing any political ideology promotes subjective wellbeing through fulfilling epistemic, existential and relational needs, irrespective of the perceived consequences of the ideology for society as a whole. These lay theories are consistent with experimental findings such as those offered by Jost (2006) and support Corbetta et al.'s (2009) findings which suggest that political ideology is best defined as a shared representation, helping people to make sense out of events and their societies.

If individuals perceive that endorsing a political ideology will satisfy these needs, then it can be argued that individuals, whether implicitly or explicitly, are motivated to find an ideology to identify with. In that sense, the findings within this thesis demonstrate that lay theories are consistent with the contention that political ideology is likely to be endorsed as a result of motivated social cognition (Jost & Amodio, 2012; Jost et al., 2003). These same findings suggest that lay theories are consistent with Choma et al.'s contention that ideology is likely to promote wellbeing through factors which satisfy dimensions such as belonging, purpose and mastery (Ryff & Keyes, 1995) in addition to promoting hedonic wellbeing.

Taken together, these findings suggest that people recognise the benefits of endorsing an ideology generally, and within specific contexts. First, and supported by meaning maintenance models (Heine et al., 2006) and the conception of political ideology as a shared representation (Corbetta et al., 2009), people recognise that political ideology helps to reduce uncertainty by providing norms and expectations for behaviour which guide decision making. For example, people recognise that right wing ideology promotes just world beliefs (Studies 8 and 9) and distribution of resources based upon equity considerations (Farwell & Weiner, 2000). This in turn informs people that a right wing government will be far more restrictive



with welfare allocations compared to a left wing government. Thus, when concerned about the state of the economy and how public money is spent, people align themselves with a right wing government who will offer support only to individuals who can be considered blameless for their misfortune and who are unable to help themselves and align themselves with that party. Alternatively, people who are more sensitive to social injustice and strive for less inequality, or indeed are in need of social support, will align themselves with a left wing political party.

Second, when engaged in international conflicts, people are drawn to ideologies which legitimise the pursuit of dominance despite mounting costs, for example SDO (Studies 2 and 3). Ultimately, people recognise that this same ideology will increase the likelihood of emerging successfully from the conflict (Studies 4 and 5) providing further evidence that ideologies might be endorsed for strategic reasons.

This poses interesting questions, particularly when considering the finding that strengthening the endorsement of political ideology is perceived to be advantageous (Study 9). Given that people recognise the benefits of political ideology, why do they not endorse these ideologies more strongly? It may well be the case that individuals do not draw upon their lay theories when adopting ideologies. Alternatively, people may be concerned with identifying themselves as strong right or left wing, given the stereotypes of those two groups as ‘heartless conservatives’ and ‘bleeding heart liberals’, respectively (Farwell & Weiner, 2000). Finally, people may well adopt a political ideology in order to fulfil needs such as reduced uncertainty and forming meaningful ideological group memberships (e.g., Jost & Amodio, 2012; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003). However, people may simultaneously believe that they do not have the cognitive resources available to engage more strongly with politics in order to strengthen their convictions. Future research should aim to assess the extent to which these considerations form barriers to strengthening one’s political conviction.

**8.2.4: Reconciling lay theories with scientific theories.** Corbetta et al. (2009) and Levy, Chiu, et al. (2006) argue that lay individuals are capable of constructing theories to explain and predict intergroup behaviours and would likely appreciate the functions of political ideology. Both Levy et al. and Fletcher (1995) have argued that lay theories should be considered reconcilable with scientific theories and, often, each type of theory informs the other.

In terms of the role of ideological variables in promoting conflicts, Chapter 5 provided evidence that lay participants appreciated the ability of SDO to promote support for conflict. In that sense, the lay theories uncovered in Chapter 5 were reconcilable with scientific findings reported by Henry et al. (2005) and McFarland (2005), for example. In this same chapter, participants attributed SDO and conservatism with promoting inequality and contentment in upper classes. These attributions are reconcilable with the functions of these ideologies suggested by Pratto et al. (1994) and Jost, Glaser, et al. (2003), for example. Furthermore, system justification was attributed as promoting cohesion and contentment across classes. These attributions are comparable with the functions of system justification as discussed in scientific theories (e.g., Kay and Jost, 2003).

Study results from Chapters 6 and 7 have been discussed at length. However, it bears explicit acknowledgement that participants were strikingly accurate in their lay theories of the consequences of endorsing Conservatism and Liberalism to the extent that they could be reconciled with scientific theories such as those offered by Jost, Glaser, et al. (2003).

One area where lay theories differed from scientific, psychological theories concerned the ability of SDO in promoting harmony in the face of inequality, as postulated by Pratto et al. (1994). Participants attributed SDO as promoting social disorder, especially under

conditions of high inequality. The only ideological variable that participants thought would promote harmony was system justification. Taken together, the findings within this thesis suggest that lay individuals are able to distinguish between different ideologies and their consequences. As a result, these findings validate the use of lay theories in informing scientific theories and suggest that they are a valuable tool for investigating the antecedents of the endorsement of different ideological variables within specific contexts.

### **8.3: Limitations**

Given the importance of assessing the contribution of ideology to promoting conflict and social unrest, it is important to note the limitations of the studies presented in this thesis.

First, studies which aimed to establish a positive association between SDO and increased investment in conflict were carried out using a single measure of willingness to invest. Similarly, the two hypothetical war scenarios depicted conflicts which were economically irrational or rational from the start. As a result, it was not possible to determine the threshold of economic irrationality at which SDO mediates the competition-investment relationship. Nor is it possible to establish whether there is a ceiling effect within this relationship. In other words, is there a point when conflicts become so economically irrational that SDO is no longer enough to motivate further investment? Future research should aim to establish this by measuring SDO and willingness to invest at multiple stages within a conflict.

While this limitation was somewhat addressed with Study 1 by measuring SDO and defection over three iterations of a prisoner's dilemma task, the rational choice for individuals (or groups) who are interested in pursuing relative gains within these tasks is to defect

(Sidanius et al., 2007). As a result, this particular task was more similar to the independent variable utilised in Study 3 (stakes) which described a conflict in which the rational choice was to invest.

Second, there are other contributory factors which motivate defection in these tasks. For example, a tit-for-tat strategy is often employed within these tasks (Andreoni & Miller, 1993; Van Lange & Visser, 1999; Wedekind & Muilinski, 1996). Varying each participant's experience of the outgroup behaviour between cooperation and defection would allow for the disentangling of the effect of tit-for-tat strategies and SDO in the promotion of defection towards outgroups. Furthermore, participants took part in this study as individuals due to logistical restrictions of recruiting enough students to participate as groups. Given that SDO is an ideology which is concerned with dominance at the group level (e.g. Jost & Thompson, 2001; Sidanius et al., 2001), future research should aim to carry out group studies which allow for hierarchical linear modelling.

An additional consideration is that individuals are motivated to be and appear consistent (Festinger, 1954). This may go some way to explaining the results of Study 1. An initial experience of outgroup defection elicited increased SDO. However, both ANCOVA and mediation analysis revealed that the decision to defect at time two was predicted by the outgroup behaviour experienced. The only significant predictor of the decision at time three was participants' previous decisions. As a result, one could infer that while outgroup defection elicited increased SDO, the motivation to remain consistent produced subsequent defection. The motivation to remain consistent could also be researched in relation to the decision to invest in conflicts. It may be the case that increased endorsement of SDO motivates the initial decision to invest, which is then perpetuated by a combination of factors including the fact that SDO is not easily reduced (Liu & Huang, 2008) and the motivation to remain, and be seen to remain, consistent.

Third, Studies 4-8 were correlational and analysed using one-sample *t* tests against scale midpoints. As a result, relationships which were found were bidirectional and causality among variables could not be inferred. One reason for implementing correlational designs, particularly in Chapter 6, was that it did not seem feasible to manipulate participants' endorsement of ideological variables. Given that the endorsement of SDO is recognised as a personality trait (Pratto et al., 1994) and one can expect individuals who endorse political ideologies to identify strongly with their chosen political groups, I felt that individuals would report reduced wellbeing in response to being told that they were representative of a political ideology which contradicted their core values, rather than as a response to the ideology itself. Study 9 was carried out with a quasi-experimental design. The results replicated those obtained in Studies 6-8 which allowed these results to be accepted with greater confidence.

An additional limitation is that these studies were carried out with participants from two Western cultures which have both experienced a steady rise in inequality over recent decades (e.g. Milanovic, 2002). Research which has been carried out in relation to system legitimization has demonstrated that the level of inequality within society is important (Brandt & Reyna, 2012) as it renders attitudes towards inequality as either promoting or reducing system justifying beliefs (Brandt & Reyna, 2012). Within the US and UK, there is also a very clear left/right wing divide within politics. As a result, this research should be replicated within a variety of cultural and political contexts in order to assess to what extent these findings can be generalised and applied.

The most important limitation of the research within this thesis is that while I have shown that people recognise the functions of ideologies (Chapters 5, 6, and 7) and endorse them when it makes sense to do so (Chapter 4), thus far there is no compelling evidence that people are basing their ideological choices on their ability to recognise ideologies' functions. Where correlations have been observed between endorsement of ideologies and their

perceived functions, effect sizes have been inconsistent and the direction of the relationship cannot be inferred.

Despite this lack of evidence, there are many theories within social psychology which suggest that people make choices with consideration of the potential utility of each choice. The theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and the expectancy-value model (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1974) informed the subsequent theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1988). The theory of planned behaviour (TPB) contends that people make choices on how to behave based on logical considerations of consequences of the behaviour, attitudes towards the behaviour, subjective norms (i.e., how normative is the behaviour within one's group or society) and perceived control (i.e., to what extent is one able to perform the behaviour and control the consequences). In turn, these considerations combined form intentions to carry out the behaviour which then promote or reduce the likelihood that the behaviour will be carried out.

Taking the example of supporting a political party, the TPB suggests that people will consider their own attitudes towards left and right wing political parties, whether their friends, family, and society are predominantly left or right wing, what the consequences would be of voting for a left or right wing party, and to what extent they are in control of their decision. These considerations would inform the person's intentions to vote for their chosen political party which would predict their actual voting behaviour. Indeed, in their research, Fishbein, Ajzen and Hinkle (1980) found that voting intentions, based upon attitudes, beliefs and values associated with political party leaders, correlated with voting decisions in the 1976 American presidential election ( $r = .80$ ). The possibility strongly suggested by the present results is that people choose to adopt ideological positions, and not only their voting decisions, partly on the basis of the consequences of doing so.

In their meta-analysis of research testing the validity of the TPB, Armitage and Conner (2001) concluded that while the theory is a better predictor of self-reported behaviour compared to observed behaviours, the model proposed by the theory still accounts for around 20% of variance in measures of actual behaviour. Armitage and Conner classify this as a “*medium to large effect size*” (p. 489). Taken together, the implication of these theories and findings is that people do make careful considerations of the consequences of their decisions, such as the endorsement of political ideologies and political voting behaviours, before making them.

Based on these considerations, studies in Chapter 7 could be replicated and modified to include measures of intentions to become more political, which could be correlated with the perceived functions of becoming more or less political. Asking participants to think about the consequences of becoming less political, in addition to more political, would also be a fruitful modification of the studies within Chapter 7. Additionally, longitudinal studies could be run in which, drawing upon the TPB, measures could assess whether people do indeed become more political following intentions to do so.

Despite evidence which suggests people engage in careful and systematic consideration of choices, there are many factors which may contribute to a person’s ideological choices besides considering the functions of ideologies. These factors include the political attitudes held by friends and family, the socio-political environment (e.g., extreme politically charged environments such as fascist or communist societies), group membership, an individual’s personality and characteristics, and neurological factors. As a result, the relationship between the perceived utility and endorsement of ideologies may be small.

