

THE CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS.
A STUDY OF BLACK REPRESENTATIVES'
LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOUR IN THE
UNITED STATES CONGRESS

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ABSTRACT

The thesis examines the work of Black Representatives in the United States Congress, with specific reference to the legislative activities of the current group of Black Representatives known collectively as the Congressional Black Caucus. In 1970, Black Representatives formed the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) with the purpose of working as a united group of legislators for the advancement of black American interests in Congress. The study analyses how effectively the CBC has worked as a race-conscious, cohesive group in Congress by examining its work within the Congressional Democratic party and the committee system, and its development of its own legislative strategy. The roots of CBC members' legislative behaviour are traced to the legislative roles developed by Black Congressmen of the Reconstruction period and the pioneer, northern Black Congressmen of the twentieth century. The development of the CBC's underlying political strategy is explored within the context of the political environment that faced the black American minority in the post-Civil Rights movement years. The focus of the study is the establishment and organisation of the CBC with particular consideration given to the factors that tended to unite and divide the group, and to the methods whereby internal disagreements were resolved. The thesis identifies the emergence of a CBC legislative strategy devised to maximise the group's political influence in Congress. The operation of the key components of the CBC legislative strategy is examined, i.e. the devising of the legislative agenda, its coordination through the work of the professional staff, CBC members' ability in forwarding the legislative agenda in their congressional committees, and the cohesiveness of members' voting behaviour on key CBC legislative issues. The thesis concludes with an assessment of the CBC's achievements and limitations, and considers the future role of black Americans in Congress.

PART ONE

THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS

- Chapter 1. Black Americans in Congress. I. Reconstruction and its Aftermath, 1870-1901. Page 1.
- Chapter 2. Black Americans in Congress. II. Pioneer Northern Black Congressmen Oscar DePriest, Arthur Mitchell, William Dawson and Adam Clayton Powell Jr., 1929-1970. Page 34.
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Chapter One.

Black Americans in Congress. I. Reconstruction and its Aftermath, 1870-1901.

"So far as the colored Republicans are concerned they have been in the past, and must be in the future, nothing more than party allies. They have never dominated a State, nor have they controlled the Republican organisation of any State to the exclusion of white men thereof. They have simply been the allies of white men who could be induced to come forward and assume the leadership. They are perfectly willing to follow where others lead provided those others lead wisely and in the right direction. All they ask, desire and insist upon is to be recognised as political allies upon terms of equality and to have a voice in the councils of the party of their choice and in the creation and administration of the government under which they live, and by which they are taxed, and also a fair and reasonable recognition as a result of party success, based, all things else being equal, upon merit, fitness, ability and capacity".

Former Representative John R. Lynch (R.Miss.)

in his book "The Facts of Reconstruction", 1913.

The Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 and the subsequent adoption of the Civil War amendments to the federal Constitution theoretically granted to the black American the same fundamental political rights as his white fellow-citizens. John R. Lynch and hundreds of other black Americans, either free-born or having just emerged from slavery, accepted the viability of the on-going political system as a means of improving the social, economic and political status of the black population and took their first tentative steps towards participating in the electoral process. Political participation was recognised as a means by which the theory of equal social and political rights could be transformed into practical reality. Once the policy of Congressional Reconstruction was implemented many black Americans with an aptitude towards political involvement seized the opportunity to gain positions of influence in southern state politics, and by the early 1870's a small number had managed to reach the summits of political power in the United States, membership of the federal Congress. Twenty-two black Americans, in fact, served in Congress during the years 1870-1901, a period which encompassed the adoption and rejection of reconstruction policies, the abandonment of the black vote by the Republican party, the emergence of

'Jim Crow' segregation, and the gradual disenfranchisement of the black American in the southern states. Of the twenty-two 19th Century Black Congressmen, all were elected as Republicans; only two, Hiram Revels and Blanche K. Bruce were nominated by a state legislature to serve in the U.S. Senate (in both cases, Mississippi), while the remaining twenty were directly elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from constituencies in the reconstructed southern states.

Reconstruction Black Congressmen did not achieve positions of legislative power or authority. The transitory nature of their presence in Congress, their minority status, and the lack of interest shown towards them by congressional Republican party leaders combined to ensure that Black Congressmen exerted minimal influence in the legislative process. Black Congressmen, however, had not arrived in Washington DC as political novices. The vast majority had been highly involved in political affairs having held elective office at state level. Black Congressmen were elected to Congress from districts that were both majority black and majority Republican. From the outset race-consciousness constituted a principal component of the Black Congressman's political behaviour simply as a natural consequence of his desire to represent his constituents' interests fully and effectively. In Congress Black Congressmen's race-consciousness was re-enforced by recognition of their minority status within that political institution. The majority acknowledged and accepted the duty to act as national representatives of all black American citizens. On Capitol Hill, the Black Representative's time was largely spent articulating the needs and aspirations of black Americans, sponsoring vital legislation on their behalf, and consistently giving their support to the Republican Party, the 'party of Lincoln' that had abolished slavery. In terms of general legislative activity, committee work, bill sponsorship, speechmaking, and roll-call voting they performed to a standard that matched, and in

some cases exceeded, their peers in Congress. On the question of corruption, which is an issue frequently raised when Reconstruction era politics are under discussion, there is little evidence to suggest that Black Congressmen were any less honest than their white counterparts. Black Congressmen attained a high level of political competence and discharged their duties credibly during this 30 year period. This was achieved inspite of the fact that they suffered the disadvantages of having their political effectiveness constantly proscribed by race bigotry, political deceit and physical intimidation.

The most important basic factors that, in varying proportions, combine to give an individual politician legislative power in Congress are: his political skill and ambition; longevity in office; apprenticeship and promotion to party leadership positions; assignment to key standing committees. Black Congressmen failed to achieve legislative power not because they lacked political skill and ambition but because they suffered deficiencies in the latter three factors. Firstly, early Black Congressmen did not enjoy long terms of office. Senator Hiram Revels served only one-sixth of a term, while Senator Blanche Bruce served for one complete term. In the House, ten of the twenty Black Representatives served either one term or part of one term. Of the remaining ten members, two served five terms each, two served three terms each, and the other six members served two terms each, (Table 1). Black Congressmen had little opportunity to develop working relationships with one another. Revels and Bruce did not serve in the Senate during the same years. On the House side it was only at the height of Reconstruction, 1871-77, that the number of Black Representatives seated in the same session of Congress exceeded four. In fact, the largest delegation of Black Representatives to be seated in any one Congress during the Reconstruction period was seven, which occurred in both the 43rd and 44th Congress. For most of this first period of Black Representation in Congress

BLACK CONGRESSMEN OF THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA.

NAME	STATE	TERM OF OFFICE	U.S. CONGRESS
Sen. Hiram R. Revels	Miss.	Feb. 25, 1870 - Mar. 3, 1871.	41st
Rep. Joseph H. Rainey	S.C.	Dec. 12, 1870 - Mar. 3, 1879.	41st-45th
Rep. Jefferson F. Long	Ga.	Jan. 16, 1871 - Mar. 3, 1871.	41st
Rep. Robert C. DeLarge	S.C.	Mar. 4, 1871 - Jan. 24, 1873.	42nd
Rep. Robert B. Elliott	S.C.	Mar. 4, 1871 - Jan. 1873. Dec. 1, 1873 - Nov. 1, 1874.	42nd 43rd
Rep. Benjamin S. Turner	Ala.	Mar. 4, 1871 - Mar. 3, 1873.	42nd
Rep. Josiah T. Walls	Fla.	Mar. 4, 1871 - Jan. 29, 1873. Dec. 1, 1873 - Mar. 3, 1875. Dec. 6, 1875 - Apr. 19, 1876.	42nd 43rd 44th
Rep. Richard H. Cain	S.C.	Dec. 1, 1873 - Mar. 3, 1875. Oct. 15, 1877 - Mar. 3, 1879.	43rd 45th
Rep. John R. Lynch	Miss.	Dec. 1, 1873 - Mar. 3, 1877. Apr. 29, 1882 - Mar. 3, 1883.	43rd-44th 47th
Rep. Alonzo J. Ransier	S.C.	Dec. 1, 1873 - Mar. 3, 1875.	43rd
Rep. James T. Rapier	Ala.	Dec. 1, 1873 - Mar. 3, 1875.	43rd

Source "America's Black Congressmen" Maurine Christopher.

(Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York 1971)

Table 1 contd.

BLACK CONGRESSMEN OF THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA.

NAME	STATE	TERM OF OFFICE	U.S. CONGRESS
Sen. Blanche K. Bruce	Miss.	Mar. 5, 1875 - Mar. 3, 1881.	44th-46th
Rep. Jeremiah Haralson	Ala.	Dec. 6, 1875 - Mar. 3, 1877.	44th
Rep. John A. Hyman	N.C.	Dec. 6, 1875 - Mar. 3, 1877.	44th
Rep. Charles E. Nash	La.	Dec. 6, 1875 - Mar. 3, 1877.	44th
Rep. Robert Smalls	S.C.	Dec. 6, 1875 - Mar. 3, 1879. July 19, 1882 - Mar. 3, 1883. Mar. 31, 1884 - Mar. 3, 1887.	44th-45th 47th 48th-49th
Rep. James E. O'Hara	N.C.	Dec. 3, 1883 - Mar. 3, 1887.	48th-49th
Rep. Henry P. Cheatham	N.C.	Dec. 2, 1889 - Mar. 3, 1893.	51st-52nd
Rep. John M. Langston	Va.	Sept. 23, 1890 - Mar. 3, 1891.	51st
Rep. Thomas E. Miller	S.C.	Sept. 24, 1890 - Mar. 3, 1891.	51st
Rep. George W. Murray	S.C.	Aug. 7, 1893 - Mar. 3, 1895. June 4, 1896 - Mar. 3, 1897.	53rd 54th
Rep. George H. White	N.C.	Mar. 15, 1897 - Mar. 3, 1901.	55th-56th

Source "America's Black Congressmen" Maurine Christopher.

(Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York 1971)

there were rarely more than one or two black Congressmen seated in the House. Numerical weakness coupled with the lack of continuity in office-holding were principal factors limiting Reconstruction Black Congressmen's legislative effectiveness.

Their congressional influence was further inhibited by the Republican leadership's refusal to give Black Congressmen much scope for legislative initiative either in committee or on the floor. Samuel D. Smith in "The Negro in Congress, 1870-1901", frequently refers to a Black Congressman being assigned to an 'insignificant' or 'unimportant' committee. The Republican leadership not only relegated unwanted committee seats to Black Congressmen but also made it difficult for them to table an amendment to a bill at committee level or on the floor. Indeed, it has been noted by one writer that Black Congressmen were often hampered in their attempts to participate in general floor debate: "Getting time on the floor was frequently a problem for the first black congressmen; some of their best speeches appeared only in the appendixes of the Congressional Globe and Record".¹ Even when an issue of vital importance reached the floor Black Congressmen found difficulty in participating in the debate. For example, on April 19th, 1876, the House voted to unseat Florida's only Black Congressman (Josiah T. Walls) as a consequence of an election challenge. During the two-day debate that preceded the vote in favour of Walls' removal the Republican Party leaders did not allow any of Walls' six fellow Black Congressmen to state their views on the matter before the House.

Early Black Congressmen spent a considerable amount of their time in Congress fighting protracted election challenges mounted persistently by Democratic party opponents in their home states. Although election challenges held before the House Committee on Elections were a regular feature of congressional life in the period under discussion, Black

Congressmen seem to have suffered disproportionately from such contests given their small numbers in the House. The task of responding to election challenges was time-consuming. M.Christopher has claimed that: "Many of the first black Congressmen were so beset with election challenges they hardly had time to concentrate on their work".² In fact, ten black Representatives served an abbreviated term as a consequence of mounting or responding to an election challenge (ie. DeLarge, Turner, Nash, Haralson, Walls, Smalls, Lynch, Langston, Miller, Murray). The most complex election contest involved John Langston who challenged Democratic Rep. Edward Venable (4th district, Va.) in the 51st Congress. Langston's challenge took more than eighteen months to reach its climax. His claim was finally upheld by the House and Langston became the first, and so far only, Black Congressman from the state of Virginia. The cost of the lengthy contest was that Rep. Langston had only three months left in which to serve in the 51st Congress. Speaking of his triumph in convincing the House of the election malpractices used against him, John Langston in his autobiography remembered that: "Not a single Democratic member of the 51st Congress of the United States was in his place in the House on 23rd September, 1890, when Mr. Langston took his place in that body"³ Discourtesies of this kind were commonly experienced by black members in Congress. The extent to which such discourtesies impaired individual Black Congressmen's legislative performance is impossible to measure, but having to endure such hostility certainly constituted an added disadvantage.

Undeniably colour prejudice was pervasive amongst large sectors of the congressional membership. Many ^{white} members held the belief that the negro race was innately inferior in terms of intelligence and general ability. The recent history of chattel slavery with all the human debilitation that it had entailed was conveniently ignored by colour-prejudiced legislators, or simply dismissed as of no importance. Bigoted anti-negro speeches were

often heard in Congress. For example, a North Carolina Democrat, Rep. William Robbins made the following remark on the House floor at a time when seven black representatives were present in Congress. "Sir, the Negro is a clinging parasite. He looks up to others as his superiors... Even here on this floor (and I mean no disrespect to any fellow member by this remark) he does nothing, he says nothing except as he is prompted by his managers. He is the world's merry Andrew.... but when you come to grand tragic and heroic parts the Negro fails".⁴ Being constantly placed on the defensive by such verbal attacks Black Congressmen became even more race-conscious in their legislative behaviour. Indeed as Black Congressmen found that they were continually in the position of defending the integrity of the American black minority on the House and Senate floors, increasingly they assumed the role of spokesmen for black Americans generally as well as their own black constituents. Black Congressmen experienced more discrimination and race-prejudice in their private lives than within the walls of Congress. The majority encountered the greatest difficulty securing accomodation in Washington DC. Also, many suffered the indignity of being physically ejected from hotels and restaurants. In July, 1874, Rep. Joseph Rainey (SC) attempted unsuccessfully to stay in a hotel in Suffolk, Virginia. The proprietor ejected Rainey from the hotel because he was a negro. Whether or not Rainey was a Congressman was of little concern. Given the racial hostility experienced, what is particularly surprising is the moderation displayed by Black Congressmen in their legislative work within Congress. The pages of the Congressional Record demonstrate the restrained nature of Black Congressmen's speeches; they rarely stooped to the level of the hostile ridiculing and racial slurs that they frequently received from southern Democratic members. Black Congressmen's speeches, on the contrary, generally revealed a clarity of style and argument that conformed to, and often excelled, the contemporary standard of congressional speechmaking and debate.

The level of political competence of Black Congressmen was quite remarkable given that the majority had begun their lives in the condition of slavery (Table 2). Some of the most politically competent and articulate black legislators came from a slave background eg. John Lynch (Miss.), Robert Smalls (SC), and George White (NC). Their achievements did not indicate that a previous slave status was no impediment to success, but rather provided testimony to their individual endeavour, intelligence, and dedication. Indeed, the presence in Congress of men of the calibre of Lynch and White acted as a living refutation of the white racist's argument that ex-slaves were inherently unfit to govern. Table 2 also demonstrates that Black Congressmen elected from reconstructed southern states prior to the 1877 Hayes-Tilden compromise were largely self-educated men from non-professional occupations. Whereas black Representatives elected to the House for the first time after 1877 tended to be highly educated with professional experience in law and public service. Undoubtedly, after 1877, a black American had to possess exceptional qualifications, in addition to political skill and perseverance, to gain a seat in Congress. Only six black Representatives were elected to Congress for the first time after 1877 (ie. O'Hara, Cheatham, Langston, Miller, Murray, White). All six were graduates, of which four were established lawyers, one a public official, and the other a teacher. Contemporary newspaper reports of the congressional performance of post-Reconstruction Black Congressmen endorse the fact that they possessed exceptional ability. Of Langston one newspaper remarked: "There are not five men in the House who can talk as well as Langston His command of language is masterly. No doubt there are scores of Democrats in that Body who would give a year's salary for half as good a gift of oratory".⁵

It is not to be inferred from this statement that the remainder of the Black Congressmen, that is those who served during the height of Southern Reconstruction 1870-77, were men of mediocre qualities and negligible

Table 2

RECONSTRUCTION BLACK CONGRESSMEN: SOCIAL, EDUCATIONAL & OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUND.

NAME	PREVIOUS SOCIAL STATUS	EDUCATION	OCCUPATION
Sen.Hiram Revels (Miss.)	Free-born	College	Preacher
Rep.Joseph Rainey (S.C.)	Slave	Secondary	Barber
Rep.Jefferson Long (Ga.)	Slave	Secondary	Tailor
Rep.Robert DeLarge (S.C.)	Slave	Secondary	Farmer
Rep.Robert Elliott (S.C.)	Free-born	Graduate	Lawyer
Rep.Benjamin Turner (Ala.)	Slave	Secondary	Liveryman
Rep.Josiah Walls (Fla.)	Free-born	Secondary	Farmer
Rep.Richard Cain (S.C.)	Free-born	College	Preacher
Rep.John Lynch (Miss.)	Slave	Secondary	Lawyer
Rep.Alonzo Ransier (S.C.)	Free-born	Secondary	Shipping- Clerk
Rep.James Rapier (Ala.)	Free-born	Secondary	Farmer
Sen.Blanche Bruce (Miss.)	Slave	College	Public- Official
Rep.Jeremiah Haralson (Ala.)	Slave	Secondary	Preacher
Rep.John Hyman (N.C.)	Slave	Secondary	Farmer
Rep.Charles Nash (La.)	Slave	Secondary	Bricklayer
Rep.Robert Smalls (S.C.)	Slave	Secondary	Ships- Pilot
Rep.James O'Hara (N.C.)	Free-born	College	Lawyer
Rep.Henry Cheatham (N.C.)	Slave	Graduate	Public- Official
Rep.John Langston (Va.)	Free-born	Graduate	Lawyer
Rep.Thomas Miller (S.C.)	Free-born	Graduate	Lawyer
Rep.George Murray (S.C.)	Slave	College	Teacher
Rep.George White (N.C.)	Slave	Graduate	Lawyer

Secondary = secondary school attendance or less.

(Many Black Congressmen were self-educated)

Source "The Negro in Congress, 1870 - 1901" Samuel D. Smith

(University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill. 1940.

Reissued Kennikat Press, Inc./Port Washington, N.Y. 1966)

political skill. Early southern histories of Reconstruction gave much emphasis to the fact that some black politicians were inept in their political duties, and made personal monetary gain from their short periods in public office. Political corruption in the Reconstruction governments was not, however, confined to black office-holders. White politicians had set the standards of political conduct, and created the political environment into which black politicians entered. Referring specifically to the charge of extensive corruption made against black politicians, the historian C.G. Woodson has noted: "(the) local, State and Federal administrative offices which offered the most frequent opportunity for corruption were seldom held by Negroes, but rather by local white men, and by those men from the North, who had come South to seek their fortunes".⁶ During the Reconstruction years most black politicians enjoyed political power at the whim of white Republicans, and it was therefore inevitable that some would take advantage of the short-term situation and pursue selfish pecuniary goals at the expense of public duty. The undisputed fact that some corruption existed does not minimise the significant contribution made by black politicians or nullify their achievements. Recent histories of Reconstruction have convincingly refuted the argument that the reconstructed southern states were helplessly plundered by negro-dominated, corrupt legislatures: "Negroes rarely had any real power and the little that was wielded was done so in a manner more generous and less corrupt than was usual among contemporary white politicians".⁷ In South Carolina, for example, where more black Americans were elected to public office than in any other Southern state, another writer has concluded that: "The black leaders were not a homogeneous group to whom such characteristics as corruption, laziness, dishonesty, ignorance, incapability, incompetence, and vindictiveness can be assigned. They were neither all good men nor all bad".⁸

The weight of evidence suggests that the majority of black politicians who reached Congress had established reputations for honesty and competence in administering public offices in their home states. Samuel D. Smith, who was far from complimentary in his appraisal of the Black Congressmen's legislative behaviour during the period 1870-1901, acknowledged that they were 'superior' to most black politicians of the Reconstruction era. The majority had worked for the Republican Party from the moment it was established in their home states, and had frequently occupied public offices in the state legislatures and governments.

PUBLIC OFFICES HELD BY BLACK CONGRESSMEN PRIOR TO ELECTION TO CONGRESS.

<u>State Senator</u>	<u>State Representative</u>	<u>Other Posts</u>
Hyman	O'Hara	Ransier - State Lieutenant Governor
White	White	
Cain	Smalls	Bruce - County sheriff, Tax collector
Rainey	Rainey	
Smalls	Cain	Rapier - Tax assessor
Miller	DeLarge	Turner - City Councilman
Haralson	Elliott	Langston - City Councilman, Board of Education member.
Revels	Ransier	
Walls	Miller	
	Haralson	
	Lynch (Speaker)	

Only Charles Nash (La.), George Murray (SC), and Jefferson Long (Ga.) had never held public office prior to their election to Congress. Parenthetically, it is important to note that 20 of the 22 Black Congressmen were elected to Congress from, and held other public offices in, their native states. The label 'black carpetbagger' can only truly be attached to James O'Hara (NC), and Robert Elliott (SC), although John Langston (Va.) held his position as city councilman in Oberlin, New York before he returned to reside in Ohio? Virginia. Elliott and O'Hara were both well-educated, practising lawyers who moved South after the Civil War. In their political style, they were more assertive and forthright than many of the native Black Congressmen. In South Carolina, for example, Rep. Elliott's political activity was always subject to hostile comment in the local press, whereas the more conciliatory Rep. Smalls, a Civil War veteran of distinction, was treated more sympathetically. The

Charleston 'News and Courier' once commented of Rep. Robert Smalls that:
 " while he has gone astray politically, he has a better heart than all the
 white scalawags and carpetbaggers of the South put together".⁹ Mild
 compliments were never paid by the same newspaper to fellow Representative
 Robert Elliott. The following remark is typical of the 'News and Courier'
 comments on Elliott: "There is not a worse or more dangerous and unscrupulous
 fellow in the state than R.B.Elliott. A relentless foe of economy and reform,
 capable, vindictive, and with no law but his own appetites and passions,
 R.B.Elliott is the exponent of the lowest and most oppressive form of
 South Carolina Radicalism".¹⁰

The political power held by black politicians during Reconstruction
 emanated from a handful of black counties in the southern states. In fact,
 all twenty Black Representatives of the 1870-1901 period were elected from
 just eleven 'black county' districts (Table 3). Table 3 reveals how state
 governments over the years gradually redrew district boundaries in order
 to include the majority of black counties within one new district and hence
 reduce the number of black politicians elected. This policy of gerrymandering
 districts to reduce the impact of the black vote was common practice
 amongst the immediate post-Reconstruction state governments as it was then
 too early politically to engage in large-scale disenfranchisement of black
 voters. Complete disenfranchisement of black Americans did not occur
 until the 1890's when the southern states amended their constitutions
 to include 'grandfather' and 'understanding' clauses, and poll taxes.
 The eleven districts responsible for electing all the Reconstruction Black
 Congressmen were both majority black and majority Republican, but they were
 never 'safe' seats for a Black Republican to gain, and keep in his possession.
 Democratic Party opponents and their supporters adopted a variety of
 unlawful practices in these districts which not only made campaigning by
 Black Republicans an arduous, dangerous activity but, more importantly,
 impeded the crucial task of getting out the black vote on election day.

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS REPRESENTED BY BLACK CONGRESSMEN, 1870 - 1901.

(State & county Black Population percentages based upon 1880 U.S. Census)

* denotes state govt. alteration of district boundaries to include majority of black counties within one new district.

SOUTH CAROLINA (61 per cent)

1st District - J.H.Rainey 1870-9.

2nd District - R.C.DeLarge 1871-3, A.J.Ransier 1873-5, R.H.Cain 1877-9.

3rd District - R.B.Elliott 1871-5, R.Smalls 1875-9.

7th* " - R.Smalls 1881-7, T.E.Miller 1889-91, G.W.Murray 1893-7.

(Above Districts contained the state's principal black counties
Aiken 54%, Beaufort 92%, Charleston 70%, Georgetown 82%,
Sumter 73%)NORTH CAROLINA (38 per cent)2nd District - J.A.Hyman 1875-7, J.E.O'Hara 1883-7, H.P.Cheatham 1889-93,
G.H.White 1897-1901.(District contained the state's principal black counties
Craven 66%, Edgecombe 69%, Halifax 70%)ALABAMA (47 per cent)

1st District - B.S.Turner 1871-3.

2nd District - J.T.Rapier 1873-5.

4th* " - J.Haralson 1875-7.

(Above Districts contained the state's principal black counties
Dallas 82%, Greene 83%, Lowndes 82%)MISSISSIPPI (57 per cent)6th District - J.R.Lynch 1873-7, 1881-3. (District contained the state's
principal black counties Adams 79%, Bolivar 85%, Sharkey 77%,
Washington 86%)LOUISIANA (51 per cent)6th District - C.E.Nash 1875-7. (District contained black counties East Carroll 91%,
Madison 91%, Tensas 91%)GEORGIA (47 per cent)4th District - J.F.Long 1870-1. (District contained black counties Burke 77%,
Lee 83%)FLORIDA (47 per cent)

2nd District - J.T.Walls 1871-6. (District contained black county Alachua 61%)

VIRGINIA (41 per cent)4th District - J.M.Langston 1890-1. (District contained black counties Amelia 71%,
Prince Edward 67%)

In one of several incidents during his congressional campaign in August, 1876, Rep. Robert Smalls had a political meeting disrupted by ex-Confederate, Democratic leader General Mathew C. Butler and his armed 'Red Shirts' who threatened Smalls' life if he attempted to speak at the meeting.

In 1878 after the congressional election in North Carolina's second district in which he had been a candidate, James O'Hara mounted an election challenge to unseat the victor, Democrat William Kitchin. O'Hara claimed that Kitchin had employed many illegal measures to defeat him, including the fixing of the count. He argued also that he had collected sufficient evidence to prove his case. While his case was in preparation, however, O'Hara's home, which contained much of the vital evidence, was mysteriously burnt to the ground.

Instances of physical intimidation of this nature serve to illustrate the extreme disadvantages that aspiring Black Congressmen had to face. Unquestionably, though, it was the ordinary black American voter who bore the brunt of intimidation and white hostility. In exercising his right to vote, let alone to vote for a black candidate, the black American voter often ran the risk of physical violence and economic reprisal. In North Carolina, for example, during John Hyman's campaign the Ku Klux Klan used the tactic of digging graves along the roads that black voters would have to walk on their way to the polls. The many thousands who bravely ran the gauntlet of intimidation found that at the polling stations their problems had only just begun. Apart from physically debarring black voters from entering the polling booths, political opponents adopted some extremely innovative tactics designed to have the same effect. In South Carolina on election day the black voter was confronted with eight different ballot boxes in which to chance his vote! During Langston's bid for Congress in 1888 it was noted that at some polling stations black, and white voters were separated into two queues. The queue of black voters moved exceedingly slowly; in fact, each black

voter had to queue for up to five hours before he could actually cast his vote, whereas the white voter hardly had to queue and was able to cast his vote and depart within minutes. In order to surmount problems of this complexity the black politician had to develop exceptional political skills. The majority of Reconstruction Black Congressmen were astute 'grass roots' political organisers. For example, on election day in the 4th Congressional district of Virginia in 1888, prospective Representative John Langston had organised approximately five hundred persons to observe the polling stations and record any irregularities. The data collected proved crucial in Langston's successful election contest. Rep. Robert Smalls' biographer attributed Smalls' political success to his masterly organisational ability: "Many of them (ex-slaves) did not understand the political implications of their newly acquired status and had to be carefully guided by their leaders. Smalls understood this well and worked it to his political advantage. He moved among his people explaining the meaning and power of the vote. Smalls built his own local, political machine ... He kept his concern for the community well publicised by the local newspaper and even founded an organ of his own, the Standard".¹¹

The argument that Reconstruction black politicians simply shepherded masses of ignorant black voters to the polls for no other purpose than to enhance their own political fortunes does not stand the test of close scrutiny. Political demagogues were not unknown, of course, but they were to be found amongst both races. Ignorance was probably as endemic amongst poor white voters as it was amongst poor black voters. On the whole Black Congressmen acted responsibly serving their constituents fairly and in a manner in accordance with contemporary political standards. On a visit to South Carolina, British M.P. Sir George Campbell remarked of Representative Smalls: "He is not very highly educated nor brilliant but is a thoroughly representative man among the people

and seems to have their unlimited confidence".¹² Black Congressmen held the confidence of many white constituents as well as the majority of their black constituents. Available evidence indicates that many Black Representatives won the support of considerable numbers of white voters. Smalls always received support from the white voters of his Beaufort county constituency; white voters regarded him as a capable legislator who would represent their interests fairly. Robert DeLarge (SC) in his successful bid for Congress in 1871 received the support of many white voters who regarded his white opponent, Democrat Bowen, as being thoroughly corrupt. While contesting the seat of his opponent in the 1880 congressional elections Lynch successfully argued before the House that many white voters had voted for him. Undoubtedly, under the protection of the secret ballot in general elections many white voters gave their support to a man with the best credentials and reputation, regardless of his race.

In Congress many Black Congressmen emphasised their desire to represent the interests of both races. Rep. Henry Cheatham (NC) expressed this desire as follows: "I have both races in my district, I want to cast my vote for that law which will be best not for one race or the other but for both equally".¹³ Even the most race-conscious black members sought to represent their white constituents fairly. A black Representative's race-consciousness was not incompatible with his ability to properly represent both races in his district. Rep. Robert Smalls (SC), for example, in his legislative behaviour successfully combined race-consciousness with a fair-minded approach to his white constituents. Smalls' attitude is illustrated by his statement on the House floor in 1882: "Mr. Speaker my race of upward 7 millions of people are represented on this floor by the honorable gentleman from North Carolina (James O'Hara) and myself. How long this injustice will be tolerated I will not dare to prophesy; but so long as one of us is permitted on this floor our voice and vote will not be withheld from any measure of legislation which will add to the prosperity

and happiness of all the people, without regard to color or condition".¹⁴ Smalls' statement also reveals his political philosophy; a philosophy that was shared by a majority of Reconstruction Black Congressmen. They embraced the contemporary laissez faire ideology and accepted the on-going political system as a potentially effective means of eliminating race discrimination. By articulating black Americans' aspirations in Congress and publicising the racial hostility under which the majority of ex-slaves had to live, Black Congressmen hoped that they might successfully appeal to the white American conscience to uphold, or at least work towards the realisation of, the constitutional principles of political equality and individual liberty for all American subjects. In their view the only viable political strategy was to protest for change within the bounds of the existing structures of government. This willingness to participate in the on-going political system, with all its imperfections, has led early Black Congressmen, in some quarters, to be labelled as 'Uncle Tom' figures. Many early Black Congressmen, particularly those serving after 1877, were not only lighter-skinned but also, as a consequence of their higher educational attainment and professional occupations, were much wealthier than the majority of black Americans in their states. As some modern historians have suggested, it is certainly true that some Black Congressmen, notably Senator Hiram Revels and Rep. Henry Cheatham, in their efforts to be accepted in white society on equal terms were perhaps too deferential to the wishes of white Republicans. To attach the label 'Uncle Tom' to Reconstruction Black Congressmen generally, however, is just as incorrect and absurd as the assertion that all Black Congressmen were politically corrupt.

The most relevant question that has to be resolved is :- How well did Black Congressmen perform in Congress? What were their achievements, and failures? If they failed to perform well, for what reasons? S.D. Smith expressed no doubt in his evaluation of their legislative performance:

"The Negro failed to accomplish much worthwhile in Congress during the period (1870-1901)".¹⁵ Any evaluation of legislative performance, of course, must state clearly the criteria upon which an individual legislator, or group, is judged. Smith's evaluation was based upon two criteria; firstly, the volume of legislation Black Congressmen successfully sponsored, and secondly, the positions of authority they achieved in the congressional party and committee structures. It will be argued here that in order to properly evaluate Reconstruction Black Congressmen's legislative performance other criteria need to be established which take into account their unique minority position within Congress, and the peculiar difficulties that they had to suffer in their constituencies. The discussion above has emphasised that the majority of Black Congressmen served relatively short terms and that their numerical strength in any one session was minimal. Also, it has been noted that they were deprived of major influence within the congressional Republican party and the standing committees by their white colleagues. Consequently, it was inevitable that Black Congressmen rarely played significant roles in the passage of important legislation. The fact that they were not principal participants in the major legislative successes of the period does not prove that they lacked legislative ability and statesmanship. Black Congressmen should be judged on the basis of how they performed in the limited role that historical circumstances forced upon them. Without committee or party influence, Black Congressmen faced the situation that there were only two viable legislative functions open to them. Firstly, they could assume the position of national spokesmen for black Americans and seek to protect their general interests whenever an issue of importance to the black American minority came before Congress. And, secondly, in spite of the physical difficulties of harassment and intimidation, they could attempt to serve the local constituency to the best of their ability. Throughout the period 1870-1901 Black Congressmen performed these two functions consistently and effectively.

Black Congressmen contributed the black American perspective to the principal congressional policy discussions which involved black American interests. Between 1870-77 Black Congressmen played a positive role in the major debates on southern reconstruction policy, particularly concentrating their legislative effort on the issues of amnesty for ex- Confederates, civil rights and education. After 1877 Black Congressmen were forced to assume the defensive role of guarding the black American's citizenship rights as state governments and the Supreme Court proceeded to undermine the intent of Reconstruction legislation. The first major issue to occupy the attention of Black Congressmen was that of general amnesty for former secessionists. Under provisions of the 14th Amendment ex-confederates were declared ineligible to vote and hold political office. By 1872 many Democrats had drawn up bills which sought to remove these political disabilities. On this question of amnesty Black Congressmen were opposed to the complete removal of political disabilities from the former secessionists without a guarantee that the political rights of southerners who had been loyal to the Union, and particularly the black population, would be adequately protected. A difference of opinion existed amongst some black members on the matter of how the necessary protection would be assured. Senator Hiram Revels was prepared to grant amnesty to former Confederates if they declared loyalty to the Federal Government and swore to uphold all the laws of Congress. Whereas Rep. Robert Elliott was adamantly opposed to any hasty general restoration of political rights. Elliott expressed astonishment that: "This Congress desires to hand over loyal men of the South to the tender mercies of the rebels who today are murdering and scourging the loyal men of the southern states".¹⁶ He argued that the correct way to proceed was to consider individual petitions from ex-Confederates for removal of political disabilities. The majority of Black Congressmen agreed with Elliott's view. In fact, all Reconstruction Black Congressmen were generous in their presentation of hundreds of petitions on behalf of

white constituents requesting removal of political disabilities. Many Black Congressmen hoped to link the question of general amnesty with that of full civil rights for black Americans. As early as 1871 Rep. Josiah Walls (Fla) had proposed a measure that combined reinforcement of the 1866 Civil Rights Act with the removal of political disabilities from ex-Confederates. On the surface this appeared to be astute political strategy. Theoretically, it would mean that former Confederates would have their political rights restored only on their recognition that black southerners possessed equal political rights. But, in reality, the Republican Party did not possess the political will to enact strong civil rights legislation. In 1872 the Amnesty bill passed Congress, whereas Sumner's civil rights bill died in a House committee. The Republican Party was interested, primarily, in protecting the black American's voting rights, not in making him a social equal. Radical Republican legislation ensuring black American voting rights had been designed to tilt the balance of political power in the South to the Party's advantage. With the exception of Senator Charles Sumner and a few other legislators, the Republican Party's advocacy of full civil rights for the ex-slaves was insincere. Eventually, in 1875, a weakened civil rights bill was passed, but only as an empty gesture of a defeated Republican Congress.

Nevertheless, in the years 1872-5, Black Congressmen did their utmost to keep the issue of civil rights legislation alive. One writer has suggested that Black Congressmen played the crucial role of bringing the civil rights issue to the forefront of political discussion in Congress: "The question of respecting the Negro as a social equal seems to have been brought to the attention of Congress when it admitted him as a Senator or Representative and seated him beside a white man. The Negro Congressmen objected to the inconsistency of sitting with white men in the Senate or House and having to separate from them on the steamboat, railroad cars, or in theatres. This was Sumner's first argument for civil rights when

he appeared before the Senate in debate in 1872".¹⁷ Black members took regularly to the House floor in the 43rd Congress to refute the various arguments put forward by Democratic Party opponents of civil rights legislation. During the protracted debate Southern Democrats had developed three major arguments against the bill. Firstly, they argued that given the Supreme Court's ruling in the Slaughterhouse cases in 1873, which recognised two separate classes of citizenship, state and federal, the proposed civil rights legislation clearly infringed states' rights and, hence, was unconstitutional. Secondly, opponents claimed that the bill sought to legislate social equality between the races; this argument was used principally against the mixed schooling clause which, from the Democrats' viewpoint, was the most obnoxious section of the bill. Thirdly, the southern Democrats asserted that 'ordinary negroes' did not want civil rights legislation. As the debate proceeded Black Representatives persistently challenged the validity of these three arguments against the bill.

Southern Democrats Rep. James B. Beck (Ky) and Rep. Alexander H. Stephens (Ga) were the main proponents of the argument that the bill, if passed, would be unconstitutional. In their view Congress did not possess the power to legislate against a state law or custom that was discriminatory. Black Representative Robert Elliott (SC) accepted this assertion, but suggested that Congress did have the authority to enforce the 14th Amendment by 'appropriate legislation'. Elliott argued that the 14th Amendment guaranteed equality of citizenship rights and the civil rights bill simply proposed to enforce these rights. He added that: "Not only does the decision in the Slaughterhouse cases contain nothing which suggests a doubt of the power of Congress to pass the pending bill, but it contains an express recognition and affirmance of such power".¹⁸ Many Republican members acknowledged that Elliott's contribution to the debate effectively dismissed the validity of the argument that the proposed bill would be

unconstitutional. Rep. Benjamin Butler (R.Mass.), the floor manager of the bill, remarked: "I should have considered more at length, the Constitutional argument, were it not for the exhaustive presentation by the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Elliott) of the law, and the only law quoted against us in this case, the SlaughterHouse Cases".¹⁹ Several black Representatives responded to the suggestion of Rep. Robert Vance (D.NC) that the civil rights bill by forcing social equality would be harmful to both races. Rep. John Lynch (Miss.) replied sarcastically: "I can then assure that portion of my Democratic friends on the other side of the House whom I regard as my social inferiors that if at any time I should meet any one of you at a hotel and occupy a seat at the same table with you, do not think that I have thereby accepted you as my social equal".²⁰ Black Rep. Richard Cain(SC) considered that the forced social equality argument was an irrelevancy emotively introduced by the bill's opponents with the aim of exploiting fears of race-mixing and intermarriage. The proposed civil rights bill, he emphasised, strove to ensure equal citizenship rights for all Americans; social relationships would remain the responsibility of the individual: "I do not ask any legislation for the colored people of this country that is not applied to the white people. All that we ask is equal laws, equal legislation, equal rights throughout the length and breadth of this land".²¹

Rep. Alexander White (D.Ala.) was one of several southern members who insisted that in opposing the civil rights bill he was truly representing the views of his state's black constituents. Fellow Alabamian, black Representative James T. Rapier however, contested White's claim on the House floor by reading a statement in support of the civil rights bill endorsed by a mass meeting of black Americans in the state. A similar tactic was employed by another black member, Alonzo Ransier (SC); Ransier collected and brought before Congress scores of pro-civil rights resolutions that had been passed at black American assemblies and conventions throughout the states. Ransier also tabled an amendment to the civil rights bill

which sought to impose a \$5,000 fine where race discrimination in jury selection was proven, and to eliminate the discriminatory use of the word 'white' in both federal and local statutes. Owing to insufficient Republican support the amendment failed, but Ransier's six black colleagues supported the measure. The civil rights debate in the 43rd Congress offered the Black Congressmen an opportunity to work as a group, and the chance was not missed. During this Congress their numerical strength in the House reached the highwater mark of seven members. In fact, throughout the civil rights debate Black Congressmen systematically challenged every key aspect of the opposition's arguments, frequently yielding their time to each other to enable an individual member's professional expertise, or experience to be usefully employed.

The legislative battle for the survival of the open schools clause within the civil rights bill offers the best example of the early Black Congressmen working with a united purpose. The House black delegation of the 43rd Congress were totally united in the belief that education was most crucial to the freedman's interest and future success. The right to vote had little substance without the intellectual ability to weigh political alternatives. Black members jointly lobbied for free, mixed public schools preferably supported by national aid from Washington. They displayed considerable legislative ability in sponsoring bills and amendments that contained innovative techniques for raising revenues for national aid to education. Rep. Richard Cain (SC) introduced a bill to establish a national education fund; the fund's revenue was to be derived from the sale of unused public lands. Whereas Rep. Josiah T. Walls (Fla.) went a stage further and introduced a measure proposing a national system of education with public lands being allocated for school construction. Walls persevered with his measure and forced a debate, during the course of which he justified the need for a national education system as follows: "It has been admitted by every lover of free government that popular

education, or the education of the masses, is necessary to and inseparable from a complete citizenship....Then, let us make provision for the education of all classes; and if the State governments are unwilling to provide equal facilities for all, then let the national government take the matter in hand".²² The measure, however, did not gain enough support to pass. There is ample evidence available from the proceedings of the 43rd Congress, therefore, to demonstrate that Black Congressmen as a group contributed significantly to the general discussion and passage of the civil rights legislation. They consistently acted as national spokesmen for the black American minority. The Civil Rights Act of 1875 did not satisfy the majority of the House black membership because the controversial mixed public schooling clause was excluded. Four black Representatives, Elliott, Kinsler, and Rainey (SC), and Walls (Fla.) deliberately abstained from participating in the final vote on the bill, February 5th, 1875, as a protest against the Republican leadership's decision to delete the education clause. The other three black members, Lynch (Miss.), Rapier (Ala.), and Cain (SC) reluctantly voted in favour of the emasculated bill recognising that, under the circumstances, it was the best that could be obtained. It had been beyond the political power of the few Black Congressmen to stop the exclusion of the education clause. The political tide was turning against the Republican Party in the forthcoming elections. Republicans feared that their apparent support of strong civil rights legislation was losing the party political support in the border states, particularly Tennessee. At best, the Republican Party had only half-heartedly sponsored the mixed public schooling clause; consequently at the end of the 43rd Congress House Republicans excluded the education clause without any visible signs of remorse.

In addition to acting as national spokesmen for black American interests, black members attached equal importance to their roles as constituency representatives. Attending to the immediate needs of their

districts consumed as much of the black legislator's time as that of his white counterpart. Black Representatives were equally aware of the fact that providing services for the district, and general 'fence-mending', were the surest paths towards a long congressional career. Black members constantly introduced bills and requests for appropriations in order to provide their districts with new public buildings, river improvements and other services. On the basis of their constituency work black Representatives, under normal circumstances, would have been destined for long careers in Congress. It is difficult to fault black legislators on their performance in this area of their legislative duty. One writer has asserted that: "Measures designed to provide superior facilities for the trade and commerce of their communities constituted, in some instances, the most valuable service rendered by these (black) legislators".²³ Most of their measures seeking local improvements suffered the same fate as the amendments and bills they sponsored on major national issues; they either died in committee or were defeated during debate on the floor. Nevertheless some black members successfully lobbied for local improvements. Robert Smalls (SC) gained appropriations for a naval yard to be built at Port Royal, and for navigational improvements to be made throughout his district.

The Republican Party's abandonment of the pretence of supporting strong civil rights legislation was the forerunner to the Party's complete abandonment of Reconstruction policies which followed as a consequence of the Hayes-Tilden presidential election compromise in 1877. The Compromise led to the final removal of federal military support from reconstructed southern state governments and, hence, to a rapid diminution in the number of black American political office-holders. Only three of the Reconstruction Black Congressmen were returned to Congress after 1877, Robert Smalls (SC), John Lynch (Miss.), and Joseph Rainey (SC). By 1880 the 'Redeemer' state governments had practically eliminated the black American as a political force in the South. In the words of Thomas Miller, who was

one of the six black Americans to be elected to Congress for the first time after 1880, he and other post-Reconstruction Black Congressmen were just a few 'flukes of success'. Miller, in fact, was being rather modest because he won his seat on merit, and only after a hard-fought campaign. Moreover, John Langston (Va.), George Murray (SC) and Miller himself had also to mount complex election challenges before they were able to take their seats in Congress. George H. White (NC) was the only post-Reconstruction Black Congressman whom it can truthfully be said gained his seat under fortuitous circumstances. White owed his congressional career to the success of Fusion between the Populist and Republican parties in North Carolina during the 1896 elections.

Post-Reconstruction Black Congressmen performed their legislative duties in a similar manner to their black predecessors, continuing the emphasis on constituency work, and being national spokesmen for black American interests. However the cause of equal civil rights for the black minority was not a major priority in white legislators' minds in the congressional sessions of the 1880's and 1890's. Black Congressmen, nevertheless, at every available opportunity attempted to divert the attention of their fellow legislators to the plight of the black American. In the 49th Congress, James O'Hara (NC) introduced a resolution to appoint a five-man committee, with subpoena powers, to investigate the murder of black citizens by a white mob in Carrollton, Mississippi on March 18th, 1886. O'Hara argued that the committee was urgently required because state authorities had refused to bring the accused murderers before the local courts. But yet again a black Representative's plea fell on deaf ears, and the resolution was rejected. Earlier, however, O'Hara had had more success with an amendment to an interstate commerce bill. His amendment required that all interstate passengers should be treated equally, without any discrimination being made on the basis of race or colour; O'Hara emphasised that the price paid for a ticket should be the sole determinant

of the facilities received. In tabling his amendment, O'Hara reminded the House of its constitutional right to regulate commerce between the states, and added: "All I ask of the American Congress is that ...you shall... give voice and expression to the protection of the rights of American colored citizens".²⁴ The House was taken by surprise at O'Hara's ingenuity in introducing the race question into the discussion of a trade bill, and the amendment passed by 134 votes to 97. But, by the time the bill eventually passed Congress as the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, O'Hara's amendment had been rendered meaningless by extensive revision in the Senate. O'Hara had decided originally to introduce his amendment after his failure to gain support for a constitutional amendment guaranteeing black American civil rights. To achieve the passage of his amendment on the constitutional basis of the commerce clause seemed to him to be the best alternative to an actual constitutional amendment. Little did he know it, but O'Hara had devised the legislative strategy which was to be used successfully to secure passage of Title II, the public accommodations section, of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. O'Hara's legislative work certainly illustrates that Black Congressmen of the Reconstruction period possessed considerable political skill and legislative competence.

George H. White (NC) was the last black American to serve in Congress in this period; he spent two consecutive terms in the House, from 1897 to 1901. In these years one historian has claimed: "Negroes were subjected to vilification in Congress the like of which has rarely been equalled, except in the early days of the Nazi struggle for power in Germany".²⁵ From the moment of his arrival White recognised that, as sole representative of his race in Congress, his primary responsibility was to defend black Americans against the vicious charges regularly made against them. In the course of his speeches he would usually remind his white colleagues, as in this excerpt from a speech in January, 1899, that he was: "the only

representative of 10,000,000 people, from a racial standpoint. They have no one else to speak for them, from a race point of view, except myself".²⁶ White was, perhaps, the most eloquent and effective speaker on behalf of the black American in Congress during the 19th century. In response to the racist speeches of Southern demagogues, Ben Tillman and William Kitchin, which invariably referred to black Americans as 'vicious', 'worthless', 'ignorant savages' White's replies were moderate and constrained, as the following indicates: "It is easy for these gentlemen to taunt us with our inferiority, at the same time not mentioning the cause of this inferiority. It is rather hard to be accused of shiftlessness and idleness when the accuser closes the avenues for labor and industrial pursuits to us. It is hardly fair to accuse us of ignorance when it was made a crime under the former order of things to learn enough about letters to even read the Word of God".²⁷ In the tradition of his black predecessors White sponsored legislation of particular importance to black citizens. He introduced the first bill designed to make lynching a federal offence. His measure was based on the argument that murder by mob violence should be regarded as an act of treason against the United States, and hence the accused should be tried in the federal courts. In fact by proposing that participation in a lynching be made an act of treason White ensured the defeat of his bill, inspite of the fact that approximately one hundred black citizens were lynched in the year his bill was introduced. It was unrealistic to expect Congress to pass a federal anti-lynching act when speeches condoning race violence were openly, and regularly expressed in its chambers. Even in the same session White introduced his measure, Ben Tillman candidly admitted to fellow Congressmen that in pursuing the disenfranchisement of black voters in his state: "We shot them (negroes). We are not ashamed of it".²⁸ Although, naturally, his federal anti-lynching bill failed, White did achieve legislative success with a measure proposing the establishment of a home for elderly black Americans

in Washington DC. Also, similar to many Black Congressmen before him, White attempted unsuccessfully to persuade the federal government to reimburse black American depositors who had lost their savings when the Freedman's Saving and Trust Company collapsed.

As the twentieth century opened, Rep. George White made his final speech on the House floor. And, in 1901 the first period of black American Representation in Congress drew to a close. In evaluating the legislative behaviour of Black Congressmen in this 30 year period, 1870-1901, many writers have attached major significance to the fact that black members consistently supported the policies of the Republican Party even after it had become obvious that the Republican leadership had forever abandoned the cause of black American civil rights and political equality. The highly partisan voting behaviour of Black Congressmen has been cited constantly as evidence that black members were simply 'voting machines' controlled at the hands of white Republican congressional leaders. Criticism of this nature conveniently ignores the fact that Black Congressmen served in Congress in an era of partisanship; party-line voting was the norm amongst the white membership of both major congressional parties. It is undeniably true, however, that black Representatives, similar to the black population at large, continued to identify with the Republican Party long after reconstruction policies were abandoned. The explanation for this was that black Americans who wanted to participate in the mainstream of American political life had no where else to go other than to work for the Republican Party. Reconstruction Black Congressmen were essentially pragmatists. They made the best of a bad situation by pursuing an active, race-conscious role within the ranks of the Republican Party. The majority recognised that the Republicans were increasingly simply using the black vote to their own political advantage. Many black members struggled vainly to keep the Republican Party to the ideals that it had propounded during the civil war years, ie. social equality, education, liberty, and a free ballot.

When asked in 1912 why he was still a staunch Republican, former Black Representative Robert Smalls replied: "I can never lose sight of the fact that had it not been for the Republican Party, I never would have been an office-holder of any kind from 1862 to the present".²⁹

The majority of Reconstruction Black Congressmen (1870-77) were moderate men; they accepted the abrasive laissez-faire ideology of their times and believed that once put on an equal footing the Black American could create the conditions for his own self-advancement in American society. Most Black Congressmen spent their time sponsoring legislation specifically designed to place the ex-slave on an equal footing with the White American, but legislative measures which proposed full civil rights for Black Americans, mixed public schooling, and the suppression of lynching were anathema to the White American majority. Recognising this, the Republican Party was unwilling to pay the political price of supporting such policies. Post-Reconstruction Black Congressmen (1877-1901) were certainly not under any illusions concerning the Republican Party's commitment to Black American civil and political rights. Black Representative J.M. Langston reflected the majority view when, in 1892, he said: "When it comes to the race question the Republicans are all Democrats".³⁰ After 1877 Black Republican Congressmen were literally outsiders within their own party in Congress.

The Black Politician's first taste of Congressional Government offered him two important lessons for the future. The Republican Party's abandonment of its stated commitment to protect the Black American's newly acquired civil rights warned the next generation of Black Congressmen that it was unwise to place faith in the promises of a political party. As a general rule for his own political survival in the future, the Black Congressman should always put the interests of his race before those of his party. Secondly, Reconstruction Black Congressmen had observed at first hand that brilliant oratory, logical argument and legislative skill did not usually make legislation. Real legislative power

resided with those Congressmen who had accumulated high party seniority and gained major standing committee positions. Future Black Congressmen should give priority to building strong, and if possible independent, district political bases from which to ensure continual re-election, and hence congressional authority.

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Footnotes

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28. Ibid. p. 2245.
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Chapter Two

Black Americans in Congress. II. Pioneer Northern Black Congressmen

Oscar DePriest, Arthur Mitchell, William Dawson and Adam Clayton

Powell Jr.

"I'm always on that soapbox. I've always got my mouth open -- sometimes my foot's in it, but it's always open. It serves a purpose; it digs at the White man's conscience".

Representative Adam Clayton Powell Jr.

"Name calling and playing to the grandstands is not the way to get things done here on Capitol Hill. If you want to get any advantages for our people, colored Representatives must learn to play on the team".

Representative William L. Dawson.

Reconstruction Black Congressmen had owed their political careers to the Radical Republicans who had opened the door to black electoral participation in the Southern states. The departure of George H. White from Congress in 1901 symbolised the final closing of that door as the 'lily-white' factions came to ascendancy in the southern Republican Party, and the process of black disenfranchisement by state constitutional amendment was completed. In the North, however, from the end of the Civil War onwards, the Republican Party had kept the door to black electoral participation firmly closed, occasionally opening the door slightly to allow a few minor patronage appointments to be awarded to prominent black citizens who worked diligently to maintain the northern black voter's loyalty to the Party. After the ratification of the 15th Amendment northern blacks theoretically possessed the right to vote, but in practice were not widely encouraged to exercise that right. The Democratic Party largely ignored the black voter, and the Republicans did little more than keep politically-conscious black Americans within their ranks. The principal reason for this was that during the Reconstruction era the northern black vote remained

numerically insignificant.¹ The Republican Party never felt compelled to nominate black candidates for Congress simply because the black vote did not comprise more than four per cent of the potential electorate in any northern state. In addition to the numerical argument, the factor of race prejudice further inhibited Republicans in their choice of candidates. Black Americans were regarded as 'second-class' citizens by the majority of northern whites and, consequently, Republicans were reluctant to arouse white hostility towards the Party by running a black candidate for office. The acid test of the Republican Party's sincerity on the question of black American political equality in the late 19th century was whether it was willing to sponsor black candidates in northern districts where black voters constituted a minority, not in the 'black belt' districts of the southern states. An examination of contemporary records demonstrates clearly that the Republican Party failed this test. Black Americans were consistently rejected as candidates for public electoral offices, state and federal, in northern districts prior to 1915.

The northward migration of tens of thousands of impoverished rural southern blacks that occurred in the first three decades of the 20th century radically altered the political situation. In their search for employment the migrants naturally tended to concentrate in the major northern industrial cities, particularly Chicago and New York City which stood at the terminus points of the continental railroads. As a consequence, the demographic structure of many city districts underwent rapid change; some gained substantial black populations virtually overnight. The electoral advantages that could be reaped in city districts by harnessing the transplanted southern blacks' traditional loyalty to the 'Party of Lincoln' were recognised immediately by northern white Republicans. Under white guidance black precinct workers were organised to educate the new city inhabitants in their voting duties. From the ranks of the precinct workers there emerged a new generation of professional black politicians whose

political careers depended upon their ability to organise the voting strength of the inner-city black districts. By 1920, a few black Republicans had secured party nominations and, in some instances, were elected to city councils, and state legislatures. It was not until 1928 however, that a Chicago black Republican, Oscar DePriest, had acquired sufficient political leverage to manoeuvre successfully for a Congressional nomination and win the general election.

At the Congressional level, the transportation of Black Republicanism from the South to the North proved to be shortlived. The economic reality of the Depression years had the effect of wrenching the northern black electorate from their nostalgic attachment to the Republicans and towards the Democrats. In 1934 DePriest was defeated by a black Democrat, Arthur Mitchell, who campaigned on the merits of 'New Deal' policies. As the national swing to the Democratic Party engulfed Chicago and other northern cities, many northern black Republican politicians learnt the political reality of the phrase, 'to the victor, go the spoils'. With the defection of growing numbers of black voters to the Democrats, Republican black politicians acknowledged that the political tide had turned, and switched party affiliations for their own political survival.² The tangible benefits that the implementation of 'New Deal' policies brought to urban black communities initiated a re-alignment in black American party allegiance which has persisted to the present day. Since the defeat of Oscar DePriest, all subsequent black Americans elected to the House of Representatives have run as Democrats.

In the new political environment of the urban North the general rule governing the election of Black Congressmen remained similar to that of the Reconstruction period: Black Representatives were elected only from the congressional districts containing the highest density black populations. In comparison with the Reconstruction period, black electoral

gains at Congressional level in the first half of the 20th century were sparse. During the first twenty-five years of the modern era of Black Representation in Congress, 1928-53, just four black Americans were seated in Congress. Basically, the explanation for this lies in the fact that only two northern congressional districts contained black American voting majorities, Chicago's South-Side district, and the Harlem district of New York City. The first four northern Black Congressmen owed their political careers to the black voting majorities of those two districts. Oscar DePriest, Arthur Mitchell, and William Dawson represented consecutively the Chicago south-side district (Illinois 1st), and Adam Clayton Powell Jr. represented the Harlem (New York 16th) from 1944 onwards.

On arrival in Congress the four pioneer northern Black Congressmen were confronted with the identical problem that had bedevilled their Reconstruction predecessors - How could a minority representative in a legislative body containing several hundred members maximise his political influence to the benefit of his black constituents, and the black American minority generally? An examination of the manner in which the first northern Black Congressmen approached this inherited problem is crucial in order that the legislative behaviour of current Black Congressmen can be fully understood. The foundations of the Congressional Black Caucus, its philosophy, political strategies, and policy goals rest upon an appreciation of early northern Black Congressmen's legislative experiences, political attitudes, styles, achievements and failures.

Mass black immigration was the root cause of the growth of black political strength in the northern cities. The first northern Black Congressmen gained their political experience in Chicago and New York during the turbulent decades, 1900-1940, when black migration to those cities reached its highest levels. During those years Chicago and New York experienced traumatic changes in the racial composition of their inner-city districts. South-Side Chicago was transformed from a racially-

mixed group of neighbourhoods with a minority black population of fourteen thousand in 1890, to a black American enclave of a quarter of a million persons in 1930. In 1890 New York City's small black population was dispersed. Pockets of black population were to be found in the city's five boroughs, particularly in the Manhattan districts of Tenderloin, San Juan Hill, and Harlem. By 1930, the massive influx of black migrants had resulted in the confinement of the majority of the city's black population to one district, Harlem, which soon became the largest, most concentrated racial enclave in the United States.

BLACK POPULATION GROWTH IN CHICAGO AND NEW YORK CITY, 1890- 1930.

City	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930
Chicago	14,271	30,150	44,103	109,458	233,903
New York	36,183	60,666	91,709	152,467	327,706

As the number of poor, uneducated black migrants arriving in Chicago and New York increased, the level of white hostility and racial discrimination intensified. The creation of exclusive black enclaves in both cities was a direct consequence of the operation of a rigid pattern of discriminatory practices in housing and employment endorsed by the white majority.³ The new black city dwellers did not chose to reside in South-Side Chicago, or Harlem, as a matter of preference, but simply because they had no alternative. Poverty may have been the initial force that caused black migrants to huddle together in the crowded properties of the black areas, but it was the physical debarment of black Americans from moving out to the white neighbourhoods that ensured the permanence of the black sections of both cities. Physical confinement inevitably encouraged the development of separate black civic organisations, business and political groupings. Black districts quickly produced an indigenous political leadership representing all strands of black political opinion, integrationists,

separatists, and Garveyites. In the forefront of black political leadership was the black politician. The black politician understood the black migrant's problems and frustrations and harnessed their discontent to create political bases in the black districts. In Chicago, Oscar DePriest, Arthur Mitchell, and William Dawson communicated with the new black migrants on the basis of their shared experiences as southerners who had moved North in search of employment opportunities. The principal asset of the successful black politician, however, was his organisational ability. His political career depended upon his skill in organising thousands of politically-inexperienced black migrants into a bloc vote which was bartered at City Hall for political favours. Prior to their election to Congress Oscar DePriest and William Dawson had worked for many years as local machine politicians organising the black vote at ward level. Although inexperienced in ward politics, Arthur Mitchell had been associated with Republican and Democratic groups in the South-Side before his election. Adam Clayton Powell began his political career as a fierce independent. Powell, a Baptist minister in Harlem, had organised local economic boycotts, civil rights campaigns and sat as a city councilman from Harlem before his congressional career began. (Table 4) The early northern Black Congressmen's political attitudes, and styles were formulated, therefore, in a period of transition for the black American minority. In Congress, consequently, their legislative behaviour reflected the vicissitudes in black political thought that occurred as a large sector of the black minority faced the problems of adapting to the urban environment of the northern city.

Black Congressman Oscar DePriest's political career has been described as "a classic case of the poor southern Negro migrant who made good in the North".⁴ DePriest had migrated to Chicago in 1889 and initially earned his living as a decorator and house painter.

TABLE 4.

PIONEER NORTHERN BLACK CONGRESSMEN; OCCUPATIONAL & POLITICAL BACKGROUND.

<u>Black Rep.</u>	<u>District & State</u>	<u>Terms in Congress</u>	<u>Date & Place of Birth</u>	<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Political Background</u>	<u>Congressional Committee Work</u>
Oscar DePriest (Repub.)	Ill.1st	3 terms 1928-34	Alabama 1871 Died 1951	Real Estate Business Owner	Cook County Commissioner (R), 1904-8. City Alderman (R), 1915-17. 3rd Ward-committeeman (R), 1928-36.	Indian Affairs. Invalid Pensions.
Arthur Mitchell (Dem.)	Ill.1st	4 terms 1935-42	Alabama 1883 Died 1968	Lawyer, Wash DC & Chicago	No previous public office held. Switched from Republicans to Democrats, 1932	Civil Service.
William Dawson (Dem.)	Ill.1st	14 terms 1943-70	Georgia 1886 Died 1970	Lawyer, Chicago	Chicago city Alderman (R), 1933-9. Switched from Republicans to Democrats, 1939. 2nd Ward-committeeman (D), 1939-70.	Government Operations. (Chairman, 1949-52, 1955-70.)
Adam C. Powell (Dem.)	NY 16th	12 terms 1945-66, 1969-70.	NewHaven Conn. 1908 Died 1972	Baptist Minister, Abyssinian Baptist Church. Journalist, Amsterdam News. Publisher, People's Voice.	New York City Councilman, (Ind.), 1941-4.	Education & Labour. (Chairman, 1961-66.)

His entry into politics was quite fortuitous. Prompted by a friend he attended a South-Side 3rd ward Republican precinct meeting. At the meeting his organising ability rapidly emerged, as evidenced by the fact that he left his first political meeting as the precinct captain's new secretary.⁵ DePriest's considerable skill in organising black voters in his neighbourhood precincts was not unnoticed by the 3rd ward's white Republican party bosses, in particular the South-Side's 1st district Congressman, Martin B. Madden. With Madden's political support DePriest won his first public electoral office as a county commissioner in 1904, and became Chicago's first black alderman in 1915. From the outset, however, DePriest never allowed himself to be totally controlled by the South-Side white Republican leaders. He did not hesitate to cultivate the friendship of white ward bosses but only in so far as it would further his political ambitions. Throughout his political career DePriest was a "supreme opportunist (who) did not regard himself as bound by party loyalty, by personal loyalty to any white man, or by loyalty to any abstract cause".⁶

DePriest attempted to build a separate, autonomous black political organisation in the South-Side black districts, but he was unable to achieve complete political autonomy because black political organisations remained dependent upon white party patronage. The lack of economic resources in the Chicago black districts constantly undermined the development of a permanent, independent political base. Nevertheless, DePriest came close to wielding genuine independent power via his masterful use of the only powerful asset the black districts possessed, the bloc vote. His personal organisation maintained tight control of the black vote in the 3rd ward black district. If necessary, he was prepared to use this bloc vote against the Republican

party machine which usually relied heavily on the black vote to win mayoralty and other city elections. In 1918 when he was out of favour with the white Republican party leaders, DePriest organised his supporters into an independent group, the 'People's movement'. Under the banner of his independent organisation he ran as a candidate for the 2nd ward aldermanic seat and was only narrowly defeated by the regular Republican candidate. DePriest was able to engage in displays of political independence principally because of his enormous popularity in the black districts. He made the newly-arrived southern black migrants his personal constituency. As a southern migrant himself, he had direct experience of their problems, and he skilfully established a popular following amongst them by articulating their grievances and making demands on their behalf. DePriest identified particularly with the poor, uneducated migrant; he often remarked in his speeches to migrant audiences, "I come from the common herd".⁷ In his political style he was always race-conscious, a 'race man' who frequently used racial appeals in his election campaigns. However, all aspects of DePriest's political behaviour, his creation of a personal following amongst the poor black migrants, his appeals to racial solidarity, can only be fully understood when explained within the context of his political opportunism. DePriest's bouts of independent action, and race-consciousness were calculated with one aim in mind - to build up his strength and leverage within the regular Republican organisation. He would readily abandon the concept of racial solidarity if he felt that to do so would enhance his own political fortunes. For example, in 1928 when a young black lawyer, William Dawson (later to be the third northern black Congressman) challenged the veteran white Congressman Martin Madden in the Republican primary, DePriest placed the weight of his organisation behind the incumbent. On this occasion DePriest's behaviour was explained by the fact that for many years he had been engaged in political manoeuvres to secure the 1st district congressional nomination on Madden's retirement. Furthermore,

in recognition of his political work in aiding Mayor 'Big Bill' Thompson's re-election, DePriest had just received the important party position of 3rd ward Republican committeeman; he knew that this position could easily become his "stepping-stone to Congress".⁸ In Chicago during the 1920's the political opportunities open to black politicians were few indeed, and consequently each man jealously guarded his political status. DePriest was the most successful black politician of the period because he was totally ruthless in defeating his competitors whether they were black or white, independent or regular Republicans. In DePriest's list of priorities his political career came first, race interests and party interests always took second place. When Congressman Madden died suddenly, shortly after the 1928 Republican primary in which DePriest helped Madden defeat the Dawson challenge, DePriest immediately seized the opportunity to gain Madden's congressional seat and worked equally vigorously to outmanoeuvre his white competitors. He quickly elicited Mayor Thompson's endorsement of his candidacy for the congressional nomination which, in effect, presented his white competitors with a 'fait accompli'. In one important respect, therefore, the first northern black Congressman differed from his 19th century predecessors. Whereas the southern black Representatives' congressional careers had depended ultimately on the goodwill of white Republicans in maintaining reconstruction policies in their respective states, DePriest was elected to Congress on the strength of his individual initiative, and his political skill in creating a situation in which he was able to bargain with white Republican leaders as more of a political equal.

