Reconstituting Hegemony: US Power and the New Left in Latin America

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Abstract

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, and in stark contrast to the immediate post-Cold War period, Latin American politics was defined by the ascendency of leftist and centre-left forces. The emergence and consolidation of the 'New Latin Left', as this thesis terms these governments, signalled a profound challenge to the longstanding hegemony of the United States in the Western hemisphere. In their foreign and domestic policies, the countries of the region began distancing themselves from Washington's geopolitical and economic agenda. This thesis examines the ways in which US foreign policy responded to the counter-hegemony manifested in the New Latin Left. Defining hegemony as an asymmetrical and dialectical relationship patterned by multiple and overlapping forms of power, it investigates US efforts to reconstitute its hegemonic position in the Americas. Building on Gramscian historical materialism, it situates US hegemony alongside the political economy of the Post-Washington Consensus. The analysis utilises the taxonomy of power developed by Barnett and Duvall to examine the interplay of the different facets of US hegemony in Latin America, which, as the argument goes, are inextricably interlinked with on-going processes of neoliberalisation. Empirical chapters focus on: the coercive leverage of US compulsory power, as realised through the Pentagon's resources and strategy in the region; the institutional power of the Organization of American States in relation to newly-created and Latin American-led mechanisms of multilateral cooperation; the structural power of the US's multi-track free trade agenda; and the productive power expressed in the discursive construction of Latin American populism. By exploring the different facets of US power in the region, the thesis brings clarity to what remains an open and contested process of hegemonic reconstitution. In doing so, it contributes to critical International Relations/International Political Economy scholarship on US hegemony, US foreign policy and contemporary US-Latin American relations.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
ALBA	*Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América* (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America)
APC	*Alianza Patriótica por el Cambio* (Patriotic Alliance for Change [Paraguay])
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APRA	*Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (American Popular and Revolutionary Alliance [Peru])
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATPA	Andean Trade Preference Act
ATPDEA	Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act
BIT	Bilateral Investment Treaty
BRICs	Brazil, Russia, India, China
CAFTA(-DR)	Central American Free Trade Agreement(-Dominican Republic)
CAN	*Comunidad Andina* (Community of Andean Nations)
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CELAC	*Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños* (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States)
CEPCIDI	Permanent Executive Committee of the Inter-American Council for Integral Development (Organization of American States)
CEPR	Center for Economic and Policy Research
CET	Common External Tariff
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COHA	Council on Hemispheric Affairs
CRS	United States Congressional Research Service
CSD	*Consejo de Defensa Suramericano* (South American Defense Council)
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
CSL	Cooperative Security Location
DCA	Defense Cooperation Agreement
DoD	United States Department of Defense
EU	European Union
FA	*Frente Amplio* (Broad Front [Uruguay])
FARC	*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FMLN	*Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación* (Farabundo Martí Liberation Front [El Salvador])
FOL	Forward Operating Location
FOS	Forward Operating Site
FSLN	*Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* (Sandinista National Liberation Front [Nicaragua])
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
FTAAP	Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GWOT	Global War on Terror

HM	Historical Materialism
IACHR	Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
IAHRS	Inter-American Human Rights System
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IGPBS	Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy
IFI	International Financial Institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	International Organisation
IOC	International Oil Company
IPE	International Political Economy
IPRs	Intellectual Property Rights
IPS	Institute for Policy Studies
IR	International Relations
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialisation
LAWG	Latin America Working Group
MAS	*Movimiento al Socialismo* (Movement toward Socialism [Bolivia])
Mercosur	*Mercado Común del Sur/Sul* (Common Market of the South)
NACLA	North American Congress on Latin America
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NLL	New Latin Left
OAS	Organization of American States
PDVSA	*Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.* (Venezuelan Petroleum)
PJ	*Partido Justicialista* (Justicialist Party [Argentina])
PRI	*Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (Institutional Revolutionary Party [Mexico])
PS	*Partido Socialista* (Socialist Party [Chile])
PSUV	*Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela* (United Socialist Party of Venezuela)
PT	*Partido dos Trabalhadores* (Workers Party [Brazil])
PTPA	United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement
RCTV	*Radio Caracas Televisión Internacional* (Radio Caracas Television)
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
Southcom	United States Southern Command
SSI	Strategic Studies Institute (United States' Army)
TIFA	Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
TPA	Trade Promotion Agreement
TPA	Trade Promotion Authority ('fast track')
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
UN	United Nations
UNASUR	*Unión de Naciones Suramericanas* (Union of South American Nations)
UNE	*Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza* (National Unity of Hope [Guatemala])
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
USG	United States Government
USOAS	United States Permanent Mission to the Organization of American States
USTR	Office of the United States Trade Representative
WOLA	Washington Office on Latin America
WTO	World Trade Organization

Chapter 1

Introduction: Latin America's New Left and the Question of US Hegemony

For the better part of the 20th Century, the international relations of the Western hemisphere were characterised and conditioned by the hegemony of the United States. The US rose to great-power status on the heels of its 1898 war with Spain, quickly adopting a neo-colonial posture in the Caribbean basin. During the Cold War, as the US intervened across the Americas, its geopolitical dominance was routinely challenged, but never in doubt. In a well-worn trope, Latin America was the US's 'backyard'. Its pre-eminence seemed a natural state of affairs, at least to planners in Washington. The post-Cold War period witnessed the steady expansion of US influence. In 1994, heads of state from across the hemisphere (with the lone exception of Cuba) gathered at the first Summit of the Americas in Miami, Florida. They proclaimed their commitment to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), an economic integration scheme based on the 'free market' policies of the Washington Consensus. In an era of American-led globalisation, there seemed to be no alternative to Washington's hemispheric vision. The region, now comprised of liberal democracies, was bound together by deepening processes of neoliberalisation, underpinned by the hegemonic power of the United States.

In the first decade of the 21st Century, however, the narrative of US dominance became outmoded. The countries of the region gained increased autonomy from the superpower to the north. This trend was closely related to the 'left turn' in Latin America's politics. The rise of nationalistic leaders, such as Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, Bolivia's Evo Morales and Brazil's Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, among others, bolstered the image of an independent Latin America free from the political and economic dictates of Washington. Latin American governments created new multilateral forums that excluded the US, potentially undermining the centrality of the Organization of American States (OAS) to institutional cooperation. Meanwhile, the Washington Consensus had all but collapsed. The region's progressive governments began implementing policies in line with their socialist and 'populist' platforms, which, while largely market-driven, called for a greater role for the state in the economy. In this context, US policy toward the region seemed adrift, a point on which analysts of various theoretical and ideological stripes agreed. The administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama appeared uninterested or incapable of reversing these trends. Questions were raised about the status of US hegemony and the efficacy of US power in Washington's 'near abroad'.

For scholars and policymakers alike, the US's geopolitical decline in Latin America was connected to the rise of the region's 'new left' governments. Some suggested that Washington had 'lost' Latin America.[1] Others perceived the beginnings of a 'post-hegemonic' hemisphere.[2] Commentators pronounced the death of the Monroe Doctrine, which had loomed large over the US's asymmetrical relationship with Latin America since it

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[1] See for example, Peter Hakim, 'Is Washington Losing Latin America?' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85 No. 1 (2006), pp. 39-53; and Peter H. Smith, 'Chavez, Cuba and the New Populism: Are We Losing Latin America?' Der Spiegel Online, 4 March 2007: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/chavez-cuba-and-the-new-populism-are-we-losing-latin-america-a-475423.html.

[2] See for example, Russell Crandall, 'The Post-American Hemisphere: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90 No. 3 (2011), pp. 83-95; and Christopher Sabatini, 'Rethinking Latin America', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91 No. 2 (2012), pp. 8-13.

was first decreed in 1823.[3] In 2008, the venerable Council on Foreign Relations issued a report claiming that the era of US dominance in Latin America was over.[4] In recognition of this new reality, President Obama called for a 'new era' of 'true partnership' in the US's relations with its southerly neighbours.[5] Gradually, discussion of the US's position in Latin America was coloured by the prospect of American decline on a broader scale. As the Obama administration 'reset' America's foreign relations, it reiterated the United States' traditional commitment to an active, internationalist foreign policy. There was to be no retrenchment—not globally, nor in Latin America. Echoing Clinton-era discourse, Obama and his team routinely referred to the US as the 'indispensable nation'.[6] Following in the footsteps of the Bush administration, the US would remain 'first among equals', far and away the hemisphere's most powerful actor. The 'hegemonic presumption', to borrow a phrase from Lowenthal,[7] was alive and well. But, given the emergence and durability of Latin America's new political bloc, what of US hegemony itself? How would it be reconstituted?

This project engages the debates over US foreign policy toward Latin America in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 period(s). It does so from the perspective of International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE). The thesis builds on the Gramscian theoretical tradition insofar as it conceptualises hegemony as a unified, asymmetrical social relationship combing material and ideational elements of coercion, consensus-building and ideological legitimation. However, I argue that Gramscian theory in IR/IPE has been inattentive to the complexities of different forms of power and, more to the point, the ways in which they are manifest in the agency of system-leading states. US hegemony in Latin America has been challenged at multiple levels of social/international interaction: militarily, institutionally, structurally (on the level of economic policy) and ideologically (at the level of discourse). Employing the taxonomy of power developed by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, this thesis argues that these strata correspond to different forms of power in the international arena. Empirically, I aim to show how the US has attempted to protect and augment—to reconstitute—its hegemonic position in the Americas. This process is open-ended and on-going, but it can be mapped in accordance with the four forms of power demarcated by Barnett and Duvall, which they label *compulsory*, *institutional*, *structural* and

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[3] See for example, Daniel P. Erikson, 'Requiem for the Monroe Doctrine', *Current History*, Vol. 107 No. 706 (2008), pp. 58-64; Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, 'Washington and Latin America: farewell, Monroe', Open Democracy, 7 October 2008: http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/washington-and-latin-america-farewell-monroe-doctrine. See also, Philip Brenner and Saul Landau, 'Farewell, Monroe Doctrine', February 2009, Transnational Institute: http://www.tni.org/article/farewell-monroe-doctrine.

[4] Council on Foreign Relations' Independent Task Force on U.S.-Latin America Relations, *U.S.-Latin America Relations: A New Direction for a New Reality* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, May 2008).

[5] Obama used the turn of phrase during his April 2009 speech to the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago. He also used it during his first multi-country tour of Central and South America in March 2011: Simon Reid-Henry, 'Why Obama is courting his troublesome neighbours', *New Statesman*, 23 March 2011: http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2011/03/latin-america-obama-brazil. It dates to his 2008 presidential campaign: Barack Obama, 'A New Partnership for the Americas', Obama for America campaign document (2008): http://obama.3cdn.net/ef480f743f9286aea9_k0tmvyt7h.pdf.

[6] The term 'indispensable nation' is most often associated with Madeline Albright, former UN ambassador and Secretary of State during the Clinton administration. Obama himself has used the phrase multiple times. See for example, ABC News, 'Obama Says He Restored America's Image as "Sole, Indispensable Power"', 19 January 2012: http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/01/obama-says-he-restored-americas-image-as-sole-indispensable-power/.

[7] Abraham F. Lowenthal, 'The United States and Latin America: ending the hegemonic presumption', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 55 No. 1 (1976), pp. 199-213. See also Abraham F. Lowenthal, *Partners in Conflict: The United States in Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), p. 31.

productive power.[8] The empirical body of the thesis (Chapters 3-6) is organised around this taxonomy, which is delineated in greater detail in Chapter 2.

This introductory chapter begins by reviewing the literature on the history of US foreign policy toward Latin America. It argues for the superiority of critical and revisionist accounts. Then, drawing on the existing literature on Latin America's left turn, I sketch the contours of the New Latin Left (NLL), as I have dubbed these governments. To date, there has been a dearth of academic analysis on the relationship between US hegemony/foreign policy and Latin America's new left, at least from a regional, inter-American perspective. This thesis is aimed at filling this gap. The present chapter also outlines the research design underpinning the project, denoting its originality and scope. Finally, it concludes with a brief section on the methodological approach used to answer the project's primary research question:

How has the United States attempted to reconstitute its hegemony in Latin America following the rise of the New Latin Left?

Contemporary US Policy toward Latin America in Historical Perspective

The re-emergence of Latin America's left coincided with the US administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. For much of the 2000s, US foreign policy toward Latin America was subsumed to the 'Global War on Terror' (GWOT), which, of course, focused primarily on events and actors outside of the Western hemisphere. As discussed in Chapter 3, the GWOT framework did contribute to the militarisation of US policy in Latin America. It placed considerable focus on Colombia, where the US was already involved in counter-narcotics/counter-insurgency following the implementation of Plan Colombia under President Clinton. By the time of Bush's re-election (2004), Latin America's left turn was increasingly defining US diplomacy and strategy in the region. After backing the failed 2002 coup against Hugo Chávez, the Bush administration geared its efforts toward isolating his 'populist' government. For some observers, the Bush administration viewed Latin America primarily through a War on Terror lens.[9] Others emphasised the Cold War-style treatment of adversarial governments, calling attention to the fact that Bush had stocked his administration with Reagan-era officials.[10] Either way, Latin America never rated high on Bush's foreign policy agenda. A common refrain during the Bush (and Obama) years was that Washington had 'ignored' Latin America.[11] This thesis shows otherwise.

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[8] Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, editors, *Power in Global Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005a); Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, 'Power in International Politics', *International Organization*, Vol. 59 No. 1 (2005b), pp. 39-75.

[9] R. Guy Emerson, 'Radical Neglect? The "War on Terror" and Latin America', *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 52 No. 1 (2010), pp. 33-62; Grace Livingstone, *America's Backyard: The United States and Latin America from the Monroe Doctrine to the War on Terror* (London: Zed Books, 2009), pp. 120-166.

[10] William LeoGrande, 'A Poverty of Imagination: George W. Bush's Policy in Latin America', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 39 No. 2 (2007), pp. 355-385.

[11] See for example, Howard J. Wiarda, *American Foreign Policy in Regions of Conflict: A Global Perspective* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 135. Wiarda writes that 'Latin America, along with sub-Saharan Africa, is the most neglected area of the world from the point of view of U.S. foreign policy'. See also, Arturo Valenzuela, 'Beyond Benign Neglect: Washington and Latin America', *Current History*, Vol. 104 No. 679 (2005), pp. 58-63; and Michael Reid, *Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America's Soul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 4.

Obama's election appeared to herald a new direction. During the 2008 presidential contest, Obama stated that he would engage the US's adversaries in Latin America (including the governments of Cuba and Venezuela) as part of a broader effort aimed at recalibrating Washington's diplomatic compass. There was a sense among many Latin America specialists in Washington that US policy toward the region was due for an overhaul.[12] Despite the sheen of the new president, Washington's approach to Latin America changed little under Obama, who, like Bush, failed to advance a singular project or initiative to draw together the various strands of US objectives and policies in the region. On issues of economic policy and security, Obama's multilateral posture obscured his commitment to a rather traditional understanding of American primacy. As stated by one observer, 'there is little that is surprising about the continuity of the Obama administration's foreign policy in Latin America with that of the Bush administration'.[13] The history of American statecraft in the region, discussed below, had produced a kind of path dependency in US policy. It is clear that expectations of a major shift in Washington's approach were unfounded. Obama stumbled even to reset diplomatic relations in the region. Two years into his presidency, the US was without ambassadors in Mexico, Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador.

Critical IR Theory and the Revisionist School of US Foreign Policy

Despite the disciplinary cleavages separating IR, IPE and foreign policy analysis, there is considerable overlap between the literature on US hegemony (in the international system/global economy) and the literature on US diplomacy, strategy and regional policymaking. However, academic analysis of US foreign policy tends to be more historical in scope, often drawing on particular case studies, periods or trends in American statecraft, including in relation to Waltz's second image—that is, at the level of the US's domestic society and national state.[14] Within the structure of this thesis, the second image literature acts as the historical foundation to the more theoretical discussion on hegemony and power, as initiated in Chapter 2. My reading of the historical trajectory of US-Latin American relations helps to solidify the project's empirical scope, which is focused on more contemporary issues than those addressed in the majority of writings on the continuities of US policy. This is all the more important because, as I state in the research design section of this chapter, the project comprises a historical analysis rather than a case study.

The discipline of IR has been characterised by grand debates between competing theoretical approaches to the study of world politics.[15] These have generally pitted two

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[12] See Abraham F. Lowenthal, Theodore J. Piccone, and Laurence Whitehead, editors, *The Obama Administration and the Americas: Agenda for Change* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009); Washington Office on Latin America, 'Forging New Ties: A Fresh Approach to U.S. Policy in the Americas', September 2007. My interviews with foreign policy experts (see Appendix 1) also gave this impression.

[13] Mark Weisbrot, 'Obama's Latin America Policy: Continuity Without Change', *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 38 No. 4 (July 2011), p. 70. On the continuities between Bush and Obama, see also, 'Waiting for Change: Trends in U.S. Security Assistance to Latin American and the Caribbean', a joint publication of the Center for International Policy (CIP), the Latin America Working Group Education Fund (LAWG), and the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), May 2010. For a case-by-case overview of the ways in which US policy in the Americas *did* change during the first few years of the Obama administration, see Abraham F. Lowenthal, Theodore J. Piccone, and Laurence Whitehead, editors, *Shifting the Balance: Obama and the Americas* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011).

[14] Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001 [1954]). Waltz's framework was further developed in J. David Singer's seminal article, 'International Conflict: Three Levels of Analysis', *World Politics*, Vol. 12 No. 3 (1960), pp. 453-461.

[15] See for example, Yosef Lapid, 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects for International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33 No. 3 (1989), pp. 235-254; Robert Keohane,

sparring camps against each other—realists versus idealists, traditionalists versus scientists, positivists versus post-positivists, and so on. Tangential to these 'paradigm wars', IR has witnessed additional efforts to neatly bifurcate the discipline's theoretical landscape along normative lines. Robert W. Cox's distinction between 'problem solving theory' and 'critical theory', which has elicited much comment since it was first put forth in 1981, was highly influential. For some, Cox's formulation has long since grown banal,[16] but his admonishment that all theories have 'perspectives and purposes' represents a useful starting point for a project focused on the asymmetries of US-Latin American relations. Cox reminds us that 'theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose' and that 'there is no such thing as theory in itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space'.[17] This is worth remembering when attempting to address questions of US foreign policy given the dominance of Anglo-American perspectives in IR. Although the present project is situated in the broad tradition of critical theory, it makes no attempt to extend (or refute) Cox's axiom. Instead, it begins here so as to highlight the inadequacies of mainstream theories to fully address the question driving this inquiry. For, as discussed below (and in Chapter 2), though realist and liberal perspectives may speak to the ebb and flow of US policies toward Latin America, they are poorly equipped for an examination into US hegemony in the region, particularly as it relates to the uneven history of inter-American relations and the complexity of US power therein.

Much like IR, the study of US foreign policy is defined by theoretical divisions. One prominent schism stems from competing views on US objectives in the international arena, and whether they've shifted over time. Some scholars perceive real and indisputable changes in the goals of US strategy. Others view the objectives of American statecraft as fundamentally inert. While the first group sees epochal shifts resulting from the end of the Cold War and the attacks of 9/11 (and hence *discontinuity* in US foreign policy objectives), the second group is inclined to approach these events as largely immaterial to the core goals underpinning US behaviour (a condition of *continuity*). In many ways, this dis/continuity schism gives shape to the multitude of debates over US foreign policy within the academy. By and large, it pits *orthodox* scholars against *revisionists*, though by no means does it exhaust the meanings of these labels. In general, the latter group tends to employ a critical outlook, whereas orthodox scholars are aligned with more conventional or mainstream approaches. The basic division here can be traced to the debates over the origins of the Cold War. As noted by Saull, revisionists stress the expansionary character of US policy, which mirrored that of the Soviet Union in several important ways.[18] The pioneering work of American historian William Appleman Williams did much to advance revisionist ideas.[19]

International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 158-175; and Chris Brown, 'Situating Critical Realism', *Millennium – Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 35 No. 2 (2007), pp. 409-416.

[16] See for example, Paul Cammack, 'RIP IPE', Papers in the Politics of Global Competitiveness, No. 7, Institute for Global Studies, Manchester Metropolitan University e-space Open Access Repository, 2007.

[17] Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium*, Vol. 10 No. 2 (1981) p. 128. On the Coxian tradition of critical theory in IR, see Anthony Leysens, *The Critical Theory of Robert W. Cox* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). For an explication of the non-positivist commonalities of various critical approaches in IR theory, see Mark Neufeld, *The Restructuring of International Relations Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

[18] Richard Saull, *The Cold War and After: Capitalism, Revolution and Superpower Politics* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), pp. 53-56.

[19] See, most notably, William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1972), and *The Roots of the Modern American Empire* (London: Anthony Blond, 1969).

Gabriel Kolko and Walter LaFeber have also contributed major works in this area, as have Noam Chomsky, William Blum and Chalmers Johnson, among others.[20]

Debates over the goals of US foreign policy echo IR's paradigmatic fissures, but in a way that cuts across IR's established (meta-)theories. Those operating from the perspective of discontinuity include both realists and liberals. While revisionists often draw on a Marxian approach, there are also self-proclaimed realists who adhere to the continuity thesis (which aligns them with the revisionists).[21] In general, however, orthodox scholars subscribe to the tenets of realism and/or liberalism. This means they accept and advance the view of a country pursuing an objective 'national interest' while adhering to and promoting liberal values. Revisionists critique this dominant narrative and its portrayal of US hegemony as largely benign. Many focus on the history of US policy in the context of 'the geo-economic and strategic interests of US (trans)national capital and the construction of a world order conducive for the long-term preservation of capitalism'.[22] Others prioritise the cultural factors that work alongside socio-economic concerns to facilitate domination or exploitation.[23] Importantly for this thesis, revisionists pay close attention to the history of US foreign policy in the 'Third World' (or 'Global South'),[24] which is rife with various forms of intervention and, in some cases, outright domination; a history, in other words, characterised by US imperialism and deep hegemonic rule. This history encompasses US relations with Mexico, the Caribbean and Central and South America.

As this project focuses on the US drive to maintain/reconstitute its hegemony in Latin America, it is concerned primarily with continuity. It works from the assumption that the rise of the New Latin Left (NLL) has not altered the fundamental objectives or priorities of US

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[20] Gabriel Kolko, *Confronting the Third World* (New York: Pantheon, 1988); Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1996, Eighth Edition* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997); Noam Chomsky, *World Orders, Old and New* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) and *Deterring Democracy* (New York: Vintage, 1992); William Blum, *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II. Revised Edition* (London: Zed Books, 2003) and *Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower* (London: Zed Books, 2001); Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequence of American Empire* (New York: Owl Books, 2000) and *Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Owl Books, 2004). For a comprehensive reading of the continuities of US expansionism in North America and elsewhere, see Walter Nugent, *Habits of Empire: A History of American Expansion* (New York: Vintage Books, 2008). Stephen Kinzer traces the history of US interventionism in *Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq* (New York: Henry & Holt, 2006). For recent accounts of US imperialism in historical perspective, see Paul L. Atwood, *War and Empire: The American Way of Life* (London: Pluto Press, 2010) and Carl Boggs, *The Crimes of Empire: Rogue Superpower and World Domination* (London: Pluto Press, 2010).

[21] Andrew Bacevich, for example, is a realist who sees much continuity in US statecraft and militarism over time, and who associates his work with revisionist views of American foreign policy. He acknowledges an intellectual debt to the historians Charles A. Beard and William Appleman Williams. Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); *The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

[22] Doug Stokes, *America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia* (London: Zed Books, 2005), p. 22.

[23] See for example, Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009 [1987]). The writings of social critic and literary theorist Edward Said, while focusing primarily on European colonialism, have also dealt with the imperialist policies of the US in the Middle East and elsewhere. His major works in this area are *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994 [1978]) and *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993).

[24] As noted by Blakeley, the term 'Global South' is not just a geographic category. Among other things, it denotes the particular historical relationship between the wealthy 'developed' world (the 'North') and that of poorer 'developing' societies. Although the North/South categories are not uniform or permanent groupings, we can say that, at present, Latin American states belong to the category of the Global South. Ruth Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 2-3.

foreign policy in Latin America. It reinforces the emerging view that, under Obama, the prospect of meaningful change in US policy was overrun by the forces of the status quo.[25] The thesis builds on the tradition of revisionist historiography of US foreign policy, which centres on the US's uninterrupted expansionary drive (for power and influence in the international system, if not for territory) as a process underpinned by geo-economic imperatives and a concomitant ideological/discursive rationale. I believe the revisionist narrative matches the historical experience of US involvement in Latin America. A cursory survey of the literature on US actions vis-à-vis its southerly neighbours reveals a history that undercuts many of the liberal and realist assumptions of US foreign policy, and which problematizes the orthodox position.

Revisionist and Critical Perspectives on US-Latin American Relations

My reading of the history of US-Latin American relations stimulates the critical disposition motivating the overall approach of this project. There is a large body of literature on the history of US foreign policy in Latin America written from a revisionist angle. This includes seminal works by Lars Schoultz and Peter Smith, among others.[26] From a Latin American perspective, Eduardo Galeano and Clara Nieto have also written highly illustrative accounts.[27] LaFeber and LeoGrande have offered comprehensive revisionist interpretations of US policy toward Central America.[28] Greg Grandin provided a revisionist telling of the importance of Latin America for Washington's imperialist policymaking in *Empire's Workshop*, one of the few works to be written after the emergence of Latin America's new left.[29] As revisionist scholars have argued, Latin America's geopolitical subjugation to the United States has been so thorough at times that the region has often served as a kind of 'laboratory' for US foreign policy writ large.[30]

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[25] Revisionist and critical scholarship is gradually accounting for the relative continuity in US foreign policy in the transition from Bush to Obama, a moment that, for many mainstream analysts at least, should have evidenced a transformation in Washington's approach to the world. See for example, Atwood (2010), especially pp. 232-239; Boggs (2010), especially pp. 22-25; and Andrew Bacevich, *Washington Rules: America's Path to Permanent War* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010).