In considering the first of these factors, people’s affiliation with left and right wingers along with their socio-political environment, cultural values theory (Jellison & Arkin, 1977; Sanders & Baron, 1977) becomes relevant. According to the theory, people are motivated to

maintain social approval. In order to achieve this goal, people consider the values and opinions that are held by friends and family, and which are normative in their culture, and align their own views with them. This would be especially true of societies in which there is an extreme and prominent ideology, such as fascist or communist environments. In these cases, people are particularly likely to adopt ideologies which are accepted within their environment. Greenberg and Jonas (2003) argue that within these more extreme political environments, the functions of different ideologies are less likely a consideration in adopting political ideologies, compared to doing what is necessary to meet social approval. Even when people are not living within politically extreme environments, it could still be argued that people are motivated to adopt ideologies which are endorsed by friends and families and may, in fact, be under pressure to do so. If so, this would certainly diminish the effect of the perceived functions of ideologies contributing to ideological choices.

In addition to being motivated to achieve social approval within groups, groups' relative status may also dictate which ideologies are endorsed. It has been well documented that SDO, for example, is more likely to be endorsed by higher status groups compared to lower status groups (e.g., Kteily et al., 2012; Levin & Sidanius, 1999; Liu & Huang, 2008; Schmitt et al., 2003), and has a stronger relationship with political conservatism within higher status groups (Sidanius et al., 1996). Sidanius et al.'s findings have been replicated recently by Duckitt and Sibley (2014) who found evidence that ideological attitudes, such as SDO and RWA, are predictors of voting behaviours and political party support within ethnic majority, but not ethnic minority groups. Taken together, these findings suggest that there will be variations in what factors contribute to endorsing political ideologies depending upon a group's status within society.

An additional potential factor which might determine ideological choices suggests that people's personality or preference for certainty versus ambiguity may well predispose



them to a left or right wing orientation, despite being able to recognise functions of different ideologies. This consideration was touched upon in Chapter 7 where the relationship between conservatism and BJW compared to liberalism with justice sensitivity was investigated. Similarly, Choma et al. (2012) have found evidence that liberalism is related to creativity and openness, whereas conservatism is related to dogmatism. The aforementioned study by Duckitt and Sibley (2014) found that the effect of personality on ideological attitudes is consistent across both high and low status groups.

In addition to reviewing behavioural evidence of differences between liberals and conservatives, Jost and Amodio (2012) consider neuroscientific evidence that liberals and conservatives are drawn to their ideologies based upon differing psychological and neural processes. Research carried out by Amodio et al. (2007) and Weissflog et al. (2013) has provided evidence that compared to conservatives, liberals perform No-Go tasks with greater accuracy. These tasks are based on conflict (or process) monitoring and demonstrate differences in information processing mechanisms (Jost & Amodio). In a No-Go task, participants are told to respond to a particular stimulus with a specific behaviour (for example clapping whenever they see the letter 'W'). As a result of rehearsing this task, the response to the stimulus becomes 'habitual' (Jost & Amodio, p. 59). Following this, participants are exposed to the 'Go' stimulus, and other 'No-Go' stimuli (such as other letters) in rapid, random sequences. The test measures participants' ability to refrain from acting out the habitual response to the 'Go' stimulus when they are presented with 'No-Go' stimuli. Liberals have been shown to respond to these tasks with greater accuracy (Amodio et al., 2007; Weissflog et al., 2013) which has been attributed to liberals' openness to new information (Weissflog et al., 2013). Jost and Amodio (2012) contend that this neuroscientific evidence further supports Jost, Glaser, et al's (2003) theory that political

ideology is a result of motivated social cognition. A further implication of these findings is that people might be predisposed to political ideologies as a result of their neural functioning.

An additional consideration is that it might not be beneficial for people to be consciously aware of the basis for their ideological choices. While Fishbein et al.'s (1980) research suggested that people carefully consider their choices before voting for political parties, the research within this thesis has considered ideological choices other than voting behaviours. Specifically, this thesis considered whether people may make personal ideological choices based on their knowledge of the functions of those ideologies within international conflict and maintaining inequality within society, and for their own wellbeing. Particularly in endorsing political ideologies for themselves, it is possible that it would be anathema to the meaning function of ideology for people to be aware of the extrinsic reasons behind their political orientation. To be convincing and psychologically satisfying, it is likely that people need to perceive their ideological positions to be based on deep moral convictions and other intrinsic concerns (Skitka, in press). If people see their beliefs as being based on strategy rather than truth, and expedience rather than conviction, then their metacognitive confidence in the veracity and authenticity of their beliefs is likely, almost by definition, to be undermined, and with it, the psychological benefits of those beliefs.

As a result, for the benefits of ideology as postulated by Jost, Glaser, et al (2003) to be experienced, it might be important that people remain consciously unaware of the basis for their attraction towards particular political ideologies. In other words, the strategic adoption of ideology is likely to require a significant degree of self-deception (Shelley, 1989; von Hippel & Trivers, 2011). As a result of differences in underlying information processing and the possibility that it might be adaptive to remain unaware of the basis for ideological choices, people may not explicitly choose ideologies based on beliefs about their functions.

Thus, implicit or indirect experimental methodologies may be required to detect relationships between perceived functions of ideology and the decision to endorse them.

#### **8.4: Future directions**

In addition to the proposed corrections to the study limitations outlined above, other areas for potential future directions have been identified.

**8.4.1: Implementing qualitative research.** In response to both the research findings and the limitations outlined above, several future directions have been identified. First, the data within these studies have been quantitative. A qualitative approach would provide several options for future research. First, if politicians, or at least their speechwriters, share the perception that SDO is useful to groups engaged in conflicts, the one would expect to find connotations of SDO within speeches made during wars. Indeed, during a speech in the House of Commons in 2011, Tony Blair made a speech urging the House to vote in support of the Iraq war. Within his speech, Blair challenges all those who opposed the war by stating:

“...that at this moment, faced with this threat from this regime, that British troops are pulled back, that we turn away from the point of reckoning...What will Saddam feel? Strengthened beyond measure. Who will celebrate and who will weep, if we take our troops back from the Gulf now?” (UKWestminsterNews, 2011)

Within the speech, Saddam’s regime is described as a threat to Britain which will grow stronger if not stopped. This has clear connotations with dominance. If lay theories are consistent with experimental findings that SDO responds to threat (e.g. Rios Morrison & Ybarra, 2008), then this phrasing may be intentional in order to motivate increased endorsement of ideologies such as SDO which in turn will be thought to motivate support for

the conflict. Research could code speeches which are made throughout the duration of conflicts in order to determine whether there are stronger connotations of dominance concerns when motivating initial support for conflict, embroiled within the conflict and when attempts are made to negotiate resolutions. Furthermore, the perceived likelihood that these speeches will successfully promote support for conflicts could be measured as a further implicit measure of the perceived utility of SDO.

**8.4.2: What are the behavioural consequences?** One area which the research within this thesis did not explore was participants' voting preferences. The literature which was reviewed in Chapter 6 contended that individuals are motivated to find an ideology with which they can identify in order to fulfil epistemic needs such as the needs for knowledge, uncertainty reduction and to acquire meaning to one's life (Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2003). According to Jost (2006), ideologies also fulfil existential needs (i.e. security) and relational needs (i.e. finding similar others to identify with).

Whilst the motivations which draw individuals to political ideology are universal, the orientation of the chosen ideology reflects identification with, or endorsement of, different constructs (Jost, 2006). Empirical evidence has shown that the core and stable differences between left and right wing ideologies concern attitudes towards inequality and apprehension towards change and uncertainty (Jost 2006; Jost et al., 2003). However, right wing ideology has also been positively related to religiosity, closed mindedness and dogmatism (Jost, 2006)

Additionally, in Study 9 participants were asked to consider the consequences of strengthening their political ideologies. Future research should aim to establish whether, for example, imagining strengthening the endorsement of right wing ideologies would promote voting preferences for extreme right parties over Conservative parties in the UK. Given the

recent results of the European elections which demonstrated a surge in support for the UK Independence Party over the Conservative Party, gaining insight into the lay theories which explain this change in voting behaviour would be fruitful.

Furthermore, extending the research by asking participants to consider strengthening or weakening their ideology in favour of the opposite political orientation, and measuring whether voting intentions are strengthened or weakened as a result, would provide interesting insights into whether attitudes towards inequality and the endorsement of ideologies such as SDO are indeed perceived to predict voting preferences. Research by Van Hiel and Mervielde (2002) demonstrated positive correlations between SDO, RWA and voting preferences for Conservative parties. Most of the variance was explained by SDO rather than RWA (Hiel & Mervielde, 2002). In contrast, Sibley and Wilson (2007) researched predictors of voting preferences within New Zealand. The research highlighted that voting was predicted by inequality positioning. Individuals who view inequality as group-based were more likely to vote for left wing parties whereas those who perceived inequality as meritocracy were more inclined to vote for right wing parties. Crucially, regression analysis revealed that the effect of inequality positioning were unique. Personality attributes, such as the endorsement of SDO, did not predict voting preferences. Extending the research into lay theories concerning factors which are perceived to motivate self and other's voting preferences would be advantageous.

**8.4.3: Considering other types of ideology.** Jost (2006) states that the endorsement of religious, scientific and political beliefs depend upon what individuals and their group members want to believe and are able to believe as determined by situational constraints (Kunda, 1990). Furthermore, Jost's contention that the endorsement of ideology is motivated

for the fulfilment of existential, epistemic and relational needs is said to apply to “every belief” (p.655). This begs the question of whether the benefits associated with endorsing a political ideology can be applied to other ideologies, for example religious beliefs.

The endorsement of religious beliefs has been linked to uncertainty reduction, particularly in response to mortality salience as postulated by terror management theory (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Rosenblatt, Veeder et al., 1990; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski & Lyon, 1989; Solomon, Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1991; Vail, Rothschild, Weise, Solomon, Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 2010) and in response to threats upon personal control (Kay et al., 2008; Kay, Moscovitch, & Laurin, 2010). Additionally, Kay, Gaucher, McGregor and Nash (2010) found that when one source of external control (e.g., the government) is threatened, people are likely to look for an alternative source of external control through other ideologies, such as religious beliefs (see Rutjens, van Harreveld, & van der Pligt, 2013 for a review).

In addition to reducing anxiety and uncertainty, and offering another similarity between political and religious ideologies, Silberman (2005) identifies religion as a system of meaning. Similarly to political ideology, the endorsement of a religious belief fulfils people’s needs to derive meaning from and justify subsequent events (Silberman, 2005). Furthermore, Unger (2007) presents evidence that religiosity was a variable which predicted voting preferences in the 2004 US Presidential election. The implication of this finding is that systems of meaning including religious and political ideologies likely hold the same epistemic, existential and relational benefits for individuals. Furthermore, these findings suggest that when one system of meaning is threatened, people compensate by increasing their endorsement of an alternative ideology (Kay, Gaucher, McGregor, & Nash, 2010).

The benefits associated with political and religious beliefs have also been attributed to the endorsement of scientific theories (Rutjens, van Harreveld, & van der Pligt, 2013). In earlier studies, Rutjens, van der Pligt and van Harreveld (2010) provided experimental evidence that when people's sense of control is threatened, they favour religious explanations for events which describe an external agent (religious figure) as being in control. In this example, when reminded that people do not always have control over external events, participants favoured a religious account for life and creation over evolutionary accounts which stressed that natural selection had a component of randomness and chance. However, when evolutionary accounts were described as more orderly, with inevitable and predictable outcomes, participants did not differ in their preference for scientific (evolutionary) or religious theories. According to Rutjens et al. (2010), their results are consistent with Kay et al.'s (2008) contention that when threatened by a sense of loss of control, people compensate by endorsing ideologies or theories which offer an alternative, external source of control, more strongly.

