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SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SWEDEN:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS .

by

Richard Scase

Thesis submitted for the Degree  
of Doctor of Philosophy at the  
University of Kent at Canterbury,  
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## PREFACE

This thesis is about the role of social democracy in capitalist society. It seeks to find out whether the development of social democratic parties and trade union movements has had any noticeable impact upon systems of social stratification. To study this issue satisfactorily it would be necessary to investigate the social structures of several countries. Because of practical constraints, only one society has been chosen for this study: Sweden. It has been selected because it can be regarded as a 'critical case' for the purposes of this analysis. No other industrial-capitalist society has experienced such a sustained period of social democratic governments and few, if any, other countries have been characterised by the development of so well-organised and influential a trade union movement. But without making comparisons with at least one other country it would be difficult to determine the degree to which particular features of the Swedish stratification system are specifically a result of social democratic and trade union policies and the extent to which they differ from those of the stratification systems of other societies. Consequently, Britain is used for the purposes of comparison. Although it does have a social democratic party - the Labour Party - and a trade union movement, these have been less influential than the comparable Swedish institutions. In investigating these issues, this study also considers a wider problem; the relative effects of industrialism and purposive political action for the stratification systems of modern society.

Chapter One suggests that an interest in the comparative study of societies has recently become more pronounced in sociology. It argues that this is mainly due to the debate generated by the 'thesis of convergence'; a set of ideas which claims that as different societies industrialise, they

become increasingly similar. This argument is criticised on a number of points, particularly because it overemphasises the 'logic' of industrialism and devotes too little attention to political ideology and to the purposive action of social groups.

Chapter Two traces the development of industrialisation in Britain and Sweden. It argues that, despite important variations in the processes of industrialisation, the contemporary structures of the two countries are characterised more by their similarities than their differences. This is followed by a comparison of the development of the Labour and the Social Democratic parties and of the growth of trade unionism. It suggests that the Swedish working-class movement has been more successful in commanding the allegiance of industrial manual workers than its British counterpart and that it is one of the more influential political and social forces in Swedish society.

Chapter Three tries to find out whether the emergence of an influential working-class movement has affected patterns of economic and social rewards in Sweden. It suggests that there are few differences between Britain and Sweden in terms of income and wage differentials and in rates of social mobility.

The following chapters then investigate the degree to which the Social Democratic ideology of egalitarianism has affected workers' perceptions of the stratification system; particularly about social mobility, economic rewards and the power structure. This is undertaken by comparing attitudes among two samples of English and Swedish industrial workers. Chapter Four discusses the characteristics of the samples and the methods used in order to collect the data.

Chapter Five describes the two samples' conceptions of the respective class structures and of their estimations of the possibilities for upward mobility. The interview data indicate that the Swedish workers are more



likely to define the class structure by reference to 'meritocratic' criteria and to be more optimistic about the possibilities for children's upward mobility. It is suggested that these attitudes are a result, if only partly, of the ideological themes of the Social Democratic Party.

Chapter Six discusses the two samples' attitudes towards economic inequality. It shows that the Swedish workers demonstrate a greater awareness of inequality and that this is reflected in heightened feelings of resentment. It suggests that these responses are the consequence of various egalitarian appeals by the Social Democratic Party, the wages policy of the Trade Union Confederation and the structure of trade unionism in Sweden.

The presentation of data is concluded in Chapter Seven by the investigation of the two samples' conceptions of power. It confirms that the trade union movement and the Social Democratic Party enjoy a greater degree of allegiance and legitimacy among workers than the comparable British institutions. At the same time, the Swedish workers have a more 'realistic' assessment of the distribution of power in society and that they are more aware of the influence exercised by dominant economic groups.

Finally, Chapter Eight attempts to evaluate the role of Social Democracy in Sweden. It claims that although the egalitarian goals of the Swedish working-class movement have often been frustrated and constrained by the institutions of industrial-capitalism, 'strains' have been generated which are reflected in the attitudes of rank-and-file supporters. As a result, the legitimacy of capitalism as a long-term socio-economic system could become questioned.

## CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOCIETIES

The early sociologists emphasised the need for the comparative method. Comte<sup>1</sup>, Durkheim<sup>2</sup> and Weber<sup>3</sup>, for example, argued that the comparative study of societies should be an integral part of sociological analysis, not only for the investigation of specific empirical variables, but also for the study of large-scale social processes. Therefore, they claimed, it was only by the comparative method that it was possible to identify patterns of human development and to understand social structures. However, during the inter-war years there were few attempts to investigate the social structures of two or more societies. Instead, sociological enquiry tended to focus almost exclusively upon the precise documentation of social variables as they were found to exist within specific societies. This was partly a result of sociologists ignoring the 'grand theories' of the earlier writers and also because the major locus for sociological research during this period was in the United States where, until the late 1930's, the 'Chicago School' was one of the major influences, defining what was appropriate for empirical investigation<sup>4</sup>. Thus, there was a tendency for investigators to focus only upon those areas which they felt were appropriate for precise measurement and sophisticated quantification. These included the ecological structure of cities, demographic differences between rural and urban communities, patterns of migration and a wide range of 'social problems'<sup>5</sup>. Similarly in Britain, where the tradition of sociology was empirical, practical and problem-orientated, the comparative perspectives of such writers as Weber and Durkheim were disregarded and sociological research tended to concentrate upon describing particular aspects of the social structure. Hence, British



sociology during the inter-war years studied almost exclusively the extent and causes of such 'problems' as urban poverty, bad housing, crime, illness and various other features of social and economic deprivation<sup>6</sup>. Consequently, it was not until after the Second World War that more attention was devoted by sociologists - both in Britain and in the United States - to the comparative study of social structures. The reasons for this would appear to include the following.

Firstly, there appears to have been some scepticism among sociologists about the validity of developing a subject which, although heavily laden with empirical data, was highly limited in its theoretical perspectives<sup>7</sup>. Thus, there was a search for theories and a renewed interest in the ideas of the 19th century writers. Therefore, much of the research in the sociology of deviance was related to the ideas of Durkheim - particularly to his discussions about anomie and social control<sup>8</sup> - while discussions of social class and of social change were often linked to the writings of Marx<sup>9</sup>. But, in addition to providing hypotheses for empirical research, the ideas of the 'Founding Fathers' generated a recognition among investigators that sociology should study large-scale structural changes and in doing so, adopt a perspective which was both historical and comparative<sup>10</sup>.

Secondly, there was a growing interest in the sociology of development. After the Second World War sociologists, economists and other social scientists began to investigate the social structures of developing countries, using perspectives and methodologies which had been used for the study of industrial societies. Thus, there were attempts to formulate theories of social change; all of which were conducive to the development of a comparative sociology of the kind which the earlier social theorists had advocated<sup>11</sup>.

Thirdly, the emergence of a number of socialist states in Europe stimulated an interest in the comparative study of industrial societies. A number of writers, interested in the inter-relationships between political

ideology and social structure, attempted to ascertain the differences and similarities in the social structures of capitalist and socialist societies. Within this context, an issue which received special attention was the degree to which socialism, as a political ideology and an economic and political system, was leading to the development of industrial societies with important structural differences compared with capitalist countries<sup>12</sup>.

These, then, are the three major influences which were conducive to the development of a comparative study of societies. While the perspectives of the 19th century social thinkers provided the theoretical bases, developments in non-industrial societies and in socialist states became some of the major areas for enquiry. It is from issues of this kind that the present interest in the 'convergence thesis' developed.

The term, 'convergence thesis', is frequently used in contemporary sociology as though it consisted of a set of inter-related propositions which are closely linked to a general theory of social change<sup>13</sup>. However, there is no single proponent of the 'convergence thesis' and the term rarely seems to have been explicitly defined. It is merely a descriptive label which has been applied to a range of ideas which suggest in a fairly crude manner, that as societies industrialise they become increasingly similar in terms of a range of institutional and cultural features<sup>14</sup>. Thus, it is often stated by proponents of this thesis that industrialisation will lead developing societies to acquire the overall characteristics of the already industrialised countries<sup>15</sup>, and that capitalist and socialist societies at similar levels of industrialisation will develop a large number of common institutional features which will largely override diversities generated by their different political and economic systems<sup>16</sup>. What, then, are these features which are supposed to develop in different societies as they industrialise?

Firstly, with industrialisation and the utilisation of inanimate sources of power, there is the development of a division of labour. Consequently,



occupational roles emerge which - to a considerable degree - are separated from other relationships within the social structure<sup>17</sup>.

Secondly, with the development of a relatively autonomous occupational structure, there is a change in the structure of the labour force; the proportion of the population engaged in agricultural activities declines and there is an increase in the percentage of those engaged in industrial and administrative occupations. At the same time, because modern technology requires certain skills, the occupational structures of all industrialising societies will become fairly similar<sup>18</sup>.

Thirdly, there is the development of an educational system which is specifically geared to producing trained manpower for the newly-created occupational roles. More specifically, there is an expansion of technical and higher education because of the need for scientists, technologists and various categories of white-collar workers<sup>19</sup>.

Fourthly, industrialisation leads to changes in the system of social stratification. There is a breakdown in traditional systems of ranking based on 'ascribed' characteristics - such as kinship and inherited privilege - and the development of an occupational-based stratification system. As a result, occupation becomes the major determinant of an individual's social identity and of his position within the reward structure of society<sup>20</sup>. To a large extent, it determines his prestige and social honour, his power and authority, and his level of income and wealth. It is often suggested that industrial societies have similar stratification systems. Hence, in terms of such dimensions as economic rewards, status and authority, professional, managerial and administrative workers tend to be the most highly rewarded, followed by various categories of white-collar and manual employees<sup>21</sup>. At the same time, once different societies have reached a high level of industrialisation, it is claimed that their overall rates of social mobility will tend to become high; higher, that is, by comparison with those in



non-industrial societies<sup>22</sup>. Consequently, the class structures of the advanced societies are fairly 'open'<sup>23</sup>.

Fifthly, it is argued that irrespective of their political character, industrialisation leads to the development of similar power structures in all societies. Thus, Kerr and his associates suggest that traditional class ideologies and antagonisms decline to be superseded by the emergence of occupational and professional interest groups. These operate within the context of power structures which are increasingly regulated by omnipresent political states providing 'webs of rules' within which the objectives of various interest groups are pursued. In these societies modern corporations play dominant roles although their activities are 'checked' by the constraints of labour movements. Therefore, the power structures of all industrial societies - both socialist and capitalist - become increasingly similar. In other words, they are characterised by the emergence of 'pluralistic industrialism' in which the relative degrees of power exercised by the State, the corporation and organised labour become much the same in all countries<sup>24</sup>.

Finally, industrialisation is supposed to lead to changes in value systems. It is argued by some writers that there is a breakdown of traditional attitudes and values and the development of ideologies, goals and expectations which are common to all industrial societies. Inkeles, for example, has argued that the growth of large-scale, industrial-bureaucratic structures leads to the development of similar hierarchies of values in different countries<sup>25</sup>, while Inkeles and Rossi have attempted to demonstrate that profiles of occupational prestige are fairly similar for a large number of industrial societies<sup>26</sup>. Furthermore, Kerr and his associates have claimed that all industrial societies have common values in that they emphasise the importance of educational qualifications, technical and scientific competence, occupational performance and individual achievement<sup>27</sup>.

These, then, are some of the themes found in the ideas of writers who

have suggested that industrialisation leads to the development of common features in the social structures of different countries. The points are not intended to provide a comprehensive account of the convergence thesis, but merely to give an indication of the main ideas which it incorporates. At least they provide a sufficient indication of the general thesis to allow some critical comments to be made.

Firstly, the terms industrialism and industrialisation are often vaguely defined<sup>28</sup>. In some writings they refer to inanimate, technological processes<sup>29</sup>, while in others they are more embracing concepts, incorporating not only technology but a range of social and economic variables<sup>30</sup>. In other words, there is no agreement among investigators about the variables to be included for definitions of industrialism and industrialisation. In many writings it is unclear which variables constitute the causes of industrialisation, which the effects and which the components of the process itself<sup>31</sup>. Consequently, many discussions seem to be tautologous.

Secondly, in those writings in which industrialism and industrialisation are defined in terms of technology, there is often the implication of a crude form of technological determinism. Hence, technology is often regarded as an independent variable which determines most features of a social structure. Lenski, for example, in his discussion of inequality in different societies regards technological development as the major determinant of greater economic surpluses and of greater economic and political inequalities<sup>32</sup>. Similarly, studies of developing societies often regard technology as an external source of social change which acts upon relatively 'passive' social structures. 'Problems' of development are then regarded as relating to those features of the recipient social structure which are resistant to the forces of change brought about by the introduction of foreign-sponsored technological systems<sup>33</sup>.

Thirdly, in much of the writing on convergence, societies are conceptualised as highly integrated social systems; changes in one aspect of the



system are expected to bring about changes in all others<sup>34</sup>. However, the inter-relationships that exist between the different institutional structures of society cannot be assumed, a priori, but instead must be the subject for empirical enquiry. With industrialisation, the social structure of a society may change in certain respects - for example, the emergence of an occupational-based stratification system - but this does not inevitably lead to changes in all other aspects of the society. Therefore, traditional values and life styles may continue to persist for a long time, even within the context of new urban and industrial environments. The degree to which changes in one aspect of a social structure will have repercussions for others must be regarded as problematic, in precisely the same way as the direction of these changes must be seen as uncertain<sup>35</sup>. As Dunning and Hopper have suggested, it is quite possible to conceive of societies as converging in some respects, but diverging or developing in parallel directions in others<sup>36</sup>.

Fourthly, because of an emphasis upon the 'logic' or 'dynamics' of industrialism, a number of writers have given insufficient attention to the role of ideology and of purposive political action in shaping the development of social structures<sup>37</sup>. Goldthorpe makes this point in a discussion of the stratification systems of capitalist and socialist societies<sup>38</sup>. He argues that there are important generic differences between these two types of society in terms of the forces which shape their stratification systems; in the former, the structure of inequality is more-or-less determined by the operation of market forces and the private ownership of the means of production, while in the latter it is heavily influenced by the explicit objectives of political leaders. Consequently, a 'logic' of industrialism cannot be seen to have inevitable consequences for all features of a social structure: an increase in the level of technological complexity may create more economic wealth but the distribution of this will be determined by various social,

economic and political factors; in the case of socialist and capitalist countries, by different political institutions and property relationships.

Finally, the whole debate about industrialisation and the convergence of different societies is limited by a lack of comparative and empirical evidence of a time-series kind<sup>39</sup>. Implicit in the concept of convergence is the idea of development and change so that in order to document whether or not societies are becoming increasingly similar it is necessary to collect data which demonstrate long-term social changes. Generally speaking the data are not available; even in the study of a particular society it is difficult to collect data which are comparable over time. There is, then, a lack of social indicators which can be used to measure variables over time and between societies. Until such indicators have been established, the discussion about the convergence of societies will tend to be based more upon assumptions than the scientific testing of ideas by the collection and analysis of empirical data.

However, despite these criticisms, the proponents of the convergence thesis have stimulated a considerable degree of discussion among those interested in the comparative study of societies; both in terms of changes in the structure of capitalist and socialist societies and in the industrialisation of developing countries. The present study has been similarly motivated by these ideas. Consequently it attempts to describe for two industrial societies - Britain and Sweden - the overall patterns of industrialisation and political change which have occurred. It then tries to ascertain the consequences of these processes for the respective systems of social stratification. More specifically, it seeks to find out whether the development of the working-class movement and a Social Democratic ideology of egalitarianism in Sweden has, compared with Britain, led to important differences in the stratification systems of the two countries.

This study, then, is an exercise in comparative sociology. Chapters



Two and Three rely heavily upon secondary sources of data, especially those produced by governments. The interpretation of these should be treated with extreme caution if only because the systems of classification that have been developed in Sweden and Britain have been rarely the same; this is particularly evident in the discussion of patterns of industrialisation. At the same time Chapter Three refers to a number of sociological investigations; specifically in relation to the study of social mobility and occupational prestige. Because of differences in the characteristics of the samples used and the dates when the studies were conducted, great care should be taken in regard to the comparative generalisations which can be made on the basis of these. The remainder of this study focuses upon aspects of consciousness among workers in each of the two countries and for this, secondary sources of data were either unavailable or not assembled in a form useful for the purposes of comparison. Consequently, a comparative study of two groups of English and Swedish industrial workers was undertaken, the results of which are produced in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.

In conclusion, it should be emphasised that although the evidence used in the present study - both primary and secondary - is subject to limitations of interpretation, nevertheless, it is probably indicative of trends within each of the two countries. Certainly it allows an attempt at finding out whether there are important differences and similarities in the stratification systems of Britain and Sweden which have been brought about by the processes of industrialisation and political change.



## NOTES

1. A. COMTE, Cours de Philosophie Positive, Paris, 1830-42. For an edited translation of this work, see H. MARTINEAU, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, London, 1853.
2. E. DURKHEIM, The Rules of Sociological Method, Chicago, 1958.
3. M. WEBER, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, Chicago, 1949.
4. For a detailed discussion of the 'Chicago School' during the 1920's and the 1930's, see R. FARIS, Chicago Sociology, 1920-1932, California, 1967.
5. R. FARIS, op. cit.
6. See, for example, G. MITCHELL, A Hundred Years of Sociology, London, 1968, Chap. 10; and J. REX, Discovering Sociology, London, 1973, Chap. 5.
7. For some critical comments on 'abstracted empiricism', see C. WRIGHT MILLS, The Sociological Imagination, New York, 1959.
8. See, for example, R. MERTON, 'Social Structure and Anomie', in R. MERTON, Social Theory and Social Structure, New York, 1957.
9. For example, R. DAHRENDORF, Class and Class Conflict in an Industrial Society, London, 1959.
10. Examples of two such studies conducted during the 1950's are, S. LIPSET and R. BENDIX, Social Mobility in Industrial Society, California, 1959; and R. BENDIX, Work and Authority in Industry, New York, 1956.

11. For two early attempts, see D. LERNER, The Passing of Traditional Society, New York, 1958; and H. LEIBENSTEIN, Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth; Studies in the Theory of Economic Development, New York, 1957. For more recent discussions, see R. BRAIBANTI and J. SPENGLER, (eds.), Tradition, Values and Socio-Economic Development, Durham (N.C.), 1961; B. HOSELITZ and W. MOORE, (eds.), Industrialisation and Society, Paris, 1963; C. KERR, J. DUNLOP, F. HARBISON and C. MYERS, Industrialism and Industrial Man, Cambridge, (Mass.), 1960; M. LEVY, Jnr., Modernisation and the Structure of Societies, Princeton, 1966; W. MOORE, The Impact of Industry, New Jersey, 1965; and W. MOORE, Social Change, New Jersey, 1963.
  
12. For two early discussions, see R. BAUER, A. INKELES and C. KLUCKHOHN, How the Soviet System Works, Cambridge (Mass.), 1956; and A. INKELES and R. BAUER, The Soviet Citizen, Cambridge (Mass.), 1959.
  
13. See, for example, G. INGHAM, Strikes and Industrial Conflict: Britain and Scandinavia, London, 1974, Chap. 6.
  
14. The literature is vast. For a major statement, see A. FELDMAN and W. MOORE, 'Industrialisation and Industrialism: Convergence and Differentiation', Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology, Vol. 2, (1962); C. KERR et al., op. cit.; M. LEVY, Jnr., op. cit.; and W. MOORE, op. cit., 1965. For two major reviews of the literature on convergence, see A. MEYER, 'Theories of Convergence', in C. JOHNSON (ed.), Change in Communist Systems, Stanford, 1970; and I. WEINBERG, 'The Problem of Convergence of Industrial Societies: A Critical Look at the State of a Theory', in Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 11, (1969).

15. C. KERR, et al., op. cit.
16. A. INKELES and R. BAUER, op. cit.
17. W. MOORE, op. cit., 1965.
18. C. KERR, et al., op. cit.
19. C. KERR, et.al., op. cit.
20. W. MOORE, op. cit., 1965.
21. C. KERR, et al., op. cit.
22. W. MOORE, op. cit., 1965.
23. S. LIPSET and R. BENDIX, op. cit.
24. C. KERR, et al., op. cit.
25. A. INKELES, 'Industrial Man: The Relation of Status to Experience, Perception and Values', Amer. J. Sociol., Vol. 66, (1960-1).
26. A. INKELES and P. ROSSI, 'National Comparisons of Occupational Prestige', Amer. J. Sociol., Vol. 61, (1955-6).
27. C. KERR, et al., op. cit.
28. C. KERR and his associates, for example, state that "Industrialisation refers to the actual course of transition from the traditional society toward industrialism. Industrialism is an abstraction, a limit approached through historical industrialisation. Industrialism is the concept of the fully industrialised society, that which the industrialisation process inherently tends to create". C. KERR, et al., op. cit., p. 33.



29. To quote W. MOORE, "Industry refers to the fabrication of raw materials into intermediate components or finished products by primarily mechanical means dependent on inanimate sources of power. The prominence given to technology in this definition is not to be taken as some sort of technological determinism, or as denying the relevance of the factory system as a social organisation. For analytical purposes, however, the social characteristics of industry are best viewed as conditions and consequences of its technical characteristics and not as an intrinsic part of the definition. This distinction is further justified by the fact that the social organisation of industry is only partly a correlate or derivative of technology". W. MOORE, op. cit., 1965, p.4.
30. According to FAUNCE and FORM, "The processes with which we are primarily concerned are economic growth or increasing income per capita, mechanisation of production and increasing size of production organisations. The consequences of these processes in combination are important changes in patterns of division of labour, bases of social stratification and mechanisms of social integration. These particular social structural attributes are critical variables for differentiating one type of social order from another since any change in them ramifies throughout a whole society. Certainly among the hallmarks of industrial society are a complex division of labour, an occupationally based stratification system, and rationalised procedures for achieving social integration. It is our contention that these attributes are basic structural characteristics of industrial societies and that they are directly or indirectly consequences of economic growth, mechanisation and increasing scale of organisation". W. FAUNCE and W. FORM, 'The Nature of Industrial Society', in W. FAUNCE and W. FORM, (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Industrial Society, Boston, 1969, p. 3.

31. This is evident with the definition used by C. KERR, et al., op. cit.
  32. G. LENSKI, Power and Privilege, New York, 1966.
  33. See, for example, C. KERR, et al., op. cit.
  34. See, for example, N. SMELSER, 'Mechanisms of Change and Adjustment to Change', in W. FAUNCE and W. FORM, (eds.), op. cit.
  35. A similar point is made by A. FELDMAN and W. MOORE, op. cit.
  36. E. DUNNING and E. HOPPER, 'Industrialisation and the Problem of Convergence: A Critical Note', Sociological Rev., Vol. 14, (1966).
  37. See, for example, W. MOORE, op. cit.; N. SMELSER, op. cit.; and W. FAUNCE and W. FORM, op. cit.
  38. J. GOLDTHORPE, 'Social Stratification in Industrial Society', Sociological Rev., Monograph, No. 8, (1964).
  39. This comment is made by E. DUNNING and E. HOPPER, op. cit.
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## CHAPTER TWO

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF BRITAIN AND SWEDEN: 'AN OVERVIEW'

To compare two social structures as complex as those of Britain and Sweden involves a number of problems for comparative analysis. In order to provide a background for the study of inequality in the two countries, it is difficult to decide which factors to include and which to omit; investigators are unlikely to agree about the criteria and so any selection of issues will almost certainly incorporate personal prejudices and interests. Therefore, the present analysis will only consider developments in the two countries which the investigator feels to be most important for the study of their contemporary stratification systems. In this, more attention will be devoted to Sweden on the grounds that information about that country is generally less known to the English reader than is the material about Britain; for the latter, references will be given to the relevant discussions.

To investigate aspects of social and economic inequality in each of the two countries it is necessary to describe historical developments in terms of (i) patterns of industrialisation - together with the related processes of urbanisation - and (ii) patterns of political change. Clearly for a more comprehensive discussion it would be necessary to consider a range of other factors, but the objective of this thesis is not to present a detailed review of all developments in the two social structures but to ascertain differences and similarities in their systems of social stratification. Therefore, this discussion focuses only upon patterns of industrialisation and political change since it is these factors which many sociologists have considered to be among the more important determinants of stratification systems<sup>1</sup>.

(i) Patterns of Industrialisation

There are important differences in the development of industrialisation in Britain and Sweden if only because of contrasts between their pre-industrial social structures. Pre-industrial Sweden consisted of four estates - the clergy, nobility, burghers and the free peasantry - and within this framework there were a number of changes which led to the development of a highly centralised national bureaucracy. At the beginning of the 16th century the Church exercised considerable power and owned about 21 per cent of the land; by contrast, the proportion owned by the Crown was only approximately 5 per cent<sup>2</sup>. But with the Reformation (c. 1520), the influence of the Church was reduced by Gustav Vasa (1523 - 1560), the Swedish king, who dispossessed the Church of much of its wealth and placed its authority directly under the State<sup>3</sup>. As a result, the King became temporal head of the Church while the clergy increasingly took on the functions of a state civil service. Furthermore, the clergy provided administrative links between the parishes and the King's court so that by the end of the 16th century there was the emergence of a highly centralised state with a national authority structure<sup>4</sup>. In Britain, by contrast, the state was relatively weak at this time<sup>5</sup>. It was not until three centuries later in Napoleonic France that any other country in Europe developed a political state as centralised as that which had evolved in 16th century Sweden<sup>6</sup>.

However, within this structure, the nobility exercised considerable influence. At the beginning of the 16th century it owned 21 per cent of all land and by 1650 the figure had increased to approximately 72 per cent<sup>7</sup>. This concentration was largely brought about by three major processes<sup>8</sup>. Firstly, the Crown's need to pay for military activities. During the 17th century, the financing of wars was heavily dependent upon the availability of foreign currencies and these could only be obtained by the export of mineral resources. But, except for the sale of copper, the reserves of which



were owned by the Crown, the revenues obtained from the foreign sales of minerals accrued to private owners, predominantly the nobility. Consequently, the Crown had to buy its foreign reserves from the nobility and this was generally done by the State exchanging its land. Secondly, by the direct purchase of land with wealth acquired through warfare. Thirdly, by the Crown transferring to the nobility, land and the privilege of collecting taxes from the peasants in return for services rendered in the civil service and in the military. One of the consequences of the nobility's right to levy taxes was that a large number of peasants were unable to pay and so they were reduced to the status of tenants. Thus, ownership of a large proportion of land was transferred from the peasantry to the nobility.

By the middle of the 17th century, then, the nobility constituted a powerful, economic, social and political force. The 'higher' nobility consisted of a small number of families who were inter-related by marriage and who, in many ways, constituted an endogenous social group quite separate from 'the gentry' and the lesser nobles. Indeed, it was from the 'higher' nobility that most of the King's top-ranking civil servants and military officers were chosen and this, together with the extensive ownership of land, made its allegiance to the Crown always problematic<sup>9</sup>. But it was not until 1680 that Charles XI attempted to reduce its power by forcing it to give up much of the land which the State had earlier exchanged and which the peasantry had been compelled to surrender. As a result of this 'Reduction' - as it is often called - the distribution of land at the end of the 17th century was such that the nobility owned 33 per cent, the Crown 36 per cent and the peasantry 31 per cent<sup>10</sup>. However, despite the 'Reduction' the nobility continued to be a potential threat to the authority of the Crown throughout the rest of the 17th and the 18th centuries. This, at least to some extent, was neutralised by the peasantry which was used by the Crown as a source of countervailing power<sup>11</sup>.



The peasantry in Sweden, as in Britain, were not subject to the legal status of 'serfs' as they were in most European feudal social systems. They consisted of small independent farmers and although they were compelled to pay taxes - either to the Crown or to the nobility - and to render various services of labour, the State and the nobility had no feudal rights over them. Indeed, as early as the middle of the 15th century the peasantry was recognised as an autonomous estate to the extent that it had representatives at the Crown's assemblies (Riksdag.) which had among its purposes the levying of taxes<sup>12</sup>. Although the peasantry did not constitute a political force equal to that of the nobility, it is significant that it had representatives in the Riksdag because its spokesmen could protest against any proposals and motions which they considered to be unjust. In fact, this put the Swedish peasantry in an advantageous political position compared with the serfs of feudal Europe since it constituted an autonomous political force which could be used by the King in his negotiations with the nobility. Consequently, it could often obtain considerable concessions - the 'Reduction' is probably the best example. But perhaps most importantly, this bargaining situation allowed the King to avoid granting feudal rights to the wealthy nobility since this would have made him even more dependent upon them. When, in the middle of the 17th century, the military power, the material wealth and the administration of Sweden were largely in the hands of the nobility, the existence of the peasantry as a fourth estate with representation in the Riksdag, provided the Crown with one of the few resources legally and politically independent from this powerful group<sup>13</sup>.

The power of the nobility flourished in Sweden until at least the end of the 18th century; one of the periods of its greatest influence was during the Age of Liberty (1718 to 1772) which was brought about by the death of Charles XII and his succession by a series of weak kings. As a result of this, the Riksdag which was by then almost completely dominated by the

nobility was able to exercise virtually absolute power. However, this period came to an end in 1772 when Gustaf III drastically reduced the powers of the Riksdag and introduced a system of Royal autocracy<sup>14</sup>. This persisted for 37 years until 1809 when it was replaced by the introduction of a new constitution which remained operative until 1973.

The social structure of pre-industrial Sweden, then, was characterised by a certain degree of administrative centralisation in which the clergy and the nobility were crucial elements<sup>15</sup>. The clergy were largely responsible for education, culture and the administration of state duties in the parishes, while the nobility often collected taxes and executed the functions of state at the national level and in foreign affairs. Indeed, because the civil service was almost completely controlled by the 'higher' nobility, it tended to reflect the aspirations of this estate and to constrain the Crown at most times from pursuing policies which would be contrary to its own interests. However, the fact that this was not always the case was borne out by the 'Reduction'. Furthermore, the existence of a centralised national state, together with its related bureaucracy, was to have important consequences for the later development of industrialisation in Sweden, if only because it played a more active role than it did in other countries such as Britain and the United States.

Although Sweden remained a predominantly agricultural country until the latter part of the 19th century, the foundations for industrialisation were laid during the previous century. During the 18th century, agriculture supported directly about 75 per cent of the population while as late as 1870 it still accounted for 72.4 per cent<sup>16</sup>. Indeed, on the basis of vital statistics collected by the clergy and interpreted by Heckscher it appears that the social structure of Sweden in 1760 was as indicated in Table II.1.



TABLE II.1: THE OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE SWEDISH POPULATION  
IN 1760 \*

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY	NOS.	PER CENT
Nobility	8,918	0.5
Clergymen and Teachers	14,705	0.8
Gentry	26,943	1.5
Servants	39,745	2.1
Total for "Gentlefolk" and Servants	90,311	4.9
Soldiers	154,208	8.4
Court and Church Servants etc.	26,013	1.4
Total for Lower State Employees, etc.	180,221	9.8
Merchants	10,500	0.6
Manufacturers	14,431	0.8
Craftsmen	38,786	2.1
Shippers and Sailors	5,704	0.3
Other Burghers	32,894	1.8
Servants	20,055	1.1
Total for Townsmen and their Servants	122,370	6.7
Iron and Metal Makers, Miners	58,033	3.2
Rural Craftsmen	39,532	2.2
Millers	10,708	0.6
Rural Shippers and Sailors	6,699	0.4
Peasants	888,793	48.2
Cottagers	195,557	10.6
Paupers and Crofters	236,873	12.9
Lapps, Settlers, etc.	8,514	0.5
Total for Rural Population (except Soldiers, Nobility, etc.)	1,444,769	78.6
TOTAL POPULATION	1,837,671	100.0

Source: E. HECKSCHER, op. cit., Table 11.

\* The figures are for Sweden proper and exclude Finland.

Table II.1 clearly confirms the essentially rural character of the Swedish social structure in the middle of the 18th century; in fact, the statistics probably underestimate the proportion. As Heckscher suggests, a substantial number of those who are categorised as 'soldiers', 'gentlefolk with servants' and 'craftsmen' should be more appropriately regarded as farmers<sup>17</sup>. Furthermore, there are few signs to suggest that Sweden in 1760 was at the beginning of any 'take off' in industrialisation - a process which was not to occur until a century later. But there was some trade at this time; copper and iron were both exported in large quantities and many Stockholm merchants were involved in the Hanseatic League<sup>18</sup>. Most commerce during the 18th century - both domestic and foreign - was in the hands of the burghers who were allowed to manufacture and trade goods within terms stipulated by the State. However, despite the fact that some of them were extremely wealthy, their impact on the social structure was very limited if only because of the predominantly peasant economy. But like their counterparts elsewhere, the capital which they accumulated was to play a significant role in the later industrialisation of the country.

It is difficult to compare the social structure of Sweden with that of Britain in the middle of the 18th century if only because of the absence of comparable statistical evidence. There is little data available for Britain in the 18th century which are as comprehensive as the Swedish data in Table II.1 and the limited British material which can be used for the purposes of comparison is Joseph Massie's estimate of the social structure in 1760. Massie's figures have been analysed by Mathias and from these it appears that the social structure of Britain at that time was somewhat as shown in Table II.2<sup>19</sup>.



TABLE II.2: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF BRITAIN IN 1760,  
ACCORDING TO JOSEPH MASSIE

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY	FAMILIES	
	NOS.	PER CENT
Nobility, Gentry, Rentiers	18,000	1.2
Professions, Govt. Service, Forces, Service, Pensioners	83,000	5.6
Agriculture	565,000	38.4
General Labour	220,000	15.0
Manufacturers	308,000	20.9
Trade, Distribution	277,500	18.9
TOTAL	1,471,500	100.0

Source: Extracted from P. Mathias, op. cit., Table III

Table II.2 suggests that the social structure of Britain was much less agricultural than that of Sweden in 1760. Tables II.1 and II.2 indicate that a higher proportion of the population in Britain was engaged in trading and manufacturing than in Sweden; perhaps something like 40 per cent compared with less than 10 per cent. Whereas Britain was beginning to industrialise at this time there was no indication of this happening in Sweden. But despite this, there were a number of common features in the social structures of the two countries. Both were agrarian economies - although Britain was much less so than Sweden - and it is highly likely that the life chances and life styles of the bulk of the two populations were fairly similar; in the rural areas the majority of the agrarian populations existed at the subsistence level with poor diets. Mortality rates were high and there were periodic outbreaks of famine. Samuelsson claims that only hunting and fishing

supplemented a drab diet which for most of the peasantry consisted of bread which, during lean years, was mixed with bark<sup>20</sup>. Conditions for the English agrarian population were probably not much better and whether or not early industrialisation raised living standards for the bulk of this group of the population is regarded as problematic by many economic historians<sup>21</sup>.

However, from the middle of the 18th century the social structures of the two countries became increasingly different until the advent of the 20th century. Throughout the 19th century Britain rapidly developed as an industrial society while Sweden remained almost completely agricultural; certainly until at least the 1880's. Differences in the development of the social structures of the two countries during this time are illustrated in Tables II.3 and II.4, although it must be emphasised that there are differences between the two tables in terms of their systems of classification and the reliability of the data upon which they are based.

TABLE II.3: THE PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL SWEDISH POPULATION ACCORDING TO MAIN INDUSTRIAL GROUPS, 1790 - 1900<sup>22</sup>

Date	Agriculture Forestry & Fishing	Manufacturing & Industry	Trade & Communication	Public Service & Professions	Total
1790	79.6	11.0	1.5	7.9	100.0
1810	82.4	6.7	2.8	8.1	100.0
1830	82.1	7.4	2.1	8.4	100.0
1840	80.9	8.5	2.2	8.4	100.0
1850	77.9	9.2	2.0	10.9	100.0
1870	72.4	14.6	5.2	7.8	100.0
1880	67.9	17.4	7.3	7.4	100.0
1890	62.1	21.7	8.7	7.5	100.0
1900	55.1	27.8	10.4	6.7	100.0

Source: Extracted from Kalvesten, op. cit., Table 4.



TABLE II.4: ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE BRITISH  
LABOUR FORCE, 1801 - 1901<sup>23</sup>

Date	Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	Manufacture, Mining, Industry	Trade & Transport	Domestic & Personal	Public, Professional & all Other
1801	35.9	29.7	11.2	11.5	11.8
1811	33.0	30.2	11.6	11.8	13.3
1821	28.4	38.4	12.1	12.7	8.5
1831	24.6	40.8	12.4	12.6	9.5
1841	22.2	40.5	14.2	14.5	8.5
1851	21.7	42.9	15.8	13.0	6.7
1861	18.7	43.6	16.6	14.3	6.9
1871	15.1	43.1	19.6	15.3	6.8
1881	12.6	43.5	21.3	15.4	7.3
1891	10.5	43.9	22.6	15.8	7.1
1901	8.7	46.3	21.4	14.1	9.6

Source: Extracted from P. Deane and W. Cole, Table 30<sup>24</sup>.

From Tables II.3 and II.4 it is clear that Sweden in 1900 was even less industrialised than Britain had been in 1801; indeed, as a later table will suggest, it was not until after 1940 that the proportion of the Swedish population engaged in agriculture, forestry and fishing declined below the estimated figure for Britain in 1801<sup>25</sup>. Whereas the period of most rapid early industrialisation in Britain was before 1831, the comparable period in Sweden was after 1880. But this is not the only difference between the two countries in terms of their experiences of industrialisation; there were also important variations in the actual processes whereby industrialisation occurred.

Whereas industrialisation led to a rapid concentration of the population into densely-settled localities in Britain, this did not occur to the same extent in Sweden. Instead, industrialisation was much more dispersed in the

countryside, mainly because of the central importance of iron mining and the forest industry in Swedish economic growth. Iron ore had been exported from as early as the 13th century and by the 18th century Sweden dominated the world iron ore market<sup>26</sup>. It was the mining of iron ore which led to one of the principal features of early industrialisation in Sweden - the 'bruks'. These were essentially mining villages which had developed within the context of the rural economy. They were scattered throughout Sweden where there were ore deposits - particularly in the central districts - and they consisted of elaborate social structures. The 'bruk' was usually owned by one family, including the mine, the land and the employees' houses. Consequently, these communities were structured in a very hierarchical manner. But at the same time, social relationships between employer and employee were often paternalistic with the owner of the 'bruk' providing not only employment but also rudimentary forms of 'social welfare' such as care of the sick, the old and the widowed. Hence 'bruks' were significant within the early industrialisation of Sweden because they avoided many of the manifest tensions often found in the few densely populated areas of Sweden. Therefore, the origins of organised labour are not to be found in these communities but among the craftsmen of Stockholm, who had often obtained training abroad, gained first-hand experience of industrialisation in other countries and who had become acquainted with socialist thinking, particularly as it existed in Germany and England<sup>27</sup>.

During the 19th century, however, the significance of the 'bruks' in the Swedish economy gradually declined because of growing international competition; mainly due to the fact that foreign competitors started to use coal instead of charcoal in the production of iron. This led to a concentration of output in the Swedish industry so that while a few of the 'bruks' developed into flourishing steel towns, most of them either stagnated or ceased production. However, the iron industry, in a more 'rationalised' form,



continued to provide one of the major bases for Swedish industrialisation; during the 1870's it led to the beginning of the machine and ship building industries, while in the 1890's with the exploitation of electricity, its products were used for the manufacture of electrical goods. It was these developments which, in the latter part of the 19th century, led to the rapid growth of urban centres which had previously not been founded on 'bruks'; for example, Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö. At the same time, the rapid exploitation of iron ore in the north of Sweden for export markets led to the growth of such urban settlements as Kiruna and Luleå<sup>28</sup>.

In addition to the production of iron and the manufacture of its different products, the other major base for the development of industrialisation in Sweden during the 19th century was exploitation of the forests, a process which had two important results. Firstly, there was the growth of medium-sized industrial communities at the heads of the rivers in northern Sweden; due to the utilisation of steam power for the operation of saw mills in order to produce timber for exports. Secondly, the development of forest-based industries led to an 'industrialisation' of the countryside in the sense that there was a rapid growth of small carpentry workshops specialising in the manufacture of furniture and components used for house construction. But neither of these processes were conducive to the concentration of populations in large urban areas. Even the largest saw mill towns in the north of Sweden had relatively small populations; Sundsvall, for example, had a population of only 13,215 in 1890<sup>29</sup>.

As a result of these developments Sweden had, by the 1870's, reached what Rostow has termed the 'take off' stage<sup>30</sup> of industrialisation<sup>31</sup>. This is demonstrated in Table II.5 which measures the level of industrialisation in terms of the rate of gross capital formation expressed as a proportion of gross national product.

TABLE II.5: RATE OF INDUSTRIALISATION IN SWEDEN

Decade	Gross Capital Formation/ Gross National Product
1861 - 70	5.8
1871 - 80	8.8
1881 - 90	10.8
1891 - 1900	13.7
1901 - 10	18.0
1911 - 20	20.2
1921 - 30	19.0

Source: W. Rostow, op. cit., Table 2

Thus it can be suggested that the social structures of Sweden and Britain, which were so different for the greater part of the 19th century, increasingly shared a number of common features with the advent of the 20th century. Indeed, during the first half of the present century Sweden caught up; hence, by the 1950's the two countries had rather similar industrial profiles. The patterns are shown in Tables II.6 and II.7:

TABLE II.6: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL POPULATION IN SWEDEN  
According to Occupational Group, 1910 - 1950<sup>32</sup>

Date	Agriculture	Manufacturing & Industry	Trade & Communication	Public Service & Professions	Total
1910	48.8	32.0	13.4	5.8	100.0
1920	44.0	35.0	15.2	5.8	100.0
1930	39.4	35.7	18.2	6.7	100.0
1940	34.1	38.2	19.5	8.2	100.0
1950	24.6	42.7	22.6	10.1	100.0

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, op. cit., Table A21



TABLE II.7: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE BRITISH LABOUR FORCE, 1911-1951<sup>33</sup>

Date	Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	Manufacture, Mining, Industry	Trade & Transport	Domestic & Personal	Public, Professional & all Other	Total
1911	8.3	46.4	21.5	13.9	9.9	100.0
1921	7.1	47.6	20.3	6.9	18.1	100.0
1931	6.0	45.3	22.7	7.7	18.3	100.0
1951	5.0	49.1	21.8	2.2	21.9	100.0

Source: P. Deane and W. Cole, op. cit.

A comparison of Tables II.6 and II.7 suggests that whereas the percentage of the total occupied population engaged in industry and manufacturing in Britain was very much the same in 1951 as it was in 1911, the proportion in Sweden continued to increase; from approximately one-third in 1910 to more than 40 per cent in 1950. Furthermore, there was decline of more than one-half in the proportion of the Swedish population engaged in agriculture and allied trades. By the 1950's, then, Sweden and Britain were industrial societies of a similar type in the sense that the greater proportion of their respective labour forces were engaged in industrial and manufacturing activities. In fact, between 1910 and 1950 - and particularly after 1930 - there was a rapid growth of large-scale manufacturing industry in the towns of central and southern Sweden, while there was a decline in the timber, the iron mining and the agricultural industries. By 1950, then, Britain and Sweden both manufactured a wide range of engineering, electrical, metallic and chemical goods; indeed, they were now in competition with each other in international markets. Similarities in their industrial profiles in the 1960's are shown in Tables II.8 and II.9 which compare the structure of manufacturing within the two economies in terms of the distribution of employment. As with previous tables, there are problems of interpretation because of differences between the two countries in the systems of classification used.

TABLE II.8: DISTRIBUTION OF MANPOWER AMONG VARIOUS BRANCHES  
OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY IN SWEDEN IN 1969

INDUSTRY	NOS.	%
Food, beverages and tobacco	55,461	8.5
Textile, wearing apparel and leather goods	66,490	10.2
Wood and wood products, including furniture	65,852	10.1
Paper, paper products, printing and publishing	75,117	11.6
Chemicals, petroleum, coal, rubber and plastic products	41,404	6.4
Non-metallic products except products of petroleum and coal	31,574	4.9
Basic metal industries	49,841	7.6
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment	259,774	40.0
Other manufacturing industries	4,705	0.7
TOTAL	650,218	100.0

Source: Extracted from Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Sweden, Stockholm, 1971, Table 106.

TABLE II.9: DISTRIBUTION OF MANPOWER AMONG VARIOUS BRANCHES  
OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY IN BRITAIN IN 1969

INDUSTRY	NOS.	%
Food, drink and tobacco	850,000	9.7
Chemicals and allied industries	528,000	6.0
Metal manufacture and metal goods	1,217,000	13.9
Engineering and electrical goods	2,234,000	25.6
Vehicles	827,000	9.4
Textiles, leather clothing and footwear	1,254,000	14.4
All other manufacturing industries	1,831,000	21.0
TOTAL	8,741,000	100.0

Source: Extracted from Central Statistical Office, Social Trends, London, 1970, Vol. I, Table 26.



From these tables it is clear that in both countries, the production of finished metal and engineering goods provided the major source of work for those employed in manufacturing industry in the 1960's. Perhaps the major difference between the two economies was in the sizeable proportion of Swedish workers who were engaged in trades related to the timber industry; something like 21 per cent. But in view of the role of timber in the industrialisation of Sweden it is surprising that this figure is not higher. However, Tables II.8 and II.9 only describe the distribution of employment in manufacturing industry and they give no details about the structure of this labour force in terms of occupational categories. Therefore, although Sweden and Britain may now have a common 'type' of industrialism, it could be that the occupational structure within manufacturing industry in the two countries is remarkably different; industry in one country, for example, could be more capital-intensive so that a smaller proportion of production workers are required but a larger number of administrators and technicians. At the same time, it could be that in sectors of society other than of manufacturing that the two countries have distinct social structures which produce different occupational profiles. However, this does not appear to be the case; they appear to have remarkably similar occupational structures. This is demonstrated in Table II.10:

TABLE II.10: THE STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION  
IN SWEDEN AND BRITAIN

CATEGORY	BRITAIN %	SWEDEN %
Professional, technical and related workers	9.6	15.3
Administrative, executive and managerial workers	3.1	2.2
Clerical workers	13.7	9.5
Sales workers	9.6	9.3
Farmers, fishermen, etc.	3.5	11.7
Miners, quarrymen and related workers	1.5	0.4
Workers in transport and communication occupations	6.0	6.6
Craftsmen and production workers	39.3	34.4
Service, sport and recreation workers	12.0	9.7
Workers not classifiable by occupation	0.7	0.3
Members of the armed forces	1.0	0.6
TOTAL	100.0	100.0

Source: International Labour Office, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, Geneva, 1969, Table 2B.

Table II.10 suggests that although the occupational structures of the two countries are not identical, there are no fundamental differences between them: in each, 'craftsmen and production workers' constitute between 35 and 40 per cent of the economically active population. The major differences between the two countries are in terms of the proportions of professional and technical workers, and of farmers and fishermen; in each case Sweden has a higher proportion than Britain. But these differences do not override the overall similarities that exist between the gainfully employed populations of the two countries.

Clearly, this analysis of the occupational and industrial structures of Britain and Sweden suggests that they are now fairly similar representations



of the same 'type' of industrial society. Their industrial environments are made up of similar occupational roles, with relatively small numbers of administrators regulating the activities of larger numbers of operatives and other manual workers. Each is characterised by the existence of specialist productive institutions so that there is an industrial division of labour, and the predominance of bureaucratic types of social and economic organisation with all that this entails for the development of specialist social roles and the delegation of authority. Therefore, a comparative study of these two countries is appropriate in order to investigate the claims that industrialism has a 'logic' which 'standardises' not only the industrial environments of different countries, but also their social structures. If this claim is valid then it could be expected that Britain and Sweden would not only have common social structures but also similar patterns of economic and social inequality. However, it should not be assumed that the industrial structures of the two countries are similar in all respects. Indeed, there are many differences, among the more important of which are the sizes of industrial enterprises and the distribution of industrialism as it is reflected in patterns of urbanism.

Sweden has a population which is only about one-sixth of the size of Britain. This obviously has important implications for the absolute size of both industrial enterprises and of urban areas in the two countries, although, of course, this will not necessarily determine the relative degrees of industrial and urban concentration. Generally speaking, industrial enterprises are of a much smaller size in Sweden than they are in Britain; measured, that is, according to number of employees. The differences between the two countries are illustrated for selected branches of their respective economies in Tables II.11 and II.12:

TABLE II.11: THE SIZE OF INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES IN SELECTED BRANCHES OF THE ECONOMY IN SWEDEN ACCORDING TO NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES, 1968

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY	NOS. OF ENTERPRISES WITH EMPLOYEES OF:				TOTAL NOS. OF ENTERPRISES
	0-19	20-99	100-499	500+	
Mining	434	60	13	2	509
Manufacturing	21486	3507	904	241	26138
Textiles and leather goods	2640	537	152	16	3345
Paper and paper products	1775	356	136	42	2309
Wood products	4556	645	93	9	5303
Food, drink and tobacco	3526	304	96	24	3950
Chemicals	887	186	63	24	1160
Non-metallic products	1050	211	45	13	1319
Metal industries	292	73	17	23	405
Fabricated manufactured goods	6138	1123	289	88	7638
Other manufacturing	614	71	13	2	700
Building industry	33571	1456	193	33	35253

Source: Extracted from Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Sweden, Stockholm, 1971, Table 400.

TABLE II.12: THE SIZE OF INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES IN SELECTED BRANCHES OF THE ECONOMY IN BRITAIN ACCORDING TO NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN 1958

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY	NOS. OF ENTERPRISES WITH EMPLOYEES OF:			
	1-24	25-99	100-499	500+
Manufacturing	N.A.	14257	7240	1950
Construction and Mining	N.A.	5207	1420	233

Source: Extracted from M. Utton,<sup>34</sup> Industrial Concentration, Table 3



Although great care must be taken in interpreting these figures since they are far from comparable, they do confirm that there are far more enterprises of a large size - in terms of the numbers employed - in Britain than in Sweden. On the face of it, this constitutes an important difference in the structure of industrialism in the two countries since a number of investigators have argued that the size of industrial organisations has important consequences for various aspects of worker behaviour; such as the rate of absenteeism, the incidence of strikes and the development of various worker attitudes<sup>35</sup>. At the same time, others have demonstrated that organisational size is directly related, at least to some extent, with the level of bureaucratisation<sup>36</sup>. However, on a closer examination of the data it becomes clear that the differences between the two countries in terms of the proportions of their industrial labour forces employed in large enterprises, that is with at least 1,000 employees, is not as significant as would be expected from an examination of Tables II.11 and II.12. This is shown in Tables II.13 and II.14 which illustrate the percentage distribution of industrial employees among enterprises of different sizes in each of the two countries.

TABLE II.13: THE PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYEES AMONG ENTERPRISES OF DIFFERENT SIZES IN SWEDEN, 1964

NOS. OF EMPLOYEES	INDUSTRY	OTHER SECTORS	TOTAL
-99	28.9	55.3	41.7
100-499	20.3	17.5	18.9
500-999	8.6	6.8	7.7
1000+	42.2	20.4	31.7
	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Extracted from S.O.U., "Ågande och Inflytande inom det Privata Näringslivet, Table 2:4. <sup>37</sup>

TABLE II.14: THE PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYEES AMONG ENTERPRISES OF DIFFERENT SIZES IN BRITAIN, 1958

SIZE OF ENTERPRISE	MANUFACTURING	CONSTRUCTION, MINING, QUARRYING
	% TOTAL EMPLOYMENT	% TOTAL EMPLOYMENT
-99	15.8	53.0
100-499	20.1	21.1
500-999	9.2	7.3
1000+	54.9	18.5
	100.0	100.0

Source: Extracted from M. Utton, op. cit., Table 3.

Tables II.13 and II.14 suggest, despite the remarkable differences in the sizes of the populations in the two countries, that relatively similar proportions of their respective industrial workforces are employed by enterprises with at least 1,000 employees. Among those working in Swedish industry, 42.2 per cent are employed in enterprises of at least this size compared with 54.9 per cent in British manufacturing industry. At the same time, similar proportions of the totals employed in manufacturing industry work in enterprises with between 500 and 999 employees. Therefore, it can be stated that roughly one-half - 50.8 per cent - of Swedish industrial workers and a slightly higher proportion - 60.1 per cent - of English workers who are employed in manufacturing industry work in enterprises of a fairly similar size. Of course, this should not detract from the significant differences that remain between the two countries in terms of the absolute distribution of large enterprises, but Tables II.13 and II.14 do suggest that the size of the employing enterprise for substantial proportions of the two industrial labour forces is much the same. Certainly the variations between



the two societies in this respect are not as great as the differences in the sizes of their populations would suggest. Indeed, Bain has shown that the level of industrial concentration, as measured by the percentage of industrial employment accounted for by the twenty largest plants in thirty selected industries, was much higher in Sweden than in Britain during the 1950's<sup>38</sup>. Using the figure for the United States as a constant (100), he found that the level of concentration was 234 for Sweden compared with 131 for Britain<sup>39</sup>.

Clearly the foregoing discussion suggests, despite somewhat fundamental differences in the processes of industrialisation in Britain and Sweden, that there are a number of similarities in their contemporary industrial structures. However, it is also clear that patterns of industrialisation have led to variations in the structure of urbanism between the two countries; urbanisation in Sweden has been much more recent and of a much smaller scale than in Britain. In 1800, somewhat less than 10 per cent of the Swedish population lived in what were 'administratively' defined as towns and it was not until the more rapid industrialisation of the 1870's that the urban population began to rapidly increase<sup>40</sup>. This was mainly a consequence of the highly diffuse nature of Swedish industrialisation which led to the growth of a large number of relatively small-scale urban communities - that is with between five and ten thousand inhabitants - rather than the concentration of populations in very large urban areas. In fact, by 1930 only five Swedish towns had more than 50,000 inhabitants and these included one town with more than half a million (Stockholm) and two with at least one hundred thousand (Malmo and Gothenburg)<sup>41</sup>. The overall pattern of urbanisation in Sweden since 1800 is documented in Table II.15:

TABLE II.15: THE DISTRIBUTION OF SWEDISH TOWNS ACCORDING TO SIZE OF POPULATION

SIZE OF POPULATION	NUMBER OF TOWNS					
	1800	1865	1895	1910	1930	1963
500,000+	-	-	-	-	1	1
100,000 - 500,000	-	1	2	2	2	2
50,000 - 100,000	1	-	1	1	2	11
25,000 - 50,000	-	1	2	8	9	22
10,000 - 25,000	2	5	14	15	25	48
5,000 - 10,000	3	17	20	25	35	31
2,000 - 5,000	18	21	25	28	28	15
500 - 2,000	62	44	28	18	11	3
All sizes	86	89	92	97	113	133

Source: Extracted from D. Thomas, Table 8<sup>42</sup>; C-G. Janson, Table 7.4<sup>43</sup>.

From Table II.15 it can be seen that in 1963 there were only three Swedish towns with populations of more than 100,000 compared with the 62 in Britain in 1969<sup>44</sup>; most Swedish towns had populations of between ten and twenty-five thousand with the next largest group consisting of communities with between five and ten thousand inhabitants. Expressed in terms of percentages, no less than 78.3 per cent of the population in Britain lived in towns of 100,000 or more in 1961<sup>45</sup> compared with a 1963 figure of 37 per cent for Sweden<sup>46</sup>. This, of course, has had important implications for the ecological structure of towns in the two countries and for the development of urban life styles. For example, the smaller size of Swedish towns, together with their more recent growth, has possibly restricted the development of working-class sub-cultures and life styles of the kind which have been found in many British towns<sup>47</sup>. Hence the more recent migration to Swedish towns may have limited the possibilities for the emergence of three-



generational, 'extended' families within the context of traditional community structures. The Swedish urban dweller is generally either the son of an earlier migrant to the town, or a migrant himself; perhaps the only exceptions are the one-occupation mining communities in the north of Sweden, the older areas of Stockholm, Malmö and Gothenburg, and the former 'bruks' and saw-mill communities which have developed into larger urban areas. Consequently, the lack of 'traditional' and occupationally homogeneous urban communities in Sweden could be conducive to important differences compared with Britain, in terms of life styles and socio-political attitudes - even between workers of similar occupational groups<sup>48</sup>. For example, engineering workers in Britain and Sweden could have quite separate life-styles and attitudes which stem from variations in the histories of urbanisation in the two countries<sup>49</sup>. Accordingly, these could largely override the 'constraints' or the 'logic' of industrialism which is supposed to be conducive to the development of similarities in the life styles and attitudes of workers in different countries. Unfortunately, the relative 'weightings' of occupation and 'urbanism' for the development of life styles and attitudes is a relatively unexplored area of sociological analysis.

To sum up the discussion so far, it suggests that there are similarities as well as differences between Britain and Sweden in terms of their contemporary industrial structures. The major differences appear to be 1) the processes of industrialisation - the more recent and 'diffused' nature of industrialisation in Sweden compared with the earlier 'concentrated' process in Britain; 2) the structure of industrialism - a larger absolute number of big enterprises in Britain than in Sweden; and 3) patterns of urbanisation and urbanism - the more recent developments on a smaller scale in Sweden which have limited the growth of 'traditional' community structures. At the same time the similarities between the two countries are linked to 1) the development of rather common types of manufacturing industry; 2) a high

percentage of industrial workers employed in relatively large enterprises;  
 3) the growth of a division of labour and of 'specialist' institutions; and  
 4) the development of similar occupational structures.

Clearly these items do not exhaust the range of possible influences, but they are among the more important. But which of these two sets of factors have had the greater impact upon the two social structures: the similarities or the differences? If sociology was a 'precise' empirical discipline which could attach numerical values to the variables which it identifies in its analyses, it would be possible to quantify each of the above items and then ascertain in a fairly 'scientific' way the relative significance of the various influences upon the development of the two social structures. But in the absence of such sophistication, it is necessary to resort to the 'sociological imagination' in order to decide which, among the various factors, have been the major influences shaping the two social structures, particularly patterns of social and economic inequality in each of the two countries.

In view of the foregoing discussion it can be argued that the contemporary industrial structures of Britain and Sweden are characterised more by their similarities than by their differences; especially in terms of those factors which determine the structure of inequality in society. Although there has always been considerable discussion about the origins of inequality in industrial society, a large number of writers have emphasised the importance of the occupational structure. Hence they claim that an individual's occupational role is the major determinant of his life chances and his style of life<sup>50</sup>. Of course, this is not to suggest that occupational roles are the sole determinants; in capitalist societies the inter-generational inheritance of private property is extremely important for the perpetuation of economic inequalities. But within industrial society the occupational structure is the major basis of the reward system, not only in terms of



income but also of prestige and authority. Therefore, the occupational structure can, for most purposes of analysis, be regarded as the major determinant of a society's stratification system. Consequently, most sociological investigations of life styles, life chances and socio-political attitudes have demonstrated the importance of occupation as the major determinant of systematic variations within the social structures of different industrial societies<sup>51</sup>. In fact some sociologists have gone so far as to suggest it is because the occupational structure is so fundamental in these processes that similar patterns of social stratification are to be found in different societies which are at similar levels of industrialisation. Therefore, Inkeles and Rossi have suggested that different industrial societies are characterised by similar occupational prestige hierarchies<sup>52</sup>, Lipset and Bendix have claimed that there are similar rates of inter-generational upward mobility in societies at the same levels of industrialisation<sup>53</sup>, while Clark Kerr and his associates have argued that industrialisation in different countries leads to the development of relatively uniform occupational structures and as a result, common systems of social stratification<sup>54</sup>. Finally, Parkin has suggested that, "As far as advanced Western capitalist societies are concerned, we can represent the backbone of the reward system as a hierarchy of broad occupational categories. This runs from high to low as follows:

Professional, managerial and administrative.

Semi-professional and lower administrative.

Routine white collar.

Skilled manual.

Semi-skilled manual.

Unskilled manual."<sup>55</sup>

These arguments suggest, then, that for an analysis of social stratification in Britain and Sweden it is important to give primary emphasis to

their respective occupational structures rather than to those items which may contribute to differences within the industrial structures of the two countries. This is not to suggest that such differences are irrelevant - for the investigation of certain issues they may be of crucial significance - but for the study of social stratification the industrial profiles of the two countries may be regarded as similar in the sense that they both generate rather common occupational structures. Furthermore, in view of the significance of occupational structures for shaping stratification systems, it can be hypothesised that Sweden and Britain will have similar patterns of social and economic inequality; indeed, it can be argued that the hierarchy of rewards in both countries will be of the kind suggested by Parkin. But why should this be assumed to be the case? Sociologists have put forward two major explanations for the existence of such reward hierarchies.

Firstly, it has been claimed that industrial societies are confronted with particular needs and that some occupations are functionally more important for the fulfillment of these needs than others<sup>56</sup>. As a result some occupations are more highly rewarded in order to motivate those with talent to fill the functionally important occupations. However, this assumption is problematic. What criteria of a relatively 'objective' kind can be used in order to decide which occupations are 'functionally more important'? Since the 'functional theory' of stratification fails to adequately deal with issues of this kind, it has been considered by many to be more of an ideological justification for existing inequalities rather than an explanation of them<sup>57</sup>.

The second major set of explanations for inequalities in industrial society has focused upon discussions about the exercise of power. Hence it has been suggested that one of the major reasons why managerial, administrative and professional workers are more highly rewarded than semi-skilled employees is because of the greater power which their skills enable them to wield in society<sup>58</sup>. Within the context of labour markets they are able to



acquire high rewards because of the scarcity values of their skills and, at the same time, to reinforce these by restricting the acquisition of skills by insisting that recruits undergo relatively long periods of training. These periods of training are then used as justifications for demanding a larger share of economic rewards. Furthermore, managerial, professional and most categories of white-collar workers occupy positions of authority within the occupational structure so that they are able to protect and perpetuate their privileges in relation to other occupational groups, a process which can be strengthened outside the workplace by electing political parties to government which will represent their wider economic and social interests. In these ways, the overall pattern of rewards will reflect the structure of power in society. If, then, Britain and Sweden have similar power structures, it could be expected that these will reinforce similar patterns of economic and social inequality as generated by their rather common occupational structures. If, however, this is not the case, there is the possibility that the reward structures of Britain and Sweden will vary, if only to a limited extent. In order to answer this question it is necessary to summarise, if only briefly, political developments within each of the two countries.

#### (ii) Political Developments

Britain and Sweden are capitalist societies; in this sense they both have market economies in which the means of production are predominantly privately owned. In both countries there are shareholders, rentiers, property owners and working populations whose major source of income is their labour. Britain and Sweden, then, possess a number of characteristics common to all capitalist societies; features, that is, which distinguish them from socialist countries where the almost total absence of private property in the means of production prevents the development of social classes which are based on legal property relationships. At the same time Britain and Sweden are similar in that they are both 'welfare states'; so that their respective

governments accept the financial responsibility for providing a wide range of social services. Since it would require a detailed study to describe the differences and the similarities in the provision of these services in the two countries, only three general points will be made<sup>59</sup>. Firstly, the proportion of gross domestic product devoted to social security in Britain and Sweden is fairly similar; in 1960 it was 11.0 per cent and 12.4 per cent respectively.<sup>60</sup> Secondly, the structure of social security benefits in the two countries follows a rather similar pattern; this is shown in Table II.16:

TABLE II.16: THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS  
IN BRITAIN AND SWEDEN, 1960

	SWEDEN	BRITAIN
Health and Welfare	42.7	49.7
Employment Injuries	1.1	1.9
Family Allowances	14.1	5.2
Unemployment	1.3	1.3
Pensions	40.6	38.3
War Victims	0.2	3.6
TOTAL	100.0	100.0

Source: Extracted from United Nations, Incomes in Post-War Europe, Geneva, 1967, Table 6.9.

Table II.16 shows that the health and welfare services together with pensions constitute the highest proportion of social security benefits in the two countries. Indeed, the only major difference between them is that family allowances account for a far greater proportion of benefits in Sweden than they do in Britain; otherwise the overall structure of benefits is much the same. Thirdly, social security provision in both Sweden and Britain is, to a large extent, financed from general government funds whereas in a number



TABLE II.17: SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS AND BENEFITS IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1960

	FINANCING OF SOCIAL SECURITY (TOTAL RECEIPTS = 100)				EMPLOYEES CONTRIBUTIONS AS A % OF PER- SONAL PRIMARY INCOME	SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS AS A % OF PER- SONAL PRIMARY INCOME
	CONTRIBUTIONS		GENERAL GOVT.	OTHER SOURCES		
	EMPLOYERS	EMPLOYEES				
Austria	50.5	24.4	20.6	4.5	5.3	18.8
France	61.5	15.4	19.8	3.3	3.0	17.7
W. Germany	41.2	24.9	26.1	7.9	6.0	20.7
Italy	59.0	11.9	23.0	6.1	2.4	16.5
Netherlands	39.2	40.3	12.7	7.7	7.1	14.0
Norway	26.5	31.7	40.0	1.7	5.4	15.6
Sweden	11.0	20.5	66.9	1.6	3.3	15.6
Switzerland	23.8	32.9	27.4	16.0	4.3	9.2
United Kingdom	17.0	18.9	59.2	4.9	2.8	13.8

Source: Extracted from United Nations, Incomes in Post-War Europe, Geneva, 1967, Table 6.4.

of other countries employers and employees contribute higher proportions than the government. Some international comparisons are presented in Table II.17:

Table II.17 suggests that in 1960 the central governments of Sweden and Britain financed social security to a far greater degree than those of almost all other European countries; among those compared, only Norway with a government contribution of 40 per cent came within reach of the proportions in Sweden and Britain. However, Britain and Sweden do not differ significantly from other European countries in terms of the overall level of benefits. Expressed as a percentage of gross national product in 1960, the proportion allocated to social security expenditure was 16.1 per cent in W. Germany, 14.9 per cent in France, 14.0 per cent in Austria, and 14.2 per cent in Belgium. By comparison, the figures were 11.0 per cent in Britain and 12.4 per cent in Sweden<sup>61</sup>. Furthermore, the two countries are not particularly generous in the provision of these benefits; when expressed as a percentage of personal primary income, Table II.17 shows that in 1960 they represented 20.7 per cent of personal primary income in W. Germany, 18.8 per cent in Austria and 17.7 per cent in France. The figures for Sweden and Britain were 15.6 per cent and 13.8 per cent respectively.

In view of these figures it is possible to claim that Sweden and Britain can be regarded as capitalist societies with highly developed state welfare systems. But in spite of this, important differences remain between them in terms of their political processes and traditions. One of the more important of these is the relative strength of their respective working-class movements; particularly as regards the development of 1) trade unions and 2) of the Labour and Social Democratic political parties.

#### 1) Trade Unions

Because of a late industrialisation compared with that of Britain, the origins of trade unionism in Sweden are fairly recent. It was not until the 1880's that viable trade unions were first established although workers' associations existed before that time; historians often claim that the oldest trade union dates from 1846 when the Union of Typographers was formed in



Stockholm, but this was not a trade union in the contemporary sense of the word - it was merely a 'club' or an association which provided educational facilities for its members<sup>62</sup>. Similarly, during the 1860's and 1870's there was the development of many comparable organisations but few of these provided the basis for 'genuine' trade unions, established to pursue the economic and political objectives of their members<sup>63</sup>. Such organisations began to flourish during the 1880's among skilled craftsmen in the larger urban and industrial towns, particularly among printers, building tradesmen and machinists<sup>64</sup>. By contrast, the smaller industrial areas based on the 'bruks' were of little consequence in providing the foundations for the development of trade unionism because of their 'paternalistic' social structures which reduced the degree to which workers could organise themselves for the purposes of bargaining with their employers and also because the strains of industrialisation were less severely experienced by these workers compared with those who had migrated to the growing industrial communities. Consequently, it was among the craftsmen of the larger urban areas that the foundations of Swedish trade unionism were established. Often these workers had travelled abroad - to England and to Germany - in order to obtain craft skills and this had brought them into contact with socialist ideas and with flourishing trade union movements<sup>65</sup>. This, coupled with the exploitation and the deprivation which they experienced in the growing Swedish industrial communities, together with the absence of 'welfare benefits' available in the 'bruks', led to the rapid acceptance of trade union ideas. As a result, there was rapid growth in the number of local trade unions in the 1880's, particularly in Stockholm and in the growing industrial communities in the south of Sweden, first among craftsmen and then later among unskilled workers<sup>66</sup>. But it was not until the end of the decade that the bases were laid for the growth of national federations; the first of these was established in 1886 and during the 1890's this became the dominant type of union structure among

both unskilled and skilled workers<sup>67</sup>. However, Swedish trade unions were, at this time, numerically very weak. Bäckström has suggested that at the beginning of the 1880's there were only between eight and nine thousand trade union members and this increased to only 66,000 by the end of the century; a figure equivalent to about 25 per cent of all workers employed in industry. He claims that the most rapid growth was between 1895 and 1898 when numbers increased from 15,000 to 60,000<sup>68</sup>. But it was not until 1898 that the Swedish trade unions established their own central organisation - the Confederation of Trade Unions (LANDSORGANISATION, LO). Up until then, the major focal point for co-ordination between the various national unions had been the Social Democratic Labour Party<sup>69</sup>. However, in its early years LO was relatively weak and its major function was to provide advisory services and information to its various affiliated unions<sup>70</sup>. It was not until the formation of the Confederation of Swedish Employers (SVENSKA ARBETSGIVARE-FORENINGEN, SAF) in 1902 that LO began to operate as an effective centralised negotiating body for the trade union movement and as a result, there was the establishment of collective agreements between SAF and LO<sup>71</sup>. The first of these was in 1905 and possibly because of this, there was an increase in union membership so that by 1909 the figure had increased to 231,000 - equivalent to approximately two-thirds of the industrial labour force<sup>72</sup>. But in that year SAF organised a lockout which led to a defeat for LO; consequently, LO lost more than one-half of its membership and it was not until 1917 that the 1909 figures were again achieved<sup>73</sup>. From 1911, however, the membership of trade unions continued to grow for the next fifty years so that by 1967 it had reached a figure of more than 1,600,000<sup>74</sup>. The growth of LO membership during the 20th century is shown in Table II.18:



TABLE II.18: THE GROWTH OF MEMBERSHIP AMONG  
TRADE UNIONS AFFILIATED TO LO

DATE	NOS. OF UNIONS AFFILIATED TO LO	NOS. OF MEMBERS
1899	16	37,523
1907	28	186,226
1911	26	79,926
1920	31	280,029
1929	36	508,107
1939	45	961,216
1949	44	1,255,987
1959	44	1,467,117
1967	37	1,607,077

Source: T. Karlbom, op. cit., p. 72.

However, the growth of LO has not been unimpeded. The Labour movement entered the 1920's with many policies for changing the structure of society and for improving the economic, political and social conditions of workers. But little was achieved during the decade because of its weak bargaining position. The 1920's were characterised by high levels of unemployment, political instability and a Labour movement which was torn by ideological divisions<sup>75</sup>. Nevertheless, the membership of LO continued to grow during this period and, coupled with a big increase in the number of working days lost through strikes, there was pressure by Conservative groups in parliament for legislation to 'regularise' the labour market. Consequently 'anti-trade union' laws were passed in 1928 which stipulated that there should be no strikes during periods of collective agreements drawn up between LO and SAF. Although the trade union movement protested, these laws have continued to provide some of the foundations of industrial relations in present-day Sweden<sup>76</sup>.

During the 1930's the position of trade unions in Sweden was fundamentally

altered by the general election of 1932; this produced the first Social Democratic government to have an effective majority in parliament. It was the result of an agreement between the Social Democratic Party and the Böndeförbundet (Farmers') Party which led to the formation of a coalition committed to reducing the high level of unemployment - a policy which has underlined the programme of successive Social Democratic governments and the trade union movement ever since. But the result of the 1932 general election meant that trade unions were in partnership with the government rather than in opposition to it. As a result, and for the first time, LO was actively involved in the formulation of government economic and social policies. Although this strengthened the position and the legitimacy of trade unions in Sweden, it was also conducive to the development of internal strains within the Labour movement since successive Social Democratic governments often formulated policies in collaboration with LO that were contrary to the economic interests of specific affiliated unions. For example, the priority given to economic growth and the raising of living standards emphasised the need to continually 'rationalise' the economy and this often led to redundancies among workers of specific unions in particular industries. Furthermore, and particularly since the Second World War, the LO policy of 'wage solidarity', backed by government support, has meant that considerable pressure has often been brought upon unions in powerful bargaining situations to moderate their wage claims<sup>77</sup>.

However, the new political situation heralded by the 1932 general election was not the only factor which strengthened the position of trade unions in Sweden; there were other factors which also contributed to this development. One of the more important was the 'Saltjöbadan Agreement' of 1938 which reinforced the 'centralised' features of Swedish industrial relations which had been in existence since 1905. As a result, LO and SAF established a code of practice in order to regulate industrial relations and



other aspects of the labour market<sup>78</sup>. The major implications of this agreement were as follows. Firstly, it provided the basis for industrial relations and wage negotiations which has continued until the present. Secondly, it has led to the development of a highly institutionalised and 'formal' system of industrial relations with a subsequent emphasis upon written rules and procedures. Thirdly, - and most importantly, - the highly centralised nature of the agreement confirmed the super-ordinate authority of LO over the member unions. Consequently, the structure of power within the Labour movement became more and more concentrated into the hands of the officials of LO with the result that member unions became highly constrained in terms of the policies which they could independently pursue. Whether or not this has constituted a beneficial development for rank-and-file members of the Labour movement will depend upon the criterion which is used for the basis of evaluation. But because LO has been the central negotiating body for manual unions, it has been in a position to develop policies in relation to at least two aspects of equality; the first, in terms of attempting to narrow wage differentials between various groups of manual workers through its policy of 'wage solidarity' and the second, in terms of reducing differences in the earnings and employment conditions of manual workers and other occupational groups in society<sup>79</sup>. With a less centralised structure it is possible that Swedish trade unions would have formulated less coherent policies about these differentials and that individual manual unions would, to a far greater extent than at present, be in competition with each other for wage increases. Finally, the centralised system of collective bargaining in Sweden has meant that LO, together with the Social Democratic Party, has been able to present itself as the institutional articulation of the working-class movement, committed to protecting the rights of the individual against the potential 'abuses' of modern capitalism. If the trade union movement was more fragmented, it is doubtful whether it would be able to perform this

function as effectively. Therefore, it can be argued that the highly bureaucratised working-class movement has been able to establish a set of 'constraints' upon the prerogatives of private business to possibly a greater degree than in most other capitalist societies where the trade union movement has been more divided and less coherent.

These, then, are but four of the consequences of a Swedish trade union movement which is highly centralised, both in terms of its organisational structure and in its pattern of negotiations with other groups in society<sup>80</sup>. But the strength of LO does not stem solely from this, it also comes from the very high allegiance which it commands from workers. This is shown in Table II.19 which lists the percentage of manual workers who, in 1968, were members of LO affiliated unions.

TABLE II.19: PERCENTAGE OF LO MEMBERSHIP AMONG MANUAL WORKERS  
IN DIFFERENT SECTORS OF THE SWEDISH ECONOMY, 1968

Sector	Nos. of Employees (000's)	% of Employees who are Members of LO- Affiliated Unions
Wood and Paper Products	103	88.8
Fabricated Metal Goods, Machinery and Equipment	340	87.9
Building and Construction	233	87.3
Textile and Leather	77	83.5
Engineering Goods	94	76.1
Food, Beverages, Tobacco	96	71.0
Public Utilities	414	67.5
Transport and Services	69	61.3
Retail Trades	217	54.3
Forestry and Farming	110	38.1
Other Sectors	154	50.8
Unemployed	104	43.3
TOTAL	2,012	69.7

Source: C.V. Otter, Arkiv, 1973<sup>81</sup>.



From Table II.19 it is clear that the level of LO penetration among Swedish manual workers is very high; approximately 70 per cent. Indeed, among men the figure is as high as 80.2 per cent, while for women it is 51.9 per cent<sup>82</sup>. Clearly, LO constitutes a very influential movement within the social structure of contemporary Sweden. It is the largest organisation of any kind - measured, that is, in terms of membership<sup>83</sup> - and it is one of the two major institutional reflections of working-class interests in Sweden - the other being, of course, the Social Democratic Party. Indeed, the essentially working-class character of LO is reinforced by the fact that categories of employees other than manual workers, belong to separate unions which are, in turn, linked to their own central confederations<sup>84</sup>.

After LO, the largest union confederation which represents the interests of employees is the Central Organisation of Salaried Employees (TJÄNSTEMÄNNENS CENTRALORGANISATION - TCO)<sup>85</sup>. The origins of TCO are much more recent than those of LO; there was little union activity among white-collar workers before the 1930's and it was not until then that white-collar unions began to flourish. In 1931 a confederation was formed by white-collar unions within private industry - The Central Organisation for Employees (DE ANSTÄLLDAS CENTRALORGANISATION - DACO) and this was followed by the formation in 1937 of another white-collar confederation - The Central Organisation of Salaried Employees (TJÄNSTEMÄNNENS CENTRALORGANISATION - TCO). These two organisations then amalgamated in 1944 in order to form the present-day TCO. Since then, the growth of TCO has been rapid and the size of the membership has more than trebled: from 204,650 in 1945<sup>86</sup> to 719,493 in 1970<sup>87</sup>. This has reflected itself in terms of a high degree of union 'density' among white-collar workers, although it has not been as substantial as the level of LO penetration among manual workers. Elvander calculates that in 1967 about 90 per cent of all white-collar workers in the public sector and approximately 70 per cent of those employed in the private sector were members of unions affiliated to



TCO<sup>88</sup>. However, within the private sector there was a wide variation between banking and insurance where the proportions reached 90 per cent, industry with about 75 per cent and the service trades with a level of about 50 per cent<sup>89</sup>. Unlike LO the TCO performs fewer 'political' functions; it is not directly linked to any of the major political parties in the same way in which LO is related to the Social Democratic Party<sup>90</sup>. This is possibly because the membership of TCO is much more heterogeneous than that of LO; in the sense that it consists mainly of lower-grade white-collar workers who are employed in a wide spectrum of work situations, ranging from large-scale public and private bureaucracies located in large urban areas, to small private businesses where relationships between employers and employees are face-to-face and personal. A further reason why TCO adopts a relatively explicit a-political role is probably because of the voting behaviour of its members. Whereas in the 1968 general election, 75 per cent of the votes of industrial manual workers went to the Social Democratic Party and only 10 per cent and 7 per cent to the Centre and Folk Parties respectively, among lower-grade white-collar workers (that is, those without academic qualifications), the votes were more widely distributed among the political parties<sup>91</sup>. As a consequence, 43 per cent of their votes went to the Social Democratic Party, 24 per cent to the Folk Party, 15 per cent to the Högern Party and 14 per cent to the Centre Party. In fact the distribution of voting preferences among lower-grade white-collar votes is an indication of the non-political role of TCO to the extent that it devotes little attention to the explicit political socialisation of its members. But it also should be stressed that no less than 43 per cent of lower-grade white-collar workers voted for the Social Democratic Party in 1968; the reasons for this will be discussed later.

There are, in addition to TCO, two other Swedish white-collar trade union confederations. The oldest is the National Federation of Civil Servants (STATSJÄNSTEMANNENS RIKSFÖRBUND - SR)<sup>"</sup> which was founded in 1917 and since then



has represented the interests of higher civil servants and of military officers. It is the smallest and in many ways, the socially most homogeneous of the trade union confederations; in 1946 it had a membership of 18,000<sup>92</sup> but by 1970 this figure had only increased to 19,279<sup>93</sup>. One of the reasons for this is that a number of SR-affiliated unions joined SACO in the 1950's<sup>94</sup>.

The Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (SVERIGES AKADEMIKERS CENTRALORGANISATION - SACO) has, after TCQ, the largest group of white-collar employees affiliated to it. This includes a number of unions which represent the interests of such diverse groups as clergymen, school-teachers, dentists, lawyers, engineers and so on<sup>95</sup>. The only common element which links the interests of these occupations is that their members all have higher academic qualifications from universities or equivalent institutions of higher education. SACO, in terms of its present organisational structure, was founded in 1947 when it had a total membership of approximately 15,000<sup>96</sup>. But because of changes in the occupational structure creating a demand for professional skills, the growth of higher education and the fact that a number of white-collar unions transferred their allegiance from SR to SACO in the 1950's, its affiliated membership has increased by more than seven times to reach a figure of 114,991 by the end of 1970<sup>97</sup>. Although the overall 'density' of unionisation among these qualified workers is not as high as that found among some sectors of manual workers, nevertheless Elvander has calculated that in 1967 approximately 70 per cent of all those with university degrees and equivalent qualifications were members<sup>98</sup>.