As the first black politician to sit in Congress for almost three decades, DePriest accepted the responsibility to act as a national spokesman for the political interests of all black Americans, and in doing so he continued the tradition of his Reconstruction predecessors. In fact, during his maiden speech in the House on December 18th, 1929, Representative

DePriest deliberately introduced the issue of American race prejudice into a debate on the passage of a bill that would establish a Haitian survey. He commented wryly, "I am very glad to see the gentlemen on the minority side of this House so very solicitous about the conditions of the black people in Haiti. I wish to God they were equally solicitous about the black people in America".⁹ DePriest came to Congress with a strong reputation as a forceful defender of his race. And, in fact, during his three terms he fully lived up to his reputation. He paid particular attention to legislative measures that would affect black Americans, and in the majority of his floor speeches he exhibited a race-conscious attitude. His frequent willingness to draw attention to race issues in Congress caught the eye of the 'Philadelphia Tribune' which remarked of DePriest that "(he) looks the GOP squarely in the eye and declares he is a Negro before he is a Republican".¹⁰ In his general legislative behaviour DePriest was 'conservative' on economic matters, and 'liberal' on the question of civil and political rights. He opposed federal government intervention in the economy during the early years of the Depression, including proposals which would have established a federal unemployment compensation scheme. The pressure of high unemployment in his district, however, led him in 1932 to reverse his position and support bills providing federal aid to states for relief purposes. DePriest favoured federal government intervention to guarantee every citizen equal civil and political rights, and he devoted most of his legislative activity to sponsoring bills which sought to provide equal employment opportunities, equal voting rights, and impartial justice. As had been the case with his Southern predecessors, the vast majority of DePriest's legislative proposals died in committee. There was one notable exception. On March 29th, 1933 DePriest successfully attached an amendment to a legislative measure that proposed the establishment of a Civilian Conservation Corps to help alleviate unemployment. His amendment forbade discrimination on the grounds of race,

colour or religion in recruiting men to work in the Corps. The legislation with DePriest's amendment intact passed both the House and Senate and became public law.

Characteristically, DePriest was able to turn his solitary position in Congress to political advantage. He extracted the maximum political influence from the tactic of acting as national spokesman for all black Americans. Moreso than his predecessors, he used Congress as a vehicle of publicity for race demands. DePriest fully exploited his national status as a Congressman to forward race interests, expose prejudice, and educate his people. In fact, DePriest developed the political tactics that Adam Clayton Powell Jr., a few years later, would shape into a fine art. In Congress, DePriest regularly reminded his fellow legislators of the denial of equal political rights to black citizens; on one occasion in 1930 he remarked, "If we had a right to exercise our franchise.... as the constitution provides, I would not be the only Negro on this floor".¹¹ Also, he did not hesitate to forcibly speak his mind on contemporary race issues. On the House floor he defended the legal rights of the nine black youths accused of rape in the famous 'Scottsboro cases' in Alabama, questioning whether an impartial trial had been conducted. DePriest travelled throughout the southern states giving lectures to black audiences, often at considerable personal risk.¹² In his speeches to southern audiences, he always emphasised racial pride, and encouraged political awareness. DePriest recognised that as the sole representative of his race in Congress he had a duty to perform an educative role in the black communities. While acknowledging that political opportunism dominated DePriest's career, Harold Gosnell, in evaluating DePriest's congressional performance concluded as follows, "That DePriest felt his obligation to his race cannot be denied".¹³ Whether or not his motives were self-serving or altruistic, the black American press gave wide coverage to DePriest's congressional activities, and especially his lecture tours. He was depicted generally as a race hero whose success epitomised the black

American's newly-found political power in the North.

It was ironical that at the very moment Representative DePriest emerged as a black leader whose reputation was admired in black communities throughout America, his congressional career came to an abrupt end. In the 1934 congressional elections the national political swing in favour of the Democratic Party's 'New Deal' programme finally swept through South-Side Chicago, and the black Democrat, Arthur Mitchell, captured DePriest's House seat. In defeating DePriest, Mitchell won the distinction of being the first black Democrat ever to be elected to Congress. Mitchell owed his victory to the solid support of the South-Side's white voters. For a black candidate to win on the strength of the white vote in a 58% black district was a formidable achievement. Mitchell managed this feat by securing the sponsorship of the white Democratic Party political boss, 'Hinky Dink' Kenna, who controlled the party vote in the majority-white first ward, and by winning enough black votes in the district's other three wards to gain a plurality of 3,000 votes. The vast majority of black voters had supported DePriest. Even in 1936 in the midst of a Democratic electoral landslide DePriest still received the majority of black votes, but Mitchell maintained his overall plurality. In 1938, with DePriest out of the race, Mitchell finally captured the support of the majority of the black districts' voters.

Representative Mitchell's political style was quite different from DePriest. During his election campaign Mitchell had promised that he would effectively represent the district's interests without any of the unnecessary "bombast, ballyhoo and noise"¹⁵ which was DePriest's hallmark. It was this attitude that probably explained Mitchell's failure to capture the support of the majority of black voters for many years; in his congressional campaigns he was rarely race-conscious, and never made overt race appeals to the electorate. By continuing to support DePriest Chicago's black voters demonstrated that they preferred the nation's sole black Congressman to be an

assertive 'race man'. In terms of their political background, DePriest and Mitchell were poles apart. Whereas DePriest was a self-made professional politician fully versed in the 'rough and tumble' tactics of Chicago's ward politics, Mitchell was by contrast a political novice. In his political views Mitchell had been strongly influenced by the accommodationist philosophy of Booker T. Washington for whom he worked for many years. Consequently, in Congress he adopted a low-key role deliberately refusing to be race-conscious in his legislative behaviour. Mitchell was never a 'race man' instinctively taking a race position on contemporary issues. Unlike DePriest, whose political power was centred entirely in the black wards, Mitchell felt a commitment to the 19,000 white constituents who had given him his margin of victory in the district. Mitchell's moderate racial attitude was often illustrated in his floor speeches, as in this extract from a speech he made in support of Senator Hugo Black's nomination to the Supreme Court, "...Other Congressmen may draw the color line, but I have not done it; and no man, however bitter his criticisms, will cause me to descend from the high stand which I have taken, namely, that of being absolutely fair to all men, paying no attention to their race or their color".¹⁶

Nevertheless, Mitchell could not escape from the fact that he was black, and that black Americans faced peculiar disadvantages in American society. As the only black American in Congress, Mitchell, too, found himself compelled to pay special attention to legislation relating to race discrimination and segregation. In his private life, particularly, he fought adamantly against segregation. As had DePriest before him, Mitchell insisted on dining in the congressional private restaurants and generally using all the facilities of Capitol Hill that were exclusively available to legislators. In 1937, Mitchell engaged in a costly legal suit to seek redress after having been evicted from a first-class railway

carriage in order to conform with Arkansas segregation practices. The Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Illinois federal district court both ruled that they were unable to interfere with Arkansas 'separate but equal' laws that prohibited blacks and whites from travelling in the same carriage. Dissatisfied with this decision, Mitchell appealed to the Supreme Court for a definitive ruling. Eventually in March 1941, the justices ruled in Mitchell's favour stating that the railroad company by complying with Arkansas laws had violated the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court upheld Mitchell's suit on the basis of a section of the 1887 Act which had been originally introduced in the form of an amendment by a Reconstruction Black Congressman, James O'Hara of North Carolina (see above, chapter one). In Congress, Mitchell did not regularly perform the traditional role of acting as a national spokesman for the black minority, but he did develop a political tactic that modern Black Congressmen have adopted as an important element in their overall congressional strategy. In his standing committee work he made certain that the committee members had some understanding of the black American viewpoint before deciding legislative priorities. While a member of the House Civil Service Committee, Mitchell consistently tried to persuade fellow members to eliminate discriminatory practices in candidate selection; he frequently offered alternative schemes devised to minimise the occurrence of racial bias in civil service recruitment. Unfortunately, the legislative proposals he introduced at committee level, and those offered as amendments on the House floor, failed to pass for similar reasons to those of his black predecessors. Mitchell's conciliatory congressional behaviour and his racial moderation did not meet with any more legislative success than had DePriest's abrasive, race-conscious approach.

After four terms Mitchell voluntarily retired from Congress, and his place was filled by William L. Dawson in 1942. By this time the Chicago

Democratic Party organisation had recognised that the majority-black 1st district would remain permanently in their hands as long as a black candidate continued to be placed before the electorate. Consequently, the first 'safe' black congressional seat was established. The new black Congressman, William Dawson, had been a late convert to the Democratic party. In 1939 after losing his seat as a Republican city alderman which he had held for six years, Dawson acknowledged that the political reality of Democratic ascendancy in the country and Chicago necessitated that he switch party allegiances if he valued his own political future. Dawson admitted quite bluntly that "Roosevelt and Kelly made a Democrat out of me".¹⁷ When Chicago Democratic mayor Edward Kelly offered him the key patronage position of ward committeeman in the city's black 2nd ward, Dawson eagerly accepted and proceeded to organise the black vote for the Democrats. Once Dawson was assimilated into the regular Democratic party organisation his political behaviour underwent gradual transformation. In his earlier political career as a Republican alderman Dawson had a reputation as a maverick who was not averse to breaking ranks to vote for measures that he believed would help the black minority. During his two congressional bids as a Republican candidate, in 1928 against Martin Madden in the primary, and in 1938 against Arthur Mitchell in the general election, Dawson displayed a militant, race-conscious style. At one stage during the hustings prior to the 1928 primary Dawson said of his opponent, "Mr. Madden, the present Congressman, does not even live in the district. He is a white man. Therefore, for those two reasons, if no others, he can hardly voice the hopes, ideals and sentiment of the majority of the district".¹⁸ Evidence of race-consciousness and political militancy is rarely discovered when examining the long political career of Democratic Congressman William Dawson. Although, prior to his assumption of the chairmanship of the Government Operations Committee in 1949 and his concomitant acceptance of membership of the congressional establishment, junior Representative Dawson did exhibit some race-conscious political

behaviour. He took a special interest in legislative measures to remove poll taxes, and racial discrimination in the armed services. Indeed, in 1945 Dawson was described as "the fighting Congressman"¹⁹ whose political style was more forceful on race issues than his predecessor, Mitchell. But, as the years passed, Representative Dawson gave less of his attention specifically to race issues. He became accustomed to the political security that his loyalty to the Chicago Democratic organisation provided. Furthermore, he enjoyed the congressional authority and prestige that the seniority system brought, and had no desire to jeopardise his party standing by pursuing race ends. In his latter years Dawson was commonly depicted as a "strict, disciplined, party line politician",²⁰ a man whose loyalty to the party machine overrode his desire to represent the interests of his mainly poor, black constituents.

Representative Dawson came to Congress possessing the firm belief that the only way black political gains would be made was through organising a strong black vote that, in turn, would influence the policies of the Democratic party. He expressed this belief as follows, "We have the numbers. We are the largest ethnic minority in America today, but we must be made to understand the power of the vote. We.... must educate the Negro to politics. He must be made to understand that the vote is the best weapon the Negro has".²¹ Dawson partially realised his political belief by building, within the ranks of Chicago's Democratic party machine, a tightly-disciplined personal organisation which exercised a far more rigid control over the South-Side black vote than ever achieved by Oscar DePriest. Representative Dawson's theory never worked in practice, however, because he regularly delivered the black vote to the Chicago Democratic Administrations without, in exchange, exacting significant policy commitments that would benefit the South-Side's impoverished black residents. In fact, the course of Representative Dawson's political career illustrates especially that

the lessons of the Reconstruction Black Congressmen's collective experience had not yet been fully learnt. He made the similar mistake of placing too much faith in the hope that a major political party would conscientiously enact policies to benefit the black American minority once their political support was obtained.

As the post-war civil rights movement gained momentum in the southern states Representative Dawson remained noticeably silent. Black political activists began to regularly criticise Dawson for his silence and apparent apathy on the question of black political and civil rights. Over the years Dawson grew more sensitive to such criticism until, finally, in 1957, he replied bitterly, "How is it that after fighting all my life for the rights of my people, I suddenly awake in the September of life to find myself being vilified and abused Not for civil rights? I have tried to fight for civil rights where it is the most effective, within the caucuses of my own party".²² The facts of the matter were that Dawson did not possess a good record on civil rights. On Capitol Hill, unlike DePriest and Mitchell before him, Dawson placidly accepted the pervasive discriminatory procedures that regulated the use of congressional facilities. In 1955 when a fourteen-year-old black youth from Dawson's Chicago district, Emmett Till, was lynched in Mississippi after allegedly making 'indecent advances towards a white woman', Representative Dawson, to the astonishment of many prominent civil rights leaders, hardly uttered a word of condemnation. A year later Dawson had opposed the 'Powell Amendment' which sought to bar federal aid to segregated schools. The boycotts and marches and other political tactics adopted by the civil rights campaigners, and the independent, race-conscious strategies used by Representative Adam C. Powell Jr. were anathema to Dawson who believed that party loyalty and covert negotiation with the congressional hierarchy were the only means whereby black political gains could be achieved. Dawson would frequently offer the following advice

to his critics, "We must play the game according to the rules. I always play it that way and I play with my team".²³ But when his performance is judged on the basis of his own political standards, that is, the principles of strict adherence to party loyalty and conformity to congressional norms, it is apparent that in a congressional career which spanned almost three decades Representative Dawson achieved remarkably little of direct benefit to the black American minority. At the local ward level in Chicago, Harold Gosnell concluded that "Dawson's unswerving loyalty ... has not served his constituents in the poverty-stricken South-Side well, or acted in their real interests".²⁴ Dawson had deliberately structured his Chicago political organisation in such a manner that his black constituents did not expect any returns from his work in Congress.²⁵ He created two quite separate roles for himself, that of the local politician, and the Congressman. Constituency problems were dealt with solely at the local level. Unfortunately though, as a local politician he, too often, worked on the assumption that the party's interests were essentially identical to his black constituents' interests. In Congress, Representative William Dawson chose to ignore his base of support in the black community and refused to concern himself with national legislative remedies for race problems. Although Representative Dawson was the first black American to become chairman of a congressional standing committee, he did not use his congressional power to the advantage of black citizens. As chairman of the House Government Operations Committee from 1949 onwards, Dawson possessed the authority to investigate and oversee Government departmental expenditures. He could have used the committee's investigatory and oversight functions to expose any discriminatory practices in the use of public funds, particularly the distribution of federal contracts. Also Dawson's considerable influence in the Democratic party was rarely used specifically for race ends. As early as 1944 he was appointed assistant chairman of the Democratic

National Committee and by the end of the decade he had been elected as its vice-Chairman. Occasionally, Dawson was accused of using his national position in the Democratic party in a manner that worked against black American interests. In 1952 it was alleged that Dawson as a member of a Democratic Party Platform Committee assisted in the watering-down of the civil rights plank in order to improve the political chances of his home state's 'favourite son' presidential candidate, Governor Adlai Stevenson. In a study of the politics of civil rights in the Truman years, W.C.Berman noted that, 'William Dawson.... reportedly favored platform conciliation to prevent a party rupture, while placing more faith in the party's nominee than in its platform'.²⁶ In national politics, too, Representative Dawson tended to equate Democratic party interests with black American interests.

While acknowledging the validity of much of the criticism levelled at William Dawson, the importance of his political career cannot be underestimated. Representative Dawson achieved the dual distinction of being the first black American to gain real political influence in Congress, and the first to become a major figure within the Democratic Party national leadership. Dawson worked diligently to be accepted by the congressional hierarchy and, indeed, became a respected member, although the price he paid for the honour was his silence on race issues. Nevertheless, his hard-won congressional authority served to legitimise black American claims that they possessed the necessary political acumen required to contribute positively in the congressional policy-making process. Although Dawson refused to act as national black spokesman for race interests in Congress, he did use skilfully his congressional authority and party influence to lobby for more black American appointments in the federal government. As early as 1945 he possessed sufficient influence within the Truman Administration to have his recommendations accepted. In that year, on Dawson's request, a Chicago lawyer, Irvin C.Mollinson became the first black American appointed

to a federal judgeship in the United States. Dawson's political status in the Democratic party rested less on his congressional authority than his political power in Chicago. His political organisation, with its control of a massive bloc Democratic vote, not only sustained Democratic Administrations in Chicago, but also proved a crucial factor in presidential elections, particularly in a closely-run contest. In 1960 Dawson could boast with some justification, "Who was it that elected John F. Kennedy in Illinois? He carried the state by less than 10,000 votes; my district gave him a margin of 30,000".²⁷ President-elect Kennedy was not unaware of the significance of the Chicago black vote to his victory. He offered Dawson the position of PostmasterGeneral, and hence the opportunity to become the first black American appointed as a member of the Cabinet. Typically, Dawson declined the offer; he had no intention of abandoning his firmly-rooted congressional authority for the vagaries of Cabinet office.

In 1945, Representative Dawson had been joined in the House by another black Congressman, Adam Clayton Powell Jr., from the Harlem district of New York City. As junior representatives the two men displayed a willingness to work together on legislative matters of race interest, particularly anti-poll tax legislation and measures designed to eliminate discrimination in the armed services. For example in 1945 Dawson and Powell sat on an 'ad hoc', eight-member bipartisan committee established by Rep. Vito Marcantonio (ALP. NY) to steer anti-poll tax legislation through the House of Representatives. The committee introduced a discharge petition and successfully organised the collection of the vital 218 signatures required to free the legislation from the clutches of the recalcitrant Rules Committee.²⁸ As a result of the 'ad hoc' committee's work, the anti-poll tax legislation eventually passed in the House, but unfortunately, only to be defeated in the Senate. Later, in 1951, Dawson and Powell joined forces again to oppose a bill that would have led to the construction of a

separate hospital for black American war veterans; they issued a statement describing the bill as 'class legislation'. On the House floor both men argued that the passage of the bill would undermine progress made in eradicating segregation in the armed services during World War II.²⁹ But, instances of cooperation between the two black legislators were quite exceptional. For most of their congressional careers Dawson and Powell were separated by the incompatibility of their political styles and attitudes. As a Congressman, Powell was the very antithesis of Dawson. Whereas Dawson was a moderate on race issues, and a loyal party man, Powell was a militant 'race man', and a supreme political maverick.* As Dawson became more influential in Congress and his political stature in the Democratic party increased, he grew intolerant of the race-conscious, flamboyant behaviour of Representative Powell.

Powell gained his congressional seat after New York City's political boundaries were re-drawn in 1944. Before the redistricting, Harlem's concentrated black population had formed only one quarter of the electorate in a large congressional district, the 21st. In spite of demographic disadvantages though, there had been a few early attempts by black Americans to win the seat. Black Republicans Charles H. Roberts, Edward E. Johnson, and Hubert T. Delany, respectively, were candidates in the general elections of 1924, 1928 and 1929. In each case the black candidates received substantial support from Harlem black voters, but were defeated by the strength of the white Democratic vote in the district's three other wards. Harlem's black voters were more race-conscious and independent in their voting behaviour than Chicago's South-Side black voters. The existence of a competitive two-party system in New York City, particularly during the interwar years, placed the black vote in a pivotal position and hence encouraged political independence. Black American loyalty to the Republican party was eroded much earlier in Harlem than South-Side Chicago.

* maverick= a person who acts independently of an organisation, political party et.
(Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language,
World Publishing Company, New York, 1973.).

On many occasions Harlemites switched their political support to the Democrats and elected black Democratic state assemblymen and city aldermen. Also, in 1921, Harlem black voters cast 73% of their vote for the Democratic mayoralty candidate, John F. Hyland; in the same year Democrat Al Smith won the state governorship with the support of the majority of the black vote. Indeed, the apparent political independence of New York's black electorate led the black writer James Weldon Johnson to remark in 1924, "The Negro in Harlem has in very large degree emancipated himself from (single party domination) and become an intelligent voter".³⁰ On the whole, however, black political independence was as superficial in New York City as in Chicago; white party leaders still controlled the amount of patronage to be distributed by black politicians in the Harlem wards.

Adam Clayton Powell Jr. entered New York City politics as a race-conscious, aggressive independent who was determined to wrench the political control of Harlem's wards from the hands of white party leaders. In 1941, he put his name forward as a candidate for a seat on the restructured New York City Council. Powell won easily and became the first black American to be elected to the City Council. In this election, as well as later in the 1944 congressional race, Powell quite fortuitously benefitted from election procedure changes that had the effect of enhancing the opportunities of black candidates. Powell's political success owed as much to his reputation as a Harlem civil rights, and religious leader as it did to any timely revisions in district boundaries and election procedure. As the son of the Reverend Adam Clayton Powell Sr., the influential black pastor of Harlem's Abyssinian Baptist Church, Powell Jr. from his earliest years was groomed to occupy a leadership position in the black community. And, as expected, Powell succeeded his father as pastor of the Abyssinian Church in 1937. However, this was not before he had collected the rather unorthodox credentials for a pending clergyman of being a radical political activist, political journalist, and a noted 'playboy'. Many years later, in 1967,

when Rep. Powell was excluded from Congress, a fellow legislator, Emanuel Celler (D.NY) expressed the opinion that the root of Powell's troubles was his possession of "an undue sense of bravado".³¹ This phrase captures perfectly the character of Powell's behaviour throughout his public life. The ingredients of Powell's political success were a race-conscious political style, charismatic appeal, iconoclastic behaviour, unpredictability, and above all, an uncanny ability to survive the consequences of his political acrobatics. Inevitably though, in the long run the accumulated results of his disparate political actions led also to his final undoing.

Powell's first involvement in politics began in February 1936, when he accepted an offer to write a regular political column in the weekly Harlem black newspaper, 'Amsterdam News'. His column expressed a radical, race-conscious viewpoint on contemporary issues, always displaying skilful use of rhetoric, and was aptly named 'The Soap Box'. Eighteen months later, on becoming Baptist minister at the Abyssinian Church, Powell not only continued to write the column but broadened his political activity to include participation in local civil rights campaigns. Political affairs soon absorbed most of the new pastor's time. Powell's work as a Baptist minister became so intimately bound with his work as a political leader that the two roles were virtually indistinguishable. And in this fact lies the secret of his political success. Powell used his authority as a pastor, and the considerable influence and wealth of the Abyssinian Baptist Church, to enhance his political fortunes. The Abyssinian Church provided Powell with a firm, independent base of political support. The Church pulpit was his political platform; the large congregation became both his campaign workers and loyal voters. The Church gave Powell a personal following unfettered by any commitments to party organisations.³² In the year that he took his seat in Congress for the first time, 1945, Powell proudly admitted that, "I am what I am because of the Abyssinian Church - one of the most financially independent institutions anywhere in the black world."³³

In three important respects the election of Adam C. Powell Jr. marked a distinct change in the pattern of Black Representation in Congress. Powell was the first northern-born black American to be elected to Congress from a northern state. Secondly, Powell was the first black Congressman to gain office from the firm base of an independent political organisation in his district. And thirdly, Powell was the first black Congressman whose political experience had been gained in civil rights activities rather than local party politics. Rep. Powell's possession of an independent political base, and more importantly, his civil rights background led him to adopt a radically different attitude towards the legislative process than that of his predecessors. In Congress Powell viewed himself as an independent, militantly race-conscious defender of black American interests. Powell brought a new approach to the legislative process; he incorporated the political techniques he had learnt in civil rights campaigns into his congressional behaviour. With the benefit of hindsight, it can be argued that Powell, in doing this, was a forerunner to the modern black Congressmen who established the Congressional Black Caucus. Civil rights-experienced black Congressmen constituted the motivating force behind the formation of the CBC, its philosophy and political tactics; they brought the political style and tactics of the civil rights movement into the arena of Congressional politics.

Powell developed an interest in civil rights campaigns in the early 1930's when he was a young clergyman. The central aim of civil rights groups in New York at that time was to increase the number of job opportunities available to black Americans. Powell had regularly participated in various group boycotts and picketing campaigns. But, it was not until Powell succeeded his father as minister of the Abyssinian Church that he emerged as a major civil rights leader in the Harlem community. In 1938 Powell, together with prominent Harlem black leaders of various political persuasions, formed the 'Greater New York Coordinating Committee for Unemployment'.

In its first year the Committee had more success in opening up job opportunities to black citizens than any other civil rights organisation in New York City. The political tactic employed most effectively by the group was the 'Don't Buy Where You Can't Work' boycott. The rigid application of this strategy brought the group its most noted success, the creation of white-collar employment for blacks in department stores situated on Harlem's principal thoroughfare, 125th Street. On behalf of the Coordinating Committee, Powell signed an agreement with the local Chamber of Commerce guaranteeing that one-third of all white-collar jobs in Harlem stores would be filled with black employees. Two years later Powell achieved another significant success in creating job opportunities. He managed to persuade the New York Omnibus Company and the Irish-dominated Transport Workers Union to accept the employment of over two hundred blacks as drivers and mechanics. Powell accomplished this by successfully organising a total bus boycott in the black community. Powell astutely used his pulpit as a rallying point to gain support for the boycott. Similar tactics were to be adopted equally effectively by Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. in Montgomery, Alabama, fifteen years later. Powell's civil rights achievements in New York had the effect of projecting him into the national political limelight for the first time. In recognition of Powell's work, President Franklin Roosevelt offered him a seat on a Church Council which had just been created for the purpose of aiding handicapped children. With a dramatic gesture that caught the attention of the press, Powell refused to accept the invitation on the grounds that black crippled children were discriminated against in hospital treatment and aid. The unpredictable manner in which Powell responded to the President's offer proved to be indicative of the kind of political behaviour that would dominate his public career. In snubbing Roosevelt, Powell took the first step in establishing his reputation as a protest leader and defiant agitator for black American civil rights.

By the time Powell was elected to Congress in 1945 he was widely

recognised as the national voice of black American protest. Immediately, Rep. Powell brought the issue of black American civil rights to the attention of Congress, and kept the issue alive until his activities were eclipsed by the growth of the modern civil rights movement in the late 1950's. On taking his seat in the House, Powell recalled that Speaker Sam Rayburn offered him the following advice, "Everybody down here expects you to come with a bomb in both hands. Now don't do that, Adam.... Just see how things operate here. Take your time. There are a lot of good men around here. Listen to what they have to say, drink it all in, get reelected a few more times, and then start moving".³⁴ Needless to say, Powell chose to ignore this advice and proceeded to break all the informal rules governing the behaviour of 'freshmen' representatives. Two basic norms of the seniority system regarding 'freshman' behaviour were that junior representatives should be seen but not heard, and should defer to the views of elder members. During his first day in Congress, Powell broke both rules simultaneously by engaging in a heated dispute on the House floor with Rep. John Rankin (D.Miss.), a twelve term member who openly held white-supremacist views. While Congress was convening the following exchange occurred- Rep. Rankin "I won't sit by Powell". Rep. Powell "I'm happy that Rankin will not sit by me because that makes it mutual. The only people with whom he is qualified to sit are Hitler and Mussolini".³⁵ In a matter of weeks Powell had introduced several bills, all of which dealt with some aspect of black American civil rights; he submitted measures designed to remove poll taxes, outlaw lynching, halt segregation in public accommodations, and to establish suffrage rights in Washington DC. Unlike other 'freshmen' Powell never dropped his bills quietly into the legislative hopper. He always publicised each bill and, furthermore, openly criticised Congress for not having acted in that particular legislative field before. The chief weapon in Powell's arsenal was always his rhetorical skill which he used constantly to deride Congress for its hypocrisy and complacency on racial matters. The black American's role in Congress, in

Powell's view, was to publicise America's race prejudice and discriminatory practices. Rep. Powell rationalised that if it was inevitable that he would achieve little in legislative terms, he would, at least, make certain that his black constituents and black citizens generally were aware of what he was trying to do. Powell expressed this view as follows, "The way of the legislator is hard and especially so if he is black. If he happens to be Negro he must virtually build a way out of no way. For one thing, however, there can never be an excuse - and that is silence".³⁶ If his forthright speeches on aspects of race discrimination did not convince fellow legislators of the need for legislative remedies, Powell calculated that they would perform the equally important functions of keeping him to the forefront of black political leadership, and of enhancing black political consciousness.

Powell had been elected to Congress with the endorsement of all three major political parties in New York, the Democratic, Republican and American Labour parties. In Congress, Powell chose to align with the Democrats, regarding them as closest to his political thinking. It was evident, however, from the moment of his arrival, that his race-consciousness and unpredictability would not endear him to the congressional Democratic party leadership. The possession of an independent political base enabled Powell to adopt an uncompromising attitude on race issues which often placed him in disagreement with Democratic party leaders. Furthermore, Powell knew that his defiance of the Democratic party leadership on race questions worked to enhance his political stature in Harlem. Indeed, the maintenance of his outspoken, flamboyant, aggressively race-conscious congressional behaviour virtually guaranteed his continual reelection. Consequently, Democratic leaders could never be certain of Powell's vote on issues in which he thought the race question was involved. In one of his first roll-call responses Powell voted against a labour bill that proposed the establishment of a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission. Although Powell supported the policy of a permanent FEPC, he refused to support this particular bill

on the grounds that opponents had undermined the intent of the legislation by amendment. The unpredictability of Rep. Powell's behaviour outside Congress also served to embitter his relationship with the Democratic party. From his college days, Powell had always exhibited a taste for high-living and material extravagance, and this pattern of behaviour did not halt when he became a Congressman. In fact, as J.Q. Wilson has noted, Rep. Powell astutely used his affluent lifestyle as a powerful political asset; he strengthened his support amongst black constituents by simply "doing what many of them understandably would like to do".³⁷ Poverty-stricken Harlemites were not resentful of Powell's openly displayed affluence but, on the contrary, they gained considerable satisfaction from seeing a black American enjoying a lifestyle that most of the white majority could never afford. Powell was keenly aware of the political ramifications of his flamboyant private life. Frequently, his actions were deliberately designed to encourage criticism from his white congressional colleagues. Powell knew that he could capitalise on any white criticism in his constituency. The more that Powell infuriated white political leaders and was openly criticised by them, the more his Harlem black constituents admired and supported him. The first instance of a political conflict arising from events in Rep. Powell's private life occurred in October, 1945, shortly after his marriage to Hazel Scott, the jazz pianist. In that month, Scott was refused permission to perform in Washington DC's Constitution Hall by its owners, the Daughters of the American Revolution. The racially-conservative DAR stated that they did not allow black entertainers to perform in the Hall. Immediately, Rep. Powell politicised the issue by asking President Truman to intervene. Truman responded by publicly condemning the DAR's decision as reminiscent of Nazi thinking, but at the same time he argued that he could not interfere in the business interests of a private organisation. A heated public debate on the issue ensued in Congress and the press. While the controversy raged, President Truman's wife rather tactlessly attended a

private social function organised by the DAR. On hearing of this meeting Powell, who had personally requested that Mrs. Truman not attend, issued a public statement that asserted, "From now on, Mrs. Truman is the Last Lady".³⁸

In the same statement Powell was particularly critical of the President, accusing him of hypocrisy in condemning Nazism while complacently accepting race prejudice in America. The course of Rep. Powell's actions during this incident set a pattern that was to be repeated each time his private life became subject to public attention whether the issue was marital, as in this case, or legal, as in the various income tax and libel suits lodged against him. In his private life, as well as in his political career, Powell always pursued a defiantly independent, race-conscious strategy drawing no distinctions over who he attacked or criticised. Powell's adoption of this strategy gave him political security in Harlem, made him a 'race idol' in black communities everywhere, but in Congress brought him the constant wrath of the Democratic party leadership.

Rep. Powell's congressional career contained two distinct phases. In the first phase, 1945-58, Powell established a reputation as an unassailable political maverick. This period ended with Powell triumphantly defeating his Democratic congressional critics and the New York Democratic organisation in their concerted efforts to unseat him after his support of President Eisenhower in the 1956 election. In the second phase, 1958-70, Powell's political behaviour became more erratic as he tried to reconcile the conflicting pressures of his 'maverick' political instinct and his desire to gain authority in Congress. This latter period began with Powell mending his political fences in New York by embracing the regular Democratic organisation, and benefitting from the seniority system in Congress where he became chairman of the House Education and Labour Committee; it concluded with Powell's exclusion from Congress, his successful challenging of the exclusion in the Supreme Court, and his electoral defeat in a Harlem primary. The nature of Powell's political behaviour in the first phase of his congressional career

was epitomised in the persistent efforts he made to attach anti-segregation amendments to major legislation. In the mid 1950's Rep. Powell's anti-segregation amendments were introduced so regularly that they were listed in contemporary congressional records under the collective title of the 'Powell Amendment'. Powell offered amendments to ban racial segregation in public housing, public schools, the armed services, the National Guard and many other areas of national life. The 'Powell Amendment', however, earnt notoriety in 1956 when it was added to a federal aid to education bill which provided school construction funds. Powell's amendment read, 'Bar federal aid to states which fail to comply with decisions of the Supreme Court'. Powell was advised that opponents of the bill would support his amendment in order to facilitate the consolidation of the conservative coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats in opposition to the bill. This possibility was of little concern to Powell; for him the amendment was a matter of principle. He sought to demonstrate that the Supreme Court desegregation decision in 'Brown vs Board of Education, 1954' was quite ineffective unless legislative support was provided. During the floor debate on the legislation Powell justified the need for his amendment as follows, "During the past two years since the Supreme Court decision, public schools have been built with federal funds in the impacted areas, and they have been built on a Jim Crow, segregated basis. The Supreme Court has never had the power to compel any state to obey any of its decisions".³⁹ Powell refused to withdraw his amendment, and as predicted the amended legislation was defeated. Eight years later, however, Powell gained considerable satisfaction from the fact that the principle embedded in the 'Powell Amendment', ie. that federal funds should not be used to support discriminatory practices, was used to form the basis of Title 6 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

In his early congressional career Powell's use of the 'Powell Amendment' was only one way in which his maverick behaviour began to annoy his Democratic colleagues. During these years Powell also established a

reputation for frequent absenteeism from committee work and roll-call voting. In committee and on the House floor Rep. Powell always voted in a highly independent manner. On average, in each session, Powell could only be counted on to vote with the Democratic majority on approximately half of the major legislation roll-calls. As a rule, Party leaders accepted the presence of mavericks within the ranks of the congressional parties; the maverick was a traditional element of the flexible, relatively undisciplined American party system. Rep. Powell, however, proved to be an exception to this rule. When Powell temporarily deserted the Democratic party to support President Eisenhower's reelection in 1956, many Democratic leaders felt that Powell's maverick behaviour had become excessive and could no longer be tolerated. Rep. Powell's endorsement of President Eisenhower was his definitive independent political action. Amid allegations that he had agreed to support the Administration in exchange for the halting of income tax investigations against him, Powell declared that black voters should support Eisenhower because he was 'the lesser of two evils'. He accused the Democratic party of deliberately back-peddling on the civil rights issue. Whether, in fact, Powell's action had a major impact on black American voting generally in the 1956 Presidential election is subject to conjecture. Undoubtedly, though, Powell successfully persuaded Harlem black voters to split the ticket; they voted overwhelmingly for a Republican President, while continuing to support Powell, the Democratic congressional candidate. Rep. Powell's behaviour infuriated both Democratic congressional leaders, and the regular Democratic organisation in New York. In response, both groups initiated punitive actions against Powell. At the beginning of the 85th Congress, Democratic hostility towards Powell had reached sufficient magnitude that serious attempts were made to deprive him of his seniority. Although these attempts eventually failed, minor disciplinary measures were taken. For example, the House Patronage Committee refused to endorse some Powell appointees, and Powell's new congressional office was assigned to another Congressman. In New York,

Tammany Hall refused to endorse Powell and entered their own candidate in the 1958 Harlem primary. But Harlem's black voters vigorously supported Powell's political independence and awarded him massive pluralities in the primary and general election. Ironically, the effect of the various punitive actions attempted, or taken against Rep. Powell was that many of his most effective critics in the black community rallied to his support. Many civil rights leaders believed that the Democratic party was punishing Powell simply because he was black. To support this claim, they cited the example of the 'Dixiecrat' revolt from the Democratic party in 1948. If Powell was really being punished for his independent action in the 1956 Presidential election, why had not similar punitive measures been metered out to 'Dixiecrat' Democratic members when they temporarily deserted the Party in the 1948 Presidential elections? Roy Wilkins of the NAACP, who frequently disapproved of Powell's erratic congressional behaviour, was one of many Powell critics who came to his defence; Wilkins felt that it was, "an inescapable conclusion that the Democratic party is taking punitive action because of Powell's race and also because of his efforts to secure passage of civil rights legislation".⁴⁰ When the furore eventually subsided, Rep. Powell emerged triumphant with his congressional seniority intact and his electoral base as secure as ever. In many ways though, the events of the period 1956-8 provided an omen for the future. With hindsight, it can be argued that these early attempts to discipline Powell were a dress rehearsal for a later occasion when Rep. Powell would not only lose his seniority but also be excluded from Congress.

The bitterness of the confrontation with the Democratic party led Powell to reconsider his congressional tactics. Powell recognised that to gain any further congressional authority he would have to adopt a more conciliatory approach towards his Democratic colleagues. This decision was reinforced early in 1959 when House Education and Labour chairman, Graham Barden (D. NC), announced his retirement from Congress at the end of the session. Powell was second-ranking Democrat on the committee, and had

clearly stated on many occasions his desire to become chairman. Although the committee seniority system did not distinguish between mavericks and party loyalists in allocating committee chairmanships, Powell was keenly aware that many senior Democrats would strongly oppose his assumption of the chairmanship. Consequently, if for this reason alone, Powell calculated that it would be prudent for him to mend his political fences with the Democratic party. He quickly made amends with the regular Democrats in New York, and dramatically improved his attendance rate at standing committee meetings and in the congressional lobbies. Nevertheless, the gulf between Rep. Powell and the Democratic leadership proved difficult to bridge, and there ensued a major conflict behind the scenes on the question of the Education and Labour Committee chairmanship. Some Democratic members argued that Powell's high level of absenteeism disqualified him from the chairmanship. Also many liberal Democratic members on the Education and Labour Committee were opposed to Powell assuming the chairmanship. Over the years they had grown markedly hostile to Powell's race-consciousness and independent behaviour in committee meetings, particularly when he had jeopardised the legislative future of bills in which they had vested interests by offering anti-segregation amendments. Few liberal Democrats raised any objections when chairman Barden regularly ignored Powell's committee seniority; Barden arbitrarily denied Powell a sub-committee chairmanship, and rarely consulted with Powell on committee business. AFL-CIO leader, George Meany, did not hesitate to inform the Democratic leadership of his views on the prospect of Rep. Powell as chairman. In February, 1960 Meany said, "He carried on a hate campaign and used his power to stir up racial hatred at the slightest provocation..... It's terrible to think that we'll have a man like that as chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee".⁴¹ Meany's statement implied that he preferred the current chairman, Graham Barden, a southern Democrat who had consistently killed pro-labour legislation, rather than Powell, who possessed a pro-labour voting record. Meany obviously feared that

Powell as chairman would be too independent and, furthermore, would embarrass the craft unions by continuing his tactic of exposing discriminatory practices within their ranks. In the end, the controversy was resolved by allowing the machinery of the seniority system to work its inexorable course. In the final analysis, senior Democrats were reluctant to tamper with the system on which their own authority rested. At the opening of the 87th Congress, January 1961, Rep. Powell became chairman of the House Education and Labour Committee.

As Education and Labour Committee chairman, Rep. Powell exercised more influence in the legislative process than has any other Black Congressman, past or present. During the six years of his chairmanship the House Education and Labour Committee experienced one of the most prolific periods of its history in terms of major legislation reported and passed. Under chairman Powell's direction, the committee reported sixty major pieces of legislation of which forty-nine became public law. Many important measures were successfully reported from Powell's committee, including minimum wage, fair employment practices, federal aid to education, and 'war on poverty' legislation. In a letter to Rep. Powell in March, 1966, President Lyndon Johnson praised Powell for his "brilliant record of accomplishment"⁴² as Education and Labour chairman. Powell himself, as always, was keenly aware of his own achievements; in his autobiography he proudly boasted that, "In the six years I was committee chairman, I never lost a bill once it got to the House floor".⁴³ The general consensus of opinion amongst contemporary congressional observers was that Powell was one of the most effective chairmen in the House. In spite of these facts, however, Rep. Powell's period as Education and Labour chairman was the most turbulent, and disastrous part of his political career. The problem was that Rep. Powell wanted congressional authority on his own terms. Once the Committee chairmanship was safely in his hands, Powell deliberately reverted to his earlier maverick political behaviour. Within a matter of months he had reasserted his

race-conscious, flamboyant style in Congress, and resumed his freewheeling, affluent lifestyle. In making this decision Powell sowed the seeds of his own political destruction. The Congressional leadership was prepared to endure Powell's race-conscious, independent manner as a relatively junior Representative, but they would not accept such behaviour from a committee chairman.

Powell commenced his first term as Education and Labour Committee chairman winning praise from many quarters, including some favourable comments from his most outspoken congressional critics. The top-ranking Republican on Education and Labour, C.D.Kearns (Pa.), had no criticism of Powell's chairmanship, "He's on the job the first thing Monday morning and stays to Friday night. We're getting our legislation on the floor. What more can you ask of a chairman?".⁴⁴ In August 1962, however, an event occurred that abruptly ended the 'honeymoon' period of Powell's chairmanship and, furthermore, signified the beginning of the decline of his congressional career. In that month Powell, accompanied by two members of his committee staff, departed for a six week visit to Europe on committee business. The diligent investigations of the press, however, discovered that Powell's two assistants happened to be attractive young women, and that the official committee business ostensibly being undertaken mainly involved sight-seeing, theatre visits, and expensive hotels. The press gave their findings maximum exposure throughout the United States, labelling Powell the 'Harlem Globetrotter', and the whole trip as an unnecessary 'congressional junket'. On the surface Powell's 'junket' appeared to be a rather trivial incident but, in fact, it served to reopen the deep wounds that already existed in the relationship between Powell and the Democratic congressional leadership. The 'congressional junket' was by no means an unusual occurrence; State Department 'counterpart funds' were available in many countries, and indeed, most Congressmen made use of these funds for foreign travel. But, before Powell was seen openly enjoying the benefits of the funds, their availability had been a relatively

well-kept congressional privilege. By exposing the excesses of congressional privilege Powell brought Congress as a whole into national disrepute. The inevitable result of this development was that congressional hostility towards Powell rapidly intensified and, more importantly, became bipartisan in character. This incident proved to be the first of a series that, in aggregate, created a political climate in which Powell was to be deposed as committee chairman, and excluded from Congress.

Rep. Powell's downfall resulted from a complex interaction of events. Each event had its origins in the principal traits of Powell's political character that have been identified above, i.e. his defiant independence and militant race-consciousness. These events fall broadly into three categories. The first category involved events relating to his internal congressional activity; the second category involved his increasingly militant racial attitude and conflict with civil rights leaders; finally, the third category related to developments in his private life.

The events of the first category can be grouped under the general heading, 'abuse of congressional privilege'. The first event in this category was the European 'junket'. Powell's flamboyant use of government funds and, moreover, his lack of repentance over the issue, enraged fellow Congressmen and led to the first moves to have his committee powers reduced. It can be argued that there was a strong element of hypocrisy in the motives of Congressmen who wanted to punish Powell. Disciplinary action was sought against Powell essentially not because of his actual misuse of public funds, but because the derogatory publicity that his 'junket' had engendered threatened the continued existence of hallowed congressional privileges such as 'counterpart funds'. In other words, the general feeling was that Powell should be punished because he had 'rocked the boat'. The ramifications of Powell's 'congressional junket' were felt in Congress for several months as members wrestled with the problem of how to discipline Powell. The extent of the bipartisan hostility towards Powell was dramatically illustrated

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in February 1963, when Senator John J. Williams (R. Del.) took the unprecedented step of criticising Rep. Powell on the Senate floor. Sen. Williams led the the debate over Powell's abuse of congressional privilege a stage further by not only criticising Powell's misuse of committee funds, but also by accusing him of nepotism in employing his then wife as a member of his congressional staff. Powell survived this attack and the many others in the critical period following his European trip by adopting the strategy that had served him well in the past. He charged that the attempts to discipline him were simply racially-motivated. In taking foreign trips and employing his wife, he argued that he was behaving in a manner similar to other Congressmen. A frequent answer Powell gave to the charges made against him concerning abuse of congressional privilege was as follows, "I do not do any more than any other member of Congress, and by the grace of God I will not do less".⁴⁵ Powell knew that his congressional critics were holding an untenable position when they vilified him for misuse of public funds and nepotism. Other members had spent much larger sums of public money on world travel in 1962 than had Powell. Also the pervasiveness of nepotism in congressional staff-hiring procedures was common knowledge. Four years later however, in 1967, Rep. Powell was unable to overcome similar allegations of abusing congressional privileges. In the intervening years other developments in Rep. Powell's turbulent political career had the effect of tilting the political balance in favour of his congressional opponents.

The most significant series of developments that worked to Powell's disadvantage in Congress were those deriving from his increasingly militant stance on contemporary racial issues. At the precise moment when white American sympathy for the aims of the civil rights movement led by Martin Luther King was reaching its peak, Rep. Powell embraced the black nationalist views of Malcolm X and criticised the civil rights groups for being white-dominated organisations. During a public speech in March 1963, Powell remarked, "One of the things I am very close to agreeing (on) almost

completely with Malcolm X is his analysis of our present national Negro organisations. Unless we can seize completely the administration and policy-making of our national Negro organisations, then we must say there is no hope there for us".⁴⁶ From this speech onwards Powell adopted a racial attitude that placed him outside the mainstream of black American political thinking. When Stokely Carmichael shouted the words 'Black Power' in the summer of 1966, Rep. Powell was the only black national political figure who publicly endorsed the slogan. In September 1966, Powell organised a 'Black Power Planning Conference' which was held in the Rayburn House Office Building on Capitol Hill. Two hundred representatives from a plethora of radical black organisations converged on Washington DC to participate in the conference. Powell's arrangement of the conference particularly angered many Congressmen. By convening the conference within the grounds of Congress they argued that Powell had legitimised the 'Black Power' concept, which in their view was undesirable. In the minds of most Congressmen and the white American public the proponents of 'Black Power' were synonymous with those black Americans who had rioted and looted in northern cities in the two previous summers. The overall effect of Rep. Powell's radical stance on racial issues was that his position in Congress deteriorated in three important areas. Firstly, he alienated many white liberal Democrats who had previously supported him in his struggles with the party leadership. Secondly, civil rights organisations embittered by Powell's consistent criticism became unwilling to lobby for his causes on Capitol Hill. Finally, public opinion grew intolerant of Rep. Powell's behaviour; congressional offices were flooded with letters critical of his radical racial posture and flamboyant attitude.

In addition to these factors, a third category of developments involving Rep. Powell's private life served to further undermine his position in Congress. Throughout his chairmanship of the Education and Labour Committee, Powell was fighting a libel action brought against him by a Harlem constituent whom he had accused, on a television programme, of collecting 'graft' for corrupt police officers. In challenging the suit Powell claimed that as his

allegations were simply a repetition of remarks he had made on the House floor concerning police corruption in New York City he was protected by congressional immunity and could not be indicted. The New York Court, however, disagreed and in March 1963 awarded the petitioner \$11,500 compensation damages and \$200,000 punitive damages. Powell, who had not attended the trial, refused to pay the damages. There followed a protracted legal battle which culminated in November 1966 with a criminal contempt arrest order being issued against him. Powell's usual reaction to the legal proceedings that engulfed him from 1963 onwards was to regularly leave Washington for his Bermuda retreat, the island of Bimini. This behaviour created another problem for Powell in the form of the growing consternation of his congressional colleagues who were tired of his frequent absence from important committee meetings. Given all the other controversial developments surrounding Rep. Powell, many Congressmen felt that the issuance of a criminal contempt order against him was 'the last straw'. Consequently, at the close of the 89th Congress the House Administration Committee began to investigate Powell's activities.

When Congress reconvened, the Committee recommended that Powell be deprived of his chairmanship primarily because he had used committee funds for private travel expenses and to finance a sinecure committee staff post for his wife. On January 9th, 1967, the Democratic Caucus endorsed the House Administration Committee report and voted to remove Powell from the chairmanship. With this decision made, the stage was set for Powell's exclusion from Congress. The next day, January 10th, the House voted to temporarily suspend Rep. Powell pending an investigation into his public and personal affairs by a Select Committee. After two months of inquiry, the Select Committee issued its final report. In the words of the report, Rep. Powell's defiance of the New York Courts had brought 'great disrespect on the House of Representatives'. The report concluded that as punishment for his poor standard of congressional behaviour, particularly his misuse

of committee funds as Education and Labour chairman, Rep. Powell, in addition to forfeiting the chairmanship, should be formally censured, fined \$40,000 and deprived of his party seniority. The one black American member of the Select Committee, junior Representative John Conyers (D.Mich), dissented from the majority opinion and recommended only that Powell should be severely censured. In spite of the severity of the Select Committee report, the House membership as a whole was dissatisfied with its recommendations. On March 1st, 1967, the House rejected the recommendations of its own Select Committee and voted to exclude Powell from Congress and declare his congressional seat vacant. The majority vote in favour of exclusion can be seen as the final manifestation of the deep-seated indignation many Congressmen felt about Powell and his irregular congressional behaviour. This attitude was best expressed by Rep. Durward G. Hall (R.Mo) during the House floor debate on the question of whether the Select Committee recommendations be accepted, "I submit to the members that all the humiliation, all the pleas that have been brought, all the evidences of censure in this report toward this man who has referred to all of us as hypocrites indicate this man is uncensurable, unembarrassable, and irresponsible".⁴⁷ Although Rep. Powell later won a reversal of the exclusion decision in the Supreme Court and served another term in Congress (91st Congress), his political career effectively ended with the vote to unseat him in March 1967. The Supreme Court decision⁴⁸ vindicated Powell's charge that the House had acted improperly in removing him on grounds other than the constitutional requirements of age, citizenship and inhabitancy, but upheld the Congress' right to discipline its members by other means. Shorn of his congressional authority by the loss of his seniority and committee chairmanship, Rep. Powell lost interest and, eventually, lost the support of his faithful Harlem constituents. In 1970 he was beaten in the Harlem Democratic primary by a black state assemblyman, Charles Rangel.

The implications of Rep. Powell's exclusion from Congress and, more importantly, the removal of his seniority and committee chairmanship are of considerable significance. The premature ending of Rep. Powell's controversial congressional career raised the fundamental question of the viability of Congress as an instrument for effective black American participation in national policy-making. The circumstances of Powell's removal reinforced the belief held by many black Americans that the on-going political process is inherently racist in its structure. Chuck Stone, Rep. Powell's staff director on the Education and Labour Committee, articulated this view as follows, "If a black politician becomes too powerful i.e., exercises whatever power flows from the perquisites of offices, he is regarded as a threat to the white political establishment. He must be willing to compromise far more frequently than white politicians because of the peculiarities of American racism, which demand that he not be too independent, too audacious, too unpredictable....For a black man to pursue political power and then exercise it has not been.... accepted yet".⁴⁹ Undoubtedly, Rep. Powell's eventual downfall owed as much to the inconsistencies and double standards of his fellow Congressmen as it did to his own irregular congressional behaviour. Powell's flamboyant political actions were only partly to blame for his exclusion. Powell's determination to exercise the right to behave as badly as the worst Congressman coupled with his defiant race-consciousness had the effect of alienating a majority of white Congressmen and the white American public. The volumes of anti-Powell correspondence arriving in congressional offices rendered it both desirable and politically expedient for Powell's congressional critics, and Congressmen generally, to vote for exclusion. Furthermore, Powell's inconsistency on racial issues in the 1960's undermined his support amongst civil rights leaders. In their view Rep. Powell's race-conscious, independent behaviour during that period was directed towards fulfilling his own personal political needs rather than securing policy commitments to the benefit of the black

minority. Consequently, when Powell was finally threatened with exclusion the civil rights congressional lobby failed to come to his aid. To some extent, therefore, Rep. Powell was responsible for his own downfall. Nevertheless, the unusual severity of the punishment administered to Rep. Powell by his colleagues did raise the issue of whether racism was a factor contributing to Powell's demise. There is ample evidence to suggest that Congressmen acted in an inconsistent manner when they voted for Powell's exclusion. The misuse of committee funds by Congressmen had been discovered on many occasions, and had seldom merited punishment more severe than mild censure. In an article published at the time of the Powell controversy, Andrew Kopkind provided evidence to suggest that Powell's race imposed special standards of congressional ethics upon him, "Rep. Joe Pool can defy federal court orders..., Wayne Hays can take the House dining room head-waiter to Europe, and Sam Gibbons can locate a VA hospital on his father's land. But Negroes should be a credit to their race".⁵⁰ On the question of absenteeism, Rep. Powell's behaviour as Education and Labour chairman was never any worse than that of the former chairman of the House Rules Committee, Howard Smith(D.Va) who had a reputation for taking regular sojourns whenever legislative measures that he disliked came before his committee. In the case of Rep. Powell, double standards of congressional ethics based on race seemed to apply. To give weight to this view, it is worthy of note that, in June 1966, just three months after Powell's exclusion, Senator Thomas Dodd (D.Conn) received only a mild censure after internal investigations had discovered his misuse of campaign funds. The fact of Powell's race certainly seemed to have been a major determining factor in the vote for exclusion. The chairman of the Select Committee which investigated Powell's affairs, Emanuel Celler (D.NY) was in no doubt that this was true, he concluded, "It was racism accompanied by the hysteria that had resulted from the climate of public opinion due to Mr. Powell's antics and peculiarities and swagger and defiance".⁵¹

In conclusion, the congressional careers of Rep. Dawson and Rep. Powell were particularly significant because they were the first Black Congressmen to achieve positions of authority in Congress. The course of their congressional careers demonstrated to their successors the alternative approaches to the legislative process available to the minority representative. In many ways, the Congressional Black Caucus was built upon the foundations of the collective political experience of these pioneer northern Black Congressmen. It has been seen that Dawson and Powell held quite different views concerning how congressional authority could be most effectively wielded. Rep. Dawson adopted a conciliatory approach towards the legislative process structured on party loyalty and adherence to congressional norms. Whereas Rep. Powell adopted a race-conscious, maverick approach structured on an independent political base in his district. Earlier northern Black Congressmen Rep. Mitchell and Rep. DePriest did not gain positions of authority in the committee system, but they had adopted a similar approach to that of Rep. Dawson; Rep. DePriest, however, was more race-conscious than either Mitchell or Dawson. Each approach had its merits, and its pitfalls. Dawson's approach led him to be a respected committee chairman, but an ineffective legislator in terms of representing the interests of his black constituents. Powell's approach made him an unpopular figure amongst his colleagues, but an effective spokesman for the black American minority in Congress. Owing to the relatively neutral mechanism of the House seniority system, however, Rep. Powell received a committee chairmanship in spite of his erratic behaviour and his regular conflicts with the Democratic leadership. It was a final irony that, as chairman of the Education and Labour Committee, the race-conscious, maverick Rep. Powell secured the passage of more legislation of direct benefit to the black American minority than did Rep. Dawson, a Democratic party loyalist. If Powell had not literally thrown away his committee power by his excessively flamboyant congressional behaviour, he could have remained a race-conscious, powerful committee

chairman. The fact that Rep. Powell's race-conscious, maverick behaviour had brought considerable legislative success was duly recognised by the new black Congressmen who arrived in the House in the 1960's. With the excesses of his personal behaviour removed, Rep. Powell's approach to the legislative process was used to form the basis of the initial strategy of the Congressional Black Caucus. The new Black Congressmen augmented Powell's approach with the strategies of racial partisanship and group cohesion. Black Representatives failed to coalesce in a formal caucus, however, as long as Rep. Powell and Rep. Dawson remained in the House. Until his election defeat in 1970, Rep. Powell jealously guarded his political independence and remained unwilling to engage in joint congressional activities with the new black Representatives. Whereas Rep. Dawson, until his death in 1970, maintained his staunch party loyalty and refused to take any 'race' stand in Congress.

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FOOTNOTES

1. LaWanda & John Cox, "Negro Suffrage and Republican Politics: The Problem of Motivation in Reconstruction Historiography". (Journal of Southern History, Vol. 33, 1967) Cites voting data which demonstrates that even in the few 'black counties' of northern congressional districts the impact of black voting was negligible. pp. 321-26.
2. Rita Werner Gordon, "The Change in the Political Alignment of Chicago's Negroes during the new Deal". (Journal of American History, Vol. 56, 1969-70. pp 596-7).
3. For detailed analyses of the discriminatory practices that led to the formation of the black American enclaves in Chicago and New York City; Allan H. Spear, "Black Chicago: The Making of a Negro Ghetto, 1890-1920". (University of Chicago Press. 1967), Gilbert Osofsky, "Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto. Negro New York, 1890-1930". (Harper & Row Publishers. NY.1963).
4. Spear, "Black Chicago" p 78.
5. Harold F. Gosnell, "Negro Politicians. The Rise of Negro Politics in Chicago". (University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books 1967. Originally published in 1935) In his own words, DePriest explains the events of his first political meeting. pp. 167-8. "The vote was 20-20 for rival candidates and I saw right away that a deal could be made. So I went to one of the candidates and said, 'Now you're the man who ought to be captain, I'll give you two additional votes if you'll make me secretary.' The man refused. I went to his rival and made the same proposition; he accepted. I was made secretary."

6. Gosnell, "Negro Politicians" p. 193.
7. Gosnell, p. 191.
8. Gosnell, p. 181.
9. Gosnell, p. 186.
10. M.Christopher, "America's Black Congressmen" (Thomas Y.Crowell Co. NY.1971.p171)
11. Christopher, p. 173.
12. Gosnell, "Negro Politicians" pp. 185-6, cites an example of the white hostility that DePriest's speaking tours occasionally encountered in the South, "In Birmingham, Alabama, where he was scheduled to make a speech in June, 1930, he was burned in effigy by members of the Ku Klux Klan."
13. Ibid., p. 195.
14. Rita Werner Gordon, op. cit., pp. 597-8.
15. M.Christopher, op. cit., p. 177.
16. Ibid., p. 180.
17. Ibid., p. 186.
18. 'Chicago Daily News', March 2nd, 1928. Cited in Edward T.Clayton, "The Negro Politician". (Chicago. Johnson Publishing Co., 1964) p. 69.
19. St Clair Drake & Horace R.Cayton, "Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a Northern City. Vol. 1". p. 369.
20. Clayton, "The Negro Politician" p. 75.
21. Ibid., p.70-1.
22. Harold F.Gosnell, "Machine Politics: Chicago Model". 2nd edit.(University of Chicago Press, 1967) p. 235.
23. Clayton, op. cit., p. 73.
24. Gosnell, "Machine Politics" p. 234.
25. J.Q.Wilson, "Two Negro Politicians: An Interpretation" (Midwest Journal of Political Science Vol. IV,No.1.1960). pp. 357-61. For detailed analysis of Dawson's organisation and political attitude, J.Q.Wilson, "Negro Politics: The Search for Leadership". (The Free Press, New York. 1960).
26. W.C.Berman, "The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration". (Ohio State University Press. 1970) p. 201.
27. Christopher, op. cit., p. 189.
28. "Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 1. 1945" (CQ Service Inc., Wash DC)p.354
29. "Congress and the Nation, Vol. 1. 1945-64" (CQ Service Inc., Wash DC)p.1347.
30. James Weldon Johnson, "The Crisis, No. XXVIII.Oct. 1924". Cited in Gilbert Osofsky, "Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto". p. 169.

31. Andrew Kopkind, "Powell and Black Bravado" New Republic article, Jan 21st 1967.
32. Apart from his Abyssinian Church membership of 10,000, Powell established his personal political club, the Alfred Isaacs Democratic Club. Powell remained independent of the New York regular Democratic organisation until 1959.
33. A.C.Powell Jr., "Marching Blacks" 2nd edit. (The Dial Press, NY. 1973. Originally published in 1945). p. 93.
34. A.C.Powell Jr., "Adam by Adam: The Autobiography of Adam Clayton Powell Jr." (The Dial Press, NY. 1971) p. 72.
35. N.C.Hickey & E.Edwin, "Adam Clayton Powell Jr. and the Politics of Race". (Fleet Publishing Corporation. New York. 1965) p. 93.
36. Ibid., p. 97.
37. Wilson, "Two Negro Politicians" p. 355.
38. Hickey & Edwin, op. cit., p. 100.
39. Congressional Record, June 28th, 1956. Cited in "Congress and the Nation, Vol. 1.2 (CQ Service Inc., Wash DC. 1964) p. 414.
40. Hickey & Edwin, op. cit., p. 137.
41. "Congressional Quarterly Almanac. Vol. 16. 1960. (CQ Service Inc., 1961. Wash DC p. 226).
42. Chuck Stone, "Black Political Power in America" (The Bobbs-merrill Co. Inc., Indianapolis/New York, 1968) p. 192. Full text of letter quoted.
43. A.C.Powell Jr., "Adam by Adam" p. 202.
44. Hickey & Edwin, op. cit., p. 191-2.
45. 'Newsweek' quote. Cited in A.C.Powell, "Adam by Adam", p. 210.
46. Hickey & Edwin, op. cit., p. 236.
47. Congressional Record. 90th Congress. 1st Session.(1967) pp. 4997-5039.
48. Powell vs McCormack. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
49. C.Stone, op. cit., p. 162.
50. A. Kopkind, "Powell and Black Bravado", 'New Republic', 21/1/1967.
51. Kent M.Weeks, "Adam Clayton Powell and the Supreme Court". (The Dunellen Publishing Company, Inc., New York, 1971). p. 134.

Chapter Three.

The Political Setting: The Post-War Civil Rights Movement, Black Population Concentration in the Inner-Cities, and Reapportionment. 1945-1970.

While the foundations of the Congressional Black Caucus, in terms of congressional strategy, can be traced to the political behaviour of earlier Black Congressmen, its origins are firmly based in contemporary, post-1945 American history. In the post-war years the pattern of American race relations underwent several dramatic upheavals. The period began in a spirit of hope and high expectations for America's black minority. After the American victory against fascism abroad, American race prejudice at home became a major subject of party debate and black American civil and political rights emerged again as a national political issue. The Supreme Court began to challenge the constitutionality of segregation laws and practices. A strong civil rights movement based on the concept of integration developed in the southern states. By using non-violent political techniques, civil rights groups began the process of breaking up deep-rooted southern race prejudice, and awakening the northern white conscience on the race question. Finally, Congress, for the first time in eighty years, began to pass civil rights legislation, culminating in the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In spite of these positive developments however, the period ended in a negative spirit of despair and disillusionment. The progress made in removing legal impediments to black American social and political equality had not ameliorated the economic conditions of the average black citizen's everyday life. In the important policy areas of housing, employment, and education, the black minority remained seriously disadvantaged in comparison with the white majority. Once it became apparent that the civil rights legislation contained form rather than substance, a bitter frustration overcame many urban black communities which manifested in race riots, looting, and the development of

revolutionary, guerilla movements. By the end of the sixties, the civil rights movement had collapsed in the wake of the assassination of its leading force, Martin Luther King Jr., and the black American minority faced the presence in Washington DC of an Administration that possessed an attitude of 'benign neglect'¹ towards black political and economic interests.

The Congressional Black Caucus was established to fill the huge vacuum in black national leadership that had occurred following the demise of the civil rights movement and, moreover, to guard recently acquired black political gains from the encroachments of the Nixon Administration. The CBC was formed by the new black Representatives who had been elected to Congress from the mid 1950's onwards. The new black Representatives had gained their political experience in the environment of the post-war civil rights struggle, and they incorporated the assertive, race-conscious political style of the civil rights activist into their congressional behaviour. In establishing the CBC on the principles of racial partisanship and group cohesion, the new black Representatives were responding to the new mood of self-reliance in the black American community. The new mood of the black minority was expressed in the words of a founder member of the CBC, Rep. William Clay (D.Mo.), when he announced the formation of the group, "We have no permanent friends, permanent enemies, just permanent interests".² This statement embodied the underlying philosophy of the CBC, and indeed, articulated succinctly the general political attitude of the black American minority after the failure of the integrationist civil rights movement.