More recently, the contention that scientific theories offer an additional system of meaning was supported by Rutjens, van Harreveld, van der Pligt, Kreemers and Noordewier's (2013) findings. In five studies, Rutjens et al. (2013) threatened participant's feelings of control and measured preferences for stage versus continuum theories. Continuum theories describe processes as 'gradual transitions' without a clear structure. As a result, they have a component of randomness. In contrast, stage theories describe processes as chronological, orderly and predictable phases (Rutjens et al.). Rutjens et al. found that participants favoured stage theories of grief, moral development and disease progression over continuum theories. Furthermore, participants rated stage theories (compared to continuum theories) as offering a greater sense of control. Crucially, stage theories were favoured even in the context of disease progression, such as describing the progression of Alzheimer's disease, which Rutjens et al. assert strengthens the validity of their findings. Participants did

not just favour stage theories which concerned positive outcomes. The greater sense of control and order within stage theories was preferable even when describing an inevitably negative outcome. The implication of these findings is that feelings of control are desirable in a variety of different contexts, and are promoted through ideologies such as political, religious, or scientific ideologies. Future research should aim to establish whether lay theories that endorsing a political ideology irrespective of orientation promotes wellbeing can be extended to other types of systems of meaning, such as religious beliefs and scientific theories.

Furthermore, future research should be carried out to confirm that endorsement of systems of meaning fulfil needs beyond those that can be satisfied by any attitude. It is likely that endorsing a political ideology or religious belief promotes wellbeing beyond what could be achieved from holding a preference for cats compared to dogs, for example. While all attitudes fulfil needs pertaining to certainty, one can contend that these more basic attitudes would not fulfil epistemic and existential needs to the same degree as systems of meaning such as political and religious beliefs.

This contention can be supported by drawing on models of meaning maintenance (Heine et al., 2006) and shared reality theory (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). Both theories postulate that people are motivated to give meaning to every day events in order to reduce uncertainty, enhance feelings of control and a sense of being able to predict future events. Furthermore, shared reality theory postulates that when systems of meaning are shared, relational needs are fulfilled along with epistemic and existential needs. In discussing shared reality theory, Jost, Ledgerwood and Hardin (2007) highlight that well-formed ideologies are best suited to fulfil epistemic, existential and relational needs. Jost et al. state,



To the extent that political and religious ideologies are sets of interrelated beliefs and attitudes that can provide many different individuals with the same ‘lenses’ through which to view the world and thereby communicate with each other, they should be especially useful for building and maintaining a sense of shared reality. Ideologies, in other words, may function as ‘pre-packaged’ units of interpretation that are useful for regulating interpersonal relationships and navigating social and political life (p. 5).

Jost et al.’s (2009) paper is also consistent with the contention that ideologies offer unique psychological benefits. Jost et al. offer several definitions of ideology. First, Jost et al. (p. 309) provide a definition by Parsons (1951),

“...ideologies are the shared framework of mental models that groups of individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how that environment should be structured”

Jost et al. provide a second definition of ideology from (Converse, 1964) which characterises ideology as,

“...any configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence” (p. 309).

Finally, Jost et al. (p. 309) provide a more recent definition by Erikson and Tedin (2003), who characterise political ideology as, “*a set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved*”. These quotes demonstrate that ideology is a sophisticated construct which fulfils epistemic, existential and relational needs beyond what could be achieved by a simpler attitude.

Taken together, models of meaning maintenance, shared reality theory and Jost et al.'s (2009) contentions are consistent with the idea that ideologies such as religious and political beliefs should be perceived to offer psychological benefits beyond what can be fulfilled from more basic attitude formation. Nonetheless, future research should aim to establish whether lay individuals recognise the fundamental and unique characteristics of an ideology and are able to discern that ideologies provide unique and important psychological benefits.

### **8.5: Concluding thoughts**

The research within this thesis has contributed to the knowledge of the functions, and perceived functions, of ideology within intergroup, intragroup and individual contexts. While it is not my contention that ideologies such as SDO can wholly account for why some conflicts become intractable, the research within this thesis has provided evidence that they do indeed play a contributory factor in motivating investment in conflicts. The findings within this thesis are therefore consistent with Deutsch and Coleman's (2002) contention that ideology plays a role in the formation of intractable conflicts. Within societies, right wing ideologies are perceived as promoting negative consequences such as inequality and reducing social cohesion.

It is tempting therefore, to cast right wing ideologies such as SDO in a negative light. However, once embroiled in conflict, ideologies which motivate support and financial investment for one's ingroup, which in turn are likely to promote success within the conflict can be evaluated as serving beneficial functions. It is also important to consider that these findings have been obtained within the context of Western, individualistic cultures which are high in inequality. Research has already demonstrated that ideological beliefs, such as system

legitimation, differ in content depending upon factors such as levels of inequality (Brandt & Reyna, 2012). Additionally, the conflicts depicted within this thesis have depicted competition for resources. Given the established effect of SDO responding to threat (Rios Morrison & Ybarra, 2008) and competition (Dru, 2007), these conflicts were likely to promote the endorsement of SDO. However, conflicts which are fought for other reasons, for example based upon a conflict between religious beliefs, may involve different ideologies such as RWA, which has been shown to respond to threats to the norms and values of one's ingroup (Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007, 2010).

In addition to exploring the perceived functions of right wing ideologies, lay theories surrounding the utility of left wing ideologies were also explored. Participants perceived that both left and right wing political ideologies fulfil both hedonic and eudaimonic aspects of wellbeing such as increasing positive affect, self-esteem, feelings of belonging, mastery and certainty. Participants were also able to recognise differentiating aspects of left and right wing ideologies. For example, participants perceived that conservatism would promote just world beliefs whereas left wing ideology would promote justice concerns for others. Taken together, these findings suggest that lay people have an appreciation of the crucial role political ideologies play in preserving epistemic, existential and relational needs for which, as Jost (2006) argues, there is a universal motivation to fulfil.

Arguably, the most important finding from the research carried out within this thesis is that individuals have shared, detailed, and largely accurate ideas about the functions of ideology. Many of the findings reported within this thesis show clear parallels between the content of lay theories and theories constructed using social and political psychological research. The findings from Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 demonstrate accurate perceptions of the functions of ideology, and knowledge of when it makes strategic sense to endorse ideologies. Despite the fact that arguably there are many factors which contribute to people's ideological

choices, the fact that there is consistency with content from empirical research suggests that individuals are able to make educated decisions about the ideologies they chose to endorse. As a result, this doctoral research supports a theory of motivated social cognition in explaining individuals' endorsement of political ideologies.

## REFERENCES

- Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). *The authoritarian personality*. Oxford, England: Harpers.
- Ajzen, I. (1988). *Attitudes, personality and behavior*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (1980). *Understanding attitudes and predicting social behavior*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- Allport, G.W. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Altemeyer, B. (1996). *The authoritarian specter*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Altemeyer, B. (1981). *Right-wing authoritarianism*. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press.
- Amodio, D. M., Jost, J. T., Master, S. L., & Yee, C. M. (2007). Neurocognitive correlates of liberalism and conservatism. *Nature Neuroscience*, *10*, 1246-1247.
- Andreoni, J., & Miller, J. H. (1993). Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma: Experimental evidence. *The Economic Journal*, *103*, 570-585.
- Armitage, C. J., & Conner, M. (2001). Efficacy of the theory of planned behavior: A meta-analytic review. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *40*, 471-499.
- Argyle, M. (1994). *The psychology of interpersonal behaviour*. London, England: Penguin UK.

- Asbrock, F., Nieuwoudt, C., Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. (2011). Societal stereotypes and the legitimation of intergroup behavior in Germany and New Zealand. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 11*, 154-179.
- Bar-Tal, D. (2007). Sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts. *American Behavioral Scientist, 50*(11), 1430-1453.
- Bar-Tal, D. (2009). Reconciliation as a foundation of culture of peace. In J. de Rivera (Ed.), *Handbook on building cultures of peace* (pp. 363-377). New York: Springer New York.
- Batalha, L., Reynolds, K. J., & Newbigin, C. A. (2011). All else being equal: Are men always higher in social dominance orientation than women? *European Journal of Social Psychology, 41*, 796-806.
- Baumeister, R. F., & Jones, E. E. (1978). When self-presentation is constrained by the target's knowledge: Consistency and compensation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36*(6), 608-618.
- Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., DeWall, C. N., & Zhang, L. (2007). How emotion shapes behavior: Feedback, anticipation, and reflection, rather than direct causation. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11*(2), 167-203.
- Beauvois, J., & Dubois, N. (1988). The norm of internality in the explanation of psychological events. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 18*(4), 299-316.
- Bell, N. E., & Tetlock, P. E. (1989). The intuitive politician and the assignment of blame in organizations. In R. A. Cialalone & P. Rosenfeld (Eds.), *Impression management in the organization* (pp. 105-123). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

- Benabou, R., & Ok, E. A. (2001). *Mobility as progressivity: Ranking income processes according to equality of opportunity* (No. w8431). National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Berry, D. S. (1990). Taking people at face value: Evidence for the kernel of truth hypothesis. *Social Cognition*, 8(4), 343-361.
- Bobo, L. (1988). Group conflict, prejudice, and the paradox of contemporary racial attitudes. In P.A. Katz & D. A. Taylor (Eds.), *Eliminating racism* (pp. 85-114). New York: Springer US.
- Bobo, L. (2000). Race and beliefs about affirmative action: Assessing the effects of interests, group threat, ideology and racism. In D. O. Sears, J. Sidanius, & L. Bobo (Eds.), *Racialized politics: The debate about racism in America* (pp. 137-164). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Brandt, M. J. (2013). Do the disadvantaged legitimize the social system? A large-scale test of the status-legitimacy hypothesis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 104(5), 765-785.
- Brandt, M. J., & Reyna, C. (2012). The functions of symbolic racism. *Social Justice Research*, 25(1), 41-60.
- Brewer, M. B. (1979). In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive-motivational analysis. *Psychological Bulletin*, 86(2), 307-324.
- Brewer, M. B. (1999). The psychology of prejudice: Ingroup love or outgroup hate? *Journal of Social Issues*, 55(3), 429-444.

- Cameron, D. (2012, June 25). *Prime Minister's speech on welfare*. Retrieved 09<sup>th</sup> May 2014 from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/9354163/David-Camerons-welfare-speech-in-full.html>
- Campbell, D. T. (1965). Ethnocentric and other altruistic motives. In R. Levine (Ed.), *Nebraska symposium on motivation* (pp. 283–311). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.
- Camus, A. (1955). An absurd reasoning. *The Myth of Sisyphus and other essays*, 3-49.
- Camus, A. (1960). *The Plague*. (S. Gilbert, Trans). London, New York: Penguin. (Original work published 1947).
- Chang, L., Lu, H. J., Li, H., & Li, T. (2011). The face that launched a thousand ships: The mating-warring association in men. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 37(7), 976-984.
- Cheng, P. W., & Novick, L. R. (1990). A probabilistic contrast model of causal induction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 58, 545-567.
- Christopher, A. N., Zabel, K. L., Jones, J. R., & Marek, P. (2008). Protestant ethic ideology: Its multifaceted relationships with just world beliefs, social dominance orientation, and right-wing authoritarianism. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 45(6), 473-477.
- Choma, B. L., Busseri, M. A., & Sadava, S. W. (2009). Liberal and conservative political ideologies: Different routes to happiness? *Journal of Research in Personality*, 43(3), 502-505.