This, then, concludes a very brief outline of the development of trade unionism in Sweden. Clearly, the point to emphasise is that the overall density of unionism in Sweden is very high. However, two further remarks need to be made. Firstly, the structure of trade unionism is very centralised so that although each confederation has developed its own specific means for incorporating its affiliated unions, it is the confederations acting as their



representatives which are significant for the purposes of wage negotiations, consultations with governments and as pressure groups within the social structure. But secondly, and perhaps more importantly, there is a high degree of consistency between the composition of the class structure and the membership of the separate confederations. As it has already been mentioned, SAF represents the interests of employers, SR those of higher civil servants, SACO those of professional and higher administrative workers, TCO those of lower-grade and non-professional white-collar employees and finally, LO primarily those of manual workers. Admittedly the 'fit' is not quite as clear-cut as this because of the small proportion of lower-grade white-collar workers who are affiliated to LO and the rather ambiguous division that often exists between 'professional' and 'non-professional' workers, which provides the basis for some tension between TCO and SACO about the eligibility of membership for some occupational groups. In view of what has already been stated about the reward structure of capitalist societies as consisting of a hierarchy of occupational categories, it appears that the occupational structure of Sweden is linked to the various trade union confederations in the following manner:

<u>OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY</u>		<u>TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION</u>
Professional, Managerial and Administrative		SACO and SR
Semi-professional and Lower Administrative	)	TCO
Routine white-collar		
Skilled manual	)	LO
Semi-skilled manual		
Unskilled manual		

One of the consequences of these inter-relationships is that it is potentially conducive to stimulating a general awareness in society about the differences that exist in the social and economic rewards of the various occupational groups. Consequently, when there are national wage negotiations



- and these normally take place once every year - it is evident to the society that SACO, SR, TCO and LO are acting as the representatives of fairly clearly delineated socio-economic groups; in fact, Fulcher has argued that the structure of trade unionism in Sweden is such that it represents an extremely bureaucratised form of class conflict<sup>99</sup>. If this is the case, then it can be hypothesised that there will be a heightened level of consciousness, perhaps even of a class kind, among members of the various occupational groups. But, furthermore, if the structure of economic rewards in Sweden constitutes a hierarchy of the kind suggested earlier, then it can also be suggested that there might be heightened feelings of resentment among those lowly placed in the hierarchy, particularly among manual and lower-grade white-collar workers, if only because they are aware of the high rewards accruing to other occupational groups. Indeed, these feelings are likely to be more pronounced among Swedish manual workers than among comparable occupational groups in other countries where the structure of trade unionism is not so directly consistent with the occupational structure. In those societies it might be expected that class inequalities will be less widely known and that there will be less articulated resentment about the overall structures of economic rewards.

If the institutional structure of trade unionism in Sweden is conducive to the expression of class interests, then LO is in a position to do this much more forcefully than any of the other confederations. Of course, the very high degree of LO 'penetration' among manual workers strengthens its bargaining position but unlike the other confederations, it acts as a political interest group<sup>100</sup>. Whereas they explicitly, if not informally, stress their political neutrality and always emphasise that they are solely interested in pursuing the economic objectives of their affiliated members, LO is at all organisational levels closely linked to the Social Democratic Party<sup>101</sup>. As a result, it has a large number of 'political' functions in

addition to those of a solely 'industrial' or 'economic' kind and it thus constitutes an important political pressure group within the structure of Swedish society. In view of the fact that the Social Democratic Party has been in government since 1932, this means that the institutional basis for the articulation of working-class interests is extensive. Whether or not this has led to the development of a distributative system which is more favourable to the manual working-class than in other capitalist societies will be considered later. At this juncture it is only necessary to emphasise that the potential basis for the pursuit of manual working-class interests appears to be greater in Sweden than it is in Britain. In fact, the whole development of British trade unionism is much less impressive, both in terms of its 'penetration' among potential members and the degree to which it is conducive to the widespread articulation of working-class interests. To quote a P.E.P. enquiry, "By the standards of Sweden (and Austria) ..... British trade unions have a long way to go."<sup>102</sup>

It is impossible to give an accurate estimate of the size and structure of British trade unionism before the 1890's; 1892 is the first year for which there are reasonably satisfactory statistics. However, Clegg, Fox and Thompson have estimated that in 1888 about 5 per cent of the 'occupied population' were trade union members, as were something in the region of 10 per cent of all male manual workers<sup>103</sup>. The authors claim that only rough estimates can be given for union 'density' because of the difficulty in determining the actual numbers of adult male workers in each industrial group. But they do suggest that engineering, shipbuilding, mining and quarrying probably had 'densities' of about 20 per cent, building and printing of about 15 per cent, textiles and woodwork of about 10 per cent and the transport industries of about 5 per cent<sup>104</sup>. In other branches of industry, by contrast, the proportion of union members was negligible. However, even within the same branch of industry there was often a remarkable variation in



the 'density' of unionism among craftsmen and skilled workers on the one hand, and semi-skilled operatives and labourers on the other. But these figures must be regarded only as estimations in the absence of reliable statistical evidence. At the same time it must be borne in mind that the degree of unionisation among workers was subject to wide fluctuations from one date to the next. According to Clegg and his associates, during the nineteenth century, unions tended to flourish in periods of prosperity and to decline in times of depression<sup>105</sup>.

The first reliable statistics of trade union membership in Britain were published in 1894 in the Board of Trade's 6th Report on Trade Unions. This stated that in 1892 total union membership was 1,576,000<sup>106</sup>. However, there were more than three million members by 1911 and by 1920 this figure had increased to more than eight million. The numbers then declined so that by 1933 there were less than four and a half million members. But during the latter part of the 1930's there was a rapid increase in membership so that by 1938 there were again more than six million members and by 1948 this figure had increased to over nine million. By this time the rapid growth of trade unionism, which had started in the 1930's, declined and in 1965, fifteen years later, only a further 800,000 workers had been enrolled to make a total membership of rather more than ten million. However, there was a further increase after this date when the membership expanded by another 800,000 by 1970<sup>107</sup>.

According to Bain, the long-term growth of British trade unionism has been quite impressive; the overall 'density' of unionism among all employees increased from a little more than 10 per cent in 1892 to about 47 per cent in 1970<sup>108</sup>. But he also claims that from the end of the 1940's until the mid 1960's the growth of trade union membership was much less outstanding; whereas between 1933 and 1948 actual membership increased by 113 per cent, compared with an increase in 'potential' membership of only 6.5 per cent,

between 1948 and 1965 actual membership increased by only 8 per cent, while 'potential' membership increased by 14 per cent<sup>109</sup>. As a result, union density increased to a peak in 1948 when it reached a level of 45 per cent, after which there was a slight decline so that in 1965 the overall density was 42.6 per cent<sup>110</sup>. But then, after 1965, there was an increase in the level of union density so that by 1970, the figure had reached 46.9 per cent<sup>111</sup>. The principal features of the development of trade unionism in Britain are shown in Table II.20:

TABLE II.20: TOTAL UNION MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED KINGDOM,  
1892 - 1970

YEAR	LABOUR FORCE (000's)	TOTAL UNION MEMBERSHIP (000's)	DENSITY OF UNION MEMBERSHIP (%)
1892	14126	1576	11.2
1901	16101	2025	12.6
1911	17762	3139	17.7
1920	18469	8348	45.2
1923	17965	5429	30.2
1933	19422	4392	22.6
1938	19829	6053	30.5
1945	20400	7875	38.6
1948	20732	9362	45.2
1950	21055	9289	44.1
1955	21913	9741	44.5
1960	22817	9835	43.1
1965	23920	10181	42.6
1970	23446	11000	46.9

Source: Extracted from G.S. Bain and R. Price, op. cit., Table 8.

As in Sweden there are variations between different sectors of the British economy in terms of the proportions of workers who are unionised. The figures, taken from Bain, are shown in Table II.21:



TABLE II.21: THE DENSITY OF UNION MEMBERSHIP BY INDUSTRY  
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1964<sup>112</sup>

INDUSTRY	DENSITY PER CENT	EMPLOYEES (000's)
Education	50	1094
Professional and business services	24	1268
Insurance, banking and finance	31	637
Distribution	15	3026
Paper, printing and publishing	57	632
Gas, electricity and water	51	413
Building	37	1708
Metals and engineering	54	4537
Chemicals and allied	20	515
Food, drink and tobacco	11	842
Transport and Communications	75	1320
Local Government	84	776
Theatres, cinemas, sport, etc.	39	251
Furniture, timber, etc.	37	296
Footwear	63	116
Clothing	30	452
Textiles other than cotton	21	613
Cotton	75	228
National Government	83	550
Coal-mining	89	596
Railways	84	396
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	27	551

Source: Extracted from Bain, op. cit., Table 3.2.

Table II.21 shows that in 1964 the highest percentage of union membership in Britain was in the 'traditional' industrial sectors of coal-mining and the railways and in national and local government. In 'metals and engineering' on the other hand, which in 1964 was the largest industry in the economy with 4,537,000 employees, the proportion of trade union members was only 54 per cent. Furthermore, the second largest industrial sector, 'distribution', had a percentage membership of no more than 15 per cent. Granted the distributive trades have a number of organisational characteristics - small units of production, close face-to-face relationships between employers and employees, variations in working conditions from one employer to the next, and so on - which may cause difficulties for union

recruitment, but the 'density' of unionisation within this sector is remarkably low by Swedish standards<sup>113</sup>. Perhaps the most difficult category of employees to organise into trade unions in Sweden is forestry and farm workers and yet despite their relative geographical and social isolation, no less than 38 per cent of them were union members in 1968, a figure which is almost - although not quite - as high as the proportions unionised in the building industry in Britain<sup>114</sup>. Indeed, the lower 'density' of unionism among workers in Britain applies to both manual and non-manual employees. Bain and Price have calculated that in 1970 only 42.9 per cent of all male white-collar workers were unionised, compared with the overall figure of 60.8 per cent for male manual workers<sup>115</sup>. Similarly, as with total union membership, the proportion of white-collar workers who are members varies between different industrial sectors; Bain suggests that in 1960 the density of white-collar unionism was 84 per cent in local government, 83 per cent in national government, 50 per cent in the educational system, 31 per cent in insurance, banking and finance, and only 12 per cent in manufacturing industry<sup>116</sup>. These figures are much lower than those for white-collar workers employed in the comparable sectors of the economy in Sweden. According to Elvander in 1967, approximately 90 per cent of Swedish white-collar workers employed in the public sector as well as those in banking and insurance were unionised, compared with 75 per cent of those working in manufacturing industry and roughly 50 per cent of those engaged in service trades<sup>117</sup>. But the higher density of unionism among manual and white-collar workers in Sweden compared with Britain is not the only difference between the two countries. At the same time there are important contrasts in the structure of trade unionism.

In the first place, British trade unionism is not characterised by the same degree of centralisation as the Swedish movement. Although the Trade Union Congress (TUC) often functions as a centralised negotiating body for



its affiliated unions, it does not do so to the same extent as LO and the other trade union confederations in Sweden; the TUC may negotiate with governments and the Confederation of British Industry about such issues as economic growth, national minimum wage levels and the desirable level of wage increases, but any agreements achieved do not have the same binding impact upon the behaviour of the affiliated unions in the same way as they do in Sweden. If there is 'strength in unity', then LO and the other trade union confederations have greater bargaining power in their negotiations with government and the various interest groups than the TUC in Britain. In this sense, then, the more centralised structure of trade unionism in Sweden enables it to be more 'effective' and 'influential' in pursuing its policies.

Secondly, there is less of a consistency between the occupational structure and the structure of trade unionism in Britain than there is in Sweden. It has already been mentioned that the various Swedish trade union confederations represent the interests of different occupational groups. Similarly, each trade union is confined to one occupation or industry. But this is not the case in Britain. Generally speaking, most trade unions have a varied membership which transcends both occupational and industrial boundaries. At the same time, although there are a number of unions which are purely 'white-collar' or 'manual' in their social composition, there are a larger number which have a mixed membership of both types of workers. Therefore, occupational divisions, particularly in terms of manual and non-manual differences, are less relevant in industrial relations and wage negotiations in Britain than they are in Sweden<sup>118</sup>. Furthermore, the 'mixed' composition of British trade unions means that the TUC has affiliated to it a rank-and-file membership which is made up of both manual and white-collar workers. This is reinforced by the fact that, unlike the Swedish situation, there are a number of solely white-collar trade unions which are also



affiliated to the TUC. Bain has calculated that approximately 20 per cent of the total TUC membership was made up of white-collar workers in 1964<sup>119</sup>; by contrast, far less than 10 per cent of the total LO membership was made up of white-collar employees in 1967<sup>120</sup>. Consequently, the TUC cannot be regarded to all effects and purposes as solely a manual workers' confederation to the same extent as the Swedish LO. This means that the TUC is less able to pursue policies which are intended to further the interests of manual workers as a social group in society.

Because of the fragmented structure of British trade unionism, which often transcends manual and non-manual occupations, it can be argued that this generates less awareness, particularly among manual workers in Britain, about the economic rewards and privileges of different occupational groups; especially those which exist between professional, white-collar and manual workers. Indeed, such differentials do not articulate themselves in the form of institutional structures like the trade union confederations in Sweden. There is no genuine British equivalent to LO, which operates both as a political pressure group and as a trade union confederation, representing the interests of almost all manual workers. The most comparative organisation in Britain is the TUC, but it lacks many of the manifest political functions of LO and it does not exclusively articulate the interests of manual workers<sup>121</sup>. Thus, the absence of centralised trade union confederations in Britain, closely linked to major divisions within the occupational structure means that, potentially, the political and economic interests of manual workers - as an occupational group - are less well represented than they are in Sweden.

Furthermore, it is possible to suggest that, as a result of the structure of trade unionism in Britain, it is difficult for the union movement to develop two policies which have been central for LO since the early 1950's. Firstly, it is almost impossible for the TUC to introduce and to enforce a



policy of 'wage solidarity', in the sense of attempting to narrow differentials in the economic rewards of different groups of manual workers. One of the main features of wage negotiations in Britain has been the efforts of specific unions to preserve, if not increase, differentials between themselves and others; unions have tended to compete with each other in an economic 'free for all'. Although the TUC has frequently emphasised the desirability of improving the relative economic position of lower-paid groups, it lacks the institutional means whereby it can exercise any influence upon the policies of the affiliated unions<sup>122</sup>. In Sweden, by contrast, the more centralised structure of LO means that, potentially, it is in a better position to enforce such policies upon its affiliated unions<sup>123</sup>. If the equalisation of wages among various categories of manual worker is adopted as a desirable objective by trade movements, then the structure of unionism in Sweden is more conducive to the achievement of success than it is in Britain. Secondly, because of its mixed, cross-class membership, the TUC is limited in the degree to which it can pursue a policy of equality in terms of the social and economic rewards of manual and non-manual workers; it is prevented from developing such a policy because of a fear that it will 'alienate' its white-collar membership. In contrast, by operating as the manifest interest groups of professional, white-collar, and manual workers, the Swedish trade union confederations implicitly, if not always explicitly, reveal the major social and economic divisions of society<sup>124</sup>. Within this context, LO is in a position to argue for the narrowing of differentials as they exist between manual workers and other occupational groups in society in a way in which the TUC cannot. Consequently, policies formulated in order to ameliorate the economic deprivations of manual workers in Britain cannot be pursued by the union movement in the same explicit manner as they can in Sweden<sup>125</sup>.

These, then, are important differences in the structure of trade

unionism in Sweden and Britain, which have had implications for the kinds of policies which can be pursued. At the same time, it appears that the legitimacy of the trade union movement is better established in Sweden than in Britain. This, of course, has important implications for the degree to which it is able to command the support of rank-and-file members, to influence their attitudes and to bargain with other groups in society. Thus, in a study of attitudes among manual and white-collar workers in Sweden, Dahlström asked "What factors, do you think, explain the increase in living standards over the last 50 years?" He found that only a small proportion - generally fewer than 10 per cent - of any occupational group claimed that any improvements had been the result of efforts by private enterprise. On the other hand, no less than one-half of all the manual respondents in his sample attributed improvements to the activities of labour unions<sup>126</sup>. Similarly, in a study of two industrial communities in Sweden, Segerstedt and Lundquist asked a number of open-ended questions among which were "In what ways do you think that the working conditions of workers have improved over the past 40 to 50 years?" and "What is it that has brought about these improvements?" Among all the respondents, 44.2 per cent stated that it was the result of the activities of labour unions, a further 22.5 per cent mentioned labour political movements, while only 7.7 per cent attributed improvements to general technological progress<sup>127</sup>. The investigators found that there was no significant variation in these responses among members of different occupational groups. Dahlström also asked, "Do you think that trade unions have too much or too little power in this country?" He found that less than 5 per cent of the manual workers in his sample stated that unions were too powerful<sup>128</sup>.

By contrast, the legitimacy of the British Labour movement appears to be less established. Goldthorpe and Lockwood, for example, in their study of workers in Luton, asked: "Some people say that trade unions have too much



power in the country: would you agree or disagree, on the whole?" They found that as many as 41 per cent of their sample of manual workers agreed with this statement<sup>129</sup>. McKenzie and Silver also found in their investigation of political attitudes in Britain that a substantial proportion of manual workers felt that trade unions exercised too much influence. They discovered that 55 per cent of labour voters agreed with the general statement that 'trade unions have too much power in the country'<sup>130</sup>. In yet another enquiry into political opinions in Britain, Butler and Stokes concluded '..... the fact that attitudes towards the unions were, on balance, unfavourable in the period of our studies is none the less plain. When we asked our respondents whether their sympathies were generally for or against strikers, 61 per cent of respondents from non-union families, and even 45 per cent from union families, said 'against'. Nearly three-quarters of our respondents who were not union members said that unions have too much power; and very nearly half of the respondents from union households expressed the same view'<sup>131</sup>.

In view of such findings, it is not altogether surprising that the degree of trade union 'density' is much lower in Britain than in Sweden. Obviously, there are a number of factors which explain the growth of trade unionism - the attitudes of employers, the recruitment policies of unions and so on - but the 'social climate' within which trade unions operate and the legitimacy which they are able to command in society are also important factors. It does appear that the Swedish trade union movement not only has greater organisational effectiveness, but also a greater degree of normative influence than its British counterpart. This has had a number of important consequences which will be considered in a later chapter. It is now necessary to compare the 'political wings' of the two Labour movements, expressed in terms of the development of the Labour and Social Democratic Parties.



ii) The Development of the Labour and Social Democratic Parties

The Social Democratic Workers Party (SOCIALDEMOKRATISKA ARBETARPARTIET, SDAP) was founded in 1889 and, before the foundation of LO in 1898, it was the only central organisation of the working class<sup>132</sup>. With the formation of LO, strong links were established so that LO and the Social Democratic Party became closely inter-related and regarded as separate wings of the same movement. As Branting, the first acknowledged leader of the Social Democratic Party, stated in 1898, 'the Labour movement is a single entity, working in a trade-union direction and in a political direction, neither stifling the other, but supporting each other and working hand in hand for social emancipation'<sup>133</sup>. Indeed, even to the present day the Social Democratic Party and LO have continued to be ideologically and organisationally closely inter-related.

The origins of the Social Democratic Party were founded among small groups of radical thinkers - intellectuals and skilled workers - who had been in contact with socialist ideas in various European countries: particularly Germany, Denmark and, to a lesser extent, Britain<sup>134</sup>. The ideological basis of the early Party was Marxist and during the first decades, it was committed to a programme which emphasised the need to restructure society<sup>135</sup>. At the same time, and within the context of Swedish politics in the latter part of the 19th century, it insisted upon universal suffrage, which was one of the major political issues of the period. During the 1890's only one-quarter of the men over the age of 21 were entitled to vote. This meant that the two-chamber parliament was dominated by representatives of the land-owning class in the Upper House and by those of farmers and the middle classes in the Lower House; in the latter, the farmers generally had the majority. But in 1890 a Universal Franchise Union was formed and in a petition which was organised in 1898 it managed to collect more than 350,000 signatures. This organisation was predominantly organised by 'radical'



intellectuals and by the more liberal representatives of the urban lower-middle class and in 1902 they organised themselves into a national party, the Folk Party<sup>136</sup>. The Social Democratic Party, although committed to universal suffrage had no representation in Parliament until 1897 when Branting was elected. Consequently, the Folk and the Social Democratic Parties co-operated with each other against the vested interests of the upper-classes. Therefore, in order to protect these interests, the Conservatives organised themselves into a national party - the Högern - in 1904<sup>137</sup>.

Universal suffrage was gradually introduced from 1907 but by then the electoral support of the Social Democrats had continued to grow rapidly. Tomasson has suggested that between 1895 and 1907 the Party increased from 10,000 to 133,000 members<sup>138</sup>. In elections which were held in 1911 - the first after the franchise reforms - the Social Democrats won 64 of the 230 seats in the Lower Chamber, while the Folk Party won 101 and the Högern Party, 65<sup>139</sup>. The franchise reforms, therefore, had increased Social Democratic representation in the Lower Chamber so that it was as large as that enjoyed by the Högern Party. But the Upper Chamber continued to be dominated by wealthy businessmen and by landowners since representatives for this chamber were elected by municipal and county councils. The electoral reforms which had been implemented for elections to the Lower Chamber had not been applied to municipal and country elections so that in the 150-seated Upper Chamber there were only 12 Social Democrats and 51 members of the Folk Party, but 87 representatives of the Högern Party as a result of the 1911 elections<sup>140</sup>. However, in 1918 a Coalition government - made up of the Folk Party and the Social Democrats - introduced a number of electoral changes with the result that the Högern domination of the Upper Chamber was broken and in the 1919 elections for representatives to this Chamber, the number of Social Democrats increased to 49, while the number of elected Högern and Folk Party members

fell to 38 and 41 respectively. In these elections the newly-established B  ndef  rbundet (Agrarian) Party gained 19 of the 150 seats<sup>141</sup>.

The Coalition Government which was formed as a result of the 1917 elections was the first to include representatives of the Social Democratic Party. But in 1920 this government, formed with the Folk Party, broke down and so the Social Democrats continued in office as a minority government. This lasted for only a brief period of six months, but for this period it could regard itself as the first elected socialist government in the world. A major reason for the breakdown in co-operation between the two parties was that their joint programme for constitutional reform had been completed by 1920 and there was little else to keep them together. They had very different views on socio-economic issues so that whereas the Social Democrats were in favour of nationalisation and increased state intervention with the economy, the Folk Party only wanted to reform the existing economic system. Consequently, nationalisation became the major cleavage between the various political parties with the Folk Party, the H  gern, and the B  ndef  rbundet opposed to further state intervention, while the Social Democrats and the Communists were in favour<sup>142</sup>.

The period 1920-1932 has often been called by Swedish historians as the era of minority parliamentarism. During the 1920's the Folk Party declined in size and became split into two factions, the B  ndef  rbundet became a national political organisation exercising an increasingly effective influence, while in 1917 the left-wing of the Social Democratic Party had broken away in order to establish its own separate organisation, providing the basis for the Communist Party. Consequently, during the 1920's there were five political parties none of which were able to establish a majority position in parliament. Furthermore, it proved to be difficult to form coalitions; not only were the Social Democrats unable to reach agreement with any one of the 'non-socialist' parties, but the non-socialist parties were unable to



collaborate with each other. Consequently, there was change of government at least once every two years and at every election to the Lower Chamber, the governing party was defeated<sup>143</sup>. But with the election of a Social Democratic government in 1932 political instability in Sweden came to an end. Since then, Sweden has been governed either by a majority Social Democratic government or by a coalition, with the Social Democratic Party as the dominant partner. The composition of the Swedish Parliament between 1922 and 1970 is shown in Table II.22:

TABLE II.22: THE COMPOSITION OF THE SWEDISH PARLIAMENT, 1922-1970  
(According to the Number of Seats held by each of the Parties)

UPPER CHAMBER

	"HÖGERN	FOLK	"BONDE- FORBUNDET (Centre)	SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC	COMMUNIST	OTHER	TOTAL
1922	41	38	18	50	1	-	150
1925	44	35	18	52	1	-	150
1929	49	31	17	52	1	-	150
1933	50	23	18	58	-	1	150
1937	45	16	22	66	-	1	150
1941	35	15	24	75	1	-	150
1945	30	14	21	83	2	-	150
1949	24	18	21	84	3	-	150
1953	20	22	25	79	-	4	150
1957	13	30	25	79	-	3	150
1959	16	32	22	79	-	2	151
1961	19	33	20	77	-	2	151
1965	26	26	19	78	2	-	151
1969	25	26	20	79	1	-	151

LOWER CHAMBER

	"HÖGERN	FOLK	"BONDE- FORBUNDET (Centre)	SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC	COMMUNIST	OTHER	TOTAL
1922	62	41	21	93	7	6	230
1925	65	33	23	104	5	-	230
1929	73	32	27	90	8	-	230
1933	58	24	36	104	2	6	230
1937	44	27	36	112	5	6	230
1941	42	23	28	134	3	-	230
1945	39	26	35	115	15	-	230
1949	23	57	30	112	8	-	230
1953	31	58	26	110	5	-	230
1957	42	58	19	106	6	-	231
1959	45	38	32	111	5	-	231
1961	39	40	34	114	5	-	232
1965	33	43	36	113	8	-	233
1969	32	34	39	125	3	-	233

Sources: Extracted from N. Stjernquist, 1966, Table Appendix 4.1<sup>144</sup>, and  
Statistical Abstracts, 1971, Table 463<sup>145</sup>.

After the 1968 elections, the Swedish parliament was reformed: the two chambers were abolished and replaced by a single assembly. A general election was then held in 1970 and this resulted in the following composition of the one-chamber parliament:

TABLE II.23: THE COMPOSITION OF THE SWEDISH PARLIAMENT IN 1971  
 (According to the Number of Seats held by each of  
 the Parties)

PARTY	NO. OF SEATS
Höger	41
Folk	58
Centre	71
Social Democratic	163
Communist	17
TOTAL	350

Source: Statistical Abstracts, 1971, Table 463<sup>146</sup>



Except for a brief period of three months in 1936, the Social Democratic Party has been in government since September 1932. The history of Swedish governments since 1905 is shown in Table II.24:

TABLE II.24: THE COMPOSITION OF SWEDISH GOVERNMENTS, 1905-1970

DATES:			GOVERNMENT:
July	1905 - October	1905	National Coalition, (no Soc. Dem.)
October	1905 - May	1906	Folk
May	1906 - October	1911	Högers
October	1911 - February	1914	Folk
February	1914 - March	1917	Högers
March	1917 - October	1917	Högers (Caretaker Government)
October	1917 - March	1920	Folk - Social Democratic
March	1920 - Autumn	1920	Social Democratic
Autumn	1920 - Autumn	1921	Non-party Government
Autumn	1921 - April	1923	Social Democratic
April	1923 - October	1924	Högers
October	1924 - June	1926	Social Democratic
June	1926 - October	1928	Folk
October	1928 - June	1930	Högers
June	1930 - September	1932	Folk
September	1932 - June	1936	Social Democratic
June	1936 - September	1936	Böndeförbundet
September	1936 - December	1939	Social Democratic/Böndeförbundet
December	1939 - July	1945	Social Democratic/Folk/Högers/ Böndeförbundet
July	1945 - October	1951	Social Democratic
October	1951 - October	1957	Social Democratic/Böndeförbundet
October	1957 - October	1970	Social Democratic

Sources: N. Stjernquist, op. cit., Appendix Table 4.2<sup>147</sup>;

K. Samuelson, op. cit., Appendix 3<sup>148</sup>.

From Table II.24 it is clear that 1932 is an important watershed in the history of Swedish politics; indeed, the dominance of the Social

Democratic Party has led Tomasson to remark that, 'probably no democratic party anywhere has been able to maintain for such a long period the overall legislative and popular support enjoyed by the Swedish Social Democrats and they have accomplished this in the framework of a five-party system',<sup>149</sup>.

Thus, he claims that the Swedish Social Democrats are the preeminent example of Maurice Duverger's "dominant party". Similarly, in a highly speculative account of contemporary Sweden, Huntford has argued that the role of Social Democracy in Sweden has been such that it has led to the development of a 'new totalitarianism', characteristic of Aldous Huxley's Brave New World<sup>150</sup>. Clearly, the political ascendancy of the Swedish Social Democrats since the 1930's has been impressive and comparable parties in other countries have been unable to match their record<sup>151</sup>.

Although the Social Democratic Party was in government for brief periods during the 1920's they achieved little; there was no nationalisation of the economy and few other socialist measures were introduced. But when they came to power in the 1930's they adopted policies which provided the bases for the development of the welfare state and the 'mixed economy'. After the 1932 elections, they dropped nationalisation as central to their policies and instead concentrated upon programmes which would guarantee full employment and lead to the development of the welfare state. Thus, there were no attempts to transfer the means of production from private to state ownership since it was considered that socialist ideals could be just as easily achieved by more 'gradual' and 'indirect' means<sup>152</sup>. Indeed, this has continued to be the major characteristic of successive Social Democratic governments; they have tended to concentrate upon social welfare policies and on measures intended to regulate the distribution of income and personal wealth after it has been generated. Therefore, legislation has been passed over the past forty years which, many observers claim, has made Sweden one of the most sophisticated welfare states in the world<sup>153</sup>. But if the Social



Democrats have changed the economic and social environment of Swedish society, they have not, as yet, altered the essential generic feature of any capitalist society; the means of production remain predominantly in the hands of private individuals. Some Social Democrats justify this by stating that since successive governments have been able to establish sufficient controls over economic production there is no injustice in the private ownership of wealth so long as the rewards accruing to it are redistributed by government action to the rest of society. Consequently, they claim it is unnecessary to own in order to control and that socialist ideals - particularly those relating to greater economic and social equality - can just as well be achieved in a society where property and wealth are privately owned as in one in which all the resources are owned by the State<sup>154</sup>. Although this view has been increasingly challenged by the Swedish 'New Left' over recent years, it is without doubt that the policies of the Social Democrats have enabled them to retain a high degree of electoral support among the more disadvantaged groups in society, particularly among manual workers. This is illustrated in Table II.25 which shows the results of a survey conducted into the party affiliation of voters in different occupational groups in the elections to the Lower Chamber in 1968<sup>155</sup>.

TABLE II.25: THE PARTY AFFILIATION OF VOTERS IN DIFFERENT OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS IN THE ELECTIONS TO THE LOWER CHAMBER, 1968 (PERCENTAGES)

	" HOGERN	(1) CENTRE	FOLK	(2) K.D.S.	SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC	COMMUNIST	UNKNOWN	TOTAL	NOS.
Employers, Directors, Managers and Professional Workers	39	16	28	1	14	0	2	100	175
Small Business Owners	16	24	22	2	31	0	5	100	216
Lower-grade White- Collar Workers (excluding Foremen)	15	14	24	1	43	1	1	100	549
Foremen	6	7	11	0	71	2	3	100	209
Industrial Manual Workers	3	10	7	2	75	2	1	100	1186
Farmers	19	61	9	3	6	0	2	100	222
Agricultural Workers	6	27	8	1	56	1	1	100	119

(1) The B ndef rbundet changed its name to the Centerpartiet (The Centre Party) in 1957 in an attempt to broaden its electoral appeal.

(2) Kristen Demokratisk Samling (Christian Democratic Union).

Source: B. S rlvik, op. cit., Table 6.5B.



Table II.25 suggests that in the 1968 elections no less than 75 per cent of the votes of industrial manual workers and 43 per cent of those of lower-grade white-collar workers went to the Social Democratic Party. By contrast, only 22 per cent of those industrial manual workers who voted supported 'non-socialist' parties and only 2 per cent declared their allegiance to the Communist Party<sup>156</sup>. Indeed, the high level of commitment by manual workers to the Social Democratic Party does not appear to be eroded by high earnings. This is disclosed in Table II.26:

TABLE II.26: THE PERCENTAGE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC ALLEGIANCE AMONG INDUSTRIAL MANUAL WORKERS AND LOWER-GRADE WHITE-COLLAR EMPLOYEES BY LEVEL OF EARNINGS, IN THE ELECTIONS TO THE LOWER CHAMBER, 1968

INCOME (S.Kr.)	MANUAL WORKERS	WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS
Less than 9999	63	37
10,000 - 19,999	63	38
20,000 - 29,000	73	49
30,000 - 39,000	79	49
More than 40,000	N.A.	27

Source: Særlvik, op. cit., Table 6.4B.

Table II.26 demonstrates that at each level of income, the level of support for the Social Democratic Party is greater among manual than it is among white-collar workers<sup>157</sup>. But it also indicates that among manual workers the degree of allegiance is greater within the higher income groups, whereas for white-collar workers, Social Democratic allegiance tends to decline at the highest level of income. It is also interesting to note that the level of voting turnout does not differ significantly between manual and white-collar workers at similar levels of income. Therefore, according

to Särilvik's survey of voting in the 1968 election, among those earning less than 9999 Kr. per annum, 12 per cent of manual and 10 per cent of white-collar workers did not vote, compared with 12 per cent and 13 per cent respectively among those earning between 10,000 and 19,999 Kr. and 5 per cent and 4 per cent of those manual and white-collar employees who earned between 20,000 and 29,000 Kr. a year<sup>158</sup>. If voting in elections can be regarded as an index - although an unsatisfactory one - of political awareness and involvement, then it does appear that Swedish manual workers tend to be as integrated into the political system as white-collar employees.

Clearly, all this indicates that the Social Democratic Party has, over the past 50 years, gradually become the dominant party within Swedish politics. Within the context of a five-party political system it commands the greatest share of electoral support and, as a result, has been in government for the past forty years. It is the party which is predominantly supported by industrial manual workers and, to a lesser extent, by lower-grade white-collar workers. In essence it is a working-class party which claims to give primacy to the interests of industrial manual workers. Only the Communist Party receives a higher proportion of its total support from manual workers. This is illustrated by an earlier survey which was conducted by Särilvik into voting behaviour in the 1964 election<sup>159</sup>. The results are shown in Table II.27:



TABLE II.27: 1964 VOTERS BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS IN THE DIFFERENT POLITICAL PARTIES

	LARGE EMPLOYERS, HIGHER SALARIED EMPLOYEES	FARMERS	SMALL EMPLOYERS	LOWER SALARIED, SHOP ASSISTANTS ETC.	AGRICULTURAL WORKERS	INDUSTRIAL WORKERS	TOTAL	NOS.
Höger	25	13	12	36	2	12	100	265
Folk	10	8	18	40	5	19	100	408
Centre	1	48	10	11	8	22	100	359
K.D.S.	10	12	12	30	5	31	100	41
Social Democratic	1	1	4	25	6	63	100	1248
Communist	-	1	3	18	9	69	100	67

Source: Riksdagsmanna Valen, 1961-1964, op. cit., Table 9.3.

Table II.27 shows that the Social Democrats received 63 per cent of their votes from manual workers and 25 per cent from lower-grade white-collar workers. By contrast, none of the major 'non-socialist' parties - (The Centre) the Högern, Folk and Böndeförbundet/- received more than one-fifth of its support from manual workers. Therefore, in view of its long period in government, it can be suggested that the interests of industrial workers have been better represented than in other capitalist countries where similar parties have had less electoral success. Whether or not this has led to the development of a more egalitarian society in which manual workers enjoy a more favourable share in the distribution of resources than in these other countries will be considered later. But it is without doubt that the Swedish Social Democratic Party has been much more successful in commanding the allegiance of manual workers than its British counterpart, the Labour Party.

In Britain, electoral reforms were carried out much earlier than in Sweden. There was a series of legislative changes which included the first extension of the franchise in 1832, the Second Reform Bill of 1867 and a redistribution of parliamentary seats in 1885<sup>160</sup>. But, as Moorhouse has recently argued, these reforms did not have any immediate effect in terms of the level of participation by the urban working-class in British politics.<sup>161</sup> Thus, unlike developments in Sweden there was not the rapid ascendancy of the Labour Party. In 1890 a few trade unions joined forces with a small group of radical thinkers to form the Labour Representation Committee<sup>162</sup>. This provided the basis for the development of the Labour Party but in the 1900 elections it had only 15 candidates of which two were elected to parliament. In this election, Labour received only 1.8 per cent of the electorate's total votes<sup>163</sup>. In the 1922 General Election, which was the election which was the first at which the urban working-class was fully enfranchised and constituted a clear majority of the electorate, the Labour



Party was able to gain 29.5 per cent of the total votes<sup>164</sup> and, although it supplanted the Liberals as the major alternative party to the Conservatives, it never seriously challenged the political ascendancy of the Conservative Party until 1945. Until then it was in a position to form a government only on two occasions - in 1924 and in 1929-31 - but in each case it was in a minority in parliament. Since the Second World War the electoral performance of the Labour Party has improved. In the 1945 General Election it gained a majority of about 150 seats over the other political parties, but in the following election of 1950 this was reduced to seven<sup>165</sup>. It then lost all subsequent elections until 1964 when it gained a majority of five, which was increased to ninety nine in the 1966 elections<sup>166</sup>. But in 1970 the Conservative Party regained power and remained in office for almost four years. The Labour Party, then, has had a far less successful electoral history than the Social Democratic Party in Sweden. There have been only four General elections which have returned Labour governments with majorities in the House of Commons - 1945, 1950, 1964 and 1966. Unlike the Swedish Social Democrats, the British Labour Party has held office for only two substantial periods of time - 1945 to 1951 and 1964 to 1970. Consequently, up until 1970, it has been in office for a total period of only approximately 13 years; an unimpressive record by comparison with the 40 years of Social Democratic ascendancy in Sweden. Indeed, as McKenzie and Silver have stated: 'since 1885, the (British) Conservatives have had a record of electoral success almost unrivalled among political parties in parliamentary systems'<sup>167</sup>. The failure of the British Labour Party to form majority governments is shown in Table II.28 which documents the political composition of the House of Commons as a result of general elections held between 1922 and 1970.

TABLE II.28: GOVERNMENTS AND COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS  
AS A RESULT OF GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1922 - 1970

YEAR OF ELECTION	GOVERNMENT ELECTED	SEATS				
		CONSERVATIVE	LIBERAL	LABOUR	OTHER	TOTAL
1922	Cons.	346	115	142	12	615
1923	Labour	258	159	191	7	615
1924	Cons.	419	40	151	5	615
1929	Labour	260	59	288	8	615
1931	Nat. Coal.	521	57	52	5	615
1935	Nat. Coal.	431	21	154	9	615
1945	Labour	212	12	394	22	640
1950	Labour	298	9	315	3	625
1951	Cons.	321	6	295	3	625
1955	Cons.	344	6	277	3	630
1959	Cons.	365	6	258	1	630
1964	Labour	303	9	317	1	630
1966	Labour	253	12	363	2	630
1970	Cons.	330	6	287	7	630

Sources: D. Butler, op. cit., p. 141-144; D. Butler, 1963, Table 22<sup>168</sup>;  
The Times, 1970<sup>169</sup>.

One of the major reasons for the lack of electoral success by the Labour Party is that, compared with the Swedish Social Democrats, it has been unable to command such a high degree of voting allegiance among industrial manual workers. Whereas about 75 per cent of all Swedish industrial manual workers who vote, support the Social Democratic Party, the proportion of such workers supporting the Labour Party is a good deal smaller. Leonard, for example, has pointed out that 'at most post-war general elections only about 10 per cent of the middle class voters have supported Labour. On the other hand, the Conservative Party has always appeared to enjoy the support of a substantial minority of working-class voters, seldom falling much below



one-third<sup>170</sup>. Thus, he shows in an analysis of Gallup poll figures for voting intentions in the 1966 General Election - when Labour gained its greatest electoral majority since 1945 - that only 57 per cent of manual workers expected to vote Labour while a further 30 per cent of manual workers intended to support the Conservative Party<sup>171</sup>. Similarly in 1970, according to Gallup poll figures, only 51 per cent of all manual workers supported the Labour Party while 38 per cent declared their allegiance to the Conservative Party<sup>172</sup>. Alford has shown this to be a fairly regular pattern of party preference in Britain since the 1940's; the proportion of manual workers claiming to support the Labour Party fluctuated between 68 and 57 per cent between 1943 and 1962, while their preference for the Conservative Party varied between 35 per cent and 24 per cent<sup>173</sup>. The figures, taken from Alford's analysis, are shown in Table II.29:

TABLE II.29: PARTY PREFERENCE BY OCCUPATION IN BRITAIN, 1943-62

OCCUPATION AND VOTE	PER CENT PREFERRING								
	1943	1945	1950	1951	1955	1957	1958	1959	1962
<u>Manual</u>									
Labour	60	68	65	65	62	67	67	63	57
Liberal	12	--	--	--	6	9	8	10	19
Conservative	28	32	35	35	32	24	25	27	24
<u>Non-Manual</u>									
Labour	37	31	25	23	23	24	26	19	22
Liberal	10	--	--	--	6	13	7	9	29
Conservative	53	69	75	77	70	63	67	72	49

Source: Extracted from R. Alford, op. cit., Table B-1.

It seems to be only among unskilled manual workers that the level of allegiance to the Labour Party reaches the proportion of support given by manual workers to the Social Democratic Party in Sweden. Hence, in a survey conducted in 1963 Butler and Stokes found that among unskilled manual workers, 75 per cent stated an allegiance to the Labour Party while 25 per cent claimed they supported the Conservatives<sup>174</sup>. But in addition to the lower level of working-class support for the Labour Party - compared with similar support for the Swedish Social Democrats - a further reason for the lack of electoral success of the Labour Party is that it has been unable to command a substantial degree of allegiance among non-manual workers. Whereas approximately 45 per cent of lower-grade white-collar workers generally vote for the Social Democratic Party, the proportion stating its allegiance to the Labour Party in Britain is lower. Butler and Stokes found that among 'lower non-manual' workers the level of support for the Labour Party was 39 per cent, while among 'supervisory non-manual' and 'lower managerial', the proportions claiming to vote Labour were 23 per cent and 19 per cent respectively. Although these figures are not directly comparable with the Swedish data presented earlier, they do indicate that the degree of voting allegiance to the Labour Party among British non-manual workers is more limited<sup>175</sup>. In this sense, then, the British Labour Party has a narrower electoral base than the Swedish Social Democrats; whereas the Labour Party receives approximately five-sixths of its total votes from manual workers, the Social Democrats are dependent upon these votes for roughly two-thirds of their electoral support - the greater proportion of the remainder coming from lower-grade white-collar workers.

This analysis suggests that the British Labour Party has been unable to establish an electoral base of the kind enjoyed by the Swedish Social Democrats. This is because it has been unable to command the same level of allegiance among industrial manual workers and white-collar employees. An



appropriate analogy can be made between the Social Democratic Party and the British Conservative Party: both have been able to command high support among their 'natural' supporters - the working and the middle classes respectively - while at the same time, obtain the votes of substantial proportions of other social groups in society. The British Labour Party, by contrast, has been unable to do this with the same degree of success. Thus, it can be argued that there are important differences between Britain and Sweden in terms of their political histories during the 20th Century; particularly since the early 1930's. Although Britain has had a relatively influential Labour Party and trade union movement, these cannot be regarded as having exercised the same degree of influence as the equivalent Swedish institutions. Indeed, of all the capitalist countries, Sweden can be considered as possessing the most influential working-class movement, measured that is by the level of trade union membership among manual workers and the degree of support which this group gives to the Social Democratic Party. Furthermore, this influence has been reinforced by the fact that the structure of Swedish trade unionism has enabled LO to function as the institutional representative of manual workers' interests, while the electoral support of the Social Democratic Party has meant that it has been in government for the past 40 years. But in addition to these factors, the normative impact of this working-class movement has been reinforced by the educational functions of LO.

The Workers Educational Association (ARBETARNAS BILDINGSFÖRBUND, ABF)<sup>"</sup> is an integral component of LO and it dominates the provision of adult education in Sweden; for example, in 1969/70 there were 179,689 study groups and almost one-third of these - 64,176 - were organised by ABF<sup>176</sup>. In that year no fewer than 600,000 students registered on ABF courses; a figure which means that it provided instruction for one-in-every-thirteen Swedes<sup>177</sup>. Although a number of these study groups catered for interests in languages

and the arts, almost one-third focused upon the social sciences<sup>178</sup>; an appropriate area of instruction for the assessment of Labour movements. Although it is not an organisation solely committed to political socialisation among its participants, it does not denigrate the activities of the Labour movement. Consequently, many of its activities contribute to the generalised legitimacy of the working-class movement. In Britain, by contrast, the trade union movement devotes very few of its resources to the education of its members and it certainly does not contribute to the provision of adult education in the same way as the ABF in Sweden<sup>179</sup>. Therefore, an important means whereby the achievements of trade unions and the wider working-class movement could be legitimated is absent. Indeed, the overall conclusion of this section must be that the working-class movement in Sweden - both in terms of its political and industrial wings - enjoys a far greater degree of allegiance and legitimacy than the equivalent set of institutions in Britain<sup>180</sup>.

In conclusion, this chapter has argued that 1) despite various differences in the development and structure of industrialism in Britain and Sweden, there are sufficient common features to regard them as similar types of industrial society and 2) despite the fact that both are capitalist societies, they differ in terms of the relative influence of their respective working-class movements. As a result, it is pertinent to ask whether the institutions of industrial-capitalism have generated similar profiles of inequality in each of the two countries, or whether the relatively more influential Swedish working-class movement has created a more egalitarian society than that which exists in contemporary Britain. This question is the subject for the next chapter.



## NOTES

1. For discussions of the impact of industrialisation on stratification systems see, for example, M. LEVY, Jnr., Modernisation and the Structure of Societies, Princeton, 1966; C. KERR, J. DUNLOP, F. HARBISON and C. MYERS, Industrialism and Industrial Man, Cambridge (Mass.), 1960; and W. MOORE, The Impact of Industry, New Jersey, 1965. The impact of political change is most explicitly discussed by J. GOLDTHORPE, 'Social Stratification in Industrial Society', Soc. Rev. Monographs, No. 8, (1964) and F. PARKIN, Class Inequality and Political Order, London, 1971.
2. E. HECKSCHER, An Economic History of Sweden, Cambridge (Mass.), 1954, p. 31.
3. E. HECKSCHER, op. cit., Chap. 3.
4. K. SAMUELSSON, From Great Power to Welfare State, London, 1968, Chap. 1.
5. For a discussion of this, see J. PLUMB, England in the 18th Century, Harmondsworth, 1964.
6. See, for example, A. COBBAN, A History of Modern France Vol. II, 1799-1871, London, 1962.
7. E. HECKSCHER, op. cit., p. 117.
8. For a fairly detailed account of these, see E. HECKSCHER, op. cit., Chap. 4, and K. SAMUELSSON, op. cit., Chap. 1.
9. K. SAMUELSSON, op. cit., Chap. 1.

10. A-L. KÄLVESTEN, The Social Structure of Sweden, Stockholm, 1966, p. 45.
11. K. SAMUELSSON, op. cit., Chap. 1.
12. E. HECKSCHER, op. cit., Chaps. 2-4.
13. This point is discussed by K. SAMUELSSON, op. cit., Chap. 1.
14. For a review of this period see, S. OAKLEY, The Story of Sweden, London, 1966, Chap. 12.
15. See K. SAMUELSSON, op. cit., Chap. 1.
16. A-L. KÄLVESTEN, op. cit., p. 85.
17. E. HECKSCHER, op. cit., p. 142.
18. The development of trade in Sweden during the 17th and 18th centuries is discussed by K. SAMUELSSON, op. cit., Chaps. 1 and 2.
19. P. MATHIAS, 'The Social Structure in the Eighteenth Century: A Calculation by Joseph Massie', Ec. Hist. Rev., (2nd Series), Vol. 10, (1957-58).
20. K. SAMUELSSON, op. cit., Chap. 1.
21. For a discussion of whether or not industrialisation raised the standard of living for the English working class see, E. HOBSBAWN, 'The British Standard of Living 1790-1850', Ec. Hist. Rev., (2nd Series), Vol. 10, (1957-58).
22. This table refers to the total Swedish population. Retired persons are categorised according to their former industry, domestic servants according to the industry of their employers, and other dependents according to the industry of their head of household.



23. Expressed as a percentage of the total occupied population.
24. P. DEANE and W. COLE, British Economic Growth 1688-1959, (2nd Ed.), Cambridge, 1967.
25. See Table II.6.
26. K. SAMUELSSON, op. cit., Chap. 1.
27. B. CARLSON, Trade Unions in Sweden, Stockholm, 1969.
28. For a concise account of the early industrialisation of Sweden, see E. HECKSCHER, op. cit., Chap. 6.
29. Central Bureau of Statistics, Historical Statistics for Sweden, Vol. I., Stockholm, 1955, p. 17.
30. W. ROSTOW, The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge, 1961.
31. However, it is important to emphasise that any effective outcome from 'take off' was long delayed in Sweden. During the late decades of the 19th century there was extreme pauperisation which contributed to heavy emigration.
32. This table refers to the total Swedish population. For the classification of pensioners, domestic servants and other dependents, see Note 22 above.
33. Expressed as a percentage of the total occupied population.
34. M. UTTON, Industrial Concentration, Harmondsworth, 1970.
35. See, for example, G. INGHAM, Size of Industrial Organisation and Worker Behaviour, Cambridge, 1970.

36. For an early statement on this relationship see R. BENDIX, Work and Authority in Industry, New York, 1956.
37. Statens Offentliga Utredningar (S.O.U.), "Ägande och Inflytande inom det Privata Näringslivet (Ownership and Influence in the Private Economy), Stockholm, 1968.
38. J. BAIN, International Differences in the Industrial Structure: Eight Nations in the 1950's, NewHaven, 1966, p. 47.
39. This discussion has focussed upon industrial concentration solely in terms of employment. However, it can also be investigated by reference to ownership and control. Levels of industrial concentration in Britain and Sweden, considered in this way, are discussed in Chapter Three.
40. Central Bureau of Statistics, Historical Statistics for Sweden, Vol. I, Stockholm, 1955, Table A3.
41. Central Bureau of Statistics, op. cit., Table A.13.
42. D. THOMAS, Social and Economic Aspects of Swedish Population Movements 1750-1933, New York, 1941, Table 8.
43. C-G. JANSON, 'Urbanisering och Flyttning' (Urbanisation and Migration), in E. DAHLSTROM (ed.) Svensk Samhallsstruktur i Sociologisk Belysning (Sociological Perspectives on the Swedish Social Structure), Stockholm, 1969.
44. Central Statistical Office, Social Trends, London, 1970, Table 20.
45. K. DAVIS, 'The Urbanisation of the Human Population' in Scientific American, Vol. 213, (1965), p. 44.



46. C-G. JANSON, op. cit., Table 7.4.
47. For a review of some of the studies which have been conducted in Britain, see J. KLEIN, Samples From English Cultures, Vol. I, London, 1965.
48. Unfortunately, there have been few studies of working-class life styles in urban communities in Sweden. For an interesting, if rare, attempt, see T. SEGERSTEDT and A. LUNDQUIST, Människan i Industrisamhället (Man in Industrialised Society), Stockholm, 1955.
49. To give but one example, the life styles of such workers could be more 'privatised' and family-centred than those of their English counterparts living in 'traditional' urban working-class communities.
50. For a recent example of a long tradition of such writers, see F. PARKIN, op. cit.
51. For a recent empirical investigation in Britain as well as for some references to studies conducted in other countries, see. J. GOLDTHORPE, D. LOCKWOOD, F. BECHHOFFER and J. PLATT, The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure, Cambridge, 1969.
52. A. INKELES and P. ROSSI, 'National Comparisons of Occupational Prestige', Amer. J. Sociol., Vol. 61, (1955-6).
53. S. LIPSET and R. BENDIX, Social Mobility in Industrial Society, California, 1959.
54. C. KERR, et al., op. cit.
55. F. PARKIN, op. cit., p. 19.
56. K. DAVIS and W. MOORE, 'Some Principles of Social Stratification', Amer. Soc. Rev., Vol. 10, (1945).

57. For example, M. TUMIN 'Some Principles of Stratification: A Critical Analysis', Amer. Soc. Rev., Vol. 18, (1953).
58. See, for example, G. LENSKI, Power and Privilege, New York, 1966; and F. PARKIN, op. cit.
59. A comparison of various welfare services in Britain and Sweden has been undertaken by H. HECLÖ, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden, New Haven, 1974.
60. P. CUTRIGHT, 'Income Redistribution: A Cross-National Analysis', Social Forces, Vol. 46, (1967).
61. P. CUTRIGHT, op. cit.
62. T. KARLBOM, Arbetarnas Fackföreningar (Workers' Trade Unions), Helsinki, 1969, p. 12.
63. For discussions of the development of trade unionism in Sweden, see K. BÄCKSTRÖM, Arbetarrörelsen i Sverige, Vols. I and II, (The Workers' Movement in Sweden), Stockholm, 1971; B. CARLSON, op. cit., Chap. 3; and T. KARLBOM, op. cit., Chap. 1.
64. T. KARLBOM, op. cit.
65. B. CARLSON, op. cit.
66. T. KARLBOM, op. cit.
67. B. CARLSON, op. cit.
68. K. BÄCKSTRÖM, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 231.
69. D. BLAKE, 'Swedish Trade Unions and the Social Democratic Party: The Formative Years', Scandinavian Ec. Hist. Rev., Vol. 8, (1960).



70. T. LINDBOM, Den Svenska Fackföreningsrörelsens Uppkomst och Tidigare Historia, (The Growth and Early History of Swedish Trade Unions), Stockholm, 1938.
71. T. LINDBOM, op. cit.
72. K. SAMUELSSON, op. cit., p. 208.
73. N. ELVANDER, Intresseorganisationerna i Dagens Sverige (Interest Groups in Contemporary Sweden), Lund, 1969, p. 27.
74. T. KARLBOM, op. cit., p. 72.
75. For a detailed discussion of economic and political developments in Sweden during this period, see H. TINGSTEN, The Swedish Social Democrats, New Jersey, 1973.
76. The development of industrial relations in Sweden has been described by T. JOHNSTON, Collective Bargaining in Sweden, London, 1962.
77. For a discussion of these strains within the Labour movement, see, for example, J. FULCHER, 'Class Conflict in Sweden', Sociology, Vol. 7, (1973).
78. The details of this Agreement are discussed by T. JOHNSTON, op. cit.
79. The LO policy of wage solidarity has been evaluated by R. MEIDNER, 'Samordning och Solidarisk Lönepolitik under tre Decennier' (Coordination and the Policy of Wage Solidarity), in LO, Tvårsnitt (Cross-Section), Stockholm, 1973. For a more historical account, see J. ULLENHAG, Den Solidariska Lönepolitiken i Sverige (The Policy of Wage Solidarity in Sweden), Stockholm, 1971.
80. These features of Swedish trade unionism are discussed by T. KARLBOM, op. cit.

81. C.V. OTTER 'Arbetarnas Fackliga Organisationsgrad' (The Strength of Workers' Trade Unions), Arkiv för Studier i Arbetarrörelsens Historia, Nr. 4, (1973).
82. C.V. OTTER, op. cit., Table 2.
83. See N. ELVANDER, op. cit., chap. 1.
84. N. ELVANDER, op. cit. Chap. 1.
85. For an account of the size and the development of TCO, see N. ELVANDER, op. cit., Chap. 1.
86. N. ELVANDER, op. cit., Table 1.
87. Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Sweden, Stockholm, 1971, Table 243.
88. N. ELVANDER, op. cit., p. 48.
89. N. ELVANDER, op. cit., p. 48.
90. This is discussed by N. ELVANDER, op. cit., Chap. 14.
91. These figures are taken from Central Bureau of Statistics, Riksdagsmanna Valen 1965-1968 (Elections to the Parliament 1965-1968), Stockholm, 1970, Table 6.5B. The pattern of voting in the 1968 election was not atypical. In the 1964 election, for example, 74 per cent of the votes of industrial manual workers went to the Social Democratic Party, 8 per cent to the Centre Party and 7 per cent to the Folk Party. Among lower-grade white-collar employees, 46 per cent voted for the Social Democratic Party, 25 per cent for the Folk Party, 14 per cent for the Högern Party and 6 per cent for the Centre Party. See Central Bureau of Statistics, Riksdagsmanna Valen 1961-64 (Elections to the Parliament, 1961-64), Stockholm, 1965.



92. N. ELVANDER, op. cit., Table 1.
93. Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Sweden, Stockholm, 1971, Table 243.
94. N. ELVANDER, op. cit.
95. N. ELVANDER, op. cit.
96. N. ELVANDER, op. cit., p. 32.
97. Central Bureau of Statistics, op. cit., Table 243.
98. N. ELVANDER, op. cit., p. 48.
99. J. FULCHER, op. cit.
100. N. ELVANDER, op. cit., Chap. 14.
101. R. TOMASSON, op. cit., Chap. 2.
102. P.E.P., Trade Union Membership (Planning 463), London, 1962, p. 154.
103. H. CLEGG, A. FOX and A. THOMPSON, A History of British Trade Unionism since 1889, Oxford, 1964, p. 1-2.
104. H. CLEGG, et al., op. cit., p. 2.
105. H. CLEGG, et al., op. cit., Chap. 1.
106. This and the following figures are taken from G. BAIN, The Growth of White-Collar Unionism, London, 1972, Table 3.1.
107. G. BAIN and R. PRICE, 'Union Growth and Employment Trends in the United Kingdom, 1964-1970', Brit. Jour. Ind. Rel., Vol. 10 (1972), Table 8.
108. G. BAIN and R. PRICE, op. cit.



109. G. BAIN, op. cit., Chap. 3.
110. G. BAIN, op. cit., Chap. 3.
111. G. BAIN and R. PRICE, op. cit.
112. G. BAIN and R. PRICE, op. cit., do not provide evidence on the density of union membership for different branches of industry in Britain between 1964 and 1970.
113. See Table II.19 above.
114. C.V. OTTER, op. cit.
115. G. BAIN and R. PRICE, op. cit., Table 11.
116. G. BAIN, op. cit., Table 3.5.
117. N. ELVANDER, op. cit., p. 48.
118. Indeed, one of the striking features of wage bargaining in Britain has been the anxiety by unions to preserve existing differentials, particularly between various manual trades.
119. G. BAIN, op. cit., p. 25.
120. N. ELVANDER, op. cit., Chap. 2.
121. In the sense of actively urging the trade union membership to support a particular political party. However, over recent years, the TUC has tended to become more involved in political matters. After the 1970 General Election, for example, it almost took over the functions of the Opposition to the Conservative Government. Possibly, this was because the 1971 Industrial Relations Act 'blurred' the often widely-held distinction between 'industrial' and 'political' issues.



122. This point was particularly emphasised in 1974 in terms of the degree to which the TUC would be able to enforce the requirements of a 'Social Contract' with a Labour Government.
123. In Sweden, central negotiations are conducted between LO and SAF providing the cost frameworks which then constitute the bases for agreements between specific companies and unions. At these later discussions, representatives of LO and SAF act as informal arbitrators. For a discussion of the means whereby LO can influence the wage bargaining activities of its constituent unions, see J. FULCHER, op. cit., and T. JOHNSTON, op. cit.
124. See J. FULCHER, op. cit.
125. Not only in terms of wages, but also with respect to working conditions and various fringe benefits.
126. E. DAHLSTROM, "Tjänstemännen, Näringslivet och Samhället" (Management, Unions and Society), Stockholm, 1954, p. 97-99.
127. T. SEGERSTEDT and A. LUNDQUIST, op. cit., pt. II, p. 335-336.
128. E. DAHLSTROM, "op. cit.", p. 86-87.
129. J. GOLDTHORPE, D. LOCKWOOD, F. BECHHOFFER, J. PLATT, The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes, Cambridge, 1968, p. 112-113.
130. R. MCKENZIE and A. SILVER, Angels in Marble, London, 1968, p. 126-133.
131. D. BUTLER and D. STOKES, Political Change in Britain, Harmondsworth, 1971, p. 209-210.
132. For a detailed account of the development of the Social Democratic Party during the last decades of the 19th Century, see H. TINGSTEN, op. cit.

133. Quoted by D. BLAKE, op. cit., p. 21.
134. This point is made by H. TINGSTEN, op. cit.
135. H. TINGSTEN, op. cit.
136. 'Folk Party' is often translated as 'Liberal Party'. It has always attempted even until the present to represent the aspirations of the more liberal and progressive sectors of the Swedish urban middle classes; namely, managerial, professional and white-collar employees.
137. For a discussion of this period, see H. TINGSTEN, op. cit. and R. TOMASSON, Sweden: Prototype of Modern Society, New York, 1970, Chap. 2. 'Högern Party' is usually translated as 'Conservative Party'.
138. R. TOMASSON, op. cit., p. 30.
139. Central Bureau of Statistics, Historical Statistics of Sweden, (Statistical Survey), Stockholm, 1960, Table 276.
140. Central Bureau of Statistics, Historical Statistics, op. cit., Table 274.
141. Central Bureau of Statistics, Historical Statistics, op. cit., Table 276.
142. See H. TINGSTEN, op. cit.
143. For a detailed account of political developments during the 1920's, see H. TINGSTEN, op. cit.
144. N. STJERNQUIST 'Sweden: Stability or Deadlock', in R. DAHL (ed) Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, NewHaven, 1966, Appendix Table 4.1.
145. Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Sweden, Stockholm, 1971, Table 463.



146. Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, op. cit., Table 463.
147. N. STJERNQUIST, op. cit., Appendix Table 4.2.
148. K. SAMUELSSON, op. cit., Appendix 3.
149. R. TOMASSON, 'The Extraordinary Success of the Swedish Social Democrats', Journal of Politics, Vol. 31, (1969), p. 772.
150. R. HUNTFORD, The New Totalitarians, London, 1971.
151. For a comparative account of the development of Social Democratic parties in different European countries, see R. TOMASSON, 'The Extraordinary Success of the Swedish Social Democrats', op. cit.  
For a very scholarly and detailed analysis of the same topic, see C. LANDAUER, European Socialism, Vol. I and II, Berkeley, 1959.
152. The central thesis of H. TINGSTEN, op. cit., is that the development of the Social Democratic Party, up until the late 1930's, was characterised by the increasing rejection of revolutionary ideals and the adoption of reform-welfare ideologies.
153. For an earlier claim, see M. CHILDS, Sweden: The Middle Way, NewHaven, 1936; and more recently, H. HECLÖ, op. cit.
154. For such a view, see, for example, G. ADLER-KARLSSON, Functional Socialism: A Swedish Theory for Democratic Socialisation, Stockholm, 1967.
155. B. SÄRLVIK, 'Intervjuundersökningen Rörande Valet Till Andra Kammaren 1968' (The Interview Survey of the Elections to the Lower Chamber of Parliament in 1968), Central Bureau of Statistics, Riksdagsmanna Valen 1965-1968 (Elections to the Parliament, 1965-1968), Stockholm, 1970.

156. These figures do not reflect 'atypical' patterns. In the 1964 Election, for example, the Social Democratic Party obtained the votes of 74 per cent of industrial manual workers and 46 per cent of those of lower-grade white-collar employees. Only 20 per cent of those industrial manual workers who voted supported 'non-socialist' parties and only 4 per cent declared their allegiance to the Communist Party. See, Riksdagsmanna Valen, 1961-1964, Table 9.2.
157. In the 1964 Election, among manual workers, 64 per cent of those earning less than 9999 SKr, 73 per cent of those earning between 10,000 and 19,999 SKr and 77 per cent of those earning more than 20,000 SKr supported the Social Democratic Party. Among white-collar workers, the figures for the respective income groups were 34 per cent, 44 per cent and 40 per cent. Thus, the data for the 1964 and 1968 Elections are very similar. See, Riksdagsmanna Valen, 1961-1964, op. cit., Table 9.2.
158. B. SÄRLVIK, op. cit., Table 6.4B.
159. The results of this survey are reported in Riksdagsmanna Valen, 1961-1964, op. cit., Table 9.3. The data refer to the 1964 Election since SÄRLVIK did not undertake a similar analysis in his study of voting behaviour in 1968.
160. For a brief summary of these, see R. MCKENZIE and A. SILVER, Angels in Marble, London, 1968, Chap. 1.
161. H. MOORHOUSE, 'The Political Incorporation of the British Working Class: An Interpretation', Sociology, Vol. 7, (1973).
162. For an account of the early development of the Labour Party, see H. PELLING, A Short History of the Labour Party, London, 1961, Chap. 1.



163. D. BUTLER, British Political Facts, 1900-1967 (2nd Ed.), London, 1968, p. 141.
164. D. BUTLER, op. cit., p. 142.
165. D. BUTLER, op. cit., p. 143.
166. D. BUTLER, op. cit., p. 144.
167. R. MCKENZIE and A. SILVER, op. cit., p. 10.
168. D. BUTLER, The Electoral System in Britain Since 1918 (2nd Ed.), Oxford, 1963.
169. The Times, Guide to the House of Commons, 1970, London, 1970.
170. R. LEONARD, Elections in Britain, London, 1968, p. 140.
171. R. LEONARD, op. cit., Table 23.
172. R. ROSE, Politics in England Today, London, 1974, p. 165.
173. R. ALFORD, Party and Society, London, 1964, Table B-1.
174. D. BUTLER and D. STOKES, op. cit., p. 105.
175. D. BUTLER and D. STOKES, op. cit. p. 105.
176. Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Sweden, op. cit., 1971, Table 373.
177. Central Bureau of Statistics, op. cit., 1971, Table 373.
178. Central Bureau of Statistics, op. cit., 1971, Table 373.

179. The Workers Educational Association in Britain has no formal links with trade unions and it is certainly not regarded as an integral component of a more broadly-based working-class movement.
180. Indeed, this is symbolised in most Swedish communities by the Folkets Hus (The People's House) which usually provides facilities for a wide range of social, recreational and educational activities.
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## CHAPTER THREE

ASPECTS OF INEQUALITY IN BRITAIN AND SWEDEN

The study of inequality has always been an important area of interest for sociologists and yet it is fraught with many conceptual, methodological and practical problems. Among these could be cited the difficulties of definition, the specification of dimensions, and the complexities related to the collection of relevant empirical data. For the purposes of the present analysis, aspects of inequality in Britain and Sweden will be considered in terms of three major components - 'class', 'status' and 'power'<sup>1</sup>.

However, the degree to which it is possible to regard each of these categories as conceptually and empirically separate is extremely problematic. A number of writers, particularly those adopting a Marxian approach, have argued that an individual's 'class' position determines his 'status' and his 'political power'<sup>2</sup>, while Weber has claimed that "'classes', 'status groups' and 'parties' are phenomena of the distribution of power within a community"<sup>3</sup>. But on the other hand, there are others who have argued that 'class', 'status' and 'power' can, for the purposes of empirical investigation, be regarded as quite separate, both conceptually and empirically<sup>4</sup>. Which of these two perspectives is the more appropriate for the study of inequality is uncertain; it is merely sufficient to state that for the purposes of the present discussion, 'class', 'status' and 'power' are considered as categories which are useful for the description of inequality in society. But at the same time, it is necessary to add that even for describing social structures it is difficult to always adhere to such a system of categorisation. This will be evident in the following discussion where much of the data on 'power' could equally have been considered as aspects of 'class'; perhaps confirmation that

'class', 'status' and 'power' are always empirically and conceptually closely inter-related<sup>5</sup>.

(i) Class Inequality

According to Weber, 'class' refers to "a number of people (who) have in common a specific causal component of their life chances insofar as this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income and is represented under the conditions of commodity or labour markets"<sup>6</sup>. Therefore, in order to satisfactorily investigate 'class' in Britain and Sweden it is necessary to investigate a wide range of phenomena which would include, at least, the study of distributions of property and wealth, structures of economic privileges and rewards and the differentials in life chances for acquiring these resources. But unfortunately, as in most areas of enquiry, the data are compiled in such a manner that they do not readily lend themselves to meaningful cross-national, comparative analysis. Nevertheless, the objective of this section is to compare (a) distributions of income and wealth and (b) patterns of social mobility in each of the two countries. However, it must be emphasised that these are only two aspects of class inequality. In addition to these there are, for example, the effects of social welfare provisions. In both Britain and Sweden social scientists have documented patterns of government expenditure on social welfare and they have also tried to calculate the redistributive effects of these for different income groups<sup>7</sup>. But the conclusions of these enquiries have been so tentative that little can be said with confidence of whether social policies are more or less redistributive in the one country than in the other. Perhaps a method whereby this could be ascertained would be to conduct carefully controlled cross-national enquiries by using matched samples of respondents. It would then be possible to compare, by adopting various indicators, patterns of family income and expenditure and to evaluate the redistributive effects of government policies in such areas as, for



example, child maintenance, accommodation, sickness, old age, and so on. Until studies of this kind have been undertaken, the degree to which social policy is more or less redistributive between income groups in one country than in the other will remain uncertain. But it is important to stress that the 'rewards' of welfare systems must always be considered to be essential aspects of class inequality<sup>8</sup>.

a) Distribution of Income and Wealth

The data which are used in order to calculate national income distributions are most frequently taken from documents submitted for the purposes of taxation. However, the systems and procedures of taxation vary considerably from one country to the next so that the data upon which most calculations are based are not always directly comparable<sup>9</sup>. Sweden, for example, has wealth and gift taxes, neither of which yet exist in Britain. Furthermore, it is problematic whether tax avoidance and tax evasion are practised to the same extent in each of the two countries. But despite such severe limitations, it is possible to synthesise evidence which enables some relatively meaningful comparisons to be made, both within each of the two countries over a specified period and between them at given points of time. Particularly, it is possible to make some comparisons about trends since the early 1930's when the Social Democratic Party began its long period as the government of Sweden.

In a detailed enquiry into the distribution of income in Sweden between 1930 and 1950, Bentzel concluded that there was a marked shift in the vertical distribution of income towards greater equality<sup>10</sup>. He argues that during this period the proportion of individuals falling into the highest and lowest income groups declined, while those in the intermediate income strata showed a concomitant increase. The coefficient of inequality, derived from calculations based on Lorenz curves, declined both in terms of earned and disposable income<sup>11</sup>. For the former, the coefficient fell from 0.41 in 1935 to 0.34 in 1948, while for the latter, from 0.37 to 0.28. He suggests that the trend

towards greater equality can be regarded as the result of two major kinds of influences - 'the fiscal' and 'the automatic'; 'the fiscal' referring to the effects of taxation and government subsidies and 'the automatic' to structural factors such as changes within the occupational structure, demographic trends, rural-urban migration and so on. Among the more important of these was the growth of industrial occupational roles and the concomitant decline of agricultural employment. Bentzel suggests that in terms of 'fiscal' policies and 'automatic' forces, about 25 per cent of the process towards greater incomes equalisation in Sweden between 1930 and 1950 can be regarded as a consequence of the 'fiscal' forces and the remaining 75 per cent to the various 'automatic' processes.

When the data on the distribution of pre-tax income in Sweden over this period are compared with those for Britain, it appears that the shift towards equality was somewhat greater in Sweden than in Britain. This is shown in Table III.1 which compares the patterns for pre-tax incomes in each of the two countries in the 1930's and the late 1940's.



TABLE III.1: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME BEFORE TAX  
BY DECILE GROUPS

DECILE GROUP	UNITED KINGDOM		SWEDEN		
	1938	1949	1935	1945	1948
1		} 7.2		} 2.4	} 3.2
2					
3		4.3	16.0	3.7	4.0
4	33.2	5.5		4.9	5.6
5		7.0		6.7	7.3
6		8.0	6.7	8.6	9.0
7	7.5	9.7	9.0	10.6	11.4
8	9.3	10.8	12.2	12.5	12.9
9	12.0	14.5	16.6	16.5	16.3
10	38.0	33.0	39.5	34.1	30.3
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Inequality Coefficient	0.43	0.42	0.54	0.48	0.44
Maximum Equalisation Percentage <sup>12</sup>	30.0	28.0	38.0	33.0	31.0

Source: Extracted from, United Nations, 1957, Chap. 9, Table 3<sup>13</sup>.

As Table III.1 indicates, in 1935 the 'top' decile group received 39.5 per cent of the total pre-tax income in Sweden but by 1948 this figure had declined to 30.3 per cent. In Britain, by contrast, the proportion of total income acquired by this group declined by only 5 per cent; from 38.0 per cent in 1938 to 33.0 per cent in 1949; a pattern which is confirmed by Lydall and Seers. Lydall found that the amount of pre-tax income which was acquired by the top 10 per cent earners declined from 38.0 per cent in 1938 to 33.0 per cent in 1949, while that of the top 20 per cent fell from 50.0 per cent to

47.5 per cent<sup>14</sup>. Similarly, Seers found that the proportion of personal income accruing to the top 10 per cent fell from 40.0 per cent in 1938 to 33.0 per cent in 1947, while the share of the top 25 per cent declined by only 5 per cent; from 56 per cent to 51 per cent<sup>15</sup>. Furthermore, the share of total pre-tax income received by the 'bottom' 60 per cent of recipients increased in Sweden from 22.7 per cent in 1935 to 29.1 per cent in 1948, while that of the 'bottom' 60 per cent in Britain remained relatively static; 33.2 per cent in 1938 and 32.0 per cent in 1949<sup>16</sup>. Therefore, whereas Sweden appears to have had a more unequal distribution of pre-tax income than Britain during the 1930's, by the late 1940's - because of a far greater shift towards pre-tax income equality in Sweden - the patterns for the two countries became increasingly similar. This is borne out by the 'coefficient of inequality' and the 'maximum equalisation percentage' for each of the two countries. As shown in Table III.1, the coefficient of inequality for Britain remained more-or-less constant between 1938 and 1949, whereas for Sweden there was a sharp decline from 0.54 in 1935 to 0.44 in 1948. Similarly, 31 per cent of total pre-tax income in Sweden would have to be redistributed in order to attain complete equality in 1948 compared with 38 per cent in 1935.

However, it can be argued that statistics of this kind are of limited relevance for the investigation of economic inequality if only because they are based upon pre-tax incomes, whereas individuals' life styles, standards of living and patterns of private consumption are more dependent upon levels of income that remain after tax. Furthermore, the taxation system provides a means whereby governments in capitalist societies can modify patterns of economic rewards generated by the occupational structure and the market system of production. Table III.2, therefore, compares post-tax income distributions in Britain and Sweden.



TABLE III.2: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AFTER TAX  
BY DECILE GROUPS

DECILE GROUP	UNITED KINGDOM		SWEDEN		
	1938	1949	1935	1945	1948
1	} 35.7	} 8.3	} 15.9	} 2.7	} 3.5
2					
3		5.0		3.7	4.4
4		} 13.7		5.1	6.1
5				7.2	8.0
6	} 8.0	} 32.3	7.5	8.9	9.7
7			9.5	10.9	11.5
8		} 22.7	13.0	13.1	13.7
9	14.0		17.2	16.5	16.1
10	33.6	26.7	36.9	31.9	27.0
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Inequality Coefficient	.38	.34	.52	.46	.41
Maximum Equalisation Percentage	27.0	24.0	37.0	32.0	28.0

Source: Extracted from United Nations, 1957, Chap. 9, Table 12<sup>17</sup>.

Table III.2 suggests that when the role of taxation is taken into account, the bottom income ranges in both countries retained the same or, more generally, a larger share of total after-tax income than of pre-tax income in each of the years investigated. Furthermore, these gains appear to have diminished with movement up the income scale to a point from which there was an increasing relative loss in the share of income: in both countries this point was reached

within the top decile group. Thus, by comparing Tables II.1 and III.2 it can be seen that the share held by this group in Britain was reduced from 38.0 per cent to 33.6 per cent in 1938 and from 33.0 per cent to 26.7 per cent in 1949. In Sweden, the reduction in the share accruing to the top decile group brought about by taxation was less: from 39.5 per cent to 36.9 per cent in 1935 and from 30.3 per cent to 27.0 per cent in 1948. Similarly, the coefficient of inequality calculated on the distribution of post-tax income was much less compared with that based on pre-tax incomes in Britain than in Sweden; in 1949, for example, there was a reduction in the 'score' for Britain from 0.42 to 0.34, while for Sweden in 1948, the reduction was much less significant - from 0.44 to 0.41. Indeed, Seers suggests that in Britain the proportion of revenue acquired by the top 10 per cent incomes was reduced by taxation from 40 per cent to 36 per cent in 1938 and from 33 per cent to 26 per cent in 1947<sup>18</sup>. Similarly, Lydall claims that taxation reduced the share of income obtained by the top 10 per cent from 38.0 per cent to 33.6 per cent in 1938 and from 33.0 per cent to 26.9 per cent in 1949<sup>19</sup>. Consequently, it seems safe to conclude that for the years under consideration, taxation had less of a redistributive effect on the pattern of incomes in Sweden than it had in Britain. At the same time, Sweden was probably more of an egalitarian society - as measured in terms of income distribution - during this period than Britain. This is despite the fact that there was a far greater shift towards equalisation - both in terms of pre-tax and post-tax incomes - in that country between the 1930's and the late 1940's than in Britain. But as Bentzel suggests, this state of affairs can be regarded to have been more the consequence of 'automatic' factors than of government fiscal policies<sup>20</sup>.

More recent evidence suggests that this trend towards income equalisation in Sweden has not been maintained. Consequently, between 1954 and 1963, the coefficient of inequality for Sweden - calculated on the distribution of



pre-tax income - increased from 0.38 to 0.40, while over a similar period (1954 and 1964), the coefficient for the United Kingdom remained at 0.40<sup>21</sup>.

The details are presented in Table III.3.

TABLE III.3: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME BEFORE TAX

DECILE GROUP	UNITED KINGDOM		SWEDEN	
	1954	1964	1954	1963
1	) 5.5		2.0	1.6
2		3.1	3.6	2.8
3	4.5	4.2	5.0	4.1
4	5.8	6.0	6.2	5.5
5	7.3	7.5	7.8	7.7
6	8.6	9.1	9.3	9.7
7	10.4	11.0	10.6	11.4
8	12.7	12.9	12.7	13.2
9	14.8	14.9	15.5	16.1
10	30.4	29.3	27.3	27.9
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Inequality Coefficient	.40	.40	.38	.40
Maximum Equalisation Percentage	29.0	28.0	26.0	29.0

Source: Extracted from, United Nations, op. cit.,  
Table 6.10.

Table III.3 shows that in Sweden between 1954 and 1963, the share of total income received by individuals in the higher income groups increased while the share of those in lower income groups declined; the watershed

seems to fall between the fifth and sixth decile groups. In Britain there was a fall in the income share of the top decile group as well as by the three lowest groups; the net gainers, therefore, appear to have been the middle decile groups. Consequently, Table III.3 suggests that in both countries the income gap between individuals in low income groups (where non-earners such as pensioners constitute a high proportion)<sup>22</sup> and individuals in middle income groups increased between the mid-1950's and the 1960's. Indeed, during the period, Sweden and Britain seem to have had similar income distributions. But the data in Table III.3 are based on pre-tax incomes: when the role of taxation is taken into account, this appears to have been less progressive in Sweden than in Britain. Unfortunately, there are no comparable data patterns of post-tax incomes in Britain and Sweden during the 1950's and the 1960's<sup>23</sup>, but to quote a United Nations enquiry, 'the Netherlands and the United Kingdom probably have the most progressive system of income-tax among all Western European countries. In Norway and Sweden, tax rates for top incomes are not very different from those in the United Kingdom or in the Netherlands, but the system is less progressive and the overall tax-rate is higher<sup>24</sup>. Clearly, the overall system of Swedish taxation appears to have done little to alter the distribution of pre-tax incomes through the 1960's and it seems reasonable to assume that at present the structures of post-tax incomes are relatively similar in both Britain and Sweden.

A similar pattern remains when detailed comparisons are made into wage differentials as they exist between different occupational groups. Mouly found that in Sweden the structure of wage differentiates between male wage earners and male salaried employees in manufacturing industry was virtually the same in 1963 as it was in early 1950's<sup>25</sup>. Similarly, Holmberg has shown that between 1950 and 1960 there was no fundamental change in the pattern of wage differentials between various occupational groups in Sweden, although



there may have been a narrowing of differentials between technical and manual workers<sup>26</sup>. His figures are reproduced in Table III.4.

TABLE III.4: THE STRUCTURE OF WAGES IN SWEDISH INDUSTRY

OCCUPATIONAL GROUP (Adult Men)	RELATIVE WAGES (Industrial Workers = 100)	
	1950	1960
Technical Workers	179	168
Foremen	138	135
Office Workers	138	141
Industrial Workers	100	100

Source: P. HOLMBERG, op. cit., Table 31.

Finally, Johansson has investigated the pattern of wages for different occupational groups in Sweden between 1966 and 1969 and his data confirm that no fundamental changes occurred<sup>27</sup>; the average earnings of the various groups during the period are shown in Table III.5.

TABLE III.5: THE AVERAGE EARNINGS OF MEN IN VARIOUS OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS, EXPRESSED AS RATIOS OF THE AVERAGE EARNINGS OF MALE MANUAL WORKERS IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY IN SWEDEN, 1966-69.

OCCUPATIONAL GROUP (ADULT MEN)	RELATIVE EARNINGS (Manual Workers = 100)
Company Directors, Managers and Professional Workers	268
Senior Civil Servants	247
Foremen	138
Lower-Grade Non-Manual Workers in Private Concerns	143
Lower-Grade Non-Manual Workers in Public Concerns	146
Manual Workers in Private Concerns	100

Source: Extracted from S. JOHANSSON, op. cit., Table 9.33

If the data for foremen and for lower-grade non-manual workers in Table III.5 are compared with those in Table III.4, then it appears that the differential between these groups and industrial manual workers has remained relatively constant for the twenty year period between 1950 and 1969. In other words, the relative position of manual workers in relation to 'adjacent' groups within the reward structure of Swedish society has not improved. Indeed, Johansson produces data to suggest that during recent years - 1966 to 1969 - industrial manual workers employed in private industry in Sweden have been less successful than most other occupational groups in securing higher incomes<sup>28</sup>. Percentage increases in the earnings of members of different occupational categories are shown in Table III.6.

TABLE III.6: PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN THE EARNINGS OF MEMBERS  
OF DIFFERENT OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS IN SWEDEN, 1966-69.

OCCUPATIONAL GROUP (ADULT MEN)	PERCENTAGE INCREASE
Company Directors, Managers and Professional Workers	2.7
Senior Civil Servants	23.9
Foreman	16.1
Lower-Grade Non-Manual Workers in Private Concerns	16.2
Lower-Grade Non-Manual Workers in Public Concerns	16.7
Manual Workers in Private Concerns	12.8

Source: Extracted from S. JOHANSSON, op. cit., Table 9.35

Studies which have been conducted in Britain also suggest that the structure of wage differentials between different occupational groups has remained relatively constant. Routh, for example, has demonstrated that developments in wage rates between 1913 and 1960 have not led to any significant narrowing of differentials between various occupational categories<sup>29</sup>. Table III.7 provides data on trends for male earners during this period.