[26] Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); and Peter H. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations, Second Edition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). See also, Noam Chomsky, *Year 501: The Conquest Continues* (Boston: South End Press, 1993). Quasi-revisionist accounts that tilt toward a more mainstream perspective include Mark T. Gilderhus, *The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations since 1889* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2000); Alan McPherson, *Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggle: The United States and Latin America since 1945* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2006); and Lowenthal, *Partners in Conflict* (1987). On US imperial influence in the Caribbean, see Eric Williams, *From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean* (New York: Vintage Books, 1984 [1970]), pp. 408-515. On the continuities of US interventionism in Latin America, see Martha L. Cottam, *Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1994). See also, William I. Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[27] Eduardo Galeano, *Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent* (New York: Monthly Review, 1973); and Clara Nieto, *Masters of War: Latin America and U.S. Aggression from the Cuban Revolution through the Clinton Years* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003).

[28] Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1984); and William LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America 1977-1992* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). For critical views on US security policy in Central America in the 1980s, see Morris J. Blachman, William M. LeoGrande, and Kenneth Sharpe, editors, *Confronting Revolution: Security through Diplomacy in Central America* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986).

[29] Greg Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York: Owl Books, 2006). See also, Brian Loveman, *No Higher Law: American Foreign Policy and the Western Hemisphere since 1776* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2010).

[30] In addition to Grandin (2006), see Kolko (1988), p. 96; Williams (1972), p. 151; and Loveman (2010), p. 377.

I draw explicitly on this revisionist literature to make the case for a critical approach. However, it is worth noting that a careful reading of more orthodox interpretations helps to illuminate the imperial legacy of US policy in the region. Even though many mainstream accounts avoid the terminology of 'imperialism' and treat US hegemony as normatively unproblematic, many of these works do in fact capture the historical asymmetry distinguishing the United States from the countries of Latin America.[31] For example, in *Exiting the Whirlpool*, former National Security Advisor and liberal scholar Robert Pastor distances himself from the revisionist accounts of Schoultz and Smith, which he sees as part of the 'dependency paradigm'.[32] Pastor focuses on US interest-formation at the domestic level and aims to accord additional agency to Latin American countries. Nevertheless, Pastor's work acknowledges that the 'imbalance of power' in hemispheric relations did have 'pervasive effects', though he subsequently downplays the implications of this pervasiveness in his analysis.[33] Meanwhile, the realist scholar John Mearsheimer sees US hegemony in the Western hemisphere since the Monroe Doctrine as unique in its depth when compared to the hegemonies of other great powers, so much so that he refers to the US as 'the only regional hegemon in modern history'.[34] However, Mearsheimer's 'offensive realist' account naturalises this deep domination. Additionally, it divorces America's geo-strategic expansion (in the Americas as elsewhere) from the structural evolution of capitalism, highlighting the limitations of the realist approach for the purposes of this project.

Both revisionist and conventional histories have documented the extensive history of US interventionism in Latin America. As the US rose to great power and then superpower status over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it persistently intervened in the political affairs of its closest neighbours. While many of these were relatively small-scale 'police actions', the overall pattern of the interventions served to augment US power in the region. Through covert encounters and overt military manoeuvring, the US absorbed and quashed oppositional challenges of various kinds. Washington recalibrated its strategy over time in accordance with the adjustments made by the waves of agents seeking autonomy from the US and its proxies. This pattern was particularly pronounced during the Cold War. An exhaustive accounting of the US's coercive interventions in Latin America is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, the following paragraphs aim to sketch the contours of this interventionist dynamic using some of the more infamous and paradigmatic examples.

Although often expressed through anti-communist rhetoric, US interventions during the Cold War featured a multitude of rationales and impulses. Strategies too were heterogeneous, alternating between various forms of covert and overt coercion and subversion. In Guatemala, for example, the CIA orchestrated the 1954 overthrow of the

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[31] In explaining the development gap between the US and Latin America, Francis Fukuyama concludes that the divergence is due to factors internal to Latin America (including its institutions), not outside influences (such as the US). 'Conclusion', in *Falling Behind: Explaining the Develop Gap Between Latin America and the United States*, edited by Francis Fukuyama (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 268-295. In fact, contrary to critical theorists, Fukuyama sees the influence of the US in Latin America as benign, pp. 270-271.

[32] To a degree, revisionist scholarship on US-Latin American relations borrowed from the dependency school of economics, which also influenced critical international political economy (IPE). However, this thesis does not engage directly with the (dated if not wholly irrelevant) ideas of the dependency theorists (*dependistas*).

[33] Robert A. Pastor, *Exiting the Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean, Second Edition* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), pp. ix-xii. Harold Molineu offers a liberal analysis of the conflicts in inter-American relations in *U.S. Policy Toward Latin America: From Regionalism to Globalism* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986).

[34] John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2001), p. 141.

democratic and reformist government of Jacobo Árbenz in a clandestine operation.[35] Similar covert action was taken against the elected Socialist government of Salvador Allende in the early 1970s, culminating in the coup d'état of General Augusto Pinochet in 1973.[36] In both cases, imperialist actions were justified on geopolitical grounds in part to conceal the raw economic interests of US capital.[37] That is, they were dressed up as purely anti-Soviet when they served more parochial interests as a first order of business. Throughout the Cold War, when covert actions failed, Washington was not hesitant to use more overt tactics. For example, in 1965-66 US troops occupied the Dominican Republic following years of behind-the-scenes meddling. The occupation was designed to prevent the potential emergence of a 'Castroist' movement in the context of the political instability that had gripped the country following a coup against centre-left president Juan Bosch in 1963.[38] Additionally, in 1989, with the Cold War winding down, US Special Forces invaded Panama outright to depose General Manuel Noriega, a former CIA asset turned 'rogue dictator' and narco-trafficker. Although Noriega had few sympathisers in the region, the governments of Latin America were uniform in their opposition to Washington's unilateral and heavy-handed operation.[39] The line between covert and overt actions was often blurry, as was the extent of US participation in the state-directed terrorism of the region's authoritarian governments.[40] This blurriness was a deliberate component of US strategy, which shifted in accordance with political changes in Latin America (and in Washington). For instance, the US's opposition to the Marxist Sandinistas in Nicaragua went from counter-insurgency under Nixon to diplomatic criticism under Carter to barely-concealed 'covert' warfare under Reagan, all in the span of a decade or so.[41] The changes reflected both the success of the guerrilla-movement-cum-government and the sometimes-divergent concerns of US administrations.[42]

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[35] Two excellent histories of the US's role in the overthrow of Árbenz are: Stephen Schelsinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (New York: Anchor Books, 1990 [1983]); and Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991).

[36] On the 1973 coup in Chile, see for example: Smith (2000), pp. 172-178; Gilderhus (2000), pp. 198-202; and Blum (2003), pp. 207-215.

[37] In Guatemala, Árbenz had carried out land reform policies that threatened the vested interests of the United Fruit Company, a powerful US-based firm with close ties to the Eisenhower administration. In Chile, Allende had moved to nationalise the country's lucrative industrial and mineral companies, prompting opposition from several prominent US companies, including ITT, Anaconda and Kennecot Copper. The overthrows of Árbenz and Allende were also intended to prevent the Guatemalan and Chilean governments from drifting into the Soviet camp. This rationale was commonplace during the US's various interventions in Latin America during the Cold War. No doubt it formed part of the logic underpinning Washington's foreign policy in the region.

[38] Although the US was initially supportive of Bosch, his government fell out of favour with the Kennedy and Johnson administrations due to Bosch's perceived leftism and closeness to the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro. Bosch was elected following the assassination of the dictator Rafael Trujillo in 1961. The repressive Trujillo, a long-time client of the US, had become a liability in the context of the revolutionary upsurge in the Caribbean. On the US's complex relationship with Bosch and occupation of the Dominican Republic in the 1960s, see for example: Smith (2000) pp. 169-172; Gilderhus (2000), pp. 191-194; and Blum (2003), pp. 175-185.

[39] On the US invasion of Panama, known as 'Operation Just Cause', see for example: Smith (2000), pp. 293-300; and Blum (2003), pp. 305-313. Blum notes that the Organization of American States (OAS) 'approved a resolution "to deeply regret the military intervention in Panama" by a vote of 20 to 1 (the one being the United States)'; p. 312.

[40] Blakeley (2009); Marcia Esparaza, Henry R. Huttenbach and Daniel Feierstein, editors, *State Violence and Genocide in Latin America* (London: Routledge, 2011).

[41] See LaFeber (1984); and LeoGrande (2000).

[42] The Carter administration's nominal focus on human rights represented the greatest departure in this regard. Although these changes impacted policy, and reflected considerable shifts in the attitude of the US public following the period of the Vietnam War, Carter's human rights policy remained subsumed to the logic of the Cold War and the imperatives of US hegemony. Moreover, in the last two years of his term in office, Carter relinquished his human rights agenda for a more traditional security approach. See LaFeber (1984), pp. 209-213.

Of course, US Cold War policy entailed much more than military activism. Washington hoped to avoid open conflict if possible. This logic produced the Alliance for Progress, the Kennedy administration's answer to the Cuban revolution, which used foreign aid to stimulate social development.[43] It also fuelled widespread support for the region's dictatorial regimes. In Kirkpatrick's classic articulation, authoritarian states were preferable to unstable liberal alternatives that were weak on communism.[44] Washington propped-up dictatorships from the Caribbean to the Southern Cone.

The Cold War witnessed an unrelenting effort by the US to combat revolutionary movements, popular left-wing forces and nationalist governments of the political centre.[45] Although the end of the Cold War may not have mattered greatly to the US's fundamental goals in Latin America,[46] it did lead to further shifts in US strategy and policy. Among other things, the US's interventionist impulse was channelled through a greater emphasis on multilateralism. This was demonstrated by the US intervention in Haiti in 1994, which was carried out under the auspices of a UN Security Council resolution. On the surface, Washington's reinstatement of president Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a former priest ousted by the military in 1991, reversed the longstanding pattern in US-Latin American relations. Aristide was a left-leaning adherent to liberation theology who was widely popular with Haiti's large poor population. His restoration, backed by the OAS, seemed to portend a new era in hemispheric cooperation. However, the drawn out episode laid bare a kind of 'negotiation in the service of US hegemony' that would typify this period of deepened neoliberalisation. Political and economic conditions were attached to Aristide's reinstatement in an effort to counter the class-based appeal of his 'pro-poor' programme.[47] As documented by, among others, Paul Farmer, a widely-respected anthropologist and public health specialist, US opposition to Aristide and his Lavalas movement was persistent if somewhat furtive.[48] Following his re-election in 2000, Aristide was forcefully removed from power again in 2004 in a move backed by Washington (and, it should be noted, Canada, France and a number of Latin American countries, including Brazil, giving it the status of a multilateral intervention). The evolution of US policy toward Haiti shows that a shifting strategy in favour of multilateral consensus-building is fully compatible with US hegemony.

That the historical record evidences high levels of continuity in Washington's 'endgame' does not invalidate claims of shifting policy *means*. Indeed, the research question motivating this study anticipates shifts in Washington's approach toward Latin America. However, the notion that US *objectives* were readjusted as a result of the end of the Cold War (or, for that matter, the 9/11 attacks) appears tenuous when set against the overarching efforts to neoliberalise the political economy of the region as a matter of priority. As demonstrated

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[43] See Smith (2000), pp. 143-163; and LaFeber (1984), pp. 145-164.

[44] Jeane Kirkpatrick, *Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).

[45] As Kolko (1988) points out, it was not only left-wing governments that were targeted by the US, but also centrist governments that adopted a nationalist or independent posture in the context of the bi-polar Cold War, pp. 35-40.

[46] See Doug Stokes, 'Why the end of the Cold War doesn't matter: the US war of terror in Colombia', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 29 No. 4 (2003), pp. 569-585.

[47] See for example, Blakeley (2009), p. 117. See also, Blum (2003), pp. 370-382; and Peter Hallward, *Damning the Flood: Haiti, Aristide, and the Politics of Containment* (London: Verso Press, 2007).

[48] Paul Farmer, *The Uses of Haiti, Third Edition* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2005 [1994]). Farmer's analysis of Aristide's forced removal from power in 2004 can be found in his 'Who Removed Aristide?' *London Review of Books*, Vol. 26 No. 8 (2004): http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n08/paul-farmer/who-removed-aristide. See also, Hallward (2007); and Blakeley (2009), pp. 116-121.

empirically in this thesis, this neoliberalisation drive (dealt with most explicitly in Chapter 5) has underpinned the US's security policy (Chapter 3), its multilateral agenda (Chapter 4) and its promotion of democratic values (Chapters 4 and 6). The continuity here lends credence to the revisionist position. The literature on Washington's promotion of neoliberalism in Latin America, then, connects the more abstract, theoretical discussion on US power with the more detailed accounts of US policy. It carries forward the revisionist argument and updates the continuity thesis. This literature includes the work of William Robinson, whose *Promoting Polyarchy* and *Latin America and Global Capitalism* are of major import here.[49] It also includes the works of Stokes and Blakeley,[50] both of whom elucidate the role of coercive force in the consolidation of the neoliberal order in Latin America. Additionally, there is a large body of literature (from a variety of disciplines and perspectives) outlining the prominent role of the Washington-based international financial institutions (IFIs) in advancing the neoliberalisation of the political economy of the Americas, through structural adjustment programmes and other lending policies.[51] This literature, much of which was written in conjunction with debates over globalisation,[52] connects neoliberalisation to US hegemony via the Washington Consensus. I return to this connection in Chapter 2. I turn now to the literature on Latin America's new left.

The Emergence and Consolidation of the New Latin Left (NLL)

In its political culture, Latin America is situated solidly within the Western tradition. The left-right model of understanding and classifying politics, with its origins in the French Revolution, has an enduring applicability to the Latin American context. Stemming from, among other things, its idiosyncratic social cleavages, the region's political peculiarities are apparent enough. However, the left-right continuum makes sense in a Latin America that

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[49] William I. Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; William I. Robinson, *Latin America and Global Capitalism: A Critical Globalization Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008).

[50] Stokes (2005); Blakeley (2009); Doug Stokes and Sam Raphael, *Global Energy Security and American Hegemony* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010).

[51] See for example, Judith A. Teichman, *The Politics of Freeing Markets in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, Mexico* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). See also, James Raymond Vreeland, *The IMF and Economic Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). According to Vreeland, IMF lending agreements in developing countries tended to lower economic growth rates and redistribute incomes upward. Governments have used these agreements, he argues, for political and economic reasons, to advance controversial policies often opposed by popular majorities. From a Marxian perspective, see Robinson (2008), pp. 18-19; and Paul Cammack, 'What the World Bank Means by Poverty Reduction, and Why it Matters', *New Political Economy*, Vol. 9 No. 2 (2000), pp. 189-210. On structural adjustment, see Waldon Bello, 'Structural Adjustment Programs: "Success" for Whom?' in *The Case Against the Global Economy*, edited by Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1996), pp. 285-293; Susan George, *The Debt Boomerang* (London: Pluto Press, 1991). On the relationship between the IFIs and US foreign economic policy, see also, Robert Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Kenneth W. Dam, *Rules of the Global Game: A New Look at US International Economic Policymaking* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), pp. 181-229.

[52] For example, in his highly influential book *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002), Joseph Stiglitz connects neoliberalism—which he calls market fundamentalism—to the policies of the International Monetary Fund and the US Treasury Department. As Stiglitz documents, the Washington Consensus doctrine was applied in Latin America, as elsewhere, in a manner that both advanced globalisation and used it as an 'excuse' to implement policies of market fundamentalism. See also, The International Forum on Globalization, *Alternatives to Economic Globalization* (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2002), pp. 37-44. For a comprehensive look at the Bretton Woods institutions in relation to the WTO and global neoliberalism, see Richard Peet, *Unholy Trinity: The IMF, the World Bank and WTO, 2nd edition* (London: Zed Books, 2009).

continues to grapple with 'modernity', a loaded term with markedly Western overtones.[53] Questions of race, ethnicity, gender and nationality simmer alongside the dynamics of class conflict. New areas of concern reinvigorate older debates about the appropriate role for the state in society. Meanwhile, Latin America's geopolitics have witnessed the rise of new powers (Brazil, Venezuela and, from outside the hemisphere, China) and emerging uncertainties about the status of the United States' longstanding hegemony in the region. Through all of this, the left-right dichotomy remains salient in the study of Latin America. It is a heuristic that continues to find purchase in the analysis of the region's politics.

A Left Turn in Latin American Politics

Latin America's contemporary political climate was moulded in the fires of the Cold War. Histories of that period paint a picture of a continent beset by ideological struggle, in which nearly all political concerns were subsumed to the left-right conflict that tracked the superpower rivalry.[54] Although this represents a simplified version of events, the Cold War was a highly polarised era. But its culmination did not consign the left-right model to the dustbin of history. Rather, the post-Cold War period witnessed the stunning ascendency of the 'free market' right across Latin America, while the left was put on the defensive by the sudden collapse of actually-existing socialism. As documented by Jorge Castañeda in *Utopia Unarmed*, the consolidation of conservative rule led to an identity crisis on the left.[55] Although Latin America's left-leaning forces were instrumental in ending the military dictatorships of the Cold War and putting the region back on the path toward liberal democracy,[56] they seemed incapable of formulating persuasive alternatives to the primacy of the unbridled market. 'To a considerable degree', wrote Castañeda, 'the most damaging effect of the Cold War's conclusion on the Latin American left' was in its 'generalized perception of defeat'. At the same time, he added that 'the conditions in Latin America that gave birth and recognition to the left in the past (were) as pervasive as ever'.[57]

By the mid-2000s, the political pendulum was in full swing. Although embedded in the reality of a globalised capitalism with no immediate alternative, Latin America's politics came to be defined by the rise of the progressive left, a remarkable reversal of post-Cold War trends. From 2000 to 2012, fourteen Latin American countries elected left-leaning presidents (see Table 1 on page 14 below).[58] The majority replaced centre-right leaders, and many subsequently won re-election. Journalists referred to this as the 'Pink Tide', with pink representing a lighter version of the red typically associated with the left. Although the gendered connotations of the colour pink in this context render the moniker problematic (with pink signifying a feminised and therefore 'softer' type of politics), it did capture one key

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[53] On the Western characteristics of Latin America, see Mario Vargas Llosa, 'The Paradoxes of Latin America', *The American Interest*, Vol. 3 No. 3 (2008), pp. 7-11.

[54] See for example Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012); and Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2004).

[55] Jorge G. Castañeda, *Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left After the Cold War* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).

[56] On contribution of the left to the return of liberal democracy, see for example, Grandin (2004).

[57] Castañeda (1994), p. 240.

[58] This figure includes Hugo Chávez, who first won election in 1998, and Haiti's Aristide, who had served as president in the 1990s before winning re-election in 2000. With few exceptions (mainly in the English-speaking Caribbean), Latin American countries are characterised by presidential systems of government. On presidential democracies in Latin America, see Scott Mainwaring and Mathew Soberg Shugart, editors, *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

aspect of Latin America's shift: namely, that the new collection of left-wing governments were far removed from the revolutionary movements of the Cold War. By and large, they operated within the frameworks of liberal democracy and market economics. Although these governments evoked socialism, developmentalism and social democracy, the new left was 'new' partly because it emerged at a time when democratic institutions were well-established. In the context of open elections, the NLL materialised largely in response to the deepening process of neoliberalisation that took hold from the 1970s onward. It was this anti-neoliberal tinge which best expressed the novelty of Latin America's left turn, and which best offered contrast with the political currents of the centre and right.[59]

Because there is considerable disagreement over how to categorise specific politicians and parties along the left-right spectrum, any allocation of membership in the NLL is bound to be somewhat partial. For the purposes of this study, the national governments included in this new left bloc are those with executive leaders who (1) self-identify as being on the (centre-) left and (2) defeated candidates with more conservative (pro-market) ideological positions in socio-economic policy.[60] Despite the fact that it developed close ties to some NLL governments (namely Venezuela), Cuba is excluded from this grouping, as it has maintained essentially the same governing structure for decades.[61] Additionally, it should be noted that most analyses of the 'Pink Tide' are generally limited to *Latin* America, which excludes the English-speaking Caribbean (but includes Mexico and Lusophone Brazil).

By no means did Latin America's left turn 'conquer' the continent. Numerous countries maintained governments of the centre and right, including Mexico and Colombia, the second and fourth largest economies in the region, both of which remained close allies of the US. Furthermore, political trends can change in turnabout fashion. For some observers the 'Pink Tide' crested in the mid-2000s, giving way to the rise of the centre.[62] Nonetheless, the left's resurgence in the electoral arena greatly altered the political landscape of Latin America as a whole. It shaped a generation of political assumptions and expectations. By 2010, left-leaning presidents governed approximately two-thirds of the population of Latin America.[63] As the centre shifted leftward, so to speak, conservative politicians were forced to adapt. In Chile, centre-right president Sebastián Piñera ran on a platform of relative continuity with his

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[59] As Francisco Panizza wrote, 'While there are significant questions concerning the scope and nature of LOC (left-of-centre) governments in the region, there appears to be a strong consensus on what is behind their political ascendancy, namely a backlash against the economic policies that were implemented throughout the region in the late 1980s and 1990'. *Contemporary Latin America: Development and Democracy Beyond the Washington Consensus* (London: Zed Books, 2009), pp. 1-2. See also, Andy Baker and Kenneth E. Greene, 'The Latin American Left's Mandate: Free-Market Policies and Issue Voting in New Democracies', *World Politics*, Vol. 63 No. 1 (2011), pp. 43-77; and Matthew R. Clearly, 'A Left Turn in Latin America? Explaining the Left's Resurgence', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 17 No. 4 (2006), pp. 35-49.

[60] These criteria exclude figures like Peruvian President Alan García, who formerly governed the country as a leader of the centre-left *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA, American Popular and Revolutionary Alliance) party from 1985-1990. Garcia was re-elected in 2006 as the more 'pro-market' candidate when he defeated leftist-nationalist Ollanta Humala, who would go on to win the presidency in 2011.

[61] Although not a member of Latin America's new left, Cuba has tremendous symbolic importance to the region's politics, both for Washington and for the leftist governments in the region. The issue of Cuba's exclusion from the OAS is analysed in detail in Chapter 4.

[62] Michael Shifter, 'A Surge to the Center', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 22 No. 1 (2011), pp. 107-121. As Arditi points out, however, the centre itself had been moved to the left. Benjamin Arditi, 'Arguments about the Left Turns in Latin America: A Post-Liberal Politics?' *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 43 No. 3 (2008), pp. 59-81.

[63] Kurt Weyland, 'The Performance of Leftist Governments in Latin America: Conceptual and Theoretical Issues', in Kurt Weyland, Raúl L. Madrid and Wendy Hunter, editors, *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 1.

Socialist predecessors.[64] Following Álvaro Uribe's right-wing government in Colombia, his successor, the more moderate Juan Manuel Santos, deepened relations with Venezuela.[65] Surprisingly, some of the region's most outspoken critics of the US-led 'war on drugs' have been conservative heads of state, including Santos and Guatemala's Perez-Molina.[66]

Table 1: The New Latin Left
Leftist and Centre-Left Presidents Elected in Latin America, 2000-2013

Country	President	Party	Tenure*
Argentina	Néstor Kirchner	*Partido Justicialista* (PJ) Justicialist Party (Peronist)	2003-2007
	Cristina Fernández de Kirchner	*Partido Justicialista* (PJ) Justicialist Party (Peronist)	2007-present
Bolivia	Evo Morales	*Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS) Movement toward Socialism	2006-present
Brazil	Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva	*Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT) Workers Party	2003-2011
	Dilma Rousseff	*Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT) Workers Party	2011-present
Chile	Ricardo Lagos	*Partido Socialista* (PS) Socialist Party	2000-2006
	Michelle Bachelet	*Partido Socialista* (PS) Socialist Party	2006-2010
Ecuador	Rafael Correa	*Alianza Patria Altiva y Soberana* (*Alianza PAIS*) Alliance of the Proud and Sovereign Fatherland	2007-present
El Salvador	Mauricio Funes	*Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional* (FMLN) Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front	2009-present
Guatemala	Álvaro Colom	*Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza* (UNE) National Unity of Hope	2008-2012
Haiti	Jean-Bertrand Aristide	*Fanmi Lavalas* Lavalas Family	1991, 1994-1996, 2000-2004*
Honduras	Manuel Zelaya	*Partido Liberal* Liberal Party	2006-2009*
Nicaragua	Daniel Ortega	*Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* (FSLN) Sandinista National Liberation Front	2007-present
Paraguay	Fernando Lugo	*Alianza Patriótica por el Cambio* (APC) Patriotic Alliance for Change	2008-2012*
Peru	Ollanta Humala	*Partido Nacionalista Peruano* Peruvian Nationalist Partiy	2011-present
Uruguay	Tabaré Vásquez	*Frente Amplio* (FA) Broad Front	2005-2010
	José Mujica	*Frente Amplio* (FA) Broad Front	2010-present
Venezuela	Hugo Chávez	*Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela* (PSUV) United Socialist Party of Venezuela	1999-2013
	Nicolás Maduro	*Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela* (PSUV) United Socialist Party of Venezuela	2013-present

* Tenure represents time in office as of July 2013. Aristide, Zelaya and Lugo were forced from office via coups and/or extra-constitutional measures before the end of their terms (Aristide twice).

[64] Alexei Barrionuevo, 'Right-Wing Businessman Wins Chile's Presidency', *The New York Times*, 17 January 2010, p. A4.
[65] Gregory Wilpert, 'Making Sense of Colombia-Venezuela Relations', *NACLA Reports*, May/June 2011, pp. 3-4. Once thought of as a protégé of Uribe, Santos was to stake out a more moderate or independent line.
[66] Alma Guillermoprieto, 'Drugs: The Rebellion in Cartagena', *The New York Review of Books*, 7 June 2012.

Although analysis and commentary on the NLL ranged from polemical jeremiads to staid policy briefs, there was a widespread tendency to classify Latin America's various new left governments—to group them together in accordance with their differing governing styles and/or policy preferences. Because these forces were far from monolithic, observers sought to distinguish amongst the members of the NLL by placing them at differing points along the ideological spectrum, or by contrasting the temperaments of the various national leaders. In general, this categorisation took the form of a 'typology of two', an approach employed by Castañeda in an oft-cited *Foreign Affairs* article. Using highly normative language, he outlined the contours of a 'right left' and a 'wrong left'. The former was 'open-minded, reformist, and internationalist', whereas the latter was 'nationalist, strident, and close-minded'.[67] For Castañeda, the 'right left' (Brazilian President Lula and Chilean President Bachelet) was moderate, cosmopolitan and politically and economically orthodox, while the 'wrong left' (i.e. Venezuelan President Chávez and Bolivian President Morales) was radical, populist and semi-authoritarian. In this vein, one observer counterpoised a 'vegetarian left' against a 'carnivorous left',[68] while another drew a distinction between a 'well-behaved left' and a 'swashbuckling left'.[69] I explore the merits of a dichotomous approach below.