- Choma, B. L., Hafer, C. L., Dywan, J., Segalowitz, S. J., & Busseri, J. (2012). Political liberalism and political conservatism: Functionally independent? *Personality and Individual Differences, 53*, 431-436.
- Churchland, P. M. (1991). Folk psychology and the explanation of human behavior. In J. Greenwood (Ed.), *The future of folk psychology*. (pp. 51-69). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Cohrs, J. C. (2013). Threat and authoritarianism: Some theoretical and methodological comments. *International Journal of Psychology, 48*, 50-54.
- Cohrs, J. C. and Asbrock, F. (2009), Right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and prejudice against threatening and competitive ethnic groups. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 39*, 270–289.
- Converse, P. E. (1964). The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In D. Apter. (Ed.), *Ideology and discontent* (pp. 206-61). New York: Free Press.
- Corbetta, P., Cavazza, N., & Roccato, M. (2009). Between ideology and social representations: Four theses plus (a new) one on the relevance and the meaning of the political left and right. *European Journal of Political Research, 48*(5), 622-641.
- Costa Jr, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1992). Reply to Ben-Porath and Waller. *Psychological Assessment, 4*(1), 20-22.
- Crandall, C. S. (1994). Prejudice against fat people: Ideology and self-interest. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66*(5), 882-894.

- Crowson, H. M. (2009). Nationalism, internationalism, and perceived UN irrelevance: Mediators of relationships between authoritarianism and support for military aggression as part of the War on Terror. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 39*, 1137-1162.
- Dalbert, C. (2002). Beliefs in a just world as a buffer against anger. *Social Justice Research, 15*(2), 123-145.
- Dalbert, C., Lipkus, I. M., Sallay, H., & Goch, I. (2001). A just and an unjust world: Structure and validity of different world beliefs. *Personality and Individual Differences, 30*, 561–577.
- Dambrun, M., Guimond, S., & Duarte, S. (2002). The impact of hierarchy-enhancing vs. attenuating academic major on stereotyping: The mediating role of perceived social norm. *Current Research in Social Psychology, 7*(8), 114-136.
- Dar, Y., & Resh, N. (2001). Exploring the multifaceted structure of sense of deprivation. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 31*, 63–81.
- Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. *Annual Review of Psychology, 31*(1), 169-193.
- Deutsch, M., & Coleman, P. T. (2000). *The handbook of conflict resolution; Theory and practice*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Diener, E. (1984). Subjective well-being. *Psychological Bulletin, 95*, 542-575.
- Diener, E., Sapyta, J. J., & Suh, E. (1998). Subjective well-being is essential to well-being. *Psychological Inquiry, 9*(1), 33-37.
- Dollard, J., Miller, N. E., Doob, L. W., Mowrer, O. H., & Sears, R. R. (1939). *Frustration and Aggression*. New Haven, CT US: Yale University Press.

- Dollinger, S. J. (2007). Creativity and conservatism. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 43(5), 1025-1035.
- Dru, V. (2007). Authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and prejudice: Effects of various self-categorization conditions. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 43(6), 877-883.
- Dubois, N., & Beauvois, J. L. (2008). The social value of internal explanations and the norm of internality. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 2(4), 1737-1752.
- Duckitt, J. (1989). Authoritarianism and group identification: A new view of an old construct. *Political Psychology*, 10, 63-84.
- Duckitt, J. (2001). A dual-process cognitive-motivational theory of ideology and prejudice. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 33, pp. 41–113). New York: Academic Press.
- Duckitt, J. (2006). Differential effects of right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation on outgroup attitudes and their mediation by threat from and competitiveness to outgroups. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 32(5), 684-696.
- Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2007). Right wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and the dimensions of generalized prejudice. *European Journal of Personality*, 21(2), 113-130.
- Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2010a). Personality, ideology, prejudice, and politics: A dual-process motivational model. *Journal of Personality*, 78(6), 1861-1894.

- Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2010b). Right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation differentially moderate intergroup effects on prejudice. *European Journal of Personality, 24*(7), 583-601.
- Duckitt, J. & Sibley, C. G. (2014). Personality, ideological attitudes, and group identity as predictors of political behavior in majority and minority ethnic groups. *Political Psychology*. Published online July 2nd 2014. Available at: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.12222/abstract?deniedAccessCustomise dMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false>
- Duckitt, J., Wagner, C., du Plessis, I., & Birum, I. (2002). The psychological bases of ideology and prejudice: Testing a dual process model. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83*(1), 75-93.
- Durkheim, E. (1974). *Sociology and philosophy*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Eid, M., & Larsen, R. J. (2008). *The science of subjective wellbeing*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Erikson, R. S., & Tedin, K. L. (2003). *American Public Opinion*. New York: Longman.
- Esses, V. M., Dovidio, J. F., Jackson, L. M., & Armstrong, T. L. (2001). The immigration dilemma: The role of perceived group competition, ethnic prejudice, and national identity. *Journal of Social Issues, 57*(3), 389-412.
- Farwell, L., & Weiner, B. (1996). Self-perceptions of fairness in individual and group contexts. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22*(9), 868-881.

- Farwell, L., & Weiner, B. (2000). Bleeding hearts and the heartless: Popular perceptions of liberal and conservative ideologies. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 26(7), 845-852.
- Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. *Human Relations*, 7(2), 117-140.
- Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1974). Attitudes towards objects as predictors of single and multiple behavior criteria. *Psychological Review*, 81, 59-74.
- Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). *Belief, attitude, intention and behavior: An introduction to theory and research*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Fishbein, M., Ajzen, I., & Hinkle, R. (1980). Predicting and understanding voting in American elections: Effects of external variables. In I. Azjen & M. Fishbein (Eds.), *Understanding attitudes and predicting social behavior* (pp. 173-195). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1984). *Social Cognition*. Reading: MA, Addison-Wesley.
- Fletcher, G. (1995). *The scientific credibility of folk psychology*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Förster, J., Liberman, N., & Friedman, R. S. (2007). Seven principles of goal activation: A systematic approach to distinguishing goal priming from priming of non-goal constructs. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 11(3), 211-233.
- Forsterling, F. (1989). Models of covariation and attribution: How do they relate to the analogy of analysis of variance? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 57, 615-625.

- Furnham, A. (1987). Predicting Protestant work ethic beliefs. *European Journal of Personality*, 1(2), 93-106.
- Furnham, A., & Gunter, B. (1984). Just world beliefs and attitudes towards the poor. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 23(3), 265-269.
- Gilbert, D. T., & Ebert, J. E. J. (2002). Decisions and revisions: The affective forecasting of changeable outcomes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 82(4), 503-514.
- Golec de Zavala, A., Cichocka, A., Eidelson, R., & Jayawickreme, N. (2009). Collective narcissism and its social consequences. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 97, 1074-1096.
- Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 96(5), 1029-1046.
- Greenberg, J., & Jonas, E. (2003). Psychological motives and political orientation--the left, the right, and the rigid: comment on Jost et al. (2003). *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol 129(3), 376-382.
- Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Rosenblatt, A., Veeder, M., Kirkland, S., & Lyon, D. (1990). Evidence for terror management theory II: The effects of mortality salience on reactions to those who threaten or bolster the cultural worldview. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 58(2), 308-318.
- Guimond, S. (2000). Group socialization and prejudice: The social transmission of intergroup attitudes and beliefs. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 30(3), 335-354.

- Guimond, S., Dambrun, M., Michinov, N., & Duarte, S. (2003). Does social dominance generate prejudice? Integrating individual and contextual determinants of intergroup cognitions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84*, 697–721.
- Gunia, B. C., Sivanathan, N., & Galinsky, A. D. (2009). Vicarious entrapment: Your sunk costs, my escalation of commitment. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45*(6), 1238-1244.
- Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2007). When morality opposes justice: Conservatives have moral intuitions that liberals may not recognize. *Social Justice Research, 20*(1), 98-116.
- Haidt, J., Graham, J., & Joseph, C. (2009). Above and below left–right: Ideological narratives and moral foundations. *Psychological Inquiry, 20*(2-3), 110-119.
- Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2004). Intuitive ethics: How innately prepared intuitions generate culturally variable virtues. *Daedalus, 133*(4), 55-66.
- Halevy, N., Bornstein, G., & Sagiv, L. (2008). “In-Group Love” and “Out-Group Hate” as motives for individual participation in intergroup conflict: A new game paradigm. *Psychological Science, 19*(4), 405-411.
- Hardin, C. D., & Conley, T. D. (2001). A relational approach to cognition: Shared experience and relationship affirmation in social cognition. In G. B. Moskowitz (Ed.), *Cognitive Social Psychology: The Princeton Symposium on the Legacy and Future of Social Cognition* (pp. 3-17). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Hardin, C. D., & Higgins, E. T. (1996). Shared reality: How social verification makes the subjective objective. In E. T. Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), *Handbook of*

*Motivation and Cognition: The Interpersonal Context* (Vol. 3, pp. 28–84). New York: Guilford Press.

Haslam, C., Holme, A., Haslam, S. A., Iyer, A., Jetten, J., & Williams, W. H. (2008). Maintaining group memberships: Social identity continuity predicts well-being after stroke. *Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 18*(5-6), 671-691.

Hayes, A. F. (2013). *An introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis*. New York: The Guilford Press.

Heaven, P. C. L., Organ, L., Supavadeeprasit, S., & Leeson, P. (2006). War and prejudice: A study of social values, right-wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation. *Personality and Individual Differences, 40*, 599-608.

Heider, F. (1958). *The psychology of interpersonal relations*. New York: Wiley.

Heine, S. J., Proulx, T., & Vohs, K. D. (2006). The meaning maintenance model: On the coherence of social motivations. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10*(2), 88-110.

Henry, P. J., Sidanius, J., Levin, S., & Pratto, F. (2005). Social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, and support for intergroup violence between the Middle East and America. *Political Psychology, 26*(4), 569-583.

Higgins, E. T. (1997). Beyond pleasure and pain. *American Psychologist, 52*(12), 1280 -1300.

Ho, A. K., Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., Levin, S., Thomsen, L., Kteily, N., & Sheehy-Skeffington, J. (2012). Social Dominance Orientation: Revisiting the structure and function of a variable



- predicting social and political attitudes. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 38(5), 583-606.
- Hogg, M. A. (2007). Uncertainty–identity theory. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 39, 69-126.
- Hogg, M. A., Hohman, Z. P., & Rivera, J. E. (2008). Why do people join groups? Three motivational accounts from social psychology. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 2(3), 1269-1280.
- Hogg, M. A., Sherman, D. K., Dierselhuis, J., Maitner, A. T., & Moffitt, G. (2007). Uncertainty, entitativity, and group identification. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 43(1), 135-142.
- Hong, Y., Levy, S. R., & Chiu, C. (2001). The contribution of the lay theories approach to the study of groups. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 5, 98–106.
- Huddy, L. (2004). Contrasting theoretical approaches to intergroup relations. *Political Psychology*, 25(6), 947-968.
- Huseman, R.C., Hatfield, J.D., & Miles, E.W. (1987). A new perspective on equity theory: The equity sensitivity construct. *Academy of Management Review*, 12, 222–234.
- Insko, C. A., Schopler, J., Drigotas, S. M., & Graetz, K. A. (1993). The role of communication in interindividual-intergroup discontinuity. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37(1), 108-138.