TABLE III.7: OCCUPATIONAL CLASS AVERAGES AS PERCENTAGES OF THE AVERAGE  
FOR ALL OCCUPATIONAL CLASSES, 1913/14 - 1960 (MEN)

OCCUPATIONAL CLASS	1913/4	1922/24		1935/6		1955/6		1960		
	% of Av.	% of Av.	% of 1913/14	% of Av.	% of 1922/4	% of Av.	% of 1935/6	% of Av.	% of 1955/6	% of 1913/14
1. Professional										
A. Higher	410	372	91	392	105	290	74	298	103	73
B. Lower	194	204	105	190	93	115	60	124	108	64
2. Managers	250	307	123	272	89	279	103	271	97	108
3. Clerks	124	116	94	119	103	98	82	100	102	81
4. Foremen	141	171	121	169	99	148	88	149	101	106
5. Skilled Manual	124	115	93	121	105	117	97	117	100	94
6. Semi-Skilled Manual	86	80	93	83	104	88	97	85	97	99
7. Unskilled Manual	79	82	104	80	98	82	102	79	96	100
Average	115	114	99	115	100	119	103	118	99	103
Mean Deviation (%)	67	73		70		48		49		

Source: G. ROUTH, op. cit., Table 48.

In Table III.7 'percentage of average' refers to the all-class average, in which the earnings for each occupational category are then expressed. The second column for each year provides a measure of the percentage change in the relative position of each occupational category. The bottom line of the table - the mean deviation - provides an index of the dispersion of the occupational averages. This suggests that overall inequality increased between 1913/14 and 1922/4 to a level which lasted until the mid-1930's. But by 1955 this had been reduced to a level which persisted until 1960. Routh suggests that, despite these changes, the pattern of differentials did not alter dramatically over the period. He claims the only significant changes seem to have been 'the decline in the differential for professionals, clerks and foremen between 1935 and 1955 and for skilled manual workers between 1913 and 1924. The fall in the relative position of the professionals was substantial and affected both men and women; 1955 found them at between 60 and 70 per cent of their relative position of 1935. Between 1955 and 1960, however, they showed some gain'<sup>30</sup>. But these changes did not lead to modifications in the general hierarchy of rewards and the overall interpretation of Table III.7 is the extremely stable structure of earnings throughout the period investigated.

The foregoing analysis suggests, then, that the structure of wage differentials has remained relatively stable in both Britain and Sweden. Certainly in neither country have there been changes which in any fundamental manner, have radically altered the general pattern of economic differentials between the various occupational categories. But, despite this, to what extent do actual differentials differ between each of the two countries? Table III.8 provides some kind of an answer to this question.



TABLE III.8: AVERAGE EARNINGS OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS IN BRITAIN AND SWEDEN  
(Expressed as multiples of average earnings for male unskilled labourers).

	SWEDEN (1963)	UNITED KINGDOM (1960)
Unskilled Manual	1.0	1.0
Skilled Manual	-	1.5
Foremen	1.4	1.9
Clerks	1.3	1.3
Lower Administrative & Professional Staff	1.8	1.6
Higher Administrative & Professional Staff	3.1	3.5

Source: Extracted from United Nations, op. cit., 1967, Table 5.16.

It is difficult to make inter-national comparisons of wage differentials because, among other things, of differences in the systems of classification which are used<sup>31</sup>. However, Table III.8 suggests that wage differentials between various occupational groups are not fundamentally different between Sweden and the United Kingdom; for example, professional workers in both countries enjoy at least three times the level of earnings of unskilled manual workers. In view of such data it seems reasonable to conclude that both countries have similar patterns of economic inequality as measured not only by income distributions, but also by differentials in the earnings of different occupational groups.

This is an interesting conclusion in view of the fact that the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) has, particularly since the War, pursued a policy of 'wage solidarity' and thereby attempted to reduce the range of differentials between occupational groups<sup>32</sup>. But Ullenhag, in an appraisal of LO wage policy, claims that this has had little effect on the structure

of differentials between various categories of manual workers because it has been almost completely nullified by market forces which have tended to favour the skilled and the highly-paid<sup>33</sup>. In fact, his conclusions are rather similar to those of Mouly, who has also found that LO's policy of 'wage solidarity' has had little consequence for reducing differentials<sup>34</sup>. In fact, these differentials appear to be no less than they are in Britain, despite the absence of 'wage solidarity' as a feature of trade union policy.

If there appear to be remarkable similarities between the two countries in terms of income distributions and wage differentials, this is less evident in their distributions of wealth. Indeed, the evidence suggests that although wealth is highly concentrated in both countries, it is much more unequally distributed in Britain than in Sweden. Of course, it is difficult to make meaningful comparisons because of severe limitations of the data. In the Swedish official statistics, for example, assets are valued not according to market prices, but in relation to their tax values. In addition, there is the complete omission of individuals' holdings in life insurance companies and pension funds, as well as their ownership of consumer durables. Consequently, any conclusions to be drawn from a comparison of the following tables need to be regarded with extreme caution.

TABLE III.9: THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH IN SWEDEN<sup>35</sup>

YEAR	PROPORTION OF TOTAL WEALTH OWNED BY THE 'TOP'					
	1%	2%	5%	10%	25%	50%
1945	15	21	33	44	62	79
1950	13	18	29	40	58	76
1964	16	20	30	39	56	75

Source: S.O.U., 1968, Table 6.4<sup>36</sup>.



In a survey of wealth and income in 1908, Flodström found that 1.5 per cent of the population accounted for 55 per cent of the total wealth in Sweden<sup>37</sup>. Similarly, Wigforss claims that at this time 2 per cent of the total population owned 54 per cent of the national wealth<sup>38</sup>. Clearly, as Table III.9 suggests, there has been a remarkable breakdown in this degree of concentration by 1945; the proportion of wealth held by this 'top' 2 per cent had probably been reduced by almost two-thirds<sup>39</sup>. However, since 1945 the degree of concentration seems to have remained relatively constant; any changes have been minor with the 'top' 5 per cent owning rather less in 1950 than it did in 1945, but then acquiring rather more between 1950 and 1964. In Britain, by contrast, there has been no redistribution of wealth of the kind experienced in Sweden between 1908 and 1945. Instead, the pattern appears to have remained fairly stable this century and at a much higher level of concentration than in Sweden. The figures, taken from Atkinson, are reproduced in Table III.10<sup>40</sup>.

TABLE III.10: THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH IN BRITAIN

YEAR	PROPORTION OF TOTAL WEALTH OWNED BY 'TOP'		
	1%	5%	10%
1911-13	69	87	92
1924-30	62	84	91
1936-38	56	79	88
1954	43	71	79
1960	42	75	83

Source: A. ATKINSON, op. cit., Table 5.

Table III.10 gives the impression that there was a significant decline in the level of concentration between 1911 and 1960; for example, the share

of the top one per cent fell from about 70 per cent to around 40 per cent. But closer examination of the figures suggests that any redistribution went to the next top 4 per cent; the share of this group increased from 18 per cent to 33 per cent between 1911 and 1960. In fact, the top 10 per cent of the population owned only slightly less a proportion of the total wealth in 1960 than it did in 1911. Furthermore, comparisons of Tables III.9 and III.10 indicate that in 1960, the top one per cent owned three times the proportion of wealth in Britain it owned in Sweden; the top 5 per cent, two-and-a-half times as much; and the top 10 per cent more than twice as much. Obviously wealth appears to be much more unequally distributed in Britain than in Sweden.

In terms of economic rewards, then, Britain and Sweden seem to be similar in their income distributions and patterns of wage differentials, but very unlike in their distributions of personal wealth. Does this mean that the overall patterns of inequality in the two countries are similar or different? It is difficult to provide a straight-forward answer to this question, but what can be stated with a reasonable degree of certainty is that industrial manual workers occupy relatively similar positions within the reward structures of the two countries; the more equitable distribution of wealth in Sweden probably benefits white-collar employees more than it does industrial manual workers<sup>41</sup>. Consequently, it seems reasonable to suggest that the reward structures of Britain and Sweden - particularly in terms of the relative position of industrial manual workers - are characterised more by their similarities than by their differences. It is now necessary to ascertain whether the opportunities to acquire high economic rewards are greater within one country than in the other. This requires a consideration of another component of class inequality; social mobility.

#### b) Patterns of Social Mobility

The evidence suggests that recruitment into various occupational roles,



particularly those of a more prestigious and highly-paid kind, have tended to be highly restricted in both countries. In the late 1940's and the 1950's, for example, the rate of inter-generational mobility between manual and non-manual occupations appears to have been much the same in Sweden as in Britain and in a number of other European countries. Miller, for example, in a re-analysis of various investigations<sup>42</sup>, including the Glass<sup>43</sup> and Carlsson<sup>44</sup> studies of social mobility in Britain and Sweden respectively, demonstrated that the son of a manual worker in Sweden had no greater chance of becoming a white-collar worker during the 1950's than the son of a worker of equivalent status in Britain in the late 1940's; indeed, his chances of becoming a white-collar worker, compared with those of a son of a white-collar worker, were no greater than they were in Britain. This can be shown by an index of inequality which Miller constructs in order to compare the life chances of sons of manual workers with those of non-manual workers:

TABLE III.11: INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN BRITAIN AND SWEDEN

	(1) Non-Manual into Non-Manual	(2) Manual into Non-Manual	(3) Index of Inequality (1)/(2)
United Kingdom	57.9	24.8	234
Sweden	72.3	25.5	284

Source: Extracted from S. MILLER, op. cit., Table 4a.

Table III.11, which is based on a comparison of Carlsson and Glass's findings, suggests that if anything, the British class structure during the late 1940's was slightly more open than the Swedish during the 1950's but that in both countries, the chances of the son of a manual worker becoming a white-collar worker were roughly the same. However, since the 1950's the rate of upward mobility appears to have increased in Sweden but not in

Britain<sup>45</sup>. But it must be emphasised that this increase has tended to be in terms of recruitment into the more routine, less-qualified white-collar occupations. This is borne out by Table III.12 which is taken from a national study of social mobility in Sweden, conducted by Erikson in 1968<sup>46</sup>.

TABLE III.12: SOCIAL MOBILITY AMONG THE SWEDISH ADULT POPULATION

FATHER'S SOCIAL GROUP*	RESPONDENT'S SOCIAL GROUP			TOTAL	
	I	II	III	%	NOS.
I	50	37	13	100	254
II	11	45	44	100	1981
III	4	32	64	100	3274
TOTAL	8	37	55	100	5509

Source: R. ERIKSON, op. cit., Table 6.31.

\* In this and the following tables, 'Social Group I' refers to senior civil servants, owners of large business firms, professional people and senior managerial executives in private businesses; 'Social Group II' to lower-grade non-manual workers, owners of small businesses, independent artisans and foremen; and 'Social Group III' to manual workers. This is the usual way in which Swedish social scientists describe the stratification system of their country.

From Table III.12 it appears that 36 per cent of the sons of Swedish manual workers were in white-collar occupations in 1968; a noticeable increase compared with the findings reported by Carlsson in the 1950's. In Britain, on the other hand, a review by Noble of various studies conducted throughout the 1960's suggests that as recent as 1967, only 26 per cent of the sons of manual workers were employed in non-manual occupations<sup>47</sup>; an insignificant change compared with the Glass findings for 1949<sup>48</sup>.

However, it is arguable whether such indices of mobility adequately 'measure' the rigidity of class structures if only because, as Lipset and



Bendix have suggested, the exchange of personnel between manual and non-manual occupational roles tends to be over a short range; that is, between the more prestigious manual and 'routine' non-manual occupations<sup>49</sup>. Lipset and Bendix claim that mobility of this kind is related to changes in the occupational structure, generated by industrialisation. In view of this, rates of 'elite' mobility, that is movement into managerial and professional occupations, are probably better measures of class rigidity<sup>50</sup>. If this is the case, then the data presented in Table III.12 suggests that, although there may now be greater mobility within the Swedish class structure than during the 1950's, this tends to be between lower-grade white-collar and manual occupations rather than in terms of movement into professional, managerial and administrative roles. As Table III.12 indicates, only 4 per cent of the sons of manual workers were employed in occupations of this kind in 1968. More information on these patterns is given in Table III.13 which demonstrates the proportion of sons from different occupational backgrounds in Sweden acquiring positions that have been classified as constituting Social Groups I and III.

TABLE III.13: PROPORTION OF SONS IN SOCIAL GROUPS I AND III  
ACCORDING TO FATHERS' OCCUPATION

FATHERS' OCCUPATIONS	SONS' SOCIAL GROUP	
	I	III
Senior Civil Servants	65.6	8.3
Owners of large business concerns and professional people	52.6	8.2
Senior managerial and executive workers in private concerns	50.7	18.5
Lower-grade non-manual workers in private concerns	33.7	27.8
Lower-grade non-manual workers in public concerns	24.4	32.0
Owners of small business concerns and independent artisans	15.8	39.8
Foremen	13.1	47.6
Manual workers in public concerns	8.5	58.0
Farmers	4.0	41.3
Manual workers in private concerns	5.2	61.3
Small farmers, fishermen	2.6	71.3
Farm and Forestry workers	3.3	75.7

Source: Extracted from R. ERIKSON, op. cit., Table 6.47.

The data presented in Table III.13 confirm that the Swedish class structure was still very rigid in 1968. The son of a senior civil servant, for example, appears to have had about thirteen-times the chances of obtaining a 'Social Group I' occupation than the son of a manual worker employed in private industry. Even the son of a lower-grade white-collar worker employed in private industry had more than six-times the chances of getting such a position than a manual worker's son. In other words, these results indicate



that recruitment into professional, managerial and other highly rewarded occupations is highly restricted in Sweden.

In the absence of comparable national surveys it is difficult to assess whether elite mobility is as equally restricted in Britain as in Sweden. Miller's analysis suggested that 2.2 per cent of the sons of manual workers attained 'elite' positions in Britain during the late 1940's, compared with 3.5 per cent in Sweden in the 1950's; figures which should be contrasted with the rate of 7.8 per cent for the United States<sup>51</sup>. Rates of elite mobility, therefore, would appear to be relatively similar in both countries; indeed, investigations of recruitment into specific occupations confirm that both countries have very low rates of mobility of this kind.

In an analysis of 245 business leaders in Sweden, Malmström and Widenborg found, in the late 1950's, that 15.5 per cent were the sons of lower-grade white-collar workers and industrial manual workers, while at least 30 per cent were the sons of owners and managers of large businesses which employed at least two hundred people<sup>52</sup>. Studies conducted in Britain by investigators such as Clark<sup>53</sup>, Clements<sup>54</sup>, Copeman<sup>55</sup> and Nichols<sup>56</sup> suggested a similar pattern. Copeman, whose analysis is probably the most comparable with the Swedish study because of the year in which it was conducted, found that only 8 per cent of company directors were the sons of lower-grade white-collar workers and manual workers, while 51 per cent were the sons of directors, small businessmen and industrial managers<sup>57</sup>. It is hazardous to take such data from the two countries as if they were directly comparable, but the findings of studies such as these do suggest that the chances of a son of a manual worker moving into an elite position in industry are highly restricted in both countries.

A similar pattern is evident in the social origins of individuals who occupy elite roles within the non-industrial sectors of the two countries. In an investigation into the social background of top Swedish civil servants,

Landström found that there had been no overall change in patterns of recruitment between 1917 and 1947; only 7.1 per cent of these officials came from working-class homes in 1947 compared with 2.6 per cent in 1917<sup>58</sup>. Samuelson has also suggested that in 1965, of 200 higher state administrators in Sweden, only 10 per cent were of working-class social origin<sup>59</sup>. Indeed, this pattern is confirmed by a comprehensive study of top Swedish state officials which was conducted in 1968<sup>60</sup>. The figures are reproduced in Table III.14.

TABLE III.14: THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF SWEDISH HIGHER CIVIL SERVANTS IN 1968

DEPARTMENT	SOCIAL BACKGROUND			
	SOCIAL GROUP			TOTAL
	I	II	III	
Central Department	54	37	9	100
Central Administration, excluding State Industries	32	50	18	100
Central Administration of State Industries	25	54	21	100
County Administration	45	43	12	100
Regional and Local Administration, excluding State Industries	18	66	16	100
Local and Regional Administration of State Industries	30	52	18	100
All Departments	32	52	16	100

Source: Extracted from U. CHRISTOFFERSSON et al., op. cit., Table 2.

Table III.14 shows that only 9 per cent of the top civil servants in the Central Department came from working-class backgrounds compared with 54 per cent recruited from 'Social Group I'. Although a rather higher



proportion have working-class origins in other sectors of the civil service - especially in the state industries - more than one-third have been recruited from 'Social Group I' and less than one-fifth from 'Social Group III'. If, then, there has been any 'democratisation' in terms of selection into the higher grades of the Swedish civil service, the process has been less than dramatic. Indeed, the patterns are not unlike those for Britain. Kelsall, for example, found that the proportions of civil servants (above the rank of assistant secretary) recruited from higher administrative, professional and managerial backgrounds were 38.8 per cent and 31.7 per cent in 1929 and 1950 respectively<sup>61</sup>. But, at the same time, there was an increase in the proportion of those with fathers who were manual workers; from 7 per cent in 1929 to 20 per cent in 1950<sup>62</sup>. Since then, however, there appears to have been little change in overall patterns of recruitment; particularly in terms of the proportion recruited from manual working-class backgrounds. In a recent analysis Kelsall claims that in 1967 the percentage of civil servants above the rank of assistant secretary with manual working fathers was 17 per cent<sup>63</sup>. Table III.15, extracted from Chapman, provides recent data on the social origins of entrants into the administrative class of the British civil service<sup>64</sup>.

TABLE III.15; THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF ENTRANTS INTO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CLASS OF THE BRITISH CIVIL SERVICE BETWEEN 1948-56 AND 1957-63

FATHERS' OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS	1948-56		1957-63	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
Administrative, Professional and Managerial Workers	202	38.3	212	45.8
Lower-grade professional, Managerial and Technical Workers	205	38.9	176	38.0
Highly skilled workers, Foremen, Supervisors and Clerks	105	19.9	55	11.9
Skilled and Semi-skilled Workers	6	1.2	13	2.8
Unskilled Workers	7	1.3	2	0.4
Unknown	2	0.4	5	1.1
TOTAL	527	100.0	463	100.0

Source: Calculated from R. CHAPMAN, op. cit., Table 14.

There are, of course, immense problems in any international comparison of elite mobility. In the study of higher civil servants, for example, it is difficult to ascertain whether comparisons are being made between occupations of similar rank. In addition, the ratio of departmental heads to all other civil service positions may vary between two countries so that competition for the 'top' appointments may be more intense in the one country than in the other. Furthermore, there may be inter-societal variations in the prestige of such positions in relation to other professional and managerial occupations. In view of these factors, any conclusions about patterns of recruitment into elite roles in occupations such as the higher civil service must be treated with severe reservations. However, the sons of manual workers in Britain and Sweden appear to be equally disadvantaged



in terms of their chances of obtaining such positions; a conclusion which is confirmed by studies that have been conducted into a wide range of non-industrial occupations. Petré, for example, in a study of the social origins of university professors at Lund and Uppsala universities, found that between 1800 and 1950 there was no marked tendency towards 'broader' social recruitment; in 1950 only 8 per cent were from manual working-class homes<sup>65</sup>. Similarly, Carlsson in a discussion of the social recruitment of military leaders suggests that between 1900 and 1961 the proportion from manual working-class families remained very small<sup>66</sup>. In fact, such patterns seem to be much the same as for Britain; this is the inference to be drawn from Halsey and Trow's data on university teachers<sup>67</sup>, Guttman's investigation of politicians<sup>68</sup> and Kelsall's analysis of self-recruitment in the teaching, medical, legal and clerical professions<sup>69</sup>. Consequently, and despite the severe limitations of comparative analysis, the conclusion to be drawn from investigating both the rate and the range of social mobility in the two countries is that they are characterised by relatively common profiles; certainly, the position of manual workers is in no way fundamentally more advantageous in one society than in the other. Taken together with the evidence on patterns of economic rewards, industrial manual workers appear to occupy similar positions within the class structures of the two societies<sup>70</sup>. Indeed, Social Democratic governments appear to have had a limited consequence in changing the class structure of Sweden by improving the relative position of manual workers<sup>71</sup>. If, then, patterns of class inequality are similar in Britain and Sweden, are also status differentials?

## (ii) Status Inequality

Weber designates as status 'every typical component of the life fate of men that is determined by a specific, positive or negative, social estimation of honour'<sup>72</sup>. In order to compare patterns of social estimation for different countries, sociologists have adopted a somewhat narrow

perspective and focused almost exclusively upon the study of occupational prestige. The conclusions of these studies have suggested that different industrial societies have similar profiles. Inkeles and Rossi, in a synthesis of the findings of studies conducted in six industrial societies<sup>73</sup>, and Hodge and his associates, in their more recent analysis of the results of studies conducted in twenty-three industrial and non-industrial countries<sup>74</sup>, found that prestige ratings for specific occupations in different countries were highly correlated. But Hodge and his associates found that although there was an overall consistency between the 'scores' for different countries, the variation was greater than that suggested by Inkeles and Rossi. More interestingly for the purposes of the present study, they found, using the prestige 'scores' for the United States as constants, that among all the highly industrialised societies, Sweden had the lowest correlation, one of 0.74. By contrast, the correlation for Britain was 0.83<sup>75</sup>.

It is possible to obtain more detailed information about occupational prestige in Britain and Sweden by comparing the study conducted by Hall and Caradog Jones in 1949<sup>76</sup>, with that undertaken by Carlsson in 1958<sup>77</sup>. Unfortunately, the occupational titles, the questions put to respondents and the chosen samples are not directly comparable, but there are sufficient similarities between the two studies to make some kind of comparative interpretation possible. Table III.16 summarises the major findings.



TABLE III.16: PRESTIGE RATINGS FOR CATEGORIES OF OCCUPATIONS  
IN SWEDEN AND BRITAIN<sup>78</sup>

SWEDEN		UNITED KINGDOM	
CATEGORY	MEAN SCORE	CATEGORY	MEAN SCORE
1. Business Leaders, Higher Managerial Workers in Private Business	50	1. Professional and Higher Administrative Workers	2.2
2. Civil Servants, Professional Workers	49	2. Managerial and Executive Workers	6.4
3. Small-scale Entrepreneurs, Shopkeepers	42	3. Inspectional, Supervisory and Non-manual, Higher grade Workers	11.5
4. White-collar Workers	34	4. Inspectional, Supervisory & other Lower grade non-manual Workers	14.5
5. Skilled Workers	34	5. Skilled Manual & Routine Non-manual Workers	18.1
6. Unskilled Workers	28	6. Semi-skilled Manual Workers )	25.6
		7. Unskilled Manual Workers )	

Sources: Extracted from G. CARLSSON, op. cit., Table 8.6, and calculated from J. HALL and D. CARADOG JONES, op. cit., Table III (General Sample).

Both studies suggest that managerial and professional occupational roles were the most highly valued and that the lowest esteem was accorded to unskilled manual work. But the results also indicate that there may have been differences between the two countries in terms of the social estimation of routine white-collar and skilled manual occupational roles. In the Swedish study there appears to have been no difference in the estimations attached to each of these occupational categories, while there was in

the British study. As Table III.16 suggests, there was a difference in mean scores of 3.6 for the British categories '4' and '5', despite the fact that in the original Hall-Jones study, category '5' included the occupations of 'policemen', 'routine clerk' and 'shop assistant', all of which were recorded as 'white-collar' in the Swedish study. If these occupations are transferred from category '5' to category '4', then category '4' has a mean score of 16.0 (instead of 14.5). But it is also necessary to transfer the occupation 'coal hewer' (used in the Hall-Jones study) from category '6' to category '5' since in the Standard Classification of Occupations it is regarded as a 'skilled manual' occupation. Category '5' then has a mean score of 20.0 (instead of 18.1). By making such calculations, categories '4' and '5' in the British and Swedish studies become more directly comparable; yet it is evident that the mean scores of 'white-collar' and 'skilled manual' differ in the British data, but not in the Swedish<sup>79</sup>.

The conclusions of a study of occupational prestige in an occupationally mixed residential of Stockholm, conducted by Dahlström in 1951, are consistent with those of Carlsson<sup>80</sup>. He found that both 'manual workers' and 'others' ranked the occupations of 'foreman' and 'skilled worker' above that of 'office clerk'. His findings are reproduced in Table III.17.



TABLE III.17: OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE IN AN OCCUPATIONALLY-MIXED  
RESIDENTIAL AREA OF STOCKHOLM

	AVERAGE ORDINAL RANKINGS	
	'WORKERS'	'OTHERS'
Managers	1.2	1.1
Engineers	2.0	2.0
Foremen	2.9	3.2
Skilled Workmen	4.4	3.8
Office Clerks	4.8	5.0
Semi-Skilled Operatives	6.0	6.0
Unskilled Labourers	6.4	6.5

Source: E. DAHLSTRÖM, op. cit.,

Although the Hall-Jones enquiry did suggest that there may have been some ambiguity over the relative social estimation of some lower-grade white-collar and skilled manual occupations in Britain, it appears to have been only in communities where there are strong working-class sub-cultures that manual occupations have been consistently ranked above white-collar occupations in the same manner as in Sweden. Certainly, Young and Willmott's evidence suggests that this may have been the case in their study of occupational prestige conducted among manual workers in the East-End of London during the early 1950's<sup>81</sup>.

If the findings of occupational prestige studies can be regarded as indicative of status differentials, then these do suggest that during the post-war years and the 1950's the differences were less in Sweden than in Britain; particularly in terms of the social estimation of manual and lower-grade non-manual occupations<sup>82</sup>. However, a number of qualifications have to be made to this statement. In the first place, the overall prestige hierarchies between the two countries are similar despite the differences

mentioned above. Secondly, as Runciman has suggested, there may have been a decline in status differentials in British society<sup>83</sup>; consequently, this may reflect itself in more recent studies of occupational prestige<sup>84</sup>.

Finally, the prestige of occupations is an uncertain measure of the distribution of social honour in society and so the suggestion that status differentials are less in Sweden than in Britain needs to be substantiated by further enquiry. Possible areas worthy of investigation would include the study of patterns of social closure and acceptability, the degree to which particular styles of life and 'cultural' interests are monopolised by different social strata and the criteria which are used for status confirmment; for example, modes of speech, academic qualifications, attendance at particular educational establishments, membership of various clubs and associations, family lineage and so on. With the absence in Sweden of a distinctive set of institutions which are explicitly geared to training middle and upper-class children for professional and managerial roles - for example, fee-paying schools - and the importance of these institutions in Britain for the perpetuation of class-related cultural values and life-styles, it can be hypothesised that empirical enquiries would demonstrate that status differentials are less in Sweden than they are in Britain. Certainly there have been greater efforts to abolish status differentials in Sweden; Social Democratic governments have always stressed the social contribution of manual workers and the desirability of destroying class-related values and life styles<sup>85</sup>. Thus, and in view of the foregoing analysis, a guarded statement can be made to the effect that status inequality in Sweden may be of a lower magnitude than in Britain. It now remains to ascertain whether a similar conclusion applies to the distribution of power within the two countries.

### (iii) Power Inequality

Weber defines power as 'the chance of a man or a number of men to realise their own will in a communal action against the resistance of others



who are participating in the action<sup>86</sup>. In the light of the earlier analysis of economic inequalities and mobility possibilities it is evident that in both countries the respective working-class movements have achieved little power; defined, that is, in terms of the degree to which they have been able to alter the principles upon which Swedish and British capitalism has been established. Thus, in both countries capitalism, as a socio-economic system, determines the allocation of resources on the basis of the private ownership of the means of production and according to principles of profit, rent, wage labour and forces of supply and demand. Consequently, 'power' within the context of the present discussion is considered in terms of the degree to which the British and the Swedish working-class movements have been able to represent the interests of industrial manual workers within the context of the socio-economic parameters established by contemporary capitalism<sup>87</sup>. Since, then, this analysis focuses upon what may be termed 'representative power', it is necessary to investigate the role and the objectives of political parties and of other interest groups within the context of the two capitalist systems.

A government enquiry published in Sweden in 1968 concluded that in 1964, the fifty largest companies employed 21 per cent of all workers in private industry<sup>88</sup> and that in 1963, the one hundred largest companies accounted for 46 per cent of the total output of Swedish private industry<sup>89</sup>. Furthermore, in terms of the ownership of company shares, the enquiry suggested that seventeen groups of shareholders had, in 1963, a majority or a substantial minority holding in companies which accounted for 36 per cent of all industrial output<sup>90</sup>. The investigators claimed that the concentration of stocks and shares in Swedish private industry was probably greater than in either the United States or in Britain. An explanation for this, according to the authors, is that although Sweden is a small country, it requires large units of production in order to compete in international markets<sup>91</sup>. Indeed,

the concentration of economic power in Sweden has been encouraged by Social Democratic governments on precisely these grounds: that 'structural rationalisation' is necessary if Sweden is to increase exports and to enjoy high living standards.

Comparisons with Britain suggest that concentrations of industrial assets and income are probably less than in Sweden, although these have tended to increase since the War. Barratt Brown, for example, claims that in 1953/54, the 100 largest industrial companies in Britain accounted for 31.5 per cent of all net assets and 18.5 per cent of gross income<sup>92</sup>. By 1961/63, the proportion of net assets held by this group of companies had increased to 40 per cent and the share of gross income, to 23 per cent<sup>93</sup>. Within manufacturing industry, the degree of concentration was even greater: in 1953/54 the 'top' 100 companies owned 50 per cent of the net assets and accounted for 35 per cent of gross income and by 1961/63, the proportions had increased to 60 per cent and 50 per cent respectively<sup>94</sup>. These figures are, of course, in no way comparable with those mentioned for Sweden, but they do indicate a high concentration of economic power in Britain. To what extent, then, is this economic power in the two countries 'checked' or 'restrained' by other social forces?

It is in relation to this issue that further consideration needs to be given to the British and Swedish Labour movements and the degree to which they represent the interests of industrial manual workers. It has already been suggested in Chapter Two that the level of trade union membership and the degree of legitimacy which it enjoys are much higher in Sweden than in Britain. Thus, it can be suggested that the Swedish trade union movement operates as a greater 'check' to the economic power of companies than its British counterpart. However, a number of Swedish observers, particularly Marxists and the 'New Left', have claimed that the Labour movement in Sweden has become so 'bureaucratized' that it no longer represents workers'



interests<sup>95</sup>. Although this development has certainly generated tensions and strains within the movement, it can be argued that high degrees of 'centralisation' and 'bureaucratisation' have been necessary in order for the Labour movement to compete effectively with other power groups in society. Furthermore, the concern over recent years by the Swedish Labour movement to increase equality, particularly in terms of the earnings and working conditions of manual and white-collar workers and to increase disproportionately the earnings of lower income groups<sup>96</sup>, suggests that national union negotiators have not completely neglected the interests of rank-and-file members<sup>97</sup>.

In view of the lack of comparative evidence, it is uncertain whether Swedish Labour unions have been more effective in protecting as well as representing the interests of their members than their British counterparts. Certainly, in terms of income distribution and wage differentials, little appears to have been achieved by LO. But it has been able to impose greater 'constraints' upon the prerogatives of management. For example, as a result of recent legislation, the Boards of companies with more than 100 employees must include at least one trade union representative. Similarly, there have been attempts to 'democratise' private companies by increasing the level of trade union participation in company planning and policy formulation<sup>98</sup>. By contrast, British governments and trade unions have made few attempts to bring about similar reforms so that the influence of unions within the formal structures of companies would be increased; at least to a level enjoyed by their Swedish counterparts. Indeed, a comparative analysis of a Swedish and English factory, which was conducted in 1970, suggested that trade unions imposed far greater 'constraints' upon managerial prerogatives in the former than in the latter<sup>99</sup>. When, for example, management in the Swedish factory wanted to dismiss a worker for failing to adhere to recognised rules and procedures, it had first to notify union officials before it could give the

worker at least one warning. If, after this, management considered that the behaviour had continued and it again wanted to dismiss the employee, the reasons had to be explained to union officials. If there was agreement with these officials, the worker could then be dismissed with three weeks' notice, but if not, negotiations proceeded to higher level. In the English factory, by contrast, there was far less consultation between management and union officials. Procedures were less clearly defined and at best the worker could only appeal through a union official after he had already been given notice of dismissal.

This is only one example and it is based on a comparison of just two workplaces, but it is indicative of wider patterns in both countries. Thus, in terms of day-to-day activities and in negotiations with employees, Swedish management is more 'constrained' by various rules and procedures which have been established in agreement with the trade unions, than is its British counterpart<sup>100</sup>. This is reinforced by the fact that union membership in most sectors of Swedish manufacturing industry is extremely high and that it commands considerable support among rank-and-file members<sup>101</sup>. Consequently, although industrial power is overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of shareholders and managers in both countries, an influential working-class movement has operated to represent the interests of employees to a far greater degree in Swedish than in British industry<sup>102</sup>. Similarly, much the same statement can be made about structures of power within the non-industrial sectors of the two societies.

It has already been noted in Chapter Two that the first Labour government in the world was elected to office in Sweden in 1920 and since 1932 the Social Democratic Party has either been in office as a majority government or as the dominant partner in a government coalition. By contrast, the British Labour Party, up until 1974, has been in government for only two periods of any significant length of time<sup>103</sup>. Indeed, the contemporary



electoral strength of the Social Democratic Party is illustrated by the fact that it is supported by roughly three-quarters of all male industrial workers and by about one-half of male lower-grade white-collar employees. The British Labour Party, by comparison, receives lower proportions of the votes of these occupational groups<sup>104</sup>.

However, the influence of the working-class movement in Sweden is not solely reflected in terms of voting in general elections; it is also represented by the existence of a set of organisations and norms which, according to Anderson, significantly penetrates the life styles of manual and lower-grade white-collar workers<sup>105</sup>. Hence, these play a significant role in such areas as vocational training, adult education, sport, leisure and various political and social activities. The Workers Educational Movement (ARBETARNAS BILDNINGSFÖRBUND, ABF), for example, is an integral part of the Labour movement, created in 1892 to provide education for the industrial working class<sup>106</sup>. Many of these courses are geared to vocational ends, while others award credits which can later be taken into account for the purpose of obtaining university degrees. Some of these, particularly in the social sciences, emphasise the achievements of the Swedish Labour movement. Therefore, in ways like this, members of Swedish society, particularly manual and routine white-collar workers, are drawn into a complex of voluntary associations, a large number of which are closely related to, or affiliated with, the working-class movement<sup>107</sup>. In fact, the extent to which such organisations exercise an organisational and normative influence is indicated by Anderson in a study of perceived 'influentials' in four Swedish communities<sup>108</sup>. Although each of the communities represented different political, economic and social structures, he found that 95 per cent of all the 'influentials' mentioned by respondents were union officials. Furthermore, in an enquiry into voting behaviour and its relationship to patterns of social mobility, he found that upwardly

mobile sons, from working-class homes, were more likely to retain their voting allegiance to the Social Democratic Party than were upwardly mobiles in the United States who tended to shift their political allegiance from the Democratic to the Republican Party<sup>109</sup>. Anderson argues that this is because of the greater significance of Swedish working-class institutions in the life styles of manual workers. These, he suggests, are so salient in the political socialisation of working-class youth that they are retained after the mobility experience.

Similarly, Seeman found in a study of Swedish manual workers that the experience of alienation at work was not generalised to non-work situations<sup>110</sup>. He found that these workers were not less knowledgeable about, or less engaged in, political matters; indeed, they demonstrated a degree of political and social awareness which he had not found in similar studies that he had conducted in the United States. He suggests in his study of Swedish workers that, 'It is entirely possible that the effects of work alienation are tempered by the surrounding social system - in the present case, by the highly organised, relatively stable, fundamentally democratic and economically advanced order that modern Sweden represents. It is possible that alienated work, especially at the lower income level, is something else again in the United States'<sup>111</sup>. Seeman's description of Sweden may be rather exaggerated but it does lend support to the claim that working-class norms and institutions are highly significant within the social structure of that country.

By contrast, Britain does not appear to have such a significant set of social institutions that have developed out of working-class movement and which are salient for the non-work life styles of manual workers<sup>112</sup>; it appears to be only in 'traditional' working-class communities that institutions such as trade unions and the Labour Party exercise an organisational and normative influence of the magnitude found in Sweden<sup>113</sup>. Indeed, Parkin



has argued that these communities in Britain constitute 'deviant' cases in the sense that they are characterised by norms and institutions that led to high voting allegiance to the Labour Party<sup>114</sup>.

In view of these factors, the interests of manual workers tend to be better represented and articulated within the Swedish capitalist system than they are in Britain; this is certainly the case if account is also taken of the large number of Swedish voluntary associations, pressure groups, and cooperatives which represent and protect the interests of groups such as housing tenants, pensioners, students, the ill and the handicapped and consumers<sup>115</sup>. Britain, of course, has similar organisations, but, with a few exceptions, they operate less effectively as pressure groups; particularly in terms of representing and publicising the interests, the activities and the concerns of various 'subordinate' groups. Indeed, there is no British equivalent to the Swedish State Pension Fund which, by 1978, will be the biggest source of finance in the country; it will have assets greater than those of all the Swedish banks and credit institutions combined. This fund is increasingly being used to finance the construction of new state factories and to buy stocks and shares in private industry; an activity which, if continued in the future, could give the State a controlling interest in many of the largest Swedish companies<sup>116</sup>. There is a Commission which oversees investments made by the Fund, consisting of eleven members; five from trade unions, two from private companies, two from local authorities and a chairman and vice-chairman appointed by the government.

Sweden and Britain, then, are both capitalist countries in which wealth and income are disproportionally concentrated in the hands of restricted groups of individuals. Accordingly, there is a great temptation to argue that the power structures of both countries are similar. But to do so would be to ignore the differential degree to which the interests of manual workers are represented in each of the two countries. At the very least, various

voluntary associations, labour unions and a succession of Social Democratic governments have provided some kind of 'check' and 'balance' to the concentration of private power and wealth in Sweden; certainly, to a far greater degree than in Britain. However, some observers of Swedish society have argued that the leadership of the Social Democratic Party has become so 'removed' from the mass membership that it no longer truly represents their interests. Therefore, they often claim that the leaders of the party, together with Big Business, constitute a national elite<sup>117</sup>.

Certainly, the leadership of the Social Democratic Party consists of professional, middle-class individuals, but the 'middle-class' character of the parliamentary Social Democratic Party is no more than that of the Labour Party in Britain. This is shown in Table III.18 which provides data on the social background of Social Democratic and Labour members of Parliament.

TABLE III.18: THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF SWEDISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND BRITISH LABOUR MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

	PERCENTAGE WITH MANUAL WORKING-CLASS ORIGIN
<u>British Labour M.P's</u>	
1945	41
1951	45
1959	35
1964	30
<u>Swedish Social Democratic M.P's</u>	
1937	53
1961	47

Sources: Extracted from H. GLENNERSTER<sup>118</sup>; and  
 "L. SKOLD and A. HALVARSON<sup>119</sup>.



As Table III.18 indicates, 47 per cent of Social Democratic M.P's came from manual working-class homes in 1961 compared with 53 per cent in 1937. By contrast, only 30 per cent of Labour M.P's in Britain came from working-class homes in 1964 compared with 41 per cent in 1945. In terms of their own occupations, 33 per cent of Social Democratic M.P's were manual workers in 1960<sup>120</sup> compared with 34 per cent of the Labour Party's members of Parliament in 1966<sup>121</sup>. None of the major Swedish opposition parties has such a high proportion of representatives from working-class homes as the Social Democratic Party. In 1961, such individuals accounted for only 2.6 per cent of the Högern Party M.P's, 30.0 per cent of the Folk Party M.P's and for none of the Centre Party's M.P's<sup>122</sup>. In 1960 none of the Högern or Centre Party's members of parliament held manual occupations and this was so for only 7 per cent of those of the Folk Party<sup>123</sup>. Even if leaders of the Social Democratic Party did constitute an integral component of a Swedish national elite - and this has yet to be demonstrated - it could still be argued that they have pursued and represented at least some of the objectives of rank-and-file members; they certainly have not been the legislative spokesmen of Big Business. In fact, over the years, Social Democratic governments have continuously passed legislation which can be regarded as contrary to the financial self-interests of private business; for example, the creation of the State Pension Fund<sup>124</sup> and legislation within the areas of consumer protection, price control, conditions of work and employment, fiscal policies, and so on. More recently too, there has been an explicit policy to equalise the conditions of service and employment for different categories of manual and non-manual employees; a commitment which, if implemented, would substantially increase labour costs in industry<sup>125</sup>.

If Britain is also characterised by the existence of a power elite - and this, too, has yet to be empirically shown - it has not generally incorporated leaders that have been prepared to pursue the objectives of

manual workers when they have been contrary to the financial interests of private business. Except for two periods of any length of time, Britain has had, up until 1974, Conservative governments, none of which have given primacy to the attainment of such objectives as improvements in the quality of working life for industrial workers, the protection of consumers' interests, the strengthening of trade unionism and the legislative control of large, privately-owned financial interests. Furthermore, they have made fewer attempts than the Social Democrats to prevent the transmission of financial and social privileges from one generation to the next<sup>126</sup>. The extent to which Conservative governments are reluctant to pass legislation of this kind can be inferred from an analysis of the business interests of Conservative members of Parliament. Roth, for example, has suggested that in 1966 among the 253 Conservative members of parliament, there were 290 company chairmen, 601 company directors, 64 executives and only two manual workers<sup>127</sup>. Similarly, Spiegelberg found in 1970 that, 'just after the election, Members of Parliament with readily identifiable business interests numbered 218, or just over one-third of the House of Commons. Not surprisingly, an overwhelming number were Conservative M.P's - a mere 27 were Labour'<sup>128</sup>.

Thus, it would appear that even if there was a power elite in each of the two countries, the social composition of these elites differ to the extent that the interests of manual workers are better represented in Sweden than they are in Britain. This would appear to be so, in view of legislative histories of the two countries over the past forty years and the degree to which working-class institutions and norms act as 'checks' and 'balances' to the institutions of private wealth and property. But having said that, it is clear from this analysis that the influence of the Swedish working-class movement has been directed more to representing the interests of industrial manual workers within a capitalist framework than to changing its structure. The tendency, with some exceptions, has been to pursue



reformist-welfare policies rather than to bring about large-scale structural changes. As Tingsten has argued, the development of the Social Democratic Party between the latter decades of the 19th century and the late 1930's was characterised by a process of ideological change in which it was increasingly considered possible to achieve economic and social equality within the framework of capitalist society rather than by replacing it with an alternative economic system characterised by the absence of private property relationships<sup>129</sup>. Hence, <sup>until recently,</sup> few policies have been adopted which can be interpreted as 'anti-capitalist' in the sense of breaking down the predominant role of private property and market forces in determining the distribution of economic and social resources<sup>130</sup>. But, although by comparison with socialist countries the power structures of Britain and Sweden may be relatively similar, within the context of capitalist societies, the structure of power in Sweden incorporates the interests and objectives of subordinate groups much more than it does in Britain, where the industrial and political 'wings' of the working-class movement have been less effective in representing the interests of industrial manual workers against the economic and political ambitions of Big Business.

To conclude: an analysis of inequality in Britain and Sweden suggests that 1) patterns of class inequality are, in general terms, similar in both countries, despite differences in the distributions of wealth. As far as manual workers are concerned, their relative share of economic resources - compared with those of other occupational groups - appears to be no different in Sweden than it is in Britain<sup>131</sup>. Similarly, the chances for manual workers' sons to be upwardly mobile within the respective occupational structures do not seem to be fundamentally different in the two countries; 2) status inequality - in the light of occupational prestige studies - appears to be less in Sweden than in Britain; 3) the power structures of the two countries are fairly similar except that in Sweden it represents the

interests of subordinate groups to a greater extent. The reasons for this have already been discussed: namely, the differential normative and institutional effects of working-class movements within each of the two countries. But in view of this, why are there not fundamental differences in patterns of class inequality between Britain and Sweden?

In terms of income distribution and rates of social mobility, it appears that working-class institutions have had little effect in Sweden. In both Britain and Sweden distributions of pre-tax incomes have remained relatively similar because in both countries income and wage differentials are shaped by market forces. But why do these similarities persist in their structures of post-tax incomes? One possible reason is that which has been advanced by a United Nations report which investigated income distributions in a number of West European countries<sup>132</sup>. It states, 'for the bulk of the population the pattern of primary income distribution is only slightly modified by government action. Structural changes - such as the falling share of agriculture in manpower distribution and the reduction of self-employment generally - have probably had a more significant influence in dispersion of final household incomes than government policies'<sup>133</sup>. This statement seems to be as relevant for Sweden as it is for Britain and other capitalist countries in Western Europe, despite the fact that Social Democratic governments have argued for greater equality within the economy and that LO has pursued a policy of wage solidarity. But until there is a greater degree of direct government intervention in the economic structure of capitalist society, market forces would seem to be greater than those of social democracy in determining income and wage differentials. It is now Social Democratic policy to participate directly in the decision-making processes of business concerns; the major banks currently have government directors on their Boards and it is the intention that this should also occur in large manufacturing companies. Similarly, the resources of the



State Pension Fund have been increasingly utilised in order to further state intervention within the economy. Thus, in these ways the Social Democratic Party hopes to increase the influence of employees within the economic structure of society and to create a greater degree of economic equality. It is only if developments continue in this direction that the forces of contemporary Swedish capitalism will be subjected to some kind of challenge by the working-class movement with the result that income and wage differentials could be reduced.

The effects of Social Democracy in increasing rates of social mobility also seem to have been highly limited. Although the rate of inter-generational mobility between manual and non-manual occupational roles appears to have increased to a greater extent in Sweden than in Britain since the 1950's, this is probably a consequence of changes in the occupational structure generated by a higher level of economic growth; Lipset and Bendix suggest in their comparative study that social mobility of this kind is related to economic change<sup>134</sup>. But it is interesting that both countries should have similar rates of elite mobility, if only because Social Democratic governments have always emphasised the need to improve opportunities in society, particularly for those of children from manual working-class homes<sup>135</sup>. Thus, successive governments have completely re-organised the Swedish school system<sup>136</sup>.

Until the early 1950's, Sweden had a highly selective system of education. All children attended elementary schools and in either their fourth or sixth grades the more 'able' were given the opportunity to transfer to secondary schools where they pursued an 'academic' curriculum before going to 'gymnasium' and often, to university. The rest - those not chosen for secondary education - continued their studies at elementary school before direct entry into the labour market, although some would also attend technical colleges. A consequence of this system, as in many other countries,

was that the children from upper and middle-class homes were more likely to attend the 'gymnasium' than those from working-class backgrounds. For example, in a study of males born in 1934, H  rnqvist found that only 35 per cent of pupils with the highest academic grades and from working-class homes transferred to the 'gymnasium', compared with 85 per cent of upper-class children attaining the same level of academic competence<sup>137</sup>. Similarly, in terms of the social origins of university students, only 8 per cent of newly-registered students came from working-class homes in 1947<sup>138</sup>.

However, since the 1950's there has been a gradual introduction of non-streamed comprehensive schools so that by the early 1970's Sweden will be the only country in non-socialist Europe with a completely non-selective educational system. Furthermore, there is little doubt that these reforms have improved the educational opportunities for working-class children: Reuterberg found that 87 per cent of working-class males born in 1948 and with the highest academic grades transferred from secondary schools to the 'gymnasium' - almost three times as many as those born in 1934<sup>139</sup>. At the same time, there has been a rapid increase in the population of university students from working-class homes; in the academic year 1962/63, working-class entrants accounted for 16 per cent of all places and by 1968 this figure had increased to 20 per cent<sup>140</sup>. In Britain, by contrast, the proportion has remained at about 25 per cent since the pre-war years<sup>141</sup>. Indeed, there has been the introduction of a number of measures in Sweden designed to broaden the bases for recruitment into institutions of higher education; student loans and grants have been made more readily available than in the past and greater financial assistance has been offered in order to give individuals 'a second chance', particularly manual workers who have been employed for several years. As a result, there are a number of university disciplines which admit students without the formal entrance qualifications provided they are at least 25 years old and that they have



had no less than five years of vocational experience.

Although reforms in the educational system have improved the opportunities for working-class children, there remain important differences in the proportions of children from different social backgrounds that acquire higher educational qualifications. In 1968, a national survey found that even among the youngest age cohort (20-29) the percentage of individuals with fathers in 'Social Group I' and with at least the 'studentexamen' (taken at the termination of studies in the 'gymnasium' and a necessary qualification for entry into institutions of higher education) was more than six times greater than for those individuals from 'Social Group III' homes<sup>142</sup>. The complete figures are shown in Table III.19:

TABLE III.19: PERCENTAGE OF INDIVIDUALS WITH THE 'STUDENTEXAMEN' OR OTHER HIGHER EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION, ACCORDING TO AGE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

FATHERS' SOCIAL GROUP	AGE OF RESPONDENTS		
	20-29	30-54	55-75
I	45	42	31
II	12	7	3
III	7	2	1
TOTAL	12	6	3

Source: L. JOHANSSON, op. cit., Table 7.46

Reforms have improved the educational opportunities of Swedish working-class children but this does not necessarily mean that their mobility chances have improved within the occupational structure. Within the context of a Swedish economy which is overwhelmingly privately-owned, it is difficult to

envisage how recruitment into the more highly-rewarded occupations can be 'democratised' without an increase in government intervention. Otherwise, whether or not recruitment into these positions will change must depend upon the personal aptitude of managers and the controllers of private industry who may be far from committed to the Social Democratic goal of greater social equality. As Carlsson has suggested, in a discussion of the relationship between education and social mobility, there can be at least two consequences stemming from a broadening of educational opportunity<sup>143</sup>. Firstly, he says, 'It is quite conceivable that the very relationship between educational and occupational status may change as a result of the extension of educational services to larger segments of the population. Figuratively speaking, because education is more widespread it might take more education to 'buy' a given type of occupation than was formerly the case'<sup>144</sup>. Secondly, he suggests, 'It might ..... be argued that the more general prevalence of higher education will make .... employers more prone to take other things into consideration'<sup>145</sup>. Here, presumably, Carlsson is referring to such 'intangible' factors as 'character', 'breadth of vision', 'qualities of leadership' and so on; factors which may lead to discrimination - implicitly or explicitly - against the selection of applicants from manual working-class homes. In view of this, it is problematic whether Social Democratic governments can broaden the structure of opportunity within society by reforming solely the educational system and without influencing patterns of recruitment and selection within the occupational structure. In fact, this touches upon one of the major dilemmas confronting any Social Democratic government in a capitalist country; it may be committed to 'meritocratic' and even 'egalitarian' aims and also to promoting the social and economic interests of its working-class supporters, but it generally does so within the context of constraints imposed by the forces of a market economy<sup>146</sup>. Consequently, it is questionable whether such objectives can be achieved



without greater state control over these forces.

Clearly, it appears that similarities between Britain and Sweden in terms of these dimensions of class inequality - mobility rates as well as wage and income differentials - are largely the outcome of market forces which operate within any capitalist country. Why, then, has the working-class movement in Sweden accepted the existence of institutions of private property when these impose severe constraints upon ideological commitments? Has, in short, the Swedish Democratic Party become deradicalised in terms of its objectives, particularly since the turn of the century?<sup>147</sup>

It would be difficult to empirically prove this point, since an analysis of the declared objectives of labour unions and of the Social Democratic Party suggest that these are much the same today as they have always been. What seems to have changed are the tactics which Social Democratic and union leaders regard as legitimate means for attaining these objectives; hence there appears to have been a deradicalisation of means rather than of ends. Thus, since its inception, the Social Democratic Party has emphasised the desirability of creating a more egalitarian society in the sense that the distribution of economic and social resources should be allocated according to need rather than on the basis of property relationship and the capitalist mode of production<sup>148</sup>. In the latter part of the 19th and during the first two decades of the 20th century, the Party emphasised the need to dismantle capitalism as a means whereby egalitarian ends could be attained<sup>149</sup>. However, from the 1920's onwards, Party leaders have stressed that egalitarian goals can be achieved by the adoption of welfare-reformist government policies within the context of capitalism as a socio-economic system<sup>150</sup>. Thus, it has been claimed that by the introduction of progressive taxation and other fiscal measures, inequalities of economic rewards can be reduced while inequalities of opportunity can be abolished by reforms of the educational system. At the same time, such inequalities as they are related

to sex roles, age and place of residence can be ameliorated by government policies<sup>151</sup>. In these ways, then, the leadership of the Social Democratic Party has always been committed to egalitarian goals, although the means whereby these can be attained have been subject to revision. Thus, a deradicalisation of means has meant that the leaders of the Social Democratic Party and the trade union movement have stressed the desirability of 'functional socialism', the ideas of which are appropriately reflected in a quotation taken from a Social Democratic thinker, G. Adler-Karlsson<sup>152</sup>:

"Let us look upon our capitalists in the same way as we have looked upon our kings in Scandinavia. A hundred years ago a Scandinavian king carried a lot of power. Fifty years ago he still had considerable power. According to our constitution the king still has equally as much formal power as a hundred years ago, but in reality we have undressed him of all his power functions so that today he is in fact powerless. We have done this without dangerous or disruptive internal fights. Let us in the same manner avoid the even more dangerous contests which are unavoidable if we enter the road of formal socialisation. Let us instead strip and divest our present capitalists of one after another of their ownership functions. Let us even give them a new dress, but one similar to that of the famous emperor in H.C. Anderson's tale. After a few decades they will then remain, perhaps formally as kings but in reality as **naked** symbols of a passed and inferior development stage" 153.

If these are the objectives of working-class leaders in Sweden, then it could be that class inequality, both in terms of economic rewards and life chances will, in the long run, be shaped less by the processes of modern industrial capitalism and more by the political influences of 'functional Socialism'. Certainly, by virtue of enjoying a greater degree of representation both at the work-place and in society the Swedish working-class movement might seem to be in a better position to reduce class inequalities than its counterpart in Britain. Indeed, an increase in the representative power of the working-class movement is consistent with the ideas of 'functional Socialism' and can be regarded as a means for attaining, over time, this end. Similarly, the normative influence of the Swedish working-class movement has always emphasised that manual work should be as



prestigious and as highly regarded as other occupations; this, too, has challenged the legitimacy of existing class differentials.

But to what extent is Sweden - compared with Britain - characterised by tensions generated by a Social Democratic ideology of egalitarianism within the context of a society which consists of persisting social and economic inequalities? More specifically, in what ways do Swedish manual workers - whose interests the Social Democratic Party and LO claim to represent - perceive of the class structure? Are there fundamental differences compared with their counterparts in Britain where ideological egalitarianism has been less pronounced? As Parkin has suggested, 'although there is a factual and material basis to class inequality, there is more than one way in which it can be interpreted. Facts alone do not provide meanings and the way a person makes sense of his social world will be influenced by the nature of the meaning systems he draw upon'<sup>154</sup>. How, then, has Social Democracy affected Swedish workers' interpretations of the class structure? In order to answer this question it is necessary to refer to the findings of a social survey which was conducted among two samples of English and Swedish industrial manual workers.

## NOTES

1. In discussing inequality in these terms this study has been influenced by the conceptual framework adopted by W.G. RUNCIMAN for his analysis of economic, social and power inequalities in Britain. See W.G. RUNCIMAN, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, London, 1966.
2. See, for example, F. PARKIN, Class Inequality and Political Order, London, 1971, Chap. 1.
3. H. GERTH and C. WRIGHT MILLS, (eds.), From Max Weber, London, 1961, p. 181.
4. See W.G. RUNCIMAN, op. cit.; and his 'Class, Status and Power', in J. JACKSON, (ed.), Social Stratification, Cambridge, 1968.
5. This is particularly evident in the later section on 'Power in Industry' where much of the data could have been considered as aspects of class rather than of power.
6. H. GERTH and C. WRIGHT MILLS, op. cit., p. 181.
7. For example, for Britain see J. NICHOLSON, 'The Distribution and Redistribution of Income in the United Kingdom', in D. WEDDERBURN, (ed.), Poverty, Inequality and Class Structure, London, 1974; and for Sweden, Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU), Svenska Folkets Inkomster (The Income of the Swedish Population), Stockholm, 1970.



8. For a detailed descriptive account of the development of aspects of the welfare state in Britain and Sweden, see H. HECLLO, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden, New Haven, 1974. Unfortunately Heclo does not investigate the role of social welfare policies for the dynamics of the respective class structures.
9. For a discussion of the many problems related to the comparative study of income distributions, see United Nations, Incomes in Post-War Europe, Geneva, 1967, Chap. 6.
10. R. BENTZEL, Inkomstfördelningen i Sverige, (The Distribution of Income in Sweden), Stockholm, 1952.
11. The coefficient of inequality is generally regarded as the best measure of inequality. It can vary between the extreme limits of 0.00 (if all incomes are equal) and 1.00 (if all income goes to one individual). Therefore, the higher the value of the coefficient, the greater the degree of inequality and a reduction in the value of the coefficient measures the extent to which inequality has been reduced.
12. The maximum equalisation percentage shows the share of income to be transferred from high to low income ranges in order to obtain equal distribution.
13. United Nations, Economic Survey of Europe, Geneva, 1957.
14. H. LYDALL, 'The Long-Term Trend in the Size Distribution of Income', Jour. Royal Statistical Soc., Vol. 122, (1959), Table 6.
15. D. SEERS, The Levelling of Incomes Since 1938, Oxford, (Undated,) Chap. 3, Table 6.

16. United Nations, 1957, op. cit., Chap. 9, Table 3.
17. United Nations, 1957, op. cit., Chap. 9, Table 12.
18. D. SEERS, op. cit., Chap. 3, Table 8.
19. H. LYDALL, op. cit., Table 7.
20. R. BENTZEL, op. cit.
21. United Nations, 1967, op. cit., Table 6.10.
22. United Nations, 1967, op. cit., Chap. 6, p. 17.
23. The United Nations enquiry of incomes in post-war Europe, for example, only provides data on pre-tax income distributions for the two countries.
24. United Nations, 1967, op. cit., Chap. 6, p. 24.
25. J. MOULY, 'Wages Policy in Sweden', International Labour Rev., Vol. 95, (1967).
26. P. HOLMBERG, Arbete och L  ner i Sverige (Work and Wages In Sweden), Solna, 1963.
27. S. JOHANSSON, Inkomstutvecklingen, 1966-1969 (The Development of Incomes, 1966-1969), Mimeo, 1972.
28. S. JOHANSSON, op. cit., Table 9.35.
29. G. ROUTH, Occupation and Pay in Great Britain, Cambridge, 1965.
30. G. ROUTH, op. cit., p. 106.
31. Indeed, there are similar problems in interpreting the data which has been collected in various investigations within the same country. Compare, for example, the data on income differentials in Tables III.4, III.5 and



- III.8. Fortunately, the discrepancies are fairly small and the various data confirm the overall pattern.
32. These LO policies are discussed by R. MEIDNER, 'Samordning och Solidarisk Lönepolitik under Tre Decennier', (Coordination and the Policy of Wage Solidarity), in LO Tvårsnitt (Cross-Section), Stockholm, 1973.
  33. J. ULLENHAG, Den Solidariska Lönepolitiken i Sverige (The Policy of Wage Solidarity in Sweden), Stockholm, 1971.
  34. J. MOULY, op. cit.
  35. This table only provides data on those individuals with assets of at least 40,000 Sw. Kr. in 1945.
  36. Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU), "Ägande och Inflytande inom det Privata Näringslivet (Ownership and Influence in the Private Economy), Stockholm, 1968.
  37. I. FLODSTRÖM, "Sveriges Nationalförmögenhet Omkring 1908 (The National Wealth of Sweden in 1908), Stockholm, 1912.
  38. E. WIGFORSS, 'Icke Allenast Av Bröd.....' (Not only of Bread.....), in A. WEDIN, (ed.), Arbetarrörelsens Årsbok 1971, (The Working-Class Movement's Yearbook, 1971), Stockholm, 1971.
  39. This must be regarded as an extremely tentative estimate. Much of the shift towards equalisation as disclosed by these statistics may be more apparent than real in that it could be a function of differences between the assumptions and the bases upon which the data were collected and interpreted at the turn of the century and in 1945. However, even if the change was not so dramatic as suggested by these figures, it seems reasonable to assume that there was at least some development towards greater equality in the distribution of wealth in Sweden during the period.

40. A. ATKINSON, Unequal Shares, Harmondsworth, 1974.
41. A possible explanation for the more equal distribution of wealth in Sweden could be the widespread ownership of second homes in the form of summer houses. However, these tend to be owned more by white-collar workers than by manual workers.
42. S. MILLER, 'Comparative Social Mobility', Current Sociology, Vol. 9, (1960).
43. D. GLASS, Social Mobility in Britain, London, 1967.
44. G. CARLSSON, Social Mobility and Class Structure, Lund, 1958.
45. This statement is made in the absence of recent data for Britain. However, research into national mobility trends which is currently being undertaken by J. Goldthorpe and his associates at Nuffield College, Oxford, may show that the rate of mobility has also increased in Britain.
46. R. ERIKSON, Uppväxtförhållanden och Social Rörlighet (Childhood Living Conditions and Social Mobility), Stockholm, 1971.
47. T. NOBLE, 'Social Mobility and Class Relations in Britain', Brit. J. Sociol., Vol. 23, (1972). It is important to stress, however, that Noble's studies hardly give a comprehensive picture.
48. D. GLASS, op. cit.
49. S. LIPSET and R. BENDIX, Social Mobility in Industrial Society, California, 1959.
50. On the other hand, mobility into the elite is usually a remote possibility for the majority of sons of manual workers (See S. MILLER, op. cit., Table 7, for patterns of elite mobility in different countries).



Thus, changes in short distance mobility may have more of a real significance for most people.

51. S. MILLER, op. cit., Table 7.
52. G. MALMESTROM and B. WIDENBORG, '245 Svenska Företagsledare' (245 Swedish Business Leaders), Studier och Debatt, (1958), Diagram 1.
53. D. CLARK, The Industrial Manager: His Background and Career Pattern, London, 1966.
54. R. CLEMENTS, Managers: A Study of their Careers in Industry, London, 1958.
55. G. COPEMAN, Leaders of British Industry, London, 1955.
56. T. NICHOLS, Ownership, Control and Ideology, London, 1969.
57. G. COPEMAN, op. cit., Table 14.2.
58. S. LANDSTROM, 'Svenska Ämbetsmäns Sociala Ursprung' (The Social Background of Higher Civil Servants in Sweden), Statsvetenskapliga Föreningen i Uppsala, Vol. 34, (1954).
59. K. SAMUELSSON, From Great Power to Welfare State, London, 1968, p. 285.
60. U. CHRISTOFFERSSON, B. MOLIN, L. MÅNSSON and L. STROMBERG, Byråkrati och Politik (Bureaucracy and Politics), Stockholm, 1972.
61. R. KELSALL, Higher Civil Servants in Britain, London, 1955, Table 26.
62. R. KELSALL, 'Recruitment to the Higher Civil Service: How has the Pattern Changed?', in P. STANWORTH and A. GIDDENS, (eds.), Elites and Power in British Society, London, 1974.
63. R. KELSALL, 1974, op. cit., p. 174.

64. R. CHAPMAN, The Higher Civil Service in Britain, London, 1970.
65. G. PETRÉN, Några Uppgifter om Proffessorskåren i Uppsala och Lund under 1800 Talet och Första Hälften av 1900 Talet (Some Information on Professors at Uppsala and Lund during the 19th and the First Half of the 20th Centuries), Lund, 1952.
66. S. CARLSSON, Bonde-Präst-Ämbetsman (Farmer, Priest and Official), Stockholm, 1962.
67. A. HALSEY and M. TROW, The British Academics, London, 1971.
68. W. GUTTSMAN, The British Political Elite, London, 1963.
69. R. KELSALL, 'Self-Recruitment in Four Professions', in D. GLASS, op. cit.
70. As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, this analysis has only focused upon limited aspects of class inequality - patterns of economic rewards and social mobility. A more comprehensive study would need to take into account the effects of social welfare provisions. Thus, if it could be shown that one country was more redistributive than the other in terms of these provisions, then it could 'afford' to be more unequal in personal earnings and wealth but still be a more egalitarian society simply because the State provides more resources for low income groups.
71. In terms, that is, of personal earnings, wealth and mobility chances.
72. H. GERTH and C. WRIGHT MILLS, op. cit., p. 187.
73. A. INKELES and P. ROSSI, 'National Comparisons of Occupational Prestige', Amer. J. Sociol., Vol. 61, (1955-56).



74. R. HODGE, D. TREIMAN and P. ROSSI, 'A Comparative Study of Occupational Prestige', in R. BENDIX and S. LIPSET, (eds.), Class, Status and Power, (2nd edition), London, 1968.
75. R. HODGE, et al., op. cit., Table 2.
76. J. HALL and D. CARADOG JONES, 'Social Grading of Occupations', Brit. J. Sociol., Vol. 1, (1950).
77. G. CARLSSON, op. cit.
78. It is important to note that the scoring techniques differ in the two studies so that the most prestigious occupations receive the highest 'scores' in the Swedish investigation but the lowest in the British.
79. But it is important to note - as stated below - that Hall and Caradog Jones felt that there was a considerable degree of ambiguity in the relative prestige of skilled manual and routine white-collar occupations in Britain.
80. E. DAHLSTRÖM, <sup>"</sup>Pinehill, Sociology Institute, University of Uppsala, 1951, Mimeo.
81. M. YOUNG and P. WILLMOTT, 'Social Grading of Occupations', Brit. J. Sociol., Vol. 4, (1956).
82. This section has assumed that studies of occupational prestige do, in fact, measure the prestige and general 'reputation' of occupations. But as J. Westergaard has suggested in a private communication, it could be that such studies only provide information about people's views on the general advantages and disadvantages of various jobs.
83. W.G. RUNCIMAN, op. cit.

84. For example, the studies of social stratification currently being conducted by J. GOLDTHORPE and his associates at Nuffield College, Oxford. See J. GOLDTHORPE and K. HOPE, 'Occupational Grading and Occupational Prestige' in K. HOPE, (ed.), The Analysis of Social Mobility, Oxford, 1972.
85. For recent statements of this kind, see A. MYRDAL, Towards Equality (The Alva Myrdal Report to the Swedish Social Democratic Party), Stockholm, 1971.
86. H. GERTH and C. WRIGHT MILLS, op. cit., p. 180.
87. I am grateful to J. WESTERGAARD for clarifying the distinction between 'power' in the sense of the ability of groups to influence the parameters and the allocative processes of society and 'representation' in that various groups 'represent' certain interests within the context of these parameters.
88. S.O.U., op. cit., p. 15.
89. S.O.U., op. cit., p. 16.
90. S.O.U., op. cit., p. 23.
91. S.O.U., op. cit., Chap. 1.
92. M. BARRATT BROWN, 'The Controllers of British Industry', in J. URRY and J. WAKEFORD, Power in Britain, London, 1973, Table 7.3.
93. M. BARRATT BROWN, op. cit., Table 7.3.
94. M. BARRATT BROWN, op. cit., Table 7.3.



95. This view was widely expressed in Sweden during the winter of 1969 when an unofficial strike was called by workers in the State-owned iron-ore mines of the north of Sweden. In the initial stages this was a conflict between a 'coalition' of union leaders, management and the Social Democratic government against rank-and-file workers.
96. The concern by the Swedish Labour movement to increase equality in these terms is reflected in the various articles published in TVÄRSNITT, <sup>"</sup>op. cit. The volume was published by LO to commemorate its 75th anniversary.
97. LO's policy of 'wage solidarity', together with the desire to reduce wage differentials within the economy, has been the basis for friction among labour unions. One of the factors contributing to the strike by workers in the iron-ore mines in the winter of 1969 was LO's proposal that lower percentage wage increases should be negotiated for miners than for lower-paid occupations.
98. LO's policies for the 'democratisation' of companies are summarised by B. SCHILLER, 'LO Paragraph 32 och Företagsdemokratin' (LO, Paragraph 32 and Company Democracy), in TVÄRSNITT (Cross-Section), <sup>"</sup>op. cit.; and in LO, Demokrati i Företagen (Democracy in the Company), Stockholm, 1971.
99. For a more detailed discussion of the two factories, see Chapter Four.
100. Of course, even in the English factory manual workers were able to impose constraints upon management, especially on the shop floor. But these were, on the whole, less institutionalised and less effective in protecting the interests of individual employees; particularly in relation to such matters as dismissal procedures.
101. For the relevant statistical data on union membership in Sweden, see Chapter Two.

102. For example, before the 1970 Swedish General Election, LO distributed literature and financed a large publicity campaign stating, 'De Sociala Orättvisorna i Jobbet Ska Bort! Med en Social Demokratisk Regering Kan vi Klara Det' (Social Injustices at Work Must be Removed. This can be done with a Social Democratic government).
103. Between 1945 and 1951 and then from 1964 until 1970.
104. For the statistics on these points, see Chapter Two.
105. B. ANDERSON, 'Some Problems of Change in the Swedish Electorate', Acta Sociologica, Vol. 6, (1962).
106. The degree of support for ABF activities among the Swedish population is discussed in Chapter Two.
107. See B. ANDERSON, op. cit.
108. B. ANDERSON, 'Opinion Influentials and Political Opinion Formation in Four Swedish Communities', Int. Soc. Sci. Journ., Vol. 14, (1962).
109. B. ANDERSON, 'Some Problems of Change', op. cit.
110. M. SEEMAN, 'On the Personal Consequences of Alienation in Work', Amer. Sociol. Rev., Vol. 32, (1967).
111. M. SEEMAN, op. cit., p. 284.
112. 'Nationalised' industries can therefore be discounted for the purposes of the present discussion. In any case, they can hardly be regarded as a source of working-class norms.
113. It is only in these communities that working-class institutions, particularly trade unions and the Labour Party, play any significant role in the life styles of manual workers. This is one of the



explanations that Young and Willmott advance for their findings on occupational prestige. See M. YOUNG and P. WILLMOTT, op. cit.

114. F. PARKIN, 'Working Class Conservatives: A Theory of Political Deviance', Brit. Jour. Sociol., Vol. 18, (1967).
115. The role of voluntary associations in Sweden is documented by N. ELVANDER, Intresseorganisationerna i Dagens Sverige (Interest Groups in Contemporary Sweden), Lund, 1966.
116. By July 1974, the Fund had bought shares in several large Swedish companies including Aga, Asea, Atlas Copco, LM Ericsson, SAAB-Scania, Volvo, Sandviken Steel and Perstop. Altogether it had acquired shares in twenty-three large companies for a total value of 53 million Sw.Kr. See Dagens Nyheter, 3rd July, 1974.
117. The strike in the State-owned mines during the winter of 1969 is frequently used as an example of this. See footnote 95 above.
118. H. GLENNERSTER, 'Democracy and Class', in B. LAPPING and G. RADICE, (eds.), More Power to the People, London, 1968.
119. L. SKOLD and A. HALVARSON, 'Riksdagens Sociala Sammansättning under Hundra År', (The Social Composition of Parliament during 100 Years), in Samhället och Riksdag, Del.I. (Society and Parliament, Part I), Stockholm, 1966.
120. L. RUDEBECK, 'Det Politiska Systemet i Sverige', (The Swedish Political System), in E. DAHLSTROM, Svensk Samhällsstruktur i Sociologisk Belysning (Sociological Perspectives on the Swedish Social Structure), Stockholm, 1969, Table 13.9.

121. A. ROTH, The Business Background of M.P.'s, London, 1972, p. 24.
122. L. SKOLD and A. HALVARSON, op. cit.
123. L. RUDEBECK, op. cit.
124. It is the intention of the Social Democratic Party and LO that the resources of the State Pension Fund should be used to inject financial resources into private industry so that these will provide a means whereby it will be possible to 'democratise' the authority relations of companies in the interests of their employees.
125. In the 1970 General Election, the Social Democratic Party adopted for its campaign the phrase ('Ökad Jämlikhet - för ett Rättvisare Samhälle' (Increased Equality - For a More Just Society). Since this election, issues of equality have continued to be at the centre of political debate in Sweden. They have also been widely discussed in all sectors of society, particularly in the press and on television.
126. For example, the British Conservative Party has never argued for the introduction of wealth and gift taxes.
127. A. ROTH, op. cit., p. 24.
128. R. SPIEGELBERG, 'Parliamentary Business', The Times, 3rd July, 1970.
129. H. TINGSTEN, The Swedish Social Democrats, New Jersey, 1973.
130. However, the long-term objectives of the State Pension Fund could transform the nature of Swedish capitalism.
131. This is stated with the qualification mentioned earlier: namely that this analysis has made no attempt to assess the redistributive effects of the British and the Swedish welfare systems. See note 70 above.



132. United Nations, op. cit.
133. United Nations, op. cit., Chap. 6, p. 41.
134. S. LIPSET and R. BENDIX, op. cit.
135. A. MYRDAL, op. cit.
136. For a concise discussion of reforms in the Swedish educational system, see R. TOMASSON, Sweden: Prototype of Modern Society, New York, 1970, Chaps. 4 and 5.
137. K. HÄRNQVIST, Reserverna För Högare Utbildning, (Reserves of Talent for Higher Education), Stockholm, 1958.
138. J. ISRAEL, 'Uppförstran och Utbildning' (Socialisation and Education), in E. DAHLSTRÖM (ed.), op. cit.
139. S-E. REUTERBERG, Val av Teoretisk Utbildning i Relation till Sociala och Regionala Bakgrundsfaktorer (Choice of 'Academic' Education in Relation to Social and Regional Background), Mimeo, Gothenburg, 1968.
140. Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU), Val Av Utbildning och Yrke (Choice of Education and Work), Stockholm, 1971.
141. Committee on Higher Education (The ROBBINS REPORT), Higher Education, London, 1963, Appendix 2. However it appears that in 1969, 30 per cent of British university undergraduates came from manual working-class homes. See H. GLENNERSTER, 'Education and Inequality', in P. TOWNSEND and N. BOSANQUET, Labour and Inequality, London, 1972, p. 90.
142. L. JOHANSSON, Utbildning-Empirisk Del (Education - Some Empirical Data), Stockholm, 1971.

143. G. CARLSSON, op. cit.
  144. G. CARLSSON, op. cit., p. 122-123.
  145. G. CARLSSON, op. cit., p. 126.
  146. Of course, meritocratic selection is quite compatible with capitalism and should not be regarded exclusively as a 'socialist' doctrine. However, in capitalist societies meritocratic criteria are often applied to individuals who are the 'products' of educational and parental privileges. One of the policies of the Swedish Social Democratic Party has been the attempt to remove the influence of such privileges. See A. MYRDAL, op. cit.
  147. MICHELS has argued that as socialist movements develop and become successful, their political objectives become deradicalised. See R. MICHELS, Political Parties, New York, 1962.
  148. See H. TINGSTEN, op. cit.; A. MYRDAL, op. cit.; TVÄRSNITT (Cross-Section), op. cit.
  149. H. TINGSTEN, op. cit.
  150. H. TINGSTEN, op. cit.
  151. A. MYRDAL, op. cit.
  152. G. ADLER-KARLSSON, Functional Socialism, Stockholm, 1967.
  153. G. ADLER-KARLSSON, op. cit., p. 101-102.
  154. F. PARKIN, Class Inequality and Political Order, London, 1971, p. 81.
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## CHAPTER FOUR

THE SOCIAL SURVEY: A STUDY OF ATTITUDES AMONG  
TWO SAMPLES OF WORKERS

In order to investigate conceptions of inequality in each of the two countries it would be desirable to conduct a social survey of attitudes among representative samples of the two populations. However, such an exercise would be costly, both in time and finance. Consequently, consideration was given to the possibility of conducting a much more modest investigation which, although not producing results that would be generalisable to the total populations, would, nevertheless, be indicative of more general patterns within each of the two countries. Hence two alternatives were considered as feasible; either to undertake a comparative study of random samples chosen from two communities - one in Sweden and the other in Britain - or to compare samples taken from similar occupational groups. The first alternative was rejected on the grounds that the problems of matching 'like' with 'like' would be too great. It was found to be almost impossible to identify English and Swedish communities which could be 'matched' according to criteria such as size, industrial structure, political institutions, ecological arrangement and so on. In view of this, it was decided to compare and contrast matched samples of manual workers in the two countries.

The major reason for deciding to compare matched samples was that it would enable a comparison to be made of individuals occupying relatively similar positions within the social structures of the respective societies. As Chapter Two has demonstrated, Britain and Sweden - despite differences -

have relatively similar occupational structures. Furthermore, Chapter Three has shown that the positions of manual workers within the class structures of the two countries are remarkably alike. Therefore, it was felt that by comparing matched samples of these workers it would be possible to ascertain the degree to which they held common conceptions of their respective class structures. More specifically, it would enable some kind of assessment to be made of whether similarities in terms of the structural location of these workers were conducive to similar attitudes and conceptions, or whether the normative influences of the Swedish labour movement had affected interpretations of the class structure so that there would be differences in the attitudes of Swedish and English workers. To investigate this issue the two samples of workers were chosen so that they both possessed a number of common characteristics, both in relation to their occupational roles and their personal attributes.

In order to match the samples in terms of their occupational roles, they were chosen from two factories; one from each country. It is not possible to reveal the identities of these factories or to mention any of the characteristics which may lead to their identification, because management in both workplaces only co-operated with the study on the condition that this stipulation was respected. However, it is possible to describe the two factories - if only in fairly rudimentary terms - in order to demonstrate that they possessed a number of common characteristics.

In the first place, they both manufactured similar products; in each case the work process consisted of producing a wide range of engineering goods and components. These varied from the construction of heavy equipment to the production of small, complex pieces of machinery. In addition, both factories had departments that were primarily concerned with the maintenance and repair of equipment, owned by each of the two parent organisations<sup>1</sup>.

Secondly, by virtue of producing the same goods, the two factories had



relatively similar modes of technology. In both places, the productive process enabled employees to communicate with each other while they were at work, and for a large number of the work tasks to be undertaken by work teams. The division-of-labour, although complex in both factories, was less developed than that normally associated with assembly-line technology. As a result, although work tasks were broken down into a number of specialist activities, they were less routinised and standardised than those found on the assembly lines of, for example, the automobile industry<sup>2</sup>. Both factories consisted of a number of different workshops so that, depending upon the functions undertaken, there were variations in the size of work groups, the routinisation of work tasks, and the degree to which operatives could regulate their own output. Perhaps the outstanding difference between the two factories was the Swedish workplace was much more highly capitalised than the English; therefore, a large number of tasks which were undertaken by machinery in the Swedish factory were often performed by manual labour in the English workshops<sup>3</sup>. There are several reasons for this but they include the more recent origins of the Swedish factory, its higher level of capital investment over the years, and the greater pressure exercised by trade unions to compel management to improve the quality of the working environment<sup>4</sup>. Whereas most of the workshops in the English factory were constructed during the nineteenth century, the Swedish factory was mainly built during the course of the present century. Consequently, it was a more modern construction than the English workplace, incorporating improved standards of design and functional utilisation. But despite these differences, the similar types of technology in the two factories imposed common constraints upon work tasks; thus, the activities of manual workers in both places were characterised more by their similarities than by their differences.

Thirdly, both factories were owned by organisations which were in 'static' or even contracting markets; neither had experienced growth over

recent years and there was little expectation among managers and workers that this was likely to occur within the foreseeable future. However, at the time of the investigation, neither factory had been confronted with the threat of redundancies, and there was a general assumption by both groups of workers that their employment was secure.

Fourthly, both factories were located in communities of a similar size. The Swedish workplace was in a community of 25,000 inhabitants, while the English workplace was on the outskirts of a town with a population of 28,000 people. Since most of the employees in both factories lived locally, it is possible to suggest that the community situations of the two groups of workers were, demographically speaking, fairly similar.

Although the two factories were similar in terms of product, technology, market situation and community setting, they differed in at least two important respects. Firstly, work and employment conditions, by any absolute standard of comparison, were much better in the Swedish factory. This was evident in the quality of heating, lighting and ventilation, in the provision of social and recreational amenities and in the regulations controlling industrial safety and the use of machinery<sup>5</sup>. This, to some extent, was a reflection of the more recent origins of the Swedish factory but it was also probably a consequence of the activities of the union movement. Swedish trade unions have not only bargained with companies for improvements in the working conditions of their members but also - and particularly over recent years - for an erosion in the differentials in the conditions of employment for white-collar and manual workers<sup>6</sup>. Therefore, an important difference between the two factories was that for certain aspects of the employer-employee relationship, the treatment of manual and white-collar workers were characterised by greater similarities in the Swedish factory than in the English<sup>7</sup>. In the former, for example, both categories of workers were paid on a monthly basis although manual workers could, if they wish, receive their



wages at the end of every two weeks<sup>8</sup>. By contrast, manual workers in the English factory were paid weekly and white-collar workers monthly. In the case of dismissal procedures - as mentioned in Chapter Three - there were greater provisions for trade unions to represent the interests of their members in the Swedish than in the English factory. At the same time, in the event of a dismissal, Swedish manual workers were given three weeks' notice compared with the one month for white-collar employees. In the English factory, by comparison, manual workers were given only one week's notice compared with the one month given to office employees.

A further example of reduced differentials in the treatment of manual and white-collar workers in the Swedish factory is that manual workers were allowed to take a maximum of fifteen days off work each year for personal reasons and for these days they were paid 70 per cent of their average earnings. White-collar workers were also entitled to the same benefit, but no deduction was made from their salary. In the English factory, on the other hand, manual workers were given no days off work with pay for personal reasons, except to attend the funeral of a relative and yet white-collar workers were granted days off for personal reasons, without the loss of salary.

