

T H E S E S O N T I M E

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SUMMARY:

The concept of time is in some essential and non-trivial way tied up with the issue of "structure". But while there is reason discouraging us from saying that time itself is a structured specificity, (in the manner let's say of McTaggart), nevertheless in some way its meaning consists as a linguistic/conceptual substitute for the idea of structuration of non-temporal determinations.

Philosophically, we are better off not saying that time possesses "ontical being" - (to borrow a term from Heidegger) - ie. that time itself is a set of facts to be found "in the world". Yet, at the same time we cannot say that time does not exist. What then might the correct manner be so that we can both account for its meaningful descriptions and steer clear of contradictions?

So, too, we must say that time is not (simply) an ontological commitment. If we did, we would have to decide on a privileged starting-point, a set of most fundamental claims about the world which would serve as the grounds from which time is to be inferred. But if different choices would lead to different interpretations of time, on what basis should we account for an independent ontological status for time? In this way time remains bound thematically and is made an inexplicable horizon of whatever structures are assumed to constitute the world.

Rather, we must philosophically assert that time meta-logically pre-dates and indeed grounds these logical functions of construing the world as either "factual" or "factical". This, time can do because it is what we might call an "onto-constitutive" function.

In addition to the attempt to metaphysically clarify the manner of being of time, I have made specific proposals on and have suggested analyses of the multiple and varying ways that temporal determinations are articulated as modalities. This I let for the reader of the thesis to tackle if he so wishes. I must, however, mention one additional methodological implication so that this very sketchy synopsis of the argument can be rounded off.

What we might call the inter-translatability thesis asserts that in some non-trivial way the structuration of any perspective on reality, in all its relativity, is paralleled by the syntactical behaviour of time. This position if defensible, can serve as a powerful philosophical clue. A cross-interpretation of temporal structures and of sets of non-temporal specificities opens up new possibilities for "hermeneutical metaphysics". A case in point would be the possibilities for a systematic discussion of individuality. It is my contention that an exhaustive ontological interpretation of individuality need be thought of as an attempt at accounting for the possibilities of "individuation", (which I try to show is one function of temporal syntaxis), in varying discursive contexts rather than as a putting forth of a predeterminate view of individuality.

Preface

This preface is meant as a statement of intent.

The choice of the issue of temporality as my subject for a doctoral thesis and as a programmatic initial skirmish in an area that will probably occupy me for a long time to come attempts to realize two, in effect, philosophical intentions. It is a fleshing out of the desire to give this analysis of the problematics of time as paradigmatic of an approach that hopes to transcend the existing state of philosophy to which the prevalent traditions of recent philosophical reflection have brought us. But at the same time, the problematic of time is put forward for your consideration accompanied by the claim that the issues which are raised are somehow foundational.

These two poles of attraction have created the stir which might be called the inspiration for this text.

There might only be one excuse I can plead for the excessiveness of my claims and that is that the nature of the case is such that what I have called inspiration consistently refused to accept the status of a more or less "good idea", thus ridding itself of the suggestion that it inescapably assumes for itself tragic dimensions. To cope with this it even occurred to me to thematize tragicity itself--after all time is an integral dimension of that state of affairs--but I felt this would have taken us too far in too rushed a way.

Chapter 1

THE ISSUE OF THE CORRECT STARTING POINT

Section 1.1 Beginning with 'factuality'

Thesis 1.1.1. The issue of thematization

The issue of time is the problem of how to thematise time.

What are the obstacles which stand in the way?

In the first instance, it consistently appears problematic to disentangle time thematically from other logical contents. Time resists thematization in that it is difficult to show time as 'something-in-itself'. This is the first problem, namely, how to ascribe a substantial nature to time which is independent of, rather than dependent on, other non-temporal concepts.

But there is another problem: time's thematization must be integral. Proposing a definition would not do -- a definition restricts the applicability of a concept. In this thematization, no expression which implicates time or temporality must be left unbound. It would be as if time were thought of as a limited locality. If, however, the boundary itself and what lies on the other side are also in some way temporal then we could not plausibly claim that time has been thematically grasped in an exhaustive and integral way.

These are more than surface problems. Perhaps they are the fundamental difficulties which have made the problem-

atics of time the most unapproachable and neglected. As J. Derrida admits: "In a certain sense it is already too late to pose the question of time, since it has already appeared."¹ This general issue can be called the issue of a systematic view of time.

Thesis 1.1.2. Time as a part of the world and time as an
aspect of the world

Traditionally there appear to have arisen two general positions regarding the 'ontological status' of time: firstly, there is the conception of time as a part of the world and, secondly, the conception of time as an aspect of the world.

The best way to characterise the conception of time as a part of the world would be, perhaps, to call it a view of "time as a ———". The second conception can be called the view of time as always "a time of——".

Both these views can be critiqued from the point of view of the philosophical problems that they raise yet fail to answer. Nevertheless, what is of more interest to me is that these two initial ways of taking up the issue of time present a problem of how to proceed -- how to proceed to a successful thematization of time and subsequently to an analysis of time's structures.

Thesis 1.1.3 The 'factuality' of time

If time is taken "as a ————" not only is it presupposed that the constitution of the world-picture itself is independent of the 'onto-logical' structuring function of time but we cannot, also, avoid posing time as in time. If time itself is factual, if in other words there are facts of time itself, these facts must be functions of another time by reference to which we can determine the non-simultaneity of their truth function values. To repeat, by making time a member of a greater class, namely, that of "existents," we are assuming that the concept of 'an existent' does not implicate a temporal determination. Especially if these "existents" are construed as "factual existents" then time along with the rest of the members of this class must exist in as well as through time.

But also, and perhaps more significantly, if we take time as a concrete "something" we thematically restrict time by necessity. But as it would appear from the force of the conclusion, toward which I have already oriented, namely, that all structured specificities assume a temporal arrangement of their parts, time must be thematised as in some sense the issue of thematization itself. The possibility must be left open for grasping time as a variable function in the constitution of any world-picture.

McTaggart² is one example of the approach discussed above. Time is, for him, a perplexing but proper subject-matter of ontology. Time is posited as a structure of specificities (a series of positions and a set of determinate relations) and then it is examined philosophically as a possible existent. Thus it is treated in some way as an object or an entity; it is objectified. McTaggart easily imagines the world as complete in its remaining determinations and characterizations. McTaggart unwittingly concludes that time cannot be a member of the class of "existents." He, however, phrases this conclusion differently: he says "time does not exist" whereas he should have simply said that time is not a member of this class.

Time is not a member of the class of "existents" not because there is no time but because time does not have "ontical being," if we are allowed to borrow a phrase.³ Rather, time's substantiality is thematic.

Thesis 1.1.4 The 'factuality' of particular processes

If we take time or temporality as the rhythm and unity of the internal, factual differentiation of particular processes, we are again faced with a problem of how to proceed.

This belongs to the conception of time as always "a time of ———." The temporality of particular processes is the time which is encompassed by the beginning and completion points of these processes.

This conception arrests two moments; there is, first of all, the idea of time as supplementable, secondly, the idea that time is totalizable, in other words, that it can be-- and it is-- given as a totality. Thus there is a dialectical nature that arises for it--it appears both as what is encompassed and what encompasses, as what contains and is contained.

The idea that time is encompassed temporality is present in Heidegger, who characterizes the mode of temporality of human life as the in-between⁴ extension between birth and death. This in-between, of course, does not simply denote a "spatial" in-between but also captures a temporal "in the meantime"-- the moments after one's birth and before one's death are always the ones, indeed the only ones, that have

a truly temporal character. Heidegger, thus, does not simply speak about the in-between but also about the "temporalization of temporality"⁵ as if he would recognize any abstract "encompassing" by beginning and end boundaries (of processes) as temporal but wanting at the same time to ascribe to human consciousness a doubly "thick" temporal constitution by means of the dimension of the urgent.

This idea of encompassed temporality is discoverable also in Wittgenstein in whose writings we find in addition something else which is of interest. "Our life has no end just like our visual field has no limits."⁶ To the question "Can I experience my own death?" the answer is negative. "Death is not an event in life, we do not live to experience death."⁷ "So at death the world does not alter but comes to an end."⁸ I can, in other words, have an experience at my last moment but not of my last moment as an end. Thus, consciousness does not project its own limits (differently than Heidegger) and remains of necessity an irreducible eternality.⁹ It is drawn towards the boundaries of its being, however. But a boundary is a discontinuity between two continuities. Thus, time transcends and encompasses life.

Here we have another witness to the thematic dispensation of time and the inability to thematize it exhaustively by

means of any concept of in-between. Furthermore, time's coincidence with structures (such as processes) makes time a horizon (or a transcription) of these which is not directly explicable and does not possess an **independent** determination.

Section 1.2 Is time given in experience?

Thesis 1.2.1 Time is not directly perceptible

An interesting story is told about a discussion between the philosopher McTaggart and his colleague, G.E. Moore. McTaggart argued that the statement "time exists" cannot be plausibly defended to which Moore wittily responded, "do you mean to say that I didn't have my breakfast after I got up this morning?"

Moore seems to suggest: whatever the metaphysicians might say, time is unproblematically part of experience--it is an empirical given.

But is it? What does Moore take as the empirical grounds which prove time's existence beyond all reasonable doubt? Are these the same grounds as those on which we establish the existence of other sorts of things? We might claim to know that someone has two hands because we directly perceive him and his two hands attached to the rest of his body.¹⁰ But is time ever directly perceived? What Moore perceived, in this case, was two individual events ("getting up" and "having breakfast") and a relation between them.

Thesis 1.2.2 Specific relations are not factual
instances of time

Empiricism as the doctrine of the philosophical primacy of external relations is from the start rendered, by its choice of a starting point, incapable of arriving at a view of time as an integral totality. Even if we were to accept the idea of time as a concrete empirical entity, in other words a process, how can we infer a set of internal relations constituting time from any number of external, and thus contingent, relations between specific events A and B?

The quality which time possesses and which is given to experience is supposedly "non-simultaneity."¹¹ But if we ask "what is non-simultaneous?" of "what is before and what is after?" the answer is not "the parts of time" but "events A and B." Similarly, if we ask "what endures in duration?" the answer is usually "process x" or "individual x" and again never "the parts of time."

This fact of time's elusive nature should be ample evidence that the attempt to thematize time on the basis of experiential qualities is destined to fail. We have, at the beginning of this chapter, posed the issue of the thematization of time as the problem of showing time to have an independent thematic substantiality. This precondition

remains unfulfilled. Eventhough time was posed as a set of facts (as an empirical entity), it proved impossible to discover any facts about time itself.

Thesis 1.2.3 The thematization of time is dependent and restricted if we make time a locality

If it is the parts of time that are held together in a relation r of non-simultaneity, then what would be held together in a relation s of simultaneity? Is it again the parts of time? If so, there must be more than one part of time to one part of time since in relation r we assumed that at t' time had one part which was related to the one part of time at t".

"Precisely," some philosophers¹² would say, "there are as many parts of time as there are points to space." (In what sense then time can still be "a dimension" is unclear.) This is the possibility of time being local. But again we have a thematization problem because if time is simply a function of space, time cannot be thematized independently of space. Time grounds the numerical differentiating function of space, but time is not itself a function of differentiation. As we saw in the first paragraph, it remains indeterminate as to exactly how many parts there are to time since the co-existence of the one and the many is not impossible. If, for example, we simply enumerate a number of events, we cannot in an a priori way determine if they can or cannot be simultaneous unless a locality is also implicated. If two events make a claim about a single exclusive locality, then they must be temporally removed.

If they do not make a claim about a single exclusive locality, their 'temporal comparability' remains indeterminate. Furthermore, if time could, all by itself, function as a differentiating principle, we would again have a problem, this time of leaving out a certain extent of time's logical functionality. Just as effectively as time differentiates and discriminates, time integrates. While the before-after relation holds two discrete events at a distance between them, the temporal relation of opportunity integrates a number of eventualities into what we call a state of affairs or a situation, the relation of whose members is supplementation, or complementation and not differentiation.

Thesis 1.2.4 "All existence is temporal" is an analytic and
a synthetic a priori statement

That all existence is temporal is an analytic truth-- and yet not a tautology. Thus while it is analytic, it also appears to be synthetic, if we are to accept these categories. As far as this is concerned, there is an ambiguity which remains unresolved in Kant. As a form of intuition, time is in some way part of what is experienced. But time is also a synthesizing function of the imagination and is thus purely formal. In addition, in the schematism¹³ time is transcendently determined which makes time neither a form nor a synthesizing function, but a manner of logically transcribing the proper reference of a schema. The concept of time-in-general must be given a content.

The content of the concept of time-in-general cannot be the generalization of any specific relation, e.g., the before-after relation. The unity of the manifold is more than an arrangement of representations even if the latter, too, is considered as necessary. Any specific time-relation is a relation between certain members of the class of all entities which are temporally related and not others. Obviously, a relation between some members of a class cannot also be the set-constitutive relation as well.

Temporal concepts are thus resistant to being taken as

factual instances of time not only because they are other-referring, but also because there are definite restrictions on their generalization. The manner of being a generality of time is not a simple extension of its manner of being empirical.

Section 1.5 Starting with some fundamentally
Priviledged logical specificity

Thesis 1.3.1 A gesture-hypothesis and the thematization
of time

It can be argued, plausibly I believe, that most if not all of what has been said about time by philosophers could be conveniently illustrated and summarized integrally into a single gesture. Let us call this gesture H.

With your right hand clutched into a fist, bring it through the air to clash with your left hand's open palm which has meanwhile been travelling at a similar speed in the opposite direction.

H does not gesture time but a collision. Time must be inferred from H as a statement about the world.

Collisions may well have been the conscious or unconscious models adopted from which conclusions about time's nature and structure have been drawn.

Thesis 1.3.2 Time is the ontological grounds of 'factuality'
and 'facticity'

The interpretation of a logical specificity as a 'factuality' is defined for the purposes of this thesis as the construing of the way of being of an entity in such a way that all its true descriptions are taken as simultaneous. (Simultaneity here is basically a logical rather than a temporal concept.) Thus, the interpretation of a logical specificity as a factuality supports also the conclusion that the number of all its verifiable descriptions exceeds the number of those which together are true in any one instance.

The interpretation of a logical specificity as a facticity is defined, always in the context of this argument, as the construing of the being of an entity or a process as a generality, e.g., as a member of a class of similar entities.

If a number of descriptions of the same entity share a co-possibility which is constrained by the structure of a specific-our-world, then the interpretation of the being of this entity is considered as the construing of factuality. If the co-possibility of the different descriptions survives in all possible worlds, then the interpretation is considered as the construing of the being of an entity

as identical to the way this entity is given.

(The importance of this manner of defining these concepts lies in the fact that philosophical priority is given to descriptions and their mutuality. The common logical space which they share and which relates them opens up the possibility--as will be seen more explicitly later--for the co-interpretation of temporality and onto-constitutive functions.)

What is of most interest here, however, is possible starting-points. In section 1.1 we examined the possibility for time to be factual and the possibility of starting with the factuality of specific processes. In section 1.2 we looked at the possibility of taking certain experiential givens as the grounds on which the facticity of time is construed. Now we must examine one more possibility, namely, whether we can arrive at time's unique structures by starting with the facticity of some logical specificity considered as somehow fundamentally privileged.

Our position is that time is neither factual nor factical and also that we cannot start with the facticity or factuality of some logical specificities and infer time because time itself is the grounds of facticity and factuality as should be readily apparent from the definitions

given above. The interpretations of factuality and facticity presuppose the concept of co-possibility. At a certain level, as we have said, co-possibility binds only a formal tautochrony, but logical co-possibility is subsequently interpreted as a temporal co-possibility because in both cases it is a co-possibility in the context of a world, of ours or of a possible one.

Thesis 1.3.3 The facticity of events

As a first possibility,¹⁴ on the basis of gesture H, time can be construed as the idea of coherence of spatial idiom or as a definite ontological commitment unavoidable in a formulation of the efficacy and restrictiveness of natural laws. This manner of reasoning moves between and encompasses two conceptual poles or moments, 'actuality' and 'impossibility.' Time as the formal condition of events, physical events usually, (e.g., collisions) is a conception of this sort. If a point of space could be occupied by two different masses at the same time, collisions would not take place. By the same token, unless the objectivity of space is assumed, movements and collision-events would not take place. The objectivity of space, however, commits us to the objectivity of time, this group of philosophers point out. A "being-at" as an event is also a "being-when." As every point in a spatial continuum must be assumed to be related in a single manner to every other if movement is to have a univocally objective direction, similarly the time of every event must be connected to that of others as together constituting a single dimension.

In gesture H the element of locality more appropriately than any other, it is held, appears to have two objective aspects, a spatial and a temporal. Both as a distance covered and as a necessary condition of any event it is a space-time continuum.

All that can be shown, however, is that "assuming a certain place...", "relating to adjacent objects..." "being observable"--as events-- have a temporal dimension. Events have a temporal aspect. But is an unimplicated or unattended to point of space itself an event? A point of space as an abstraction is neither existent nor non-existent unless a certain event--even that of being called "the point at"--integrates it into the realm of being by inducing to it a relevance to itself.

Thesis 1.3.4 The facticity of processes

The second idea could be termed the view that time is the totalizing aspect of the dynamic self-sufficiency of systems or the ontological commitment unavoidable in the assertion of the inherence of structural dynamism.¹⁵

This group would not look to locality in gesture H for a likely thematizing agent of time, but would instead look to the movement as a whole, i.e., as a self-contained process. These philosophers would argue that unless there were (a) an irreversible direction to the change that is taking place understood not simply as a linearity but as a cumulative effect, and (b) a marking out of the completing-totalizing effect of the movement by means of points given by it and reference to which enables descriptions of processes as unitary, time would not be a concept that had any use at all.

Time for these thinkers is the asymmetry of the cumulative effect between points A and B. If the right hand travels at x cm/sec in the opposite direction of the movement of the left hand which is travelling at y cm/sec then at time t' the distance between them cannot be equal to the distance at time t'' unless time were cyclic and/or the process repeated itself. (In addition, a series of causally related events cannot be reversed.)

If the points marking the seriality of time as well as its direction are "dictated" by the processes themselves, then two additional conclusions can be supported: firstly, it can be consistently advocated that time is divisible and, in principle, in more than one way according to the unique factual arrangement of the primary points of reference in the different processes, and, secondly, it can justifiably claim that the time of qualitatively different processes is constituted differently as one of so many distinguishable temporalities.

Thesis 1.3.5 Time as the idea of a contact

The third position construes time as the idea of a contact, the ontological juxtaposition, as it were, of entities.

Depending on how the being of discrete entities is taken and defined, a different possibility of providing an exegesis of gesture H comes into **its** own accordingly. Contact here, of course, does not mean the same as collision. Contact as a temporal relation is a constant, unchanging relation which grounds the describability of change. The describability of change assumes that there is a structure to this contact. The task of philosophical reflection would be, according to this formulation, the determination of time as a theoretical entity which facilitates this describability.

In terms of gesture H there are two such possibilities, both of which depend on the assumption that time is the formal condition of anything contained in gesture H having a description.

Thesis 1.3.6 The facticity of facts

The first of these two views construes time as the formal condition of the truth or falsity of anything said in reference to the gesture. No assertion (of fact) which does not have a time reference can either be true or false. To say that the two hands are 30 cm apart is true at time t' and not true at time t". Time is thus the condition of the asymmetry between the truth and falsity of empirical propositions.

The first view we looked at in this section took events as the foundation of its conception and distinguished between actual and impossible events. The conception we are examining now utilizes a conceptual distinction and yet an interdependence between the notions of 'event' and 'fact.' A fact as a state of being given, is the assertion of an event and as an utterance it is itself an event. But of course a fact is an assertion about more than one event. There are positive and negative facts, both of which embody a determinate referent which might be an actual or a non-actual event. 'Fact-uality' does not determine the impossibility or actuality of events, but rather it differentiates this actuality into a past, present or a future eventuality. (And this because by necessity it embodies a temporal reference according to the formal truth, "x is real if and only if x is temporally determinate.")