In American race relations the years 1945-70 can be regarded as an era when 'de jure' segregation was gradually outmoded by 'de facto' segregation. The development of this process had two root causes, one political, the other economic. The post-war reassertion of black American demands for social and political equality, and particularly the evangelical zeal of the civil rights movement, created a political climate in which the majority

of white Americans became responsive to the need for federal civil rights legislation. Simultaneously, however, as the political momentum behind the campaign to end legal segregation gathered strength, economic forces were shaping patterns of segregation based on residency and employment. The drift of the black population to the cities in search of employment opportunities intensified markedly after 1945. In fact, by 1970 seven out of every ten black Americans lived in major metropolitan areas. Furthermore, the urban black population had become increasingly concentrated in the poorest, most dilapidated inner-city sections of the metropolitan areas. Also, the vast majority of black, city inhabitants were employed in industries requiring low-paid, unskilled labour e.g. public works, catering and other service industries. In the face of segregation enforced by the economic realities of poverty, poor housing, and menial employment, the enactment of civil rights legislation removing legally-based segregation brought only superficially beneficial changes to black citizens' lives.

While the relative economic status of the black American citizen improved only marginally during the civil rights struggle, it is important to recognise that highly significant intangible benefits were gained. The major achievement of the civil rights movement was the positive contribution made in developing race pride, assertiveness and political consciousness in all sectors of the black American community. The civil rights movement had collapsed essentially because white America, and particularly white liberal politicians, had become unwilling to support social and economic policies that would give substance to the new civil rights legislation. The decline of white liberal support for the civil rights movement left the black American minority with no other alternative than to seek its own political solutions. The emergence of a race-conscious caucus of black legislators in Congress was just one manifestation of the widespread black American attempts to

construct new political models that would facilitate more effective black participation at all levels of public decision-making. Black American race-consciousness and political assertiveness, stripped of the moral fervour, idealism, and integrationist philosophy that had characterised these attitudes during the civil rights movement, hardened to form a defiant racial unity and racial partisanship that reflected the new political reality. Shortly before his assassination, Martin Luther King Jr., had perceived the harsh nature of the new political reality facing the black minority. Although he personally refused to abandon his belief in the concept of integration, King reluctantly concluded, "White America was ready to demand that the Negro should be spared the lash of brutality and coarse degradation, but it had never been truly committed to helping him out of poverty, exploitation or all forms of discrimination".³ In response to white American intransigency, King called for a 'second phase' of the civil rights revolution to be launched. As a crucial part of this 'second phase', King argued that, "... people must be organised to work together in units of power... More and more, the civil rights movement will have to engage in the task of organising people into permanent groups to protect their own interests and produce change in their behalf".⁴ The formation of the CBC in the House of Representatives by the civil rights-experienced young black Congressmen can also be seen as a practical expression at federal Government level of King's 'second phase' strategy. In the CBC's list of policy priorities however, integration always took second place to economic policies that would improve the black minority's standard of living, employment and educational opportunities. The CBC sought to harness the intangible forces developed during the experience of the post-war civil rights struggle i.e. racial unity and racial partisanship, and direct them towards achieving economic improvements in black American Communities.

In terms of strategy and philosophy, therefore, the origins of the CBC are found in both the congressional behaviour of past Black Congressmen and the experience of the post-war civil rights struggle. However, the CBC owed its very existence, in the physical sense, to a combination of demographic and legal factors. Prior to the 91st and 92nd Congress, when, respectively, nine and then twelve black Americans were elected to the House of Representatives, there were simply not enough Black Congressmen to make it viable to operate as a caucus. The expansion in the number of black Representatives elected to Congress (from four in 1960, to twelve in 1970) was a consequence of the increasing concentration of the black population in the inner-city districts of the nation's largest cities coupled with the Supreme Court's decision to enter the 'political thicket'⁵ and tackle the complex question of the malapportionment of electoral districts.

In the 1960's, the new Black Congressmen were elected from northern inner-city districts that had either been transformed, by black migration, from racially-mixed to black majority areas, or had been reapportioned to create a black majority. The demographic forces that contributed significantly to the election of additional Black Congressmen are illustrated in Tables 5&6. Table 5 demonstrates that the concentration of the black population in inner-city areas intensified markedly during the period, 1950-70. In the twenty year period the size of the inner-city black population almost doubled (from 6.6 million in 1950, to 13.1 million in 1970). Furthermore, during the latter decade the population increase amongst black Americans was largely confined to the inner-city areas; out of a total U.S. black population increase of 3.8 million, a 3.2 million increase occurred in the inner-city areas. An analysis of Table 5 also identifies the other major urban demographic trend of the period, the exodus of the white population to the suburbs. In direct contrast to the black population figures, the inner-city white population remained relatively static. Also, significantly, the bulk of the white population increase occurred

TABLE 5.BLACK POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE COMPARED WITH WHITE POPULATION, 1950-1970.(a) Expressed in Millions.(b) Expressed as a Percentage.

(a)

<u>AREA</u>	<u>BLACK POPU.</u>			<u>WHITE POPU.</u>		
	<u>1950</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>
United States Total	15	18.9	22.7	135.1	158.8	177.6
Metropolitan Areas	8.8	12.8	16.8	85.1	106.4	121.3
Inner City	6.6	9.9	13.1	46.8	50.1	49.5
Outside Inner City	2.2	2.8	3.7	38.3	56.3	71.8
Outside Metropolitan Areas	6.2	6.1	5.8	50.0	52.5	56.4

(b)

<u>AREA</u>	<u>BLACK POPU.</u>			<u>WHITE POPU.</u>		
	<u>1950</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>
U.S. Total (Millions)	15	18.9	22.7	135.1	158.8	177.6
Percent Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Metropolitan Areas	59	68	74	63	67	68
Inner City	44	53	58	35	32	28
Outside Inner City	15	15	16	28	35	40
Outside Metropolitan Areas	41	32	26	37	33	32

SOURCE "The Social and Economic Status of Negroes in the United States".
 Special Studies. BLS Report No. 394. Published July 1971. pp.12-13.
 United States Department of Commerce/ Bureau of the Census.

in the suburbs; out of a total U.S. white population increase of 18.8 million (1960-70), a 15.5 million increase occurred in the suburbs. The combined effect of the operation of these two major demographic trends was felt most seriously in the nation's largest cities. In Table 6, it can be seen that America's ten largest cities not only experienced massive increases in the black population but, more importantly, the black population assumed a larger proportion of each city's total population. In New York City, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, and Houston the size of the black population more than doubled in the period, 1950-70. On average, the density of the black population in the ten largest cities increased by 18%; Washington DC experienced the highest density increase (36%), whereas Houston experienced the lowest (5%). Once the black population became concentrated in several inner-city areas, it was virtually inevitable that a few more Black Congressmen would be elected. It has already been noted (Chapter 2) that the two cities with the largest black populations, New York and Chicago, had developed black majority inner-city districts and elected Black Congressmen before 1945. As the post-war period progressed, the other top-ranking cities in terms of black population developed black majority inner-city districts capable of electing Black Congressmen. In 1954 Charles Diggs Jr. was elected to Congress from a central Detroit district; he was followed by Robert Nix (central Philadelphia) in 1958, and Augustus Hawkins (Los Angeles) in 1962.

This process of gradual black congressional gains was accelerated by the Supreme Court's decision in 'Baker vs Carr' (1962) and subsequent cases, which ruled that electoral districts should be reapportioned on the principle of 'one man, one vote'. Congressional districts were gradually restructured to contain equal levels of population (approx. 450,000 each district). The principal aim of the Reapportionment decisions was to rectify the electoral imbalance that had clearly developed between the rural and

TABLE 6.BLACK POPULATION 1950-1970 IN THE 20 CITIES WITH THE HIGHEST BLACK POPULATIONS.

<u>1970 RANK</u>		<u>CITY AND STATE</u>	<u>1970</u>		<u>1960</u>		<u>1950</u>	
<u>Total</u>	<u>Black</u>		<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>
<u>Popu.</u>	<u>Popu.</u>			<u>Black</u>		<u>Black</u>		<u>Black</u>
1	1	New York, N.Y.	1,667	21	1,088	14	749	10
2	2	Chicago, Ill.	1,103	33	813	23	493	14
5	3	Detroit, Mich.	660	44	482	29	299	16
4	4	Philadelphia, Pa.	654	34	529	26	376	18
9	5	Washington D.C.	538	71	412	54	280	35
3	6	Los Angeles, Calif.	504	18	335	14	171	9
7	7	Baltimore, Md.	420	46	326	35	224	24
6	8	Houston, Tex.	317	26	215	23	125	21
10	9	Cleveland, Ohio.	288	38	251	29	148	16
19	10	New Orleans, La.	267	45	234	37	181	32
27	11	Atlanta, Ga.	255	51	186	38	121	37
18	12	St. Louis, Mo.	254	41	214	29	153	18
17	13	Memphis, Tenn.	243	39	184	37	147	37
8	14	Dallas, Tex.	210	25	129	19	58	13
36	15	Newark, N.J.	207	54	138	34	75	17
11	16	Indianapolis, Ind.	134	18	98	21	64	15
48	17	Birmingham, Ala.	126	42	135	40	130	40
29	18	Cincinnati, Ohio.	125	28	109	22	78	16
38	19	Oakland, Calif.	125	35	84	23	48	12
23	20	Jacksonville, Fla.	118	22	106	23	82	27

(Numbers in thousands)

SOURCE "The Social and Economic Status of Negroes in the United States".
 Special Studies. BLS Report No. 394. Published July 1971. pp. 17.
 United States Department of Commerce/ Bureau of the Census.

urban areas. Before Reapportionment, generally speaking, rural areas had been overrepresented, and urban areas underrepresented at congressional level. Being concentrated in the urban areas, the black American minority benefitted from reapportionment decisions. Between 1963-70, seven additional Black Congressmen were elected from cities possessing high density black populations (Detroit, New York, Cleveland, St. Louis, Baltimore, Oakland, Chicago). Since 1970, the trend has continued with five more Black Congressmen being elected (Washington DC, Atlanta, Houston, Los Angeles, Memphis). In the 87th Congress there had been just four black Americans in the House of Representatives. In the 96th Congress their numbers had risen to sixteen Representatives, and one delegate (Washington D.C.).

On the surface, this increase appears impressive. But, in fact, the overall effect of reapportionment on black congressional power has been detrimental. The Supreme Court's decision to resolve the problem of malapportionment has had a similar effect as its decision to desegregate public schooling. It facilitated the emergence of the policy of 'tokenism' on the part of state governments. The majority of recent black congressional gains have been achieved where state legislatures have deliberately reapportioned an inner-city area to form a token 'black district'. Moreover, the creation of 'black districts' has tended to be confined to those states which contain cities with the nation's highest density black populations and, consequently, have been subject to the greatest political pressure from black constituents demanding fair representation. Elsewhere, the Supreme Court reapportionment decisions have led the way to subtle gerrymandering which has provided for 'one man, one vote', but allowed black Americans to be outnumbered in each district. In the long term, the reapportionment process will probably lead to the diminishment of the number of 'safe' black districts in the federal, and state legislatures. One writer has already observed that, "In some cities, the number of House districts with black majorities may be reduced somewhat if a conscious redistricting policy is to divide the predominantly black

areas of the city among several congressional districts having white majorities, rather than to create districts which are predominantly black".⁶ Although the Supreme Court has ruled against redistricting plans that are blatantly racial,⁷ it will continue to be relatively easy for state legislatures to construct districts in which black voters are outnumbered. The practice of gerrymandering remains a major obstacle obstructing the path to effective black political participation in the legislative process at federal and state level.

The Congressional Black Caucus was created, therefore, in a political setting characterised by instability and insecurity. From the black American viewpoint, many of the social and political advances gained in the post-war years had proved to be merely hollow and cosmetic. The true nature of the state of American race relations at the end of the 1960's was best expressed in the conclusions of the Kerner Commission Report on Civil Disorders, "Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white - separate and unequal.... Pervasive discrimination and segregation in employment, education, and housing growing concentrations of impoverished Negroes in our major cities (are) creating a growing crisis of deteriorating facilities and services and unmet human needs".⁸ The economic reality behind the words of the Kerner Commission Report is outlined in Table 7. After a quarter of a century of renewed black American efforts to secure the realisation of their constitutional rights, and the enactment of federal civil rights legislation, the relative social and economic status of the black minority, compared with the white population, had not significantly improved and, indeed, in some important respects had deteriorated. Almost one-third of black American families (31%) had an annual income below the official poverty level, and one-quarter of the black population lived in dilapidated and inadequate housing conditions. In addition, black American unemployment levels had worsened, particularly amongst black teenagers (29% of whom were unemployed in 1970), as a result of technological innovation

TABLE 7. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE U.S. BLACK POPULATION, AND WHITE POPULATION, 1969/70.*

	BLACK POPU.	WHITE POPU.
<u>EMPLOYMENT</u>		
Total no. of persons/all occupations.	8,445,000	70,182,000
" " (As a percentage)	100	100
Professional and Technical	9	15
Managers, Officials and Proprietors.	4	11
Clerical/Sales	15	25
Craftsmen and foremen	8	13
Operatives	24	17
Private Household workers	8	1
Service Workers	18	9
Nonfarm Labourers	10	4
Farmers/farm workers	4	4
<u>UNEMPLOYMENT</u>		
Unemployed Married Men (as a percent of total popu.)	3.9	2.4
Unemployed Adult Men	5.6	3.2
Unemployed Adult Women	6.9	4.4
Unemployed Teenagers	29.1	13.5
<u>ANNUAL FAMILY INCOME</u>		
Total no. of Families	5,215,000	46,022,000
Under \$3,000 (as a percentage of total no. of families)	20	8
\$3,000 - \$4,999	19	10
\$5,000 - \$6,999	17	12
\$7,000 - \$9,999	20	22
\$10,000 - \$14,999	16	28
\$15,000 and over	8	21
Median Family Income	\$6,191	\$9,794
<u>POVERTY</u> (Below \$3,745, nonfarm 4-mb family)		
Total no. of persons living below official poverty level.	7,600,000	16,700,000
Above expressed as a percentage of total popu.	31	10
Total no. of persons receiving welfare payments.	4,400,000	6,700,000
Above expressed as a percentage of total popu.	18	4
<u>HOUSING</u>		
Total no. of persons living in houses either dilapidated or lacking basic plumbing.**	5,448,000	10,656,000
Above expressed as a percentage of total popu.	24	6
Metropolitan Areas:		
Central cities (as a percent of total popu.)	9	3
Suburbs	16	3
NonMetropolitan Areas	55	11

* Housing statistics apply to 1968.

** A house is categorised as "lacking basic plumbing" if one or more of the following facilities are not fitted: "hot running water in the structure, flush toilet for private use of members of the household, and bathtub or shower for private use of members of the household." A house is categorised as "dilapidated" if its structure "requires extensive repairs, rebuilding, or razing, or was of inadequate original construction."

TABLE COMPILED FROM DATA CONTAINED IN "BLACK AMERICANS: A CHARTBOOK",
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR/ BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. BULLETIN 1699.
(WASH.DC., 1971) pp. 24-95.

Shows 57M7
from total popu

reducing the need for unskilled labour. In attempting to improve the social and economic conditions of the black American minority, the Congressional Black Caucus and other minority politicians at other levels of government faced a formidable task. At least, however, the experience of the post-war period had ensured that black politicians would no longer labour under the illusion that the white majority was willing to make personal sacrifices for black American advancement.

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FOOTNOTES

1. The phrase 'benign neglect' originated in a confidential memorandum sent to President Nixon by his Domestic Affairs adviser, Daniel P. Moynihan, early in 1970. Moynihan proposed that, "the time may have come when the issue of race could benefit from a period of benign neglect.
2. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. April 2nd, 1971. p.733. (Congressional Quarterly Inc., Wash. DC 1971)
3. M.L.King Jr., "Where do We go from Here: Chaos or Community?". Pelican Books, 1969. (Penguin Bks Ltd. London) p. 13.
4. Ibid. p. 128.
5. In 'Colegrove vs Green', 330 US 804 (1947), Justice Frankfurter concluded that if the federal courts intervened in the process of legislative redistricting, the judiciary would become enmeshed in a 'political thicket'. In his view this was undesirable because;- "the Constitution has conferred upon Congress exclusive authority to secure fair representation by the States in the popular House".
6. Milton C. Cummings Jr., "Reapportionment in the 1970's: Its effects on Congress". Article in N.W.Polsby, "Reapportionment in the 1970's", (University of California Press, Los Angeles/London 1971) p. 237.n.24.
7. Gomillion vs Lightfoot, 364. US. 339 (1960).
8. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968. Wash DC.) pp. 1, 10-11.

PART TWO

THE CBC: ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANISATION

Chapter 4. Early Stages of Development; The Congressional Black Caucus Takes Shape Page 94.

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Chapter 6. The CBC Professional Staff. Page 151.

Chapter Four.

Early Stages of Development; The Congressional Black Caucus takes shape.

The process whereby the Congressional Black Caucus emerged as a viable, race-conscious legislative group involved two distinct stages of development. The first stage, the 'formative stage', encompassed the years 1965-70. This period began with the arrival of new, civil rights-experienced black Representatives, and continued with their emergence as the majority group within the House black American delegation until finally the Congressional Black Caucus was formed in January 1971. The second stage, the 'exploratory stage', spanned the first two years of the CBC's formal existence, the 92nd Congress. During these years, CBC members attempted to devise a political strategy that would maximise their limited influence in Congress. The 'exploratory stage' witnessed the CBC experimenting with innovative congressional techniques, eg. 'ad hoc' committee hearings. Other initiatives were taken also in the sphere of national politics, including the instigation of a National Black Political Convention. The diversity of the CBC's political activity during the 'exploratory stage' created considerable friction within the membership. Many conflicts developed between senior and junior members over questions of political tactics and strategies. In order to overcome these divisions, the CBC entered a period of critical self-examination. As a result, from the 93rd Congress onwards, the CBC adopted a more limited, less divisive legislative strategy.

The 'formative stage' began in November, 1964, with the election of Rep. John Conyers (D. Mich.) to the 89th Congress. Rep. Conyers was the first of the 'new breed' black politicians to take a seat in the House of Representatives.¹ The 'new breed' black politician had gained his political experience in the post-war civil rights struggle. When running for Congress he displayed the independent 'protest' style of the civil rights

movement, mobilising grass roots support in the black community behind his candidacy. In terms of political attitude, he was more concerned to develop black American issues than to adhere to political party interests. The 'new breed' black politician arrived in Congress determined to make the legislative process more responsive to the needs of the black American minority. It was this 'new breed' black politician who constituted the motivating force behind the formation of the CBC, and the development of its legislative strategy and agenda. The momentum towards coalescence that began with the election of Rep. Conyers was enhanced rapidly in the following sessions as other Black Representatives sharing similar political characteristics were elected, ie. Shirley Chisholm (D.NY), William Clay (D. Mo.), and Louis Stokes (D.Ohio) in the 91st Congress, and Ronald Dellums (D.Calif.), Parren Mitchell (D.Md.) and Charles Rangel (D.NY) in the 92nd Congress.

Prior to Rep. Conyers' election, three other black Americans had been elected to the House in the post-war period, Charles Diggs (D.Mich.), Robert Nix (D.Pa.) and Augustus Hawkins (D.Calif.). Diggs, Nix and Hawkins were not 'new breed' black politicians; they had entered upon their congressional careers via the traditional route of local party politics. Rep. Charles Diggs Jr. had been born into a prominent Detroit black political family. A biographer of Diggs Jr. noted that, "since boyhood, Diggs, had hoped to go into politics like his father, who was a Michigan state senator".² In fact, Diggs Jr. quickly fulfilled his ambition, succeeding his father in the state senate in 1951. He served a full term as state senator before running for election to the federal Congress in 1954. Rep. Robert Nix came to Congress in 1958 after a long political career as a ward committeeman in the Philadelphia Democratic party machine. Rep. Augustus Hawkins had served in the California Assembly for twenty-eight years before he was elected to Congress in 1962. As Representatives, neither Diggs, Nix or

Hawkins had challenged the 'status quo' on Capitol Hill. All three men had quietly taken their places in the urban liberal wing of the congressional Democratic party. They had not developed an overtly race-conscious approach to the legislative process, or coalesced on black American political issues.

In contrast to his immediate predecessors, Rep. Conyers came to Congress from a political background of involvement in civil rights and labour activities. He gained his congressional seat by successfully challenging the candidate of the party establishment in the Michigan Democratic primary. The key to Conyers' electoral success had been the establishment of his own independent district club, with its cadre of campaign workers, in opposition to the official district Democratic party club. Given the nature of Rep. Conyers' political past it was to be expected that his congressional behaviour would differ from that of Diggs, Nix and Hawkins. Indeed, in his first term Conyers rapidly earned a reputation for being, "energetic, ambitious, and unwilling to kowtow to the powers or the traditions of the House of Representatives".³ On arrival Rep. Conyers assumed the position of the militant, outspoken black congressional leader. At that very time Rep. Powell forever abandoned the same role which had been his alone for twenty years. In the 89th Congress, Powell's effectiveness as a black political leader diminished as he became enmeshed in legal proceedings and the struggle for his political survival. In one important respect, the emergence of Rep. Conyers as the dominant black spokesman in the House of Representatives marked a distinct advance in militant black congressional leadership. Conyers infused militant black congressional behaviour with a degree of consistency that had been conspicuously absent in the Powell years. Throughout his congressional career, Rep. Powell had been frequently criticised by prominent civil rights leaders for the erratic manner in which he supported black American causes. It was characteristic of Powell's behaviour that, on one occasion, he would make a major speech

on a black American issue in the House and then proceed to ignore the issue for the remainder of the session. In the latter years of Powell's congressional career particularly, when his political future was at stake, many of his congressional actions on black legislative issues simply became self-serving expedient exercises designed to rally black American support to his cause in Congress. Rep. Conyers' recollections of his early political relationship with Powell in the House give weight to this contention. In an interview Rep. Conyers recalled that in his first session in Congress he suggested to his black colleagues that they should coalesce in a caucus, and adopt consistent stances on black legislative issues. According to Conyers, Powell was "just not interested" in the proposal.⁴ The most plausible explanation of Powell's response was that he was unwilling to share the political limelight, even if to do so meant the advancement of black American political interests. The other senior Black Congressman, William Dawson made no response to the Conyer proposal probably reflecting his staunch loyalty to the Democratic party and extreme reluctance to take any 'race' stand in Congress. Diggs, Nix and Hawkins deferred to the views of the senior members of the House black delegation.

The most important national issue on which Rep. Conyers adopted a consistent stance from the outset of his congressional career was the question of United States military policy in Vietnam. On May 5th 1965, in the course of a House floor debate, Rep. Conyers declared, "I do not support the present policy in Vietnam".⁵ Conyers' statement came during House consideration of a joint resolution (HJ Res.447) which proposed to add \$700 million to fiscal 1965 defence appropriations for the specific purpose of escalating U.S. military operations in Vietnam. The significance of the joint resolution was that the supplemental appropriations request marked the first time that the Johnson Administration had sought additional defence funds for exclusive use in Vietnam. And furthermore, as the 'Congressional Quarterly' observed at

the time, "In the eyes of President Johnson, HJ Res. 447 was not only an appropriation but also a vote 'to persist in our efforts to halt Communist aggression in South Vietnam' ".⁶ In fact, the vote on the joint resolution proved to be the preliminary step to the massive escalation of U.S. military involvement in the Vietnam war. Rep. Conyers was amongst a minority of seven House members who voted against the joint resolution and hence declared their early opposition to the U.S. policy in Vietnam.⁷ The other black Representatives, with the exception of Rep. Powell who typically was absent, voted with the majority in favour of the resolution. The majority of black Representatives, as did most Congressmen, viewed their vote for the resolution as a necessary patriotic response to the President's call for national unity on U.S. foreign policy. In the ensuing months, however, as American involvement in terms of military equipment and ground forces rapidly accelerated, a skepticism of the merits of U.S. policy in Vietnam developed amongst black Congressmen far sooner than in other sectors of the House. Rep. Conyers' persistent opposition to U.S. policy in Vietnam, and his contention that the escalating material and human costs of U.S. involvement was contributing substantially to the growing civil unrest in the black communities of major American cities, played a crucial part in developing skepticism over Vietnam policy within the House black delegation. While United States military involvement in Vietnam escalated, and Conyers' criticism mounted, senior black Representatives began to reconsider their attitude towards the War. In mid-January 1966, Rep. Diggs together with seven other white liberal Democrats sponsored a two day 'ad hoc' conference on the Vietnam War. On February 15th, the group issued a conference report which criticised Administration policy. The report suggested that the Administration should accept North Vietnam's major demands, including U.S. military withdrawal from South Vietnam, as a basis for negotiations. In addition, the report considered that,

"there should be no further escalation of American troop commitment".⁸

Later, in May 1967, Rep. Hawkins joined Rep. Conyers and twenty-seven other liberal Democrats in publicly urging President Johnson not to bomb or mine the North Vietnamese port of Haiphong (a course of action which was being suggested to the President by his military advisers). By opposing the further escalation of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, the senior black members took their first steps towards endorsing Rep. Conyers' stance of total opposition to U.S. policy in Vietnam. As the 90th Congress progressed and U.S. military involvement in Vietnam continued unabated, black congressional opposition to Vietnam policy spread to the senior members. In fact, the whole question of the United States' role in the Vietnam War emerged as the first national policy issue that acted as a major centrepetal force on the House black membership.

The 'formative' stage in the development of the CBC represented the gradual convergence of two major political forces. The two political forces were, firstly, the emergence of important policy issues that served to draw Black Congressmen together, and secondly, the ascendancy of the 'new breed' element to majority status within the House black delegation. At the final point of convergence, the CBC was formed. The establishment of the CBC indicated that the position had been achieved where the majority of black Representatives were 'new breed' politicians who held similar views on important national issues and prescribed similar policies and legislative remedies to resolve those issues. And, furthermore, it announced that the elder black Representatives recognised the political necessity to endorse the 'new breed' leadership. The process of the gradual convergence of the two political forces began when Rep. Conyers arrived in Congress and developed a critique of United States policy in Vietnam. The process was enhanced when more 'new breed' black Representatives were elected. Their presence served to reinforce the growing black opposition to Vietnam policy.

In addition, they proceeded to focus attention upon other important national issues.

In the 91st Congress the 'new breed' element in the House black membership was strengthened by the arrival of Representatives Shirley Chisholm, William Clay and Louis Stokes. At this juncture, 'new breed' black politicians constituted, in effect, one half of the House black membership (see table below). Although Rep. Powell was reelected in this Congress and became the ninth member of the House black delegation, he attended very infrequently and rarely voted. The four 'new breed' members possessed an important political

<u>TABLE 8</u>		<u>BLACK REPRESENTATIVES</u>		<u>89th - 94th CONGRESSES *</u>		
<u>89th</u>	<u>90th</u>	<u>91st</u>	<u>92nd</u>	<u>93rd</u>	<u>94th</u>	
W.Dawson (Ill.1st)	W.Dawson C.Diggs	W.Dawson ¹ C.Diggs	C.Diggs R.Nix	C.Diggs R.Nix	C.Diggs R.Nix	
A.Powell (NY 18th)	R.Nix	R.Nix	A.Hawkins	A.Hawkins	A.Hawkins	
C.Diggs (Mich.13th)	A.Hawkins J.Conyers	A.Hawkins J.Conyers	J.Conyers	J.Conyers	J.Conyers	
R.Nix (Pa.2nd)	<u>Total = 5</u>	S.Chisholm (NY 12th)	S.Chisholm W.Clay	S.Chisholm W.Clay	S.Chisholm W.Clay	
A.Hawkins (Calif.21st)		W.Clay (Mo. 1st)	L.Stokes G.Collins ³ (Ill.7th)	L.Stokes R.Dellums R.Metcalf	L.Stokes R.Dellums R.Metcalf	
J.Conyers (Mich.1st)		L.Stokes (Ohio 21st)	R.Dellums (Calif.7th)	P.Mitchell	P.Mitchell	
<u>Total = 6</u>		A.Powell ²	R.Metcalf (Ill.1st)	C.Rangel	C.Rangel	
		<u>Total = 9</u>	W.Fauntroy	W.Fauntroy	W.Fauntroy	
			P.Mitchell (Md.7th)	Y.Burke (Calif.37th)	Y.Burke B.Jordan	
			C.Rangel (NY 18th)	B.Jordan (Texas 18th)	A.Young	
			W.Fauntroy ⁴ (Wash.DC)	A.Young (Ga.5th)	C.Collins	
			<u>Total = 13</u>	C.Collins ⁵ (Ill.7th)	H.Ford (Tenn.8th)	
				<u>Total = 16</u>	<u>Total = 17</u>	

* Representatives are listed in order of seniority.

characteristic that distinguished them from other Black Congressmen. As Representatives, Conyers, Chisholm, Clay, and Stokes skilfully adapted their civil rights experience to the congressional environment. They incorporated the race-conscious, 'protest' style of the civil rights movement into their congressional behaviour and assumed the role of independent protagonists for black American advancement. All four 'new breed' members held the view that their commitment to the forwarding of black political interests took priority over any other political considerations, including party loyalty or conformity to congressional norms. On taking her seat in Congress, Rep. Chisholm expressed this commitment as a determination "to fight for a people that have too long been denied the opportunity to have their problems and hopes dramatically focused".⁹ During her first days in the House, Rep. Chisholm amply demonstrated her determination to keep to her word. When she was allocated a seat on the forestry sub-committee of the House Agriculture Committee, Rep. Chisholm openly ignored informal norms of 'freshman' behaviour and refused to accept her assignment. At a meeting of the Democratic Caucus, which had been convened to approve committee assignments, Rep. Chisholm interrupted the proceedings to state the grounds of her objection to her assignment. Chisholm told her Democratic colleagues, "I think it would be hard to imagine an assignment that is less relevant to my background or to the needs of the predominantly black and Puerto Rican people who elected me".¹⁰ Following her statement, Rep. Chisholm successfully introduced a resolution which asked the Ways and Means Committee to offer her another assignment. Shortly afterwards an alternative assignment was offered, a seat on the Veterans Affairs Committee. Chisholm accepted the new assignment, remarking with satisfaction that, "there are a lot more veterans in my district than there are trees!"¹¹ Chisholm had not been alone amongst the newly-elected black Representatives in receiving an unsuitable committee assignment. Rep. Louis Stokes had been allocated a place on the low-status Internal



Security Committee.¹² Unlike Chisholm, Rep. Stokes did not appeal against his assignment. But, he did adopt a course of action that, in a different way, equally reflected his 'new breed' political credentials. He decided to keep his seat on the Committee, and try to exert a liberal influence on its deliberations. Throughout the 91st Congress, Stokes skilfully used his past experience as a civil rights group lawyer to temper the rigid conservative political bias of the Committee membership as they conducted hearings and investigated the activities of the Black Panther Party and the Students for a Democratic Society movement. In assigning committee places, the Democratic leadership, however, had not been totally unsympathetic to Black Representatives' requests. As he had requested, Rep. William Clay received a seat on the Education and Labour Committee. Before him, in the 89th Congress, Rep. Conyers had received his first choice as a committee assignment, the Judiciary Committee.

In the 91st Congress, through the impetus of 'new breed' members, Black Representatives were amongst the most prominent critics of the Vietnam War, and particularly, of the Nixon Administration's failure to fulfil its promise to de-escalate U.S. military involvement. During the first legislative session, there were two House roll-calls on major Defence Department procurement authorisation bills that contained massive fundings for the United States war effort in Vietnam. In each case Black Representatives formed a significant proportion of the minority of legislators who voted against the authorisations. The first vote occurred on March 27th, 1969, when the House divided 341-21 in favour of \$ 76 million supplemental appropriations for military aircraft procurement (HR 7757). Of the twenty-one legislators voting against the bill, five were black Representatives. Only one black member, Rep. Diggs, voted for the authorisation.¹³ By October 3rd, 1969, when the House voted on the major Defence procurement authorisation bill of fiscal year 1970 (HR 14000), which authorised \$21.3 billion in military spending, congressional opposition to

the continued massive funding of the Vietnam War had doubled in strength. The House divided 311-44 in favour of the authorisation. On this occasion, seven Black Representatives voted against the bill. And, more significantly, not a single black member voted in favour of the authorisation.¹⁴

It was not only the issue of U.S. conduct in Vietnam that served to unite Black Congressmen in the 91st Congress. As the months passed, it became the view of many Black Representatives that the general political posture of the Nixon Administration was 'anti- Black American' in character. During the 1968 Presidential race many black politicians had expressed the fear that Nixon's rhetorical calls for 'law and order' were but thinly-disguised appeals to disgruntled white voters for their advanced endorsement of policies that would seek to rollback the political and legal advances gained by Black Americans in the post-war years. This view was felt to be borne out in August, 1969, when President Richard Nixon nominated Clement F. Haynsworth of South Carolina to be an associate Justice of the Supreme Court. As a justice on the 4th Circuit Court Haynsworth had shown, on many occasions, his unwillingness to rule against the dilatory tactics used by some southern counties to resist the desegregation of schools and hospitals. The choice of Haynsworth as a nominee for the Supreme Court clearly demonstrated President Nixon's desire to reverse the 'judicial activist' role that the previous Warren Court had adopted, particularly in cases involving civil rights. In spite of strong political pressure from the Administration the Senate refused to confirm the Haynsworth nomination, principally on the grounds of his ethical impropriety in failing to exclude himself from the adjudication of cases where his financial interests were indirectly involved. The Senate's decision to reject the nomination was also considerably influenced by civil rights groups and labour union lobbying. Senatorial rejection of the judicial credentials of Haynsworth did not deter President Nixon from nominating to the Supreme Court another Southern judge, G.H. Carswell of the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals. As with

Haynsworth, the nomination of Carswell reflected Nixon's intention to appoint 'strict constitutional constructionists'¹⁵ to the Supreme Court. The Senate investigations of Carswell's career, however, uncovered aspects of his behaviour which revealed him to be more unsuitable for appointment to the Supreme Court than the previous Nixon nominee. It was discovered that Carswell when running unsuccessfully for a seat in the Georgia legislature in 1948 openly expounded white supremacist views. Furthermore, it was revealed that in 1956 he was involved in the transfer of a Tallahassee municipal golf course to private ownership in order to avoid desegregating the course. But, the most damaging indictment of Carswell's unsuitability for the nomination, and that which swayed the decision of many Senators, came from members of the legal profession who summarised his legal career as, "mediocre, undistinguished and hostile to civil rights causes".¹⁶ On the basis of this evidence and other testimony the Senate voted 51-45 not to confirm his nomination. President Nixon's decisions to nominate Haynsworth and Carswell as Associate Justices of the Supreme Court had the effect of strengthening the emerging unity of Black Representatives in Congress. In order to effectively challenge the Haynsworth nomination Black Representatives formed a delegation to draw up a statement in opposition to the nomination and present it before the Senate Judiciary Committee. On September 25th, 1969, Representatives Diggs, Conyers, Chisholm, Clay and Stokes attended the Judiciary Committee hearings and submitted the statement, which was endorsed by all House black members except William Dawson; the statement read, in part, "We are disappointed with the President's choice of a man whose views have been so often at odds with a Supreme Court which achieved distinction through its attacks on the malaise of racial discrimination in this country".¹⁷ A similar strategy was employed to help defeat the second nomination. But, in the case of Carswell, the statements made by Black Representatives before the Senate confirmation hearings were

endorsed by all House black members including Dawson. Rep. Conyers had the total support of the House black delegation when he appeared at the hearings and stated, "I am here to prevail upon you to establish the basic principle that any person of a racist or segregationist persuasion is per se unqualified to serve on the Supreme Court".¹⁸ The eight-month political controversy over President Nixon's nominees, which began in August 1969 with the selection of Haynsworth and ended in April 1970 with the Senate's rejection of Carswell, forced the House black membership to close ranks and act as a united congressional force. In their opposition to the Supreme Court nominations Black Representatives for the first time in the post-war period worked in unison to achieve a clear political goal. Furthermore, in the course of the political battle, permanent links were forged between Black Representatives and the major black congressional lobbies, the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights.

The contribution that black political opposition made towards the defeat of the Haynsworth and Carswell nominations in the Senate is impossible to assess accurately. Certainly, however, the unity of black political opposition to the nominations was a factor taken into account by Senators as they decided which way to cast their vote. On this question Rep. Chisholm reached the following conclusion, "It seemed to me that the effect was visible. Whether we changed any votes, we will never know. But I believe we left our mark".¹⁹ Whether or not the display of black political unity influenced Senators' voting decisions, it strongly influenced the political thinking of Black Representatives. The House black membership as a whole became conscious of the political advantages to be gained from working as a group. Reflecting upon the experience of the fight against the nominations, senior Black Representative Charles Diggs observed, "I felt that then numerically we had enough to think in terms of some kind of consensus effort, consolidated effort at least; that we would be much more

effective working that way as we would be as individuals".²⁰ The defeat of Haynsworth and Carswell nominations therefore, awakened Black Representatives to the fact of the internal advantages of working as a unit. || X

Congress operates on the basis of group conflict and compromise. Groups of legislators with special interests coalesce to maximise their political influence and bargaining power. It was logical for black members, given their increased numerical strength in the 91st Congress, to work together on legislative matters of importance to Black Americans. As Clarence Mitchell, chief congressional lobbyist of the N.A.A.C.P., noted, "Most people in the House knew that if you got that many black members of Congress together, if they had any sense they would be acting in concert most of the time, just as the Southerners acted in concert and still do".²¹ Early in the 91st Congress Rep. Diggs had made preliminary moves to bring the House black membership together as a congressional unit. Diggs organised informal meetings of all Black Representatives, and tentatively named the grouping 'the Democratic Select Committee'. From the viewpoint of 'new breed' members the new Committee was ineffective. Rep. William Clay criticised the meetings of the group as lacking in "adequate programming and planning".²² Nevertheless, the Democratic Select Committee fulfilled Diggs' basic intention, which was to bring together the senior Black Representatives William Dawson and Adam C. Powell with the 'new breed' members and attempt to reconcile political differences. Although Dawson and Powell continued to remain aloof from the 'new breed' members, they did not interfere in the new members' congressional activities. At this time, rather ironically, the difficult task of unifying the House black membership was achieved more by the political actions of the Nixon Administration than by the efforts of Black Representatives themselves. From the Haynsworth and Carswell Supreme Court nominations onwards, opposition to the Nixon Administration became a constant factor enhancing group unity and race-consciousness amongst House black members.

In February, 1970, President Nixon again aided the cause of black political unity when he rebuffed the House black membership by refusing to accept their request for a meeting to discuss the problems confronting black American communities. Many of the younger black Representatives were particularly incensed by the cursory treatment their request received from the White House. Rep. Clay complained that, " We were absolutely outraged. We got about the same consideration as a letter from a guy in Idaho complaining about his garbage collection".²³ In the face of such hostility from the Nixon Administration, black congressional unity became an instinctive defensive reaction. Once this situation existed, the next inevitable step was that black congressional unity would be employed as a calculated, offensive strategy. At this point the final phase of the 'formative stage' of CBC development was reached. Before the close of the 91st Congress, a political event occurred which acted as a catalyst on the House black membership transforming their nascent political unity from a defensive response to an offensive strategy. In October, 1970, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights published a report which exposed the failure of the federal Government to enforce civil rights laws. The report argued that the federal Government had the legal means at its disposal to enforce civil rights laws in housing, employment, and particularly in the administration of federal programmes and contracts, but simply lacked the political will to do so. Within days of its publication senior black Representative Charles Diggs, acting on behalf of all House black members, issued a statement which described the report as a "searing indictment of American public policy (which) validates the charge that we are living in a racist society".²⁴ The statement was followed by an announcement that House black members had formed a 'Shadow Cabinet' to monitor federal enforcement of civil rights laws. In making the announcement Diggs was joined by another senior member, Rep. Augustus Hawkins, and two 'new breed' black Representatives, Shirley Chisholm and Louis Stokes. The fact that the decision to form the

'Shadow Cabinet' was taken jointly by the senior and 'new breed' black Congressmen indicated that group cohesion and race-consciousness had finally emerged as major elements in the political behaviour of all black Representatives. The 'Shadow Cabinet' proved to be the forerunner of the Congressional Black Caucus which was formed three months later at the opening of the 92nd Congress.

The new Congress witnessed significant changes in the composition of the House black membership. Rep. Dawson's death and Rep. Powell's primary defeat had left two seats vacant which were filled by Representatives Ralph Metcalfe and Charles Rangel respectively. In addition three new black Representatives were elected, Ronald Dellums (Oakland, Calif.), Parren Mitchell (Baltimore, Md.), and George Collins (Chicago, Ill.). Later, in March 1971, a fourth new black Representative, Walter Fauntroy, was seated following a special election in Washington D.C.²⁵ Of the six new black members seated in the 92nd Congress, four members possessed 'new breed' political characteristics, ie. Dellums, Mitchell, Rangel, and Fauntroy. Consequently, 'new breed' black Representatives formed a majority of eight in the thirteen member black delegation. Under the leadership of Representatives William Clay and John Conyers the majority 'new breed' membership immediately asserted its new-found strength and demanded that new initiatives in congressional strategy be taken. The senior black Representatives did not challenge these demands. Recognising their own minority status in the black delegation, they endorsed the new demands, and generally placed the weight of their seniority and influence behind the majority 'new breed' leadership (with one notable exception, Rep. Robert Nix of Philadelphia). It was not just the changes in the internal balance of power within the House black delegation that led the majority of senior members to follow the political lead of the 'new breed' membership. Both senior and junior black Representatives found themselves being drawn together by a complexity of external political

factors. The demise of the civil rights movement had left a huge vacuum in black national political leadership. Black Representatives came under strong pressure from many elements in the black community to jointly fill that leadership gap. Senior black Congressmen felt this pressure most acutely. Young black political activists in their constituencies began to question what they had achieved during their many years in Congress. As a result, senior black Congressmen became aware that to simply compile the 'correct' voting record was no longer enough.

'New breed' black Representatives argued that their strategic position as members of Congress gave them a national platform from which to assume political leadership of the black American minority. Additionally, they recognised that Congress because it receives constant press coverage could be utilised as an excellent vehicle of publicity. Capitol Hill, therefore, would provide not only a natural political base for black leadership, but also a central focus for the discussion of black American issues. Also, as their numerical strength had further increased, the internal advantages of working as a political unit had multiplied. It was argued that if black Representatives formed a cohesive, race-conscious caucus, they could act as an internal lobby for black American political interests. After due consideration of all these factors, the decision was taken to form the Congressional Black Caucus.

Within a few days of the opening of the 92nd Congress, the Congressional Black Caucus was formally established. On publicly announcing the formation of the CBC, black Representatives described the group's basic political aims as follows;- to improve the economic circumstances, educational and employment opportunities of the black minority, and protect hard-won political and civil rights from infringement; to develop a comprehensive policy programme designed to alleviate the problems of black communities, and the American poor generally; to present that policy programme to the President, and the Congress; to act in Congress as

'Representatives at large' for the total black population, and become their permanent voice in Congress; to establish networks of communication between black politicians, community leaders, businessmen and civil rights organisations in order to maximise black political strength at national, state, and local level; and generally, to use Congress as a vehicle of publicity to draw attention to black American political issues. From the outset the principle of collective leadership constituted the cornerstone

TABLE 9

<u>Congressional Black Caucus Officials, 92nd - 96th Congress</u>				
<u>Year</u>	<u>CBC Chairman</u>	<u>CBC Vice-chairman</u>	<u>CBC Secretary</u>	<u>CBC Treasurer</u>
1971	C.Diggs Jr.	A.Hawkins	C.Rangel	-
1972/3	L.Stokes	P.Mitchell	C.Rangel	W.Clay
1974/5	C.Rangel	Y.Burke	W.Fauntroy	A.Young
1976/7	Y.Burke	W.Fauntroy	C.Collins	A.Young
1978/9	P.Mitchell	S.Chisholm	R.Dellums	C.Collins

of the CBC's political philosophy. It embodied the group's determination to dispel the traditional image of black American political leadership, that of the individual, charismatic 'national Negro leader'. In order to emphasise the collective leadership principle, when the initial decision was made to nominate CBC officials, ie. chairman, vice-chairman etc., the rule was adopted that the positions be regularly rotated amongst the membership. This rule has remained in force throughout the duration of the CBC's political existence (see table above). Senior black Representative Charles Diggs was nominated as the first CBC chairman, and the third-ranking senior black Representative, Augustus Hawkins, was nominated as the first CBC vice-chairman. By nominating senior members to the formal CBC leadership positions the 'new breed' majority demonstrated its desire to build the new group on the basis of consensus. Reciprocally, in accepting the chairmanships, Diggs and Hawkins demonstrated their willingness to try and work within the political framework created by the younger members. Both Diggs and Hawkins endorsed the political view held by 'new breed'

members that collective rather than individual congressional activity would achieve more substantive legislative results for the black American minority. Recalling his acceptance of the CBC chairmanship, Diggs stated, "The Congressional Black Caucus was established to more effectively represent the people we are identified with. To more effectively deal with the issues that are their concern".²⁶

The establishment of a race-conscious group of black legislators caused a considerable stir within some sectors of the House. Rep. Louis Stokes remembered that, "the southern Democrats got a little excited when we first formed the CBC. Some white Congressmen didn't like to see blacks improving themselves, particularly forming power blocs".²⁷ But, Stokes added that once their initial reaction had subsided, "they soon realised we (CBC) were like any other special interest group".²⁸ Nevertheless, the question of whether or not the CBC was similar to other special interest groups did continue to bother some Congressmen. Those who were critical viewed the CBC as a uniquely separate, even divisive, group which ran counter to the code of reciprocity that characterised House political behaviour. Rep. William Clay remembered that he had to constantly refute such charges; he would argue that, "The Congress is made up of a combination of caucuses. There are about 75 to 80 caucuses that operate in Congress. You have got all kinds of special interest group caucuses. You've even got two peanut caucuses here representing two types of peanut growers!".²⁹ In adopting this line of argument in defence of the CBC's existence, 'new breed' Representatives were supported by the senior members. Commenting on the formation of the CBC, Rep. Diggs expressed the view that, "It was not an unprecedented decision. The House of Representatives is composed of 435 people, and coalitions are the way things are done. You have got all kinds of coalitions and caucuses all over the place. The Black Caucus is just one of them".³⁰ It was undeniably true that the formation of caucuses was a common feature of congressional life. But, nevertheless, the CBC did

possess two rather unique characteristics that distinguished it from other internal caucuses. Firstly, unlike other House caucuses, the CBC publicly declared its aims and intentions. Most other caucuses preferred to conduct their business in a covert manner. The openness of CBC strategy was not only an unusual tactic, but it was deliberately chosen by black Representatives. Acknowledging this, Rep. Clay remarked, "When we formally organised the CBC, we made it public. We were out there working, not behind the scenes, not under the table, but out front".³¹ It was the fact that the CBC chose to operate in an overt manner that markedly distinguished the group from other House caucuses. Clarence Mitchell, chief Washington DC lobbyist for the NAACP, confirmed this view, "Representatives who are interested in wool, or lead, or whatever, coalesce. They don't say what they are trying to do because they don't want to attract any attention. They'd rather do things under a cloak of secrecy. The Black Caucus, though, came out and said what it was for. That really was the big difference between the Black Caucus and most of the other alignments in the House".³² Secondly, and obviously, the factor of race marked the CBC apart from other House groupings. The CBC was unusual quite simply because its membership was black. As has been demonstrated in earlier chapters, black Representatives had been rare political phenomena in Congress. Until the late 1960's they had never possessed sufficient numerical strength in the House to regularly operate as a group (in the hundred year period, 1870-1970, only 34 black Americans were seated in Congress). The public emergence of a thirteen-member, race-conscious caucus of black legislators in the 92nd Congress, therefore, was a unique development in a political institution in which the black American traditionally had been a largely invisible force.

At its inception, however, the CBC was far from being a monolithic group of black legislators thinking and acting in concert. When publicly launching the CBC, black Representatives deliberately fostered an image

of the group as tightly-knit and unified. The mass media tended to reinforce this public image by its uncritical coverage of the event. But, in fact, the public image of the CBC was quite different to the political reality. As an AFL-CIO congressional lobbyist remarked, "The Press tended to mistakenly view the CBC as a totally united group. They were a bunch of Congressmen, and the same as any bunch of politicians had diverse political backgrounds, style and outlook".³³ The true political nature of the CBC was that it was a loosely-structured group containing strong inherent tendencies towards disagreements and disunity. Black Representatives had found it relatively easy to establish the CBC and publicly announce its general aims, but they would confront greater difficulties in resolving the basic question of the new group's political functions. What actual role could a racially-based caucus play in Congress, and in national politics generally? This basic question was tackled in the second stage of the CBC's development, the 'exploratory stage', which occurred against the political background of the 92nd Congress and the Presidential election of 1972. At this stage the CBC membership were often disunited, and sometimes in open conflict, as they wrestled with the fundamental problem of defining the group's overall political strategy, and specific legislative functions. Some senior black members viewed the CBC as basically a symbolic gesture of black political unity which would have limited functions in national politics, and in the legislative process. Senior Black Congressmen, such as Diggs, Nix and Hawkins, and indeed, some of the newly-elected black members in the 92nd Congress, Ralph Matcalfe and George Collins from Chicago, had spent their political careers in Democratic party politics, and naturally were more disposed towards working loyally through regular Democratic party channels in Congress rather than taking an independent path. Whereas the new, younger black Representatives saw the CBC developing as an independent, internal lobby for black political interests in both Democratic national politics and

the legislative process. The young black Representatives had come to Congress as independent political activists with civil rights and community work experience; they felt no firm commitment to the interests of the Democratic party. In fact, many of the new black members eg. Chisholm, Stokes, Clay, Dellums and Mitchell, had been bitterly opposed by the local district Democratic party organisations during their election campaigns. The 'exploratory stage' of the CBC's development was characterised by frequent disagreements between the two main elements within the group, ie. the senior Democratic party-experienced members, and the younger, independently-minded ex-civil rights members. It was not until the 92nd Congress drew to a close, and the Republican party regained the Presidency, that these two elements in the CBC began to reconcile their political differences and devise a group strategy based upon mutual respect for each other's political experience, attitudes, and style.

Throughout the 'exploratory stage' disagreements between the senior and younger black members usually concerned matters of style and attitude. The older black Representatives had begun their congressional careers at a time when Speaker Rayburn's words 'to get along, go along' were sound advice if a freshman wished to survive in the House. Like many other Congressmen of their generation they had diligently adhered to such advice and were on the verge of gaining the rewards that the seniority system bestowed, ie. committee and sub-committee chairmanships. Quite naturally, therefore, the senior CBC members took a more conservative view of how to approach the legislative process than the younger, ex-civil rights members. The younger black Representatives had entered Congress committed to the reform of the seniority-apprenticeship system. As a means of expressing both their impatience with the seniority rule and their determination to force Congress to consider black American issues, junior black members adopted the innovative congressional tactic of forming 'ad hoc' congressional committees. In the 92nd Congress CBC members convened four major 'ad hoc'

committees to discuss political issues which they believed the standing committee chairmen had deliberately chosen to ignore. The topics discussed in the 'ad hoc' committees were, in chronological order, Vietnam war crimes, Racial Discrimination in the Armed Services, Racial Bias in the Mass Media, and Governmental Lawlessness. Not only did CBC members choose controversial subjects for discussion, but they also held the 'ad hoc' committee meetings in public to attract media attention. This tactic worked well generally in facilitating national debate on the subjects, particularly in the case of the committee hearings on Vietnam war crimes which had been an aspect of U.S. military policy in South-east Asia completely ignored by Congressmen. The Vietnam war crimes hearings provoked considerable controversy in Congress as they exposed the general complacency of the congressional leadership on the conduct of Vietnam policy. As a consequence, the CBC membership as a whole became very unpopular with many of the senior, white Democratic Congressmen. Some senior black Representatives felt alienated from their white colleagues because of the action taken by the junior black members in instigating the 'ad hoc' hearings. Rep. Robert Nix, a nine-term black legislator, did not hesitate to severely criticise the unorthodox tactics of the 'new breed' CBC members, "I've seen people come into this Congress feeling it was incumbent upon them to give everybody hell, talking about all the wrongs and fancied wrongs that happen everyday..... In voicing your disapproval, you don't make your fellow member of Congress responsible for what you're condemning unless he is responsible".³⁴

Mainly however, in the 92nd Congress, senior and junior CBC members disagreed on the means to achieve desired policy goals, not the actual policy goals. While arguments between individual members over the merits and dismerits of various political tactics continued, the CBC membership did manage to work together to produce a group statement of policy goals. Black Representatives had begun the process of defining

policy goals in the 91st Congress, in preparation for their requested meeting with President Nixon. The President's constant refusal, on the grounds of 'scheduling difficulties', to meet the CBC and discuss the black minority's problems hardened the resolve of Black Representatives to develop their own policy programme.³⁵ When President Nixon finally agreed to meet Black Representatives in March 1971, thirteen months after their original request and following the total CBC membership's boycott of Nixon's 1971 State of the Union Message, they had prepared a comprehensive list of policy priorities. Entitled "60 Recommendations to the President", the CBC policy document began with an opening statement which pronounced that, "Our people are no longer asking for equality as a rhetorical promise. They are demanding from the National Administration and from elected officials without regard to party affiliation, the only kind of equality that ultimately has any real meaning - equality of results".³⁶ The policy document listed its recommendations under thirteen main headings. In summary, the principal policy recommendations were as follows:-

1/ Manpower and Employment Rights. (a) The provision of a permanent, federal job creation programme, with jobs in the public sector targeted to the areas of persistent unemployment. The federal programme should aim to provide over one million public sector jobs in its first year. (b) Reform of federal recruitment and promotion practices to ensure that black Americans and other minorities achieve equal results to whites in the middle and upper levels of federal employment. (c) Enforcement of existing Executive orders requiring affirmative action by government contractors and sub-contractors to provide equal employment opportunities. Expansion of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to provide 'cease and desist' power to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, coverage to employers of eight or more persons, and to eliminate the exemption of state and local governments and educational institutions.

2/ Welfare Reform. Replacement of the existing welfare system by a guaranteed adequate income system (with a minimum guaranteed income of \$6,500 for a family of four). Federal welfare programmes should operate standardised eligibility requirements, and have as an ultimate objective the realisation of individual economic self-sufficiency.

3/ Federal Assistance to State and Local Government. Revenue-sharing funds should be spent in a manner that ensured that the poor and disadvantaged minority groups received the maximum benefit. This should be achieved by:- (a) the participation of neighbourhood/community groups in planning and decisions about how funds will be spent, (b) the enforcement of civil rights laws with respect to the expenditure of federal funds, and (c) changing revenue-sharing distribution apparatus ie. the population

based distribution formula, to a system which channelled more funds to major urban areas. The revenue-sharing programme should not replace the need for national leadership in major policy areas such as housing and education.

4/ Minority Economic Development. (a) The establishment of an independent, publicly-financed development bank to assist minority businesses, which should receive an annual appropriation of one billion dollars. (b) The enactment of legislation requiring federal government contractors to allocate a specified percentage of their subcontract work to minority businesses. (c) Community Development Corporations' funding should be increased to at least \$50 million for the development of community-based minority businesses.

5/ Poverty Programmes. More funding for the programmes of the Office of Economic Opportunity, and expansion of the OEO's legal services to the poor. (The Nixon Administration had declared its intention to gradually phase out many of the OEO programmes, and finally dismantle the Agency).

6/ Education. (a) The further development and federal funding of day-care and child development programmes giving special attention to the needs of disadvantaged minority groups. (b) The abandonment of plans to consolidate federal aid to education into a programme of revenue-sharing; the full integration of schools should be a firm requirement for receipt of federal funds. (c) Increased financial support for black institutions of higher education, and the provision of more aid in grants to students from low-income families.

7/ Housing and Urban Development. (a) Increased funding for public housing programme. (b) The enactment of legislation to amend the Housing Act so that urban renewal money may be used for housing development projects other than new construction. (c) Tax legislation should be enacted which provided favourable treatment to investors in inner-city property development, particularly community development corporations and minority group community organisations. (d) Executive action should be taken to assure that federal installations are not located until it has been proven that applicant communities are open to all economic and racial groups for residence.

8/ Drug Abuse. Drug abuse and addiction should be recognised as a major national crisis, and emergency measures taken, including (a) the suspension of economic and military assistance to any country which fails to take steps to prevent narcotic drugs produced or processed in that country from entering the United States illegally, and (b) the federal funding of drug rehabilitation centres in every major American city.

9/ Criminal Justice. (a) The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) should support law reform and the development of a fair criminal justice system, particularly in urban areas, rather than its present policy of assisting local government in the purchasing of excessive amounts of weaponry and equipment. (b) The Executive should appoint more black Americans as federal judges and other legal officers in every region of USA.

10/ Civil Rights. (a) Civil Rights legislation should be rigidly enforced. The Office of Management and Budget should establish an adequately staffed division on civil rights which would monitor every department and agency to insure that all civil rights legislation and executive policies are implemented. (b) The Attorney-General should investigate and take corrective action to halt efforts to disenfranchise black Americans and minority voters, wherever they occur.

11/ Veterans' Affairs. The establishment of a civil rights division within the Department of Defence to ensure equitable treatment of complaints of racial discrimination against military personnel.

12/ District of Columbia. The granting of full congressional representation and home rule to the District of Columbia.

13/ Foreign Policy. (a) Disengagement from South-east Asia by the end of the 92nd Congress. Drastic reduction in military expenditures and the redirection of these funds to domestic programmes. (b) The U.S. should redefine the priorities of its foreign aid programmes to give substantially more economic assistance to black African states.

In compiling "60 Recommendations to the President" CBC chairman Charles Diggs had ensured that each CBC member's views were represented. In its final form the policy document constituted a careful amalgam of all thirteen members' specialised political interests. Consequently, when on March 25th, 1971, black Representatives finally had their meeting with President Nixon, Rep. Diggs was able to present him with a policy document which had the unanimous support of the CBC membership. As expected, however, the long-awaited meeting with President Nixon did not produce any significant results. Although, in a private letter to Diggs, President Nixon stated that "your broad goals are largely the same as those of the Administration",³⁷ the Administration's official response was basically negative. 'Newsweek' observed that, "(Nixon's) reply simply catalogued the Administration record to date, accepted only a few relatively marginal black proposals (e.g. a task-force study of military justice), and rejected most of the expensive ones".³⁸ The considerable political effort exerted by the CBC in producing the policy document was not, however, totally wasted. The forging of the document performed the important function of creating a firm base of consensus within the group on broad policy goals which could be developed at a later stage.

Following the Nixon Administration's refusal to give serious consideration to the CBC proposals, the next step taken by the CBC members was to offer their policy document to the Democratic party for its approval. With national elections on the political horizon, CBC members expected to have more influence on the Democratic leadership, particularly

Presidential aspirants. Black Representatives were fully aware of the political fact that in the post-war period the black vote had played a crucial role in the Democratic party Presidential election victories. In the 1972 Presidential election CBC members envisaged that, with the Democratic candidate facing a strong incumbent Republican, solid black support for the Democrats would be vitally necessary if the Party was to win. In a political scenario of this nature, the CBC believed that it would hold a strong bargaining position. As Rep. William Clay argued, "(The Democrats) are going to give us what we are entitled to, or we are going to deny them what they want from us - our votes. They know the consequences of our taking even 25% of the black vote out of the Democratic column: they wouldn't have a chance in hell to win".³⁹ As the price for black electoral support, Black Representatives hoped to extract from the Democratic leadership a firm commitment to the CBC policy document.

Prior to approaching the Democratic leadership, Black Representatives sought to gain maximum support for the CBC policy document from as many sectors of black political leadership as possible. It was thought that if the CBC could gain endorsement of its policy recommendations from a wide cross-section of black political leaders, ie. local elected officials, civil rights and community leaders, the full potential of black political strength could be mobilised and, hopefully, merged into an effective political force in the upcoming elections. With this aim in mind CBC chairman C.Diggs, on November 20th, 1971, called for a National Black Political Convention of all black leaders, whatever their political persuasion. Diggs stated that the purpose of the convention would be to develop "strategies for maximum practical unity in the national participation of blacks in the Democratic and Republican conventions and in local, state, and national elections".⁴⁰ Rep. Diggs joined with Richard G.Hatcher (black mayor of Gary, Indiana) and Imamu Baraka (a Pan-Africanist from Newark, New Jersey) in organising the convention, which finally materialised

in March 1972 at Gary, Indiana. The Gary Convention was attended by 4,267 official delegates from 43 states, and approximately an equal number of alternate delegates and observers. One member of the delegation described the convention as "one of the most diverse gatherings of black people in the history of the nation".⁴¹ Taken as a whole, the delegates attending the convention literally represented every shade of political opinion in Black America. Under one roof there were assembled black elected officials of both major political parties, black nationalists and separatists, black trade union leaders, integrationist civil rights leaders and Black Panther Party members. Over 150 black political organisations sent delegates and observers. The political diversity of the gathering was reflected in the principal speakers to address the convention; they included CBC chairman Charles Diggs, Samuel C. Jackson, Assistant Secretary of the Housing and Urban Development Agency in the Nixon Administration, Bobby Seale, a founder member of the Black Panther party, and Rev. Jesse L. Jackson of the newly-formed Chicago community organisation 'Operation PUSH' (People United to Save Humanity). In observing the plethora of black political organisations and interests represented at the convention, Rev. Jesse Jackson remarked that it was "a lightweight miracle"⁴² that the meeting had been organised successfully. However, apart from establishing a dialogue between black political groups that previously had been separated, which was a considerable achievement, the Gary Convention produced few tangible political results. In attempting to reach agreement on a national black political strategy, the National Black Political Convention had set itself an impossible task. The political unity achieved at the convention was artificial rather than substantive; this fact was reflected in the contradictory resolutions that were adopted in the National Black Political Agenda, the principal political outcome of the meeting. In the closing hours of the convention when a substantial proportion of the delegates committed

to the concept of racial integration had left, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), which had recently abandoned its traditional integrationist posture, secured the passage of a resolution that condemned the busing of black children to achieve racial integration in the school system. Busing of this type, the resolution stated, was "racist and suicidal", and based on "the false notion that black children are unable to learn unless they are in the same setting as white children".⁴³ Additionally, to the annoyance of many delegates who represented black groups that received strong moral and financial support from the Jewish community, a coalition of nationalist groups passed a resolution which called for the dismantling of Israel, and black American unity with the Arab cause in the Middle East. Many black elected officials, including CBC members, felt the necessity to publicly disassociate themselves from the passage of these two resolutions. Nevertheless, inspite of these difficulties, CBC members were able to gain an overwhelming endorsement from the Convention delegates for their policy document. The CBC's "60 Recommendations" document formed a major part of the adopted National Black Political Agenda. Furthermore, the CBC members together with other black elected officials managed to steer the convention away from supporting the creation of a separate black American political party. A compromise resolution, calling for an 'independent black political movement', was accepted as a substitute. The Convention decided that this new movement would take the form of a 'National Black Political Assembly'. The Assembly would be composed of 427 delegates (10% of those delegates attending the convention) who would meet regularly between national black conventions. Its main political tasks would be to organise the national black community for implementation of the Gary Convention's 'National Black Political Agenda'; to endorse and support black candidates for elective office; to conduct national voter education and registration programmes; to lobby for black political interests; to act as a power broker in dealing with white political institutions; to make

recommendations to future conventions.⁴⁴ On its establishment black politicians recognised that the new Assembly, given the limited financial resources and manpower available, could not possibly perform its myriad functions effectively. But, as politicians they understood that in politics appearances are often more important than reality. The principal success of the Gary Convention was the unprecedented level of black political unity achieved. Black politicians reasoned that this massive display of black unity would convince the major political parties, particularly the Democratic party, that black political demands could no longer be ignored. CBC members played a key role in engineering the Convention unity to have this desired effect. Acknowledging this, a leading newspaper noted, "the Convention would seem to have been a victory for the mostly Democratic professional politicians, who hope to use this show of strength and unity ... to bargain with the Democratic party".⁴⁵

Armed with the Gary Convention's broad endorsement of its policy document, the CBC commenced the difficult task of fighting to gain the Democratic party's acceptance of its principal policy demands. By June 1972, the CBC had defined a list of 'non-negotiable', minimum policy demands to be presented to the Democrats. The CBC named the list, 'the Black Bill of Rights'; the new document contained the major policy proposals from the original '60 Recommendations' and included some new demands, e.g. a national health insurance scheme and free medical services for the poor, a new Homestead Act 'to rebuild inner cities without removing those who live there', and prison reforms 'that guarantee rehabilitation and prisoners' rights'. Announcing the 'Black Bill of Rights', Rep. Louis Stokes stated, "We strongly intend for these demands to be reflected in the (Democratic) Party's platform and to be accepted by the Party's nominee for President".⁴⁶ Unfortunately though, although the CBC membership was united on the policy goals contained within the 'Black

Bill of Rights', this was not the case regarding the question of the political strategy to be employed in forwarding the policy goals. Just as CBC members had disagreed over political tactics to be used in Congress, they were also divided over how best to forward their policy proposals within the Democratic party. Major disagreement existed on the question of which Democratic presidential candidate to endorse. Which candidate was most likely to work ardently for the inclusion of the CBC's policy document in the Democratic party platform? Moreover, which candidate if elected would genuinely attempt to implement the proposed policies? Some CBC members believed that Senator George McGovern would work hardest for black political interests, while others preferred to support Senator Hubert Humphrey. Still other members believed that the CBC should keep its options open until the Democratic convention. In their view the primary task of the CBC was to persuade black delegates to unite as an uncommitted voting bloc at the convention and bargain with the candidates from a position of strength. One CBC member, Rep. Shirley Chisholm, had decided that the only way to effectively bargain with the Democratic leadership would be to run a strong black American presidential candidate in the Democratic primaries. In January 1972, Rep. Chisholm had put her theory into practice by announcing her own candidacy for the Democratic Presidential nomination. Although throughout her campaign she insisted that she was in the presidential race to win, Rep. Chisholm's prime intention in running was to seek answers to two basic questions facing black Democrats. Expressed in her own words these questions were as follows, "Could a black candidate swing enough votes behind him to go to the Democratic national convention with a solid bloc of delegates that would compel the powers in the party to listen to black demands? Could these delegates rally behind one candidate, submerging ideological and personal differences?"⁴⁷ As events in the 1972 Democratic presidential campaign unfolded, the answers to both questions proved to be negative.