- Insko, C. A., Schopler, J., Graetz, K. A., Drigotas, S. M., Currey, D. P., Smith, S. L., ... & Bornstein, G. (1994). Interindividual-intergroup discontinuity in the prisoner's dilemma game. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *38*(1), 87-116.
- Iyer, A., Jetten, J., Tsivrikos, D., Postmes, T., & Haslam, S. A. (2009). The more (and the more compatible) the merrier: Multiple group memberships and identity compatibility as predictors of adjustment after life transitions. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *48*(4), 707-733.
- Jackson, L. M., & Esses, V. M. (2000). Effects of perceived economic competition on people's willingness to help empower immigrants. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *3*(4), 419-435.
- Jackson, L. E., & Gaertner, L. (2010). Mechanisms of moral disengagement and their differential use by right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation in support of war. *Aggressive Behavior*, *36*(4), 238-250.
- Jellison, J., & Arkin, R. (1977). Social comparison of abilities: A self-presentation approach to decision making in groups. In J. M. Suls and R. L. Miller (Eds.), *Social comparison processes: Theoretical and empirical perspectives* (pp. 235-57). Washington: Hemisphere Press.
- Jellison, J. M., & Green, J. (1981). A self-presentation approach to the fundamental attribution error: The norm of internality. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *40*(4), 643-649.
- Jetten, J., Haslam, S. A., & Barlow, F. K. (2013). Bringing back the system one reason why conservatives are happier than liberals is that higher socioeconomic status gives them

access to more group memberships. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 4(1), 6-13.

Jetten, J., Haslam, C., & Haslam, S.A. (Eds.). (2012). *The social cure: Identity, health and well-being*. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.

Jetten, J., & Iyer, A. (2010). Different meanings of the social dominance orientation concept: Predicting political attitudes over time. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 49(2), 385-404.

Jetten, J., Postmes, T., & McAuliffe, B. J. (2002). 'We're all individuals': group norms of individualism and collectivism, levels of identification and identity threat. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 32(2), 189-207.

Jones, E. E. (1979). The rocky road from acts to dispositions. *American Psychologist*, 34(2), 107-117.

Jones, E.E. & Davis, K.E. (1965). From acts to dispositions: the attribution process in person perception. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 2, pp. 219-266). New York: Academic Press.

Jones, E. E., & Harris, V. A. (1967). The attribution of attitudes. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 3(1), 1-24.

Jost, J. T. (2006). The end of the end of ideology. *American Psychologist*, 61(7), 651-670.

Jost, J. T., & Amodio, D. M. (2012). Political ideology as motivated social cognition: Behavioural and neuroscientific evidence. *Motivation and Emotion*, 36, 55-64.

- Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M. R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the production of false consciousness. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 33*(1), 1-27.
- Jost, J. T., Banaji, M. R., & Nosek, B. A. (2004). A decade of system justification theory: Accumulated evidence of conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo. *Political Psychology, 25*(6), 881-919.
- Jost, J. T., & Burgess, D. (2000). Attitudinal ambivalence and the conflict between group and system justification motives in low status groups. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26*(3), 293-305.
- Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M., & Napier, J. L. (2009). Political ideology: Its structure, functions, and elective affinities. *Annual Review of Psychology, 60*, 307-337.
- Jost, J., & Hunyady, O. (2003). The psychology of system justification and the palliative function of ideology. *European Review of Social Psychology, 13*(1), 111-153.
- Jost, J. T., & Hunyady, O. (2005). Antecedents and consequences of system-justifying ideologies. *Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14*(5), 260-265.
- Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. *Psychological Bulletin, 129*(3), 339-375.
- Jost, J. T., Ledgerwood, A., & Hardin, C. D. (2007). Shared reality, system justification, and the relational basis of ideological beliefs. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2*, 171-186.

- Jost, J. T., Napier, J. L., Thorisdottir, H., Gosling, S. D., Palfai, T. P., & Ostafin, B. (2007). Are needs to manage uncertainty and threat associated with political conservatism or ideological extremity? *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 33(7), 989-1007.
- Jost, J. T., Pelham, B. W., Sheldon, O., & Ni Sullivan, B. (2003). Social inequality and the reduction of ideological dissonance on behalf of the system: Evidence of enhanced system justification among the disadvantaged. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 33(1), 13-36.
- Jost, J. T., & Thompson, E. P. (2000). Group-based dominance and opposition to equality as independent predictors of self-esteem, ethnocentrism, and social policy attitudes among African Americans and European Americans. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 36(3), 209-232.
- Kagan, J. (1972). Motives and development. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 22, 51-66.
- Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society*, 263-291.
- Katz, I., & Hass, R. G. (1988). Racial ambivalence and American value conflict: Correlational and priming studies of dual cognitive structures. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 55(6), 893-905.
- Kay, A. C., Gaucher, D., McGregor, I., & Nash, K. (2010). Religious belief as compensatory control. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 14, 37-48.

- Kay, A. C., Gaucher, D., Napier, J. L., Callan, M. J., & Laurin, K. (2008). God and the government: Testing a compensatory control mechanism for the support of external systems. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95*, 18–35.
- Kay, A. C., & Jost, J. T. (2003). Complementary justice: effects of "poor but happy" and "poor but honest" stereotype exemplars on system justification and implicit activation of the justice motive. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85*(5), 823-837.
- Kay, A. C., Moscovitch, D. A., & Laurin, K. (2010). Randomness, attributions of arousal, and belief in God. *Psychological Science, 21*, 216–218.
- Keister, L.A., 2005. *Getting Rich: America's new rich and how they got that way*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kelley, H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. L. Vine (Ed.), *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation*. (pp. 192-238). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Kramer, R. M. (1999). Trust and distrust in organizations: Emerging perspectives, enduring questions. *Annual Review of Psychology, 50*(1), 569-598.
- Kreindler, S. A. (2005). A dual group processes model of individual differences in prejudice. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 9*(2), 90-107.
- Kruglanski, A. W. (1989). *Lay epistemics and human knowledge: Cognitive and motivational basis*. New York: Plenum.
- Kruglanski, A. W. (1996). Motivated social cognition: Principles of the interface. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), *Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles* (pp. 493-520). New York: Guilford Press.

- Kruglanski, A. W. (1999). Motivation, cognition, and reality: Three memos for the next generation of research. *Psychological Inquiry*, 10, 54–58.
- Kruglanski, A. W., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., & De Grada, E. (2006). Groups as epistemic providers: need for closure and the unfolding of group-centrism. *Psychological Review*, 113(1), 84-100.
- Kteily, N., Ho, A. K., & Sidanius, J. (2012). Hierarchy in the mind: The predictive power of social dominance orientation across social contexts and domains. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 48(2), 543-549.
- Kteily, N. S., Sidanius, J., & Levin, S. (2011). Social dominance orientation: Cause or ‘mere effect’?: Evidence for SDO as a causal predictor of prejudice and discrimination against ethnic and racial outgroups. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 47(1), 208-214.
- Kugler M. B., Cooper J., Nosek B. A. (2010). Group-based dominance and opposition to equality correspond to different psychological motives. *Social Justice Research*, 23, 117-155.
- Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. *Psychological Bulletin*, 108(3), 480-498.
- Lee, I, Pratto, F., & Johnson, B. T. (2011). Intergroup consensus/disagreement in support of group based hierarchy: An examination of social-structural and psycho-cultural factors. *Psychological Bulletin*, 137, 1029-1064.
- Lehmiller, J. J., & Schmitt, M. T. (2007). Group domination and inequality in context: Evidence for the unstable meanings of social dominance and authoritarianism. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 37(4), 704-724.

- Lemyre, L., & Smith, P. M. (1985). Intergroup discrimination and self-esteem in the minimal group paradigm. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 49(3), 660 -670.
- Lerner, M. J. (1965). Evaluation of performance as a function of performer's reward and attractiveness. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1, 355-360.
- Lerner, M. J. (1970). The desire for justice and reactions to victims. In J. Macaulay & L. Berkowitz (Eds.), *Altruism and helping behaviour* (p. 205-229). New York: Academic Press.
- Lerner, M. (1980). *The belief in a just world: The fundamental illusion*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Levin, S. (2004). Perceived group status differences and the effects of gender, ethnicity, and religion on social dominance orientation. *Political Psychology*, 25(1), 31-48.
- Levin, S., Federico, C. M., Sidanius, J., & Rabinowitz, J. L. (2002). Social dominance orientation and intergroup bias: The legitimization of favoritism for high-status groups. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 28, 144-157.
- Levin, S., & Sidanius, J. (1999). Social dominance and social identity in the united states and Israel: Ingroup favoritism or outgroup derogation? *Political Psychology*, 20(1), 99-126.
- Levin, S., Sidanius, J., Rabinowitz, J. L., & Federico, C. (1998). Ethnic identity, legitimizing ideologies, and social status: A matter of ideological asymmetry. *Political Psychology*, 19(2), 373-404.
- LeVine, R. A., & Campbell, D. T. (1972). *Ethnocentrism: Theories of conflict, ethnic attitudes, and group behavior*. Oxford England: John Wiley & Sons.



- Levy, S. R., Chiu, C. Y., & Hong, Y. Y. (2006). Lay theories and intergroup relations. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 9(1), 5-24.
- Levy, S. R., West, T. L., Ramirez, L., & Karafantis, D. M. (2006). The Protestant work ethic: A lay theory with dual intergroup implications. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 9(1), 95-115.
- Lickel, B., Hamilton, D. L., Wierzchowska, G., Lewis, A., Sherman, S. J., & Uhles, A. N. (2000). Varieties of groups and the perception of group entitativity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 78, 223-246.
- Lipkus, I. (1991). The construction and preliminary validation of a global belief in a just world scale and the exploratory analysis of the multidimensional belief in a just world. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 12(11), 1171-1178.
- Liu, J. H., Hanke, K., Fischer, R., Huang, L., Adams, G., Wang, F., . . . Lonner, W. J. (2009). In-group favoritism in international justice concerns: Power, involvement, and attitudes toward the Iraq war and the cross straits relationship in five societies. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 31(2), 148-159.
- Liu, J. H., Huang, L., & McFedries, C. (2008). Cross-sectional and longitudinal differences in social dominance orientation and right wing authoritarianism as a function of political power and societal change. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 11(2), 116-126.
- Lovas, L., & Wolt, R. (2002). Sensitivity to injustice in the context of some personality traits. *Studia Psychologica*, 44, 125-131.

- MacInnis, C. C., Busseri, M. A., Choma, B. L., & Hodson, G. (2013). The happy cyclist: Examining the association between generalized authoritarianism and subjective well-being. *Personality and Individual Differences, 55*(7), 789-793.
- Malle, B. F. (2004). *How the mind explains behavior: Folk explanations, meaning, and social interaction*. US: MIT Press.
- Malle, B. F., & Knobe, J. (1997). The folk concept of intentionality. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33*, 101-121.
- McFarland, S. G. (2005). On the Eve of War: Authoritarianism, Social Dominance, and American students' attitudes toward attacking Iraq. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31*, 360-367.
- McFarland, S. G., & Adelson, S. (1996). An omnibus study of personality, values, and prejudice. In *Annual Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Vancouver, Canada*.
- McFarland, S. G., Ageyev, V. S., & Abalakina-Paap, M. A. (1992). Authoritarianism in the former Soviet Union. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63*(6), 1004-1040.
- Merrick, J. (2013, July 21). *Government's welfare benefits and tax changes amount to 'speeded-up Thatcherism'*. Retrieved 09<sup>th</sup> May 2014 from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/governments-welfare-benefits-and-tax-changes-amount-to-speededup-thatcherism-8723079.html>
- Messick, D. M., & Mackie, D. M. (1989). Intergroup relations. *Annual Review of Psychology, 40*:45-81.