Time is the contact between an agent who asserts a fact and the reality of which this fact is a part. But since the contact of the agent need not be a simultaneity with the event but simply a simultaneity with the truth of its assertion, time appears, on the basis of this manner of reasoning, as a progressive extensionality. Its progression is given in the asymmetry between the truth and falsity of the same two assertions when they are not uttered simultaneously and its extensionality by the possibility of true but divergent time reference.

Thesis 1.3.7 Time as presence and absence

The second view which exploits this idea of time as contact argues that time is not simply the condition of an assertion's being true or false but, more significantly, it is the condition of it being sayable. Before a proposition can be examined as to whether it is true or false, it must have a meaning. Meaning, especially adverbial meaning, is taken as achievable by means of schemata of contrastive signification. To use the adverbs "formerly," "not yet," etc., is to utilize schemata of contrastive reference like "here--not here," "this--not this" which have no meaning unless a finite observer is assumed to be in the picture either standing and watching or himself mobile with the "flow" of things.

For these thinkers, the meaning of the world of experience is a meaning which is constituted by a perspectival consciousness. The categories of presence and absence, for example, are supplementary manners of organizing experience for a finite perspective. For the past is the past in the present; in the past it was not a past but itself a present. It is present as absence, its meaning is constituted differently but interrelatedly with the meaning of presence.

Therefore the meaning of time is, for these thinkers,¹⁶ given as the meaning of the entity for which time has a meaning. While time is pre-givenly the contact between this entity and the world, time has no meaning other than what it is given it by the specific manner, the mode of existence, of this entity in the world. Time like all other phenomena is constituted as meaning. As constituted meaning it, when analysed ontologically,¹⁷ reveals its dependence on the constitutive function of human subjectivity.

Yet time is not a process or a phenomenon taking place in the world, but the very possibility and structure of subjectivity's contact with the world it inhabits.¹⁸

Thesis 1.3.8 General critical comments

There are four main problems built into these approaches to the issue of the thematization of time:

(a) Concepts of logical specificities depend on time for their determinateness, whereas time does not depend on them for its determinateness.

(b) If time is explicable in terms of a privileged concept, then time is thematically dependent on the content of that concept.

(c) If time is dependent on the content of a concept of a logical specificity, then time is restricted by the extensionality of that concept.

(d) We have a problem of which specificity to choose as the most fundamental. Starting with the facticity of a certain logical entity, we have done so at the expense of other logical entities which could have just as easily be chosen and which might have given us a different picture of time's structures.

Thesis 1.3.9 The determination of structure and the independent determinateness of time

That "time is implicated with structure" which is a true observation does not lead to the conclusion that time is dependent on structure for its determination. For one thing, time, as it should be apparent, is implicated with all structures. What we must say is that time is the condition of structure and not that it arises out of a certain structure.

What an analysis of "time and space" should show is not that time depends on space for its determinateness (this it cannot do), but that space cannot be constituted by means of the concept of "dimensionality" without implicating the concept of time.

In the case of space and time, in particular, the constitution of a dimensionality is abstract. Obviously, it could not in turn be construed as the determination of time. This becomes apparent in taking the facticity of events as the structure the world is but being unable at the same time to show time as anything more than a formal necessity.¹⁹ The time of the space-time conception is not time at all but a function (an abstraction) of the concept of time.

Thesis 1.3.10 "Consciousness is time" but not "time is
consciousness"

Thus, by the same token, we agree with the philosophical proposition "consciousness is time."²⁰ But we cannot agree with the statement "time is consciousness." Time is more than consciousness in that time is logically instantiated in a way which transcends consciousness. It is thematically broader and its structures do not coincide with those of consciousness. This latter does not mean that there are any supra-intelligible temporal relations not grasped by consciousness but that time's substantiality is not "noumenality" and that time's structure is not simply analysable by means of the categories that consciousness employs in interpreting itself in a particular way.

In Heidegger 'factuality' is the way of being of Dasein.²¹ The way of being of Dasein is its facticity. The facticity of Dasein is finitude and transcendence. Finitude and transcendence can be shown to give us duration. But this has two results: firstly, for Dasein factuality and facticity are made equivalent,²² a fact which while being an instance of interpretation denies the general possibility of interpretation since the facticity of human consciousness can be interpreted by human consciousness in other than, and not simply in, factual terms, as in the case of Dasein

interpreting itself as an incarnation of a deity and thus as eternal. Secondly, time is thematically restricted to factuality and interpreted by means of the concept of duration and thus runs the danger of being objectified.

Thesis 1.3.11 Is duration intrinsic to time?

What then could duration be if it is not an intrinsic quality of time?²³

We have already spoken of the Existentialist interpretation of factuality by means of the categories of finitude and transcendence; this interpretation takes the mode of conscious human being-in-the-world as the integration of its having been already, of its continual endurance and of its anticipation of a future inauthentically hoping and planning and authentically in resolution towards becoming a whole in death. Its finitude is partly given in the structure of ek-stasis;²⁴ simultaneously being tied to a present (which is after birth and before death) and its transcendence in that it is with birth and death as "having been born" and as inescapably towards death.

But equally basic to it is the interpretation of birth and death as the boundaries (ends) of human existence. Entities for which endurance is not an issue cannot have intrinsic temporal dimensions construed by means of the categories of urgency: "being," "being no more as," "being not yet" and "not being at all." As an entity which is both spread out and unified, it gives to itself as duration the things in the world which it parallels by means of its own temporal-existential extensionality

regardless of whether these are standing or moving.

"Within things themselves, the future and the past are in a kind of eternal state of pre-existence and survival; the water which will flow by tomorrow is at this moment at its source, the water which has just passed is now a little further downstream in the valley.... The objective world is too much of a plenum for there to be time."²⁵

Heidegger's expression "temporalization of temporality" is to a similar effect.²⁶

Duration is an overlapping of the structures of perception and those of the entities in the "objective world."

Thesis 1.3.12 Metaphysics and the issue of determinateness

It should be abundantly clear that we do not object to the explication of determinate specificities by means of the concept of time. This we support fully, indeed we hold it to be, if it does its work while keeping the generality/universality of this fact as a basic doctrine, the hope of a new metaphysics, if it can still be called that. It will be new in that, differently than the history of metaphysics, it will not start by assuming an already determinate world of given specificities but will raise the issue of determinateness as the most fundamental one.

The above conclusion is the reverse side of our objection to the attempt to start with an idea of a determinate world and infer the structures of time on the basis of a construing of facticities.

This obviously would fail to meet our two criteria of an independent and integral thematization of time.

But now there is another point that must be introduced. The issue of determinateness cannot itself become the central issue unless, firstly, the possibilities of time's variable structuring functions are delineated in a sufficiently clear and systematic manner.

Chapter 2 EXCURSUS

Section 2.1 A set of new models

Excursus: A set of new models; Gesture 1

The left hand (operator A) moves in a straight line from right to left and then from left to right with a certain speed s' covering a distance of about 40 cm from the middle of the chest sideways. The right hand (operator B) outlines a circle in the air by a movement at speed s'' .

The movements of the two operators can be altered in a number of ways. Either operator A or operator B may stand still while the other continues in its path. The speed of the two operators may be the same or different. In addition, the speed of each operator may vary during the gesture. It is also possible to alter the pattern outlined by each operator and still have the same gesture as long as the patterns remain independent of each other.

Attending to this gesture is accomplished thus: one looks at operator A and then operator B and then operator A again and so forth. One discovers in due course what each operator is doing. Subsequently, one checks with each operator to see if any change has been made.

Gesture 2

Operators A and B stand at a certain distance, say 20 cm apart, but facing each other, palms open.

Gesture 2 can also be altered within certain limits while remaining the "same" gesture. Operators A and B make a certain movement toward each other, as for example in the case of illustrating a narrowing or an attraction.

As a gesture, 2 contrasts with the previous one. It embodies this difference: operators A and B are totally inter-dependent. A and B constitute a bi-polarity by means of this dependence. Yet strictly speaking, they do not form a self-sufficient pattern which functions independently of a speech context.

In seeing this gesture and attending to what it says, a person watching looks at the "distance" between the two operators and not at the operators themselves. The substance, as it were, of the gesture is the "in-between" formed by the two operators.

Gesture 3

Operators A and B start from a position of a vertical distance of, say, an inch. The operator at the bottom moves to a position of an inch above the other operator, then the other one takes the top position, etc. Progressively the two operators climb up each other leaving behind them a series of positions which they have occupied and which form a pattern.

Gesture 3 is different than gesture 1 in the way that it is similar to gesture 2 and different than gesture 2 in the way it is similar to gesture 1. Like in 2, the function of each operator is dependent on that of the other but like in gesture 1 the pattern formed need not be other-referring. There is a change of positions (movements of the operators) and in following this change the observer is caught up in the emergence of the pattern.

In attending to this gesture, one is active and even utilizes an illusion. While the two operators are never both standing at the same time but the one sets off before the other comes to a complete rest, we think of them as if their "positions" are at any moment comparable.

Watching this movement consists of remembering where the operators came from just now, and perhaps a minute ago,

and predicting where they are, and will be, going a moment from now. In grasping an emerging complex pattern as a linearity, we upset the static nature of our visual field. A peculiar kind of opening to time is required since what is given us in perception transcends an otherwise "primary" present.

Gesture 4

Operators A and B are involved in a common project--they press somebody's nose.

Gesture 4, the least dramatic of the set, is philosophically the most interesting.

Operators A and B are doing the same thing, but while they are not doing it to each other²⁷ they are neither doing it independently of each other; two fingers pressing a nose are not the same thing as one thing pressing a nose.

Similarly with gesture 1, the two operators are in this gesture individuated definitively. Similarly to gesture 2 they do not form a pattern but are other referring. Yet this other reference is not simply a speech situation. Similarly to gesture 3, all the relevant facts transcend what is given at any one time. But differently than in gesture 3 what we are after, in order to grasp the full extent of their mutuality, is an additional dimension of interaction which also provides criteria of relevant description and which needs to be discovered rather than simply but on-goingly reconstructed.

One grasps what A and B are doing by means of a description of what they are doing. If the result of their action were

visible, in other words if the nose was transparent, the on-looker would be attending to it rather than to the operators. But the result might be invisible in more than one way--contingently there might be something standing in the way or it might be invisible in principle.

Section 2.2 General comments

Thesis 2.2.1 The general grounds for the distinction
between temporal and specific relation

Particular relations between entities are in time. What must be thematically arrested, however, are those relations which are time.

The general grounds on which a distinction is made between a temporal relation and a specific relation is this: There is an infinite number of specific relations. All these "relations of concreteness" have a temporal aspect to them. Yet temporal relations are of a few kind.

Thesis 2.2.2 Fulfilling the criteria

Our criteria of adequacy in chapter one for theories of time were two: the first one was that the thematic of time must be independent of the thematic of other logical specificities, and the second that the thematization of time should be exhaustive.

The new set of models fulfils these two criteria in this way: the distinction between a temporal relation and specific relations is respected, indeed it is grounded, by our new set of models. Time is held to be not an inference (like in gesture H) from the elements of the gesture but, in fact, one of the empiricities of it in each case. In addition, the set of these models is or can potentially be exhaustive of the possibilities of identifying mutuality-relations between the operators which are qualitatively different. The possibilities of identifying mutuality-relations which are qualitatively distinct are in principle limited.

In gesture 1-4, the temporal relation is the constant mutuality-relation between the operators given as a description which remains true from the beginning of it to the end and which would have also been so if the gesture had continued indefinitely. The specific relations embodied in these gestures are the totality of relations which bind all that is contained in these and which are

not only affected by the duration of the gesture but which are in other ways also contingently dependent.

In gesture 1, for example, any part of cycle L or R of operators A or B is comparable to any other in terms of the specific relation of before-after. But as a relation between cycles or portions of them forming part of a larger set of these, it is different than the constant relation between the operators since these two form a totality by themselves.

Chapter 3

THE ANALYSIS OF TEMPORAL RELATIONS
OR THE METAPHYSICS OF TIME

Section 3.1 General comments

Thesis 3.1.1 Treating time as a determination

Time can be treated as a sort of extentionality (see chapter 4), not an ontic, factual extensionality of course, but a modal extensionality. But time can and must at the first instance be looked at as a qualitative determination of specific relations. In terms of gestures 1-4, this means two things: (a) that we must explicate the **qualitative** differences between the temporal relations embodied in the four gestures, and (b) examine how the generic description of the temporal relation corresponds in each case with a differently constituted set of specific relations, which sets are, in fact, employed in our everyday comprehension of the world.

Thesis 3.1.2 There are two ways of describing the mutuality-
relation in each gesture

We will later argue (in chapter 4) for what we will call the translatability thesis. This is the idea that sets of relations and representative relations of these sets are translatable into temporal terms and at the same time any temporal concept is given as a relational term. This dialectic between "temporality" and "relationality" we do not take as a weakness but as indicative of the two facts essential to a correct and fruitful theory of time, namely, first that time possesses a trans-substantiality nature given as the other-reference of time, and second that the conceptual linkage between time and any other concept of a logical specificity (which will determine what sort of content we will ascribe to time) must be established as a link between time and another concept whose generality matches that of time.

Thus, again running ahead of ourselves, in gesture 1 the mutuality-relation can be given both in terms of relationality as a relation between factualities and in terms of temporality by means of the notion of 'tautochrony' or whatever else we might decide to call their parallelism in change. Similarly in gesture 2, the mutuality-relation can be described as "formal facticity," in other words, as a specific comparability depended on a temporal non-comparability which we can also call a necessary synchrony. In gesture 3

we have a formal "factuality" also describable as necessary succession, and in gesture 4, a concrete "facticity" also describable as synchronicity or formal simultaneity.

Thesis 3.1.3 Gestures 1-4 embody four different temporal relations

A temporal relation is taken in gestures 1-4 as the possibility of giving a description to the mode of togetherness of the two operators which correctly characterizes their constant mutuality-relation throughout the gesture.

This proposition contains three basic ideas which form the fundamental cornerstones ~~to our~~ approach to the theory of time. (a) The idea of a correct description of time. In accepting the possibility that time may be described incorrectly, what we are in fact doing is to ascribe an empirical character to time. Yet this empiricity that time possesses is of a certain kind, for as we have argued, it is incorrect to ascribe a factuality-character to time.

(b) The way that time is both empirical and non-factual is given in the idea of time as a "mode" of togetherness of entities. The mode of togetherness is an inseparable part of how entities are given and yet it is also one that needs to be given a description.

(c) The temporal relation between entities given, in this first instance, as a constant mutuality relation between the operators and which holds true throughout the whole gesture. For example, in gesture 1 the specific relations "A is x cm away from B" or "A was at p' t time units ago"

true but for an instant, whereas the description of their mutuality-relation as "comparability in change," or as something similar, remains true regardless ~~of~~ the fact of the gesture's duration.

Thesis 3.1.4 The gestures as complex propositions

When we say that the mode of togetherness of the operators needs to be described, we leave the possibility open that this description may be given either as a number of single propositions or as a descriptive account.

The mode of togetherness of the operators has certain characteristics or aspects, eg., how the operators and/or their paths are differentiated or individuated, how their intelligibility might depend on certain criteria and what these might be (how the perception of each gesture involves different factors), and so on.

All these aspects are, however, in each case interdependent and integral parts of how the specific temporal structure is given. The four gestures must, therefore, be treated as embodying or occasioning complex propositions on the variable structure of time.

Thesis 3.1.5 Time is not any totality of units

If time were the totalization of units of experience or of aspects of units of experience, then time could have easily been thought of as determined by structures given in experience.

In gestures 1-4, we are led to taking time as a generic description of a mode of togetherness in which case time cannot be plausibly shown to be dependent on concrete relationality. Rather, the individual or the partial and instantaneous are in this case dependent on the generic arrangement.

If we take the set of models that we have suggested as embodying true, although complex, propositions on time's nature, we cannot come to different conclusions. It seems to us that these propositions support conclusively the sort of theory we are putting forward.

Section 3.2 Exposition of gesture 1

Temporal Relation	Specific Relations
Gesture 1 Comparative 'factuality' ²⁸ Tautochrony	Concrete relations; ²⁹ notions of simultaneity, non-simultan- eity, dyschrony
Gesture 2 Formal 'facticity' ²⁸ necessary synchrony	Abstract relations; ²⁹ timeless- ness I, specifically compar- able pairs
Gesture 3 Formal 'factuality' Necessary succession	Abstract relations; timeless- ness II, appropriate arrange- ment
Gesture 4 Concrete 'facticity' Synchrony	Concrete relations Opportune arrangement Unopportune arrangement Contemporaneity

Thesis 3.2.1 Temporal relation 1 (gesture 1)

The temporal relation embodied in gesture 1 can be described as "comparative factuality," "parallelism in change," or "tautochrony". Each operator has a time-line³⁰ and a time "rhythm" of its own since each delineates its own pattern by means of an independent path. At the same time, there is a contingent co-ordination of the two paths (a concrete parallelization) giving us a number of points in time for each of which there corresponds a concrete comparability of distance or position etc., on the basis of simultaneity. There is also a time comparability between these points themselves. This, however, requires that the two operators are taken together. In this instance we have a concrete comparability between the concrete togetherness of the operators (distance) at one point and their concrete togetherness at another point. An example of the first one would be the sentence "while John was getting ready to leave, Jane called on the telephone." An example of the second would be a statement of the sort "John flying to Gatwick" and "Mary riding the train to the airport" are earlier than "John and Mary meeting in the airport arrival room." "

But there is another possibility in addition to the two we have already looked at (simultaneity and non-simultaneity). This third possibility we may call "dyschrony."



Consider this example: My friend Jim knew that I would be coming to England to stay at 95 WW Bridge Road towards the end of September 1978. He was there on the 25th, his last day in England, but I was not yet there. In the evening he flew off to the U.S. while I, in turn, was preparing for a trip to England the next morning. On the next day and as soon as I had arrived, I was told that my friend who I had not seen for years had been there asking for me; I had just missed him. What's the closest Jim and I came to seeing each other again? Not less than two thousand miles!!

In terms of gesture 1, "A at point p' on path L(left) at t' and B at point p" at t' on path R(right)" are comparable because they are simultaneous. So is "A at p¹ while B at p² with A at p³ while B at p⁴." But "position p⁵ of A at t" " is not comparable to "B at p² on path R at t'."

A factual comparability does not exist between "A is at P'" on L" and "B is at p" on path R" because these are not simultaneous. However, "A is at p'" on path L" can be simultaneous with "B was at p' on path R" and on the basis of this we can have a factual comparability given as "A is 28 cm at t" from where B was at t'." Similarly, there are other logical techniques by means of which we establish (by expanding the use of the notion of) a simultaneity between the truth functions of two non-simultaneous facts

asserted in propositions. We can, for example, compare the speeds with which two runners finished an 100 meter race even though they did not compete side by side. What in fact we are doing is to assume a single time dimension between the two events. This, however, testifies against the idea that time is an objective entity possessing the structure of a scale since the idea of a scale arises out of this expanded use of temporal concepts and the convention of reading clocks, utilizing an abstract concept of time. A corresponding case is given in the example of asking the question "who matured earlier" for two men one of whom was born in 1900 and who matured at 13 and the other born in 1950 and having matured at 11. The question is ambiguous unless we make a further clarification. If we compare them as if they were born at the same time in order to see who matured earlier, we are again utilizing the convention of pretending as if there is a common time dimension between them, the answer in this case being different than if we had taken the question as strictly literal.

We cannot also factually compare a portion of an operator's path with a greater portion of the same path which contains it. Thus for example the question "Which was earlier, the Battle of Britain of W.W.II?" is inappropriate.