Although the physical working conditions of the Swedish manual workers were better than those of their English counterparts in terms of any absolute comparison so, too, were they in a relative sense; that is, by comparison with those of white-collar workers. In each of the factors mentioned above - quality of lighting, ventilation, sanitation and heating - differences in the provisions for manual and white-collar workers were less in the Swedish factory than in the English workplace<sup>9</sup>. This cannot be explained solely in terms of the more recent origin of the Swedish factory; some consideration must also be given to the aims of the Swedish trade unions and the legislation of successive Social Democratic governments<sup>10</sup>.

The second major difference between the two factories was that the Swedish workplace was much smaller than the English; in Spring 1970 there were 298 manual workers employed in the former compared with 972 in the latter. This difference may have had important consequences for a wide range of industrial behaviour, especially for manager-worker relationships, and the frequency of industrial disputes<sup>11</sup>. But this does not appear to have been the case; strikes were almost unknown in both factories and by comparison with other industries in the two countries, there had been little industrial unrest<sup>12</sup>. Whether a difference in the size of the two factories affected the samples' conceptions of inequality is problematic since this was not investigated during the course of the present enquiry. But it has been suggested that small workplaces are conducive to frequent face-to-face contacts between managers and workers so that the latter tend to adopt deferential attitudes<sup>13</sup>. If this is the case, then it could be expected that the Swedish workers would tend to be more deferential and rather less radical than their English counterparts. However, in the absence of investigating the relationship between size and workers' attitudes in each of the factories, it is reasonable to assume that the smaller size of the Swedish factory did not have this consequence. This is because although it was smaller than the English workplace, it was still too large to encourage close face-to-face contact between managers and workers. Indeed, discussions of the relationship between deference and organisational size have usually referred to workplaces of a much smaller size than the Swedish factory<sup>14</sup>. In fact, even if the appropriate conditions had existed within the Swedish factory, it is unlikely that deferential attitudes would emerge if only because - as suggested in Chapters Two and Three - of the strong normative influence exercised by the Social Democratic Party and the labour unions. Of course, ideally it would have been desirable to have chosen samples of workers who were employed in factories that had a large number of common characteristics and which were



also of a similar size. But it was impossible to find two factories of this kind.

As far as wage differentials are concerned, it is difficult to make accurate calculations because earnings in both factories, particularly those of non-manual workers, varied according to age and length of service. Moreover, management, especially in the English factory, were reluctant to disclose detailed information about the structure of wages and salaries. However, they were prepared to give 'approximate' earnings. This information suggested that for the English factory in 1970 the highest-paid manual workers (skilled) could earn approximately £30 a week, or £1,560 a year, 'senior clerical officers' up to £2,000 a year and 'senior management' up to £4,500. In the Swedish factory during the same year, the highest-paid manual workers (skilled) could earn about 3,000 kr. a month, white-collar employees about 4,000 kr. and senior managers up to 6,750 kr. Thus, it appears that in the remuneration of the more highly-paid manual workers and senior management, there was less inequality in the Swedish workplace than within the English; the earnings of the Swedish senior managers were approximately two-and-a-quarter times more than those of highly-paid manual workers, while those of their English counterparts could be as much as three times greater. However, differences in the earnings of these 'affluent' manual workers and white-collar employees were about the same in both workplaces; 'higher' white-collar workers could be earning something like one-third more by the time they were 40 years old. At the younger age levels, particularly among employees in their late teens and early twenties, there was often an overlap between the earnings of these two groups. But it must be emphasised that the above differentials refer to those that exist between the highest-paid manual workers and other occupational groups. It would, of course, have been desirable to have obtained systematic evidence on the structure of earnings for all occupational and age categories, but the reluctance of

management, particularly in the English factory, prevented this. Data of this kind - had it been available - would have disclosed the earnings of such low-paid groups as teenage clerks and the youngest manual workers and they would have almost certainly indicated that wage differentials within each of the two factories were much greater than those described above. However, in the absence of this information it was considered appropriate to describe differentials in terms of the highest earnings that members of each occupational category could hope to acquire; an analysis which does suggest that the position of manual workers within the reward structures of the two factories were approximately the same. Therefore, it seems safe to assume that the two samples were selected from work environments which, despite some differences, were characterised by several similar features.

The two samples were chosen from manual workers who were between the ages of 25 and 54. This was in order to hold constant - as far as possible - stages in the family cycle and in work career. Therefore, younger workers were excluded on the grounds that their occupational preferences may not yet be finally decided and that their attachment to their present employment would not be firmly established. At the same time, it was considered that a high proportion of workers younger than 25 years old would either be single or only recently married. These workers, then, were excluded because it was felt that factors of this kind would have important implications for their conceptions of inequality<sup>15</sup>. Consequently, the samples were drawn from workers whose positions within the reward structures of their respective societies were reasonably well established; they would be unlikely to change their jobs with any degree of frequency and their attitudes could thus be regarded as indicative of opinions held among middle-aged, industrial manual workers. It was also for these reasons that workers over the age of 54 were excluded; these would be approaching retirement and their family responsibilities would probably be less than among younger workers. More likely than



not their children would be married and have left home. Therefore, by excluding younger and older workers, an attempt was made to choose two samples of workers whose occupations were well-established and who were at similar stages in the family cycle.

In order to select the samples, management in the two factories made available information which listed the names, addresses and ages of all their manual employees. Whereas the Swedish management felt obliged to consult trade union officials before deciding whether or not they could allow the research to be undertaken, their English counterpart considered themselves to be under no such obligation<sup>16</sup>. Furthermore, once this approval was granted, the Swedish management was positively interested in the project and not suspicious of its objectives in the same way as management in the English factory. Indeed, the sole involvement of the latter in the research project was to provide the names, addresses and ages of their employees and the approximate earnings of different occupational groups. Other than providing this information, it was reluctant to be involved in the study<sup>17</sup>. Consequently, one of the major limitations of the research is that there is insufficient information about the structure of earnings and wage differentials among employees in the two factories from which the samples were chosen.

Among the 298 Swedish manual workers, there were 141 between the ages of 25 and 54. Every attempt was made to obtain the co-operation of each of these workers and by the end of the study, 122 had participated. Of the 19 non-respondents, 13 refused to take part and 6 persistently postponed an arranged appointment with the research worker. Consequently, there was an overall response rate of 86.5 per cent among this group of workers.

In the English factory there were 528 manual workers between the ages of 25 and 54. Because of financial constraints, it was impossible to consider more than a one-in-three sample of these employees. Therefore, 176 workers

were asked to take part in the enquiry but with 39 refusals and 9 others that continually deferred appointments, 128 workers finally co-operated in the study, providing a response rate of 72.7 per cent. No attempt was made to ascertain the characteristics of these non-respondents except that among the 39 English 'refusals', 61.5 per cent (24) were within the oldest age group; that is between the ages of 45 and 54 years. But it is of interest to note that the response rates for the two samples were remarkably similar to the levels of turnout recorded in the general elections which were held in each of the two countries in 1970<sup>18</sup>. The characteristics of the two samples in terms of age distribution and marital status are shown in Tables IV.1 and IV.2:

TABLE IV.1: THE AGE DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE TWO SAMPLES

AGE	SWEDISH WORKERS		ENGLISH WORKERS	
	Nos.	%	Nos.	%
25 - 34	17	13.9	22	17.2
35 - 44	31	25.4	32	25.0
45 - 54	74	60.7	74	57.8
TOTAL	122	100.0	128	100.0

Table IV.1 shows that the age distributions of the two samples were very similar; the only difference between them is that there was a slightly higher proportion of younger workers among the English respondents than among the Swedish.



TABLE IV.2: MARITAL STATUS AMONG THE TWO SAMPLES

MARITAL STATUS	SWEDISH WORKERS		ENGLISH WORKERS	
	Nos.	%	Nos.	%
Married	104	85.3	111	86.7
Single	16	13.1	11	8.6
Widowed	1	0.8	5	3.9
Divorced	1	0.8	1	0.8
TOTAL	122	100.0	128	100.0

The proportion of married respondents within each of the two samples was much the same - over 85 per cent in each case - and the only major difference between the two groups was the higher representation of single men within the Swedish sample. On the other hand, only one of the Swedish respondents was widowed compared with five of the English workers.

The two samples of workers, then, possessed a number of common characteristics; their occupational roles and their work environments displayed a large number of similarities and they represented a comparable range of ages and of marital status. Consequently, the two samples can be regarded as occupying relatively similar positions within the social structures of their respective societies. Obviously they are not identical; it would be very difficult to obtain two groups of workers which were exactly comparable in terms of all characteristics. Indeed, it would be strange if there were not important differences both within and between the two groups of workers in certain aspects of life style, work experience, geographical and social mobility, family background and place of residence. All these factors could, conceivably, affect respondents' conceptions of social and economic inequality. But if an attempt was made to obtain samples

of workers in two countries which could be matched in terms of a large number of factors such as these, then the chances of obtaining a sufficient number of cases for the purposes of comparative analysis would be extremely limited. Consequently, the two samples chosen for the purposes of the present study are only comparable at an unsophisticated level. But despite this, they do possess a sufficient number of common characteristics in order to be regarded as constituting similar 'types' of industrial workers in each of the two countries. However, can the two samples be regarded as representative of the general populations of Britain and Sweden?

Obviously they cannot. Because they were chosen from specific industrial and work environments, their representativeness of more general populations is extremely limited. Certainly their attitudes cannot be interpreted as typical of opinions held within the two countries. The samples were chosen from industries which, like all industrial environments, possessed characteristics peculiar to themselves. For example, every industry has its own tradition of historical development, technological change, industrial conflict, labour-management relations, and so on. The industries from which the present samples were chosen were very alike in these respects. In both cases, labour relations were considered to be good and there had been very little industrial conflict<sup>19</sup>. Both industries had reputations for offering secure employment and very rarely had there been redundancies. Furthermore, neither industry was regarded as the spearhead of technological innovation; indeed, within their respective countries, they had reputations as being somewhat 'conservative' and 'traditional'. These features, together with the fact that the two samples were chosen from industries which, like all industries, had their own specific technological and occupational structures, means that the respondents cannot be regarded as typical of all industrial workers in each of the two countries. Thus, it is important to emphasise the dangers of generalising the conclusions derived from this study to the



Swedish and British populations. Indeed, in the presentation of the survey's results in the following chapters, it is important to bear in mind that the respondents were chosen from groups of workers in only two factories and that they are in no way statistically representative of the respective national populations.

Despite these factors, however, it is possible to make some generalised statements about attitudes within the two countries, even if they must always be treated with extreme caution. Although the two samples were chosen from specific occupations and industries, they were also selected from wider social structures, each consisting of norms, values, ideologies and institutions. Consequently, although industrial and occupational roles do shape workers' attitudes and experiences, these are also determined by 'wider' normative and institutional influences<sup>20</sup>. Therefore, the opinions of the two samples may reflect certain occupational ideologies but, at the same time, they ~~reflect~~ more widely-held beliefs within the two societies. If, then, the opinions of the two samples cannot be regarded as representative of those held by more general populations they can, at least, be considered as indicative of them. In this sense the social survey can only be considered as an exploratory study, suggesting the existence of particular opinions and attitudes within the two countries, rather than a confirmation of them. Indeed, only more large-scale social surveys will be able to substantiate whether or not the attitudes held by the two samples are shared by other social groups within the two countries.

The data was collected by conducting detailed interviews with each of the respondents during the Spring of 1970. A number of alternatives were considered before the final procedure was adopted. In the first instance it was considered appropriate to conduct in-depth, relatively unstructured conversations with respondents on the grounds that the subject matter of the enquiry prevented the fruitful use of structured questionnaires. A

number of investigators, for example, have argued that structured interview schedules are inappropriate for the purposes of obtaining information about respondents' conceptions of inequality and their images of society, since they often include terms which are subject to wide and varied interpretation. Consequently, it has been suggested that the resultant responses are of little sociological relevance<sup>21</sup>. Therefore, an attempt was first made to avoid the use of poll-type questions in the present enquiry. Six pilot conversations were conducted with manual workers in each of the two countries, each lasting for approximately three hours. These were recorded on tapes and then transcribed. However, it soon became clear that there were enormous difficulties in analysing the interviews, even with only 12 respondents and despite the fact that the conversations were structured around a number of common themes<sup>22</sup>. It was evident that the collection of data in this way could provide useful insights into attitudes among groups of workers selected for comparative study, but that little more could be achieved. As a result, it was decided that a more quantitative approach should be adopted, using a fairly structured questionnaire schedule. It was felt that it would be easier to analyse the data and also to make numerical statements about attitudes among the two groups. But the use of such a procedure would, of course, pose many of the problems related to the use of poll-type questions<sup>23</sup>. However, it was considered that many of these could be avoided if great care was taken during the course of the interviews to explain to respondents the meanings of words and of particular questions and also if respondents were asked to explain what they meant when they used terms such as 'promotion', 'inequality' and 'social class', in their replies. This procedure, which was adopted in the interview survey, probably did not solve completely the difficulties relating to respondents' interpretations of questions, or to the investigator's interpretation of respondents' answers, but it would be a mistake to assume that the responses disclosed nothing about the two



groups' conceptions of society<sup>24</sup>. This was possibly aided by the fact that all the respondents had the same occupation, but it was complicated because the research was cross-national. Since the workers had the same occupation, it could be assumed - although with qualification - that they would interpret questions in a relatively similar way; certainly more so than respondents participating in a study of a community or of a national population. But on the other hand, because two languages were involved, there were difficulties in ensuring that the questions on the interview schedule would stimulate similar meanings among the two samples. In an attempt to ensure this, the following procedure was adopted.

On the basis of an analysis of the 12 conversations, a draft questionnaire was produced, written in English. This was then tested with 12 English workers who were employed in the same workplace as the sample. As a result of these interviews, the schedule was reformulated and then used for the social survey. At the same time, this schedule was translated into Swedish and discussed with Swedish sociologists who compared it with the original English schedule<sup>25</sup>. They suggested a number of alterations so that, in their view, it would stimulate similar meanings among Swedish workers as the original version of the schedule was supposed to do for the English employees. The schedule was then tested with six Swedish workers and as a result, it was reformulated and tested with a further six Swedish workers. On the basis of this, a final questionnaire was produced. Consequently, every effort was made so that the schedule was as similar as possible for both samples of workers; not in a 'literal' but in a 'sociological' sense. The English and the Swedish schedules, together with the coding frame which was used for the purposes of analysing the responses, are reproduced in the Appendices<sup>26</sup>.

All of the Swedish and most of the English interviews were conducted by a research worker who was fluent in both languages<sup>27</sup>. She was Swedish by birth and had spent most of her life in Sweden except for the previous two years, when she had lived in England. During the course of the enquiry she

gave no indication to respondents of either sample that they were participating in a cross-national study. It was felt that had they been aware of this it could have affected their responses about aspects of inequality within the respective countries; notions of patriotism may have concealed other consistently-held beliefs and opinions.

The next three chapters present the results of the interview survey. Chapter Five discusses the two samples' conceptions of their respective class structures, together with their beliefs about the opportunities available for individuals to be socially mobile within it. This is followed in Chapter Six by a discussion of the samples' attitudes about the distribution of economic rewards. Finally, in Chapter Seven, there is an analysis of their beliefs about the distribution of power in society. In other words, whereas Chapter Three described patterns of social, economic and political inequalities in Britain and Sweden, the next three chapters investigate workers' conceptions of these in order to ascertain the degree to which they have been shaped by various normative and ideological influences within each of the two countries. Because of the methods by which the two samples have been selected, the respondents' attitudes cannot be regarded as representative of more widely-shared beliefs in the two countries but they are, more likely than not, indicative of them.<sup>28</sup>.



## NOTES

1. Both factories were owned by large national corporations.
2. For a discussion of the relationship between work tasks and assembly-line technology, see J. GOLDTHORPE, D. LOCKWOOD, F. BECHHOFFER and J. PLATT, The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour, Cambridge, 1968; and H. BENYON, Working for Ford, Harmondsworth, 1973.
3. This was particularly evident in the movement of materials, components, and equipment between workshops and from one area of the shop floor to another.
4. Swedish trade unions - more than their English counterparts - have, since the 1930's, negotiated with governments and employers about the need to improve the quality of the working environment for their members. This has been linked to LO's concern about the physical and psychological health of its rank-and-file members and the frequency of industrial accidents among them. For a statement of LO's policy, together with data on working conditions as experienced by a sample of its members, see E. BOLINDER, E. MAGNUSSON and L. NYREN, Risker i Jobbet (Risks at Work), Stockholm, 1970.
5. These comments are based on personal observations of conditions in each of the two workplaces.
6. As mentioned in Chapter Three, in the 1970 General Election, for example, LO financed a large publicity campaign, stating 'De Sociala Orättvisorna i Jobbet ska Bort! Med en Social Demokratisk Regering kan vi Klara Det!'

(Social Injustices at Work must be Removed. This can be done with a Social Democratic Government). One of the major injustices which LO has emphasised over the years is the difference in the employment conditions of manual and non-manual workers in many Swedish factories; particularly in terms of hours of work, sickness and pension schemes and various fringe benefits.

7. For a comparison of differences in conditions of employment for separate occupational categories in Britain, see D. WEDDERBURN and C. CRAIG, 'Relative Deprivation in Work', in D. WEDDERBURN, (ed.), Poverty, Inequality and Class Structure, London, 1974; for differences in Sweden, see H. HART and C. V-OTTER, Lokal Lönbildning (Workshop Wage Determination), Mimeo, Department of Sociology, University of Gothenburg, 1972.
8. This and the following information about conditions of employment was obtained by interviews with management and trade union officials in each of the two factories.
9. This statement is based on personal observation of conditions in each of the two factories.
10. See note 4 above.
11. For a study and discussion of the relationship between organisational size and workers' attitudes, see G. INGHAM, Size of Industrial Organisation and Worker Behaviour, Cambridge, 1970.
12. According to information provided by management and union officials in the two workplaces.
13. See, for example, D. LOCKWOOD, 'Sources of Variation in Working-Class Images of Society', Sociological Rev., Vol. 14, (1966).



14. D. LOCKWOOD, op. cit.
15. For a discussion of the relationship between age, stage in the family cycle and work satisfaction, see H. WILENSKY, 'Work as a Social Problem', in H. BECKER, (ed.), Social Problems: A Modern Approach, London, 1966.
16. This, perhaps, is a clear indication of the greater degree to which management in the Swedish workplace felt constrained by union influence.
17. One of the major reasons for this suspicion was that, despite arguments to the contrary by the investigator, senior management in the English factory identified sociology with 'left-wing' political protest. It should be mentioned that the research was conducted in a year (1970) when there was considerable and well-publicised student protest in English universities.
18. In the 1970 Swedish General Election, 89.7 per cent of all those eligible to participate, cast their votes. See Central Bureau of Statistics, Allmänna Valen, 1970 (The General Election, 1970), Stockholm, 1973, Table 3.1. In the elections in Britain in that year, the turnout was 72.0 per cent - the lowest figure since 1935. See R. ROSE, 'Voting Trends Surveyed', in THE TIMES, Guide to the House of Commons 1970, London, 1970.
19. This and the following comments are based on interviews with management and union officials in each of the two factories.
20. For a discussion of the ways in which workers' attitudes are shaped not only by their occupational roles but also by wider non-work experiences, see J. GOLDTHORPE, D. LOCKWOOD, F. BECHHOFFER and J. PLATT, The Affluent Worker: Political Attitudes and Behaviour, Cambridge, 1968.

21. Such an opinion has been strongly expressed by J. GOLDTHORPE and D. LOCKWOOD, 'Affluence and the British Class Structure', Sociological Rev., Vol. 11, (1963); and J. GOLDTHORPE, D. LOCKWOOD, F. BECHHOFFER and J. PLATT, The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure, Cambridge, 1969, Chap. 5. However, for a discussion of the sociological relevance of structured interview schedules for the study of attitudes towards inequality, see W. RUNCIMAN, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, London, 1966, p. 152-154.
22. Particularly in terms of coding the responses.
23. For example, the different ways in which respondents may interpret the questions.
24. Runciman also makes this point. See W. RUNCIMAN, op. cit.
25. I am particularly grateful to STEN JOHANSSON, OLAVI JUNUS, ANN LUNDEN and ANITA EHN-SCASE for their kind assistance.
26. See Appendix I.
27. I thank ANITA EHN-SCASE for her help.
28. In this study no statistical tests of significance are used. This may seem strange in view of the large number of quantitative comparisons which are made. The reasons for this are that, firstly, the present enquiry is exploratory rather than confirmatory in its objectives. Most tests of significance are designed to be used on data in order to confirm or refute hypotheses that have been derived from the findings of earlier investigations. Secondly, the populations to which the theoretical discussion refers are not the same populations from which the two groups of workers are chosen. Thus, to replicate this study



with other samples would seem to offer a more fruitful guarantee of the general validity of the findings of this analysis for an understanding of attitudes in Britain and Sweden in general than tests of significance. For a detailed comment about the advantages and limitations of statistical tests of significance in exploratory social surveys, see S. LIPSET, M. TROW and J. COLEMAN, Union Democracy, Illinois, 1956, Appendix 1. See also R. HENKEL and D. MORRISON, (eds.), The Significance Test Controversy, London, 1970.

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## CHAPTER FIVE

CONCEPTIONS OF THE CLASS STRUCTURE AMONG THE TWO SAMPLES:1) PATTERNS OF SOCIAL MOBILITY

Did the two samples of workers, occupying relatively similar positions within the social structures of Britain and Sweden, have similar conceptions of the respective class structures or were there important differences between them which could be regarded to be the consequence of the differential impact of working-class norms and institutions? In the study of images of class structures many investigators have emphasised the need to analyse actors' immediate social relationships. Lockwood, for example, has stated that, 'for the most part men visualise the class structure of their society from the vantage points of their own particular milieux and their perceptions of the larger society will vary according to their experiences of social inequality in the smaller societies in which they live out their daily lives'<sup>1</sup>. He goes on to suggest that 'the industrial and community milieux of manual workers exhibit a very considerable diversity and it would be strange if there were no correspondingly marked variations in the images of society held by different sections of the working class'<sup>2</sup>. Similarly Inkeles, in a comparative study of attitudes in different industrial societies, has argued that '.... people have experiences, develop attitudes and form values in response to the forces or pressures which their environment creates. By "environment" we mean, particularly, networks of inter-personal relations and the patterns of reward and punishment one normally experiences in them'<sup>3</sup>. He suggests that '.... within broad limits, the same situational pressures,



the same framework for living, will be experienced as similar and will generate the same or similar response by people from different countries<sup>4</sup>.

However, the processes whereby these social relationships are conducive to particular types of subjective responses are unclear. For example, it has often been suggested that roles which bring employees into close personal contact with their employers will lead workers to adopt deferential attitudes<sup>5</sup>. But it could also be argued that these relationships are conducive not to deference but to workers making comparisons with their employers so that they feel relatively deprived, resentful and adopt radical attitudes. If this is a possibility, why has deference been seen to be the more likely outcome than radicalism? Of course, there is empirical evidence, although of a limited kind, to indicate that these patterns of relationships do lead to deferential attitudes<sup>6</sup>, while there is little to indicate that they are conducive to radicalism<sup>7</sup>. But is this a function of specific social relationships as such, or is it more a consequence of the procedures whereby these relationships have become defined and attributed with social meanings?

The point can be further clarified by reference to Lockwood's typification of the 'proletarian traditionalist'. He states that '.... the dominant model of society held by the proletarian traditionalist is most likely to be a dichotomous or two-valued power model. Thinking in terms of two classes standing in a relationship of opposition is a natural consequence of being a member of a closely integrated industrial community with well-defined boundaries and a distinctive style of life'. (my italics)<sup>8</sup>. But why should such an image of society be regarded as an inevitable outcome of social environments of this kind? In fact, Moore, in a study of mining communities in county Durham, found that there was little evidence of a heightened awareness of class consciousness among miners<sup>9</sup>. He states, 'It is clear that the miners have developed a strong sense of occupational community (unlike the traditional deferential workers), but this does not mean that

class consciousness emerged from this<sup>10</sup>. He goes on to add '.... Lockwood does not consider the possibility that men have to be converted to a traditional proletarian outlook in certain situations'<sup>11</sup>. Consequently, he argues that in order to see whether miners will adhere to 'traditional-proletarian' images of society it is necessary to consider the role of ideas and ideologies in shaping actors' definitions of social reality; in the case of the Durham miners, the relative influences of Methodism, Trade Unionism and the Labour Party. Indeed, Moore's argument lends weight to Parkin's claim, already quoted in Chapter Three, that structural inequalities do not in themselves provide meanings, and the way a person interprets them will be influenced by the nature of the meaning systems he draws upon<sup>12</sup>. These meaning-systems, according to Parkin, are a function of the influence exercised by different groups in society.

Arguments such as these do not, of course, refute the significance of social relationships in shaping individuals' images of society. But they do suggest a consideration of only these factors is insufficient, and that it is necessary to investigate the processes whereby these relationships become defined by the actors involved. Such arguments would also suggest that this is particularly necessary in the comparative study of attitudes in different industrial societies if only because there has been a tendency for writers to imply that the institutions of advanced industrial-capitalism generate similar patterns of attitudes among workers in different countries which tend to override differences generated by national, cultural and political factors<sup>13</sup>. Therefore, if the two samples of workers had similar interpretations of their respective class structures, it would indicate that institutional social environments do have major consequences for shaping individuals' conceptions of social reality. If, on the other hand, this is not the case it would suggest the significance of factors of the kind emphasised by Parkin and others<sup>14</sup>. More specifically, for the Swedish



workers, it would indicate the impact of Social Democratic ideology.

In order to investigate this, both samples were asked, 'Some people say that there are no longer social classes in this country. Others say that there are. What do you think?' An overwhelming majority of both groups stated that there were: 97 per cent (N - 118) of the Swedish and 93 per cent (N - 119) of the English workers<sup>15</sup>. These respondents were then asked the open-ended question 'why do you think this is the case?' The coded responses are shown in Table V.1:

TABLE V.1: 'WHY DO YOU THINK THIS IS THE CASE?'  
('That there are social classes')

BECAUSE OF:	SWEDISH WORKERS (N-118)		ENGLISH WORKERS (N-119)	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
'Birth' and family background	2	1.7	13	10.9
'Money', 'Wealth' and various economic factors	65	55.1	44	37.1
Status and 'Snobbery'	7	5.9	15	12.6
Educational Qualifications and experiences	24	20.3	3	2.5
'An inevitable feature of Life'	1	0.9	30	25.2
Occupation	2	1.7	3	2.5
Don't Know	3	2.5	3	2.5
Other and non-classifiable responses	14	11.9	8	6.7
TOTALS	118	100.0	119	100.0

Any similarity between the two samples in terms of their recognition of social classes evaporated when they were asked to describe their reasons for the existence of these classes. As Table V.1 shows, one-half of the Swedish respondents referred to economic and 20 per cent to educational

factors. At the same time, only 2 per cent considered 'birth' and family background to be important<sup>16</sup>. By contrast, although one-third of the English workers mentioned economic factors, only 3 per cent referred to education, but more than 10 per cent to 'birth' and family background. At the same time, as many as 25 per cent considered social classes to be an inevitable feature of life; they made such statements as 'you will always have leaders and followers', 'some people are bound to be better than others', 'breeding makes social classes inevitable'.

A further question asked, 'What is the major factor, do you think, which determines the class a person belongs to?' Whereas the previous question tried to find out why the respondents thought there were social classes, this attempted to identify the criteria which they used in allocating individuals to class positions.

TABLE V.2: 'WHAT IS THE MAJOR FACTOR, DO YOU THINK, WHICH DETERMINES THE CLASS A PERSON BELONGS TO?'\*

FACTORS MENTIONED	SWEDISH WORKERS		ENGLISH WORKERS	
	NOS. (118)	%	NOS. (119)	%
'Birth' and family background	12	10.2	45	37.8
Educational qualifications and experiences	45	38.1	16	13.5
'Money', 'Wealth' and Economic factors	81	68.6	69	58.0
Occupation	7	5.9	13	10.9
Attitudes and Appearances	4	3.4	6	5.0
Patterns of Social Interaction	-	-	4	3.4
Other and Non-classifiable responses	11	9.3	13	10.9

\* Most respondents mentioned more than one factor and so the figures add to more than 100 per cent.



Table V.2 shows the Swedish workers considered that an individual's class position was determined primarily by his economic circumstances and his level of education while other factors, such as his 'birth' and family background, were regarded to be of limited importance. Among the English workers, on the other hand, there was also a recognition of the importance of economic factors but they were much more likely to emphasise the significance of 'birth' and family background and to give little consideration to the role of education. Therefore, the responses indicated that although both samples stressed the importance of economic factors for determining the class position of individuals, the Swedish workers were more likely to refer to 'meritocratic' factors than the English. Indeed, this pattern was confirmed by their descriptions of different social classes.

The workers that recognised the existence of social classes were asked, 'Which are the major classes in this country today?' In reply to this question all respondents mentioned more than one class: 28 per cent of the Swedish and 29 per cent of the English workers conceived of a two-class model of society; 66 per cent and 60 per cent, a three-class model and a further 5 per cent and 11 per cent, a class model consisting of four or more categories. In other words, somewhat less than one-third of both groups of workers mentioned two and a further two-thirds, three major social classes. In terms of their own class positions, all those respondents of both samples who considered there were only two social classes placed themselves in the 'bottom' category. But among those who conceived of their society in terms of a three-class 'model', there was an important difference between the two groups. Whereas 47 per cent of the Swedish respondents adhering to this 'model' allocated themselves to the 'intermediate' category, this was done by only 21 per cent of the English; indeed, as many as 79 per cent placed themselves in the 'bottom' category.

The replies to the question 'Which are the major classes in this country today?' were coded, as far as possible, according to the actual phrases used by respondents. The results are shown in Table V.3:

TABLE V.3: 'WHICH ARE THE MAJOR CLASSES IN THIS COUNTRY TODAY?'

'LABELS' MENTIONED	SWEDISH WORKERS (N-118)		ENGLISH WORKERS (N-119)	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
1 'Upper', 'Top', 'Higher classes'	24	20.3	89	74.8
2 'The Wealthy', 'Rich', 'Those with plenty of money'	14	11.9	19	16.0
3 'Social Group I'	57	48.3	-	-
4 'Middle class'	19	16.1	90	75.6
5 'White-collar people'	20	17.0	1	0.9
6 'Educated people'	5	4.2	1	0.9
7 'Social Group II'	56	47.5	-	-
8 'Social Group III'	47	39.8	-	-
9 'Working class	46	39.0	89	74.8
10 'Ordinary people', 'Average people'	2	1.7	2	1.7
11 'Lower class'	2	1.7	21	17.7
12 'The Poor', 'The Lower Paid,' etc.	7	5.9	8	6.7
13 Negative Evaluation ('Those who don't want to work', etc.)	10	8.5	1	0.9
14 Other and non-classifiable responses	15	12.7	13	10.9

Both samples were then asked 'Which of these classes would you say that you belong to?', the replies to which are shown in Table V.4:



TABLE V.4: 'WHICH OF THESE CLASSES WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOU BELONG TO?'

'LABELS' MENTIONED	SWEDISH WORKERS (N-118)		ENGLISH WORKERS (N-119)	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
'Middle class'	11	9.3	23	19.3
'Social Group II'	30	25.4	-	-
'Social Group III'	25	21.2	-	-
'Average people', 'Ordinary People'	2	1.7	2	1.7
'Working-class'	46	39.0	83	69.8
'Lower class'	2	1.7	6	5.0
'The Poor'	-	-	4	3.4
Other and non-classifiable responses	2	1.7	1	0.8
TOTAL	118	100.0	119	100.0

In view of the fact that replies to these questions were coded according to the actual 'labels' used by respondents, it is interesting that they used relatively few categories; both in terms of their descriptions of the class structure and of their own class positions. This would suggest that in their replies to these deliberately vague and ambiguous questions respondents did not consciously work out their own conceptions of the class structure but instead 'gave back' a received cultural, ideological interpretation of it.

However, it is also clear that the two samples had rather different reasons in order to explain their own positions within the respective class structures. This is borne out by Table V.5 which correlates respondents' self-assigned class with the factors regarded to be important in determining

an individual's class position.

TABLE V.5: RESPONDENTS' SELF-ASSIGNED SOCIAL CLASS RELATED TO THE FACTORS THEY CONSIDERED IMPORTANT IN DETERMINING AN INDIVIDUAL'S POSITION IN THE CLASS STRUCTURE (Percentages)\*

FACTORS MENTIONED AS IMPORTANT	RESPONDENTS' SELF-ASSIGNED SOCIAL CLASS				
	SWEDISH WORKERS			ENGLISH WORKERS	
	'SOCIAL GROUP II' (N-30)	'SOCIAL GROUP III' (N-25)	'WORKING CLASS' (N-46)	'MIDDLE CLASS' (N-23)	'WORKING CLASS' (N-83)
'Birth' and Family Background	6.7	12.0	15.2	21.7	42.2
Educational Qualifications & Experience	40.0	40.0	41.3	17.4	12.1
'Money', 'Wealth' & Economic Factors	86.7	72.0	58.7	56.5	57.8
Occupation	3.3	4.0	8.7	4.4	14.5
Attitudes and Appearances	-	-	2.2	13.0	2.4
Patterns of Social Interaction	-	-	-	4.4	3.6
Other and Non- Classifiable Responses	13.3	8.0	8.7	17.4	8.4

\* Most respondents mentioned more than one factor and so the figures add to more than 100 per cent. Only those class 'labels' used by a substantial number of respondents have been used in this cross-tabulation (see Table V.4).

Table V.5 shows that both samples, irrespective of the specific terms which they used in order to describe their own class positions, considered economic factors to be the major determinants for an individual's placement



within the class structure. But it is also clear that the Swedish workers persistently stressed the role of education to a degree unreflected in the English responses. In addition, although the number of Swedish workers that emphasised the importance of 'birth' and family background was greater among those considering themselves to be 'working class', this did not equal the high frequency of this response found among the English 'working class' respondents. Indeed, 'birth' and family background were emphasised among these English workers to about the same degree as 'education' was among the Swedish respondents regarding themselves as 'working class'. In other words, Table V.5 suggests that while the Swedish respondents perceived their own positions within the class structure to be largely determined by economic and educational factors, the English sample, although recognising the primary importance of economic criteria, were more likely to emphasise the role of 'birth' and family background. In fact it is only among the English respondents describing themselves as 'middle class' that education is given as much importance as 'birth' and family background.

Similar patterns emerged in respondents' descriptions of the 'top' social classes. These, together with their descriptions of all other social classes (as listed in Table V.3), are presented in Table V.6:

TABLE V.6: RESPONDENTS' DESCRIPTIONS OF THE MEMBERSHIP OF DIFFERENT SOCIAL CLASSES\*SWEDISH WORKERS

RESPONDENTS' DESCRIPTIONS	SOCIAL CLASS												
	(1) 'UPPER' 'TOP', ETC. (N=24)	(2) 'THE WEALTHY' ETC. (N=14)	(3) 'SOCIAL GROUP I' (N=57)	(4) 'MIDDLE CLASS' (N=19)	(5) 'WHITE- COLLAR PEOPLE' (N=20)	(6) 'EDUCATED PEOPLE' (N=5)	(7) 'SOCIAL GROUP II' (N=56)	(8) 'SOCIAL GROUP III' (N=47)	(9) 'WORKING CLASS' (N=46)	(10) 'ORDINARY PEOPLE' ETC. (N=2)	(11) 'LOWER CLASS' (N=2)	(12) 'THE POOR' ETC. (N=7)	(13) NEGATIVE EVALUATION (N=10)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
'Lords and Ladies', 'People with Titles', 'The Aristocracy'	4.2	-	1.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Economic Factors ('The Rich', 'The Wealthy', etc.)	29.2	35.7	31.6	5.3	5.0	20.0	17.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
Big Businessmen', 'Directors'	50.0	78.6	52.6	5.3	5.0	-	5.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
'Professionals' (or specific occupational title mentioned)	33.3	42.9	56.1	26.3	20.0	100.0	10.7	-	4.3	-	-	-	-
'Higher White-collar workers'	37.5	21.4	28.1	15.8	15.0	60.0	14.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
'Educated People'	4.2	7.1	26.3	5.3	15.0	20.0	1.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
'Engineers'	16.7	14.3	12.3	10.5	25.0	-	12.5	-	2.2	-	-	-	-
'Manager'	25.0	21.4	26.3	15.8	10.0	-	1.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
'Small Shopkeepers'	-	-	-	5.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
'Lower White-collar Workers'	-	-	-	21.1	15.0	-	26.8	21.3	34.8	100.0	-	-	-
'Average People', 'Ordinary People'	-	-	-	15.8	-	-	7.1	6.4	8.7	-	-	-	-
Specific Non-manual Occupation Mentioned	-	-	-	42.1	55.0	-	42.9	-	8.7	-	100.0	-	-
'Manual', 'Factory Workers' or Specific occupational title	-	-	-	52.6	5.0	-	55.4	70.2	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	-
'Those Who Don't Work'	-	7.1	1.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Positive Evaluation	-	-	1.8	5.3	15.0	-	8.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
Negative Evaluation	4.2	14.3	3.5	-	-	-	1.8	25.5	-	-	-	14.3	90.0
'The Poor', Low Incomes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27.7	2.2	-	-	71.4	20.0
Other and Non-classifiable Responses	8.3	42.9	12.3	5.3	5.0	-	7.1	6.4	6.5	-	-	-	20.0



TABLE V.6 (continued)

## ENGLISH WORKERS

RESPONDENTS' DESCRIPTIONS	SOCIAL CLASS												
	(1) 'UPPER' 'TOP', ETC. (N=89)	(2) 'THE WEALTHY' ETC. (N=19)	(3) 'SOCIAL GROUP I'	(4) 'MIDDLE CLASS' (N=90)	(5) 'WHITE- COLLAR PEOPLE' (N=1)	(6) 'EDUCATED PEOPLE' (N=1)	(7) 'SOCIAL GROUP II'	(8) 'SOCIAL GROUP LII'	(9) 'WORKING CLASS' (N=89)	(10) 'ORDINARY PEOPLE' ETC. (N=2)	(11) 'LOWER CLASS' (N=21)	(12) 'THE POOR' ETC. (N=8)	(13) NEGATIVE EVALUATION (N=1)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
'Lords and Ladies', 'People with Titles', 'The Aristocracy'	41.6	26.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Economic Factors ('The Rich', 'The Wealthy', etc.)	20.2	31.6	-	5.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Big Businessmen', 'Directors'	53.9	73.7	-	14.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
'Professionals' (or specific occupational title mentioned)	14.6	5.3	-	17.8	-	100.0	-	-	1.1	-	-	-	-
'Higher White-collar workers'	1.1	-	-	4.5	-	-	-	-	-	50.0	-	-	-
'Educated People'	4.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
'Engineers'	-	-	-	1.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
'Manager'	27.0	21.1	-	18.9	-	-	-	-	1.1	-	-	-	-
'Small Shopkeepers'	-	-	-	25.6	-	-	-	-	1.1	-	-	-	-
'Lower White-collar Workers'	-	-	-	7.8	-	-	-	-	11.2	50.0	-	-	-
'Average People', 'Ordinary People'	-	-	-	7.8	-	-	-	-	24.7	50.0	-	-	-
Specific Non-manual Occupation Mentioned	-	-	-	40.0	-	-	-	-	13.5	-	-	-	-
'Manual', 'Factory Workers' or Specific occupational title	-	-	-	17.8	-	-	-	-	86.5	100.0	47.6	75.0	-
'Those Who Don't Work'	9.0	5.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Positive Evaluation	1.1	-	-	5.6	-	-	-	-	4.5	-	-	-	-
Negative Evaluation	2.2	21.1	-	2.2	100.0	-	-	-	4.5	-	57.1	12.5	100.0
'The Poor', Low Incomes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11.2	-	9.5	50.0	-
Other and Non-classifiable Responses	18.0	31.6	-	13.3	100.0	-	-	-	6.7	-	19.0	50.0	100.0

\* The results for the two samples are presented separately in order to assist interpretation of the data; only the percentages are given for the same reason. These should be treated with extreme caution in many of the columns because of the very small numbers which they represent. Since most respondents mentioned more than one factor in their descriptions of specific classes, the figures add to more than 100 per cent.

In their models of the class structure there were no respondents who placed themselves in the 'top' category. But it is useful to study their descriptions of the social classes which they included within this category since it gives some indication of what they regarded as necessary to be members of 'successful' and 'important' groups in society. This can be done by comparing the Swedish workers' descriptions of the 'Upper Class', 'The Wealthy', and 'Social Group I' with the English respondents' characterisations of 'Upper Class' and 'The Wealthy'. More specifically, it is helpful to compare the samples' descriptions of the two groups which were most frequently mentioned in this category; for the Swedish workers, 'Social Group I', and for the English, 'Upper Class'. 'Labels', that is, which were mentioned by 49 per cent (N-57) and 75 per cent (N-89) of the Swedish and the English samples respectively.

In view of this, Table V.6 suggests that both samples emphasised the importance of economic factors in their descriptions of these particular 'top' social classes. But at the same time, the Swedish workers mentioned a number of occupations which require individuals to undergo relatively long periods of formal education and often, specialist training. Therefore, various professional occupations, 'engineers', 'higher white-collar workers', and 'educated people' were frequently mentioned, while 'lords and ladies', 'the aristocracy' and other descriptions that would indicate respondents perceived of the class structure in 'traditional' and 'ascriptive' terms were absent. Among the English sample, by contrast, 'traditional' attitudes of this kind were frequently expressed; these were mentioned by no less than 42 per cent of those who referred to the 'Upper Class' in the descriptions of the class structure.

Clearly, the foregoing analysis suggests that the two samples, despite the similarity in the emphasis which they gave to economic factors, had rather different conceptions of their respective class structures. From



this it seems as though the Swedish workers would be more likely to conceive of the class structure as 'open' and as one in which there were considerable opportunities for individual upward mobility. Among the English respondents, on the other hand, it would appear that their conceptions of the class structure would lead them to have limited beliefs in the possibilities of upward mobility if only because, as shown in Tables V.5 and V.6, of the importance which they gave to ascriptive and traditional factors in determining individuals' class membership.

In order to test whether or not this was the case, those workers recognising the existence of social classes were asked 'Do you think that many people move from one class to another these days?'. Among the Swedish workers, 70 per cent (N-82) said 'yes' compared with 42 per cent (N-50) of the English respondents: more than two-thirds compared with less than one-half. These workers were then asked 'What are the reasons for this?' The coded responses are shown in Table V.7:

TABLE V.7: 'WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR THIS?'

('That many People move from one Class to Another These Days')

BECAUSE OF:	SWEDISH WORKERS		ENGLISH WORKERS	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
Opportunities to improve personal economic circumstances	27	33.0	19	38.0
Possibilities for promotion at work	5	6.1	8	16.0
Possibilities for obtaining Educational qualifications	46	56.1	6	12.0
'Personal Contacts'	-	-	3	6.0
'Equal opportunity for Everyone'	2	2.4	2	4.0
Individual effort and enterprise, etc.	-	-	6	12.0
Other and Non-classifiable responses	2	2.4	6	12.0
TOTALS	82	100.0	50	100.0

Similar proportions of both samples felt that people could now move from one class to another because of greater opportunities to improve their economic circumstances. But the factor mentioned most frequently by the Swedish respondents was that there were now better possibilities for obtaining educational qualifications; this was mentioned by only a few of the English workers. Instead, the latter were more likely to cite the need for 'personal contacts' and for individuals to exercise 'initiative', 'enterprise' and so on.

These results were further substantiated by the responses to a more specific question 'How likely is the son of a factory worker to move from one class to another? Would you say that he was 'very likely', 'likely', 'unlikely', or 'very unlikely'? No less than 98 per cent of the Swedish workers considered that he was either 'very likely' or 'likely', compared with 70 per cent of the English; indeed, 48 per cent of the Swedish respondents claimed that he was 'very likely' but this view was held by only 6 per cent of the English sample. Obviously both samples were optimistic about the mobility chances of the son of a factory worker, but this attitude was held to a far greater degree among the Swedish respondents. Whereas there was almost complete acceptance of this opinion among the Swedish workers, a substantial minority of the English respondents - 20 per cent - felt that it was either 'unlikely' or 'very unlikely'. Both samples were then asked 'What would he have to do in order to move from one class to another?'



TABLE V.8: 'WHAT WOULD HE (THE SON OF A FACTORY WORKER) HAVE TO DO  
IN ORDER TO MOVE FROM ONE CLASS TO ANOTHER?'

	SWEDISH WORKERS		ENGLISH WORKERS	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
Improve his personal economic circumstances	-	-	3	2.5
Obtain promotion at work, or get a 'better' job	-	-	15	12.6
Obtain some educational qualifications	113	95.6	61	51.3
Make use of, or establish 'personal contacts'	1	0.9	2	1.7
Exercise some 'Individual effort', 'initiative', etc.	1	0.9	7	5.9
Don't know	1	0.9	6	5.0
Other and Non-classifiable responses	2	1.7	25	21.0
TOTALS	118	100.0	119	100.0

The results in Table V.8 show that the Swedish sample regarded the acquisition of educational qualifications as almost the sole means by which individuals could be upwardly mobile within the class structure. Although this opinion was shared by one-half of the English workers, it is evident that educational qualifications were considered to be of far less importance. Indeed, of the 25 English respondents giving 'other and non-classifiable' answers, no less than 40 per cent (N=10) mentioned 'ascriptive' factors such as 'he would need to be born into the right family' and 'make certain that he had a wealthy father'. Among the remaining, considerable importance was attached to 'luck' and 'chance'; they suggested the need to 'win the pools',

'have a good bet', 'be left a fortune' and so on. But did the Swedish respondents consider that children from all social backgrounds enjoyed the same degree of 'participation' within the educational system? To investigate this, both samples were asked 'A lot of children stay on at school and go to university these days. Do you think that the sons of some people are more likely to stay on than others?'<sup>17</sup> Similar proportions of both samples - 60 per cent (N-73) of the Swedish and 61 per cent (N-78) of the English - agreed that the sons of some people were more likely to stay on than others. These respondents were then asked 'What sort of people are more likely to have their sons at university?'

TABLE V.9: 'WHAT SORT OF PEOPLE ARE MORE LIKELY TO HAVE THEIR SONS AT UNIVERSITY?'<sup>\*</sup>

	SWEDISH WORKERS (N-122)		ENGLISH WORKERS (N-128)	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
'Educated People'	34	46.6	2	2.6
'The Rich', 'The Wealthy'	14	19.2	32	41.0
'Professionals' (or specific occupation mentioned)	65	89.0	24	30.8
Big Businessmen, 'Directors'	14	19.2	42	53.9
Other Non-manual (or specific occupation mentioned)	8	11.0	15	19.2
'The Aristocracy', 'Lords and Ladies'	-	-	2	2.6
'Depends on Parents'	3	4.1	2	2.6
'Manual Workers' (or specific occupation mentioned)	-	-	2	2.6
Other and Non-classifiable responses	1	1.4	11	14.1

\* A number of respondents mentioned more than one 'Sort of People' and so the figures add to more than 100 per cent.



Table V.9 shows that both samples were aware of inequalities within the respective educational systems. But it is also clear that the Swedish workers perceived of these in terms of advantages accruing to the sons of 'educated' and other qualified, professional workers. By comparison, the English respondents rarely mentioned 'educated people' and they were less likely to refer to various categories of professional workers. Instead, they mentioned 'The Rich', 'The Wealthy' and 'Businessmen'.

The results of the interview survey suggest, then, that there were important differences between the two samples in terms of their conceptions of the class structure and of social mobility within it. Although both groups gave primary emphasis to economic factors in their descriptions, the Swedish workers attached greater importance to education, while the English workers were more likely to stress the significance of 'ascriptive' and 'traditional' characteristics. Furthermore, the Swedish workers were more likely to express a belief in the possibilities of individual upward mobility and for this to occur, they emphasised the need to obtain formal educational qualifications. When privileges within the educational system were recognised to exist, these were seen to be enjoyed by the sons of 'educated' and other qualified people. For the English workers, on the other hand, possibilities of individual upward mobility were considered to be less likely and when this was seen to be possible, fewer respondents mentioned the importance of education. In short, the Swedish workers were more likely than the English to conceive of the class structure as 'open' and meritocratic. Why was this?

It would be surprising if the attitudes were not shaped, at least to some extent, by a whole range of historical processes as well as by a number of individual and group experiences<sup>18</sup>. However, attention will be given to only those variables which seem most likely to explain the difference.

Obvious factors to consider are the samples' experiences of mobility at work, since it could be argued that their different conceptions of the

possibilities for individual mobility in society are a consequence of these. However, the evidence does not support this. Asked about the possibilities for promotion, both samples were invited to name an occupation which they would be most likely to get if they were given promotion<sup>19</sup>. For both groups of workers 'foremen' and various supervisory manual occupations such as 'inspector' and 'chargehand' were most frequently mentioned: by well over 85 per cent of both the Swedish and the English samples. In other words, promotion was perceived in terms of movement within manual jobs, rather than into white-collar occupations. Indeed, these were 'realistic' assessments since in neither factory was there an effective scheme that would have enabled manual workers to become office employees. But the similarity in the samples' responses did not persist when they were asked 'How likely is a factory worker to get promotion at work? Would you say that it was 'very likely', 'likely', 'unlikely', or 'very unlikely'? Almost twice as many (73 per cent) of the English workers thought it either 'likely' or 'very likely' compared with the Swedish workers (39 per cent).

Obviously, the Swedish respondents' optimistic assumptions about mobility within the class structure cannot be regarded as a function of their conceptions about their own possibilities for promotion at work. Indeed, the discrepancy between their conceptions of promotion in the factory and of mobility in society was such that it indicates they adopted very different frames-of-reference in their consideration of these issues. It suggests they made a clear distinction between 'industry' and 'society' as institutional and normative systems<sup>20</sup>. At the same time, the Swedish workers seemed to differentiate between the opportunities available to their children through the educational system and their own chances within the occupational structure. Consequently, it appears that their descriptions of the class structure were a function of factors other than those relating to immediate



work experiences. Indeed, this claim can be supported by a consideration of the mobility patterns of respondents' sons. Those workers with sons at work (there were 45 and 52 among the Swedish and the English samples respectively) were asked to name and describe their sons' occupations. The results are shown in Table V.10:

TABLE V.10: OCCUPATIONS OF RESPONDENTS' SONS

	SWEDISH WORKERS		ENGLISH WORKERS	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
Manual	36	80.0	38	73.1
Non-manual	7	15.6	6	11.5
Selfemployed (Not farmer)	1	2.2	-	-
Farmer	-	-	-	-
Farm Worker	-	-	-	-
Military (Conscription and Regular)	1	2.2	8	15.4
TOTALS	45	100.0	52	100.0

Table V.10 indicates that there was little difference in patterns of occupational mobility among the sons of workers in the two samples: only 16 per cent of those of the Swedish workers were in non-manual occupations compared with 12 per cent of the English. Consequently, the margin between these figures is too small to explain the differences in the two samples' conceptions of mobility in society. Here then is an interesting paradox; the Swedish workers were optimistic about the general possibilities for mobility in society and yet they, themselves, had limited expectations about their own chances at work. Furthermore, their sons were non-mobile in the sense that they were also mainly employed in manual occupations. Again,

this suggests the need to consider influences other than those directly relating to the respondents' own personal social experiences. What are these?

An obvious factor to consider is the rate of social mobility in each of the countries because if this was higher in Sweden it could be this which was reflected in the attitudes of Swedish workers. However, the evidence presented in Chapter Three suggested that patterns of recruitment into various occupational roles, particularly those of a more prestigious and highly-paid kind, are highly restricted in Sweden and certainly to a far greater extent than the beliefs of the Swedish sample would suggest.

Clearly, then, variations in the two samples' conceptions of their respective class structures cannot be seen to be the consequence of different mobility patterns, either in terms of immediate social experiences or within the respective countries. As Chapter Three suggested, the chances of the son of a manual worker becoming a lower-grade white-collar employee are probably greater in Sweden than they were in Britain, but the differences between the two countries in terms of overall patterns of social mobility are insufficient to account for the considerable variation in the attitudes of the two samples. How, then, are the differences to be explained? Since they do not seem to be a function of 'structural' differences it is pertinent to suggest they may be a consequence - if only partly - of certain normative influences: to follow Parkin, those of a political character<sup>21</sup>.

Although Social Democratic Governments, despite recent electoral appeals, have achieved little in reducing inequality in terms of patterns of social recruitment into the more prestigious and highly-rewarded occupations, they have emphasised the desirability of establishing Sweden as a meritocratic society. A society, that is, in which all individuals are able to acquire occupational roles suited to their personal 'talents' and 'skills' and in which recruitment into various occupations - particularly those which are



prestigious and highly-rewarded - is determined by 'competence' and ability rather than by social background<sup>22</sup>. This was particularly evident during the 1950's when the Social Democratic Party considered that equality in society could be achieved as much by improving educational opportunities as by creating a more equal distribution of economic rewards<sup>23</sup>. Thus, it has often been claimed that differences in the rewards accruing to various occupational roles are justifiable provided that all children, irrespective of their social background, have the same chances to acquire them. This concern by the Social Democratic Party has reflected itself in large-scale reforms of the educational system of the kind described in Chapter Three.

Changes in the educational system appear to have generated a set of beliefs that emphasises the openness of the class structure and the possibilities of upward mobility for all: provided, that is, individuals take the opportunities of obtaining the necessary qualifications in the much-praised 'democratised' and 'egalitarian' educational system. Furthermore, the Swedish mass media gives considerable emphasis to the opportunities available for individuals to obtain educational qualifications that can be used for career advancement. In addition to providing a large number of their own courses, the radio and television services of the Swedish Broadcasting Corporation devote 'peak' time to publicising the various vocational and academic courses that are available throughout the country. LO is also very active in this work; the Workers Education Movement, for example, provide a large number of courses which award 'credits' that can be taken into account for the purposes of obtaining university degrees. During the 1970's LO has been negotiating with employers and the government about the possibilities of workers having time from employment in order to study and obtain educational qualifications. Furthermore, the government has, over recent years, conducted a massive advertising campaign in newspapers explaining the 'new' opportunities that have been made available by

various reforms of the educational system<sup>24</sup>.

But with government policies of this kind, it could be that although aspirations for individual upward mobility become heightened, so, too, could feelings of frustration, 'failure' and resentment when these expectations are not fulfilled. Therefore, although workers believe in the 'success' goals of society, they find that they are employed in the lesser-esteemed and more lowly-paid occupations. Indeed, such attitudes are likely to develop in a country like Sweden where there are highly restricted patterns of recruitment into the more prestigious and highly-rewarded occupations. Up until now the Social Democratic pursuit of meritocratic aims has led to various educational reforms and to the development of widespread beliefs in the 'openness' of the class structure. Policies such as these have, so far, retained the allegiance of rank-and-file supporters but in the long run, these could generate feelings of resentment, particularly if the class structure remains as rigid as it is at present<sup>25</sup>. Unfortunately, the interview survey did not enquire into the Swedish respondents' personal reactions to the discrepancy between their beliefs in individual upward mobility and their own and their children's non-mobility. However, it could be that they explained the difference in terms of personal 'failure' and various psychological and domestic attributes rather than according to features of the social structure. In this way, the ideology of equal opportunity would remain unchallenged. Alternatively, it could be that the interview survey did not measure the respondents' own personal evaluations of opportunities in society but rather what they considered to be the general factual state of affairs as defined for them by various ideological influences of the kind which have been discussed above. In this sense, then, the discrepancy between their beliefs and their own personal experiences could be explained by virtue of the fact that they referred to these broadly-based influences when they answered the interview questions. Indeed, the foregoing



analysis suggests that this was the case.

In Britain, by contrast, meritocratic ideas have been less emphasised. Consequently, the class structure is still seen to be shaped by a number of 'traditional' factors and, by comparison with Sweden, there is less of a belief in the possibilities for upward mobility. As a result, it can be argued that manual workers will have more limited aspirations for the occupational advancements of themselves and their children. Indeed, feelings of failure are likely to be less pronounced among these workers and they are more likely than Swedish workers to regard their own positions within the class structure as inevitable<sup>26</sup>. However, should Britain have prolonged periods of Labour governments, it could be that meritocratic norms would become as widely accepted as they appear to be in Sweden. Certainly, with Labour governments there have been attempts to 'equalise' opportunities by introducing changes within the educational system. But on the whole, most of the schemes relating to the introduction of comprehensive education which were approved between 1964 and 1970 by the Labour government included selective elements and they were, on the whole, generally less 'egalitarian' in their objectives than the Swedish educational reforms<sup>27</sup>.

In conclusion, the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that although the two samples occupied relatively similar structural positions within the two societies, there were important differences between them in terms of their conceptions of the respective class structures, despite the emphasis which both groups gave to economic factors. Whereas in Sweden the respondents determined the allocation of individuals to positions within the class structure according to meritocratic, achievement-orientated criteria, in Britain they were more likely to stress the importance of traditional and 'ascriptive' factors. This, in turn, influenced the two samples' conceptions about the possibilities for individual, upward mobility. The data indicate, therefore, that the two samples' conceptions of their respective class

structures were shaped not only by objective patterns of structural relationships, but also by their exposure to rather different political ideologies. Hence, the data suggest that the Swedish workers' conceptions of the class structure were influenced, if only partially, by the meritocratic ideology of Social Democracy. Consequently, the inference to be drawn from this chapter is that although Social Democratic governments have not altered the opportunity structure of Swedish society to the extent that it is, in any fundamental sense, more egalitarian than that which exists in Britain, there has been the development of a system of beliefs among industrial workers which emphasises the opportunities available for upward mobility in society and which, to some degree, justifies the allocation of individuals to their positions in the class structure. However, this does not take into account the extent to which the economic rewards that are attached to these positions are regarded as acceptable by workers. This is discussed in the next chapter.



## NOTES

1. D. LOCKWOOD, 'Sources of Variation in Working Class Images of Society', Sociological Rev., Vol. 14, (1966), p. 249.
2. D. LOCKWOOD, op. cit., p. 250.
3. A. INKELES, 'Industrial Man: The Relation of Status to Experience, Perception and Values', Amer. J. Sociol., Vol. 66, (1960-61), p. 2.
4. A. INKELES, op. cit., p. 2.
5. See, for example, D. LOCKWOOD, op. cit.
6. This evidence is discussed by D. LOCKWOOD, op. cit., p. 252-256.
7. However, BELL and NEWBY have suggested that in some work and community situations, agricultural workers, although generally in close personal contact with their employers, will adopt 'radical' attitudes. See C. BELL and H. NEWBY, 'The Sources of Variation in Agricultural Workers' Images of Society', Sociological Rev., Vol. 21, (1973).
8. D. LOCKWOOD, op. cit., p. 251.
9. R. MOORE, 'Religion as a Source of Variation in Working Class Images of Society'; presented to an S.S.R.C. Conference on The Occupational Community of the Traditional Worker, University of Durham, 1972.
10. R. MOORE, op. cit., p. 30.
11. R. MOORE, op. cit., p. 32.

12. F. PARKIN, Class Inequality and Political Order, London, 1971, p. 81.
13. See, for example, N. BIRNBAUM, The Crisis of Industrial Society, London, 1969; and R. MILIBAND, The State in Capitalist Society, London, 1969.
14. F. PARKIN, op. cit.
15. Unless otherwise stated, the questions that follow were put only to these respondents.
16. In order to assist the reader, only rounded-up percentages are given in the text.
17. This question was put to all respondents and not merely to those who recognised the existence of social classes.
18. Industrialisation and urbanisation, for example, have been much more recent in Sweden (see Chapter Two). This, of course, has affected the structure of communities and possibly the development (or lack of) occupational sub-cultures.
19. This question was put after respondents had defined exactly what they meant by 'promotion'.
20. Dahrendorf has argued that 'industry' and 'the State' can be regarded as separate institutional orders in 'post-capitalist' society. See R. DAHRENDORF, Class and Class Conflict in an Industrial Society, London, 1959.
21. F. PARKIN, op. cit.
22. This has always been a feature of Social Democratic objectives, even since the 1880's. See, G. RICHARDSON, Kulturkamp och Klasskamp: Ideologiska och Sociala Motsättningar i Svensk Skol - och Kulturpolitik



Under 1880-Talet (Cultural Struggle and Class Conflict: Ideological and Social Disputes in Swedish School and Cultural Politics During the 1880's), Gothenburg, 1963.

23. See A. MYRDAL, Towards Equality, Stockholm, 1971; and R. TOMASSON, Sweden: Prototype of Modern Society, New York, 1970, Chap. 4.
  
  24. It is interesting to speculate about what proportion of English manual workers are aware of the educative opportunities provided by, say, the Open University. It is probably small; not surprisingly in view of the extremely limited publicity which has been given to it by those sectors of the mass media with which most manual workers have direct contact.
  
  25. If these attitudes were to develop, then the allegiance of rank-and-file supporters to the Social Democratic Party could become extremely problematic. Particularly since it has always presented itself as the Party of social reform, social justice and equality. It is in terms of these factors that it has asked to be judged at general elections.
  
  26. A selective educational system is likely to enforce these attitudes. One of the major socialising effects of the English secondary modern school is that it lowers the ambitions of pupils so that they accord with opportunities available in the labour market. See, for example, M. WILSON, 'The Vocational Preferences of Secondary Modern School Children', Br. Jour. of Ed. Psychology, Vol. 23, 1953. Conversely, a non-streamed, non-selective educational system of the Swedish type is unlikely to lower the occupational expectations of working-class youth.
  
  27. For example, a number of the comprehensive schemes introduced during this period included academic 'streaming' either within or between schools.
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## CHAPTER SIX

CONCEPTIONS OF THE CLASS STRUCTURE AMONG THE TWO SAMPLES:2) PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC REWARDS

In Chapter Three it was suggested that in Sweden there has been the development of a Social Democratic ideology of egalitarianism despite persisting inequalities in the distribution of economic rewards between various occupational groups. In view of this, has the Social Democratic Party been successful in falsely persuading industrial workers that incomes have been 'equalised'? If so, and although with very different causes, the effects could be much the same as investigators have reported for Britain; namely, that the awareness of economic inequalities - particularly among manual workers - is limited.

In Britain, for example, Runciman found that only a small majority of manual workers considered that there were other occupational groups which were financially better off than themselves<sup>1</sup>. Furthermore, they generally made limited comparisons; they tended to mention either other groups of manual workers or individuals who could be compared with a specific aspect of their own personal situation. Hence, respondents referred to 'people with no children', 'people on night work', 'people with good health' and so on; comments which suggested that British manual workers did not perceive of inequality as a structural feature of society, but rather as a consequence of personal effort and circumstance<sup>2</sup>. Similarly, Goldthorpe and his colleagues found that 54 per cent of a sample of manual workers conceived of the class structure in terms of a 'money' model, in which there was a large central class consisting of most manual and white-collar workers, and



one or more residual or 'elite' classes, differentiated in terms of wealth, income and material living standards<sup>3</sup>. As a result, Goldthorpe and his associates suggest that these workers' perceptions of their position in the class structure were inconsistent with their roles in the productive process; roles characterised by deprivation in the spheres of decision-making, working conditions, fringe benefits and status differentials. They argue that these attitudes were derived from social roles outside the workplace and that there was little awareness of inequality as a structural and socially-organised feature of society.

In view of these findings, it is likely that the two samples of workers, occupying relatively similar positions within the social structures of their respective societies, will have fairly similar notions about economic differentials. If they do, the evidence would lend weight to the claims of some writers, who argue that the institutions of different industrial-capitalist societies have similar effects upon the cultural and political socialisation of manual workers so that their attitudes are characterised by a 'false consciousness' and a restricted awareness of their real position in society<sup>4</sup>. Furthermore, and in view of the ideological egalitarianism of Swedish Social Democracy, it could be that the Swedish respondents would not only be less knowledgeable, but even less resentful of existing economic differentials than their English counterparts.

In his enquiry, Runciman asked respondents "Do you think there are any sorts of people doing noticeably better at the moment than you and your family?" He found that 25 per cent of all respondents and 27 per cent of manual workers stated that they could think of no other sorts of people<sup>5</sup>. A similar question was used in the present enquiry: "Are there any people you can think of who are better off than workers like yourself?" Whereas only 8 per cent of the Swedish sample claimed that they could think of no other people, this opinion was held by more than 20 per cent of the English

workers<sup>6</sup>. The figures are presented in Table VI.1:

TABLE VI.1: "ARE THERE ANY PEOPLE YOU CAN THINK OF WHO ARE  
BETTER OFF THAN WORKERS LIKE YOURSELF?"

	SWEDISH WORKERS		ENGLISH WORKERS	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
Yes	98	80.3	91	71.1
No	10	8.2	28	21.9
Don't Know	14	11.5	9	7.0
TOTAL	122	100.0	128	100.0

In view of the fact that patterns of wage differentials in the two countries are very similar<sup>7</sup>, the opinions expressed by the two samples would suggest that the awareness of economic inequality was greater among the Swedish respondents than among the English. All those workers who held that there were others better off than themselves were then asked: "What sort of people?" Whenever possible, the responses were coded according to the actual terms used by workers.



TABLE VI.2: "WHAT SORT OF PEOPLE?"

('Are Better Off than Workers like Yourself')

	SWEDISH WORKERS		ENGLISH WORKERS	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
'Businessmen', 'Directors'	15	15.3	4	4.4
'Managers'	2	2.0	6	6.6
'Professionals', 'Professional People'	7	7.1	5	5.5
'Higher White-Collar Workers'	5	5.1	-	-
'White-Collar Workers' or Specific Non-Manual Occupation Mentioned	15	15.3	3	3.3
'Educated People'	7	7.2	-	-
'The Rich'	1	1.0	1	1.1
Specific Manual Occupation Mentioned	43	43.9	69	75.8
Other and Non-classifiable Responses	3	3.1	3	3.3
Don't Know	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	98	100.0	91	100.0

Table VI.2 shows that the Swedish workers were more likely to mention non-manual occupations than were the English sample. Indeed various non-manual occupational titles, together with 'Educated People' and 'The Rich' were mentioned by 53 per cent of the Swedish workers compared with only 21 per cent of the Workers in the English sample. On the other hand, 76 per cent of the English respondents mentioned various manual occupations compared with only 44 per cent of the Swedish workers; a difference between the two samples of 32 per cent. In these responses, both samples stressed similar occupations - those in the car, steel and dock industries. The only major difference between the two groups was that the Swedish respondents gave greater

emphasis to the earnings of building construction workers. Indeed, the earnings of Swedish workers employed in the building construction industry, relative to other groups of workers, are high compared with the relative earnings of English construction workers<sup>8</sup>.

Clearly, the evidence indicates that the awareness of inequality was not the same for both groups of workers; in fact, the responses of the English workers were fairly consistent with those obtained by Runciman in his analysis. He found that only 19 per cent of his samples of manual workers who claimed that there were other people better off than themselves mentioned non-manual workers<sup>9</sup>. The present enquiry confirms Runciman's contention that English manual workers make highly restricted comparisons when they assess their own economic position in society. The Swedish workers, on the other hand, articulated a greater frequency of relative deprivation and this seems to have been a consequence of their adoption of more broadly-based reference groups, incorporating both non-manual and manual occupations. The differences in the two groups of respondents were particularly striking in view of the fact that wage differentials, both within the factories and the two countries, were more or less the same<sup>10</sup>. Furthermore, the attitudes of the Swedish workers were such that they refuted any claims that a Social Democratic ideology of egalitarianism 'concealed' - certainly for them - 'objective' profiles of inequality.

The greater awareness of inequality among the Swedish workers was substantiated by their responses to questions which invited them to make comparisons between specific aspects of their own work roles with those of white-collar workers employed in the same factory. For the purposes of these, the term 'white-collar worker' was defined so that it was clear each respondent understood the kind of occupation with which he was being invited to make comparisons. It was emphasised that the term referred not only to office workers, but also to management and other higher officials. The



samples were then invited to express opinions about earnings, possibilities for promotion and conditions of work,

Respondents were asked: "What do you think of the money you earn compared with that of white-collar workers? Would you say that it was 'much better', 'better', 'about the same', 'worse' or 'much worse'?" Among the Swedish workers, 63 per cent claimed that it was 'worse' or 'much worse', while only 4 per cent stated that it was 'better' or 'much better'. A further 30 per cent suggested it was 'about the same' for both manual and white-collar workers. By contrast, 44 per cent of the English sample said their earnings were 'better' or 'much better' and only 23 per cent thought that they were 'worse' or 'much worse'. There were 25 per cent who claimed they were 'about the same'. Clearly, the Swedish workers felt more deprived about their earnings, compared with those of white-collar workers, than the English respondents.

When they were asked about the possibilities for promotion, the Swedish workers were far less optimistic about their chances than their English counterparts<sup>11</sup>. Furthermore, when they were invited to compare these chances with those of white-collar employees, 80 per cent claimed that they were either 'worse' or 'much worse' and only 3 per cent said they were 'better' or 'much better'. By contrast, the English workers held a more favourable view of their promotion prospects compared with those of white-collar workers, with only 33 per cent stating these were either 'worse' or 'much worse', and 29 per cent suggesting they were 'better' or 'much better'. A further 31 per cent of the English sample perceived their chances to be 'about the same', compared with only 12 per cent of the Swedish workers.

The two groups of workers were then asked the open-ended question: "Why is this?"; the responses to which were cross-tabulated with their opinions about opportunities for promotion compared with those available for white-collar workers. Of the 98 Swedish workers who claimed that their chances

were 'worse' or 'much worse', 54 per cent stated this was because promotion was 'automatic' for white-collar workers. The kinds of responses which they made included such statements as 'white-collar workers get promoted as they get older', 'you just sit there and go up', 'it's automatic for them' and so on. But of the 43 English respondents who evaluated their chances in this way, only 16 per cent gave similar reasons. At the same time, 81 per cent of the 37 English workers who claimed that their own opportunities for promotion were 'better' or 'much better' said this was because there were more opportunities available on the shop floor than in the office. They made statements like 'chances are always cropping up on the factory floor, but you have to wait for dead men's shoes in the office', 'there are always chances' and 'jobs are always coming up'. Consequently, these figures tend to indicate that the Swedish workers had more 'realistic' assessments of their career prospects compared with those of white-collar workers employed in the same organisation, than the English workers. Indeed, the Swedish workers perceived that white-collar employment provided a built-in career structure which was not available to manual workers. The English workers, by contrast, felt that there was much more opportunity in the factory than in the office and they seemed to be unaware of the structural differences which existed between manual and non-manual employment.

Both samples were asked: "What about your working conditions compared with those of white-collar workers? Would you say that they were 'much better', 'better', 'about the same', 'worse', or 'much worse'?" Among the Swedish workers, 89 per cent claimed that their working conditions (meaning physical working conditions) were either 'worse' or 'much worse' than those of white-collar workers and a further 10 per cent felt that they were 'about the same'; only one respondent said they were 'better'. Among the English sample, by contrast, 58 per cent considered their working conditions to be 'worse' or 'much worse' and 34 per cent thought that they were 'about the



same'; 7 per cent held they were either 'better' or 'much better'. The English sample seem to have felt more deprived in terms of working conditions than in terms of earnings but they still felt less deprived on that score than the Swedes; 31 per cent fewer of the English workers considered their working conditions to be either 'worse' or 'much worse' than those of white-collar workers. The difference is particularly noticeable in view of the fact that actual differences in the working conditions of manual workers and white-collar workers were less in the Swedish factory than in the English.

The evidence clearly suggests that the Swedish sample demonstrated a greater awareness of the inequalities which existed between themselves and white-collar workers than the English. Indeed, there was a tendency for this to be reflected in heightened feelings of resentment. Both samples were asked: "How do you feel about all these things - earnings, conditions of work, etc?" The responses were then coded according to those expressing sentiments of 'approval' and 'disapproval'. Table VI.3 presents the data relating to attitudes to earnings analysed in this way.

TABLE VI.3: "HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT ALL THESE THINGS - EARNINGS?"

EARNINGS COMPARED WITH THOSE OF WHITE- COLLAR WORKERS	SWEDISH WORKERS								ENGLISH WORKERS							
	'APPROVAL'		'DISAPPROVAL'		D. K.		TOTAL		'APPROVAL'		'DISAPPROVAL'		D. K.		TOTAL	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%	NOS.	%	NOS.	%	NOS.	%	NOS.	%	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
Much better	-	-	1	100.0	-	-	1	100.0	5	83.3	1	16.7	-	-	6	100.0
Better	-	-	4	100.0	-	-	4	100.0	39	76.5	11	21.6	1	1.9	51	100.0
About the same	2	5.4	35	94.6	-	-	37	100.0	22	68.8	8	25.0	2	6.2	32	100.0
Worse	20	29.0	48	69.5	1	1.5	69	100.0	13	46.4	14	50.0	1	3.6	28	100.0
Much worse	-	-	8	100.0	-	-	8	100.0	-	-	2	100.0	-	-	2	100.0
Don't know	-	-	-	-	2	100.0	2	100.0	-	-	-	-	8	100.0	8	100.0
Not recorded	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	100.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	100.0
TOTAL							122	100.0							128	100.0



Among the 77 Swedish workers who claimed that their earnings were either 'worse' or 'much worse' than those of white-collar workers, 26 per cent 'approved' and 72 per cent 'disapproved'. By contrast, of the 30 English workers who thought their earnings were either 'worse' or 'much worse', 43 per cent 'approved' and only a small majority - 53 per cent - 'disapproved'. This suggests that among those workers of both samples who felt they were relatively deprived, the Swedish respondents were more resentful than the English.

But what is more surprising is that 'disapproval' was also expressed by very high proportions of the Swedish sample who felt their earnings were 'much better', 'better', or 'about the same' as white-collar workers. For the first two of these categories the numbers are so small that it is difficult to make further interpretation. However, among the 37 Swedish workers who felt their earnings were 'about the same', as many as 95 per cent 'disapproved', compared with only 25 per cent of the 32 English respondents. Why did such a high proportion of the Swedish sample 'disapprove'? Was it because they felt that their earnings should have been higher or lower than those of white-collar workers? Their responses to other questions suggest that they felt their earnings should have been higher; for example, 91 per cent of these 35 Swedish workers claimed that white-collar workers had a number of advantages over themselves and felt that this was 'a bad state of affairs'. In view of this, the overall interpretation of Table VI.3 is that a far higher proportion of the Swedish workers than the English felt relatively deprived and resentful about their earnings.

This pattern was reflected in responses to the very general, open-ended question: "What are the major differences, as you see them, between factory workers and white-collar workers these days?" This question was formulated in order to obtain respondents' opinions about the relative rewards accruing to white-collar and manual workers in society rather than within the two

respective factories.

TABLE VI.4: "WHAT ARE THE MAJOR DIFFERENCES, AS YOU SEE THEM, BETWEEN  
FACTORY WORKERS AND WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS THESE DAYS?"

	SWEDISH WORKERS		ENGLISH WORKERS	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
Responses suggesting advantages for white-collar workers	109	89.4	73	57.0
Responses suggesting advantages for manual workers	-	-	5	3.9
Claims that there were no differences	11	9.0	44	34.4
Claims that they were 'just different'	-	-	5	3.9
Don't Know	1	0.8	1	0.8
Not recorded	1	0.8	-	-
TOTAL	122	100.0	128	100.0

As Table VI.4 suggests, a majority of both samples stressed advantages for white-collar workers, but the Swedish workers did so to a far greater degree than the English. Furthermore, the two samples differed considerably in the extent to which they held that there were no differences between white-collar workers and manual workers. The responses to this question were then coded according to the reasons workers gave for suggesting that white-collar workers had advantages.



TABLE VI.5: REASONS FOR SUGGESTING THE ADVANTAGES OF WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS\*

REASON	SWEDISH WORKERS		ENGLISH WORKERS	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
Economic factors	80	73.4	25	34.3
Working conditions - noise, lighting, ventilation, etc.	25	22.9	29	39.7
'Intrinsic' job factors	18	16.5	5	6.9
'Status' factors	20	18.4	25	34.3
Other and non-classifiable responses	13	11.9	18	24.7

\* 109 Swedish and 73 English workers said that there were advantages for white-collar workers but some people gave more than one reason, so the answers total more than 100 per cent.

There were important differences between the two groups in the reasons given by those people who thought that white-collar workers were advantaged. As Table VI.5 shows, almost three-quarters of the Swedish sample mentioned economic advantages compared with about one-third of the English workers; the latter tended to mention economic factors with the same frequency as 'status' factors, and working conditions. The reasons given for suggesting the advantages of white-collar workers included comments such as they were 'better paid' and acquired 'higher earnings'; for 'intrinsic' job factors, that 'their work is more interesting' and that 'they have more responsibility'; and for 'status' factors, that white-collar workers are 'looked up to', 'they have more prestige' and generally 'have better reputations in the community'.

Furthermore, feelings of resentment stimulated by this question, asking for their opinions about the major differences between factory and white-collar workers, were not the same for both samples. Both groups of workers

who perceived advantages for white-collar workers were asked: "Do you think that this is a good state of affairs? - 'Yes' or 'No'?" Only 6 per cent of the Swedish respondents claimed that it was a good state of affairs, while 93 per cent disapproved. On the other hand, 47 per cent of the English workers approved, while only 48 per cent held that it was a bad state of affairs.

The two samples were then asked a number of general questions about the economic rewards accruing to different social classes. As stated in Chapter Five, 118 and 119 of the Swedish and English samples respectively recognised the existence of social classes. Having named the classes<sup>12</sup> and described the composition of them<sup>13</sup>, the respondents were asked, "Which class do you think has done best economically over the past few years?". Their replies to this question are shown in Table VI.6.



TABLE VI.6: "WHICH CLASS DO YOU THINK HAS DONE BEST ECONOMICALLY OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS?"<sup>14</sup>

'Labels' mentioned by respondents in describing the class structure	Nos. of respondents mentioning specific classes in their description of the class structure (1)		Nos. of respondents stating that a specific class 'had done best' (2)		Percentage of respondents mentioning a specific class and who also stated it 'had done best' $\frac{(2)}{(1)} \times 100$	
	Swedish Workers	English Workers	Swedish Workers	English Workers	Swedish Workers	English Workers
1. 'Upper', 'Top', 'Higher Classes'	24	89	13	15	54.2	16.9
2. 'The Wealthy', 'Rich', 'Those with Plenty of Money'	14	19	9	4	64.3	21.1
3. 'Social Group I'	57	-	33	-	57.9	-
4. 'Middle Class'	19	90	5	29	26.3	32.2
5. 'White-Collar People'	20	1	10	-	50.0	-
6. 'Educated People'	5	1	3	1	60.0	100.0
7. 'Social Group II'	56	-	16	-	28.6	-
8. 'Social Group III'	47	-	7	-	14.9	-
9. 'Working Class'	46	89	12	51	26.1	57.3
10. 'Ordinary', 'Average People'	2	2	-	-	-	-
11. 'Lower Class'	2	21	1	3	50.0	14.3
12. 'The Poor', 'The Lower Paid'	7	8	-	3	-	37.5
13. Negative Evaluation ('Those who don't want to work', etc.)	10	1	-	-	-	-
Don't Know	-	-	9	13	-	-
TOTAL	-	-	118	119	-	-

In Table VI.6, column (1) gives the number of respondents of each sample that described the class structure by reference to various labels; this column, in fact, repeats the figures listed in Chapter Five, Table V.3. Column (2) specifies which class of those which they mentioned in describing the class structure they considered to have done best economically over the past few years. The final column then calculates the percentage of workers who, having mentioned a specific class, considered it 'to have done best'.

From Table VI.6 it is clear that the two samples had very different conceptions about which classes had made the most financial gains recently. For example, among those respondents that mentioned 'Upper', 'Top', or 'Higher' in their descriptions of the class structure, 54 per cent of the Swedish but only 17 per cent of the English considered this class to have experienced the greatest economic gains. There is a similar magnitude in the differences between the responses of the two samples among those who mentioned 'The Wealthy', 'Rich' and 'Those with plenty of money'; 64 per cent and 21 per cent of the Swedish and English samples respectively considered this class to 'have done best economically'. In addition, among those Swedish respondents who mentioned 'Social Group I' - which in many ways is comparable with the English 'Upper Class' - 58 per cent considered it to have made the greatest economic gains. On the other hand, among those respondents referring to 'Working Class' in their descriptions of the class structure, only 26 per cent of the Swedish respondents, compared with 57 per cent of the English, claimed that it 'had done best'. Consequently, the only interpretation to be taken from Table VI.6 is that the Swedish workers were much more likely than their English counterparts to believe that, over recent years, the greater economic gains had been enjoyed by the more dominant groups in society. The English respondents, by contrast, were more inclined to think that these had been achieved by the working class.



Although Table VI.6 describes which of the classes respondents mentioned in their conceptions of the class structure they felt had done best economically over recent years, it does not specify their own class self-placements. Consequently, it fails to show whether they felt their own economic position, or that of other groups, had enjoyed the greatest economic gains. This is analysed in Table VI.7 where respondents' own class-self-placements are cross-tabulated with their comments about which class 'has done best economically over the past few years'. For the purpose of classification, these opinions have been re-coded in terms of whether respondents referred to their 'own class' or to 'another class'.