- Milanovic, B. (2002). True world income distribution, 1988 and 1993: First calculation based on household surveys alone. *The Economic Journal*, *112*(476), 51-92.
- Molden, D. C., & Dweck, C. S. (2006). Finding "meaning" in psychology: a lay theories approach to self-regulation, social perception, and social development. *American Psychologist*, *61*(3), 192-203.
- Morrison, K. R., Fast, N. J., & Ybarra, O. (2009). Group status, perceptions of threat, and support for social inequality. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *45*(1), 204-210.
- Morrison, K. R., & Ybarra, O. (2008). The effects of realistic threat and group identification on social dominance orientation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *44*(1), 156-163.
- Moscovici, S. (1963). Attitudes and opinions. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *14*(1), 231-260.
- Mulder, L. B., Van Dijk, E., De Cremer, D., & Wilke, H. A. (2006). Undermining trust and cooperation: The paradox of sanctioning systems in social dilemmas. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *42*(2), 147-162.
- Muller, J. Z. (2001). Conservatism: Historical aspects. In N. J. Smelser & B. Baltes (Eds.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 2624–2628.
- Napier, J. L., & Jost, J. T. (2008). Why are conservatives happier than liberals? *Psychological Science*, *19*(6), 565-572.
- Norton, M. I., & Ariely, D. (2011). Building a better America—One wealth quintile at a time. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, *6*(1), 9-12.

- Nosek, B. A., Banaji, M., & Greenwald, A. G. (2002). Harvesting implicit group attitudes and beliefs from a demonstration web site. *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice*, 6(1), 101- 115.
- Nowicki, D. (2013, March 17). *Ten years later, many see Iraq war as a costly mistake*. Retrieved 09<sup>th</sup> May 2014 from:[http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/03/17/iraq-war-10-years-later/1993431/?utm\\_medium=referral&utm\\_source=t.com](http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/03/17/iraq-war-10-years-later/1993431/?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=t.com)
- O'Brien, L. T., & Major, B. (2005). System-justifying beliefs and psychological well-being: The roles of group status and identity. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 31(12), 1718-1729.
- Oldmeadow, J., & Fiske, S. T. (2007). System-justifying ideologies moderate status= competence stereotypes: Roles for belief in a just world and social dominance orientation. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 37(6), 1135-1148.
- Onraet, E., Van Hiel, A., & Dhont, K. (2013). The relationship between right-wing ideological attitudes and psychological well-being. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 39(4), 509-522.
- Opatow, S. (1990). Moral exclusion and injustice: An introduction. *Journal of Social Issues*, 46(1), 1-20.
- Opatow, S. (1995). Drawing the line: Social categorization, moral exclusion, and the scope of justice. In B. B. Bunker & J. Z. Rubin (Eds.), *Conflict, cooperation, and justice: Essays inspired by the work of Morton Deutsch* (pp. 347-369). San Francisco, CA US: Jossey-Bass.

- Orvis, B. R., Cunningham, J. D., & Kelley, H. H. (1975). A closer examination of causal inference: The roles of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32*(4), 605-616.
- Otten, S., & Moskowitz, G. B. (2000). Evidence for implicit evaluative in-group bias: Affect-biased spontaneous trait inference in a minimal group paradigm. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 36*(1), 77-89.
- Parks, C. D., Henager, R. F., & Scamahorn, S. D. (1996). Trust and reactions to messages of intent in social dilemmas. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40*(1), 134-151.
- Parsons, T. (1951). *The Social System*. New York: Free Press.
- Perdue, C. W., Dovidio, J. F., Gurtman, M. B., & Tyler, R. B. (1990). Us and them: Social categorization and the process of intergroup bias. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59*(3), 475-486.
- Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2006). A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90*(5), 751-783.
- Petty, R. E., & Jarvis, W. B. G. (1998, October). *What happens to the "old" attitude when attitudes change?* Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society of Experimental Social Psychology, Lexington, KY.
- Pickett, K. (2012). Why Inequality Matters. Retrieved 09<sup>th</sup> May 2014 from: <http://www.equalitytrust.org.uk/sites/default/files/The%20Coalition%20Government%20and%20Income%20Inequality%20-%20Half-term%20Report.pdf>

- Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (2006). *The evolution of top incomes: a historical and international perspective* (No. w11955). National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Pratto, F., Glasford, D. E., & Hegarty, P. (2006). Weighing the prospects of war. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 9(2), 219-233.
- Pratto, F., Liu, J. H., Levin, S., Sidanius, J., Shih, M., Bachrach, H., & Hegarty, P. (2000). Social dominance orientation and the legitimization of inequality across cultures. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 31(3), 369-409.
- Pratto, F., & Shih, M. (2000). Social dominance orientation and group context in implicit group prejudice. *Psychological Science*, 11(6), 515-518.
- Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., & Levin, S. (2006). Social dominance theory and the dynamics of intergroup relations: Taking stock and looking forward. *European Review of Social Psychology*, 17, 271-320.
- Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 67(4), 741-763.
- Pratto, F., Stallworth, L. M., & Conway-Lanz, S. (1998). Social dominance orientation and the ideological legitimisation of social policy. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 28, 1853 – 1875.
- Pratto, F., Stallworth, L. M., & Sidanius, J. (1997). The gender gap: Differences in political attitudes and social dominance orientation. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 36(1), 49-68.

- Pratto, F., Stallworth, L. M., Sidanius, J., & Siers, B. (1997). The gender gap in occupational role attainment: A social dominance approach. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72*(1), 37-53.
- Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. *Behavior and Research Methods, 40*(3), 879-891.
- Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Arndt, J., & Schimel, J. (2004). Why do people need self-esteem? A theoretical and empirical review. *Psychological Bulletin, 130*(3), 435-468.
- Rafiq, U., Jobanuptra, N., & Muncer, S. (2006). Comparing the perceived causes of the second Iraq war: A network analysis approach. *Aggressive Behavior, 32*(4), 321-329.
- Rankin, L. E., Jost, J. T., & Wakslak, C. J. (2009). System justification and the meaning of life: Are the existential benefits of ideology distributed unequally across racial groups? *Social Justice Research, 22*(2-3), 312-333.
- Rawls, J. (2001). *Justice as fairness: A restatement*. USA: Harvard University Press.
- Rios Morrison, K., & Ybarra, O. (2008). The effects of realistic threat and group identification on social dominance orientation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44*, 156-163.
- Rosenblatt, A., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., & Lyon, D. (1989). Evidence for terror management theory: I. The effects of mortality salience on reactions to those who violate or uphold cultural values. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57*(4), 681-690.

- Roth, J., & Steffens, M. C. (2014). When I Becomes We: Associative self-anchoring drives implicit intergroup bias in minimal groups. *Social Psychology, 54*, 253-264.
- Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. *Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 80*(1), 1-28.
- Rutjens, B. T., van Harreveld, F., & van der Pligt, J. (2013). Step by step: Finding compensatory order in science. *Current Directions in Psychological Science, 22*(3), 250-255.
- Rutjens, B. T., van Harreveld, F., van der Pligt, J., Kreemers, L. M., & Noordewier, M. K. (2013). Steps, stages, and structure: Finding compensatory order in scientific theories. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142*, 313-318.
- Rutjens, B. T., van der Pligt, J., & van Harreveld, F. (2010). Deus or Darwin: Randomness and belief in theories about the origin of life. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46*, 1078–1080.
- Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. *American Psychologist, 55*(1), 68-78.
- Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2001). On happiness and human potentials: A review of research on hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. *Annual Review of Psychology, 52*(1), 141-166.
- Ryff, C. D., & Keyes, C. L. M. (1995). The structure of psychological well-being revisited. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69*(4), 719-727.
- Sanders, G. S., & Baron, R. S. (1977). Is social comparison relevant for producing choice shift? *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 13*, 304-314.



- Schlenker, B. R., Chambers, J. R., & Le, B. M. (2012). Conservatives are happier than liberals, but why? Political ideology, personality, and life satisfaction. *Journal of Research in Personality, 46*(2), 127-146.
- Schmitt, M. T., Branscombe, N. R., & Kappen, D. M. (2003). Attitudes toward group-based inequality: Social dominance or social identity? *British Journal of Social Psychology, 42*(2), 161-186.
- Schmitt, M., Gollwitzer, M., Maes, J., & Arbach, D. (2005). Justice Sensitivity: Assessment and Location in the Personality Space. *European Journal of Psychological Assessment, 21*(3), 202 -211.
- Shaver, K.G. (1975). *An Introduction to Attribution Processes*. Oxford, England: Winthrop.
- Shelly, E. (1989). *Positive Illusions: Creative self-deception and the healthy mind*. New York: Basic Books
- Sherif, M., & Sherif, C. W. (1953). *Groups in harmony and tension; an integration of studies of intergroup relations*. Oxford England: Harper & Brothers.
- Sherif, M. (1966). *Group conflict and cooperation*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Sibley, C. G., & Duckitt, J. (2008). Personality and prejudice: A meta-analysis and theoretical review. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 12*(3), 248-279.
- Sibley, C. G., & Duckitt, J. (2010). The ideological legitimization of the status quo: Longitudinal tests of a social dominance model. *Political Psychology, 31*, 109-137.

- Sibley, C. G., & Duckitt, J. (2013). The Dual Process Model of Ideology and Prejudice: A Longitudinal Test During a Global Recession. *The Journal of Social Psychology, 153*, 448-466.
- Sibley, C. G., & Liu, J. H. (2010). Social dominance orientation: Testing a global individual difference perspective. *Political Psychology, 31*(2), 175-207.
- Sibley, C. G., Robertson, A., & Wilson, M. S. (2007). Social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism: Additive and interactive effects. *Political Psychology, 27*, 755-768.
- Sibley, C. G., & Wilson, M. S. (2007). Political Attitudes and the Ideology of Equality: Differentiating support for liberal and conservative political parties in New Zealand. *New Zealand Journal of Psychology, 36*(2), 72-84.
- Sidanius, J., Haley, H., Molina, L., & Pratto, F. (2007). Vladimir's choice and the distribution of social resources: A group dominance perspective. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 10*(2), 257-265.
- Sidanius, J., Levin, S., Federico, C. M., & Pratto, F. (2001). Legitimizing ideologies: The social dominance approach. In J. T. Jost & B. Major (Eds.), *The psychology of legitimacy: Emerging perspectives on ideology, justice, and intergroup relations* (pp. 307-331). New York, NY US: Cambridge University Press.
- Sidanius, J., Levin, S., Liu, J., & Pratto, F. (2000). Social dominance orientation, anti-egalitarianism and the political psychology of gender: An extension and cross-cultural replication. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 30*(1), 41-67.

- Sidanius, J., Levin, S., & Pratto, F. (1996). Consensual social dominance orientation and its correlates within the hierarchical structure of American society. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 20, 385 – 408.
- Sidanius, J., Liu, J. H., Shaw, J. S., & Pratto, F. (1994). Social dominance orientation, hierarchy attenuators and hierarchy enhancers: Social dominance theory and the criminal justice system. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 24(4), 338-366.
- Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1993). The inevitability of oppression and the dynamics of social dominance. In P. M. Sniderman, P. E. Tetlock, & E. G. Carmines (Eds.), *Prejudice, politics, and the American dilemma* (pp. 173-211). California: Stanford University Press.
- Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). *Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., & Bobo, L. (1996). Racism, conservatism, affirmative action, and intellectual sophistication: A matter of principled conservatism or group dominance? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 70(3), 476-490.
- Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., & Mitchell, M. (1994). In-group identification, social dominance orientation, and differential intergroup social allocation. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 134(2), 151-167.
- Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., van Laar, C., & Levin, S. (2004). Social dominance theory: Its agenda and method. *Political Psychology*, 25(6), 845-880.
- Sidanius, J., van Laar, C., Levin, S., & Sinclair, S. (2003). Social hierarchy maintenance and assortment into social roles: A social dominance perspective. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, 6, 333 – 352.