It should be obvious that the before-after relation is not without restrictions as concerning its applicability and should be taken not as universal but as arising out of a certain way of taking the togetherness of entities.

Thesis 3.2.2 "Factuality"

What we have just looked at is the idea that the mutuality of the two operators is best given as a comparability-- a contingent but on-going comparability. But we have also suggested that their mode of being as entities is taken to be that of factuality. The idea has two constituent elements:

- (1) That all true descriptions applicable to an entity throughout a time period are greater in number than all true descriptions applicable to it at a specific point in time.
- (2) That at any point in time there are a number of simultaneously true descriptions which are not contextually or criterially dependent.

Thesis 3.2.3 Differentiation of time-units

There is one other characteristic function of this gesture that we must now look at; How are time units differentiated from each other?

We have just said that there are a number of different sets of simultaneously true descriptions. These sets can in principle be enumerated which means that a comparison between the sets is possible. If the enumeration in two sets is the same, then we have an identical time reference. This is in principle how the differentiation of time-units is achieved.

Thus in gesture 1, time is given as a set of discrete points. But it is also given as a continuum. Since the differentiation of time-units depends on descriptions, this differentiation can be done at different levels depending on the generality of the descriptions employed. "John is in London" is a more general description than "John is having breakfast at the restaurant" and "John is riding in a taxi."

It is obvious that units of time as a way of breaking up total time allow for this possibility of using different units. Total time is itself a unit of time.

The invention of clock time measurement makes time units

independent of the descriptions that are true for them.
Clock time is abstract and the differentiation of time
units is artificial, the ideal in the construction of
clocks being to make their units equal.

Thesis 3.2.4 Time units cannot co-exist

We have said that true descriptions with different time references give us the idea of discrete time units. Their differentiation is achieved by means of an enumeration of sets of simultaneously true descriptions.

We must now explicate the idea fundamental to this mode of time, and only to this one, that time units of the same generality cannot co-exist.

There is nothing about the existence and co-existence of entities which necessitates a differentiation of this existence into/according to categories of existence and nonexistence. There is no reason why existence should be broken up in this way. On the contrary, if we do break up existence itself according to time units whose co-existence is impossible asking of these units to contain it and support it, we run into philosophical difficulties saying nonsense like "the past and future do not exist." We also have the problem of an ever shrinking present which is the portion of time that supports existence. But relating existence and time-units is a conceptual category mistake. Our analysis has shown that differentiation of time units is achieved on the basis of truth-functions of factual descriptions. And this is where the idea of the impossible co-existence of time units arises. The co-existence of time

units is impossible only because two opposite descriptions (eg., "A is at P" and "A is not at P") cannot be true at the same time. But since "A exists at t' " is not the opposite of "A exists at t" " we cannot differentiate time-units on the basis of these descriptions alone.

Thus the impossibility of the co-existence of time-units appears as a requirement of the grammar of speaking about entities in terms of factuality descriptions and is by no means universally necessary to do so. Therefore, no claim can be made about existence in terms of time units. In terms of our gestures, the temporality concepts by means of which existence is predicable are those of generic temporal relations and not those of before-after or of other specific concrete relations. "Existence" as a description can have an opposite if by existence we mean "life," or something similar. But the idea of the non-existence of the past and future **or** of the existence of the present are non-factual descriptions of this sort that can have opposites. "Being dead" is the opposite of "being alive" in a different sense than the "existence of the past" is the opposite of "the existence of the present" (if these are opposites).

On the other hand, it should be abundantly obvious that time-units cannot coexist due to a definitional stipulation. If time-units correspond to sets of descriptions which are

simultaneously true and these sets can in principle and do in every case contain opposite descriptions, these sets cannot be simultaneous.

Section 3.3 Exposition of gesture 2

Thesis 3.3.1 Temporal relation 2 (gesture 2)

Differently than the temporal relation embodied in gesture 1, in gesture 2 the mutuality of the two operators is given, because of the total dependence of the two operators, as a necessary synchrony. In addition, and since there is no self-contained pattern with an internal differentiation of its own, it is given as an other-referring gesture. This generic dependence of the two operators on each other (differently again than in gesture 3 where if the one operator were removed there would still be a pattern of some sort) is given in their description as "factual." Their temporal non-comparability supports a specific comparability between them. This comparability, however, is dependent on a criterion and a context. If we alter gesture 2 in a way we have already mentioned, namely, by removing the one operator as we are placing the other into position, we would still have the gesture because the position of operator B functions as if it is still occupied.

Thesis 3.3.2 Gesture 2 embodies an abstract relation

In gesture 1 we have a concrete relation at every instant of the gesture. In gesture 2 what corresponds to it is an abstract relation. In gesture 1 the set of concrete relations is either a spatial one or one given in terms of the before-after relation or its negation. The two operators are concretely related in a "common time" although they also both possess their own time-line, a geneticity of their own. The notion of "common time" is inseparable from that of temporal parallelism. In gesture 2 the question of before-after, and more generally the issue of origin and direction, does not arise. So instead of the notion of a common time's tautochrony, we have introduced a notion of timelessness which we have called timelessness I. It should be noticed, however, that the description of a specific relation as timeless does not correspond to the gestures in which there are no cycles of movement (g.1,4). Gesture 4 in which there is no movement gives rise to sets of specific relations which are concrete rather than abstract and gesture 3 in which there is movement embodies sets of relations which are abstract. The criteria for this ascription must thus be looked for elsewhere.

Thesis 3.3.3 Why the specific relation in gesture 2
is judged as abstract

A difficulty presents itself here which calls for some elaboration. The problem is to give the grounds of the (intuitively valid) distinction between the temporal-ontological state of affairs that are reconstructed in gestures 1 and 4 and in gestures 2 and 3.

The grounds of this distinction as far as our argument is concerned are two: Firstly, in gestures 2 and 3 we have a suspending of primary temporal functions carried out by the two modes of within-timeness (see chapter 4), namely, that of passing time and that of opportune time. So although the generic mutuality relation of the two operators is predicable by means of a unique temporality description, on the one hand, it appears on the basis of its "relationality" description as if it were an instance of another gesture.³¹ Secondly, in gestures 2 and 3 we do not have a set of co-possible descriptions applicable to two concrete enduring entities which thus necessarily exhibit an "open-ended" describability character but relations (we might call them internal) between "attributes" and/or already described entities. Thus "abstract" is a description that is given from a point of view. (We are here following the use of H. Dooyeweerd in his A New Critique of Theoretical Thought,³² where he treats abstraction as the bracketing of "irrelevant aspects" so

that a single aspect may come into focus for theoretical purposes.) Thus treating a certain cultural object theoretically as an aesthetic object in effect brackets away its pre-theoretical experiential plurivocality in order that a single "dimension" or aspect of it may be uninterruptedly apparent. This use is certainly defensible and seems to do justice to the use of the word concrete to denote the thematizable but undeterminate character of the "lived world."³³ On the other hand, however, our linguistic employment of the terms "concrete" and "abstract" to denote "specific" in the one case and "non-specific" in the other result in a certain conceptual twist that must be accounted for. The criteria we have given above, however, cover the whole extent of the use of notions.

The suspending of primary temporal functions makes that which is abstract a generality, whereas a temporal function of within-timeness would have made it specific. On the other hand, the plurivocality of the concrete is accounted for by the absence of a necessarily privileged description (e.g., "green is a colour") which takes up the logical space otherwise occupied by a set of descriptions.

Thesis 3.3.4 Abstract relation 1 is a "factual" relation

The relation of similarity or whatever, which grounds the judgement that since person A is human then person B is also a member of the human race,³⁴ or the relation which makes a certain colour more luminous than another colour is dependent on the applicability of a criterion and a context³⁵ in which the criterion finds its meaning. Colours are not individually comparable to each other independently of the set of internal³⁶ relations which constitute the colour spectrum. In determining that the degree of redness contained in a certain colour presentation is greater than that contained in another, **there is** both a criterion at work and a context constructed by a set of internal relations. To perceive a difference in degrees of redness, the two colour presentations under consideration are not perceived in isolation from each other or from the spectrum. The perception here is a perception of a relative distance from or nearness to the red region of the spectrum.

Thesis 3.3.5 "Napoleon the opposite of Pericles"

Thus the description "Napoleon is a human being" need not be simultaneous with any other description true of Napoleon since it is criterially depended. Napoleon's "facticity," the construing of his beingness as "a being as _____" does not have a concrete time reference. Similarly, the statement "Napoleon is the opposite of Pericles" is an instance of a criterially and contextually dependent assertion which does not depend on but rather functions despite of a specific date-referring comprability.

"Napoleon is a human being" is a factual not a factual description of Napoleon. To say that there are descriptions which are true of Napoleon does not implicate that Napoleon still exists.³⁷

Thesis 3.3.6 Formally synchronous events

Just as living creatures can be comparable as to a criterion independently of their birthdays, so the use of a certain colour, say red, is comparable to the use of another colour, say green, even though they are not temporally given together. On the basis of this overlooking of a time lapse between the two uses, a specific comparability is built. Without this comparability neither red would mean, in the case of traffic lights, "stop" nor would green mean "proceed." Thus also, in studying the ritual cycle of a certain tribe we treat the use of a certain colour on one occasion as formally synchronous with another colour used on another occasion, say six months later. The meaning of the colour used in the one occasion is not sought for independently of the use of the other colour on the other.

We have named this an abstract relation in the sense that it is not a relation between enduring entities but between attributes or descriptions of these. In the case of the traffic lights, there is a distinction between the relation of the two light bulbs and between red and green. Red and green do not co-exist in the same way as the light bulbs of the traffic light pole co-exist. Neither do "the chief dressed black" and "the chief dressed in white" bear the same relation to each other as "chief W" bears to "chief N."

The use we have suggested of the notion of "abstract" is reinforced by this example. Between the two ritual situations there are a number of other **changes and aspects which** are judged irrelevant and are bracketed away. Such examples are the chief's length of hair, his family situation, his age, his health, etc., ad infinitum.

Thesis 3.3.7 Space-time and the experience of time

What can we say of the supposed incompatibility of the space-time conception of the world and the possibility of giving a phenomenological description of the temporal structure of consciousness? Is it not nothing more than a pseudo-problem? One possible application of the distinctions between different temporal relations that we have made is on this issue.

The way that consciousness knows itself as in time (by means of horizons of relative indeterminateness)³⁸ is qualitatively different than the way this might be imagined if the meaning of time were exhausted in being a dimension of space-time-- even if this were to be taken as the perception of simultaneity and non-simultaneity between events.

Merleau-Ponty³⁹ effectively shows that the past and future, as past and future, are given with the present. Yet it is imperative to note that the past and future are here thought of as determinations. The past as past is present but the past as present is passed. Similarly with the future.

The "co-existence" of past, present and future as determinations shows us that consciousness is unavoidably one which

has the character of a linguistic subject. Temporal determinations are the result of thematization.

On the other hand, the past, present and future co-exist for the space time view as well but not as determinations; the same kind of existence is attributed to them⁴⁰ whereas for phenomenology their "co-existence" is in terms of the necessary synchrony of "presence" and "absence." So whereas the space-time conception works its way from the idea that all actuality is integral, phenomenology explicates a conceptual schema of necessary synchrony. The space-time view ascribes "existence" in an abstract, but not illegitimate, way to past, present and future events. The description "existence" is attributable according to formal criteria of applicability and does not mean that the "existence" of past events, for example, is accessible to experience. It thus does not have experiential criteria.⁴¹

Section 3.4 Exposition of gesture 3

Thesis 3.4.1 Temporal relation 3 (gesture 3)

In gesture 3 we have an interdependence between the paths of the two operators which together form a single pattern, differently than in gesture 1 where in fact we have two patterns. Similarly to 1 we have a self-contained, self-referring pattern which is emerging as the gesture proceeds. The pattern as in gesture 1 is constituted by a great number of specific relations between the operators' positions and between different portions of the operators' paths. But differently than in gesture 1 again, we do not have a set of individuated, contingent specific relations but a totalizing effect of some sort. A present specific relation between operators A and B is, in some special way, dependent on the previous positions. Its character is that of "development"-- as we would say in music. Previous positions, relations or events are determinant of the specific character of those that follow. In order to capture this idea in **particular** we have labelled their mutuality relation "formal factuality." Formal factuality in terms of temporality concepts is given as formal simultaneity of the terms and as necessary succession.

Thesis 3.4.2 Formal simultaneity

Formal simultaneity of the terms means two things:

(a) That whereas there is never, in the course of the gesture, a strict simultaneity between the one operator's being at a certain point and the other's being an inch below it or above it, because the two operators are never both standing still at the same time, our perception of the gesture requires that we do treat their being at the two positions tautochronously.

(b) But not only are the specific positions of the two operators as one inch from each other taken as a simultaneity, but also all the positions occupied previously by the operators are held into a kind of constant simultaneity with the contrastive positions given presently. This is an integral part of our perception of the pattern as a linearity.

Thesis 3.4.3 Music as an illustration

The example of music is a good one for illustrating this sort of set of relations because not only is the experience of music taken as an experience ~~out-of-normal-passing-~~ time, but it is also a case of a set of specificities (sounds) which are arranged in a way similar to the one we have here. Yet the "forgetting" of normal time which takes place when we are listening to music is not an accidental forgetting as it might be in the case of being busy with something interesting. It is commonly admitted that music is itself a temporal structure and, we might add, again not simply because of tempo and rhythm but also because the arrangement of its constituent elements is different qualitatively than the arrangement of events through which the experience of normal passing time is given.

In contrasting music with the visual arts I. Stravinsky says: "Music, however, depends on temporal succession and requires awakening of memory. Therefore music is a temporal art in the same way as painting is an art of space. Music presupposes above all a certain organization in time, a temporal ordering...."⁴²

Here too we have the ~~holding-of-what-has-gone-on-before~~ idea. Our perception of music is by means of memory

supplementing direct perception.

To complete our use of the illustration, let us point out that the temporal arrangement spoken of here concerns, as in gesture 2, the specific expressions of sounds and not the musical instruments themselves.

The mere co-existence of the instruments in a single room is a relationship that is reducible to another temporal modality while at the same time this reduction violates something essential and unique to their co-existence as performing musical instruments.

Thesis 3.4.4 Gesture 3 embodies a set of specific abstract relations

The set of relations between the sounds in a musical piece are abstract timeless relations. What integrates a set of sounds into the linearity we call a melody is appropriate arrangement. Appropriate arrangement is a specific abstract relation.

Relations of appropriateness are not contingent, external relations between concrete enduring entities⁴³ but rather they are constructions of sets of internal relations on the basis of a judgement.

The difference between the specific relations in gesture 2 and in gesture 3 must be construed as a difference between two kinds of abstract relations. In the one case we have an abstract relation between two terms which are held together by a judgement according to a criterion and in the other it is an abstract relation between a number of terms which are judged as given in some sort of abstract linearity. A melody is an abstract linearity whereas two colour presentations may be a single comparable pair.

Section 3.5 Exposition of gesture 4

Thesis 3.5.1 Temporal relation 4 (gesture 4)

The temporal relation embodied in gesture 4 can be characterized as concrete facticity, or in terms of a temporality concept, as synchrony.

Synchrony is a different temporality concept than tautochrony. Tautochrony, as we have shown, is bound up with the concept of time-units. Tautochrony as simultaneity depends on the possibility for a discrimination into, potentially, minute parts of a temporal continuum. Synchrony, on the other hand, is close to the idea of contemporaneity but also includes the idea of belonging together in time regardless of a specific time reference. Thus, preparation for an event and the activities that take place during the event belong together in time although they are not strictly tautochronous. Similarly, sorrow and death belong together as celebration and weddings belong together. We thus speak of a time of celebration and a time of sorrow, but this time is not a set of discrete time units during which we have an identical enumeration of descriptions but an extensionality throughout which, although descriptions might change, a certain unity is preserved.

The idea of time possessing any significance or "colour" cannot be fully grasped by a conception of time of the sort we had in gesture 1.

Thesis 3.5.2 Opportune arrangement

We have thus decided to use this description--opportune arrangement--as the best description of this specific relation.

"His coming out the door when I was going in," does not only give us a tautochrony but might also constitute the grounds for describing a dangerous, embarrassing, symbolic or tragic situation. Yet since these descriptions are not and need not be asserted or be true in totality, or in any combination, or at all, we have chosen the term opportune⁴⁴ as a generic term to signify this indeterminacy. But then somebody's coming out the building ten minutes before I enter might be equally symbolic or tragic or embarrassing or dangerous at that as it would be if the two actions were simultaneous.

Thus description by means of the notion of synchrony binds two meanings:

- (a) Opportune arrangement
- (b) The necessarily open-ended, non-committal character of the descriptions proper to concretely synchronous objects.

Like in gesture 1 where dyschrony was also considered as a function of tautochrony, in gesture 4 we may speak of unopportune arrangement as the contrast of opportune and of non-pertinent descriptions in contradistinction to pertinent descriptions.

Thesis 3.5.3 Concrete relation in 1 compared to concrete relation in 4

Gestures 1 and 4 are similar in that in both the sets of specific relations do not include nonconcrete relations. Yet concrete relations in 1 (simultaneity, non-simultaneity and dyschrony) differ from concrete relations in 4 which are construed by means of the notion of synchrony. The notion of synchrony is different from the notion of tautochrony.

Simultaneity is the truth-function value T of a token-reflexive assertion of fact or the integration of two converse propositions including "is true at the time of" into the factuality descriptions of two distinct entities. But above and beyond this or even despite it, entities are temporally arrangeable into states of affairs which have unique structures. This very fact points to the assumption that situations and states of affairs have a certain constancy so that both the constancy and the arrangement are important.

If there is a reason which makes two actions belong together in other than coincidental juxtaposition then their analysis in terms of gesture 1 is not sufficient. A simple comparability of life-histories cannot support a connection of that sort.

Thesis 3.5.4 The open-ended character of the mutuality
relation in gesture 4

In gestures 1-3 the limits of the gesturing were set at the point of perceiving it as a gesture of a certain sort. In gestures 1 and 3 the factuality character of the discursive entities involved allowed us to treat them as revealing all their true descriptions since neither the descriptions nor their truth-function values depended on anything external to them and their constant but immediate mutual togetherness and givenness. Even in gesture 2 where the description is criterially dependent this dependence appeared to be unidimensional. A simple temporal non-comparability, a logical synchronization of the two entities, produced a specific comparability in terms of a criterion and by means of a context.

By contrast, in gesture 4 the description of the individuality of the two operators vis-a-vis each other contains an additional aspect to gesture 2's supplementary and functional independence. In gesture 4 this individuality is best accounted for as a double or dual reference to an anonymity, an objective numericity aspect of the operators, as well as to this supplementary functional referential independence. In gesture 4 we could have had three operators instead of two, or we could have had four, etc.. This would result in a change of some sort but this change

is again a specific change and not a change of the determinateness given to philosophical description. If four people share a loaf of bread instead of two, there is an objective resultant effect on how their specific shares are calculated. But on the other hand, four people eating the bread instead of two is "2+1+1" people. It is their anonymous sameness, as it were, which makes the objectivity of the calculation of their share the principle consideration.

In addition, the dependence of the description of the two operators' togetherness makes the gesture's limits extend beyond the mere perceptual grasp of the gesture. Just as easily as the two fingers could be taken as pressing my nose, they could be taken as symbolizing something or as expressing an emotion or a desire or an insult to somebody present or absent, etc.

This "social individuality" of the operators as the dialectic between an objective anonymity and a supplementary functional independence also accounts for the sui generis character of the set of "facts" which are deducible on the basis of their mutuality relation.