At the Democratic convention the highest delegate count that Rep. Chisholm received was 151.25. The four hundred black delegates attending the convention failed to coalesce in support of one candidate, their votes being split between McGovern, Humphrey and Chisholm. Furthermore, the McGovern supporters, who formed a majority in the black delegation, were unable to extract from their candidate any commitment to black American policy demands that went beyond generalities.

The 'exploratory stage' of the CBC's development, therefore, witnessed the membership in a constant state of disarray and disagreement over questions of congressional tactics, and political strategy in national Democratic politics. The only real advance made in the 'exploratory stage' was the general agreement reached on broad policy goals. From the standpoint of the CBC membership however, an important positive result did emerge from amidst the turmoil of the group's first two years' existence. As the 92nd Congress drew to a close, the CBC membership entered a phase of critical self-examination which led to a complete reassessment of the group's political tactics. CBC members recognised that, given their limited resources and political strength, they had been too ambitious. Too much had been attempted at the political cost of deep divisions within the group. Consequently, it was decided that the CBC would narrow its political focus and confine its activities to the legislative sphere. CBC members would attempt to implement their policy programme by devising a legislative agenda, and by lobbying for the enactment of specific legislative measures. The CBC would minimise conflict within the group by drawing equally upon the political energy of its junior members and the legislative expertise of the senior members. The new mood in the CBC was reflected in the fact that Rep. Louis Stokes was elected as CBC chairman, replacing senior Rep. Charles Diggs. The election of Louis Stokes, who was the least iconoclastic of the 'new breed' members, signified the group's determination to reconcile the differences between its junior and senior membership, and work together as a legislative

caucus. In his first major statement as CBC chairman, Rep. Stokes, reflecting candidly on the experience of the first two years, summarised the CBC's new role as follows, "At first we were unclear about our proper role. Therefore.... we have had to analyse what our resources are, what we should be doing, and how best to do it. And our conclusion is this: If we are to be effective, if we are going to make a meaningful contribution to minority citizens and this country, then it must be as legislators. This is the area in which we possess expertise - and it is within the halls of Congress that we must make this expertise felt. This, essentially, is our mandate in the 93rd Congress..."⁴⁸

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FOOTNOTES

1. The term 'new breed' was originally used in this context by Joyce Gelb in 'Blacks, Blocs, and Ballots: The Relevance of Party Politics to the Negro'. (POLITY. Vol.III No.1. Fall 1970).
2. M.Christopher, 'America's Black Congressmen' (Thomas Y.Crowell Co. New York 1971) p. 209.
3. Michael Barone, Grant Ujifusa, Douglas Matthews. 'The Almanac of American Politics. 1974'. (Gambit Books Inc., Boston 1973) p. 470.
4. Fieldwork Interview, Rep. John Conyers (D. Mich. 1st). Washington DC. 1st July, 1974.
5. 'Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. XI. 1965.(CQ Service Inc., Wash.DC. 1966) p. 181.
6. Ibid., p. 180.
7. The seven dissenting votes were all cast by Democrats; they were Rep. John Conyers (Mich), Rep. George E.Brown Jr. (Calif), Rep. Philip Burton (Calif), Rep. John G.Dow (N.Y.), Rep. Don Edwards (Calif), Rep. Edith Green (Ore), Rep. William F.Ryan (N.Y.).
8. 'Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. XII. 1966. (CQ Service Inc., Wash. DC. 1967) p. 382.

9. Charles Rabb, 'The Black Freshmen'. (Article in THE NATION magazine, January 6th, 1969).
10. S.Chisholm, 'Unbought and Unbossed'. (Avon Books, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston. 1970). p. 98.
11. Ibid., p.101.
12. In the 91st Congress the House Internal Security Committee replaced the Committee on Un-American Activities. The new Committee had jurisdiction to hold investigations on 'communist and other subversive activities', and to make recommendations to Congress on 'any necessary remedial legislation' needed to curtail subversive group activities.
13. Black members' votes on HR 7757 (CQ House vote 16) divided as follows:-
AGAINST Hawkins, Clay, Chisholm, Stokes, Nix. FOR Diggs. ABSENT Conyers, Dawson, Powell.
14. Black members' votes on HR 14000 (CQ House vote 93) were as follows:-
AGAINST Hawkins, Conyers, Diggs, Clay, Chisholm, Stokes, Nix.
ABSENT Dawson, Powell.
15. Shortly before his election to the Presidency, Richard Nixon, on Nov. 2nd 1968, stated that he would nominate to the Supreme Court, 'strict constructionists who saw their duty as interpreting law and not making law'. Implying criticism of the Warren Court, Nixon added that, 'they would see themselves as caretakers of the Constitution and servants of the people, not super-legislators with a free hand to impose their social and political viewpoints upon the American people'. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac vol. XXV 1969. CQ Service Inc., Wash. DC. 1970. p. 130.)
16. 'Congressional Quarterly Almanac Vol. XXVI 1970' (CQ Service Inc., Wash. DC. 1971) p. 154.
17. Black Representatives' statement in 'Congressional Quarterly Almanac vol. XXV 1969'. (CQ Service Inc., Wash. DC. 1970) p. 345.
18. John Conyers quoted in 'Congressional Quarterly Almanac Vol. XXVI, 1970'. (CQ Service Inc., Wash. DC. 1971) p. 158.
19. Chisholm, 'Unbought', op. cit. p. 124.
20. Fieldwork Interview, Rep. Charles Diggs Jr. (D. Mich. 13th). Wash. DC. July 17th, 1974.

21. Fieldwork Interview, Clarence Mitchell (Washington Bureau, N.A.A.C.P., congressional lobbyist) Wash. DC. July 17th, 1974.
22. Rep. W. Clay quoted in an article on the CBC, 'Newsweek' June 7th, 1971.
23. Clay, Ibid.
24. Rep. Charles Diggs quoted in 'Congressional Quarterly Almanac Vol. XXVI 1970 (CQ Service Inc., Wash. DC. 1971) p. 690.
25. Rep. Fauntroy has delegate status in Congress; he can vote in standing committees and the Democratic caucus, but not in House roll-calls.
26. Fieldwork Interview, Rep. Charles Diggs. Wash. DC. July 17th, 1974.
27. Fieldwork Interview, Rep. Louis Stokes (D. Ohio 21st). Wash. DC. June 20th, 1974.
28. Stokes interview.
29. Fieldwork Interview, Rep. William Clay (D. Mo. 1st) Wash. DC. June 26th, 1974.
30. Diggs interview.
31. Clay interview.
32. Clarence Mitchell interview.
33. Fieldwork Interview, Ken Young (AFL-CIO Congressional lobbyist) Wash. DC. July 19th, 1974.
34. Rep. Robert Nix quoted in article 'The Black Caucus' (EBONY magazine, June 1973 edition).
35. Many young Black Representatives believed that President Nixon deliberately avoided meeting with them. On the House floor, May 18th, 1970, Rep. William Clay expressed this belief as follows;- 'There is no question where Mr. Nixon has placed his priorities. He has travelled more than 35,000 miles in foreign countries. He has entertained hundreds of foreign diplomats but refuses to meet with the elected representatives of the black 'nation' within this country. In all the President's travels he has not seen the suffering and deprivation in Watts... Harlem... or any of the other ghettos... The President, despite his pledge to serve all the people of this country, has ignored his responsibility to our people'. (Speech quoted in I.F. STONE'S BI-WEEKLY, June 1970).
36. '60 Recommendations to the President' document. Placed in the 'Congressional Record' by CBC chairman C. Diggs (92nd Congress, 1st session, March 30th, 1971).

37. Letter to Diggs from President Nixon, quoted in 'CQ Weekly Report', May 28th, 1971. p. 1173. (CQ Service Inc., Wash. DC. 1971)
38. 'Newsweek' magazine, June 7th, 1971. p.22.
39. 'Wall Street Journal', Oct. 26th, 1971. (quoted in J.L.Sundquist, "Dynamics of the Party System", Brookings Institution, Wash. DC. 1973. p. 367.)
40. 'New York Times', November 21st, 1971.
41. John Dean, 'Black Political Assembly: Birth of a New Force'. (FOCUS, Vol.2. No.1. Nov. 1973 p.4. Joint Centre for Political Studies, Wash. DC. 1973).
42. 'International Herald Tribune', March 15th, 1972.
43. Excerpt from anti-busing resolution from 'The Guardian', March 14th, 1972.(Article by Adam Raphael, 'Black Unity Begins in Gary').
44. The political functions of the National Black Political Assembly, — as listed, are paraphrased from the Nov. 1973 edition of 'FOCUS' op. cit.
45. I.H.T. 15/3/72. op. cit.
46. Stokes quote, in 'Black Caucus Warns Democrats' by Austin Scott, 'The Washington Post, June 2nd, 1972.
47. S.Chisholm, 'The Good Fight', (Bantam Books, Bantam Bks. Inc., New York, 1974.) p. 21.
48. Rep. Louis Stokes, "The Caucus: Progress through Legislation" (FOCUS, Vol.1. No.11. Sept. 1973. J.C.P.S. Wash. DC.)

Chapter Five

The Congressional Black Caucus Adopts a Legislative Role.

The decision to adopt a legislative role rested on two basic considerations. Firstly, Black Representatives acknowledged that, in its first two years, the CBC had adopted a role that had been both too burdensome and unrealistic. CBC members had attempted to fill every aspect of the national political leadership vacuum in Black America. As a group, the CBC did not possess the political capacity to perform such a role effectively. The overall result of the CBC's early political activities had been general confusion, and the growth of unnecessary divisions within the group. Consequently, the CBC's initial behaviour had served to further reduce their limited political influence in Congress. Secondly, the 1972 Presidential election contest had produced a massive, 'landslide' victory for Richard Nixon. Black Congressmen were not enamoured by the prospect of another four years of an Administration that appeared determined to dismantle federal anti-poverty agencies, to drastically reduce welfare expenditure, and to ignore the intent of existing civil rights legislation. In their view, if the Nixon Administration's proposed policy goals were achieved in the 93rd and 94th Congresses, there would be a rapid deterioration in the standard of living, health and welfare of millions of black Americans. As a significant proportion of low-income black families, and poverty-level families in general, lived in the crowded, inner-city districts represented by Black Congressmen, the CBC membership were convinced of the necessity for the group to adopt a united purpose during Nixon's second term. With these two political considerations foremost in their minds ie. the recognition of the shortcomings of earlier CBC behaviour, and the need to respond to the threat posed to their constituents by Nixon Administration policies, Black Representatives concluded that the only viable role open to the CBC was

to operate as a legislative caucus and formulate alternative policies, and lobby for their enactment in Congress. From the beginning of the 93rd Congress CBC members began to develop a legislative strategy that would enable them to more effectively defend their shared constituency interests.

In setting up the CBC Black Representatives had hoped to fill the national black leadership vacuum that had developed following the collapse of the civil rights movement. The experience of the CBC's first two years demonstrated that the vacuum was too large for even the most enthusiastic, and energetic junior black Representatives to be able to fill adequately. Black Congressmen had been subjected to a vast array of political pressures and demands from black communities throughout the states who believed the CBC would be able to help them. Looking back on the initial years, Rep. Stokes took the view that, "the formation of the CBC raised expectations a little too high in black communities".¹ Black Representatives' haphazard attempts to match these high expectations had had a two-fold derogatory effect. By trying to move in too many directions simultaneously, CBC members had created confusion and disorientation within the group. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, black Americans who had hoped for effective political leadership or individual help from the CBC felt a deeper sense of disillusionment with the political process when results did not materialise. When the decision was made to adopt a purely legislative role, therefore, black Representatives were careful not to repeat the CBC's earlier error and promise too much of this new initiative. The new chairman, Rep. Louis Stokes emphasised that the devising of an effective legislative strategy would be an uphill struggle. It was by no means certain that tangible legislative results could be achieved in the short term. In making this point, Stokes observed succinctly, "After all, 16 men and only 15 votes, out of 435, cannot achieve miracles".²

FN shall follow

The CBC did possess an added advantage when it set out to develop a legislative role; its membership had increased from 13 to 16 Representatives. The Republican party 'landslide' in the 1972 Presidential election had not been matched in the congressional elections. In the House of Representatives the Republicans only succeeded in gaining six seats, and consequently the Democrats retained an overall majority (ie. in 93rd Congress 248 Democrats, 187 Republicans). Included amongst the Democratic House majority were three new black Representatives, Barbara Jordan (Texas 18th), Andrew Young (Ga. 5th), and Yvonne Brathwaite Burke (Calif. 37th). Representatives Jordan and Young were the first black Americans to be elected to Congress from the South since Reconstruction. The significant black congressional gains made in the 1972 elections, and in the two preceding congressional elections were, however, to level off in the 1974 mid-term elections. In the 1974 elections, principally as a result of the ramifications of the Watergate scandal in the Republican party, the Democrats gained forty-three House seats. But, in spite of this, only one new black Democrat was elected, Rep. Harold Ford (Tenn. 8th). In the 94th Congress, therefore, the CBC membership stood at seventeen (Table 10).

The first step taken by the CBC in developing its legislative strategy was the drafting of an alternative legislative agenda. Starting from the basis of the broad policy goals presented in the '60 Recommendations to the President' document, CBC members constructed a comprehensive legislative programme. The CBC presented its legislative programme to Congress in the form of an alternative 'State of the Union' address. On January 31st, 1973, black Representatives took to the House floor, one by one, and listed CBC legislative proposals in every major policy area. The reading of the CBC legislative programme took the CBC membership most of the afternoon legislative session and absorbed twenty-five pages of the 'Congressional Record'. In a preamble to the presentation of the

CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS MEMBERSHIP - 94th CONGRESS (TABLE 10)

<u>CBC member, State & District</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Terms in Congress</u>	<u>Career.</u>
Ronald Dellums Calif. 8th. Oakland.	41	3rd	Born in Oakland, Calif. Graduate in Social Science. Psychiatric social worker, Dept. of Mental Hygiene, Calif. 1962-4. Programme Director, Bayview Community Centre, 1965-6. Director, Concentrated Employment Programme, 1967-8. Berkeley City Council Mb., 1967-71.
Yvonne Burke Calif. 28th. Los Angeles.	44	2nd	Born in Los Angeles. Graduate in Law. Attorney. State Assembly, 1966-72. Deputy Corporation Commissioner, Los Angeles.
Augustus Hawkins Calif. 29th. Los Angeles.	69	7th	Born in Shreveport, Louisiana. Graduate in Economics. Real Estate Business, 1945-. Calif. Assembly, 1935-62.
Andrew Young Ga. 5th. Atlanta.	44	2nd	Born in New Orleans, Louisiana. Ordained Minister, United Church of Christ. Executive Committees, Southern Christian Leadership Conf., National Urban Coalition, Citizens Committee for Govt. Reorganisation, Common Cause.
Ralph Metcalfe Ill. 1st. Chicago.	66	3rd	Born in Atlanta, Georgia. Graduate in Physical Educ. Athlete. Chicago 3rd ward committeeman, 1952-. Alderman, 1955-70. Chicago City Council, 1955-70.
Cardiss Collins Ill. 7th. Chicago.	45	2nd	Born in St. Louis, Missouri. Accountant. Illinois Dept. of Revenue. Won a special election in June 1973, following the death of her husband Rep. G.W. Collins in Dec. 1972.
Parren Mitchell Md. 7th. Baltimore.	54	3rd	Born in Baltimore, Md. Graduate in Social Science. Professor of Sociology, Morgan State College. Executive Sec. Maryland Commission on Interracial problems and relations, 1963-5. Director, Baltimore Community Action Agency, 1965-8.
John Conyers Jr. Mich. 1st. Detroit.	47	6th	Born in Detroit, Mich. Army career. Graduate in Law. A.C.L.U. lawyer. Legislative Assistant to Rep. John Dingell, 1958-61.

CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS MEMBERSHIP - 94th CONGRESS (TABLE 10 pt.II)

<u>CBC member</u> <u>State & District</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Terms in</u> <u>Congress</u>	<u>Career</u>
Charles Diggs Jr. Mich. 13th. Detroit.	54	11th	Born in Detroit, Mich. Graduate in Law. Mortician. Member of State Senate, 1951-4.
William Clay Mo. 1st. St.Louis.	45	4th	Born in St.Louis. Graduate in Science. Alderman, 26th ward St.Louis, 1959-64. City Employers Union, 1961-4. Educ. Coordinator Steamfitters Local No. 562, 1966-7.
Shirley Chisholm NY 12th. Brooklyn, NYC. Bedford Stuyvesant.	52	4th	Born in Brooklyn. Graduate in Educ. Teacher, 1946-53. Child welfare worker, 1953-9. Educ. consultant, Div. of Day Care, NY 1959-64. NY State Assembly, 1964-8
Charles Rangel NY 19th. Harlem, NYC.	46	3rd	Born in Harlem. Graduate in Law. Attorney. Legal Counsel to NYC Housing & Dev. Board. Assistant US Attorney in Justice Dept, 1963-4. NY State Assembly, 1966-70.
Louis Stokes Ohio 21st. Cleveland,	51	4th	Born in Cleveland. Graduate in Law. Practicing Attorney, 1954-68. As NAACP attorney, he won Ohio Redistricting suit which led to the creation of his congressional district.
Robert Nix. Pa. 2nd. Philadelphia.	71	10th	Born in Orangeburg, S.C. Graduate in Law. Practicing Attorney, 1925-. Ward Comm. Chairman, 1950-8. Democratic ward leader 32nd ward Philadelphia, 1958-.
Harold Ford Tenn. 8th. Memphis.	31	1st	Born in Memphis. Graduate in Science. Mortician. State House of Reps., 1971-4.
Barbara Jordan Texas 18th. Houston.	40	2nd	Born in Houston. Graduate in Law. Admin. Assistant, Judge of Harris County. State Senator, 1967-72. Executive Committee member, National Democratic Policy Council.
Walter Fauntroy (delegate) Washington DC.	43	3rd	Born in Wash. DC. Ordained Minister. Director, Washington Bureau, SCLC, 1960-71. Vice-chairman, DC City Council, 1967-9. Coordinator, Selma to Montgomery March, 1965.

legislative programme, CBC chairman Louis Stokes announced the basic theme of the group's proposals, "Today, the members of the Congressional Black Caucus stand together in this chamber to present an alternative to what the President has to offer... On January 20th, 1973, in a perverted twist on the message of John F. Kennedy, President Nixon callously exhorted the American people: 'In our own lives, let each of us ask - not just what will government do for me, but what can I do for myself?'.... We, too, would like to believe in self-reliance, but we see it as a goal. It is not, as Mr. Nixon would have us believe, a means. The means to the end of self-reliance lie in a Federal commitment to the fulfillment of human and social needs".³ Following this introductory statement, individual CBC members proceeded to offer specific legislative proposals dealing with policy areas which were within the jurisdiction of the standing committees on which they sat.⁴ The fact that Black Representatives agreed to speak on policy issues relating to their committee assignment was a significant new development. It reflected the determination of Black Representatives to advocate CBC proposals in the relevant standing committees. It was to become an integral part of the CBC legislative strategy that individual members would use their committee position and expertise to forward specific CBC legislative proposals. All Black Representatives have attempted to do this, with one exception, Rep. Robert Nix of Philadelphia. Nix had been the only Black Representative who had not participated in the CBC 'True State of the Union Message'. His non-participation reflected his indifferent attitude towards CBC activities in general. One CBC member's legislative assistant asserted that, "Nix has had nothing to do with the CBC since its beginning". Another legislative aide, commenting cynically on the degree to which Nix involved himself in CBC affairs, remarked that, "It is rumoured that Nix is dead".⁵ Rep. Nix's behaviour is explained by the fact that he is the last of the loyal, 'machine' black politicians

to survive in Congress. As the 'Almanac of American Politics' observed, "Nix is a man who has the Philadelphia Democratic machine to thank for his political career. Accordingly, he is a politician who makes few waves of any kind".⁶ When even the late Rep. William Dawson's handpicked successor, Rep. Ralph Metcalfe, who had been a faithful Daley lieutenant on Chicago's south-side for twenty years, has openly rebelled against the Daley machine in response to constituency pressure on the issue of police brutality, Nix has remained loyal to his white mentors in Philadelphia. Rep. Nix keeps his involvement with the CBC at a minimum; he usually votes in agreement with the CBC, but otherwise he confines his CBC activity to posing for group photographs, and attending important meetings such as those between the CBC and President Nixon, and President Ford (August, 1974). Nix's narrow primary victory in May, 1976 indicates that he is unlikely to survive beyond the 95th Congress.⁷

Once the CBC legislative agenda had been announced in the 'True State of the Union Message', Black Representatives began to organise formal group meetings. The meetings usually took the form of briefings in which individual members informed the group of the progress of important legislation in their committees. The meetings were not organised on a regular basis, but were called when a major legislative issue affecting black political interests needed to be discussed. Rep. William Clay explained that, "We don't meet, say, the third Tuesday in each month; we only meet when we feel there is something important to meet about. But, that usually averages twice a month".⁸ The decision to limit group meetings demonstrated again that the CBC had learnt from its earlier experience. In the 92nd Congress, CBC members had tried to organise a system of informal 'sub-committees', which members theoretically would regularly attend to discuss and formulate CBC positions on various policy issues. There were established CBC informal sub-committees on foreign

affairs, welfare and drug abuse, and other subjects, but in practice, they rarely functioned properly. The pressures upon a Representative's time, particularly a black member from a demanding, problem-ridden urban constituency, did not physically allow him to regularly participate in 'talking shops' of this nature. When asked about their involvement with the early sub-committees, several Black Representatives replied, "I didn't have the time", while others acknowledged frankly that many of the sub-committees existed only on paper. CBC meetings held from the 93rd Congress onwards were not of the discursive type, but were usually called for a specific legislative purpose. The meetings were designed to be complementary to members' legislative and committee work, not disruptive and unproductive. Individual members were encouraged to become CBC spokesmen in the policy areas where they possessed committee expertise. The emphasis in the CBC meetings was on the pooling of legislative expertise so that each member was aware of the current status of important legislation in the House. The CBC chairman's function was to maintain regular contact with all other members, and keep informed of their committee work. In his period as CBC chairman, Rep. Stokes remembered performing this function, "If I wanted to know about legislative measures on public health, I'd consult Ralph Metcalfe. On crime and the judicial system, I'd consult John Conyers".⁹ In this way the chairman developed a comprehensive picture of the overall status of legislation that involved black political interests. He was able then to notify the membership as a whole when an important legislative measure was to reach the House floor. If an informal legislative group like the CBC wanted to effectively function in a legislature as labyrinthine and uncoordinated as the House of Representatives, it was vital that regular channels of communication between the membership be established. It took several months to routinize group contacts and communications; indeed, the maintenance of regular channels of contact still poses many problems

for the CBC to this day. It remains a formidable task, even for a group as relatively small as the CBC, to keep its membership astride of legislative developments in Congress.

The practical problems involved in keeping CBC members in regular contact, however, has not seriously impaired group cohesion on legislative matters. Black Representatives are bound together as a group basically by the fact that their districts are very similar in their racial make-up, and social and economic structure. Overriding the many differences in individual CBC members' political styles and backgrounds is the common recognition that their constituents share similar problems, and require essentially similar legislative remedies. Concurring in this view, Clarence Mitchell, Washington lobbyist for the NAACP, remarked that, "They are perhaps the only members, and certainly are among the few members, who have the same kind of problems in their districts no matter where they are located".¹⁰ Shared constituency interests constantly encourages black members to act as a group in Congress. This natural tendency towards unity was reinforced in the 93rd and 94th Congresses by the added necessity of protecting constituency interests from Republican Administration policies. Shared constituency interest virtually ensures that CBC members vote in a similar manner. To illustrate this point it is noteworthy that CBC chairmen have never needed to operate an internal 'whip system' to facilitate group cohesion on House roll calls in which important black political interests were at stake. One former chairman, Louis Stokes, confirmed this, stating that, "I knew how other members would vote on a particular issue. We were in general agreement. I never had to persuade. Perhaps, on one or two issues in a session, a couple of members might have voted differently from the majority".¹¹

The roots of CBC group cohesion can be easily identified in the statistics collected from their congressional districts. An analysis of the racial make-up, and socio-economic structure of Black Representatives'

congressional districts reveals the predominance of three variables - high density black population, low median family income, and high poverty ratios. Table 11 demonstrates that CBC members represent the ten congressional districts with the highest black populations in the United States.

Only one member, Rep. Ronald Dellums, represents a district that ranks below 20th in terms of density of black population (Table 11 column II).

In every district represented by Black Congressmen at least one quarter of the population is black American; in fact, thirteen of the seventeen districts have a majority-black population. As in the Reconstruction period, therefore, Black Representatives have been elected largely from majority-black districts. All the districts represented by CBC members are located in the inner-city sectors of the nation's largest metropolitan areas where the problems of overcrowded, dilapidated housing, family poverty, high unemployment, juvenile crime and drug abuse are concentrated. Table 12 illustrates that CBC members' congressional districts rank amongst the poorest in the nation. In the seventeen districts the average percentage of families living below the official poverty level income is 17.4%. In every district, therefore, one in ten families exists on an income below the official poverty level; in five districts, Watts (Calif. 21), West-side Chicago (Ill. 7), Central Detroit (Mich. 13), Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn (N.Y. 12), and Harlem, Manhattan (N.Y. 19), more than one fifth of families live below official poverty level income. Median family income figures contained in Table 12 demonstrate saliently that even in the nation's poorest districts there exists a significant disparity between the level of white, and black family income. In CBC members' congressional districts (excluding Wash. DC.) the average, median family income was \$7,156 per annum for black families, compared with \$9,793 per annum for white families. In only one district, Bedford-Stuyvesant, the median family income of black families exceeded that of white families; the exception to the rule is explained by the fact that, in the NY 12th district,

TABLE 11

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS REPRESENTED BY CBC MEMBERS, 94th CONGRESS.

BLACK POPULATION STATISTICS.

State & District. (City)	Rank.	Black Popu. in District.	Percent Black Popu. of District.	Percent Black Popu. Voting Age.	Black Representative.
Calif. 7 * (Berkeley)	58	118,173	25.5	21	R.Dellums (D)
Calif. 21* (Los Angeles)	11	251,960	54.2	49	A.Hawkins (D)
Calif. 37* (Los Angeles)	13	234,666	50.7	45	Y.Burke (D)
Ga. 5. (Atlanta)	16	203,650	44.2	39	A.Young (D)
Ill. 1. (Chicago)	1	411,262	88.9	85	R.Metcalf (D)
Ill. 7. (Chicago)	9	255,082	54.9	46	C.Collins (D)
Md. 7. (Baltimore)	3	361,082	74.0	68	P.Mitchell (D)
Mich. 1. (Detroit)	4	327,389	70.0	64	J.Conyers (D)
Mich. 13. (Detroit)	6	305,862	65.8	59	C.Diggs (D)
Mo. 1. (St. Louis)	10	254,092	54.3	48	W.Clay (D)
N.Y. 12. (NYC)	2	358,745	77.1	76	S.Chisholm (D)
N.Y. 19. (NYC)	8	274,143	58.7	57	C.Rangel (D)
Ohio 21. (Cleveland)	5	306,661	66.3	60	L.Stokes (D)
Pa. 2. Philadelphia	7	305,679	65.0	58	R.Nix (D)
Tenn. 8. (Memphis)	14	243,469	47.5	41	H.Ford (D)
Texas 18. (Houston)	20	192,369	41.6	37	B.Jordan (D)
Wash. DC.	-	538,000	71.0	-	W.Fauntroy (D) (Delegate)

* Californian districts data applies to the 93rd Congress.

TABLE 12

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS REPRESENTED BY CBC MEMBERS, 94th CONGRESS.
INCOME AND POVERTY LEVEL STATISTICS.

State & District.	Median Family Income		Percent of Families below Poverty level (\$3745 per year)	Percent of Families below Poverty level with Female as Head of Household.
	Black	White		
Calif. 7.*	7,634	11,902	10.2	50.7
Calif. 21.*	6,174	8,008	21.5	55.6
Calif. 37.*	7,899	11,580	11.7	57.1
Ga. 5.	6,083	11,866	15.1	49.8
Ill. 1.	7,983	12,353	17.3	63.2
Ill. 7.	6,247	9,075	22.4	60.8
Md. 7.	7,408	9,053	18.3	58.7
Mich. 1.	9,749	10,630	10.8	54.2
Mich. 13.	7,259	8,727	21.2	60.0
Mo. 1.	6,930	10,401	15.1	53.4
N.Y. 12.	6,461	5,889	25.1	61.2
N.Y. 19.	6,296	7,707	21.0	57.7
Ohio 21.	7,892	9,785	17.1	60.0
Pa. 2.	7,448	11,413	15.7	61.6
Tenn. 8.	5,166	9,878	18.6	45.7
Texas 18.	5,873	8,424	18.0	43.1
Wash. DC.	-	-	17.0	-

DATA SOURCES (Tables 11& 12)

'Congressional District Data Book, 93rd Congress',
 (U.S. Bureau of the Census/Dept. of Commerce, Wash. DC. 1973)
 'Potential Influence of Low Income Voters in Congressional Districts',
 (J.C.P.S., Wash. DC. 1974)
 'Potential Black Voter Influence in Congressional Districts',
 (J.C.P.S., Wash. DC. 1973)

* Californian districts data applies to the 93rd Congress.

the category 'white' includes the large Puerto Rican population.

The most significant statistic contained in Tables 11/12 is that one in five black Americans (ie. 4.8 million out of a total US black population of 22.7 million in 1970) live in the seventeen districts represented by Black Congressmen. It is this fact, plus the recognition that their districts share virtually identical problems, which leads CBC members to believe that their role in Congress includes representing a national constituency, that is the black American people as a whole. Rep. Ronald Dellums expressed this belief as follows, "We come here having to assume a dual responsibility, a responsibility to our constituents locally, and a responsibility to the national black constituency. Many white politicians do not have to worry about any kind of national constituency. They have no other responsibility than their committee assignment, answering mail, and going to their district. They really see themselves as representing a tiny geographical area. I think it is much more difficult to be black in this Congress because you must assume burdens and responsibilities far beyond most members of Congress".¹² The vast majority of Black Representatives accept this dual responsibility as described by Rep. Dellums. The only exception is, again, Rep. Robert Nix (Pa.2.). Rep. Nix repeatedly declined to be interviewed on his role within the CBC. However, his principal legislative aide gave an indication of Nix's attitude towards the national black constituency when he emphasised that Nix was "first and foremost, a local politician". To underline this point, the aide pointed to a series of election posters on the congressional office wall which advised, 'Keep Nix in Congress to get things done for Philadelphia'. The only other white Democratic party machine-backed Black Representative, Cardiss Collins (West-side, Chicago), who in the words of one Democratic staffer was "handed the nomination on a silver plate", is prepared to go along, at least publicly, with the CBC majority view on dual congressional responsibility. In an

interview she insisted that, "Our job is to represent our people, that is all black people". (Collins' emphasis)¹³ The basic similarity in the racial composition, and the social and economic problems of their congressional districts, therefore, enables Black Representatives to adopt a national view of the legislative needs of the black American population; they can behave as national politicians and address themselves as a group to national issues. Black Representatives' willingness to act as national politicians makes the CBC a rather unique political force within the House. Few Representatives will risk taking a national view rather than a local district view on issues, because usually such behaviour amounts to a quick path to electoral defeat. Because of the similar needs of their districts, CBC members can speak as national politicians without the fear of reprimand from their electorate. Clarence Mitchell, Washington lobbyist of the NAACP, elaborates on this point, "Blacks everywhere, whether in California, Maryland, or Georgia are having the same kind of problems, so they (CBC members) can afford to, even if they weren't inclined to do it, take a statesmanlike posture on a national issue. Interestingly, most of them have that commitment in common. They have run for office on the grounds that if they got into Congress they would do something that would help blacks generally throughout the country".¹⁴

Whereas the factors of constituency base and attitude towards national black political leadership tend to unite Black Representatives, the same factors had the opposite effect regarding the relationship between the sole black American Senator, Edward Brooke (R.Mass.1966-78), and the CBC. Unlike CBC members, Senator Brooke represented a constituency where the black population is a distinctly small minority (approx. 3%); consequently, a large black vote was not a significant contributory factor in Brooke's electoral success. He won political office by under-emphasising the fact of his race origin. When beginning his Senate career

in 1966, Brooke stated emphatically, "I do not intend to be a national leader of Negro people. I intend to do my job as a Senator from Massachusetts".¹⁵ Brooke kept to his word. He never sought to join the CBC, nor did he adopt a race-conscious approach in the Senate. Nevertheless, inspite of his low-key political style, Brooke often fought on the same side as CBC members in major congressional battles involving civil rights, social welfare, labour and employment legislation. Brooke had played an instrumental role in the successful fight to defeat the Haynsworth and Carswell Supreme Court nominations. Also, his criticisms of the Nixon Administration's domestic and civil rights policies, although not as vocal as those of some CBC members, were as equally severe. Differences in party identification were not the major factor that separated Brooke from the CBC membership. Brooke's voting record, and his public stands on major national issues (e.g. busing) marked him as a strong liberal on the Republican liberal-conservative spectrum. His political association with the Republican party was based upon personal loyalty rather than commitment to the conservative ideology that currently dominates the Party. Brooke stated that he owed his political career to the support given to him by the Massachusetts Republican party. When in 1950 Brooke decided to run for the office of state representative in Boston's majority-black, Roxbury 12th ward, it was the Republican party, not the Democrats, who gave him his first chance to win political office. He had cross-filed for both the Democratic and Republican nominations, ran in both primaries, and won the latter. Although he lost to the Democrat in the general election, Brooke chose to stay loyal to the Party that had given him initial support; in his words, "Since the Republicans endorsed me in that primary, I considered it a matter of ethics to remain a member of their party".¹⁶ As a black Republican elected from an overwhelmingly white constituency, Senator Brooke was a political anomaly in black congressional politics, indeed in black electoral politics

as a whole. He had stood amongst a small minority of thirteen black elected officials (out of a total of 3,503 in the United States¹⁷) who had managed to win a political office that was elected on a state-wide basis. Brooke's success symbolised the possibilities of 'coalition politics'; he had been a candidate who had established political support across racial lines, and had won office on the basis of merit rather than race identity. When the CBC abandoned its more aggressive, race-conscious political posture and decided to confine its activities to the legislative sphere, Senator Brooke had moved towards a closer association with Black Representatives.¹⁸ Although he still had not sought membership of the CBC, he had endorsed openly many of the legislative goals announced by Black Representatives in their 'True State of the Union Message'. From then, until his defeat in the 1978 primary, he had worked for the Senate passage of many of the legislative measures given priority status by the CBC in the House, particularly the continuation of OEO programmes, and the extension of the Voting Rights Act.

As the 93rd Congress progressed, Black Representatives moved towards agreement on an overall congressional strategy, and distilled a list of legislative priorities from their alternative state of the union message. On the question of congressional strategy, Black Representatives identified three basic legislative roles for the CBC:-

- 1/ to devise and promote legislation of importance to black Americans, and other American racial minorities,

- 2/ to lobby fellow Representatives for their support of CBC-sponsored legislation, particularly members who have sizeable black populations in their districts,

- 3/ to coordinate black elected officials, black lobby groups, black businessmen and professionals in support of CBC-sponsored legislation at the local and national level, and hence maximise black political influence in Congress.

Black Representatives calculated that if they could put this three-fold congressional strategy into operation the CBC's legislative effectiveness in Congress would be enhanced dramatically. They faced no major problems in performing the first role of the CBC's new congressional strategy. Individual members had always devised and sponsored legislative measures that reflected constituency needs; the compilation of a group-sponsored priority list of legislation simply involved identifying those legislative measures on which a consensus existed amongst the CBC membership. The CBC began to perform the first role of its congressional strategy as early as March 1973. In that month the CBC organised a 'National Strategy Session' on Capitol Hill to gain congressional support for the group's first major pieces of priority legislation. At the strategy session Black Representatives announced that the total CBC membership had sponsored major legislation which sought, "to rescue the Office of Economic Opportunity from Presidential dismemberment, (and) to prevent the President from impounding congressionally appropriated funds without notice and congressional consent".¹⁹ The meeting, which was held on March 12th, 1973, in the old Senate Caucus room, was attended by scores of influential Congressmen, including Senators Hubert Humphrey, Edward Kennedy, House Speaker Carl Albert, House Appropriations Committee chairman George Mahon, and congressional lobbyists who were opposed to the Nixon Administration's policy of applying the weight of federal expenditure cuts to domestic social programmes. The strategy session gained considerable support for CBC priority legislation, particularly the measures designed to save the OEO. Shortly after the strategy session, CBC members sponsored four other major pieces of legislation which completed the CBC's legislative priority list for the 93rd Congress. These legislative measures were a "Bureaucratic Accountability Act" which aimed to ensure that public laws were implemented, rather than ignored by the Administration and its agencies; a bill to establish self-government in Washington DC; a bill to repeal the Byrd

Amendment (ie. to ban U.S. importation of Rhodesian chrome); and finally, a bill to raise the basic minimum wage, and include domestic workers within its provisions. In the 94th Congress, the CBC continued to perform the role of sponsoring major legislation of importance to black Americans, but as a result of the experience of failing to secure the enactment of the majority of its priority legislation in the previous two sessions, decided to limit its legislative priority list to two major pieces of legislation. CBC members concentrated their efforts upon forwarding two bills which sought, respectively, to renew and expand the provisions of the Voting Rights Act, and to establish a federal Government commitment to a full employment economy (ie. the Humphrey-Hawkins bill, HR/S 50).

The CBC's second, and third legislative roles have yet to be fully developed; in fact, the third role remains in its early stages of development. The two roles are interrelated, being designed primarily to widen the base of political support for CBC-sponsored legislation within the House. The passage of CBC priority legislation depends ultimately on the latter two roles being performed successfully. Under normal circumstances black Representatives can count upon the political support of between 100-130 urban-based, liberal Democrats who generally share CBC members' views on the nation's legislative needs. This natural base of support is insufficient to achieve the passage of major legislation. Even with CBC members' votes included, the liberal bloc in the House rarely amounts to more than 150 votes. Whereas, of course, when the House is in full attendance and major legislation is under consideration, a minimum of 218 votes is required. To gain the vital extra votes, CBC members concluded that they would have to expand their lobbying activities to cover other sections of the House membership. Hence, the CBC's second legislative role was devised. CBC members decided that the only other section of the House membership where potential congressional support for CBC-sponsored legislation existed was amongst those Representatives whose districts

contained sizeable black populations. The rationale behind this decision was explained by Rep. William Clay, "There are approximately 60 or 65 white Congressmen here who would not be in this Congress if the black vote in their district had not gone to them in large numbers. Their constituencies are 25% black or better, in some cases better than 40% black. Blacks constitute the balance of power in those districts. We (CBC members) have identified those Congressmen. We feel they ought to be willing to support the issues that we deem to be of great importance to black people in the country".²⁰

In addition to lobbying their regular supporters CBC members began a concerted campaign of lobbying Representatives from high density black districts. Political pressure was applied upon such members at all levels of congressional activity, in the Democratic party caucus, the standing committees, the state delegation meetings, and in informal private meetings. The basic problem with this strategy was that the majority of the districts containing 25% or more black population were located in the southern states, and consequently were represented mainly by conservative Democrats who rarely voted in unison with the urban liberal wing of the congressional party. No amount of internal lobbying by Black Representatives was liable to induce such men to change their voting habits. In order to overcome this major problem, the strategy of coordinating black elected officials and black civic leaders to lobby white Congressmen at the district level was devised. This third legislative strategy was based on the assumption that influential black elected leaders lobbying a white Congressman in his district, requesting his support on a specific CBC-sponsored legislative measure, were far more likely to be effective in converting him to the black viewpoint than Black Representatives could be in the House. This third stage of the CBC legislative strategy has begun to be implemented. Rep. Clay stated, "We have touched base and established relationships with black elected officials and other key black people in their districts ... They apply a subtle kind of pressure."²¹ When

grass-roots lobbying of this nature is used to complement intensive lobbying at House level, Black Representatives argued that white Congressmen from districts with significant black voting populations would be forced, for their own political survival, to vote for CBC priority legislation.

In summary, therefore, from the 93rd Congress onwards the Congressional Black Caucus, having learnt from its earlier experience, narrowed its political focus and adopted a purely legislative role. Black Representatives recognised the necessity of placing emphasis on protecting shared constituency interests from the encroachments of Nixon Administration policy. Senior and junior black Representatives united to produce an alternative legislative programme that challenged the principal tenets of Administration policy. Regular meetings of the CBC membership were held in which legislative and committee expertise were pooled. As a result of these meetings CBC members identified a list of legislative priorities for each congressional session. Eventually, a three-fold legislative strategy was devised to maximise Black Representatives' political influence in Congress, and hopefully, to facilitate the enactment of CBC-sponsored legislation. The successful performance of the new CBC legislative role, however, depended upon the level of each individual member's commitment, and perhaps more importantly, the organisational ability of the CBC's professional staff.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Fieldwork Interview, Rep. Louis Stokes (D.Ohio 21st). Wash. DC. June 20th, 1974.
2. Stokes, *ibid.*

3. CBC True State of the Union Message, in 'Congressional Record', 93rd Congress, 1st session. Vol.119. No. 17. January 31st, 1973. pp. H617 - H642.
4. CBC members offered legislative proposals in the following policy areas. Their 93rd Congress standing committee assignments are in parenthesis. R. Dellums, military affairs (Armed Services), A.Hawkins, employment (Education and Labour; chrmn. sub-c. on Equal Opportunity), Y.Burke, environmental affairs (Interior and Insular Affairs), A.Young, rural housing and poverty (Banking and Currency), R.Metcalf, health care reform (Interstate and Foreign Commerce), P.Mitchell, minority business affairs (Banking and Currency, and Select Small Business), J.Conyers, criminal justice system and penal reform (Judiciary Committee; chrmn. sub-c. on Crime), C.Diggs, foreign affairs (Foreign Affairs; chrmn. sub-c. on Africa), W.Clay, education (Education and Labour), S.Chisholm, welfare and social programmes (Education and Labour), C.Rangel, drug abuse (Judiciary Committee, and Select Crime Investigation), B.Jordan, civil rights law enforcement (Judiciary Committee), W.Fauntroy, Wash. DC affairs (D.C. Committee).
5. Fieldwork interviews, Michael Dubenstein, aide to Rep. R.Dellums, 19th June 1974, and Howard Gleckman, aide to Rep.R.Metcalf, 25th June, 1974. Wash.DC.
6. M.Barone, G.Ujifusa, D.Matthews. 'The Almanac of American Politics. 1974' (Gambit Books Inc., Boston. 1974) p. 856.
7. Philadelphia (Pa.) 2nd district primary result, April 27th, 1976. Robert Nix, 27,129 (48%). Rev. William Gray, 26,676 (47%). (FOCUS Vol.4 No. 6, May, 1976. JCPS Wash.DC 1976 p.8). In fact, Nix was defeated by William Gray in the May, 1978 primary (Nix, 23,135 votes to Gray's 33,470 votes). Gray was elected to the 96th Congress.
8. Fieldwork Interview, Rep. William Clay (D.Mo. 1st) Wash. DC. June 26th, 1974.
9. Stokes interview.
10. Fieldwork Interview, Clarence Mitchell, Washington Lobbyist NAACP. Wash. DC. July 17th, 1974.
11. Stokes interview.
12. Research Interview, Rep. Ronald Dellums (D.Calif.8th) Wash.DC. July 10th, 1974.

13. Fieldwork Interview, Rep. Cardiss Collins (D. Ill. 7th) Wash. DC.
June 27th, 1974.
14. C. Mitchell interview.
15. Senator Brooke quoted in C. Stone, 'Black Political Power in America'.
(The Bobbs-Merrill Company. New York 1968) p. 165.
16. G. R. Metcalf, 'Black Profiles'. (McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1969) p. 283.
17. The figure of 3,503 black elected officials was calculated in May,
1975 by the Joint Centre for Political Studies, Wash. DC. ('National
Roster of Black Elected Officials'. Vol. 5. July, 1975. J.C.P.S.).
18. Senator Brooke's closer association with CBC members was clearly
demonstrated by his decision to accept the CBC's request to be the
main speaker at the group's third annual fund-raising dinner in
Washington DC. on Sept. 29th, 1973. In his speech Brooke praised the
legislative work of the CBC, and even jokingly referred to the frosty
nature of their earlier relationship, "This is a very special occasion.
For one thing it is a conspicuous meeting of the Congressional Black
Caucus and the Senate Black Caucus. I know some of you have wondered
whether the two Caucuses ever caucused. We do and we will continue
to do so". (Speech placed in 'Congressional Record', Oct. 3rd, 1973.
93rd Congress. 1st session. Vol. 119. No. 147).
19. 'Report on the National Strategy Session'. (CBC Report. April, 1973. Wash. DC.)
20. W. Clay interview,
21. Clay interview.

Chapter sixThe CBC Professional Staff

From the establishment of the Congressional Black Caucus, it was envisaged that it would be served by a professional staff in addition to individual members' personal office staffs. A professional staff was needed to represent the collective nature of the CBC, to organise and coordinate the group's legislative activities and publicise its work to the outside world. CBC members built upon the experience of other House informal groups in setting-up and financing its professional staff, in particular the Democratic Study Group. Facilities and resources were available to CBC members, through the normal House internal budgetary procedures, to allow the formation of "support groups" of professional staff, and these were utilised and supplemented by other fund raising activities. The emergence of the professional staff's role and functions reflected the changing focus of CBC members' approach and political behaviour; the staff role evolved from ambitious beginnings in which it hoped to serve as a national group responding to, and acting on behalf of all black Americans and minorities, to its latter form as a legislative support group coordinating members' efforts to develop CBC legislative strategy and to facilitate the passage of its legislative agenda.

At the beginning, the professional staff was appointed to perform the dual function of acting on behalf of the collective CBC membership in all relations with the press and the mass media, and coordinating the CBC's legislative activities in liaison with the individual members' staffs. However, it was recognised that, given the small size of the original staff, i.e., one full-time Director and a couple of part-time assistants, probably only one of these functions could be tackled. Members decided that, in order to maintain the momentum of the launching of the CBC, priority should be given to the first function of acting as a vehicle of publicity for CBC activities. In July 1971 the first Executive Director of the CBC professional staff, Howard Robinson, was appointed and charged with the responsibility

of developing this function. Upon his appointment Robinson outlined his general approach to the CBC staff's first year of work in an internal memo to CBC members; he stated that the CBC should "launch a public relations and substantively based spectrum of activities and . . . sharply focus its energies upon the type of program activity that will establish a reputation for being concerned with the wider institutional issues which affect the poor and the black".¹ In putting this theory into practice, Robinson as Staff Director played the major role in organising the CBC's activities in the 'exploratory stage' of its development. The coordination and operation of the tactics pursued during this early period, i.e., the convening of 'ad hoc' committee hearings to focus and develop national issues of importance to black Americans, the organisation of a National Black Political Convention, and the drawing up of a Black Political Agenda (see Chapter 4 above) were largely the responsibility of Howard Robinson as Staff Director.

As a first step, however, before these tactics were initiated, the CBC professional staff had had to be placed on a firm financial footing. A significant amount of the first Staff Director's time (and that of his successors) was absorbed by raising funds to ensure an adequate operating budget. The first source of funding that was available to the CBC was the use of the clerk-hire allowance which was allocated to each Representative every session. In the 92nd Congress the clerk-hire allowance stood at between US dollars 133,500 - US dollars 140,500 per year depending upon the number of constituents per constituency. Other House informal groups had drawn upon individual members' clerk-hire allowances to finance professional staffs; the most extensive use of this allowance had been made by the Democratic Study Group. The DSG Staff Director, Richard Conlon, had indicated that in addition to receipts from payment of membership dues a substantial part of the DSG funds derived from clerk-hire allowance contributions - "We ask them (DSG members), when they are not using all of their money for staff salaries, to make some

of it available to us to help with our payroll. And 80 of them have seen fit to do that."² Congressional procedures, therefore, in allowing individual members considerable discretion in deciding how to spend their staff allowances provided informal groups plenty of scope to gather funds to support professional staffs. The CBC did not, however, make extensive use of members' clerk-hire allowances for this purpose. This fact did not result from a lack of knowledge of how other informal groups utilised the staff allowances because, as implied above, its use in this context was a matter of common knowledge within the House. Indeed, the DSG Staff Director had made available his expertise and advice on funding matters when the CBC had been established.³ Rather, the decision rested upon the reality of the smaller CBC membership compared with the DSG (and hence less scope to pool a substantial sum) and, more importantly, the fact that black Representatives had more need to make full use of staff allowances for Congressional and district offices purposes. Unlike many DSG members, the vast majority of the CBC membership possessed low seniority and, therefore, had little opportunity to utilise the extra staff allowances that were attached to committee and sub-committee chairmanships.⁴ A member who received a combined staff allowance (e.g. US dollars 200,000 to cover clerk-hire allowance and a sub-committee staff allowance) had more flexibility to keep a part of the funds for other purposes such as donations to an informal group. Also, the black Representatives being relatively junior had not developed strong contacts with congressional lobby groups, who provided legislative support and information services which helped free some of the staff allowances for other uses.

If the CBC was to evolve as an effective organisation, black Representatives believed that the level of funding required would have to be far higher than that which could be raised by pooling the meagre unused portions of their staffing allowances. An independent source of funds was needed. Rep. William Clay, the CBC's first Treasurer, conceived the idea of holding an annual fund-raising dinner (with contributors paying a

100 US dollars a-plate minimum). The first dinner was held in September 1971, and they have continued as an annual event to the present day. The revenues forthcoming from the annual dinners have formed the mainstay of the CBC's operating budget. In its first year the annual dinner netted more than US dollars 144,000 from a US dollars 200,000 gross income.⁵ The level of income from the annual dinner has grown gradually in subsequent years, and has been supplemented by the sponsorship of benefit concerts and a limited use of the clerk-hire allowance. For the year ending 30th June, 1977 the CBC Financial Report showed that total support and revenue stood at US dollars 240,932 of which US dollars 193,368 derived from the annual dinner and benefit concerts.⁶ In that year, over 400 individual and corporate contributions were made to the annual dinner fund-raiser; the range of contributors included major US private corporations (International Telephone and Telegraphic, Atlantic Richfield ARCO, Chrysler Corporation) trade unions (International Brotherhood of Teamsters, American Federation of Teachers, United Auto Workers) civil rights and activist organisations (NAACP, National Urban League, National Black Women's Political Leadership Caucus) and black-owned businesses (Motown Industries, Johnson Publishing Co., Freedom National Bank of New York, Afro-American Newspapers). The development of an independent source of funds was a considerable achievement for the CBC, as there were relatively few major bases of private economic power within the black American community which could be used as a natural source from which to draw funds. Funding the CBC was a prodigious exercise that involved establishing contacts with a plethora of groups, organisations and small businesses. Inevitably, the price of establishing an independent funding base was that the fund-raising itself absorbed a substantial amount of staff time, which reduced the time available to develop the CBC staff's other functions. The second CBC Staff Director, Augustus Adair, admitted that the staff workload consisted for a large part with dealing with administrative and financial

matters relating to the annual dinner, "It takes us half the year to organise our principal fund-raising event, the CBC dinner each September."⁷ Fortunately, however, the accumulated income from the annual dinner receipts after the first few years enabled a larger staff to be recruited to perform other functions. The growth of the CBC professional staff is illustrated in the table below. Throughout their existence, the CBC professional staff have

TABLE 13

Staff Director Term of Office	Full-time Staff	Part-time Staff
Howard Robinson 1971-2	-	2
Augustus Adair 1973-4	3	2
Barbara Williams 1975-present day	7	-

been housed in a small, increasingly-cramped, suite of offices on the third floor of the Old Congressional Hotel adjacent to the Congressional Office Buildings. The Offices are provided rent-free by Congress because the CBC is regarded, similar to other informal House groups, as a support group providing services for representatives. Other informal groups' staffs, are based in the same building; indeed, the offices of the Republican Wednesday Group are just across the corridor from the CBC.

The basic functions of the CBC professional staff were similar to those of other House informal groups. Essentially, they provide group members with needed information, promote their interests and keep them

informed of relevant legislative developments. In the House of Representatives party leadership has remained fundamentally weak and uncoordinated. Furthermore, the reforms in the seniority system adopted by respective Democratic majorities in the 1970s have served to weaken the power and authority of the standing committees, whose significance in the past had been to provide order in congressional life (via the committee apprenticeship system) in the absence of a disciplined party system. The latter tendency coupled with the inherent weakness of the party structure has strengthened further the legislator's natural inclination to coalesce into groups based on shared interests related to geographical, economic, social and ethnic factors. In addition, the patterns of this informal group life have become more complex and kaleidoscopic. Overlapping membership within various groups is commonplace. For example, all CBC members belong to several other groups and caucuses. Rep. Charles Diggs stated, "We are all part of other caucuses in the House. I guess that I am a member of four or five of them. For example, my state caucus, I am chairman of that."⁸ Rep. Andrew Young made a similar point as follows, "I am part of several informal groups of the House, and I think the House functions that way. With 435 people you have got to build coalitions, and coalitions grow out of continuous associations and relationships, so that the CBC is made up of sixteen of us who happen to be black. But we also have a freshman Democratic Caucus which usually has about 35 or so active freshman Democrats, who came in with a particular mood of the nation, of congressional reform, anti-war, and an emphasis on peoples' programmes. Actually, we are probably more active legislatively than the CBC in some ways. Then, there's the DSG, a group of liberal Democrats that work together and have a staff like the CBC. They do a lot of keeping us up with alot of the subtle issues that might slip by."⁹ In his last sentence Rep. Young provides the major explanation behind the continued growth of informal groups and their recruitment of professional

staffs. Informal groups provide the kind of facilities and services that would be normally the function of a strong party system within a legislature. While some groups are more highly structured than others and offer a more complex array of services, most groups perform the basic functions of providing a forum in which members can discuss how best to forward their shared interests; supplying information on legislative developments relating to their various interests; coordinating members' legislative behaviour and developing linkages with relevant governmental actors outside Congress (eg. lobby groups, government departments, the Executive).

In the 95th Congress there existed twelve House informal groups, including the CBC, that performed, to a greater or lesser degree, the functions mentioned above. The other groups were: the Wednesday Group (a liberal Republican group of approximately 30 members); the Republican Study Committee (a conservative Republican group of approximately 60 members); the Democratic Study Group (a liberal-moderate Democratic group - membership numbers are not available, but it is known that over 115 congressmen pay membership dues of 100 US dollars per year and that over 200 are associated members receiving DSG material); Southern Caucus of House Democrats (a conservative group of approximately sixty Southern Democrats); United Democrats in Congress (a group of approximately 100 moderate Democrats); Democratic Freshman Class (consisting of approximately 70 members); the Northeast-Midwest Economic Advancement Coalition (a development of the New England Caucus, a bipartisan group of 204 members¹⁰); the Congressional Rural Caucus (a bipartisan group of approximately 50 members); the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (a group of five Democrats representing Spanish-speaking constituencies¹¹); the Congresswomen's Caucus (a bipartisan group of 15 out of the 18 women Representatives in the 95th Congress¹²); members of Congress for Peace Through Law (a bipartisan

and bicameral group of members of Congress interested in foreign policy, in particular military spending and the United Nations¹³). In addition to these twelve groups, a number of quasi-social groups existed in the House, for example, the Republican SOS, Acorns and Chowder and Marching Clubs. These groups operated primarily in a social capacity, and were totally unstructured possessing neither support staff or research capacity. Of the twelve informal groups identified above, the Southern Caucus of House Democrats and the United Democrats in Congress were perhaps closer to the model of these traditional quasi-social groups. Extensive research on House informal groups which measures and compares their structure and organisation (in relation to their functions, staffing and finance) has yet to be undertaken. In 1975, however, an article on the CBC compared the CBC with eight other House informal groups in terms of the size of their staff and annual budget and concluded that the CBC possessed the third largest staff and was one of the best financed groups.¹⁴

While accepting the similarity of the functions performed by informal group staffs, some CBC members would claim that from its beginning in 1971 the CBC professional staff worked to a structured programme and, more significantly, adopted a new, open approach in conducting their activities, whereas, at that time, other informal group staffs were less organised and operated in a low-key fashion. These CBC members would argue that subsequently other groups have adopted the CBC approach. In an interview Rep. William Clay stated, ". . . the Rural Caucus existed prior to our forming the CBC, but it was a very informal kind of thing. It wasn't structured. It wasn't publicised. But a number of these members have seen the advantages that we have been able to secure. And we are reaping alot of advantages. So, some of these groups are now formally structured. They've hired more officials, and are issuing press releases, and they've let the leadership here know what they want. So

I think maybe that we have inspired that kind of thing whereas before there were just informal meetings."¹⁵ Rep. Clay's assertion is a matter for debate; in some respects he is correct, in other wrong. In 1971, there were certainly other informal groups that were better organised than the CBC staff. Two groups, in particular, were manned by staffs that worked to a structured programme, *ie.* Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, and the Democratic Study Group. The MCPL staff were responsible for the administration of eight programme committees on which group members sat. Each committee worked to reach a group position on the particular aspect of foreign policy with which it was concerned; the aspects of foreign policy covered by the eight committees were arms control and disarmament, overseas aid and development, East-West trade, international law, the Middle East, military spending, South-East Asia, and the United Nations. The MCPL committees met regularly and policy positions were reached within the group's sphere of interest, but policy positions were not announced widely or publicised outside Congress. In respect of its staff structure, therefore, MCPL was more organised than the CBC. It took several years before the CBC staff developed an effective sub-committee system that allowed individual members to develop policy positions and discuss legislative proposals in their particular spheres of interest. But on the other hand, from the outset the CBC staff were employed to publicise both within and outside Congress the CBC's goals and activities. This strong emphasis on publicity and promotion was the most innovative aspect of the CBC staff role. MCPL staff, like all other congressional staff, were employed solely in an internal service capacity to assist members. MCPL members were mainly junior Congressmen with strong interests in foreign affairs but who did not possess standing committee assignments in this field. Hence their purpose in belonging to MCPL was to maintain and develop their expertise in foreign affairs in order to help them build up their credentials to gain

a committee seat at a later date. Group activity was directed solely towards internal goals and hence the group staff had no external role.

In the case of the Democratic Study Group, its staff were highly organised and committed to a broad programme of procedural reform in the House. The DSG staff provided a constant flow of written information on congressional developments ; legislative reports, 'fact sheets', background papers and a weekly whip system alerting members to crucial votes plus supplementary information summarising the issues on pending legislation. Staff work was structured upon the activities of task force teams composed of DSG members whose remits broadly reflected the House committee structure. In a sense the DSG acted as a kind of informal Democratic Caucus; in 1971, the Democratic Caucus had no staff and was just emerging from a moribund period. DSG staff were essentially in the business of providing information which generated debate amongst Democratic members on procedural reform and legislative matters and indirectly worked towards assisting the passage of legislation, strengthening party leadership, and developing party consensus on national issues. Again, however, unlike the CBC, the group's programme was not formally announced or publicised by the DSG staff. While the DSG's views on the need for procedural reform in the House were well-known, there were no formal statements issued and no attempts were made to bind members to particular views. Another point of contrast between the two groups was that the CBC staff took a position on a legislative issue from its introduction and recommended either support or opposition. In an interview the DSG Staff Director, Richard Conlon, emphasised this latter point as the principal factor distinguishing the different approaches of the two groups; he stated, "We do not deal with legislative measures until they are reported out of committee. Whereas the CBC takes positions on bills as early as their first sponsorship. We do not determine the inputs in legislative terms, although we have provided

leadership on internal matters such as seniority and committee secrecy."¹⁶ On the whole, it can be said that, in terms of their staff organisation and operation of a structured programme, DSG and MCPL were more advanced than the CBC in its first years of existence. Certainly, the CBC staff, by working publicly for the group's general aims and legislative measures and using Congress as a national vehicle of publicity for its activities, was adopting a new approach that had not been used by other House informal groups. In this latter respect the above views of Rep. Clay can be substantiated. On the question of the influence of the formation of the CBC staff upon the political behaviour of other informal groups, the evidence is mixed. The DSG and MCPL have continued to operate in their original manner. Of the other groups that existed before the CBC, the same conclusion can be reached. Only in the case of those groups that have been formed after the CBC (*ie*, the New England Caucus, and its successor organisation the Northeast-Midwest Economic Advancement Coalition, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, and the Congresswomen's Caucus), it can be argued to some extent that the CBC staff's 'public' approach has been emulated. These groups have publicised their aims and objectives and sponsored collectively legislative measures, and hired officials to rally support for their programmes within and outside Congress.

The early years of the CBC professional staff's work were, in fact, rather hectic and uncoordinated. As the two preceding chapters have illustrated, these years, "the exploratory period", saw CBC members pursuing a set of ambitious and sometimes conflicting goals. The launching of the CBC coupled with the wide-ranging, well-publicised activities that it mounted in its first two years generated a massive response from the black American community. CBC members were inundated with thousands of letters requesting help and advice from black Americans throughout the

country. The extent of the response had not been anticipated by CBC members and inevitably the burden of dealing with most of the enquiries fell to the professional staff. The increased volume of mail to Black Congressmen that began in 1971 never really ebbed. Three years later, the CBC professional staff were still unable to cope with the number of enquiries received. One staffman admitted that many letters went unanswered because the CBC did not have the resources to deal with the problems raised, and particularly the follow-up action that was required. Most enquiries asked for specific help on problems relating to, for example, homelessness, welfare payments, prison convictions, which would involve substantial casework and follow-up with the government departments and agencies involved. Furthermore, many of the requests for help came from persons living in congressional districts not represented by Black Congressmen. As CBC members' individual office staffs were overburdened with such 'casework' problems from their own constituents, it was not always possible to channel these additional requests to them. In these circumstances, the CBC professional staff simply had to cope as best as they could. If letters were not answered, it was usually because to do so would be counterproductive; as Cleo Hancock, a CBC staffman in 1974, concluded, "It is better that we don't reply rather than send a letter which raises expectations, only to find in the long run that the CBC can be of little help".¹⁷ Even in the case of those enquiries which the CBC staff acted upon, by referring to the appropriate Congressman or government agency, the CBC staff director admitted frankly that the most the CBC could hope to achieve was, ". . . to give people hope, inspiration and (the) will to fight and work for improvements. Sometimes that can do alot of good. It helps to sustain people through difficult times."¹⁸

The fact that the CBC staff had to assume considerable 'casework' duties in addition to administering the vast array of activities mounted by individual members provides some explanation for the confusion and lack of

direction of the staff role in the early years. It was against this background that the CBC staff had to turn its attention to developing functions that would help implement the legislative strategy that CBC members had decided to try to adopt from the beginning of the 93rd Congress.

The first concern was to establish regular channels of communication between the CBC Staff Office and the offices of individual members. A fairly formal hierarchy of contacts was decided upon. The Staff Director would have direct contact with the CBC Chairman. It was not envisaged that other Caucus members would need to be in direct contact with the CBC office. A member of their respective congressional office staffs would be appointed as a link person to liaise with the CBC staff. Recalling the situation when he took over as CBC chairman in late 1972, Rep. Louis Stokes confirmed these arrangements, "I, as chairman, saw it as my responsibility to keep in regular contact with the Staff Director. I doubt whether the other members of the Caucus knew who the CBC staff were."¹⁹ The viability of the network of contacts was first tested shortly after Stokes was elected Chairman, when it was agreed that an 'Alternative State of the Union' address containing a new CBC legislative agenda would be prepared for presentation early in the first session of the 93rd Congress. Stokes, in consultation with other CBC members, drew up the framework for the address; the Staff Director, Augustus Adair was responsible for its preparation. Under his direction, the CBC staff liaised with the link person in each congressional office in producing the respective section of the address that related to the individual member's standing committee assignment and interests. This project proved to be highly successful; the address was prepared over a two-month period, and was presented to the House on schedule. The 'Alternative State of the Union' address proved to be the forerunner to the annual CBC legislative agenda which was presented from the 94th Congress onwards. The preparation of the legislative agenda

has become a central CBC staff activity which performs the important functions of maintaining the channels of communication within CBC, and of setting the priorities for Caucus activity each session.