A great deal has been written on the agents behind the NLL, including individual leaders. Unsurprisingly, Hugo Chávez garnered the most attention from analysts and biographers.[70] However, Brazil's Lula has also generated substantive scholarly interest,[71] as has Evo Morales of Bolivia,[72] among other heads of state. Investigation into NLL agency extends beyond presidents. Social movements have also received much attention within this literature. In general, the analysis of these movements is interwoven into the broader discussion on the new left.[73] Detailed studies carried out by Petras and Veltmeyer and Eduardo Silva demonstrated the ways in which social movements in Latin America resisted neoliberalism, thus creating the conditions for the re-emergence of progressive

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[67] Jorge Castañeda, 'Latin America's Left Turn', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85 No. 3 (2006), pp. 42, 29.

[68] This phrasing comes from conservative economist and pundit Alvaro Vargas Llosa. Cited in Greg Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York: Owl Books, 2006), p. 241.

[69] This terminology is used by Roberto Mangabeira Unger, a Brazilian academic and former government official. Cited in Jorge Castañeda, 'Where do we go from here?' in *Leftovers: Tales from the Latin American Left*, edited by Jorge G. Castañeda and Marco A. Morales (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 238.

[70] See for example, Richard Gott, *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution* (London: Verso, 2005); Bart Jones, *Hugo! The Hugo Chavez Story from Mud Hut to Perpetual Revolution* (London: The Bodley Head, 2008); Nikolas Kozloff, *Hugo Chávez: Oil, Politics, and the Challenge to the U.S.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold, *Dragon in the Tropics: Hugo Chávez and the Political Economy of Revolution in Venezuela* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011); and Douglas Schoen and Michael Rowan, *The Threat Closer to Home: Hugo Chávez and the War Against America* (New York: Free Press, 2009).

[71] See for example, Sue Branford and Bernardo Kucinski, *Lula and the Workers Party in Brazil* (New York: The New Press, 2005); Richard Bourne, *Lula of Brazil: The Story So Far* (London: Zed Books, 2008); Joseph L. Love and Werner Baer, editors, *Brazil under Lula: Economy, Politics, and Society, under the Worker-President* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Perry Anderson, 'Lula's Brazil', *London Review of Books*, Vol. 33 No. 7 (March 2011); and Emir Sader, 'Taking Lula's Measure', *New Left Review*, Vol. 33 (2005), pp. 59-80.

[72] See for example, Sven Harten, *The Rise of Evo Morales and the MAS* (London: Zed Books, 2011); Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian, *Electoral Rules and the Transformation of Bolivian Politics: The Rise of Evo Morales* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Nancy Postero, 'Andean Utopias in Evo Morales's Bolivia', in *Power, Culture, and Violence in the Andes*, edited by Christine Hunefeldt and Misha Kokotovic (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2009); and James Dunkerley, 'Evo Morales, the "Two Bolivias" and the Third Bolivian Revolution', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 39 No. 1 (2007), pp. 133-166.

[73] See for example, Geraldine Lievesley and Steve Ludlam, editors, *Reclaiming Latin America: Experiments in Radical Social Democracy* (London: Zed Books, 2009).

governments.[74] On the structural side, the rise of the NLL led to a re-examination of the status of neoliberalism in the region, with some scholars and commentators reaching the conclusion that Latin America was entering a post-neoliberal age.[75] Culturally, the re-emergence of the left has been associated with a rise in nationalism.[76] It has also been identified with an increase in 'anti-Americanism'.[77]

Multiple Lefts: A Typology of the NLL

Many of the academic studies published on Latin America's new left aimed to distinguish between the different national currents that comprised it as a regional trend.[78] They created analytical separation based on economic and financial policies, leadership styles, attitudes toward democracy and foreign relations, among other things. The usual breakdown—one that crops up in US diplomacy, and which will be investigated further in this thesis—is that between the 'radicals' on one hand (Venezuela chief among them) and the 'moderates' on the other (with Brazil the paradigmatic example). The radicals are widely labelled populists, while the moderates avoid this association. The basic binary has a number of variations, many of which are tethered to very different normative conclusions.[79] It is a

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[74] James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, *Social Movements and State Power: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador* (London: Pluto Press, 2005); James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, *Social Movements in Latin America: Neoliberalism and Popular Resistance* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); and Eduardo Silva, *Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). See also, Richard Stahler-Sholk, Harry E. Vanden and Glen David Kuecker, 'Introduction: Globalizing Resistance: The New Politics of Social Movements in Latin America', *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 34 No. 2 (2007), pp. 5-16.

[75] Eric Hershberg and Fred Rosen, editors, *Latin America After Neoliberalism: Turning the Tide in the 21st Century* (New York: The New Press, 2006). This is also the position of William Robinson, who maintains that neoliberalism in Latin America entered its 'twilight' stage; Robinson (2008), pp. 226-286. See also, Jean Grugel and Pia Riggirozzi, editors, *Governance after Neoliberalism in Latin America* (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2009); John Burdick, Philip Oxhorn and Kenneth M. Roberts, editors, *Beyond Neoliberalism in Latin America? Societies and Politics at the Crossroads* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); and Laura Macdonald and Arne Ruckert, editors, *Post-Neoliberalism in the Americas* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). Sader refers to Latin America under the new left as the 'weakest link' in the global neoliberal order. Emir Sader, 'The Weakest Link: Neoliberalism in Latin America', *New Left Review*, Vol. 52 (2008): pp. 5-31.

[76] Jorge G. Castañeda, Marco A. Morales, and Patricio Navia, 'Resilient Nationalism in the Latin American left', in Jorge G. Castañeda and Marco A. Morales, editors, *Leftovers: Tales from the Latin American Left* (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 92-101; Michael Goebel, 'Introduction: Nationalism, the Left and Hegemony in Latin America', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, Vol. 26 No. 3 (2007), pp. 311-318. As noted by Lomnitz, this nationalism coincided with renewed anti-imperialist discourse. Claudio Lomnitz, 'Latin America's Rebellion', *Boston Review*, Vol. 31 No. 5 (2006), pp. 7-10.

[77] 'Anti-Americanism' has a protracted history in Latin America, where it has long been associated with leftist, nationalist and populist governments and movements. See for example, Alan McPherson, *Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). I use square quotes to indicate that anti-US sentiment is often directed at US policy rather than essentialised notions of the US's culture or character. Scholars identified an upswing in anti-US sentiment during the re-emergence of the left, much of it directed at the Bush administration. McPherson writes that the leftist governments of the region, backed by non-state actors in civil society, constitute 'potentially the most powerful anti-US movements in Latin American history'. Alan McPherson, 'Anti-Americanism in Latin America', in *The Anti-American Century*, edited by Ivan Krastev and Alan McPherson (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007), pp. 70-71. See also, Julia E. Sweig, *Friendly Fire: Losing Friends and Making Enemies in the Anti-American Century* (New York: Public Affairs, 2006).

[78] See for example, Jorge G. Castañeda and Marco A. Morales, editors, *Leftovers: Tales from the Latin American Left* (London: Routledge, 2008); Patrick Barrett, Daniel Chavez, and César Rodríguez-Garavito, editors, *The New Latin American Left: Utopia Reborn* (London: Pluto Press, 2008); and Weyland, Madrid and Hunter (2010).

[79] Tariq Ali, for example, maintains this distinction, but turns it on its head, discussing Chávez, Morales and Correa as virtuous agents of change creating a 'social-democratic alternative to neo-liberal capitalism'. *Pirates*

dichotomisation that has surfaced in much of the academic literature on the recent political shifts in Latin America, contributing to a broad understanding of the 'Pink Tide' as a wave of two lefts.[80] More descriptive accounts of the NLL have often taken a similar path, spelling out plausible if limited typologies. Polemical and journalistic writings celebrating,[81] condemning[82] or downplaying[83] this regional trend have proliferated as Latin America's turn to the left became entrenched. Although the 'typology of two' has its merits (as expounded upon below), it is true that the NLL is characterised by a wider diversity.[84] With conditions differing on a country-by-country basis, it is unsurprising that governments sharing common ideological tendencies diverge when it comes to policy. The significance of the dichotomy to US hegemony has not been adequately addressed in the literature. The division of the region's leaders into 'good' and 'bad' leftists is wrapped-up in the US's ideological (or 'productive') power in the region, as detailed in Chapter 6.

One strand of the literature on the New Latin Left focuses on the regional nature of this political shift beyond the usual divisions of 'radical versus moderate'.[85] This thesis builds on this literature to reframe the dominant 'typology of two' argument. Given that the NLL emerged in the context of deep neoliberalisation, the analytical division used here is based on the degree of receptiveness to, or rejection of, neoliberalism itself. I therefore define the two main blocs within the NLL as *anti-neoliberals* and *neoliberal reformers*. The anti-neoliberal bloc is comprised of the governments of Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, while the remaining members of the NLL (including, most prominently, Brazil) are more accurately understood as neoliberal reformers. Argentina and Nicaragua occupy a kind of middle ground. Although they correspond to particular countries often viewed as being on opposite sides of the moderate/radical split, these two groups, or tendencies, are best seen as ideal-types. I believe that a more fluid categorisation reflects the actuality of Latin American politics, in which diverse leftist agents are ascendant but constrained by pre-existing

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of the Caribbean: Axis of Hope (London: Verso, 2008), p. ix. This is contrasted with 'the abandonment by Lula's Workers Party (PT) of its traditional programme in favour of neo-liberal capitalism', p. 43.

[80] See for example, Weyland, Madrid and Hunter, editors, *Leftist Governments in Latin America* (2010). Contributors to this volume situate a 'moderate' left (Brazil and Chile) against a 'contestatory' left (Venezuela and Bolivia).

[81] See for example, Ali (2008). See also, Emir Sader, *The New Mole: Paths of the Latin American Left* (London: Verso, 2011); and Barrett, Chavez and Rodríguez-Garavito, editors (2008).

[82] See for example, Schoen and Rowan (2009). See also, Sebastian Edwards, *Left Behind: Latin America and the False Promise of Populism* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2010). While Edwards lauds the centre-left governments of Chile and Brazil for maintaining pro-market policies, his overall argument centres on the claim that the reforms of the Washington Consensus did not go far enough in 'modernising' the economies of Latin America.

[83] See for example, Michael Reid, *Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America's Soul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). Despite the rather sensationalistic title, Reid's account downplays the notion that Latin America is in the throes of a resurgence of left-wing politics. Reid stresses the more 'moderate' or centrist elements of the region's new left, which he views as the dominant trend. See also, Shifter (2011). From a Marxist perspective, Petras and Veltmeyer have been reluctant to categorise Latin America's progressive governments as being on the left given their broad commitment to market economies. Petras and Veltmeyer see these states as protecting neoliberalism and diluting the revolutionary capacity of the region's social movements. James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, *What's Left in Latin America? Regime Change in New Times* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2009); Petras and Vetlmeyer (2011), pp. 160-161.

[84] On the diversity of lefts in Latin America, see especially, Maxwell A. Cameron and Eric Hersberg, editors, *Latin America's Left Turns: Politics, Policies, and Trajectories of Change* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010). See also, Hector E. Schamis, 'A Left Turn in Latin America? Populism, Socialism, and Democratic Institutions', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 17 No. 4 (2006), pp. 20-34.

[85] See for example, Sader (2011); Panizza (2009); Cameron and Hersberg, editors (2010); and Nikolas Kozloff, *Revolution! South America and the Rise of the New Left* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

structures of varying scope and depth. Scholars highlight the fact that, however similar, these governments came to power for differing reasons.[86]

In addition to pursuing divergent policies in the socio-economic realm, the NLL as a whole appears highly accommodating of (and even supportive of) a plurality of political strategies. When it comes to the all-important details of state behaviour in fiscal and monetary affairs, researchers point to the 'ample diversity of specific policies being applied by current leftist administrations', a trend that 'underscores the considerable pragmatic blending that goes on'.[87] In examining monetary policy, exchange policy (currency valuation), fiscal positioning (after debt payments), debt administration, social expenditures, support for free trade agreements with the US, and support for regional economic integration, Tussie and Heidrich highlight the incredible 'ecumenism' of the NLL, and hence the 'considerable difficulty of conceptualizing the phenomenon of the new left in a dichotomous fashion'.[88] In delineating the differences within the NLL's various presidential administrations, the authors show that these differences criss-cross those governments generally seen as being on opposite sides of the typological divide, implicitly calling into question the moderate/radical binary. Moreover, they see unity interwoven in the NLL's diverse policies, with similarities in approach marking 'a clear turnaround from the confidence in the cure-all ability of markets' as well as 'the emergence of a pragmatic belief in a role for state management'.[89] In other words, as summarised by Grugel, 'all of Latin America's left democrats are, in different ways, concerned to strengthen state authority in the social and economic domains'.[90]

That there are important differences between the various NLL governments is fairly intuitive given the breadth of the 'Pink Tide' and the diversity of the Latin American countries governed by centre-left administrations. As stated by Castañeda and Morales, if 'there is too much diversity across the Latin American left to conceive it as a single entity', there may also be 'too much variation to conceive a dichotomous classification as means (sic) to understand patterns in the behaviour of the left'.[91] That these governments have pursued different outcomes and achieved different levels of 'success' in social and economic policy is reflected in the literature. Important though they are, these differences do not negate the similarities or abrogate the conceptual utility of the left-turn as a meaningful development in the politics of the hemisphere. As written by Grandin, 'despite differences in manner, Latin American governments have committed themselves to a common agenda of economic diversification, regional integration, and development policies that spur not just growth but equality'.[92] It is the definitiveness of the left turn as a *regional trend* that makes it significant from a geopolitical and geo-economic perspective. In William Robinson's assessment of these debates, he concludes: 'The fact is that there *are* two Lefts: one that dominated the pink tide and sought to reintroduce a mild redistributive component into the global capitalist program in the region, and a more radical one that sought a more substantial transformation

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[86] Karen L. Remmer, 'The Rise of Leftist-Populist Governance in Latin America: The Roots of Electoral Change', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 45 No. 8 (2012), pp. 947-972.
[87] Diana Tussie and Pablo Heidrich, 'A tale of ecumenism and diversity: economic and trade policies of the new left', in *Leftovers: Tales from the Latin American Left* (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 62.
[88] Ibid., pp. 62-63.
[89] Ibid., pp. 62-64.
[90] Jean Grugel, 'Democracy after the Washington Consensus', in *Governance after Neoliberalism in Latin America* (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2009), p. 45.
[91] Jorge G. Castañeda and Marco A. Morales, 'The Current State of the Utopia', in *Leftovers: Tales from the Latin American Left* (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 17.
[92] Grandin, *Empire's Workshop* (2006), p. 242.

of social structures, class relations, and international power dynamics'.[93] But the left turn was not wholly defined by this schism. In fact, Robinson sees the broader 'turn to the left' as both symbolic of 'the end of the reigning neoliberal order' and demonstrative of the 'limits of parliamentary changes in the era of global capitalism'.[94]

In sum, it is crucial not to overplay the distinction between the anti-neoliberal governments of the new left and those classified as neoliberal reformers. That several members of the NLL seem to straddle the two groups reinforces the notion that such categories are largely ideal-typical; for instance, many analysts have sought to place Argentina's Kirchner and Fernández de Kirchner governments somewhere between the Chávez and Lula 'poles', and others have done the same with the Sandinista government of Nicaraguan President Ortega. Moreover, the distinction between anti-neoliberals and neoliberal reformers loses some of its cogency when applied to the foreign policies of the NLL states, particularly in the regional arena. The governments of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador have maintained strong ties with those of a more 'moderate' bent, despite obvious points of conflict in the bilateral relations amongst some of these countries.[95] Chávez and Lula had an amiable and productive relationship, particularly in light of their supposed rivalry for symbolic leadership of the region. On issues of trade, there was widespread cooperation. As examined in Chapter 5, opposition to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) was relatively consistent among both anti-neoliberal and reformist governments.[96] This unified stance effectively felled the US-backed proposal.[97]

The Anti-Neoliberals: Chávez, Morales, Correa and the 'Bolivarian' Bloc

First elected in 1998, Hugo Chávez became the most potent symbol of the region-wide turn to the left. Chávez epitomised the 'radical' or 'populist' elements of the NLL,[98] garnering much international media attention for his flamboyant style and larger-than-life character. Chávez's highly personalised movement presented itself as explicitly anti-neoliberal from the very beginning,[99] even if, in practice, the Venezuelan state under Chávez was slow to break with the tenets of neoliberal orthodoxy.[100] Chávez routinely condemned 'savage neoliberalism', a conjunction that was prominent in his rhetorical repertoire by the

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[93] William I. Robinson, *Latin America and Global Capitalism: A Critical Globalization Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), pp. 293-294. Italics in original.

[94] Ibid., p. 290.

[95] For example, Bolivia has historically had poor relations with Chile dating to the War of the Pacific in the late 1800s, when Bolivia's loss of the Atacama region left it land-locked. Under presidents Morales and Bachelet, bilateral relations improved considerably, despite the lack of a diplomatic breakthrough on Bolivia's access to the sea.

[96] On the other hand, some members of the NLL entered into bilateral free trade agreements with the US, including Chile and Uruguay (which negotiated a 'trade and investment framework agreement' [TIFA] with Washington). Additionally, left-leaning governments in Central America (namely those of Nicaragua and El Salvador) adhered to the pre-existing Central American Free Trade Agreement with the US (CAFTA-DR, which also includes the Dominican Republic). Trade issues are addressed further in Chapter 5.

[97] See for example, Kozloff (2008), pp. 47-48, 65.

[98] On populism in Venezuela, see Kirk A. Hawkins, *Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). See also, Schamis (2006).

[99] As described by Richard Gott, Chávez's early identity as a political actor was greatly impacted by the *Caracazo*, the violent riots/popular rebellion that ripped through Caracas in 1989 as a result of the decision by then-President Carlos Andrés Pérez to implement a neoliberal austerity package sponsored by the IMF. *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution* (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 35-87.

[100] See for example, Julia Buxton, 'Economic Policy and the Rise of Hugo Chávez', in *Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization, and Conflict*, edited by Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp. 113-130.

time of his first campaign.[101] The discourse of anti-neoliberalism that enveloped Chávez, his supporters (often referred to as *Chavistas*) and the Venezuelan government overlaid the implementation of economic policies that countered the orthodoxy of the Washington Consensus. Over his 14 years in office, Venezuela represented Latin America's exemplar post-neoliberal country, and Chávez the region's anti-neoliberal agent *par excellence*.[102] Using Venezuela's oil wealth, he exercised influence on the international stage, including as the leader of the region's 'anti-American' states. Venezuela's regional influence, organised through the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), is examined in Chapters 4 and 5. Chávez's discourse of Bolivarianism (which references Simón Bolívar, South America's independence hero) was constitutive of his nationalist, anti-imperialist and pan-Latin American appeal.[103] Chávez's death from cancer in March 2013 raised questions as to the future of his 'Bolivarian' project, both in Venezuela and regionally. Although Nicolás Maduro, Chávez's chosen successor, was subsequently elected to a full term, his narrow victory raised the prospect of heightening divisions within Venezuela's *Chavista* bloc.

To a degree, Chávez's marriage of socialist rhetoric with statist, redistributive and developmentalist policies served as a model for other leaders in South America, particularly in the Andean region. President Evo Morales of Bolivia and President Rafael Correa of Ecuador were widely seen as those leaders closest to Chávez, so much so that they were often portrayed as 'protégés' of the Venezuelan president. Although this involved the vague characterisation of Morales and Correa as underlings of the Chávez juggernaut, the linking of the three leaders was not without merit, as they shared an explicitly anti-neoliberal praxis that was largely absent from the rest of Latin America's centre-left heads-of-state.[104] Keeping in mind that the anti-neoliberal dispositions of these governments are conditioned by differing national experiences, and are thus manifested in different ways, it is clear that, within the diversified NLL, the Venezuelan, Bolivian and Ecuadorian governments form something akin to an anti-neoliberal bloc.[105] This is not to say that the other left-leaning governments of the region do not at times challenge neoliberalism, or that the Andean members of the NLL necessarily represent a 'revolutionary' break with capitalism. Rather, it is simply to state that that which gives Latin America's new left its 'newness' and its 'leftness' is demonstrably stronger in certain circumstances. Among other similarities, Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador are major producers and exporters of hydrocarbons.[106] In Bolivia and Ecuador, leftist administrations draw support from vibrant peasant- and indigenous-based social movements,

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[101] Nikolas Kozloff, *Hugo Chávez: Oil, Politics, and the Challenge to the U.S.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 56.

[102] Studies into the anti-neoliberal characteristics of Chávez's movement and government abound. See for example, Leslie C. Gates, *Electing Chávez: The Business of Anti-Neoliberal Politics in Venezuela* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 2010); and Daniel Hellinger, 'When "No" Means "Yes to Revolution": Electoral Politics in Bolivarian Venezuela', *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 32 No. 3 (2005), pp. 8-32. See also, Terry Gibbs, 'Business as Unusual: What the Chávez Era Tells Us about Democracy under Globalisation', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 27 No. 2 (2006), pp. 265-279. According to Gibbs, 'the Bolivarian Revolution has first and foremost represented an all-out assault on neoliberal doctrine and its authoritarian elements, bringing into question elite control of the economy', p. 269.

[103] See Gott (2005); Kozloff (2006); and Ali (2008), among many other accounts.

[104] See for example, Sader (2011), p. 111; Ali (2008); Roger Burbach, Michael Fox and Fred Fuentes, *Latin America's Turbulent Transitions: The Future of Twenty-First Century Socialism* (London: Zed Books, 2013); James Rochlin, 'Latin America's Left Turn and the New Strategic Landscape: the case of Bolivia,' in *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 28 No. 7 (2007), pp. 1327-1342.

[105] See for example, Robinson (2008), p. 293; and Burbach, Fox and Fuentes (2013).

[106] On resource nationalism in the NLL, see Osmel Manzano and Francisco Monaldi, 'The Political Economy of Oil Production in Latin America', *Economía*, Vol. 9 No. 1 (2008), pp. 59-98.

a role played by the more clientelistic Chavistas in Venezuela.[107] All three countries ratified new constitutions in an effort to incorporate groups long excluded from political decision-making. These changes allowed executives to remain in office for extended periods of time by abolishing term limits. Morales and Correa have, following Chávez, routinely affirmed their commitment to 'Socialism for the 21st Century'.[108]

Even within the anti-neoliberal faction of the NLL important differences exist. In Venezuela, politics were quickly polarised around the figure of Chávez himself. Anti-neoliberal and class-based social movements, as well as the political opposition, operated largely in reference to Chávez's Bolivarian 'project' and, more to the point, Chávez's central position within the new order. Meanwhile, Morales and Correa have governed with the tenuous support of highly autonomous social movements; anti-systemic groups that brought down several presidents who adhered to the Washington Consensus.[109] (As a leader of the national coca growers' union, Morales himself was instrumental in Bolivia's protest movement.) Additionally, Venezuela's massive oil reserves 'make it the only county in the region with a truly independent source of wealth, and this (gave) Chávez increased manoeuvrability'. In contrast, 'even with the limited bargaining power produced by Bolivia's natural-gas reserves, Evo Morales has been forced to moderate his anti-neoliberal aspirations'.[110] Likewise, although Ecuador is South America's third-largest exporter of oil to the US, the country's overall output and proven reserves are a fraction of Venezuela's.