Thesis 3.5.5 Gesture 4 and gesture 1⁴⁵

Gesture 4 in conjunction with gesture 1 gives us social individuation. In the social world individuals could be persons, small groups or macro-groups. What determines their being individuals is the temporal dimension which is taken as pertinent to their description. A concrete individual always has a history. At one level a class is taken as context to individual persons. 'Class' in this case is not a historical entity but a structural context constructed on the basis of certain criteria which being structural, appear to be criteria which do not have a specific date-reference.⁴⁶ At another level 'class' might be taken as an individual, but in that case class is taken historically as one of a number of historically related entities. In other words, in gesture 4 the two operators may be named at different levels of generality. Depending on what this level is chosen to be, the criterion/context aspect of their relation appears accordingly. If the two operators are taken as persons, for example, the criterion/context would be at a different level of generality than if they are taken as two nations or as two social classes.

Thesis 3.5.6 Social time distinguished from the time
of social phenomena

If we take the operators in each of the gestures to be conscious "minds" we will, by means of this substitution, have in each case a social situation and "social" time. Gesture 4, however, embodies a socializing time which is structurally different than the one which would result from the above substitution. For this reason we should call gesture 4's time "societal"⁴⁷ rather than social time. Gesture 4 uniquely thematizes⁴⁸ societal time whether or not its operators are conceived of as "minds." The distinction between social and societal time must be made explicit by contrasting the results of a substitution with those of an exegesis based on the gesture without a substitution. This difference will, perhaps, show up as a difference between perceptions of social reality constructed by social agents themselves according to variable, corresponding to different gestures, principles and a univocal ontological determination of societal structuration by a single temporal-logical structure. This latter can, for example, be applied to a clarification of the old **issue** of what sort of "reality" could be attributed to "wholenesses."

It is in our opinion not totally useless to attempt such a discussion of the metaphysics of social life.

Thesis 3.5.7 Gesture 4 and gesture 2

The difference between gesture 4 and gesture 2 must be explicated along the following lines: whereas in gesture 2 we are dealing always with a simple case of comparability, in gesture 4 the togetherness of the two operators can be taken as a comparability, or an opposition, or an exclusiveness, or a synergy, etc., and this in varying contexts. In gesture 2 the specific comparability is preserved from context to context. In gesture 4 what is comparability in one context is complementarity, synergy or opposition in another. This is why the temporal relation pertaining to this gesture was called concrete facticity. It attempts to describe this kind of togetherness as in some way necessarily multidimensional; social phenomena are in some significant way total phenomena made up of a number of components and aspects.

Thesis 3.5.8 Gesture 4 and gesture 3

The difference between gestures 3 and 4 should be explicated as a difference between two different ways of achieving unity. In gesture 3 we have a case of abstract unity, as we pointed out, and in gesture 4 we have a concrete opposing, complimentary or synergetic unity. To return to our example of four people sharing a loaf of bread, we see that the concreteness of the totalizing effect of their action is given in the possibility of mathematising their relations and actions. But again a number of people sharing a loaf of bread can be construed according to different contexts. If the four people are sharing bread because it is all they have to eat in order to survive, there is a difference with the case of people sharing bread in order to symbolize their spiritual brotherhood. In the former case the less people the better and in the latter the more the better.

Thesis 3.5.9 Social acts and social facts

In social science, differently than in the natural sciences, an individual event (act) is not subsumed under a general law but is part of that law. Social "laws" are different means of generalizing individual acts which have been homogeneously interpreted by means of a criterion. This explains how social fact can be thought of as sui generis while social acts remain free.⁴⁹

There is a synchronicity at work between a social act and its context because of the factual character of social individuality. Laws of nature are theoretical formulations of patterns of events which obtain always when the conditions are the same. A social law, on the other hand, is the synchronicity itself of individual social acts,⁵⁰ or an individual act and its context. So social laws are neither individual nor universal. On the one hand, there are as many laws as there are actions but, perhaps, on the other, many social actions hardly ever require us to invoke laws in order to find them comprehensible. Narratives are thus extensional with theoretical social science. History is the one end of the spectrum and the theoretical disciplines the other.

Every social act has a generality aspect to it. Social reality is the generality (the concrete facticity) of actions.

It appears that not everything generic which concerns social activity is **significant**. At least it is not pre-givenly significant. This is why a primary function is fulfilled by criteria in our thinking of social action.

In terms of our analysis which we will pick up again in chapter 4, the mode of temporality that belongs to history is that of passing time, whose basic conceptual function is to discriminate and to individuate. On the other hand, the mode of temporality of social life is that of synchronicity whose basic function is to integrate mutually differentiated entities. Thus temporality is like the lens through which reality is looked at, and depending on how the lens is rotated a different part of reality comes into focus. Thus the metaphysics of social life as a metatheoretical view of social entities can never be an ontology. What must be achieved is a clarification of the temporal mode of social co-existence.

Perhaps, social "laws" is the wrong term anyway and we should instead restrict ourselves to talking about social **facts** only.

Thesis 3.5.10 Phenomenal descriptions

In contrasting gesture 4 with other gestures, especially gesture 1, we pointed out that in gesture 4 the togetherness of the two operators is not totally given by their immediate appearance. We insisted that there is an additional dimension of interaction which provides the necessary links which make the mutuality of the two operators fully intelligible. This is paralleled in social life where phenomenal descriptions do not suffice for giving an intelligible description of a social situation. Let us take as an example the case of "exercise of power:" Two persons are described as arguing in an excited manner. After a while, the one says something to which the other submits and proceeds to carry out. The majority of available definitions of power emphasize that exercise of power means "coercion" of the will of a person who would otherwise act differently.⁵¹ But the phenomenal description of the situation of an exercise of power cannot arrest this aspect of coercion since most often this coercion is not in the form of physical subjection of the other. A power relation as a social relation is mediated by social conditions which are present to the social situation but at the same time "invisible," in some sense. They are the whole series of other facts which facilitate, say the imposition of penalization and which are synchronously given as part of the

state of affairs to be described. Moreover, it is an unassailable fact that reference is made to this supplementary aspect of a social situation in generic terms. Against the opinion of the authors we have cited, we do use the concept of power simpliciter. But in our scheme of things this does not entail an objectification, an ontologization of power simpliciter. It must be explained as being due to (and an integral part of) the factual character of individual social specificities (acts). This concept of "facticity" we have in a preliminary way characterized as "the way of being individual of a social specificity so as to be extensive with its manner of being a generality." Thus in the social situation we are describing here, the two agents are not simply persons A and B, but are also describable in terms of generic categories as well if any sense is to be made of their mutuality relation. Person A, let us say, is a person "who has power" and person B is a person who "does not have equal power with person A."

Section 3.6 Methodological implications

Thesis 3.6.1 The ontological constitution of individuality

Thus, social individuality like all individuality is constituted ontologically by means of concepts of temporality.

Without making claims about a specific causal correlation between two aspects of what we might call an ethno-ontology, it would appear that there is a relationship between what a certain people would hold about the nature of time and their view of individuality. Yet, in addition, the systematic exposition we are attempting to give of the whole extent of temporality concepts can also function as a checklist, as it were, of what to look for in examining the conceptual system of a people. Thus, our opinion is that the conceptual system of a people is not exhausted in the specific system of coded determinations that they have constructed on the basis of, what we have characterized as, synchronous relations but should include their ideological interpretation of their social individuality and at another level their being as a historical group. Thus, if an integration could be achieved of their view of the self, their view of social man and society, as well as their view of the existential nature of man (beliefs about birth, death and the afterlife), as well as a number of other factors, we would perhaps come up with a view of the world which is unique. As Levi Strauss would respond; "the specific

conceptual systems do differ; it is the systematicity relations that are common to all men, primitive and modern." We are interested in the systematicity relations too, but it seems that logical relations do not only refer to formally synchronous specificities but also to other kinds of relations. The opposition between "going up" and "going down" is not the same sort of opposition as what exists between a deity and a man. A human can according to certain world-views be an incarnation of a deity. And this in two ways: It might be possessed by the divine spirit arbitrarily or the divine spirit might be a gift at the end of a long life of struggle. There is also the possibility of certain actions being directed by the spirit and others not. Thus, it is not only of importance that a human is different than a deity, but their specific relation is also important. We may thus have an interpretation of the mutuality relation between them which resembles more with gesture 3, or with gesture 1, etc. The idea of fulfilment of divine purpose or plan resembles the set of relationships in gesture 3 where we have a necessary succession of events and a linearity just as we do in the case of a teleological view of the world and of life which holds that the meaning of the earlier is only guaranteed by what follows and that meaning as a whole is a function of completion of a process.

Thesis 3.6.2 Reference to the self and ideological individualism

To say that a society's ideological ontology is qualifiedly determined by a leading temporal relation is not to exclude the possibility of struggle within that ideology. Every ideology in a sense contains an interpretation of all relevant factors, "the spirit" of the ideology being how it integrates all these interpretations. We also have a conceptual hierarchy of explanatory principles.

The ideological struggle of Western culture, for example, has been fought between a transcendentalist view and an immanentistic view, dating from the trans-personal arguments of the Medieval Church and the humanist reaction. But even in contemporary culture where historically differentiated individuality is emphasized, we have notions of self-fulfilment creating a polarization on the other side of the prevalent view.

The ability to refer to the self does not license an interpretation of the experience of the self in all societies as of the same kind. There is a distinction between the self as a functional referent and a view of individuals. In most primitive societies the individual is not treated as an issue, at least not in the way it is treated in our societies.⁵²

We have said that there is a certain view of individuality, or better a certain ontological commitment about individuality entailed in sociological thinking. This is true; however, the mere search for sociological facts does not prejudge the issue. Afterall, ontologically entailed individuality is different than the ideological commitment to individualism characteristic of modern societies. As we have said, this depends on a certain way of taking passing time (which corresponds to gesture 1) and the individualization entailed in sociological reasoning corresponds to gesture 4.

It is when we think of primitive society as made up of private individuals that we transgress this rule of respect of the thought of the societies we are studying.⁵³

Thesis 3.6.3 Ideological ontology and practical life decisions

It is obvious that decision is common to all societies and can be regarded as an attribute of human consciousness, but at the same time it is equally certain that decisions, whatever the specific form they assume, are also variably informed in different societies.

What needs to be shown is how self-consciousness and self-interpretation is operative in decision and choice and that the possibilities for different manners of self-interpretation correspond to and ground the realm of freedom of human consciousness. This realm of freedom is not given in the direct intentionality exhibited by consciousness because this intentionality can be shown to be at least minimally consistent with a set of cultural values and thus as a freedom within bounds and also as functionally and more or less causally related to the existence of reasons for action. But yet human freedom must be theoretically extended beyond the mere ability to compare between degrees of rationality of courses of action. It must rather cover the grounds which determine reasons as having a rational qualification at all, i.e., to the very possibility of any set of reasons being verifiable. Thus a validating function of human consciousness which transcends systems of values must be posed. This "primordial" validating function depends on interpretive self-perception.

Thesis 3.6.4 On Epistemological Reductionism

It is our opinion that the fundamental terms by means of which consciousness is taken as describable, suggested by theories of subjectivity which want to make a radical distinction between consciousness and the world do not manage to foreclose the possibility of epistemological reductionism. Epistemological reductionism need not deny that there is a unique and specific manner that the world appears to consciousness. Yet at the level of taking the subject of knowledge as an object, epistemology neglects the radical distinction and offers one of two equally reductionistic models. It either explains the subject as physiologically determined or as possessing innate ideas and patterns which order sense data.

Why cannot these theories of consciousness determine the distinctions which are made at the epistemological level? Epistemology establishes "a line of connection." This line of connection is usually between parts of the field which share a common determination. How could a radical distinction work?

The argument between these theories of consciousness and epistemological reductionism is whether consciousness merely grasps or if it constitutes its world in some way. We will accept these as the defining terms by which

consciousness can be described. We will take our tentative working characterization of consciousness as exhibiting the dialectic between mere grasping and constituting the world.

While epistemological reductionism does not deny that at the level of direct perception consciousness both grasps and constitutes the world, it proceeds on the assumption that this is not also the case at the epistemological level. In its need for global conclusions, epistemology finds no obstacle in construing "finite perspective" as so many angles of viewing the world, "ecstatical unity" as the ordering of pre-given dimensions of existence, and "the transcendental imagination" as an accommodation of the material given to intuition.

The most important point which gets overlooked in this formulation is that in grasping itself as in the world consciousness constitutes the world epistemologically. By predicating its own relation to the world, consciousness makes the first step of releasing itself from the objective world. This achievement can be, however, easily rolled back. While it is obvious that the structure of the epistemological field itself can be shown to be ontologically constituted (according to the 'logic' of the assumed 'being of an entity'), and since this 'being' is unavoidably temporal being, time as the structure of this

contact can be taken as either variable or invariant. If, in other words, the structure of time is taken as univocal and unidimensional, then the epistemological field on the basis of the need for a determinateness which is regular can assert itself as determinate independently of subjectivity's freedom-for-itself. If, on the other hand, consciousness looks at itself as an entity which is not simply 'factual' or simply 'factical' but as both and as more, it can, on the basis of time's multiple modalities, see how it determines the constitution of its own world. Thus by means of its mere grasping of its individuality, and since individuation is a function of which temporal modality is determining the mutuality relation of entities, it does unwittingly and can in an explicit theoretical way constitute its world.

The fundamental concept which delimits the possibilities of epistemological distinctions is thus not any special quality or function of consciousness which it brings to perception but the conception of a consciousness capable of perceiving itself, of thematically grasping itself as temporally yet deliberately given to its world. Although the determinateness of temporal relations is guaranteed by the polysemy of time itself, consciousness in accepting itself by judging how it belongs to the world makes this determining structuring function of time its own and by means of it it constitutes the world.

Chapter 4

TEMPORAL MODALITIES

Thesis 4.0.1 Preface to chapter 4

The discussions of chapters 3,4, and 5 correspond to three different levels of temporal determination. In chapter 3 we looked at the level of universal temporal determination. We treated time as the possibility of generic descriptions being applicable to mutuality relations between entities or other specificities. Temporal relations were differentiated on the basis of a qualitative difference between differently described mutuality relations. In chapter 5 we will look at how temporal schemata exhibit a theoretically constant determining function for pairs of events and other specificities. Temporal schemata are treated as "binding" relations. They are distinguished on the basis of differences in how they bind their terms.

An analysis of temporal meaning determinations would, however, be incomplete if it does not treat of time as "a lived extensionality." The discussion must explore how the claims we made in chapter 1, namely that time is neither factical nor factual, can be compatible with a view of time as a lived extensionality. There are thus three sections to this chapter; firstly, we will examine how time can be experienced without being factual, secondly, we will discuss the idea of a plurality of temporal modes, and lastly, we will examine how the generality of time must be accounted for if the position we have taken in chapter 1--that time is not factical--is to be respected.

Section 4.1 Time is not "factual"

Thesis 4.1.1 The reality of time

What can we then say about time?

Is there time or isn't there time?⁵⁴

The propositions "there is time" and "there isn't time" seem at first sight equally plausible. The person who held that there is time was shown to be unable to ground it empirically and to make heads and tails of it theoretically. The person who denies the existence of time prides himself of an accomplishment and then inescapably proceeds to live as if there is time.

In this chapter we will discuss what we will call the translatability thesis. This means, among other things, that we accept the possibility, indeed we take it as a given, that all temporal concepts can be resolved (according to a variety of conceptual methods) into non-temporal categories. A closer look at the claims that are made about time's substantiality show that this substantiality is in fact a trans-substantiality and that these claims are distinguished ways of talking about entities in the world. But while this is true--this is the chosen route of the space-time conception--it is also an undoubtable fact that the opposite is also true, namely, that all categories without exception are temporally determined. Thus there is no escape from this logical perplexity.

Our solution is this: "Time is" but it is not in the same way as other entities and specificities are. Its being is not ontic but thematic. It is not itself a locality although locality without it is inconceivable. Similarly with all other such determinations. The translatability thesis tells us that while the issue is unresolvable, if we proceed from within the cycle it can be theoretically resolved by thematizing this circularity in the form of a global philosophical conclusion called upon to serve as a starting-point.

In this chapter we are attempting to account for the possibility of time being experienced.

Thesis 4.1.2 The idea of modality

If temporality is to have a temporal character, it must not have contingent relative boundaries and an empty content (a substantiality nature that ascribes the content of time to something not integral to it). This problem was raised before. Events cannot be taken as parts of time even though these are what are held together by temporal relations. Events are not integral members of time itself. We must be able to characterize time as something more than a total other-reference. The substantiality content of time must be logically constant and exhaustive. A temporal modality, on the other hand, has both a specific content (the family of its determinations distinguished from other such) and the exhaustiveness of a logical class.

The non-emptiness of time (substantiality) corresponds to the conception of the modality structure of temporality.

Thus a modality, differently than a locality, is not a congruity but a family of uniquely similar determinations. Its substantiality is thematic⁵⁵ not ontic.

Thesis 4.1.3 The possibility for an exhaustive description

The substantiality of time is its own relational structure. The trans-substantiality of time is the universal time-dependence of all specific relations.

In the concept of modality we have a fulfilment of the condition that time must be given as time-in-general. Modes are always inter-determinate and so the method of breaking up a totality of determination gains significance. A conception in terms of modality structures is always a potentially exhaustive conception.

To say that modalities are inter-determinate is the same as denying that a temporal modality is factual. The determination 'factuality,' as we showed in gesture 1, is a description which is applicable to members of sets of entities given as contingently comparable in change. But modalities are inter-determinate because they are supplementary yet opposite ways of exhausting a totality of possibilities of determination.

Thesis 4.1.4 The everyday language of time

To say that the extensionality of time is modal is to deny the possibility that time is a factual "something" which does anything. Nevertheless, we do not consider it necessarily misleading for everyday language to say that time does something, eg., that it changes things and that it gives opportunities and takes them away. What this means is that relations are regimented and ensured thematically by having some sort of substantive character ascribed to them.

Our analysis, therefore, does not contradict but endorses this usage. What it denies is that the intelligibility of these everyday expressions on time commits us to a view of time as a factuality.

Thesis 4.1.5 Can we ask "What is time?"

Experientially time is given us as a lived extensionality (as the length and breadth of the world). Philosophically we cannot say that "time exists like other things exist." We must instead say that "time exists because other things exist." This "because" is not a causal "because" since it is not experientially verifiable but is part of a philosophical formulation and has logical force. The first proposition is philosophically untenable, whereas the second is, in our opinion, correct. While no substance or properties language is properly applicable to time, we can, nevertheless, say what time is just like we can say what time it is.

Wittgenstein is correct in saying that you cannot ask the question "what is time?" if we take this to mean that time should not be posed as a factual something. But if it is intended to discourage us from attempting a systematic exposition of time, without making this assumption, we cannot accept it. This thesis explores this very possibility.

Thesis 4.1.6 The factuality of time versus the factuality of events

A temporal modality is not factual. What is factual is the set of events that are organized by it. Two sets of specificities which are both described ontologically as factual cannot occupy the same "ontological space."

Either events are factual or time is factual. Ontologically a factual time is incompatible with events. Thematically, however, time is supplemented by the factuality of events. Time is their determination as factual specificities. If time were factual, it could be thought of as comparable to events but only if events were not themselves determined by time. If we say that time exists factually, we would either have to say that time is universal reality in which case no other factuality could be asserted or we would have to say that time were a part of the world in which case it would be comparable with events but events would be by the same token outside of time. And if they were, they would not be comparable to anything.

The reality of temporal modalities, on the other hand, does not restrict the extensionality of time to anything less than universal since the specific empiricity of time in a certain instance, if thought of in terms of modalities, presupposes rather than excludes the universality of time.