The role of the CBC professional staff, beyond the coordination of a legislative agenda was, at first, difficult to define. Indeed, in the first year of the implementation of the CBC legislative strategy (1973) the staff role was modelled very much on that of the DSG. The staff's efforts were concentrated upon providing a legislative support and research service which gave detailed information on major, pending legislative measures that were vital to the interests of black Americans. Weekly CBC 'legislative alerts' were issued, which were of a similar design to the well-established 'DSG legislative reports' (also issued weekly). The essential difference between the two groups' legislative 'alerts' was that the CBC analysed legislation from a strictly black perspective, rather than the broad liberal perspective adopted by the DSG. Augustus Adair, the staff Director, decided that each CBC alert on the key legislation should contain comprehensive information in order that CBC members were aware of the full context of the bill. Each 'alert' provided details on the bill's sponsors; the probable House and Senate supporters; positions of major unions and industries; the need for the legislation; the Administration's position; the minority or opposing views; the approximate cost if enacted; and, the probable amendments or other floor strategies designed to kill, weaken or enhance its passage. In gathering the information for the 'legislative alerts', similarly to DSG, the CBC staff drew upon materials from the main congressional analytic support agencies (i.e., the Congressional Research Service, and the General Accounting Office), committee and sub-committee reports, and federal government documents. The legislative measures and issues analysed in the CBC alerts were selected carefully; otherwise, as Adair acknowledged, "We would simply be duplicating Democratic Study Group material."²⁰

Although it operated until mid-1974, the legislative alert system never really proved to be successful. The effectiveness of the system depended upon the investment of a substantial amount of time and effort on the part of both the CBC staff and individual members' office staffs, and it was the latter staffs' scepticism of the value of the exercise that served partly to undermine its operation. Each 'legislative alert' required the extensive cooperation of the staffs of particular CBC members who had expertise or standing committee jurisdiction in the specific area to be analysed. The operation of the system demanded their cooperation not only at the stage of preparing the 'alert', but also in the 'follow-up' monitoring activities. Once an 'alert' had been issued, meetings of members' staffs and Caucus staff were held in which the 'leading' office staff members (i.e., those from the offices of members with the committee jurisdiction and/or relevant expertise) briefed other members on subsequent developments, and led discussions on how CBC members were supporting the particular measure, or how they might offer amendments and generally develop a legislative strategy. In theory, such meetings appeared to be an excellent method of ensuring CBC group cohesion on legislative issues of importance; in practice, however, given the pressure of the congressional office workload, office staffs found difficulty in devoting much of their time to such meetings. Many staff members felt that the meetings did not merit high priority. In the course of fieldwork interviews with CBC members' legislative aides, the response was made often that the meetings were "a waste of time", or it was said, "I could be more effective here, working in the Office." Replies of this type emphasised the independent nature of the role of the individual legislator's staff; their prime concern was to promote the activities and achievements of the Congressman, to make him look good in Congress, and hence in the constituency back home. Legislative aides to CBC members, like all congressional office staff, feel instinctively

that their time is best served meeting the needs of their employer, the individual Congressman. It is difficult to persuade them of the value of collective meetings with other staffs when, from their viewpoint, the meetings appear discursive and not concerned with an immediate end-product.²¹ When pressed on the issue of whether the legislative alert weekly 'follow-up' staff meetings still occurred, staff Director Augustus Adair admitted that the meetings had largely 'petered out' by early 1974.²²

Another major reason for the apparent lack of success of the legislative alert system was the fact that, undoubtedly, the DSG material (the 'legislative reports', and 'fact sheets') did undercut the need for the service. There was, inevitably, a lot of overlap between the legislative issues that the two groups analysed. For example, in the autumn of 1973 both the DSG and CBC staff produced legislative reports on the progress of the DC Home Rule bill. While the CBC material approached the issues from a different perspective than the DSG, it was questionable whether the amount of CBC staff time (and members' office staff time) invested in the 'alert' exercise was justified. Every CBC member was a member of DSG and received all the legislative information services. Compared with the volume and range of the material received from DSG, the output of the CBC staff that was circulated to individual members and their offices was too small to be of more than marginal value. While CBC members themselves, when interviewed, expressed the view that the legislative alerts were useful, their legislative aides' views on the subject were unanimous in asserting that the 'alerts' were too repetitive of DSG material. The general view on the value of the CBC legislative alerts compared with the DSG material was perhaps best expressed by a legislative aide in the office of CBC member, Ronald Dellums, who stated simply, "I don't know what they (CBC members) would do around here without the DSG."²³

By mid-1974 it became widely recognised within the CBC that

the provision of current legislative research services was not the most efficient means of utilising CBC professional staff resources. The new CBC chairman, Charles Rangel (NY 19th), and his chief legislative aide George Dalley worked with Staff Director Augustus Adair to develop a revised CBC staff role which would complement rather than overlap with individual members' staff-work, and would not duplicate the internal legislative research function performed by the DSG staff. The CBC staff role was reviewed in the context of the overall legislative strategy and the degree to which it had been implemented. It was agreed that too much attention had been given to implementing the first part of the legislative strategy (i.e., the devising and promotion of legislation of importance to black Americans) which had been at the expense of the development of the second and third parts i.e., the lobbying of Representatives for their support of CBC-sponsored legislation, particularly members who had sizeable black populations in their districts, and the coordination of black elected officials, black lobby groups, black businessmen and professionals in support of CBC-sponsored legislation at the local and national level). The development of the CBC legislative research function (the 'legislative alerts') had been an outgrowth of the work involved in devising a legislative agenda; once a legislative agenda had been agreed, it was a logical step to monitor the progress of sponsored legislation and report on related legislative developments. However, it had been seriously underestimated how much staff time the latter work would absorb, and clearly the utility of the services provided was not of commensurate value to the time invested.

The lack of progress in defining the CBC staff role in relation to the other two parts of the legislative strategy was not simply a result of the fact that staff energies were being expended elsewhere. Firstly, CBC staff resources were very limited and it was doubtful that the staff would be able to perform all the support services that would be required to operate the legislative strategy effectively. Secondly, it was realised

that the information base and the analytical work required as a prerequisite to the implementation of the second and third aspects of the legislative strategy was formidable. In revising the staff functions, CBC members attached importance to rectifying the most immediate problem - the need for a larger full-time professional staff. It was decided to allocate a greater proportion of the operating budget to staff recruitment. Consequently in the 94th Congress the CBC professional staff grew in size to eight full-time workers. Consideration of how to overcome the second inhibiting factor, the dearth of information on black electoral strength and analysis of how it might be coordinated to maximise black political influence, was assisted by the CBC's growing awareness of the significance of the research data collected and analysed by the Joint Centre for Political Studies, an independent research organisation based in Washington DC.²⁴ In 1973/4 the JCPS published a series of three research papers which provided the information base upon which the implementation of the second part of the CBC legislative strategy could rest. The first paper entitled, "Potential Black Voter Influence in Congressional Districts"²⁵ demonstrated that there were 58 congressional districts in which black Americans constituted 25% or more of the population and that there were 51 congressional districts in which the number of black Americans of voting age was two or more times the margin of victory of the winning candidate in the 1972 congressional election. In all there were 86 districts which contained one or both of those characteristics. The second paper, "Potential Influence of Low Income Voters in Congressional Districts"²⁶ analysed districts on the basis of income rather than race, and demonstrated that there were 93 congressional districts in which 15% or more of the families had incomes below the official poverty level (the total included 30 districts that had not appeared in the earlier study). The final paper, "Congressional Votes on Important Issues for Blacks"²⁷ selected forty-one roll-call votes on issues of importance

to black Americans (taken in the first session, 93rd Congress) and studied the voting behaviour of the 58 Congressmen who had been identified in the first paper as representing districts with 25% or more black population. The principal finding of the study was that 24 of the 58 Congressmen supported the position taken by CBC members on less than one-third of the roll-call votes. The implications of the findings produced by these studies for the development of the CBC legislative strategy were quickly recognised by CBC members. The studies had focused a target, a clearly-defined group of Congressmen, upon whom the CBC could concentrate its lobbying efforts. In an interview, the JCPS Deputy Director of Research, Kenneth S Colburn, who had written the research papers, stated that he had been surprised at the response received from the CBC membership. In his view, the CBC's response indicated that they had not really thought out properly how the mechanics of their legislative strategy would operate (in particular, the lobbying and coordinating aspects) - "CBC members started to look at our work, and saw all the names there and how they voted. They just hadn't conceptualised it until then."²⁸ Other work carried out by JCPS provided the foundations upon which the third part of the legislative strategy (i.e. the coordination of black elected officials, black lobby groups in support of the CBC legislative agenda) was able to be built. From 1971 onwards, JCPS had collected data on all black Americans holding elective offices throughout the states, and had published annually a "National Roster of Black Elected Officials" which contained full details about every official, including their mailing addresses. Using this data in conjunction with the findings from the above-mentioned research papers, the CBC staff could draw up lists of black elected officials (BEO's) who held offices within the 'target' congressional districts. Once a network of contacts had been established, it was envisaged that groups of BEO's could be asked to apply 'grass-roots' lobbying pressure within the congressional districts to encourage Congressmen to support CBC sponsored priority legislative measures.

In the summer of 1974 a change of emphasis in the CBC staff role occurred, which set a pattern for their work that has continued to the present day. It was decided that, with regard to the first part of the CBC legislative strategy, the role of the CBC staff would be confined largely to preparing the annual legislative agenda and monitoring the progress of key 'high priority' legislation. Less emphasis would be placed upon performing an internal legislative research function for the CBC membership as a whole. It was recognised that the individual members' legislative aides were better placed to keep them informed of developments relevant to their interests, and that the DSG material circulated to members' offices gave adequate analysis of major legislation of importance to black Americans and minorities (the CBC weekly 'legislative alert' was abandoned at the end of the 93rd Congress). CBC staff, it was agreed, should be employed mainly in an 'external' legislative capacity i.e., keeping black American leadership groups informed of the CBC legislative agenda and involving them in working for its passage. The adoption of this 'external' role would lead hopefully to the effective performance of the second and third stages of the legislative strategy. The most important function of the CBC staff, therefore, would be to act as a national coordinator of black political and business groups, and elected officials. The creation of a permanent, national network of communications with black groups and elected officials would enable the CBC to utilise their combined political resources and experience to maximise black political support for the CBC legislative agenda.

In an interview, George Dalley, chief legislative aide to CBC chairman Charles Rangel, explained the reasoning behind the changes in the staff role. Dalley had played a large part in reviewing the staff role, acting on behalf of CBC Chairman Rangel who, as a member of the House Judiciary Committee, was highly involved in the committee's investigation of whether sufficient grounds existed for the impeachment of President Richard Nixon. Dalley placed emphasis on the need for the CBC staff to

act as a national focus to gain support for legislation of importance to black Americans and minorities. The aim of the staff legislative role was to develop members' interests into a legislative agenda, and to project these legislative interests as national issues for discussion within the black American, and wider community. He explained this role, as follows, "Members should use the CBC to help project their own legislative ideas, their own programmes beyond the normal attention that one Congressman might receive. (Under the direction of the CBC chairman) . . . the staff role is to take the issues that the members are essentially interested in . . . and to project these into CBC national issues when a consensus can be reached on the importance of the issue."²⁹ It was envisaged that the staff role in promoting national debate on key issues should not be limited to those priority issues contained in the legislative agenda. Dalley added that, "Rangel considers that there should be a conscious effort by the CBC to address broad issues that affect black people on a national level. So the CBC should talk about, for example, the effect of revenue-sharing on the black community, the effect of inflation on blacks, the problems of the black veteran, black unemployment. Each of the national issues have a black sub-problem which is not highlighted by the normal media. The CBC has access to the media . . . and the responsibility to put minority viewpoints"³⁰. The new emphasis on the external legislative role would clearly, therefore, involve greater use of the press release to convey CBC views on national issues and developments.

Dalley had no illusions about the difficulties that would confront the staff in assisting the implementation of the lobbying and coordinating aspects of the legislative strategy. He emphasised that without progress on the development of these aspects of the strategy the effectiveness of the CBC at House level would remain seriously inhibited. He remained optimistic that a network of contacts could be established that would facilitate increased effectiveness:- "The CBC has always been able to depend upon a

group of 120 - 130 liberals who are sympathetic because of their philosophy or ideology. But I would guess you have got 150 votes at the most. This is not enough to win needed legislation. The CBC is trying to build on that constituency, on that natural base in the House by using a network of local elected officials and local community leaders. These people can contact and lobby white Congressmen . . . much more effectively than the CBC members can. The black elected official, who is viewed by the Congressman as a potential ally or threat depending on the relationship, can call the Congressman and say, 'I would sure appreciate your vote on this bill. I know you have opposed it in the past, but hope you can see your way clear to support it this time.' That kind of phone-call can be made, not in a hostile way. It's recognised that this is the way the game is played."³¹ The success of the overall strategy would depend upon gaining the extensive cooperation of existing black leadership and lobby groups. Dalley's optimism was rooted in his belief that the cooperation of most groups would be forthcoming. In his view, the harnessing of their expertise would be crucial, "The CBC cannot do all this by itself. It doesn't have the staff. The way it will be done is by building liaison relationships, alliances with black groups, for example, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). We must use the research and resources that they have developed over the years and develop the CBC as a legislative arm for these groups and their goals."³²

By 1974, in fact, substantial progress had already been made in establishing firm links between the CBC staff and the Washington DC offices of the major black American pressure groups and civil rights organisations, in particular, the National Urban League (NUL), the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR)³³ and the NAACP. Interviews with lobbyists from these three organisations, Bob McAlpine (NUL), Marvin Caplan (LCCR) and Clarence Mitchell (NAACP) revealed agreement on the view that an important

achievement of the CBC and its staff had been to provide black pressure groups with greater access to the decision-making process in the House. In the past, access had had to be negotiated on an 'ad hoc' basis with individual members each time a particular relevant legislative issue arose. Whereas, since the formation of the CBC a permanent, reliable point of access had been established for information and input on current and pending legislative developments relevant to their interests. Bob McAlpine (NUL) placed strong emphasis on the significance for black pressure groups of having gained a permanent point of access that allowed groups to have an early input into the legislative process and to be able to play an initiatory role rather than just be responsive. Black pressure groups had always been seriously disadvantaged because their past role had tended to be limited to a responsive posture. The only qualification that McAlpine expressed on the progress made was that the improvements on access that the CBC had achieved in the House had not been matched in the Senate. Lack of black American representation (Brooke's presence excepted), in his view, was the major inhibition to black pressure groups working effectively there, "We are still rather in the dark as to what is going on there."³⁴ In addition to forging links with the national offices of the major black American pressure groups, the CBC staff had made early progress in establishing contact with the two main organisations that coordinated and acted as a sounding board for the views of local black elected officials, i.e., the National Black Caucus of Local Elected Officials (NBC/LEO), and the National Black Legislative Clearing House (NBLC).³⁵ The membership of these two organisations represented a substantial proportion of the 3,000 black elected officials in office in 1974. CBC staff had begun to use both organisations as a means of communicating efficiently to black elected officials information on the CBC legislative agenda, and seeking a consensus on priority national issues. The CBC staff were aware also that the establishment of channels of communication between themselves and black

organisations and black elected officials was not in itself enough to ensure the effective operation of the legislative strategy. Coordination of the lobbying efforts of these organisations and individuals was essential; the key function of the CBC staff was to make certain that all the various actors in the lobbying process on behalf of priority CBC legislation spoke with one voice. Congressmen representing the 'target' districts for grass-roots lobbying would be liable to become alienated, or disinclined to listen if confronted with a cacophony of voices urging support for a particular legislative measure. CBC staffer, Cleo Hancock, endorsed this point on the need for effective coordination of the lobbying effort, as follows - "A man can get pretty annoyed if five or six groups are continually urging him to support a measure all for different reasons."³⁶ More importantly, there was general recognition that the grass-roots lobbying aspect of the legislative strategy would have to be used selectively if it was to have a major impact. Otherwise, if the approach was used on all items in the CBC legislative agenda, regardless of whether a potentially favourable political climate existed in Congress, the individuals and groups who were investing substantial amounts of their time in lobbying efforts would quickly become disillusioned when results failed continually to appear. An early experiment in testing the potential of the selective use of the grass-roots lobbying strategy had achieved a certain measure of success. In 1973 a grass-roots lobbying campaign directed at Southern Democratic districts with high percentage black populations had been used to help aide the passage of the Washington DC Home Rule bill; the strategy had been coordinated largely from the office of CBC member Walter Fauntroy (DC delegate and Member of the House District of Columbia Committee), with assistance from CBC staff. Chapter 8 provides a detailed legislative case study of this first attempt by the CBC to implement its legislative strategy.

The next major issue on which it was decided that the CBC staff should try to implement the full legislative strategy was the struggle to

save the Office of Economic Opportunity and the anti-poverty programmes from dismemberment. Initially, CBC efforts to stop the elimination of the OEO and its programmes had been directed from the Office of CBC member Rep. Augustus Hawkins (Calif. 29th), who was Chairman of the House sub-committee on Equal Opportunity which was highly involved in writing legislation to save OEO programmes. However, as the second session of the 93rd Congress progressed the CBC staff gradually assumed full responsibility for the coordination of the CBC lobbying effort. The campaign proved to be both long and arduous but eventually, in 1974, Congress approved a compromise measure, the Community Services Act, which salvaged the anti-poverty programmes by placing them under the authority of an autonomous Community Services Administration within the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). Working in cooperation with the major lobby organisation that represented the nine hundred community action agencies, their staff and clients ('Action Committee for Community Services') the CBC staff, through coordinating black political support at the district level, played a significant part in building up the political momentum in Congress that helped to stop the complete dismantlement of the anti-poverty programmes. Since the 93rd Congress, the full implementation of the CBC legislative strategy, including a grass-roots lobbying campaign coordinated by the CBC staff, has occurred only on a highly selective basis, on the most crucial items on the CBC legislative agenda. In the 94th and 95th Congresses respectively, the legislative strategy was employed to help achieve passage of the Voting Rights Act Extension (1975), and the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act (1978).

The expanded CBC professional staff of eight full-time workers (including a new Staff Director) that was recruited at the start of the 94th Congress has enabled the CBC to broaden considerably its external role in terms of disseminating information on legislative developments to black leadership and professional groups. Under the new staff Director, Barbara

Williams, a lawyer and an ex-legislative aide to CBC member Ronald Dellums, the CBC legislative strategy has been augmented by a variety of new staff activities and functions. The most significant of the new functions that have been developed by the CBC staff has been the organisation of a group of CBC sub-committees and "brains trusts". It has been noted above (Chapter 5) that in the 92nd Congress the CBC had tried unsuccessfully to organise a system of informal sub-committees in which members could discuss and formulate CBC positions on various policy issues. There were three basic reasons why it had become possible to mount a system of CBC informal sub-committees by the 95th Congress. Firstly, and obviously, the increased staff resources meant that there was sufficient staff-time available to prepare and organise sub-committee business and meetings. Secondly, by the 95th Congress CBC members had managed to gain representation on all 22 House standing committees. Consequently, each CBC sub-committee jurisdiction could be based upon a particular policy area covered by the House standing committee/s, and moreover, could be chaired by a CBC member who served on the standing committee and hence had the expertise to speak with authority on current congressional thinking in a particular policy area. The earlier sub-committees had failed partly because members had lacked the necessary 'inside' knowledge that would enable the CBC to formulate viable policy positions. The third reason, which was closely related to the second, was that the CBC staff had organised a network of over six-hundred policy experts, most of whom were black Americans, who would be linked in to attend the sub-committee meetings to provide specific policy expertise. CBC members recognised the usefulness to their standing committee work of having a group of relevant policy experts with whom they could confer regularly. The CBC staff have referred to the various groups of policy experts as "Brains Trusts". The concept of the "Brains Trust" had been pioneered by CBC member Parren Mitchell (Md. 7th). In 1972, he had organised a group of black businessmen, lawyers and academics to discuss

methods of encouraging the expansion of minority businesses. Mitchell had convened the meetings in order to receive regular advice which would help him formulate legislative and regulatory measures that, hopefully, he could utilise in his capacity as a member of the House sub-committee on Minority Small Business Enterprise (of the House Select Committee on Small Business).

This original CBC "Brains Trust" has continued to meet on a regular basis, and has developed an effective lobbying function in addition to its educational role. The "Brains Trust" demonstrated its potential as a lobby when, early in the 94th Congress, the House leadership announced plans to reorganise and, in effect, phase out the Minority Business Sub-Committee of the Small Business Committee. CBC staff, in liaison with Rep. Mitchell's office, contacted immediately all "Brains Trust" members and asked them to write individual letters to the key House leaders protesting against the plans and pointing to the value of the Sub-Committee's work. Within three days of the announcement of the plans the House leadership in response to this CBC-orchestrated pressure reversed their decision. This example provides an illustration of how quickly the CBC staff had established good channels of communication, and had begun to perform efficiently in its external role as a national coordinator of black political strength.

By autumn 1977, eight of the thirteen CBC sub-committees had developed advisory "brains trusts" and each sub-committee had begun to hold quarterly meetings in Washington DC. In beginning his term as CBC chairman (for the 95th Congress) Rep. Mitchell stated that his aim would be to have each sub-committee develop a "brains trust" which, on the model of the 'Minority Enterprise brains trust' would develop educational and lobbying functions.³⁷ At the time of writing, it is too early to measure how effectively the sub-committees and associated "brains trusts" have performed. Quite clearly, however, the organisation of nine of the CBC sub-committees was sufficiently well advanced to mount legislative workshops as part of the 1977 CBC Annual Dinner weekend. The legislative workshops were held

on the theme of "The Federal Connection" and the stated goals were (a) to gain a perspective on the direction of the Carter Administration's plans with regard to the minority community, (b) to identify goals to be attained by 1980 strategies for attaining these goals, and (c) to further expand the Caucus' legislative support network.³⁸ The legislative workshops were held on the following subjects;- the Aged; Communications; Voter Participation; Criminal Justice; Health; Education; International Affairs; Economy/Full Employment; Minority Enterprise and Housing. Participants at the workshops included representatives of the Carter Administration, and House and Senate committee/sub-committee chairmen responsible for legislative policy-making in the above fields. It was the intention that in the future, the CBC staff would be responsible for organising annual legislative workshops which would be held as the culmination of each year's series of sub-committee meetings. (Table 14, below, lists the CBC sub-committees and their chairmen, as of 95th Congress).

Increased CBC staff numbers has also meant that another aspect of the staff role, as perceived originally, has been performed more satisfactorily. In the 95th Congress, the CBC staff began operating a 'casework referral system' to deal with the hundreds of enquiries and requests for help received from black American and minority citizens resident in districts not represented by CBC members. A file is now opened on each request for assistance. Preliminary work is undertaken on each enquiry, in particular to identify the relevant branch of a government department or federal agency that would be able to provide assistance or respond to a complaint, whichever is the case. CBC staff then write to the enquirer informing him of this preliminary work's findings and notifying him that his letter is being referred to the Member of Congress who represents the district in which he lives. All the correspondence, including the CBC staff's initial findings on the case is then forwarded to the Member of Congress. The CBC staff

TABLE 14CBC SUB-COMMITTEES95th CONGRESSPOLICY AREA
(in alphabetical order)CHAIRMAN

THE AGED*

Harold Ford

COMMUNICATIONS*

William Clay
Louis StokesCRIMINAL JUSTICE*
DEFENCE POLICY
ECONOMY/FULL EMPLOYMENTJohn Conyers Jr
Ronald Dellums
Augustus Hawkins
John Conyers Jr

EDUCATION*

Shirley Chisholm

ENERGY/TRANSPORTATION

Charles Rangel
Yvonne BurkeEQUAL OPPORTUNITY/
INTER-GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONSWilliam Clay, A Hawkins
Barbara Jordan, Robert Nix

HEALTH*

Louis Stokes
Ralph Metcalfe

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS*

Charles Diggs
Cardiss Collins

MINORITY ENTERPRISE AND HOUSING*

Parren Mitchell

WELFARE REFORM

Charles Rangel
Shirley Chisholm

VOTER PARTICIPATION*

Walter Fauntroy
Barbara JordanSUB-COMMITTEE COORDINATOR
CBC STAFF

=

Helene Colvin

*Sub-Committees which have developed a "brains trust" of policy advisers.

SOURCE: "ABOUT THE CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS"
CBC OFFICE PUBLICATION, 1977

monitor the progress of each referred enquiry by requesting a follow-up report after a period of 30 days. The CBC staff have claimed that the casework referral system has made other members of Congress more aware of, and responsive to the needs of their minority constituents. In general, the CBC staff believe that the casework referral system works well, and as evidence of this they point to letters received from Members of Congress praising the effectiveness of the system. A long term goal is to link the casework referral system to CBC sub-committees in order to provide the basis for the development of an oversight function within each sub-committee. It is felt that the development of an oversight function is important, because many 'casework' enquiries involving discrimination by government agencies have demonstrated that agencies are not acting in compliance with existing civil rights legislation and related regulations. In the short term, the CBC staff are compiling dossiers of 'casework' where the complaints suggest that systematic discrimination is being exercised by a federal agency. Once enough evidence is collected, the CBC staff pass the dossiers to CBC members who present the casework findings at congressional committee hearings as evidence to support a CBC legislative proposal, or a request for an investigation.

The growing sophistication of the CBC staff organisation is, perhaps, most clearly demonstrated by the recent launching, in September 1977, of a "legislative intern program" designed to provide black American and minority graduate students with the opportunity to work in the legislative arena. The intern programme offered four places in its first year of operation; each intern received course credit from their college or university for the time spent on the programme. Apart from the educational role of enhancing minority students' understanding of the legislative process, the CBC has funded the intern programme for a specific practical purpose. A CBC staff document announcing the intern scheme states that "the program

is aimed specifically at increasing the number of Black and minority legislative staff in the US House of Representatives and the Senate, particularly on the committee level."³⁹ The promotion and organisation of the legislative intern programme indicates that the unique external role of the CBC professional staff is becoming highly developed.

A staff function that had always featured prominently from the earliest days of the CBC, that is publicity and press relations, had developed similarly into a highly professional form by the 95th Congress. In addition to the publication of the annual CBC legislative agenda each January (to coincide with the President's State of the Union Address), a legislative report was produced at the end of each session which measured progress made in fulfilling the agenda's goals. A quarterly newsletter entitled "For the People" had been launched in 1975. Also, the preparation of press releases and press conference speeches for CBC members announcing CBC initiatives and responses to Executive and Congressional actions had become a normal part of the daily life for the professional staff. According to a senior staffman, the publications and press releases were circulated throughout the CBC's national network of black lobby and leadership groups, elected officials and "brains trust" members. CBC publications were described as the oil which kept the machine working, by keeping people informed and building-up support for priority legislative issues.⁴⁰

There was one staff role that emerged in the course of the 95th Congress which had remained totally undeveloped until then, that is, liaison with the Executive Office of the White House. The fact was hardly surprising because, as noted earlier, the perceived hostility of the Nixon Administration toward black American and minority interests had been a major motivating force behind the formation of the CBC. However, liaison between the White House and the CBC office had not been non-existent in the years of the Republican Administrations; a black American, Stanley S Scott, who served as a special assistant to both President Nixon and

President Ford, had been responsible for keeping open the channels of contact to the CBC and other representatives of black and minority communities. The change to a Democratic Administration brought a greater work burden to the CBC professional staff. In his first year in Office, President Carter held meetings with the CBC as a group and consulted frequently with individual Caucus members; all of these meetings required extensive preparation and liaison on the part of the CBC professional staff. Another staff task concomitant to the arrival of the new Administration was the preparation of a list of proposed black American appointees to federal executive posts at Cabinet and sub-Cabinet level. While there was considerable disappointment within the CBC that most of their suggestions were either ignored or not taken up,⁴¹ this disappointment did not prevent the professional staff from being charged with developing contacts with Administration officials on CBC legislative issues.

The CBC professional staff had evolved, therefore, from its original form as a hastily assembled, predominantly part-time staffed publicity office set up to launch the CBC and its collective activities, to an effective House support group providing a range of functions designed to enhance the CBC's effectiveness in the legislative process. The early decision to establish an independent base of funding for the professional staff was crucial to its success. The CBC annual dinner served not only as a fund-raiser, but also helped to gradually focus the staff role of acting as a national coordinator of black leadership groups, elected officials and businesses in support of CBC legislative goals. After a period of trial and error in which the staff sought a viable support role, drawing upon the experience and example of other House informal groups, the professional staff developed a unique 'external' legislative role which involved promoting the CBC legislative agenda and establishing a national network of black political, professional and business groups to lobby for the passage of the legislative agenda, and act as a comprehensive

support system of expertise for CBC members to utilise in devising new legislation and monitoring the activities of the federal government and its agencies. By mid-term in the 95th Congress, fieldwork observation of professional staff's work organisation and activities suggested that this 'external' legislative role had begun to operate effectively. In an interview in January 1978 the CBC Legislative Director expressed the view that the earlier massive staff effort involved in establishing a national network of contacts was now beginning to pay dividends; effective lobbying had begun to be achieved on the major CBC legislative issues, and constructive legislative proposals were emanating from the development of the "brains trust" strategy. He admitted frankly that his main organisational problem was not staff-related; in his words, his main concern usually was, "to get members to do things in the name of the Caucus as a collective. Their first impulse was to do things and claim individual merit."⁴² The extent to which CBC members acted collectively in their legislative behaviour is studied in the next section.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Robinson memo of July 1971 quoted in "FOCUS" magazine Vol 5. No. 8, "Special Issue on the Congressional Black Caucus" August - September 1977. (Joint Centre for Political Studies, Wash DC) p. 4.
2. Richard Conlon, quoted in "CO Guide to Current American Government. Fall 1973 Edition". Article, "The Democratic Study Group; Ability to Produce Results Increases Stature in House" p. 100. (Congressional Quarterly Service Inc. Wash DC. 1973).
3. Richard Conlon mentioned his offer of advice to CBC on utilization of clerk-hire allowances during a fieldwork interview (July 18th, 1974. Wash DC).

4. Congress does not exercise strict central administrative control on the use of staffing allowances (both clerk-hire and committee staff allowances). "Committee and sub-committee chairmen and other more senior members may make use of committee staff personnel from time to time for chores not directly related to committee operations . . ." Donald G Tacheron and Morris K Udall provide detailed information on the flexibility granted to Representatives in the use of staffing allowances in "The Job of the Congressman" 2nd Edition. (The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. Indianapolis and New York, 1970) Quote, above p. 47.
5. 1971 CBC income quoted in "The Black Caucus: Five Years Later" Article by Alex Poinsett in June 1973 edition of EBONY MAGAZINE p. 66.
6. The CBC Financial Report (prepared by Lucas Tucker and Co, Certified Public Accountants Wash DC) is reproduced in the CBC annual dinner programme booklet. The 1977 programme provided the following breakdown of the CBC annual revenue

Contributions (personal donations)	=	13,560
Donated Services (use of clerk-hire etc)	=	26,318
Special events (annual dinner and benefits)	=	193,368
Interest income	=	6,902
Miscellaneous income	=	<u>784</u>
	=	<u>\$240,932 *</u>

*The CBC was recognised from December 1971 as a not-for-profit corporation and is, therefore, exempt from federal and state income taxes (under Internal Revenue Code Section 501 (c) (4)).
7. Fieldwork interview, CBC Staff Executive Director, Augustus A Adair. Wash DC June 25th, 1974.
8. Fieldwork interview, Rep. Charles Diggs (D. Mich 13th) Wash DC. July 17th, 1974.
9. Fieldwork interview, Rep. Andrew Young (D. Ga 5th) Wash DC. June 26th 1974.
10. The "New England Caucus" was established in 1973 by Rep. Michael J Harrington (D Mass 6th), and contained twenty-five members. Its expansion to the "Northeast-Midwest Economic Advancement Coalition"

occurred in late 1976. Its membership is drawn from 17 states ranging from New York to Minnesota. Harrington was the group's first chairman, and Rep Frank Horton (R NY 34th) was co-chairman. The group has a Staff Director and four full-time staff. ("Regionalism in Congress: Formulas Debated" CQ Guide to Current American Government Spring 1978. Congressional Quarterly Service Inc. Wash DC. 1977, pp. 5 - 10).

11. The "Congressional Hispanic Caucus" was organized in December 1976. Its Chairman is Rep. Edward R. Roybal (D Calif 25th), the only Congressman of Spanish origin elected to the House from California. ("Interest-Group Doubts Rise on Top Jobs", CQ Guide to Current American Government. Fall 1977. CQ Service Inc. Wash DC. 1977, pp. 100 - 104).
12. Established in 1977, the Congresswomen's Caucus was co-chaired by Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman (D NY 16th) and Rep Margaret Heckler (R Mass 10th). Three conservative Congresswomen refused to join the Caucus - Rep. Virginia Smith (R Nebraska 3rd), Rep. Marjorie Holt (R Md 4th) and Rep. Marilyn Lloyd (D Tenn 3rd). ("Congressional Women Pick up Where Bella Left Off". by Susan J Tolchin. POLITICKS AND OTHER HUMAN INTERESTS, VOL I, NO. 6, January 17th, 1978, pp. 24-5. Morgan Publishing Company, NY 1978).
13. MCPL was established in 1959, and its membership had grown from a small group to 100 members by 1970. In 1971, a study noted that the group employed a staff of eight full and part-time researchers and raised an annual budget of over \$200,000 from private contributors, fund-raising and membership dues ("Congressional Information Processes for National Policy", Norman Beckman. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 394, March 1971, pp. 84 - 99).
14. "The Congressional Black Caucus", Marguerite Ross Barnett, in "Congress Against the President" edited by Harvey C Mansfield Sr (Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 1, New York 1975, pp. 34 - 50).
15. Fieldwork interview, Rep. William Clay (D. Mo. 1st) Wash. DC, June 26th, 1974.
16. Fieldwork interview, Richard Conlon, Staff Director Democratic Study Group (1968 -) Wash. DC, July 18th, 1974.

17. Fieldwork interview, CBC professional staff member Cleo Hancock.
Wash. DC, June 22nd, 1974.
18. Fieldwork interview, CBC Staff Director, Augustus A Adair.
Wash. DC, June 25th, 1974.
19. Fieldwork interview, Rep. Louis Stokes (D. Ohio 21st) Wash. DC,
June 20th, 1974.
20. Adair, fieldwork interview.
21. Studies of the workloads of congressional offices have tended to show that the bulk of staff-time is spent involved in constituency service work and correspondence (for example, see J. S. SALOMA III "CONGRESS AND THE NEW POLITICS" Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1969, pp. 184 - 187 which examines survey results to reveal that in an average week only 30 hours of total staff-time is spent engaged in legislative support work). On the basis of fieldwork observation in 1974 and 1978, it would appear that CBC members' offices deviate markedly from this norm. While most staff were involved in constituency service, there were, at least, two legislative aides in each office whose time was totally absorbed by work relating to members' committee work and other House activity (i.e., drafting of legislation, meeting with lobby group representatives, legislative research).
22. Adair interview.
23. Fieldwork Interview, Michael Dubenstein. June 19th, 1974.
Washington DC.
24. Established since 1970, JCPS is a private, non-profit and non-partisan organisation which provides research, education, technical assistance and information for minority elected officials. JCPS was funded originally by a two-year grant from the Ford Foundation. Subsequently, it has received financial support from 25 corporations, 9 foundations and 13 labour unions. In 1978, JCPS employed 30 full-time staff engaged in research and data gathering (A useful summary of the history of JCPS, its research and training programmes, and publications is contained in an article by L Harris-Hurd, entitled, "JCPS: Keeping Tabs on Black Politics", BLACK ENTERPRISE magazine Vol. 8, No. 6, January, 1978. E. G. Graves Publishing Co.. NY).

25. JCPS, March 1973 .
26. JCPS, February 1974 .
27. JCPS, April 1974.
28. Fieldwork interview. Kenneth S. Colburn, Deputy Director of Research . JCPS. July 19th, 1974 . Wash. DC.
29. Fieldwork interview, George A Dalley, Legislative aide to Rep. Charles B Rangel (NY 19th) June 26th, 1974.
30. Dalley interview.
31. Dalley interview.
32. Dalley interview.
33. While several black civil rights and leadership groups are affiliated members of LCCR, the organisation is not a black American pressure group. LCCR is an umbrella organisation which represents 135 national civil rights, religious, labour, civic, professional and fraternal organisations and coordinates their efforts on behalf of the passage of federal civil rights and related legislation (e.g. anti-poverty programmes, social security, minimum wage legislation).
34. Fieldwork interview, Bob McAlpine, Lobbyist, National Urban League. July 15th, 1974. Wash. DC.
35. NBC/LEO (founded 1969) is an independent coalition of local black elected officials, which is also a caucus within the National League of Cities/US Conference of Mayors. NBLC (also founded 1969) is a coalition of black state legislators formed on a non-partisan basis.
36. Hancock interview.
37. Rep. P J Mitchell "National Black Network: A Caucus Goal" FOCUS, VOL. 5, NO. 3, March 1977, p. 3 (Joint Centre for Political Studies, Wash. DC).
38. Quoted from CBC document, "Legislative Workshops Program, The Federal Connection" September 23rd, 1977. (Unpublished).
39. From the "Report on Caucus Staff Operations" presented to the Annual CBC Dinner, September 1977 (Unpublished).

40. Fieldwork interview, CBC Legislative Director, Kenneth Colburn (formerly Deputy Director of Research, JCPS). January 19th, 1978. Washington DC.
41. Speaking on the issue of Carter Administration federal appointments to the "Congressional Quarterly", CBC Chairman Parren Mitchell stated, "I must confess that our efforts along these lines were completely thwarted. I'm not sure the President even saw the lists". In general, he felt that, "(the Carter Administration were) almost going through the same kind of tokenism as we had before - but the tokens are at higher levels." CQ GUIDE TO CURRENT AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, FALL 1977 EDITION. Congressional Quarterly Inc. 1977 Wash DC.p. 102
42. Fieldwork interview, Kenneth Colburn 19/1/78.

PART THREE

CBC LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOUR: AN ANALYSIS

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Chapter 7

Black Representatives in the Congressional Democratic Party and the Committee System

While the development of an efficient and sophisticated system of professional staff support would be an essential ingredient in the emergence of the CBC as an effective House informal group, the degree of success that the CBC would achieve in the legislative process would be dependent primarily upon the relationships and influence its members built up with the Congressional Democratic party leadership, and concomitantly, the positions of authority that were gained in the standing committee structure. At the beginning of the 93rd Congress when the CBC decided to narrow its focus and concentrate upon legislative activity, the majority of its members were relatively junior representatives with little influence or standing respectively with the Democratic leadership or in the committee system. Over half the CBC membership were either freshmen or second-term representatives. Even the more senior members were only just beginning to reach the stage of their congressional careers when the rewards of the seniority system could be realized in committee and sub-committee chairmanships. It was not until 1973 that the most senior CBC member, Charles Diggs (D Mich), who had served nine terms in Congress, assumed the chairmanship of the House District of Columbia Committee and became only the third black Congressman ever to gain a chairmanship. Other senior CBC members were moving into their first important sub-committee chairmanships; Augustus Hawkins (D Calif), in his sixth term, gained an Education and Labour sub-committee chairmanship, while John Conyers (D Mich), in his fifth term, gained a Judiciary sub-committee chairmanship. While the achievement of these positions was not insignificant, the fact remained that the CBC membership were not well-represented on the most powerful House standing

committees. Of the three most important House standing committees, Ways and Means, Appropriations, and Rules, it was only on the Appropriations Committee that the CBC was represented; Rep. Louis Stokes (D. Ohio) had gained a committee seat in the 92nd Congress. In setting out to fulfill its new goal of performing an effective legislative role on behalf of the black American minority, the CBC, therefore, faced an uphill struggle. At least, however, the struggle was not commenced unnoticed by the Democratic party leadership. If the CBC's first two years had been uncoordinated and unproductive in legislative terms, their activities had, if nothing else, drawn attention to the growing black presence in Congress. The CBC had emerged as an internal lobby for black American interests within the Congressional Democratic party, and the point was not lost on the Democratic leadership of the significance of the CBC as a potential voting bloc. While 15 votes out of a total of 435 votes did not appear significant, it did represent a negotiable block of votes within a Democratic majority of 248 members (93rd Congress) which was useful in a political institution where the leadership normally had to ply for votes on an individual basis on each issue. The importance of consistent bloc voting, particularly on issues where there was a strong black American interest, was recognised by the CBC to be a crucial factor in the campaign to convince the Democratic leadership that it needed to take heed of CBC views. Furthermore, it was believed that the Democratic leadership would be responsive to requests for better committee assignments if they knew that the CBC as a whole backed each member's choice of assignment. As an early priority in exercising its new legislative role, the CBC sought to discipline and coordinate its members to apply for a wide variety of committee assignments, and to vote as a bloc which, when necessary, would take an independent position on roll-calls relevant to black American interests.

The narrowing of CBC activity to the legislative sphere did

not necessitate that the majority group within the CBC ~~is~~ those members with a civil rights-activist rather than ward politics background, had to moderate their independent approach to the Democratic Party within Congress. On the contrary, it was felt that only by demonstrating independence and consistency in their legislative behaviour would the CBC as a group earn the respect of the Democratic leadership, and be able to negotiate effectively for improved committee assignments and support for their priority legislation. Their legislative behaviour would remain firmly orientated to promoting issues of importance to black Americans rather than demonstrating loyalty to the Democratic Party. CBC members were anxious to emphasise this point when discussing their legislative strategy in the 93rd Congress. Rep. William Clay expressed this view as follows, "We are Democrats by choice. We were born black, we live black, and we will die black. But we don't always have to be Democrats. We feel that if the interests of the Democratic Party are contrary to the interests of black people then we have but one alternative and that is saving the interests of black people."¹

Rep. Andrew Young concurred with this view, stating, "I am far less likely to go along just because it is a Party issue. I try to deal with things out of the same kind of perspective as I did in the civil rights movement."² The Congressional Democratic party, to use a phrase that is more usually applied to the Democratic Party nationally, is a 'broad umbrella' which shelters many dissident voices espousing sectional interests. The Democratic leadership has, therefore, to operate in a manner which seeks constantly to accommodate these disparate views. While the emergence of a black American sectional interest within the Congressional Democratic party membership was a new development it was certainly not a phenomenon with which the Democratic leadership was unfamiliar. Rep. Andrew Young explained in an interview that, as a freshman representative, he had found no difficulty in working primarily for black American interests and maintaining good liaison with the Democratic leadership:- "The Democratic

leadership is not a public style leadership. They will get on the phone and talk with people, key people on an individual basis on certain bills. They don't do it very heavy-handed; it's all very friendly. Even as a freshman Democrat who ought to be dependent on the leadership, if the Speaker calls me up he doesn't say, 'We want your vote on this', he says, 'I would like you to consider such an such an issue, if you can go along with us, we would really appreciate it.' But normally when somebody makes a friendly appeal like that you really try to go along, unless it is directly against your principles. And when it has been directly against my principles I have said so, and there has been no reprisal. There is a very easygoing leadership style in the House of Representatives which I think is very effective considering the strong wills and the differences of opinion which make up this House."³ On the whole the Democratic leadership viewed CBC members as a part of the northern urban liberal wing of the party. Whether from a southern or western district, CBC members tended largely to vote in agreement with that wing of the party. However, the Democratic leadership could not afford to ignore the specific interests of the CBC because CBC members represented some of the 'safest' seats occupied by urban district-based liberal Democrats. It was recognised that a sizeable caucus of black Democrats was likely to become a permanent feature in Congress, and hence their views had to be accommodated.

Relations between the CBC and the Democratic leadership had been amicable generally in the 92nd Congress except for moments of strain caused by the controversy and publicity generated by the various CBC 'ad hoc' committee hearings. CBC involvement in internal Democratic party committees though had been minimal. Only one CBC member had held a party post in the 92nd Congress; Rep. Augustus Hawkins (D Calif) had served as a member of the House Democratic Patronage Committee. In Chapter 4 above, it has been noted that some conflict had tended to develop between black

members and the Democratic leadership over standing committee assignments (for example, Shirley Chisholm's challenge within the Democratic Caucus against her assignment to the Agriculture Committee in the 91st Congress). Frictions arose because the method whereby committee assignments were made was governed largely by the working of the seniority system. The senior Democrats who comprised the Committee on Committees represented groups ('zones') of state delegations and sought committee approval for the assignment of their zone's members to particular standing committees. The views of the standing committee chairman to whose committee a member was to be assigned, and the Democratic leadership (usually the Speaker and majority leader) were crucial elements in determining the selection. CBC members held the belief which was shared by many other liberal urban Democrats particularly newer members, that the Committee on Committees in making committee assignments was too deferential to the views of standing committee chairmen. Such deference, which was an attitude rooted in the seniority system, worked against liberal urban Democrats, as many of the standing committee chairmen were ageing Southern conservative Democrats who were hostile generally to taking any new members who might be critical of how the committee operated.⁴ Most of the CBC involvement in the House Democratic Party was confined to the informal level, working amongst colleagues within the Democratic Study Group. All CBC members were also members of DSG and supported strongly the reforms that the Group were seeking in relation to the seniority system, committee secrecy and Democratic party procedure. In fact, in the 91st Congress, two CBC members Rep. William Clay and Rep. Parren Mitchell were prominent in DSG activities serving, respectively, as a Vice-chairman and Programme Chairman.

At the beginning of the 93rd Congress, there were signs that the impact of the CBC's early activities had been felt and that the Democratic leadership had begun to move towards accommodating their views.

The three new CBC members received the committee assignments that they had requested; Rep. Yvonne Burke (D. Calif) was assigned to the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, Rep. Andrew Young (D. Ga) to the Banking and Currency Committee and Rep. Barbara Jordan (D. Texas) to the Judiciary Committee.⁵ More importantly, however, CBC member Parren Mitchell (D. Md) gained a seat on the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee, a party committee which devised legislative strategy and advised the party leadership on policy positions. Mitchell had stated plainly that he would regard his role on the committee as being a spokesman for black American interests, and that he would attempt to forward CBC legislative priorities. Mitchell's announced intentions as a committee member did not inhibit him from gaining a seat. The most significant CBC breakthrough in respect of new committee assignments, however, came with the appointment of Rep. Ronald Dellums (D. Calif) to the Armed Services Committee. The way in which Dellums won a seat on the Armed Services Committee will be looked at in some detail because it illustrates well the leverage that the CBC, acting as a united group, could exert upon the Democratic leadership. The Dellums assignment was achieved in the face of opposition from the committee chairman, and against the majority vote within the Democratic Committee on Committees. It is worthy of special study also, therefore, as an example of how the seniority system was weakening under pressure from party leaders and informal group interests (i.e. prior to the major reforms adopted in the Democratic Caucus in the 94th Congress).

Rep. Dellums' assignment to the House Armed Services Committee in the 93rd Congress; a brief case study.

Ronald Dellums was elected to Congress in 1970 from California's seventh district which, at that time, was described as 'the nation's most radical congressional district'.⁶ The district's radical reputation rested upon

the fact that contained within its boundaries were the Berkeley campus of the University of California, where in the late 1960's the anti-war, reform movement dominated student politics, and Oakland's large black American community which was the home of the Black Panther Party. Dellums, then a Berkeley councilman, outran the district's six-term liberal Democrat incumbent, Rep. Jeffrey Cohelan, in the primary with a 7,500 vote plurality, and went on to defeat the Republican challenger in the general election with 56% of the vote. Dellums achieved these results by mounting a militant anti-Vietnam war campaign which forged an effective coalition between the black community, students and high-income voters opposed to the war. In his campaign, Dellums was not averse to embracing some of the views of the Black Panther Party, and in spite of his Republican opponent's heavy exposure of this fact in an attempt to alienate white voters (the black vote and the student vote accounted for only 40% of the electorate in the seventh district), this position did not inhibit his ability to win. On arrival in Congress, Dellums did not temper his radical stance, or make any concessions to the congressional establishment in terms of conforming to the norms of behaviour traditionally expected of freshmen representatives. He took up his seat in Congress with a single-minded determination to use his position to work for the ending of US military involvement in Vietnam and, moreover, to shift America's budgetary priorities from military to domestic, social and economic concerns. In his words, "I came to Congress opposing the Vietnam War and militarism in general, and the position I was taking then was that the Vietnam War was illegal, immoral and insane.. But I said that I go beyond simply demanding America's withdrawal from Vietnam, but America's withdrawal from a mentality that sees the need to bomb and destroy as a way of handling international disputes and solving human problems. I came here, therefore, also opposed to the related subject of America's exorbitant military

expenditures. My point being that the degree to which the military budget is an extraordinary percentage of the total budget is the degree to which we would never deal effectively and fully with the myriad of human problems that confront people in this country and the humanitarian problems that confront people in underdeveloped nations in the world."⁷

Rep. Dellums was assigned to the Foreign Affairs Committee in his first term in Congress. However, most of his legislative activities in the 92nd Congress involved policies and issues that were relevant to the Armed Services Committee. One of his first acts in Congress on February 4th 1971, was to introduce a resolution calling for a full-scale joint congressional inquiry into potential war crimes and atrocities by US military forces in Vietnam. On March 1st 1971 the resolution (i.e. House Joint Resolution 409) was re-introduced with the co-sponsorship of twenty-one fellow congressmen. If the resolution had been passed by both Houses of Congress and signed by the President the responsibility for holding the hearings would have rested with the Armed Services Committees. In fact, the resolution did not even reach the House floor for a vote. In spite of letters sent from Dellums and co-sponsors to party leaders and the Rules Committee urging action on the resolution, the resolution died in the Rules Committee. Undeterred by this, Dellums undertook a tour of several military installations to gather evidence from Vietnam veterans at first hand. Armed with this evidence, and assisted by political groups opposed to the war, in particular 'Vietnam Veterans Against the War', Dellums organised a series of 'ad hoc' congressional hearings under his chairmanship, entitled 'Hearings on War Crimes in Vietnam', in the Caucus Room of the Cannon House Office Building on Capitol Hill.⁸ Several Vietnam war veterans testified before the 'ad hoc' committee on the atrocities they had witnessed during their periods of active service in the war. The hearings received a high level of coverage in the mass media which

generated a considerable degree of public interest. Within Congress, however, Rep. Dellums was roundly condemned by senior representatives for creating controversy on this issue. Amongst these 'private critics' was Rep. F Edward Hebert (D. La. 1st), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. Hebert was incensed particularly by the 'ad hoc' hearings because they had drawn attention to the Armed Services Committee's apparent lack of interest in monitoring the conduct of the military services in the execution of the Vietnam War. Dellums, in his summing-up at the conclusion of the 'ad hoc' hearings, had stated that if the Congress did not act upon the joint resolution calling for a full-scale congressional inquiry, the onus would be on the House Armed Services Committee to investigate the evidence that the 'ad hoc' hearings had brought forward; he said, "My hope is that the clarity of the testimony here, and the power of the testimony here, will force the Armed Services Committee to hold open hearings on war atrocities in Southeast Asia."⁹ The Armed Services Committee chose to ignore the challenge.

The congressional opponents of the 'ad hoc' hearings claimed that Dellums, because he was not a member of the relevant standing committee, did not have the right to hold hearings on subjects within its jurisdiction. There was no federal law against holding 'ad hoc' hearings, of course, but it was asserted that his actions offended congressional norms and rules of conduct. However, there were precedents to be found in recent congressional history that demonstrated that, while undoubtedly unorthodox, 'ad hoc' hearings had been used by several Congressmen to draw attention to issues when the regular committee machinery was not available. Two examples can be given which illustrate that 'ad hoc' hearings had been used in both the Senate and House as a means of 'hurdling' standing committees that refused to deal with crucial problems falling within their jurisdictions. In 1956, several senators had sponsored a voting rights bill, but had failed to get

the agreement of the Judiciary Committee to hold hearings because the chairman was opposed. In response to this refusal, Senator Paul Douglas (D. Ill) chaired 'ad hoc' hearings on the proposed bill in the Senate parlour which received testimony from black American victims of voting discrimination. Later in 1969, Rep. L Farbstein and other New York Democrats held 'ad hoc' hearings in New York City on the problem of air pollution. ^{Neither?} None of these hearings had legal status; their deliberations were not published by the Government printing Office as congressional documents. But they attracted the attention of the media, and hence worked to focus concern on particular issues. In reality, the principal grounds on which opponents objected to 'ad hoc' hearings were political. In the case of the Dellums' hearings, his opponents were those representatives, particularly conservative southern Democrats and Republicans, who were strongly pro-military in terms of both budgetary priorities and the conduct of the Vietnam War. Such men were predominant amongst the membership of the Armed Services Committee. The Chairman, F. Edward Hebert, with thirty years service on the committee, headed the overwhelming bipartisan majority who consistently supported high levels of military spending, and the US military involvement in the Vietnam war. Hebert, too, was an archetype of the conservative Southern Democrat who had dominated the congressional committee system in the post-war years; since 1940 he had represented a district in which over one-third of the potential electorate were black Americans but that operated under election laws which effectively inhibited the black minority from exercising its right to vote.

Dellums' incursion into the territory of the Armed Services Committee did not end when the 'ad hoc' hearings on war crimes closed its doors. He turned his attention next to the issues of military justice and the treatment of black servicemen under the court system, and the general position of the black American in the armed services. Dellums' interest

had been stirred by the large number of letters that he, other CBC members and the CBC office had received from black servicemen stationed throughout the states and abroad alleging unfair treatment from military courts, and discriminatory practices in relation to promotion opportunities and the provision of housing for their families. In liaison with the same veterans groups that had helped him organise the war crimes hearings, Dellums decided to follow up these complaints by undertaking a tour of military installations over a period of several months. In conducting the tour Dellums recalled that, "Our format was to not publicise the fact that I was coming to a military base. I would get within a short distance of the base and I would have a staffman call the Commanding General and say that a member of Congress wanted to get in and talk to the GI's and look at their facilities I had been thoroughly briefed by a network of volunteers, both inside and outside the military as to which places to go and what questions to ask."¹⁰ On the basis of his experiences and the evidence collected during his visits, Dellums was convinced that many of the complaints that the CBC had received from black servicemen could be substantiated. To draw attention to the evidence of racial discrimination in the armed services, he chose to employ again the tactic of holding 'ad hoc' congressional committee hearings. Under the title of 'Racism in the Military', the hearings were held from November 16th - 18th 1971. Whereas the 'war crimes' hearings had been organised by Dellums' office and veteran groups, the 'ad hoc' hearings on racism in the military were financed and organised as a CBC operation. On November 15th, the day before the Capitol Hill hearings began, eleven CBC members visited ten military bases and held hearings simultaneously 'on site' at which black servicemen testified.¹¹ The 'ad hoc' hearings' findings were used as the basis for a CBC report (which had been prepared by Dellums) which was sent to the Department of Defence and the House Armed Services Committee.¹²

Ironically, within months of the publication of the CBC report racial unrest in the military reached a post-war peak with major racial disturbances occurring on the USS Constellation, and the USS Kitty Hawk.¹³ In spite of these developments and the relevance of the report's recommendations to them, the Armed Services Committee failed to respond. However, in April 1972, prior to the report's publication, the Secretary of Defence had established a Pentagon Task Force on the Administration of Military Justice partly in response to the testimony produced at the 'ad hoc' hearings which suggested that a higher percentage of minority servicemen, in comparison to white servicemen, received judicial punishments and dishonourable military discharges. Dellums agreed to present the CBC report's findings to the Task force, and many of his recommendations were, in fact, included in the Task Force final report.

As the 93rd Congress convened, therefore, it was quite obvious that given Dellums' activities in the field of military affairs, he was the last person in Congress that Chairman Hebert would welcome as a member of the House Armed Services Committee. But Dellums was determined to become a member, and he decided to seek the united support of the CBC to achieve this goal. In an interview Dellums explained his decision as follows, "It seemed to me totally absurd that in the United States in 1973, that there would still be no black member, or non-white member, of the Armed Services Committee and maybe a handful of people, at best, left of centre politically I was in my second term, and I had a chance to go on the Education and Labour Committee or the Banking and Currency Committee. I made the decision that I wanted to go on the Armed Services Committee. I went to the CBC and said, 'We need to have a black person on the Armed Services Committee, at least one, and I am willing to serve in that capacity.' The CBC unanimously agreed to back me because they felt that I knew more about the issues than any other member of CBC."¹⁴

With the full support of the CBC achieved, Dellums faced the potentially more difficult task of persuading the California representative on the Democratic Committee on Committees, Rep. James Corman (D. Calif. 22nd), to fight strongly in that committee for his assignment to Armed Services. In fact, this did not present any problem. There were no other more senior Californian members who wanted a seat on Armed Services; hence, Corman was willing to make the recommendation that Dellums be assigned to the Committee. Having gained Corman's agreement, Dellums had now to await the decision of the Committee on Committees. Dellums recalled how he received news of the decision; - "On the day the Committee on Committees met - they go by the alphabet, the Armed Services Committee is one of the first that they dealt with - I received a telephone call from Jim Corman He said, 'I'm sorry Ron, but I couldn't get you on the Armed Services Committee.' 'What do you mean?' I said. 'Well, F. Edward Hebert did a hatchet-job on you. He told some of the members that you were a radical, a Berkeley bomb-thrower, that he would never be able to hold any executive meetings because you would leak secret documents.' All this (was) really absurd stuff! I said, 'Well, I still want to make a fight out of it.' He said, 'I think you'd better forget about it. It's over. Nobody gets on a committee over the open objection of the Chairman'".¹⁵

Dellums rejected Corman's advice, and immediately held a meeting with Rep. Louis Stokes (CBC Chairman) and Rep. William Clay (CBC Treasurer) to decide upon a strategy to challenge the decision. At the meeting, it was agreed to take urgent action and to try to get the decision reversed before the Committee on Committees completed its deliberations. Louis Stokes contacted Rep. Carl Albert (D. Okla. 3rd), the Speaker of the House, Rep. Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill (D. Mass. 7th), the Majority Leader, and Rep. Wilbur Mills (D. Ark 2nd), the Chairman of the Committee on Committees and asked for an afterlunch meeting to discuss the decision.

At the meeting, Dellums was accompanied by CBC members Louis Stokes and William Clay; Carl Albert and Wilbur Mills were present, but not 'Tip' O'Neill. Stokes, speaking as CBC Chairman, stated that the CBC position on the decision was that 1) the CBC wanted representation on the Armed Services Committee, 2) Ronald Dellums was the most qualified person within the CBC to perform that role, and 3) given the public interest generated by the 'ad hoc' hearings, and the fact of racial unrest in the military and the respect that Dellums had gained with minority servicemen, it would be an important statement to place him on the Committee. Dellums added that he wished to refute the suggestion, which, he understood, might have played a part in the decision, that he was liable to leak restricted documents if appointed as committee member. He cited the fact that he had served for two years on the Foreign Affairs Committee, which had considered many sensitive documents, and no leaks had occurred. According to Dellums, Carl Albert replied that every effort had been made to ensure that CBC members obtained the committee assignments of their choice, but that there were simply not enough votes in the Committee on Committees in favour of placing Dellums on the Armed Services Committee. Paraphrasing Carl Albert's exact words, Dellums stated that the Speaker then offered the following alternative to the CBC, "Is Barbara Jordan acceptable? Because we can get Barbara Jordan on the Committee."¹⁶ Stokes, Clay and Dellums had been prepared for this question, because ever since Dellums had sought openly for a seat on Armed Services there had been a rumour circulating within the House that Barbara Jordan was interested also in the seat. However, on first hearing of this, Dellums had met immediately with Jordan to check whether the rumour was true. Jordan had denied that she wanted the seat, and stated that her preference was a seat on the Judiciary Committee. Furthermore, in order to kill the rumour, Jordan had agreed to write to the Speaker on this matter, expressing her

full support as a CBC member for Dellums' assignment to the Armed Services Committee. In reply to the Speaker's question, after firstly having him confirm that he had received Jordan's letter, Stokes stated that the CBC held the view that it was not the role of the Committee on Committees, or committee chairmen, to decide which black member of Congress was more acceptable or less acceptable as a committee member.¹⁷ The CBC stood united behind Dellums' nomination, and wanted the decision to be reconsidered. Faced with this uncompromising stand, Albert and Mills agreed to take the issue back to the Committee on Committees for further discussion. Later that afternoon Dellums' Office received a telephone call informing him that his nomination had been accepted.

Rep. Dellums became, therefore, the first black American to serve as a member of the House Armed Services Committee. Dellums and other CBC members have claimed that this was achieved only because the CBC had been united, and had stood firm and refused to compromise. Furthermore, Dellums' success was put forward as evidence of the value of the tactic of holding 'ad hoc' hearings as a means of gaining influence within Congress. Without doubt, it is true that the convening of the 'ad hoc' hearings and the CBC's unified support were the major contributory factors in Dellums gaining the seat. There were, however, other factors that played a part which were not of the CBC's making. An indicator of the fact that there were other underlying reasons for the success was that when Dellums' nomination to the Armed Services Committee was presented for approval in the Democratic Caucus, the nomination went through unchallenged. By the 93rd Congress, the vast majority of Democrats did not have a strong commitment to the status quo regarding the working of the seniority system in relation to committee assignments. Over half the House membership had been first elected to Congress in the years since 1964, and this new majority had little stake in a status quo which benefitted men such as Rep. F. Edward Hebert. In fact by 1973 this majority favoured institutional changes that would enhance their power at the expense

of elder members like Rep. Hebert. Hence, in the Democratic Caucus at the opening of the 93rd Congress, it was unlikely that many voices would be raised in support of Rep. Hebert's autocratic behaviour in opposing Dellums' nomination. Indeed, later on in the same session, it would be this new majority in the Democratic Caucus that would pass a sub-committee 'bill of rights' that would curb chairmen's powers by creating defined jurisdictions and separate budgets for sub-committees, and requiring legislative measures to be referred to sub-committees within two weeks of being received by the full committee. The growing pressures for a fairer distribution of power within Congress would not halt there; in the 94th Congress the Democratic Caucus would adopt the procedure of annual elections of committee chairmen by secret ballot. Interestingly, Rep. Hebert would be one of the first victims of the new procedure, losing his chairmanship of the Armed Services Committee in January 1975. Before his impending fate, Rep. Hebert insured, however, that Dellums would be ineffective as a member of the Armed Services Committee throughout the 93rd Congress. At the first Armed Services Committee meeting Hebert created a special sub-committee on human relations and assigned Dellums as a member of the sub-committee. The purpose of the sub-committee was ostensibly to consider legislative measures relating to the kind of issues raised by Dellums' 'ad-hoc' hearings. In reality, the sub-committee was a sham because Hebert, exercising his chairman's powers, limited severely its jurisdiction and starved it of legislation to consider. In 1974 after one year on the Committee Dellums acknowledged that, in the light of Hebert's subsequent behaviour, his assignment to Armed Services had been, in a sense, a bitter-sweet victory bearing little concrete results; he complained, "My staff and I, as a result of the 'ad hoc' hearings that we held on racism in the military, have drafted nine pieces of legislation to deal with the issues, none of which have ever been referred to the sub-committee on human

relations which was charged with that responsibility. I have challenged Mr Hebert in writing to tell me why this is the case. It's extremely frustrating. The stranglehold on that Committee is awesome."¹⁸ Nevertheless, although Dellums had little influence and was outvoted constantly, at least his voice was being heard, and the CBC viewpoint was being written into the record of the Committee's deliberations.

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The achievement of Rep. Dellums' appointment to the Armed Services Committee acted as strong encouragement to the CBC to be more ambitious in its choice of committee assignments. Furthermore, Dellums' example heralded a change of tactics in the CBC's approach to the standing committee system. It was decided to adopt a strategy of applying for a wide variety of committee assignments in order to gain the broadest possible representation in the committee structure. In the past, black Congressmen had tended to group on those standing committees which had jurisdictions most relevant to black interests particularly the areas of civil rights, education and employment (eg the Judiciary, Education and Labour, and District of Columbia Committees.¹⁹) The new approach was for CBC members to act as an internal lobby for black Americans throughout the standing committee system, expressing the CBC viewpoint whenever possible to ensure that the senior congressional decision-makers were made aware of the particular problems of blacks and other minorities when drafting and 'marking-up' legislation. The incentive to disperse CBC members throughout the committee structure came also in the 93rd Congress from the simple fact that CBC membership had increased by three members. Rep. William Clay placed emphasis on the increased CBC membership as a key factor in determining the new policy, "There is a strategy now to make sure that we are represented on all the committees, but when there weren't too many of us here we thought that the best committee to be on was the

Education and Labour Committee because so much of that legislation had a deep impact on our lives. All the poverty legislation, all the education money for the educationally disadvantaged, all of the major labour issues were coming through there. We felt that that had more of an impact on our constituencies than perhaps some of the other committees. Now that we have got 16 members in the House, we have made an effort to spread them among the other committees that also affect our lives, housing, banking and currency, appropriations."²⁰

On first sight, the new strategy of dispersal could be viewed as an inappropriate policy for such a small group of legislators to pursue. Given their small numbers would it not have been wiser for black Congressmen to continue concentrating their efforts upon working within selected key committees? In 1974, most CBC members felt that it was more important to get black minority viewpoints on the record in as many standing committees as possible, particularly in the powerful committees, i.e. Appropriations, Ways and Means and Rules. It was asserted that for far too long many committees had drawn up legislation without taking the needs of minorities into consideration; even when minority interests had been considered they were 'represented' by white committee members. The new strategy would seek to insure that, at least, the black minority's voice was heard on every major legislative measure as it passed through the crucial committee 'marking-up' stage. To illustrate this point, Rep. Parren Mitchell explained his approach as a committee member when the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 was being considered by the Banking and Currency Committee. He was highly dissatisfied with the form of emerging legislation primarily because of its minimal position on the expansion of public housing programmes. In the committee sessions he argued the case for public housing in relation to the needs of many sectors of the black American community and the poor in general and presented twenty amendments. While all these amendments

failed to be adopted, Mitchell saw his function as putting these alternatives on the record. In the case of this particular bill, the Senate version contained a stronger public housing element, hence Mitchell emphasised that it was crucially important to state the case for the record, in his words;- "to create a legislative history in the hope that the conference committee will take up some of the amendments."²¹ Another factor arguing in favour of dispersal of the CBC membership in the committee structure was the dispersed nature of legislative authority in Congress, and the overlapping responsibility of several standing committees in major policy areas. These characteristics inherent to the committee system were developed further by the adoption of the sub-committee 'bill of rights' and other procedural reforms. In a legislature, therefore, where an increasing decentralisation of authority was taking place, the dispersal of the CBC membership would enable them, theoretically, to wield more influence. Reflecting on the effects of the dispersal strategy, Rep. Louis Stokes (CBC chairman in the 93rd Congress) in an interview in 1978, felt that the adoption of the strategy, occurring against the background of Democratic reforms, had given the CBC more influence because members had begun to occupy important positions and hence were able to adopt a coordinated effort on behalf of CBC legislative priorities at the various levels of committee consideration. He stated that, "We are in some key positions. So that when legislation comes before particular committees or sub-committees we can fight for it, we can attempt to explain it, and we can lobby for it. And this is what it is really about."²² As an example, it was suggested that CBC opposition to high military expenditure could be applied not only in the relevant standing committee, in this case Armed Services, but also the Appropriations, Budget and Rules Committees. While such anticipated coordination is certainly desirable, it can only be, in reality, a long term goal subject to increased black representation in Congress. In present

circumstances, the highly fragmented nature of the committee structure when coupled with the fact of the CBC's small membership will mean that such coordinated effort cannot extend across the full range of policy issues. The most immediate goal of the dispersal strategy, and that which at this early stage the success of the strategy should be measured, was to gain a foothold on the most powerful committees.