The Neoliberal Reformers: Brazil's Lula and the 'Moderates' of the NLL

If Chávez exemplified the NLL's anti-neoliberal faction, Brazilian President Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva embodied the more reformist aspects of Latin America's left turn. Lula, who governed from 2003-2011, was a metallurgist and union organiser before helping to found Brazil's Workers Party (PT). He was known as the country's first 'worker president'.[111] A committed socialist for most of his career, Lula came under criticism from PT activists and Brazil's social movements for his perceived willingness to capitulate to the country's macroeconomic status quo. According to his biographer, 'the strategic case against Lula is that he compromised too much on economic policy, so that a conservative, market-friendly approach made it hard to achieve real social reform'.[112] In moving to the centre, Lula positioned himself to win two elections after failing to gain the presidency in three previous attempts. During the 2002 campaign, Lula issued a highly publicised 'Letter to the Brazilian People' to calm international financial markets' apprehension about the prospects for a PT government. The letter clarified that the incoming Lula administration was prepared to forfeit its anti-neoliberal platform to avoid the risks associated with macroeconomic instability, a pattern that held throughout Lula's tenure (and that of his PT successor, Dilma Rousseff). Specifically, the letter stated that Lula would respect business contracts and continue to abide by the conditions of the country's existing financial arrangement with the IMF. According to

[107] Cristóbal Valencia Ramírez, 'Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution: Who Are the Chavistas?' *Latin American Perspectives,* Vol. 32 No. 3 (2005), pp. 79-97.
[108] Amy Kennemore and Gregory Weeks, 'Twenty-First Century Socialism? The Elusive Search for a Post-Neoliberal Development Model in Bolivia and Ecuador', *Bulletin of Latin American Research,* Vo. 30 No. 3 (2011), pp. 1-15; Burbach, Fox and Fuentes (2013).
[109] Petras and Veltmeyer (2011); Silva (2009).
[110] Clearly (2006), p. 46.
[111] Bourne (2008).
[112] Ibid., p. 229

Panizza, Lula's 'commitment to economic orthodoxy could be seen as a case of a left-wing leader abandoning radical policies under overwhelming economic constraints'.[113]

In contrast to Chávez's move towards an increasingly anti-neoliberal posture, Lula metamorphosed into a reformer operating largely within the parameters of neoliberalism. Although his government maintained tight control over public expenditures and prioritised Brazil's external debt payments, Lula insisted that fiscal austerity did not imply full compliance with the neoliberal model.[114] Yet even his signature social programme, the *Bolsa Familia* (Family Grant) initiative, which centred on monthly stipends to poor families, was an extension of programmes implemented by the previous (neoliberal) government.[115] Similar dynamics can be seen in other parts of South America's Southern Cone, especially in Chile and Uruguay, where 'parties of the left... have become increasingly integrated into the existing political system and have moved from the radical left towards the centre-left'.[116] Though they implemented economic and social policies that challenged the Washington Consensus in important ways, the majority of NLL governments adhered to this cautionary, ostensibly piecemeal approach. In general, however, 'there would appear to be insufficient reason for affirming that these countries... are in a process of "transition from neo-liberalism"'. In the case of Brazil's PT government, this was demonstrated by the 'undeniably neo-liberal nature of the macroeconomic policies it has implemented', including continued liberalisation of the financial sector.[117]

If Venezuela's exceptionalism is defined by its oil wealth,[118] Brazil occupies a unique position within the NLL based on its status as South America's largest economy. Under the governments of Lula and Rousseff, Brazil consolidated its standing as a leader of the Global South in a variety of forums, including the WTO. The country has used the Mercosur customs union to curry influence in South America. It is one of the BRICs, alongside the rising economies of Russia, India and China.[119] To the consternation of much of the PT rank-and-file, the management of Brazil's rise to regional power status was prioritised at the expense of socio-economic development and wealth redistribution.[120] As the PT scrapped its traditional emphasis on social and economic justice, Lula justified such a turn on pragmatic grounds—a pragmatism that was extended to cover the country's foreign policy. Scholars point to the relative stability in Brazil's foreign relations from the 1990s through the 2000s, which remained fixed around the regional/international orientation of the country's elite. Overall, the evidence suggests that Lula's foreign economic policy did not represent a radical break from that of previous administrations. Rather, his administration was focused primarily on adjusting Brazil to 'the new realities imposed by global capitalism and the need to form coalitions with other countries in similar conditions to advance the international interests of

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[113] Panizza (2009), pp. 216-217.
[114] Ibid., p. 218.
[115] Félix Sánchez, João Machado Borges Neto, and Rosa Maria Marques, 'Brazil: Lula's Government: A Critical Appraisal', in *The New Latin American Left: Utopia Reborn*, edited by Patrick Barrett, Daniel Chavez, and César Rodríguez-Garavito (London: Pluto Press, 2008), p. 54.
[116] Panizza (2009), p. 223.
[117] Sánchez, Neto and Marques (2008), pp. 66-67.
[118] Manuel Hidalgo, 'Hugo Chávez's "Petro-Socialism"', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 20 No. 2 (2009), pp. 78-92. See also, Schamis (2006); and Cesar J. Alvarez and Stephanie Hanson, 'Venezuela's Oil-Based Economy', Council on Foreign Relations, 9 February 2009: http://www.cfr.org/economics/venezuelas-oil-based-economy/p12089.
[119] On the rise of Brazil, see Julia E. Sweig, 'A New Global Player: Brazil's Far-Flung Agenda', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89 No. 6 (2010), pp. 173-184.
[120] Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, 'Brazil as a Regional Power and Its Relations with the United States', *Latin American Perspectives* Vol. 33 No. 3 (2006), pp. 12-27.

the Brazilian capitalist class'.[121] At the same time, the PT has retained a residual emphasis on its social agenda, and this has impacted its foreign economic policy. The lack of a major ideological shift notwithstanding, Brazil's foreign relations have placed it on a path of antagonism with US hegemony in South America. This trend, along with the US response, is explored in Chapters 4 and 5. The rest of this chapter is dedicated to the design, methodology and contribution of the thesis as a whole.

Originality, Research Design and Limitations

Much ink has been spilled on the topics of US imperialism/hegemony in Latin America and the rise of the region's new left governments. However, surprisingly little has been written on the relationship between the two, at least from within the English-language academy. In the context of the more pressing issues that confront US policy (from the conflicts in the Middle East to the rise of China), Latin America is not as high on Washington's agenda as it once was (during the Cold War, for instance). For whatever reason, conjecture on the recent changes in Latin America has yet to give way to a concerted effort to assess these trends from the standpoint of international relations. As such, the impact of the new left on US foreign policy has yet to be fully appreciated. Furthermore, Latin America has not factored into the protracted debates over American decline that erupted in the wake of the Iraq war and the 2008 financial crisis. What makes this surprising is that US hegemony in Latin America began fracturing at a time when the broader discussion was focused on Washington's imperial turn, and before the decline in the US's global standing became so visible.[122] Without losing sight of my specific research question, this thesis seeks to redress some of these oversights—at least to the degree that such a redress is possible from within the parameters of the research design outlined here.

Put simply, the originality of this project begins with its ability to speak directly to the relationship between the New Latin Left and US foreign policy, a move that obliges an in-depth explication of the dialectical relationship between hegemony and resistance that is constitutive of contemporary inter-American relations. It is this line of inquiry which motivates my research question and gives the thesis its title. There is originality here despite the fact that the basic idea of 'reconstituting hegemony' is not a novel one on its own. Robert Cox and Stephen Gill have, in passing, used the term 'reconstitution' to refer to the efforts of hegemonic groups/states to resolve organic crises and, in Gill's case, to ask 'how far and in what ways (American) hegemony is being reconstituted, in a historical process that involves continuity and discontinuity, limits and contradictions'.[123] However, in my reading of the IR/IPE literature, this notion of 'reconstitution' has not been developed in any meaningful way, nor has it been linked to the hegemony/counter-hegemony dialectic. Moreover, the counter-hegemonic moment associated with the emergence of anti-neoliberal movements and progressive, nationalistic governments in Latin America has piqued the interest of Gramscian

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[121] Matthew Flynn, 'Between Subimperialism and Globalization: A Case Study in the Internationalization of Brazilian Capital', *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 34 No. 6 (2007), p. 11.

[122] During the George W. Bush administration, there was increased discussion of the United States as an empire, as detailed at the beginning of the next chapter. The topic of American decline is explored briefly in Chapter 7.

[123] Cox writes that 'the solution to an organic crisis is the reconstitution of hegemony around a social group which is capable of leading and acquiring the support or acquiescence of other groups'. Robert W. Cox, 'Structural Issues of Global Governance: Implications for Europe', in *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations*, edited by Stephen Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 278-279; Stephen Gill, *Power and Resistance in the New World Order, Second Edition* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 75.

scholars almost as an afterthought to wider-ranging analyses.[124] In contrast, this thesis places US-Latin American relations front and centre.

As noted above, this project is situated in the discipline of IR and its subfield of IPE. Although the subject of the thesis pertains to changes in Latin American politics, the analytical focus is on the agency of the United States. It does not strive to be a work of comparative political analysis, in that it is not designed to explain differences amongst the countries of Latin America. It does not aim to shed new light on the variations within the counter-hegemonic push emanating from the region (on a case-by-case, country-by-country basis), nor does it seek to compare and contrast US policy in Latin America with US policy elsewhere. In other words, the project is not a case study analysis insofar as a case study is, quoting Gerring, 'an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units', with a 'unit' understood as a spatially-bound phenomenon.[125] Rather, it is, at its core, a historical analysis of US foreign policy at a particular juncture in US-Latin American relations. In this vein, it is informed by historical materialism (HM), which, as Cox notes, involves an understanding of 'history in the sense of being concerned with not just the past but with a continuing process of historical change'—a process that unfolds dialectically.[126] As a philosophical disposition (and not just a heuristic device), the dialectic precludes the total separation of the hegemon from its 'subordinates', as would be implied by the boundedness of Gerring's delineation of a case study. Hegemony, as discussed in Chapter 2, involves some amount of pushback, or resistance. It requires a counter-hegemony that is both constitutive of the hegemonic 'order' and a potential threat to its durability, depending on the contingencies of human agency.

The present project is aligned with what Colin Hay labels the 'reflexive turn in political science and... international relations'.[127] It is driven primarily to understand the (attempted) reconstitution of US hegemony in Latin America, and is therefore biased in the direction of an interpretive mode of reasoning, insofar as it emphases the ability to 'reflect (on) the complexity and indeterminacy of political processes'.[128] The project's principal research question has more in common with the 'how-possible questions' typical of constructivist theorising than it does with the 'why-questions' of more mainstream (realist and liberal) approaches.[129] In other words, the project is not explanatory. It eschews the

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[124] Gill, for example, examines the on-going political changes in Latin America in a broader discourse on 'alternatives' to the 'new world order', speculating on the limits and possibilities of the 'new forms of political agency' that have arisen to challenge disciplinary neoliberalism in the region; Gill (2008), pp. 259-265. Given his background as a Latin Americanist, William Robinson's analysis of these dynamics (2008) is notably deeper and more thorough.

[125] John Gerring, 'What is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?' *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 98 No. 2 (2004), pp. 341-342.

[126] Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair, *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 88. As written by Eric Herring, 'there is increasing interest in HM as an open, flexible approach that involves synthesis with other theoretical approaches rather than a closed system of thought that excludes others'. Eric Herring, 'Historical Materialism', in *Contemporary Security Studies, Second Edition*, edited by Alan Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 163.

[127] Colin Hay, *Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 1. Similarly, surveying the discipline in the 1980s, Keohane famously posited a distinction between rationalist and reflective theories in IR. Robert Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 158-175.

[128] Hay (2002), p. 36.

[129] On the distinction between why-questions and how-possible questions in IR, see Roxanne Lynn Doty, 'Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37 No. 3 (1993), pp. 297-298.

language of causality and causal inference so comprehensively outlined by King, Keohane and Verba, while heeding their advice to be as precise and concrete as possible in the area of conceptualisation, particularly with concepts that are highly abstract and unobservable.[130] The project is guided first and foremost by a sensitivity to the complexity of processes of change and stasis—of action and reaction—in the international relations of the Western hemisphere.

All told, my research design tilts towards a critical, reflexive approach.[131] While it cannot be classified as positivist or rationalist, it is also distinct from constructivism and post-positivism. This is because the 'analytical paradigm' overlaying this project, borrowing again from Hay, encompasses a 'realism of assumptions' in its basic precepts.[132] The ontology here is realist; in its philosophical commitments, the thesis has been informed by my reading of the emerging critical/scientific realist literature in IR.[133] A number of scholars have commented on the compatibly of this philosophical approach with historical materialist theory.[134] I need not wade into the wider debates over positivism, post-positivism and critical realism. To be blunt, I assume that social phenomena exist 'out there' in the real world of inter-American relations, irrespective of our attempts to study or label it as such. Importantly for this study, critical realism allows for the analysis of both discursive and extra-discursive phenomena.[135] In its design, the project makes use of several methodological tools to analyse and describe the actually-existing process of hegemonic reconstitution. The aim is to illuminate the ways in which US hegemony has internalised the opposition of the NLL so as to protect and augment existing asymmetries. The analysis tracks the different forms of power in US-Latin American relations, using a framework delineated in Chapter 2.

A Mixed Methodological Approach to US Power and Policy

The methodology of this project flows from my philosophical 'realism of assumptions'. It requires an acknowledgement of the ontology on which the inquiry is built, including in relation to the agent-structure problem, a dilemma that cuts across the many cleavages in IR theory.[136] Although I have identified the hegemony/counter-hegemony

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[130] Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 75-112.

[131] Keohane (1989), pp. 158-175.

[132] See Table 1.9 in Hay (2002), p. 29. Hay includes a 'realism of assumptions' as part of the values he associates with new institutionalist and constructivist paradigms in contemporary political science, which he distinguishes from rationalist and behaviouralist approaches. Hay's discussion here does not include any mention of historical materialism, which informs the theoretical approach employed in this project, and which shares in this scientific realism. On the importance of clarifying ontological issues in social science research design, see Gerard Delanty, *Social Science: Beyond Constructivism and Realism* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997). Delanty, like Hay, argues for the ontological compatibility of constructivist and scientific realist approaches, despite some obvious tensions, pp. 131-134.

[133] Critical realism is distinct from political or IR realism. For an overview of critical realism's relationship to IR theory, see for example: Brown (2007); Heikki Patomaki and Colin Wight, 'After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 44 No. 2 (2000), pp. 213-237; and Jonathan Joseph, 'Philosophy in International Relations: A Scientific Realist Approach', *Millennium – Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 35 No. 2 (2007), pp. 345-359. For a critical realist view on hegemony, see Jonathan Joseph, *Hegemony: A Realist Analysis* (London: Routledge, 2002).

[134] Brown (2007); Joseph (2007).

[135] On this point, see Jonathan Joseph, 'Critical of What? Terrorism and its Study', *International Relations*, Vol. 23 No. 1 (2009), pp. 93-98; and Doug Stokes, 'Ideas and Avocados: Ontologising Critical Terrorism Studies', *International Relations*, Vol. 23 No. 1 (2009), pp. 85-92.

[136] On the importance of ontologising the agent-structure division, see for example Colin Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Wight uses the agent-structure dilemma 'as a vehicle to unpack and illuminate the competing ontological

dialectic as a key theoretical issue driving the research, the implications of this dialectic for the structures and agents at play have remained somewhat ambiguous. Let me clarify my position here. If US hegemony in Latin America is understood as a *set of asymmetrical power relations* between agents (the US state, Latin American governments, classes and other subnational [and transnational] groups), this arrangement is conditioned by various structures (the inter-state system, the transnational/global economy). These structures are (re)created through purposeful human action, the parameters of which are set by the (pre-existing) structures themselves. I take structures and agents to be co-determined (or 'mutually implicated', in Colin Wight's phrasing).[137] But because this project investigates US policy, its desiderata lies primarily on the agentic side of the agent-structure divide.

The main agent to be analysed is the US state. The counter-hegemonic agents are the members of the NLL. Their shared structural 'space' is the inter-American system, which includes formalised institutions of cooperation (such as the OAS) as well as deeper, unobservable structures (the hemispheric political economy, as theorised in Chapter 2). Ontologically, the agency of the US is expressed via different forms of power. These are classified through Barnett and Duvall's aforementioned taxonomy. They include *compulsory power* (the direct or command capabilities of the US, such as its coercive capacity). They also include the US's *institutional power*—its ability to construct, and work through, formalised mechanisms of indirect control. The ability of the US to (re)shape pre-existing structures of economic production (through trade policies, for example) represents its *structural power*. Finally, the US's role in moulding ideological understandings through discursive and representational practices is referred to as its *productive power*. These terms will be further clarified in Chapter 2. Suffice it to say that there is a complexity of social and historical processes to which the methodology of the project must be attuned.

The different forms of power assessed in the chapters that follow are not separate case studies as such. They necessarily overlap to shape one another in important ways. For instance, it is difficult to consider the ability of the US to augment its structural power without referencing the formal institutions (i.e. free trade regimes) used to codify and lock-in neoliberalised structures of economic production. It is problematic to discuss the US's compulsory power in Latin America without also addressing the ideological construction of 'radical populism' as a threat to the US and its interests. The thesis uses Barnett and Duvall's taxonomy to organise its empirical examination, leaving space for the consideration of the ways in which different forms of power are related to one another. Feeding into the overarching research question enumerated above, then, each empirical chapter is guided by three fundamental (if subsidiary) questions:

- How have NLL governments problematized US power in the given area or strata under investigation?
- How has the US attempted to protect/augment/recoup its power in this particular area?
- How is the particular form of power addressed in the chapter related to other forms of power in the taxonomy?

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perspectives that underpin IR theories'; p. 3. For Wight, writing in the traditional of scientific realism, ontological concerns precede the epistemological in all social theories, even those that fail to acknowledge this truism. This broad disciplinary debate was stimulated by the publication of Alexander Wendt's seminal article, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', *International Organization*, Vol. 41 No. 3 (1987), pp. 335-370.

[137] Wight (2006), p. 121.

Content Analysis: From Official Sources to Wikileaks Cables

I address these questions through an analysis of different facets of US foreign policy—security and military strategy, multilateral diplomacy, economic and trade policy, the promotion of US values, etc. In this vein, the content analysis of the thesis begins with the official 'texts' of US foreign policymaking in the Americas during the 2000s—the period in which the New Latin Left gained prominence. This includes statements and speeches by government officials in the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations. Of course, the key agencies in this regard are the Department of State and the Department of Defense (DoD). To a lesser extent, it also includes the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) and the US's Permanent Mission to the Organization of American States (which is housed in State). The posture statements of Southcom (US Southern Command, the Pentagon's unified command structure for Latin America [bar Mexico]) and monographs published by the Army's Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) shed light on US security strategy in Latin America in relation to the NLL. Analysis of official texts was not limited to the executive branch. I made substantial use of Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports as well as statements from relevant Congressional committees and sub-committees. Multilateral agreements to which the US is a party (in the OAS, FTAA) were also examined. For news reports, I relied on the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*,[138] among other outlets.

The dominant analytical focus is on US foreign policy toward the *region* of Latin America. To a significant extent, Latin America is a singular thing for US policymakers—albeit one comprised of smaller national units. For geographic, cultural and historical reasons, the region is seen as a distinct locale. This is reflected in US bureaucracy. For example, the State Department features a Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, headed by an Assistant Secretary of State for the region. Although this grouping nominally includes Canada, the Bureau is essentially the 'Latin America desk' at State, with an official mission of 'working with (US) partners in the Americas to generate broad-based growth through freer trade and sound economic policies; to invest in the well-being of people from all walks of life; and to make democracy serve every citizen more effectively and justly'.[139] At DoD, Southcom is 'responsible for providing contingency planning, operations, and security cooperation for Central and South America, the Caribbean (except US commonwealths, territories, and possessions), Cuba; as well as for the force protection of US military resources at these locations'.[140] To quote a leading academic text on the subject: 'Although few generalizations would apply to all of the Latin American states, a degree of commonality exists among them; and certain generally, if not universally, applicable patterns and shared experiences and traits emerge out of the diversity'. From an IR perspective, 'viewing Latin America in terms of a single unit is appropriate but incomplete'.[141]

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[138] While both are newspapers of record in the United States, the editorial board of the *Washington Post* tends to be more conservative than that of the *New York Times*, particularly on foreign policy.

[139] See the 'About Us' section on the webpage of the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs: http://www.state.gov/p/wha/about/.

[140] See the 'About Us' section on the Southcom webpage: http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/about.php.

[141] G. Pope Atkins, *Latin America and the Caribbean in the International System, Fourth Edition* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), pp. 31-33.

To gain an understanding of the wider debates around US foreign policy, I consulted reports from major US foreign policy think tanks,[142] including the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Brookings Institution, CATO Institute, the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR), the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) and the Center for International Policy (CIP), among others. I also consulted US-based think tanks that focus primarily on Latin America, including the Inter-American Dialogue, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) and the Council of the Americas. Other non-governmental organisations (NGOs) of import to the project included the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), the Latin America Working Group (LAWG) and Human Rights Watch. Collectively, this material provided insight into US policy from critical perspectives (e.g. COHA, CEPR, WOLA) and from within the US foreign policy establishment (i.e. CFR, CSIS, Brookings).

In 2010, the whistle-blower website Wikileaks published over 250,000 secret, classified and confidential diplomatic cables from US embassies, consulates and interest sections around the world. In effect, the cable dump created a massive archive of contemporary primary documents virtually unparalleled in the study of international politics. In contrast to on-the-record statements, public documents and the like, the cables provided an 'unfiltered' view of official opinion. They opened a panorama onto the 'actual' perspective(s) and position(s) on many of the foreign policy issues of the 2000s, within the State Department and in the embassies' consultations with other actors and agencies. Cables classified as 'top secret' or higher were not released. Moreover, as noted by one journalist, 'diplomatic cables are versions of events. They can be speculative. They can be ambiguous. They can be wrong'.[143] And yet, there is no doubt as to the utility of the material for researchers. This thesis makes significant use of these cables, thousands of which pertained to US policy in Latin America. While relevant cables were always analysed and triangulated in conjunction with other sources of information, they give the project a certain depth that would not have existed without their timely release. I believe that my use of this archival data adds a considerable degree of originality to the thesis as a whole.

The use of the Wikileaks cables raises a number of ethical considerations. The organisation released documents in a careless and haphazard way, putting certain individuals (e.g. low-level informants in Afghanistan) in physical danger.[144] As noted by one observer, the 2010 cable dump 'drew the rebuke of five human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, because, they felt, civilian sources were not adequately protected'.[145] Although Wikileaks implemented a scheme to address this issue,[146] I acknowledge its seriousness in the context of an academic project. However, I do not think these ethical issues preclude the use of Wikileaks data. Indeed, the concerns pertained mainly to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, neither of which is addressed in this thesis. Moreover, Wikileaks cables are already a matter of public record existing on numerous websites. I am not revealing/publishing any new confidential information in this project. Because of the wider controversies surrounding the group (particularly it's targeting of US policy), the 2010 cable release generated an

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[142] On the role of think tanks in US foreign policy, see Inderjeet Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of the Role and Influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939-1945* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

[143] Bill Keller, 'Dealing with Assange and the Wikileaks Secrets', *The New York Times Magazine*, 26 January 2011: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/magazine/30Wikileaks-t.html?pagewanted=all.

[144] Ibid.

[145] Peter Ludlow, 'Wikileaks and Hacktivist Culture', *The Nation*, 4 October 2010, p. 26.

[146] Keller (2011).

'integrated, cross-system attack on Wikileaks, led by the US government with support from other governments, private companies, and online vigilantes'.[147] This facilitated the development of 'mirror sites' designed by concerned 'netizens' to keep the information accessible to the public. In my research, I accessed the documents through the website www.cablegatesearch.net, which allows visitors to search cables by keyword, date and/or diplomatic post. As a general rule, I searched for cables by keyword (such as 'OAS', 'FTAA' or 'populism'). I then read every cable containing that word as transmitted by embassies in Latin America, citing the most relevant and illustrative examples where appropriate. I have identified the cables in footnotes (and in the bibliography) through their State Department identification number, subject heading and date of transmission.

Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis has become a widely-used methodology within IR research. Following Milliken, Weldes and Hansen, among many others, it is associated primarily with constructivist and poststructuralist theoretical approaches.[148] I acknowledge that discourse analysis is a distinct methodology from the kind of content analysis at the centre of this project. However, I do see compatibility between different kinds of textual analysis in the context of my focus on multiple and overlapping forms of US power. In Gramscian fashion, the discourse analytical techniques implemented here were used to uncover the representations and ideological constructions overlaying the reconstitution of US hegemony in the Americas. As noted by Iver Neumann, discourse analysis 'is particularly well suited for studying situations where power is maintained by aid of culture and challenged only to a limited degree, that is, what Gramscians call "hegemony"'.[149] Although discourse analysts often emphasise the fluidity of that which they study, Neumann adds that 'not all representations are equally lasting' and 'not everything is equally fluid'.[150] Given the realist ontological commitments of this project, it should be obvious at this stage that I do not take discourses as exhaustive of the social sphere. As noted by Neumann, a constructivist, 'meaning and materiality must be studied together'.[151] This position is fully compatible with what Barnett and Duvall call productive power. (They define discourses as 'the social processes and the systems of knowledge through which meaning is produced, fixed, lived, experienced, and transformed'.[152]) This work is concentrated in Chapter 6, which investigates the construction of Latin American 'populism'[153] in US foreign policy. Productive power is further conceptualised in Chapter 2.

For ontological and epistemological reasons, I position my discourse analysis alongside that of Norman Fairclough, whose critical discourse analysis (CDA) maintains that

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[147] Yochai Benkler, 'A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate', *Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review*, Vol. 46 (2011), pp. 311-397.

[148] Jennifer Milliken, 'The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 5 No. 2 (1999), pp. 225-254; Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); and Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (London: Routledge, 2006).

[149] Iver B. Neumann, 'Discourse Analysis', in *Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide*, Audie Koltz and Deepa Prakash, editors (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 70.

[150] Ibid., p. 73.

[151] Ibid., p. 74.

[152] Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, 'Power in Global Governance', in Barnett and Duvall (2005a), p. 20.

[153] The quotes around 'populism' in the thesis reinforce the position that populism is more of a social or discursive construct than an objective condition or phenomenon.

texts should be studied in relation to extra-discursive structures.[154] However, as noted by Hansen, from a methodological standpoint, and in terms of specific techniques, there are 'significant points of convergence' between constructivist/poststructuralist discourse analysis and the CDA of Fairclough.[155] Following Hansen's modelling, I limited myself to official documents and the wider foreign policy debate over Latin American populism within the US government (excluding media output, popular culture and marginal discourses).[156] In particular, my analysis of the discourse on populism is informed by Milliken's notion of predicate analysis, which looks primarily at 'language practices in texts (e.g. diplomatic documents…)' as the main research materials in IR.[157] She writes: 'Predicate analysis focuses on the language practices of predication—the verbs, adverbs and adjectives that attach to nouns. Predications of a noun construct the thing(s) named as a particular sort of thing, with particular features and capacities'.[158] Along these lines, I examined the use of labels like 'authoritarian' and 'caudillo' to construct anti-neoliberal governments as dictatorial, dangerous and imprudent. In addition, I utilise Fairclough's concept of collocation to analyse the conjunctions of 'radical populism' and 'false populism' and their place in US diplomacy and security strategy. Fairclough defines collocations as 'more or less regular or habitual patterns of co-occurrence between words'.[159] These collocations helped demarcate the boundaries of the discourse analysis implemented in the project, as used alongside other forms of content/textual analysis discussed above.

Focused Elite Interviews

To complement these methods, I carried out a series of 13 elite interviews with experts and policymakers in Washington, DC, in the summers of 2011 and 2012. (For a list of interviewees, see Appendix 1.) The subjects included officials from the State and Defense departments and representatives from think tanks and NGOs. These focused, qualitative interviews provided an up-to-date picture of the issues confronting US foreign policy toward Latin America. Alternately known as semi-structured, non-standardised or unstructured interviews, focused interviews fall between the structured (highly-scripted) and unstructured formats, 'but are more similar to the latter in the sense that they too generate qualitative data'.[160] In this format, the interviewer has a specific agenda of relevant topics and themes, but pursues the inquiry in a relatively loose manner. Semi-structured/focused interviews are

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[154] There is a scientific realism to Fairclough's CDA that matches the ontological position of this project. For Fairclough, 'critical approaches differ from non-critical approaches in not just describing discursive practices, but also showing how discourse is shaped by relations of power and ideologies, and the constructive effects discourse has upon social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and belief, neither of which is normally apparent to discourse participants'. Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 12. Although Fairclough accepts, with some reservations, Foucaultian notions about the constitutive properties of discourse, he emphasises that discursive practices are 'constrained by the fact that they inevitably take place within a constituted, material reality, with preconstituted "objects" and preconstituted social subjects', (1992), p. 60. See also, Norman Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research* (London: Routledge, 2003).

[155] Hansen (2006), pp. xvi-xviii.

[156] My discourse analysis corresponds with models 1 and 2 of Hansen's (2006) four models of foreign policy discourse analysis, which limit research to official speech/texts and those of the wider foreign policy debate. In contrast, models 3 and 4 of her typology focus on cultural representations and marginal political discourses, respectively.