Thesis 4.1.7 Time as a lived extensionality

A modality is thus a family of homogeneous determinations. But there is something that we must note here. We speak of a mode of temporality as the family of all uniquely similar determinations. But in addition, time as lived extensionality is the experience of a certain set of entities of specificities as both bearing a qualitatively similar determination and as concretely arranged in a certain way. Thus in speaking about a mode of temporality, we must identify both the characteristic relations (which we have done in chapter 3) that correspond to each mode and a characteristic function of each modality. If temporal modalities did not exhibit this function, they would not be empiricities in any additional way than the way they had appeared in the gestures of chapter 3. They would simply be the possibilities of descriptions according to kinds. But in addition to the level of temporal determination we explored in chapter 3, we find it necessary to speak of time as a lived extensionality. Thus, for example, there are not only relations of before-after and not-before-after, but there is also the experience of passing-time.⁵⁶

Thesis 4.1.8 A family of homogeneous determinations

We have just said that one way a temporal modality is describable is as a family of homogeneous determinations. If we are to use music parabolically, we can say that the temporal modality of passing time is like music without a fixed (determinate) rhythm. There is meter which is the division of a piece into equal units and there is tempo. But tempo is a function of the performance of a musical line and not of meter or rhythm. Thus the "speed" of passing-time, if there is such a thing, is due to the specific way that events succeed each other and is not a function of time. If there was no fixed metricity there would be no speed either. Thus the experience of fast or slow succession is not intrinsic to time, but rather what we must say is that time facilitates such a perception. Time is the family of homogeneous determinations of events according to a temporal relation. The specific judgement of a "fast moving time" or "slow moving time" does not entail the factuality of time.

If anything like rhythm is ascribable to time again this would be done on the basis of contingent considerations. Rhythm as the "grouping together of equal parts" is again not a function of time itself. The difference between the rhythm (or tempo) of life in the desert and in a big city is not due to a different constitution of time but due to

a difference of how life is organized in these two places.

We certainly do not mean to be taken as endorsing an objectivist position by ascribing to time a determinate metricity. The point was made on the basis of the consideration that the conception of passing time holds in itself the possibility of treating descriptions of events as equally individual (in the sense of Tractatus 6.4 "All propositions are of equal value"). We have spoken of enumeration of sets of descriptions. Since passing time is not in respect of events but in respect of descriptions of events it remains independent of events in some way. Thus the possibility of a conception in terms of artificially equal time units pre-existed the historical development of pendulum clocks, etc.


Thesis 4.1.9 Temporal relations distinguished from
temporal modalities

The concept of a temporal relation arises out of a sharp distinction between qualitatively unique generic descriptions **and** the sets of concrete or abstract relations that are described by them. A temporal modality, on the other hand, takes the terms of specific relations as directly determined by the relevant mode of temporality. Thus individuation as a form of restriction of terms by the relations that hold them together is a function of temporal modalities. This is what was called the characteristic function of a temporal modality.

Section 4.2 Discussion of temporal modalities

Thesis 4.2.1 There are four modes of temporality

We can identify four modes of temporality. These are: Passing-time, Opportune-time, Timelessness I and Timelessness II. Diagrammatically they can be given as:



These four temporal modalities are, as we have said, inter-determinate. Any pair of two of these can be taken together and contrasted with the pair of the remaining two. The way any one of them is uniquely similar to any other is the way it is uniquely different than the other two.

Thesis 4.2.2 Within-timeness and timelessness

We have also said that modes of temporality are identified on the basis of a unique function which they perform in organizing sets of experiential qualities. We must now qualify this and say that there are two instances of primary functions performed by two of these modalities and two instances of a suspension of these functions. This grouping corresponds to the categories "within-timeness" and "timelessness." Passing-time and opportune-time are the two modes of within-timeness.

The function of passing-time is the differentiation and individuation of events.

The basic function of opportune time is the integration of a number of eventualities into a generic category, a state of affairs describable according to its structure.

Thesis 4.2.3 Passing-time

Passing-time is the conception of time as progressing by means of events which are differentiated from each other according to relations of earlier-later and not-earlier-later. Passing-time affords us with a way of making our experience of duration and temporal distance intelligible. We think of passing-time in terms of units of time.

Passing-time is a mode of time which individuates. Not only does the passage of time differentiate complexes which were previously integral, but also in the relation of before-after which characterizes this mode "what is before" and "what is after" are always individual terms.

It is not necessary to expand on passing time because it is the most familiar thematization of time, indeed it is often the only mode that is at all discussed.

Thesis 4.2.4 Opportune time

Opportune time is not time standing still. Opportune time is itself an extensionality. Opportune time is the extensionality of significances. Any significant arrangement of factors is achieved by means of opportune time and exhibits the temporal relation of synchrony.

Significant arrangement can be distinguished at least in two cases. Firstly, we have opportune arrangement whereby a certain arrangement of conditions provides the significant context which facilitates certain actions, and secondly, when the context of a certain action, by reference to which its description is given, is itself given a generic description on the basis of its structuration. This is what allows certain situations of action to be called "opportunity," "choice," "performance," etc. The characterization of any state of affairs in the above way presupposes a recognition of a unique arrangement of factors. The structure of a choice situation, for example, exhibits a differentiation of alternatives which are set side by side and which form the basis of a subject's interpretation of his past and a potential manipulation of his future. If this choice situation is, furthermore, an ethical one, then we have what might be called "a taking of sides" of a number of factors in a "to do" and "not to do" decision.

This opportune arrangement refers both to the mediating

relation of a context to an action and to the description
of a state of affairs generically on the basis of an
identifiable structuration.

Thesis 4.2.5 Being without time

A number of thinkers were able to imagine a world without time. But since the "time" they had in mind was passing-time, this was not totally impossible. The arguments for passing-time are of course strong. The point here, of course, is that it is opportune time that puts us in contact with the world and integrates what is in the world. So the world would still be present to us and we to the world. Passing-time is not the temporal mode of this contact. In passing-time this contact can at best be a parallelization.⁵⁷ So the absence of passing-time does not disturb the givenness of the world.

But even if a world existed independently of passing-time, this world would still be temporal. Co-givenness implicates a mode of temporality. And so does, even more obviously, the idea of presence. Two elements of a picture cannot be present to each other outside a temporally determinate relation. Any world picture implicates time.

Thesis 4.2.6 Generalizability of relations

In the case of a factuality relation between two events given in terms of passing time as an earlier-later relation, we have an example of a relation between individual terms which conceptually gives primacy to the terms rather than to the relation. This means that although inference is possible from a factual proposition (e.g., "John is in London") the relation itself is not generalizable without restrictions. To speak of the before-after relation in general (as McTaggart does, for example) is to violate this restriction. What could be meant by "the before-after relation is unchange-able" if this relation is nothing more than so many instances of a relationship between individual terms? If we speak of the before-after relation simpliciter for the sake of examining its logical properties--if we simply thematize it in other words--this is permissible. But in no other way is this relation a general one; it cannot be disassociated from its terms in the way a string cannot be disassociated from its ends (although a distinction is indeed functional). On the other hand, when we are dealing with an instance of opportune arrangement, we observe a primacy of the relation of arrangement and a certain independence from its terms. In other words, the differentiating function of passing-time retreats thus giving primacy to the differentiated terms, whereas the integrating function of opportune time preserves its primacy over the terms it binds, a structured state of affairs appearing as an instantiation of a generic concept, i.e., indecision, irony, etc.

Thesis 4.2.7 Timelessness

Modes of timelessness too arise out of the need to delineate all things as temporal.

Timelessness is not the absence of time. Timelessness is a presupposition of thought when the characteristic functions of the two modes of within-timeness (passing-time and opportune-time) are suspended.

Timelessness is not a timeless property. Timelessness is a temporal modality; it depends on a common relational determination of at least two terms.

Timelessness is not unreal. It is rather formal time. It is a mode of temporality which exhibits a unique temporal structure. Timelessness is always part of a complex relation in time. By suspending the functions of within-timeness, it constitutes the grounds for conceiving the necessary.

Thesis 4.2.8 Timelessness II

In the diagram of thesis 4.2.1 we showed both modes of timelessness as equidistant from each mode of within-timeness.

Timelessness II possesses the structure of passing-time but forecloses the possibility of a superimposition of the opportune time function. Appropriate arrangement is different than opportune arrangement in that in the latter the terms of the arrangement remain free-standing whereas in the former they are bound. Thus in conceptualizing a process of "becoming," we treat new expressions as bound by what had preceded them. Thus "opportunity for random choice" in a process of "becoming" is effectively bracketed and substituted for by a kind of pre-engagement of the subsequent expressions. Accepting a certain performance as preparation for something to follow restricts the possible range of choice of what is to follow.⁵⁸ So too an expression that has taken place and has fulfilled its predetermination in some way itself becomes part of that predetermination for something else which is still to follow. Thus again its free-standing is replaced by an "engaged status."

Thesis 4.2.9 Timelessness I

Similarly, timelessness I possesses the structure of opportune time, but forecloses the possibility for a super-imposition of the passing time function of differentiation. In the application of this mode we have a bracketing of all issues of origin. The co-givenness of a determination with its criterion, for example, is always strictly synchronous. Neither the determination can pre-exist its criterion nor the criterion can pre-exist the determination. What have been called by some philosophers syntactical propositions exhibit this kind of time reference. That "four is greater than two" is true as long as a convention exists for determining the positions of four and two in a number series and for determining the meaning of "greater than."

Overlooking the inter-dependence of this mode of temporality with the other ones we have identified can lead to absurd assertions (that have infact been made) that propositions of the sort cited above are "eternal." In ancient Greek mythology the laws of necessity transcended and even determined the demiurgical powers of the gods. But whereas the temporal dimensions of such formulations is indeed timeless, the interpretation of this fact should be done, we believe, in the way proposed above.

Thesis 4.2.10 The existence of a timeless realm

Thus the question remains whether this temporal modality should be thought of, even though it can be thought of, as a single integral modality in the way that passing time is often thought of as an integral dimension. People like Plato, and Christian theology too, have taken this step. But the considerations that must not be overlooked are these: If it is determinations and not concrete entities that enter these sorts of relations then we must not pose this temporal modality as implicating "existence," and secondly, not all determinations that bear this relation to another do in fact bear this determination to all other such determinations.

Thus we should pose timelessness as so many instances of presupposing strict synchrony rather than as an integral realm of Being.

Thesis 4.2.11 A short historical note

Does history testify against the thematization of modes of temporality other than that of passing time?

Thinking of men of ancient times as modern day empiricists is one of those instances of historiological insensitivity that should be obvious enough to us, the descendants of Vico, so as not to exemplify. We cannot claim, therefore, that passing time has been the mode of temporality that has received privileged treatment in the thought of humanity. It is more accurate to say that it is the mode of timelessness II that has had this honour. Thus, the reason for the readiness with which this mode of temporality has been thematized must not be sought for in the so-called "primitiveness" of the intuition of non-simultaneity.⁵⁹ As a matter of fact, humanity has from very early on thematized "eternality" (timelessness I) alongside of the "unfolding and maturing process of 'becoming'." And the primary intuition at work appears to be the intuition of "repetitiveness" rather than that of non-simultaneity. This is not a strict repetition of identical units of course⁶⁰ but the building up of unities of time (days, moons, years, etc.). These unities of time are integrations of human and divine significances. The word time in English is possibly the translation of two words by which this reality is designated in other languages. For example, in Greek there are two

terms, "chronos" and "kairos," whose use exhibits what we might call, following a certain usage, a logical grammar which distinguishes more modalities than surface grammar in English would suggest.

Section 4.3 Time is not "factual"

Thesis 4.3.1 Generic temporal concepts are results of
interpretation not extension

In thesis 4.2.6 we saw that generalization of relations (whether of time relations or not) which are grounded in one mode of temporality is different than the generalization of relations grounded in another mode of temporality. Proceeding from the application of temporal concepts at a certain level to a description of the functionality of temporal concepts at a more general level is done by means of an interpretation. Thus, more generic concepts of time are not directly extensional with less generic ones. These are the grounds on which we have claimed that time is not factual.

By the same token, time cannot be defined; it cannot be given as a concept of restricted applicability.

Thesis 4.3.2 The interpretation of the concept of time is
done by means of the concept of "relationality"

The interpretation of time is done by means of a classification of types of "relationality." This holds true at all levels of generality. But, furthermore, all instances of relations are also always characterizable in terms of modes of temporality. This is what we have called the "translatability thesis." A dialectic exists between the concepts of "relationality" and "temporality" which is discoverable at all levels of generality. The two concepts exemplify the same generality and universality. Whereas any other concept that might be considered as a likely candidate for an interpretation of time, eg., "change," "movement," "progression," etc., fail to meet this criterion of universality, the concept of "relationality" does not. At the most general level the world can be described as "a system of relations," because of the need to assume both multiplicity and integration in any world picture, and as a "system whose members are temporally related." There is no possibility of there being a world without temporality. Thus both descriptions are totally general and totally exhaustive. We therefore can philosophically state that "temporality is relationality" and vice versa. The converse statement, however, although equally true is at the same time a different starting point for differentiating these generic categories.

The inter-translatability also means that the description of temporal modalities as relational structures is one level of interpretation of the concept of time.

Thesis 4.3.3 The thematic independence of "relationality"

Another presupposition of this dialectic is that the concept of "relationality" can stand on its own; in other words, that "relationality" can be thematized independently of its terms. To support this claim we will cite a passage from Ernst Cassirer's The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms,⁶¹:

(Needless to say that we disagree with its Kantian slant and that we believe that treating "relationality" in the specific way that Kantianism treats it is to restrict the possibility for explicating "relationality" fruitfully.)

∴ let us call the elements of the relation a and b and the relationship by which they are held together R Moreover, the form of the relation itself (R) signifies something new and specific as opposed to the contents that are ordered in it. It belongs, so to speak, to a different plane of signification from the particular contents; it is not itself a particular content, a specific thing, but a universal, purely ideal relation.

Thesis 4.3.4 Dialectic versus dependence

In section 3 of chapter 1 we argued against taking a logical specificity as the fundamentally privileged starting-point for explicating the concept of time. We disapproved of this explication in terms of another concept because this would have made time dependent on this other concept for its determinateness. Instead, now we suggest that whatever the other concept is that time is matched with, the conceptual link must possess the character of a dialectic.⁶² We must not have a dependence of time on this other concept but rather we must have an inter-dependence. This is what we have called inter-translatability.

The dependence of one determination on another assumes that the determination which is the grounds of the determinateness of the other is more universal. The inter-translatability thesis, on the other hand, assumes that the whole extent of one determination is translatable into the other.

Chapter 5

TEMPORAL GRAMMAR

Section 5.1 Temporal grammar as relational

Thesis 5.1.1 'Past,' 'present,' 'future' as relational terms

It is not simply that "what is the present" has "neighbours" that makes it a relational term.⁶³ The 'present' and equally the 'past' and 'future' are determinations (descriptions, interpretations) that arise within certain semantic schemata.

The 'past,' 'present' and 'future' as determinations are not univocal but plurivocal. In speaking of a continuum of past-present-future, we do so at the expense of the idiomorphies of the temporal schemata which have given rise to the determinateness of each term. The idea of a "continuum" is an abstraction from the specific applicability of these interpretations.

Thesis 5.1.2 Temporal semantics

In analysing these determinations and the way they are semantically bound--by a relevant schema in each case--we discover two distinguishable manners in which this "binding" appears. We can call this the instance when a term is "formally" bound and when it is "existentially" bound. "Formal" implication of a term is when this term is simply part of the schema in question. It is part of this schema in the form of the scope of a variable which can take a number of values. It thus means that the term is necessarily implicated but not implicated as an invariable. An "existentially" bound term is a term which is implicated as a specific unique value.

If I am playing chess and I have brought my pieces to such an arrangement that the opponent will lose one of two of his good pieces and I am waiting for my turn, my "present" binds my "future" in the way we have called "existential." If he makes a move to save his piece a then I will attack piece b, if, on the other hand, he makes a move to save piece b, I will attack piece a. In intention I hold in hand a unique future action. But if on the other hand the game is still undecided and I am not certain what the opponent will do, in resolving "to wait and see" I hold in view an extension-area of possible future eventualities. In expectation, the future is bound as an "object" towards which our attention is directed but it is only "formally" bound.

Thesis 5.1.3 The translatability thesis and the plurivocality
of 'past,' 'present,' 'future' as determinations

It is of utmost importance to note that the plurivocality of these determinations and the translatability thesis which we have propounded in the previous chapter are mutually reinforceable. If these determinations were not plurivocal the translatability thesis in the form we have proposed it--as the foundation stone to a broad cross-interpretation of temporality and of the content of the world--would be redundant. Not that the translatability thesis would not apply; the idea of the "existence" of the present and the "non-existence" of the past and future are a degenerate case of the translatability thesis. In interpreting the present as the "existent" and the past and future as "non-existent" we do indeed apply the translatability thesis but we make a serious mistake: the determinations 'past,' 'present,' 'future' are interpreted as universal categories rather than generic. And although the universality of time is an unassailable fact and a necessary starting point (or conclusion) it arises at a different level. At this level the determining function of time is the applicability of generic yet non-universal descriptions. The existence-non-existence fallacy arises with the translation of the whole realm (the whole extent) of "Being" into categories of 'past,' 'present' and 'future.' The doctrine of temporal schematism is meant to mend this erroneous conclusion.

Thesis 5.1.4 The significance of how the translatability
thesis is construed

It might in fact be unavoidable to presuppose a translatability of some sort. It makes a great deal of difference, however, which terms are chosen as the two sides of this conceptual bridge. For in our opinion, this single issue gives us both the orientation of what we have called the traditional conception of time in summary form, as it were, and the difference between this conception and the one suggested and elaborated here. Whereas traditionally the subject of the temporal transcription was taken to be "existence," the result being that the extensionality of temporal significance was necessarily limited and regimented into an "other-dimensionality," in our opinion this subject could not plausibly be taken as anything other than "co-existence." And because "co-existence" is, by some ontological necessity, always interpreted as either "factual" or "factual" an elaboration becomes possible and pertinent. In the first case "other-dimensionality" remains a surface description and in the latter temporal translation in effect becomes a reproduction and an unfolding of structuration.

Section 5.2 Some ideas and preliminary analyses

Thesis 5.2.1 The schemata

We do not intend to analyse all the possible interpretive schemata here. (The reason for this is partially given in thesis 5.3.2 where we ascribe to metatheory a preparatory role.) What we would instead do is to give some elementary ideas and some preliminary analyses on temporal semantics.

The general point to be made here is that temporal schemata arise out of a mutual implication of two or all of these terms--'past,' 'present' and 'future.'

The schema past-present is distinguishable from the schema present-past. Similarly, with the other schemata the order is a principle of differentiation between schemata because it coincides with a different way of implicating the terms discoverable independently but not analytically.

Thesis 5.2.2 Past-present, present-past: two distinct schemata

That the present-past and past-present are two distinct schemata is a conclusion necessitated by analysis of applications of these. Let us look at the example of causal reasoning. It is taken from a previous paper discussing this form of reasoning.

Although 'effect' cannot be so called or distinguished outside a scheme of cause-effect, the event that eventually takes up this position in the scheme is axiologically primary. Our interest to causally explain things is always provoked, whether in science, ascription-of-responsibility situations or in everyday conversation, by an event that has proved interesting, abnormal, bothersome, beneficial or harmful. When the scheme, the 'closed system,' is constructed this event always constitutes the end-state (effect) and never the cause. We do not just pick out events from the infinite number which surrounds us and construct closed systems around them (or ahead of them) and attempt to imagine their possibilities. We only do that if a certain effect, which is important to us, already seems a probable member of the closed system. But this still recognizes axiological primacy to the effect. Both Von Wright and Collingwood ascribe this primacy to the effect although maybe not consciously. Hart and Honoré⁶⁴ come closer. In Von Wright, for example the questions for causal explanations are of the sort "...why did c happen...?" and "...why did this state materialize...?"⁶⁵ Collingwood, too, begins his description of the difference between the various senses of cause with the statement "Here that which is 'caused' is...."⁶⁶

Another simple fact about effects, or rather the events that constitute effects in an explanation scheme, is that they belong to objects and persons in a way that event-causes do not. This is the reason why they are axiologically primary. Effects are always effects on somebody or something. The same holds true when we are talking about results, consequences and outcomes. A result is always in terms of change in an object or a person's condition

as, for example, when we say that peace was the result of the negotiations. Similarly, when we say "Unhappiness was the consequence of their divorce," it is unhappiness for somebody. Another consequence might have been that the house was sold and the money divided. Because objects and people--nations, children, houses--are important to us, or to governments, etc., then events are important if they are events of, to, or for these people and objects.