An examination of the committee assignments of CBC members in the 92nd Congress through to the 95th Congress demonstrates that the progress made in securing seats on important committees ^{was} has been impressive. Table 15 reveals that the number of CBC members seated on the three most powerful House Committees (Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Rules) had increased from a single member in the 92nd Congress (Louis Stokes, Appropriations) to five members in the 94th Congress (Yvonne Burke joined Stokes on Appropriations; Charles Rangel and Harold Ford, Ways and Means; Andrew Young, Rules). In addition, Louis Stokes and Parren Mitchell gained seats on the new Budget Committee established in the 94th Congress. All of the gains achieved in the 94th Congress were maintained in the 95th Congress; in particular, it should be noted that on Andrew Young's retirement from Congress to accept the appointment of US Ambassador to the United Nations, his seat on the Rules Committee was taken up by Shirley Chisholm. Table 15 demonstrates also the growth of the influence of CBC members in terms of the number of sub-committee chairmanships held, from two in the 92nd Congress to eleven in the 95th Congress. It is important to examine the two main CBC achievements that are shown in Table 15 (i.e. the securing of prestigious committee seats, and the increased sub-committee chairmanships) within the context of the changing congressional environment in which these advances were made.

Prestigious committee seats were obtained partly as a result of the implementation of the CBC's new strategy of encouraging its members

(continued on page 214)

TABLE 15

CBC CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP92nd - 95th CONGRESSES

CBC MEMBER	92ND CONGRESS (1971/2)	93RD CONGRESS (1973/4)
DELLUMS Cal 8th	FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	ARMED SERVICES DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA* (Sub-c on Education)
BURKE Cal 28th	-	INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, PUBLIC WORKS
HAWKINS Cal 29th	EDUCATION AND LABOUR, HOUSE ADMINISTRATION	EDUCATION AND LABOUR* (Sub-c on Equal Opportunities) HOUSE ADMINISTRATION
YOUNG Ga 5th	-	BANKING AND CURRENCY
METCALFE Ill. 1st	INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE	INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES
COLLINS Ill. 7th	-	GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
MITCHELL Md 7th	BANKING AND CURRENCY SELECT SMALL BUSINESS	BANKING AND CURRENCY SELECT SMALL BUSINESS
CONYERS Mich. 1st	JUDICIARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS	JUDICIARY* (sub-c on Crime) GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
DIGGS Mich 13th	DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FOREIGN AFFAIRS* (sub-c on Africa)	DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA** FOREIGN AFFAIRS* (sub-c on Africa)
CLAY Mo. 1st	EDUCATION AND LABOUR	EDUCATION AND LABOUR, POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
CHISHOLM NY 12th	EDUCATION AND LABOUR	EDUCATION AND LABOUR

CBC MEMBER	92nd CONGRESS	93rd CONGRESS
RANGEL NY 19th	PUBLIC WORKS, SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS SELECT CRIME INVESTIGATION	JUDICIARY DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SELECT CRIME INVESTIGATION
STOKES Ohio 21st	APPROPRIATIONS	APPROPRIATIONS
NIX Pa 2nd	FOREIGN AFFAIRS POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE* (sub-c on Postal Facilities and Mail)	FOREIGN AFFAIRS* (sub-c on Asian and Pacific Affairs) POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
FORD Tenn 8th	-	-
JORDAN Texan 18th	-	JUDICIARY
FAUNTROY DC delegate	DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA* (sub-c on Judiciary) BANKING AND CURRENCY
Total number of chairman- ships	Chairmanships = Nil Sub- Chairmen = 2	Chairmanships = 1 Sub- Chairmen = 6

* sub-committee chairmanship

** Committee chairmanship

CBC MEMBER	94th CONGRESS (1975/6)	95th CONGRESS (1977/8)
DELLUMS Cal. 8th	ARMED SERVICES DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA* (sub-c on Education, Labour and Social Services) SELECT INTELLIGENCE	ARMED SERVICES DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA* (sub-c on Fiscal and Government Affairs)
BURKE Cal. 28th	APPROPRIATIONS	APPROPRIATIONS SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
HAWKINS Cal. 29th	EDUCATION AND LABOUR* (sub-c on Equal Oppor- tunities) HOUSE ADMINISTRATION* (sub-c on Electrical and Mechanical Office Equipment)	EDUCATION AND LABOUR* (sub-c on Employment Opportuni- ties) HOUSE ADMINISTRATION* (sub-c on Printing) JOINT COMMITTEE ON PRINTING
YOUNG Ga. 5th	RULES	RESIGNED TO ACCEPT APPOINTMENT AS US AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS
METCALFE Ill 1st	INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES* (sub-c on Panama Canal)	INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES* (sub-c on Panama Canal) POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
COLLINS Ill. 7th	GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS* (sub-c on Manpower and Housing) INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL
MITCHELL Md. 7th	BANKING, CURRENCY AND HOUSING BUDGET	BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS* (sub-c on Domestic and Monetary Policy) BUDGET
CONYERS Mich. 1st	JUDICIARY* (sub-c on Crime) GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS	JUDICIARY* (sub-c on Crime) GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
DIGGS Mich. 13th	DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA** INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS* (sub-c on International Resources, Food and Energy)	DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA** INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS* (sub-c on Africa)

CBC MEMBER	94th CONGRESS (1975/6)	95th CONGRESS (1977/8)
CLAY Mo. 1st	EDUCATION AND LABOUR POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE* (sub-c on Employee Political Rights and Intergovernmental Programs)	EDUCATION AND LABOUR POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE* (sub-c on Civil Service)
CHISHOLM NY. 12th	EDUCATION AND LABOUR	RULES
RANGEL NY. 19th	WAYS AND MEANS	WAYS AND MEANS SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL HOUSE-SENATE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY
STOKES Ohio 21st	APPROPRIATIONS BUDGET	APPROPRIATIONS BUDGET SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS**
NIX Pa 2nd	INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS* (sub-c on International Economic Policy) POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE	INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE** (plus chairman of sub-c on Investigations)
FORD Tenn 8th	WAYS AND MEANS SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGEING	WAYS AND MEANS SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
JORDAN Texas 18th	JUDICIARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS	JUDICIARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
FAUNTROY DC delegate	DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA* (sub-c on Government Operations) BANKING, CURRENCY AND HOUSING	DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS* (sub-c on Historic Preservation and Coinage) SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
Total number of Chairmanships	Chairmanships = 1 Sub- Chairmen = 9	Chairmanships = 3 Sub- Chairmen = 11

* Sub-Committee Chairmanship

** Committee Chairmanship

to spread their forces throughout the committee structure. At the opening of the 94th Congress the CBC exerted its maximum effort to implement this policy successfully. Yvonne Burke decided to bid for a seat on Appropriations, while Andrew Young opted for a seat on the Rules Committee. Whereas Burke and Young volunteered for new assignments, Charles Rangel's decision to bid for a seat on Ways and Means was more a matter of circumstances rather than choice. There was a strong tradition of geographical balance in the membership of the Ways and Means Committee. When a member retired the rule held that a member from the same state should take up his seat. Hence, in late 1974 when Rep. Hugh Carey (D. NY 15th) retired to become Governor of New York, one of New York's two seats on Ways and Means became vacant. The CBC membership contained two New York members, Shirley Chisholm (NY 12th) and Charles Rangel (NY 19th), who were therefore eligible to fill the seat. In their current committee assignments both Chisholm and Rangel sat on standing committees on which two other CBC members were also present (i.e. Education and Labour, and Judiciary Committees). Both appeared to be suitable candidates for transfer under the new policy. However, on the Education and Labour Committee Chisholm tended to specialise, and oversee CBC interests, in education matters whereas her two CBC colleagues, Augustus Hawkins and William Clay, specialised in the fields of equal opportunity in employment, and labour legislation generally. Whereas on the Judiciary Committee there was not such a clear division of responsibilities and interests between Charles Rangel, John Conyers and Barbara Jordan. Consequently, Rangel was felt to be the appropriate candidate available to fill this major gap in CBC representation in the committee system. Rangel, as the new CBC Chairman who was responsible for the execution of the new strategy, found himself under considerable pressure from his colleagues to make the transfer to Ways and Means. Rangel accepted, but not with much enthusiasm, as evidenced by

the following extract from a report in the 'Congressional Quarterly', "When an opening developed for a New Yorker on Ways and Means in 1975, Rangel was prevailed upon to take it - even though he was far more interested in staying on the Judiciary Committee."²³ As Table 15 has demonstrated, all three bids were successful. It would be erroneous to conclude, though, that the success rested upon the use of the CBC new strategy alone. A major change in the congressional environment occurred which combined with the implementation of the CBC strategy to produce the desired results.

The 1974 congressional elections produced an overwhelming Democratic majority in the House of Representatives. Within the enlarged Democratic majority there were seventy-five new members. Elected to Congress in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, the vast majority of the new Democrats were reform-minded. Their presence created a political environment that was favourable to the passage of many major procedural reforms that had been devised by House liberals within the Democratic Study Group over several years. Most of the reforms were designed to weaken the seniority system, particularly in respect to the authority that seniority granted committee chairmen to act in defiance of the Democratic majority view, and to tilt the balance of power within the House to the advantage of the party leadership and the Democratic Caucus. When the 94th Congress Democratic Caucus held its first meeting five major procedural reforms were passed. These were, 1) the transfer of committee assignment authority from the Committee on Committees (Ways and Means Democratic members) to the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee, 2) the requirement that committee chairmen, and the powerful Appropriations sub-committee chairmen, be approved by secret ballot in the Democratic Caucus, 3) the granting to the Speaker the sole power to nominate Democratic members of the Rules Committee, 4) the dispersal of power to junior members of committees by

altering the procedures whereby committees establish sub-committees and assign sub-committee membership, and 5) the expansion of the size of the Ways and Means Committee from 25 to 37 members.²⁴ All of these adopted reforms assisted the CBC in its efforts to place members in positions of greater influence in the committee system. From the CBC's perspective, however, the most significant reform was the decision to shift the power of committee assignments away from Ways and Means members to the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee. The reform brought the process of committee assignments firmly under the control of the party leadership, subject to the approval of the Democratic Caucus, and ended the practice which had existed on the Committee on Committees whereby committee chairmen held major sway over whom was assigned to their committees. Black Representatives, as a permanent group within the Democratic majority given their safe seats, were liable to exercise more leverage with party leaders over committee assignments than they could ever have done with senior Democratic, often southern conservative, committee chairmen. The party leadership had already demonstrated in the 93rd Congress that they could be responsive to CBC ambitions regarding committee assignments, albeit under considerable pressure in the case of Rep. Dellums. Moreover, the major advantage to the CBC of the transfer of committee assignment authority to the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee was the fact that the CBC was represented on that body. As noted above, Rep. Parren Mitchell had served on the Committee in the 93rd Congress. CBC representation was continued in the 94th Congress when the Speaker, Carl Albert, nominated Reps. Ralph Metcalfe and Barbara Jordan to serve as committee members. Metcalfe and Jordan, therefore, participated in making decisions on committee assignments for the approval of the Democratic Caucus at the opening of the 94th Congress.

The securing of representation on the Steering and Policy

Committee was a major step for the CBC. However, under the new system of committee assignments, Representatives had still to gain the support of their state delegation before the nomination was passed to the Steering and Policy Committee. Rep. Yvonne Burke (D. Calif 28th) explained how the system worked when she sought the Appropriations Committee nomination, "I ran for the seat in my state Caucus. That was the way it was set up. You had first to get your state caucus by vote to approve your nomination. Then the senior California member would take it to the Steering Group. For each seat you may have two or three states competing. The Steering Committee made the final decision on who would get the seat."²⁵ Her statement illustrates that an important change had taken place at the nomination stage of the process. Whereas, in the past, Representatives seeking nominations were dependent upon winning the support of the senior member (the 'dean' of their state delegation), the nomination was now decided on a democratic rather than a seniority basis by a vote in the state delegation.²⁶ In the 94th Congress CBC members seeking to change their committee assignments had been particularly successful in winning majority votes in their state delegations; they had achieved this by drawing upon their experience in the House to call on the support of colleagues with whom they had established working relationships in the state caucus itself and/or informal groups such as DSG, and by lobbying amongst the sizeable contingent of new members. The latter group were perhaps the most important element in the equation in the 94th Congress, and, in the future, would assume greater significance in relation to the CBC's progress. As long as the current CBC members decided to continue to seek reelection from their safe constituencies, the increasingly high turnover in the House membership would have the effect of enhancing their influence in the committee system, and more importantly, their value to the party leadership.²⁷

From the 94th Congress onwards, therefore, a combination of factors accounted for the CBC's success in securing influential committee assignments. In summary, therefore, these factors were, (a) the CBC membership's decision to adopt a new strategy of dispersal rather than concentration within the committee system, and to encourage experienced members to seek assignment to prestigious committees; (b) the adoption by the Democratic Caucus of major procedural reforms, particularly the transference of committee assignment authority to the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee; (c) the cooperation of the Democratic party leadership in terms of nominating CBC members to the Steering and Policy Committee, and supporting CBC members requested committee assignments; (d) the security of tenure of CBC members in the House because of their safe seats, and hence their growing experience and party seniority; and (e) the high turnover in the House membership. All of these factors played a part in producing CBC members' committee gains, but not with equal weight. When asked to identify the two most important factors that had helped CBC members achieve influential positions in the committee system, Rep. Louis Stokes, without hesitation, replied as follows, "Firstly, the system for assignments is now different from the old system where the Committee on Committees had so much control over who was going to go on what committee. Under the old system you were more or less left in the hands of the powerful chairman of that committee. I think that the system is much more democratic now, and gives you much more opportunity. Secondly, we have had the complete cooperation of the Speaker of the House in terms of the kinds of assignments we have requested. In fact, he (Tip O'Neill) has always been extremely considerate; he and Carl Albert both have given us about everything we have wanted."²⁸

The evidence in Table 15 certainly demonstrates the correctness of Rep. Stokes' assessment. The Speaker, as chairman of the Democratic

Steering and Policy Group with half of its membership consisting of other key party leaders (i.e. the Majority Leader, and the chairman of the Democratic Caucus) and his appointees, exercised his full powers under the new procedural reforms in support of CBC requested assignments. Yvonne Burke's nomination to the Appropriations Committee was endorsed without any of the difficulties that had confronted Louis Stokes in his bid for an Appropriations seat in the 92nd Congress. Stokes had been successful, but only after appealing to the House leadership to overrule the intransigence of the senior Democrat who represented his region on the Committee on Committees and who refused to approve Stokes' nomination. The intervention on Stokes' behalf was the first occasion that the House leadership had assisted the CBC on committee assignment requests. Charles Rangel's appointment to the Ways and Means Committee, although it could not have happened without the House leadership's support, was aided more perhaps by another of the new procedural reforms, i.e. the substantial expansion of the Ways and Means membership. However, the fact that Rep. Harold Ford (the only black American 'freshman' in the 94th Congress) managed to gain a seat on Ways and Means later in the session was clear testimony to the willingness of the House Democratic leadership to give priority to granting CBC members favourable committee assignments. Rep. Ford (D. Tenn 8th) had been assigned originally to the Banking, Currency and Housing, and Veterans Affairs Committees, but became interested in Ways and Means Committee membership when fellow Tennessee Democrat Rep. Richard Fulton resigned and left a vacancy on the Committee. As Fulton had been the only Tennessee Democrat on the expanded Ways and Means Committee, Rep. Ford felt that, inspite of his being a 'freshman' member, the traditional factor of the maintenance of geographical balance on the Committee would work to his advantage. In any case, it was clearly a rare chance to gain a prestigious committee assignment, which was not to be

missed - as Ford's legislative aide remarked, "the opportunity arose, and he jumped on it."²⁹ The CBC, as a group, decided to support Ford's bid, and lobbied for his nomination with the House leadership and within their respective state delegations. The latter exercise was important. The views of other state delegations remained a factor in committee assignments because half of the Democratic Steering and Policy Group membership consisted of elected 'geographical zone' representatives, and hence some support from them was needed to gain a majority vote. Rep. Ford campaigned amongst his own state delegation and southern Democratic members of the Ways and Means Committee to convince them that, if appointed to the Committee, he would attach equal weight to representing Southern and black American interests, and that these interests were not necessarily mutually exclusive. In normal circumstances the odds against a 'freshman' member gaining a seat on Ways and Means, Appropriations or Rules Committees were high, although the situation was improving with the recent growth in the turnover of House membership.³⁰ Ford's success suggested, therefore, that the CBC had gained considerable influence with the House leadership.

The most convincing evidence which pointed to the political clout that the CBC had developed with the House Democratic leaders was the appointment of Rep. Andrew Young to the Rules Committee. Young was placed in one of the two vacant seats by the Speaker, who was exercising his newly-acquired sole power to nominate Democratic members of the Rules Committee. The CBC had attached highest priority to lobbying for a Rules Committee seat because representation there would enable CBC members to be involved directly in the key stages of the development and scheduling of the Democratic leadership's legislative agenda. In recent years, the Rules Committee had begun to work closely with the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee in the programming of the legislative agenda. With

representation on both Committees, therefore, black Congressmen would be able to lobby for the consideration of CBC legislative priorities throughout the development of the Democratic legislative agenda. When Andrew Young resigned from Congress in early 1977, the CBC was particularly anxious that another member from their ranks should succeed him in this strategic position. Rep. Shirley Chisholm (D. NY 12th) came forward as the CBC nominee for the seat. Chisholm had decided to move from the Education and Labour Committee, where she had served for three terms, because she had been unable to obtain a firm commitment from the chairman, Rep. Carl Perkins (D. Ky 7th) that she would gain a sub-committee chairmanship. The CBC supported Chisholm's bid and the seat was secured with little difficulty. The fact that the new Speaker, Rep. Tip O'Neill (D. Mass 8th) was prepared to nominate Chisholm to the Rules Committee seat suggests that the CBC may have gained a permanent position on that Committee. Throughout her career in Congress, Rep. Chisholm had been one of the most unpredictable and independent CBC members from the perspective of the Democratic leadership. Many Democrats found her strident, independent political style unpalatable; for example, a senior Democrat on the Education and Labour Committee, in an interview, expressed the following, not uncommon, view of her legislative behaviour, "It's too polite to call her a maverick." However, in the early days of a new Democratic Administration which had acknowledged the crucial role that the black American vote had played in its electoral success, most Democrats were reluctant to vote against Chisholm's nomination, and be seen to oppose the wishes of one of the few black Representatives of President Carter's 'key' constituency. Naturally, as part of their campaign within the House for Chisholm's nomination to the Rules Committee, CBC members were not at a loss to remind their Democratic colleagues of the impact of the black vote in the 1976 elections. The appointment of Shirley Chisholm to the Rules Committee was a watershed for the CBC because it demonstrated

that, acting as a united group and as representatives of a significant national constituency, they now possessed sufficient influence with the House Democratic leadership to place even their most outspoken, and independent members in important Committee positions. Although the Rules Committee under recent chairmen has abandoned the independent role that it had performed under the chairmanship of Rep. Howard Smith (D. Va) and now works closely with the Speaker, Rep. Chisholm as a Rules Committee member has not moderated her maverick style in favour of partisanship. For example, in 1977, she was part of a minority on the Rules Committee who opposed Speaker O'Neill's plans for the composition of the Ethics Committee to be set up to investigate South Korean Government payments to Congressmen by insisting upon an equally balanced bipartisan membership for the special committee. Chisholm, while keen to be a member of an important committee that worked closely with the House leadership, did not intend to become a loyal supporter of the House leadership. This independent attitude was representative of the manner in which the vast majority of CBC members approached their committee work.

With the goal of representation on all major House Committees achieved, CBC members adopted the role of acting as spokesmen for black minority viewpoints on issues relevant to their respective committee jurisdictions. Those members whose route to Congress had been through Democratic party 'regular' channels, Rep. Diggs, Hawkins, Metcalfe, Collins, Jordan, were as willing to accept this role as their colleagues from a 'civil rights' background. Only Rep. Nix tended to eschew the role if he could. An important outcome of the performance of this role was that other Democratic members came to recognise and accept the value of the black minority perspective to their committee work. For example, when questioned on the role of the CBC within the congressional Democratic party, Rep. Frank Thompson (D. NJ 4th) emphasised the importance of

their members' lobbying for black interests, and stating black minority viewpoints in the committee system. In his view, it was an effective tactic for the CBC to have a member in each committee as a point of contact for other Democrats. As a member of the Education and Labour Committee, Rep. Thompson indicated that he valued fellow committee member, Rep. Augustus Hawkins, as his main linkpoint to CBC viewpoints; he stated, "Whenever I want to know the black viewpoint, I talk to Hawkins."³¹ In addition to acting as spokesmen for black minority viewpoints in the committee system, from the 95th Congress onwards CBC members served as chairmen of a set of independent CBC sub-committees which met periodically to consult with black American policy advisers and interested parties in order to formulate CBC positions on legislative needs. The CBC independent sub-committee chairmanships were filled by those members who possessed the relevant standing committee expertise. An examination of Table 15 (95th Congress, CBC standing committee assignments) in conjunction with Table 14 in Chapter 6 (CBC independent sub-committees) demonstrates how each CBC sub-committee jurisdiction was tailored to fit individual CBC members' standing committee expertise and interests. The integration of these two roles was designed to emphasise further the independence of the CBC's approach to its standing committee work, and its attitude to the Democratic leadership.

The CBC's campaign for representation throughout the committee structure had included also the work of House Select Committees. Select Committees are set up usually for specific investigative tasks, on the basis of a majority vote on a House resolution. Select Committee membership is decided upon by the Rules Committee on the advice of the House leadership. CBC members have been successful in lobbying for representation on the major Select Committees that have been established since the 94th Congress. Rep. Ronald Dellums was appointed as a member of the Select

Committee on Intelligence (94th Congress), which was charged with investigating the activities of the CIA, and Rep. Charles Rangel as a member of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control (95th Congress). In both cases, the nominations were accepted on the grounds that the substantive issues that would be involved in the investigations were relevant to the specialised interests that each legislator had developed as CBC members and as members of standing committees. Rangel's appointment, for example, was made in recognition of his long-standing concern over the drug addiction problem and its impact in black American communities particularly in his own constituency of Harlem, New York City.³²

Over and above the securing of these individual assignments to select committees, the major achievement of the CBC in acting as a group lobby on behalf of black American interests in the committee system was the establishment of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (to investigate the deaths of President J F Kennedy, and Martin Luther King Jr) at the beginning of the 95th Congress. Not only had the CBC been the prime motivating force behind the Select Committee's establishment but also its strong commitment to a full investigation of the circumstances surrounding King's murder saved the Committee from an early demise when its chairman, Rep. Henry B Gonzalez (D. Tex. 20th), and chief counsel, Richard Sprague, engaged in a heated, and much-publicised, dispute over the scope, direction, and staffing requirements of the investigations. The dispute had seriously disrupted the Committee's early meetings, and as a result the House membership became sceptical of the value of the investigations and voted to end the committee's life after two months unless, in the meantime, the difficulties were resolved and the committee had proved its worth. The prevailing scepticism was not shared by CBC members, four of whom had been appointed as committee members.³³ The CBC viewpoint was reflected in a statement made by select committee member Harold Ford after

the House vote, he said, "I'm concerned about the committee continuing the investigations, which are more important than any personalities involved. If Gonzalez and Sprague can't get together, maybe we don't need either of them."³⁴ On the basis of this argument that the importance of the inquiry, particularly to black Americans, outweighed the damage caused by the internal bickerings between Gonzalez and Sprague, the CBC managed to persuade the House leadership and a majority of House members that the select committee should be placed under the chairmanship of CBC member Rep. Louis Stokes, and given a two year budget. In late March 1977, in fact during the week that its life was due to expire, the House approved (by a 230 - 181 vote) the new proposal to reprove the Select Committee. (In the interim period Rep. Gonzalez had resigned his committee membership, and the chief counsel, Richard Sprague, had been replaced). Discussing the CBC operation of salvaging the select committee from near self-destruction, the new chairman, Rep. Louis Stokes, summarised the case that he had presented to the Speaker and the House membership in support of the continuance of the select committee's work, "I think that the key to it was that I was able to convince the House that what had happened between Gonzalez and Sprague was not at all the reflection of any material disarray amongst the other members of the committee, and that we were not really participants in it. I was able to convince them, by the way we began to put the Committee into a posture of being reliable, responsible and professional, that we had a serious mandate to perform and that the American people wanted this investigation completed, and that the House had the responsibility to do so."³⁵ He explained that he had also spoken of his hopes for the outcome of the investigation, as follows, "Basically, what we are trying to do is to put to bed many of the rumours and theories, by way of a thorough, professional investigation."³⁶ In this latter respect, the investigations mounted under Stokes' chairmanship

proved to be rather unsatisfactory. Although the Select Committee was commended for conducting a highly competent, thorough investigation, the Committee Report, published in the Spring, 1979, raised more major questions relating to the circumstances of the assassinations than it provided answers.

The CBC's influence within the Congressional Democratic Party, particularly in relation to its ability to secure important committee positions, had grown significantly, therefore, by the 95th Congress. The above-mentioned factors that contributed to the CBC's success in committee assignments also accounted for the other main achievement that was demonstrated in Table 15, *ie.* the increased number of sub-committee chairmanships held by CBC members. Of most importance, however, were the 1973-5 House sub-committee reforms adopted by the Democratic Caucus. The reforms removed the authority to select sub-committee chairmen, and to determine sub-committee jurisdictions from the committee chairman to the committee membership as a whole, and established a bidding procedure that was weighted to open up sub-committee chairmanships to less senior members. Table 15 reveals that after the adoption of the first wave of reforms, the 1973 sub-committee 'bill of rights' (93rd Congress), the number of sub-committee chairmanships held by CBC members trebled from two to six. The growth of CBC-held sub-committee chairmanships has continued, consequent upon later reforms, but not at such a rapid pace; in the 95th Congress CBC members occupied eleven sub-committee chairmanships out of a total number of 146. On first examination, it might be concluded that the rapid growth in the number of CBC-held sub-committee chairmanships indicated that the legislative power of CBC members in the committee system had increased substantially. While certainly the eleven sub-committee chairmanships has meant some increased authority in the committee system, their acquisition has to be seen in the context of the recent extensive growth

in the overall number of sub-committees, and the effects of the 1970's Democratic reforms in terms of accelerating the process of the decentralisation of congressional power. By 1973 the number of sub-committees of House standing committees had reached 125. Given that the 93rd Congress contained 243 Democrats, this meant that, on average, one in every two Democrats was a chairman of a House sub-committee. The 16 member CBC, therefore, with six sub-committee chairmanships and one committee chairmanships was in a worse than average position in the 93rd Congress. Furthermore, the major Democratic procedural reforms of the 1970's had not only had the centripetal effect of strengthening the hand of the House Democratic leadership in many spheres of congressional authority (eg. in the sphere of committee assignments, which, as has been shown above, worked to the CBC's advantage), but also had released a strong centrifugal force by the dispersal of congressional power to sub-committees. The recent literature on Congress has concluded that, on balance, the innate tendency towards the decentralisation of power within the House has been strengthened rather than weakened by the 1970's Democratic procedural reforms.³⁷ In the context of these changes, the sub-committee chairmanship gains made by the CBC members were not as significant as they might at first appear. While the number of sub-committees, and their power and authority have increased substantially, the CBC have gained only a relatively small proportion of these chairmanships, and hence these gains have not constituted a major advance in terms of legislative authority for the CBC as a group. Nevertheless, the Committee and sub-committee chairmanships have provided the majority of CBC members with their first opportunity to exercise a measure of congressional power. In the next chapter (Chapter 8) a legislative case study will examine how CBC members used their newly-acquired positions of authority within the committee system in conjunction with the CBC legislative strategy to forward the group's policy goals.

Before proceeding to the legislative case study, some attention needs to be given to the CBC members' voting behaviour. It has been argued above that the CBC's influence with the House Democratic leadership had grown because the latter had recognised that Black Congressmen, given the safety of their district seats, had become a permanent force within the congressional Democratic party. As in all aspects of congressional life, the spirit of reciprocity had governed this developing relationship between the House Democratic leadership and the CBC. Improved committee assignments and seats on key party committees were gained partly also because Democratic party leaders could usually count upon the CBC as a reliable bloc of votes in support of mainstream Democratic legislative issues. On most House roll-call votes the CBC voted in agreement with the northern urban liberal wing of the congressional Democratic party. When interviewed, CBC members always acknowledged this fact. But, the point was emphasised constantly that the CBC as a group was committed to taking an independent position on issues of major importance to the black American minority. Rep. Ronald Dellums made this point, as follows, "There are only 16 of us, and only 15 can vote. And there are over 25 million blacks, and so, whether we want to be or not, we, in effect, speak for a national constituency, or at least we speak for issues that affect that national constituency."³⁸ The vast majority of CBC members argued that they were prepared to use their bloc of votes in whatever way possible to advance black American issues. In the light of the small number of votes held by the CBC as a group, there were only two conceivable methods that they could employ to maximise the impact of their bloc vote. Firstly, the CBC could try to identify legislative measures pending House floor action on which their bloc vote could be the margin of victory or defeat, and to proceed to 'trade' a reciprocal arrangement with those members interested in the passage of the particular measures; as the

price for CBC votes, those members would agree to support another measure of key interest to the CBC. The other method had more of a symbolic rather than practical value. The method amounted to simply using their bloc vote as a protest vote on behalf of the black American minority, i.e. to vote consistently for black American interests whether or not this meant breaking ranks with the Democratic majority, or the urban liberal wing of the party, and perhaps jeopardising the passage of a major part of the Democratic legislative agenda.

The first method has been employed by the CBC, but has met with very limited success. Basically, the method of vote-trading has not been a viable option for the CBC because there have not been enough instances where 15 or 16 votes could be influential. Since the establishment of the CBC, there have only been a few roll call votes where the CBC votes have constituted the margin of victory for a major legislative measure, but in these cases CBC votes have not been cast as part of a vote-trading reciprocal arrangement. For example, in 1971, the House voted 217 - 204 for an amendment to halt further funds for the development of the prototype supersonic transport aircraft (SST).³⁹ According to Rep. William Clay, the CBC as a group were undecided on the issue, and their votes were courted constantly by proponents and opponents of SST. Eventually, CBC members reached a decision and cast 10 votes in favour of the amendment. The ten votes were crucial; if they had been cast against the amendment, it would have been defeated. The CBC had twelve members at the time of the SST vote, but was unable to cast a unanimous vote. Rep. Clay explained the reason for the lack of unity, as follows, "Two members had some vested interest in their district, and we could understand this. In Gus Hawkins' district the planes were going to be built! So we could understand him going the other way."⁴⁰ Situations of this nature which provide an informal group of legislators with the

opportunity to exercise the balance of power are rare indeed. In most instances, CBC votes are committed firmly for or against a pending roll-call, and hence the group possesses no flexibility to act as a broker.

On the whole, CBC members, when asked to provide other examples similar to the SST vote, acknowledged that the opportunities for the effective use of their bloc vote on the House floor were limited. Nevertheless, most CBC members were optimistic that their bloc vote could be used to greater effect within the Democratic Caucus. Subsequently, in an interview with 'Congressional Quarterly', CBC member Rep. Parren Mitchell has claimed that the CBC's votes had been crucial in the 1975 Democratic Caucus vote of 101 - 100 in favour of ending the military draft.⁴¹ The potential impact of the CBC bloc vote on legislative resolutions taken within the Democratic Caucus was not able to be tested fully, however, because in mid-1975 the Democratic Caucus abandoned its temporary intervention into the field of legislative policy-making in the face of opposition from House leaders and committee chairmen who disliked the Caucus usurping their legislative authority.⁴² From available evidence of Democratic Caucus voting on legislative resolutions in 1975, it would appear that the closeness of the Vote on the military draft cited by Rep. Mitchell was exceptional. In April, 1975, the 'Congressional Quarterly' disclosed two Democratic Caucus votes on controversial resolutions; the Green (Pa.) and Wilson (Texas) resolution directing the Democratic members of the Rules Committee to vote for a rule allowing two amendments dealing with the oil depletion allowance to be offered to the Tax-Reform Act of 1975 when the bill reached the House floor (Adopted 152 - 99), and the Carr (Mich.) resolution expressing the opposition of the Caucus to any further military assistance to South Vietnam or Cambodia in fiscal year 1975 (Adopted 189 - 49)⁴³. On both of these resolutions, the CBC bloc of 17 votes did not constitute the margin of victory (or defeat).⁴⁴ In

the case of the Green resolution, the CBC had cast a united vote in favour of the resolution, and on the Carr resolution all but one CBC member voted in favour (Rep. Barbara Jordan dissented). While the Democratic Caucus has tended to move away from direct voting on legislative policies, it has maintained an important indirect influence over legislative policy-making by its authority to select and approve committee Chairmen and committee assignments generally. The CBC might be able to play a crucial role in a closely-run competition for a committee chairmanship, and hence have an impact on legislative policy by pledging its bloc vote to the candidate who declared himself in support of a particular CBC priority legislative measure that would fall within his committee's jurisdiction.

The CBC has had one major success with vote trading, which occurred in 1973 when Rep. William Clay negotiated a reciprocal arrangement with conservative southern Democrats whereby CBC support for the farm subsidy programme was exchanged for southern Democratic support of minimum wage legislation and appropriations legislation that, inter alia, kept alive the Office of Equal Opportunity (OEO) for a further year. Minimum wage legislation was viewed as a major civil rights issue from the CBC perspective because minorities were used traditionally as cheap labour, and many remained outside trade unions whose membership were paid usually at or above the proposed minimum wage. Rep. Clay had been highly involved in drafting the minimum wage legislation as a member of the Education and Labour Committee; he had been asked by his CBC colleagues to take the lead in conducting the negotiations. He explained how the vote-trading operated, as follows, "We viewed the minimum wage bill as being a very essential issue for our constituencies . . . In developing the minimum wage bill we brought in an additional 7 million people who had formerly not been covered by minimum wages,

and included in that 7 million were approximately 1½ million domestic workers. These were the people who had been making, on average, between 60-70 cents an hour, and we now have them covered under the \$2.30 an hour minimum wage bill. In our efforts to secure the necessary votes to pass the bill, and also to ensure we had enough votes to override a Presidential veto, we made a bargain with influential members of the Southern Democratic bloc. And that bargain was that in exchange for their votes to support the OEO poverty programmes and the minimum wage bill, we would support them on the key provisions of the agricultural bill which was in real trouble, and they knew it was in trouble. They knew that they were not going to be able to get the subsidies for their constituencies So it was a fairly even exchange as we saw it."⁴⁵ While undoubtedly the CBC took a leading role in conducting negotiations with Southern Democrats, the 1973 vote-trading on minimum wage / OEO funds / farm subsidies could not have succeeded on the basis of CBC votes alone. An increasing number of urban liberal Democrats were opposed to the farm subsidy programme, and their numbers by 1973 were sufficient to pose a real threat to the renewal of the programme. Rep. Clay's success in negotiating the vote-trading with leading Southern Democrats, Rep. W R Poage (Tex. 11th) and Rep. Otto Passman (La 5th) was rooted in the fact of the latter's awareness that Clay had the full backing of the urban liberal wing of the congressional Democratic party. An examination of the key vote (i.e. the Michel amendment) on the 1973 Farm Programme Extension legislation (HR 8860) reveals that farm crop subsidies were saved by a large Northern Democratic vote, of which CBC members formed a part but not a crucial part.⁴⁶ The CBC's claim, as expressed by Rep. Clay, of a great victory over the vote-trading on farm subsidies has, therefore, to be heavily qualified. The CBC bloc vote is simply too small to be the decisive factor in determining

the outcome of roll-call votes on major legislative issues.

On the vast majority of House roll-calls, CBC bloc votes play a symbolic rather than effective role. CBC members recognise this fact but, at the same time, emphasise that the symbolic role of CBC bloc voting should not be undervalued. In their view, CBC bloc voting, particularly on issues of importance to black Americans, demonstrates to their local constituencies and the black American minority as a whole that the CBC is prepared to act independently on their behalf. In their voting behaviour they believe that they represent black American interests better than white Congressmen. In particular, CBC members argue that many white Congressmen whose districts contain sizeable black populations are unresponsive in their voting behaviour to the needs of their black constituents. CBC members, who represent high density black population districts, claim that they serve their black constituents' needs more consistently than their white colleagues from similar districts. Tables 16 and 17 attempt to test the validity of this claim by analysing how frequently the CBC managed to vote as a bloc on legislative issues of major importance to black Americans, and how the voting behaviour of white Congressmen who represented sizeable black constituencies compared with that of CBC members. Twenty House roll-call votes were selected from 94th Congress, first session (1975) as the basis for the voting study. The choice of the twenty roll-call votes was determined by reference to the CBC legislative agenda for 1975, which listed legislative issues of priority to black Americans in the pending session. The 1975 legislative agenda was the first of what were to become annual CBC formal statements of legislative goals and activities in each session.⁴⁷ The vast majority of the priority legislative issues identified in the 1975 agenda never reached the House floor for a roll-call vote. Hence, the twenty roll-call votes chosen for the study constitute a comprehensive

collection of House key votes on legislative issues of both major and minor importance to the CBC agenda in the 94th Congress, first session. Within the twenty votes, the most important from the CBC perspective were those that related to the renewal of the 1965 voting rights legislation, the reduction of military expenditure, and tax reform (for details of each roll-call vote, see below).

Table 16 examines the voting behaviour of CBC members on the twenty key votes on issues of major importance in the CBC legislative agenda. The table demonstrates clearly that the CBC, in its first year of announcing a formal statement of legislative goals, achieved a high level of group unity on key votes. Exactly one half of the CBC membership voted consistently in agreement with the CBC group position. While five members dissented from the CBC position only once, and three members dissented more than once. The highest level of dissent was registered by Rep. Barbara Jordan, who voted against the group position on four occasions. The impressive level of group unity that Table 16 reveals was achieved without the application of a formal whip system. This had been considered to be unnecessary because it was expected that, as had occurred in past years, CBC members' votes on key black American issues would be drawn together naturally by shared constituency interests. It had always been recognised that, under this informal system, an occasional split vote would occur. An elaborate system of formal consultation before each week's votes was a too high price to pay, in terms of members' and staffs' time, to ensure total group unity. Most members were reconciled to the fact that the occasional split vote was inevitable given the normal pressures of congressional life. Rep. Ronald Dellums acknowledged this fact as follows "From time to time we split. I think that where we split on a few issues, had we had the time and the opportunity to come together to discuss the vote prior to the time that the bill came

(continued on page 240)

TWENTY HOUSE ROLL CALLS ON ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE CBC LEGISLATIVE
AGENDA. 94TH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION (1975)

- VOTE 1 Tax Reductions (HR 2166). Green (D Pa) amendment to repeal the 22% depletion allowance on oil and gas income retroactive to Jan. 1st 1975
- Adopted 248 - 163: R 44 - 94; D 204 - 69 (ND 172 - 17;
SD 32 - 52) 27/2/75
- CBC = FOR
- VOTE 2 Defence Dept. Procurement Authorizations (HR 6674). Aspin (D Wis) amendment to delete a \$1.89 billion authorization in the bill for initial procurement of the B1 bomber.
- Rejected 164 - 227: R 23 - 110; D 141 - 117 (ND 126 - 49;
SD 15 - 68) 19/5/75
- CBC = FOR
- VOTE 3 Defence Dept. Procurement Authorizations (HR 6674)
Dellums (D Calif) amendment to reduce US forces stationed overseas by 70,000 by Sept. 30, 1976
- Rejected 95 - 311: R 9 - 127; D 86 - 134 (ND 80 - 104;
SD 6 - 80) 20/5/75
- CBC = FOR
- VOTE 4 Voting Rights Act Amendments (HR 6219) Wiggins (R Calif) amendment in the form of a substitute bill to apply coverage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, to jurisdictions where minority groups comprised more than 5% of population and where less than 50% of minority voters cast ballots in the previous general election, to strengthen Justice Department authority to approve states' election laws and to extend those protections through 1987.
- Rejected 134 - 269: R 83 - 52; D 51 - 217 (ND 4 - 185;
SD 47 - 32) 3/6/75
- CBC = AGAINST
- VOTE 5 Voting Rights Act Amendments (HR 6219) McClory (R Ill) amendment to delete Title II of the bill that would expand protections of the Voting Rights Act to Spanish - speaking Americans and other language minorities.
- Rejected 104 - 305: R 53 - 84; D 36 - 234 (ND 7 - 182;
SD 29 - 52) 3/6/75
- CBC = AGAINST

- VOTE 6 Fair Trade Repeal (HR 6971) Jordan (D Texas) motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill to repeal federal anti-trust exemptions for state 'fair trade' laws that allowed manufacturers to set the retail prices of their products. A two-thirds majority vote (261 in this case) is required for passage under suspension of the rules.
Motion agreed to 380 - 11: R 123 - 8; D 257 - 3 (ND 183 - 2; SD 74 - 1) 21/7/75

CBC = FOR
- VOTE 7 Consumer Product Safety Commission Authorization (HR 6844) McClory (R Ill) amendment to allow the commission to regulate defective firearms and ammunition and labeling on firearms and ammunition.
Rejected 80 ; 339: R 5 - 135; D 75 - 204 (ND 69 - 125; SD 0 - 79) 29/7/75

CBC = FOR
- VOTE 8 Drug Abuse Prevention (HR 8150) Carter (R Ky) amendment to eliminate provisions in the bill which would extend the life of the White House Office of Drug Abuse Prevention through June 30, 1976.
Rejected 167 - 235: R 114 - 19; D 53 - 216 (ND 14 - 171; SD 39 - 45) 11/9/75

CBC = AGAINST
- VOTE 9 Energy Conservation and Oil Policy (HR 7014). Separate vote, as requested by Bauman (R. Md), on the Collins (R. Texas) amendment to prohibit the use of gasoline or diesel-fuel-powered vehicles to transport school children, other than one's own, to public schools other than the appropriate grade school closest to the student's home in his school district.
Adopted 204 - 201: R 95 - 44; D 109 - 157 (ND 48 - 138; SD 61 - 19) 23/9/75

CBC = AGAINST
- VOTE 10 Rhodesian Chrome (HR 1287) Passage of the bill to amend the UN Participation Act of 1945 and bring the US into compliance with the UN-sponsored economic boycott of Rhodesia, thus halting the further importation of Rhodesian chrome.
Rejected 187 - 209: R 22 - 108; D 165 - 101 (ND 150 - 34; SD 15 - 67) 25/9/75

CBC = FOR
- VOTE 11 Defence Appropriations, Fiscal 1976 (HR 9861) Stokes (D. Ohio) amendment to add \$5 million to the bill for army recruiting counseling services
Rejected 112 - 296: R 22 - 119; D 90 - 177; (ND 76 - 109; SD 14 - 68) 30/9/75

CBC = FOR

VOTE 12

Defence Dept Appropriations, Fiscal 1976 (HR 9861)
 Passage of the bill appropriating \$90,219,045,000 for the
 Department of Defence for fiscal 1976 and \$21,674,571,000
 for the budget transition period, July - September 1976,
 for Department of Defence activities and all armed services
 and weapons programmes.

Passed 353 - 61 R 142 - 2; D 21 - 59 (ND 128 - 58; SD 83 - 1)
 2/10/75

CBC = AGAINST

VOTE 13

Federal Employees' Political Activities (HR 8617)
 Passage of the bill to give federal employees the right to
 participate in partisan political campaigns and to run for
 local, state or federal office.

Passed 288 - 119 R 49 - 93; D 239 - 26 (ND 180 - 5;
 SD 59 - 21) 21/10/75

CBC = FOR

VOTE 14

Agency for Consumer Protection (HR 7575) Passage of the
 bill to create an independent Agency for Consumer Protection
 to coordinate federal consumer protection activities and
 represent consumer interests before other federal agencies
 and the courts.

Passed 208 - 199: R 20 - 119; D 188 - 80 (ND 160 - 25; SD 28 - 55)
 6/11/75

CBC = FOR

VOTE 15

Federal Enclave (HR 10041). Ketchum (R. Calif) amendment,
 in the nature of a substitute for the bill, to retain federal
 control over certain areas of the District of Columbia where
 federal offices were located and to delegate to the President
 authority to appoint an official within the federal government
 to serve as director of the National Capitol Service Area,
 which had authority over the federal enclave.

Adopted 201 - 150: R 105 - 14 D 96 - 136 (ND 40 - 124;
 SD 56 - 12) 10/11/75

CBC = AGAINST

VOTE 16

Fiscal 1976 Budget (H Con 466) Adoption of the budget reso-
 lution, as amended, to set ceilings of \$374.9 billion on
 fiscal 1976 outlays and \$409 billion on budget authority;
 set a floor of \$301.8 billion on revenues and \$73.1 billion
 as the budget deficit and \$620.5 billion as the public debt.

Adopted 225 - 191: R 11 - 124; D 214 - 67 (ND 162 - 31;
 SD 52 - 36) 12/11/75

CBC = FOR

VOTE 17

Community Action Programmes (HR 8578) Passage of the bill to increase the federal share of funding for community action programmes serving the poor to 80% through fiscal 1977.

Passed 244 - 172: R 36 - 103; D 208 - 69 (ND 170 - 24; SD 38 - 45) 19/11/75

CBC = FOR

VOTE 18

Tax Revision (HR 10612) Karth (D. Minn) amendment to shorten to three years from five years the grace period provided in provisions limiting the amount of export income by a domestic international sales corporation eligible for deferral of federal taxes.

Rejected 199 - 223: R 5 - 136 D 194 - 87 (ND 163 - 29; SD 31 - 58) 4/12/75

CBC = FOR

VOTE 19

Labour - HEW Appropriations, Fiscal 1976 (HR 8069) Question on whether the House should concur in the Senate amendment to prohibit HEW from using, directly or indirectly, any funds in the bill to require school districts to bus students beyond the school closest to their homes for the purpose of school integration

Senate amendment concurred in 260 - 146: R 112 - 24 D 148 - 122 (ND 75 - 109; SD 73 - 13) 4/12/75

CBC = AGAINST

VOTE 20

Inter-American Development Bank (HR 9721) Passage of the bill to authorize \$2.25 billion as the US share of the replenishment of the Inter-American Dev. Bank and to authorize participation up to \$25 million in the African Dev. Fund

Passed 249 - 166: R 70 - 70; D 179 - 96 (ND 148 - 45; SD 31 - 51) 9/12/75

CBC = FOR

STATE AND CD	CBC MEMBER	% BLACK POPU	VOTES																				% SUP CBC	% OPP CBC	% ABSENT	KEY
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20				
Cal 8th	DELLUMS	21	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	95	5	0	+ voted or paired for - voted or paired against 0 absent
Cal 28th	BURKE	40	+	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	95	5	0	
Cal 29th	HAWKINS	59	+	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	85	15	0	
Ga 5th	YOUNG	44	+	+	+	-	-	0	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	95	0	5	
Ill 1st	METCALFE	88	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	100	0	0	0 absent
Ill 7th	COLLINS	54	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	100	0	0	
Md 7th	MITCHELL	74	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	100	0	0	
Mich 1st	CONYERS	70	+	+	+	-	-	0	+	-	-	+	+	-	0	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	85	5	10	
Mich 13th	DIGGS	65	+	0	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	90	5	5	
Mo 1st	CLAY	54	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	100	0	0	
NY 12th	CHISHOLM	77	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	100	0	0	
NY 19th	RANGEL	58	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	100	0	0	
Ohio 21st	STOKES	66	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	100	0	0	
Pa 2nd	NIX	65	+	0	0	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	85	5	10	
Tenn 8th	FORD	47	+	+	+	-	-	0	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	-	+	80	10	10	
Texas 18th	JORDAN	41	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	-	-	+	75	20	5	
CBC	GROUP POSITION*		+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+				

to the floor, I think we could have worked out accommodation to each other. It's interesting, because we are called on to be super-human when no other members of Congress are."⁴⁸

Even if a formal whip system had been applied and members had had adequate time for full consultations, it was unlikely that total group unity could be achieved. Although a united CBC vote rested generally upon shared constituency interests, paradoxically the occasional split vote resulted from a conflicting local interest on the part of one or two CBC members. On the whole, CBC members perceive their role as representatives in similar terms to those expressed by Rep. Yvonne Burke in a fieldwork interview in 1978. "I have three constituencies. But my first constituency is the one that elects me. I am answerable to them first of all. They are my first priority. My second priority is to answer to the black constituency, and then there is the national constituency and I am answerable to them. But first of all I wouldn't be here if I didn't answer the people who sent me here. And really my first responsibility is to respond to their needs."⁴⁹ The application of Rep. Burke's approach in terms of voting behaviour leads to the level of dissent displayed in Table 16. On most roll-calls the strength of shared constituency interests on the issues results in a united vote, but occasionally an overriding special local interest divorces one or two members from the CBC group position. In Table 16 the majority of the dissenting votes can be explained by the overriding importance of local interests. Of the twenty votes there were six on which a minor split in the CBC ranks appeared (i.e. Votes 1 - 2, 7, 12, 16 and 18). On Vote 1 Rep. Jordan was the only dissenting member; she deferred to local state interests, keeping in line with other Texas Democrats and voting against the repeal of the oil depletion allowance.⁵⁰ In the case of Vote 2, the amendment to delete funds for the initial development of the B1 bomber,

Reps Burke and Hawkins voted against the CBC group position on the grounds of the potentially serious effect of the measure, if passed, on the employment opportunities of their constituents (Lockheed Corporation was a major employer in both of their Los Angeles constituencies). For similar employment reasons, Rep. Hawkins voted against the mild regulations for gun sales proposed in Vote 7. Reps. Ford and Jordan were the two other CBC members to join with Hawkins in dissenting from the group position on Vote 7. In their cases, they refused to break ranks with their state delegations who were opposed solidly to the measure (even liberal Democrat, Bob Eckhardt, kept in line with his Texas colleagues on this vote). Interestingly, the only other CBC member elected from a Southern district, Rep. Andrew Young (Ga 5th) was not as concerned about the sensitivities of his white colleagues on this issue as were Jordan and Ford. Not only was Young the only Southern CBC member to vote for the McClory amendment (Vote 7), but he was also the only Georgian Representative to do so. In the case of Vote 18, Rep. Jordan demonstrated again that she intended to keep rank with her conservative Democratic Texas colleagues on issues that she viewed as marginal to black American interests. On this vote, Jordan was the only CBC member who was opposed to stricter tax controls on domestic corporations' overseas earnings.

The remaining two CBC split votes, ~~ie~~ Votes 12 and 16, cannot be explained by reference to strong state or local interests on the part of one or two members, but appear to indicate a disagreement on group policy within the CBC. A major point of principle enunciated in the 1975 legislative agenda was the CBC's opposition to the growth of the military budget at the expense of funding for social programmes and the expansion of public sector jobs. However, when the opportunity arose to protest against the growing size of the military budget, ~~i.e.~~ by voting against the 1976 Defence Department Appropriations for all armed

services and weapons programmes (Vote 12) a significant minority within the CBC, Reps. Diggs, Nix, Ford and Jordan felt unable to support the agreed group position. The other twelve CBC members joined with 49 House members, mainly northern Democrats, in a protest vote against the defence appropriations bill (Rep. Andrew Young was the only Southern Democrat to participate in the protest vote). Having made this protest, the CBC agreed to vote for the Fiscal 1976 Budget resolution when it reached the House floor the following month (i.e. Vote 16), in spite of their reservations over the high military funds within the budget. When the vote on the budget resolution finally occurred, however, three CBC members, Reps. Dellums, Conyers and Hawkins voted against the resolution. In the case of Reps. Dellums and Conyers, their votes were designed as a further protest against the lack of priority given to domestic, social welfare programmes vis-a-vis military and defence spending within the total federal budget. Their decision on Vote 16 was consistent with their past voting behaviour; both men had established reputations within Congress as strong opponents of increased military spending. Rep. Hawkins' vote against the budget resolution was puzzling though, and remains difficult to explain. The only plausible answer would seem to be that, in his voting behaviour, Rep. Hawkins discriminated between the military budget as a whole, and projects that affected employment within his district (in particular, the aircraft industry). Approaching his voting behaviour from this perspective helps to explain why he voted for funds for the B1 bomber (Vote 2) and against increased military expenditure (Votes 12 and 16). Hawkins faced another dilemma which might also throw further light on his apparent contradictory voting behaviour on Votes 2, 12 and 16. As a member of the House Education and Labour Committee and chairman of the sub-committee on Equal Opportunities, Rep. Hawkins was committed to expanding public

sector jobs as a means of widening job opportunities for the black American minority and meeting the social needs of the poor within minority communities generally. His legislative efforts on behalf of employment and equal opportunity issues, for example, his introduction of the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment bill which contained in its original form a massive public job creation programme, were thwarted constantly by the expansion of military spending in the total federal budget. Faced with this situation, he probably felt the necessity to register a strong protest against the budget resolution.

It is asserted, therefore, that Table 16 demonstrates that the CBC voted as a united group on key issues of importance to black Americans, with some small-scale dissent when local interests/loyalties and policy disagreements intervened. As has been emphasised above, the CBC bloc vote was too small to make the difference between victory and defeat on each key vote, but the importance of the bloc vote lay in its symbolic value as a means of Black Representatives being seen to stand firm in support of black American issues. The symbolic value of CBC voting unity rests partly upon the comparisons that Black Caucus members encourage black voters to make between their voting record on black legislative issues and those of white Congressmen who represent districts with sizeable black populations. Table 17 (parts A, B, C and D) takes the twenty key votes (1975) and measures the voting behaviour of the 131 white Congressmen with district containing 10% and above black populations against the CBC group position on each vote. The purpose of Table 17 is to test CBC members' claim that they vote more consistently in favour of black American issues than white Congressmen who represent a sizeable body of black constituents.

Table 17 (Parts A, B) considers firstly the voting behaviour of white Congressmen from the North-East, Mid-West and Western states

(continued on page 253)

STATE AND CD	MEMBER, PARTY	% BLACK POPU	VOTES																				% SUP CBC	% OPP CBC	% Absent
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20			
Md 3	Sarbanes (D)	12	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	85	15	0
Md 4	Holt (R)	10	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	10	90	0
Md 5	Spellman (D)	15	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	70	30	0
Mass 9	Moakley (D)	19	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	85	15	0
NJ 1	Florio (D)	12	+	+	0	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	65	30	5
" 2	Hughes (D)	13	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	60	40	0
" 4	Thompson (D)	13	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	90	10	0
" 8	Roe (D)	10	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	70	30	0
" 10	Rodino (D)	51	+	0	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	85	10	5
" 12	Rinaldo (R)	11	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	0	+	+	-	+	+	55	40	5
" 14	Daniels (D)	12	+	0	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	65	30	5
NY 7	Addabbo (D)	36	+	+	0	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	85	10	5
" 10	Biaggi (D)	13	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	-	60	40	0
" 11	Scheur (D)	16	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	0	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	75	20	5
CBC Group Position			+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+			

VOTING BEHAVIOUR OF CONGRESSMEN FROM NORTH-EAST STATES REPRESENTING DISTRICTS WITH MORE THAN 10% BLACK POPULATIONS ON TWENTY HOUSE VOTES RELEVANT TO CBC LEGISLATIVE AGENDA

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STATE AND CD	MEMBER, PARTY	% BLACK POPU	VOTES																				% SUP CBC	% OPP CBC	% ABSENT
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20			
NY 14	Richmond (D)	23	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	95	5	0
" 16	Holtzman (D)	22	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	90	10	0
NY 20	Abzug (D)	15	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	100	0	0
" 21	Badillo (D)	41	+	+	+	-	-	0	+	-	-	+	+	-	0	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	85	5	10
" 22	Bingham (D)	17	+	+	+	-	-	0	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	95	0	5
" 23	Peyser (R)	12	+	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	55	35	10
" 24	Ottinger (D)	12	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	95	5	0
" 37	Nowak (D)	20	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	75	25	0
PA 1	Barrett (D)	39	0	0	0	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	70	15	15
" 3	Green (D)	28	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	90	10	0
" 14	Moorhead (D)	21	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	+	0	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	70	25	5
CBC GROUP POSITION			+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+			

STATE AND CD	MEMBER, PARTY	% BLACK POPU	VOTES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	% SUP CBC	% OPP CBC	% ABSENT
Ill 2	Murphy (D)	39	+ + - - - + + - - + - + + + + + + + - +	80	20	0
" 5	Fary* (D)	31	VACANCY + + 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 + 0 0 + - +			
" 8	Rostenkowski (D)	18	0 + - - - + + - - - - + + + + + + + - +	70	25	5
" 23	Price (D)	15	+ - - - - + - - - + + + + + - + + + - +	80	20	0
Ind 1	Madden (D)	23	+ 0 + - - + - - - + - + 0 + - + + + - +	75	15	10
" 11	Jacobs (D)	22	+ + + - - + - - - - - + + - - - + + - -	65	35	0
Ky 3	Mazzoli (D)	19	- + - - - 0 + + + - - + + - - + + - + 0	45	45	10
Mich 7	Riegle (D)	13	+ + 0 - - + - - - + + + + + - + + + + +	80	15	5
Mo 5	Bolling (D)	24	+ + - - - + - - - + + 0 + + 0 + + + - +	80	10	10
Ohio 1	Gradison (R)	20	- - - + - + - + + - - + - - 0 - - - + +	15	80	5
" 2	Clancy (R)	11	- - - + + + - + + - - + + - + - - - + -	10	90	0
" 3	Whalen (R)	16	+ + + - - + - + - + + + + + - + + - - +	80	20	0
CBC GROUP POSITION			+ + + - - + + - - + + - + + - + + + - +			

VOTING BEHAVIOUR OF CONGRESSMEN FROM MID-WESTERN AND WESTERN STATES REPRESENTING DISTRICTS WITH MORE THAN 10% BLACK POPULATIONS ON TWENTY HOUSE VOTES RELEVANT TO CBC LEGISLATIVE AGENDA

* Vacancy and absence left too few votes on which to make significant measurement

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STATE AND CD	MEMBER PARTY	% BLACK POPU	VOTES																				% SUP	% OPP	% ABSENT
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20			
Ohio 9	Ashley (D)	11	+	-	-	-	-	0	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	70	25	5
" 12	Devine (R)	10	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	5	95	0
" 14	Seiberling (D)	10	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	95	5	0
" 15	Wylie (R)	12	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	0	-	25	70	5
" 19	Carney (D)	10	+	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	65	35	0
Calif 5	Burton (D)	10	+	+	+	-	-	+	0	0	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	85	5	10
Calif 6	Burton P (D)	12	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	0	-	+	+	+	-	+	95	0	5
" 9	Stark (D)	14	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	100	0	0
" 31	Wilson (D)	28	+	-	+	-	-	+	0	-	-	+	0	+	0	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	70	15	15
" 42	Van Deerlin (D)	11	+	-	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	0	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	75	20	5
Okla 5	Jarman (R)	11	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	5	95	0
Wisc 5	Reuss (D)	21	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	90	10	0
CBC GROUP POSITION			+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+			

STATE AND CD	MEMBER, PARTY	% BLACK POPU	VOTES																				% SUP CBC	% OPP CBC	% ABSENT	
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20				
Ala 1	Edwards (R)	32	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	0	0	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	15	75	10	
Ala 2	Dickinson (R)	29	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	20	80	0	
Ala 3	Nichols (D)	31	+	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	25	75	0	
Ala 6	Buchanan (R)	30	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	35	65	0	
Ala 7	Flowers (D)	37	-	-	-	+	-	0	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	20	75	5	
Ark 4	Thornton (D)	31	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	40	60	0	
Ga 1	Ginn (D)	33	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	30	70	0	
Ga 2	Mathis (D)	36	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	0	-	-	+	-	10	85	5	
Ga 3	Brinkley (D)	32	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	20	80	0	
Ga 8	Stuckey (D)	31	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	0	+	+	-	0	-	-	-	+	+	20	70	10	
Ga 10	Stephens (D)	32	-	0	0	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	30	60	10	
La 1	Hebert (D)	31	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	0	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	10	85	5	
La 2	Boggs (D)	39	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	-	0	+	50	40	10
La 4	Waggoner (D)	31	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	5	95	0	
La 5	Passman (D)	34	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	5	95	0	
La 6	Moore (R)	29	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	5	95	0	
CBC GROUP POSITION			+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+				

VOTING BEHAVIOUR OF CONGRESSMEN FROM SOUTHERN STATES REPRESENTING DISTRICTS WITH MORE THAN 25% BLACK POPULATIONS ON TWENTY HOUSE VOTES RELEVANT TO CBC LEGISLATIVE AGENDA

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STATE AND CD	MEMBER, PARTY	% BLACK POPU	VOTES																				% SUP CBC	% OPP CBC	% ABSENT CBC
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20			
Ga 8	Long (D)	36	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	50	50	0
Miss 1	Whitten (D)	35	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	5	95	0
" 2	Bowen (D)	45	-	-	-	+	0	0	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	0	15	70	15
" 3	Montgomery (D)	40	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	10	90	0
" 4	Cochran (R)	43	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	0	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	15	80	5
NC 1	Jones (D)	35	+	-	-	0	0	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	15	75	10
" 2	Fountain (D)	40	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	15	85	0
" 3	Henderson (D)	26	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	10	90	0
" 7	Rose (D)	25	+	-	-	+	-	0	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	40	55	5
SC 1	Davis (D)	34	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	-	-	0	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	0	40	50	10
" 2	Spence (R)	33	-	-	-	+	-	0	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	5	90	5
" 5	Holland (D)	31	0	+	+	+	-	+	-	-	+	-	0	+	+	0	0	+	-	-	+	+	40	40	20
" 6	Jenrette (D)	42	+	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	35	65	0
Va 1	Downing (D)	30	+	-	-	+	0	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	20	75	5
Va 3	Satterfield (D)	26	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	5	95	0
Va 4	Daniel (R)	37	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	5	95	0
Va 5	Daniel (D)	29	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	5	95	0
CBC GROUP POSITION			+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+			

STATE AND CD	MEMBER, PARTY	% BLACK POPU	VOTES																				% SUP CBC	% OPP CBC	% ABSENT
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20			
Ala 5	Jones (D)	13	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	0	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	0	-	+	+	30	60	10
Ark 1	Alexander (D)	23	+	-	-	0	0	+	-	-	0	-	-	+	+	-	0	+	-	-	+	+	30	50	20
Ark 2	Mills (D)	16	0	0	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	35	55	10
Flor 1	Sikes (D)	14	+	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	0	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	10	85	5
" 2	Fuqua (D)	24	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	0	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	40	55	5
" 3	Bennett (D)	24	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	35	65	0
" 4	Chappell (D)	15	0	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	15	80	5
" 5	Kelly (R)	16	+	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	10	90	0
" 7	Gibbons (D)	13	+	+	-	-	+	0	-	-	0	0	-	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	-	35	45	20
" 8	Haley (D)	14	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	10	90	0
" 10	Bafalis (R)	14	+	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	20	80	0
" 11	Rogers (D)	18	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	40	60	0
" 12	Burke (R)	12	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	-	0	+	+	-	+	-	-	0	0	-	20	65	15
" 13	Lehman (D)	18	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	-	+	75	20	5
" 14	Pepper (D)	15	+	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	+	-	0	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	70	20	10
" 15	FaScell (D)	11	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	85	15	0
CBC POSITION			+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+			

VOTING BEHAVIOUR OF CONGRESSMEN FROM SOUTHERN STATES REPRESENTING DISTRICTS WITH BETWEEN 10 - 24% BLACK POPULATIONS ON TWENTY HOUSE VOTES RELEVANT TO CBC LEGISLATIVE AGENDA

cont'd

STATE AND CD	MEMBER, PARTY	% BLACK POPU	VOTES																				% SUP CBC	% OPP CBC	% ABSENT
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20			
Ga 4	Levitas (D)	15	+	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	40	60	0
" 6	Flynt (D)	19	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	5	95	0
La 3	Treen (R)	15	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	10	90	0	
" 7	Breaux (D)	21	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	20	80	0
Miss 5	Lott (R)	19	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	10	90	0
NC 4	Andrews (D)	23	+	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	25	70	5
" 5	Neal (D)	14	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	50	50	0
" 6	Preyer (D)	21	+	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	50	50	0
" 8	Hefner (D)	20	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	0	-	-	-	+	-	25	70	5
" 9	Martin (R)	22	-	0	0	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	10	80	10
" 10	Broyhill (R)	11	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	10	90	0
SC 3	Derrick (D)	23	+	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	0	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	45	50	5
" 4	Mann (D)	18	-	-	-	+	-	0	-	-	+	-	-	+	0	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	15	75	10
Tenn 3	Lloyd (D)	11	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	40	60	0
" 5	Fulton*(D)	19	-	0	-	-	0	0	0	VACANCY
" 6	Beard (R)	14	-	-	-	0	0	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	5	85	10
CBC POSITION			+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+			

* Where a vacancy occurs voting figures are considered too few to be subject to measurement

... cont'd

STATE AND CD	MEMBER, PARTY	% BLACK POPU	VOTES																				% SUP CBC	% OPP CBC	% ABSENT
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20			
Tenn 7	Jones (D)	19	+	-	-	0	0	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	30	60	10
Texas 1	Patman (D)	22	-	0	0	-	-	0	-	-	-	+	-	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	55	25	20
" 2	Wilson (D)	20	-	-	-	+	0	+	0	-	-	+	-	0	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	0	35	45	20
" 4	Roberts (D)	15	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	15	85	0
" 5	Steelman (R)	20	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	20	80	0
" 6	Teague (D)	10	0	-	0	+	0	+	0	+	+	-	-	+	0	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	10	65	25
" 8	Eckhardt (D)	19	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	85	15	0
" 9	Brooks (D)	22	-	-	-	+	-	0	-	-	0	0	-	+	+	+	+	+	0	-	+	+	30	50	20
" 10	Pickle (D)	14	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	40	60	0
" 11	Poage (D)	12	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	5	95	0
" 12	Wright (D)	16	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	40	60	0
" 20	Gonzalez (D)	11	-	-	-	+	-	0	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	45	50	5
" 22	Casey (D)	13	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	0	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	10	85	5
" 24	Milford (D)	24	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	0	-	0	-	-	-	+	-	10	80	10
Va 2	Whitehurst (R)	22	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	5	95	0
" 6	Butler (R)	12	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	15	85	0
" 7	Robinson (R)	15	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	5	95	0
CBC POSITION			+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+			

whose districts contain 10% plus black populations. Within this group of 49 Congressmen, there were 40 Democrats and 9 Republicans. Of the Democratic members, only four voted consistently in support of the CBC group position, ~~ie~~ Reps. B Abzug (NY 20th), J Bingham (NY 22nd), P Burton (Calif 6th) and F Stark (Calif 9th). However, a further 26 Democrats voted in support of the CBC position on three out of every four key votes. On the whole, therefore, it can be concluded that these non-Southern Democratic members represented their black constituents' interests reasonably well. Although, it is important to note that on votes 2, 3, 7, 9, 10 - 12, 16 and 19, the majority of which were major rather than minor black issues, six or more Democrats voted in opposition to the CBC group position.⁵¹ For example, the anti-busing amendment tacked onto the Energy Conservation and Oil Policy bill (Vote 9) was supported by six Democrats from this group. The amendment, which passed by only three votes and was opposed by a united CBC bloc vote was one of the most important black American issues to be voted on in the 1975 session. Similarly, on another close vote of major significance to the CBC, the Rhodesian chrome bill (Vote 10), eight Democrats voted against the measure which sought to halt the importation of Rhodesian chrome and hence bring the US into compliance with the UN-sponsored economic boycott of Rhodesia. This measure had been high on the CBC list of priorities for several years, and was supported by a united CBC bloc vote in 1975. Finally, the sensitivities of the white Northern Democrat on the issue of busing was demonstrated again on Vote 19 in which the House agreed to prohibit the use of HEW-Labour funds for busing for the purpose of school integration. Twelve Democrats voted to prohibit the use of funds for busing, while the CBC cast its full 16 votes in favour of busing.. Of the 9 Republicans identified in Table 17 (parts A and B) six members registered the highest level of opposition to the CBC group position,

voting against the CBC position at least 70% of the time. However, three Republicans, ~~ie~~ Reps M Rinaldo (NJ 12th), P Peyser (NY 23rd) and C Whalen (Ohio 3rd), supported the CBC group position on over half their votes cast on the twenty key votes.