[157] Milliken (1999), p. 231.

[158] Ibid., p. 232.

[159] Fairclough (2003), p. 213.

[160] Hilary Arksey and Peter Knight, *Interviewing for Social Scientists: An Introductory Resource with Examples* (London: Sage, 1999), p. 7.

particularly useful to researchers who want to obtain more specific information than is often provided through the more narrative-based unstructured format; it allows the researcher to introduce a topic and 'guide the discussion by asking specific questions'.[161] For my interviews, I used different sets of key questions to guide the various discussions, but with the goal of allowing for the free flow of ideas around these questions. Subjects were encouraged to go off-topic to address the aspects of US policy they thought most relevant to the broader subject of US power. In an effort to glean as much information as possible from these encounters (to maintain an open environment), they were not electronically recorded.

For Rubin and Rubin, 'qualitative interviewing requires listening carefully enough to hear the meanings, interpretations, and understandings that give shape to the worlds of the interviewees'.[162] Focused interviews can help tease out important contradictions in elite thinking, contradictions which may not be apparent via other kinds of research.[163] As Blakeley demonstrates, elite interviews can enrich the type of critical, HM-inflected project outlined here, but this requires viewing the interview itself as a social event rather than a simple transmission of facts from interviewee to researcher. Consideration of the information gained in interviews must account for the context of the interview 'conversation', including the questions asked by the researcher him/herself.[164] Importantly, the interviews I conducted took place in Washington. Though the discussions addressed knowledge-gaps in my reading of primary documents and secondary material, they performed this function from a particular standpoint. In taking on board the analyses and interpretations of my interview subjects, I did so with the knowledge that they were embedded in the power relations discussed in this thesis. Nevertheless, their insights proved invaluable.

Conclusion

The Western hemisphere is fraught with the historical baggage of the domination and subordination of those countries 'beneath the United States', to borrow from Schoultz.[165] The various critical approaches that stimulate the revisionist argument discussed in this chapter are far from uniform. But they speak to gaps in an orthodox view that is ill-equipped to grapple with the legacy of a dynamic that goes by several names—aggression, expansion, intervention and empire, among others. A critical approach tackles head-on the implications of the asymmetry captured in these terms. For reasons further spelled out in the following chapter, I conceptualise this asymmetry as hegemony, a term that, in critical IR/IPE, owes much to the (neo-)Gramscian theoretical tradition. At the same time, the project is grounded in a realist ontology, one that acknowledges a meaningful material world. The originality of this PhD project stems from the consideration of the theoretical problematic of hegemonic reconstitution alongside an understudied phenomena in the 'real world' of international relations—Latin America's contemporary challenge to US hegemony, and the concomitant response on the part of US foreign policy. The ascendency of the NLL was a watershed moment for Latin America and for inter-American relations.

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[161] Herbert J. Rubin and Irene S. Rubin, *Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data* (London: Sage, 1995), p. 5.
[162] Ibid., p. 7.
[163] Ruth Blakeley, 'Elite Interviews', in *Critical Approaches to Security: An introduction to theories and methods*, edited by Laura Shepard (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 158-168.
[164] Ibid.
[165] Schoultz (1998).

The framework developed in this thesis accounts for the coercive and institutional aspects of US power, the traditional purview of realist and liberal theories, respectively. However, I maintain that realism and liberalism are inefficacious as theoretical approaches to my research question, in part because the concept of power in international relations encompasses much more than military and economic coercion and/or institution-building. It is imperative that American foreign policy be situated in relation to capitalism, including the globalised, neoliberal version fortified by the US in recent decades. Thus, this thesis draws on historical materialism, which, especially in its Gramscian form, also allows for the exploration of the ways in which the particularities of policy spring from subjectivities produced in discourse. As developed in Chapter 2, by opening-up the power relations often taken for granted in orthodox theories, a critical, reflective approach of the kind deployed here allows for a richer understanding of US hegemony. Mine is an account which aims to capture the fullness of the concept of hegemony and the tensions inherent in its actualisation.

Chapter 2

Hegemony, Power and US Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis

This chapter outlines the theoretical framework underpinning this PhD project. The introduction distinguishes hegemony from imperialism. The following section argues for a Gramscian-inflected historical materialist (HM) theorisation of hegemony, which, I maintain, is better suited to capture the complexity of the concept than are more mainstream (realist and liberal) theories. With hegemony defined as an asymmetrical social relationship patterned over time by multiple and overlapping forms of power, the subsequent section relates this definition to US foreign policy in the international system. In the context of the Western hemisphere, particular weight is accorded processes of neoliberalisation under the (Post) Washington Consensus. Finally, I develop Barnett and Duvall's taxonomy of power as a means of animating US hegemony. By disaggregating US power into its compulsory, institutional, structural and productive dimensions, I can better illuminate Washington's on-going attempt to reconstitute its hegemony in Latin America. This moves the thesis beyond the traditional Gramscian focus on the balance between coercion and consensus-building while retaining its emphasis on counter-hegemony as constitutive of hegemony itself.

Introduction: Hegemony and Imperialism

The policies of the George W. Bush administration, including the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, led to an explosion of interest in the US as an imperium, both inside academia and in the wider public discourse.[166] 'Increasingly', wrote historian Charles Maier in 2002, 'Americans talk about themselves, and others talk about America, as an empire'.[167] As noted in the previous chapter, critical and revisionist scholars had long grappled with the expansionist and (neo-)imperialist characteristics of US foreign policy. In this vein, historical materialist critiques generally sought to place the unilateralist militarism of the Bush administration in a broader historical setting, while also connecting the evolution of US policy to the structures of the global capitalist economy.[168] On the right, some commentators began calling for a more robust American imperialism.[169] Occasionally, they were supported

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[166] For reflections on this new imperial discourse, see Michael Cox, 'The Empire's Back in Town: Or America's Imperial Temptation—Again', *Millennium*, Vol. 32 No. 1 (2003), pp. 1-27; G. John Ikenberry, 'Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83 No. 2 (2004), pp. 144-154; Doug Stokes, 'The Heart of Empire? Theorising US empire in an era of transnational capitalism', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26 No. 2 (2005), pp. 217-236; Daniel H. Nexon and Thomas Wright, 'What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 101 No. 2 (2007), pp. 253-271; and Bryan Mabee, 'Discourses of empire: the US "empire", globalisation and international relations', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 25 No. 8 (2004), pp. 1359-1378.

[167] Charles S. Maier, 'An American Empire? The problems of frontiers and peace in twenty-first-century world politics', *Harvard Magazine*, November/December (2002), p. 28. Maier examines questions of American empire in *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its Predecessors* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

[168] See for example, Alejandro Colás and Richard Saull, editors, *The War on Terrorism and the American 'Empire' after the Cold War* (London: Routledge, 2006); David Harvey, *The New Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, *Global Capitalism and American Empire* (London: Merlin Press, 2003); Perry Anderson, 'Force and Consent', *New Left Review*, Vol. 17 (2002); and Stokes, 'The Heart of Empire?' (2005).

[169] See for example, Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire* (London: Penguin Books, 2004); and Max Boot, 'The Case for American Empire', *The Weekly Standard*, 15 October 2001.

by liberals who saw empire as a means of pursuing humanitarian intervention.[170] More often, though, liberals (in IR and American punditry) were sceptical of this imperial turn—even hostile to Bush's grand strategy, which they viewed as a departure from the prudential tradition of American statecraft.[171] Meanwhile, many neoconservatives advocated the unbridled application of American power while rejecting the proposition that the US was, in fact, an empire.[172] This denial was shared by policymakers themselves (neoconservative or otherwise), who argued defensively that America had 'no empire to extend or utopia to establish', in the words of President Bush's 2002 West Point speech.[173] As stated by Condoleezza Rice, Bush's National Security Advisor, 'in stark contrast to the leading powers of centuries past, our ambitions are not territorial'.[174] More recently, and in light of strategic setbacks in the Middle East and the 2008 financial crisis, talk of empire has given way to a debate over American decline. In a few short years, the US saw its 'unipolarity' devolve from definitive fact to speculative proposition, even as it remained far and away the strongest single actor in the international system.

Many observers have commented on the US's deeply-rooted ideological aversion to seeing itself as an empire. This view, part and parcel of American exceptionalism, shaped US political culture for decades as the US strode across the global stage. The post-9/11 period did not kill this mythology. However, as noted above, the style and actions of the Bush administration did precipitate a re-think of America's global pre-eminence, including in mainstream commentary. What is interesting is the degree to which Latin America was an afterthought to this new imperial discourse. As outlined in Chapter 1, the history of US interventionism in Latin America is extensive and well-documented, and it persisted after the Cold War. Although Washington's attention was squarely on the Middle East, events around the time of the Iraq war laid bare the challenges confronting the US in its 'near abroad'. In 2001, Argentina, the darling of the IMF and its Washington Consensus policies, experienced a stunning economic and political collapse. The Bush administration's support for the 2002 coup in Venezuela backfired as Chávez regained power just days after his ouster. That year, Lula was elected president of Brazil, prompting Congressman Henry Hyde, chairman of the House International Relations Committee, to declare that an 'axis of evil' was emerging in Latin America (comprised of Cuba, Venezuela and Brazil).[175] In Colombia, the US's counter-narcotics/counter-insurgency strategy against leftist guerrillas was reframed as counter-terrorism. In Haiti, Washington backed the forceful overthrow of left-leaning president

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[170] In general, liberals calling for policies of military intervention based on humanitarian and/or human rights grounds eschewed the language of empire. One exception was Michael Ignatieff, who openly called for 'empire lite' in advocating US regime change in Iraq. 'The Burden', *The New York Times Magazine*, 5 January 2003.

[171] G. John Ikenberry, 'America's Imperial Ambition', *Foreign Affairs*, (September/October 2002), pp. 44-60; Jack Snyder, 'Imperial Temptations', *The National Interest* (Spring 2003), pp. 29-40; and Edward Rhodes, 'The Imperial Logic of Bush's Liberal Agenda', *Survival*, Vol. 45 No. 1 (2003), pp. 131-154. See also, John Newhouse, *Imperial America: The Bush Assault on the World Order* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003).

[172] Charles Krauthammer, for example, the doyen of neoconservative pundits, used every conceivable descriptor to refer to the US except for 'empire' (i.e. hegemony, superpower, primacy, unipolarity). On his promotion of the Bush administration's foreign policy agenda, see 'The Unipolar Moment Revisited', *The National Interest*, Vol. 70 (Winter 2002/2003), pp. 13-18. For a neoconservative denial of US empire, see Victor Davis Hanson, 'A Funny Sort of Empire: Are Americans really so imperial?' *National Review Online*, 27 November 2002: http://old.nationalreview.com/hanson/hanson112702.asp.

[173] The White House, 'President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point', 1 June 2002: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html.

[174] The White House, 'Remarks by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice on Terrorism and Foreign Policy', 29 April 2002: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020429-9.html

[175] Juan Forero, 'Latin America's Political Compass Veers Toward the Left', *The New York Times*, 19 January 2003, p. A4.

Aristide amidst widening instability.[176] Drug violence in Mexico snowballed. The US unveiled the Mérida Initiative, loosely modelled on Plan Colombia.

Ultimately, the US remained, and remains, the most powerful actor in the international relations of the Western hemisphere, so much so that its dominance is often taken for granted in the wider discourse of US foreign policymaking. I contend that the fullness of this asymmetrical relationship is best conceptualised as hegemony rather than imperialism. The two terms are related. Fundamentally, both concern power and its application. At times, however, their transposable use has been cause for confusion. According to Raymond Williams, empire and hegemony are ambiguous in the social/cultural vernacular, meaning it is worthwhile to distinguish between them. Modern imperialism—while unquestionably political—has often been tied to a particular stage in the development of capitalist economies. It is a more *direct* form of governance, following earlier systems of organised colonial rule by European powers. It is also more territorial in scope, as captured in the idea of an 'imperial centre'.[177] Hegemony, by contrast, 'is not limited to matters of direct political control but seeks to describe a more general predominance which includes, as one of its key features, a particular way of seeing the world and human nature and relationships'. To a degree, hegemony overlaps with the idea of ultra-imperialism advanced by Karl Kautsky, which is often applied to the post-World War II United States.[178] Kautsky's thesis focused on cooperation amongst dominant capitalist powers under the leadership of an imperialist superpower, in contrast to the ideas of inter-imperialist rivalry advanced by Lenin and John Hobson. Beyond these dynamics, Williams explains that 'an emphasis on hegemony and the hegemonic has come to include cultural as well as political and economic factors', as expressed in 'active forms of experience and consciousness'.[179] Intimately associated with Gramsci, Williams writes that the concept of hegemony is 'both complicated and variable' within his work.[180]

Hegemony is privileged in this thesis for several reasons. It allows for an analytical focus on the building of consent and on consensual relations, including through international institutions. It allows for an accounting of the non-territorial aspects of US 'rule'. It incorporates ideational/ideological phenomena. In short, hegemony, as a foundational concept, fosters a more complete analysis of the US's place in the world. For the purposes of this thesis, hegemony is defined as an *asymmetrical social relationship patterned over time by the multiple and overlapping forms of power that exist in international relations.* Hegemony involves both consent and coercion. It implies a tenuous and ever-changing 'balance' between the two. It invites forms of resistance that track those forms of power which shape and reshape the social relationship between the hegemon and its subordinate (or 'subaltern') elements. In fact, hegemony *requires* a counter-hegemony that is both

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[176] See Peter Hallward, *Damning the Flood: Haiti, Aristide, and the Politics of Containment* (London: Verso Press, 2007); Paul Farmer, 'Who Removed Aristide?' *London Review of Books*, Vol. 26 No. 8 (2004).

[177] Raymond Williams, *Keywords* (London: Fontana Press, 1988 [1976]), pp. 159-160.

[178] See for example, Simon Bromley, 'American Power and the Future of International Order', in *Ordering the International: History, Change and Transformation*, edited by William Brown, Simon Bromley, and Suma Athreye (London: Pluto Press, 2004), pp. 149-182. For a discussion of the various perspectives on contemporary US imperialism from within the historical materialist tradition, see also, Alejandro Colás and Richard Saull, 'Introduction: the War on Terror and the American empire after the Cold War', in *The War on Terror and the American 'Empire' After the Cold War*, by Colás and Saull (2006), pp. 1-23. For a historical materialist explanation as to why hegemony better encapsulates the status of the US in the contemporary world order, see John Agnew, *Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005).

[179] Williams, *Keywords* (1988), pp. 144-146.

[180] Ibid., p. 145.

constitutive of the hegemonic relationship and a potential threat to its durability (the nature of which is contingent on the agency of counter-hegemonic forces). Here, then, is another conceptual difference with imperialism. At the heart of this thesis is the notion of the *hegemony/counter-hegemony dialectic*, which effectively puts hegemony *in motion*. As stated in Chapter 1, the dialectic is not merely a heuristic but a philosophical orientation informed by historical materialism (HM). As understood in this thesis, hegemony is a dynamic, dialectical *process* rather than a static *order*. The dynamism of hegemony does not preclude the continuity of US objectives within this dialectic, as explained previously.

My conceptualisation of hegemony should not be read as an attempt to dismiss the discussion of US imperialism that exploded onto the scene after 9/11. Firstly, the notion of a US empire remains relevant in part because it captures the structural logic underpinning Washington's actions in the global political economy. Secondly, it can be said that policies of US imperialism (i.e. military interventions) feed into and consolidate broader relations of hegemony. There is, after all, a territorial aspect to *geo*-politics.[181] In Barnett and Duvall's terms, imperialism is an expression of *compulsory power* in its most direct, militarised and coercive guise. In the case of Latin America, US imperialism reached its zenith in the early 20th century, when the Caribbean basin was turned into a veritable 'American lake'. During the Cold War, imperialist interventions (including the overthrow of leftist or nationalist governments), along with support for rightist authoritarian regimes, lubricated a deeper, longer-lasting asymmetry. Washington utilised coercion while also constructing a consensual system of multilateral cooperation (expressed in the OAS, the Alliance for Progress, the Inter-American Development Bank and so on). The US strengthened its focus on multilateral consensus-building after the Cold War, a pattern which largely held (in Latin America) in the post-9/11 environment.[182] This is not to say that coercion disappeared from US policy in the Americas. On the contrary, the compulsory power of the US military remains an important part of the hemispheric landscape, as examined in the following chapter.

Theorising US Hegemony from a Gramscian Perspective

This section outlines my theoretical approach to hegemony, which has several meanings in IR/IPE. I begin by reviewing mainstream or 'rationalist' approaches, namely realism and liberalism. Moving past hegemony as 'domination' or 'leadership', I make the case for Gramscian historical materialism (HM), which, I believe, is better suited to capture the complexity of the concept as I define it above. Considering the role of the contemporary United States in the international system, I review the extensive (neo-)Gramscian tradition in IR/IPE. Though applications of Gramsci vary, they are broadly compatible in opening up the concept of power to illuminate the 'moving parts' in hegemonic relationships (including counter-hegemonies, as represented by the NLL).

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[181] As highlighted in the work of Chalmers Johnson, the US maintains an 'empire of bases' around the world. This expansive network of hundreds of military sites is integral to Washington's ability to project its power overseas. Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Owl Books, 2004), especially pp. 15-37. This issue is addressed in greater detail in Chapter 3.

[182] As Blakeley demonstrates, the US focused increasingly on legitimation strategies in the pursuit of its objectives in Latin American and the Global South after the Cold War. However, this did not signify the complete absence of policies of coercion in the promotion of a neoliberal agenda. Ruth Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 106-156. This is also one of the major themes of Robinson's *Promoting Polyarchy* (1996).

Rationalist Theories of Hegemony

There are two main points of emphasis in conventional IR scholarship on hegemony.[183] These correspond to the discipline's realist and liberal traditions. In realist language, hegemony refers to a situation in which one state is *dominant* over others. This dominance is determined by a country's resource base. In liberal theory, hegemony is akin to *leadership*. Liberals emphasise the formal institutional arrangements that protect the hegemonic state's leadership position, but in ways that benefit international cooperation. For both realists and liberals, hegemons are rational actors, and situations of hegemony are the outcome of rational behaviour in the international system. For both, hegemony is about power—its allocation in the international system and its utility to egoistic states. Hegemony, in this rationalist view, represents a relatively steady and predictable *order*. Contra Marxian/Gramscian notions, hegemony is benign, even desirable. Although it has fallen out of favour, hegemonic stability theory, 'which argues that international economic openness and stability is most likely when there is a single dominant state', was 'the most prominent approach among American political scientists for explaining patterns of economic relations among the advanced capitalist countries' in the decades following World War II.[184]

Hegemony can never be entirely, exclusively *political*. Susan Strange made this point rather straightforwardly when she wrote that to understand contemporary international relations one must pay attention to 'both the dominant international political system of states' and 'the global production structure'.[185] Realist and liberalist approaches tend to take the material resources of states as the basis of their power capabilities, but, all too often, adherents have demurred from examining the processes of economic production that determine the capacity of hegemonic states to act qua hegemons. Of course, there are exceptions to this, as was the case with Strange. IPE is littered with attempts by scholars to grapple with the (geo-)economic foundations of hegemonic states and the numerous issues that overlap the international/global economy and international relations more broadly. Robert Gilpin has been hugely influential in this regard. In his earlier work, Gilpin articulated a rationalist, materialist view of hegemony as a particular type of 'imperial' structure in the international system, which could be contrasted with bipolar and balance of power structures. Under hegemony, 'a single powerful state controls or dominates the lesser states in the system'.[186] Turning his attention to the world economy, Gilpin in his later work reconciled his statist view of hegemony with the importance of market interactions.[187] In the 1980s,

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[183] In their introductory IR textbook, Viotti and Kauppi offer a summary of hegemony, defining it in their glossary of terms: 'Relations of dominance as when a major power exercises hegemony over countries within its sphere of influence… An alternative characterization reflecting preeminent position for a state, but not necessarily implying dominance, is to refer to it as a leader exercising leadership of other states within its sphere'. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond, Third Edition* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999), p. 479.

[184] Michael C. Webb and Stephen D. Krasner, 'Hegemonic stability theory: an empirical assessment', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 15, Special Issue 2 (1989), p. 183. On hegemonic stability, see also, Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 32-39.

[185] Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 24. Strange incorporates elements of the Gramscian perspective into her own theoretical approach to IPE, which is put to use in her analysis of the shift in structural power from states to markets in the world economy in recent decades. Her analysis thus corroborates the discussion of the rise of neoliberalism in later sections of this chapter; pp. 16-30.

[186] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 29.

[187] Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

Gilpin was weighing the decline of American hegemony.[188] By 2000, however, he was emphasising the centrality of the US to the construction and maintenance of an explicitly *global* capitalism.[189] In a similar realist vein, Christopher Layne has elucidated the importance of the US's 'Open Door' strategy to the formation of a globalised economy, which, in turn, serves US interests.[190]

For obvious reasons, a great deal of scholarship on hegemony has been written with the US as its focal point. John Ikenberry, for instance, has tailored his theorising to the US's leadership of the 'liberal order' after World War II. He understands hegemony as a particular form of hierarchy between a pure 'balance of power' arrangement and a more formalised and cooperative 'constitutional' system. For Ikenberry, in his realist pose, hegemony is primarily about domination/coercion. However, his liberalism shines through in his emphasis that a stable international order can be achieved through multilateral institutions.[191] A rules-based system serves US interests and creates public goods that benefit the broader international community. This explains the US's construction of the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions, NATO, etc. In *Liberal Leviathan*, Ikenberry sketches the contours of the 'American World Order'. It is American authority that nurtures liberal values, which are realised through American leadership. Against more imperial notions of hegemony advanced by realists like Gilpin, Ikenberry writes that 'liberal hegemony is hierarchical order built around political bargains, diffuse reciprocity, provision of public goods, and mutually agreeable institutions and working relationships'.[192] In this narrative, the benevolence of US power makes possible an open, stable and relatively lawful order. Ikenberry's logic is persuasive but limited in scope. He writes: 'In some part of the developing world—including Latin America and the Middle East—American involvement has often been crudely imperial'.[193]

Ikenberry's liberalism owes much to the earlier neoliberal institutionalism of Robert Keohane. In *After Hegemony*, Keohane examined the prospects for stability and international cooperation in the *absence* of American hegemony. The book, published in 1984, assumed American power was in decline, but that future cooperation could be attained through the appropriate institutional mechanisms.[194] This was made possible via the logic of interdependence. It was Keohane who, surveying the field in the 1980s, famously posited a distinction between 'rationalist' and 'reflective' theories.[195] As already alluded to, rationalists

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[188] Gilpin (1987), pp. 343-408.

[189] Robert Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). For a richer theoretical approach to these issues, see Robert Gilpin, *Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

[190] Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007). Layne's work in this area has antecedents in the revisionist scholarship of William Appleman Williams.

[191] G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 21-49.

[192] G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 26. With Gilpin, however, Ikenberry defines power in overly materialistic terms; pp. 39-77.

[193] Ikenberry (2011), p. 27. In a footnote, he adds that his study 'focuses primarily on the international order created by the United States and the other great powers. It does not fully illuminate the wider features of the world order that include America's relations with weaker, less developed, and peripheral states'; footnote 35.

[194] Keohane (1984).

[195] Rationalism for Keohane included realism and neoliberal institutionalism (liberalism). Robert Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 158-175.

associate hegemony with a particular type of instrumentalist power derived from material resources. They take nation-states to be singular actors who behave rather predictably based on their innate characteristics and the uncertain environment in which they find themselves. In essence, states (or the individuals leading them) make policy choices in pursuit of their ascribed interests (security, prosperity) and in accordance with their power (resources, capabilities) in the international system. Again, this is an incredibly intuitive narrative, but it is also exceedingly narrow. The key concepts on which it is built—like 'interests' and 'power'—are often bracketed-off by rationalists; they are made unproblematic. Self-proclaimed 'critical' scholars have staked their criticalness on problematizing those aspects of international relations left unexamined in conventional scholarship. My critical intervention is laid out primarily in the following sections on US hegemony.

This summary of IR's 'rationalist mainstream' may seem facile, but my account is meant to convey a rather simple point: that there are trade-offs associated with different theorisations of grand ideas like hegemony. I argue that the weight of the phenomena downplayed or ignored in 'mainstream' approaches overwhelms any benefit derived from defining hegemony in a more limited fashion. Whereas rationalist approaches to hegemony may be parsimonious, I hope to draw out the concept's complexity. Hegemony involves multiple layers of social experience that bind actors to each other and to the structures that mould their existence.[196] Yes, hegemony involves both 'domination' *and* 'leadership'. It also involves the interplay between these two facets of international hierarchy—and the structures and discourses that make domination/leadership possible. Any conceptualisation that misses one or more of the elements needed to sustain such patterns of asymmetry is inadequate. For example, although the IPE of Gilpin situates hegemony alongside capitalism, it does so in an atomistic way, further reifying the state. Moreover, rationalist theories tend to focus on the material capabilities of states to the detriment of those factors that Strange calls 'intangible',[197] and to which others might call (inter)subjective, ideational or discursive. This is unsatisfying not because material factors are somehow unimportant, but because a framework that focuses solely on such factors is incomplete in attending to the depth of hegemony—to the layers of social experience implied by the concept itself. Finally, realist and liberalist theories of US hegemony tend to focus on its implications for the 'West', or 'North'—for the 'American World Order', in Ikenberry's terms. The normative implications of these theories are far thornier when we consider the history of US policy in Latin America and other regions of the Global South.

US Hegemony from a Gramscian Perspective

For Antonio Gramsci, the Italian political theorist and Communist tactician, hegemony was a highly nuanced and multi-layered concept.[198] In his *Prison Notebooks*,

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[196] On the importance of accounting for social structures in hegemony, see Jonathan Joseph, *Hegemony: A Realist Analysis* (London: Routledge, 2002).

[197] Strange (1996), p. 23.