A cause, however, does not necessarily belong to significant 'objects' in the same way. General conditions are causal contributors and yet they are not thought of as related to anything for their significance. Even an event like "a strong blow by a heavy solid on somebody's head" may or may not be a human action or even a reflex movement and it will still be what it is as a cause. But we have argued that the same is not true about the relation of an event-effect to an object or person.

I suspect that this is the source of the asymmetry between cause and effect. This is an alternative to viewing cause as more powerful, by itself and in itself somehow, than effect. Would such asymmetry exist between a possible cause and an effect? No, because it may not necessarily bring about that effect. And it is meaningless to talk about power of causes over effects which they do not bring about. Such power, and the resultant asymmetry, could be possessed only by the cause of an event which has already taken place. At the beginning of the process of reflection we have an actual and important effect and, at best, a hypothetical cause. The effect has happened and it is important to us as it has happened. This importance requires that it is irreversible. The asymmetry, we often hear discussed, is actually a 'reversed' asymmetry grounded in the fact that the event-effect by having happened in the way it did, it, "once and for all," subjected itself to its cause no matter what this cause may be.

I have talked in the previous paragraph about reversing. It seems to me that this is the case in causal explanations. Causal explanations are 'artificially' forward progressing. They are actually 'reversed inferences.' In such a reversed inference we try to establish that E_c caused E_e . But originally we started with E_e and inferred an E_o . Reversing the inference we try to conclude

E_e from E_c which is substituted in thought for E_o .

This, in turn implies that causation, in its original and perhaps most significant sense, is the way that the event-effect is related to (an) antecedent event(s).⁶⁷

The following observations must be made:

(a) Both schemata are applied in the course of this reasoning. In the next section we will look at how this is a very common occurrence and that it happens with all forms of complex reasoning.

(b) These schemata are, however, different. In the case of the present-past schema (which precedes the other schema) we have an instance of an existentially bound present and only a formally bound past. In the case of the past-present schema, we have both an existentially bound past and an existentially bound present. Causal sequence is pointedly called "bound sequence" on the basis of this fact, namely that both terms are existentially bound whereas the mere interpretation of an event-effect as having been caused by "something" that preceded it cannot deserve this description.

Thesis 5.2.3 The causal chain: Does it bind the future?

We are, therefore, denying that what the causal chain binds is the past and the future. "The sun has been rising everyday for so many thousands of years, therefore the sun will rise tomorrow" has the surface appearance of a causal statement. The fact, however, that the sun rose today is in no way a condition--neither necessary nor sufficient--of the sun rising tomorrow. The sun's having risen so many times constitutes the grounds for inferring (and if we are to believe Wittgenstein in the Tractatus⁶⁸, it is not even that) that the sun will rise again tomorrow and not the conditions.

Unfortunately the "grammar" of causal reasoning has not been fully unfolded. The enterprise must, as one of its first tasks, consider the conditions under which the schematic relation is generalizable. It appears that part of the problem is the illegitimate generalization of this relation which produces confusion concerning its application.

Thesis 5.2.4 The teleological chain is a closed system

Most discussions on the notion of teleology appear to assume that the paradigmatic instance of the application of this notion is human intentionality. Intentions, goals and other projects of the human mind concern future, yet unrealized states of affairs. They are thus ends which according to these approaches is the field or object of study of teleology.

But why should this be so? Why should intentional behaviour not be analysed by intentionalist schemata rather than teleological? This quarrel over terminology (technical not everyday) is perhaps indicative of the choices built into the analysis. Why treat teleological statements as "metaphorical" rather than call teleology the "truth"--indeed the literal truth--of certain statements which are sui generis teleological descriptions? Is there then a literal meaning to teleological statements which concern the future and which are not intentionalist interpretations?

The "teleological chain," if we are permitted the term, is a closed system;⁶⁹ it must be a self-contained process. What we mean by this is that all terms within a field must be semantically bound. Applying a description which identifies a teleological process requires the identification of a mechanism which integrates a number of steps--instances throughout which the subject under discussion

maintains a certain orientation and is flexible to variation according to the input of new information. This 'record of behaviour' is a function of the determinateness of the past. Thus this schema does not primarily bind the present.

We are thus claiming that the differentiating principle between different interpretive schemata should not be identified in terms of "etiologies"⁷⁰ but in terms of temporal schematism.

Thesis 5.2.5 Behaviourist criteria for intentionality

Two instances when the present is bound are in the reversed inference of causal reasoning and in, a similar case, the reversal in imagination by an acting agent who decides what to do at present on the basis of his ability "to see the future as present."

Descriptions of intentions are both post hoc and partial. The network of human intentionality is far too complex to be made part of "a closed process." In going to a tobacconist's shop, I might be intending to buy cigarettes but also to see somebody working there and to get a £5 note changed, etc. Or even I might be testing myself to see if I could resist smoking even though I had a packet sitting on my desk, or I might be going back on my word that I would not smoke again, etc.

Behaviourist criteria for intentionality apply only to limiting actions whereas a teleological system integrates all instances-steps. Goal-orientation in the case of intentions is not totally reducable to a mechanism of utilizing information because it is not totally reducable to outward behaviour. I might be oriented towards a goal even when I am not engaged in the appropriate actions which promote the achievement of that goal. This does not mean that I am engaged in activities that foreclose the possibility of achieving that goal. However, not doing something

which reinforces the achievement of the goal is not necessarily foreclosing that eventuality. The issue of whether I have an intention or not is not totally decidable by individual present acts. Afterall, there is such a thing as deception. Furthermore, the ascription of a goal even if done by me to myself, is not a totally determinate description. There is a whole host of questions that I have not raised and to which I do not know the answers and which make the ascription of a goal-- about which these are unsettled--indeterminate, at least not totally determinate. I may be oriented towards winning a doctorate and towards gaining an academic teaching job, but that does not mean that this intention is totally determinate. There are a number of other possibilities-- "is this then what" s and "if not this then what" s-- that I have not settled. It is thus misleading to take as the paradigmatic instance of intentions the simple cases of intentions about opening windows and buying tobacco.

Thesis 5.2.6 Introductory note on intentional action

The analysis of intentional action would show that the relief of its meaningful aspects extends between all three terms, 'past,' 'present' and 'future.' Even in the simple case of deciding to and **performing the act** of going across the street to buy a packet of cigarettes that we have looked at, there is not only future oriented intentionality but also an interpretive function directed towards the past. To decide in this instance to buy a packet of cigarettes is to continue a habit, or to go back on one's word. The money used has perhaps already been budgeted. In the case of a younger person, it might be an act of disobedience to parents or school authorities. In the case of more weighty decisions, it might be legitimately thought that in taking them one is accommodating his past to a new way of life.

Human action and decision is not one-dimensional, neither towards the past nor towards the future. In a sense decision arrests the flow of time momentarily and opens up a purely present extension. A person faced with a choice is confronted with two or more equally present alternatives. Thus, the present is not simply given to him as an extension of the past and future but as possessing an internal arrangement of its own, namely, a differentiation of present factors that he is called to reckon with and choose from. The structuration of the present has a

constancy from situation to situation. All decision is given as the state of affairs where there is differentiation of alternatives which are rooted in the past and binding of the future.⁷¹

The future is unavoidably implicated in any analysis of human intentionality. The resultant schema must therefore be an irreducible three-fold one, past-present-future, or perhaps--if we follow Heidegger⁷²--a future-past-present one. (I emphasize irreducible because there are a number of other cases where although all three terms are implicated, the resultant schema is only a two-fold one.) The three-fold schema by which human decision and action might be analysed allows a connection to be made between actions and the meaning of the totality of human life and existence. Thus, the possibility for the religious/symbolic (self)-interpretation of life is grounded in the fact that human actions effectively rehabilitate the totality of temporal extensionality of human existence. Thus, human actions can be informed by commitments which are generic in character and which are fulfilled or transgressed by individual acts.⁷³

Thesis 5.2.7 Teleology and the semantic implication
of the past

Teleology can be thought of as the study of "fulfilment." "Fulfilment" as a notion is applicable in two cases: (a) When any new term which emerges within a certain field attended to is judged on the basis of the terms already in existence. (b) When a past term determines which from a plethora of new terms is judged appropriate to count for a continuation/development of the term(s) already in existence. An example of the first might be found in the unfolding of a musical melody. (The analysis of musical perception is, of course, more complex, but we are here identifying one of the schemata at work.) If, let us say, n notes have been performed and on the basis of their having been performed in the specific way they were performed, i.e., on the basis of a determinateness given as the past, a certain field of attention functions within which any new notes emerging are judged as appropriate or inappropriate developments of what has already been. Thus in musical appreciation, a schema is at work which compares what is later with what is earlier. This temporal schema, however, does not necessarily--or not at all--refer to the present. It is the mere fact of a note's relative position to the others which is the important factor. The past is given as a linearity which arrests the emergent terms as a development of it. This linearity is a perceptive connection. If we take another example, which is not too dis-similar, of a person with a belief in the overall

transcendent meaning of the events of his life, we might be able to see more clearly how this linearity works. (Historically speaking teleology has been associated with this conception much more closely rather than with goal-orientation.) Let us say that this person believes that a divine power controls the development of his life and on the basis of his past experiences he judges that the direction it is taking is towards a certain end. What happens when an event apparently out of line takes place? A way is sought for integrating the meaning of this event with the overall pattern. Let us take the example of Jonah. He was supposed to go East and he went westwards. Yet the linearity was not broken. Being thrown over the side of the ship to be swallowed by a big whale was in his mind not meaningless but substantively related to this pattern with the result that in the end what came of it was a more intense belief in the existence of this pattern. He probably argued to himself that without his experience of going westwards he would not have been able to understand the full significance of his going East. Thus, both his experience with the whale and the eventual outcome fulfilled the initial experiences in a way that post facto appeared necessary.

The other case in which a fulfilment relation exists exemplified in writing, say a letter, or of asking a question or of asking for a favour. These are instances of the relation of fulfilment in which the already-in-

existence term(s) determine(s) the grounds on which the new term will be chosen from a plethora of events. If I write a letter to my brother, I set an imbalance, in a sense, which will be restored when and if he reads the letter. Thus, my action calls for fulfilment and the objectivication of my act (the letter) is a structure which is unrealized until the person concerned, or at least someone else, matches what has already occurred with a new act. Similarly with a request not anything counts for a response. If I ask my wife to bring me tea to bed and the next thing she does is open the window, the latter act is either not taken as a response at all or it is taken as the inappropriate one. If she thereby refused it would, of course, be the case that the request was "fulfilled." In both these cases, again, the determinateness of an earlier event is the decisive factor in deciding what term can come under the description asserting a fulfilment relation. It thus appears that in these cases too the relevant schema at work is a schema which implicates past and future.

Thus, although the teleological schema and the intentionalist schema are both future-oriented, they are distinguishable on the basis of a different temporal structure.

Thesis 5.2.8 Two distinct teleological schemata

In the discussion that has just preceded we have seen two different cases of the mutual implication of past and future--these being two cases when a teleological description applies. In the one case, (a) the determinateness of the past implicated a "variable-place" within which specific events eventually assumed the place of unique but yet open-ended terms. This appears to be a future-past schema. The characteristic which differentiates this as an interpretive schema is that what follows, in its turn, accommodates what had preceded to a re-evaluation. Thus, in the possibility of this variation we detect the "formal" binding of the future not its "existential." In the second case, (b) the past "existentially" determines the future because it has already prejudged the choice of what is to be taken as fulfilment of it. This schema is not, however, a future-past schema; it is not a looking at the past from the point of view of the future but a past-future schema since it is a looking at the future from the point of view of the past.

Thesis 5.2.9 Present, future: Two schemata

There are thus two other schemata which we must mention explicitly in this brief discussion. These are the schemata of present-future and future-present. In thesis 5.1.2 we gave the example of playing chess as a situation which illustrates two different ways of thinking about the future. In having a specific intention of achieving a particular goal, we are in fact looking at the present from the point of view of the future. A goal is a state of affairs a subject desires to be true in the future. The statement asserting it as a state of affairs which obtains should be true if uttered at a certain date in the future. If, for example, my goal is to pass a certain test, "I have passed such and such a test" is a statement that I am hoping to be able to truthfully utter at or after a certain date. If, furthermore, I am intending to do something at present to ensure that this will be so, it is as if I am hypothetically applying causal reasoning. So I interpret my meditated present action as what will provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for the desired eventuality to obtain. "The spaciousness" of the present arises with a future-present schema. The "spaciousness" of the present extends to the point where "events" can be recognized from the point of view of some position in the future as determinate. Thus, there is no principle on the basis of which the exact extent of the present can be calculated.

In the other instance, however, of looking at the future from the point of view of the present the future appears as an open yet formally bound horizon towards which my attention is turned. I wait to see what will happen next.

Thesis 5.2.10 The plurivocality thesis repeated

We must thus reassert the idea that the 'past,' 'future,' 'present' determinations exhibit a plurivocality and not an equivocality. We are accustomed to hearing the thesis that the past is always bound and determinate and the future always open and indeterminate. Yet neither thesis is universally true. There are instances when the past is open to a new interpretation--not only a possible new interpretation of the significance of something that happened but even a change or a reconsideration of the descriptions of what happened. There are an infinite number of instances when an earlier event does not take its correct description until its results and consequences are made manifest and known. Can we call a certain event "the events which led to the discovery of x" before x is actually discovered? Similarly, our perception of the future is not like the experience of looking into the midday Mediterranean sun. We do in fact see the future in a lot of instances. Otherwise we would be, effectively, totally disoriented. It is absurd to claim that all statements about the future other than statements of intentions and desires are absurd. A significant number of cases when we apply conditionals refer to the future.

Thesis 5.2.11 Additional note on schematism

Thus the specific, independently verifiable applicability of temporal schemata presents us with a pattern of semantic constraint of temporal meanings which is both generic (can take one of a number of values) and translatable. Even though by means of the idea of plurivocality of temporal determinations we assert that these are not invariable, we also hold that the temporal schemata themselves and their particular manners of restricting their terms are theoretically constant.

Section 5.3 Complex Schematism

Thesis 5.3.1 Note on complex schematism

The schemata we have considered were simple. Yet the analysis of "structures of experience" and the descriptions and interpretations which arise with and are applicable to them would show--a conclusion already gestured towards-- that these are more complex than a simple arrangement-- a grouping--of terms in accordance to any simple schema. In analysing such structures, we discover a superimposition of schemata. This superimposition we have called complex schematism.

Thesis 5.3.2 The example of musical appreciation

Let us take as our example the attending to the performance of a musical piece.

In the performance of a musical piece we can initially distinguish the notes that have been performed, the notes that have not been performed and the notes that are being performed at present, those that are immediately audible. There are at least three sets of temporal relations that can be identified. (Perhaps this is an instance of there being two structurally incorporated sets of relations and a resultant third one which becomes effective in the act of performing itself, or in reading the score as if one is hearing the music in one's head. This issue will, however, not occupy us here.) There is, first of all, in the performance of a musical piece preparation for what is being heard--the notes--now. This preparation effectively restricts the way the present expression will be heard and the possible choice of an appropriate development from what has already occurred. In artistic appreciation we "approve" or "disapprove" of individual choices made by the artist. In such appreciation we reconstruct the artistic issue to be resolved and follow through its resolution. This interpretive schema appears to be past-present, its organizing principle being that of predetermination of a value by the values assumed in the past. This is the relation of preparation of the past predetermining what is present at hand.

It is not, however, a past-future schematic relation of the kind we have identified in discussing teleology. The term that follows is not determinate simply because it is subsequent. In music where temporal distance is itself of utmost importance because of tempo and rhythm the "present-ing" of a new expression also gains significance. When temporal distance is of importance it is as if the future is in contact with the past and it cannot thus be properly considered as future. Like causalist arguments in the courts time lapse is important. In these cases the subsequent is intrinsically related to the antecedent. What we have here appears to be a past-present structuration.

But what is the relation of the new notes to what has preceded them? What has preceded is a preparation for what follows and what follows is a fulfilment of what has preceded. When a new note is performed it itself becomes part of the preparation for what is still to follow. The new terms accommodate the already performed to a new determinateness--the preparation is developed. This in turn seems to be a future-past schematic relation.

But attention to the performance of a musical piece is not directed towards the past. The past maintains itself in memory but this attentiveness is given as an attentiveness to what is immediately audible and as a leaning towards an indeterminate future. In listening to what is immediately

before us and in waiting, predicting and anticipating what is next. Thus, performance grounds the function of suspense. This interplay between suspense and verification of choices as they are being presented is the essence of musical appreciation.

Section 5.4 Metatheory

Thesis 5.4.1 General note on the relation between
metatheory and temporal schematism

We are now proposing to discuss the relation of metatheory to temporal schematism. This relation is, of course, quite complex. It is possible that temporal considerations can provide metatheoretical reflections with criteria of completeness. What we are interested in, however, in this section is how metatheory can function as a starting-point, as an initial topography of certain structures which can serve as a first step to an interpretation of these by means of temporal schematism. We can thus limit ourselves to how temporal considerations function as independent metatheoretic criteria of consistency and not of completeness.

It would not, however, be much of an achievement if all that was proposed for a temporal metatheory was the joyless chore of being a watch dog over illegitimate application of schemata. But this need not be all that such a metatheory may be intended for. The reason why it was explicitly insisted on that a topography of structures must assume an important role as a place to start was related to this. If in talking with an artist, for example, the metatheoretician were to tell him what he is to think and what he can think, nothing could be achieved. In such a case the philosopher should do nothing more than facilitate the integration of "significances" into syntactical sets. For in this case

more than in any other, it becomes apparent that no description is uniquely privileged to an object and that the first philosophical struggle to be won is the breaking down of this prejudice so that the full extent of the hermeneutic responsibility will come into its own.

At least in some contexts anything can be spoken about. And whatever can be spoken about has a significance, for significance is a function of conceptual association and is not inherent. Ontologically speaking, it is interpretation that possesses primordially not objects.

Thesis 5.4.2 Topography and interpretation

If the translatability thesis is true then metatheory can serve as an initial topography of structuration. In this possibility of matching a topography with independent considerations⁷⁴ which ground the metatheoretic interpretation in accordance with already verified criteria of applicability, we identify the grounds of a theory of temporal schematism. The classification of metatheoretically translated⁷⁵ assertions provides the theory of temporal schematism with its subject matter. On the other hand, application of descriptions which is illegitimate can be detected on the basis of previously stipulated criteria.

Appendix

"REMARKS ON DAN SPERBER'S RETHINKING SYMBOLISM"

I

The objective of this section is to illustrate, as well as possible, what the temporal metatheory that has been suggested in the previous chapters can come to methodologically.

Instead however of approaching a set of data directly, it was thought better that a theoretical, methodological resolution for approaching data should be looked at. This enables discussion to be directed in two ways: towards the theoretical method and/or strategy used and towards the material itself, attempting a suggestion of how it could be looked at more adequately.

For these purposes, the temporal metatheory appears, firstly, as a non-empiricist and non-positivist conception of factuality and, secondly, as a general clue on the possibilities of organizing discourse. The plan of this chapter is thus to discuss Sperber's manner of approach to ethnomethodological material, and how this is affected by philosophical presuppositions of a certain sort, and then discuss in what way the temporal metatheory is a key or a clue to the interpretation of human thought.