Table 17 (parts C and D) identifies Southern Congressmen who represent districts with sizeable black populations, and compares their voting behaviour on the twenty key votes with the CBC group position on each vote. Southern Congressmen are divided into two groups; Table 17C lists those Congressmen with the highest density black districts (25% and above), while Table 17D lists those with 10 - 25% black populations. This division has been made to provide an additional test, that is whether Southern Congressmen's voting behaviour on major black American issues varies according to the proportion of black constituents in their districts. Within Table 17C there are listed 26 Southern Democrats and 7 Southern Republicans. An examination of Southern Democratic members' voting behaviour in Table 17C reveals, not surprisingly, that they voted generally in opposition to the CBC group position. A comparison between Table 16 (CBC members' voting behaviour on the twenty key votes) and Table 17C establishes clearly that Southern CBC members elected from high density black districts represent black political interests far more consistently than their fellow Southern Democrats from similar districts. Of the 26 Southern Democrats 16 members voted with the CBC position on less than one in four votes. From the remaining 10 members, only two voted with the CBC on more than half the key votes. The most hostile Southern Democrats tended to be those elder members who had been elected to Congress before the civil rights and voting reforms of the mid-1960's came into effect.⁵² Whereas the least hostile were those members elected to Congress in the post-1965 Voting Rights Act era, who had had to take some account of the increased

number of registered black constituents in their districts.⁵³ The apparent correlation between Southern Democrats' dates of election and their degree of support for the CBC position seems to be operable, however, only in relation to black American issues of minor importance. On the crucial key votes involving major black American issues, i.e. renewal of the Voting Rights Act (Vote 4) and anti-busing amendments (Votes 9 and 19), Southern Democrats closed ranks and voted against black political interests.⁵⁴ Other important legislative issues from the perspective of the CBC, i.e. Rhodesian chrome bill (Vote 10), regulation of gun sales (Vote 7), reduction of military expenditure (Votes 2, 3 and 12), were opposed strongly by Southern Democrats as a united group. The seven Southern Republicans identified in Table 17C emerge as the most persistent opponents of black political interests. Their conservative voting behaviour on the twenty key votes reflects that of the dwindling group of elder Southern Democrats. As these elder Southern Democrats have retired, Southern Republicans have inherited their seats by cultivating the support of traditional conservative elements in their districts. Southern Republican opposition to black political interests is, therefore, considerably more consistent than that of their Northern Republican colleagues who represent districts with sizeable black populations.

Table 17D reveals similar patterns of voting behaviour on the part of the Southern Democrats and Republicans as those identified above in the analysis of Table 17C. However, the strength of the opposition to black political interests on the part of the 37 Southern democrats listed in Table 17D is less marked than that of their Democratic colleagues listed in Table 17C. Of the 37 Southern Democrats, 25 members supported the CBC group position on 25% or more of the key votes. And, within this group, seven members voted with the CBC position on 50% or more of the

votes. The most significant fact to emerge from Table 17D was that, on the crucial key votes (Votes 4, 9, 19), Southern Democrats were not united in opposition; less than two thirds of the total group voted against the CBC group position on two of the three votes.⁵⁵ The more moderate position taken on these major black American 'civil rights' issues by the Southern Democratic members was reflected in their voting behaviour on the other key votes except those relating to the reduction of military expenditure, the halting of the importation of Rhodesian chrome, and the regulation of gun sales.⁵⁶ The phenomenon of the more moderate Southern Democrat, in terms of voting behaviour on issues of importance to black Americans, was a function of the reformed nature of electoral politics in many southern congressional districts, and the state of the racial balance in those districts. Many Southern Democrats elected to Congress for the first time in the post-Voting Rights Act years have courted the black vote, and in return have shown willingness to give some support to black American legislative concerns. This willingness to support black American issues on the House floor has been more forthcoming from Southern Democrats who represent districts where the black electorate forms a significant but not potentially dominant section of the total electorate. Comparative analysis of Southern Democratic members' voting behaviour in Tables 17C and 17D would suggest that, as a general rule, the level of support given to key black American legislative issues is related inversely to the density of the black population in the congressional district. In their voting behaviour, Southern Democrats elected from high density black population districts (Table 17C) were generally less sympathetic to black American issues because the black electorate was largely excluded from their electoral base of support. Whereas Southern Democrats elected from lower density black population districts were more sympathetic

because the black electorate had been integrated as a part of their electoral base. Black Caucus members appeared to work on the basis of this general rule when seeking votes in favour of CBC priority legislative issues. Rep. Parren Mitchell, as chairman of the CBC in the 95th Congress, indicated in an interview that he kept a list of thirty Southern Democrats elected from districts containing a significant black electorate who had shown some sympathy towards CBC legislative aims since their election to Congress. On key CBC issues, particularly where a close vote was likely, he gave priority to lobbying for support amongst this group.

On the whole, the voting analyses contained in Tables 16, 17 (parts A-D) give considerable support to the CBC's assertion that Black American political interests are represented more consistently by Black Congressmen than White Congressmen. Also, it has been shown that the CBC have acted as a united bloc vote on the vast majority of key black American legislative issues that have reached the House floor. While the high degree of unity and consistency attained by CBC members in their voting behaviour has been a considerable achievement, the broad conclusion reached from the voting study is that CBC bloc voting performs a symbolic rather than functional role in terms of representing effectively black American interests in Congress.

In the next chapter, a legislative case study is undertaken on a measure upon which the CBC attached high priority, *ie* a bill to provide self-government ('home rule') for the District of Columbia. The case study will seek to demonstrate how the CBC utilised their newly-gained positions of authority within the committee system and the Congressional Democratic Party to promote the bill and steer it through the congressional procedures, and how CBC members mounted a large-scale lobbying campaign within the House to help secure the necessary votes to gain the passage of the legislation.

FOOTNOTES

1. Fieldwork Interview. Rep. William Clay (D. Mo. 1st)
Wash DC. June 26th, 1974.
2. Fieldwork Interview. Rep. Andrew Young (D. Ga. 5th)
Wash. DC. June 26th, 1974.
3. Young interview
4. The Democratic Party Committee on Committees in the House comprised the Democratic members of the Ways and Means Committee. The chairman of Ways and Means acted as chairman of the Committee on Committees. In 1974, as part of the procedural reforms adopted by the Democratic Caucus, Democratic members' committee assignments became the responsibility of the newly-created 23 member Democratic Steering and Policy Committee. The purpose of the change was to increase the influence of the party leadership and the Democratic Caucus in making committee assignments at the expense of committee chairmen and the seniority system, and to bring the assignments process more in line with the development of party policy and the views of the Democratic majority. The Steering and Policy Committee was chaired by the Speaker. Its membership comprised a mixture of Representatives from the party leadership, some appointed by the Speaker, and some elected by geographical region.
5. Press reports rumoured that Barbara Jordan had been helped in gaining her Judiciary Committee assignment by the intervention of ex-President Lyndon Johnson. (cited in 'FOCUS' magazine, VOL 1, No. 4, p. 7. February, 1973, JCPS publications, Wash. DC).
6. M Barone, G Ujifusa, D Matthews, 'The Almanac of American Politics, 1972' (MacMillan Press Ltd., London and Basingstoke, 1972). p. 54
7. Fieldwork interview. Rep. Ronald Dellums (D. Calif. 7th)
Wash. DC. July 10th, 1974.
8. The 'ad hoc' hearings took place over a four-day period, 26th - 29th April 1971. Twenty-one Representatives attended the hearings over that period. Ronald Dellums (Chairman), CBC members John Conyers, Parren Mitchell, Charles Diggs, Shirley Chisholm. Other Democratic Representatives attending were Herman Badillo (NY 21st), Bella Abzug (NY 19th), William F Ryan (NY 20th), Jonathan Bingham (NY 23rd), Edward Koch (NY 17th), Benjamin Rosenthal (NY 8th), Don Edwards (Calif 9th), Philip Burton (Calif 5th),

Patsy Mink (Hawaii 2), Henry Reuss (Wisc. 5th), John Seiberling (Ohio 14th), Andrew Jacobs (Ind. 11th), Abner Mikva (Ill 2nd), Robert Kastenmeier (Wisc. 2nd), James Abourezk (S. Dak 2nd).

One Republican representative attended;- Donald W Reigle (Mich 7th)

9. 'The Dellums Committee Hearings on War Crimes in Vietnam; An Inquiry into Command Responsibility in Southeast Asia' Edited Transcript (Vintage Books, New York May 1972) p. 332
10. Dellums interview
11. CBC members visited the following bases - Shirley Chisholm; Fort Dix NJ. George Collins, Ralph Metcalfe; Great Lakes Naval Bases, Illinois. John Conyers; Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Ronald Dellums; Travis Air Force Base, California. Charles Diggs; Westover Air Force Base, Massachusetts. Walter Fauntroy; Quantico Marine Base, Virginia. Augustus Hawkins; Camp Pendelton, California. Parren Mitchell; Fort Meade, Maryland. Charles Rangel; Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Louis Stokes; Fort Hood, Texas.
(Details of CBC members' findings on these visits are contained in the transcripts of the 'ad hoc' hearings. Unpublished document, CBC office).
12. "Racism in the Military: A New System for Rewards and Punishment" (Wash DC. The Congressional Black Caucus Office, May 15th, 1972)
An edited version is contained in the 'Congressional Record' Vol. 118, No. 166 - part II (proceedings of Friday 13th October, 1972).
13. For details of these incidents, see, "Racial Unrest in the Military: the Challenge and the Response." Richard Stillman II. (PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, MAY/JUNE 1974. No 3 pp 221 - 229).
14. Dellums interview
15. Dellums interview
16. Dellums interview
17. In his interview Dellums stated this view in stronger terms,
"We are tired of whites deciding who is, or who is not, a legitimate black because we all came here (Congress) by the same process . . . We all got elected by our own respective constituences, and the day is over for white people to decide who is the nice guy and who is not."

18. Dellums interview
19. In the 93rd Congress 9 out of the 16 CBC members were seated on these three standing committees.
20. Clay interview.
21. Fieldwork interview. Rep. Parren Mitchell (D.Md.7th) July 2nd, 1974. Wash. DC.
22. Fieldwork Interview. Rep. Louis Stokes (D. Ohio 21st) January 19th, 1978. Wash DC.
23. "Current American Government, Fall 1977 Edition" Article, "Blacks in Congress; A Wary Carter Ally" (CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC, WASH DC 1977) P. 60
24. "Congress Report/New Democratic procedures affect distribution of power" M J MALBIN (NATIONAL JOURNAL REPORTS VOL 6 No. 50 WASH DC. 1975) pp 1881 - 1890
25. Fieldwork Interview, Rep. Yvonne Brathwaite Burke (D. Calif 28th). January 19th, 1978. Wash. DC.
26. The crucial role that the 'deans' of state delegations had played in negotiating members' committee assignments with the Democratic Committee on Committees is analysed in, "Committee Assignments" Nicholas A Masters ('NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2ND EDITION. EDS. R. L. PEABODY, N W POLSBY. Rand McNally and Company, Chicago 1969) pp 227 - 252
27. By the start of the 96th Congress in January, 1979, almost half the House membership had gained their seats in the 1974 elections, or subsequent elections.
28. Stokes interview (1978)
29. Fieldwork Interview, Scott Marell, legislative aide to Rep. Harold E. Ford (D. Tenn 8th). January 20th, 1978. Wash DC.
30. In the 94th Congress, nine of the seventy-five 'freshmen' Democrats won seats on either Ways and Means or Appropriations (including Rep. Harold Ford). None were placed on the Rules Committee. (Source, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, WEEKLY REPORT. May 17th, 1975. Congressional Quarterly Inc. Wash DC) pp 18 - 45

31. Fieldwork interview, Rep. Frank Thompson (D. NJ 4th) July 18th, 1974, Wash. DC.
32. Prior to his arrival in Congress in 1971, Charles Rangel had developed expertise in the field of drug addiction while representing the Harlem district in the New York Assembly. In his first term in Congress, Rangel's identification with the drug addiction problem gained the recognition of the House leadership who created an additional place for him on the Select Committee on Crime. Throughout his congressional career, Rangel had sponsored legislative measures designed to tackle the social effects of drug addiction and to rehabilitate drug addicts, and to enhance federal agencies' efforts to combat drug trafficking. His campaign in support of a bill that proposed to sever military and economic aid to countries that refused to halt the production of opium was instrumental in encouraging the Nixon Administration to persuade the Turkish Government to eliminate opium production. (The Administration's efforts met with only temporary success). Rangel's efforts in tackling the drug addiction problem in his Harlem constituency are described in "RANGEL? WHO'S RANGEL?" by V LEONE, the Progressive Magazine, May 1972 edition pp 37 - 41. (Progressive Inc., Wisconsin).
33. Louis Stokes, Yvonne Burke, Harold Ford and Walter Fauntroy served as members of the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Fauntroy (who had been a close associate of M L King in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference) chaired the sub-committee investigating M L King's assassination.
34. Rep. Harold Ford's remarks quoted from "Newsweek" magazine (International edition) February 21st, 1977 p. 39 (Newsweek Inc, New York).
35. Stokes interview, (1978).
36. Stokes interview, (1978).
37. Morris P Fiorina, "Congress; Keystone of the Washington Establishment" (YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS, NEW HAVEN AND LONDON, 1977); Walter J Oleszek, "Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process" (CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY PRESS. Politics and Public Policy Series. Wash DC 1978).
38. Dellums interview.

39. 92nd Congress, First Session, March 18th 1971. House Joint Resolution 468. Department of Transportation Appropriations, Fiscal 1971. Yates (D. Ill.) amendment deleting section of the committee's bill appropriating an additional \$134 million in fiscal 1972 for continued development of two prototype SST aircraft. Adopted 217 - 204. Republican vote 85 - 90. Democratic vote 132 - 114 (ND 110 - 54; SD 22 - 60).
40. Clay interview.
41. "Blacks in Congress: A Wary Carter Ally" (CURRENT AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, FALL 1977 EDITION. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., WASH DC. 1977) p. 62
42. "Party Caucus Role on Legislative Issues" (CURRENT AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, FALL 1978 EDITION. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., WASH. DC. 1978) pp 13 - 15
43. "Caucus Votes: Freshmen United, South Split." (CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, APRIL 5th, 1975. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC. WASH.DC.1975) pp 693 - 695. (In 1975, Democratic Caucus vote tallies were not available to the public).
44. In the 94th Congress, the CEC contained 17 members (including Walter Fauntroy, delegate for Wash. DC, who was not entitled to vote on the House floor). Fauntroy was able to vote in the Democratic Caucus, and in standing committees.
45. Clay interview.
46. The vote on the Michel amendment came the closest to eliminating farm crop subsidies. 'Congressional Quarterly' recorded the vote as follows;- "Vote 234T (HR 8860) Farm Programme Extension. Michel (R. Ill) amendment to provide a three- year phaseout of "income supplement" payments for farmers and to eliminate crop-by-crop acreage allotments. Rejected 186 - 220; R = 146 - 35; D = 40 - 185 (ND = 30 - 120, SD = 10 - 65) July 11th 1973 (CQ Almanac 1973 p. 74 - H. CQ Publications Inc. 1973. Wash DC). Within the Northern Democrat bloc of 120 votes against the amendment, there were 14 CDC votes (out of a possible 15 votes). In exchange for this support, Southern Democrats voted against a key amendment (which, ironically, was also introduced by Rep. R H Michel, Repub. Ill. 18th) to the Labour, HEW Appropriations

bill which sought to reduce substantially the funds allocated to the OEO, ~~ia~~ Recorded teller vote 203T, the Southern Democratic vote split 18 - 56, the majority vote being against the amendment. (CQ Almanac 1973 p 66 - H op. cit). The two key votes are cited to illustrate the vote trading arrangement reached between the CBC and urban Northern Democrats, and Southern Democrats on farm subsidies (HR 8860), OEO funds (HR 8877), and minimum wage legislation (HR 7935). In fact, the arrangement covered a series of roll-call votes on each measure, ~~ia~~ Minimum wage = Votes 119T - 129; OEO Funds = Votes 203T - 204T, 207T; Farm subsidies = 232T, 234T. (CQ Almanac 1973 pp 42H - 74H. Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1973 op. cit)

47. The first legislative agenda was placed in the 'Congressional Record' by CBC chairman, Charles Rangel, on March 5th, 1975. Copies of the CBC legislative agendas for 1975 through to 1978 are included in an Appendix of primary documentation.
48. Dellums interview.
49. Burke interview (1973).
50. Fellow Houston Representative Bob Eckhardt (Tex. 8th) was the only Texas Democrat to vote in favour of the repeal. A forward glance at Table 17D demonstrates that Eckhardt had a better voting record on the 20 key votes than Jordan (Eckhardt voted in agreement with the CBC position 85% of the time). Jordan's vote on the oil depletion allowance provides a good illustration of her occasional reluctance to alienate unnecessarily her Texas colleagues. During a fieldwork interview, Mr Ken Young, an AFL-CIO lobbyist, offered an interesting anecdote which, in his view, provided an early indication of Rep. Jordan's desire to keep in step with her Texas colleagues, whenever possible. He stated that when Jordan arrived in Congress in early 1973 she was told by her CBC colleagues that the CBC sat together as a group in Democratic Caucus meetings. Reportedly, Jordan refused to do so, stating categorically, "I sit with the Texas delegation!" (Interview, Ken Young, July 19th, 1974. Wash. DC).
51. The number of Democrats (from Table 17, parts A, B) who voted against the CBC group position on each of these key votes were as follows; Vote 2 = 7, Vote 3 = 17, Vote 7 = 16, Vote 9 = 6, Vote 10 = 8, Vote 11 = 16, Vote 12 = 26, Vote 16 = 7, Vote 19 = 12.

52. Nine Southern Democrats voted with the CBC position on less than 10% of the key votes. Their dates of election are placed in parentheses, together with their congressional districts. Mathis (Ga. 2nd. 1970); Hebert (La. 1st 1940); Waggoner (La 4th 1961); Passman (La 5th 1946); Whitten (Miss 1st 1941); Montgomery (Miss 3rd 1966); Henderson (NC 3rd 1960); Satterfield (Va 3rd 1964); Daniel (Va 4th 1968).
53. Ten Southern Democrats voted with the CBC position on more than 25% of the key votes. Districts and dates of election in parentheses. Nichols (Ala 3rd 1966); Thornton (Ark 4th 1972); Ginn (Ga 1st 1972); Stephens (Ga 10th 1960); Boggs (La 2nd 1973); Long (La 8th 1972); Rose (NC 7th 1972); Davis (SC 1st 1971); Holland (SC 5th 1974); Jenrette (SC 6th 1974).
54. Of the 26 Southern Democrats in Table 17C, the following numbers voted against the CBC position on voting rights and anti-busing measures. Vote 4 = 24; Vote 9 = 23; Vote 19 = 25.
55. Of the 37 Southern Democrats in Table 17D, the following numbers voted against the CBC position on voting rights and anti-busing measures. Vote 4 = 20, Vote 9 = 24; Vote 19 = 30.
56. The highest level of opposition to the CBC group position was recorded on these three issues. Of the 37 Southern Democrats (Table 17D) the following numbers voted against CBC position. Vote 2 (delete B1 bomber funds) = 28; Vote 3 (reduce US troops based overseas) = 33; Vote 7 (limited regulation of gun sales) = 32; Vote 10 (Rhodesian chrome import ban) = 23; Vote 12 (Defence Department budget) = 33.

Chapter 8

Testing the Effectiveness of the CBC Legislative Strategy. A Legislative Case Study from the 93rd Congress; the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganisation Act, 1973.

The restoration of self-government ('home rule') for the residents of the District of Columbia, i.e. the right to elect a mayor and city council, had been an important legislative goal for the CBC since its beginning. Within the House, however, the CBC knew that the chances for the passage of a legislative measure providing for DC self-government were remote as long as the chairman of the House District of Columbia Committee was Rep. John McMillan, a conservative, Southern Democrat and staunch opponent of home rule. In the quarter of a century of his chairmanship of the House District of Columbia Committee, Rep. McMillan had worked consistently to make sure that the Committee never took action on home rule legislation even when, as in several instances, a measure had already been passed in the Senate. In 1972, however, Rep. McMillan's reign came to an abrupt end when he was defeated in the Democratic primary race in his South Carolina district. By coincidence, at the same time, the next two most senior Democrats on the House District Committee retired from Congress. This unlikely combination of events placed CBC member, Rep. Charles Diggs, in line for the chairmanship, which, in fact, he gained when the 93rd Congress convened in January 1973. Diggs' ascendancy to the chairmanship of the House District of Columbia Committee provided the CBC with its first opportunity to try to implement its emergent legislative strategy in support of a CBC priority legislative measure from a key position of authority within the committee system.

Black Caucus members felt that the absence of self-government in the District of Columbia was a major example of the continued denial

of full civil rights to black American citizens. Of the three-quarters of a million residents of Washington DC, 71% were black Americans. CBC members believed that this fact was the principal reason why the right of DC residents to vote in Presidential elections was not granted until 1961, and why full congressional and local representation continued to be denied in 1973. Congress, and in particular the House District of Columbia Committee, were unwilling to hand over the government of the District of Columbia to locally elected representatives because the city contained a substantial black majority electorate. Furthermore, the relinquishing of congressional control over DC local affairs would mean the loss of considerable political patronage for many Congressmen, but particularly those Congressmen from southern states and states bordering on the District who have traditionally utilised congressional jurisdiction over the District of Columbia to further constituency interests. Such beliefs were held strongly by CBC members. Rep. Charles Diggs expressed this belief, as follows, "The House District Committee has traditionally been dominated and controlled by some of the most conservative elements in the House, and I should add some of the most racist elements in the House, who looked upon the city of Washington in terms of its past segregated status, who were afraid of the consequences of a black majority in the nation's capital and how that black majority might impact upon the lifestyle of the capital, the education system and government in general. Consequently, they have frustrated all efforts to permit the local people to determine their own destiny through the political process."¹ CBC member, Walter Fauntroy (DC non-voting delegate), was less circumspect in stating his views on the matter, - "This city has been run by business special interests through money which they raised every two years to assist in the campaigns of just a few members of the House District Committee And so, Rep. X got money every two years

from the business establishment in Washington in order to make sure that the Committee passed legislation that raised real estate taxes for the people but not corporate and business taxes for those who owned businesses here but lived out in Rep. X's district".² In order to understand how these viewpoints were formed, it is important to examine briefly the constitutional and historical circumstances that have shaped the development of the District of Columbia governmental structure.

Within the US Constitution, the Congress possesses the authority, by enactment of legislation, to determine the nature of local government in the District of Columbia and make changes whenever it chooses. Congressional authority over the District of Columbia derives from Article I, section 8, clause 17, which states that Congress shall have power "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the Government of the United States". Ever since the establishment of the District of Columbia as the site for the federal government, the arguments for and against an elected local government in the federal city have revolved around the intent of this constitutional clause. There can be no doubt that the framers of the Constitution assumed that the residents of the federal district would have the right to elect a local government. James Madison, in Federalist Paper No. 43, when justifying the procedures that would operate in establishing the federal district indicated clearly that he envisaged district residents governing their own affairs; he wrote, ". . . the inhabitants will find sufficient inducements of interests to become willing parties to the cession; as they will have had their voice in the election of the government which is to exercise authority over them; as a municipal legislative for local purposes, derived from their own suffrages, will of course be allowed them; . . . every imaginable

objection seems to be obviated".³ Since Madison wrote this opinion several legislative and judicial precedents have occurred which support the constitutional authority of Congress to grant legislative and budgetary power to a DC government and to rescind that power at any time. The most significant legislative precedents can be traced to the years, 1802, 1812, 1820, 1871 and 1874. In 1802, shortly after the incorporation of the District of Columbia, the first local government of the city of Washington was established, which consisted of a mayor appointed by the President and an elected council. In 1812, the city charter was altered to provide for a mayor selected by the council members, and again in 1820 to provide for a directly elected mayor. In 1871 the Congress passed legislation which granted the District of Columbia 'territorial status' and a system of government which divided authority between appointed and elected officials. Under this system the elected mayor and council were replaced by a chief executive, an eleven-member council and a board of public works who were all appointed by the President; this 'upper chamber' of appointees shared power with an elected, twenty-two member House of Delegates and a non-voting delegate to Congress. In 1874, the Congress repealed the latter legislation and placed the District of Columbia under the authority of a three-member Board of Commissioners who were Presidential appointees. An equivalent list of judicial precedents can be cited from 19th century cases, but more recently the Supreme Court restated the constitutional authority of Congress vis-a-vis the DC government in its ruling in the case of the District of Columbia vs Thompson (1953). The Supreme Court stated that, "on the issue of home rule, however, Congress may grant self-government to the District of Columbia to the same extent as it may do in the case of territories".

Opponents of home rule for Washington DC have read a different interpretation into the constitutional authority of Congress in relation

to the District of Columbia. Traditionally, their argument has been that the intent of Article I, section 8, clause 17 was to insulate the federal district from the vagaries of local government. Hence, in their view, the power of Congress "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever" meant that elected local government was inappropriate, as government in the District of Columbia should be concerned primarily with protecting the federal interest in the city. DC self-government legislation, therefore, would render the federal interest subservient to local government, and consequently would violate the spirit of the constitution. This latter view prevailed over the hundred year period that followed upon Congress revoking the territorial status of Washington DC and ending self-government in 1874, and disenfranchising DC residents in 1878.

Although the constitutional argument was important, the historical circumstances in which Congress revoked DC self-government in 1874 provide the most crucial insight into the dynamics of the debate over DC home rule. The right to self-government was revoked by Congress principally on the grounds that the 1871-4 DC government had driven the city to bankruptcy and severe debt through financial mismanagement and corruption. The severe debt incurred by the 1871-4 DC government was beyond doubt (the Board of Public Works spent \$19 million on its programme of development when its original cost had been projected at \$6.2 million), but the extent to which this was the result of deliberate corruption or the large-scale, and rather careless, development of necessary basic utilities within the federal city by the appointed Commissioner of Public Works, and effective Governor of the new 'territory' of the District of Columbia, Alexander Shepperd, is more debatable. Under his direction the Board of Public Works undertook its costly programme because the development of basic utilities in DC had been seriously neglected for decades, and

the problem had become exacerbated in the Civil War years. A recent text on DC History described the conditions existing in the District of Columbia in 1870, as follows, "Postwar Washington had become a grim sight, with slums, beggars, filth, hundreds of truant school children roaming the streets, and according to one senator, 'the infinite abominable nuisance of cows and horses, and sheep and goats, running through all of the streets of this city.' He added, 'Whenever we appropriate money to set up a shade tree, there comes along a cow or a horse or goat, and tears it down the next day, and then we appropriate again.' Even major streets were unpaved and sewers were minimal."⁴ The Sheppard Administration had run into serious financial debt in attempting to rapidly implement an ambitious public utilities programme to alleviate these conditions. However, the free-wheeling manner in which the new DC government operated, awarding contracts and dispersing funds with little proper record-keeping and public accountability, provided ample evidence from which the Congress were able to make the case for the existence of substantial corruption. Nevertheless, the running-up of major debts and the evidence of corrupt practices, serious matters as they were, were not uncommon phenomena at state and local government level in the United States in the late 19th century. While such developments were of legitimate concern to Congress, given its constitutional authority over DC governmental affairs, and merited corrective action, say, the dismissal of the DC government and the calling of new elections, they would not seem to constitute adequate grounds for the drastic action of revoking self-government in DC and disenfranchising DC residents. It is necessary, therefore, to look to other factors to discover the full explanation of why such drastic action was taken. The key factors that largely determined the action taken by Congress were that the failure of the government occurred in the political environment of the Reconstruction years, and that Washington DC was a city

with a rapidly growing black American electorate.

Governor Sheppard's Republican Administration in DC had come to power in 1871 on the votes of an electorate that was one quarter black American, and the black vote had played a significant part in his Administration's election. Inevitably, in the Reconstruction years, the failure and corruption of local government tended to be attributed to the new political phenomenon of black American suffrage. In spite of the facts that the Presidentially-appointed Board of Public Works, upon whose shoulders the responsibility for the financial debt and malpractices rested, contained not a single black American appointee, and that only five black Americans served in an appointed or elected capacity in the 1871-4 DC government (three were appointed to the eleven-member upper council, and two were elected to the twenty-two member House of Delegates) the majority of the blame for the state of malaise of DC government was apportioned to black American political participation. The connection between incompetent and corrupt government and black American suffrage was forged in the public mind by local newspapers and journals throughout the Reconstruction years. In Washington DC, the 'Georgetown Courier' did not hesitate to blame the failure of the Sheppard Administration on the "curse" of black American suffrage.⁵ The desire to blame black American suffrage for all aspects of government failure in the Reconstruction years reflected the white majority's constant fear of the potential political power of the recently emancipated slaves. In Washington DC this fear was more manifest, not only because of the large influx of emancipated slaves in the mid 1860's, but also because of the substantial 'free' black population that had lived in the city since the eighteenth century. As early as 1800, more than one quarter of Washington's population was black and twenty per cent of their number held 'free' status. In spite of the existence of the 'black codes' and development of Washington

DC as a major slave-trading centre (being conveniently located between the two largest slave-owning states, Maryland and Virginia), a strong free black community developed and flourished in the period prior to the abolition of slavery in Washington DC in 1850. The presence of a cohesive black community not only worked to encourage generally further black immigration into the federal city but also attracted prominent black American public figures who took up residence in the city, the most notable being Frederick Douglass, the black abolitionist, who became a formidable advocate of DC self-government and, in fact, served in the 1871-4 DC Government. At the point at which DC self-government was revoked, the size of the black population was gradually approaching one-third of the total population of Washington DC and black Americans were making unprecedented gains in securing government employment. In these historical developments lie the principal reasons why elected local government in Washington DC was removed by the Congress in 1874. For the next one hundred years the same underlying factors, the traditional strength and cohesiveness of the DC black community, its growth towards majority status within the district, and therefore, its potential political control of the organs of local government in the federal district, account substantially for the reluctance of Congress to legislate for the return of home-rule to Washington DC.

However, once the right of DC self-government had been removed, other factors began to play their part over the years in consolidating the unwillingness of Congress to grant home-rule to DC. These factors began to assume importance as the appointed commissioner system of local government, operated under the authority of the President and Congress, began to take shape. In the debate over home rule, to many peoples' minds these other factors were more significant in explaining Congressional resistance to DC self-government than the underlying fear of the


potential political power of the majority black population. Clarence Mitchell, Executive Director of the NAACP, described these factors and their operation, as follows, "I think that even more persuasive than the racial factor is the desire on the part of some members of Congress to use DC as a kind of baronry in which they could have immunity from obeying the law in some cases. For example, there are the kind who would like to go and park by a fire hydrant and not get a ticket, or if they got a traffic ticket to be able to get somebody on the telephone and say, 'cancel it!'. Then, of course, there were people who had various interests in real estate or public transportation" ⁶ Mitchell's remarks illustrate the degree to which Congress, through its oversight of the Board of Commissioners by the District of Columbia Standing Committees, exercised control over decision-making at all levels of government in Washington DC, and furthermore, emphasise the considerable benefits that this control offered in terms of patronage. Mitchell emphasised the fact that such patronage was acceptable within the scope of Congressional authority over DC affairs, "It was a case of straight exploitation. The reason I make a distinction between corruption and exploitation is that I don't think necessarily that anything dishonest was done. But many of them took advantage of their positions to help their friends make money, and make it legitimately, or to find jobs. For example, Southern members of Congress literally took over the police and fire departments by getting their constituents in as job-holders. It was very simple, say, if somebody white came in from North or South Carolina and got in touch with his Congressman who could find him a job in the District of Columbia So that it was a kind of built-in patronage system. And, of course, as the district became more black from a population composition standpoint, the fear on the part of those who had profited by that system that not only would the system be destroyed that they had enjoyed for so long, but in

addition they might find themselves being treated just like any other ordinary citizen by black officials in the capital."⁷ In exercising its general legislative jurisdiction over the District of Columbia and approving the annual budget prepared by the Board of Commissioners, the Congress, principally through the District Committees and Appropriations sub-committees, worked to preserve this patronage system. Over the hundred year period, 1874-1973, the patronage system developed into a massive, labyrinthine form as authority was fragmented and dispersed horizontally by Congress through the creation of many federal and quasi-federal agencies. Tables 18 parts A, B and C demonstrate the complexity of the District of Columbia Government's relationship with the President and Congress and the various federal agencies. The Table refers to the organisation of DC Government as it existed in 1973 prior to the formulation of home-rule legislation.⁸

In the House District of Columbia Committee, Chairman John McMillan and his Southern colleagues, as had their predecessors, nurtured this complex government structure and its built-in patronage system and exercised a major influence over virtually every aspect of government activity in the District. Rep. McMillan and the Southern Democratic and conservative Republican members, who formed the majority of the committee membership, virtually operated the House District Committee as a private government. As chairman, McMillan developed to full capacity the potentially dictatorial powers that the seniority system bestowed. He rewarded his supporters on the Committee by distributing sub-committee chairmanships and seats on his favoured sub-committees, and punished his critics by banishing them to a sub-committee which was left moribund. For most of his rule as chairman, the sub-committees of the House District Committee were not given fixed jurisdictions, but were simply numbered. His favoured sub-committees were assigned the most important legislative


TABLE 18A

RELATIONSHIP OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT WITH THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS



(Source: Hearings of the House DC Committee, sub-committee on Government Operations Part I 93rd Congress, First Session. US Government Printing Office. Wash. DC 1973 p. 79)


TABLE 18B

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA IN 1973

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TABLE 18C

AN EXAMPLE OF COMPLEX DISTRIBUTION OF AUTHORITY WITHIN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BETWEEN DISTRICT AND FEDERAL AGENCIES: AGENCIES ENGAGED IN PLANNING, HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA



measures, whereas the sub-committee on which those members who were critical of McMillan's practices and philosophy were confined was starved of legislative assignments. It was into this private world of Rep. McMillan's District of Columbia Committee that Rep. Charles Diggs stepped as a junior member in 1964. In an interview, Rep. Diggs confessed that, in the early years, he was overawed by the power and authority that Chairman McMillan and his Southern Democratic colleagues exerted over the work of the District Committee - "When I went on the Committee there were two chairmen of other committees on it. The chairman of the Rules Committee was a member. 'Tiger' Teague was on there. There was a lot of rank on that Committee. I remember going on that committee and looking up the line at that murderous row! It was formidable!"⁹ As a new committee member, Diggs kept a low profile, but he was firmly associated with the small band of urban Democrats who were critical of McMillan's chairmanship and policies, and were in favour of the restoration of home-rule for DC. However, he was never a vocal critic in committee; he subscribed to the contemporary congressional norms epitomised in Speaker Rayburn's phrase 'to get along, go along' and accepted the rules of the committee apprenticeship system. He knew that if he accepted these norms the seniority system would eventually reward his efforts - "I had the consolation of knowing that I was much younger than the average man on that committee. So I knew that under the system, given my own political security and their age, I would eventually move to the top."¹⁰

While Diggs bided his time on the committee its composition was changing gradually as more liberal members joined the committee who were more critical of the extensive role of Congress in DC local affairs. Changes within the House District Committee membership reflected the overall changes occurring within the House membership in the mid-1960's.

In those years the strength of the Southern Democrat - conservative Republican coalition in the House was waning, and majorities were being formed in favour of the passage of national civil rights legislation. The pro-civil rights climate that existed in the House even permeated the House District of Columbia Committee. The irony of the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 by an institution that continued to deny the right of local representation to DC residents became apparent to many House members. In that year, House members did manage to introduce successfully a discharge petition that prized a DC self-government bill from the grip of Rep. McMillan and brought the subject of DC home rule to the House floor for debate for the first time since 1948. In his sixteen years as House District Committee Chairman this had been the only occasion when such a measure had reached the House floor; during those years Rep. McMillan had stalled in the District Committee seven Senate-passed bills that had provided for some measure of DC self-government, and had ensured that no further action was taken.¹¹ Although McMillan lost the fight on the discharge petition, he had no difficulty in defeating the home rule proponents in the wider battle of getting the measure through the parliamentary procedures necessary for passage. Under his leadership home rule opponents managed through a series of procedural manoeuvres to pass a substitute bill, which enabled the House District Committee members to scuttle the bill in the conference committee. As the years passed, however, it was becoming increasingly difficult to resist the growing pressure within the House and the District Committee membership for the granting of limited forms of representation in DC. In 1960 McMillan had not been able to resist the pressure behind a legislative measure that sought to grant DC residents the right to vote in Presidential elections. The measure was eventually incorporated into

the 23rd Amendment to the US Constitution which was ratified in 1961. Rep. McMillan and his supporters on the House District Committee were not strongly opposed to legislative measures of this type because such measures did not challenge directly Congressional authority over the operation of the DC Government. Similarly, the House District Committee reported two further legislative measures, in 1968 and 1970, which provided for limited forms of DC self-government, *ia*, the right of DC residents to elect an eleven-member Board of Education, and a Delegate to the US Congress respectively. Both measures were not seen as a threat to Congressional authority over DC affairs as the Board of Education performed only administrative functions vis-a-vis the public school system with the District Committees in Congress retaining control over policy-making and the education budget, and the DC delegate had no vote in the House and held no authority over the appointed Mayor-Commissioner and city council.

Contrary to the expectations of DC home rule opponents, however, the passage of the bill granting DC residents the right to elect a non-voting Delegate to the House of Representatives proved to be a significant factor in creating the political climate in Congress that would accept home-rule legislation. The significance of the development had not resulted from the status and influence of the DC Delegate Office, which was as limited as that granted to the US territories of Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands, but from the character and determination of the man who had been elected to the Office, Walter Fauntroy. Fauntroy, a well-known baptist minister in DC and a national figure in the civil rights movement (he had been a close aide of Dr Martin Luther King and had served as coordinator of the Selma to Montgomery march in 1965), emerged as a strong advocate for DC home rule legislation. He marshalled

all his experience as a civil rights campaign organiser in his efforts on behalf of DC home rule. As he recalled when interviewed in 1974, "I came to this whole struggle out of my historical background, my civil rights work in the South."¹² Fauntroy employed his skills as a grass-roots civil rights organiser as soon as he took office in March 1971. He identified that the key to the early consideration of home rule legislation was the removal of Rep. McMillan from Congress and he worked towards this ambitious goal assiduously from the outset. Fauntroy's efforts to get Rep. McMillan unseated predated his election as DC delegate, having campaigned against McMillan amongst black voters in his South Carolina district in the 1970 congressional elections. To the surprise of many observers, and not least Rep. McMillan, the 1972 campaign against McMillan succeeded, with his defeat in the Democratic primary. Fauntroy saw the defeat not as a surprise, but simply the result of a political strategy built upon the reality of changing voting patterns in the South. He explained McMillan's defeat in the following terms, "The situation became susceptible to change as a result of the Voting Rights Act, 1965. I learned in my direction of the Poor People's Campaign in 1969 that 36% of the electorate of Mr. McMillan was black. While that was not enough to throw him out of office, if that black vote were diverted from support of him he would lose his margin of victory. On the basis of that hypothesis we worked through two elections; on the second election we defeated him. The black vote pulled off from him."¹³ Fauntroy was inclined to claim full credit for the defeat of McMillan, and certainly his organisation and development of a network of contacts in South Carolina, i.e., civil rights groups, black ministers and local elected officials, built up the political leverage amongst black voters that caused McMillan's defeat. However, other people had played their part over the years in helping to raise political consciousness amongst black voters in South Carolina's sixth district, and hence had made a

contribution to McMillan's defeat. One of these people had been Rep. Charles Diggs who had campaigned amongst black voters in McMillan's district in the 1970 elections.¹⁴ Interestingly though, Rep. Diggs did not participate in Fauntroy's broader campaign in the 1972 congressional election in McMillan's district. The reason for this was that a state of rivalry had begun to develop between the two men over their perceived roles and responsibilities in Congress in relation to the District of Columbia. The growing friction between Diggs and Fauntroy had implications for the CBC in terms of how it might affect the implementation of its legislative strategy on behalf of DC home rule legislation. In his first eighteen months in Congress, Fauntroy had worked single-mindedly on building momentum behind the Home rule cause, not only in his campaign to defeat McMillan but also in promoting the importance of the issue through his network of civil rights contacts, particularly in the Southern states, and in helping to wield together a national coalition of lobby groups under the umbrella organisation, "Self-Determination for DC". Rep. Diggs, who had worked quietly on the DC Committee for nearly ten years and now found himself on the verge of gaining the committee chairmanship, began to resent the fact that Fauntroy was taking the lead on the home-rule issue and as a newcomer getting the credit on Capitol Hill for forwarding the issue.

As the 93rd Congress opened, therefore, the likelihood of the passage of DC home-rule legislation was uncertain. Although the chairmanship of the House DC Committee had changed hands and the dominance of the Southern Democrat-conservative Republican element on the committee had ended, the traditional, constitutional argument against DC home rule, and the unstated fear of the black majority in the city, were still strongly held by many Congressmen. Furthermore, the CBC, the most united group of legislators in Congress in favour of home-rule

legislation, were temporarily divided. Fortunately, after a publicised, damaging conflict between Diggs and Fauntroy, the CBC worked out a compromise which defined clear lines of responsibility for each man in carrying through the CBC legislative strategy on the DC home rule legislation. As Diggs and Fauntroy would have to take the lead within the CBC on the home rule legislation, it was crucial for the success of the legislative strategy that they work together without personal rivalries intervening. It was hoped that the compromise reached on dividing responsibilities would enable the CBC to work as a united group in operating its legislative strategy on behalf of home rule legislation.

The personal rivalry between Diggs and Fauntroy reached its peak and came to the public's attention in the closing months of the 92nd Congress when it had become apparent that Diggs would gain the DC committee chairmanship in the next Congress. Fauntroy felt that the Congress should move quickly to ensure the passage of DC home rule legislation, and that he should be put in charge of a House District Committee sub-committee that would be responsible for drafting the legislation. Diggs, on the other hand, had no intention of letting Fauntroy set the pace on the issue and resented Fauntroy's strictures on how he, as the new chairman, should organise the work of the House District Committee. Diggs had already drawn up his own plans for the next session, and he had decided upon setting-up a new sub-committee to look into future prospects for DC city government which would be chaired by Rep. Brock Adams (D. Wash 7th). In Diggs's view, it would have been a major tactical error to proceed too rapidly with the home rule issue; he preferred to establish a sub-committee which had the broad remit of reviewing DC government affairs, including taking consideration of the recent Nelson Committee recommendations,¹⁵ before drafting DC self-government legislative proposals. Diggs felt that the successful passage of DC self-government

legislation would depend upon convincing the majority of Congressmen that the federal interest in the city would remain protected. When Diggs made his views public, he was criticised strongly by Fauntroy and other home rule advocates in DC. In an interview in 'Focus' magazine in November 1972, Rep. Diggs expressed the view that the federal and local interests were complexly intertwined and that his role as chairman of the House District Committee would be to devise legislation that acknowledged the legitimate federal interest in the city while devolving the maximum degree of self-government to the local community. He stated, "I represent the link between the federal interest and that of the local community; that link is the vehicle for transferring to the local people the required resources for viable self-determination. . . . You cannot separate them (the federal and local interest). Every time the federal government sneezes, the local government gets economic pneumonia . . . I do not believe that this Congress or the next Congress, if one can anticipate their character, is going to be willing to give up the entire investment of the federal government in this community."¹⁶

As a response to Diggs' published views, Fauntroy began to give speeches that called for immediate home rule, and dismissed the concept of the federal interest by arguing for the abolition of the District of Columbia Committees. In addition to publicising these speeches, the major Washington DC newspapers began to disclose the growing personal conflict between Diggs and Fauntroy. The most damaging newspaper article appeared in the 'Washington Post' in an edition shortly before the new Congress convened, which ran the headline, "Diggs, Fauntroy At Odds. Each Supports Different Plan for Home Rule."¹⁷ The article made the important point that the conflict between the two men had begun to concern pro-home rule members of the House District Committee; they felt that the prospects for the passage of DC home rule legislation in the 93rd Congress

could be undermined by the continuing feud between Diggs and Fauntroy. However, the conflict did spill over into the 93rd Congress when Diggs attempted to stop Fauntroy gaining seniority as a member of the House District Committee. Although Fauntroy was commencing his second term as a committee member, Diggs argued that Fauntroy's status as a Delegate made him ineligible for seniority rights on the Committee. Recalling this development a Fauntroy staffman remarked, "We were genuinely shocked over Digg's opposition."¹⁸ Nevertheless, Fauntroy was quick to react and took his case to Rep. Wilbur Mills, who was chairman of the Democratic Committee on Committees. Fauntroy argued that he should be granted seniority on the District Committee on the grounds that the earlier DC non-voting delegate, Norton Chipman (who had served in Congress during the period 1871-4) had been given committee seniority. After consulting with the Speaker, Carl Albert, Rep. Mills ruled in favour of Fauntroy's plea on the grounds of parliamentary precedent, and his ruling was endorsed by a vote in the Democratic Caucus. Diggs, therefore, faced with this ruling, and the fact that ten of the twenty six District Committee members were new members, was obliged to meet Fauntroy's request, as a second-term member, that he be seated on the sub-committee that would consider the question of home rule legislation. Fauntroy did not achieve his full ambition and gain the sub-committee chairmanship. Diggs assigned the chairmanship to a new Committee member, Rep. Brock Adams, as he had originally intended. It is doubtful, however, that this assignment was made for the purpose of a further snub to Fauntroy by Diggs. Rep. Adams, although a newcomer to the District Committee, was an experienced, five-term Congressman who was a strong supporter of home rule for the District of Columbia. The bruising battle between Diggs and Fauntroy over the seniority question had, in a sense, resulted in a political draw which both men were prepared to accept. Fauntroy had gained his committee

seniority and a seat on the sub-committee of his choice, and Diggs had demonstrated his authority as the new House District Committee chairman by carrying through his plans for the chairmanship and jurisdiction of the sub-committee that would consider the home rule issue. CBC members, as a whole, built upon this situation by persuading Diggs and Fauntroy to accept a division of responsibility between themselves in terms of both their work as District Committee members, and as the key agents in implementing the CBC legislative campaign on behalf of DC home rule legislation. It was resolved that Rep. Diggs would be responsible for the formal leadership on the development of home rule legislation in the House, *ie*, at committee level and through all the parliamentary stages that preceded floor consideration and passage, and that Rep. Fauntroy would be responsible for the informal leadership on the DC home rule issue, *ie*, coordinating support for DC home rule legislation amongst lobby groups at the national level, and amongst civil rights, black elected officials and black voters at the congressional district level. A division of labour drawn on these lines, which reflected the respective relevant experience and skills of each man, it was hoped, would enable the CBC under the leadership of Diggs and Fauntroy to work as an effective force for the passage of DC home rule legislation in the 93rd Congress.

As the new House District Committee Chairman, Rep. Diggs moved quickly to establish a new sub-committee (named 'government operations') and appoint its membership. District Committee staffmen gave credit to their new chairman for employing two important tactical moves in setting-up the new sub-committee. Firstly, it was argued that Diggs was very conscious to avoid projecting the image of DC self-government as being exclusively a civil rights issue. The decision to name the new sub-committee 'government operations' rather than something more explicit was taken because of Diggs' concern to avoid DC self government being

tagged in Congress as a civil rights measure. Rep. Diggs, a veteran of the protracted battles over civil rights legislation within the House in the 1960's, was determined to adopt a low key approach to the development of home rule legislation; in doing so, he was anxious to deprive home rule opponents of the opportunity of labelling the subject as a controversial, civil rights measure, and hence of having an early start in organising opposition to DC self-government amongst traditional conservative elements in the House. Bob Washington, Staff Director of the House District Committee remembered that Diggs was emphatic that, "An important point of strategy was that we had the sub-committee funded and operating before home rule was announced as its jurisdiction."¹⁹ There is cause for some scepticism over this claim for the effectiveness of the tactic of disguising the jurisdiction of the new subcommittee. Any Congressman interested in the question of DC self-government would have been aware of the strong likelihood that home rule legislation would be placed on the District Committee's agenda given Diggs' succession to the chairmanship. Furthermore, the well-publicised conflict between Diggs and Fauntroy had itself focussed attention on the home rule issue at the time when the new sub-committee was established. The second tactic that the District Committee staff claimed that Diggs employed successfully at the outset was that he deliberately packed the Democratic side of the sub-committee membership with strong home rule supporters. In Bob Washington's view, another chairman might have put one or two Democratic members on the sub-committee who were not committed, in principle, to DC home rule, which would have made it difficult for a majority to report out a home rule bill. The validity of this claim depends upon conjecture on whom the Chairman might have been instead of Rep. Diggs. If the Chairman had been either of the two Southern Democrats who were next in line for the chairmanship in committee seniority, *ie*, Rep. John Dowdy (Texas 2nd)

and Rep. Thomas Abernethy (Miss. 1st), but who retired in the session of McMillan's defeat, it would have been extremely unlikely that home rule would have been placed on the agenda, and hence the question of the composition of the sub-committee would have been academic.²⁰ On the other hand, if Diggs had retired or been defeated the chairmanship would have probably passed to Rep. Donald Fraser (Minn. 5th), the fifth ranking Democrat on the Committee. Fraser's record on the District Committee had been that of a consistent supporter of DC self-government. Indeed, Fraser was keen to serve as a member of the new sub-committee established by Diggs. There can be little doubt that he would have appointed an equally strong, pro-home rule sub-committee. However, no matter what Diggs' specific tactics were, or the validity of the claims made for their effectiveness, the real significance of Diggs making an early start in establishing the new sub-committee on government operations was the fact that, as a Black Congressman, he was seen to be changing the direction of the District Committee's work.

As the 93rd Congress opened, the House District of Columbia Committee emerged as a body that bore little resemblance, in terms of structure and composition, to its previous form under McMillan's imprint. In the previous session, the Committee had contained seven conservative Southern Democrats who had dominated the Committee's work and chaired four of the five sub-committees. On Diggs' acquisition of the chairmanship, only one Southern Democrat stayed on the Committee (W. W. Stuckey) and of the six seats previously held by conservative Southern Democrats only three were filled by Southern members. The departure of the senior Southern Democratic members from the Committee enabled Rep. Diggs to seize the opportunity to award sub-committee chairmanships to northern liberal members. In fact, he placed northern Democrats in four of the now six sub-committee chairs (including government operations); two of the sub-committee chairmanships were assigned to

CBC members (Walter Fauntroy, Judiciary Sub-committee, and Ronald Dellums, Education Sub-Committee). The membership of the House District Committee, and the sub-committee on Government Operations (93rd Congress) is listed below.

Diggs gave Rep. Adams full jurisdiction over the working schedule of the sub-committee on government operations i.e. the convening of the hearings, and the drafting of legislation for the consideration of the full committee. Although both he and Ancher Nelsen, the ranking Republican member, were ex-officio sub-committee members, Diggs did not take the lead on DC self-government legislation until the reported measure reached the full committee. However, the sub-committee's work proceeded along the lines that had been originally intended when Diggs first considered Adams for the chairmanship at the end of 1972. When the sub-committee hearings were being conducted, Rep. Adams confirmed that the primary purpose of the sub-committee's work would be to draft legislation that combined the concept of home-rule with recommendations for government reorganisation drawn from the Nelsen Commission report. In opening the hearings of April 3rd, 1974 Rep. Adams disclosed for the first time publicly that this was the general aim of the sub-committee's work; he stated, "It is my feeling that self-government and government reorganization are compatible and can and should proceed together."²¹

After receiving testimony from 17 individuals (including many Congressmen) and 35 organisations, and considering numerous written statements, the sub-committee focussed its work upon the discussion of the twelve bills that had been presented which provided for various forms of government in Washington DC. Amongst those twelve bills was the CBC proposal, introduced by Rep. John Conyers, which provided for an elected mayor and an eleven-member city council with authority to conduct city affairs independently of congressional control and oversight (HR 5211). Conyers' bill represented the ideal goal for DC self-

HOUSE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMITTEE, 93RD CONGRESSChairman

Charles Diggs Jr. (D. Mich 13)

Donald Fraser (D. Minn 5)
 W S Stuckey (D. Ga. 8)
 Ronald Dellums (D. Calif 7)
 Thomas Rees (D Calif 26)
 Brock Adams (D. Wash. 7)
 Walter Fauntroy (Delegate, Wash DC)
 James Howard (D. New Jersey 3)
 James Mann (D S Car 4)
 Romano Mazzoli (D Ky 3)
 Les Aspin (D Wisc 1)
 Charles Rangel (D NY 19)
 John Breckinridge (D Ky 6)
 Fortney H Stark (D Calif 8)

Ancher Nelsen (R Minn 2)
 William Harsha (R. Ohio 6)
 Joel Broyhill (R. Va. 10)
 Gilbert Gude (R. Md 8)
 Henry P. Smith (R NY 36)
 Earl Landgrebe (R. Ind. 2)
 Stewart McKinney (R. Conn 4)
 Gene Taylor (R Mo 7)
 E G Shuster (R Pa 9)
 Robin L Beard (R Tenn 6)
 Steven Symms (R Idaho 1)

Chief of Staff Dorothy Quarker
Chief Counsel Robert B. Washington
Minority Counsel John E Hogan

Sub-Committee on Government OperationsChairman

Brock Adams

Donald Fraser
 Walter Fauntroy
 James Howard
 John Breckinridge
 Charles Diggs (ex officio voting
 member)

Earl Landgrebe
 Joel Broyhill
 Steven Symms
 Ancher Nelsen (ex-officio
 voting member)

Counsel Jacques DePay

- (Source: 1. Congressional Directory 1974 US Government Printing
 Office. Jan 1974
2. Almanac of American Politics, M Barone, G Ujifusa,
 D Matthews. Gambit Books 1973 Boston)

government from the perspective of the CBC, but it was expected that the bill would form the basis for compromise as consideration of other measures in the sub-committee proceeded. Other bills considered by the sub-committee included a proposal from Rep. Donald Fraser which was broadly similar to the CBC sponsored measure, and a proposal from conservative southern Democrat Rep. John Rarick (La. 6th) which would cede most of the District of Columbia back to Maryland. Interestingly, amongst the bills considered was a measure sponsored by CBC member Ronald Dellums which provided for a referendum on the question of statehood for the District of Columbia. Dellums, as a member of the House District Committee since 1970, had been a consistent supporter of statehood for DC, but he accepted that the granting of statehood would be a radical departure that the House District Committee was not likely to recommend, or the House likely to pass. Nevertheless, he placed the referendum measure in the legislative hopper. This was done essentially to broaden the congressional debate on DC home rule, and cannot be read as a sign of disunity over legislative strategy within the CBC. Rep. Dellums supported the elected DC mayor and city council CBC proposal as the best possible measure that might be attainable in the 93rd Congress. After six months of sub-committee deliberations and the consideration of forty-two amendments in the full Committee, the House District Committee finally reported out, on July 31st, 1973, a DC self-government bill which, it was calculated, was the strongest measure that had a good chance of House passage. The assessment of the bill's chances on the House floor was based on the fact that the bill was reported out of the full committee by an overwhelming vote of 20 yeas to 4 nays. However, as has been emphasised above, the District Committee's composition had changed, and its stronger sympathy for DC self-government legislation could not be guaranteed to be reflected in the House membership as a whole. The major battle over DC self-

government had not occurred in the District Committee's deliberations, but would take place throughout the complex parliamentary process of getting the bill to the floor and through the debate without major amendment.

The committee-reported bill (HR 9682) provided for a less autonomous form of DC home-rule than the CBC had proposed in its sponsored bill. The committee bill was a compromise measure that had been drawn up to achieve the maximum bipartisan support within the House District Committee. It reflected the pragmatism of the new chairman, Rep. Diggs. Throughout the committee's deliberations, Diggs had purposefully adopted the pragmatic strategy that he had indicated would be his approach when he discussed his attitude towards the passage of home-rule legislation when interviewed by 'Focus' magazine in late 1972. As Diggs had originally intended, the reported bill established self-government for residents of DC, but also protected the federal interest and preserved the constitutional authority of Congress over the District. While some CBC members, particularly Walter Fauntroy, had been somewhat critical when Diggs had stated publicly his moderate approach at an early stage, there was full CBC support for the committee bill when it was reported in July 1973. The speed with which the District Committee under Diggs' chairmanship had produced a DC self-government measure disarmed his critics, and there was general recognition of the fact that the carefully balanced measure reflected a keen assessment of what was needed to gain a majority vote on the House floor. The principal provisions of the committee bill provided for, (a) the replacement of the Presidentially-appointed DC government by a locally elected city Council and Mayor (elected for four-year terms beginning January 1975), (b) the incorporation of the major governmental reorganisation and modernisation recommendations of the Nelsen Commission²², (c) the granting of the legislative power

over the District of Columbia to the elected Council (from Congress), subject to some protections including authority over local courts, (d) the retaining by Congress of ultimate authority to revoke or modify at any time the actions of the elected city council and delegated bodies in DC, (e) the continued involvement of the Congress in the District's fiscal affairs by retaining appropriations authority over the federal payment²³, (f) a judicial system in which the federal role in the appointments process would be retained (judicial appointments would be made by nominating and tenure commissions which would be composed of, in each case, three Presidential, two congressional, two Mayoral, and two local bar appointees). In its provisions, the House District Committee bill was in fact, a stronger measure than the Senate bill which had been reported out of the Senate District of Columbia Committee earlier in June. In two respects the Senate bill was a weaker home rule measure. Firstly, the Senate bill allowed either the House or Senate by a majority vote to revoke an act of the DC mayor or city council, whereas under the terms of the House bill both Houses of Congress had to vote down a local government act before it was revoked. Secondly, the whole Senate bill constituted the city charter and could not be amended by the elected DC government, whereas in the House bill the city charter was contained within one title (title IV of the bill) and this title could be amended by the DC government without affecting the other provisions of the bill. In containing these two weaker provisions, the Senate bill was similar to those DC self-government measures that the Senate had passed in earlier sessions. House supporters of DC home-rule legislation reflected with some irony on this fact, expressing their belief that the two major flaws within the Senate bill explained how the Senate had always managed to pass home-rule bills relatively easily.²⁴

With a satisfactory home rule bill reported out of the

House District Committee, the CBC were faced with their first opportunity to put into practice their legislative strategy of lobbying fellow Representatives for their support, particularly members who had sizeable black populations in their districts, by coordinating black elected officials, black lobby groups, black businessmen and professionals to exert political pressure at the congressional district level. As had been agreed, Walter Fauntroy took charge of the operation of the grass-roots lobbying strategy, and coordinated the effort from his own Office utilising his own network of contacts established in the South and those networks that had been developed by the CBC professional staff. Before the start of the lobbying campaign the CBC had estimated that the District committee reported bill had about 150 supporters in the House, and most of these supporters were members, mainly Democrats, from northern and western congressional districts. In operationalising the CBC legislative strategy, Fauntroy was convinced of the need to concentrate grass roots lobbying efforts on key southern districts, held by Democrats, where the black voter as a result of the implementation of the 1965 Voting Rights Act constituted more than a quarter of the electorate. Fauntroy believed that the defeat of Rep. McMillan had disturbed several southern Democrats who represented districts containing large black electorates. He felt that to help win the support of black voters in their districts, these southern Democrats might be prepared to vote for DC home rule legislation. Fauntroy explained his views as follows "That act (the defeat of McMillan) sent tremors through other Southern Congressmen who had at least a 25% black electorate. They realised that if the blacks in their districts did what we got the blacks in McMillan's district to do, that they would lose."²⁵ Fauntroy channelled most of his and the CBC staff's efforts into drawing up a target group of Southern Democrats with over 25% black electorates, and establishing an organised lobby of black elected officials

in each of the key districts. In his view, black elected officials were likely to have most impact in persuading Representatives to vote for the DC home rule measure. Fauntroy spelt out his approach to the lobbying exercise in the following way, "My organising for home rule was first to identify the 30 marginal districts where our votes as blacks could impact upon the election of the men. I then organised 1400 black elected officials in these districts into caucuses which called upon these Congressmen to urge them to support the Home Rule bill for DC. Now when these men, some of them were county commissioners, city councillors, state representatives, called on a Congressman, he recognised that this was not just a bush-beard, bead-wearing demonstrator but this was a member who had precinct workers who turned out votes to get them elected. And that if all of these precinct workers got together and decided that he was not to be in the Congress, what happened to McMillan could happen to him."²⁶ In addition, Fauntroy asked each of the 1400 black elected officials to write to their local Congressman and urge support of the Committee reported bill. Examples of the letters sent by black elected officials to Southern Democratic Congressmen, and the Congressmen's letters of reply are contained in DOCUMENTS I (correspondence to and from Rep. Ike Andrews N. Car 4th, Rep. Bill Nichols. Ala. 3rd, Rep. Mendel Davis S. Car. 1st).