TABLE VI.7: RESPONDENTS' CONCEPTIONS OF WHETHER THEIR 'OWN CLASS' OR 'ANOTHER CLASS' HAS DONE BEST ECONOMICALLY OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS'

RESPONDENTS' OWN CLASS SELF- PLACEMENT	CLASS WHICH 'HAS DONE BEST'											
	SWEDISH WORKERS						ENGLISH WORKERS					
	'OWN'		'ANOTHER'		TOTAL		'OWN'		'ANOTHER'		TOTAL	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%	NOS.	%	NOS.	%	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
'Middle Class'	3	27.3	8	72.7	11	100.0	14	60.9	9	39.1	23	100.0
'Social Group II'	12	40.0	18	60.0	30	100.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
'Social Group III'	6	24.0	19	76.0	25	100.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
'Average People'	-	-	2	100.0	2	100.0	-	-	2	100.0	2	100.0
'Working Class'	12	26.1	34	73.9	46	100.0	49	59.0	34	41.0	83	100.0
'Lower Class'	1	50.0	1	50.0	2	100.0	3	50.0	3	50.0	6	100.0
'The Poor'	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	75.0	1	25.0	4	100.0
Other & Non-classifiable responses	-	-	2	100.0	2	100.0	1	100.0	-	-	1	100.0
TOTAL	34	28.8	84	71.2	118	100.0	70	58.9	49	41.1	119	100.0

As Table VI.7 demonstrates, a far higher proportion of the Swedish workers considered that 'another class' had done best than the English; 71 per cent compared with 41 per cent. Conversely, only 29 per cent of the Swedish workers, but as many as 59 per cent of their English counterparts, felt their 'own class' to have acquired the highest economic gains. In view of these differences, it is interesting to enquire whether or not there were variations between the two samples in terms of feelings of resentment. It could, of course, be entirely possible that the Swedish workers approved of 'other classes' achieving greater economic rewards than themselves. In order to investigate this possibility, the two samples were asked: "How do you feel about this?", the responses to which were coded according to whether opinions of 'approval' or 'disapproval' were expressed. The results are presented in Table VI.8:

TABLE VI.8: RESPONDENTS' OPINIONS ABOUT THE ECONOMIC GAINS ACQUIRED BY THEIR 'OWN CLASS' AND 'ANOTHER CLASS' (in absolute numbers)\*

SWEDISH WORKERS

RESPONDENTS' OWN CLASS SELF-PLACEMENT	'OWN CLASS'			'ANOTHER CLASS'			TOTAL
	'APPROVE'	'DISAPPROVE'	DON'T KNOW	'APPROVE'	'DISAPPROVE'	DON'T KNOW	
'Middle' Class'	3	-	-	1	5	2	11
'Social Group II'	12	-	-	4	14	-	30
'Social Group III'	6	-	-	3	15	1	25
'Average People'	-	-	-	-	2	-	2
'Working Class'	12	-	-	2	30	2	46
'Lower Class'	1	-	-	-	1	-	2
'The Poor'	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other & Non-classifiable responses	-	-	-	-	2	-	2
TOTAL	34	-	-	10	69	5	118



ENGLISH WORKERS

RESPONDENTS' OWN CLASS SELF- PLACEMENT	'OWN CLASS'			'ANOTHER CLASS'			TOTAL
	'APPROVE'	'DISAPPROVE'	DON'T KNOW	'APPROVE'	'DISAPPROVE'	DON'T KNOW	
'Middle Class'	14	-	-	4	2	3	23
'Social Group II'	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
'Social Group III'	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
'Average People'	-	-	-	2	-	-	2
'Working Class'	48	-	1	20	8	6	83
'Lower Class'	2	1	-	1	2	-	6
'The Poor'	3	-	-	-	-	1	4
Other & Non- classifiable responses	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
TOTAL	68	1	1	27	12	10	119

\* In view of the small numbers involved, no percentage figures are given.

It is clear from Table VI.8 that for both the Swedish and the English workers, 'approval' was expressed by virtually 100 per cent of those claiming their 'own class' to have done best. However, there was a striking difference between the responses of the two groups when 'another class' was mentioned. Of the 84 Swedish respondents who mentioned 'another class', 82 per cent 'disapproved' and only 12 per cent 'approved'. Among the comparable 49 English workers, only 25 per cent 'disapproved' and as many as 55 per cent<sup>(27)</sup> 'approved'. Among these 27 English respondents, the classes most frequently mentioned were the 'Upper' and 'Middle' classes; these were specified by 41 per cent and 33 per cent of the workers respectively.

Table VI.8 clearly suggests that the Swedish workers were much more likely than the English to resent the greater economic gains which they perceived had

been acquired by other classes in society. In sharp contrast to these feelings, the English workers expressed such opinions as 'best of luck to them', 'I would do the same if I were them', 'it doesn't make any difference to me', 'it doesn't bother me', etc; indeed, statements which indicated that they perceived little or no social link between their own position and that of other groups in society. Accordingly, by comparison with the Swedish workers, they experienced little resentment.

These results, then, when taken together, suggest that there was a greater awareness of inequality among the Swedish workers than among the English. Furthermore, this awareness tended to be associated with heightened feelings of resentment. Indeed, the differences between the two samples are so striking that it is necessary to consider the degree to which the attitudes of the English respondents were atypical for those of English workers in general. As emphasised in Chapter Four, the samples cannot be regarded as representative of either the national populations or of industrial workers in the two countries. But the attitudes of the English respondents were such that they suggest rather more acquiescence than that which has been found among workers in many other industrial situations in Britain<sup>15</sup>. Since there was no attempt in this study to ascertain the relative representativeness of the English sample, it is only possible to speculate about some of the reasons for this. For example, labour-management relations - according to both senior management and local union officials - were considered to be good. Thus, the 'culture' of the factory was such that it was not conducive to generating feelings of resentment among employees. Indeed, this was probably reinforced by the community within which the factory was located: a town of 28,000 people which had no tradition of industrial disputes. Furthermore, at the time when the interview survey was undertaken - Spring 1970 - there appears to have been a low level of socio-political involvement in Britain; demonstrated, that is, by the low level of turnout among voters in the general election which was



held in that year<sup>16</sup>. These, then, are some of the factors which need to be taken into account in any attempt to relate the interview results for the English sample to the study of English manual workers in general; if only because the findings of various studies indicate that there are wide sources of diversity within the English working-class in terms of feelings of resentment and of levels of articulated protest<sup>17</sup>. However, even if the differences between the attitudes of the English and the Swedish groups of respondents were greater than those which would be produced by a comparative study of national samples, it does seem as though Swedish workers tend to be rather more aware of large-scale economic inequalities than their English counterparts. Particularly in view of the fact that the Swedish respondents in the present enquiry were comparable to the English workers in terms of a number of important respects<sup>18</sup> and especially since they were also chosen from a factory in which management-worker relations were considered to be good and also located in a community with a population of only 25,000 inhabitants, which, again, had no tradition of industrial conflict. Why, then, as far as the two samples of workers are concerned, were the Swedish respondents more aware of inequalities than the English?

Runciman has argued that in order to explain the experience of relative deprivation among individuals in society, it is necessary to take into account the reference groups which they adopt for the purpose of comparison. Consequently, he suggests that the resentment of class inequality in Britain is slight because individuals, particularly manual workers, tend to adopt highly restricted reference groups<sup>19</sup>. However, this does not appear to be the case in Sweden because, as the results of the interview survey demonstrated, the Swedish respondents adopted more broadly-based reference groups which incorporated both manual and non-manual workers. Thus, a factor to consider is the degree to which the respondents of the two samples had had immediate experiences of white-collar 'worlds'. If there were differences in these, it

could be conducive to variations in their knowledge of inequalities as they existed between manual and other groups in society. In order to investigate this possibility, the two samples were compared in terms of criteria likely to enable them to experience immediate white-collar influences, namely, patterns of social mobility as measured in terms of

- 1) the occupations of (a) their sons and (b) their fathers;
- 2) the social background of their wives, as represented by the occupations of their father-in-laws when they were first married,
- 3) the occupations of working wives.

The two samples were first compared in terms of the patterns of social mobility among their sons. But as the evidence presented in Chapter Five suggested, for both groups of respondents, similar numbers of sons were engaged in non-manual employment; only 7 and 6 of the Swedish and English samples respectively. Consequently, inter-generational upward mobility of this kind cannot be seen to have accounted for differences in their awareness of inequality. Therefore, the two samples were compared in relation to the occupations of their fathers. This was in order to ascertain whether the Swedish workers were more likely than the English to have been exposed to white-collar norms by virtue of their fathers' employment and to find out whether the frequency of downward mobility, of an inter-generational kind, was greater among the Swedish respondents. However, the evidence does not suggest this. Both samples were asked: "What was the title of your father's job when you left school?" The coded responses to this question are presented in Table VI.9:



TABLE VI.9: "WHAT WAS THE TITLE OF YOUR FATHER'S JOB  
WHEN YOU LEFT SCHOOL?"

FATHER'S OCCUPATION	SWEDISH WORKERS		ENGLISH WORKERS	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
Manual	89	73.0	98	76.6
Non-Manual	8	6.5	4	3.1
Self-Employed (Not Farmer)	7	5.7	7	5.5
Farmer	11	9.0	1	0.8
Farm Worker	3	2.5	11	8.6
Military (Conscription and Regular)	1	0.8	3	2.3
Don't Know	3	2.5	4	3.1
TOTAL	122	100.0	128	100.0

From Table VI.9 it is clear that there are no large differences between the two groups in terms of their fathers' occupations; 73 per cent of the Swedish sample were the sons of manual workers compared with 76 per cent of the English. The only major difference between them is in the proportion that were the sons of farmers; this was higher among the Swedish workers. However, this is unlikely to have provided a white-collar or middle-class 'experience' for these respondents since with one exception, they were the sons of farmers who worked small-holdings without the use of employed labour<sup>20</sup>. Accordingly, these sons - presently employed in manual work - cannot be seen to be downwardly-mobile. To say the least, a home background of this kind is hardly likely to generate an awareness and even less a resentment of inequalities as they exist between manual and white-collar workers in society. Therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest, on the basis of this evidence, that the Swedish workers were no more likely than the

English to have encountered white-collar life styles. Consequently, their heightened awareness of inequality, together with their more intense feelings of resentment, cannot be explained by/<sup>a</sup> more frequent experience of inter-generational, downward mobility. In view of this, it is worthwhile to consider the role of a further possible white-collar influence: the wives - both in terms of their social backgrounds and, if they are at work, their occupations.

The married respondents were asked: "What was your father-in-law's job when you got married?" Among the English workers there was a surprisingly large number who claimed that they did not know; this was stated by no less than 19 per cent of the 111 married respondents. By comparison, only 8 per cent of the 104 married Swedish workers gave a similar response. In view of this, the figures presented in Table VI.10 are for only those workers who were able to name the occupations of their wives' fathers;\*that is, for 96 and 90 of the Swedish and English respondents respectively.

TABLE VI.10: "WHAT WAS YOUR FATHER-IN-LAW'S JOB WHEN YOU GOT MARRIED?"\*

FATHER-IN-LAW'S OCCUPATION	SWEDISH WORKERS		ENGLISH WORKERS	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
Manual	56	58.3	53	58.9
Non-Manual	13	13.5	10	11.1
Self-Employed (Not Farmer)	12	12.5	9	10.0
Farmer	14	14.6	4	4.4
Farm Worker	1	0.1	12	13.4
Military (Conscription & Regular)	-	-	2	2.2
TOTAL	96	100.0	90	100.0



Table VI.10 indicates that there are close similarities between the two samples in terms of the occupational backgrounds of their wives. The only major differences are the proportions from different types of farming background; a far higher percentage of the Swedish wives were the daughters of farmers, while among the English respondents, more wives came from the homes of agricultural workers. However, only two of these 14 farmers employed workers. In view of this, it is difficult to regard these 14 wives as coming from middle-class homes in terms of life-styles and normative influences. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the social backgrounds of the respondents' wives were similar for both samples and as a result, cannot explain the different attitudes expressed by the two groups of workers.

But an alternative method by which the respondents' wives could have brought white-collar influences into their homes is by their employment. If, for example, they had clerical, secretarial and other kinds of white-collar jobs, they would be able to observe the privileges and rewards accruing to professional, managerial and other non-manual workers, and to convey these observations to their husbands. Of the 104 Swedish and the 111 English wives, 67 per cent and 61 per cent respectively held some kind of occupation. But among these, there were important differences between the two groups in terms of the proportions employed in white-collar jobs. No less than 80 per cent (56) of the Swedish working wives were engaged in white-collar employment compared with only 35 per cent (24) of the English wives. Similarly, only 20 per cent (14) of the Swedish wives were in manual employment by comparison with as many as 65 per cent (44) of their English counterparts. This does suggest, then, that a higher proportion of the Swedish respondents - because of the employment of their wives - were more likely than the English workers to be exposed to influences which were conducive to a heightened awareness of inequality as it existed between manual and other occupational groups.

Therefore, in order to test whether or not this was the case, the Swedish sample's responses to the question "Are there any people you can think of who are better off than workers like yourself?"<sup>21</sup> were cross-tabulated with the experience of having wives employed in non-manual occupations. The figures are presented in Table VI.11:

TABLE VI.11: SWEDISH RESPONDENTS' AWARENESS OF INEQUALITY  
RELATED TO THEIR WIVES' EMPLOYMENT

'ARE THERE ANY PEOPLE BETTER OFF THAN WORKERS LIKE YOURSELF?'	WIFE'S OCCUPATION			
	MANUAL		NON-MANUAL	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
Yes	10	71.5	42	75.0
No	1	7.1	6	10.7
Don't Know	3	21.4	8	14.3
TOTAL	14	100.0	56	100.0

Table VI.11 suggests that wives' occupations do not affect in any fundamental manner the Swedish respondents' awareness of inequality. Only 3 per cent more of those with wives in non-manual employment could think of 'people better off than themselves' than those workers with wives in manual jobs - 75 per cent compared with 72 per cent. Therefore, it appears that experiences of 'white-collar worlds' by the wives had little significance in determining the Swedish workers' conceptions of inequality.

Thus, the evidence suggests that the Swedish respondents were no more likely to be 'exposed' to white-collar influences within the family than their English counterparts; the two samples only appear to differ in this respect in terms of the occupations of their wives. However, this does not



seem to have been conducive to generating an experience of relative deprivation. Therefore, in order to understand the differences in attitudes of the two samples it appears necessary to consider the effects of influences other than those located within the immediate structural experiences of the respondents<sup>22</sup>.

Parkin has suggested that the awareness of inequality in capitalist societies is closely related to the relative influence of different ideologies<sup>23</sup>. He claims that in these societies that there are at least three kinds of meaning-systems, all of which have as one of their functions the interpretation of social and economic inequality. These are (1) the dominant value system, which endorses existing structures of inequality and becomes internalised by members of the 'under-class' in either 'aspirational' or 'deferential' terms<sup>24</sup>; (2) the subordinate value system, generated by the working-class community and which promotes an accommodative response to inequality; this is often reflected in terms of fatalism, resignation, limited levels of aspiration and an acceptance of existing structures of inequality as legitimate<sup>25</sup>; (3) the radical value system, with its source in the mass political party based on the working class and which promotes an oppositional interpretation of class inequality<sup>26</sup>.

Empirical studies that have been conducted in Britain have suggested that of these meaning-systems, the radical has been the least influential. Investigations have shown, for example, that not only the Labour Party, but also large sectors of the trade union movement, have given little emphasis to the grass-roots participation of rank-and-file members and to political socialisation<sup>27</sup>. As a result, the radical value system is largely ineffective among many sectors of manual workers in Britain in providing an oppositional interpretation of social inequality, with a consequence that inequality has been interpreted according to ideas inherent in either the dominant or subordinate value systems. Accordingly, the existing structure of inequality

has remained fundamentally unquestioned<sup>28</sup>.

In Sweden, on the other hand, has the development of working class institutions been more influential in providing oppositional interpretations of social and economic inequality? Differences in the frequency of relative deprivation, the adoption of reference groups and attitudes of resentment between the two samples of workers could then be regarded as a consequence of the differential degree to which they have been exposed to radical values. Of course, the reverse is also possible; there could be a more radical labour movement in Sweden simply because workers are more radical. Which, then, is cause and which is effect? This is a difficult relationship to unravel and perhaps it is inappropriate to pose the problem in this way. A better way to conceive of this relationship is in terms of mutual feedbacks; the attitudes of rank-and-file members will impose certain constraints upon the policies of their leaders but at the same time, leaders will shape the attitudes of rank-and-file members. In most circumstances, however, the latter is more likely to occur if only because of the highly bureaucratised structure of working class institutions. Certainly the evidence lends support to this contention.

In both samples union membership was 100 per cent, but there were striking differences between them in terms of their opinions about the aims of labour unions. Both groups of workers were asked the open-ended question: "What do you think should be the major aim of trade unions?":



TABLE VI.12: "WHAT DO YOU THINK SHOULD BE THE MAJOR AIM OF TRADE UNIONS?"

MAJOR AIM	SWEDISH WORKERS		ENGLISH WORKERS	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
Responses suggesting improved social justice, socialism	52	42.6	2	1.6
'To represent workers' interests'	3	2.5	17	13.4
Economic factors	48	39.4	72	55.9
Improved working conditions	12	9.8	30	23.6
'To protect the individual'	2	1.6	4	3.1
Other & Non-classifiable responses	5	4.1	2	1.6
Not recorded	-	-	1	0.8
TOTAL	122	100.0	128	100.0

Whereas substantial minorities of the Swedish sample stated either 'socialist' or economic factors, the former were hardly ever mentioned by the English workers, even if those respondents who made the general statement 'to represent workers' interests' are counted. Instead, the English sample tended to stress the need for unions to improve pay and working conditions, factors which suggested that respondents perceived trade unions in instrumental and economic ways rather than in ideological terms<sup>30</sup>. The Swedish workers, by contrast, when they mentioned 'socialist' factors tended to stress such things as the need to 'increase equality', to 'improve social justice' and 'to remove social injustices at the workplace'; sentiments which were not evident in the responses of the English sample.

As it has been suggested in earlier chapters, Labour unions in Sweden have adopted as an explicit objective, the need to increase equality. Particularly since the War, LO has pursued a policy of 'wage solidarity', the objective of which has been to negotiate with employers, wage increases which would, at the same time, reduce differentials between groups of manual

workers. Although this policy has had little consequence in narrowing differentials between groups of male manual workers, it has remained a desirable and a central goal of Labour union policy<sup>31</sup>. In Britain, on the other hand, despite the trade union movement expressing concern over low-wage groups and the desirability of a national minimum wage, it has never seriously pursued an explicit policy of 'wage solidarity' in the Swedish sense. But not only have Swedish Labour unions attempted to narrow differentials between categories of manual workers, they have also, as mentioned earlier, questioned differentials in terms of the wages, fringe benefits, conditions of employment and general working conditions as they exist between white-collar workers and manual workers<sup>32</sup>. Because Swedish manual and white-collar workers predominantly belong to unions which are affiliated to separate national confederations, manual and non-manual differentials are generally more salient in industrial bargaining than they are in Britain. LO can, therefore, pursue policies of 'equality' between white-collar workers and manual workers in a more explicit manner than is available to the Trade Union Congress in Britain, with its affiliation of both white-collar and manual unions<sup>33</sup>. Indeed, Fulcher has argued that the structure of collective bargaining in Sweden represents a highly institutionalised representation of class conflict<sup>34</sup>.

All this has created in Sweden a general awareness of differences in the economic conditions of manual and non-manual workers; a situation which has led to the adoption of broadly-based, cross-class, reference groups among manual workers and a consciousness of relative deprivation<sup>35</sup>. In fact, this pattern has been reinforced by the activities of the Social Democratic Party which, over recent years, has questioned the legitimacy of manual/non-manual differentials<sup>36</sup>.

Both samples of workers were asked if they had voted in the last election; 98 per cent of the Swedish workers claimed they had compared with 88 per cent



of the English sample. These respondents were then asked: "If a General Election were to be held in the near future, which party would you vote for?"<sup>37</sup>. Among these Swedish workers 81 per cent declared their allegiance to the Social Democratic Party and 68 per cent of the English respondents said they would vote for Labour. These respondents were then asked: "Why would you vote in this way?"

TABLE VI.13: "WHY WOULD YOU VOTE IN THIS WAY?"\*

REASONS	SWEDISH WORKERS		ENGLISH WORKERS	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
General 'Working Class' identification with Labour/Social Democrats	64	66.7	50	64.9
Family traditions	5	5.2	8	10.4
Economic factors	42	43.8	15	19.5
'Socialist' policies	17	17.7	4	5.2
'Welfare' policies	69	71.9	23	29.9
Other and non-classifiable responses	26	27.1	18	23.4

\* Asked of those people who said that they had voted in the last General Election and who also claimed that they would vote for the Social Democratic or Labour Party in the next. Some people gave more than one answer so that the numbers add to more than 100 per cent.

For both samples there was a 'generalised' working class identification with the political party. But as Table VI.13 shows, although they were a small minority of both samples, more than three times as many Swedish workers as English mentioned 'socialist' policies; these responses included such statements as 'they are more likely<sup>to</sup>/increase equality', 'they are more likely to make a more just society', 'we haven't achieved equality yet'. At the

same time more than 70 per cent of the Swedish respondents perceived the Social Democrats as the party most likely to improve social benefits and to develop the welfare state; factors mentioned by less than one-third of the English workers.

Over recent years, issues of equality and social justice have been at the centre of political debate in Sweden to the extent that in the 1970 General Election, the Social Democratic Party adopted 'Increased Equality' ('Ökad Jämlikhet') as its election slogan. This was supported by other statements, many of which were financed by specific labour unions and by LO and which included 'We shall remove social injustices at work' and 'Dangers at work will be removed'. The British Labour Party, on the other hand, has not stressed issues of inequality when it has been in government, nor has it made them the centre of its electoral campaign<sup>38</sup>. In presenting itself as the champion of social justice, the Social Democratic Party has generated a sense of relative deprivation among manual workers which exists to a greater degree than among large sectors of the working class in England.

Furthermore, Social Democracy in Sweden has led to the development of an achievement-orientated, 'open' and egalitarian ideology, which has had important implications for the experience of relative deprivation. As Lipset and Trow have suggested, "An egalitarian, 'open class' value system with its less rigid social structures may actually engender more immediate discontent among low socio-economic groups, than does a more rigidly stratified structure. An open-class value system leads workers to define inequalities in income and status between themselves and others as illegitimate more frequently than do workers in countries which have more sharply and rigidly defined social structures"<sup>39</sup>. But as the evidence in Chapter Three suggested that economic inequalities and mobility chances are much the same in Sweden as they are in England, the social structure of the former is no less rigid than the latter. As a result, differences in the frequency of relative deprivation between the



two samples of workers must be seen to be more as a consequence of differences in meaning-systems than to any structural variations between either the immediate situations of the two samples or of the two countries.

However, it is appropriate at this point to refer to an apparent contradiction in the attitudes of the Swedish workers. In this discussion, considerable emphasis has been given to the Social Democratic ideology of egalitarianism and the degree to which it has shaped attitudes. But why should this ideology have created an awareness of inequalities in economic rewards but not in mobility chances? A possible explanation is that - according to Social Democratic appeals - equality of opportunity has already been achieved, especially by the reforms of the educational system which were undertaken during the 1950's and the 1960's<sup>40</sup>. Hence the introduction of a comprehensive system of education, together with the debate which this has generated, appears to have created a public ethos of equal opportunity<sup>41</sup>. However, the Swedish working-class movement has made no such claims in terms of its discussion about the structure of economic rewards. The Social Democratic Party, particularly since the late 1960's, has increasingly emphasised the need to increase economic equality and in doing so it has focused upon the persisting inequalities of Swedish society<sup>42</sup>. Thus, in order to retain rank-and-file allegiance, it has presented itself as the only movement in Sweden capable of at least reducing existing differentials; an appeal which has been further supported by the arguments of LO. In this way, an awareness of existing inequalities has been created among industrial manual workers. This has been reinforced by the structure of Swedish unionism, which, during national wage negotiations, illuminates differences in the economic rewards accruing to various occupational categories<sup>43</sup>. Therefore, although on the face of it the attitudes of the Swedish respondents were contradictory in the sense that they were aware of inequalities in patterns of economic rewards but not in mobility chances, the political objective of

egalitarianism, as developed by the working-class movement, explains these differences.

This chapter suggests, then, that contrasts in the awareness of inequality between the two samples was a function of variations in the meaning-systems to which they were exposed. The greater knowledge of 'objective' inequality articulated by the Swedish workers appears to have been a consequence of the impact of radical values, articulated by working-class institutions. If this interpretation is correct, then it highlights a dilemma of Social Democratic governments in capitalist countries. It seems that aspirations are heightened and the experience of relative deprivation among rank-and-file supporters, particularly manual workers, increases. But the institutions of capitalism generate various degrees of economic and social inequality. Accordingly, it may be appropriate to consider Social Democracy in capitalist societies as a 'transitional' phenomenon so that over the long term, two possible developments could be expected. Disillusionment could become so widespread among manual workers that there is a shift in support for more 'right-wing' political parties. Alternatively, there could be increased government intervention in the economy so that ultimately the means of production are publicly owned and a socialist society established. If this were to occur then the whole process could be regarded as one in which, in the initial stages, Social Democratic and union leaders generate heightened experiences of relative deprivation in order to command and later maintain the support of rank-and-file members, but at a later stage this leads to the adoption of more 'radical' policies. But irrespective of either of these alternatives, it appears that, at present, an ideology of egalitarianism and the persistence of structural inequalities has generated in Sweden inevitable tensions. To what extent, then, have these tensions affected the legitimacy of the labour movement among industrial workers and particularly among the Swedish respondents? This issue is investigated in the next chapter.



## NOTES

1. W. RUNCIMAN, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, London, 1966.
2. WESTERGAARD, however, in a reinterpretation of Runciman's findings, has suggested that the awareness of inequality, together with feelings of discontent, was probably greater among the respondents than Runciman claimed. See J. WESTERGAARD, The Rediscovery of the Cash Nexus, Socialist Register, London, 1970.
3. J. GOLDTHORPE, D. LOCKWOOD, F. BECHHOFFER and J. PLATT, The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure, Cambridge, 1969, Chap. 5.
4. See, for example, R. MILIBAND, The State in Capitalist Society, London, 1969. For a discussion of the development of industrialisation in different capitalist societies and how this has affected forms of working-class consciousness in Europe, the United States and Japan, see A. GIDDENS, The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies, London, 1973.
5. W. RUNCIMAN, op. cit., p. 192.
6. As in Chapter Five, only rounded-up percentages are given in the text.
7. See Chapter Three.
8. In ranking the earnings of male wage-earners in 13 industries, a United Nations enquiry found that construction workers came 'first' in Sweden and 'sixth' in Britain. See UNITED NATIONS, Incomes in Post-War Europe, Geneva, 1967, Table 5.2.
9. W. RUNCIMAN, op. cit., Chap. 10, Table 20.

10. For data on the two countries, see Chap. Three; and for the two factories, Chap. Four.
11. For the relevant data, see Chap. Five.
12. See Table V.3.
13. See Table V.6.
14. For the ways in which respondents defined the classes which they mentioned, see Table V.6.
15. See, for example, T. LANE and K. ROBERTS, Strike at Pilkingtons, London, Harmondsworth, 1971; H. BEYNON, Working for Ford, London, 1973; and R. BROWN, P. BRANNEN, J. COUSINS and M. SAMPHIER, 'The Contours of Solidarity: Social Stratification and Industrial Relations in Shipbuilding', Brit. Jour. Ind. Rel., Vol. 10, (1972). Studies which have suggested relatively high degrees of acquiescence include R. MCKENZIE and A. SILVER, Angels in Marble, London, 1968; J. GOLDTHORPE, et al., op. cit.; and W. RUNCIMAN, op. cit. However, WESTERGAARD has suggested that these studies underestimate the degree of discontent which is articulated by sectors of the working class. See J. WESTERGAARD, op. cit.
16. See, for example, R. ROSE, 'Voting Trends Surveyed' in The Times, Guide to the House of Commons 1970, London, 1970.
17. Indeed, there is a need to synthesise the evidence on patterns of protest, resentment and acquiescence within the working class. Lockwood has touched upon some of these. See D. LOCKWOOD, 'Sources of Variation in Working Class Images of Society', Sociological Rev., Vol. 14, (1966).
18. See Chapter Four.
19. W. RUNCIMAN, op. cit.



20. If a respondent mentioned his father was a farmer he was asked whether or not he had any employees. This was in order to differentiate crudely between 'large' and 'small' farmers.
21. See Table VI.1.
22. Of course, this analysis has not discussed all of the possible structural influences. For example, it has not considered the social composition of the neighbourhoods in which the respondents lived; a factor which could have affected their awareness of economic inequalities. Thus, if they lived in 'mixed' neighbourhoods in which there were both non-manual and manual workers, it is possible that they would have been more likely to have been aware of inequalities than if they lived in neighbourhoods consisting of only manual workers.
23. F. PARKIN, Class Inequality and Political Order, London, 1971, Chap. 3.
24. Parkin defines 'aspirational' as 'a view of the reward structure which emphasises the opportunities for self-advancement and social promotion' and 'deferential' as 'a view of the social order as an organic entity in which each individual has a part to play, however humble. Inequality is seen as inevitable as well as just, some men being inherently fitted for positions of power and privilege'. F. PARKIN, op. cit., p. 85.
25. 'Insofar as it is possible to characterise a complex set of normative arrangements by a single term, the subordinate value system could be said to be essentially accommodative; that is to say its representation of the class structure and inequality emphasises various modes of adaptation, rather than either full endorsement of, or opposition to, the status quo.' F. PARKIN, op. cit., p. 88.

26. 'The radical value system purports to demonstrate the systematic nature of class inequality and attempts to reveal a connectedness between man's personal fate and the wider political order'. F. PARKIN, op. cit., p. 97.
27. See, for example, J. GOLDTHORPE, D. LOCKWOOD, F. BECHHOFFER and J. PLATT, The Affluent Worker: Political Attitudes and Behaviour, Cambridge, 1968; and B. HINDESS, The Decline of Working Class Politics, London, 1971.
28. Although Westergaard has suggested that the level of radicalism is probably greater than that which has been suggested by several sociological studies. See J. WESTERGAARD, op. cit.
29. R. MICHELS was one of the first to stress/<sup>that</sup> the bureaucratisation of organisations leads to the development of oligarchical tendencies. See R. MICHELS, Political Parties, New York, 1962. For a summary of the structure of the Swedish trade union movement, see T. JOHNSTON, Collective Bargaining in Sweden, London, 1962.
30. This finding is consistent with the results reported in J. GOLDTHORPE, D. LOCKWOOD, F. BECHHOFFER and J. PLATT, The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour, Cambridge, 1968, Chap. 5.
31. This is discussed in Chapter Three.
32. See Chapter Three.
33. This point is discussed in Chapter Two.
34. J. FULCHER, 'Class Conflict in Sweden', Sociology, Vol. 7, (1973).
35. The roles of political and labour union leaders in defining the references groups of rank-and-file members is discussed by S. LIPSET and M. TROW, 'Reference Group Theory and Trade Union Wage Policy', in M. KOMAROVSKY, (ed.), Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences, Glencoe, 1957.



36. See Chapter Three.
  37. In fact, general elections were held in both countries in 1970; the year when the social survey was conducted. The interviewing was completed before the respective 'campaigns' had started.
  38. Until, that is, the two election campaigns of 1974, when it gave rather more attention to issues of equality and social justice than in the elections of 1964, 1966 and 1970.
  39. S. LIPSET and M. TROW, op. cit., p. 401.
  40. See, for example, the statements in A. MYRDAL, Towards Equality, Stockholm, 1971.
  41. See Chapter Five.
  42. In this it has made considerable use of the findings of the Commission on Low Incomes which demonstrated the persisting economic inequalities of Swedish society. See, for example, Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU), Svenska Folkets Inkomster (The Income of the Swedish Population), Stockholm, 1970.
  43. See Chapter Two for a discussion of this point.
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## CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCEPTIONS OF POWER AMONG THE TWO SAMPLES

It has been emphasised in previous chapters that the Swedish labour movement enjoys far greater legitimacy among industrial manual workers than its British counterpart. For example, it was suggested that the Swedish respondents' conceptions of the class structure, together with their opinions about the possibilities for individual upward mobility, were largely a consequence of certain 'meritocratic' ideas emphasised by the Social Democratic Party<sup>1</sup>. At the same time, it was argued that that the egalitarian objectives of the Party, together with those of the trade union movement, had heightened their general awareness of economic inequalities<sup>2</sup>. It was further suggested that in Britain, by contrast, the Labour Party and the trade union movement have exercised less influence upon the attitudes of industrial manual workers so that these institutions have been less significant in shaping workers' attitudes towards the class structure. As a result, the English respondents appeared to have a limited awareness of class inequality as it exists in contemporary Britain. Furthermore, it has been argued that the power structure of Sweden probably represents the interests of industrial manual workers to a far greater extent than that of Britain<sup>3</sup>. Consequently, the objectives of dominant economic groups, representing the interests of various institutions of private property, are more 'constrained' and 'checked' by the Swedish labour movement than they are in Britain by the equivalent working-class institutions.

The objective of this chapter is to investigate the two samples' conceptions of power in society and more specifically, to study their



attitudes towards the Labour movement. In this way, an attempt will be made to ascertain the levels of legitimacy of the respective Labour movements among the two samples and the degree to which these movements are perceived as influential forces within the power structures of the two countries. Therefore, the two groups of workers will be compared in terms of their attitudes towards trade unionism, the Labour and Social Democratic Parties, and the exercise of power in society.

Although membership was not compulsory, 100 per cent of both samples belonged to trade unions. Despite this, they were asked: "Is it compulsory for you to belong to a trade union in your job?" In reply to this question, 66 per cent of the Swedish and 78 per cent of the English workers claimed that it was<sup>4</sup>. These respondents were then asked: "Do you think that it is a good thing or a bad thing?" There was an interesting difference between the two samples in their answers; whereas 96 per cent (78) of the Swedish workers stated that it was "a good thing", this opinion was expressed by 68 per cent (68) of the relevant English respondents. Conversely, only 4 per cent (3) of the Swedish respondents claimed it was a "bad thing" compared with as many as 32 per cent (32) of the English. The respondents of both samples were then asked: "Why do you think it is a good (or bad) thing?" Their coded replies to this question are reported in Table VII.1:

TABLE VII.1: "WHY DO YOU THINK IT IS A GOOD (OR BAD) THING?"  
(that it is compulsory to belong to a trade union)\*

RESPONSES SUGGESTING THAT:	SWEDISH WORKERS				ENGLISH WORKERS			
	'GOOD'		'BAD'		'GOOD'		'BAD'	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
It strengthens the bargaining power of workers	67	85.9	-	-	13	19.1	-	-
Everyone should belong because they all receive the benefits	9	11.5	-	-	49	72.1	-	-
It restricts individual freedom	-	-	3	100.0	-	-	31	96.9
Other and non-classifiable responses	1	1.3	-	-	6	8.8	1	3.1
Don't Know	1	1.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	78	100.0	3	100.0	68	100.0	32	100.0

\* Asked of the 81 and 100 Swedish and English workers respectively who considered that union membership was compulsory.

As Table VII.1 suggests, 86 per cent of the Swedish sample who thought that union membership was compulsory, considered it to be 'a good thing' because they felt it strengthened the negotiating position of workers. Consequently, they made such statements as 'solidarity gives strength', 'if you all stick together, things can be done', 'it strengthens our position against managers', etc. Among the comparable English workers, by contrast, only 19 per cent made comments of this kind, while a further 72 per cent said it was 'a good thing' because everybody took advantage of the benefits. Hence, they stated that 'everyone should belong and pay their dues because



they all reap the rewards', 'why should some pay for the benefit of others?' and 'everybody gets the benefits of a wage increase'. In other words, whereas the Swedish workers stressed the positive advantages of 'collective action' and 'solidarity', the English workers were more alarmed about the possibilities of some colleagues enjoying advantages which had been brought about by the efforts of others. Indeed, the Swedish workers appeared to be thinking about the role of trade unions in relation to other groups in society, while the English respondents tended to be more 'introspective' and concerned about union membership among manual workers. Finally, of the 32 English workers who considered that compulsory union membership was 'a bad thing', no less than 97 per cent made comments which suggested they felt it infringed individual freedom in some way. Consequently, these respondents often made such remarks as 'it restricts individual choice', 'it limits individual freedom', 'it takes away the liberty of the individual' and so on. In fact, if these workers are regarded as a proportion of the total sample, then no less than 24 per cent of the 128 English workers were opposed to the idea that union membership should be compulsory; by comparison, this opinion was shared by only 2 per cent of the 122 Swedish respondents. Therefore, the evidence suggests - if only indirectly - that 'collectivistic' sentiments were more widely shared among the Swedish workers. In other words, the legitimacy of compulsory union membership and, perhaps, union membership in general, was better established among the Swedish workers than their English counterparts. At the same time, however, the Swedish sample appeared to be more interested in union affairs. This was reflected in two ways - the frequency of attendance at local meetings and the proportion that held positions within the local branch.

Both samples were asked: "How often do you go to union meetings? Would you say that you went regularly, occasionally, rarely, or never?" Among the Swedish workers, 15 per cent claimed that they attended 'regularly' and a

further 30 per cent stated that they went 'occasionally'. For the English respondents, by comparison, only 8 per cent and 20 per cent gave similar replies. Furthermore, whereas 15 per cent of the Swedish sample said that they never attended meetings, this was claimed by no less than 39 per cent of the English workers. In other words, as many as two-fifths of the English respondents never attended a union meeting<sup>5</sup>. Indeed, the greater involvement of the Swedish workers in union affairs was confirmed by the higher proportion that were union officials. The respondents of both samples were asked: "Do you hold any position in your present trade union?" In their replies, twice as many of the Swedish than the English workers claimed that they did; 15 per cent compared with 7 per cent. Although the positions mentioned by these Swedish workers ranged from 'local secretary' to 'assistant flag-bearer', the higher proportion of these respondents holding office does illustrate an important difference between the role of trade unions within the two workplaces. The 'density' of active union members, measured not only in terms of the proportion that were local officials but also by the frequency of attendance at branch meetings, was far greater in the Swedish workplace than in the English. Thus, the national union in Sweden was, potentially, in a better position to generate a greater degree of involvement among its 'grass-roots' members than its English counterpart. Consequently, it was possible for the Swedish union to influence more effectively the attitudes of workers and to reinforce their commitment to the organisation. In other words, the higher proportion of union 'influentials' in the Swedish workplace meant that the union could use them in order to publicise official policies among rank-and-file members and as agents of political socialisation. In fact, these local officials appear to have been more highly regarded by the Swedish respondents than by their English counterparts. The two samples were asked: "Do you think that local union officials represent the interests of the ordinary members?" For the purposes of this question, it was explained to



the respondents that 'local union officials' referred to shop stewards as well as to branch officials<sup>6</sup>. Among the 104 Swedish workers who were not officials, 76 per cent claimed that they did, compared with 64 per cent of the comparable English respondents. Only 22 per cent of the Swedish, compared with 33 per cent of the English workers, considered that local union officials did not represent the interests of ordinary members and a further 2 per cent and 3 per cent of the Swedish and English samples respectively claimed they did not know. The respondents who were not local union officials and who felt that these officials did not represent the interests of ordinary members were then asked: "Why is this?" The coded responses are shown in Table VII.2:

TABLE VII.2: "WHY IS THIS?" (that Local Union Officials do not represent the interests of the ordinary members)\*

RESPONSES SUGGESTING THAT:	SWEDISH WORKERS		ENGLISH WORKERS	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
They only think of themselves	10	43.5	16	41.0
They are too closely allied with management	1	4.3	15	38.5
Other and Non-classifiable responses	6	26.1	8	20.5
Don't Know	6	26.1	-	-
TOTAL	23	100.0	39	100.0

\* Asked of the 23 Swedish and the 39 English workers who were not local officials and who felt such officials did not represent the interests of ordinary members.

Table VII.2 indicates that similar proportions of these respondents in both samples considered that local union officials did not represent their interests because of a range of 'selfish' reasons. A number of respondents

felt, for example, that local officials were only interested in 'working their way up the union', 'advancing their own interests' and 'looking after number one'. But a far smaller proportion of the Swedish workers claimed that local union officials did not represent their interests because they were too closely identified with management. A number of English workers, for instance, stated that 'they always side with management', 'they are too much with the managers', 'they're more concerned with the managers' interests than with ours'.

The inference to be drawn from these results, then, is that a far higher proportion of the English than of the Swedish sample were 'estranged' from the local union. They were more likely to be suspicious of local officials and as a result, this restricted the degree to which these officials could be used in order to shape and influence opinions. The national union could hardly use them effectively as agents of political socialisation, if only because they were regarded with suspicion by a substantial minority of the ordinary members. Among the Swedish workers, on the other hand, and despite the fact that there was a minority of respondents who were sceptical of their local officials, there was a greater belief that they did represent the interests of ordinary members. Even when officials were regarded as pursuing their own self-interests, they were not considered to be 'taking the side of management', in the same way as they were regarded by members of the English sample. In view of this, together with the greater level of active participation in local union affairs, it does seem reasonable to suggest that the Swedish respondents were more likely than the English to feel 'integrated' into the local union structure.

However, when respondents were asked for their opinions about national union leaders, the Swedish workers seemed to be more dissatisfied than their English counterparts. Both samples were asked: "Do you think that union leaders at the national level represent the interests of the ordinary members?" Among the total Swedish sample - local union officials as well as ordinary



members - 43 per cent claimed that they did, 55 per cent stated that they did not and 2 per cent said they did not know. Among the English respondents, 52 per cent felt that national union leaders did represent their interests, while 44 per cent claimed that they did not and 4 per cent stated that they did not know. Thus, the Swedish workers appeared to feel more estranged from their national leaders than their English equivalents. Was it that they felt national leaders were primarily concerned with pursuing their own self-interests or because they perceived of organisational difficulties which prevented good communications between leaders and rank-and-file members? In order to investigate this, the samples were asked: "Why is this?" (that national leaders do not represent the interests of ordinary members).

TABLE VII.3: "WHY IS THIS?" (that national leaders do not represent the interests of ordinary members)\*

RESPONSES SUGGESTING:	SWEDISH WORKERS		ENGLISH WORKERS	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
They have not obtained greater social justice or equality for workers	9	13.4	-	-
There are organisational problems	27	40.3	7	12.5
They only think of themselves	6	9.0	33	58.9
They are not interested in the individual workers	14	20.9	8	14.3
Other and Non-classifiable responses	8	11.9	7	12.5
Don't Know	3	4.5	1	1.8
TOTAL	67	100.0	56	100.0

\* Asked of the 67 Swedish and 56 English respondents who felt that national union leaders did not represent the interests of the ordinary members.

From Table VII.3 it is evident that the Swedish workers were less likely than the English respondents to question the legitimacy of their leaders. Among those who considered that these leaders did not represent the interests of ordinary members, as many as 40 per cent considered this to be a function of organisational size<sup>7</sup>. By comparison, as many as 58 per cent of the English workers (but only 9 per cent of the Swedish) felt that national leaders did not represent the objectives of ordinary members because of self-interested motives. Furthermore, there was an interesting difference between the two groups of workers in that there was a small minority of Swedish respondents who felt that national leaders had not represented members' interests since they had not obtained greater equality or social justice for them. If, as it was suggested in Chapter Six, union leaders have been largely instrumental in generating a heightened sense of relative deprivation among their members, then it could be that this in turn is creating feelings of resentment, particularly in terms of attitudes towards union leadership. However, only 7 per cent of the total Swedish sample held these opinions and whether or not this will increase in the immediate future can only be a matter of conjecture<sup>8</sup>. But it is also clear that a far higher proportion of the total English sample were suspicious of the motives of their national leaders; whereas only 5 per cent of all the Swedish workers considered that these leaders were motivated by self-interest, this opinion was shared by no less than 26 per cent of their English counterparts. Consequently, it appears that the English sample incorporated a far larger proportion of workers who were suspicious of their national union leaders.

All this suggests in terms of participation at branch meetings, the 'density' of active union members and the general level of legitimacy enjoyed by local and, to some extent, national officials, that the Swedish respondents were more involved in the activities of union affairs than their English counterparts. As a result, the Swedish union was able to exercise a greater



degree of normative influence on its members and thereby shape, in a more effective way, their attitudes and beliefs. This is confirmed by the extent to which LO's policies of wage solidarity and of greater economic equality in the earnings of various manual and non-manual occupational groups have been accepted by rank-and-file members. As reported in Chapter Six, when asked "What do you think should be the major aim of trade unions?", no less than 43 per cent of the Swedish, compared with only 2 per cent of the English workers, gave replies suggesting the need for greater social justice and for more equality<sup>9</sup>. In other words, they appeared to be expressing opinions which had been presented to them by the trade union leadership and to some extent, by the Social Democratic Party<sup>10</sup>. Furthermore, as many as 48 per cent of these 52 Swedish workers felt that trade unions had been either 'extremely successful' or 'successful' in achieving this aim; a surprisingly high percentage in view of their general awareness of inequality as it existed between manual workers and other occupational groups in society<sup>11</sup>. Perhaps this is indicative of the degree to which the respondents accepted the legitimacy of trade unionism. Although they recognised the existence of inequalities in Sweden, a substantial proportion felt that trade unions were playing an active role in reducing them.

Similarly, the Social Democratic Party appears to have attained a higher level of support among the Swedish respondents than the Labour Party among the English sample. Both groups of respondents were asked: "Did you vote in the last general election?"; elections, that is, which were held in Sweden in 1968 and in Britain in 1966. In reply to this question, 98 per cent of the Swedish and 88 per cent of the English sample claimed that they had. They were then asked two further questions: "Which party did you vote for in the last general election?" and "If a general election were to be held in the near future, which party would you vote for?" By comparing their replies to these two questions, it is possible to ascertain the degree of respondents'

political loyalty during the latter part of the 1960's as expressed in terms of voting behaviour. Party preferences in the English general election of 1966 and in the 1968 Swedish election are given in Table VII.4:

TABLE VII.4: "WHICH PARTY DID YOU VOTE FOR IN THE LAST GENERAL ELECTION?"\*

POLITICAL PARTY	SWEDISH WORKERS (1968)		ENGLISH WORKERS (1966)	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
Social Democratic	103	86.6	-	-
Folk	3	2.5	-	-
Centre	4	3.4	-	-
Högers	1	0.8	-	-
K.D.S.**	2	1.7	-	-
Communist	3	2.5	-	-
Refused to disclose	3	2.5	4	3.5
Did not know/could not recall	-	-	6	5.3
Labour	-	-	81	71.7
Conservative	-	-	15	13.3
Liberal	-	-	7	6.2
TOTAL	119	100.0	113	100.0

\* The elections were held in 1966 and 1968 in England and Sweden respectively. This question was asked of those respondents who claimed to have voted.

\*\* Kristen Demokratisk Samling (Christian Democratic Union).

It is clear from Table VII.4 that among those who voted in the 1966 and 1968 general elections, a rather higher proportion of the Swedish workers voted for the Social Democratic Party than of the English sample who voted for the Labour Party<sup>12</sup>. Indeed, the difference is more marked if the proportions that voted for these two parties are calculated on the basis of the total samples rather than as percentages of those that voted. All the



workers in both samples were eligible to participate in general elections and so those respondents who abstained can be regarded as 'committing a political act' in the same way as those who voted. In fact, to abstain from voting is considered by some social scientists to be indicative of feelings of alienation and of a lack of involvement in general socio-political issues<sup>13</sup>. Therefore, if these abstainers are also included for the purposes of calculation, then 84 per cent of the total sample of Swedish workers claimed that they voted for the Social Democratic Party in 1968 compared with only 63 per cent of the total English sample in 1966. Since both samples consisted of industrial manual workers and could thus be regarded as the bases for 'solid' Social Democratic and Labour support, it is clear that the Swedish party had achieved a greater degree of penetration among this group than the equivalent English institution; whereas the Social Democratic Party appears to have succeeded in acquiring more than four-fifths of its potential support among the Swedish sample, the Labour Party had obtained little more than three-fifths.

These patterns seem to have persisted in the 1970 general elections. Those respondents who claimed that they had voted in 1966 and 1968 - 113 and 119 of the English and Swedish samples respectively - were asked: "If a general election were to be held in the near future, which party would you vote for?" The answers to this question are given in Table VII.5:

TABLE VII.5: "IF A GENERAL ELECTION WERE TO BE HELD IN THE NEAR FUTURE, WHICH PARTY WOULD YOU VOTE FOR?"\*

POLITICAL PARTY	SWEDISH WORKERS (1970)		ENGLISH WORKERS (1970)	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
Social Democratic	96	80.7	-	-
Folk	3	2.5	-	-
Centre	5	4.2	-	-
Höger	-	-	-	-
K.D.S.	2	1.7	-	-
Communist	3	2.5	-	-
Refused to disclose	3	2.5	3	2.7
Don't Know	7	5.9	1	0.9
Labour	-	-	77	68.1
Conservative	-	-	18	15.9
Liberal	-	-	14	12.4
TOTAL	119	100.0	113	100.0

Again, as Table VII.5 suggests, the Social Democratic Party enjoyed a far greater support than the Labour Party among the respective samples. Indeed, the Social Democratic voters of the 1968 election appeared to be far more loyal to the party than were the Labour voters of the 1966 general election. Among the 1968 Social Democratic voters, as many as 93 per cent claimed that they would vote for the party again in 1970, whereas among the 1966 Labour voters, 81 per cent thought they would vote for the party again in 1970. In other words, this evidence suggests that commitment to the Social Democratic Party - as measured in terms of voting behaviour - was greater among the Swedish workers than that to the Labour Party among their English counterparts. This was further confirmed by respondents' replies to a number of questions which asked for their opinions about improvements in conditions of employment and standards of living.



Both samples were asked: "Do you think that employment conditions have improved for factory workers since the war?"<sup>14</sup> An overwhelming majority of the workers in both samples claimed that they had: 93 per cent and 98 per cent of the total Swedish and English samples respectively. These respondents were then asked: "In what ways do you think they have improved?" The coded responses are shown in Table VII.6:

TABLE VII.6: "IN WHAT WAYS DO YOU THINK THEY (EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS) HAVE IMPROVED?" \*

IMPROVEMENTS IN:	SWEDISH WORKERS		ENGLISH WORKERS	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
Physical conditions - noise, lighting, ventilation	37	32.7	103	81.8
Work tasks	64	56.6	44	34.9
Manager/Worker relationships	5	4.4	11	8.7
Welfare benefits	17	15.0	3	2.4
Shorter working hours	30	26.5	27	21.4
Wage rates	39	34.5	13	10.3
'Social justice' and 'Equality'	26	23.0	4	3.2
Other and Non-classifiable responses	9	7.9	9	7.1

\* Asked of those 113 Swedish and 126 English respondents who claimed that employment conditions had improved. Since most workers mentioned more than one factor, the figures add to more than 100 per cent.

Among those of the Swedish sample who felt that employment conditions had improved, 57 per cent mentioned 'work tasks', making such comments as 'the new machinery has made work easier', 'the jobs are not so tiring now' and 'you don't have to carry things about so much today'. A further 33 per cent referred to improvements in the physical conditions of the factory - lighting, heating, and ventilation and 34 per cent mentioned improvements in

wage rates. Twenty seven per cent mentioned shorter working hours but as many as 23 per cent suggested that there was now more 'social justice' and 'equality' in the workplace. Among these responses there were a number of statements which suggested that 'the individual has more rights now than before', 'managers treat the workers more on equal terms', 'there is less of a division between white-collar workers and the rest of us'. By contrast, 82 per cent of the English workers referred to improvements in the physical conditions of the workplaces, 35 per cent to better 'work tasks', 21 per cent to shorter working hours, and only 3 per cent to 'social justice' and 'equality'. But it is interesting that such a high proportion of the English workers should have referred to 'physical' improvements, since, as it was shown in Chapter Five, in their comparisons with white-collar workers, they tended to be more discontented about these than about their earnings and their chances for promotion. On the face of it, this suggests a possible contradiction in the attitudes of the respondents. However, this need not necessarily have been the case; it is quite possible for the respondents to have been aware of improvements in physical working conditions as these may have occurred over a period of time, but still feel that these were less satisfactory than those enjoyed by white-collar workers.

Those respondents who considered that employment conditions had improved for factory workers since the War were then asked: "What do you think is the major factor which has brought this about?" The coded answers are presented in Table VII.7:



TABLE VII.7: "WHAT DO YOU THINK IS THE MAJOR FACTOR WHICH HAS BROUGHT THIS ABOUT?" (Improvements in the employment conditions of factory workers)\*

MAJOR FACTOR:	SWEDISH WORKERS		ENGLISH WORKERS	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
Trade Unions	55	48.7	59	46.8
Social Democratic/Labour Party	23	20.4	1	0.8
Management	7	6.2	36	28.6
Technological Change	13	11.5	19	15.1
Other and Non-classifiable responses	14	12.3	10	7.9
Don't Know	1	0.9	1	0.8
TOTAL	113	100.0	126	100.0

\* Asked of the 113 and 126 Swedish and English workers respectively, who considered that employment conditions had improved since the War.

Although both samples gave equal significance to the role of trade unions, there were important differences in their responses. Whereas one-fifth of the Swedish respondents claimed that improvements in employment conditions had been brought about by the efforts of the Social Democratic Party, only one of the English workers mentioned the role of the Labour Party. At the same time, as many as 29 per cent of the English, but as few as 6 per cent of the Swedish workers, attributed improvements to the efforts of management. Consequently, Table VII.7 suggests that more than two-thirds of the Swedish workers compared with less than one-half of the English respondents attributed improvements in their conditions of employment to the activities of the Labour movement; that is to the efforts of trade unions and the Social Democratic Party. In other words, it appears as though the Swedish workers were more likely to regard the Labour movement as a force for reform in the workplace; they perceived that it was this which had brought about improvements

rather than the 'goodwill' of management.

The greater legitimacy of the Labour movement among the Swedish respondents - particularly that of the Social Democratic Party - was confirmed by their answers to a number of questions which referred to their material standard of living. In Chapter Two it was suggested that a number of enquiries have found that Swedish workers tend to attribute improvements in their standard of living to the efforts of the Labour movement. Dahlström, for example, when he asked: "What factors do you think explain the increase in living standards over the last 50 years?" found that approximately one-half of all the manual workers in his sample claimed that they were a consequence of the activities of Labour unions<sup>15</sup>. Similarly, Segerstedt and Lundquist found that almost 23 per cent of their respondents attributed improvements in the living conditions of workers to the role of the Social Democratic Party, and a further 44 per cent to the efforts of Labour unions; they found that these institutions were mentioned to the same extent by both manual and non-manual workers<sup>16</sup>. In the present enquiry, the respondents were asked: "Do you think that the standard of living for people like yourself has improved in this country since the War?" In both samples, an overwhelming majority of workers stated that it had; 96 per cent and 98 per cent of the Swedish and English respondents respectively. These workers were then asked: "What do you think has brought this about?" Their coded replies are shown in Table VII.8:



TABLE VII.8: "WHAT DO YOU THINK HAS BROUGHT THIS ABOUT?"  
(the increase in the standard of living)\*

FACTOR MENTIONED:	SWEDISH WORKERS		ENGLISH WORKERS	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
General Improvements in trade and business	11	9.4	12	9.5
Social Democratic/Labour Party	61	52.1	8	6.4
Trade unions	10	8.6	37	29.4
'Worker Demands'	-	-	10	7.9
'Full Employment'	16	13.7	13	10.3
'Higher Wages'	8	6.8	26	20.6
Other and Non-classifiable responses	11	9.4	19	15.1
Don't Know	-	-	1	0.8
TOTAL	117	100.0	126	100.0

\* Asked of the 117 Swedish and 126 English respondents who claimed that the standard of living had improved.

As Table VII.8 suggests, a far higher proportion of the Swedish workers mentioned the Social Democratic Party as the major reason for the increase in the standard of living than of the English respondents who referred to the Labour Party; 52 per cent compared with 6 per cent. Even when the figures are combined for those workers who mentioned the Social Democratic/Labour parties, trade unions and 'worker demands', it is clear that these accounted for as many as 61 per cent of the replies of the Swedish sample, but for 44 per cent of the English respondents. But it is also interesting to note that only 9 per cent of the Swedish, compared with as many as 30 per cent of the English workers, referred to the role of trade unions. One

possible explanation for this - as suggested in Chapter Five - could be that the Swedish workers tended to make a distinction between 'work' and 'society' as normative and institutional orders. Consequently, when they referred to the working-class movement in their replies to questions, they tended to mention trade unions in their comments about the factory and their employment and working conditions and to refer to the Social Democratic Party in their attitudes about society. In other words, they regarded the Social Democratic Party and the labour unions as the inter-related institutions of the same movement and they referred to either of these according to the institutional context about which they were being invited to comment.

← In Sweden, with a long tradition of Social Democratic governments and an economy which is overwhelmingly privately-owned, the division between 'industry' and 'society' as separate normative and institutional orders possibly becomes pronounced.

It is clear from Table VII.8 that the English workers, despite recognising the importance of trade unions, gave little emphasis to the activities of the Labour Party in improving the standard of living. Among the Swedish workers, by contrast, the legitimacy of the Social Democratic Party was strengthened by the fact that it was regarded as the major force which had brought this about. Indeed, this point has been emphasised by the Social Democratic Party in successive general elections; it has stressed that since coming to power in 1932, the standard of living in Sweden has increased from amongst the lowest in Northern Europe to among the highest in the world<sup>17</sup>. In fact, by any absolute comparison, the standard of living enjoyed by the Swedish respondents was far higher than that of the English sample of workers. This is shown in Table VII.9 which compares the two groups in terms of their ownership of various goods.



TABLE VII.9: THE OWNERSHIP OF VARIOUS MATERIAL GOODS AMONG THE TWO SAMPLES

ITEM:	SWEDISH WORKERS		ENGLISH WORKERS	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
House	20	16.4	35	27.3
Central Heating	120	98.4	17	13.3
Bathroom	118	96.7	111	86.7
Deep Freezer	54	44.3	0	0
Refrigerator	120	98.4	97	75.8
Washing Machine	54	44.3	81	63.3
Telephone	119	97.5	23	18.0
Television	119	97.5	123	96.1
Car	84	68.9	56	43.8
Summer House	55	45.1	0	0

It is only in the ownership of houses and washing machines that the English sample enjoyed advantages over their Swedish counterparts. However, these advantages are more apparent than real. Since 84 per cent of the Swedish workers lived in rented housing, there was less need for them to buy washing machines because they are normally provided with the accommodation. Similarly with house ownership, although 11 per cent more of the English respondents owned their own homes, this figure fails to take into account the fact that almost one-half of the Swedish workers owned summer houses. Indeed, on the basis of visiting only a few of these and seeing photographs of others, the interviewer claimed that many were of a better construction than the permanent residences owned or rented by workers of the English sample. Thus, even in terms of house ownership, the Swedish workers appeared to be more advantaged than their English counterparts<sup>18</sup>. At the same time, they were more likely to go away on holiday; 71 per cent of the Swedish sample compared with 55 per cent of the English workers had been away from

home for at least one week's holiday during the previous year. Furthermore, of these 87 Swedish workers, 51 per cent had been abroad; a figure representing 36 per cent of the total sample. By contrast, only 12 per cent of the total sample of English workers had been abroad for their holidays.

The Swedish workers, then, enjoyed a much higher standard of living compared with that of the English respondents. At the same time, they perceived this to be a consequence of the activities of the Social Democratic Party; an attitude which reinforced its general legitimacy in the minds of respondents. Indeed, this was confirmed by answers to the question "Do you think the present government reflects the interests of people like yourself?" Of the Swedish workers, 89 per cent stated that it did, while only 11 per cent considered that it did not. Among the English workers, only 64 per cent claimed that it did and as many as 32 per cent said that it did not; a further 4 per cent of the respondents could not give an answer. Of these 41 English workers who claimed that the Labour government did not represent their interests, 29 per cent stated this was because it had failed to pursue the objectives of 'workers', 'the working class' and 'working men'; and a further 61 per cent made comments such as 'all political parties are the same', 'they only look after themselves', 'they do nothing but put up taxes' and so on<sup>19</sup>. In other words, almost one-third of the English respondents felt 'estranged' from the Labour government. The Swedish respondents, on the other hand, seemed to regard the Social Democratic Party as representing their interests in society.

In view of these findings, it is interesting to enquire into the Swedish workers' conceptions about the exercise of power in society. More specifically, did they conceive of themselves as members of an influential social group in the manner suggested in an earlier investigation conducted by Segerstedt and Lundquist? In a study of two industrial communities they had asked: "Which class do you think is the most influential in Sweden?"



Among male manual workers, 46 per cent of those identifying themselves as 'working class' had stated their 'own' social class, while only 37 per cent had mentioned 'another' class<sup>20</sup>. In order to enquire into this, those workers of both samples who recognised the existence of social classes - 118 and 119 of the Swedish and English respondents respectively - were asked: "Which class, do you think, has the most influence over things today?" The responses are shown in Table VII.10:

TABLE VII.10: "WHICH CLASS DO YOU THINK HAS THE MOST INFLUENCE OVER THINGS TODAY?"<sup>21</sup>

'Labels mentioned by respondents in describing the class structure	Nos. of respondents mentioning specific classes in their descriptions of the class structure (1)		Nos. of respondents stating that a specific class 'had the most influence' (2)		Percentage of respondents mentioning a specific class and who also stated it 'had the most influence' $\frac{(2)}{(1)} \times 100$	
	Swedish Workers	English Workers	Swedish Workers	English Workers	Swedish Workers	English Workers
1. 'Upper', 'Top', 'Higher Classes'	24	89	15	49	62.5	55.1
2. 'The Wealthy', 'Rich', 'Those with Plenty of money'	14	19	11	7	78.6	36.8
3. 'Social Group I'	57	-	47	-	82.5	-
4. 'Middle Class'	19	90	5	18	26.3	20.0
5. 'White-Collar People'	20	1	9	-	45.0	-
6. 'Educated People'	5	1	5	-	100.0	-
7. 'Social Group II'	56	-	6	-	10.7	-
8. 'Social Group III'	47	-	4	-	8.5	-
9. 'Working Class'	46	89	6	37	13.0	41.6
10. 'Ordinary People'	2	2	-	1	-	50.0
11. 'Lower Class'	2	21	-	1	-	4.8
12. 'The Poor', 'The Lower Paid'	7	8	-	1	-	12.5
13. Negative Evaluation	10	1	-	-	-	-
Don't Know	-	-	10	5	-	-
TOTAL	-	-	118	119	-	-



From Table VII.10 it is clear that a majority of both samples who mentioned 'upper' class, considered that it exercised the most influence in society. However, 83 per cent of the Swedish workers claimed 'Social Group I' had the greatest degree of influence, together with 79 per cent of those who referred to 'the Rich' in their descriptions of the class structure. By contrast, only 37 per cent of the English respondents who mentioned 'the Rich' shared the same opinion. At the same time, they were more likely to mention the 'working class'; no less than 42 per cent of the English workers who had used this 'label' considered that it exercised the most influence in society compared with only 13 per cent of their Swedish counterparts. In fact, of the 47 Swedish workers who mentioned 'Social Group III' in their descriptions of the class structure, as few as 9 per cent felt that it was the most influential group in society.

The respondents were then asked: "Why is this?" (that this class has the most influence over things these days). The coded answers are given in Table VII.11. Some of the classes were mentioned by only a very small number of respondents<sup>22</sup>. Therefore, for the purposes of this analysis, those considered to be most influential by the two groups of workers were allocated to three categories - (A), (B) and (C) - in the following manner:

Upper, Top, Higher Class	)	
The Wealthy, The Rich	)	(A)
Social Group I	)	
Middle Class	)	
White-collar People	)	(B)
Educated People	)	
Social Group II	)	
Social Group III	)	
Working Class	)	
Ordinary People	)	(C)
Lower Class	)	
The Poor	)	

TABLE VII.11: "WHY IS THIS?" (that this class has the most influence over things these days)

RESPONSES  SUGGESTING:	CATEGORY MENTIONED AS THE 'MOST INFLUENTIAL'											
	SWEDISH WORKERS						ENGLISH WORKERS					
	CATEGORY (A) (N=73)		CATEGORY (B) (N=25)		CATEGORY (C) (N=10)		CATEGORY (A) (N=56)		CATEGORY (B) (N=18)		CATEGORY (C) (N=40)	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%	NOS.	%	NOS.	%	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
Economic Factors	55	75.4	5	20.0	-	-	29	51.8	2	11.1	-	-
Activities of Trade Unions	-	-	2	8.0	2	20.0	-	-	-	-	24	60.0
'Majority of People'	-	-	4	16.0	4	40.0	-	-	3	16.7	9	22.5
Specific examples of Influence	9	12.3	6	24.0	-	-	24	42.9	7	38.9	1	2.5
Other and Non- classifiable responses	9	12.3	8	32.0	4	40.0	2	3.6	4	22.2	4	10.0
Don't Know	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1.7	2	11.1	2	5.0
TOTAL	73	100.0	25	100.0	10	100.0	56	100.0	18	100.0	40	100.0



Table VII.11 indicates that 76 per cent of the Swedish respondents attributed the influence exercised by category (A), that is the 'Upper', 'The Rich' and 'Social Group I', to economic factors<sup>23</sup>. Hence they claimed that 'money talks', 'those with the money take the decisions', 'it's their wealth which makes them powerful'. Among the English workers there were also respondents who referred to economic factors of this kind; for example, 52 per cent did so in their comments about the classes grouped in category (A). But there was a far greater tendency for them to give examples of 'influence' which often appeared to be unconnected with economic characteristics<sup>24</sup>. Hence, they often made statements such as 'they are the born leaders', 'they have always taken the decisions' and 'they occupy the powerful positions'. The Swedish workers, on the other hand, appear to have regarded the 'influence' exercised by these groups to be primarily determined by the economics of the marketplace. Furthermore, it is not altogether surprising that the English respondents made fewer references to economic factors in their explanations for the influence of the 'Upper Class' - the class most frequently mentioned by them in category (A) - because, as stated in Chapter Six, only 17 per cent of those who referred to this class in their descriptions of the class structure considered it to have 'done best economically over the past few years', compared with as many as 57 per cent who stated the 'working class'<sup>25</sup>. If a high proportion of the English respondents - 42 per cent - considered the 'working class' exercised the most influence in society<sup>26</sup>, it is also clear from Table VII.11 that they felt this to be a consequence of the activities of trade unions. Thus, these were mentioned by no less than 60 per cent of those workers who claimed that the classes included in category (C) exercised the most influence over things<sup>27</sup>. At the same time, a further 23 per cent felt the classes in category (C) exercised the most influence because they were 'the majority of people', 'most people in the country' and 'the greater proportion of the country'<sup>28</sup>.

Although Tables VII.10 and VII.11 describe the respondents' views about which classes exercise the most influence in society, they do not specify the respondents' own class self-placements. Consequently, it is not possible to ascertain whether the respondents perceived their 'own class' or 'another class' to exercise the most influence. Such an analysis is presented in Table VII.12:



TABLE VII.12: RESPONDENTS' CONCEPTIONS OF WHETHER THEIR 'OWN CLASS' OR  
'ANOTHER CLASS' EXERCISED THE MOST INFLUENCE OVER THINGS 29

RESPONDENTS'  OWN CLASS  SELF-PLACEMENT	CLASS MENTIONED AS THE 'MOST INFLUENTIAL'											
	SWEDISH WORKERS						ENGLISH WORKERS					
	'OWN'		'ANOTHER'		TOTAL		'OWN'		'ANOTHER'		TOTAL	
	NOS.	%	NOS.	%	NOS.	%	NOS.	%	NOS.	%	NOS.	%
Middle Class	3	27.3	8	72.7	11	100.0	7	30.4	16	69.6	23	100.0
Social Group II	6	20.0	24	80.0	30	100.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Social Group III	4	16.0	21	84.0	25	100.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Average People	-	-	2	100.0	2	100.0	1	50.0	1	50.0	2	100.0
Working Class	6	13.0	40	87.0	46	100.0	35	42.2	48	57.8	83	100.0
Lower Class	-	-	2	100.0	2	100.0	1	16.7	5	83.3	6	100.0
The Poor	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	25.0	3	75.0	4	100.0
Other and Non- classifiable responses	11	50.0	1	50.0	2	100.0	1	100.0	-	-	1	100.0
TOTAL	20	16.9	98	83.1	118	100.0	46	38.7	73	61.3	119	100.0

As Table VII.12 suggests, more than twice as many of the English respondents as of the Swedish workers considered their 'own class' exercised the most influence; 39 per cent compared with 17 per cent. It is only among workers who thought of themselves as 'middle class' that there is any similarity between the two groups. On the other hand, of the 'working class' respondents, no less than 42 per cent of the English workers compared with only 13 per cent of the Swedish respondents felt their 'own class' exercised the most influence. In other words, it is clear that the Swedish workers were much less likely than their English counterparts to regard themselves as members of the 'most influential' group in society. This is a surprising result in view of the conclusions of the study conducted by Segerstedt and Lundquist<sup>30</sup>. How, then, can the difference between their finding and that of the present study be explained?

The major factor accounting for the difference is probably the development of feelings of relative deprivation among Swedish manual workers during the 20 years since Segerstedt and Lundquist conducted their investigation. As was discussed in Chapter Six, the Social Democratic Party and the Labour unions have emphasised, particularly over recent years, the persistence of 'objective' patterns of economic inequality and the need to reduce them. It would, therefore, be surprising if the feelings of deprivation which these policies have generated did not 'spill over' into attitudes about the distribution of power in society; particularly in view of the fact that the Swedish respondents overwhelmingly attributed the influence of the 'Upper Class' of 'the Rich' and of 'Social Group I' to economic factors. At the same time, it can be suggested that the Swedish respondents' awareness of the influence exercised by 'other groups' in society was a function of their greater commitment to the Social Democratic Party; certainly, by comparison with the English workers' attachment to the Labour Party. In successive general elections, the Social Democratic Party, with the support of the



labour unions, has emphasised the need for Social Democratic governments in order that the interests of wage earners be protected against the interests of 'Big Business'. Hence, the Swedish labour movement has emphasised the importance of its role in society as a 'check' against the economic self-interests of modern capitalism; political appeals have stressed that without a strong labour movement and a Social Democratic government, political and economic power will become concentrated in the same hands. Consequently, if 'democracy' is to be preserved, according to Social Democratic arguments, it is necessary for the political apparatus of the state to be 'isolated' from the control of financial and industrial interests and this can only be achieved by electing Social Democratic governments<sup>31</sup>. In other words, the appeals that have been put forward by the Party and the trade union leadership have emphasised the class basis of political power and because of this, Swedish manual workers - as illustrated by the attitudes of the respondents - have become more aware not only of economic inequalities, but also of power differentials as they exist in contemporary Sweden. However, such workers have not, as yet, become more conscious of the persistence of inequalities in children's opportunities<sup>32</sup>. But this is probably for the same reasons. Whereas the Social Democratic Party has emphasised the perpetuation of economic and power inequalities and the need for these to be reduced by the Labour movement, it has also stressed that inequalities in children's <sup>now</sup> opportunities have/been largely removed.

Unfortunately, the interview survey did not probe into the feelings of those English respondents who felt that they were members of the most influential group in society. Did they, for example, approve or disapprove of this? Their responses relating to feelings about their 'own' class having acquired the greatest economic benefits during recent years would indicate that they approved<sup>33</sup>. On the other hand, various investigations have suggested that when working-class institutions such as trade unions are

perceived to be influential, a substantial proportion of manual workers disapprove<sup>34</sup>. Consequently, had the present study inquired into the English respondents' feelings about their 'own class' being the most influential, it could be that they also strongly disapproved. Thus, whether or not the English workers approved or disapproved of the perceived influence exercised by the 'working class' must remain a matter of conjecture. But what the evidence of the present enquiry does suggest is that the Swedish workers were much more aware of the influence exercised by other groups in society than were their English counterparts. Indeed, this appears to have been a direct consequence of their self-perceived membership in a coherent and influential working-class movement which incorporated both labour unions and the Social Democratic Party. The ideological commitment to egalitarianism which this movement has attempted to generate among its rank-and-file supporters seems to have created an awareness of power deprivation. However, if power differentials continue to persist, this could have important implications for rank-and-file commitment to the leadership of the movement as well as for the future development of Social Democracy in Sweden<sup>35</sup>. But the findings of the interview survey suggested that at the time of the enquiry, the Swedish Labour movement had attained a level of legitimacy among manual workers which was far greater than that enjoyed by its counterpart in Britain. As a result, it was able to exercise a far greater degree of influence upon the determination of workers' conceptions of social reality, particularly towards patterns of inequality.

This, then, concludes the discussion of the interview survey and of the two samples' conceptions of their respective class structures. Having analysed the 'objective' patterns of inequality in Britain and Sweden as well as the respondents' subjective interpretations of them, the next chapter attempts to make a general assessment of the role of Social Democracy in Sweden.



## NOTES

1. See Chapter Five.
2. See Chapter Six.
3. See Chapter Three.
4. As in previous chapters, only rounded-up percentages are given in the text.
5. GOLDTHORPE and his associates found for their sample of manual workers that 7 per cent attended union meetings 'regularly' and 14 per cent 'occasionally'. As many as 60 per cent 'never' attended a meeting. Thus, it appears as though union involvement among the English sample was, to some extent, greater than among Goldthorpe et al.'s sample. See J. GOLDTHORPE, D. LOCKWOOD, F. BECHHOFFER, J. PLATT, The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour, Cambridge, 1968, Table 40.
6. In retrospect, this was a badly formulated question. It would have been far more useful to have asked separate questions about respondents' attitudes towards shop stewards and local union officials. It would have then been possible to investigate whether they held different sets of opinion about shop stewards and officials. For example, the English workers could have been favourably disposed towards shop stewards but negative or even hostile in their attitudes towards branch officials.
7. Thus, they made such comments as 'the union is so big there can be little contact between them and the workers', 'the organisation is very large - it is difficult to get in touch with them' and 'in a large union there is little contact between leaders and workers'.

8. In the long run, these attitudes could become more pronounced if union-defined goals are not attained to the extent regarded as acceptable by rank-and-file members. This illustrates the relative uncertainty of workers' attitudes and the fact that union leaders cannot automatically assume the long-term allegiance of rank-and-file members. For a brief discussion of this point, see the final paragraph of Chapter Six.
9. Table VI.12.
10. For a discussion of this point, see Chapter Six.
11. Respondents were asked, "How successful do you think they have been in achieving this aim? Do you think they have been 'extremely successful', 'successful', 'not so successful' or 'completely unsuccessful'?"
12. Nationally, a far higher proportion of industrial workers vote for the Social Democratic Party in Sweden than for the Labour Party in Britain. See Chapter Two.
13. See, for example, W. KORNHAUSER, The Politics of Mass Society, London, 1965; and S. LIPSET, Political Man, London, 1964.
14. 'Employment conditions' were defined to respondents to refer to all aspects of the employment relationship - the work tasks, the physical environment of the workplace, and relationships with fellow workers and management. In other words, to refer to all of the economic, social and physical aspects of work.
15. E. DAHLSTRÖM, <sup>"</sup>Tjänstemännen, Näringslivet och Samhället, (Management, Unions and Society), Stockholm, 1954, p. 97-99.



16. T. SEGERSTEDT and A. LUNDQUIST, Människan i Industrisamhället, (Man in Industrialised Society), Stockholm, 1955, pt. II, p. 335-6.
17. In 1972 the national income per capita, as expressed in U.S. \$, was 4032 in Sweden compared with 4573 in the United States, 3769 in Canada, 3168 in W. Germany and 2218 in the United Kingdom. See United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1972, Pt. III-International Tables, New York, 1974. Thus, in 1972, as measured in terms of per capita income, Sweden had the second highest standard of living in the world (second only to the United States) and almost double that of the United Kingdom.
18. Unfortunately, the interview survey did not measure the 'quality' of housing by enquiring into the size and the number of rooms in the respondents' houses.
19. For the coding frame which was used for the analysis of the responses to this question, see Appendix I.
20. T. SEGERSTEDT and A. LUNDQUIST, op. cit., pt. II, p. 287-293.
21. For the ways in which respondents defined the social classes which they mentioned, see Table V.6.
22. See Table VII.10.
23. 'Economic Factors' were mentioned by 93 per cent, 82 per cent and 68 per cent of those who referred to the 'Upper Class', 'The Rich' and 'Social Group I' respectively.
24. Of those who referred to the 'Upper Class', 49 per cent mentioned economic factors, while 45 per cent gave specific examples of influence.

25. See Table VI.6.
  26. See Table VII.10.
  27. Of those who specifically mentioned the 'working class', 65 per cent referred to the activities of trade unions.
  28. These factors were mentioned by 22 per cent of those who claimed that the 'working class' exercised the most influence.
  29. For respondents' descriptions of the various social classes, see Table V.6.
  30. T. SEGERSTEDT and A. LUNDQUIST, op. cit.
  31. Those appeals were particularly emphasised in the Party's campaigns before the 1970 and 1973 general elections. But they have always been a persistent feature of Party policy. See, for example, G. ADLER-KARLSSON, Functional Socialism, Stockholm, 1967; A. MYRDAL, Towards Equality, Stockholm, 1971; and H. TINGSTEN, The Swedish Social Democrats, New Jersey, 1973.
  32. See Chapter Five.
  33. See Chapter Six.
  34. A number of these studies are mentioned in Chapter Two. See, for example, J. GOLDTHORPE, et al., op. cit.; R. MCKENZIE and A. SILVER, Angels in Marble, London, 1968; and D. BUTLER and D. STOKES, Political Change in Britain, Harmondsworth, 1971.
  35. Resentful attitudes could develop so that rank-and-file commitment to the existing institutional structure and leadership of the Labour movement declines. See note 8 above.
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## CHAPTER EIGHT

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SWEDEN: SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

This study has attempted to identify some of the major consequences of Social Democratic policies for patterns of social and economic inequality. This has been undertaken by comparing industrial and political developments in Sweden with those which have occurred in Britain. However, it is important to emphasise that there has been no attempt to assess the effects of Social Democracy for many other aspects of society; for example, economic growth and the development of the welfare state<sup>1</sup>. Indeed, this restricted analysis has been reinforced by the fact that only limited dimensions of class inequality have been studied. Thus, in any complete assessment of Swedish Social Democratic policies it would have been necessary to have analysed the economic rewards of such groups as the retired, the long-term ill and the unemployed, with those gainfully employed in the labour market. In this way it would have been possible to have estimated the possible redistributive effects of Social Democratic welfare policies. But these important dimensions of class inequality have been neglected and instead this study has focused almost completely upon differentials between various occupational groups; particularly as they exist between manual and non-manual workers<sup>2</sup>. The main reason for adopting such an approach has been that the Swedish Social Democratic Party has always claimed one of its major objectives to be the creation of an egalitarian society in which the economic, social and political interests of industrial manual workers would be better represented.

However, one of the conclusions of this study is that Social Democratic policies have had limited effects in narrowing differentials in the earnings

of various occupational groups. Government attempts to increase equality, together with LO's policy of wage solidarity have achieved - as yet - little success. Within the constraints of a capitalist economy it is not difficult to understand why this should be the case. Despite direct government intervention in some sectors of the economy and further 'indirect' influence brought about by the adoption of various fiscal policies, the price of labour has continued to be determined by the market forces of supply and demand. Thus, it is difficult to envisage how policies of equality and 'wage solidarity' can have their desired effects without more direct governmental control over the ownership of industrial and commercial resources. Without such control it seems likely that the forces of Swedish and international capitalism will continue to impose severe constraints upon government and trade union policies. But having said this, the results of the present investigation do suggest that the Social Democratic Party and LO have, in the pursuit of egalitarian goals, brought about changes in Swedish society. The more important of these can be considered in terms of firstly, the structure of power and secondly, workers' consciousness.

Throughout this study it has been stressed that Sweden, like Britain, is a capitalist country. But this does not imply that these two countries have identical power structures. In Sweden, the development of an influential working-class movement has increased the representation of industrial manual workers in the governmental decision-making process and thus restricted the emergence of a national administrative structure in which political and economic interests are relatively united in primarily pursuing the objectives of private capital. Although this analysis has not investigated the inter-relationships between the state and the privately-owned economy in each of the two countries, it has argued that these two sectors of society are probably separated from each other to a far greater extent in Sweden than they are in Britain<sup>3</sup>. Probably one of the most systematic studies of the



relationship of the political state to private capital in modern western societies has been undertaken by Miliband<sup>4</sup>. He argues that in such countries there are a plurality of economic elites which constitute a dominant economic class. This class, he claims, has more power and influence than any other class and exercises a decisive degree of political power. Although the structure of power in Britain may be of the kind described by Miliband, it is difficult to argue that similar circumstances prevail to the same degree in Sweden. Most certainly there is a dominant economic class which primarily represents the interests of private property, but it is doubtful whether it can also be regarded as a ruling class in the sense of dominating the formal state political apparatus. If successive Social Democratic governments have done little to destroy the influence of private property by extending public ownership, they have restricted the degree to which privately-owned economic interests have been 'converted' into political power. In other words, a succession of such governments has tended to reinforce an institutional separation between 'the state' and 'the economy'. Indeed, the Social Democratic Party has emphasised the importance of such a separation in order to preserve the 'pluralism' of Swedish society. In recent elections, for example, it has argued that only the continuation of Social Democratic governments prevents the development of a power structure in which economic and political interests are united in a capitalist-based elite<sup>5</sup>. Such electoral appeals are, of course, an important form of political legitimation for the Social Democratic Party, but they can also be supported by a certain amount of evidence. Hence, since the War - and particularly during the past decade - Social Democratic governments have passed legislation which has protected the interests of employees and consumers; for example, in laws relating to job security, employment and working conditions, participation in company decision-making and consumer protection. In these ways, Social Democratic governments have represented the interests of industrial manual

workers to a far greater degree than has been the case in Britain. If, then, both countries can be regarded as similar types of capitalist society in the sense that they are both dominated by economic classes which overwhelmingly own the means of production, they must also be seen as different to the extent to which the self-interests of these classes are 'restrained' by the representation of the Labour movement within their respective political decision-making processes. In other words, the emergence of a strong working-class movement in Sweden has tended to reduce the degree to which economic dominance has been 'converted' into political control. Thus, a comparison of political developments in Britain and Sweden suggests that although they possess a number of features common to all capitalist societies, they also have a number of differences. As Runciman has argued<sup>6</sup>, it is possible to categorise societies in terms of whether they are 'capitalist' or 'socialist' but this should not lead to the assumption that there are no significant differences between countries within each of these two types of socio-economic system<sup>7</sup>. Because the growth of a well-organised working-class movement in Sweden has led to the development of a power structure which represents the interests of industrial manual workers to a greater extent than in Britain, it means that this movement is in a better position than its counterpart in Britain to fundamentally alter the economic structure of society. Until now, the distribution of income, earnings and wealth in Sweden has been primarily determined by the private ownership of the means of production and the market forces of supply and demand. But in the long term, the legitimacy of capitalism in Sweden could be breaking down if only because of the way in which the Labour movement's ideological commitment to egalitarianism has affected workers' attitudes.