- Silberman, I. (2005). Religion as a meaning system: Implications for the new millennium. *Journal of Social Issues, 61*(4), 641-663.
- Skitka, L. J. (2002). Do the means always justify the ends, or do the ends sometimes justify the means? A value model of justice reasoning. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28*(5), 588-597.
- Skitka, J. (in press). The psychological foundations for moral conviction. Chapter prepared for J. Wright & H. Sarkissian (Eds.), *Advances in Moral Psychology*. New York: Bloomsbury Academic Press.
- Skitka, L. J., & Tetlock, P. E. (1993). Providing public assistance: Cognitive and motivational processes underlying liberal and conservative policy preferences. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65*(6), 1205 -1223.
- Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (1991). A terror management theory of social behavior: The psychological functions of self-esteem and cultural worldviews. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 24*, 93-159.
- Stankov, L. (2009). Conservatism and cognitive ability. *Intelligence, 37*(3), 294-304.
- Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (2000). An integrated threat theory of prejudice. In Oskamp, S. (ed.), *Reducing prejudice and discrimination* (pp. 23-45). Psychology Press.
- Stephan, W. G., Ybarra, O., & Bachman, G. (1999). Prejudice towards immigrants: An integrated threat theory. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 29*, 2221-2237.
- Stern, G. S., & Manifold, B. (1977). Internal locus of control as a value. *Journal of Research in Personality, 11*(2), 237-242.

- Sutton, R.M., Cichocka, A., & van der Toorn, J. (in press.). Social inequality: Social-psychological consequences, causes, and solutions. In A. G. de Zavala & A. Cichocka (Eds.). *Social psychology of social problems: The intergroup context*.
- Sutton, R. M., & McClure, J. (2001). Covariational influences on goal-based explanation: An integrative model. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 80(2), 222-236.
- Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 33(1), 1-39.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, 33(47), 74.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behaviour. *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, 7-24.
- Taylor, P., Funk, C., & Craighill, P. (2006). Are we happy yet? Retrieved May, 19, 2014 from <http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/AreWeHappyYet.pdf>
- Terracciano, A., & McCrae, R. R. (2007). Perceptions of Americans and the Iraq Invasion Implications for Understanding National Character Stereotypes. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 38(6), 695-710.
- Tetlock, P. E. (2002). Social functionalist frameworks for judgment and choice: intuitive politicians, theologians, and prosecutors. *Psychological Review*, 109(3), 451-471.
- Tetlock, P. E., & Boettger, R. (1989). Accountability: a social magnifier of the dilution effect. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 57(3), 388-398.
- Till, J. (2013). The broken middle: The space of the London riots. *Cities*, 34, 71-74.

- Tomkins, S. S. (1965). Affect and the psychology of knowledge. In S. S. Tomkins & C. E. Izard (Eds.), *Affect, cognition, and personality* (pp. 72-97). New York: Springer.
- Turner, J. C., Brown, R. J., & Tajfel, H. (1979). Social comparison and group interest in ingroup favouritism. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 9(2), 187-204.
- Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (2004). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. In E. Shafir, & E. Shafir (Eds.), *Preference, belief, and similarity: Selected writings by amos tversky* (pp. 673-702). Cambridge, MA US: MIT Press.
- UKWestminsterNew. (2011, April, 12). Tony Blair makes the case for the Iraq War [Video file]. Retrieved 09<sup>th</sup> May 2014 from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HPCTBXse80c>
- Unger, R. K. (2007). Religious ideology, a neglected variable. *American Psychologist*, 62(9), 1076-1077.
- Vail, K. E., Rothschild, Z. K., Weise, D. R., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., & Greenberg, J. (2010). A terror management analysis of the psychological functions of religion. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 14(1), 84-94.
- Van Hiel, A., & De Clercq, B. (2009). Authoritarianism is good for you: Right-wing authoritarianism as a buffering factor for mental distress. *European Journal of Personality*, 23(1), 33-50.
- van Hiel, A., & Mervielde, I. (2002). Explaining conservative beliefs and political preferences: A comparison of social dominance orientation and authoritarianism. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 32, 965 – 976.

- van Hiel, A., & Mervielde, I. (2005). Authoritarianism and social dominance orientation: Relationships with various forms of racism. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 35*(11), 2323-2344.
- Van Lange, P. A., & Visser, K. (1999). Locomotion in social dilemmas: How people adapt to cooperative, tit-for-tat, and noncooperative partners. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77*(4), 762-773.
- Van Vugt, M., De Cremer, D., & Janssen, D. P. (2007). Gender differences in cooperation and competition: The male-warrior hypothesis. *Psychological Science, 18*(1), 19-23.
- Vigil, J. M. (2010). Political leanings vary with facial expression processing and psychosocial functioning. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 13*(5), 547-558.
- Von Hippel, W., & Trivers, R. (2011). The evolution and psychology of self-deception. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34*(01), 1-16.
- Wallston, K. A., Wallston, B. S., & DeVellis, R. (1978). Development of the multidimensional health locus of control (MHLC) scales. *Health Education & Behavior, 6*(1), 160-170.
- Wedekind, C., & Milinski, M. (1996). Human cooperation in the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma: Pavlov versus Generous Tit-for-Tat. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 93*(7), 2686-2689.
- Wegener, D. T., & Petty, R. E. (1998). The naïve scientist revisited: Naive theories and social judgment. *Social Cognition, 16*, 1-7.

- Weissflog, M., Choma, B. L., Dywan, J., van Noordt, S. R. J., & Segalowitz, S. J. (2013). The political (and physiological) divide: Political orientation, performance monitoring, and the anterior cingulate response. *Social Neuroscience*, 8, 434-447.
- Will, G.F. (2006, February 26). Smile if (and only if) you're conservative. Retrieved April 9, 2014, from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/22/AR2006022202012.html>
- Wilson, T. D., Kraft, D., & Dunn, D. S. (1989). The disruptive effects of explaining attitudes: The moderating effect of knowledge about the attitude object. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 25(5), 379-400.
- Zarate, M. A., Garcia, B., Garza, A. A., & Hitlan, R. T. (2004). Cultural threat and perceived realistic group conflict as dual predictors of prejudice. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 40(1), 99-105.



## APPENDIX A: Anticipation questions used in Studies 2 and 3

Under what circumstances will citizens of your country think or feel:

	More likely if efforts fail				More likely if efforts succeed			
1) That the world treats them fairly?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
2) That they got what they deserve?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
3) That they get treated fairly in life?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
4) That they deserve their rewards and punishments?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
5) That they get treated with the respect they deserve?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
6) That they get what they are entitled to have?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
7) That their efforts are noticed and rewarded?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
8) That when they meet with misfortune, they have brought it upon themselves?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9) Willing to pay tax to their governments?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
10) More able to secure favourable trade agreements?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
11) More supportive of military action?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
12) More confident of economic success?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
13) That their country is feared?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
14) That their country is respected?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
15) That their country is admired?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
16) That their country is held in contempt?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

17) That their country is seen as weak?      1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8

18) That their country is seen as strong?      1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8

Under what circumstances will citizens of your country feel that the outcome of the conflict is?

	More likely if efforts fail				More likely if efforts succeed			
19) Just?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
20) Unfair?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
21) Morally right?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

**APPENDIX B: Factor analysis carried out on dependent variables in Study 5**

Factor loadings and communalities based on factor analysis with varimax rotation for 6 items measuring the perceived function of conservatism, SDO and system justification within intergroup conflicts.

	Support for conflict			Success in conflict			Communality		
	C	SDO	SJ	C	SDO	SJ	C	SDO	SJ
Popular support for war or conflicts with other nations for resources	.91	.92	.91	.06	.20	.21	.82	.88	.88
Popular support for war or conflicts with other nations for status	.90	.90	.90	.03	.20	.17	.81	.86	.83
Popular support for war or conflicts irrespective of financial rewards	.85	.90	.90	.11	.07	.10	.74	.81	.83
Popular support for war or conflicts irrespective of costs incurred	.90	.91	.90	-.03	.13	.22	.82	.84	.86
Effective military action in the event of conflict with other nations	.18	.16	.29	.88	.91	.86	.80	.87	.82
Victory in the event of military conflict with other nations	-.09	.13	.07	.90	.92	.92	.82	.87	.85

**APPENDIX C: Zero-order correlations between participants' SES, perceptions of inequality and the extent to which conservatism, system justification and SDO are perceived to be normative within society in Study 6**

<i>N</i> = 44	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>1) Participant SES</b>	1	-.01	.01	.06	.02
<b>2) Perception of inequality</b>		1	.09	-.07	-.07
<b>3) Perceived normality of conservatism</b>			1	-.25	.10
<b>4) Perceived normality of system justification</b>				1	.20
<b>5) Perceived normality of SDO</b>					1

**NB: no correlation coefficients were significant**

**APPENDIX D: Zero-order correlations between participants' SES and perceptions of inequality, the perceived normality of each ideological variable and its perceived consequences in Study 6**

**Zero-order correlations between the perceived participants' SES, perceptions of inequality, normality of conservatism and its perceived functions.**

<i>N</i> = 44	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1) Perceived normality	1	.04	-.05	.12	.42**	.37*	.21	.13	.07
2) Positive affect		1	-.23	.40**	.45**	.35*	.39**	.52***	.02
3) Negative affect			1	.52**	-.30*	.03	-.69***	-.30	.14
4) Self-esteem				1	.56***	.32*	.68***	.45**	-.02
5) Mastery					1	.49**	.55***	.57***	.04
6) Security						1	.35*	.39**	.21
7) Certainty							1	.49**	.14
8) Belonging								1	.17
9) Future success									1
10) Participant SES		-.08	.22	-.13	.30*	.10	-.12	-.17	.33*
11) Perception of inequality		-.01	.22	.15	.07	.06	-.10	.14	.08

**NB: Correlation coefficients are significant where \*\*\**p* < .001, \*\**p* < .005, \**p* < .05**

**Zero-order correlations between the perceived participants' SES, perceptions of inequality, perceived normality of system justification and its perceived functions.**

<i>N</i> = 44	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1) Perceived normality	1	.17	-.00	.12	.36*	.39*	.26	.19	.34*
2) Positive affect		1	-.48**	.29	.77***	.73***	.79***	.50**	.69***
3) Negative affect			1	-.43**	-.35*	-.38*	-.39*	-.61***	-.29
4) Self-esteem				1	.43**	.28	.29	.55***	.35*
5) Mastery					1	.78***	.73***	.45**	.77***
6) Security						1	.75***	.49**	.71***
7) Certainty							1	.51***	.74***
8) Belonging								1	.33*
9) Future success									1
10) Participant SES		.32*	-.17	.10	.30*	.25	-.04	.33*	.33*
11) Perception of inequality		.09	.03	-.10	.07	.21	.01	.20	.08

**NB: Correlation coefficients are significant where \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .005$ , \* $p < .05$**

**Zero-order correlations between the perceived participants' SES, perceptions of inequality, normality of SDO and its perceived functions.**