While the grass-roots lobbying was gaining momentum, Fauntroy worked with Rep. Charles Rangel (CBC chairman in 93rd Congress) to coordinate the lobbying of fellow Representatives undertaken by CBC members. All CBC members were asked to work informally amongst their own state delegations to gain support for the committee reported home-rule bill. (DOCUMENT II provides an example of a written reminder to CBC members on the strategy of lobbying amongst state delegations). Fauntroy

was also anxious to gain the assistance of the Congressional and national Democratic party leadership in applying pressure upon southern Democrats to vote for the DC home rule measure. Consequently, he wrote to Speaker Carl Albert and Robert Strauss, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee (DOCUMENTS III). In his letters, as a supporting argument for Southern Democrat votes on DC home-rule, he stressed the vulnerability of certain Southern Democratic congressional seats if the black vote deserted the incumbent for a black Independent candidate, and the consequences for the Democratic party in Congress if the Republicans took these seats. In an interview, Fauntroy explained the message that he wanted to get across to the Democratic leaders in the letters, "One of the other things I did was to go to the Democratic leadership and note the fact that as the result of our (black voters) defection from the Democratic party and its candidate, Mr McMillan, a Republican was elected. In any other of the thirty districts, if we had run a black as an Independent in the general election the black candidate would have siphoned off the Democrat's margin of victory. If that were to happen a Republican would come in his place, and at the beginning of this 93rd Congress the Republicans were within 25 seats of taking control of the House, which means that all of the chairmanships go over to the Republican side Therefore, it is important not only to us as blacks but also to the leadership of the House that these places remain Democratic, and if they are to remain Democratic they've got to stay on good terms with blacks in their districts."²⁷ In exercising this latter tactic, Fauntroy proved to be too heavy-handed, particularly in relation to the memorandum to Robert Strauss mentioning the names of Southern Democrats to be lobbied, which became known as 'the Fauntroy list'. It will be seen below that 'the Fauntroy list' would be used by opponents of home rule during the House floor debate to suggest that improper methods had been

applied in forwarding the DC home-rule measure.

The responsibility for the formal leadership on the committee-reported bill rested with Chairman Diggs. After twenty years' service in the House, Diggs faced, for the first time, the task of acting as floor leader on a legislative measure. He approached the task cautiously, therefore, and worked quietly within the established congressional norms to prepare the ground for the passage of the bill. While Fauntroy built up support for the bill by organising external pressure, Diggs launched a personal campaign within the House to win support for the committee bill. He arranged formal appointments with known opponents and 'waverers' on the DC home rule issue and tried to persuade them to support the committee bill. At these meetings, Diggs was always accompanied by the District Committee Chief Counsel, Bob Washington, and occasionally by a CDC member who was from the same state as the member being lobbied. Bob Washington remembered that early September 1973 was spent "endlessly walking the corridors to get the bill passed."²⁸ Diggs even tried to convince staunchly conservative Southern Democrats, men like Rep. Joe Waggoner (La 4th), that they should support home-rule legislation. Essentially, Diggs argued that Southern Democrats could afford to vote for home rule in DC as the issue did not directly affect their constituents back home. There was some feeling in the House that Diggs tried too hard in his personal campaign to win support for the committee bill. It was felt, in some quarters, that Diggs was naive in making formal appointments with members (e.g. Joe Waggoner) who would never vote for DC home rule no matter what the bill's provisions. Jacques DePuy, counsel to the sub-committee on government operations, felt that Diggs made the error of becoming too personally identified with the committee bill, "He wanted this to be his bill. He was a black American who wanted to return Home Rule to DC after one hundred

years. It became a personal thing with him."²⁹ DePuy was critical of Digg's personal management of the committee bill on two counts. Firstly, he felt that Diggs' arrangement of formal appointments with members, accompanied by the District Committee chief counsel, was not a good tactic. He believed that the approach was too formal, particularly in relation to involving the chief counsel, and might have alienated some conservative members. In his view, the more traditional, informal approach of "chatting over lunch, or at the gym" would have been more effective. Secondly, he felt strongly that Diggs should have involved more District Committee members in lobbying informally on behalf of the Committee bill in the House. He apportioned part of the blame here to other committee members, in particular Reps. Fraser and Adams, who deferred to Diggs too often, not wanting to appear to challenge his leadership on the bill.

An important aspect of floor leadership on a legislative measure is scheduling the progress of the bill to the Rules Committee and then to the House floor for debate. Diggs had aimed to bring the committee bill to the House floor by mid-September. However, at the last minute, he changed his mind and put back the schedule for the consideration of the committee bill by three weeks. Diggs extended the schedule in response to an appeal from members of the House Banking and Currency Committee who were about to embark on an official visit to Nairobi, but who did not want to be absent on the vote on the home-rule bill. Diggs' loyalty to those committee members who wanted to vote for the bill led him to agree to a delay in scheduling the committee bill which, with the benefit of hindsight, may have reduced the chances of the committee bill passing through the House without experiencing weakening amendments. It can be argued that by mid-September the political climate within the House was at its most favourable for the passage of the committee

bill. The climate was right for three basic reasons. Firstly, the pressure group lobbying organised by the CBC, under Fauntroy's direction, and national lobby groups, Common Cause, NAACP, SCLC and LSW under the umbrella organisation 'Self Determination for DC', reached its peak at this time; many Congressmen were receiving a significant amount of favourable mail on the home-rule issue from their districts.³⁰ Secondly, Republican opposition to the committee bill was still fragmented and lacking direction. In fact, the major amendments that were to be offered by Reps. Nelsen, Brophy and Democratic member Edith Green (Ore 3rd) in October had not been conceptualised by mid-September. Finally, the "Fauntroy list" had not yet become public, and hence its ramifications had not been felt. However, it cannot be proven that the delay did have a major effect, and hence Diggs' leadership on the home-rule measure should not be judged on the basis of this incident. The most important test of his leadership came in early October when the committee bill finally came before the Rules Committee.

On October 2nd the Rules Committee began its consideration of the committee bill. Because, on October 1st, Reps. Nelsen, Brophy and Green had introduced substitute bills in opposition to the committee bill, the Rules Committee agreed to give three days to the consideration of the committee bill. Rules Committee meetings are rather like hearings, where Committee chairmen put their case for their committee reported bills and seek a favourable rule. The rule recommended by the Rules Committee governs the nature of the procedures that a bill will be subject to during House floor debate. On the first day of the Rules Committee's deliberations Diggs and the District Committee chief counsel testified on behalf of the committee bill and requested a favourable rule, two hours of debate with the committee bill open for amendments. Observers of the first day's proceedings felt that it was at this stage that Diggs'

inexperience of bill management became noticeable. Whereas it was normal practice for committee chairman to present their case alone before the Rules Committee, Diggs chose to have the District Committee chief counsel by his side throughout his testimony. Moreover, Diggs had tended to defer to the chief counsel when questioned on the details of the committee bill. On occasion, the extent of the chief counsel's involvement in the testimony went so far as to lead him, in the words of one observer, into "heady, verbal exchanges" with some members of the Rules Committee. On the second day, the opponents of the committee bill, Reps. Nelsen, Broyhill and Green testified on behalf of their substitute bills. Finally, on the third day, other members of the District Committee supported Diggs' case for the committee bill. At the conclusion of the testimony, the Rules Committee, by a narrow vote of 8 - 6, granted an unusual rule which allowed for four hours of debate and the consideration of the three substitute bills offered by Nelsen, Broyhill and Green.³¹ There was some feeling that this relatively 'bad' rule given to the committee bill reflected Diggs' poor representation of his case before the Rules Committee. However, it is doubtful that one factor explained the rule that was granted. The most plausible explanation was that, on balance, the Rules Committee, in facing the complex question of DC home-rule legislation for the first time, decided on a rule that provided for full discussion of the strongly-held views on the alternative methods of organising DC local government. Clarence Mitchell, the NAACP's senior lobbyist in Congress, who had spent many years observing the behaviour of the House Rules Committee summed up his opinion of the rule given to the committee bill, as follows, "I think it was largely an effort to try and keep everyone happy. Normally, the rule provides that one substitute will be in order. Which would mean that if the boys who are for a different bill can get enough votes it would be in order to offer that. Well, I say

normally, that is almost meaningless, because usually the people who want to offer a substitute don't have enough votes to do it. In this case where three substitutes would be in order, it was a very unusual thing, but I think based more on a desire to get everything out on the table, and let everybody have his chance to do whatever he wanted to do I think that it was just as well in retrospect, (but) I didn't feel that way at the time it happened."³² Rep. Diggs was not surprised by the rule that was granted, as he had become sensitive to the fact, while lobbying informally for the committee bill, that many members were concerned about the constitutional issues that DC home rule raised. Recalling the Rules Committee's decision, he stated, "It was a very controversial matter, it always had been. We had never gotten a Home Rule bill out of Committee, except by the discharge route and that was only on one occasion. And there were some very serious questions. They had never been confronted with this matter before on the Rules Committee. And when they were confronted with a serious effort, then they had to devote some attention to it. There were some very legitimate questions that were raised. There were some genuinely good people here who look upon the Nation's Capital as a federal preserve and can point to a constitutional basis for that view. It is in the Constitution that the Nation's capital is under the jurisdiction of Congress, and any power that anyone else would have, would have to be delegated. And how to protect the federal interest remembering what happened when the Congress was in Philadelphia . . . and the local police, the militia, would not protect Congress. Then there was the recollection of the history of home rule when it was in operation over 100 years ago; unfortunately, the local government was caught up in a public works scandal that resulted in home rule being taken away from the local government. There were those also who felt that a local government would be soft on crime

and law enforcement, and therefore, the people in the Government who lived here would be jeopardised, and the 20 million people who visit here every year who come from constituencies all over the country would have problems with crime in the District. So all of these things came into play."³³

Although, when interviewed in the summer 1974, Rep. Diggs was able to be philosophical about the reasoning behind the Rules Committee's decision, the decision posed serious problems for the committee bill at the time and called for swift action to be taken before the bill reached the floor for debate on October 9th, 1973. As a consequence of the recommended rule, a majority vote for any of the three substitute bills that could be offered on the House floor would effectively scuttle the DC home rule issue in the 93rd Congress.³⁴ Faced with this serious possibility, Diggs decided to negotiate behind the scenes to produce compromise amendments to the committee bill that would undermine support for the substitute bills. Diggs had to weigh the relative value of particular compromise measures in relation to the votes that would be gained for the committee bill. He decided that the concession of incorporating congressional budgetary control into the committee bill would bring in the largest number of votes. In the original committee-reported bill, it was proposed that the elected city council would be responsible for appropriating funds for the District government. Diggs now proposed that the committee bill retained the traditional congressional control over appropriations. In making this compromise, Diggs had virtually faced a Hobson's choice. Rep. William Natcher (D. Ky 2), chairman of the House Appropriations Committee's sub-Committee on the District of Columbia, sensing from the nature of the recommended rule that the committee-reported bill was in trouble, demanded that congressional control of the DC budget, and hence the basis of his prestige and authority in the Appropriations Committee

and the House, be retained in the bill. Natcher made this demand in the knowledge that his influence and seniority within the Appropriations Committee would command which way Appropriations Committee members voted on the home rule measure. Diggs knew, therefore, that his response to Natcher's demand would determine whether over 50 votes were to be gained or lost. Diggs explained how the decision was reached, as follows, "We tried several modifications (of congressional budgetary control) with him without being public about it. I went to see him several times and I had several modifications in order to indicate to the community that we were trying to work out some accommodation. But, in the final analysis, I knew that if these modifications of the role of the DC Appropriations sub-committee were not satisfactory to Natcher, we would just have to leave it as it was, and that's the way it ended up. He examined all the proposals and concluded that he preferred to have it left where it was."³⁵ Having agreed to meet Natcher's demands, Diggs decided, on the advice of Reps. Adams and Fraser, to draw up a "committee substitute" bill which incorporated this compromise. The "committee substitute" bill would be offered at the beginning of the House debate instead of the original committee-reported bill. This parliamentary manoeuvre of offering a compromise "committee substitute" at a late stage, was designed to forestall support for opponents' substitute bills and amendments on the House floor. Before drafting the committee substitute, however, Diggs consulted informally again with those members whose votes he was uncertain of, and agreed to further compromises in the hope of gaining their support. In its final form, the committee substitute bill, in addition to retaining line-item congressional control over the DC budget, contained the following compromise provisions, (a) election of the council and mayor on a non-partisan basis rather than by partisan elections, (b) specific authority to the President to take over control.

of the local police force in an emergency, (c) Senate confirmation of judges appointed to DC courts (under the original committee bill, judges appointed by the mayor were to be confirmed by the city council only), (d) the city council to be prohibited from making changes in the DC criminal code, and (e) no city council action would take effect until 30 days after enactment; during that period, Congress would be able to veto the measure (under the original committee bill the congressional veto was allowed but no specific time period was set).³⁶ Diggs would not disclose which particular individuals had sought these further compromises as the price for their support; he provided only the general answer that the compromises were necessary to win enough votes for passage of the bill. A "Congressional Quarterly" report on the progress of the DC home rule legislation indicated, however, that the compromise provision giving the President emergency authority over the local police was included at the request of the Nixon Administration.³⁷

On Tuesday 9th October when the debate on DC home rule legislation opened, the strategy of introducing a committee substitute bill paid dividends. Diggs and the District Committee staff had held an early meeting in the Majority Whips' Office to get the agreement of the whips to accept the committee substitute bill and to distribute it to House members as they entered the chamber for the debate. An examination of the opening exchanges of the debate demonstrates that the principal opponents of the committee bill felt out-manoeuvred by the introduction of the committee substitute bill. Opponents referred to the committee substitute as a 'clandestine committee print', implying that the substitute had been drawn up in an improper manner, and also sought to have the new bill ruled out of order because there had been insufficient time to digest its contents. Neither of these specific complaints were widely endorsed in the House. Diggs, and the District Committee members involved

in drafting the substitute, had prepared their ground carefully, and this was reflected in the fact that the committee substitute was accepted by a 346 - 50 vote. With the new committee substitute bill accepted for consideration, opponents switched their strategy of attack and raised the issue of the "Fauntroy list".³⁸ For example, Rep. J. Broyhill, reading the worst implications into the lobby pressure that Rep. Fauntroy hoped to apply by sending his memorandum to the Chairman of the National Democratic Committee, Robert Strauss, made the following remark on the House floor, "Let me say this, Mr Chairman, that the idea that any Member of this body would threaten to defeat a colleague because he did not rubber-stamp this legislation brings the discussion of this subject to a new low and is beneath the dignity of the House of Representatives."³⁹ Broyhill's remarks failed, however, to raise the temperature of the debate to the disadvantage of home rule supporters. After a short exchange between Broyhill and Fauntroy, the charges of improper lobbying methods made by Broyhill were dispelled by an effective intervention by Southern Democratic Rep. C. Boggs (La. 2nd) in which she said, "Mr. Chairman, I, of course, along with some of the other Democratic members have heard from many black organisations and black churches and people The letters have been thoughtful, courteous, and very well presented, asking that we give the people of the District of Columbia the right to vote and to be full American citizens, and in no way has there been any undue pressure."⁴⁰

The real test of the effectiveness of Rep. Diggs' strategy of compromise on the original committee bill, and of the CBC's legislative strategy of grass-roots lobbying of 'target' Congressmen, came on the second day of the House debate when the major amendments to the committee substitute bill were offered. The first amendment was put forward by Rep. W. Harsha (Ohio 6th), the second-ranking Republican on

the District Committee. The Harsha amendment sought to remove the power to appoint judges for the District of Columbia courts from the mayor and place the authority with the President. Harsha argued that the appointment and reappointment of DC judges by the elected mayor would subject the judicial system to local political pressure, and hence judicial independence in the District would be undermined. Opponents of the amendment responded that the committee substitute bill already had the safeguard that all judicial nominations were subject to Senate confirmation, and pointed out that the elected mayor would only have authority to nominate judges to the local DC courts, federal court judges would continue to be appointed by the President. When the vote on the amendment was finally taken, there was an early shock for supporters of the Committee bill. The amendment passed with a comfortable majority of votes, 228 - 186. "That first vote on the floor really frightened us," recalled Bob Washington, chief counsel to the District Committee. He added wryly, "Many on Fauntroy's list voted against us there."⁴¹ With hindsight, it can be seen that the passage of the amendment had occurred as a result of the influence of the local judicial establishment. Judges had mounted an extensive, but informal, lobby to preserve the status quo, and particularly security of tenure, in the DC court system. Home rule supporters had seriously underestimated the power of the "judges' lobby" in the House. At the time, however, Rep. Diggs and other key supporters of the home rule measure were extremely worried by the vote on the Harsha amendment and began to doubt whether sufficient concessions had been made in the committee substitute to secure its passage. Some confidence was restored, however, by the vote on the next amendment, which was offered by Rep. Brodyhill (the third-ranking Republican on the District Committee). Brodyhill chose to withdraw his substitute bill, and to offer instead an amendment which would allow either House of Congress or the President

to veto actions taken by the city council. The Broyhill amendment aimed, therefore, to bring the House bill in line with the Senate-passed home rule bill by strengthening the federal veto power over local government actions. The amendment was roundly defeated by a 273 - 138 vote. After this reassuring vote for home rule supporters, the debate turned next to the discussion of the federal nature of the city of Washington, and the separation of the federal city and its functions from local government jurisdiction. Many Congressmen believed strongly, on historical and constitutional grounds, that Washington DC as the seat of the national government was a federal city that belonged to all US citizens, and therefore, should be governed on their behalf by their elected representatives in Congress. Diggs was aware of the depth of feeling on this issue from his informal lobbying on behalf of the committee bill. It was Rep. Edith Green (D. Ore 3rd) who articulated these deeply-held views during the House debate. Although Rep. Green had also decided to withdraw her substitute bill, she introduced an amendment which sought to create a 'federal enclave' within Washington DC that would contain all the major federal buildings and be under federal control. Rep. Green presented her case for a 'federal enclave' with a strong patriotic appeal that was difficult for many Congressmen to resist. On the House floor, she stated, "It is my firm belief that the US Capital belongs to every American citizen on an equal basis whether that citizen lives in California, Indiana, Oregon, Virginia or Maryland; whether that person lives 3,000 miles away, 300 miles away, or 3 miles away and that those citizens should have an equal voice in how their capital is to be governed So, Mr. Chairman, this amendment simply says that we will draw a line around the Federal area and we will have a national director for that area appointed by the President."⁴² Rep. Fraser led the opposition to the Green amendment on the House floor

stating that it was unnecessary as the federal buildings were already under federal control through the Department of the Interior, the General Services Administration and the Architect of the Capitol who were all Presidential appointees. While Rep. Fraser's assertions were correct, the patriotic appeal to Congressmen to not abandon their constituents' interest in the federal city carried the day, and the amendment passed by a narrow vote of 209 - 202. The Green amendment proved, however, to be the last amendment that was successfully made to the committee substitute bill. Three further amendments failed, by a similar margin of votes to the Brodyhill amendment. The most significant of these final amendments were offered by the ranking Republican on the District Committee, Rep. Ancher Nelsen. Racial undertones formed part of the first Nelsen amendment offered, which sought to provide for the Presidential appointment of the Washington DC chief of police rather than appointment by the elected DC mayor; the amendment was defeated by a 273 - 132 vote. Nelsen's second amendment took the form of his substitute bill which he had presented to the Rules Committee; the substitute bill was defeated by a 273 - 144 vote. At the end of the day with the committee substitute bill passed by the House on a 373 - 74 vote, Rep. Diggs strategy of making key concessions was vindicated. Professional observers were generally in agreement that the original committee bill would not have passed, and that the drawing up of a compromise substitute bill had been a sound strategy.⁴³

While Rep. Diggs' strategy as floor leader on the home rule bill had produced results, the CBC's external legislative strategy of applying local pressure in the congressional districts of key Congressmen, particularly Southern Democratic members with large black American constituencies, had tended only to be partially successful. To test the effectiveness of the CBC external legislative strategy on the home rule

issue, Table 19 examines the voting behaviour of the 52 Southern Democrats identified as targets for concerted black political lobbying at the local level on the 'Fauntroy list'. Of the 52 Southern Democrats on the 'Fauntroy list', 30 voted for the final passage of the committee substitute bill. While this was a considerable achievement for the CBC external legislative strategy under Fauntroy's direction, the vote on the final passage was not the crucial test of the degree of support gained from Southern Democrats. Table 19 demonstrates that less than half of the 52 Southern Democrats supported the CBC position and voted against the first four major weakening amendments that were offered on the House floor. Moreover, in the case of the two amendments that were accepted (the Harsha, and Green amendments, Votes 1 and 3) Southern Democratic support for the CBC position was confined to a small minority (8 votes and 14 votes respectively). The evidence in Table 19 suggests that the grass-roots lobbying aspect of the CBC legislative strategy has a limited effectiveness. In the case of the home-rule issue this may have resulted from the fact that, in some quarters, it was felt that Fauntroy employed the strategy too abrasively and publicly, which may have led certain members to feel over-lobbied and hence had a counter-productive effect. On the other hand, the failure of many Southern Democrats to respond to black elected officials and voters lobbying at the local level demonstrates simply that, in their calculations for re-election, the black vote, inspite of their districts containing large black populations, does not constitute a significant factor in the body of voters that regularly puts them in office. Fauntroy, himself, was unperturbed by the lack of support of some Southern Democrats, and was optimistic for the results of the future application of the grass-roots lobbying strategy. His views on the effectiveness of the CBC lobbying strategy were clear, "The result was that, on the vote on Home rule, 30

(continued on page 314)

VOTING BEHAVIOUR OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON FAUNTROY'S LIST ON DC SELF-
GOVERNMENT BILL (SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS)

TABLE 19

		VOTE 1	VOTE 2	VOTE 3	VOTE 4	VOTE 5	VOTE 6	VOTE 7
	<u>ALABAMA</u>							
3rd	Nichols	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
7th	Flowers	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
	<u>ARKANSAS</u>							
1st	Alexander	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
2nd	Mills	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
4th	Thornton	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	<u>FLORIDA</u>							
2nd	Fuqua	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y
3rd	Bennett	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
4th	Chappell	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
5th	Gunter	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y
8th	Haley	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
11th	Rogers	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
1st	Sikes	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
	<u>GEORGIA</u>							
1st	Ginn	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y
2nd	Mathis	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
6th	Flynt	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
7th	Davis	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
8th	Stuckey	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y
9th	Landrum	Y	Y	Y	Y	O	Y	N
10th	Stephens	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y

TABLE 19 (CONT'D)

		VOTE 1	VOTE 2	VOTE 3	VOTE 4	VOTE 5	VOTE 6	VOTE 7
	<u>KENTUCKY</u>							
1st	Stubblefield	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
2nd	Natcher	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
	<u>LOUISIANA</u>							
1st	Hebert	Y	Y	Y	Y	O	O	N
2nd	Boggs	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y
4th	Waggoner	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
5th	Passman	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
6th	Rarick	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
7th	Breaux	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
8th	Long	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y
	<u>MISSISSIPPI</u>							
1st	Whitten	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
2nd	Bowen	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
3rd	Montgomery	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
	<u>SOUTH CAROLINA</u>							
1st	Davis	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
3rd	Dorn	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y
5th	Gettys	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
	<u>TEXAS</u>							
1st	Patman	Y	O	N	O	N	N	N
2nd	Wilson	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
4th	Roberts	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
6th	Teague	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
9th	Brooks	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
10th	Pickle	N	N	Y	O	O	O	Y

TABLE 19 (CONT'D)

	VOTE 1	VOTE 2	VOTE 3	VOTE 4	VOTE 5	VOTE 6	VOTE 7
<u>TEXAS</u>							
11th Poage	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
12th Wright	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
14th Young	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
15th La Garza	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y
16th White	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
17th Burleson	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
19th Mahon	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
20th Gonzalez	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y
21st Fisher	Y	Y	Y	Y	O	Y	N
22nd Casey	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N
23rd Kazen	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
24th Milford	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y
CBC POSITION	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y

All CBC members voted the
CBC position (no disunity
or absence)

SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS	VOTE 1	VOTE 2	VOTE 3	VOTE 4	VOTE 5	VOTE 6	VOTE 7
FOR CBC	8	25	14	24	34	28	30
AGAINST CBC	43	25	37	25	13	21	21
ABSENT	1	2	1	3	5	3	1
TOTAL	52	52	52	52	52	52	52

KEY Y. = Voted for, Paired for.
 N = Voted against, Paired against
 O = Absent, not voting

Vote 1

Harsha (R. Ohio) amendment to the committee substitute amendment to provide for Presidential appointment of judges to the DC Court of Appeals and the DC Superior Court, rather than appointment by the DC mayor.

ADOPTED 228 - 186 R 145 - 36; D 83 - 150
(ND 26 - 127; SD 57 - 23)

Vote 2

Broyhill (R. Va) amendment to the committee substitute amendment to allow either chamber of Congress or the President to veto actions taken by the city council.

REJECTED 138 - 273 R 102 - 80; D 36 - 193
(ND 5 - 145; SD 31 - 48)

Vote 3

Green (D. Ore) amendment to the committee substitute amendment to create a federal enclave containing most of the federal buildings and lands in the District of Columbia to be supervised by a national service Director to be appointed by the President.

ADOPTED 209 - 202 R 128 - 51; D 81 - 151
(ND 30 - 120; SD 51 - 31)

Vote 4

Nelsen (R. Minn) amendment to the committee substitute amendment to provide for Presidential appointment of the city's chief of police rather than appointment by the DC mayor.

REJECTED 132 - 275 R 96 - 84; D 36 - 191
(ND 5 - 144; SD 31 - 47)

Vote 5

Hogan (R. Md) amendment to the committee substitute amendment to limit the National Capital Planning Commission's planning authority to the District of Columbia, thus excluding parts of Maryland and Virginia.

REJECTED 130 - 278 R 103 - 75; D 27 - 203
(ND 6 - 146; SD 21 - 57)

Vote 6

Nelsen (R. Minn) substitute amendment to the committee substitute amendment that would provide for an 8-member elected city council but continue Presidential appointment of the mayor.

REJECTED 144 - 273 R 105 - 80; D 39 - 193
(ND 8 - 145; SD 31 - 48)

Vote 7

Passage of bill (HR 9682), as amended by the committee substitute, to provide for the non-partisan election of a 13 member city council and a mayor by the residents of DC and to reorganise DC Government.

PASSED 343 - 74 R 138 - 47; D 205 - 27
(ND 150 - 2; SD 55 - 25)

Southern Democrats said to the conservative coalition, 'We are sorry fellows, but we got so much pressure on us on this matter we are going to vote for Home rule'. 30 votes from the opposition means 60 votes because it means 30 votes added to our position. And with those votes we broke the coalition of the Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans. Admittedly, it was broken on an issue which had little relevance for the racist elements in their own districts, but our thinking was that if we could do that on the home rule bill, then could we not also do that on other pieces of national legislation."⁴⁴

Rep. Diggs' compromise committee substitute bill stood the test of the conference committee deliberations, and the Senate conferees agreed generally to the provisions of the House passed bill. The District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganisation Act was signed into law by President Nixon on December 24th, 1973. Undoubtedly the passage of legislation that provided for even limited home rule in the District of Columbia, within one year of the removal of Rep. McMillan from the chairmanship of the House District Committee, was a significant achievement for Rep. Diggs, the CBC and House home rule supporters. However, there was some criticism expressed in the DC community that Rep. Diggs, particularly, had given away too many unnecessary concessions in drawing up the compromise committee bill. For example, the DC Statehood Party dismissed the legislation as "half rule, not home rule - a parliamentary placebo in place of true local autonomy".⁴⁵ In addition, there were some House insiders who felt that while the budgetary control concession to Natcher was vital, the other five concessions included in the committee substitute need not have been made to secure passage of the bill. Jacques DePuy, for example, suggested that, in addition to congressional budgetary control, only the concession on the prohibition of the city council from making changes in the DC criminal code may have been

necessary to get the committee substitute bill accepted. He conceded, however, that this conjecture was made with the benefit of hindsight, and that it would have been a risky venture at the time. Rep. Diggs was certainly in no doubt that Rep. Natcher's demands on line-item congressional budgetary control had to be met if a home rule measure was to pass successfully through Congress. Reflecting on the drafting of the committee substitute, he stated, "Bill Natcher has only lost one fight since I have been around here There are several keys to the success of this legislation. The substitute bill that we offered made about six changes which pulled in various groups. But Bill Natcher, if I were to pick any one key person out of this whole operation who had to be satisfied in order to get support, it was Bill Natcher. And I had no problems with that matter."⁴⁶ Disagreements over the necessity of the compromises made in the 1973 DC self-government legislation will probably continue to be voiced until complete home rule and full congressional representation is finally granted to the District of Columbia. The final statement on the debate on the necessity of the compromises reached by Diggs is, perhaps, best left to Clarence Mitchell, the seasoned NAACP lobbyist who had witnessed several congressional struggles over the final passage of controversial legislation, "It's like a football game. Monday morning, you can always see various plays that weren't visible at the time the game was taking place. My feeling is that you had a group of members of Congress trying to get the bill through. They were faced with the practical question, "Where will we get the votes?" And such compromises that they made were made in terms of being able to get an acceptable bill. I would say, if Congressman Diggs reached the conclusion that the financing had to be the way that it now appears in order to get the bill through, I think that would be his judgement based on the facts that only he could know.

I would say most committee chairmen are very much aware of what kind of changes need to be made in order to get support, and what changes you can ignore because you have got a reasonable chance of overriding them with votes."⁴⁷

The case study of the passage of the DC self-government legislation in the 93rd Congress demonstrates that the CBC were able to achieve a degree of success on a CBC priority issue when a member of the group held a senior position within the committee system. The fact of Rep. Diggs' chairmanship of the House District of Columbia Committee constituted the principal factor in explaining the CBC's success in forwarding the DC home rule issue. The operation of the CBC legislative strategy of grass-roots lobbying at the congressional district level was only able to play a secondary, supportive role to Diggs' informal negotiations on behalf of the home rule measure in the House. It was essentially the compromises that Diggs, exercising his powers as committee chairman, was able to make on the committee bill that led many Southern Democrats to decide to give their support to the home rule measure and hence ensured the passage of the legislation. The case study points particularly, therefore, to the limitations of the CBC's ability to act as a group in forwarding its legislative goals within Congress. In spite of the CBC's efforts in working as a group to jointly sponsor a DC home rule bill, and to build up support for the measure by drawing upon the network of black political contacts developed by the CBC professional staff, and the liaison between CBC chairman Rangel and Rep. Fauntroy to ensure that all CBC members lobbied for support for DC Home rule amongst their colleagues in their state delegations, the successful passage of the legislation in the House resulted principally from the work of an individual CBC member who occupied a strategic position in Congress. The 1974 DC Self-Government

Act passed because Diggs, as committee chairman, commanded the authority to negotiate with the party leadership and other senior, influential Members a compromise measure that would gain majority support within the House. Furthermore, the experience of the DC home rule legislation tends to suggest that CBC priority legislation in its original form, given the current numerical strength of the group, is unlikely to be steered successfully through Congress, even if individual CBC members hold key committee positions and the legislation at issue is a minor concern in terms of national policy.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Fieldwork Interview, Rep. Charles Diggs (D. Mich. 13th) July 17th, 1974. Washington DC.
2. Fieldwork Interview. Rep. Walter Fauntroy (DC delegate) June 27th, 1974. Washington DC.
3. James Madison, Federalist paper No. 43. "The Federalist Papers" (Mentor Books edition, New York 1961) pp. 272 - 3.
4. Sam Smith, "Captive Capital. Colonial Life in Modern Washington" (Indiana University Press. Bloomington/London 1974) pp. 44 - 5.
5. S. Smith, op. cit. p. 51.
6. Fieldwork Interview, Clarence Mitchell, Executive Director of the NAACP. July 17th, 1974. Washington DC.
7. Mitchell interview.
8. In 1967 President Johnson, under his presidential authority, reorganised DC city government and replaced the appointed Board of Commissioners with an appointed Mayor-Commissioner and city council. The reorganisation plan added no new powers to the

District of Columbia Government and did not alter its relationship with Congress. The Mayor-Commissioner assumed all the executive and administrative responsibilities that were previously exercised by the appointed three-member Board. The appointed nine-member city council received ordinance-making and regulatory powers and reviewed the budget before its submission to the President and Congress. Tables 18 parts, A, B and C refer to this reorganised, appointed mayor-council type of government. The only significant development that emerged from the reorganisation was that, for the first time, the President appointed a black American to the DC Government. Walter E. Washington was appointed as Mayor-Commissioner in 1967, and was reappointed by President Nixon in 1969 and 1973.

9. Diggs interview.
10. Diggs interview.
11. The seven legislative measures died in the House District Committee in the following years - 1949, 1951, 1953, 1955, 1958, 1959 and 1962.
12. Fieldwork Interview. DC delegate Walter Fauntroy, June 27th, 1974. Washington DC.
13. Fauntroy interview.
14. Diggs' campaigning in McMillan's South Carolina sixth district is cited in "Making Congress Work" by Ralph Nader, in 'New Republic' magazine, edition of April 21/28th, 1971.
15. The Nelsen Commission on the Organisation of the DC Government was set up as a result of a bill passed through Congress on the initiative of the House District Committee. Under the chairmanship of Rep. Ancher Nelsen (R. Minn. 2nd) the Commission examined efficiency in the District of Columbia, and reported its recommendations in 1972. The Commission's recommendations were concerned with improving the operation of the appointed Mayor and city council system of DC government; consideration of proposals for self-government was not a responsibility of the Commission. Rep. Ancher Nelsen was the ranking Republican member on the House District Committee, and a major opponent of home rule legislation.

16. Rep. Diggs quoted from 'Focus' article entitled "Official Word" ('Focus' Vol 1, No. 1, November 1972. Joint Centre for Political Studies, Wash. DC, 1972. p. 6).
17. 'Washington Post'. December 31st, 1972, pp. B1 and B3.
18. Fieldwork Interview. Harly Daniels, Legislative aide to DC delegate, Walter Fauntroy. July 23rd, 1974, Wash. DC.
19. Fieldwork Interview, Bob Washington, Staff Director of the House District of Columbia Committee. July 3rd, 1974. Wash. DC.
20. Thomas Abernethy, the second-ranking Democrat, decided to retire and return to Mississippi (at the relatively early age of 64). John Dowdy, the third-ranking Democrat, was convicted on federal bribery and perjury charges and left the House. (Almanac of American Politics, M. Barone, G. Ujifusa, D. Matthews, 1974, Gambit Books Inc., Boston, p. 497).
21. "Hearings before the Subcommittee on Government Operations" 93rd Congress, first session, April 3rd, 1973. Part I (US Government Printing Office. Wash. DC 1973) p. 119.
22. The committee bill proposed to implement the recommendation of the Nelsen Commission that authority over many federal agencies in DC be transferred to the Mayor and the City Council (i.e. the Redevelopment Land Agency, National Capital Housing Authority, the local planning functions of the National Capital Planning Commission, and the DC Manpower Administration). Hence, the existing fragmented authority over planning, redevelopment, housing and manpower programmes (see Table 18C) would be transferred to the local government. The major difference between the committee bill's proposals on the implementation of the Nelsen Commission's recommendations, and the recommendations of the Nelsen Commission as expressed in its own report, was that under the committee bill the authority over federal agencies would be transferred to the elected Mayor and city council, whereas the Nelsen Commission report envisaged that the presidentially-appointed commissioner system of DC government would continue.
23. The federal payment constitutes the annual payment that Congress makes to the DC Government to cover the 'costs' to the city of the presence of the federal government within its boundaries.

The predominance of federal government property in the District (over 50% of property in DC is federal property and enjoys tax exempt status in relation to the local government) reduces the tax base of the city government, and places more demands on local services e.g. police force, fire brigade, road programmes and other public utilities. To compensate for the loss of the tax base etc., the Congress contributes an annual federal payment which amounts to, approximately, one quarter of the city's total revenues. Many DC residents have felt that over the years the federal 'costs' have grown (particularly in relation to the growth of the tourist traffic in the city) and that the federal payment as a proportion of the total budget has become inadequate. As evidence of these increased 'costs', the higher local purchase tax in DC compared to the surrounding states is often cited. On the other hand, the presence of the federal Government in DC does provide the major source of employment and forms the mainstay of the local economy.

24. The remarks of Rep. Diggs on the House floor when the conference report on the DC self-government measure was finally being considered in December 1973 demonstrated his surprise over the discovery that the Senate's consistent support for DC home rule was not as strong as he always thought it to be. "In the give and take of this conference report, Mr. Speaker, we note that some of the strongest feelings on the part of some of us have been set aside. For example, on congressional veto, the Senate was very strong on that and as a matter of fact I think I learned for the first time the real reason the Senate has been able to pass home rule in the past so expeditiously is because it was just felt in the other body that as long as there is a veto apparatus, as long as there is a congressional process to correct what they might consider to be a misaction on the part of a local legislative body, then they were inclined to be generous about it." (Congressional Record, 93rd Congress, first session. VOL. 199, No. 198. Monday, 17 December 1973. P. H11509).
25. Fauntroy interview.
26. Fauntroy interview.
27. Fauntroy interview.
28. Washington interview.

29. Fieldwork interview, Jacques DePuy. Counsel to the House District of Columbia Committee, Sub-Committee on Government Operations. July 3rd, 1974. Wash. DC.
30. 'Self-Determination for DC' was a coalition of 51 national and 60 local organisations. In addition to the CBC the other organisations that played a major part within this umbrella group to forward the home rule issue were;- Common Cause, National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, League of Women Voters, the United Auto Workers and other trade unions.
31. An interesting background note to the close vote in the Rules Committee was provided by Jacques DePuy, counsel to the sub-committee on government operations. In his view, the group of Rules Committee members, led by Rep. Richard Bolling (D. Mo. 5th), who were willing to grant the favourable rule requested by Diggs, might have won the day had it not been for two intervening factors. Firstly, throughout the three days of deliberations, Speaker Carl Albert, who was in favour of the committee reported bill on home rule, was in London attending a conference. In his absence, Albert's "man on the Rules Committee", Rep. Clem McSpadden from his home-state of Oklahoma, voted the wrong way. Secondly, the only absence from the Rules Committee on the day of the vote was Rep. John Anderson (R. Ill. 16th). Anderson had indicated privately that he was in favour of the passage of the committee bill. DePuy speculated that when it became apparent that the vote in the Rules Committee was going to be close, the Republican leadership placed pressure on Anderson to lose interest in the home rule issue. (DePuy interview, op. cit).
32. Clarence Mitchell interview.
33. Diggs interview.
34. The three substitute bills, in varying degrees, sought to maintain the appointed commissioner system of DC government, and preserve strict congressional authority over the District particularly in relation to fiscal policy. The Nelsen substitute proposed to retain the presidentially-appointed mayor and would continue presidential appointment of judges. The substitute would also retain congressional authorisation and appropriations

procedures relating to District funds and the federal payment. The Nelsen Commission recommendations on the reorganization of DC government were incorporated in the bill. Congress would retain most of its local legislative responsibilities for the District, with an elected local council performing minor functions, but even these limited powers would be subject to congressional or presidential veto. The Green substitute contained the basic features of the Nelsen bill, except for the deletion of the provisions relevant to the Nelsen Commission recommendations, and the retention of the presidentially-appointed Council. The substitute would also enable the state of Maryland, if it wished, to acquire the bulk of the District of Columbia as part of the state. In this event, the bill would provide Maryland with two additional Congressmen and \$200 million a year for ten years. The Broyhill substitute proposed to divide the District into two distinct entities, 'the federal city of Washington', and the 'city of Washington'. The federal city, containing the major federal buildings, would be governed under Congressional authority, and the city of Washington would be governed by an elected local Government. The President would continue to appoint judges to the DC court system.

(Sources: HR 10692, HR 10693, and HR 10597).

35. Diggs interview.
36. Diggs drafted the compromise provisions in consultation with 14 House District Committee members (including three Republicans). These fifteen members signed a "Dear Colleague" letter announcing the compromises and the introduction of the committee substitute bill, which was distributed to House members on October 9th, the day the debate on DC home rule commenced ('Congressional Record' Vol. 119, No. 150, 93rd Congress, first session. 9th October, 1973. p. H8701).
37. 'Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report' October 13th, 1973 (Congressional Quarterly Inc., Wash. DC). p. 2751.
38. In early October, Rep. James Stanton (D. Ohio 20th) had learned that he was on Fauntroy's list of members to be lobbied on the home rule issue that had been sent to Robert Strauss (see DOCUMENTS III). He was infuriated by the abrasive tone of

the memorandum and the bluntness of the lobbying strategy proposed, and consequently he obtained a copy of the memorandum and placed it in the 'Congressional Record'. The Washington press then proceeded to publish the contents of the memorandum, and a public debate on the ethics of the lobbying strategy proposed by Fauntroy ensued.

39. 'Congressional Record' Vol. 119. No. 150. 93rd Congress, first session. 9th October 1973. p. H8727.
40. 'Congressional Record' op. cit. p. H8732.
41. Washington interview.
42. 'Congressional Record' Vol. 119, No. 151, 93rd Congress, first session. 10th October 1973. p. H8831.
43. For example, the 'Congressional Quarterly' in reporting the passage of the home rule bill in the House, stated, "Acceptance by Diggs of the compromise provisions probably staved off the adoption of one of three substitute bills, all weaker than the version finally approved by the House." (Weekly Report, October 13th, 1973 p. 2750). Congressional Quarterly Inc. Wash. DC, 1973.
44. Fauntroy interview.
45. Smith 'Captive Capital' op. cit. p. 136.
46. Diggs interview.
47. Mitchell interview.

PART FOUR

CONCLUSION

Chapter 9: The CBC, its past and future role in Congress

Chapter 9

The CBC: its past and future role in Congress

The election of a Black Congressman has been a comparatively rare political phenomenon in United States political history. By the 96th Congress there had only been 49 black Americans elected to Congress. Twenty-two of these Black Congressmen were seated in Congress during the short-lived era of Reconstruction in the Southern States. In the 20th Century, twenty-six Black Congressmen have been elected, at various times, from seventeen congressional districts, and only one black American has gained a seat in the Senate. Until the late 1950's, with the exception of the 44th Congress when eight Black Representatives were elected, there were rarely more than one or two Black Congressmen seated in the House. Black Congressmen, with few exceptions, have recognised the implications of their minority status as representatives of their race in Congress and have accepted the obligation to speak on behalf of the black American population as a whole, articulating their grievances and aspirations. The extent to which individual Black Congressmen have developed the role of acting as national spokesmen for the black American minority has varied in accordance with their political backgrounds, political style and character. When the reapportionment of congressional districts occurred in the 1960's, the growth in the number of Black Congressmen elected to the House of Representatives provided the opportunity to institutionalise the traditional role of acting as national black spokesmen that had been played by individual Black Congressmen by the formation of a political caucus that would represent collectively black American interests in Congress. The Congressional Black Caucus was established in 1970 essentially through the efforts of the newly-elected, civil rights-experienced black Representatives who felt the need to fill the

black leadership vacuum that had developed following the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. and the demise of the national civil rights movement that he had led. Black Representatives were drawn together into a political caucus by the recognition of the shared interests and problems of their black constituents who lived in the poor, inner-city quarters of the major US metropolitan areas. The formation of the CBC was a statement of independence which reflected the growing mood of self-reliance in the black American community that was sceptical of the extent of the commitment of the major political parties to protect the gains made by the civil rights movement and, more importantly, to move on to tackle the crucial economic factors that determined patterns of segregation and disadvantage based on residency and employment. Although all the CBC members were elected as Democrats, the establishment of the CBC was intended to demonstrate that black Representatives were not married to the Democratic Party in Congress, but that their principal concern was to represent the shared interests of their black constituents, which they perceived to reflect largely the political interests of the black American minority as a whole. The underlying philosophy of the CBC was embodied in Rep. William Clay's words when he first announced publicly the launching of the CBC in 1970 - "We have no permanent friends and no permanent enemies, only permanent interests."

Throughout the ten years of its existence, the CBC has generally adhered to this stated philosophy and has developed as an independent voice for black Americans in national politics. It has worked as effectively as possible, given a limited membership, as an internal lobby for black American interests within the Congressional Democratic party and the committee system. Although for much of their time, CBC members, in their congressional behaviour, have found themselves in the ranks of the urban, liberal group of the Democratic Party, they have not

hesitated to take an independent course on behalf of black American interests where they have felt this to be necessary. In the early years this independent action took the form of instigating 'ad hoc' congressional hearings to draw attention to black American issues that were being ignored by Congress, e.g. racial discrimination in the military services. As the group's congressional tactics matured, the CBC developed a legislative strategy which involved devising an annual legislative agenda; voting en bloc for priority legislation when it reached the House floor; creating a national network of contacts with black local elected officials, black businesses, black church and civil rights organisations, professional and lobby groups for the purpose of consultation on legislative priorities, and mobilisation of black political support behind CBC-supported legislation at the federal and local level; and, most importantly, securing and maintaining broad representation on the major standing committees in the House. In many respects the CBC legislative strategy has proved to be too ambitious and has yet to prove its effectiveness in terms of producing the desired legislative output, but given its limitations, the development of a legislative strategy has been a significant achievement and its approach reflects a sound assessment of the options open to a small group of legislators who wish to maximise their impact on the legislative process.

In identifying a role for the CBC in the House, the CBC membership have not always been in agreement among themselves. Although the CBC and its staff in their public pronouncements have fostered an image of group unity and cooperation, and the mass media have tended to depict the CBC as a monolithic group, the reality has been that many internal disagreements have occurred, particularly in the early years, between senior and junior members over the scope and objectives of the CBC's activities. Compromises have had to be reached for both the

sake of unity and group effectiveness. The originally planned external role of the CBC, which envisaged filling the black national leadership gap left by the civil rights movement, proved impossible and the CBC agreed to narrow its focus to work exclusively within the national legislature. While recognising the limitations upon their ability to provide leadership outside Congress, most CBC members have deliberately approached their work as legislators from a national rather than a local perspective. Black Caucus members have assumed a unique role in the House of Representatives by acting as national politicians rather than the more usual role of representatives of parochial interests. The basic similarities in the racial make-up, and socio-economic problems of their congressional districts enables CBC members to adopt a national view of the legislative needs of the black American population. They can behave as national politicians without the fear of reprimand from their electorate. Undoubtedly, the CBC, over its first ten years, has firmly established itself in the public eye as a body of national politicians who address themselves to the problems and issues that concern the black American minority, and who seek to devise and promulgate national legislative remedies to tackle those problems.

Within Congress, the CBC has worked as an internal lobby for black American political interests and has been accepted as such by the Democratic party leadership, who have recognised the need to accommodate CBC members' views and ambitions as the group has gained stature and has demonstrated that it would not be a temporary phenomenon. As a group, the CBC have successfully negotiated with the party leadership the implementation of their strategy of getting black Representatives on all the major congressional standing committees and party committees, so that black American viewpoints can be constantly voiced throughout the various stages of the legislative process in the House. The permanent

presence of the CBC, with its elected officers and professional staff, has provided a valuable point of access to black American political opinion for the congressional party leadership, individual congressmen and the Administration. It has also provided an important focal point for the coordination of black American interest groups' lobbying of the federal Government. The CBC professional staff have established an extensive network of communications with black American lobby groups at the national level (SCLC, NAACP and NUL) and their local offices, and local black elected officials, black businesses and professional groups which can be activated to maximise black political pressure on national issues of importance to the black American minority. In the past, a major inhibition to the effectiveness of black American lobbying has simply been the fact that there have been few lobby organisations and their activities have been relatively uncoordinated and restricted to the individual efforts of a handful of full-time lobbyists who have had to negotiate access on each legislative issue. The work of the CBC and its staff has begun to fill a major need in coordinating black lobbying efforts and providing a permanent point of access to the national legislature. There remains much potential in this aspect of the CBC's role that has yet to be developed.

While the functional aspects of the CBC's role are being developed, inevitably at a slow pace given the group's limited membership and resources, the CBC's symbolic role within Congress will continue to assume major importance. Since its establishment, the CBC has used Congress, given the constant press attention that it receives, as a national platform from which to publicise the group's aims and objectives, and articulate the concerns of the black minority. By using Congress as a vehicle of publicity for the group's activities the CBC is demonstrating constantly to Black Americans the possibilities that can develop from

greater black participation in the political process. Many CBC members and their staff, when interviewed, emphasised the importance of the symbolic function of the CBC in terms of raising black political consciousness. When Rep. Rangel was CBC chairman in 1974/5, George Dalley, his legislative aide, stated that Rangel regularly encouraged CBC members to be highly visible in Congress and keep CBC activities in the public eye - "The CBC likes to blow its own horn, as it does, not because of the desire for self-enhancement of its own members - every member wants to be elected and likes to look good - but because the real purpose of the CBC is a little symbolic. It is to encourage the unregistered black person to participate in the political process by showing him that black politicians can be effective. That way, when he comes to a registration van, he might think about voting. This is an important function."¹

However, as the CBC's presence in Congress begins to span a long period the placing of too much emphasis by its members on the symbolic role may start to have counterproductive effects in the sense that the heightened expectations engendered in the black American community will subside into disillusionment as the CBC's legislative efforts fail to deliver major tangible benefits. It could be argued that, after ten years, this point might have been reached. Some CBC members have felt that black American disillusionment with the legislative process would be inevitable, particularly given the fact that a plateau in national black representation was reached in the mid-1970's when all the majority-black congressional districts had elected Black Congressmen. Rep. John Conyers held this view in 1974, and stated in blunt terms the problem facing black Representatives, "We are only 16 here, battling against over 400".² Considerable evidence could be cited from the CBC's legislative experience in its first ten years to support Rep. Conyers' pessimistic assessment. The CBC has been unable to deliver any of the major priority

legislative goals as presented in their original form in the publicly announced annual legislative agenda. The above legislative case study of the 1973 DC Home Rule Act demonstrated that the CBC, even where a member held the chairmanship of the relevant standing committee, had to negotiate major compromises that reduced the CBC priority legislation to a shadow of its original form in order to secure the passage of a bill through Congress. Other major pieces of CBC priority legislation introduced in subsequent sessions, in particular measures to save the Office of Economic Opportunity from abolition and to establish a major public jobs programme (the Humphrey - Hawkins full-employment bill³) have suffered substantial modification to gain majority support to secure passage. Nevertheless, most CBC members, on examining the evidence of the group's legislative achievements, err on the side of optimism believing that the compromises reached, while far from the desired legislative outcomes, have represented positive steps towards the realisation of the group's political agenda. Rep. Andrew Young best expressed the optimistic view, reflecting on his earlier experience as a civil-rights worker, as follows;- "I learnt in the civil rights movement that progress in this country tends to be symbolic. I can remember being very discontented with the civil rights bill of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act 1965, because it didn't have all the enforcement powers and everything I would have liked. But by the fact of its passage, it became a symbol which made sweeping changes in both areas. So, in some ways, the legislative process is a lot more effective than it appears to be. Because it is symbolic of a mood which is more powerful. When the Congress begins to do something, it mobilises the opinion of intellectuals, it forces a response in the business community, it becomes the focus of a lot of media reporting and research, and it is essentially an educational process. It works that way. So the things that seem to be very limited,

almost toothless, kinds of legislation can end up, in fact, being very powerful."⁴

Andrew Young's optimism applied also in relation to his belief that the CBC and the black American minority generally would benefit from the replacement of the Ford Administration by a Democratic Administration. Many CBC members shared his belief that the CBC would be able to play a positive role under a Democratic Administration and have more influence over national policy-making. During the Nixon and Ford Administrations the CBC had played largely a defensive role, protecting the political gains of the 1960's: indeed, a major motivating force behind the formation of the CBC had been black American opposition to the policies of the Nixon Administration. When Democratic candidate, Jimmy Carter, was elected to the Presidency in 1976, the CBC hoped for new leadership from the Executive Branch on the kinds of legislative issues that the group had sponsored in Congress with limited success. An immediate effect that the new Administration had upon the CBC was the appointment by President Carter of Rep. Andrew Young as the US Ambassador to the United Nations. In making the appointment, President Carter was acknowledging the significant role that Andrew Young had played in campaigning for a strong black American vote for Carter which, it has been argued, provided Carter with his margin of victory. The selection of Andrew Young for the UN post was met with mixed feelings within the CBC membership and the black American political community. There was some feeling that his appointment to a foreign policy-making position was an important step, but on the other hand many held the view that Young's easy access to the President could have been employed to more effect for the black American minority if he had remained in Congress. However, Young's departure from the CBC did not close off the group's access to the new Administration. As President Carter's first term progressed

CBC members found that consultations with administration officials on legislative matters occurred on a frequent basis.⁵

The new experience of having relatively good access to the Administration posed new problems for the CBC. Black Congressmen found that the competition to gain the attention of the Administration was severe, as other issues such as the energy crisis and developments in the Middle-East demanded more of the President's time. By 1978 some CBC members were becoming worried over the extent to which black American needs had begun to take a back seat in terms of the Carter Administration's policy priorities. Confidence in Carter's integrity remained, but his ability to respond to black American needs given other competing pressures was beginning to be doubted. CBC member, Yvonne Burke expressed these emerging doubts, as follows - "I have confidence, but I think that he and the Administration have to be constantly reminded of their commitments. Everybody is competing to be Number One in the Administration's list of priorities. Industry is competing to be Number One, the environmental issues are competing to be Number One. He is being torn in different directions by everyone. As a result of the whole process it is necessary more and more for blacks to make their concerns known in a dramatic way."⁶

The essential problem facing the CBC was that their legislative goals necessitated initiating major new programmes of public expenditure in the fields of social welfare policy and job creation, while the Carter Administration's approach to domestic policy was based upon a philosophy of fiscal conservatism. In particular, CBC members were becoming frustrated in seeking to convince the Administration to take action to alleviate the most pressing problem in the black American community - unemployment. As Rep. Louis Stokes remarked. "I think that he is aware of the problem, but I am not sure that he knows how to solve it. That's the basic problem we have to face. He is overconcerned with things like

balancing the Budget, and that has affected his ability to approach positively solutions to the unemployment problem."⁷ In fact, the continuing failure of the Carter Administration to launch federal aid programmes to tackle the soaring rates of black unemployment, particularly amongst black teenagers, worked constantly to undermine the CBC's confidence in President Carter's commitment to improve the black minority's social and economic conditions. After September 1978, when a meeting between President Carter and CBC members to discuss black unemployment broke up in dissension,⁸ the spirit of cooperation and consultation, in which relations with the new Administration had opened, soured considerably. In spite of the fact that the black American minority was a significant part of the constituency that elected Carter to the Presidency, the CBC as its national representatives faced the situation that they were unable to command policy results from the Administration. The underlying reasons for this were the same as those which inhibited the CBC's effectiveness in Congress, that is the basic numerical weakness of the group, which, in turn, reflected the continued lack of political and economic resources in the black American community.

The future role of the CBC in Congress will depend upon the extent to which progress is made with respect to improving the level of black American registration, and to halting the gerrymandering of congressional districts to minimise the impact of the black vote. In the short term, the facts of low black registration and gerrymandering by state legislatures will ensure that the CBC's numerical strength, and hence the legislative strategy options available to the group, will not be improved. CBC members acknowledge that low black registration, low turnout and political apathy are the major factors that continue to inhibit increased black representation in Congress. The prevalence of these political characteristics in black American communities perpetuate

the situation that Black Representatives are only able to be elected from the handful of black majority congressional districts. In spite of these hard facts, CBC members remain determined that increased black representation can be achieved. In 1978 Rep. Stokes emphasised that working for increased black representation was an essential goal, "It is important for us to try to concentrate on electing more black Representatives to this body. I think that then we would be able to achieve more change in terms of a real representative government. I think that the Congress really ought to reflect the nation. If we are 11% of the total population then we ought to be represented by an 11% minority membership in this body. For this reason, I think that we have to keep our sights on the goal of having much greater representation."⁹ With this goal in mind, the CBC, in future, will continue to sponsor and lobby for less complex voter registration procedures, e.g. national post card registration, and to provide support to those local groups that seek to encourage black Americans to register, vote and run for political office. However, even with greatly improved levels of black registration, the achievement of increased black Representation will be a major uphill struggle because the congressional districts in which black candidates might be elected are highly-Democratic districts where white incumbents are relatively safe. In most districts of this type, the black constituency is not sufficiently large, even if well-organised and strongly supporting a black candidate, to eliminate the white incumbent's plurality.

The only viable way forward to increased black Representation in Congress is through 'coalition politics', whereby a black candidate establishes a firm base of support in the local black constituency and builds coalitions of support around issues that affect other groups of voters in the congressional district. Only a small minority of

Black Representatives have managed to win seats through coalition-building of this type (i.e. Reps. Dellums, Young and Jordan, who were elected from districts where the black minority accounted for less than 40% of the voting age population). Those CBC members elected from white majority districts are convinced that, particularly now that a plateau has been reached in the number of black-majority districts created by state legislatures, black candidates must embrace the strategy of building coalitions of support around local issues of mutual concern to black and white voters. Rep. Ronald Dellums expressed his views as follows, "Frankly, the number of blacks in this Congress is not going to appreciably change unless you use the concept of coalition politics. Most of the black Congressmen have come here by virtue of the state legislature carving out a black district and saying 'let's cut this out and the blacks can have that one.' If I could win in a predominantly white district with a coalition of blacks and non-blacks, then that same kind of coalition politics can take place in lots of congressional districts around the country."¹⁰

Rep. Dellums was relatively fortunate in the fact that he ran for office in a unique constituency where the student vote (from the University of California, Berkeley campus) was a significant factor in helping him to construct a winning coalition. Most black candidates seeking election face the formidable task of convincing a substantial proportion of the white majority in a congressional district that their real interests are similar to those of many black constituents. The deeply-ingrained racial attitudes of many white Americans, particularly those who are relatively disadvantaged in social and economic terms, continue to inhibit seriously their ability and willingness to accept that they have shared interests with the black American minority. In the long term, it can only be hoped that the traditional racial attitudes, based upon the heritage of the black

minority's former slave status, will diminish in importance as more political candidates, both white and black, are prepared to appeal for support across racial lines. The majority of CBC members remain optimistic that in the long term the issue of race will assume less importance. They feel that other factors such as the pressures of scarce resources, and economic problems will force the political system to be responsive to the needs and interests of a greater proportion of the electorate. At present, however, racial divisions continue to hide the shared interests of many Americans; Rep. Andrew Young stated the present situation succinctly, "If we could all of a sudden wipe out colour in America and all be the same colour, we would see that the problems that I am sensitive to as a black Congressman are probably characteristic of about 40 million Americans. I say all the time that America is, the American experiment in Democracy is, working fairly well for 150 million citizens, but we have a total population of 200-220 million. The remainder are not a part of the mainstream. About 15 million of those are black, 5 million are Spanish or Indian or so forth, but the majority of them are white."¹¹ Whether black Americans as voters or as elected representatives will be able to play a greater role in national and local policy-making will depend ultimately, therefore, on the extent to which a greater degree of social and economic equality is achieved in American society. For the foreseeable future, the Congressional Black Caucus, acting on behalf of the black American minority, will continue to play the role of developing and promoting legislative programmes that are designed to improve the social and economic conditions of black Americans and other racial minorities. Black Americans have no effective alternative available to them other than to work within the existing political system to achieve desired changes. In the words of CBC member, Rep. Louis Stokes, "You have to try and utilise the system for the purpose

of getting progress for minorities, particularly on domestic programmes and issues. You really don't have any alternatives. It's the only ball game in town."¹²

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FOOTNOTES

1. Fieldwork Interview. George A. Dalley, legislative aide to Rep. C Rangel (NY 19th). June 26th, 1974. Wash. DC.
2. Fieldwork Interview. Rep. John Conyers (Mich. 1st). July 1st, 1974, Wash. DC.
3. CBC member, Rep. Augustus Hawkins (Calif. 29th), co-author of the legislation, introduced the bill in the House in 1975. The Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act was passed by Congress in 1978, but it provided only an economic policy framework for full employment; the originally-planned public jobs creation programme was removed. The CBC implemented its full legislative strategy on behalf of the measure. Rep. Hawkins has claimed that the use of the CBC's network of contacts to lobby members in their congressional districts won 47 votes for the bill from key districts in Southern states ("The Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act", Rep. A. F. Hawkins 'Focus' Magazine Vol. 7. No. 1, January 1979, pp 4 - 5. J.C.P.S. Wash DC 1979)
4. Fieldwork interview. Rep. Andrew Young (Ga. 5th), June 26th, 1974. Wash. DC.
5. "Blacks in Congress: A Wary Carter Ally". Current American Government. Fall 1977. (Congressional Quarterly Inc. Wash DC. 1977) p. 58.
6. Fieldwork Interview. Rep. Y. Brathwaite Burke (Calif. 28th), January 19th, 1978. Wash. DC.
7. Fieldwork Interview. Rep. Louis Stokes (Ohio 21st), January 19th, 1978. Wash DC.

8. "The Guardian", 28th September 1978
9. Stokes interview (1978)
10. Fieldwork Interview. Rep. Ronald Dellums. (Calif. 8th)
July 10th, 1974 (Wash DC)
11. Young interview.
12. Stokes interview (1978).

LIST OF FIELDWORK INTERVIEWS

1. Augustus Adair. Executive Director. CBC Professional Staff.
25th June, 1974.
2. Robert Alcock. Legislative aide to Rep. Barbara Jordan (Texas
18th). 19th June, 1974 and 18th January, 1978.
3. Johnny Barnes. Legislative aide to Rep. Walter Fauntroy
(Delegate. Wash. DC.). 20th January, 1978.
4. Maybelle Bennett. Research Officer. Joint Centre for Political
Studies. Wash. DC. 20th January, 1978.
5. Edward Black. Legislative aide to Rep. Louis Stokes (Ohio 21st).
25th June, 1974.
6. Rep. Yvonne Braithwaite Burke, (California 28th). 9th July, 1974
and 19th January, 1978.
7. Marvin Caplan. Director. Leadership Conference on Civil Rights.
Wash. DC. 26th July, 1974.
8. Rep. William Clay, (Missouri 1st). 26th June, 1974.
9. Kenneth Colburn. Deputy Director of Research. Joint Centre
for Political Studies. Wash. DC. 19th July, 1974. Mr. Colburn
was interviewed also on 19th January, 1978, in his new post of
Legislative Director of the CBC Professional Staff.
10. Rep. Cardiss Collins, (Illinois 7th). 27th June, 1974.
11. Richard Conlon. Staff Director. Democratic Study Group.
18th July, 1974.
12. Coleman Conroy. Legislative aide to Rep. Ralph Metcalfe,
(Illinois 1st). 2nd July, 1974.
13. Rep. John Conyers, (Michigan 1st). 1st July, 1974.

14. George Dalley. Legislative aide to Rep. Charles Rangel, (New York 19th). 26th June, 1974.
15. Harly Daniels. Legislative aide to Rep. Walter Fauntroy (Delegate. Wash. DC). 23rd July, 1974.
16. Rep. Ronald Dellums, (California 8th). 10th July, 1974.
17. Jacques DePuy. Staff Counsel. House District of Columbia Committee, Sub-Committee on Government Operations. 3rd July, 1974.
18. Rep. Charles Diggs, (Michigan 13th). 17th July, 1974.
19. Shirley Downs. Legislative aide to Rep. Shirley Chisholm, (New York 12th). 12th January, 1978.
20. Michael Dubenstein. Legislative aide to Rep. Ronald Dellums, (California 8th). 19th June, 1974.
21. Rep. Walter Fauntroy, (Delegate. Wash. DC.). 27th June, 1974.
22. Robert Frishman. Legislative Aide to Rep. John Conyers, (Michigan 1st). 13th January, 1978.
23. Howard Gleckman. Legislative aide to Rep. Ralph Metcalfe, (Illinois 1st). 25th June, 1974.
24. Susan Grayson. Deputy Staff Counsel. House Education and Labour Committee, Sub-Committee on Equal Opportunity. 15th July, 1974.
25. John Guess. Legislative aide to Rep. Parren Mitchell, (Maryland 7th). 17th July, 1974.
26. Cleo Hancock. CBC Professional Staff member. 22nd July, 1974.
27. Rep. Augustus Hawkins, (California 29th). 1st August, 1974.
28. Dr. Adam Herbert. Director of Research. Joint Centre for Political Studies. Wash. DC. 20th January, 1978.

29. Lloyd Johnson. Staff Counsel. House Education and Labour Committee, Sub-Committee on Equal Opportunity. 15th July, 1974.
30. Jack Kelly. Legislative aide to Rep. Charles Rangel, (New York 19th). 16th January, 1978.
31. Martin LaVor. Minority Counsel. House Education and Labour Committee, Sub-Committee on Equal Opportunity. 31st July, 1974.
32. Singleton MacAlister. Legislative aide to Rep. Parren Mitchell, (Maryland 7th). 18th January, 1978.
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