A basic assumption in Sperber's book is that knowledge is structured like an encyclopedia. Encyclopedia is the co-existence in memory of logically compatible 'facts.' It thus appears that this structured set of observations which constitutes our operational consciousness of what the world is like embodies an abstract principle of arrangement; it consists of a number of entries which have both the status of individual descriptions of entities and states of affairs and the function of reinforcing or modifying a general picture by means of what they might be committing us to.

The temporal metatheory being a metatheory about 'co-existence' rather than 'existence' recognizes an inclination, resulting from the above formulation, to treat descriptions as individually acquired information in a temporally non-complicated way, as predeterminate of perception and as independently determinate. This tendency is, though, partly balanced out by assigning some kind of temporal basis to the 'shared' treatment of items of information as so many pieces of a world-picture or perspective. Thus, 'memory' and 'knowledge acquisition' are temporally extended but individual descriptions are metatheoretically neutral as far as time is concerned. So then, perception as a 'level' of knowledge-formation exhibits a significance as regards its place in the order of a process--a process, however, which is the same in all instances--but percep

tion as an 'instance,' a temporally bound event, does not.

Putting it differently, the element 'intentionality' as in any way a variable is left out by the view of knowledge as encyclopedia. Thus with expression, for example, all intention is flattened out as the intentionality embodied in the 'language-game' of making propositional declarations about the world, either about the world as one "really" knows it or about the world as one wished it to be.

Alternatively, a broader view of discourse would leave open the question of the plurality and polyphony of expressive intention. Thus in principle a distinction between different employments of non-literal elaborations, magic, and ritual becomes theoretically insignificant. But the cultural 'diachronicities' of these practices and the combinations of relative cultural significance in which they are found are indeed variable.

Thus, the idea of the encyclopedia as an abstract syntactical structure leads to two choices for the strategic tackling of the material: On the one hand, it leads to a view of the symbolic system as itself a form of (substitute) encyclopedia, one however which integrates 'non-falsifiable' or 'not yet falsified' statements,⁷⁸ and on the other, to an account of perception by means of a (complex) mechanism.

The form of the symbolic assertion is similar to the form of the encyclopedic entry. Furthermore, the common form of

these is suggested, perhaps unwittingly; to be the categorical propositional form embodying the copula "is." Thus, encyclopedic or semantic statements of the sort:

- (1) The lion is an animal
- (2) A good knife is a knife that cuts well
- (3) A lion is a dangerous animal
- (4) A good knife is expensive
- (5) Isidore is the husband of Ursula
- (6) Marriage is an institution
- (7) Adultery is pleasant

suggest symbolic statements like the following:

- (8) The leopard is a christian animal who observes the fasts of the Orthodox Church
 - (9) It is taboo to kill a snake
 - (10) The proper food of ancestor spirits is the blood of animals sacrificed to them
 - (11) Adultery is a sin
 - (12) '(9)' is true
 - (13) '(10)' is true
 - (14) '(11)' is true
- etc.

This set-up makes the comparison literal-nonliteral or empirical-nonfalsifiable appear more natural and intuitively clear. But does it do justice to native cognition to consider it in this way?

Like anti-naturalistic ethics, Sperber's theory poses the

problem of knowledge in terms of the contrast between 'factuality'-'judgement.' The reference of course to 'judgement' or interpretation here is not the same as with anti-naturalistic ethics. The symbolic statement has value in a double sense. It does not only have relative value as concerning the remainder of the set it forms a part of but also has 'existential,' evocational value. Thus, the significance of the fact that the symbolic statement expresses itself by means of the verb "is" rather than by "ought." The "is" is here a blind "ought." It is overinvested in. The conceptual conditions do not exist for the native, it is thought, to be able to simply say "things are not like this but they ought to be like this." Rather, the native unintentionally infers how things are from how things must be, the 'real' from the 'intelligible.'

The similarity, however, between this view and anti-naturalistic ethics is that both treat factuality as an empirically complete and self-sufficient description which is neutral to interpretive evaluation. In chapter 3 we have argued that the manner of givenness of a 'fact' is variable. Offering a phenomenal description and assuming that it is sufficiently exhaustive reflects the assumption of a perspective on what is given in experience. The conclusion that it hinges on the assumption of a perspective challenges the assertion that this manner of perception is natural or endemic. And in this particular

way Sperber exemplifies an a-historical, or anti-historical, position. He makes a perspective endemic, a natural condition, rather than assert that it is the assumption of some perspective which is endemic. Thus, native man is considered to be some kind of modern day empiricist. In contrast to this, we must account for the conditions that made the assumption of a certain native perspective more likely or privileged than that of another.

The other implication of the view of knowledge as encyclopedia is, as we have said, for an account of perception.

A symbolic elaboration when compared to a 'proper' cognitive elaboration demonstrates a "gross irrationality" or a paradoxicality. Both are however significant. The difference, Sperber argues, is that the one is literal whereas the other is not. But is this pair of categories literal-symbolic, although pertinent for a characterization of elaborated thinking, also applicable to perception? It would appear not. Any individual observation by itself can have logical import for endorsing both a literal account of the world and for endorsing a symbolic account. As Wittgenstein would say, what constitutes a proof is determined by the context and conditions in which the issue has a meaning. Thus, "personA is eating a pork chop" can in one context be considered proof that this person is alive and well and in another context that he is breaking a taboo. In other words, there appears to be an irreducible integrality of discursive accounts of experience and this

is what gives 'relative evidential value' to observations. If I see somebody, of whom I have heard that he is lazy, sleeping under a tree after lunch, I would probably think "he is lazying." If I saw the same person or someone else sleeping in his bed at midnight, I might think "he is resting." Is there a difference in what I perceived? The logical empiricist solution would be to say that what I perceived was the same, namely, that "A is sleeping," in both cases. What that does is to assume, even tentatively, that an observation can be disassociated from the determinant context of the description on the basis of a philosophical postulation concerning the existence of a set of 'abstractly' empirical sense data. But even though the context might in many cases appear to be neutral, this is simply in the sense that it is non-intrusive. But what if the person who is now in front of me "sleeping" had told me earlier that he was going to implement a method for catching whoever it was that was regularly stealing money from his pocket? In such a case the general context does intrude on a neutral acceptance of phenomenality. The self-sufficiency of a phenomenal description is suspended. Treating a phenomenal description as sufficient is on the condition of a non-suspension of its sufficiency. Treating phenomenal descriptions as sufficient is then no less a perspective on what one perceives in the world simply because "we" employ it often.

It seems to me that Sperber's mechanism solution is an attempt to cope with, or at least it bears on, the problem that arises from this non-immediacy of the categories literal-symbolic. In effect, what the mechanism solution does is to pose a methodological dis-continuity between acquisition of data and elaboration.

Acquisition thus appears neutral to the choice of interpretation that is given to it. Thus, the necessity that characterizations should be applicable at the instance of perception is suspended while at the same time a post-elaboration return to the level of perception is made possible. In the terms of the previous paragraph this means that the integrality principle is employed while at the same time it is denied of any explicit methodological import.

Alternatively, the integrality principle would require that perception was itself interpretive and the point where entries were "essentially" qualified.

In my opinion this conclusion can be grounded only if the central role is given to the idea of discourse rather than to that of encyclopedia. If nothing else, this substitution secures the requirement of maintaining open possibilities of what the constructive character of a version of thought might be. But in addition to this, it also appears unforced to say that perception is the habilitation of experience by discourse both in the sense that 'the world'

inescapably qualifies as discursive and intelligible and in the sense that discourse is unavoidably qualified as worldly; any construing of 'the world' occasions discourse and all discourse projects a world.

Perception is recognition. It is the discrimination of an individual, but this individual can never be simply a radical individual. It embodies a perpetuation and a continuation of a judgement about the meaningfulness of the world.

But that is something that for Sperber cannot be accepted as a characteristic of symbolism. Symbolism cannot be the continuity-character between a manner of perceiving inherent symbolic significance--since this is ruled out by the assumption that all men's perception is always a perception of empirical sense data--and a way of thinking, a self-perpetuating and all-intrusive orientation. Thus, symbolism is neither ever a privileged description of states of affairs nor a constant and consistent orientation toward 'the world.' On the contrary, symbolism is the product of a dependent process made possible by a secondary cognitive mechanism. Consequently and in addition, it is the repeatable act of organizing memory. Rather than self-perpetuating it is cyclically completable. Thus Sperber believes he can get away with an account of how the world appears to the native confessedly different than the way the native himself gives it, by posing this double

dis-continuity of symbolism, namely the non-immediacy of symbolic evidence and the available-on-demand character of symbolism.

III

Indeed the object of study is how man sees himself in the world.

One thing should be clear: the way Sperber looks at man-in-the-world is not shared by all men. This is particularly true in the case of native users of symbolism. What kind of discrepancy might this be? Can it be justified as a necessary discrepancy between theory and concrete thought or is it an inability to authentically reconstitute the phenomenon of thought?

Levi-Strauss is one who at least tries to work with a set of principles which are supposedly also employed in the internal organization of a structure of determinations by the native himself. Sperber's theoretical starting-point, on the other hand, is the foundational distinction between the literal informativeness of 'facts'--what in our terminology would be called factuality--and the non-literal but relatively significant content of symbolic information. This criterion of literality is, however, one which is brought to the ethnomethodological givens from the outside by the anthropologist and is not in reality an endogenous organizing principle of the world-picture of the native user himself.

A hypothesis could, of course, be conceived and formulated which would be asserting that it is in fact an endogenous organizing principle. The truth value of such a hypothesis would then be empirically verifiable. What this hypothesis would be stating is that the native user is in some way or other insincere if he confessed a belief in the 'literalness' of symbolic descriptions. This hypothesis is not in fact put forward by Sperber although there is an insinuation about the insincerity of symbolism. In such a case what would need explanation as a primary datum is how come the natives do not give up such a practice of uttering and endorsing "lies." Such an explanation would more or less be a "functionalist" one.

In our metatheoretical scheme we associated the interpretation of factuality with a view of time. More generally we must say that a view of "facts" is variable and hinges on a view of, or at least implicates a way of taking, time. In other words, a way of defining what a fact is is a resolution on the temporal status of specificities concerned, independently of whether this correlates directly with a culture's integral view of time or not. (The point about this correlation is one that must be researched. It nevertheless does not seem implausible to say that if a culture consistently treats definition as a timeless comparison and contrast between two specificities, it would also be apt to think of its own place in the world non-genetically and in terms of an architecture of statuses

and hierarchies, whereas another culture which exemplified use of diachronic schemata of assigning significance is more apt to come up with a genetic view.) Furthermore, we have in thesis 4.2.11 suggested that it is ethnomethodologically probable that traditional native views of time resemble more the two views of timelessness we have expanded on. In the case of people who do the resultant interpretation of factuality that they are apt to hold to would be different than the one Sperber is apt to hold to. Thus we have a situation of the sort we described above, namely an original discrepancy between the native and the anthropological views of 'the world.'

I think both of the points made above would probably not be contested by Sperber, namely (a) that there is a difference in how he looks at them and how they look at themselves and (b) that this difference is expressible in terms of a difference in views of time or, at least, merely that there is a difference in views of time. What we want to explore are the exact methodological implications of this.

Sperber might not contest ~~what we have just said~~ but would instead respond: "Naturally, the point however is that their world interpretation in general as well as their time interpretation are themselves symbolic." To counter this we would like to make two points, a lesser and a greater one. Firstly, we would defend that either all world-interpretations are symbolic or none are. Is the native interpretation any more or any less symbolic than Sperber's? What would, for example, count as evidence that universal

or historical man is an empiricist in heart or in part? In the first five chapters of this thesis we have tried to show that the description 'factual' is a member of a set of onto-constitutive and thus interpretive categories. The other point is whether the description of the native onto-interpretation as symbolic adds anything significant to the defense of the legitimacy of a possible discrepancy in the theoretical reconstitution of the native world-picture. Or does it instead of saying anything significant hide anything significant? We have tentatively conjectured that (the consistency of) the native self-interpretation might give away the principles of the immanent organization of the material.

As a justification of a practice the native might say anyone of the following:

- (1) "It is the custom"
- (2) "It was commanded us by the ancestors at the beginning"
- (3) "We must atone for sins"
- (4) "By doing this we attain a state of spiritual perfection without which we cannot come into communion with our gods"

etc.

Why should we consider that the above statements are interpretable as mere functions of indicating that "the statement that follows is put in quotes?"⁸⁰ From the point of view of the temporal metatheory the differences

between them are significant.

For Sperber, the justification of a practice is a secondary datum in that it is a potential extension of the evocational cycle. It is usually an implicit and potentially an explicit part of the attempt to replace and re-establish the grounds on which a certain 'symbolic informational entry can be made acceptable. By contrast to this, our perspective takes these particular sets of statements as especially rich in clues as concerning the native perspective, since they are at least embryonically the indications of a view of history, societal life and metaphysical reality.

The basic issue, as we see it, is this: What is the key to the understanding and interpretation of what an instance of thought is about?

The suggestion we have been toying around with is that this clue is none other than the way the issue of temporal 'syntaxis' is treated. We have established two sorts of grounds for this task. Firstly, we have elaborated a broad view of the elements of a treatment of time and secondly, we have asserted that a metatheoretical transcription is possible with any form of discursive organization. Thus, we proceed on the basis of an initial hermeneutic sensitivity to the many possibilities of organizing discourse and thought to an on-goingly testable

re-construction of the whole extent of a way of thinking. What we are interested in are the complexities, and the direction of an instance of thought, its possibilities to continue to be productive, what expressive means make it possible and constrain it, the similarities and differences it exemplifies with other instances of thought, its traditional thematic set, how certain concepts, eg., "nature," "culture," "the supernatural," etc., get stabilized, etc.

Alternatively, and this is what we feel Sperber is doing, the key to an instance of thought can be taken to be a set of cultural practices, eg., 'science,' 'logic,' 'religious creeds,' 'taxonomic knowledge,' etc., and a set of judgements about how these are instantiated. Thus the key if taken reflects a double judgement on the part of the researcher, firstly, on the trans-historical status of these practices and secondly, on a criterion of construction of the practice itself, since none of these practices would exist unless the specific human concern they reflect also existed. In this case what we might be interested in are culturally endorsed procedures of collection, verification, ideologization and social employment and reproduction of kinds of messages. We move in other words on the basis of human potentialities as we confess to know them, or rather on how we judge them and define them theoretically, to a study of how they are concretized.

What we want to do is to relativize the absoluteness with which these practices are considered pertinent and to seek for the clues to the thought and set of views pre-dating and/or constituting the grounds of any such practice.

A little earlier we suggested that there is a difference between Levi-Strauss and Sperber's approach. Now we must add that there is also a similarity. It appears that a point on which we would object of Levi-Strauss' methodological resolution also applies to Sperber, although the case might be that in the case of Levi-Strauss this is a necessary assumption whereas in the case of Sperber this might be an incidental one.⁸¹ Specifically, both treat "native" thought as basically exemplifying a formal synchronicity schema. In other words, the possibility is denied the native that he can and does think 'diachronically.' Sperber's analysis of the cultural symbolism of the Dorzo like Levi-Strauss' analysis of myths materialize on the assumption that native thought concerns a 'timeless' logical symmetry. It is assumed that the native way of definition is static contrast between specificities. We do not deny that this schema is certainly one that is employed but we consider it an interesting fact when it is the basic characteristic of a pattern of thought.

For Levi-Strauss, and perhaps for Sperber too, I do not know, the determinate significance of an 'event' is a

function of the 'structure' in which it originates and which it might modify. Thus, an event is an instantiation of structure, as for example, a motion and a vote in Parliament or protocol. This structure-event schema is considered both a theoretical tool and an immanent principle of organization employed by the native thinker.

IV

What we want to do here is to give a counter-example and argue for the possibility of a native 'diachronic' schema. We assert that it is possible for the determinate significance of an event to be a function of its place in a set of events, employing an event-events schema. The relevant structure, if it could still be called that, would in such a case be 'a diachronic structure' rather than a synchronic one.

A narrative is this kind of diachronic structure. Thus, a story is not only an appropriate form of expression for a thematization of temporal 'dispersion' but as Paul Ricoeur observes in The Symbolism of Evil⁸² it itself generates and introduces a complexity to thought. My examples would then naturally be stories. They are three instances taken from the Greek tradition, one from ancient Greece, one from folk tradition and one which I have heard myself from my wife's grandfather.

Androcles was a man who at one time had to seek refuge into the forest because of his disagreements with an unfriendly king. There he met a wounded lion which he treated and took care of until the lion became well again. Later Androcles was captured. His fate was to be the same as that of most political dissidents of the time: he was going to be forced to fight empty-handed with a wild lion. The day of his execution came but the king and all others present were up for a surprise. The lion instead of attacking Androcles went over to him and greeted him in friendly gestures. It was the same lion that Androcles had met in the forest. The king, moved at the sight of such a 'miracle,' ordered Androcles' release.

The kindness of the man could not have gone unrewarded.

The song "of the dead brother" tells a story about a family. A mother has ten children, nine sons and one daughter who she takes care to rear well and to prepare for marriage. Later when marriage representatives come to ask for her, the mother is about to refuse because the proposal comes from far-away Babylon. Her eight sons agree with her but her ninth tries to convince his mother to accept. But the mother is still unwilling. She asks Costantis, her ninth son, "What will happen if we need her here to share joy or sorrow that might come our way?" Costantis makes a promise and takes an oath that he will

fetch her if need be. So Areti, the daughter, is given away to marriage in Babylon.

Bad times followed and sickness killed all nine sons. The mother laments over the graves of her eight sons but over Costantis' grave she curses. "You are the one," she says "who sent my dear daughter away." "You promised me that you would bring her back." "When are you going to fulfil your promise?" Suddenly the earth shook and Costantis arose. Making the cloud his horse, the star his bridle, and taking the moon as companion he set on his way to go and fetch her. He finds Areti brushing her hair in the moonlight and sits her on the back of his horse and starts the trip back. On the way Areti hears the birds singing in human voices saying how strange and miraculous this incident was. This happens three times and every time Areti realizes a bit more clearly what is happening. But soon they are there. Costantis lets her off at the church and returns to his place. Areti walks over to her house. She finds the garden overgrown, the trees dried up. The door is locked. She knocks once. The mother answers from inside "Whoever you are go away." But Areti knocks again shouting "Mother, open the door." The mother is surprised. She asks "Who is this calling me mother?" Areti tells her who she is and the mother comes out. They embrace and both fall dead.

A solemn promise made to a mother could not have been left unfulfilled.

Grandfather remembers a man from his village. This man, he says, inherited a lot of land but he was careless and wasteful and before long he lost it all. So he started borrowing money from fellow villagers. After a while he decided to go to town and try his luck with a new start.

Here the narration is interrupted and the master storyteller looks around at his audience. "Do you know the strangest thing about this man?" he asks. Without waiting for an answer he says: "He was one who foresaw the time of his death." When the right question is asked, "How do you know grandfather?" he continues. "Well, hear what happened." "One day, many years later, we were all sitting in the village coffee-shop and this man walked in. He greeted us and then taking his purse out of his pocket he went around paying everybody the exact amount he owed them. Of course all of us who had given him money never thinking we will ever get it back, were happily surprised. And so that man did that day and returned to his home in town. A few days later we heard that he had died."

An honest man was not deprived the chance to prove himself.