<i>N</i> = 44	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1) Perceived normality	1	-.23	-.01	-.25	-.36*	-.11	-.09	-.36*	-.07
2) Positive affect		1	-.11	.17	.46**	.36*	.43**	.25	.41*
3) Negative affect			1	-.41*	-.33*	-.19	-.24	.50**	-.34*
4) Self-esteem				1	.34*	.49**	.41*	.66***	.34*
5) Mastery					1	.75***	.58***	.58***	.71***
6) Security						1	.61***	.49**	.68***
7) Certainty							1	.46**	.74***
8) Belonging								1	.60***
9) Future success									1
10) Participant SES		.21	.11	-.16	-.08	-.16	-.20	-.15	-.18
11) Perception of inequality		-.09	-.14	.15	.01	.18	-.02	.19	.11

**NB: Correlation coefficients are significant where \*\*\**p* < .001, \*\**p* < .005, \**p* < .05**

**APPENDIX E: Zero-order correlations between participant's SES, perceptions of inequality, the perceived normality and own endorsement of each ideological variable for Study 7**

<i>N</i> = 168	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1) SES	1	-.04	.20*	.09	-.07	.02	.10	.20*	.11.	-.05
2) Inequality		1	.06	.08	.02	-.06	-.12	-.22*	-.13	-.19*
3) Normality of conservatism			1	.20*	.22**	.34***	.08	.01	.01	-.22*
4) Normality of system justification				1	.14	.14	-.08	.10	-.13	-.30***
5) Normality of SDO					1	.55***	-.25**	-.06	-.07	-.34***
6) Normality of RWA						1	-.34***	-.17*	-.27*	-.27***
7) Participants' conservatism							1	.10	.56***	.70***
8) Participants' system justification								1	.29***	.14
9) Participants' SDO									1	.53***
10) Participants' RWA										1

NB: correlations are significant where \*\*\**p* < .001, \*\**p* < .005, \**p* < .05



**APPENDIX F: Zero-order correlations between the perceived normality and participants' endorsement of each ideological variable with their perceived consequences for Study 7**

<i>N</i> = 168	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1) Norm	1	.08	.08	-.05	-.07	.10	.12	-.02	.16*	.12
2) Own endorsement		1	.32***	-.22*	.23**	.21*	-.01	.14	.09	-.01
3) Positive affect			1	-.37***	.25**	.45***	.27***	.24**	.37***	.19*
4) Negative affect				1	-.39***	-.30***	-.21*	-.39***	-.20*	-.06
5) Self-esteem					1	.33***	.24**	.54***	.11	.07
6) Mastery						1	.68***	.47***	.68***	.56***
7) Security							1	.43***	.65***	.51***
8) Certainty								1	.42***	.29***
9) Belonging									1	.72***
10) Future success										1
11) Participant SES			.05	.05	.03	.14	-.12	-.15	.05	.10
12) Perception of inequality			-.17*	.26*	-.15*	.02	-.07	-.07	.03	.15*

NB: Correlations are significant where \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .005$ , \*  $p < .05$

**Zero-order correlations with system justification.**

	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>1) Norm</b>	1	.10	-.08	-.00	-.03	-.12	-.05	-.12	-.12	-.07
<b>2) Own endorsement</b>		1	.12	.04	.12	.02	.04	-.03	-.12	-.15
<b>3) Positive affect</b>			1	-.55***	.34***	.57***	.57***	.53***	.70***	.57***
<b>4) Negative affect</b>				1	-.50***	-.38***	-.42***	-.64***	-.47***	-.43***
<b>5) Self-esteem</b>					1	.36***	.36***	.60***	.31***	.32***
<b>6) Mastery</b>						1	.78***	.62***	.73***	.74***
<b>7) Security</b>							1	.59***	.71***	.68***
<b>8) Certainty</b>								1	.61***	.64***
<b>9) Belonging</b>									1	.79***
<b>10) Future success</b>										1
<b>11) Participant SES</b>			-.01	.18*	-.01	-.04	.04	-.15	-.05	-.02
<b>12) Perceptions of inequality</b>			.09	-.05	.04	.08	.15	.09	.16*	.17*

**NB: Correlations are significant where \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .005$ , \* $p < .05$**

**Zero-order correlations with SDO.**

	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>1) Norm</b>	1	-.07	.01	.06	-.01	-.03	.08	-.07	-.04	.01
<b>2) Own endorsement</b>		1	-.07	-.04	.01	-.23**	-.22**	-.19*	-.14	-.26**
<b>3) Positive affect</b>			1	-.20*	.27***	.54***	.52***	.41***	.58***	.46***
<b>4) Negative affect</b>				1	-.61***	-.31***	-.27***	-.48***	-.24**	-.25**
<b>5) Self-esteem</b>					1	.43***	.36***	.57***	.36***	.31***
<b>6) Mastery</b>						1	.74***	.57***	.74***	.78***
<b>7) Security</b>							1	.50***	.76***	.73***
<b>8) Certainty</b>								1	.52***	.57***
<b>9) Belonging</b>									1	.79***
<b>10) Future success</b>										1
<b>11) Participant SES</b>			.04	.11	-.04	-.05	-.01	-.07	-.05	-.02
<b>12) Perception of inequality</b>			-.09	.14	-.20*	-.05	-.12	-.03	.02	.07

**NB: Correlations are significant where \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .005$ , \* $p < .05$**

**Zero-order correlations with RWA.**

	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>1) Norm</b>	1	-.27***	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.15	-.05	-.07	-.14	-.08
<b>2) Own endorsement</b>		1	.06	-.28***	.24**	.07	.08	.04	.06	.03
<b>3) Positive affect</b>			1	-.26**	.33***	.60***	.51***	.53***	.62***	.48***
<b>4) Negative affect</b>				1	-.48***	-.16*	-.27***	-.36***	-.20*	-.06
<b>5) Self-esteem</b>					1	.33***	.39***	.49***	.25**	.22**
<b>6) Mastery</b>						1	.71***	.57***	.70***	.68***
<b>7) Security</b>							1	.52***	.59***	.58***
<b>8) Certainty</b>								1	.57***	.49***
<b>9) Belonging</b>									1	.74***
<b>10) Future success</b>										1
<b>11) Participant SES</b>			.01	.11	-.01	.01	-.04	-.12	-.00	-.03
<b>12) Perceptions of inequality</b>			-.03	-.20*	-.20*	-.05	-.08	-.12	.00	.01

**NB: Correlations are significant where \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .005$ , \* $p < .05$**

## APPENDIX G: Factor analysis with dependent variables for Study 8

Factor loadings and communalities based on factor analysis with varimax rotation for 17 dependent variables measuring closed-mindedness, hardworking and certainty in Study 8.

	<b>Closed- mindedness</b>	<b>Hardworking and approval</b>	<b>Certainty</b>	<b>Communality</b>
Out of touch with reality	.80	-.04	.16	.67
Delusional about their society	.86	-.01	.14	.76
Unaware of the problems in their society	.87	.03	.27	.82
Uncaring about the problems in their society	.89	.01	.19	.82
Selfish	.85	-.05	.23	.77
Free from doubt and uncertainty	.33	-.01	.77	.71
Certain about who they are and their place	.13	.46	.68	.70
Closed-minded	.87	-.02	.19	.79
Rigid and dogmatic	.87	.05	.13	.76
Compassionate	.84	-.04	.07	.71
Curious and critical in their thinking	.75	-.12	-.12	.59
Independently minded	.79	-.11	-.19	.67
Hardworking	-.37	.69	.10	.62
Successful in their career or business	-.03	.78	.25	.67
Productive	-.27	.80	.19	.75
In step with the views of their friends and family	.18	.78	-.10	.66
Approved of by their friends and family	.11	.85	-.08	.74

**APPENDIX H: Zero-order correlations between the perceived normality and participants' own endorsement of political ideology with its perceived consequences in Study 8**

	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>1) Norm</b>	1	.37***	.09	.05	-.07	.08	.03	.04	-.02	-.00	.06
<b>2) Participant</b>		1	.14*	-.08	-.07	.08	.21***	-.08	-.01	-.070	.04
<b>3) Positive affect</b>			1	-.41***	.38***	.19**	.21***	.15*	.42***	.38***	-.09
<b>4) Negative affect</b>				1	-.50***	.02	-.13*	.26***	-.30***	-.14*	-.06
<b>5) Self-esteem</b>					1	.04	.01	-.12*	.31***	.29***	.10
<b>6) BJW</b>						1	-.53***	.56***	.25***	.49***	.66***
<b>7) Justice sensitivity</b>							1	-.81***	.06	-.33***	-.66***
<b>8) Closed mindedness</b>								1	-.11	.37***	.56***
<b>9) Work ethic and approval</b>									1	.32***	.29***
<b>10) Certainty</b>										1	.35***
<b>11) Pro inequality</b>											1
<b>12) Participant SES</b>			.06	-.09	.11	.05	.01	-.03	.08	.08	.01
<b>13) Perception of inequality</b>			-.01	.12*	-.04	-.06	.05	.10	-.00	.04	-.02

**NB: Coefficients are significant where \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .005$ , \* $p < .05$**

## APPENDIX I: Factor analysis with dependent variables in Study 9

Factor loadings and communalities based on factor analysis with varimax rotation for 17 dependent variables measuring closed-mindedness, hardworking and certainty in Study 9.

	<b>Closed- mindedness</b>	<b>Hard working and approval</b>	<b>Certainty</b>	<b>Communality</b>
Out of touch with reality	.81	-.09	.17	.69
Delusional about their society	.88	-.12	.10	.81
Unaware of the problems in their society	.90	-.02	.05	.81
Uncaring about the problems in their society	.89	-.09	.03	.81
Selfish	.88	-.20	.11	.83
Free from doubt and uncertainty	.43	-.57	-.26	.58
Certain about who they are and their place	.32	.00	.77	.70
Closed-minded	.07	.10	.80	.65
Rigid and dogmatic	.76	-.40	.02	.74
Compassionate	.77	-.38	.10	.74
Curious and critical in their thinking	.33	-.71	-.15	.64
Independently minded	.42	-.67	-.21	.67
Hardworking	-.29	.76	.15	.68
Successful in their career or business	-.15	.83	.09	.72
Productive	-.23	.87	.09	.81
In step with the views of their friends and family	.09	.83	-.18	.73
Approved of by their friends and family	.09	.80	-.21	.69

**APPENDIX J: Zero-order correlations between SES, perceptions of inequality, political orientation and its perceived consequences for Study 9**

<i>N</i> = 202	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1) Participant	1	-.11	-.03	-.10	-.02	-.01	.04	.22**	-.17*	-.09	.07	.19*	.05
2) Positive affect		1	-.23**	.32***	.64***	.57***	.51***	.10	.40***	.55***	-.42***	.43***	.15*
3) Negative affect			1	-.61***	-.22**	-.15*	-.15*	.21**	-.26***	-.13	.48***	-.17*	-.06
4) Self-esteem				1	.22**	.13*	.14*	-.31***	.33***	.17*	-.43***	.07	.01
5) Mastery					1	.74***	.63***	.22**	.34***	.61***	-.37***	.57***	.15*
6) Security						1	.63***	.35***	.21**	.57***	-.24***	.42***	.19*
7) Future success							1	.44***	.10	.59***	-.15*	.40***	.18*
8) BJW								1	-.26***	.17*	.25***	.18*	.13
9) Justice sensitivity									1	.35***	-.71***	.51**	-.07
10) Belonging										1	-.32***	.50***	.15*
11) Closed mindedness											1	-.48***	.20**
12) Work ethic and approval												1	.03
13) Certainty													1
14) Participant SES		-.02	.02	-.04	-.01	-.03	-.01	-.10	.07	-.00	-.10	-.01	-.03
15) Perception of inequality		.14*	-.05	.02	.07	.13	.12	-.12	.07	.14*	-.10	.05	.02

**NB: Coefficients are significant where \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .005$ , \* $p < .05$**