[198] The secondary literature on Gramsci's political philosophy is truly massive. According to Antonio Santucci, Gramsci's biographer, 'hundreds of books and thousands of essays and articles have been written on this eminent communist intellectual, not only in Italy but around the world'. He is one of the 250 most-cited authors in the arts and humanities; Antonio Santucci, *Antonio Gramsci* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2010), p. 27. For one of the more influential and instructive studies see Joseph V. Femia, *Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). In general, Femia's account tilts toward a more 'idealist' reading of Gramsci than that employed in this project. On the complexities of Gramsci's Marxism and his concept of hegemony, see also, Walter L. Adamson, *Hegemony and Revolution: Antonio Gramsci's Political and Cultural Theory* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

Gramsci developed a dialectical version of hegemony to explain the dynamics of Italy's class system, a theorisation that involved the 'unity of theory and practice' as realised through a 'historical process'.[199] For Gramsci, hegemony brings together the philosophical and the politico-practical in a way that echoes Marx's arguments about 'ideas becoming a material force'.[200] Gramsci writes that hegemony 'supposes an intellectual unity and an ethic in conformity with a conception of reality that has gone beyond common sense and has become, if only within narrow limits, a critical conception'.[201] The cultural aspects of Gramsci's notion of hegemony are crucial to this project. Consider, for instance, Gramsci's inclusion of 'common sense' as part of hegemony. Common sense here is a 'traditional' or 'popular conception of the world' that envelops the subaltern classes.[202] Far from a given, however, common sense is contested terrain.[203] Hegemony is deepened when particular common sense understandings serve the leadership position of the dominant group. Beyond ideology or 'false consciousness', hegemony 'is seen to depend for its hold not only on its expression of the interests of a ruling class but also on its acceptance as "normal reality" or "commonsense" by those in practice subordinated to it'.[204]

Although profoundly cultural, the utility of a Gramscian conceptualisation of hegemony is its dialectical linkage of the cultural sphere to an objective and pre-existing material reality. This is seen in Gramsci's discourse on Leninist strategy. In the context of his explication of his Marxism, Gramsci writes about 'the philosophical importance of the concept' as well as 'the fact of hegemony' (that is, the success of the Soviet Revolution) as brought to fruition by political agents (namely 'Ilich', i.e. Lenin). He states: 'Hegemony realised means the real critique of a philosophy, its real dialectic'.[205] In Gramsci's purposefully cryptic prose, devised to circumvent the prison censors, the philosophical and the politico-practical ('Marx and Ilich', or 'science and action') 'express two phases' of the same thing and 'are homogenous and heterogeneous at the same time'.[206] This reading of Gramsci necessarily rejects his theorising as fundamentally idealist, as is often construed in post-Marxist or poststructural deployments of Gramscian concepts.[207] In the terminology of IR/IPE, the Gramscian meta-theoretical approach creates the scope to jointly examine the material and ideational aspects of social reality, in much the same way that it calls for the mutual consideration of coercion, consent and ideological legitimation. This unifying thrust,

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On the complexities of Gramsci's views on power, see Benedetto Fontana, *Hegemony and Power: On the Relation between Gramsci and Machiavelli* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).

[199] Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 333.

[200] Ibid., p. 333 and footnote 16.

[201] Ibid., pp. 333-334.

[202] Ibid., pp. 197-199. I use 'subaltern' to signify those who are disempowered in relations of hegemony, largely as a synonym for 'subordinate'. I recognise the term has as a more specific meaning in postcolonial studies, closer to 'marginalisation'.

[203] Gramsci writes that 'common sense is a collective noun, like religion: there is not just one common sense, for that too is a product of history and a part of the historical process' (1971), pp. 325-326. The work of Stuart Hall was highly influential in developing this aspect of Gramscian thought. See for example, 'The Problem of Ideology: Marxism without Guarantees', *Journal of Communication Inquiry*, Vol. 10 No. 2 (1986), pp. 28-44; and 'Gramsci and Us', *Marxism Today* (June 1987), pp. 16-21.

[204] Williams, *Keywords* (1988 [1976]), p. 145.

[205] Gramsci (1971), p. 381.

[206] Ibid., p. 382.

[207] Perhaps the most influential post-Marxist reading of Gramsci can be found in Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, Second Edition* (London: Verso, 2001). For an overview of Gramsci from a post-modernist perspective, see Peter Ives, *Language and Hegemony in Gramsci* (London: Pluto Press, 2004). On the paucity of analysis of the relationship between Gramsci and Marx within IPE, see Mark Rupert, *Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 14-38.

fleshed out in the following paragraphs, further distinguishes Gramscian hegemony from realist and liberal conceptions.

David Harvey, among others, points out that 'Gramsci's own use of the concept (of hegemony) was sufficiently ambiguous to allow multiple interpretations'.[208] This caused confusion in its application to the study of inter-state relations. Does hegemony rest on the economic resources needed for domination over others? Or is it primarily about the acceptance of a given state as the commonsense 'leader' among a group of nations? The answer is that it is both at once—and more. There are different forms of power at work here. The hegemony of the US, for example, involves the discursive and institutional construction of consensus, but it rests on the 'hard power' of the US's military capabilities. In a sense, then, the Gramscian concept bridges realist and liberal understandings. Arrighi writes that hegemony is manifest in terms of both 'domination' and 'intellectual and moral leadership'.[209] Or, in Gramsci's evocation of Machiavelli's Centaur, it is a creature that is half-beast and half-man, an allegorical reference that highlights the layered nature of power as something involving both force and consent.[210] As elaborated by Robert Cox, who was central in bringing Gramsci's ideas into IR, hegemony in the Gramscian sense involves 'a unity between objective material forces and ethico-political ideas... in which power based on dominance over production is rationalized through an ideology incorporating compromise or consensus between dominant and subordinate groups'.[211] In the context of the international system, then, hegemony is essentially an arrangement of consensus-based power and legitimated domination,[212] albeit one that is never fully severed from the capability to coerce through force. Hence Gramsci's famous quote about consent being protected by the 'armour of coercion'.[213]

There is a substantial body of IR literature analysing US hegemony from a (neo-) Gramscian perspective. This includes, most prominently, the works of Cox, Gill, Robinson and Rupert. There are important analytical differences within the collage of theorists influenced by Gramsci's ideas, and it is not my intention to gloss over the dissimilarities in what is sometimes referred to as the 'Italian school'.[214] Moreover, the neo-Gramscian approach has been subject to reappraisal from a segment of critically-inflected IR scholarship.[215] However, the advantages of such a theory stem from its ability to account for

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[208] Harvey (2003), p. 36; Williams (1988 [1976]).

[209] Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly Silver, *Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pp. 26-28.

[210] Gramsci (1971), pp. 169-170 and footnote 71.

[211] Robert W. Cox. 'Labor and Hegemony', *International Organization* Vol. 31 No. 3 (1977), p. 387. Cox's ideas are laid-out in full in his *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[212] Cox (1981), p. 153.

[213] Gramsci (1971), p. 263.

[214] See Cox (1996); Rupert (1995); Stephen Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); William Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). For a wider assortment of neo-Gramscian perspectives in IR, see Stephen Gill, editor, *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Andreas Bieler, Werner Bonefeld, Peter Burnham and Adam David Morton, *Global Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour: Contesting Neo-Gramscian Perspectives* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); and Adam David Morton, *Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and the Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy* (London: Pluto Press, 2007).

[215] See for example, Peter Burham, 'Neo-Gramscian Hegemony and the International Order' (1991), reprinted in Bieler, Bonefeld, Burnham and Morton (2006), pp. 28- 44; Alison J. Ayers, editor, *Gramsci, Political Economy, and International Relations Theory: Modern Princes and Naked Emperors* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); and Paul Cammack, 'RIP IPE', Papers in the Politics of Global Competitiveness, No. 7, Institute for Global Studies, Manchester Metropolitan University e-space Open Access Repository, 2007.

the multiple forms of power in the geopolitics/economics of North-South relations in the Western hemisphere. It allows for analysis of the discursive and cooperative components of US hegemony in Latin America in a way that does not treat such phenomena as wholly detached from more 'concrete' politico-economic factors. Simultaneously, it avoids a reductionist analysis of ideational factors as merely 'superstructural' reflections of a material base. Gramsci's original analysis of various groups in society also helps neo-Gramscian IR/IPE avoid the reification of the nation-state, a major drawback of realist theory. It provides scope to address the importance of class and economic production in international relations, as developed by Cox, Rupert, Robinson, Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, among others. As alluded to throughout this chapter, and as reiterated here, my framework is Gramscian *and* historical materialist.

As I see it, Gramscian theory brings together structure and agency in a way that positions them as co-determining yet distinct, consistent with the ontology outlined in the previous chapter. It is the asymmetry between the hegemon and its subordinates that drives the dialectical process forward towards an 'outcome' or 'synthesis', from counter-hegemonic resistance to hegemonic reconstitution. Although it is (re)shaped through the interplay of dominant and subordinate agents, this asymmetry is captured and distilled via extant social structures. From a critical realist perspective, Jonathan Joseph argues that hegemony should be seen as the relationship between social groups and structures, not just between dominant and subordinate groups.[216] Although this project analyses the power(s) of the United States as an actor the international system, it can do so only by referencing existing institutions, discourses and structures. These phenomena (co)determine the ability of the US to realise its power in the international arena, whether it be coercive or consensual, direct or indirect. As noted above, the conceptual move from imperialism to hegemony occasions the prioritisation of consensus, which is nevertheless underpinned by coercive force. One must keep in mind that, in practice, a consensus in international relations exists between those in charge of state policy. In other words, it does not automatically extend to subordinate groups 'below' this level of analysis (to cover the entirety of what Gramsci called civil society). Recalling the importance of common sense to hegemony in the cultural realm, however, this can be seen as a central goal of hegemony in its ideological machinations. The tensions involved in maintaining such a consensus will become clearer in the discussion on the Washington Consensus, below.

Finally, as alluded to above, Gramscian IR/IPE allows for the theorisation of resistance to hegemony, which is called *counter-hegemony* by scholars working in this tradition (though Gramsci himself never used this term).[217] For Randolph Persaud, 'resistance and counter-hegemony are too often seen as responses to the embedded interests already formed, rather than theorized as dialectically defining the conditions which make hegemonic practices historically "necessary" in the first place'. It is more accurate, he notes, to understand hegemony and counter-hegemony as 'a simultaneous *double movement*, the consequence of which is the reciprocal configuration of each other'.[218] Resistance to

[216] Joseph (2002), pp. 1-4, 75, 128-129. Against the neo-Gramscian school in IR and post-Marxists like Laclau and Mouffe, Joseph reads Gramsci through a critical/scientific realist lens, pp. 19-42.
[217] Gramsci did, however, discuss the 'struggle of political "hegemonies" and of opposing directions' in the 'ethical field' and in 'politics proper'. Gramsci (1971), p. 333. It is clear that, for Gramsci, (counter-)hegemony was a historically-constructed dialectic in which revolutionary resistance could be realised through purposive human action. This was, of course, the goal of his own activism, which resulted in his imprisonment and death.
[218] Randolph B. Persaud, *Counter-Hegemony and Foreign Policy: The Dialectics of Marginalized and Global Forces in Jamaica* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001), p. 49. Italics in original.

domination is part and parcel of hegemony itself, a dynamic that, in the international sphere, helps to intuit the special significance of hegemony as opposed to more overt types of imperialist rule. The need for some amount of consensus within a hegemonic relationship is born out of the resistance to domination that is thrown up by arrangements of governance that are completely lacking in consent from within the subordinate group. As clarified in this chapter's conclusion, counter-hegemony is expressed through the various forms of power that layer the asymmetrical social relations found in the international arena.

US Foreign Policy and the Global Political Economy

I have defined hegemony as an asymmetrical social relationship patterned over time by multiple and overlapping forms of power. This definition is mute on the uses or utility of hegemony (and power) in international relations. Although power is not *exclusively* instrumental, it is nonetheless expressed, or manifest, via agency. This begs several questions. What are asymmetrical power relationships in the international system *for* (to the degree that power is 'for' anything at all)? Are hegemons motivated simply to maintain their hegemony? Or is hegemony a means of obtaining security, prosperity, prestige and/or other 'benefits' or 'goods'? In other words, how is US hegemony related to its 'national interest'? Obviously, answers to these questions will vary in accordance with competing theories in International Relations. This section engages these issues by building on the Gramscian perspective outlined above, linking it more directly with US policy. (The power problematic is fleshed out in the following section.)

For decades, debates over things like the nature of the anarchical system; relative versus absolute gains; and the formation of national interests have defined IR's field of inquiry. Suffice it to say that the logic of the hegemony/counter-hegemony dialectic compels the hegemon to protect and augment its asymmetric position. To a degree, when challenged 'from below', the reconstitution of hegemony becomes its own end. Additionally, however, from the perspective of historical materialism, hegemony in the international system must be situated alongside global capitalism. It is capitalist relations of production that secure the US's coercive capabilities (through the differentiated allocation of material resources). Capitalist social relations help constitute the US as a particular kind of actor. This is closely related to what Barnett and Duvall define as *structural* power, as we will see. Of course, US policy, as an expression of US agency, can work to reconfigure the very structures of global capitalism. But to what end? To who's benefit?

Historical materialism has stimulated a powerful critique of the nexus between US foreign policy and the international political economy, but this critique remains somewhat disjointed. Competing analyses of the nature of the global/international capitalist system posit different implications for the role of the US therein.[219] This debate was reinvigorated by the publication of Hardt and Negri's *Empire* in 2000. The book's unique synthesis argued that the imperialism of the past had given way to a new imperial form of sovereignty based on the decentred, de-territorialised processes of capitalist globalisation. Proclaiming the end of the modern imperialism of the nation-state, Hardt and Negri heralded a new postmodern order in which the agency of the US government was becoming relatively inconsequential, if not

[219] For a diverse collection of HM views on globalisation, see Mark Rupert and Hazel Smith, editors, *Historical Materialism and Globalization* (London: Routledge, 2002).

totally insignificant.[220] 'Against such (older) imperialisms', they wrote, 'Empire extends and consolidates the model of a network power'. It has a 'universal', 'boundless' and 'inclusive architecture' which pits 'powers and counterpowers' against one another in a way that has 'nothing to do with imperialism' in its traditional sense.[221] Emphatically provocative, Hardt and Negri's hypothesis was premature if not fanciful, for reasons clarified in this section.

A similar line of reasoning can be seen in much of the historical materialist literature on globalisation, which includes scholars focused on the transnationalisation of capital, class and/or political rule. The work of William Robinson is paramount in this regard. For Robinson, globalisation is an 'epochal shift' in the history of capitalism, which marks the 'transition from a *world* economy to a *global* economy'.[222] By this Robinson means that globalisation is best seen as a transitional phase of capitalism driven by the rise of transnational capital, which is increasingly decentralised and highly mobile. This new structural arrangement marks a qualitative change.[223] In Robinson's understanding, it has led to the creation of a transnational capitalist class and an emerging transnational state, to which the US state is subsumed. Rather peculiarly, he writes that 'the empire of capital is headquartered in Washington', alluding to the US government and the IFIs based in the city.[224] This statement, forceful though it is, seems disconnected from the bulk of Robinson's argument. He agrees with Hardt and Negri that earlier forms of imperialism have lost relevance under globalisation; that the emerging global order lacks a centre; and that power is no longer mediated primarily through the nation-state.[225]

To a degree, it becomes difficult to pin down agency in Robinson's theorising, which disregards the importance of the US to the formation of the globalised order as it actually exists. As put by Stokes, although 'Robinson contends that the US state continues to be the global hegemonic capitalist state', he also argues that the US 'now acts as the central agent of transnational capital, rather than having a nationally grounded ruling class'.[226] With Washington now serving the transnational capitalist elite, it would seem that US hegemony is no longer *US* hegemony, a proposition that is somewhat perplexing in a world of nation-states. Robinson's position is made more problematic when considering his argument that 'globalization is not a project conceived and planned at the level of intentionality'.[227] This is surprising given the scope of his earlier work, which proffered a trenchant critique of US foreign policy in the Global South (as regards the promotion of polyarchy as the political component of neoliberalism).[228] In short, Robinson's account of the emerging global order loses sight of the inter*national* dynamics that continue to shape it.

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[220] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), especially pp. xi-xvii. The authors defend and develop this hypothesis in the context of the post-9/11 wars in their subsequent writings, including *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004).
[221] Hardt and Negri (2000), pp. 166-167.
[222] William I. Robinson, *A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, State and Class in a Transnational World* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), p. 2.
[223] Ibid., pp. 9-10.
[224] Ibid., p. 140.
[225] Ibid., pp. 138, 175.
[226] Doug Stokes, 'The Heart of Empire? Theorising US empire in an era of transnational capitalism', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26 No. 2 (2005), p. 227.
[227] William I. Robinson, 'Capitalist globalization and the transnationalization of the state' in *Historical Materialism and Globalization*, edited by Mark Rupert and Hazel Smith (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 226. In this piece, Robinson clarifies his position that 'states are not actors as such. Social classes and groups are historical actors. States do not "do" anything per se'; p. 215.
[228] Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy* (1996).

In contrast to this 'global-capitalist' angle of HM critique, in Stokes' terms,[229] scholars such as Peter Gowan emphasise the ways in which the contemporary international economic order is a product of US policy. For Gowan, globalisation is a euphemism for a neoliberal monetary and financial regime erected by the US in recent decades, a system that serves primarily as a tool of American statecraft. Dubbed 'the Dollar-Wall Street Regime' in his book *The Global Gamble*, Gowan argues that the liberalisation of the international financial system consolidated the US dollar as the principal world currency, a move that, among other things, allowed the US to backhandedly benefit from international financial crises, such as the East Asian crisis of the late-1990s. Indeed, dollar hegemony has produced a myriad of benefits for the US.[230] Gowan writes that 'the process of globalization has been driven most crucially by the enormous political power placed in the hands of the American state and of US business through the particular type of international financial and monetary system and associated international financial regime that was constructed—largely by the US government—in the ashes of the Bretton Woods system'.[231] In turn, what is called 'globalisation' has served the geopolitical ends of the US as a national entity. Thus, in many respects, Gowan is making a state-centric argument against the globalisation thesis of historical materialists like Robinson. Conceding that his scholarship was not 'fundamentally Marxist', Gowan's work features serious engagement with the realism(s) of John Mearsheimer, Andrew Bacevich and Christopher Layne.[232]

I contend that, as Hardt and Negri and Robinson failed to appreciate the agential properties of the US in the construction and maintenance of 'globalisation', Gowan's approach missed the structural changes in global capitalism above the level of US agency. Where does that leave our analysis of the US under capitalism? There is a way out of this conundrum—a solution which accurately reflects the interplay of structure and agency as regards the role of the US in the global/international political economy. Ultimately, as argued by Stokes, the aims of US foreign policy are embedded in the 'dual logic' of national and global capitalism.[233] As the most powerful agent in the inter-state system, the US pursues the interests of its own national capital while also consolidating a particular global economic system in the interests of international capital—which, to be sure, is becoming increasingly transnational. This is a 'both/and' rather than 'either/or' position regarding the goals of US strategy vis-à-vis the 'levels' of capitalism. Stokes' dual logic argument brings clarity to the

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[229] Stokes, 'The Heart of Empire?' (2005), p. 225.

[230] Gowan writes that 'Washington's capacity to manipulate the dollar price and to exploit Wall Street's international financial dominance enabled the US authorities to avoid doing what other states have had to do: watch the balance of payments; adjust the domestic economy to ensure high levels of domestic savings and investment; watch levels of public and private indebtedness; ensure an effective domestic system of financial intermediation to ensure the strong development of the domestic productive sector. The DWSR provided an escape route from all of these tasks'. Peter Gowan, *The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid for World Dominance* (London: Verso, 1999), p. 123. Michael Hudson makes a similar state-centric argument in *Super Imperialism: The Origin and Fundamentals of U.S. World Dominance, Second Edition* (London: Pluto Press, 2003).

[231] Gowan (1999), p. xi.

[232] Peter Gowan, *A Calculus of Power* (London: Verso, 2010), chapters 7, 8 and 9. In an interview published in the same book, Gowan stated that, although he was influenced by Marxism, his work was also indebted to critical realist philosophy (which is distinct from political/IR realism); p. 201.

[233] Stokes writes that the role of the US state within the global economy shows a 'dual "national" and "transnational" logic inherent within contemporary US Empire that seeks to enhance US interests in the world *and* maintain a world order conducive to the generic reproduction of global capitalism'. Stokes (2005), p. 218. Doug Stokes and Sam Raphael advance this dual logic argument to analyse the relationship between US foreign policy and global oil and gas supplies in *Global Energy Security and American Hegemony* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), p. 15 and pp. 35-38.

discussion of the relationship between the US and globalisation, which Rupert and Solomon define as 'the continuation and intensification' of long-standing processes of 'internationalization of commodity production and capital accumulation'.[234] In this more balanced view, 'a Gramscian-inflected HM enables an understanding of globalizing capitalism, its relations of power structures of governance, as the product of struggles—at once material and ideological—among concretely situated social agents'.[235] Prominent amongst these agents is the US government. Rupert and Solomon note that 'globalization is fraught with relations of social power, some of which can be directly connected to a project of US global supremacy'.[236] Indeed, they conclude that 'contemporary capitalist globalization and US power are intimately entwined', as evidenced in the ways in which Washington has upheld its own trade and investment interests within the joint pursuit of a global order supportive of capitalist production writ large.[237]

Neoliberalism and Global Capitalism

Washington's promotion of capitalism in the Global South is nested within the dual logic outlined by Stokes, and is related to economic globalisation as defined by Rupert and Solomon. If HM scholars are split concerning the nature of the global political economy and its relationship to US foreign policy, they are fairly uniform in their critique of neoliberalism as a variant of late-capitalism and its periodisation alongside 'globalisation'. For Tickell and Peck, 'neoliberalization, like globalization, should be thought of as a contingently realized process, not as an end-state or "condition"'; in other words, it is a 'process of political-economic change, not just (an) institutional outcome'.[238] Tickell and Peck demonstrate that neoliberalism has evolved in stages, from 'proto-neoliberalism' (the intellectual crystallisation of anti-Keynesianism and the critique of embedded liberalism), to 'roll-back neoliberalism' (the Reagan and Thatcher 'revolutions' built on privatisation, liberalisation, monetarism and the assault on trade unions), and finally 'roll-out neoliberalism' (the global consolidation and naturalisation of the ideology of the market).[239] In the context of the Americas, one might ask whether, given the rise of the NLL, neoliberalism has entered into a more defensive posture. As mentioned in Chapter 1, there is increased discussion of 'post-neoliberalism' in Latin America.

The proto-neoliberalism outlined by Tickell and Peck began with the writings of the economists Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, who did much to advance the 'classical liberal' or 'laissez-faire' version of 'free market' ideology over the course of the 20th century. The ideas articulated by these individuals came in for very different treatment in the economic history of Karl Polanyi's classic work, *The Great Transformation*. Critics of neoliberalism have drawn on Polanyi to gain an understanding of the intellectual pedigree of market liberalism, its deficiencies and its historical origins and implications, from the enclosure of the commons in England to the rise of fascism in the inter-war period. The conceptual centrepiece of Polanyi's account is the 'double movement', which holds that, as capitalist relations advance and the so-called 'self-regulating market' is

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[234] Mark Rupert and Scott Solomon, *Globalization and International Political Economy: The Politics of Alternative Futures* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), p. 7.
[235] Ibid., p. 79.
[236] Ibid., p. 22.
[237] Ibid., p. 131.
[238] Adam Tickell and Jamie Peck, 'Making Global Rules: Globalization or Neoliberalization?' in *Remaking the Global Economy*, edited by Jaime Peck and Henry Wai-chung Yeung (London: Sage, 2003), p. 165.
[239] Ibid., p. 169.

propelled forward, the negative social effects generated by the move to a laissez-faire economic order create an attendant backlash. For Polanyi, the self-regulating market is but a utopian idea, a powerful trope which, despite innate contradictions, constitutes the essence of liberal economic thought.[240] Through 'the extension of the market organization',[241] a process of disembedding takes hold, in which the economic 'sphere' is removed (though never completely) from its societal nest. This leads to a variety of social and political problems that beget a 'counter-movement' which, in turn, activates checks on the market's extremes. A balance of sorts is eventually reached, as 'society protect(s) itself against the perils inherent in a self-regulating market system'.[242]

There is much cogency in Polanyi's critique of the fallacies of the self-regulating market, which can enrich a more explicitly historical materialist analysis of neoliberalism. David Harvey, for example, writes that Polanyi's 'diagnosis' of 'neoliberal utopianism'—as a process 'doomed... to be frustrated by authoritarianism, or even outright fascism'—is 'peculiarly appropriate for our contemporary condition'.[243] Polanyi's insight into the ways in which neoliberalism reduces 'freedom' to the 'freedom of enterprise' is particularly instructive for Harvey, as is the related but often overlooked point that the state never truly disappears, or fully retreats, under a neoliberal order.[244] Harvey builds on Polanyi to address the ideational aspects of neoliberalism, which have 'become hegemonic as a mode of discourse'.[245] He writes:

> Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defence, police and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist... then they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture.[246]

Harvey notes that, in addition to the *values* and *ideas* of the supposedly unfettered free market, neoliberalism has a tangible history as a political-economic force that has proliferated across the world stage. He writes that 'neoliberalization was from the very beginning a project to achieve the restoration of class power'.[247] It involved, and continues to involve, elites overturning 'embedded liberalism' and the welfare state through 'accumulation by dispossession', or the separation of that from which individuals/groups already have (e.g. the removal of peasants from their land). Essentially, accumulation by dispossession is class-based plunder akin to the primitive accumulation theorised by Marx. It includes privatisation, or the transferring of property from the public sphere to private ownership. It also includes processes of commodification (of 'the commons', for instance)

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[240] On the supposedly utopian character of neoliberalism, see for example, John Gray, *False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism* (New York: The New Press, 1998). Although there is some merit to this line of critique, neoliberalism is more a class-based project than a utopian project.
[241] Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001 [1944]), p. 79.
[242] Ibid., p. 80.
[243] David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 37.
[244] Ibid., pp. 64-81.
[245] Ibid., p. 3.
[246] Ibid., p. 2.
[247] Ibid., p. 16.

and financialisation, both of which serve a redistributive function favouring capital at the expense of labour.[248] By inserting class into the discussion, Harvey broadens the critique of neoliberalism beyond its Polanyian limitations to match the realities of a phenomenon that is, after all, an offspring of the capitalist mode of production.