The social survey conducted with the two samples of workers suggested that the Swedish respondents were much more aware of economic inequalities than their English counterparts. It was suggested that there were three



major reasons for this. Firstly, the egalitarian appeals of successive Social Democratic governments. Secondly, the related policy of wage solidarity which has been pursued by LO, and thirdly, the structure of Swedish trade unionism that tends to be a fairly clear reflection of divisions within the occupational structure and which emphasises differences in the economic and employment conditions of manual and non-manual workers. Thus, it is possible to claim that the attitudes of industrial workers in Sweden are somewhat more class-based than those which are to be found among workers in Britain. Whereas the policies of the Social Democratic Party have contributed to creating a heightened level of class awareness among industrial workers, political developments in Britain, together with the structure of trade unionism, have been conducive to the emergence of attitudes which reinforce sources of differentiation within the working class<sup>8</sup>. Indeed, one of the more striking features of industrial conflict in Britain has been the emphasis among large sectors of industrial workers about wage differentials between different categories of manual employees, rather than about the structure of income differentials in society as a whole<sup>9</sup>. As a consequence, the earnings of highly-paid groups such as managerial and professional workers have not been subject to the same degree of public debate and scrutiny as the wages of miners, assembly-line workers and other categories of manual employees. In fact, it can be argued that the policies and the fragmented structure of British trade unionism serve the interests of the more highly-paid occupational groups since it reduces the general awareness of their privileged position in society<sup>10</sup>.

Although the Swedish respondents demonstrated a greater awareness of economic inequalities in society, this does not seem to have led to the development of a revolutionary consciousness. At most it appears to have generated feelings of resentment and demands for creating a more egalitarian society. Furthermore, they tended to regard the working-class movement as the only force capable of producing such a society. Indeed, the conception



of the working-class movement as the major instrument for social change was implicit in many of their responses; they often made such comments as 'more needs to be done', 'we haven't achieved equality yet', 'further changes will bring increased equality' and so on. This was an important difference compared with the English respondents who appeared to lack almost any conception of progress and social development. For them, society merely existed; its framework was well-established and individuals filled various social roles within it. But not only did the English workers fail to conceive of themselves as members of a social movement which would bring about large-scale social changes, they also appeared to express a high level of fatalism and general resignation<sup>11</sup>. Consequently, they demonstrated limited feelings of relative deprivation and little resentment about patterns of economic inequality compared with their Swedish counterparts. But in view of the Swedish workers' greater awareness of the inequalities generated by capitalism, why have there not been more demands for a radical re-structuring of society and the abolition of the institutions of private property? In order to answer this question it is necessary to consider changes in the ideological themes of the Social Democratic Party during various periods of the 20th century.

Since its inception in the latter part of the 19th century, the primary aim of the Social Democratic Party has been to create a more egalitarian society<sup>12</sup>. However, the means whereby this objective could be achieved has been subject to considerable debate within the party and the basis for the revision of policies at different points of time. Thus, it is possible to identify phases in the history of the party when the abolition of private property has been considered to be essential if egalitarian goals are to be achieved, while at other times it has been argued that such goals are attainable within the parameters of capitalist society. The first was the period until the end of the First World War when the public ownership of the means of production was considered to be the only way whereby greater equality



and social justice could be attained<sup>13</sup>. The second period was from this time until the early 1930's when, during a decade of minority governments, the Party concentrated upon developing policies which would solve immediate economic crises rather than pursuing radical, socialist objectives. It was in the 1920's, according to Tingsten, that the Party became de-radicalised, rejecting the necessity for socialising the means of production for the attainment of egalitarian goals<sup>14</sup>. The Party was then elected to office in 1932 and during a third period - which lasted for approximately thirty years - reformist-welfare policies almost completely dominated Social Democratic thought. Thus, it was considered by the Party leadership that the development of the welfare state, the utilisation of Keynesian economics and government economic planning were sufficient in order to guarantee that the resources created by capitalism would be distributed according to Social Democratic notions of social justice and equality. However, at the beginning of the 1960's, it is possible to identify a distinct shift of emphasis in Social Democratic thought, when there was an appraisal of the degree to which Social Democratic goals could be achieved within the context of capitalist society. Consequently, a fourth stage in the development of Social Democratic thinking can be delineated which has persisted until the present. Therefore, since the early 1960's, more radical measures have been contemplated and the Party has re-adopted a more positive attitude towards state ownership of the means of production<sup>15</sup>. In this way, it has again recognised that public ownership provides an instrument whereby the traditional ideological objectives of the Party can be attained.

Thus, the development of Social Democracy in Sweden suggests that a process of de-radicalisation, in the sense of rejecting the extension of public ownership over the means of production as the major instrument for achieving specific social and economic goals, cannot be regarded to be an inevitable feature of working-class parties in capitalist societies in the

manner suggested by Michels<sup>16</sup>. At certain stages in its history, it may be necessary for a social democratic party to pursue less radical policies in order to obtain electoral support, but at a later period of time the heightened expectations of the rank-and-file may force the leadership to adopt more radical objectives. Whether such ideological shifts are initiated by changes in the attitudes of leaders, or by the leadership responding to perceived changes in the attitudes of its supporters, is problematic. Michels, for example, suggests it is the attitudes of the leadership which determine the policies of working-class parties<sup>17</sup>, but Tjallingsten claims that the rejection of policies advocating the public ownership of the means of production by the Swedish Social Democratic Party during the 1920's was primarily a consequence of the leadership responding to the immediate demands of rank-and-file members<sup>18</sup>. He argues that during this period the Party membership was more concerned with specific policies for unemployment, wage levels and social security than with a fundamental re-structuring of ownership and control in society. Consequently, it is difficult to identify the bases for shifts in Social Democratic thought in terms of whether they originated from the leadership or the rank-and-file. But it does seem that once specific objectives have been formulated as party policy, the working-class movement in Sweden - certainly until the present - has enjoyed a considerable degree of success in retaining the commitment of its membership. Whether this allegiance will continue in the future is, of course, problematic and will largely depend upon the extent to which rank-and-file supporters perceive that the leadership has been successful in achieving the movement's explicitly-stated goals. The ideological commitment to egalitarianism by the Party appears to have been conducive to the generation of attitudes which could have important implications for the long-term development of the Swedish working-class movement; particularly - as the interview survey demonstrated - in generating feelings of relative deprivation and resentment. These attitudes



could, if they are indicative of wider patterns in Sweden, lead to an increased recognition among workers of the inherent contradictions that exist between the movement's goals and the existing socio-economic framework of society. But so far, these contradictions have been successfully accommodated by the Social Democratic Party adopting the following legitimating tactics.

In the first place, it claims to have equalised opportunities for workers' children by dramatically reforming the educational system, and to be currently pursuing policies which are intended to break down existing inequalities in patterns of economic rewards. But at the same time, it has legitimated its relationships with the Swedish working class by emphasising improvements in the standard of living which have occurred since the 1930's. This argument has been strengthened by the adoption of two sets of comparisons which are frequently used in Social Democratic debate - one, historical and the other, international. In terms of the first, the Party has always - as mentioned earlier - identified itself with progress and change. Thus, for the purposes of Social Democratic rhetoric, history has been generally categorised in terms of two eras - the 'old' and the 'new' Sweden<sup>19</sup>. Consequently, 'old' Sweden has been described as consisting of widespread inequalities, injustices and acute deprivations which have only been removed by virtue of the achievements of the working-class movement<sup>20</sup>. Thus, according to the arguments, the Social Democratic Party and the Labour movement have created a 'new' society in which remaining inequalities and social injustices are finally being removed. In this way, the pre-Social Democratic era of Swedish history has been automatically linked to notions of injustice and deprivation. Indeed, the descriptive categories used for these two 'types' of society are different; for the discussion of inequality in 'old' Sweden the terms 'Upper Class' ('Overklassen') and 'Working-Class' ('Arbetareklassen') are used, while for the Social Democratic analysis of 'new' Sweden, socio-



economic categories are described in terms of 'Social Group I', 'II', and 'III'.

The second set of comparisons emphasises the advantages of industrial manual workers in Sweden compared with those of workers in other countries<sup>21</sup>. For these purposes, Britain and the United States are the two countries which are most frequently chosen. Britain is used in order to demonstrate the equality of Swedish society and the socio-economic advantages of Swedish manual workers. Therefore, journalists in newspapers, radio and television discuss Britain in terms of 'Overklassen' and 'Arbetareklassen', with the implication that it is a country at a similar level of development to that of 'old' Sweden. Newspaper articles and television programmes emphasise the inequalities and the 'class nature' of British society, as well as the poverty and the poor living conditions of the industrial working class. At the same time, the United States is used in order to emphasise the high qualities of the Swedish urban environment, the 'progressive' attitude of Sweden towards developing countries and the lack of corruption in Swedish political life. If, then, Britain, the United States and other capitalist societies are characterised by glaring injustices and reactionary political regimes and if, at the same time, socialist countries are regarded as failing to protect individual and civil liberties, then Sweden must - according to the arguments - be the most egalitarian and the most democratic country in the world; achievements, so it is claimed, which have been brought about by the policies pursued by the leadership of the working-class movement.

These, then, are examples of the rhetoric which have been used by the Social Democratic Party in order to legitimate its position with rank-and-file supporters. In these ways it has been possible for the leaders of the Swedish Labour movement to conceal - if not completely successfully - some of the inherent contradictions between an ideological commitment to egalitarianism and a capitalist productive system. By the use of international comparisons,



the attempt has been to demonstrate that the Labour movement has achieved a considerable degree of equality. But if there are still persisting inequalities in Sweden - according to the appeals of the leadership - these will be removed providing that continued commitment to the Labour movement by rank-and-file supporters is forthcoming. However, these appeals merely reinforce the tensions that exist between ideology and material infrastructure and if efforts by the Party leadership to accommodate these strains become less successful in the future than they have been in the past, then the Social Democratic Party may either lose its legitimacy among its rank-and-file supporters or be increasingly forced to extend public ownership over the means of production. If this occurs, then there is a greater likelihood that the original goals of the Social Democratic Party, as formulated during the latter part of the 19th century, will be achieved.

Finally, what is the relevance of this analysis for the debate about the convergence of industrial societies?<sup>22</sup> While some writers have focused upon the study of institutional structures in attempting to demonstrate the increasing similarities of different countries<sup>23</sup>, others have concentrated upon ideologies and value systems in trying to illustrate the differences<sup>24</sup>. One of the conclusions of this investigation must be that, both analytically and empirically, it is difficult to make any kind of clear distinction between the respective effects of ideology and social institutions in shaping long-term developments in different industrial countries. Hence, there are persisting differences and similarities in the social structures of Britain and Sweden which have been brought about by the interplay of various ideological and institutional influences in each of the two countries. More specifically, this study has suggested that the emergence of an influential working-class movement in Sweden has led to the development of an egalitarian ideology which has created strains that, in the long term, could lead to changes in patterns of economic and social inequality as they have been

generated by the institutions of contemporary capitalism. Thus, although Britain and Sweden may be similar types of society in the sense that they are both capitalist countries, there are important differences between them in terms of the degree to which their respective institutional structures are legitimated.



## NOTES

1. For a discussion of the ways in which the development of welfare systems in Britain and Sweden have been linked to the socio-economic policies of governments, see H. HECLIO, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden, New Haven, 1974.
2. But it is important to emphasise that the welfare system of any capitalist country constitutes an important component of class inequality. If only because social policies are significant in determining the economic position of such groups as the retired, the sick and the unemployed, as well as the general socio-economic welfare of workers who acquire low earnings within the labour market. Thus, in a capitalist society, the development of an egalitarian welfare system could operate to 'compensate' for inequalities generated by participation (or non-participation) in the market economy.
3. See the discussion in Chapter Three.
4. R. MILIBAND, The State in Capitalist Society, London, 1969.
5. See the concluding discussion in Chapter Seven.
6. W. G. RUNCIMAN, 'Towards a Theory of Social Stratification' in F. PARKIN, (ed.), The Social Analysis of Class Structures, London, 1974.
7. GIDDENS, for example, tends to devote little attention to the differences between capitalist societies in his analysis of contemporary class structure, although he does discuss some of the different characteristics of working-class movements in France, Italy, Britain and the United States.

See, A. GIDDENS, The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies, London, 1973. INGHAM is one of the few writers to have stressed that there are important differences in the institutional structures of contemporary capitalist societies. See, G. INGHAM, Strikes and Industrial Conflict: Britain and Scandinavia, London, 1974.

8. Thus, it is possible to suggest there is probably a wider diversity of attitudes in terms of acquiescence, resentment and protest among industrial workers in Britain than in Sweden, which has been fostered by the development of different forms of occupational and trade consciousness.
9. For example, in wage negotiations conducted during the 1970's, the National Union of Mineworkers has argued that the earnings of its members have not kept pace with the general increases in the pay of other workers, particularly those employed in manufacturing industry.
10. Compared, that is, with the situation in Sweden. Indeed, the general awareness about the earnings of high income groups is encouraged by the annual publication of a 'Tax Register' which, despite inaccuracies, discloses the earnings of all income receivers.
11. See, for example, their attitudes towards the economic gains acquired by the 'Upper' and 'Middle' classes as reported in Chapter Six.
12. For a detailed discussion of this, see H. TINGSTEN, The Swedish Social Democrats, New Jersey, 1973, and J. LINDHAGEN, Social Democrats Program (The Social Democrats' Programme), Stockholm, 1972.
13. The evidence for this and the following statements is mainly derived by TINGSTEN's and LINDHAGEN's excellent accounts. See, H. TINGSTEN, op. cit., and J. LINDHAGEN, op. cit.



14. H. TINGSTEN, op. cit.
15. Policies in this direction have been pursued in terms of (a) using the financial resources of the State Pension Fund to buy stocks and shares in privately-owned companies (see Chapter Three) and (b) to construct state-owned factories and manufacturing processes.
16. R. MICHELS, Political Parties, New York, 1962.
17. R. MICHELS, op. cit.
18. H. TINGSTEN, op. cit.
19. This system of categorisation is often expressed in terms of Förr i Tiden and Nuförtiden.
20. See, for example, Å. ELMER, Från Fattigsverige Till Velfärdsstaten (From Poor Sweden to the Welfare State), Stockholm, 1963.
21. This and the following statements are derived from the author's personal experience of the presentation of news and events by Party spokesmen in the Swedish mass media over the past ten years, particularly in radio, television and in the press as represented by reports in Dagens Nyheter, Expressen and Aftonbladet - the largest selling daily newspapers in Sweden. Although there was not attempt to undertake a systematic content analysis, such an investigation would almost certainly confirm the present observations.
22. As briefly summarised in Chapter One.
23. For example, C. KERR, J. DUNLOP, F. HARBISON and C. MYERS, Industrialism and Industrial Man, Cambridge, (Mass.), 1960.
24. For example, J. GOLDTHORPE, 'Social Stratification in Industrial Society', Sociological Rev., Monograph, No. 8, (1964).

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APPENDIX I

THE ENGLISH INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

(including 'probes' and  
instructions for the interviewer)

## 1. Respondent's marital status

MARRIED	
SINGLE	
WIDOWED	
DIVORCED	

## 2. Respondent's age

## 3. (a) Could you tell me the title of your job?

[Get the exact title. Nothing vague e.g. 'engineer' means nothing. Probe for grade of pay and grade of job.]

(b) Could you give me a brief description of what you have to do in this job?

4. (a) How long have you been working for your present employer?

(b) Why did you start working for your present employer?

[Probe and Probe. Was it for the security, the money, or what?. Try and get what he considered to be the most important reason.]

5. (a) Could you tell me the title of the job you were doing before you came to work for your present employer?

[Get the same kind of information as for 3(a) and 3(b).]

(b) Could you give me a brief description of what you had to do in this job?



6. How many places/jobs have you worked since you left school (including present job)?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10+

7. (a) What was the title of your father's job when you left school?

[If butcher, carpenter, builder, etc., probe whether he had his own business, or whether he was an employee. If he states farmer, find out whether he had any employees. If so, how many.]

- (b) What were the kinds of things he had to do in this job?

[Obtain the same kind of detail as in 3(b).]

8. How are you paid? Are you paid

Piece Rate	
Time Rate	
Other (specify)	
Don't Know	

[If in doubt, write down the precise way in which he thinks he is paid.]

9. (a) Have you ever been unemployed?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	

If NO proceed to Q.10. If YES then:

- (b) When was the last time?

- (c) For how long a period were you out of work that time?

All Respondents

10. (a) People often talk about the possibilities of promotion at work. What does this word 'promotion' mean to you?

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

(b) Of these things, which is the most important to you?

[Probe. Ask the question 'why?']

(c) Could you give me the name of a job that a factory worker would have after promotion?

[Try and obtain a specific example.]

(d) How interested are you in getting this job?

Would you say that you were

Very interested	
Interested	
Not interested	
Don't Know	

(e) How likely is a factory worker to get promotion

at work? Would you say that it was

Very likely	
Likely	
Unlikely	
Very unlikely	
Don't Know	

(f) What reasons would you give for this?



10. (g) How would you compare these chances with white-collar workers? By white-collar workers I mean management, office workers, technical workers, salesmen and so on. Would you say that they were

Much better	
Better	
About the same	
Worse	
Much worse	
Don't Know	

[ Stress that 'white-collar workers' refers to management as well as the other groups. ]

(h) Why is this?

11. (a) What do you think of the money you earn compared with that of white-collar workers? Would you say that it was

Much better	
Better	
About the same	
Worse	
Much worse	
Don't Know	

(b) What about in terms of the responsibility of your job compared to that of white-collar workers? Would you say that it was

Much better	
Better	
About the same	
Worse	
Much worse	
Don't Know	

11. (c) What about your working conditions compared to those of white-collar workers? Would you say that they were

Much better	
Better	
About the same	
Worse	
Much worse	
Don't Know	

[Emphasis that 'working conditions' refer to physical conditions in the workplace.]

- (d) How do you feel about all these things?

(e.g. the money, responsibility and conditions of work.)

[Get answers separately for (1) Earnings, (2) Responsibility, (3) Physical working conditions.]

12. (a) Do you think employment conditions have improved for factory workers since the war?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	

[Define 'employment conditions' to refer to all aspects of work e.g. employer-employee relationships, work tasks, relationships with fellow employees, physical aspects of work, etc.]

If NO proceed to 12(d). If YES, then

- (b) In what ways do you think they have improved?

[Obtain precise reasons]

- (c) What do you think is the major factor which has brought this about?



Only if NO at 12(a)

12. (d) Why is this?

For all Respondents

Show Card 1.

13. (a) Here are some of the things often thought to be important about a job. Which would you first look for in a job, which next and then which next?  
(Mark '1' for first thing, '2' for second, etc..)

(b) So far as these things are concerned, would you say that your job is

Very good	
Good	
Poor	
Very Poor	

(c) If you could start your life again and you were leaving school today, what job would you go into?

[Probe for actual occupational title.]

14. Do you belong to a Trade Union?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	

If YES, move to Q.16. If NO then

15. (a) Do you have any objections to belonging to a Trade Union?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	

15. (a) Cont.

If YES

(b) What are these objections?

Move to Q.21

16. (a) How long have you belonged to a Trade Union?

(b) Is it compulsory for you to belong to a Trade Union in your job?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	

If NO move to Q.16 (e). If YES then

(c) Do you think this is a good thing or a bad thing?

Good	
Bad	
Don't Know	

(d) Why do you think it is a good/bad thing?

(e) Do you hold any position in your present Trade Union?

Yes	
No	

If NO proceed to Q.16 (g). If YES then

(f) What is this position called?



16. (g) How often do you go to union meetings?

Would you say that you went

Regularly	
Occasionally	
Rarely	
Never	

If 'Regularly' or 'Occasionally' proceed to Q.17

If 'rarely' or 'Never', then

(h) Why don't you bother?

17. What is the major advantage as you see it of belonging  
to a trade union?

18. (a) What do you think should be the major aim of  
trade unions?

(b) How successful do you think they have been in  
achieving this aim? Do you think they have been

Extremely successful	
Successful	
Not so successful	
Completely unsuccessful	
Don't Know	

18. (c) Some say that unions should get workers better pay, others say that they should get workers more influence in management decisions. Which of these views do you most agree with?

Pay	
Influence	
Don't Know	

[Which do they most agree with.]

19. (a) Do you think that union leaders at the national level represent the interests of the ordinary member?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	

If YES proceed to Q.20. If NO then

- (b) Why is this?

20. (a) Do you think that local union officials represent the interests of the ordinary members?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	

[Emphasis that this refers to shop-stewards as well as to other officials.]

- (b) Why is this?



I should now like to ask you some questions about what you do after work and at weekends.

21. (a) Do you belong to any kind of club, association or organisation?

Yes	
No	

[Probe for anything, e.g. evening class, bowles club, darts club, works association.]

If NO move to Q.22. If YES then

- (b) Which ones do you belong to?

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

[Probe for titles of organisations and their possible links with such bodies as church, T.U., company, etc..]

- (c) How often do you go to the various activities and meetings and so on of these associations? Would you say that you went

	1	2	3	4	5
Regularly					
Occasionally					
Rarely					
Never					
Don't Know					

[Work through each of the organisations '1', '2', '3' etc., as mentioned in 21(b).]

21. (d) Are you on the committee(s) or hold any position(s) in this/these organisations?

Yes	
No	

If No move to Q.21 (f). If YES then

- (e) Which ones?

- (f) What kinds of people belong to these organisations?

I mean, would you say that most of them had jobs like yours, or do some of them have white-collar jobs, selling and so on?

Like own	
White-collar etc.	
Don't Know	

[Emphasis what you mean by 'white-collar jobs'.]

22. (a) Are there any kinds of clubs or associations that you would like to belong to, but to which you do not belong at the moment?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	

If NO move to Q.23. If YES then

- (b) Which are these organisations?

- (c) What kind of people belong to these organisations, people like yourself or are some of them white-collar workers and so on?

Like self	
White-collar etc.	
Don't Know	

[Note: white-collar jobs.]



23. (a) People often go out in the evenings although they do not belong to any clubs or associations. When you go out in the evening, where do you go to?

[If necessary, probe for places during the last week or month. Also for kinds of places, e.g. pubs, cinemas, etc.]

- (b) What kind of people do you meet there? Do most of them have factory jobs, or are some of them white-collar workers and so on?

Factory	
White-collar	
Don't Know	

[Again, white-collar.]

- (c) When you go out to these places, who do you normally go with?

[E.g. with friends from work, neighbours, wife, or with only the wife, or only with friends from work.]

- (d) How often would you say that you went to the places that you have mentioned? Would you say

Frequently	
Occasionally	
Rarely	
Don't Know	

24. (a) Who would you say are the two or three people you most often spend your spare time with, other than, of course, your wife and children?

PERSON	Is he/she a relative	If a relative specify	What does he/her husband do for a living	Does he work at the same place as you	Where does he/she live			
					Same house/ street	Same area	Elsewhere in same town/ village	Outside town/village (specify)
1	Yes No			Yes No				
2	Yes No			Yes No				
3	Yes No			Yes No				

(b) Which of these three people do you see most?

1	
2	
3	
Don't Know	

25. (a) Did you vote in the last general election?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	

If NO move to Q.25(c). If YES then

(b) Which party did you vote for in the last general election?



25. (c) If a general election were to be held in the near future, which party would you vote for?

(d) Why would you vote in this way?

I should now like to ask you some questions about your family

26. How long have you been married?

27. (a) What was your father-in-law's job when you got married?

[Obtain specific job title. Find out whether self-employed, farmer, etc.. If farmer, did he have employees.]

(b) What kinds of things did he have to do in this job?

[Get details.]

(c) Does your wife go out to work?

Yes	
No	

(d) If yes, what is the name of her job?

28. (a) How many children do you have?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

If no children, move to Q.34

28. (b) Could you give me some details about them?

Child	Age	Marital Status		Sex		(If at work) Occupation	(If married daughter) Occupation of husband	Place of work of Respondent		(If at school) Type of School
		M	S	M	F			Same	Diff.	
1.										
2.										
3.										
4.										
5.										
6.										



For those with more than one son at work proceed;

For others, move to Q.30

29. (a) Which of your sons do you thinks has got the best job?

1 2 3 4 5 6

(b) Why do you think that?

[Probe, e.g. pay, security, interest, skill, etc..]

For respondents with no sons at work move to Q.32. For respondents who have a son who works in a factory proceed. (If more than one son at work ask about eldest son. If no working son has a factory job, move to Q.31.

30. (a) What do you think of your son's/eldest son's job in terms of its prospects for promotion compared with that of a white-collar worker or salesman, etc.?

Would you say it was

[Note: white-collar]

Much better	
Better	
About the same	
Worse	
Much worse	
Don't Know	

(b) What do you think of your son's/eldest son's job in terms of the money that he earns compared to that of a white-collar worker and so on? Would you say that it was

[Note: white-collar]

Much better	
Better	
About the same	
Worse	
Much worse	
Don't Know	

30. (c) What about in terms of responsibility compared to these people? Again, would you say that it was

Much better	
Better	
About the same	
Worse	
Much worse	
Don't Know	

(d) How do you feel about these things?

[Ask separately for (1) promotion, (2) money, and (3) responsibility.]

For all respondents who have a son with a job other than factory work. If more than one son has such a job, ask about eldest son in such a job. If no son has such a job move to Q.32.

31. (a) How would you compare your son's job who works as a \_\_\_\_\_, with factory work? Would you say it was

Much better	
Better	
About the same	
Worse	
Much worse	
Don't know	

(b) What reasons would you give for this?



For respondents with sons at school, ask about the eldest son at school. For those with no sons at school move to Q.33.

32. (a) What kind of job do you think your eldest son at school will get?

[Probe for actual titles of jobs.]

(b) We all want children to get the kind of job that suits them the best. But in addition to this, if you could completely decide what sort of job he should get, what would you like him to do?

[Probe for actual job titles.]

(c) What do you find attractive about this job?

For respondents with daughters not married. For others, move to Q.34.

33. (a) Would you prefer your daughter to marry a factory worker or a white-collar worker?

Factory	
White-collar	
Don't Know	

[Note: white-collar. If respondents state that it doesn't matter, write it down, but then ask them for their feelings if they really did have to choose.]

(b) Why is this?

All Respondents

34. (a) How do you think the chances of a young man leaving school today of getting on compare with when you left school? Would you say that they were

Much better	
Better	
About the same	
Worse	
Much worse	
Don't Know	

(b) What is the main reason for this?

35. (a) Most children have a chance to get on these days. But do you think that the children of some people are more likely to get on than others?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	

If NO proceed. If YES move to Q.35(c).

(b) Why is this?

For those who said YES at Q.35(a).

(c) Could you give me the names of the jobs of these people?

If respondent has son proceed. If not move to Q.37.



36. (a) Suppose a son of yours had to choose between a job in a factory and a white-collar job, what would you advise him to do?

White-collar	
Factory	
Don't Know	

(b) Why would you advise him in this way?

If respondent has no son

37. (a) Suppose a son of a friend of yours had to choose between a job in a factory and a white-collar job, what would you advise him to do?

[ Explain white-collar. ]

White-collar	
Factory	
Don't Know	

(b) Why would you advise him in this way?

38. (a) A lot of children stay on at school and go to university these days. Do you think that the sons of some people are more likely to stay on than others?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	

If YES

(b) What sort of people are more likely to have their sons at university?

[ Try and get the occupational titles ]

39. (a) What are the major differences as you see it between  
factory workers and white-collar workers these days?

[Note: white-collar workers]

(b) Do you think that this is a good state of affairs?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	

(c) Why is this?

40. (a) We often say that such and such a person has done  
well for himself. What would one of your friends  
have to do for you to think that he had done very  
well for himself?

(b) How likely would you say, is a friend of yours to  
do very well for himself in this country today?

Would you say it was

Very likely	
Likely	
Unlikely	
Very unlikely	
Don't Know	

(c) Why do you think that this is the case?



40. (d) How would you compare these chances with those of other people? Would you say they were

Much better	
Better	
About the same	
Worse	
Much worse	
Don't Know	

(e) What kind of people do you have in mind?

[Try and obtain specific occupational titles.]

41. Show Card 2. Here are some things which may help a person move up in the world. Which do you think is the most important, which next and which next? (Mark '1' for most important, etc.)

42. Some people say that there are no longer social classes in this country. Others say that there are. What do you think?

There are	
There are not	
Don't Know	

43. Why do you think this is the case?

For those who say that there are no social classes, move to Q.54.

44. Which are the major classes in this country today?

[Obtain a list of all the classes which they mention.]

45. Which of these classes would you say that you belong to?

[Of those mentioned in Q.44.]

46. What sort of people do you mean when you say .....?

[That is, the class mentioned in Q.45. Probe as much as possible in order to obtain information about occupations, earnings, status, education, family, etc.]

47. What sort of people belong to the other classes which you have mentioned?

[Deal with each class in turn that was mentioned in Q.44, and obtain as much detailed information as possible.]

48. What is the major factor, do you think, which determines the class a person belongs to?

49. (a) Which class do you think has done best economically over the past few years?

[Of the classes specified in Q.44.]



49. (b) Why is this?

(c) How do you feel about this?

(d) Do you think that there will be social classes in 20 years time?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	

(e) Why do you think this?

50. (a) Which class do you think has the most influence over things today?

[Of the classes mentioned in Q.44.]

(b) Why is this?

51. (a) Do you think that the differences between social classes have changed at all over the most recent Years?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	

(b) In what ways have they changed?

52. (a) Do you think that many people move from one class to another these days?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	

- (b) What are the reasons for this?

53. (a) How likely is a factory worker to move from one class to another? Would you say that it was

Very likely	
Likely	
Unlikely	
Very unlikely	
Don't Know	

- (b) How likely is the son of a factory worker to move from one class to another? Would you say that it was

Very likely	
Likely	
Unlikely	
Very unlikely	
Don't Know	

- (c) What would he have to do in order to move from one class to another?

- (d) Compared to the son of a white-collar worker is he more or less likely to move up?

More likely	
Less likely	
About the same	
Don't Know	

- (e) Why is this?



For those who answered NO at Q.42

54. You don't think there are classes any more, but do you think that people can be divided into groups. I mean groups of different sorts of people?

Yes	
No	

[Perhaps the Swedish respondents will insist on using the term 'social group' rather than class.]

For those who say NO move to Q.65

55. Which are the major groups (or sorts) or people in this country today?

[Obtain a list as for the questions on class.]

56. Which of these groups or sorts of people would you say that you belong to?

[As mentioned in Q.55.]

57. What sort of people do you mean when you say .....?

[Group mentioned in Q.56.]

58. What sort of people belong to the other groups you have mentioned?

[Deal with each group in turn that was mentioned in Q.55]

59. What is the major factor, do you think, which determines which group(or sort) of people a person belongs to?

60. (a) Which group do you think has done best economically over the past few years?

[Of the groups specified in Q.55.]

(b) Why is this?

(c) How do you feel about this?

61. (a) Which group do you think has the most influence over things today?

[Of those mentioned in Q.55.]

(b) Why is this?

62. (a) Do you think that the differences between groups of people have changed at all over recent years?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	

(b) In what ways have they changed?

63. (a) Do you think that many people move from one group/ sort of people to another these days?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	



63. (b) What are the reasons for this?

64. (a) How likely is a factory worker to move from one group/  
sort of people to another? Would you say that it was

Very likely	
Likely	
Unlikely	
Very unlikely	
Don't Know	

(b) How likely is the son of a factory worker to move  
from one group/sort of people to another? Would  
you say that it was

Very likely	
Likely	
Unlikely	
Very unlikely	
Don't Know	

(c) What would he have to do in order to move up?

(d) Compared to the son of a white-collar worker is he  
more likely or less likely to move up?

[Note: white-collar worker.]

More likely	
Less likely	
About the same	
Don't Know	

(e) Why is this?

For all those who said NO at Q.54.

65. (a) If there are neither social classes nor different groups of people in this country, do you think that there are some people who are much better off than others?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	

[If NO to this question, try and conduct a conversation about social differences in society. Record this on a separate sheet of paper. Try and cover the problems surveyed in Qs. 44-64.]

If YES

- (b) Who are these people?

[Obtain a list of people. See note to Q.46.]

66. (a) Do you think that there are some people who have more influence over things than others?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	

If YES

- (b) Who are they?

67. (a) How likely is a factory worker to become one of those people? Would you say it was

Very likely	
Likely	
Unlikely	
Very unlikely	
Don't Know	



67. (b) How likely is the son of a factory worker to become one of these people? Would you say it was

Very likely	
Likely	
Unlikely	
Very unlikely	
Don't Know	

(c) What would he have to do in order to become one of these people?

(d) Compared to the son of a white-collar worker is he more likely or less likely to become one of these people?

More likely	
Less likely	
Same	
Don't Know	

For all respondents

68. (a) Do you think that the present government reflects the interests of people like yourself?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	

If YES move to Q.69. If NO then

(b) Why is this?

69. (a) Do you think that the standard of living for people like yourself has improved in this country since the war?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	

If NO proceed to Q.69(c). If YES then

(b) What do you think has brought this about?

Proceed to Q.70

If NO at Q.69(a):

(c) Do you think that the standard of living has improved for any group/class of people since the war?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	

If NO proceed to Q.70. If YES then:

(d) Which group/class of people do you think has benefitted most?

(e) What has been the major reason for this?

70. (a) Are there any people you can think of who are better off than workers like yourself?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	



If YES

70. (b) What sort of people?

[Probe for specific occupational titles.]

71. (a) Do you own your own house?

Yes	
No	
Don't Know	

If YES proceed to Q.72. If NO then

(b) Who is it rented from (L.A., private landlord, etc.)?

72. Does your house have the following items?

	Yes	No
Central heating		
Bathroom		
Deep Freezer		
Fridge		
Washing machine		
Telephone		
T.V.		

73. (a) Do you own a car?

Yes	
No	

(b) Do you have a weekend cottage or caravan?

74. (a) Did you go away on holiday last year?

Yes	
No	

If NO proceed to Q.75. If YES then

74. (b) Did you go abroad for your holiday?

Yes	
No	

75. (a) How long have you lived in \_\_\_\_\_ (name of town)?

(b) Where did you live before?



CARD 1

High security

Good pay

Good working conditions

Interesting work

Possibility for promotion

Good union

CARD 2

Ambition

Intelligence

Education

Hard work

Knowing the right people

Luck

Good union

Money

Social class



APPENDIX IITHE SWEDISH INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

(for 'probes' and instructions  
to the interviewer, see Appendix I)

1. Civilstånd

gift	
ogift	
Änkeman	
frånskild	

2. Ålder

3. (a) Kan ni tala om för mig vad ert yrke kallas?

(b) Kan ni ge mig en kort beskrivning av vad ni gör i ert yrke?

4. (a) Hur länge har ni varit i er nuvarande arbetsgivares tjänst?

(b) Varför började ni arbeta för er arbetsgivare?

5. (a) Vad kallades det yrke ni utövade innan ni började arbeta för er nuvarande arbetsgivare?

(b) Kan ni ge mig en kort beskrivning av vad ni gjorde i det yrke?



6. Hur många olika platser (arbeten) har ni haft sedan ni slutade skolan (inklusive er nuvarande plats)?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10+

7. (a) Vad kallades er fars yrke när ni slutade skolan?

(b) Vad sysslade han med i detta arbete?

8. Hur avlönas ni? Är er avlöning

Tidlön	
Ackordlön	
annan (specificera)	
Vet inte	

9. (a) Har ni någonsin varit arbetslös?

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

Om svaret är nej gå över till fråga 10. Om svaret är ja:

(b) När var ni sist arbetslös?

(c) Hur länge var ni arbetslös den gången?

För alla svarsgivare

10. (a) Man talar alltid om befordringsmöjligheter inom ett arbete. Vad betyder ordet 'befordran' för er?

1.

2.

3.

(b) Vilken av dessa betydelser är det viktigaste för er?

(c) Kan ni namnge ett arbete som en arbetare skulle  
•• kunna få efter befordran?

(d) Hur intresserad är ni i att få detta arbete? Kan  
ni säga att ni är

mycket intresserad	
intresserad	
inte intresserad	
vet inte	

(e) Hur stora möjligheter har en arbetare att bli  
befordrad i sitt arbete? Har han

Stora möjligheter	
Vissa möjligheter	
små möjligheter	
mkt små möjligheter	
vet inte	

(f) Varför?



10. (g) Hur skulle ni vilja jämföra dessa befordringschanser  
med tjänstemäns befordringschanser? Är era chanser

mycket bättre	
bättre	
ungefär lika	
sämre	
mycket sämre	
vet inte	

- (h) Varför?

11. (a) Hur kan ni jämföra er lön med tjänstemännens  
lön? Tycker ni att er lön är

mycket högre	
högre	
ungefär lika	
sämre	
mycket sämre	
vet inte	

- (b) Anser ni att ert arbete är mer ansvarsfullt än  
tjänstemännens? Tycker ni att det är

mycket mer ansvarsfullt	
mer ansvarsfullt	
ungefär lika ansvarsfullt	
mindre ansvarsfullt	
vet inte	

11. (c) Hur jämför ni er arbetsplatsomgivning med tjänstemännens? Anser ni att er arbetsplats är

mycket bättre	
bättre	
ungefär lika	
sämre	
mycket sämre	
vet inte	

- (d) Vad är era åsikter om dessa saker?

12. (a) Tror ni att arbetsförhållandena har förbättrats för arbetare sedan kriget?

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

Om frågan besvarats med "nej" fortsatt med fråga 12(d).

Om frågan besvarats med "ja":

- (b) Hur tror ni att de har förbättrats?

- (c) Vad tror ni är den största anledningen till detta?



Om fråga 12(a) besvarats med "nej":

12. (d) Varför?

För alla svarsgivare

Visa kort 1.

13. (a) Här är några av de saker som man tycker är viktiga  
beträffande ett arbete. Vad skulle ni först söka  
efter? (Ordna de ni söker efter med "1", "2" och  
"3" efter företräde)
- (b) Beträffande dessa saker, kan ni säga att ert arbete  
är

mycket bra	
bra	
dåligt	
mycket dåligt	

- (c) Om ni kunde leva om ert liv och slutade skolan nu,  
vilket yrke skulle ni välja?

14. Tillhör ni någon Fackförening?

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

Om frågan besvarats med "ja" fortsatt med fråga 16.

Om frågan besvarats med "nej":

15. (a) Har ni något emot att tillhöra en fackförening?

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

15. (b) Vilka är era invändningar?

Fortsätt till fr. 21

16. (a) Hur länge har ni tillhört en fackförening?

(b) Är ni tvungen att tillhöra en fackförening  
i ert arbete?

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

Om svaret är "nej" fortsätt med fr. 16(e).

Om svaret är "ja":

(c) Tycker ni att detta är bra eller dåligt?

bra	
dåligt	
vet inte	

(d) Varför tycker ni att detta är bra/dåligt?

(e) Har ni något förtroendeuppdrag i er nuvarande  
fackförening?

ja	
nej	

Om svaret är "nej" fortsätt med fr. 16(g).

Om svaret är "ja":

(f) Vad är namnet på detta uppdrag?



16. (g) Hur ofta går ni på möten? Kan ni säga att  
ni går

regelbundet	
ibland	
sällan	
aldrig	

Om svaret är 'regelbundet' eller 'ibland' fortsätt med fr.17.

Om svaret är 'sällan' eller 'aldrig':

(h) Varför bryr ni er inte om det?

17. Vilken anser ni vara den största fördelen med att tillhöra  
en fackförening?

18. (a) Vad tycker ni skall vara en fackförenings högsta mål?

(b) Hur väl tycker ni att de har lyckats i strävan att  
nå detta mål? Tycker ni att de har

lyckats mycket väl	
lyckats väl	
inte lyckats så väl	
helt misslyckats	
vet inte	

18. (c) En del säger att fackföreningar skulle se till att arbetarna fick högre löner, andra säger att de skulle se till att arbetarna fick större inflytande på ledningen. Vilken av dessa synpunkter håller ni med?

högre löner	
större inflytande	
vet inte	

19. (a) Tycker ni att den nationella fackföreningsstyrelsen framför den enskilde medlemmens åsikter och intressen?

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

Om svaret är "ja" fortsätt med fr. 20. Om svaret är "nej":

- (b) Varför?

20. (a) Tycker ni att den lokala fackföreningsstyrelsen framför den enskilde medlemmens intressen?

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

- (b) Varför?



Jag skulle nu vilja ställa er några frågor om det ni gör  
efter arbetstiden och på lördag-söndag.

21. (a) Är ni medlem i någon klubb, förening eller organisation?

ja	
nej	

Om svaret är "nej" fortsätt med fråga 22.

Om svaret är "ja":

(b) Vad tillhör ni?

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.

(c) Hur ofta tar ni del i dessa organisationers olika  
verksamheter, går på möten osv? Kan ni säga att  
ni går:

	1	2	3	4	5
regelbundet					
ibland					
sällan					
aldrig					

21. (d) Sitter ni med i någon eller några kommittéer eller har någon ställning eller ställningar inom denna eller dessa organisationer?

ja	
nej	

Om svaret är "nej" fortsätt med fr. 21(f). Om svaret är "ja":

- (e) Vilka?

- (f) Vad för sorts människor är med i dessa organisationer?

Jag menar, kan ni säga att de flesta har arbeten som liknar era egna, eller är några av dem tjänstemän, försäljare, kontorsanställda eller dyl? Tillhör de

Er egen arbetsgrupp	
tjänstemän, el.dyl	
vet inte	

22. (a) Finns det några klubber eller föreningar som ni skulle vilja vara med i men som ni inte är med i för tillfället?

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

Om svaret är "nej" fortsätt med fr. 23. Om svaret är "ja":

- (b) Vilka är dessa organisationer?

- (c) Vad för slags människor är med i dessa organisationer?

Är det människor ur samma arbetsgrupp som ni själva eller är några av dem tjänstemän, el.dyl.

samma arbetsgrupp	
tjänstemän, el.dyl.	
vet inte	



23. (a) Människor går ofta ut på kvällarna även om de inte tillhör några klubber eller föreningar. När ni går ut på kvällarna, vart går ni då?

(b) Vad för slags människor möter ni där? Har de flesta arbete eller är några av dem tjänstemän, el.dyl.

samma arbetsgrupp	
tjänstemän, el. dyl.	
vet inte	

(c) När ni går ut vem går ni då ut tillsammans med?

(d) Hur ofta kan ni säga att ni går ut på sådant som ni har nämnt? Kan ni säga att ni går ut

ofta	
ibland	
sällan	
vet inte	

24. (a) Vilka kan ni säga är de två eller tre människor som ni oftast tillbringar er lediga tid tillsammans med, bortsett från hustru och barn, naturligtvis?

Person	Är han/hon släkt	Om han/hon är släkt specificera	vad för yrke har han/hennes man	har ni samma arbetsplats?	Var bor han/hon
1.	ja nej			ja nej	
2.	ja nej			ja nej	
3.	ja nej			ja nej	

- (b) Vilken av dessa tre personer träffar ni mest?

1.	
2.	
3.	
vet inte	

- (c) Hur ofta träffar ni denna person?

25. (a) Röstade ni förra riksdagsvalet?

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

Om svaret är "nej" fortsätt med fr. 25(c).

Om svaret är "ja":

- (b) Vilket parti röstade ni på i det förra riksdagsvalet?



25. (c) Vilket parti skall ni rösta på i det nästa riksdagsvalet?

(d) Varför skall ni rösta på detta partiet?

Jag skulle nu vilja ställa några frågor rörande er familj.

26. Hur länge har ni varit gift?

27. (a) Vad för yrke had er svärfar när ni gifte er?

(b) Vad sysslade han med i sitt yrke?

(c) Har hustrun förvärsarbete?

ja	
nej	

(d) Om "ja", vad arbetar hon med?

28. (a) Hur många barn har ni?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Om svaret är "inga barn" fortsätt med fr. 34

28. (b) Skulle ni kunne se mig nægra oplysninger om dem?

[illegible]



För dem som har mer än en son som yrkesarbetar fortsätt med  
följande frågor. För andra fortsätt med fr. 30.

29. (a) Vilken av era söner tycker ni har det bästa arbetet?

1 2 3 4 5 6

(b) Varför tycker ni det?

För de svarande, som inga yrkesarbetande söner har, fortsätt  
med fr. 32. För svarande som har en son som är arbetare,  
fotsätt med följande frågor (om mer än en son arbetar, fråga  
om den äldste sonen. Om ingen av sönera är arbetare fortsätt  
med fråga 31).

30. (a) Vad tror ni om er sons/äldste sons arbete med avseende  
på möjligheter till befordran jämfört med en Tjänstemans?  
Tror ni att hans befordringsmöjligheter är

Mycket bättre	
bättre	
ungefär lika	
sämre	
mycket sämre	
vet inte	

(b) Vad tror ni om er sons/äldste sons arbete med avseende  
på den lön som han får jämfört med den lön som  
tjänstemän får? Kan ni säga att den är

mycket bättre	
bättre	
ungefär lika	
sämre	
mycket sämre	
vet inte	

30. (c) Vad tycker ni om hans arbete med avseende på hur  
ansvarsfullt det är jämfört med tjänstemäns yrken?

Återigen, tycker ni att hans arbete är

mycket bättre	
bättre	
ungefär lika	
sämre	
mycket sämre	
vet inte	

- (d) Vad har ni för åsikter om dessa saker/lön,  
befordringsmöjligheter, ansvar, osv?

För alla svarande som har en son som inte är manuell arbetare.

Om mer än en son har ett sådant arbete, fråga om den äldste sonen

i ett sådant arbete. Om ingen av sönera har ett sådant arbete

fortsätt med fr. 32.

31. (a) Hur vill ni jämföra er sons arbete som \_\_\_\_\_  
med arbete? Skulle ni vilja säga att der är

mycket bättre	
bättre	
ungefär lika	
sämre	
mycket sämre	
vet inte	

- (b) Vad kan ni ge för anledningar till detta?



För svarande med söner som går i skola. Fråga om äldste sonen som går i skola. För de som inte har några söner som går i skola fortsätt med fr. 33.

32. (a) Vad för arbete tror ni att er äldste son som går i skolan kommer att få?

(b) Vi vill alla att barn skall få det slags yrke som passar dem bäst. Men om ni dessutom fullständigt kunde bestämma vilket arbete han skulle kunna få, vad skulle ni då vilja att han skulle göra?

(c) Vad, i detta yrket, är det som tilltalar er?

För svarande med ogifta döttrar. För övriga fortsätt med fr. 34.

33. (a) Skulle ni vilja att er dotter gifte sig med en arbetare eller med en tjänstemän?

arbetare	
tjänstemän	
vet inte	

(b) Varför?

Alla svarande

34. (a) En ung man nuförtiden, som just slutat skolan, har han större chanser att ta sig fram än ni själv hade då ni slutade skolan. Är hans chanser

mycket bättre	
bättre	
ungefär lika	
sämre	
mycket sämre	
vet inte	

- (b) Vilken är den främsta anledningen till detta?

35. (a) De flesta barn får en chans att ta sig fram nuförtiden. Men tror ni att vissa människors barn har större chanser än andra människors barn

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

Om svaret är "nej" fortsätt, om svaret är "ja" fortsätt med fr. 35(c).

- (b) Varför?

För dem som svarade "ja" på fr. 35(a)

- (c) Skulle ni kunna namnge de yrken som dessa människor har (de människor vars barn har större chanser att ta sig fram)?

Om svaranden har en son fortsätt. Om inte fortsätt med fr. 37.

36. (a) Antag att en av era söner var tvungen att välja mellan att bli arbetare eller att bli tjänsteman vad skulle ni råda honom till att göra?

bli tj.man anst.	
bli arbetare	
vet inte	

- (b) Varför skulle ni råda honom till detta?

Om svaranden inte har någon son

37. (a) Antag ett en god väns son var tvungen att välja mellan att bli arbetare och att bli tjänsteman vad skulle ni råda honom att göra?

bli tj.man anst.	
bli arbetare	
vet inte	

- (b) Varför skulle ni råda honom till detta?

38. (a) Många barn fortsätter att gå i skola nuförtiden, och börjar läsa vid universiteten. Tror ni att vissa människors barn, mer än andra, fortsätter tillhögre utbildning?

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

Om svaret är "ja";

- (b) Vad för sorts människor tycks oftast ha söner som fortsätter till universiteten?



39. (a) Vilka är, i er åsikt, de största skillnaderna mellan arbetare och tjänstemän nuförtiden?

(b) Tycker ni att detta är bra?

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

(c) Varför?

40. (a) Vi talar ofta om människor som har lyckats bra. Vad måste en av era vänner ha utrettat för att ni skall kunna säga om honom att han har lyckats bra?

(b) Tycker ni att era vänner har lyckats här i livet?

stora möjligheter	
vissa möjligheter	
små möjligheter	
inga möjligheter	
vet inte	

(c) Varför tror ni att det är så?

40. (d) Hur skulle ni kunna jämföra dessa chanser med andra människors chanser? Skulle ni vilja säga att de var

mycket bättre	
bättre	
ungefär lika	
sämre	
mycket sämre	
vet inte	

- (e) Vilka människor tänker ni då på?

41. Visa kort 2. Här är några saker som kan hjälpa en människa att flytta uppåt i livet. Vad tycker ni är det viktigaste, näst viktigast osv (markera med "1", "2" osv i ordning av viktighet)?

42. En del människor säger att det inte längre finns samhällsklasser i detta landet. Andra säger att samhällsklasserna finns kvar. Vad anser ni?

klasser finns	
klasser finns inte	
vet inte	

43. Varför tror ni att det är så?

För dem som säger att det inte finns samhällsklasser fortsatt med fr. 54.

44. Vilka är samhällsklasserna i detta landet idag?
45. Vilken av dessa samhällsklasser anser ni att ni tillhör?
46. Vilken sorts människor menar ni när ni säger \_\_\_\_\_?
47. Vad för slags människor tillhör de andra samhällsklasserna som ni har nämnt?
48. Vilken anser ni vara den främsta faktorn som avgör vilken klass en människa tillhör?
49. (a) Vilken klass tror ni har lyckats ekonomiskt bäst under de sista åren?



49. (b) Varför?

(c) Vad anser ni om detta?

(d) Tror ni det vill bli samhällsklasser om 20 år?

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

(e) Varför?

50. (a) Vilken klass tror ni har det största inflytande idag?

(b) Varför?

51. (a) Tror ni att skillnaden mellan samhällsklasser har ändrats under senaste åren?

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

(b) Hur har de ändrats?

52. (a) Tror ni att många människor flyttar från en samhällsklass till en annan nu för tiden?

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

- (b) Vad är anledningen till detta?

53. (a) Hur stora möjligheter har en arbetare att flytta från en klass till en annan? Kan ni säga att han har

stora möjligheter	
vissa möjligheter	
små möjligheter	
inga möjligheter	
vet inte	

- (b) Hur stora möjligheter har en arbetares son att flytta från en klass till en annan? Kan ni säga att han har

stora möjligheter	
vissa möjligheter	
små möjligheter	
inga möjligheter	
vet inte	

- (c) Vad skulle han behöva göra för att flytta upp?

- (d) Tror ni att han har större eller mindre möjligheter att flytta upp jämfört med en tjänstemans son? Tror ni att han har

större möjligheter	
mindre möjligheter	
ung. lika möjligheter	
vet inte	

- (e) Varför?

För dem som svarade "nej" på fråga 42:

54. Ni tror inte att det finns klasser längre, men tror ni att människor kan delas in i grupper? Jag menar grupper av olika slags människor.

ja	
nej	

För dem som svarar "nej" fortsätt med fr. 65.

55. Vilka grupper(eller sorters) människor finns det i detta landet idag?
56. Vilken av dessa grupper (eller sorters) människor skulle ni vilja säga att ni tillhör?
57. Vilken sorts människor menar ni när ni säger .....?  
(grupp omnämnd i fr. 56)
58. Vad för sorts människor tillhör de andra grupperna som ni har nämnt?
59. Vilken anser ni är den främsta faktorn som avgör vilken grupp (eller sorts) människor som en person tillhör?



60. (a) Vilken grupp tror ni har lyckats ekonomiskt bäst under de senaste åren?

(b) Varför?

(c) Vad anser ni om detta?

61. (a) Vilken grupp tror ni har det största inflytandet?

(b) Varför?

62. (a) Tror ni att skillnaderna mellan grupper av människor har ändrats under de senaste åren?

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

(b) Hur har de ändrats?

63. (a) Tror ni att många människor flyttar från en grupp till en annan inför tiden?

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

63. (b) Vad är anledningarna till detta?

64. (a) Hur stora möjligheter har en arbetare att flytta från en grupp (sorts människor) till en annan? Kan ni säga att han har

stora möjligheter	
vissa möjligheter	
små möjligheter	
inga möjligheter	
vet inte	

(b) Hur stora möjligheter har en arbetares son att flytta från en grupp (sorts människor) till en annan. Kan ni säga att han har

stora möjligheter	
vissa möjligheter	
små möjligheter	
inga möjligheter	
vet inte	

(c) Vad skulle han behöva göra för att flytta upp?

(d) Tror ni att han har större eller mindr möjligheter att flytta upp jämfört med en tjänstemans son?  
Tror ni att han har

större möjligheter	
mindre möjligheter	
ung. lika möjligheter	
vet inte	

(e) Varför?

För alla de som svarade "nej" på fr. 54.

65. (a) Om det varken finns olika samhällsklasser eller olika socialgrupper i detta landet, tycker ni att det finns en del människor som har det mycket bättre än andra?

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

Om svaret är "ja":

- (b) Vilka är dessa människor?

66. (a) Tycker ni att det finns några människor som har större inflytande än andra?

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

Om svaret är "ja":

- (b) Vilka är de?

67. (a) Hur stora möjligheter har en arbetare att bli en av dessa människor? Kan ni säga att han har

stora möjligheter	
vissa möjligheter	
små möjligheter	
inga möjligheter	
vet inte	



67. (b) Hur stora möjligheter har en arbetares son att bli en av dessa människor? Kan ni säga att han har

stora möjligheter	
vissa möjligheter	
små möjligheter	
inga möjligheter	
vet inte	

- (c) Vad skulle han behöva göra för att bli en av dessa människor?

- (d) Tror ni att han har större eller mindre möjligheter att bli en av dessa människor jämfört med en tjänstemans son? Tror ni att han har

större möjligheter	
mindre möjligheter	
ung. lika möjligheter	
vet inte	

För alla svarande

68. (a) Tycker ni att den nuvarande regeringen tillvaratar era och andra människors intressen (som har samma ställning som ni)?

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

Om svaret är "ja" fortsätt med fr. 69.

Om svaret är "nej":

- (b) Varför?

69. (a) Tycker ni att levnadsstandarden för människor som ni själva har förbättrats i detta landet sedan kriget?

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

Om svaret är "nej" fortsätt med fr. 69(c).

Om svaret är "ja":

- (b) Vad tror ni detta beror på?

Fortsätt med fr. 70.

Om svaret är "nej" på fr. 69(a):

- (c) Tycker ni att levnadsstandarden har förbättrats för någon grupp (eller klass) av människor sedan kriget?

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

Om svaret är "nej" fortsätt med fr. 70. Om svaret är "ja":

- (d) Vilken grupp (eller klass) tycker ni har gagnats mest?
- (e) Vilken har varit den största anledningen till detta?

70. (a) Kan ni tänka er några människor som har det bättre än arbetare som har samma ställning som ni?

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

Om svaret är "ja":

70. (b) Vad för sorts människor?

71. (a) Är ni det hus ni bor i?

ja	
nej	
vet inte	

Om svaret är "ja" fortsätt med fr. 72.

Om svaret är "nej":

(b) Vem hyr ni av?

72. Har ni något av det följande i ert hus?

	ja	nej
Centralvärme		
badrum		
frysbox		
kylskåp		
tvättmaskin		
telefon		
T.V.		

73. (a) Har ni bil?

ja	
nej	

(b) Har ni sommarstuga?

ja	
nej	

74. (a) För ni på semester förra året?

ja	
nej	



Om svaret är "nej" fortsätt med fr. 75.

Om svaret är "ja":

74. (b) För ni utomlands på semestern?

ja	
nej	

75. (a) Hur länge har ni bott i (namn på staden)?

(b) Var bodde ni förut?

KORT 1

Stor trygghet

Hög lön

God arbetsplats

Intressant arbete

Befordringsmöjligheter

Bra fackförening

KORT 2

Ambition

Intelligens

Utbildning

Hårt arbete

Personliga kontakter

Tur

Bra fackförening

Pengar



APPENDIX IIITHE CODING FRAME

(used for both the English  
and Swedish schedules.)

NOTES

1. In many instances, the questions are reproduced in an abbreviated form. For the way in which these appeared in the original interview schedules see Appendix I.
2. Some questions were only applicable to such a small number of respondents that it was more convenient to refer to the schedules in the analysis than to code them. For example, 118 of the 122 Swedish workers recognised the existence of social classes. Thus questions 55-67, which ask for the opinions of those who did not recognise the existence of classes, were not coded. It is stated when questions have not been coded in this way.
3. Very occasionally there is an omission in the sequence of code numbers used in the analysis of responses to a specific question (e.g. 1,2,4, 5, etc.). This has been caused by amalgamating two categories when, during the analysis, it was clear that they were not, after all, mutually exclusive.

Punch Card			
<u>Column</u> (Q.)	<u>Question</u>		<u>Code</u>
<u>Card I</u>			
01-03	Interview number	Swedish workers English workers	001-122 201-328
04	Number of card		01- 07
05 (1.)	Respondent's marital status	Married Single Widowed Divorced Don't know (D.K.) Not recorded (N.R.)	0 1 2 3 8 9
06 (2.)	Respondent's age	< 25 25-34 35-44 45-54 > 54 D.K. N.R.	0 1 2 3 4 8 9
07 (3.)	Could you tell me the title of your job(Swedish workers)	Grade A Grade B Other D.K. N.R.	0 1 2 8 9
08	Could you tell me the title of your job?(English workers)	Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Other D.K. N.R.	1 2 3 4 5 8 9
09 (4(a))	How long have you been working for your present employer?	0-4 years 5-9 years 10-14 years 15-19 years 20-24 years 25-29 years 30-34 years 35-39 years D.K. N.R.	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9



(4(b)) Why did you start to work for your present employer?

		Mentioned		D.K.	N.R.
		Yes	No		
10	Only available job at the time	0	1	8	9
11	Offered security	0	1	8	9
12	Pay	0	1	8	9
13	Fringe benefits and other rewards	0	1	8	9
14	Got the job through a friend	0	1	8	9
15	Got the job through family contacts	0	1	8	9
16	Opportunities to acquire skills and training	0	1	8	9
17	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	8	9

18 (5(a))	Could you tell me the title of the job you were doing before you came to work for your present employer?	Foreman/Manual	0
		Supervisory	
		Other manual	1
		Non-manual	2
		Self-employed (not a farmer)	3
		Farmer (self-employed)	4
		Farm worker	5
		Compulsory or voluntary military service	6
		Not applicable (N.A.)	7
		D.K.	8
19 (6.)	How many places/jobs have you worked since you left school?	Other and non-classifiable response	9
		1	0
		2-3	1
		4-5	2
		6-7	3
		8-9	4
		10 +	5
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9

20 (7(a))	What was the title of your father's job when you left school?	Foreman/Manual	0
		Supervisory	
		Other manual	1
		Non-manual	2
		Self-employed (not farmer)	3
		Farmer (self-employed)	4
		Farm worker	5
		Compulsory or voluntary military service	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		Other and non-classifiable responses	9

21 (8.)	How are you paid?	Piece rate	0
		Time rate	1
		By both systems	2
		Other	3
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
22 (9(a))	Have you ever been unemployed?	Yes	0
		No	1
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
23 (9(b))	When was the last time?	1930-1939	0
		1940-1949	1
		1950-1959	2
		1960-1969	3
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
24 (9(c))	For how long a period were you out of work that time?	< One week	0
		> 1 week < 1 month	1
		> 1 month < 3 months	2
		> 3 months < 6 months	3
		> 6 months < 1 year	4
		About a year	5
		For more than 1 year	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9

(10(a)) People often talk about the  
possibility of promotion at work.  
What does this word 'promotion'

		mean to you?			
		Mentioned		D.K.	N.R.
		Yes	No		
25	Higher pay	0	1	8	9
26	More security	0	1	8	9
27	Higher status/position	0	1	8	9
28	Extra extrinsic benefits - better rewards (holidays, shorter hours, pensions, etc.)	0	1	8	9
29	More responsibility	0	1	8	9
30	Extra intrinsic rewards - more interesting work	0	1	8	9
31	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	8	9

- 32 (10(b))Of these things, which is the most important to you?
- |                                      |   |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| Higher pay                           | 0 |
| More security                        | 1 |
| Higher status/position               | 2 |
| Extra extrinsic rewards              | 3 |
| More responsibility                  | 4 |
| Extra intrinsic rewards              | 5 |
| Other and non-classifiable responses | 6 |
| D.K.                                 | 8 |
| N.R.                                 | 9 |
- 33 (10(c))Could you give me the name of a job that a factory worker would have after promotion?
- |                          |   |
|--------------------------|---|
| Foreman                  | 0 |
| Other manual supervisory | 1 |
| Work study               | 4 |
| Management/white-collar  | 5 |
| Engineer                 | 6 |
| N.A.                     | 7 |
| D.K.                     | 8 |
| N.R.                     | 9 |
- 34 (10(d))How interested are you in getting this job?
- |                 |   |
|-----------------|---|
| Very interested | 0 |
| Interested      | 1 |
| Not interested  | 2 |
| D.K.            | 8 |
| N.R.            | 9 |
- 35 (10(e))How likely is a factory worker to get promotion?
- |               |   |
|---------------|---|
| Very likely   | 0 |
| Likely        | 1 |
| Unlikely      | 2 |
| Very unlikely | 3 |
| D.K.          | 8 |
| N.R.          | 9 |
- 36 (10(f))What reasons would you give for this?
- |                                                              |   |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|---|
| Too few opportunities - too much competition, etc.           | 0 |
| Need contacts - who you know                                 | 1 |
| Poor recruitment policies                                    | 2 |
| Lack of education/training                                   | 3 |
| There are opportunities - not specified further              | 4 |
| There are opportunities - jobs always coming up              | 5 |
| There are opportunities - retirements, resignations, deaths. | 6 |
| Other and non-classifiable responses                         | 7 |
| D.K.                                                         | 8 |
| Everyone has a chance if they are able, work hard, etc.      | 9 |
- 37 (10(g))How would you compare these chances with white-collar workers?
- |                |   |
|----------------|---|
| Much better    | 0 |
| Better         | 1 |
| About the same | 2 |
| Worse          | 3 |
| Much worse     | 4 |
| D.K.           | 8 |
| N.R.           | 9 |



38 (10(h))Why is this?

'Automatic for white-collar workers'	0
Differences in education/training	1
Greater range of jobs and opportunities in the factory	2
Greater range of jobs and opportunities in the office	3
Higher economic rewards of factory workers	4
Same opportunities available to both	5
Bad recruitment policies	6
Other and non-classifiable responses	7
D.K.	8
Everyone has the same chance if they are able, work hard, etc.	9

39 (11(a))What do you think of the money you	Much better	0
	Better	1
earn compared with that of white-	About the same	2
	Worse	3
collar workers?	Much worse	4
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

40 (11(b))What about in terms of the	Much better	0
	Better	1
responsibilities of your job	About the same	2
	Worse	3
compared to that of white-collar	Much worse	4
	D.K.	8
workers?	N.R.	9

41 (11(c))What about your working conditions	Much better	0
	Better	1
compared to those of white-collar	About the same	2
	Worse	3
workers?	Much worse	4
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

42 (11(d))How do you feel about all these	Approve	0
	Disapprove	1
things - earnings?	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

43	How do you feel about all these	Approve	0
		Disapprove	1
	things - responsibilities?	D.K.	8
		N.R.	9

44	How do you feel about all these	Approve	0
		Disapprove	1
	things - working conditions?	D.K.	8
		N.R.	9

45 (12(a))Do you think that employment	Yes	0
	No	1
conditions have improved for	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9
factory workers since the war?		

(12(b)) In what ways do you think they

have improved?

Mentioned

Yes No N.A. D.K. N.R.

46	Physical conditions - noise, lighting, etc.	0	1	7	8	9
47	Work tasks	0	1	7	8	9
48	Manager/worker relationships	0	1	7	8	9
49	Welfare benefits	0	1	7	8	9
50	Shorter working hours	0	1	7	8	9
51	Wage rates	0	1	7	8	9
52	'Social justice' and equality	0	1	7	8	9
53	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9

54 (12(c)) What do you think is the major factor which has brought this about?

Trade Unions	0
Social Democratic Party	1
Labour Party	2
Management	3
Technological change/modernisation	4
Other and non-classifiable responses	5
N.A.	7
D.K.	8
N.R.	9

(12(d)) Why is this (employment conditions have not improved)?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents]

55 (13(a)) Some things thought to be important about a job - most important

High security	1
Good pay	2
Good working conditions	3
Interesting work	4
Possibility for promotion	5
Good Union	6
D.K.	8
N.R.	9

56 Some things thought to be important about a job - 2nd important

High security	1
Good pay	2
Good working conditions	3
Interesting work	4
Possibility for promotion	5
Good union	6
D.K.	8
N.R.	9

57 Some things thought to be important about a job - 3rd important

High security	1
Good pay	2
Good working conditions	3
Interesting work	4
Possibility for promotion	5
Good union	6
D.K.	8
N.R.	9

58 (13(b)) So far as these things are concerned,

would you say that your job is	Very good	0
	Good	1
	Foor	2
	Very poor	3
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

59 (13(c)) If you could start your life again

and you were leaving school today,	Other manual	0
	Same job	1
	Non-manual	2
	Self-employed (not farmer)	3
what job would you go into?	Farmer (self-employed)	4
	Farm worker	5
	Military/Navy	6
	Other	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

60 (14.) Do you belong to a trade union?

Yes	0
No	1
D.K.	8
N.R.	9

61 (15(a)) Do you have any objections to

belonging to a trade union?	Yes	0
	No	1
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

62 (15(b)) If yes, what are these objections?

[Not coded - schedules used.]

63 (16(a)) How long have you belonged to a trade union?

0-4 years	0
5-9	1
10-14	2
15-19	3
20-24	4
25-29	5
30+	6
N.A.	7
D.K.	8
N.R.	9

64 (16(b)) Is it compulsory for you to belong to a trade union in your job?

Yes	0
No	1
D.K.	8
N.R.	9

65 (16(c)) Do you think this is a good thing or a bad thing?

Good	0
Bad	1
D.K.	8
N.R.	9



66 (16(d)) Why do you think it is a good/bad thing?

It strengthens the bargaining power of workers	0
Everyone should belong because they all receive benefits	1
It restricts individual freedom	2
Other and non-classifiable responses	3
D.K.	8
N.R.	9

67 (16(e)) Do you hold any position in your present

trade union?	Yes	0
	No	1
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

- (16(f)) What is this position called?

[Not coded - referred to the specific schedules of these respondents.]

68 (16(g)) How often do you go to union meetings?

Regularly	0
Occasionally	1
Rarely	2
Never	3
N.A.	7
D.K.	8
N.R.	9

69 (16(h)) Why don't you bother?

Not interested - other commitments (family, hobbies, lack of time, etc.)	0
Not interested (no complaints, satisfied with things at work as they are)	1
No chance of influencing policy or leaders	2
Unable to attend (place of residence, journeys, etc.)	3
Not interested - no further details given	4
Other and non-classifiable responses	5
N.A.	7
D.K.	8
N.R.	9

70 (17.) What is the major advantage as you see it of belonging to a trade union?

Economic factors	0
Improved working conditions	1
They 'protect the individual'	2
More social justice and equality	4
The social benefits	5
They represent workers' interests	6
N.A.	7
D.K.	8
Other and non-classifiable responses	9

71(18(a)) What do you think should be the major aim of trade unions?	More social justice and equality	0
	'To represent workers' interests'	1
	Economic factors	3
	Improved working conditions	4
	'To protect the individual'	5
	Other and non-classifiable responses	6
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9
72(18(b)) How successful do you think they have been in achieving this aim?	Extremely successful	0
	Successful	1
	Not so successful	2
	Completely unsuccessful	3
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9
73(18(c)) Some say that unions should get workers more pay. Others say that they should get workers more influence in management decisions.	Pay	0
	Influence	1
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9
74(19(a)) Do you think that union leaders at the national level represent the interests of the ordinary member?	Yes	0
	No	1
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9
75(19(b)) Why is this (they don't represent the interests of the ordinary member)?	They have not obtained greater social justice or equality for workers	0
	There are organisational problems	1
	They only think of themselves	2
	They are not interested in the individual worker.	3
	Other and non-classifiable responses	4
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

76 (20(a))	Do you think that local union	Yes	0
		No	1
	officials represent the interests	N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
	of the ordinary members?	N.R.	9

77 (20(b)) Why is this?

Yes - they do what they can	0
Yes - because they also get the benefits	1
Yes - that's what they are elected to do	2
No - they only think of themselves	3
No - they are too closely allied with management	4
Other and non-classifiable responses	5
N.A.	7
D.K.	8
N.R.	9

Card II

01-03 Interview number

04 Number of card

(05-30)(21(a)) Do you belong to any kind of club,  
association or organisation?

(05-30)(21(b)) Which ones do you belong to?

(05-30)(21(c)) How often do you go to the various  
activities and meetings of these  
associations?

(05-30)(21(d)) Are you on the committee(s) or hold any  
positions in this/these organisations?

(05-30)(21(e)) Which ones?

(05-30)(21(f)) What kinds of people belong to these  
organisations?

05	Nos. of voluntary organisations	0	0
	belonged to	1	1
		2	2
		3	3
		4	4
		5	5
		>5	6
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9



Voluntary Association 1

06	FUNCTION	Sport	0
		Social	1
		Political	2
		Hobby/Special Interest	3
		Religious	4
		Pressure/Interest Group	5
		Other	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
07	AFFILIATION	Company	0
		Trade Union	1
		Social Democratic/ Labour	2
		Other political	3
		Church	4
		Pressure/Interest Group	5
		Other	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
08	SOCIAL MIX	Predominantly Manual	0
		Mixed	1
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
09	ATTEND	Regularly	0
		Occasionally	1
		Rarely	2
		Never	3
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
10	POSITION	Yes	0
		No	1
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9

Voluntary Association 2

11	FUNCTION	Sport	0
		Social	1
		Political	2
		Hobby/special Interest	3
		Religious	4
		Pressure/Interest Group	5
		Other	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9

Voluntary Association 2 (Cont.)

12	AFFILIATION	Company	0
		Trade Union	1
		Social Democratic/ Labour	2
		Other political	3
		Church	4
		Pressure/Interest Group	5
		Other	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
13	SOCIAL MIX	Predominantly Manual	0
		Mixed	1
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
14	ATTEND	Regularly	0
		Occasionally	1
		Rarely	2
		Never	3
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
15	POSITION	Yes	0
		No	1
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9

Voluntary Association 3

16	FUNCTION	Sport	0
		Social	1
		Political	2
		Hobby/special interest	3
		Religious	4
		Pressure/Interest Group	5
		Other	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
17	AFFILIATION	Company	0
		Trade Union	1
		Social Democratic/ Labour	2
		Other political	3
		Church	4
		Pressure/Interest Group	5
		Other	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9

Voluntary Association 3 (Cont.)

18	SOCIAL MIX	Predominantly Manual	0
		Mixed	1
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
19	ATTEND	Regularly	0
		Occasionally	1
		Rarely	2
		Never	3
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
20	POSITION	Yes	0
		No	1
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9

Voluntary Association 4

21	FUNCTION	Sport	0
		Social	1
		Political	2
		Hobby/Special Interest	3
		Religious	4
		Pressure/Interest Group	5
		Other	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
22	AFFILIATION	Company	0
		Trade Union	1
		Social Democratic/ Labour	2
		Other Political	3
		Church	4
		Pressure/Interest Group	5
		Other	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
23	SOCIAL MIX	Predominantly Manual	0
		Mixed	1
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
24	ATTEND	Regularly	0
		Occasionally	1
		Rarely	2
		Never	3
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9



Voluntary Association 4 (Cont.)

25	POSITION	Yes	0
		No	1
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9

Voluntary Association 5

26	FUNCTION	Sport	0
		Social	1
		Political	2
		Hobby/special interest	3
		Religious	4
		Pressure/Interest Group	5
		Other	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
27	AFFILIATION	Company	0
		Trade Union	1
		Social Democratic/ Labour	2
		Other political	3
		Church	4
		Pressure/Interest Group	5
		Other	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
28	SOCIAL MIX	Predominantly Manual	0
		Mixed	1
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
29	ATTEND	Regularly	0
		Occasionally	1
		Rarely	2
		Never	3
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
30	POSITION	Yes	0
		No	1
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9

32 (22(a)) Are there any kinds of clubs or	Yes	0
associations that you would like to	No	1
belong to, but which you do not	D.K.	8
belong to at the moment?	N.R.	9

- (22(b)) Which are these organisations?

[Not coded - schedules used.]

- (22(c)) What kind of people belong to these organisations, people like yourself or are some of them white-collar workers?

[Not coded - schedules used.]

(23(a)) People often go out in the evenings although they do not belong to any clubs or associations. When you go out in the evening, where do you go?

		Mentioned				
		Yes	No	N.A.	D.K.	N.R.
33	Visit relatives	0	1	7	8	9
34	Visit friends	0	1	7	8	9
35	'Audience activities' (Cinema/Theatre)	0	1	7	8	9
36	Go to a restaurant or dancing	0	1	7	8	9
37	Go to a club or pub	0	1	7	8	9
38	'Private activities' - go out with family for walks, car rides, fishing, etc.	0	1	7	8	9
39	Never go out	0	1	7	8	9
40	Other activities	0	1	7	8	9

41 (23(b)) What kind of people do you meet	Factory	0
there?	White-collar	1
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

42 (23(c))	When you go out to these places who do you normally go with?	Wife and immediate family	0
		Wife alone	1
		Friends from outside work	2
		Colleagues from work	3
		Male relatives (outside immediate family)	4
		Other relatives	5
		Alone	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		Other and non-classifiable responses	9
43 (23(d))	How often would you say that you went to the places you have mentioned?	Frequently	0
		Occasionally	1
		Rarely	2
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
44 (24(a))	Who would you say are the two or three people you most often spend your time with, other than, of course, your wife and children?	Somebody mentioned	0
		Nobody	1
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
45	Person 1: is a relative. If 'yes', who?	Parents	0
		No	1
		Parents-in-law	2
		Siblings	3
		Siblings-in-law	4
		Other relatives	5
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
46	Person 1: what does he do for a living?	Manual	0
		Non-manual	1
		Self-employed (not farmer)	2
		Farmer (self-employed)	3
		Farm worker	4
		Military	5
		Other	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
47	Person 1: does he work at the same place as you?	Yes	0
		No	1
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9





54	Person 3: what does he do for a living?	Manual	0
		Non-manual	1
		Self-employed (not farmer)	2
		Farmer (self-employed)	3
		Farm worker	4
		Military	5
		Other	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
55	Person 3: does he work at the same places as you?	Yes	0
		No	1
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
56	Person 3: where does he live?	Same block of flats/street	0
		Same area	1
		Elsewhere in same/town village	2
		Outside town/village	3
		Other	4
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
57 (24(b))	Which of these three people do you see most?	Person 1	0
		Person 2	1
		Person 3	2
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
58 (24(c))	How often do you see this person?	Daily	0
		More than once a week/less than daily	1
		About once a week	2
		About once every two or three weeks	3
		About once a month	4
		Now-and-again/Occasionally/Rarely	5
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
59 (25(a))	Did you vote in the last general election?	Yes	0
		No	1
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9

60 (25(b)) Which Party did you vote for in the last general election? (Sweden)	Social Democratic	0
	Folk	1
	Centre	2
	Höger	3
	K.D.S.	4
	Communist	5
	Refused to disclose	6
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9
61 (25(b)) Which Party did you vote for in the last general election? (Britain)	Labour	0
	Conservative	1
	Liberal	2
	Refused to disclose	3
	Other	4
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9
62 (25(c)) If a general election was to be held in the near future, which party would you vote for? (Sweden)	Social Democratic	0
	Folk	1
	Centre	2
	Höger	3
	K.D.S.	4
	Communist	5
	Refused to disclose	6
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9
63 (25(c)) If a general election was to be held in the near future, which party would you vote for? (Britain)	Labour	0
	Conservative	1
	Liberal	2
	Refused to disclose	3
	Other	4
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9
64 Change in political allegiance -	No change Lab./S.D. - Lab./S.D.	0
	Lab./S.D. → Other Party	1
	Other Party → Lab./S.D.	2
	Lab./S.D. → Abstain	3
	Abstain → Lab./S.D.	4
	No change Other Party - Other Party	5
	Abstain → Other Party	6
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9



(25(d)) Why would you vote in this way?		Mentioned				
		Yes	No	N.A.	D.K.	N.R.
65	General 'Working Class' identification with Labour/ Social Democrats	0	1	7	8	9
66	Family traditions	0	1	7	8	9
67	Economic factors	0	1	7	8	9
68	'Socialist' policies	0	1	7	8	9
69	'Welfare' policies	0	1	7	8	9
70	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9
71 (26.)	How long have you been married?					
	0-9 years					
	10-19 years					
	20-29 years					
	30-39 years					
	40 or more years					
	Other marital status (widowed, divorced)					
	Single					
	D.K.					
	N.R.					
72 (27(a))	What was your father-in-law's job when you got married?					
	Manual					
	Non-manual					
	Self-employed (not farmer)					
	Farmer (self-employed)					
	Farm worker					
	Military					
	Other and non-classifiable responses					
	N.A.					
	D.K.					
	N.R.					
73 (27(c))	Does your wife go out to work?					
	Yes					
	No					
	N.A.					
	D.K.					
	N.R.					
74 (27(d))	If yes, what is the name of her job?					
	Manual					
	Non-manual					
	Other and non-classifiable responses					
	N.A.					
	D.K.					
	N.R.					
75 (28(a))	How many children do you have?					
	None					
	1					
	2					
	3					
	4					
	5					
	6					
	More than 6					
	D.K.					
	N.R.					

Card III

01-03 Interview Number

04 Number of card

(05-39)(28(b)) Could you give me some details about  
them?