These three different cases exemplify a plurality of subjects elaborated which form members of what we might call a thematic set. They do also, however, all show a similarity in that they thematize "lapse of time," a necessary condition for completing the account of a set of significant initial events

which functions as the setting up of conditions requiring and receiving fulfilment. Consequent events acquire a meaning on the basis of what has gone on before. In the case of the song of the dead brother, for example, the question why does the mother and the daughter die in the end can only be answered in terms of what has gone on before. It seems that the mother dies because she dared curse her son, especially since he was dead and the dead should under all circumstances be respected, the Greek tradition teaches. So the mother has to die, and so has the daughter because the whole of her existence has been defined in terms of her life with her family and these conditions have been taken away in the course of the development of the narrative. This is important because it appears that taking any of these events as individual claims about the world would do injustice to the intention behind their formulation and placement into a story. Neither does the story make any 'primary' claim about the natural state of the dead. What is talked about is not dead men at all but promises. Returning to Sperber's suggested form of the symbolic statement, we see a discrepancy between that form which makes use of the copula "is" and the one here which talks simply about a single incidence necessitated by a special situation. Similarly, in the first story the human attribute of returning a kindness is not a claim about lions, or at least it is only an incidental claim about one lion. The same goes with the last story in which case the "foreseeability of death" is only elaborated in a certain definite context, and,

from what I know, it is not mentioned in any other instance nor is it explicitly asserted. If grandfather were asked if he thought death could be foretold, his answer would be non-committal. Furthermore, he would consider the question an irrelevant bother.

We thus see that at least with some traditions "nature" is not defined by contrast to "culture" but is an incidental term entering anthropocentric and sociomorphic thought. Man is defined by his social and genetic relationships and by his actions. Nature by its yielding to, help, endorsement, interpretation and witness of human affairs provides a means of furtherly dramatising and underscoring their primacy and complexity. States of nature, as the modality of the "always," are rarely if ever paid attention to. In the same tradition even death, the most likely candidate to be treated as a 'state' of some sort, is thought of as a man (Charos) and dying is the going away with or being taken away by Charos. He is described as a barefooted man, often invited to participate in such cultural activities as feasts and wrestling competitions. Food and wine he often refuses, but he always takes up an invitation to a fight. If he would lose, the price he would pay is his armoury--and thus his role and his effectiveness. This interesting detail shows that it is not considered impossible that "death himself may die;" a refusal to accept his permanence. When Charos wrestles with a particularly strong man he is almost

defeated and has to resort to dirty tricks. Sometimes he asks for a beforehand guarantee from God about the final submission of somebody particularly unyielding. Some songs even imagine that he has a wife and a mother.

V

Native diachronic thought also relativizes the absolute-ness and primacy of taxonomic axioms. Eventhough it might make "excessive claims" it does not contradict such axioms for in the dimension of passing-time, the 'logically impossible' takes on a different status. Here there are no self-confessed universal critical conditions. What can happen, given also the assumption of the supernatural, is not restricted by the same logical impossibility. We can catch God making 'category mistakes' but nothing stops Him from saying "It was about time that thing changed."

No narrative is logically impossible. It is just more or less coherent and exhaustive.

But does it not also make more sense to view these instances of 'symbolic elaborations' not as cultural techniques but as cultural products with variable life-spans and variable levels of informativeness. They are not attempts to deal with perennial or constant problems but rather they are so many instances of cultural expression. The view of symbolism as a more or less necessary cultural technique appears to be a functionalist view of symbolism.

By contrast, our suggestion is for what might be called a historiological view. Should the ability to construct and learn symbolism be considered a historically non-specific capability? Or should it be considered an item of cultural production which can inform us about expressive possibilities afforded by a people's language and by whatever other media they use, about ingenuity and charisma, about traditional perspectives and about achieved conceptions? Why should symbolism be considered as the negative fact of a contingent mistake of failure rather than as the positive fact of being a contribution to an artistic, religious, philosophical and metaphysical tradition? Put in this way, it almost appears as if the issue is one of cultural imperialism. The most important concern should not be how to judge a people's conceptual performance from the point of view of a developed criterion of rationality that has arisen in a foreign context but under what conditions it was and can continue to be productive.

If symbolism is considered a cultural product rather than a cultural technique then there will be a shift of emphasis to the conditions and constraints that affected the specific manner in which it came about and way from the conditions and constraints that make it necessary and reproducible. So, before we can draw to a close, we must reconsider the idea of necessary constraints imposed on the learning process of symbolism by a mechanism of cognition.

Making use of a simple model of learning, consisting of the four elements of 'motivation,' 'stimulus,' 'response' and 'feedback,' we see that Sperber excludes the possibility for the effective constraining of the first and the last terms and sees the constraining of the symbolic stimulus as indirect and contingent on the state of the encyclopedia's ability or inability to inform sufficiently an otherwise significant piece of information. Motivation in symbolism is not constrained because it is supposedly subjected to the general motivation of encyclopedic knowledge although his particular examples **seem** in fact to suggest in each case specific motivation, thus creating a theoretical ambiguity. Equally, 'feedback' is not in principle constrainable since as he says evocational effect is free without being totally diffuse. So the only theoretical choice that remains, it appears, is that of necessary constraints introduced at the stage of 'response' by means of a mechanical selection of entries to be processed symbolically. Thus juxtaposition of a necessary constraint with a contingent one appears to give us an economical conception. What we have tried to orient toward is a view that all stages of this learning can be contingently constrained and that if they are all sufficiently constrained at the same time a symbolic elaboration as a particular instance can be explained without resort to a necessary constraining device.

Thought is generated and restricted by the 'raw materials'

and 'means' available to a culture. Furthermore, constraints are relative and can even cause and release uses which specifically feed on the attempt to 'transcend' these constraints. For example, the constraint imposed on the ideational status of an object by its regular and everyday use is also what facilitates and delineates an extra-ordinary use.

Our analysis would, nevertheless, be incomplete if we did not consider one other claim made about the methodological usefulness of the mechanism solution, namely that it allows a more natural universalization of symbolic phenomena.

Most anthropologists are only interested in the particular properties of phenomena belonging to a culture. Anthropological theory as they see it reduces to a reasoned classification of these diverse cultural phenomena. I think, on the contrary, that anthropological theory has as its object the universal properties of human understanding, properties which, at one and the same time, make cultural variability possible and assign its limits.⁸³

Can a 'conceptual' anthropology which is rooted in the side of conceptions, feeding on their accomplished breadth rather than on their common birth right, still give us a universal perspective, or at least say anything intelligent about their universality character?⁸⁴ It appears that the position we have taken falls between the two which Sperber has pin-pointed in the above quotation. A specific account of cultural symbolism can in our view be universalized not on the basis of the limited

possibilities for the function of a common mechanism which underlines it all but in terms of what general choices it makes on how to treat 'co-existence of determinate specificities' and thus on how it treats time.⁸⁵ Sperber's approach has depended on a single transcultural view of definition and on a positivist view of verification. We have not discussed these issues to a great extent but rather we considered it sufficient to suggest that how these are resolved within a culture is consistent with and significant for the overall organization of experience and discourse. The possibilities for manners of definition and verification are in our view limited in principle and constitute a set of related manners of treating the common theme of 'co-existence.' Universalization is still, therefore, possible as a task of research in addition to the heuristic of thematic sets. At the same time it is not simply a form of classification but can, in addition, help delineate cultural conflict between world-views where this conflict exists.

References

1. Jacques Derrida, "Ousia and Grammi", pp 65-66 in F J Smith, ed, in Phenomenology in Perspective, The Hague, M Nijhoff, 1970.
2. McTaggart, John McTaggart Ellis, The Nature of Existence, 2 vols, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1931, 1927, chapter XXXIII, pp 303-351.
3. Heidegger Martin, Being and Time, New York, Harper and Row, 1962. See footnote (3) on p 31.
4. Heidegger Martin, Being and Time, Harper and Row, 1962 p 461. See also the whole of chapter VI or better the whole of Division II.
5. Same work as above, page 432.
6. Wittgenstein Ludwig, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974, p 72, 6.4311.
7. As above.
8. Same work, 6.431.
9. Same work, 6.4311.
10. G E Moore, Defense of Common Sense, quoted in Ludwig Wittgenstein's On Certainty, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1977.
11. See for example A J Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, Hammondsworth, England, Penguin 1977, pp 152-153.
12. The author has in mind the advocates of the concept of space-time.
13. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Kemp Smith, New York, St Martin's Press, 1965. (See chapter entitled "Schematism")
14. We are here going to construct ideal-type arguments as it were rather than represent arguments by specific philosophers. This technique serves our purposes here sufficiently. Any identifying classification of specific philosopher's views on these matters need not be taken up at this stage.
15. So, for example, a theology that would want to doubt the self-sufficiency and immanence of dynamism would also doubt the necessary continuity of time. It would, instead, suggest a doctrine of creation of moments.
16. The thinkers to which I am referring here are the existential phenomenologists.

17. M Heidegger, Being and Time, New York, Harper and Row, Publishers, 1962, p 414.

"Ontologically" is used here in the Heideggerian manner. Rather a more appropriate description of Heidegger's approach should perhaps be to call it the Existential Analytic; the task of reducing discursive determinateness to the existential source wherein this determination arises. Thus, for example, Heidegger in discussing the natural sciences, writes, "Thus, the paradigmatic character of mathematical natural science does not lie in its exactitude or in the fact that it is binding for 'Everyman'; it consists rather in the fact that the entities which it takes as its theme are discovered in it in the only way in which entities can be discovered - by the prior projection of their State of Being. When the basic concepts of that understanding of Being by which we are guided have been worked out, the clues of its methods, the structure of its way of conceiving things, the possibility of truth and certainty which belongs to it, the way in which things get grounded or proved, the mode in which it is binding for us, and the way it is communicated - all these will be Determined. The totality of these items constitutes the full existential conception of science."

18. See for example, M Merleau-Ponty's chapter on Temporality in Phenomenology of Perception, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, pp 410-434.
19. See, for example, D C William's article "The Myth of Passage" in Journal of Philosophy, vol 48 (1951), pp 457-472.
20. Put forward among others by Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
21. Dasein as a being-there is both a way of being given and an event.
22. From the point of view of human consciousness, the first "fact" is that it is already in the world.
23. In Thesis 1.2.2, although in a different context, we have posed the issue of the empiricity of time given in duration. The reader is reminded that it was pointed out at that instance that the question "what endures in duration?" makes apparent the same difficulties as the question "what is bound in the relation of before-after?".

24. From the Greek, meaning "standing outside".
25. M Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception, p 412.
26. Being and Time, p 351.
27. In certain cases it could also be that they are doing something to/for each other as well but in another sense. In the case for example of two people lifting a weight the one is making it easier for the other.
28. For the distinction between "factuality" and "facticity" see Thesis 1.3.2.
29. For the distinction between "abstract" and "concrete" see Thesis 3.3.3.
30. "Time-line" would, in the case of human and social individuals, be called life-history or simply history.
31. Compare Thesis 3.5.5.
32. Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Philadelphia, The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co, 1969.
33. Compare M Merleau-Ponty's account of perception in the Phenomenology of Perception.
34. Bernard Harrison's paper, "On Understanding A General Name" in G.N.A. Vesey, ed, Communication and Understanding, Sussex, Harvester Press, 1977.
35. Compare Bernard Harrison's Form and Content, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1973.
36. See article titled R M Rorty, "Relations, Internal and External" in the The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed Paul Edwards, Vol 7, pp 125-133
37. Compare A N Prior's "Thank Goodness That's Over" in Philosophy v. 34 (1959), pp 12-17.
38. Same as reference 33.
39. Same as above.
40. Thus, in attempting to avoid the existence-of-the-present-not-existence-of-the-past-and-future fallacy, it does away with the idea of the "passage" of time which is called a "myth". See, for example, D C William's article already referred to above, "The myth of passage".

41. In the same article referred to above, this becomes apparent in the explicit connection that Williams makes between the space-time conception and the (timeless) nature of Logic.
42. 1939-40 Harvard lectures, Lecture 2, The Musical Phenomenon.
43. Compare L Wittgenstein in Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus, 6.41, "If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and what is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental."
44. 'Opportunity' is here used as a neutral term. Something's, and significantly also man's, contact with "the other" is opportunity. Opportunity is the contact of the unlike. The existence of a criterion does not make the terms which are brought together by means of it similar in any way. Traditionally the epistemological task consists in "a line of connection" having to be established. Epistemology was needed only because man's existence in the world was construed as factual. The setting-up of the epistemological task prejudices the issue of man's rootedness in the world.
45. There is perhaps an issue that needs to be resolved here - whether each of the four gestures uniquely thematizes a temporal structure or if they are simply arbitrary expository devices. What needs to be said is, in my opinion, that the gestures embody primarily concepts which are uniquely appropriate to their description and only secondarily they can be considered in terms of other gestures, effecting a reduction of one to the other. Talking about any of the gestures in terms of the other is possible but the original meaning of the gesture in question is not totally grasped. Each of these is the limiting case of each of the others. (Thus, the claim that the language stipulated for a particular gesture can be applied to another is not contradictory with the claim that each possesses its own language.) So, for example, if gesture 4 is exegeted in terms of 1, the intelligibility and social causality factors are missed out in the descriptions given.
46. Compare for example Antony Giddens' Central Problems in Social Theory, London, MacMillan, 1979, chapter 2 entitled "Agency, Structure". Giddens appears to be treating the temporality of institutions as if it were thick time-linearity, this being consistent with his project of restoring temporality to social theory, but conceiving of temporality as social space-time.

When, however, he speaks of rules and resources and emphasizes the centrality of the notion of power (see Thesis 3.5.10) he is gesturing towards the need for recognizing other modes of temporality as well. This is not the point here, however. The question here is if institutions are treated as space-time (of time-space) lines then in what sense are they structural? In what sense are they anything more than collective (and/or objectified) individuals? Structure, on the contrary, as we are suggesting in this Thesis is the synchronicity of social activity with its context and criteria of intelligibility.

47. Coming back to Giddens in Central Problems: The difference of perspective that we have with Giddens concerning the temporality of social reality, which as we have said, he sees as a time-space continuum, is due to another more basic difference in the choice of starting-points. He sees temporality as an element of reality and thus concentrates on a particular quality of it, whereas the strength of our emphasis has been that time is the structure of reality. Yet, in a certain sense and to a certain extent, Giddens would grant such a claim, it appears, or rather, he gets close to making that sort of claim himself when he ascribes necessary extensionality (gesture 3's necessary succession??) to social structure. Nevertheless, he would not want to accept all the implications of holding to a strong necessary succession view and thus, in sufficing himself to a weak necessary succession thesis, makes minimal claims about the structuring function of temporality.
48. See reference 45.
49. It appears that this is the concern behind Methodological Individualism as if the issue of social freedom were a theoretical one.
50. Following from the above, it appears that an individual act cannot be considered the nuclear unit of social reality. (After all, individuation is a function of structuration.) Rather it is at best a sub-level of (or abstraction in) social analysis, the nucleus of social reality being a mutuality between an action and its context, which is normally the existence (synchronously) of other social actors and of states of affairs. Individual actions are social in that they have a sui generis character, an intelligibility overflowing the phenomenality (see Thesis 3.5.10) of biographical entries.

51. B Russell, Power: A new Social Analysis, (London and New York, 1938).
D M White, "The Problem of Power", British Journal of Political Science, 1972, 479-490.
Denis Wrong in American Journal of Sociology, 73:678.
Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, MacMillan, 1974.
52. Compare Steven Lukes, Individualism, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1973.
53. The reference here is to Methodological Individualism. Compare also the Introduction of K Marx's Grundrisse, Hammondsworth, England, Penguin, 1973.
54. We allow for the possibility that this would be taken in the way that such a question about time is usually taken, ie, as referring to passing-time. In our opinion the same problems exist for any mode of temporality and the same conclusions apply.
55. Thematic substantiality is not at all the same as ideational substantiality; thematic substantiality is experientiable.
56. Compare J M E McTaggart, Nature of Existence, vol II, (Cambridge 1927), chapter 33, where an argument is constructed on the basis of a distinction and a perceived difference between the before-after relation and the past, present, future relative determinations.
57. See Thesis 1.3.6.
58. There are, ofcourse, instances, as for example in music, when the upsetting of expectation is itself functional. In this case too, however, the subsequent is "bound" in that if the preparation of it was not in some way a predetermination of it, the "upsetting" we are talking about would not take place. We will discuss this more extensively in chapter 5.
59. See, for example, A J Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, Pelican Original 1956, and
C J Ducasse, Truth, Knowledge And Causation, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968.
60. See Dave Reason, "Classification, Time and the Organization of Production" in Classifications in Their Social Context, London, Academic Press, 1979.

61. Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, New Haven and London, Yale Univ. Press, 1953, vol 2, p 62.
62. Heidegger in Being and Time fails, in my opinion, because the conceptual link he claims to establish between Being and Time is not a dialectic one but one of dependence of Time on Being. The result is that the internal differentiation of the concept of Being does not proceed naturally and a jump is required (this is evident in the Introduction) if we are to go from the concept of Being-in-general to its differentiations. This differentiation is reduced philosophically to a mapping out of the discriminations of modes of being already effected in Dasein's understanding of Being (Dasein's average understanding of Being).
In addition, Being is already a complex concept which implicates temporality.
63. Compare P M S Hacker, Insight and Illusion, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1972, pp 202-203, where Hacker discusses Wittgenstein's view of "the present" as a relational term.
64. Hart and Honorè, Causation in the Law, Oxford, Clarendon, 1959.
65. G H Von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971, pp 55 ff.
66. R G Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, Oxford 1940, p 285.
67. L Pantelides, "Time, Freedom and Causation", 1978, Unpublished paper.
68. Due, ofcourse, to the atomicity character of facts. Tractatus 6.37.
69. G H Von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, London 1971.
70. See Larry Wright, Teleological Explanations, Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1976.
71. L Pantelides, "Time, Freedom and Causation" quoted above.
72. M Heidegger, Being and Time quoted above.
73. It thus appears that the analysis of religious consciousness must proceed along these lines. The interpretive schema of religious experience is

world-divine personality. This is an important point because of the danger of anthropologically reconstituting religious feeling simply as a function of thought about "the sacred". The sacred, despite its importance, is localized (sacred places, sacred objects, etc) rather than trans-individual and trans-personal because of trans-temporality. Thus, not only is there anthropological data for the sacred, but there are also examples of identifying the soul with memory images, etc.

74. See Herminio Martin's "Time and Theory in Sociology" in Approaches to Sociology, edited J Rex, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974. In this article Martins suggests:
- a) That metatheory is the refraction of the contours of theory.
 - b) That metatheoretic criteria of adequacy and consistency are independent, in other words, that they are not immanent and relative to the applications of theory.
 - c) That temporal considerations are of paramount importance for settling such issues of consistency, adequacy, coherence, etc.
75. Martins, in the above quoted article, assumes that the translation of schemata binding sociological non-temporalist meanings into temporalist schemata - the totality of which can be used, more or less, as a chartograph against which theoretical constructs can be compared - is possible. Thus, it seems that Martins in fact accepts the translatability Thesis.
76. Dan Sperber, Rethinking Symbolism, Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1975.
77. Sperber seems to use these three terms interchangeably.
78. It is not totally clear if Sperber considers symbolic statements as non-falsifiable which appear falsifiable or as falsifiable which appear non-falsifiable.
79. The "inference-fallacy" as we might call it causes 'judgement-statements' to be unable to be self-referring (token reflexive) - as anti-naturalistic ethics would like them to be - but rather world-referring and evocative.
80. A statement in quotes is, according to Sperber's use, a statement that cannot be immediately recognized as literal.

81. I am not totally clear on this point: whether this assumption is one that arises with Sperber's method and is thus methodologically necessary, like for Levi-Strauss.
82. Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, Beacon Press, 1967.
83. Rethinking Symbolism, p 147.
84. Yet, what we might call a fixed interpretation of experience hardly seems the best way for universalizing cultural phenomena.
85. The interpretation of time is not fixed. Rather it is culturally specific. What might be fixed is that temporal Grammar is always schematic and thus relational. Time is a means of dealing with the manifold.