Keeping in mind the strictures of capitalism, it is important to point out that there are tensions inherent in the neoliberal project. In terms of the neoliberal state, this includes problems of economic policy related to the rise of monopolies and oligopolies; market failures and harmful externalities; the imbalance of information in market transactions; and the instability wrought by technological dynamism, among other things.[249] As uncertainties grow more pronounced, the retreat of the state in some areas creates effects which require its reappearance in adjoining areas. Then there are the antinomies of capitalism itself, which processes of neoliberalisation may exacerbate. Asymmetries of information interfere with the ability of the archetypal 'rational actor' to reach a decision that is in its objective best interest, making market interactions more opaque than they should be according to neoliberal theory. These asymmetries are often widened by new technologies developed in the service of capital, a dynamic that further aggravates social inequalities. The invention of the internet, to cite one obvious example, has become emblematic of neoliberal globalisation's capacity for 'creative destruction', as financial crises spread at the speed of wireless telecommunications. This is despite the fact that the internet is simultaneously seen as egalitarian and even emancipatory in some circles.

Undoubtedly, the experience of the 2007-2009 global crisis, which began in the US, lends much to this hypothesis. From a Marxian standpoint, the crisis was not merely a financial meltdown and concomitant credit crunch, in which 'wealth' was created out of the smoke and mirrors of the money economy before vanishing into thin air. Financial mismanagement and manipulation were undoubtedly part of the story. More fundamentally, however, the crisis can also be seen as one of overproduction and/or underconsumption, which was created by a prolonged period of stagnating real wages, rising inequality and the drive for accumulation by dispossession (as seen in the predatory lending and foreclosures in the US housing market, for example).[250] The spread of the tumult echoed the contagion of the East Asian financial crisis of the late-1990s. Both episodes demonstrated the interconnectedness of the world's economies in an era of heightened transnationalisation. The crises also showed how these globalising trends are interlocked with neoliberalism, while demonstrating that the state remains the ultimate protector of the economic status quo. In the US, the UK and elsewhere, it took strict state action to save the flailing banking system from complete collapse. Thus, and as discussed below, the implications of capitalism's crises are contingent on how they are understood and acted upon by agents, including governments.

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[248] A major concept in Harvey's thought, accumulation by dispossession can be described as a fragmented version of capital accumulation similar to Marx's primitive (or original) accumulation. The state often plays an active role in accumulation by dispossession, which, in addition to privatisation, commodification and financialisation, can be pursued through the manipulation of crises and changes to tax codes. On accumulation by dispossession, see Harvey (2005), pp. 178-179. See also, David Harvey, *A Companion to Marx's Capital* (London: Verso, 2010), pp. 310-313. To provide just one example, in the run-up to the 2008 crisis, Harvey in this text writes that 'predatory lending practices—a form of accumulation by dispossession—eventually resulted in foreclosures, which allowed assets to be acquired at low cost and transferred wholesale to boost the long-run wealth of capitalist class interests'; p. 335.

[249] Harvey (2005), pp. 67-70.

[250] For a discussion of the 2008 financial crisis and its implications from the perspective of Marxist political economy, see David Harvey, *The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), and *A Companion to Marx's Capital* (2010), pp. 315-343.

The contradictions of neoliberal capitalism do not remain confined to an economic sphere that is wholly detached from the realm of socio-political relations. Neoliberalisation and its economic outcomes have a track record of producing social crises which engender a backlash against the policies of deregulation, privatisation, financialisation, liberalisation and austerity; crises which bleed over into the arena of politics proper as dissatisfied forces attempt to 're-embed' the market in society, in the spatial metaphor of Polanyi's counter-movement. One does not have to strain one's eyes to see this occurring in Latin America, the region of the world most thoroughly subjected to neoliberalism from the 1970s onward.[251] From a Polanyian perspective, this attempted re-embedding has been highlighted by Kenneth Roberts. 'Eventually', he writes, 'the contradictions of the new (neoliberal) model—particularly the tension between democratic citizenship and social exclusion—would create fault lines along which resistance could mobilize'.[252] Implicitly acknowledging the rise of the New Latin Left, Roberts states:

> Recent changes in Latin America thus continue a historical pattern of cyclical fluctuation between the political exclusion and incorporation of popular majorities, along with a tradition of contention of the terms of the incorporation itself—terms that largely define the character of democratic regimes and the breadth, depth and content of citizenship rights... These dynamics of contention are heavily conditioned by attempts to politicize or depoliticize social inequalities, and to regulate or unshackle market forces.[253]

The work of Petras and Veltmeyer reaches similar conclusions from a more radical and historical materialist starting-point. In their analyses of Latin American social movements,[254] Petras and Veltmeyer begin with the economic dysfunctionalism and ungovernability inherent in the neoliberal order. As the antimonies of production create social uncertainty, popular forces respond through three main channels of opposition: electoral politics, which have shifted governments to the left; confrontational protest movements, based largely around a resurgent peasantry; and localised alternative development strategies, as captured in the proliferation of NGOs in the region. The neoliberal state is the main site of class struggle. However, as the authors argue, because these oppositional forces have failed to grasp the class dynamics at play, politics remain stuck in a holding pattern, with revolutionary opportunities unmet even as socialism remains on the horizon. What is perhaps most important for the purposes of this chapter is that these oppositional, antisystemic movements formed largely in response to neoliberalism (though they also descended from earlier waves of protest). Unable to confront capitalism directly, as Petras and Veltmeyer would have it, they have nevertheless turned back the neoliberal offensive of the Washington Consensus.

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[251] As is well-established in the literature, the world's first experiment with neoliberalism unfolded in Chile under the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. Pinochet, who was installed in a US-backed coup in 1973, used neoliberal policies to dismantle the democratic socialism of his predecessor, Salvador Allende. Stephen Gill views the Chilean coup as the inauguration of what he calls 'disciplinary neo-liberalism', or the establishment of a free enterprise system under an authoritarian state. This was related to US efforts to promote the hegemony of transnational capital throughout Latin America in the 1970s. Stephen Gill, *Power and Resistance in the New World Order, Second Edition* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 67-71.

[252] Kenneth Roberts, 'The Mobilization of Opposition to Economic Liberalization', *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 11 (2008), p. 336.

[253] Ibid., p. 329.

[254] James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, *Social Movements and State Power: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador* (London: Pluto Press, 2005); and, *Social Movements in Latin America: Neoliberalism and Popular Resistance* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

In addition to its economic contradictions, neoliberalism's tensions destabilise it at the level of ideology. 'At the heart of the problem lies a burgeoning disparity between the declared public aims of neoliberalism—the well-being of all—and its actual consequences—the restoration of class power'.[255] The neoliberal model failed to spur economic growth, reduce poverty or stimulate development in Latin America.[256] Robinson's account of the contradictions of global capitalism is useful in linking the ideological disconnect produced by the neoliberal model to its material realities as a politico-economic project. These involve several interrelated aspects stemming from its structural incompatibilities: '(1) overproduction or underconsumption, or what is alternately known as overaccumulation; (2) global social polarization; (3) the crisis of state legitimacy and political authority; (4) the crisis of unsustainability' (or 'the contradiction between capitalism and nature').[257] Given these tensions, Robinson anticipates the demise of neoliberalism and its replacement with an alternate model (a kind of global neo-Keynesianism), in part to protect the viability of capitalist production from the oppositional forces gathering in its interstices.[258] This describes the situation in much of contemporary Latin America, in which rapid social polarisation and growing difficulties of social reproduction generated a new cycle of popular resistance,[259] paving the way for the NLL.

From the vantage of historical materialism, the various interrelated tensions of neoliberalism unfold dialectically. A constantly moving process involving the internalisation and accommodation of the contradictions that put it in motion, this dialectic is never fully resolved.[260] Necessarily open-ended, it is comprised of curvilinear turning-points on the way to an unfinished synthesis. The inherent structural tensions of neoliberalisation are not fully manifest until they are internalised at the level of agency; in other words, its contradictions don't become full-blown *crises* until they are understood as such—and acted upon accordingly—by those agents embedded in the structure(s) of neoliberal capitalism.[261] Or, as stated in Blyth's Polanyian account, 'what constitutes an economic crisis *as a crisis* is not a self-apparent phenomenon... Agents must argue over, diagnose, proselytize, and impose on others their notion of what a crisis actually *is* before collective action to resolve the uncertainty facing them can take any meaningful institutional form'.[262] Policy elites in Latin

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[255] Harvey (2005), p. 79.

[256] See for example, Ray Kiely, 'Poverty reduction through liberalisation? Neoliberalism and the myth of global convergence', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 33 No. 3 (2007), pp. 415-434; Juan Carlos Moreno-Brid, Esteban Pérez Caldentey and Pablo Ruíz Nápoles, 'The Washington consensus: a Latin American perspective fifteen years later', *Journal of Post Keynesian Economics*, Vol. 27 No. 2 (2005), pp. 345-365. See also, Center for Economic and Policy Research (Washington, DC), 'Scorecard on Development: 25 Years of Diminished Progress', September 2005.

[257] Robinson (2004), p. 147.

[258] Ibid., pp. 162-178.

[259] William I. Robinson, *Latin America and Global Capitalism: A Critical Globalization Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), pp. 226-359.

[260] Harvey, *A Companion to Marx's Capital* (2010), pp. 12-13 and 62-63.

[261] For an excellent discussion of 'the dialectical imagination' in Marxist social science, see Gerard Delanty, *Social Science: Beyond Constructivism and Realism* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997), pp. 59-76. Delanty writes that 'clearly Marx believed structure and agency to be dialectically related from the point of view of theory', even if, ontologically, 'they seemed to have laid greater stress on structure. It is in this sense that Marx was a realist', he adds, 'but in so far as his realism was expressed in a dialectical form it necessarily embodied constructivism'; p. 69.

[262] Mark Blyth, *Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 9. Italics in original. For an engagement and critique of Blyth and constructivist IPE from a Gramscian perspective, see Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, 'The Deficits of Discourse in IPE: Turning Base Metal into Gold?' *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52 No. 1 (2008): pp. 103-128, especially p. 108.

America and Washington understood the economic problems of the late-1970s and1980s as attributable to the developmentalist state and import substitution industrialisation, leading to hyperinflation and the 'Third World debt crisis'. The Washington Consensus was born out of this diagnosis. It prescribed a set of solutions leading to the 'roll-out' of neoliberalism. Subsequent tensions of capitalist production were translated into crises by groups with a different political agenda.[263] Indeed, the forces of the NLL targeted slow economic growth and widening inequality following Latin America's 'lost decades' of development.

Neoliberalism and US Policy in Latin America: The (Post) Washington Consensus

What, then, is the specific relationship between neoliberal capitalism and US foreign policy in Latin America? As discussed in Chapter 1, US objectives in the Global South have been characterised by continuity. In recent decades, efforts to entrench US hegemony in Latin America were closely tied to the neoliberalisation of the region's political economy. The stability of the neoliberal model remains a cornerstone of US policy. Washington's stated goals (democracy promotion, 'free trade') are wrapped-up in, if not wholly subsumed to, geo-economic objectives. Returning to Stokes' dual logic, neoliberalisation serves US interests while also consolidating an increasingly transnational capitalism. The rise of the New Latin Left did not alter this logic, though it presented challenges to US strategy. The NLL emerged mainly as a response to these socio-economic shifts, which began in the 1970s. There is some historical unpacking needed at this juncture of the analysis. As noted by Gowan, among others, it was the 'Nixon shock' and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates that paved the way for the neoliberalisation of the global economy through the unleashing of financial capital.[264] US foreign policy guided this unfolding process through the end of the Cold War. With the bipolar struggle finished, Washington's diplomacy and foreign aid policies focused increasingly on the 'democratisation' of the Global South and the former Soviet bloc. The political and institutional 'face' of neoliberalism came to the fore. Under the Clinton administration, democracy promotion became the overarching principle of the US's globalising strategy.[265]

William Robinson argues that, despite the façade of democratisation, US policy toward the South in the post-Cold War era was driven firstly by the consolidation of its transnational economic project. Neoliberalism, for Robinson, is 'a model which seeks to achieve the conditions for the total mobility of capital', including 'the elimination of state interventions in the economy and of the regulation by individual nation-states of the activity of capital in their territories'.[266] Washington's democracy promotion of the 1990s was but the political side of this project. It consisted of the promotion of polyarchy, or 'low-intensity democracy', as a top-down system that was highly conducive to the realisation of the broader aims of economic liberalisation.[267] Of importance here is the notion of consent and its relative absence under the authoritarian governments supported by the US during the Cold War. Robinson demonstrates how the consistencies in US economic objectives were translated into

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[263] Francisco Panizza, *Contemporary Latin America: Development and Democracy Beyond the Washington Consensus* (London: Zed Books, 2009).
[264] Gowan (1999).
[265] See for example, Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938* (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), pp. 398-428; Robinson (1996).
[266] Robinson (1996), p. 35.
[267] Robinson is borrowing the concept of polyarchy from Robert Dahl. Robinson writes that 'the economic and political planks of the transnational elite project are reciprocal', and that, 'in close correlation to neo-liberalism, the political project of the transnational elite is the consolidation of political systems that function through consensual mechanisms of social control'; Robinson (1996), pp. 36-37.

the promotion of polyarchic neoliberalism in the changed geopolitical milieu of the post-Cold War world. Support for elections, yes, but also staunch opposition to the demands of the popular classes. This type of elite-led consensual rule was promoted both covertly and overtly by the US government and the IMF and World Bank, including through the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). Here, Robinson's handling of US foreign policy coincides with the dual logic outlined by Stokes. Robinson 'simultaneously analyse(s) "democracy promotion" as a *United States* policy intended to secure *US* interests *and* argue(s) that this policy responds to an agenda of a *transnational* elite'.[268]

Robinson's argument is supported by the work of other critical scholars, many of whom point to the continuity of US objectives in the post-9/11 era. Blakeley, for instance, documents the various policies, mechanisms and strategies used to entrench neoliberalism throughout the South in the latter part of the 20th and early 21st centuries. These policies ranged from support from institutions like the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) to repression and state terrorism.[269] Stokes demonstrates that, despite the various rhetorical changes associated with the US's approach to Colombia—from anti-communism to counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism—Washington's counter-insurgency efforts in that country's civil conflict were in fact efforts to counter the development of alternatives to US-led neoliberalisation.[270] Updating his own hypothesis in the context of the NLL, Robinson noted that, as the transition to polyarchy in Latin America frayed, casting uncertainty on the idea of 'market democracy', the US continued to support the region's transnational elite through 'an ever deeper alignment with local authoritarian political forces and paramilitary groups'.[271] One could argue that this reliance on coercive power further aggravated the ideological tensions of neoliberalism, which, in the dominant narrative of the US and its elite allies, was inseparable from a consent-based (liberal) democratic system. A major component of this larger discourse was, of course, the Washington Consensus, which began to crack amidst the antinomies of an expanding neoliberal capitalism. As some observers contemplated its passing from the scene,[272] others spoke increasingly of a *Post*-Washington Consensus, which, as addressed below, was only marginally different from the original.

The Washington Consensus was proclaimed by economist John Williamson in 1989.[273] It originally pertained to Latin America, though it was later extended to encompass the broader 'developing world' as well as the former Soviet bloc. It consisted of ten policy

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[268] Robinson (1996), pp. 11-12. Italics in original.
[269] Blakeley (2009).
[270] Stokes, *America's Other War* (2005).
[271] William I. Robinson. 'Promoting Polyarchy in Latin America: The Oxymoron of "Market Democracy"', in *Latin America after Neoliberalism. Turning the Tide in the 21st Century*, edited by Eric Hershberg and Fred Rosen (New York: The New Press, 2006), pp. 96-119. In this quote, Robinson is referring explicitly to the experiences of US support for repressive elements in Colombia and Mexico; p. 118.
[272] See for example, Robin Broad and John Cavanagh, 'The Death of Washington Consensus?' *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 16 No. 3 (1999), pp. 79-88; Charles Gore, 'The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries', *World Development*, Vol. 28 No. 5 (2000), pp. 789-804; Mosisés Naím, 'Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion?' *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 118 (2000), pp. 86-103; David Held, 'At the Global Crossroads: The End of the Washington Consensus and the Rise of Global Social Democracy?' *Globalizations*, Vol. 2 No. 1 (2005), pp. 95-113; and Dani Rodrik, 'Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank's "Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform"', *Journal of Economic Literature*, Vol. 44 No. 4 (2006), pp. 973-987.
[273] John Williamson, 'What Washington Means by Policy Reform', Peterson Institute for International Economics, November 2002. The document was originally a 1989 conference paper that was first published in 1990.

reforms. These were: fiscal discipline; the re-ordering of public expenditure priorities; tax reform; the liberalisation of interest rates; a competitive exchange rate; trade liberalisation; the liberalisation of inward foreign direct investment; privatisation; deregulation; and property rights (see table below).[274] Over time, the buzzword became orthodoxy. The Consensus was synonymous with 'neoliberalism' and 'market fundamentalism', though Williamson himself understood these terms differently.[275] The Consensus's name is revealing. It was the *Washington* Consensus not because its tenets were somehow proprietary to Washington, or because it lacked support outside of the US. Rather, the name reflected the 'common sense' status of the reforms within Washington's institutional landscape, from the US Treasury to the IMF, World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Moreover, the US state and its institutional partners *used* the incontrovertibility of the Consensus as a rhetorical and ideological *tool* to entrench the on-going neoliberalisation of Latin American economies.

Table 2: John Williamson's Washington Consensus (1989)

Policy area	Description
1. Fiscal deficits	Emphasis on fiscal discipline and balanced budgets against 'Keynesian' stimulation via budget deficits
2. Public expenditure priorities	Preference for reducing expenditures rather than increasing tax revenues; elimination of unnecessary subsidies
3. Tax reform	In the context of overall focus on reducing government expenditures, preference for a broad tax base and moderate marginal tax rates
4. Interest rates	Interest rates should be market-determined; real interest rates should be positive but moderate so as to promote public investment and avoid increase in government debt
5. The exchange rate	Pursuit of competitive real exchange rate as central to an outward-oriented economic policy where balance of payments constraint is overcome by export-led growth rather than import substitution
6. Trade policy	Trade liberalization as part of outward-oriented economy, with qualifications for infant industries and the timing of dismantling of protections
7. Foreign direct investment	Promotion of foreign direct investment (including through debt-equity swaps) against economic nationalism
8. Privatization	Privatization of state enterprises to relieve pressure on government budgets and increase competition
9. Deregulation	Loosening of regulations on investment, FDI, profit remittance, price controls, import barriers, corporate tax rates, credit allocation and the labour market
10. Property Rights	Securing the rights of private property owners

As argued by Williamson, the history of the Washington Consensus is fraught with contested meanings and interpretations.[276] In the Americas, differences could be traced to divergent structural interests among the various agents at play (from the US government and

[274] John Williamson, 'A Short History of the Washington Consensus', in *The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance*, edited by Narcis Serra and Joseph E. Stiglitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 16-17.

[275] Williamson has insisted that the interpretation of the Washington Consensus as synonymous with neoliberalism or market fundamentalism is a 'dramatic deviation' from the original intent of his ideas, as well as a 'thoroughly objectionable perversion of (their) original meaning'. Williamson (2008), p. 22. Specifically, Williamson has been critical of monetarism, supply-side economics and the notion of minimal government as part of the consensus he identified. Williamson (2008), p. 16. It should be noted that Williamson's defence of the Washington Consensus policies, which has included a partial 're-think' of their prudence and desirability, unfolded at time when these policies were under increased criticism from academics and practitioners.

[276] Williamson (2008), pp. 15-23 and footnote 2.

transnational elites to the NLL). The Washington Consensus came to mean different things to different people (a process that Williamson saw as 'essentially semantic').[277] A paradigm of 'responsible policymaking' in Washington and in many Latin American capitals, popular sectors viewed the Consensus as an odious, imperialist imposition. To the degree that an actual small 'c' consensus existed amongst the hemisphere's technocratic elite, it always coexisted with the various meanings of the capital 'C' Consensus, which constituted the broader discourse of economic restructuring in US-Latin American relations. As written by Panizza, 'the issue is not to determine the neoliberal nature of the (Consensus), but to show how, under the appearance of a highly codified and prescriptive policy agenda, there was a surplus of meaning that left it open to interpretation, contestation and redefinition by friends and foes alike (and even by its own author)'.[278] The language and ideology of the Washington Consensus infused, legitimated and naturalised the neoliberalisation of the countries of Latin America, while also connecting this process to the foreign economic policy of the United States. Politically, then, it 'cut both ways'. Williamson was later to lament that his label constituted a 'propaganda gift' to the left.[279]

As Williamson was the architect of the Washington Consensus, the idea of a Post-Washington Consensus is attributed largely to Joseph Stiglitz.[280] In 1998, Stiglitz, then Chief Economist at the World Bank, delivered a lecture in which he stated that the policies of the Washington Consensus were incomplete and 'sometimes misguided'.[281] However, he added, they 'provided some of the foundations for well-functioning markets'.[282] As Serra, Spiegel and Stiglitz wrote in 2008, the Post-Washington Consensus differed from its predecessor in several ways: 'It emphasizes broader goals for macroeconomic policy (including long-term sustainable growth and equity), a wider range of economic policy instruments (including prudential regulations and other microeconomic tools…), and a balanced role for markets and government (as opposed to minimizing the role of the state)'.[283] This balance meant a role for governments in 'helping markets to work better'. The authors reiterated that 'there are government failures, just as there are market failures'.[284] If anything, the Post-Washington Consensus was both broader and hazier than the original set of policies outlined by

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[277] Williamson (2008), p. 29.

[278] Panizza (2009), p. 13.

[279] Williamson (2008), p. 20. In an interview with *The Washington Post* in April of 2009, Williamson commented, 'people have been saying the Washington Consensus is dead for about twenty years now, ever since it was first created'. Pressed on whether the 2008 global financial crisis truly spelled the end of his consensus, he responded, 'the world has changed. We are now in a Keynesian situation, which we weren't in 1989'. *The Washington Post*, 'John Williamson Conversation', 12 April 2009.

[280] Stiglitz is far from the only person to use the term, but he has been central to the interdisciplinary and policy debates over the Post-Washington Consensus, and many analysts attribute the term to him. On his impact, see José Antonio Sanahuja Perales, 'Consensus, dissensus, confusion: the "Stiglitz debate" in perspective—a review essay', *Development in Practice*, Vol. 14 No. 3 (2004), pp. 412-423.

[281] Joseph E. Stiglitz, 'More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post-Washington Consensus', Annual WIDER Lecture, World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), Helsinki, Finland, 7 January 1998. For Stiglitz's full critique of the 'market fundamentalism' of the Washington Consensus, see his *Globalization and its Discontents* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2002). He further clarified his understanding of the Post-Washington Consensus in his follow-up: *Making Globalization Work* (London: Penguin, 2006), especially pp. xxi, 17.

[282] Stiglitz (1998), p. 33.

[283] Narcís Serra, Shari Spiegel, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, 'Introduction: From Washington Consensus Towards a New Global Governance', in *The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance*, edited by Serra and Stiglitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 12.

[284] Joseph E. Stiglitz, 'Is there a Post-Washington Consensus Consensus?' in in *The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance*, edited by Serra and Stiglitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 47.

Williamson. But for Stiglitz, the revamped Consensus needed to feature 'more than an economic agenda'. It had to pay greater attention to issues of socio-economic distribution and institutional reform.[285] It also needed to deliver on (market-based) economic growth as a prerequisite for social development. The 2008-09 global financial crisis helped to solidify the more Keynesian elements of the 'new' consensus. According to Birdsall and Fukuyama, by 2008 most developing countries 'had reduced their exposure to the foreign financial markets by accumulating large foreign currency reserves and maintaining regulatory control of their banking systems. These policies provided insulation from global economic volatility and were vindicated by the impressive rebounds in the wake of the recent crisis'. In their view, the financial collapse and resulting global recession further damaged the Washington Consensus 'brand', a process underway in Latin America well before then.[286]

Although elite consensus in the North had moved away from 'market fundamentalism', this did not entail the wholesale abandonment of neoliberal orthodoxy.[287] The Post-Washington Consensus was perhaps milder in its advocacy of neoliberal policies—a kind of 'neoliberalism lite'. As noted, it allowed for state intervention to address market failures/imperfections. 'Inevitably', wrote Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus, 'the policy prescriptions of the new consensus are more vague and less explicit than those of the old'. However, 'it is imperative to stress that the gradually forming post-Washington consensus remains deeply conservative in fiscal and monetary matters; it does not in principle oppose liberalisation and deregulation, and it is broadly in favour of free trade and privatisation'.[288] Under the 'new' paradigm, international policymaking in the area of economic development remained largely with the Washington-based IFIs.[289] Moreover, the framework was incredibly loose, prompting Stiglitz himself to ask whether a Post-Washington Consensus consensus actually existed.[290] Undoubtedly, the field of development economics had changed since the early 1990s, and these changes impacted US foreign economic policy at some level. However, as demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, the Bush and Obama administrations remained committed to the core tenets of neoliberal orthodoxy in their dealings with Latin America. This was seen virtually across the board, from free trade to the disapproval of 'statist' or 'populist' programmes.

As outlined in Chapter 1, the New Latin Left emerged in opposition to the Washington Consensus. The degree to which the NLL undermined the neoliberal model is a matter of some debate, varying on a country-by-country basis. What is certain is that the election of left-leaning governments scaled-back the already-dwindling ideological purchase

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[285] Ibid., pp. 45, 54.

[286] Nancy Birdsall and Francis Fukuyama, 'The Post-Washington Consensus', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90 No. 2 (2011), p. 46. On the damage to the Washington Consensus brand, see also Naím (2000); Nancy Birdsall, Augusto de la Torre, and Felipe Valencia Caicedo, 'The Washington Consensus: Assessing a Damaged Brand', Center for Global Development working paper 213, Washington, DC (May 2010). On the gradual unravelling of the Washington Consensus in Latin America, see Panizza (2009).

[287] Robin Broad, 'The Washington Consensus Meets the Global Backlash: Shifting Debates and Policies', *Globalizations*, Vol. 1 No. 2 (2004), pp. 129-154.

[288] 'Preface', in Ben Fine, Costas Lapavitsas and Jonathan Pincus, editors, *Development Policy in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond the Post-Washington Consensus* (London: Routledge, 2003), p. xvii. On the broad similarities between the Washington Consensus and its successor in Latin America, see also, Panizza (2009), pp. 145-147.

[289] See Ziya Onis and Fikret Senses, 'Rethinking the Emerging Post-Washington Consensus', *Development and Change*, Vol. 36 No. 2 (2005), pp. 263-290; Andrew Sumner, 'In Search of the Post-Washington (Dis)consensus: the "missing" content of PRSPS', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 27 No. 8 (2006), pp. 1401-1412; and Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus, editors (2003).