Child 1

05	Age:	0-4	0
		5-9	1
		10-14	2
		15-19	3
		20-24	4
		25-29	5
		30+	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
06	Marital status and sex:	Single male	0
		Married male	1
		'Other' male	2
		Single female	3
		Married female	4
		'Other' female	5
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
07	Occupation:	Manual	0
		Non-manual	1
		Self-employed (not farmer)	2
		Farmer (self-employed)	3
		Farm worker	4
		Military	5
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
08	Place of work: Same as respondent	Yes	0
		No	1
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
09	Education:(if still at school)	Comprehensive	0
		Gymnasium	1
		Pack	2
		Yrke	3
		Primary	4
		Grammar	5
		Secondary Modern	6
		Pre-school	7
		University	8
		Technical College	9

Child 2

10	Age:	0-4	0
		5-9	1
		10-14	2
		15-19	3
		20-24	4
		25-29	5
		30+	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
11	Marital status and sex:	Single male	0
		Married male	1
		'Other' male	2
		Single female	3
		Married female	4
		'Other' female	5
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
12	Occupation:	Manual	0
		Non-manual	1
		Self-employed (not farmer)	2
		Farmer (self-employed)	3
		Farm worker	4
		Military	5
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
13	Place of work: same as respondent	Yes	0
		No	1
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
14	Education:(if still at school)	Comprehensive	0
		Gymnasium	1
		Fack	2
		Yrke	3
		Primary	4
		Grammar	5
		Secondary Modern	6
		Pre-school	7
		University	8
		Technical College	9



Child 3

15	Age:	0-4	0
		5-9	1
		10-14	2
		15-19	3
		20-24	4
		25-29	5
		30+	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
16	Marital status and sex:	Single male	0
		Married male	1
		'Other' male	2
		Single female	3
		Married female	4
		'Other' female	5
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
17	Occupation:	N.R.	9
		Manual	0
		Non-manual	1
		Self-employed (not farmer)	2
		Farmer (self-employed)	3
		Farm worker	4
		Military	5
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
18	Place of work: same as respondent	Yes	0
		No	1
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
19	Education:(if still at school)	Comprehensive	0
		Gymnasium	1
		Fack	2
		Yrke	3
		Primary	4
		Grammar	5
		Secondary Modern	6
		Pre-school	7
		University	8
		Technical College	9

Child 4

20	Age:	0-4	0
		5-9	1
		10-14	2
		15-19	3
		20-24	4
		25-29	5
		30+	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
21	Marital status and sex:	Single Male	0
		Married male	1
		'Other' male	2
		Single female	3
		Married female	4
		'Other' female	5
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
22	Occupation:	N.R.	9
		Manual	0
		Non-manual	1
		Self-employed (not farmer)	2
		Farmer (self-employed)	3
		Farm worker	4
		Military	5
		N.A.	7
23	Place of work; same as respondent	D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
		Yes	0
		No	1
		N.A.	7
24	Education:(if still at school)	D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
		Comprehensive	0
		Gymnasium	1
		Fack	2
		Yrke	3
		Primary	4
		Grammar	5
		Secondary modern	6
		Pre-school	7
		University	8
		Technical College	9

Child 5

25	Age:	0-4	0
		5-9	1
		10-14	2
		15-19	3
		20-24	4
		25-29	5
		30+	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
26	Marital status and sex:	Single male	0
		Married male	1
		'Other' male	2
		Single female	3
		Married female	4
		'Other' female	5
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
27	Occupation:	N.R.	9
		Manual	0
		Non-manual	1
		Self-employed (not farmer)	2
		Farmer (self-employed)	3
		Farm worker	4
		Military	5
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
28	Place of work: same as respondent	Yes	0
		No	1
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
29	Education:(if still at school)		
		Comprehensive	0
		Gymnasium	1
		Pack	2
		Yrke	3
		Primary	4
		Grammar	5
		Secondary Modern	6
		Pre-school	7
		University	8
		Technical College	9



Child 6

30	Age:	0-4	0
		5-9	1
		10-14	2
		15-19	3
		20-24	4
		25-29	5
		30+	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
31	Marital status and sex:	Single Male	0
		Married male	1
		'Other' male	2
		Single female	3
		Married female	4
		'Other' female	5
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
32	Occupation:	Manual	0
		Non-manual	1
		Self-employed (not farmer)	2
		Farmer (self-employed)	3
		Farm worker	4
		Military	5
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
33	Place of work: same as respondent	Yes	0
		No	1
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
34	Education:(if still at school)	Comprehensive	0
		Gymnasium	1
		Pack	2
		Yrke	3
		Primary	4
		Grammar	5
		Secondary Modern	6
		Pre-school	7
		University	8
		Technical College	9

Child 7

35	Age:	0-4	0
		5-9	1
		10-14	2
		15-19	3
		20-24	4
		25-29	5
		30+	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
36	Marital status and sex:	Single male	0
		Married male	1
		'Other' male	2
		Single female	3
		Married female	4
		'Other' female	5
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
37	Occupation:	Manual	0
		Non-manual	1
		Self-employed (not farmer)	2
		Farmer (self-employed)	3
		Farm worker	4
		Military	5
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
38	Place of work: same as respondent	Yes	0
		No	1
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
39	Education:(if still at school)	Comprehensive	0
		Gymnasium	1
		Pack	2
		Yrke	3
		Primary	4
		Grammar	5
		Secondary Modern	6
		Pre-school	7
		University	8
		Technical College	9

40 (29(a)) Which of your sons do you think	Son 1	1
has got the best job?	Son 2	2
	Son 3	3
	Son 4	4
	Son 5	5
	Son 6	6
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	Son 7	9

- (29(b)) Why do you think that?

[Not coded - schedules used.]

41 (30(a)) What do you think of your son's/	Much better	0
eldest son's job in terms of its	Better	1
prospects for promotion compared	About the same	2
to that of a white-collar worker?	Worse	3
	Much worse	4
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

42 (30(b)) What do you think of your son's/	Much better	0
eldest son's job in terms of the	Better	1
money that he earns compared to	About the same	2
that of a white-collar worker?	Worse	3
	Much worse	4
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

43 (30(c)) What about in terms of respon-	Much better	0
sibility compared to these	Better	1
people?	About the same	2
	Worse	3
	Much worse	4
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

- (30(d)) How do you feel about these things-

(a) promotion, (b) money and (c)  
responsibility?

[Not coded - schedules used.]

44 (31(a)) How would you compare your son's	Much better	0
job who works as a _____	Better	1
with factory work?	About the same	2
	Worse	3
	Much worse	4
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9



- (31(b))What reasons would you give for  
this?

[Not coded - schedules used.]

45 (32(a))What kind of job do you think	Manual	0
your eldest son at school will	Clerical	1
get?	'Engineer'	2
	Professional	3
	Managerial	4
	Self-employed	5
	Other and non-classifiable	
	responses	6
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

46 (32(b))We all want children to get the	Manual	0
kind of job that suits them	Clerical	1
best. If you could completely	'Engineer'	2
decide what sort of job he should	Professional	3
get, what would you like him to	Managerial	4
do?	Self-employed	5
	Other and non-classifiable	
	responses	6
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

47 (32(c))What do you find attractive	The security	0
about this job?	Good prospects for	
	promotion	1
	Interesting work	2
	Well-paid	3
	Other and non-classifiable	
	responses	4
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

48 (33(a))Would you prefer your daughter	Factory worker	0
to marry a factory worker or a	White-collar worker	1
white-collar worker?	'It doesn't matter'	2
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

- (33(b))Why is this?

[Not coded - schedules used.]

49 (34(a))How do you think the chances of	Much better	0
a young man leaving school today	Better	1
compare with when you left school?	About the same	2
	Worse	3
	Much worse	4
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

(34(b)) What is the main reason for this?		Mentioned		N.A.	D.K.	N.R.
		Yes	No			
50	Better educational opportunities available	0	1	7	8	9
51	More jobs now available	0	1	7	8	9
52	Fewer jobs now available	0	1	7	8	9
53	Government policies	0	1	7	8	9
54	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9
55(35(a))	Most children have a chance to get on these days. But do you think that the children of some people are more likely to get on than others?	Yes				0
		No				1
		N.A.				7
		D.K.				8
		N.R.				9

- (35(b)) Why is this?

[Not coded - schedules used.]

(35(c)) Could you give me the names of the jobs of these people?		Mentioned		N.A.	D.K.	N.R.
		Yes	No			
56	'Educated People'	0	1	7	8	9
57	'The Rich', 'The Wealthy'	0	1	7	8	9
58	'Professionals' (or specific occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
59	'Big Businessmen', 'Directors'	0	1	7	8	9
60	Other non-manual (or specific occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
61	'The Aristocracy'/Lords and Ladies'	0	1	7	8	9
62	'Depends on the parents'	0	1	7	8	9
63	'Manual Workers' (or specific occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
64	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9
65(36(a))	Suppose a son of yours had to choose between a job in a factory and a white-collar job, what would you advise him to do?	White-collar				0
		Factory				1
		Doesn't Matter				2
		N.A.				7
		D.K.				8
		N.R.				9

66 (36(b)) Why would you advise him in this way?	Depends on the individual	0
	Better chances for promotion	1
	Higher extrinsic rewards	2
	Higher intrinsic rewards	3
	'Can't generalise'	4
	Better working conditions	5
	Other and non-classifiable responses	6
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9
67 (37(a)) Suppose a son of a friend of yours had to choose between a job in a factory and a white-collar job, what would you advise him to do?	White-collar	0
	Factory	1
	Doesn't matter	2
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9
68 (37(b)) Why would you advise him in this way?	Depends on the individual	0
	Better chances for promotion	1
	Higher extrinsic rewards	2
	Higher intrinsic rewards	3
	'Can't generalise'	4
	Better working conditions	5
	Other and non-classifiable responses	6
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9
69 (38(a)) A lot of children stay on at school and go to university these days. Do you think the sons of some people are more likely to stay on than others?	Yes	0
	No	1
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9



(38(b))What sort of people are more likely to have their sons at university?		Mentioned				
		Yes	No	N.A.	D.K.	N.R.
70	'Educated People'	0	1	7	8	9
71	'The Rich', 'The Wealthy'	0	1	7	8	9
72	'Professionals' (or specific occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
73	'Big Businessmen', 'Directors'	0	1	7	8	9
74	Other non-manual (or specific occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
75	'The Aristocracy', 'Lords and Ladies'	0	1	7	8	9
76	'Depends on the parents'	0	1	7	8	9
77	'Manual workers' (or specific occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
78	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9

Card IV

01-03 Interview number

04 Number of card

05 (39(a))What are the major differences, as Advantages for white-collar workers 0  
you see it, between factory workers Advantages for manual workers 1  
and white-collar workers these No differences 2  
days? 'Just different' 3  
N.A. 7  
D.K. 8  
N.R. 9

(39(a))Reasons given:		Mentioned				
		Yes	No	N.A.	D.K.	N.R.
06	Economic factors	0	1	7	8	9
07	Working conditions - Noise, lighting, etc.	0	1	7	8	9
08	Intrinsic job factors	0	1	7	8	9
09	Better chances for promotion	0	1	7	8	9
10	Status factors	0	1	7	8	9
11	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9
12 (39(b))Is this a good state of affairs?		Yes				0
		No				1
		N.A.				7
		D.K.				8
		N.R.				9

13 (39(c))Why is this?

Satisfaction that there are differences	0
Dissatisfaction that there are differences	1
Satisfaction that there are no differences	2
Dissatisfaction that there are no differences	3
Non-classifiable responses	4
N.A.	7
D.K.	8
N.R.	9

(40(a))We often say a person has done well for himself. What would one of your friends have to do for you to think that he had done

		Mentioned				
		Yes	No	N.A.	D.K.	N.R.
14	Start his own business	0	1	7	8	9
15	Get promotion at work	0	1	7	8	9
16	Get better qualified	0	1	7	8	9
17	Earn more money	0	1	7	8	9
18	Enjoy contented domestic relationships	0	1	7	8	9
19	Have a good secure job	0	1	7	8	9
20	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9

21 (40(b))How likely is a friend of yours to do very well for himself in this country today?	Very likely	0
	Likely	1
	Unlikely	2
	Very unlikely	3
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

22 (40(c))Why do you think that this is the case?	Personal experience/people I know	0
	General opportunities or lack of opportunities	1
	Opportunities or lack of educational opportunities	2
	Depends on individual effort, interest, ambition, ability	3
	Other and non-classifiable responses	4
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

23 (40(d))	How would you compare these chances	Much better	0
		Better	1
	with those of other people?	About the same	2
		Worse	3
		Much worse	4
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9

(40(e)) What kind of people do you have						
	in mind?	Mentioned				
		Yes	No	N.A.	D.K.	N.R.
24	'Educated People'	0	1	7	8	9
25	'The Rich', 'The Wealthy'	0	1	7	8	9
26	'Professionals' (or specific occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
27	'Big Businessmen', 'Directors'	0	1	7	8	9
28	Other non-manual (or specific occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
29	'Manual workers' (or specific occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
30	'People in general', 'Anybody'	0	1	7	8	9
31	Personal acquaintances (friends, neighbours, workmates, relatives)	0	1	7	8	9
32	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9

(41)	Here are some things which may help a person move up in the world. Which do you think is the most important, which next, and which next?		
33	Major reason:	Ambition	1
		Education	2
		Knowing the right people	3
		Good union	4
		Social class	5
		Intelligence	6
		Hard work	7
		Luck	8
		Money	9
		D.K.	0



34 (41)	2nd reason:	Ambition	1
		Education	2
		Knowing the right people	3
		Good union	4
		Social class	5
		Intelligence	6
		Hard work	7
		Luck	8
		Money	9
		D.K.	0
35	3rd reason:	Ambition	1
		Education	2
		Knowing the right people	3
		Good union	4
		Social class	5
		Intelligence	6
		Hard work	7
		Luck	8
		Money	9
		D.K.	0
36 (42)	Some people say that there are	There are	0
	no longer social classes in this	There are not	1
	country. Others say that there	N.A.	7
	are. What do you think?	D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
37 (43)	Why do you think this is the	Birth and family background	0
	case?	Money, wealth, and various	
		economic factors	1
		Educational qualifications	2
		Status and snobbery	3
		'An inevitable feature of	
		life'	4
		Other and non-classifiable	
		responses	5
		Occupation	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
(44)	Which are the major classes in		
	this country today?	Mentioned	
		Yes No N.A. D.K. N.R.	
38	'Upper', 'Top', 'Higher' classes	0 1 7 8	9
39	'The wealthy', 'Rich', 'Those		
	with plenty of money'	0 1 7 8	9
40	'Social Group 1'	0 1 7 8	9
41	'Upper middle class'	0 1 7 8	9
42	'Middle class'	0 1 7 8	9
43	'Lower middle class'	0 1 7 8	9
44	'White-collar people'	0 1 7 8	9

		Mentioned				
		Yes	No	N.A.	D.K.	N.R.
45 (44)	'Educated people'	0	1	7	8	9
46	'Social Group 2'	0	1	7	8	9
47	'Social Group 3'	0	1	7	8	9
48	'Average people', 'Ordinary people'	0	1	7	8	9
49	'Working class'	0	1	7	8	9
50	'Lower class'	0	1	7	8	9
51	'The poor', 'Lower paid'	0	1	7	8	9
52	Negative evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
53	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9
54-55 (45)	Which of these classes would you say that you belong to?	'Upper', 'Top', 'Higher' classes 'The wealthy', 'Rich', 'Those with plenty of money' 'Social Group 1' 'Upper middle class' 'Middle class' 'Lower middle class' 'White-collar people' 'Educated people' 'Social Group 2' 'Social Group 3' 'Average people', 'Ordinary people' 'Working class' 'Lower class' 'The poor', 'Lower paid' Negative evaluation Other and non-classifiable responses N.A. D.K. N.R.				
						00
						01
						02
						03
						04
						05
						06
						07
						08
						09
						10
						11
						12
						13
						14
						15
						17
						18
						19
56	Respondents Self Placement in 'Top' Category					0
	" " " " 'Intermediate' Category					1
	" " " " 'Bottom' Category					2
	N.A.					7
	D.K.					8
	N.R.					9
57	Respondents' class model -	One				1
		Two				2
		Three				3
		Four				4
		Five				5
		N.A.				7
		D.K.				8
		N.R.				9

(46) What sort of people do you mean when  
you say \_\_\_\_\_?

(47) What sort of people belong to the

other classes you have mentioned?

Mentioned  
Yes No

N.A.

D.K.

N.R.

'Upper', 'Top', 'Higher' classes

58	'Lords and ladies', 'People with titles', 'The Aristocracy'	0	1	7	8	9
59	Economic factors	0	1	7	8	9
60	'Big businessmen', 'Directors'	0	1	7	8	9
61	'Managers'	0	1	7	8	9
62	'Professionals' (or specific title)	0	1	7	8	9
63	'Higher white-collar workers'	0	1	7	8	9
64	'Those who don't work'	0	1	7	8	9
65	Positive evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
66	Negative evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
67	'Educated people'	0	1	7	8	9
68	'Engineers'	0	1	7	8	9
69	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9

'The wealthy', 'Rich', 'Those with  
plenty of money'

70	Economic factors	0	1	7	8	9
71	'Big businessmen', 'Directors'	0	1	7	8	9
72	'Lords and ladies', 'People with titles', 'The Aristocracy'	0	1	7	8	9
73	'Managers'	0	1	7	8	9
74	'Professionals' (or specific title)	0	1	7	8	9
75	'Higher white-collar workers'	0	1	7	8	9
76	'Those who don't work'	0	1	7	8	9
77	Positive evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
78	Negative evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
79	'Educated people'	0	1	7	8	9
80	'Engineers'	0	1	7	8	9

Card V

01-03	Interview number					
04	Number of card					
05	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9



	<u>'Social Group 1'</u>	Mentioned		N.A.	D.K.	N.R.
		Yes	No			
06	'Lords and ladies', 'People with titles', 'The Aristocracy'	0	1	7	8	9
07	Economic factors	0	1	7	8	9
08	'Big businessmen', 'Directors'	0	1	7	8	9
09	'Managers'	0	1	7	8	9
10	'Professionals' (or specific title)	0	1	7	8	9
11	'Higher white-collar workers'	0	1	7	8	9
12	'Those who don't work'	0	1	7	8	9
13	Positive evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
14	Negative evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
15	'Educated people'	0	1	7	8	9
16	'Engineers'	0	1	7	8	9
17	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9
	<u>'Upper middle class'</u>					
18	Economic factors	0	1	7	8	9
19	'Big businessmen', 'Directors'	0	1	7	8	9
20	'Managers'	0	1	7	8	9
21	'Professionals' (or specific title)	0	1	7	8	9
22	'Higher white-collar workers'	0	1	7	8	9
23	'Lower white-collar workers'	0	1	7	8	9
24	'Educated people'	0	1	7	8	9
25	'Average people', 'Ordinary people'	0	1	7	8	9
26	Positive evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
27	Negative evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
28	'Small shop keepers'	0	1	7	8	9
29	'Engineers'	0	1	7	8	9
30	Other non-manual (or specific occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
31	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9
	<u>'Middle Class'</u>					
32	Economic factors	0	1	7	8	9
33	'Big businessmen', 'Directors'	0	1	7	8	9
34	'Managers'	0	1	7	8	9
35	'Professionals' (or specific title)	0	1	7	8	9
36	'Higher white-collar workers'	0	1	7	8	9
37	'Lower white-collar workers'	0	1	7	8	9

<u>'Middle Class' (Cont.)</u>		Mentioned		N.A.	D.K.	N.R.
		Yes	No			
38	'Educated people'	0	1	7	8	9
39	'Average people', 'Ordinary people'	0	1	7	8	9
40	'Small shop keepers'	0	1	7	8	9
41	'Manual', 'Factory workers' (or specific manual occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
42	Positive evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
43	Negative evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
44	'Engineers'	0	1	7	8	9
45	Other non-manual (or specific occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
46	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9
<u>'Lower middle class'</u>						
47	Economic factors	0	1	7	8	9
48	'Big businessmen', 'Directors'	0	1	7	8	9
49	'Managers'	0	1	7	8	9
50	'Professionals' (or specific title)	0	1	7	8	9
51	'Higher white-collar workers'	0	1	7	8	9
52	'Lower white-collar workers'	0	1	7	8	9
53	'Educated people'	0	1	7	8	9
54	'Average people', 'Ordinary people'	0	1	7	8	9
55	'Small shop keepers'	0	1	7	8	9
56	'Engineers'	0	1	7	8	9
57	'Manual', 'Factory workers' (or specific manual occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
58	Positive evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
59	Negative evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
60	Other non-manual (or specific occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
61	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9
<u>'White-collar People'</u>						
62	'Big-businessmen', 'Directors'	0	1	7	8	9
63	'Managers'	0	1	7	8	9
64	'Professionals' (or specific title)	0	1	7	8	9
65	'Higher white-collar workers'	0	1	7	8	9
66	'Lower white-collar workers'	0	1	7	8	9

<u>'White-collar People' (Cont.)</u>		Mentioned		N.A.	D.K.	N.R.
		Yes	No			
67	'Educated people'	0	1	7	8	9
68	'Engineers'	0	1	7	8	9
69	Economic factors	0	1	7	8	9
70	'Average people', 'Ordinary people'	0	1	7	8	9
71	'Small shop keepers'	0	1	7	8	9
72	'Manual', 'Factory workers' (or specific manual occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
73	Positive evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
74	Negative evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
75	Other non-manual (or specific occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
76	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9
<u>'Educated people'</u>						
77	Economic factors	0	1	7	8	9
78	'Big businessmen', 'Directors'	0	1	7	8	9
79	'Managers'	0	1	7	8	9
80	'Professionals' (or specific title)	0	1	7	8	9

Card VI

01-03	Interview number					
04	Number of card					
05	'Higher white-collar workers'	0	1	7	8	9
06	'Lower white-collar workers'	0	1	7	8	9
07	'Educated people'	0	1	7	8	9
08	'Office workers'	0	1	7	8	9
09	Other non-manual (or specific occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
10	Positive evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
11	Negative evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
12	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9
<u>'Social Group 2'</u>						
13	Economic factors	0	1	7	8	9
14	'Big businessmen', 'Directors'	0	1	7	8	9
15	'Managers'	0	1	7	8	9
16	'Professionals' (or specific title)	0	1	7	8	9
17	'Higher white-collar workers'	0	1	7	8	9
18	'Lower white-collar workers'	0	1	7	8	9



<u>'Social Group 2' (Cont.)</u>		Mentioned		N.A.	D.K.	N.R.
		Yes	No			
19	'Educated people'	0	1	7	8	9
20	'Average people', 'Ordinary people'	0	1	7	8	9
21	'Small shop keepers'	0	1	7	8	9
22	'Manual', 'Factory workers' (or specific manual occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
23	Positive evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
24	Negative evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
25	'Engineers'	0	1	7	8	9
26	Other non-manual (or specific occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
27	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9
<u>'Social Group 3'</u>						
28	'Small shop keepers'	0	1	7	8	9
29	'Managers'	0	1	7	8	9
30	'Professionals' (or specific title)	0	1	7	8	9
31	'Lower white-collar workers'	0	1	7	8	9
32	'Higher white-collar workers'	0	1	7	8	9
33	'Average people', 'Ordinary people'	0	1	7	8	9
34	'Manual', 'Factory workers' (or specific manual occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
35	Other non-manual (or specific occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
36	'The poor', 'Low incomes'	0	1	7	8	9
37	'Engineers'	0	1	7	8	9
38	Positive evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
39	Negative evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
40	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9
<u>'Average people', 'Ordinary people'</u>						
41	'Small shop keepers'	0	1	7	8	9
42	'Managers'	0	1	7	8	9
43	'Professionals' (or specific title)	0	1	7	8	9
44	'Lower white-collar workers'	0	1	7	8	9
45	'Higher white-collar workers'	0	1	7	8	9
46	'Average people', 'Ordinary people'	0	1	7	8	9
47	'Manual', 'Factory workers' (or specific manual occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9

'Average people', 'Ordinary people'(Cont.)

		Mentioned		N.A.	D.K.	N.R.
		Yes	No			
48	Other non-manual (or specific occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
49	'The poor', 'Low incomes'	0	1	7	8	9
50	'Engineers'	0	1	7	8	9
51	Positive evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
52	Negative evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
53	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9

'Working Class'

54	'Small shopkeepers'	0	1	7	8	9
55	'Managers'	0	1	7	8	9
56	'Professionals' (or specific title)	0	1	7	8	9
57	'Lower white-collar workers'	0	1	7	8	9
58	'Higher white-collar workers'	0	1	7	8	9
59	'Average people', 'Ordinary people'	0	1	7	8	9
60	'Manual', 'Factory workers' (or specific manual occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
61	Other non-manual (or specific occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
62	'The poor', 'Low incomes'	0	1	7	8	9
63	'Engineers'	0	1	7	8	9
64	Positive evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
65	Negative evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
66	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9

'Lower Class'

67	Non-manual (specific occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
68	'Manual', 'Factory workers' (or specific manual occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
69	'The poor', 'Low incomes'	0	1	7	8	9
70	Negative evaluation	0	1	7	8	9
71	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9

'The poor', 'The lower paid'

72	'Manual', 'Factory workers' (or specific manual occupation mentioned)	0	1	7	8	9
73	'The poor', 'Low incomes'	0	1	7	8	9
74	Negative evaluation	0	1	7	8	9

	<u>'The poor', 'The lower paid' (Cont.)</u>	Mentioned		N.A.	D.K.	N.R.
		Yes	No			
75	'Pensioners', 'The retired'	0	1	7	8	9
76	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9

Negative Evaluation

77	'Asocial people'	0	1	7	8	9
78	'People who can't look after themselves'	0	1	7	8	9
79	'Foreigners'	0	1	7	8	9
80	'Living off the state'	0	1	7	8	9

Card VII

01-03	Interview number					
04	Number of card					
05	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9
06	<u>Other and non-classifiable responses</u>	0	1	7	8	9

(48) What is the major factor, do you think, which determines the class a person belongs to?

		Mentioned		N.A.	D.K.	N.R.
		Yes	No			
07	'Money', 'Wealth', and economic factors	0	1	7	8	9
08	Educational qualifications and experiences	0	1	7	8	9
09	Appearances	0	1	7	8	9
10	Birth and family background	0	1	7	8	9
11	Attitudes	0	1	7	8	9
12	Occupation	0	1	7	8	9
13	Patterns of social interaction	0	1	7	8	9
14	Other and non-classifiable responses	0	1	7	8	9



15-16 (49(a)) Which class do you think has done best economically over the past few years?	'Upper', 'Top', 'Higher' classes	00
	'The wealthy', 'The Rich', 'Those with plenty of money'	01
	'Social Group 1'	02
	'Upper middle class'	03
	'Middle class'	04
	'Lower middle class'	05
	'White-collar people'	06
	'Educated people'	07
	'Social Group 2'	08
	'Social Group 3'	09
	'Average people', 'Ordinary people'	10
	'Working class'	11
	'Lower class'	12
	'The poor', 'The lower paid'	13
	Negative evaluation	14
	Other and non-classifiable responses	15
	N.A.	17
	D.K.	18
	N.R.	19
17 (49(b)) Why is this?	The influence of 'Big Business', 'Capital'	0
	The activities of white-collar/middle class unions	1
	The activities of trade unions	2
	Government policies	3
	General wage increases	4
	Other and non-classifiable responses	5
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9
18 (49(c)) How do you feel about this?	Approve	0
	Disapprove	1
	Other and non-classifiable responses	2
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
19 (49(d)) Do you think that there will be social classes in 20 years time?	N.R.	9
	Yes	0
	No	1
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

20 (49(e)) Why do you think this?

'They are inevitable'	0
Yes, but changes are reducing the differences between them	1
Other and non-classifiable responses	4
N.A.	7
D.K.	8
N.R.	9

21-22 (50(a)) Which class do you think has the  
most influence over things today?

'Upper', 'Top', 'Higher' classes	00
'The wealthy', 'The rich' 'Those with plenty of money'	01
'Social Group 1'	02
'Upper middle class'	03
'Middle class'	04
'Lower middle class'	05
'White-collar people'	06
'Educated people'	07
'Social Group 2'	08
'Social Group 3'	09
'Average people', 'Ordinary people'	10
'Working class'	11
'Lower class'	12
'The poor', 'The lower paid'	13
Negative evaluation	14
Other and non-classifiable responses	15
N.A.	17
D.K.	18
N.R.	19

23 (50(b)) Why is this?

Economic factors	0
Activities of trade unions	3
'Majority of people'	4
Specific examples of influence	5
Other and non-classifiable responses	6
N.A.	7
D.K.	8
N.R.	9

24 (51(a)) Do you think that the differences  
between social classes have  
changed at all over the most  
recent years?

Yes	0
No	1
N.A.	7
D.K.	8
N.R.	9

25 (51(b))	In what ways have they changed?	Great differences	0
		Less differences - reasons unspecified	1
		Less differences - economic improvements	2
		Less differences - greater contacts and communication	3
		Less differences - less 'snobbery', etc.	4
		Less differences - more opportunities	5
		Other and non-classifiable responses	6
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
26 (52(a))	Do you think that many people	Yes	0
		No	1
	move from one class to another	N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
	these days?	N.R.	9
27 (52(b))	What are the reasons for this?		
	Opportunities to improve personal economic circumstances		0
	Possibilities for promotion at work		1
	Possibilities for obtaining educational qualifications		2
	'Personal contacts'		4
	'Equal opportunity for everyone'		5
	Individual effort and enterprise, etc.		6
	N.A.		7
	D.K.		8
	Other and non-classifiable responses		9
28 (53(a))	How likely is a factory worker to	Very likely	0
		Likely	1
	move from one class to another?	Unlikely	2
		Very unlikely	3
		N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9
29 (53(b))	How likely is the son of a factory	Very likely	0
		Likely	1
	worker to move from one class to	Unlikely	2
		Very unlikely	3
	another?	N.A.	7
		D.K.	8
		N.R.	9



30 (53(c)) What would he have to do in order

to move from one class to another?

Improve his personal economic circumstances	0
Obtain promotion at work, or get a 'better' job.	1
Obtain more educational qualifications	2
Make use of, or establish, 'personal contacts'	4
Exercise some 'individual effort', 'initiative', etc.	6
N.A.	7
D.K.	8
Other and non-classifiable responses	9

31 (53(d)) Compared to the son of a white-	More likely	0
	Less likely	1
collar worker, is he more or less	About the same	2
	N.A.	7
likely to move up?	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

32 (53(e)) Why is this?

More/less chances to improve his personal economic circumstances	0
More/less chances to obtain promotion at work or get a 'better' job	1
More/less chances to obtain educational qualifications	2
More/less chances to make use of 'personal contacts'	4
More/less chances to exercise individual initiative	6
N.A.	7
D.K.	8
Other and non-classifiable responses	9

33 (54) You don't think there are classes	Yes	0
	No	1
any more, but do you think that	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
people can be divided into groups?	N.R.	9

- (55) Which are the major groups (or  
sorts of people) in this country  
today?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (56) Which of these groups would you  
say that you belonged to?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (57) What sort of people do you mean  
when you say \_\_\_\_\_?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (58) What sort of people belong to the  
other groups you have mentioned?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (59) What is the major factor, do you  
think, which determines which  
group of people a person belongs  
to?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (60(a)) Which group do you think has  
done best economically over  
the past few years?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (60(b)) Why is this?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (60(c)) How do you feel about this?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (61(a)) Which group do you think has the  
most influence over things today?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (61(b)) Why is this?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (62(a)) Do you think that the differences  
between groups of people have  
changed at all over recent years?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (62(b)) In what ways have they changed?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (63(a)) Do you think that many people move  
from one group of people to another  
these days?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (63(b)) What are the reasons for this?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (64(a)) How likely is a factory worker to  
move from one group of people to  
another?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (64(b)) How likely is the son of a factory  
worker to move from one group of  
people to another?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (64(c)) What would he have to do in order  
to move up?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (64(d)) Compared to the son of a white-  
collar worker, is he more likely  
or less likely to move up?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (64(e)) Why is this?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (65(a)) If there are neither social  
classes nor different groups  
of people in this country, do  
you think that there are some  
people who are much better off  
than others?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]



- (65(b))Who are these people?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (66(a))Do you think there are some

people who have more influence

over things than others?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (66(b))Who are they?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (67(a))How likely is a factory worker

to become one of these people?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (67(b))How likely is the son of a

factory worker to become one

of these people?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (67(c))What would he have to do in

order to become one of these

people?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (67(d))Compared to the son of a white-

collar worker, is he more likely

or less likely to become one of

these people?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

35 (68(a))Do you think that the present	Yes	0
	No	1
government reflects the interests	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
of people like yourself?	N.R.	9

36(68(b)) If no, why is this?

Do not represent the interests of the country	0
Fail to pursue the interests of the 'working class', 'the working man', 'working people in general'	1
'They only look after themselves', 'All politicians and political parties are the same', etc.	2
Other and non-classifiable responses	3
N.A.	7
D.K.	8
N.R.	9

37(69(a)) Do you think that the standard of	Yes	0
	No	1
living for people like yourself	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
has improved in this country	N.R.	9
since the war?		

38(69(b)) If yes, what do you think has	General improvements in	0
brought this about?	trade and business	
	Social Democratic/Labour	
	Party	1
	Trade Unions	2
	'Worker demands'	3
	'Full employment'	4
	'Higher wages'	5
	Other and non-classifiable	
	responses	6
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

39(69(c)) If no, do you think it has	Yes	0
	No	1
improved for any group/class	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
of people since the war?	N.R.	9

- (69(d)) Which group/class of people  
do you think has benefited  
most?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

- (69(e)) What has been the major  
reason for this?

[Not coded - insufficient number of respondents - schedules used.]

40(70(a)) Are there any people you can	Yes	0
	No	1
think of who are better off than	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
workers like yourself?	N.R.	9

41-42(70(b)) What sort of people?	'Businessmen', 'Directors'	00
	'Managers'	01
	'Professionals', 'Professional people'	02
	'Higher white-collar workers'	03
	'White-collar workers' or specific non-manual occupation mentioned	04
	'Educated people'	05
	'The Rich'	08
	Specific manual occupation mentioned	09
	Other and non-classifiable responses	10
	N.A.	17
	D.K.	18
	N.R.	19

43(71(a)) Do you own your own house?	Yes	0
	No	1
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

44(71(b)) If no, who is it rented from?	Employer	0
	Other	1
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

(72) Does your house have the following items?

		Mentioned				
		Yes	No	N.A.	D.K.	N.R.
45	Central heating	0	1	7	8	9
46	Bathroom	0	1	7	8	9
47	Deep freezer	0	1	7	8	9
48	Refrigerator	0	1	7	8	9
49	Washing machine	0	1	7	8	9
50	Telephone	0	1	7	8	9
51	Television	0	1	7	8	9

52(73(a)) Do you own a car?	Yes	0
	No	1
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9

53(73(b)) Do you own a summer house/weekend cottage/caravan?	Yes	0
	No	1
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9



54(74(a)) Did you go away on holiday last year?	Yes	0
	No	1
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9
55(74(b)) Did you go abroad for your holiday?	Yes	0
	No	1
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9
56(75(a)) How long have you lived in _____?	0-4 years	0
	5-9 years	1
	10-14 years	2
	15-19 years	3
	20-24 years	4
	25+ years	5
	Since birth	6
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9
57(75(b)) Where did you live before?	Within 20 miles of present residence	0
	Within 20-100 miles of present residence	1
	More than 100 miles from present residence	2
	N.A.	7
	D.K.	8
	N.R.	9



APPENDIX IV

PUBLICATIONS ON THE RESEARCH

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VOLUME XXIII NO 2 JUNE 1972

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*Roger Holmes*

## 'Industrial man': a reassessment with English and Swedish data

*Richard Scase*

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of discourse, the latter too often assert that the present synthesis is all. For them past articulation, the discipline of measurement and restraint, come to be seen but as arbitrary 'alienation' imposed upon their youthful will. Society, if anything, must be 'lived', lived in the inescapable present, not reduced to 'laws' that, disliked as they are in any event, may well be derived from a time that has now passed and has thus lost its 'relevance'.

And the students have half a case. Many of our 'laws' are not immutable. What may be the limits of human malleability—or the inherent strength of the formal social role—only time will tell. In the meanwhile we should see such challenge as useful antidote to our own complacencies—something that will allow us to escape the insidious certainties of our own creeping ideologies. We must accept the final ambiguities of the known, but defend what ordering we can see, aware of any internal consistencies we may achieve. Meanwhile, of course, we should not cease to hope—to hope the students have more of a case than we might at first suppose and that society—and even man—may change.



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## 'Industrial man': a reassessment with English and Swedish data<sup>1</sup>

Over recent years, sociologists have devoted considerable attention to the comparative analysis of industrialized societies. Perhaps the major impetus for such interest has been the discussion the so-called 'thesis of convergence' has generated.<sup>2</sup> This stresses the standardizing effects upon social structures of industrial technology, and suggests that these largely override other factors which make for possible diversity, such as 'national cultures', the legacies of traditional social structures, and the purposive actions of individuals and groups.

Although this thesis tends to focus upon 'structural' features of societies, there have been other arguments which have suggested that such developments are related to changes of a more 'cultural' kind. Inkeles has put forward the view that industrial modes of production, particularly of the large-scale bureaucratic kind, generate structural environments and institutional features which lead to relatively consistent patterns of attitudinal responses.<sup>3</sup> He suggests that irrespective of national traditions, the structure of perceptions and attitudes within industrial societies will be relatively the same.

This paper is an attempt to re-examine Inkeles' thesis in the light of empirical data for two industrial societies, namely England and Sweden. More particularly, the emphasis is upon the perceptions of various aspects of social stratification.

England and Sweden are chosen because both are highly industrialized societies with similar occupational structures. If Inkeles' thesis has any validity, it could be expected to apply to these two countries. The only differences in the occupational profiles of the two countries is that Sweden has higher proportions of agricultural workers and of professional workers, yet these differences do not override the overall similarities between the two countries.

In order to test Inkeles' thesis, the findings of a number of empirical studies have been synthesized. But it is important to stress the problems of comparability. The studies have been conducted at various points of

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*Structure of the economically active population*

<i>Occupational group</i>	<i>United Kingdom</i> %	<i>Sweden</i> %
Professional, Technical and Related Workers	9.6	15.3
Administrative, Executive and Managerial Workers	3.1	2.2
Clerical Workers	13.7	9.5
Sales Workers	9.6	9.3
Farmers, Fishermen, etc.	3.5	11.7
Miners, Quarrymen and Related Workers	1.5	0.4
Workers in Transport and Communication occupations	6.0	6.6
Craftsmen, Production Workers and Labourers not classified elsewhere	39.3	34.4
Service, Sport and Recreation Workers	12.0	9.7
Workers not classifiable by occupation	0.7	0.3
Members of the Armed Forces	1.0	0.6
	100.0	100.0

Source: International Labour Office, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, Geneva, 1969.

time; different research designs have been utilized; and the objectives of the studies have often been quite different. In view of these factors, any conclusions based on such comparisons are highly tentative. Nevertheless, such comparisons do suggest particular patterns.

#### (i) CLASS SELF-IDENTIFICATION<sup>4</sup>

In a study conducted into the attitudes of white collar workers and manual workers, Dahlström asked the open-end question, 'which class would you say you belong to?'<sup>5</sup> He found that over 80 per cent of all manual workers identified themselves as 'working class'. In addition between 25 per cent and 50 per cent of all foremen and lower grade office workers described themselves as 'working class'. Dahlström further found that the major criteria adopted for all respondents' self-identification was 'occupation' and 'income'.

Segerstedt and Lundquist arrived at similar conclusions.<sup>6</sup> In a study of two industrial communities in Sweden, using the same open-ended question as Dahlström, the investigators found that 84 per cent of all

male manual workers identified themselves as 'working class', together with 54 per cent of all male white-collar workers. On the other hand, only 4 per cent of male manual workers categorized themselves as 'middle class'. In a more detailed breakdown of class identification among male white-collar workers, they found that the proportion of office workers, technical workers and foremen who rated themselves as 'working class' was 42 per cent, 31 per cent and 85 per cent respectively.

A national sample conducted by the Swedish Gallup Institute found that when respondents were categorized according to their economic status as 'Higher', 'Middle' and 'Lower', 84 per cent of the respondents of 'Lower' economic status identified themselves as 'working class'.<sup>7</sup> This inquiry also asked 'What do you think is the chief reason for the class distinctions which we have in this country?' Of all the respondents, 50 per cent stated either 'money/income' or 'education' and only 5 per cent mentioned 'inherited position'.

Finally various community studies have arrived at similar conclusions. In a study conducted in a Swedish community of 60,000 inhabitants, Junus found that 87 per cent of the manual workers and 39 per cent of the white-collar workers in his sample identified themselves as 'working class'.<sup>8</sup> Similarly in a study of a small rural community, Björkman found that 84.8 per cent of manual workers and 44.7 per cent of white-collar workers defined themselves as 'working class'.<sup>9</sup>

Clearly, the findings of these studies indicate that an extremely high proportion of the Swedish population identifies itself as 'working class'. It also suggests that the criteria adopted for self-identification are 'money', 'occupation' and 'education' rather than 'ascribed' factors such as family background or 'evaluative' criteria such as social status or prestige.

One of the few English studies, that by Martin in an investigation in Hertford and Greenwich, included a question similar to that used in the Swedish studies.<sup>10</sup> He asked 'How many social classes would you say there are in this country?' And 'Can you name them?' He then asked his respondents to specify 'Which of these classes do you belong to?' Martin synthesized the responses of his sample into 'working class' and 'middle class' self-identifications. This makes it possible to compare Martin's results with Swedish studies. In the two communities studied, 32 per cent of white-collar workers (excluding 'executive', 'managerial', 'higher administrative' and 'professional' workers), identified themselves as 'working class', compared with 65 per cent who rated themselves as 'middle class'. Among skilled manual workers on the other hand, 67 per cent categorized themselves as 'working class' and 30 per cent as 'middle class'. Among semi-skilled manual workers, 69 per cent identified themselves as 'working class' and 25 per cent as 'middle class'. It is only among unskilled manual workers that the degree of



working class self-identification (83 per cent) begins to equal that found among Swedish manual workers.

A more recent study by Runciman,<sup>11</sup> suggests that a smaller proportion of manual workers in England identify themselves as 'working class'. He found that as few as 52 per cent rated themselves in this way, whereas 22 per cent rated themselves as 'middle class'. Among non-manual workers, only 19 per cent identified themselves as 'working class'. He also investigated the criteria adopted by respondents in categorizing people as 'middle class' and 'working class'. He found that among manual workers who self-assigned themselves as 'middle class', 27 per cent defined 'middle class' in terms of some personal criterion of approval. At the same time, 15 per cent adopted some criterion of disapproval in defining 'working class'.

As far as other studies in England are concerned, the evidence suggests that it is only in relatively homogeneous working class communities that there is a particularly low incidence of 'middle class' self-identification among manual workers. Willmott found in his study of Dagenham that only 13 per cent of the manual workers in his sample assigned themselves as 'middle class',<sup>12</sup> whereas in Woodford—a more socially 'mixed' residential area—34 per cent of the manual worker respondents assigned themselves to this category.<sup>13</sup> Are there common factors which explain the high level of working-class self-identification in socially homogeneous working-class communities in Britain, and among the Swedish population in general?<sup>14</sup> I return to this point later.

## (ii) INFLUENCE AND SOCIAL CLASS

In their study, Segerstedt and Lundquist<sup>15</sup> asked 'Which class do you think is the most influential in Sweden?' Among male manual workers, 46 per cent of those who identified themselves as 'working class', stated their own social class while 37 per cent claimed 'another class' exercised the most influence. For the 4 per cent of manual workers who considered themselves 'middle class', 54 per cent stated 'another class' was the most influential. The correlation between 'working class' self-identification and the view that one's own class is the most influential is supported with data for male white-collar workers. Among these, 60 per cent who self-rated themselves as 'working class' claimed their own class to be the most influential, while among self-rated 'middle class' respondents, 62 per cent considered 'another class' to be the most influential.

It is difficult to make any kind of significant comparison with studies conducted in England on this issue since this particular kind of question does not appear to have been asked in English empirical studies. However, what evidence there is suggests indirectly that



manual workers do not regard the working class as an influential group. Particularly, in those communities where there appears to be a high degree of working class self-identification among manual workers, that is, similar to that in Sweden.<sup>16</sup>

The only working class institution in Britain which appears to have been perceived by manual workers to be influential is the trade union movement. Here the evidence suggests that manual workers perceive working class strength to be illegitimate. In their study of workers, Goldthorpe and Lockwood asked 'Some people say that trade unions have too much power in the country: would you agree or disagree, on the whole?'<sup>17</sup> They found that 41 per cent of their sample of manual workers agreed. By contrast the evidence for Sweden suggests that working class influence, including trade union activity, is perceived to be not only legitimate but also desirable.

This is well illustrated by Dahlström's study.<sup>18</sup> He asked 'Do you think that trade unions have too much or too little power in this country?' He found that less than 5 per cent of manual workers claimed unions were too powerful, while approximately 7.5 per cent considered that they exercised too little power. Furthermore, he asked 'What factors do you think explain the increase in living standards over the last 50 years?'<sup>19</sup> He found that only a small minority (generally less than 10 per cent) in any occupational group attributed such an improvement to the work of private enterprise. On the other hand, about one half of all manual workers attributed such an improvement to the activities of labour unions. Segerstedt and Lundquist<sup>20</sup> also asked two open-ended questions, 'In what ways do you think that the conditions of workers have improved over the past 40 to 50 years?' And 'What is it that has brought about these improvements?' Of all respondents, 44.2 per cent claimed it was the activities of labour unions which had resulted in improved conditions, 22.5 per cent claimed labour political movements, and only 7.7 per cent suggested technical progress. Therefore two-thirds of all respondents attributed such improvements to the efforts of the working-class movement. The authors found that there was no significant difference in the responses to these questions, either for different occupational groups, or for respondents who identified themselves with different social classes.

Seeman's study of a related issue found that among a sample of Swedish male employees the experience of alienation at work was not generalized to non-work situations.<sup>21</sup> He found that workers who were alienated in the work situation were not less knowledgeable or less engaged in political matters: on the contrary, they demonstrated a degree of political and social integration not found in similar studies conducted in the United States. In view of this, he suggests that the idea that alienation in work has generalized consequences for other

situations must be seriously questioned. He also puts forward the view that 'it is entirely possible that the effects of work alienation are tempered by the surrounding social system—in the present case, by the highly organized, relatively stable, fundamentally democratic and economically advanced social order that modern Sweden represents. It is possible that alienated work, especially at the lower income levels, is something else again in the United States or in France'.<sup>22</sup> Although Seeman's description of Sweden may be somewhat exaggerated, his findings are compatible with those of Dahlström, and of Segerstedt and Lundquist. These studies, taken together, suggest that manual workers perceive themselves to be an integrated, and even influential, group in the social structure of Sweden.

### (iii) OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE

The comparative study of perceptions and attitudes in industrial societies has often focused upon occupational prestige. In this context, Inkeles and Rossi have synthesized the findings for six industrial societies.<sup>23</sup> Recently, Hodge and his associates have extended this analysis by comparing 23 industrial and non-industrial countries.<sup>24</sup> Both studies suggested that the prestige ratings for specific occupations in different countries are highly correlated. But Hodge and his associates found that the variation in scores between the United States and each of the 23 countries was greater than that suggested by Inkeles and Rossi. Within this context, Sweden had the third lowest correlation, that of .74, above only the Congo (.63) and Poland (.62). The only other countries with similar correlations to Sweden were Brazil (.76), India (.75) and the U.S.S.R. (.79). Therefore, of all the highly industrialized societies, Sweden had the lowest correlation with the N.O.R.C. 1963 data. By contrast the correlation for Britain was .83.

One can undertake a more detailed comparison of occupational prestige ratings in Britain and Sweden by analysing the studies conducted by Hall and Caradog Jones<sup>25</sup> and by Carlsson.<sup>26</sup> Both studies compiled mean scores for the prestige of different occupational groups. Although there are variations in systems of categorizations, there are sufficient similarities to make such an exercise meaningful.

The figures show that while there are no differences in the scores for categories '4' and '5', that is, 'skilled labour' and 'white collar' in Sweden, a difference in scores of 3.6 appears for these categories in England. This is despite the fact that the English category 'skilled manual and routine non-manual' includes the occupations of 'police-man', 'routine clerk', and 'shop assistant', which are included in 'white-collar' in the Swedish data. If these occupations are transferred from category '5' to category '4', then category '4' has a mean score



of 16.0 (instead of 14.5). But also, it is necessary to transfer 'coal hewer' from category '6' to '5' since it is recorded as 'skilled manual' in the Standard Classification. Category '5' then has a mean score of 20.0 (instead of 18.1). The difference in the mean scores of '4' and '5' then becomes 4.0 instead of 3.6. Clearly when calculations of this kind are undertaken, which make the data for the two countries more comparable, there remains a difference in the evaluations of skilled manual occupations and routine white-collar occupations in Britain, while in Sweden no such difference appears. On the other hand, there seems

*Prestige ratings for categories of occupations*

SWEDEN		UNITED KINGDOM	
Category	Mean Score	Category	Mean Score
1. Business leaders, Higher Managerial in Private Business	50	1. Professional and High Administrative	2.2
2. Civil Servants, Professionals	49	2. Managerial and Executive	6.4
3. Small-scale Entrepreneurs, Shopkeepers	42	3. Inspectional, Supervisory, and Non-Manual, Higher Grade	11.5
4. White Collar	34	4. Inspectional, Supervisory and other Non-Manual, Lower Grade	14.5
5. Skilled Labour	34	5. Skilled Manual and Routine Non-Manual	18.1
6. Unskilled Labour	28	6. Semi-Skilled Manual	25.6
		7. Unskilled Manual	

Sources: Extracted from Carlsson (1958) Table 8.6, and calculated from Hall-Jones (1950), Table III (General Sample)

to be little difference in terms of the evaluations of various groups of manual workers. In both countries, 'skilled manual' is evaluated more highly than 'semi-skilled' or 'unskilled'.

Dahlström in a study of an *occupationally mixed* residential area of Stockholm arrived at a similar conclusion.<sup>27</sup> He found that both 'manual workers' and 'others' ranked the occupations of 'foremen' and 'skilled workmen' above that of 'office clerks'.

Despite the limitations of comparative analysis the evidence suggests that some manual occupations relative to some white-collar occupations are more highly evaluated in Sweden than they are in Britain. It is only in relatively homogeneous working-class communities in



Britain that manual occupations appear to be ranked conclusively above those of a non-manual kind.<sup>28</sup>

In summary, the evidence suggests that (1) there is a higher degree of working class self-identification among both manual and non-manual workers in Sweden than in Britain. (2) The working class in Sweden is perceived both by itself and by other social strata to be an influential social class. At the same time the experience of alienation in the workplace is not generalized to other situations. (3) Some manual occupations in Sweden are considered to be equally as prestigious—if not more so—than a number of white-collar occupations.

These findings cast doubt on Inkeles' hypothesis that the structure of perceptions and attitudes is relatively the same in different industrial societies. Clearly, perceptions and attitudes vary in a way which cannot be explained solely in terms of the 'constraints' of industrialism. How, then, are the variations to be explained?

An adequate explanation would require investigation of the institutions and cultural systems which constitute the social structure of each society. Consideration would need to be given to, among other things, the trajectory of industrialization, specific historical events, and the actions of groups and individuals, each of which shape the social structure of any society. What follows is a less ambitious task, namely the consideration of one possible explanatory variable. But it does not, of course, discount the possible influence of other phenomena, which a more detailed and systematic analysis would reveal.

#### THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY AND PURPOSIVE ACTION

Goldthorpe has suggested that, to explain particular patterns of stratification systems, it is necessary to consider the role of ideology and the purposive actions of social groups.<sup>29</sup> He argues that in socialist societies patterns of stratification systems are readily shaped by political actions, whereas in capitalist societies they are largely determined by market forces. Parkin demonstrates this in his studies of social stratification in East European societies; he has shown that political ideology is a major variable in explaining particular structures of economic and social rewards.<sup>30</sup> Although these arguments have been related to the comparison of capitalist and socialist societies, they are relevant for the investigation of stratification between capitalist societies, particularly when such societies display considerable variation in terms of political experience.

Sweden, since the latter part of the nineteenth century, has had a relatively well-organized and influential working-class movement. In 1920 it elected the first labour government in the world. Since 1932 the Social Democratic party, which primarily represents the interests of

industrial workers, has exercised power either as a majority government or as the dominant partner in a coalition.<sup>31</sup> In Britain, by contrast, Labour governments have been very infrequent.

It is, therefore, possible to suggest that Social Democratic governments in Sweden have modified features of social stratification so that differentials between manual workers and white-collar workers have eroded. The evidence on the structure of perceptions in Sweden could then be interpreted as a consequence of such developments.

In a capitalist society this could be achieved in at least two ways. On the one hand economic differentials between manual workers and white-collar workers could be diminished. Alternatively, the opportunities for filling white-collar and 'elite' roles could be more 'equalized'. In this sense, the achievements of Social Democratic governments could be seen in terms of their impact upon the rate of social mobility rather than upon economic differentials.

#### ECONOMIC REWARDS

Bentzel has calculated that between 1930 and 1950 the vertical distribution of income in Sweden underwent a drastic change in the direction of greater equality.<sup>32</sup> During this period the relative numbers of persons falling into the lowest and highest income classes declined significantly, while the intermediate income strata showed a concomitant increase. The coefficient of inequality, derived from calculation based on Lorenz curves, declined in terms of both earned income and disposable income. For the former, the coefficient fell from 0.41 in 1935 to 0.34 in 1948, while for the latter, from 0.37 to 0.28.

This trend appears in sharp contrast to the experience of the United Kingdom over the same period. The impression from Seers' study is one of no *fundamental* shift towards equality between 1938 and 1949.<sup>33</sup>

But more recent evidence suggests that the trend to income equalization in Sweden has not been maintained. Between 1954 and 1963 the coefficient of inequality increased from 0.38 to 0.40.<sup>34</sup> For a similar period (1954 and 1964) the coefficient for the United Kingdom remained at 0.40.<sup>35</sup> The degree to which income has remained concentrated in Sweden is borne out by data analysed by Bergström.<sup>36</sup> He shows that in 1964, 10 per cent of all income receivers in Sweden accounted for 28 per cent of all income before tax, a similar concentration as for the United Kingdom. R. J. Nicholson has shown that in 1963, 10 per cent of all income receivers in the United Kingdom received 28.7 per cent of all income before tax.<sup>37</sup>

These data are based on calculations of income distributions before tax. When the role of taxation is taken into account, it appears that the Swedish system of taxation is less progressive than that of the United Kingdom.<sup>38</sup>



When a more specific comparison is made in terms of wage differentials between manual workers and white-collar workers, a similar pattern remains. For example, evidence collected by the United Nations suggests that wage differentials between white-collar workers and manual workers probably increased in Sweden between 1953 and 1963, whereas in the United Kingdom they remained relatively constant.<sup>39</sup> Mouly has also shown that in Sweden between 1959 and 1963, earnings for male wage earners in mining and manufacturing industry increased by 33 per cent, whereas for male salaried employees in the same industry, earnings increased by 35 per cent.<sup>40</sup> He suggests that these differentials have remained relatively constant since 1950—an observation which is confirmed by other studies in Sweden. Holmberg in an analysis of the incomes received by various groups of manual and non-manual workers has demonstrated that differentials in the earnings of technical workers foremen, office workers, and industrial manual workers were about the same in 1960 as they were in 1950.<sup>41</sup> More recently, Selander and Spånt have shown that the distribution of income between various occupational groups was about the same in 1966 as in 1951.<sup>42</sup>

This brief analysis suggests that manual workers in Britain and in Sweden occupy similar positions in the structure of economic rewards. Certainly, in Sweden, there appears to have been no marked redistribution of income in favour of manual workers since the late 1940s. However, it is important to stress that other differentials in the work situation between manual workers and other occupational groups may have declined. Such factors as contract of employment, sickness benefits, and holiday pay may have become more similar for both manual and white-collar workers.<sup>43</sup>

#### SOCIAL MOBILITY

Social Democratic governments committed to 'socialist' ideas in a capitalist society may more readily influence the rate of social mobility than the structure of economic rewards.<sup>44</sup> The institutions of higher education could be 'democratized' so that more sons of manual workers obtain the necessary qualifications in order to 'compete' for the more prestigious and rewarding occupational roles in private industry. And Social Democratic governments could 'broaden' the basis of recruitment into those occupational roles over which it is able to exercise a more direct influence, such as the higher civil service, the teaching profession, the military and so on.

However, the evidence suggests that the son of a manual worker in Sweden has no greater chance of entering a white-collar occupation than a son of equivalent status in Britain. Evidence analysed by Miller shows that the United Kingdom appears to be more 'open'



than Sweden when comparisons are made according to an 'index of inequality'.<sup>45</sup>

A more satisfactory index of the relative rigidity of a system of social stratification is the pattern of social recruitment into 'elite' occupational roles. Calculations undertaken by Duncan and Blau indicate that 3.5 per cent of the sons of manual workers attain 'elite' positions in Sweden compared to 2.2 per cent in Britain; similar percentages for both countries in view of the rate of 9.9 per cent for the United States.<sup>46</sup>

Confirmation of these general patterns are the inquiries into the social recruitment of specific 'elite' occupational roles. In a study of 245 Swedish business leaders, Malmström and Widenborg found that 15.5 per cent were the sons of lower grade white-collar workers and industrial manual workers.<sup>47</sup> On the other hand, 30 per cent were the sons of the owners or the managers of businesses with at least two hundred employees. In a similar inquiry in Britain, Copeman found

*Inequality of opportunity*

	(1) Non-manual into non-manual	(2) Manual into Non-manual	(3) Index of Inequality (1)/(2)
United Kingdom	57.9	24.8	234
Sweden	72.3	25.5	284

Source: Extracted from Miller (1960), Table IVA.

that of 1,000 company directors, only 8 per cent were the sons of non-professional white-collar workers and manual workers, whereas 51 per cent were the children of directors, small businessmen and industrial managers.<sup>48</sup> The validity of interpreting these figures is limited, but they suggest that the mobility chances of sons of manual workers in industry of both countries are highly restricted. The lack of data prevents an attempt to ascertain whether these rates have changed over time.

In a discussion of the social background of senior civil servants in Sweden, Landström calculated that between 1917 and 1947 there were few changes in the overall pattern of recruitment.<sup>49</sup> At most only 7.1 per cent of such officials were from working-class homes in 1947 compared to 2.6 per cent in 1917. More recently Samuelsson has suggested that in 1965 only 20 of 200 higher state administrators came from working class homes.<sup>50</sup>

Similarly in a study of the social origins of university professors at Lund and Uppsala universities Petré found that between 1800 and

1950 there was no tendency towards 'broader' social recruitment: in 1950 only 8 per cent were from working-class homes.<sup>51</sup> Furthermore, Carlsson in a discussion of the social recruitment of military leaders suggests that between 1900 and 1961 the proportion from working-class families remained small.<sup>52</sup>

These studies suggest that for occupations over which governments are able to exercise some influence, social recruitment has remained extremely narrow in Sweden. The pattern appears to be similar as in Britain. This is confirmed by studies in Britain into the social background of civil servants,<sup>53</sup> academics,<sup>54</sup> politicians,<sup>55</sup> and the professions.<sup>56</sup>

Clearly the evidence suggests that manual workers in Sweden and in Britain, both in terms of economic rewards and mobility chances, occupy similar positions relative to other social groups. The experience of successive Social Democratic governments in Sweden appears to have had little impact upon the stratification system.<sup>57</sup> Differences in the structure of perceptions and attitudes in the two countries can hardly be explained in this way. Consequently it is necessary to consider an alternative explanation.

Since the 1880's, Sweden has been characterized by the development of a highly complex system of voluntary organizations. These have been particularly prominent in the spheres of religion, adult education, leisure, sport, temperance, retail trade, industry and politics.<sup>58</sup> As a result, they play a significant role in most spheres of social life. But more important among these organizations are those which have developed out of the working-class movement: the trade unions and the Social Democratic party.

Various studies suggest that between 75 and 100 per cent of all male workers in industry belong to trade unions.<sup>59</sup> About 60 per cent of white-collar workers belong to similar associations.<sup>60</sup> The Social Democratic party receives approximately 75 per cent of the votes of industrial workers and about 45 per cent of the votes of white-collar workers who do not have university degrees.<sup>61</sup> Although membership and voting statistics demonstrate the strength of labour unions and the Social Democratic party, they fail to reflect the true significance of these organizations in Sweden. In order to do so, it is necessary to consider the institutions which have developed around them.

The Social Democratic party and the labour unions constitute a hub around which a large number of other organizations operate. Among the more important of these is the Workers Educational Movement which not only provides general adult education, but also a wide range of courses of a more vocational kind. At the same time there are a number of clubs and associations specializing in various activities for young people, women, white-collar workers and other sectors of the Swedish population. Furthermore there are organizational links with



various consumer associations and pressure groups. In this way members of society, particularly manual workers and lower-grade white-collar workers, are drawn into a web of voluntary organizations, each of which are closely related to the working-class movement.<sup>62</sup> As a result, the Social Democratic party and the labour unions have 'penetrated' working-class life in Sweden to a greater extent than respective organizations in Britain.

The degree to which this has been achieved is demonstrated by Anderson's study into perceived influentials in four communities in Sweden, each of which represented different political, economic and social structures.<sup>63</sup> Of all the influentials mentioned, 95 per cent were union officials, predominantly of manual worker unions. In a related study<sup>64</sup> he suggests that the significance of working-class institutions in Sweden explains why upwardly mobiles are more likely to retain their working-class political allegiance than are their counterparts in the United States. These institutions, he argues, provide a set of norms for the political socialization of working-class youth, which are retained after the immediate experience of upward mobility.

Although Sweden is not unique among capitalist societies in having a strong working-class movement, it is to the extent that this movement exercises such an important organizational and normative influence within society. In view of this, it is possible to suggest the following consequences.

Firstly, these institutions 'integrate' the working class into the institutional structure of Swedish society. This could then explain the evidence in relation to 'class influence' and 'alienation'. It could also explain why Sweden lacks the development of working-class sub-cultures, partly based on an estrangement from the predominant institutions of society.<sup>65</sup>

Secondly, these institutions provide an important set of norms within the structure of Swedish society. By virtue of their institutionalization, they are able to 'compete' as norms for socialization with those of the institutions and ideologies of private property.<sup>66</sup> In this way, by providing alternative criteria for socialization, these institutions have led to a re-definition of various perceptions of social stratification. As a result, the concept 'working class' and various manual occupational roles are less 'stigmatized' than they are in Britain: factors which are reflected in studies of occupational prestige and class self-identification.<sup>67</sup>

By contrast, Britain lacks a complex system of social institutions which have developed out of the working-class movement.<sup>68</sup> As a result there are few institutions which integrate the working class into the institutional apparatus of society, and at the same time provide an alternative source of norms to those of private property and traditional privilege.<sup>69</sup> Only in communities which are relatively impervious to



wider societal influences, namely homogeneous working-class communities, is there any significant impact of working-class norms.<sup>70</sup>

To conclude, the evidence suggests that Inkeles' explanation of the structure of perceptions and attitudes in society is incomplete. It is also necessary to investigate the structure of norms in society, and in doing so, take into account the purposive action of various social groups. Only in this way is it possible to advance an explanation which can incorporate the differences within two industrial societies such as Britain and Sweden.

This is, however, a tentative conclusion. The discussion has focussed only upon social stratification, and the data have been derived from empirical studies which have used different research techniques. The hypothesis can only be tested satisfactorily by conducting carefully designed cross-national studies.<sup>71</sup>

## Notes

1. The Swedish material presented in this paper was collected as part of a research study, financed by the Centre for Environmental Studies, London, investigating aspects of social stratification in Sweden. I am grateful to sociologists at the University of Kent, particularly Dr F. Parkin, for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
2. The major proponents of which are C. Kerr, J. T. Dunlop, F. H. Harbison and C. A. Myers, *Industrialism and Industrial Man*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960; A. Inkeles and R. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1959; A. Rose (ed.) *The Institutions of Advanced Societies*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1958.
3. A. Inkeles, 'Industrial Man: The Relation of Status to Experience, Perception, and Values', *Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 66 (1960-1).
4. A number of the studies discussed in this section use 'poll-type' questions. For a discussion of their sociological relevance see W. Runciman, 'Embourgeoisment, Self-rated Class and Party Preference', *Sociol. Rev.* vol. 12 (1964).
5. E. Dahlström, *Tjänstemännen, Näringslivet och Samhället* (Management, Unions and Society), Stockholm, S.N.S., 1954, ch. II. Four branches of industry were selected, each from a geographical area in order to make the sample representative of Swedish industry as a whole.
6. T. Segerstedt and A. Lundquist, *Människan i Industrisamhället* (Man in Industrialized Society), Stockholm, S.N.S., 1955, pt II, section II, ch. II.
7. E. Håstad et al., *Gallup och den Svenska Väljarkåren* (Gallup and the Swedish Voter), Stockholm, 1950.
8. O. Junus, 'Fritidsungängets Sammansättning' (The Social Composition of Friendship Groups), Sociology Institute, University of Uppsala, Ph.D. thesis, 1962, pp. 127-33.
9. J. O. Björkman, 'Bruksbor Emellan: En Sociologisk Studie av Brukssamhället' (Among the Mining Villagers: a sociological Study of an Iron-mining Village), Sociology Institute, University of Uppsala, Ph.D. thesis, 1968, ch. IX.
10. F. Martin, 'Some Subjective Aspects of Social Stratification' in D. Glass (ed.) *Social Mobility in Britain*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954.
11. W. G. Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966, ch. VIII.
12. P. Willmott, *The Evolution of a Community*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963.
13. P. Willmott and M. Young,

*Family and Class in a London Suburb*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960, pp. 100-2.

14. Other studies which have suggested a high degree of working class self-awareness among manual workers in such communities, although they have not used poll-type questions, include, N. Dennis, F. Henriques and C. Slaughter, *Coal is Our Life*, 2nd Edition, London, Tavistock, 1969. E. Bott, *Family and Social Network*, London, Tavistock, 1957, ch. V; various studies discussed in J. Klein, *Samples from English Cultures*, vol. I, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965.

15. T. Segerstedt and A. Lundquist, op. cit., pt II, pp. 287-93.

16. A number of studies present evidence from which this inference can be drawn, particularly N. Dennis *et al.*, op. cit.; E. Bott, op. cit.

17. J. Goldthorpe, D. Lockwood, F. Bechhofer and J. Platt, *The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes*, Cambridge, The University Press, 1968, pp. 112-13. See also R. McKenzie and A. Silver, *Angels in Marble*, London, Heinemann, 1968, pp. 126-33.

18. E. Dahlström, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

19. E. Dahlström, op. cit., pp. 97-99.

20. T. Segerstedt and A. Lundquist, op. cit., pt II, pp. 335-6.

21. M. Seeman, 'On the Personal Consequences of Alienation in Work', *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, vol. 32 (1967).

22. M. Seeman, op. cit., p. 284.

23. A. Inkeles and P. Rossi, 'National Comparisons of Occupational Prestige', *Amer. J. Sociol.*, vol. 61 (1955-6).

24. R. Hodge, D. Treiman, and P. Rossi, 'A Comparative Study of Occupational Prestige', in R. Bendix and S. Lipset (eds.), *Class, Status and Power*, 2nd edition, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968.

25. J. Hall and D. Caradog Jones, 'Social Grading of Occupations', *Brit. J. Sociol.*, vol. I (1950).

26. G. Carlsson, *Social Mobility and Class Structure*, Lund, C. W. K. Gleerup, 1958, pp. 146-53.

27. E. Dahlström, 'Pinchill', Sociology Institute, University of Uppsala, 1951, mimeo.

28. M. Young and P. Willmott, 'Social Grading by Manual Workers', *Brit. J. Sociol.*, vol. 4 (1956).

29. J. Goldthorpe, 'Social Stratification in Industrial Society', *Soc. Rev. Monograph*, no. 8 (1964).

30. F. Parkin, 'Market Socialism and Class Structure: Some Aspects of Social Stratification in Yugoslavia', in M. Scotford Archer and S. Giner (eds.) *Contemporary Europe: Class, Status and Power*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971.

31. For a concise account of political development in Sweden see K. Samuelsson, *From Great Power to Welfare State*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1968.

32. R. Bentzel, *Inkomstfördelningen i Sverige* (The Distribution of Income in Sweden), Stockholm, Industrins Utrednings-Institut, 1952.

33. D. Seers, *The Levelling of Incomes Since 1938*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.

34. United Nations, *Incomes in Post War Europe*, Geneva, 1967, ch. 6, Table 6.10.

35. United Nations, op. cit.

36. V. Bergström, 'Inkomstfördelningen under Efterkrigstiden' (Income Distribution Since the War) in L. Ericsson and M. Hellström (eds.) *Välfärdsklyftan och Standard Höjning* (Differences in Wealth and Increase in Living Standards), Stockholm, Prisma, 1967.

37. R. J. Nicholson, 'The Distribution of Personal Income', *Lloyds Bank Review* no. 83 (1967).

38. To compare pre-tax income distributions is wrought with ambiguities of definition. These problems become even more acute in the attempt to assess the role of taxation. I have therefore accepted as *datum* the United Nations claim that 'The Netherlands and the United Kingdom probably have the most progressive system of income-tax among all Western European countries. In Norway and Sweden, tax rates for top income are not very different from those in the United Kingdom or in the Netherlands but the system is less progressive and



the overall tax-rate is higher.' United Nations, op. cit., ch. 6, p. 24.

39. United Nations, op. cit., Table 2.14.

40. J. Mouly, 'Wages Policy in Sweden', *Int. Lab. Rev.* vol. 95 (1967).

41. P. Holmberg, *Arbete och Löner i Sverige* (Work and Wages in Sweden) Solna, Rabén and Sjögren, 1963.

42. P. Selander and R. Spånt, *Inkomstfördelningens Utveckling i Sverige 1951-1966* (The Development of the Distribution of Income in Sweden, 1951-1966), National Economy Institute, Uppsala University, 1969, mimeo.

43. Differentials of this kind have recently been the centre of political debate in Sweden. Whether they are of a more or less magnitude than in Britain is currently being investigated by the author.

44. This possibility is mentioned by F. Parkin in *Class Inequality and Political Order*, London, MacGibbon and Kee, 1971.

45. S. M. Miller, 'Comparative Social Mobility', *Current Sociology*, vol. 9 (1960).

46. O. Duncan and P. Blau, *The American Occupational Structure*, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1967, p. 434, Table 12.1.

47. G. Malmeström and B. Widenborg, '245 Svenska Foretagsledare' (245 Swedish Business Leaders), *Studier och Debatt* (1958), Diagram 1.

48. G. Copeman, *Leaders of British Industry*, London, Gee, 1955, Table 14.2.

49. S. Landström, *Svenska Ämbetsmäns Sociala Ursprung* (The Social Background of Higher Civil Servants in Sweden), Statsvetenskapliga Föreningen i Uppsala Genom C. A. Hessler XXXIV, Uppsala and Stockholm, 1954.

50. K. Samuelsson, op. cit., p. 285.

51. G. Petré, *Några Uppgifter om Professorskåren i Uppsala och Lund Under 1800 Talet och Första Hälften av 1900-Talet* (Some information on professors at Uppsala and Lund during the 19th and the first half of the 20th Centuries), Lund, 1952.

52. S. Carlsson, *Bonde-Präst-Ämbetsman* (Farmer, Priest and Civil Servant), Stockholm, Prisma, 1962.

53. R. Kelsall, *Higher Civil Servants in Britain*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955.

54. A. H. Halsey and M. Trow, *The British Academics*, London, Faber and Faber, 1971.

55. W. Guttsman, *The British Political Elite*, London, MacGibbon and Kee, 1963.

56. R. Kelsall, 'Self-Recruitment in Four Professions', in D. Glass, op. cit.

57. But it must be stressed that because of a lack of comparative evidence, the discussion has focussed solely upon certain 'conventional' measures and assumptions about social stratification. If other 'dimensions' were taken into account, such as the distribution of various 'welfare' resources, then there may be important differences between the two countries. Similarly, in view of what follows, it is problematic whether any study of elite mobility in Sweden can discount the social origins and the career patterns of officials in the trade union movement. The absence of data suitable for comparative purposes prevents consideration of these factors in the present paper.

58. The prominent role of voluntary associations in Sweden is documented by N. Elvander, *Intresseorganisationerna i Dagens Sverige* (Interest Groups in Contemporary Sweden), Lund, C. W. K. Gleerup, 1968.

59. Calculations based on data in publications of Swedish Trade Union Confederation. See also B. Carlson, *Trade Unions in Sweden*, Stockholm, Tidens Förlag, 1969. He calculated that more than 98 per cent of manual workers in 'advanced' industries belong to trade unions, while in some low paid service trades the figure is around 75 per cent.

The figures for Britain are less impressive. Although there are wide variations between occupations and industries, Bain suggests that in 1964 the overall 'density' of manual unionism was 51.0 per cent and of white collar unionism 29.0 per cent. If only unionism among males is considered, then the figure for manual workers is 60.3 per cent and for



white-collar workers 34.9 per cent. G. Bain, Research Paper No. 6, 'Trade Unions Growth and Recognition', Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employer's Associations, London, H.M. S.O., 1967, Table 12.

60. N. Elvander, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-50.

61. Sveriges Officiella Statistik, *Riksdagmannavälen 1961-1964* (Swedish Official Statistics, Elections to the Parliament, 1961-1964), Stockholm, Central Statistical Bureau, p. 95.

The proportion of Labour voters among manual workers in Britain is lower. See Blondel, *Voters, Parties and Leaders*, Penguin Books, 1965, ch. 3; R. McKenzie and A. Silver, *op. cit.*

62. For a discussion of this point see B. Anderson, 'Some Problems of Change in the Swedish Electorate', *Acta Sociologica*, vol. 6, fasc. 1-2 (1962) (a).

63. B. Anderson, 'Opinion Influentials and Political Opinion Formation in Four Swedish Communities', *Int. Soc. Sci. J.*, vol. 14 (1962) (b).

64. B. Anderson, *op. cit.* (1962) (a).

65. Community studies conducted in Sweden have failed to demonstrate the existence of working-class subcultures of the kind found in Britain. The only possible exceptions being the mining communities in the north of Sweden.

66. The role of trade unions as agents of political socialization is discussed by R. Hamilton in his *Affluence and the French Worker in the Fourth Republic*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967. In a society such as Sweden, one would expect unions and related working-class organizations to be more effective in this way

than in Britain, where working-class institutions are less developed.

67. Runciman's finding that class self-identification among manual workers is often related to criteria of personal evaluation is particularly relevant in this context. See Runciman, *op. cit.*

68. In the sense that they affect the life styles of members of society. 'Nationalized' industries can therefore be excluded for the purposes of the present argument.

69. The failure of the working-class movement in Britain, particularly the trade unions and the leadership of the labour party, to pursue policies which could lead to developments in this direction is a noticeable feature of British society. Goldthorpe *et al.* make a similar point in their *Affluent Worker in the Class Structure*, Cambridge, The University Press, 1969, pp. 187-95.

70. It is only in such communities that there appears to be working-class institutions which play any significant role in the life styles of manual workers. Parkin suggests such communities constitute 'deviant' cases, explaining the high support for the Labour party. F. Parkin, 'Working Class Conservatives: A Theory of Political Deviance', *Brit. J. Sociol.*, vol. 18 (1967). M. Young and P. Willmott make a similar suggestion as an explanation for their findings on occupational prestige. M. Young and P. Willmott, *op. cit.* (1956).

71. For a study of this kind see W. Form, 'Occupational and Social Integration of Automobile Workers in Four Countries: A Comparative Study', *Int. J. Comp. Soc.*, vol. X (1969).

# 10

## Relative deprivation: a comparison of English and Swedish manual workers<sup>1</sup>

RICHARD SCASE

Recent studies of the British class structure suggest that the awareness of inequality, particularly among manual workers, is extremely limited. Runciman, for example, found that only a small majority of manual workers perceived that there were other occupational groups better off than themselves. When they were aware of inequalities, they made limited comparisons; they tended to mention either other groups of manual workers or individuals who could be compared with a specific aspect of their own personal situation.<sup>2</sup> Hence respondents referred to 'people with no children', 'people on night work', 'people with good health', and so on; comments which suggested that manual workers did not perceive of inequality as a structural feature of society, but rather as a consequence of personal effort and circumstance.

Goldthorpe and his colleagues came to similar conclusions in their study of 'affluent' workers in Luton.<sup>3</sup> They found that 54 per cent of a sample of manual workers conceived of the class structure in terms of a 'money' model, with a large central class consisting of most manual and white-collar workers, and one or more residual or 'elite' classes, differentiated in terms of wealth, income, and material living standards. As a result, Goldthorpe and his associates suggest that workers' perceptions of their position in the class structure were inconsistent with their roles in the productive process: roles characterised by deprivation in the spheres of decision-making, working conditions, fringe benefits, and status differentials. They argue that these attitudes were derived from social roles outside the workplace and that there was little awareness of inequality as a structural, and socially-organised feature of society.

Adopting a somewhat broader perspective, Inkeles has suggested that different industrial societies have not only similar institutional structures, but also relatively similar value systems,<sup>4</sup> and there are other writers who have claimed that all industrial-capitalist societies generate common ideologies and values which promote among workers 'false consciousness' and a restricted awareness of their *real* position within society.<sup>5</sup> In view of



these suggestions it is interesting to consider whether workers in other industrial societies have similar attitudes towards inequality as they have in Britain.

This chapter investigates this issue in relation to the attitudes and opinions of manual workers in England and Sweden.<sup>6</sup> More specifically, the objective is to explore any similarities in the awareness of inequality and the experience of relative deprivation among manual workers in the two countries. If there are such similarities it would lend support to the claims that institutions of different industrial-capitalist societies have similar effects upon the political and cultural socialisation of manual workers; but if there are systematic differences it will be necessary to reconsider these claims.

Because practical difficulties prevented a comparison of random samples of manual workers in England and Sweden, a more restricted investigation had to be undertaken of two groups of English and Swedish workers who were matched according to a number of factors. Both were employed in factories which had several common characteristics.<sup>7</sup> In the first place the work processes of each factory involved converting iron and steel into a range of engineering goods and components. Secondly, the technology was similar except that the Swedish factory was more highly capitalised: consequently a number of the tasks and processes which were undertaken by machinery in the Swedish factory were done by physical labour in the English workshops. Thirdly, both factories produced goods for relatively static, or even contracting markets: there had been no expansion over recent years and there was little expectation among management and workers that this was likely to occur in the foreseeable future. At the time of the investigation neither factory was confronted with the threat of redundancies, although there had been some lay-offs in the English factory during the 1950s: there was an assumption among both groups of workers that employment prospects were relatively secure.

While the two factories were similar in terms of these items – product, technology, and market situation – they were not in at least two other respects. Working and employment conditions, by *absolute* standards, were superior in the Swedish factory: this was so for heating, lighting, ventilation, sanitation, for regulations affecting industrial safety and the use of equipment, and for refreshment and recreation facilities. In addition, there were smaller differences in the Swedish factory in the treatment of manual and non-manual workers in such areas as dismissal procedures, systems of payment, and time off from work for personal reasons.<sup>8</sup> But secondly, there were differences in the sizes of the two factories; the Swedish em-



employed 298 manual workers, compared with 972 in the English. Unfortunately it was impossible to select two factories of the same size which could also be matched according to other criteria.<sup>9</sup>

In terms of wage differentials, it was difficult to make precise calculations because in both factories earnings, particularly those of non-manual workers, varied according to age and length of service. Moreover, management, especially in the English factory, were reluctant to disclose detailed information about the structure of wages and salaries. However, they were prepared to give 'approximate' earnings. This information suggested that for the English factory the highest-paid manual workers (skilled) could earn approximately £30 a week, or £1,560 a year, 'senior clerical officers' up to £2,000 a year, and 'senior management' up to £4,500. In the Swedish factory the highest-paid manual workers (skilled) could earn about 3,000 Kr. a month, white collar employees 4,000 Kr., and senior managers up to 6,750 Kr. Thus it appears that in terms of the remuneration of highly-paid manual workers and senior management, there was less inequality in the Swedish workplace than in the English. The earnings of the Swedish senior managers were roughly two-and-a-quarter times more than those of highly-paid manual workers, while those of their English counterparts could be as much as three times greater. However, differences in the earnings of 'affluent' manual workers and white-collar employees were about the same in both workplaces; by the age of about 40, 'higher' white collar workers could be earning something like one-third more.<sup>10</sup>

The samples were limited to groups of workers between the ages of 25 and 54 in order to eliminate those whose careers had not yet been firmly established, and those who were approaching retirement.<sup>11</sup> The analysis also focussed almost exclusively upon married men who provided 85 per cent or more of both samples.

Can these workers be regarded as representative of all manual workers in England and Sweden? Because they were matched according to a number of variables, their general representativeness is extremely limited. They were chosen from industries which, like all industries, have characteristics peculiar to themselves; specific traditions of historical development, industrial conflict and technological change.<sup>12</sup> Factors such as these limit the degree to which it is possible to generalise findings derived from this study but they can be regarded as at least *indicative* of patterns in the two countries which need to be substantiated by more comprehensive investigations.

The data was collected by interviews in the spring and summer of 1970, using schedules printed in English and Swedish<sup>13</sup>; neither sample was aware

of its part in an international comparison.<sup>14</sup> The response rate for the Swedish workers was 87 per cent and 73 per cent for the English. This provided 122 completed Swedish schedules and 128 English schedules upon which the present discussion is based.

### The results of the enquiry

In his enquiry, Runciman asked respondents, 'Do you think there are any other sorts of people doing noticeably better at the moment than you and your family?' He found that 25 per cent of all respondents and 27 per cent of manual workers stated they could think of no other sorts of people.<sup>15</sup> A similar question was used in the present enquiry: 'Are there any people you can think of who are better off than workers like yourself?' Whereas less than one-tenth of the Swedish sample claimed that they could think of no other people, this opinion was held by more than one-fifth of the English workers.

It is difficult to make international comparisons of wage differentials because, among other things, of differences in the systems of classification

TABLE 10.1: *'Are there any people you can think of who are better off than workers like yourself?'*

	Swedish workers		English workers	
	No.	Per cent	No.	Per cent
Yes	98	80	91	71
No	10	8	28	22
Don't know	14	12	9	7
Total	122	100	128	100

Table 10.2: *Average earnings of occupational groups in Britain and Sweden* (expressed as multiples of average earnings of male unskilled labourers)

	Sweden (1963)	United Kingdom (1960)
Unskilled manual	1.0	1.0
Skilled manual	—	1.5
Foremen	1.4	1.9
Clerks	1.3	1.3
Lower administrative and professional staff	1.8	1.6
Higher administrative and professional staff	3.1	3.5

Source: Extracted from United Nations, *Incomes in Post-War Europe* (1967) Table 5.16



which are used. But Table 10.2, extracted from a United Nations enquiry, suggests that wage differentials between various occupational groups are certainly not fundamentally different in Sweden and the United Kingdom.<sup>16</sup>

In view of this, the difference in the opinions in the two samples suggests that the frequency of relative deprivation was greater among the Swedish respondents than among the English. All those workers who held that there were others better off than themselves were then asked 'What sort of people?'. Whenever possible, the responses were coded according to the actual terms used by workers.

Table 10.3: 'What sort of people?'

	Swedish workers		English Workers	
	No.	Per cent	No.	Per cent
'Businessmen', 'Directors'	15	15	4	4
'Managers'	2	2	6	7
'Professionals', 'Professional people'	7	7	5	6
'Higher white collar workers'	5	5	—	—
'White collar workers' or specific non-manual occupation mentioned	15	15	3	3
'Educated people'	7	7	—	—
'The rich'	1	1	1	1
Specific manual occupation mentioned	43	44	69	76
Other, and non-classifiable responses	3	3	3	3
Don't know	—	—	—	—
Total	98	100	91	100

Table 10.3 shows that the Swedish workers were more likely to mention non-manual occupations than were the English sample. Indeed various non-manual occupational titles, together with 'educated people', and 'the rich', were mentioned by 53 per cent of the Swedish workers compared with only 21 per cent of the workers in the English sample. On the other hand, 76 per cent of the English respondents mentioned various manual occupations compared with only 44 per cent of the Swedish workers; a difference between the two samples of 32 per cent. In these responses, both samples stressed similar occupations — those in the car, steel and dock industries. The only major difference between the two groups was that the Swedish respondents gave greater emphasis to the earnings of building construction workers.<sup>17</sup>

Clearly the evidence indicates that the awareness of inequality was not the same for both groups of workers; in fact, the responses of the English workers were fairly consistent with those obtained by Runciman in his



analysis. He found that only 19 per cent of his sample of manual workers who claimed that there were other people better off than themselves, mentioned non-manual workers.<sup>18</sup> The present enquiry confirms Runciman's contention that English manual workers make highly restricted comparisons when evaluating their own economic position in society. The Swedish workers, on the other hand, articulated a greater frequency of relative deprivation and this seems to have been a consequence of the adoption of more broadly-based comparative reference groups, which incorporated both non-manual and manual occupations. The differences in the two groups of respondents were particularly striking in view of the fact that wage differentials, both within the factories and the two countries, were not fundamentally different.

The greater frequency of relative deprivation among the Swedish workers was confirmed by responses to questions which invited comparisons between specific aspects of their own work roles and those of white-collar workers employed in the same factory.<sup>19</sup> Both samples were asked for their opinions about earnings, possibilities for promotion, and conditions of work. Respondents were asked 'What do you think of the money you earn compared with that of white-collar workers. Would you say that it was "much better", "better", "about the same", "worse" or "much worse"?' Among the Swedish workers, 63 per cent claimed that it was 'worse' or 'much worse', while only 4 per cent stated that it was 'better' or 'much better'. A further 30 per cent suggested it was 'about the same' for both manual and white-collar workers. By contrast, 44 per cent of the English sample said their earnings were 'better' or 'much better' and only 23 per cent thought that they were 'worse' or 'much worse'. There were 25 per cent who claimed they were 'about the same'. Clearly the Swedish respondents felt more relatively deprived in terms of their earnings than the English workers.

Asked about possibilities for promotion, both samples were asked to name an occupation which they would be most likely to get if they were given such promotion. For both groups of workers 'foreman', and various supervisory manual occupations such as inspector or chargehand were the most frequently mentioned – by well over 80 per cent of both the Swedish and the English samples. Both groups perceived promotion overwhelmingly in terms of movement within manual jobs, rather than into white-collar occupations. Indeed, both samples had 'realistic' assessments of their life chances; in neither factory was there an effective scheme for recruitment and training which would have enabled manual workers to have become office employees. But the similarity in the responses to this question by the

two groups of workers was not sustained when they were asked, 'How likely is a factory worker to get promotion at work. Would you say that it was "very likely", "likely", "unlikely", or "very unlikely"?' Almost twice as many (73 per cent) of the English workers thought it either 'likely' or 'very likely' compared with the Swedish workers (39 per cent). Indeed the Swedish workers were altogether less optimistic about their chances for advancement than were their English equivalents. Among the Swedish sample, 80 per cent claimed their chances for promotion were either 'worse' or 'much worse' compared with those of white-collar workers, and only 3 per cent said they were 'better' or 'much better'. By contrast, the English workers held a more favourable view of their promotion prospects compared with those of white-collar workers with only 33 per cent stating these were either 'worse' or 'much worse', and 29 per cent suggesting they were 'better' or 'much better'. A further 31 per cent of the English sample perceived their chances to be 'about the same', compared with only 12 per cent of the Swedish workers.

The two groups of workers were then asked the open-ended question 'Why is this?', the responses to which were cross-tabulated with their opinions about opportunities for promotion compared with those for white-collar workers. Of the 98 Swedish workers who claimed that their chances were 'worse' or 'much worse', 54 per cent stated this was because promotion was 'automatic' for white-collar workers,<sup>20</sup> but of the 43 English respondents who evaluated their chances in this way, only 16 per cent gave a similar reason. At the same time, 81 per cent of the 37 English workers who claimed that their own opportunities for promotion were 'better' or 'much better', said this was because there were more opportunities available on the shop floor than in the office.<sup>21</sup> These figures indicate that the Swedish workers had a more 'realistic' assessment of their career prospects compared with those of white-collar workers, than the English workers. Indeed the Swedish workers perceived that white-collar employment provided a built-in career structure which was not available to manual workers. The English workers, by contrast, felt that there was much more opportunity in the factory, but they were unaware of the structural differences that existed between manual and non-manual employment.

Both samples were asked 'What about your working conditions compared with those of white-collar workers. Would you say that they were "much better", "better", "about the same", "worse", or "much worse"?' Among the Swedish workers, 89 per cent claimed that their working conditions (meaning physical working conditions) were either 'worse' or



'much worse' than those of white-collar workers, and a further 10 per cent felt that they were 'about the same': only one respondent said they were 'better'. Among the English sample, by contrast, 58 per cent considered their working conditions to be either 'worse' or 'much worse' and 34 per cent thought that they were 'about the same': 7 per cent held they were either 'better' or 'much better'. Unlike their attitudes about earnings and promotion opportunities, the English sample seem to have felt more relatively deprived in terms of working conditions. But the difference in the frequency of this experience for the two samples of workers was still significant; 31 per cent fewer of the English workers considered their working conditions to be either 'worse' or 'much worse' than those of white-collar workers. The difference is particularly noticeable in view of the fact that *actual* differences in the working conditions of manual workers and white-collar workers were less in the Swedish factory than in the English.

The evidence clearly suggests that the Swedish sample demonstrated a greater frequency of relative deprivation than the English. Indeed there was a tendency for this to be reflected in heightened feelings of resentment. Both samples were asked 'How do you feel about all these things – earnings, conditions of work, etc.?' The responses were then coded according to those expressing sentiments of 'approval' and 'disapproval'. Table 10.4 presents, as an example, the data relating to attitudes to earnings analysed in this way.

Among the 77 Swedish workers who claimed that their earnings were either 'worse' or 'much worse' than those of white-collar workers, 26 per cent 'approved' and 72 per cent 'disapproved'. By contrast, of the 30 English workers who thought their earnings were either 'worse' or 'much worse', 43 per cent 'approved', and only a small majority – 53 per cent – 'disapproved'. This suggests that among those workers of both samples who felt they were relatively deprived, the Swedish respondents were more resentful than the English.

But what is more surprising is that 'disapproval' was also expressed by very high proportions of the Swedish sample who felt their earnings were 'much better', 'better' or 'about the same' as white-collar workers. For the first two of these categories the numbers are so small that it is difficult to make further interpretation. However, among the 37 Swedish workers who felt their earnings were 'about the same', as many as 95 per cent 'disapproved' compared with only 25 per cent of the 32 English respondents. Why did such a high proportion of the Swedish sample 'disapprove'? Was it because they felt that their earnings should have been higher or lower than those of white-collar workers? Their responses suggest that they felt



Table 10.4: *How do you feel about all these things – Earnings'*

Earnings compared with those of  white-collar workers	Swedish workers								English workers							
	'Approval'		'Disapproval'		Don't know		Total		'Approval'		'Disapproval'		Don't know		Total	
	No.	per cent	No.	per cent	No.	per cent	No.	per cent	No.	per cent	No.	per cent	No.	per cent	No.	per cent
Much better	—	—	1	100	—	—	1	100	5	83	1	17	—	—	6	100
Better	—	—	4	100	—	—	4	100	39	77	11	22	1	2	51	100
About the same	2	5	35	95	—	—	37	100	22	69	8	25	2	6	32	100
Worse	20	29	48	70	1	2	69	100	13	46	14	50	1	4	28	100
Much worse	—	—	8	100	—	—	8	100	—	—	2	100	—	—	2	100
Don't know	—	—	—	—	2	100	2	100	—	—	—	—	8	100	8	100
Not recorded	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	100
Total							122	100							128	100

their earnings should have been higher. For example, 91 per cent of these 35 Swedish workers claimed that white-collar workers had a number of advantages over themselves and felt that this was 'a bad state of affairs'. In view of this, the overall interpretation of Table 10.4 is that a far higher proportion of the Swedish workers than the English felt relatively deprived and resentful about their earnings.

This pattern was reflected in responses to the very general, open-ended question, 'What are the major differences, as you see them, between factory workers and white-collar workers these days?'

Table 10.5: *'What are the major differences, as you see them, between factory workers and white-collar workers these days?'*

	Swedish workers		English workers	
	No.	Per cent	No.	Per cent
Responses suggesting advantages for white-collar workers	109	89	73	57
Responses suggesting advantages for manual workers	—	—	5	4
Claims that there were no differences	11	9	44	34
Claims that they were 'just different'	—	—	5	4
Don't know	1	1	1	9
Not recorded	1	1	—	—
Total	122	100	128	100

As Table 10.5 suggests, a majority of both samples stressed advantages for white-collar workers, but the Swedish workers did so to a far greater degree than the English. Furthermore, the two samples differed considerably in the extent to which they held that there were *no* differences between white-collar workers and manual workers. The responses to this question were also coded according to the reasons workers gave for suggesting that white-collar workers had advantages.

There were important differences between the two groups in the reasons given by those people who thought that the white-collar workers were advantaged. As Table 10.6 shows almost three-quarters of the Swedish sample mentioned economic advantages compared with about one-third of the English workers who, in contrast, tended to mention economic factors with the same frequency as 'status' factors and working conditions. Furthermore, feelings of resentment stimulated by this question were not the same for both samples. Both groups of workers who perceived advantages for white-collar workers were asked, 'Do you think that this is a good



Table 10.6: *Reasons for suggesting the advantages of white-collar workers<sup>a</sup>*

Reason <sup>22</sup>	Swedish workers		English workers	
	No.	Per cent	No.	Per cent
Economic factors	80	73	25	34
Working conditions – noise, lighting, ventilation, etc.	25	23	29	40
'Intrinsic' job factors	18	17	5	7
'Status' factors	20	18	25	34
Other and non-classifiable responses	13	12	18	25

<sup>a</sup> 109 Swedish and 73 English workers said that there were advantages for white-collar workers but some people gave more than one reason, so the answers total to more than 100 per cent.

state of affairs? – "Yes" or "No"? Only 6 per cent of the Swedish respondents claimed that this was a good state of affairs, while 93 per cent disapproved. On the other hand, 47 per cent of the English workers approved, while only 48 per cent held that it was a bad state of affairs.

Among other things, the study investigated the perceptions which the English and the Swedish workers had of their respective class structures. Both samples were asked 'Some people say that there are no longer social classes in this country today. Others say that there are. What do you think?' The great majority, over 90 per cent, of both Swedish and English workers claimed that there were social classes but differences emerged when they were asked to name 'Which are the major classes in this country today?', and to state, 'Which of these classes would you say that you belong to?'. They were then asked, 'Which class do you think has done best economically over the past few years?' and the responses to this question were coded according to whether the respondent mentioned the class to which he had allocated himself or one of the other classes that he had mentioned.

Among the Swedish workers, 29 per cent claimed that their 'own class' had done best while 71 per cent mentioned 'another class' – those most frequently mentioned including 'The Upper Class', 'Social Group I', 'The Wealthy', 'The Rich', and 'Those with plenty of money'. By contrast as many as 59 per cent of the English sample considered their 'own class' to have done best with 41 per cent mentioning 'another class' which included, 'Middle Class', 'Upper Class', and 'The Rich'.

Both samples were then asked 'How do you feel about this?', and the responses were coded according to 'approval' or 'disapproval'. For both the Swedish and the English workers, 'approval' was expressed by 100 per



cent of those who claimed their 'own class' had done best. But there was a striking difference between the two groups of workers when 'another class' was mentioned: only 12 per cent of the Swedish respondents 'approved', compared with no less than 55 per cent of the English workers. The English workers expressed such opinions as 'best of luck to them', 'I would do the same if I were them', 'it doesn't make any difference to me', 'it doesn't bother me', etc.; indeed, statements which indicated that the English workers perceived little or no social link between their own position and that of other groups in society. Accordingly, they experienced little resentment.

### Discussion of the results of the enquiry

These results, when taken together, suggest that there was a greater frequency of relative deprivation among the Swedish workers than among the English and that this tended to be associated with heightened feelings of resentment. Clearly the findings show that the experience of relative deprivation differs for similar groups of manual workers in different industrial-capitalist societies. Runciman has argued that in order to explain the experience of relative deprivation among individuals in society, it is necessary to consider the reference groups which they use for the purposes of comparison. He suggests that the awareness and resentment of class inequality is slight in Britain because individuals, particularly manual workers, tend to adopt highly limited reference groups. But this does not occur to the same degree in all industrial societies for this analysis has shown that the Swedish respondents tended to adopt more broadly-based reference groups, which incorporated both manual and non-manual workers. Clearly any adequate explanation for the different responses of the two samples would require a systematic analysis of developments in the social structures and cultural systems of the two countries. Here, consideration will be given to only one factor.

Parkin has suggested that the awareness of inequality in capitalist societies is closely related to the relative influence of different ideologies.<sup>23</sup> He claims that in these societies there are at least three kinds of *meaning-systems*, all of which have as one of their functions, the interpretation of social and economic inequality. These are: (1) the *dominant* value system, which endorses existing structures of inequality and becomes internalised by members of the 'under-class' in either 'aspirational' or 'deferential' terms;<sup>24</sup> (2) the *subordinate* value system, generated by the working-class community and which promotes an *accommodative* response to inequality; this is often reflected in terms of fatalism, resignation, limited levels of

aspiration, and an acceptance of existing structures of inequality as legitimate;<sup>25</sup> (3) the *radical* value system, with its source in the mass political party based on the working class, and which promotes an *oppositional* interpretation of class inequality.<sup>26</sup>

Empirical studies that have been conducted in Britain suggest that of these meaning-systems, the *radical* has been the least influential. A number of investigations, for example, have shown that not only the Labour party, but also large sectors of the trade union movement, have given little emphasis to the grass-roots participation of rank-and-file members and to political socialisation.<sup>27</sup> As a result, the *radical* value system is ineffective among large sectors of manual workers in Britain in providing an *oppositional* interpretation of social inequality, with a consequence that inequality has been interpreted according to ideas inherent in either the *dominant* or *subordinate* value systems. Accordingly, the existing structure of inequality has remained fundamentally unquestioned.

In Sweden, on the other hand, could it be that there has been the development of working-class institutions which have been more influential in providing *oppositional* interpretations of social and economic inequality? Differences in the frequency of relative deprivation, the adoption of reference groups, and attitudes of resentment between the two samples of workers could then be regarded as a consequence of the differential degree to which they have been exposed to *radical* values. Of course the reverse is also possible; there could be a more radical labour movement in Sweden simply because workers are more radical. Which, then, is cause and which is effect? This is a difficult relationship to unravel and perhaps it is inappropriate to pose the problem in this way. A better way to conceive of the relationship is in terms of mutual feedbacks; the attitudes of rank-and-file members will impose certain constraints upon the policies of their leaders but at the same time, leaders will shape the attitudes of rank-and-file members. In most circumstances, however, the latter is more likely to occur if only because of the highly bureaucratised structure of working-class institutions, particularly in Sweden.<sup>28</sup> Certainly the evidence lends support to this contention.

In both samples union membership was 100 per cent, but there were striking differences between them in terms of their opinions about the aims of labour unions. Both groups of workers were asked the open-ended question, 'What do you think should be the major aim of trade unions?':

Whereas substantial minorities of the Swedish sample stated either 'socialist' or economic factors, the former were hardly ever mentioned by the English workers, even if those respondents who made the general



Table 10.7: *What do you think should be the major aim of trade unions?*

Major aim	Swedish workers		English workers	
	No.	Per cent	No.	Per cent
Responses suggesting improved social justice, socialism	52	43	2	2
'To represent workers' interests'	3	3	17	13
Economic factors	48	39	72	56
Improved working conditions	12	10	30	24
'To protect the individual'	2	2	4	3
Other	5	4	2	2
Not recorded	—	—	1	1
Total	122	100	128	100

statement, 'to represent workers' interests' are counted. Instead, the English sample tended to stress the need for unions to improve pay and working conditions, factors which suggested that respondents perceived trade unions in instrumental and economic ways rather than in ideological terms.<sup>29</sup> The Swedish workers, by contrast, when they mentioned 'socialist' factors tended to stress things such as the need to 'increase equality', to 'improve social justice', and 'to remove injustices at work', sentiments which were not evident in the responses of the English sample.

Labour unions in Sweden have adopted as an explicit objective, the need to increase equality. Since the 1950s, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen, LO) has pursued a policy of 'wage solidarity', the objective of which has been to negotiate with employers, wage increases which would, at the same time, reduce differentials between groups of manual workers.<sup>30</sup> Because of factors such as 'wage drift', the shortage of labour in various industries and regions, and local wage bargaining, this policy has had little consequence in narrowing differentials between groups of male manual workers, but it has remained a desirable and a central goal of labour union policy in Sweden.<sup>31</sup> In Britain, on the other hand, although the trade union movement has expressed concern over low-wage groups, and the desirability of a national minimum wage, it has never seriously pursued an explicit policy of 'wage solidarity' in the Swedish sense. However, not only have Swedish labour unions attempted to narrow differentials between categories of manual workers, they have also questioned differentials in terms of wages, fringe benefits, conditions of employment and general working conditions as they exist between white-collar workers and manual workers. In Sweden manual and white-collar workers belong to unions which are predominantly affiliated to separate national



confederations, so that manual and non-manual differentials are generally more salient in industrial bargaining than they are in Britain.<sup>32</sup> The Swedish Trade Union Confederation can therefore pursue policies of 'equality' between white-collar workers and manual workers in a more explicit manner than is available to the Trade Union Congress (TUC) in Britain, with its affiliation of both white-collar and manual unions.<sup>33</sup>

All this has created, in Sweden, a general awareness of differences in the economic conditions of manual and non-manual workers; a situation which has led to the adoption of broadly-based, cross-class, reference groups among manual workers and a consciousness of relative deprivation.<sup>34</sup> Indeed this pattern has been reinforced by the activities of the Social Democratic party which, over recent years, has questioned the legitimacy of manual/non-manual differentials.

Both samples of workers were asked if they had voted in the last general election; 98 per cent of the Swedish workers claimed they had compared with 88 per cent of the English sample. These respondents were then asked 'If a General Election were to be held in the near future, which party would you vote for?'. Among these Swedish workers 81 per cent declared their allegiance to the Social Democratic party and 68 per cent of the English respondents said they would vote for Labour. These respondents were then asked 'Why would you vote in this way?'.<sup>a</sup>

Table 10.8: *Why would you vote in this way?<sup>a</sup>*

Reasons	Swedish workers		English workers	
	No.	Per cent	No.	Per cent
General 'working class' identification with Labour/Social Democrat Parties	64	67	50	65
Family traditions	5	5	8	10
Economic factors	42	44	15	20
'Socialist' policies	17	18	4	5
'Welfare' policies	69	72	23	30
Other and non-classifiable responses	26	27	18	23

<sup>a</sup> Asked of those people who said that they had voted in the last general election and who also claimed that they would vote for the Social Democratic or Labour Party in the next. Some people gave more than one answer so that the numbers add to more than 100 per cent.

For both samples there was a 'generalised' working-class identification with the political party. But as Table 10.8 shows, although they were a small minority in both samples, more than three times as many Swedish workers

as English, mentioned 'socialist' policies; these responses included such statements as 'they are more likely to increase equality', 'they are more likely to make a more just society', 'we haven't achieved equality yet'. At the same time more than 70 per cent of the Swedish respondents perceived the Social Democrats as the party most likely to improve social benefits and to develop the welfare state; factors mentioned by less than one-third of the English workers.

Over recent years, issues of equality and social justice have been at the centre of political debate in Sweden to the extent that in the 1970 General Election, the Social Democratic party adopted 'Increased Equality' ('Ökad Jämlikhet') as its election manifesto. This was supported by other slogans, many of which were financed by specific labour unions and the Swedish Trade Union Confederation and included, 'We shall remove social injustices at work', and 'Injustices at work will be removed'. The British Labour party, on the other hand, has not stressed issues of inequality when it has been in Government, nor has it made them the centre of its electoral campaign. Therefore, in presenting itself as the champion of social justice, the Social Democratic party has generated a sense of relative deprivation among manual workers which exists to a greater degree than among most members of the working class in England.

Furthermore, Social Democracy in Sweden has led to the development of an achievement-orientated, 'open', and egalitarian ideology, which has had important implications for the experience of relative deprivation.<sup>35</sup> As Lipset and Trow have suggested: 'An egalitarian, "open class" value system with its less rigid social structures may actually engender more immediate discontent among low socio-economic groups, than does a more rigidly stratified structure. An open class value system leads workers to define inequalities in income and status between themselves and others as illegitimate more frequently than do workers in countries which have more sharply and rigidly defined social structures.'<sup>36</sup> But the evidence suggests that economic inequalities and mobility chances are much the same in Sweden as they are in England; the social structure of the former is no less rigid than the latter.<sup>37</sup> As a result, differences in the frequency of relative deprivation between the two samples of workers must be seen to be more as a consequence of differences in *meaning-systems* than to structural variations between the two countries.

If, then, there is an attempt to explain the experience of relative deprivation among manual workers, it is important to consider, among other things, *meaning-systems* and the ways in which these shape definitions of inequality. But it cannot be assumed that these are similar for all industrial-



capitalist societies; indeed, the degrees to which different *meaning-systems* interpret the structure of inequality in various societies is an empirical question. This paper has suggested, if only for extremely limited samples, that differences in the frequency of relative deprivation among English and Swedish workers is a consequence of the differential impact of *radical* values as articulated by working-class institutions.

If this interpretation is correct, then it highlights the dilemma of Social Democratic Governments in capitalist countries; aspirations are heightened and the experience of relative deprivation among rank-and-file supporters, particularly manual workers, increases. But the institutions of capitalism generate various degrees of economic and social inequality. Accordingly, it may be appropriate to consider Social Democracy in capitalist societies as a 'transitional' phenomenon so that over the long term, two possible developments could be expected. Disillusionment could become so widespread among manual workers that there is a shift in support for more 'right-wing' political parties; indeed, at the time of writing, the likelihood of this occurring in the 1973 Swedish General Election appeared to be a distinct possibility. Alternatively, there could be increased Government intervention in the economy so that ultimately the means of production are publicly owned and a socialist society established. If this were to occur then the whole process could be regarded as one in which in the initial stages. Social Democratic and union leaders generate heightened experiences of relative deprivation in order to command and later maintain the support of rank-and-file members, but at a later stage this leads to the adoption of more 'radical' policies. However, irrespective of either of these alternatives, what can be stated with a degree of certainty is that an ideology of egalitarianism and the persistence of structural inequalities generate inevitable tensions in capitalist societies which have long-established traditions of Social Democratic Governments.<sup>38</sup>

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The data presented in this paper were collected as part of a comparative analysis into aspects of social stratification in England and Sweden. The research, financed by a grant from the Centre for Environmental Studies, London, is investigating manual workers' conceptions of inequality. The



detailed results will be presented in a final report. I am grateful to Mrs Dorothy Wedderburn and to Frank Bechhofer for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

- <sup>2</sup> W. G. Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice: a study of attitudes to Social Inequality in Twentieth Century England* (London, 1966).
- <sup>3</sup> J. Goldthorpe, D. Lockwood, F. Bechhofer and J. Platt, *The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure* (Cambridge, 1969), Ch. 5.
- <sup>4</sup> A. Inkeles, 'Industrial Man: The Relation of Status to Experience, Perception and Values', *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 66 (1960-1).
- <sup>5</sup> Most sociologists, but particularly Marxists, adopt this approach. For two recent examples see N. Birnbaum, *The Crisis of Industrial Society* (London, 1969); and R. Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (London, 1969).
- <sup>6</sup> To compare aspects of two social structures without consideration of long term trends and developments restricts the contribution of any study for the debate about the convergence of industrial societies. See E. Dunning and E. Hopper, 'Industrialisation and the Problem of Convergence: a critical note', *Sociological Review*, N.S. Vol. 14 (1966). The purpose of this paper is not to discuss whether or not England and Sweden are converging in certain respects but to explore the degree to which similar attitudes are shared by workers in different industrial societies. England and Sweden are suitable for this exercise since both are highly industrialised societies with relatively similar occupational structures. See for example, R. Scase, 'Industrial Man: A Reassessment with English and Swedish Data', *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 23 (1972); and more fully, 'Inequality in Two Industrial Societies: Class, Status and Power in England and Sweden', in R. Scase (ed.), *Readings in the Swedish Class Structure* (forthcoming).
- <sup>7</sup> In the absence of national samples and in order to compare workers who were in similar 'structural' positions in the two countries, it was considered more appropriate to study two factories than two communities; with the latter there would have been greater difficulties of comparing like with like.
- <sup>8</sup> For a brief description of some of these, see the author's 'Inequality in Two Industrial Societies'. For a comparison of differences in *conditions of employment* for separate occupational categories in Britain see Chapter 7 of this volume, and D. Wedderburn, 'Inequality at Work', in P. Townsend and N. Bosanquet (eds) *Labour and Inequality* (London, 1972).
- <sup>9</sup> Whether variation in size contributed to any significant differences in the attitudes of the two samples was not investigated and must therefore remain an open question. For a study and discussion of the relationship between organisational size and workers' attitudes, see G. K. Ingham, *Size of Industrial Organisation and Worker Behaviour* (Cambridge, 1970).
- <sup>10</sup> At the younger age levels there was often an overlap between the earnings of manual and white-collar workers. See also Chapter 7 of this volume. Systematic evidence on the structure of earnings for all occupational groups in the two factories would almost certainly have indicated that there were greater differentials *within* the two factories than those described in this paper. However in the absence of this information it was considered appropriate to focus upon differentials in terms of the *highest* earnings which members of each occupational group could hope to acquire.
- <sup>11</sup> It was considered that each of these factors would affect perceptions of inequality and the experience of relative deprivation. For a discussion of the relationship between age, stage in the family cycle and work satisfaction, see H. Wilensky, 'Work as a Social Problem', in H. Becker (ed.), *Social Problems: A Modern Approach* (London, 1966).
- <sup>12</sup> The two industries from which the factories were chosen were remarkably similar in terms of these factors. Both had rather low rates of conflict and



relatively slow technological innovation by contrast with some other industries in the two countries.

- <sup>13</sup> There was an attempt to make the schedule as similar as possible for both samples, but in a 'sociological' rather than in a 'grammatical' sense. Instead of grammatically translating the English schedule into Swedish, the investigator 'tested' the schedule with Swedish sociologists and then with 'pilot' respondents in order to use questions which would convey similar 'meanings' to both groups of workers.
- <sup>14</sup> If they had been aware of this, there could have been ethnocentric bias in the responses. A Swedish research worker, normally resident in England, conducted the Swedish interviews and most of the English. I am grateful to Anita Ehn-Scase for her kind assistance.
- <sup>15</sup> Runciman, *Relative Deprivation*, p. 192.
- <sup>16</sup> United Nations, *Incomes in Post-War Europe* (Geneva, 1967). This enquiry also concluded that both pre-tax and post-tax income distributions were much the same in Sweden (1963) as they were in the United Kingdom (1964). For both countries the coefficient of inequality, calculated from Lorenz curves, was 0.40 (Table 6.10).
- <sup>17</sup> Indeed, the earnings of Swedish workers employed in the building construction industry, relative to other groups of manual workers, are high compared with the relative earnings of English construction workers. See United Nations, *Incomes in Post-War Europe*, Ch. 5.
- <sup>18</sup> Runciman, *Relative Deprivation*, Ch 10, Table 20.
- <sup>19</sup> The term 'white-collar worker' was defined so that it was clear that each respondent understood the kind of occupation with which he was being invited to make comparisons. It was emphasised that the term referred not only to office workers but also to management and other higher officials.
- <sup>20</sup> Responses of this kind included statements like, 'White-collar workers get promoted as they get older', 'you just sit there and go up', 'it's automatic for them'.
- <sup>21</sup> Some examples of these responses include, 'chances are always cropping up on the factory floor, but you have to wait for dead men's shoes in the office', 'there are always chances', 'jobs are always coming up'.
- <sup>22</sup> These reasons included for economic factors - 'better paid', 'higher earnings'; intrinsic job factors - 'their work is more interesting', 'has more responsibility'; status factors - 'looked up upon', 'more prestige', 'better reputations', etc.
- <sup>23</sup> F. Parkin, *Class Inequality and Political Order* (London, 1971), Ch. 3.
- <sup>24</sup> Parkin defines 'aspirational' as 'a view of the reward structure which emphasises the opportunities for self-advancement and social promotion', and 'deferential' as 'a view of the social order as an organic entity in which each individual has a part to play, however humble. Inequality is seen as inevitable as well as just, some men being inherently fitted for positions of power and prestige.' Parkin, *Class Inequality*, p. 85.
- <sup>25</sup> 'In so far as it is possible to characterise a complex set of normative arrangements by a single term, the subordinate value system could be said to be essentially *accommodative*; that is to say its representation of the class structure and inequality emphasises various modes of adaptation, rather than either full endorsement of, or opposition to, the *status quo*.' Parkin, *Class Inequality*, p. 88.
- <sup>26</sup> 'The radical value system purports to demonstrate the systematic nature of class inequality, and attempts to reveal a connectedness between man's personal fate and the wider political order.' Parkin, *Class Inequality*, p. 97.
- <sup>27</sup> See, for example, J. Goldthorpe, D. Lockwood, F. Bechhofer and J. Platt, *The Affluent Worker: Political Attitudes and Behaviour* (Cambridge, 1968) and B. Hindess, *The Decline of Working Class Politics* (London, 1971).
- <sup>28</sup> R. Michels was one of the first to stress that the bureaucratisation of



organisations leads to the development of oligarchical tendencies; R. Michels, *Political Parties* (New York, 1962). For a good summary of the structure of the Swedish trade union movement see T. Johnston, *Collective Bargaining in Sweden* (London, 1962).

One of the major functions of the Workers' Educational Movement (Arbetarnas Bildningsförbund, A.B.F.), the educational wing of the Labour movement, is to convey union and Social Democratic policies to rank-and-file members.

<sup>29</sup> This finding is consistent with the results reported in J. Goldthorpe, D. Lockwood, F. Bechhofer and J. Platt, *The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour* (Cambridge, 1968), Ch. 5.

<sup>30</sup> This objective has often caused conflict within the Swedish labour union movement. One of the factors contributing to a prolonged strike in the iron ore mines in the north of Sweden during the winter of 1969 was the proposal by the Confederation of Trade Unions that lower percentage wage increases should be negotiated for miners than for lower-paid occupations.

<sup>31</sup> For an assessment of 'wage solidarity', see J. Mouly, 'Wages Policy in Sweden', *International Labour Review*, Vol. 95 (1967).

<sup>32</sup> In addition to the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen, LO), the principal ones are the Central Organisation of Salaried Employees (Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation, TCO), the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation, SACO), and the National Federation of Civil Servants (Statsjänstemännens Riksförbund, SR).

<sup>33</sup> J. Fulcher has argued that the structure of collective bargaining in Sweden represents a highly institutionalised representation of class conflict, see his 'Class Conflict in Sweden', *Sociology*, Vol. 7 (1973).

<sup>34</sup> The roles of political and labour union leaders in defining the reference groups of rank-and-file members is discussed by S. Lipset and M. Trow, 'Reference Group Theory and Trade Union Wage Policy', in Mirra Komarovsky (ed.), *Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences* (Glencoe, 1957).

<sup>35</sup> Over the years, Social Democratic Governments have emphasised the need to 'equalise' opportunities for all social groups in society. In view of this, there have been drastic reforms of the school and university systems. Sweden is now the only capitalist country in Europe which has a completely non-streamed comprehensive school system. At the same time, the proportion of university students from working-class homes has increased from 8 per cent in 1947 to 22 per cent in 1968-9.

In the present enquiry, both samples were asked, 'How likely is the son of a factory worker to move from one class to another?' Among the Swedish workers, 48 per cent claimed that it was 'very likely' compared with only 6 per cent of the English sample. Of the Swedish respondents, 96 per cent stressed the need to obtain educational qualifications in order to do this compared with 51 per cent of the English workers.

<sup>36</sup> Lipset and Trow, *Reference Group Theory and Trade Union Wage Policy*, p. 401.

<sup>37</sup> For a review of some of the relevant data see R. Scase, 'Inequality in Two Industrial Societies'.

<sup>38</sup> In addition to generating heightened experiences of relative deprivation, the Swedish labour movement seems to have affected workers' perceptions of social reality in another way. Compared with their English counterparts, they appear to be more likely to perceive of themselves as members of a legitimate and influential working-class movement. In a capitalist society this, in itself, is conducive to heightened feelings of relative deprivation and of resentment if only because 'influence' is not always perceived to produce greater 'social justice'. (See the author's *Industrial Man*.)



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RICHARD SCASE

## *Conceptions of the Class Structure and Political Ideology: Some Observations on Attitudes in England and Sweden<sup>1</sup>*

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Many discussions about workers' images of society have emphasized the need to investigate actors' immediate social relationships. Lockwood, for example, has stated that, 'for the most part men visualize the class structure of their society from the vantage points of their own particular *milieux*, and their perceptions of the larger society will vary according to their experiences of social inequality in the smaller societies in which they live out their daily lives' (Lockwood 1966: 249). He goes on to suggest that 'the industrial and community *milieux* of manual workers exhibit a very considerable diversity and it would be strange if there were no correspondingly marked variations in the images of society held by different sections of the working class' (Lockwood 1966: 250). Similarly Inkeles, in a comparative study of attitudes in different industrial societies, has argued that '... people have experiences, develop attitudes, and form values in response to the forces or pressures which their environment creates. By "environment" we mean, particularly, networks of inter-personal relations and the patterns of reward and punishment one normally experiences in them' (Inkeles 1960-61: 2). He suggests that '... within broad limits, the same situational pressures, the same framework for living, will be experienced as similar and will generate the same or similar response by people from different countries' (Inkeles 1960-61: 2). A task for empirical enquiry, then, is to see how far systematic variations in patterns of social relationships are related to differences in actors' conceptions of social reality.

However, the processes whereby these social relationships are conducive to particular types of subjective response are unclear. For example, it has often been suggested that roles that bring employees into

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However, the processes whereby these social relationships are conducive to particular types of subjective response are unclear. For example, it has often been suggested that roles that bring employees into



close personal contact with their employers will lead workers to adopt deferential attitudes. But it could also be argued that these relationships are conducive not necessarily to deference but to workers making comparisons with their employers such that they feel relatively deprived and resentful, and thus adopt radical attitudes. If this is a possibility, why has deference been seen to be a more likely outcome than radicalism? Of course there is empirical evidence, although of a limited kind, to indicate that these patterns of relationships do indeed lead to deferential attitudes,<sup>2</sup> while there is little to indicate that they are conducive to radicalism.<sup>3</sup> But is this a function of specific social relationships as such, or is it more a consequence of the procedures whereby these relationships have become *defined* and invested with social meanings?

The point can be further clarified by reference to Lockwood's typification of the 'proletarian traditionalist'. He states that '... the dominant model of society held by the proletarian traditionalist is most likely to be a dichotomous or two-valued power model. Thinking in terms of two classes standing in a relationship of opposition is a *natural consequence* (my italics) of being a member of a closely integrated industrial community with well-defined boundaries and a distinctive style of life' (Lockwood 1966: 251). But why should such an image of society be regarded as an inevitable outcome of social environments of this kind? In fact Moore (1972), in a study of mining communities in Durham, found that in some circumstances there was little evidence of a heightened awareness of class consciousness among miners. He states, 'It is clear that the miners have developed a strong sense of occupational community (unlike the traditional deferential worker), but this does not mean that class consciousness emerged from this' (Moore 1972: 30). He goes on to add, '... Lockwood does not consider the possibility that men have to be *converted* to a traditional proletarian outlook in certain situations' (Moore 1972: 32). Consequently he argues that in order to see whether miners will adhere to 'traditional-proletarian' images of society it is necessary to consider the role of ideas and ideologies in shaping actors' definitions of social reality; in the case of the Durham miners, the relative influences of Methodism, Trade Unionism, and the Labour Party. Indeed, Moore's argument lends weight to Parkin's claim that, 'although there is a factual and material basis to class inequality, there is more than one way in which it can be interpreted. Facts alone do not provide meanings, and the way a person makes sense of his social world will be influenced by the nature of the *meaning-systems* he draws upon' (Parkin 1971: 81). These

meaning-systems, according to Parkin, are a function of the influence exercised by different groups in society.

These arguments do not, of course, refute the significance of social relationships in shaping individuals' images of society. But they do imply that a consideration of *only* these factors is insufficient, and that it is necessary to investigate the processes whereby these relationships become defined by the actors involved. These arguments would also suggest that this is particularly necessary in the comparative study of attitudes in different industrial societies where writers have frequently implied that the institutions of advanced capitalism generate similar patterns of attitudes among workers in different countries that tend to over-ride differences generated by national, political, and cultural factors.<sup>4</sup>

This issue is investigated in the present paper in relation to the attitudes of workers in two industrial societies – England and Sweden.<sup>5</sup> The objective is to ascertain whether or not workers in similar structural positions within the two countries have similar conceptions of their respective class structures and of social mobility within it. If they do, it would indicate that institutional social environments have major consequences for shaping individuals' conceptions of social reality. But if they do not, it would suggest the significance of other factors which may have been neglected in discussions of the sources of class imagery.

#### METHOD

In order to test these ideas a comparison was made of two groups of English and Swedish workers, who were both subject to relatively similar institutional constraints. They were chosen from two factories which shared a number of common characteristics. First, both factories manufactured similar products; in each case the work process consisted of producing a wide range of engineering goods and components. Second, the technologies were more or less similar, except for the fact that the Swedish factory was more highly capitalized; tasks undertaken by machinery in the Swedish factory were often performed by manual labour in the English workshops. In both places, productive techniques enabled employees to communicate with each other while they were working, and a number of the tasks were undertaken by work teams: the division-of-labour was much less complex than that normally associated with assembly-line technology as found, for example, in the automobile industry. Third, both factories produced goods for relatively static or even contracting markets: there had been no expansion



over recent years and there was little expectation by either management or workers that this was likely to occur in the foreseeable future. At the time of the investigation, neither factory had been confronted with the threat of redundancies, and there was an assumption by both groups of workers that employment was relatively secure.

Although the two factories were similar in terms of these characteristics, they differed in at least two important respects. First, work and employment conditions, by any absolute standard of comparison, were much better in the Swedish factory. This was evident in the quality of heating, lighting, and ventilation, in the provision of social and recreational amenities, and in regulations relating to industrial safety and the use of machinery. Second, there were differences in the sizes of the two factories: the English unit employed 972 manual workers, compared with the 298 in the Swedish. Unfortunately it was impossible to choose two factories of a similar size that could also be matched according to other criteria: whether this affected attitudes between the two samples was not investigated and must therefore remain an open question.<sup>6</sup>

In terms of wage differentials, it was difficult to make accurate calculations because earnings in both factories, particularly those of non-manual workers, varied according to age and length of service. Furthermore, the management of the English workplace were reluctant to give detailed information; they were only prepared to disclose 'approximate' earnings. However, the information they made available suggested that differences between the remuneration of the highest paid manual workers and senior management tended to be less in the Swedish workplace than in the English; whereas the earnings of Swedish senior managers were approximately two and a quarter times greater, those of their English counterparts were as much as three times as great. But on the other hand, differences between the earnings of the highest paid manual workers and white-collar employees were similar; by the age of 40, senior clerical officers and other higher grade employees could be earning about one-third more than blue-collar men.<sup>7</sup>

The two samples were taken from manual workers between the ages of twenty-five and fifty-four in order to eliminate both those whose careers had yet to become firmly established, and those approaching retirement.<sup>8</sup> The investigation also concentrated almost exclusively upon married men; these comprised 85 per cent or more of both samples.

Of course the samples cannot be regarded as representative of workers in each of the two countries; they were matched according to a number of variables and so their general representativeness is limited. They were chosen from specific industries which, like all industries, have



characteristics peculiar to themselves; traditions of historical development, industrial relations, and technological change.<sup>9</sup> Consequently, these factors limit the degree to which it is possible to generalize findings derived from this study. But the results can be regarded as at least *indicative* of patterns in the two countries which only more comprehensive enquiries will be able to substantiate.

The data were collected by interviews in the spring and summer of 1970, using schedules printed in English and Swedish, but neither sample was aware of its participation in an international comparison.<sup>10</sup> Both samples were asked a large number of specific questions about their life-styles and employment conditions, and about various aspects of social and economic inequality. But at the same time, they were asked a number of more general and abstract questions about the social structures of their respective countries.<sup>11</sup> The response rates were high – 87 per cent for the Swedish sample and 73 per cent for the English: this provided 122 completed Swedish schedules and 128 English schedules, upon which the present discussion is based.

#### RESULTS OF THE INQUIRY

Both samples were asked, 'Some people say that there are no longer social classes in this country. Others say that there are. What do you think?'. An overwhelming majority of both groups stated that they do exist: 97 per cent (N-118) of the Swedish and 93 per cent (N-119) of the English workers.<sup>12</sup> These respondents were then asked the open-ended question, 'Why do you think this is the case?'. The coded responses are shown in *Table 1*:

Any similarity between the two samples in terms of their recognition of social classes evaporated when they described their reasons for the existence of these classes. As *Table 1* shows, half of the Swedish respondents referred to economic, and 20 per cent to educational factors. At the same time, only 2 per cent considered birth and family background to be important. By contrast, although one-third of the English workers mentioned economic factors, only 3 per cent referred to education but more than 10 per cent to 'birth' and family background. At the same time, as many as 25 per cent considered social classes to be an inevitable feature of life; they made such statements as 'you will always have leaders and followers'; 'some people are bound to be better than others'; 'breeding makes social classes inevitable'. Furthermore, the English respondents were more likely than the Swedish to describe the class structure in terms of notions of status and snobbery: more than 12

TABLE 1

'Why do you think this is the case?' ('That there are social classes')

<i>Because of:</i>	<i>Swedish workers</i> (N-118)		<i>English workers</i> (N-119)	
	%	Nos.	%	Nos.
'birth' and family background	1.7	2	10.9	13
'money', 'wealth', and various economic factors	55.1	65	37.1	44
status and 'snobbery'	5.9	7	12.6	15
educational qualifications and experiences	20.3	24	2.5	3
'an inevitable feature of life'	0.9	1	25.2	30
occupation	1.7	2	2.5	3
don't know	2.5	3	2.5	3
other and non-classifiable responses	11.9	14	6.7	8
<i>Totals</i>	100.0	118	100.0	119

per cent made comments like 'there are those who think they are better than others'; and 'some people will always look down their noses at you'.

A further question asked was, 'What is the major factor, do you think, which determines the class a person belongs to?'. Whereas the previous question tried to ascertain the characteristics used by respondents for describing their respective class structures, this question attempted to identify the criteria which they would use in allocating individuals to positions *within* these structures.

Table 2 shows that the Swedish workers considered an individual's class position was determined primarily by his economic circumstances and his level of education, while other factors, such as his birth and family background, were regarded as of limited importance.<sup>13</sup> Among the English workers, on the other hand, there was a similar recognition of the importance of economic factors but they were much more likely to emphasize the significance of birth and family background, and to give little weight to the role of education. Therefore the responses indicated that although both samples stressed the importance of economic factors for determining the class position of individuals, the Swedish workers were more likely to refer to 'meritocratic' factors than the English. Indeed, this pattern was confirmed by their descriptions of different social classes.



TABLE 2

*'What is the major factor, do you think, which determines the class a person belongs to?'*\*

<i>Factors mentioned</i>	<i>Swedish workers</i> (N-118)		<i>English workers</i> (N-119)	
	%	Nos	%	Nos
'birth' and family background	10.2	12	37.8	45
educational qualifications and experiences	38.1	45	13.5	16
'money,' 'wealth', and economic factors	68.6	81	58.0	69
occupation	5.9	7	10.9	13
attitudes and appearances	3.4	4	5.0	6
patterns of social interaction	—	—	3.4	4
other and non-classifiable responses	9.3	11	10.9	13

\* Most respondents mentioned more than one factor and so the figures add up to more than 100 per cent.

The workers that recognized the existence of social classes were asked, 'Which are the major classes in this country today?'. In reply to this question all respondents mentioned more than one class: 28 per cent of the Swedish and 29 per cent of the English workers conceived of a two-class model of society; 66 per cent and 60 per cent, respectively, a three-class model, and a further 5 per cent and 11 per cent a class model consisting of four or more categories. In other words, somewhat less than one-third of both groups of workers mentioned two, and a further two-thirds, three major social classes. In terms of their own class position, all the respondents in both samples who considered there were only two social classes placed themselves in the 'bottom' category. But among those who conceived of their society in terms of a three-class model, there was an important difference between the two groups. Whereas 47 per cent of the Swedish respondents adhering to this model allocated themselves to the 'intermediate' category, this was done by only 21 per cent of the English; indeed as many as 79 per cent placed themselves in the 'bottom' category.

Although there was a close relationship between the model of the class structure and reasons given for the existence of social classes among the English workers, this was not the case for the Swedish. For



those Swedish respondents with either a two-class or a three-class model, approximately 55 per cent held that social classes were a result of economic factors. At the same time, about 20 per cent of both these groups emphasized the importance of education. Among the English workers, on the other hand, of those with a two-class model, 49 per cent mentioned economic factors, 20 per cent the inevitability of social class and 6 per cent the importance of birth and family background. But for those with a three-class model, 34 per cent referred to economic factors, 27 per cent to the 'inevitability' of social classes, and 10 per cent to birth and family background. In other words, whereas economic and educational factors were consistently considered to be important among the Swedish workers, despite any differences in their models of the class structure, ascriptive criteria were more likely to be mentioned by those English workers with a three-class model than by those with a two-class model of society.

TABLE 3

*'Which are the major classes in this country today?'*

'Labels' Mentioned	Swedish workers (N-118)		English workers (N-119)	
	%	Nos	%	Nos
'upper', 'top', 'higher classes'	20.3	24	74.8	89
'the wealthy', 'rich', 'those with plenty of money'	11.9	14	16.0	19
'social group I'	48.3	57	—	—
'middle class'	16.1	19	75.6	90
'white-collar people'	17.0	20	0.9	1
'educated people'	4.2	5	0.9	1
'social group II'	47.5	56	—	—
'social group III'	39.8	47	—	—
'working class'	39.0	46	74.8	89
'ordinary people', 'average people'	1.7	2	1.7	2
'lower class'	1.7	2	17.7	21
'the poor', 'the lower paid', etc.	5.9	7	6.7	8
negative evaluation ('those who don't want to work', etc.)	8.5	10	0.9	1
other and non-classifiable responses	12.7	15	10.9	13

The replies to the question, 'Which are the major classes in this country today?' were then coded, as far as possible, according to the actual phrases used by respondents. The results are shown in *Table 3*.

Both samples were then asked, 'Which of these classes would you say that you belong to?'; the replies to which are shown in *Table 4*.

TABLE 4

*'Which of these classes would you say that you belong to?'*

<i>'Labels' mentioned</i>	<i>Swedish workers</i> (N-118)		<i>English workers</i> (N-119)	
	%	Nos	%	Nos
'middle class'	9.3	11	19.3	23
'social group II'	25.4	30	—	—
'social group III'	21.2	25	—	—
'average people'	1.7	2	1.7	2
'ordinary people'				
'working class'	39.0	46	69.8	83
'lower class'	1.7	2	5.0	6
'the poor'	—	—	3.4	4
other and non-classifiable responses	1.7	2	0.8	1
<i>Totals</i>	100.0	118	100.0	119

In view of the fact that replies to these questions were coded according to the actual terms used by respondents, it is interesting that they used relatively few categories in describing either the class structure or their own class position. This would suggest that in replying to these deliberately vague and ambiguous questions respondents did not consciously work out their own conceptions of their respective class structures but instead, 'gave back' a received cultural, ideological interpretation of them.

However, it is also clear that the two samples of workers had rather different reasons for explaining their own positions within their respective class structures. This is borne out by *Table 5* which correlates respondents' self-assigned class with the factors they regarded as important in determining an individual's class position.

This table shows that both groups of workers, irrespective of the specific terms that they used for describing their own class positions, considered economic factors to be the major determinants of an individual's placement within the class structure. But it is also clear



that the Swedish workers persistently stressed the role of education to a degree unreflected in the English responses. In addition, although the number of Swedish workers that emphasized the importance of birth and family background was greater among those considering themselves to be 'working class', this did not equal the high frequency of this response found among the English 'working class' respondents. Indeed birth and family background were emphasized among these English workers to about the same degree as education among the Swedish respondents regarding themselves as 'working class'. In other words, *Table 5* suggests that while the Swedish respondents perceived their own positions within the class structure to be largely determined by economic and educational factors, the English sample, although recognizing the primary importance of economic criteria, were more

TABLE 5

*Respondents' self-assigned social class related to the factors they considered important in determining an individual's position in the class structure (percentages)\**

<i>Factors mentioned as important</i>	<i>Respondents' self-assigned social class</i>				
	<i>Swedish workers</i>			<i>English workers</i>	
	<i>'Social Group II' (N-30)</i>	<i>'Social Group III' (N-25)</i>	<i>'Work- ing Class' (N-46)</i>	<i>'Middle Class' (N-23)</i>	<i>'Work- ing Class' (N-83)</i>
birth and family background	6.7	12.0	15.2	21.7	42.2
educational qualifications and experiences	40.0	40.0	41.3	17.4	12.1
money, wealth, and economic factors	86.7	72.0	58.7	56.5	57.8
occupation	3.3	4.0	8.7	4.4	14.5
attitudes and appearances	—	—	2.2	13.0	2.4
patterns of social interaction	—	—	—	4.4	3.6
other and non- classifiable responses	13.3	8.0	8.7	17.4	8.4

\* Most respondents mentioned more than one factor and so the figures add up to more than 100 per cent. Only those class 'labels' used by a substantial number of respondents have been used in this cross-tabulation (see *Table 4*).



TABLE 6

*Respondents' descriptions of 'Social Group I' and 'Upper Class'\**

<i>Respondents' descriptions</i>	<i>Swedish workers 'Social Group I' (N-57)</i>		<i>English workers 'Upper Class' (N-89)</i>	
	<i>%</i>	<i>Nos</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Nos</i>
'lords and ladies', 'people with titles', 'the Aristocracy'	1.8	1	41.6	37
economic factors ('the rich', 'the wealthy', etc).	31.6	18	20.2	18
'big businessmen', 'directors'	52.6	30	53.9	48
'professionals' (or specific occupational title mentioned)	56.1	32	14.6	13
'higher white-collar workers'	28.1	16	1.1	1
'educated people'	26.3	15	4.5	4
'engineers'	12.3	7	—	—
'managers'	26.3	15	27.0	24
other and non-classifiable responses	19.3	11	30.3	27

\* The figures add to more than 100 per cent since most respondents mentioned more than one factor in their descriptions.

likely to emphasize the role of birth and family background. In fact it is only among the English respondents describing themselves as 'middle class' that education is given as much importance as birth and family background.

Similar patterns emerged in respondents' descriptions of the 'top' social classes. In their models of the class structure there were no respondents who placed themselves in the top category. But it was considered useful to study their descriptions of this category to get some idea of what criteria they regarded as necessary in order to be part of a 'successful' and 'important' group in society. *Table 6* illustrates the samples' descriptions of the two groups that were most frequently mentioned in this category: for the Swedish workers, 'Social Group I', and for the English, the 'Upper Class'. These terms were mentioned by 49 per cent and 75 per cent of the Swedish and the English samples respectively.

This table indicates that both samples stressed the importance of economic factors. But, at the same time, the Swedish workers mentioned a number of occupations that require individuals to undergo relatively long periods of formal education and specialist training. Therefore

various professional occupations, 'engineers', 'higher white-collar workers', and 'educated people' were frequently mentioned, while 'lords and ladies', 'the aristocracy', and other descriptions that would indicate that respondents perceived the class structure in traditionalist and ascriptive terms were absent. Among the English sample, by contrast, traditionalist attitudes of this kind were frequently expressed: no less than 42 per cent mentioned them in their descriptions of 'Upper Class'.

Clearly, the foregoing analysis suggests that the two samples had rather different conceptions of their respective class structures. From this it seems as though the Swedish workers would be more likely to conceive of the class structure as 'open' and as one in which there would be considerable opportunities for individual upward mobility. Among the English respondents, on the other hand, it would appear that their conceptions of the class structure would lead them to have limited beliefs in the possibilities of upward mobility, if only because of the importance given to ascriptive and traditional factors in determining individuals' class membership.

In order to test whether or not this was the case, those workers recognizing the existence of social classes were asked, 'Do you think that many people move from one class to another these days?'. Among the Swedish workers, 70 per cent (N-82) said 'yes' compared with 42 per cent (N-50) of the English respondents: more than two-thirds compared with less than one-half. These workers were then asked, 'What are the reasons for this?'. The coded responses are shown in *Table 7*.

Similar proportions of both samples felt that people could move from one class to another because of greater opportunities to improve their economic circumstances. But the factor mentioned most frequently by the Swedish respondents was that there were now better possibilities for obtaining educational qualifications; this was mentioned by only a few of the English workers. Instead, the latter were more likely to cite the need for 'personal contacts', and for individuals to exercise 'initiative', 'enterprise', and so on.

These results were further substantiated by the responses to a more specific question, 'How likely is the son of a factory worker to move from one class to another. Would you say that he was "very likely" "likely", "unlikely", or "very unlikely"?'. No less than 98 per cent of the Swedish workers considered that he was either 'very likely' or 'likely', compared with 70 per cent of the English. Obviously both samples were optimistic about the mobility chances of the son of a



TABLE 7

*'What are the reasons for this?'*

(*'that many people move from one class to another these days'*)

<i>Because of:</i>	<i>Swedish workers</i>		<i>English workers</i>	
	<i>%</i>	<i>Nos</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Nos</i>
opportunities to improve				
personal economic circumstances	33.0	27	38.0	19
possibilities for promotion at work	6.1	5	16.0	8
possibilities for obtaining				
educational qualifications	56.1	46	12.0	6
personal contacts	—	—	6.0	3
equal opportunity for everyone	2.4	2	4.0	2
individual effort and enterprise,				
etc.	—	—	12.0	6
other and non-classifiable				
responses	2.4	2	12.0	6
<i>Totals</i>	100.0	82	100.0	50

TABLE 8

*'What would he (the son of a factory worker) have to do in order to move from one class to another?'*

<i>Responses:</i>	<i>Swedish workers</i>		<i>English workers</i>	
	<i>%</i>	<i>Nos</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Nos</i>
improve his personal economic				
circumstances	—	—	2.5	3
obtain promotion at work, or				
get a 'better' job	—	—	12.6	15
obtain some educational				
qualifications	95.6	113	51.3	61
make use of, or establish				
'personal contacts'	0.9	1	1.7	2
exercise some 'individual				
effort', 'initiative', etc.	0.9	1	5.9	7
don't know	0.9	1	5.0	6
other and non-classifiable				
responses	1.7	2	21.0	25
<i>Totals</i>	100.0	118	100.0	119



TABLE 9

*'What sort of people are more likely to have their sons at university?'*\*

'Sort of people'	Swedish workers (N-122)		English workers (N-128)	
	%	Nos	%	Nos
'educated people'	46.6	34	2.6	2
'the rich', 'the wealthy'	19.2	14	41.0	32
'professionals' (or specific occupation mentioned)	89.0	65	30.8	24
'big businessmen', 'directors'	19.2	14	53.9	42
other non-manual (or specific occupation mentioned)	11.0	8	19.2	15
'the aristocracy', 'lords and ladies'	—	—	2.6	2
'depends on parents'	4.1	3	2.6	2
'manual workers' (or specific occupation mentioned)	—	—	2.6	2
other and non-classifiable responses	1.4	1	14.1	11

\* A number of respondents mentioned more than one 'Sort of People' and so the figures add to more than 100 per cent.

factory worker, but this attitude was held to a far greater degree among the Swedish respondents. Whereas there was almost complete acceptance of this opinion among the Swedish workers, a substantial minority of the English respondents – 20 per cent – felt that it was either 'unlikely' or 'very unlikely'. Both samples were then asked, 'What would he have to do in order to move from one class to another?'

The results in *Table 8* show that the Swedish sample regarded the acquisition of educational qualifications as almost the sole means by which individuals could be upwardly mobile within the class structure. Although this opinion was shared by one-half of the English workers, it is evident that 'meritocratic' norms were held to be of far less importance.<sup>14</sup> But did the Swedish respondents consider that children from all social backgrounds enjoyed the same degree of participation within the educational system? To investigate this, both samples were asked, 'A lot of children stay on at school and go to university these days. Do you think that the sons of some people are more likely to stay on than others?'<sup>15</sup> Similar proportions of both samples – 60 per cent (N-73) of the Swedish and 61 per cent (N-78) of the English – agreed that the sons of some people were more likely to stay on than others.

These respondents were then asked, 'What sort of people are more likely to have their sons at university?'.

Table 9 shows that both samples were aware of inequalities within the respective educational systems. But it is also clear that the Swedish workers perceived of these in terms of advantages accruing to the sons of educated and other qualified, professional workers. By comparison, the English respondents rarely mentioned 'educated people' and they were less likely to refer to various categories of professional workers. Instead, they mentioned 'The Rich', 'The Wealthy', and 'Businessmen', but not 'The Aristocracy' and 'Those with Titles', which is perhaps somewhat surprising in view of the importance which they attached to these latter groups in their conceptions of the class structure. Clearly such people are seen not to require educational qualifications for their position in society!

The results of the interview survey suggest, then, that there were important differences between the two samples in terms of their conceptions of the class structure and of social mobility within it. Although both groups gave primary emphasis to economic factors in their descriptions, the Swedish workers attached greater importance to education, while the English workers were more likely to stress the significance of ascriptive and traditional characteristics. Furthermore, the Swedish workers were more likely to express a belief in the possibilities of individual upward mobility, and for this to occur they emphasized the need to obtain formal educational qualifications. When privileges within the educational system were recognized to exist, these were seen to be enjoyed by the sons of educated and other qualified people. For the English workers, on the other hand, possibilities of individual upward mobility were considered to be less likely, but when this was considered to be possible, fewer respondents mentioned the importance of education. In short, the Swedish workers were more likely than the English, to conceive of the class structure as 'open' and 'meritocratic'.

#### DISCUSSION

Any adequate explanation of the differences in the attitudes of the two samples would require a detailed discussion of a large number of factors. It would be surprising if the attitudes were not shaped, at least to some extent, by a whole range of historical processes as well as by a number of individual and group experiences.<sup>16</sup> Because this paper



cannot consider all of these, emphasis will be given only to those factors which, *a priori*, seem most likely to explain the differences.

Obvious factors to consider are the samples' experiences of mobility at work, since it could be argued that their different conceptions of the possibilities for individual mobility in society are a consequence of these. However, the evidence does not support this. Asked about the possibilities for promotion, both samples were invited to name an occupation that they would be most likely to get if they were given promotion.<sup>17</sup> For both groups of workers 'foremen' and various supervisory manual occupations such as 'inspector' and 'chargehand' were most frequently mentioned – by well over 80 per cent of both the Swedish and the English samples. In other words, promotion was perceived in terms of movement within manual jobs, rather than into white-collar occupations. Indeed these were realistic assessments since in neither factory was there an effective scheme that would have enabled manual workers to become office employees. But the similarity in the samples' responses did not persist when they were asked, 'How likely is a factory worker to get promotion at work? Would you say that it was "very likely", "likely", "unlikely", or "very unlikely"?' Almost twice as many (73 per cent) of the English workers thought it either 'likely' or 'very likely' compared with the Swedish workers (39 per cent). Furthermore 80 per cent of the Swedish sample claimed their chances for promotion were either 'worse' or 'much worse' compared with those of white-collar employees, and only 3 per cent said that they were 'better' or 'much better'.<sup>18</sup>

Obviously the Swedish respondents' optimistic assumptions about mobility within the class structure cannot be regarded as a function of their conceptions of the possibilities for promotion at work.<sup>19</sup> Consequently it appears that their descriptions of the class structure were a function of factors other than those relating to immediate work experiences. Indeed, this claim can be supported by a consideration of the mobility patterns of respondents' sons. Those workers with sons at work (there were 45 and 52 among the Swedish and the English samples respectively) were asked to name and describe their sons' occupations. The results are shown in *Table 10*:

This table indicates that there were similar patterns of occupational mobility among the sons of both samples; only 16 per cent of the Swedish workers' sons were in non-manual occupations compared with 12 per cent of the English. Consequently the margin between these figures is too small to explain the differences in the two samples' conceptions of mobility in society. Again this suggests the need to



TABLE 10  
*Occupations of Respondents' Sons*

<i>Occupations of respondents' sons</i>	<i>Swedish workers</i>		<i>English workers</i>	
	%	Nos	%	Nos
manual	80.0	36	73.1	38
non-manual	15.6	7	11.5	6
self-employed (not farmer)	2.2	1	—	—
farmer	—	—	—	—
farm worker	—	—	—	—
military (conscription and regular)	2.2	1	15.4	8
<i>Totals</i>	100.0	45	100.0	52

consider influences other than those directly relating to respondents' own immediate social experiences. But what are these?

An obvious factor to consider is the rate of social mobility in each of the countries. If this is higher in Sweden it could be one factor relevant to explaining the attitudes of Swedish workers. However, what evidence there is suggests that patterns of recruitment into various occupational roles, particularly those of a more prestigious and highly paid kind, are very restricted in Sweden — certainly to a far greater extent than the beliefs of the Swedish sample would suggest. If there has been any increase in rates of inter-generational upward mobility, it has tended to be in terms of recruitment into the more routine, less qualified white-collar occupations. In the 1950s the rate of inter-generational mobility between manual and non-manual occupations appears to have been similar in Sweden, in Britain, and in a number of other European countries. Miller (1960), for example, in a re-analysis of various studies, has suggested that 26 per cent of the sons of manual workers in Sweden became white-collar employees compared with 25 per cent in Britain, 24 per cent in Denmark, 23 per cent in Norway, and 20 per cent in West Germany. But since the 1950s the rate of upward mobility, as measured in this way, appears to have increased in Sweden but not in Britain. This is borne out in *Table 11*, taken from a national study of mobility in Sweden, conducted in 1968.<sup>20</sup>

From this table it seems that 36 per cent of the sons of Swedish manual workers were in white-collar occupations in 1968, a noticeable increase compared with the 1950s. In Britain, on the other hand, there appears to have been virtually no change in the overall pattern.

TABLE II  
*Social mobility among the Swedish adult population*

<i>Father's social group*</i>	<i>Respondent's social group</i>			<i>Nos</i>	<i>Total %</i>
	I	II	III		
I	50	37	13	254	100
II	11	45	44	1981	100
III	4	32	64	3274	100
<i>Total</i>	8	37	55	5509	100

Source: Erickson (1971:76)

\* In this and the following tables, 'Social Group I' refers to senior civil servants, owners of large business firms, professional people, and senior managerial executives in private businesses; 'Social Group II' to lower-grade non-manual workers, owners of small businesses, independent artisans, and foremen; and 'Social Group III' to manual workers. This is the usual way in which Swedish social scientists describe the stratification system of their country.

MacDonald and Ridge (1972) suggest that in 1962, there were still only 25 per cent of the sons of manual workers employed in non-manual occupations. However, although there may now be greater mobility within the Swedish class structure than previously, this tends to be between lower-grade white-collar and manual occupations rather than taking the form of recruitment into professional, managerial, and administrative jobs. As Table II shows, only 4 per cent of the sons of manual workers were employed in occupations of this kind. Table 12 gives more detailed information on these patterns and shows the proportion of sons from different occupational backgrounds acquiring positions that have been classified in terms of Social Groups 'I' and 'III'.

Data of this kind confirm that the Swedish class structure in 1968 was still very rigid. For example, the son of a senior civil servant appears to have had about thirteen-times the chance of obtaining a 'Social Group I' occupation than a son of a manual worker employed in private industry. Even the son of a lower-grade white-collar worker employed in private industry had more than six-times the chance of getting such a position than a manual worker's son. In other words, these results are consistent with those of earlier Swedish studies, all of which have shown that recruitment into professional, managerial, and other highly rewarded



TABLE 12

*Proportion of sons in Social Groups 'I' and 'III' according to fathers' occupation*

<i>Fathers' occupations</i>	<i>Sons' social group</i>	
	I	III
senior civil servants	65.6	8.3
owners of large business firms, and professional people	52.6	8.2
senior managerial and executive in private business	50.7	18.5
lower-grade non-manual in private concerns	33.7	27.8
lower-grade non-manual in public concerns	24.4	32.0
owners of small business firms, and independent artisans	15.8	39.8
foremen	13.1	47.6
manual workers in public concerns	8.5	58.0
farmers	4.0	41.3
manual workers in private concerns	5.2	61.3
small farmers, fishermen	2.6	71.3
farm and forestry workers	3.3	75.7

Source: Erikson, (1971:95)

occupations, is highly restricted.<sup>21</sup> In fact these patterns appear to be much the same as they are for Britain.<sup>22</sup>

Clearly, the available evidence suggests that variations in the two samples' conceptions of their respective class structures cannot be seen to be solely a consequence of different mobility patterns, either in terms of immediate social experiences or the respective countries. Certainly the chances for the son of a manual worker becoming a lower-grade white-collar employee are greater in Sweden than they are in Britain, but the differences between the two countries in terms of overall patterns of social mobility are insufficient to account for the considerable variation in the attitudes of the two samples. How, then, are the differences to be explained? Since they do not seem to be a function of 'structural' differences it is pertinent to argue that they may be a consequence – if only partly – of certain normative influences: to follow Parkin (1971), those of a political kind.

Sweden, unlike Britain, is one of the few capitalist countries that has had a relatively continuous succession of Social Democratic govern-



ments. The Social Democratic party has been in office, either as the dominant partner in a coalition or as a majority government, since the 1930s and during this time it has claimed to represent the interests of the working class.<sup>23</sup> Most of its supporters are manual workers but there is also a substantial minority of lower-grade white-collar workers who also support the party.<sup>24</sup> Consequently, these governments have often enacted legislation with the intention of improving the economic and social conditions of its supporters, particularly those of industrial workers. Over the years priority has been given to economic growth, social welfare, housing, full employment, and factory legislation, all of which has improved the *absolute* living and working conditions of manual workers from among the worst in north-western Europe in the 1930s to the highest in 1972.<sup>25</sup> But on the whole, these programmes have had few consequences for the narrowing of differentials in the economic and social rewards of manual workers and those of other occupational groups.<sup>26</sup>

However if Social Democratic governments, despite their recent electoral appeals, have achieved little in reducing inequalities they have emphasized the desirability of establishing Sweden as a meritocratic society.<sup>27</sup> A society, that is, in which all individuals will be able to acquire occupational roles suited to their talents and skills and conversely, one in which recruitment into various occupations – particularly those which are prestigious and highly rewarded – will be determined by ‘competence’ and ‘ability’ rather than by social background. Indeed, Parkin (1971) claims that Social Democratic governments in capitalist countries are more likely to emphasize equality of opportunity rather than equality of economic rewards. This emphasis in Sweden has been reflected in reforms of the educational system.<sup>28</sup>

Until the early 1950s, Sweden had a highly selective system of education. All children attended elementary schools, and in either their fourth or sixth grades, the more able were transferred to secondary schools where they pursued an academic curriculum before going to the *gymnasium* and subsequently to university. The rest – those not chosen for secondary education – continued their studies at elementary school before direct entry into the labour market, although some would also attend technical colleges. A consequence of this system, as in many other countries, was that the children from upper- and middle-class homes were more likely to attend the *gymnasium* than those from working-class backgrounds. For example, in a study of males born in 1934, H rnqvist (1958) found that only 35 per cent of pupils with the highest academic grades and from working-class homes transferred to

the *gymnasium*, compared with 85 per cent of upper-class children attaining the same level of academic competence. Similarly, in terms of the social origins of university students, only 8 per cent of newly registered students came from working-class homes in 1947 (Israel 1968).

However, since the 1950s there has been a gradual introduction of non-streamed comprehensive schools, so that by the early 1970s Sweden will be the only country in western Europe with a completely non-selective educational system. Furthermore, there is little doubt that these reforms have improved the educational opportunities for working-class children: Reuterberg (1968) found that 87 per cent of working-class males born in 1948, and with the highest academic grades, transferred from secondary schools to the *gymnasium* – almost three times as many as among those born in 1934. But at the same time there has been a rapid increase in the proportion of university students from working-class homes. In the academic year 1962–3, working-class entrants accounted for 16 per cent of all places; by 1968, this figure had increased to 20 per cent (Statens Offentliga Utredningar 1971: 148–149).

But if reforms in the educational system have improved the opportunities for working-class children, these have not been as dramatic as the Swedish sample of workers tended to believe. Indeed, there remain important differences in the proportions of children from different social backgrounds that acquire higher educational qualifications. In 1968 it was found in a national sample that even among the youngest age cohort (20–29), the percentage of individuals with fathers in 'Social Group I' and with *at least* the *studentexamen* (taken at the termination of studies in the *gymnasium* and a necessary qualification for entry into institutions of higher education), was more than six times greater than for those individuals from 'Social Group III' homes (Johansson 1971). The complete figures are shown in *Table 13*:

The Social Democratic party has publicized these reforms of the educational system as providing the basis for the development of an open, achievement orientated, and meritocratic society. Consequently these changes have generated a set of beliefs that emphasizes the openness of the class structure and the possibilities of upward mobility for all; provided, that is, that individuals take the opportunities for obtaining the necessary qualifications in the much praised, 'democratized', and 'egalitarian' educational system.<sup>29</sup> But given government policies of this kind, it could be that as aspirations for upward mobility become heightened, so too could feelings of frustration, failure, and resentment when these expectations are not fulfilled. Indeed, these



TABLE 13

*Percentage of individuals with the 'Studentexamen' or other higher educational qualification, according to age and socio-economic background.*

<i>Father's social group</i>	<i>Age of respondents</i>		
	20-29	30-54	55-57
I	45	42	31
II	12	7	3
III	7	2	1
<i>Total</i>	12	6	3

Source: Johansson (1791:92)

attitudes are quite likely to develop in a country like Sweden where there are very restricted patterns of recruitment into the more prestigious and highly rewarded occupations.<sup>30</sup>

Within the context of a Swedish economy which is overwhelmingly privately owned, it is difficult to envisage how recruitment into the more highly rewarded occupations can be democratized without an increase in government intervention. Otherwise, whether or not recruitment into these positions will change must depend upon the personal aptitude of managers and the controllers of private industry, who may be far from committed to the Social Democratic goal of greater social equality.<sup>31</sup> In fact this touches upon one of the major dilemmas confronting any Social Democratic government in a capitalist country: it may be committed to 'meritocratic' and even 'egalitarian' aims, and also to promoting the social and economic interests of its working-class supporters, but it often does so within the context of constraints imposed by the forces of a market economy.<sup>32</sup> Consequently it is questionable whether such objectives can ever be achieved without greater state control over these forces.<sup>33</sup> In Sweden, the Social Democratic pursuit of 'meritocratic' aims has led to various educational reforms and to the development of widespread beliefs in the openness of the class structure. Policies such as these have, so far, retained the allegiance of rank-and-file supporters, but in the long run feelings of resentment could emerge, particularly if the class structure remains as rigid as it is at present.<sup>34</sup>

In Britain, by comparison, 'meritocratic' norms have been less emphasized. Consequently, the class structure is still perceived to be shaped by a number of 'traditional' factors and there is less belief in the possibilities for upward mobility. Therefore it can be argued that



manual workers will have limited aspirations for themselves and their children. As a result, feelings of failure are likely to be less pronounced among these workers and they are likely to perceive their own positions within the class structure as more or less inevitable.<sup>35</sup> But should Britain have a prolonged period of Labour governments, it could be that 'meritocratic' norms might become as widely emphasized as they are in Sweden. Certainly with Labour governments there have been attempts to equalize opportunities by making changes within the educational system.<sup>36</sup>

In conclusion, the foregoing discussion suggests that although workers' images of society may be shaped by their employment and other immediate social experiences, they are also conditioned by a number of wider normative influences. Accordingly, this paper has attempted to show that the English and Swedish respondents held rather different conceptions of their respective class structures because of exposure to different political norms. Of course this is not the only factor and a more comprehensive comparative study would doubtless disclose others. However, the evidence presented above does suggest that actors' conceptions of the class structure are shaped not only by 'objective' patterns of structural relationships but also by interpretations generated by wider social processes. In different industrial societies workers are subjected to relatively similar technological and social constraints. But this does not mean that they will necessarily have similar images of society, if only because they are also members of national, socio-political systems that vary considerably in ideological make-up. Consequently, in any investigation of workers' images of society, whether or not a cross-national comparative study, it is necessary to consider these macro-social factors as well as workers' immediate small-scale milieux.

## *Notes*

1 The data in this paper were collected as part of a comparative study of social stratification in England and Sweden. The research is financed by a grant from the Centre for Environmental Studies, London, and the complete results will be published in a final report.

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2 This evidence is discussed by Lockwood (1966: 252-256).

- 3 However, Bell and Newby (1972) have suggested that in some work and community situations, agricultural workers, although generally in close personal contact with their employers, will adopt 'radical' attitudes.
- 4 See, for example, N. Birnbaum (1969).
- 5 England and Sweden are appropriate for a discussion of this issue because they are both highly industrialized societies with relatively similar occupational structures. Shortage of space prevents a documentation of their respective social structures but this is done in Scase (1972).
- 6 For a study of the relationship between organizational size and workers' attitudes, see G. Ingham (1970).
- 7 At the younger age levels there was often an overlap between the earnings of these two groups. It must also be stated that the differentials discussed here are for the *highest paid* manual workers. Of course, it would have been desirable to have had systematic evidence on the structure of earnings for all occupational and age groups, but the reluctance of management prevented this. Data of this kind, which would have included the earnings of low paid groups as teenage clerks and manual workers, would almost certainly have indicated that there were greater differentials *within* the two factories than those described in this paper. But in the absence of this information it was considered appropriate to describe differentials in terms of the *highest* earnings that members of each occupational category could hope to acquire.
- 8 It was considered that these factors would affect conceptions of social mobility. For a discussion of the relationship between age, stage in the family cycle, and attitudes, see H. Wilensky (1966).  
The factories provided the names, addresses and ages of all manual employees so that the samples could be chosen.
- 9 In fact the two industries from which the factories were chosen were very similar in these respects. They both had low levels of conflict and relatively slow rates of technological innovation, by comparison with other industries.
- 10 Every attempt was made to ensure that the schedule was as similar as possible for both samples, but in a 'sociological' rather than a 'grammatical' sense. This was done by testing the schedule with Swedish sociologists and pilot respondents, in order to use questions that would convey similar meanings to both groups of workers.  
A female Swedish research worker, normally resident in England, conducted the Swedish interviews and most of those in England; I am grateful to Anita Ehn-Scase for her assistance.
- 11 The practice of asking respondents 'poll-type' questions about things such as social class has been criticized on the grounds that 'class' means



very different things to different people. Consequently it is often argued that the resultant responses are of little sociological relevance. In the present enquiry there was an attempt to cope with this problem by asking respondents a number of questions about what they meant by the terms used in the questionnaire, e.g. 'social class', 'promotion', 'inequality', etc. This probably did not completely solve the difficulties relating to respondents' interpretations of questions, but it would be a mistake to assume that their replies disclosed nothing about their conceptions of society. For a note about questions relating to the study of social class see J. Platt (1971); and for some favourable comments see G. Runciman (1966: 152-154).

- 12 Unless otherwise stated, the questions that follow were put to only these respondents.
- 13 These findings are consistent with those of other studies that have investigated this issue in Sweden. For a summary of these, see Scase (1972).
- 14 Indeed, of the twenty-five English respondents giving 'other and non-classifiable' answers, no fewer than 40 per cent (10) mentioned 'ascriptive' factors such as 'he would need to be born into the right family', 'make certain that he had a wealthy father', etc. Among the remaining, considerable importance was attached to 'luck' and 'chance'; they mentioned the need to 'win the pools', 'have a good bet', 'be left a fortune', and so on.
- 15 This question was put to all respondents and not merely to those who recognized the existence of social classes.
- 16 Industrialization and urbanization, for example, have been much more recent in Sweden. This, of course, has affected the structure of communities and possibly the development – or, rather, lack of – occupational sub-cultures.
- 17 This question was put after respondents had defined exactly what they meant by 'promotion'.
- 18 By contrast, the English workers held a more favourable opinion of their chances compared with those of white-collar workers; 34 per cent stated they were either 'worse' or 'much worse', but as many as 29 per cent suggested they were 'better' or 'much better'. There were a number of questions on the schedule which invited respondents to make comparisons between themselves and other occupational groups in society. For a discussion of these, see Scase (1974).
- 19 Indeed, the discrepancy between the Swedish respondents' conceptions of promotion in the factory and of mobility in society was such that it indicated the adoption of very different frames of reference in their consideration of these issues. They appeared to make a clear distinction between 'industry' and 'society' as institutional and normative systems. R. Darhendorf (1967) has argued this to be a feature of 'post-capitalist' societies.



- 20 R. Erikson (1971). The study was based on a random sample of individuals between the ages of fifteen and seventy-five years, drawn from the total Swedish population.
- 21 For a review of some of these studies, see Scase (1972).
- 22 For data on business directors, see G. Copeman (1955); for higher civil servants, R. Kelsall (1955); for university teachers, A. A. Halsey and M. Trow (1971); and for politicians, W. Guttsman (1963).
- 23 For a summary of economic and political developments in Sweden, see R. Tomasson (1970).
- 24 In the 1964 general election, for example, the Social Democratic party received approximately 75 per cent of the votes of industrial manual workers and about 45 per cent of those of 'routine' white-collar employees. See, Swedish Official Statistics (1965: 95).
- 25 According to almost all measures of material living standards – quality of housing, ownership of cars, telephones, television sets, deep freezers, and so on, as well as for such things as life expectancy and infant mortality – Sweden invariably appears in the international 'top three'. For a discussion of these achievements, see Tomasson (1970).
- 26 See Scase (1972).
- 27 In the 1970 General Election, the Social Democratic party adopted 'Increased Equality – For a More Just Society' as its election manifesto. This was supported by many other slogans with a similar theme which were financed by specific labour unions and the Trade Union Confederation.
- 28 For a summary of these reforms, see Härnqvist and Bengtsson (forthcoming). There is also a useful review in Tomasson (1970).
- 29 The Swedish mass media gives considerable emphasis to the opportunities available to individuals for obtaining educational qualifications that can be used for career advancement. In addition to their own courses, the radio and television services of the Swedish Broadcasting Corporation devote peak time to publicizing the various vocational and academic courses that are provided throughout the country. The Trade Union Confederation is also very active in this work: the Workers Educational Movement, for example, is an integral part of the trade-union movement and in 1970 it controlled 40 per cent of all adult education, providing courses for about one in ten of all adult Swedes. Some of these courses award *credits* which can then be taken into account for the purposes of obtaining university degrees. The Trade Union Confederation is currently negotiating with employers and the government about the possibilities of workers having time off from employment in order to study and obtain education qualifications. Furthermore, the government, over recent years, has conducted a massive advertising campaign in newspapers explaining the new opportunities that have been brought about by various reforms in the educational system.

It is interesting to speculate what proportion of English workers are aware of the opportunities provided by, say, the Open University. It is probably small; not surprisingly, in view of the extremely limited publicity given to it by those sectors of the mass media with which most manual workers have direct contact.

- 30 Government policies explicitly geared to narrowing economic differentials between occupational groups appear to have been conducive to generating heightened feelings of relative deprivation among Swedish manual workers. See Scase (1974).
- 31 As Carlsson (1958: 126) has suggested, 'It might . . . be argued that the more general prevalence of higher education will make . . . employers more prone to take other things into consideration'.
- 32 This and many other problems that confront Social Democratic governments in capitalist countries are discussed by Parkin (1971).
- 33 There are signs that the Social Democratic government is increasingly prepared to pursue policies in this direction, possibly as a consequence of frustrated attempts to narrow economic differentials within the context of a privately owned economy. For example, it has recently been proposed that the State Pension Fund should be used to purchase stocks and shares and, ultimately, control in commerce and industry. A commission would be set up to oversee investments and it would consist of eleven members: five from trade unions, two from companies, two from local authorities, and a chairman and vice-chairman appointed by the government. By 1978 the State Pension Fund will have assets greater than those of all the Swedish banks and credit institutions combined.
- 34 In terms of economic differentials, this seems to have occurred already. See Scase (1974). If this resentment were also to develop in attitudes towards 'opportunities', then the allegiance of rank-and-file supporters to the Social Democratic party could become extremely problematic. The Social Democrats have always presented themselves as the party of social reform, social justice, and equality; it is in terms of these factors that they have asked to be judged at general elections.
- 35 A selective educational system is likely to enforce these attitudes. One of the main socializing effects of the secondary modern school is that it lowers the ambitions of pupils to accord with opportunities in the labour market. See, for example, M. Wilson (1953). Conversely, a non-streamed, non-selective educational system of the Swedish type is unlikely to lower the occupational expectations of working-class youth.
- 36 Changes, that is, towards comprehensive education. However, most of the schemes approved by the 1964-70 labour government included selective elements and they were generally far less egalitarian than the Swedish educational reforms.



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