[290] Stiglitz (2008).

of the Washington Consensus, and in a way that underwrote the success of leftist and centre-left parties.[291] This unravelling was dependent on the NLL chipping away at the 'consensual' properties of the paradigm, problematizing its policies on a regional level. In this way, the NLL gained coherence in the geopolitics of the Americas. As a result, US foreign policy in the age of the New Latin Left coalesced around a Post-Washington Consensus that, in terms of actual content, was reminiscent of the original. US behaviour 'evolved' in reaction to the anti-neoliberalism of the NLL, while maintaining the goal of a more open and globalised regional political economy. This 'evolution' was expressed in the US's military strategy and within key multilateral institutions, as documented in Chapters 3 and 4. To use Barnett and Duvall's taxonomical categories, this evolution was also expressed in the structural and productive power of the US. Chapters 5 and 6 explore these more constitutive dimensions of US hegemonic reconstitution in the Americas.

The Powers of Hegemony

Gramscian theory engenders a sophisticated approach to the *reconstitution* of US hegemony in Latin America. This encompasses its ability to internalise the counter-hegemony of the NLL. Additionally, as the Washington Consensus was a major part of the ideological apparatus of neoliberal capitalism in the Western hemisphere, Gramscian IR/IPE is well-suited to probe its 'disintegration' amidst the structural 'contradictions of global capitalism'.[292] Indeed, scholars working in this tradition, including Robinson, have thoroughly analysed the Washington Consensus as a 'veritable Gramscian consensus around the neo-liberal project'—a consensus created and held together by the 'organic intellectuals' of the 'transnational capitalist class'.[293]

My project offers little in the way of a new critique of the Washington Consensus. As acknowledged previously, its originality lies in its focus on the reconstruction of US hegemony as an on-going response to Latin America's new left. In addition to the stabilisation of neoliberalism, this process involves the reconstitution of US power in its other forms. For, although its hegemony is entwined with the (Post) Washington Consensus, the US's asymmetrical relationship with Latin America involves more, such as its coercive capacity. Gramsci himself accounted for the 'violence' of power in his theorising. It is not for nothing that he chose to frame political contestation in terms of warfare (as in 'wars of position' and 'wars of manoeuvre').[294] That Gramsci 'concerned himself with the sphere of "civil society" and of "hegemony"... cannot be taken to indicate a neglect of the moment of political society, of force, of domination'.[295] Gramsci's appreciation of the complexities of power incorporated its instrumentalist dimension.

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[291] James M. Cypher, 'The Slow Death of the Washington Consensus on Latin America', *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 25 No. 6 (1998), pp. 47-51. By 2005, even Williamson had commented on the passing of the Washington Consensus in Latin America, writing: 'The economic performance of most Latin American countries (Chile aside) in the decade and a half since I first enunciated what became known as the Washington Consensus has been pretty disappointing'. John Williamson, 'The strange history of the Washington consensus', *Journal of Post Keynesian Economics*, Vol. 27 No. 2 (2005), pp. 195-206. On the targeting of neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus by left-leaning candidates running for office, see Sidney Weintraub, 'Latin America's Movement to the Left', Issues in International Political Economy No. 75, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2006.

[292] Robinson (2004), p. 167.

[293] William I. Robinson, *Transnational Conflicts: Central America, Social Change, and Globalization* (London: Verso Press, 2003), pp. 322-325.

[294] Gramsci (1971), pp. 238-239. It should be pointed out that these terms are largely metaphorical, however.

[295] Ibid., p. 207. The wording is that of Gramsci's editors in this quote.

Few would argue that power begins and ends with the ability of an actor to unyieldingly bend another to their will. The application of Gramscian thought to IR moved the discipline toward an understanding of power based on cultural and economic factors in addition to politico-military force, a welcome development from the perspective of this thesis. One might expect power to have been discussed and dissected to the point of exhaustion in IR. This has not been the case, despite some acknowledgement that power is essentially contestable.[296] Although central to the discipline, scholars have shied away from the complexity of power—and from the need to offer a precise definition. In mainstream approaches, power is often truncated so that it is presented almost exclusively in instrumentalist (Weberian or Dahlian) terms, as the ability of an actor to achieve a goal or realise a desired outcome.[297] As noted by Strange (in an adaptation of Cox's famous dictum), 'the treatment of power' in IR/IPE is 'usually *for* something, in that it sustains one perspective, and the prescriptions that go with it, more than rival ones'.[298] Too often, there is barely any treatment of power whatsoever, if by 'treatment' we mean a clear conceptualisation of what it is and how it works.

This section foregrounds power as a way of animating the concept of hegemony. The move allows for a closer relation of hegemony to US foreign policy. I take power to be fundamentally *social* rather than merely instrumental. Power cannot be reduced entirely to something 'possessed' by actors and subsequently wielded over others. It takes different *shapes*; it has different *forms*. In international relations, different kinds of power are used/manifest in different ways. Scholars 'see' power differently because there are different kinds of power 'out there' in the 'real world'. Context matters. If hegemonic relationships are built on certain types of power, it is conceivable that separate forms of power are needed to maintain hegemony (or maybe not). A viable analytical framework must have the ability to disentangle the various forms of social power that pattern hegemonic relationships over time, from the deployment of coercion to the construction of consent, to the (re)shaping of the structures and discourses that are (co-)constitutive of national actors and their foreign policies. When dealing with system-leading states, such an approach must illuminate the ways in which different types of power coalesce to protect, augment and/or recreate hegemonic relationships.

As noted in Chapter 1, this project utilises Barnett and Duvall's taxonomy of power as the basis for such a framework. Defining power as 'the production, in and through social

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[296] Following Gallie, I maintain that power is an essentially contested concept. This is because the 'proper use' of the term 'power' necessarily involves endless disputes over its proper use on the part of the users. W. B. Gallie, 'Essentially Contested Concepts', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. 56 (1956), pp. 167-198. This does not mean that we cannot offer definitions of power so as to be able to analyse it in the field of international relations, as I attempt to do in this section.

[297] On the impact of Max Weber on the development of Realism in International Relations, see Michael Joseph Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), pp. 23-53. For Dahl's classic articulation of power, see Robert A. Dahl, 'The Concept of Power', *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 2 No. 3 (1957), pp. 201-215. Citing Max Weber to draw a distinction between power and authority, Dahl famously writes: 'A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do', pp. 202-203. Bachrach and Baratz broadened Dahl's instrumentalist definition, writing: 'Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B. But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A'. Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, 'Two Faces of Power', *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 56 No. 4 (1962), p. 948.

[298] Strange (1996), p. 24. Italics in original.

relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate', Barnett and Duvall write that 'power does not have a single expression or form'.[299] As enumerated in an influential article and edited volume,[300] their taxonomy delineates four discrete types of power: *compulsory*, *institutional*, *structural* and *productive*. Although these four forms of power may have some affinities with different schools of thought in IR, the taxonomy 'does not map precisely onto different theories of international relations'.[301] (In heuristic terms, and somewhat confusingly, they do speak of the realist, liberal, Marxian and Foucaultian 'faces' of power in their scheme.) Barnett and Duvall maintain that their taxonomy improves on previous attempts to classify power—that it is analytically more systematic and conceptually more general—mainly because it is organised around what they see as power's 'critical dimensions'.[302] Barnett and Duvall's 'optics of power'[303] approach carves up the wholeness of the concept along its natural 'joints',[304] with two fundamental cleavages producing the taxonomy's four types of power.

The first dimension asks whether power works through social *interactions* or processes of social *constitution*. The idea of interaction presupposes fully-constituted actors who have control over how they behave in relation to others. In contrast, the constitutive position within this dimension focuses on that which precedes subjectivity; in other words, forces which initially create social beings as agents, complete with the capacities and interests that precede their behaviour and their interactions with others. In relation to more traditional understandings of power, the social interaction position corresponds to 'power over', whereas power in processes of constitution is analogous to 'power to'.[305] The second dimension pertains to the degree of immediacy or proximity (or 'specificity', in the authors' words) of the social relations at play. It asks: how immediate and straightforward are the social relations that give expression to power? Is this relationship *direct* and tangible, or is it *diffuse*, distant and relatively difficult to ascertain? This must be asked not only of the space between actors, but also of the space between actors and the mechanisms that constitute them as such (e.g. structures, discourses). In short, this dimension of power has much to do with the distance between the structural and agentic phenomena that shape the totality of social experience, be it of an interactive or constitutive nature. Of course, 'distance' here is social and temporal, as well as physical.[306]

In what follows, I provide a synopsis of the four forms of power while detailing how they are operationalized in this thesis.

Compulsory Power

Barnett and Duvall start with compulsory power, the most intuitive form of power in their taxonomy. In line with Dahl's definition of power as 'the ability of A to get B to do what B otherwise would not', Barnett and Duvall define compulsory power as 'direct control

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[299] Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, 'Power in Global Governance', in Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, editors, *Power in Global Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005a), pp. 3, 8.
[300] Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, 'Power in International Politics', *International Organization*, Vol. 59 No. 1 (2005b), pp. 39-75; Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, editors, *Power in Global Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005a).
[301] Barnett and Duvall (2005b), p. 44.
[302] Barnett and Duvall (2005a), p. 8.
[303] Ibid., p. 7.
[304] Barnett and Duvall (2005b), p.43
[305] Barnett and Duvall (2005b), pp. 45-47; Barnett and Duvall (2005a), pp. 9-11.
[306] Barnett and Duvall (2005b), pp. 47-49; Barnett and Duvall (2005a), pp. 11-13.

over another'. This image of power has several key features. It implies an element of conflict between the powerful and the disempowered, meaning the interests of A and B diverge in some important way. It also implies that actor A has the resources necessary to compel B to do something that B wouldn't do under their own free will. This, in turn, suggests that B has fewer resources at its disposal than does A. Dahl's definition also suggests intentionality on the part of A, whose actions (in most scenarios) are designed and carried out to compel B to do something against B's will.[307]

However, for Barnett and Duvall, 'compulsory power need not hinge on intentionality'. They use the example of 'collateral damage' to illustrate this point, writing that 'power still exists when those who dominate are not conscious of how their actions are producing unintended effects'.[308] Those killed through 'collateral damage' experience the compulsory power of the actor inflicting the damage regardless of that actor's intentions. The potency of this particular example serves as a reminder that, in IR, compulsory power is frequently about the deployment of material resources and the use of physical coercion. In this way, military strength may be the purest distillation of compulsory power. Indeed, the logic here calls to mind 'hard power' in Joseph's Nye's famous hard/soft dichotomy. Hard power, for Nye, is the 'command power' that rests on inducements ('carrots') and/or threats ('sticks').[309] (Whereas hard power involves material resources, soft power is 'the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments'.[310]) Although hard power need not imply the exercise of physical violence (or legal or financial coercion, for that matter), this type of force would certainly qualify as compulsory power.

In Chapter 3, I examine the US's military strategy in Latin America as the foundation of its compulsory power. The election of NLL governments engendered changes to US strategy in a number of areas. This was reflected in the strategic posture of the US Southern Command (Southcom), the Pentagon's unified command structure for Latin America. Specifically, I examine changes to US basing strategy and the reconstitution of a naval fleet for Latin America. I also examine Washington's diplomatic and institutional response to the military coup in Honduras in 2009. For Laffey and Weldes, 'the exercise of compulsory power... operates only in the context of, and indeed is partly made possible by, the other three forms of power' in the taxonomy.[311] Importantly, the anti-neoliberal members of the NLL (Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, the last of which 'ejected' the US from its military base at Manta) were viewed as radical and anti-American, and thus potential threats to US interests in the region; indeed, they were constructed as such in the discourse on populism, as explored in Chapter 6. In Honduras, President Zelaya made overtures toward populism by joining ALBA (the Venezuelan-led Bolivarian Alliance) and pursuing 'statist' economic policies. Although the OAS attempted to rectify the Honduran coup and resolve the crisis there, this effort, carried out amidst US ambivalence, proved unsuccessful. The fissures between Washington and the OAS over the issue of the Honduran coup help to pivot the thesis toward institutional power, the subject of Chapter 4.

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[307] For their explication of compulsory power, see Barnett and Duvall (2005b), pp. 49-51; Barnett and Duvall (2005a), pp. 13-15.

[308] Barnett and Duvall (2005a), p. 14.

[309] Joseph S. Nye, Jr. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), p. 31.

[310] Joseph S. Nye, Jr. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. x. Nye's ideas on soft power were formulated largely in relation to US foreign policy. For a collection of mainly critical investigations into the concept of soft power, see Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox, editors, *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, historical and contemporary perspectives* (New York: Routledge, 2010).

[311] Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, 'Policing and Global Governance', in Barnett and Duvall (2005a), p. 68

Institutional Power

Institutional power is less intuitive than compulsory power, partly because institutions, as defined here, can be formal or informal. The key feature is that institutions 'mediate' between actors. In effect, actor A works through the rules and procedures of a given institution to guide, steer or constrain actor B. As compared to compulsory power, institutional power is indirect. Barnett and Duvall define it as 'actors' control over socially distant others'.[312] Although powerful states work *through* institutions, they do not *possess* those institutions. Institutions enjoy some level of autonomy from the resource-holding actors that create them. In the case of formal international organisations (IOs), they have their own mechanisms of behavioural constraint that work independently of the states that fund them, even as those states work through the institutions themselves. Inter-governmental bodies have their own internal biases, and can create 'winners and losers' based upon their own internal logic. Institutions can also 'lock-in' a particular international order, 'freezing' it in time, as has been the case with many post-war IOs, such as the UN and the IMF. Although there is a long lineage of studies in IR pertaining to the impact of international organisations on world politics, Barnett and Duvall are careful to distance their version of institutional power from conceptualisations that focus on (1) the power of institutions as actors in their own right, and (2) the role of institutions in constituting actors, which is more in line with structural and productive forms of power than with the mediational element of institutional power. The key is that, while institutional power, like compulsory power, works via interactions between fully-constituted agents, institutional power is less direct because of the 'space' between states and institutions and—more to the point—between the states working *through* institutions to interact with other states.

Chapter 4 focuses on institutional power through an examination of the OAS, the Western hemisphere's oldest and most prominent inter-governmental body. Located in Washington, the OAS has traditionally been viewed as little more than a tool of US hegemony. However, under the executive leadership of José Miguel Insulza, a former member of Chile's Socialist government, the OAS was brought in alignment with the NLL. Nascent US efforts to reform the OAS have focused on strengthening its more traditional liberal or polyarchic functioning (with democracy promotion and human rights understood and presented in opposition to populism). Furthermore, regional cooperation has increasingly moved *away* from the OAS, in the direction of newly-created institutions that *exclude* US participation. The countries of Latin America have emphasised intra-Latin American cooperation at the expense of inter-American cooperation with the Northern superpower.[313] The new regional organisations (CELAC, UNASUR, ALBA) focus on both security and economic issues. ALBA, for example, in concert with a reinvigorated Mercosur, undercut the FTAA, a US-backed economic integration scheme. We see, then, how the loss of institutional power can impact the structural power of a hegemonic state, the subject of Chapter 5.

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[312] For their explication of institutional power, see Barnett and Duvall (2005b), pp. 51-52; Barnett and Duvall (2005a), pp. 15-17.

[313] I take the distinction between intra- and inter-American cooperation from Andrew Hurrell. See for example, 'Latin America in the New World Order: A Regional Bloc of the Americas?' *International Affairs*, Vol. 68 No. 1 (1992), pp. 121-140.

Structural Power

Structural power is defined as the 'direct and mutual constitution of the capacities of actors'.[314] Barnett and Duvall write that, 'whereas institutional power focuses on the constraints on interest-seeking action, structural power concerns the determination of social capacities and interests'.[315] Through their own internal mechanisms, structures directly create agents and imbue them with material interests and capabilities. But this is not an exclusively one-way relationship. Of importance here is the *co-constitutive* dynamic between structures and agents (although the directness of this relationship applies chiefly to the impact of structures on agents). Because structures tend to allocate differential capacities to different actors based on their positioning with the structural milieu, inequality is an essential part of structural power. Structures are also constitutive in that they shape the subjectivities of actors, which, in this view, spring from their structurally-given position in the social environment. Actors thus have a tendency to see their social position as natural, even though this may entail an acceptance of inequality and their subordinate status. The classic examples used to illustrate this form of power are the master-slave and capital-labour relationships.

This is the Marxian face of power in the taxonomy, as stated explicitly by the authors. Barnett and Duvall place the works of Gramsci, Cox and Gill in this taxonomical category, along with the world-systems theory of Wallerstein. The structure of global capitalism is paramount to the structural power perspective, as opposed to, for example, the anarchical structure of the international system as analysed in neorealist IR theory. This is because it is the 'structure of global capitalism (that) determines the capacities and resources of actors' and 'shapes their ideology, that is, the interpretive system through which they understand their interests and desires'.[316] Barnett and Duvall note that, although Gramscians prioritise the structural power of capitalism, this does not mean they necessarily dismiss other types of power. In deploying the taxonomy, Rupert writes of 'the dialectical interdependence of structural and ideological-discursive or productive forms of power, as well as their enactment in institutional contexts and exercises of compulsory power'.[317] It is in this spirit that I ground my use of Barnett and Duvall's taxonomy in a Gramscian-inflected HM. Additionally, Rupert points out that, in the context of the asymmetric distribution of capabilities, agency is *necessary* to the re-production of extant structures.

Structural power refers to the constitutive properties of structures and to the ability of states to shape those structures through economic policy. Chapter 5 examines US trade policy in Latin America in the age of the NLL. Although free trade agreements (FTAs) can be viewed as institutional arrangements, the agency of the US expressed in FTAs works to advance economic neoliberalisation, with concomitant implications for the structures of transnational capitalism in the Western hemisphere. I trace Washington's support for 'free trade' from the collapse of the FTAA through the procurement of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and bilateral FTAs with Chile, Peru, Panama and Colombia. As hinted at already, ALBA and Mercosur are important parts of this story, as they undercut the

[314] Barnett and Duvall outline structural power in (2005b) pp. 52-55; Barnett and Duvall (2005a), pp. 18-20.
[315] Barnett and Duvall (2005a), p. 18.
[316] Barnett and Duvall (2005a), p. 19. However, Barnett and Duvall note that there are non-Marxian approaches to structural power, including within IR. This includes the work of some constructivist scholars, such as Alexander Wendt. Barnett and Duvall (2005b) p. 54.
[317] Mark Rupert, 'Class Powers and the Politics of Global Governance', in Barnett and Duvall (2005a), p. 210. He writes that 'understanding the instantiation of the structural powers of capital thus entails engagement with the other aspects of power', p. 212.

viability of the FTAA. Coordinated opposition notwithstanding, the US has attempted to reconstitute its hemispheric free trade drive through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which, if realised, would connect participating American markets to those in East Asia.

Productive Power

Like structural power, productive power focuses on the constitutive social processes beyond the control of specific actors. It pertains to the ways in which these processes shape actors' self-understandings and interests, 'real' or perceived. However, productive power operates in a less direct, less tangible manner. Barnett and Duvall define this form of power as the 'production of subjects through diffuse social relations'.[318] This diffuseness is expressed in 'the constitution of all social subjects... through systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope'. The emphasis here is on discourse, signification and meaning rather than on structures per se, making it, in general, poststructuralist. Productive power asks us to consider how the discursive production of subjects and the fixing of meanings shape world politics, as seen in asymmetrical categories surrounding the 'self' and 'other'. Much of this takes place through difficult-to-grasp aspects of social experience, such as norms, customs and networks. Although, clearly, productive power is about the constitution of subjects, there is also a focus on contingency—on the ability of subjects to (re)ascribe meaning to themselves and the world around them through language practices and knowledge-production. I draw primarily on this aspect of productive power in this thesis, which nevertheless avoids the theoretical claim that language practices in the social world are purely instrumental.

This is the Foucautian face of power in the taxonomy,[319] as expressly acknowledged by Barnett and Duvall. Power, in this conceptualisation, runs *through* those discursive phenomena that produce identities, ideas and knowledge. This is often expressed via the organisation of discursive categories into binaries, such as 'democratic' versus 'autocratic', 'civilised' versus 'backward' and so on. Although 'discourse' here includes things like speech and written texts, it is more than language itself; it encompasses all cultural practices (symbols, images, meanings, representations and articulations) that undergird—and in fact produce—social subjectivity and social knowledge. In the context of IR, this version of power has been highly influential in poststructuralist, postcolonial, constructivist and feminist scholarship. However, it is important to note that, for Barnett and Duvall, and from the perspective of this project, analysis of productive power can be incorporated into theoretical traditions with distinct philosophical commitments. This is true of the structural, institutional and compulsory categories of power, as well. Insofar as discourses legitimate the expressions of power in its other guises, productive power is also ideological.[320]

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[318] Barnett and Duvall outline productive power in (2005b), pp. 55-57 and (2005a), pp. 20-22.

[319] Foucault's complex thinking on power is developed throughout his disparate writings. His ideas on power as a productive force are perhaps advanced most clearly in his book *Discipline and Punish.* In this text, he writes that 'power produces knowledge', and that 'power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations'. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1995 [1977]), p. 27. Foucault's 'archaeological' analysis in this text carefully counterpoises the 'power to punish' against the power of ideas in the context of the regulation and subjugation of the body; see for example, pp. 101-103.

[320] In this thesis, for the sake of parsimony, I use 'productive power', 'discursive power' and 'ideological power' interchangeably. However, I concede that 'discourse' and 'ideology' often differ in important ways, depending on the theoretical or philosophical position motivating a given inquiry. See for example, Trevor Purvis and Alan

The discursive construction of Latin American populism cuts across the wider empirical discussion in this thesis. Populism is often defined in relation to nationalist ideology, statist economic policies, anti-Americanism and/or anti-imperialism. But populism is not a self-evident or objective condition. In the context of the international relations of the Americas, it is a discursive construction that is bound-up with the productive power of the US. I examine the discursive construction of populism in Chapter 6, focusing on the collocations of 'false populism' and 'radical populism' in the Bush administration's diplomacy vis-à-vis the NLL. The discussion allows for an extra-discursive element to the populist phenomenon, thus connecting productive power to the other forms of power in the taxonomy. Advancing the discussion from earlier chapters, for instance, populists are defined in part through their opposition to the compulsory/hard power of the US military and to US-backed free trade policies. Populist governments are construed as hostile to democracy and US interests. This is part and parcel of the 'good left'/'bad left' schism mentioned in Chapter 1. Because populism is normatively objectionable, it serves as a means of condemning those governments who pursue an anti-neoliberal, 'anti-American' path (the 'bad left'). Additionally, it contributes to the reconstitution of US hegemony by legitimating US actions against the NLL's 'radical' members in compulsory, institutional and structural settings.

Conclusion: Extending Barnett and Duvall's Taxonomy

Barnett and Duvall conclude their discussion by stating that power 'generates a taxonomy of resistance'. They write that, like power, resistance in international politics is a 'multifaceted field'. Power and resistance are 'mutually implicated because the social relations that shape the ability of actors to control their own fates are frequently challenged and resisted by those on the "receiving end"'.[321] This acknowledgement demonstrates the degree to which their taxonomy fits with the hegemony/counter-hegemony dialectic outlined previously. Nevertheless, this reciprocal dynamic between power and resistance is left undeveloped in Barnett and Duvall's typology. This is an important limitation. The present project offers a deep description of (US) hegemonic reconstitution as a response to challenges 'from below' (the NLL). Although I focus primarily on the agency of the US, the shifting reformation of its hegemonic power calls for a foregrounding of counter-hegemony. With this in mind, I reiterate the importance of Gramscian HM as a starting point for my inquiry. Indeed, to bring the discussion in this chapter full circle, the utility of hegemony lies in the fact that, unlike imperialism, the hierarchic relations implied in the concept assume a built-in element of on-going opposition.

Moreover, Barnett and Duvall do not offer a new *theory* of power in international relations—and neither do I. The authors do not state that one form of power is necessarily more important than the others. They do not make claims as to the specific ways in which their various forms of power are mutually imbricated, co-constitutive or inter-penetrating. Barnett and Duvall insist their taxonomy 'does not map precisely onto different theories of international relations'.[322] Therefore, theory is needed as a prerequisite to utilising their schematic categories. I have identified my meta-theory as Gramscian historical materialism, with the relevant (realist) ontological commitments. I am not necessarily *subsuming* the entire, multifaceted nature of power to Gramscian theory, which generally prioritises the

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Hunt, 'Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology…', *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 44 No. 3 (1993), pp. 473-499.

[321] Barnett and Duvall (2005a), pp. 22-23.

[322] Barnett and Duvall (2005b), p. 44.

structural power of capitalism. Rather, I apply the taxonomy *alongside* the ontological and epistemological commitments of the broader philosophical scaffold. This is in the spirit of Barnett and Duvall's intervention. They view their taxonomy as enhancing pluralist research in IR by fostering dialogue among differing perspectives. They write that 'scholars can and should draw from various conceptualizations of power that are associated with other theoretical schools',[323] advice that was heeded by the contributors to their edited volume. This is also in the spirit of a more flexible 'critical' approach,[324] one based on the view that the Gramscian tradition in IR, like its mainstream competitors, has been less-than-fully-attentive to the complexity of power in its myriad forms.

Ultimately, the power(s) of the US is/are manifest in the (re)production of relations of hegemony vis-à-vis the subordinate countries of Latin America. These relations involve not only the agential capacities of the US but also the path dependent aspects of the pre-existing structures of its hegemonic rule. Hegemony, then, encompasses both specific foreign policy projects (such as the [Post] Washington Consensus, CAFTA or the TPP) and the deeper social processes that enable these projects to take hold.[325] Hegemony is put in motion and shaped through different forms of power, both immediate and diffuse. These overlap and play off of one another, but they must be kept distinct for purposes of conceptual and analytical clarity. To analyse, understand and describe US hegemony in Latin America is to recognise this layered complexity. It requires an acknowledgement that hegemony is a series of co-determining and overlapping socio-power relations rather than a fixed object of examination. In other words, hegemony is an on-going process rather than a stationary order. Its reconstitution does not signal a final resting point. Rather, this re-constitutive moment is analogous to the crest of a wave that will ebb and flow over time.

[323] Barnett and Duvall (2005b), p. 45.

[324] Following Herring, and as cited in Chapter 1, this project seeks to build on the 'increasing interest in HM as an open, flexible approach... rather than a closed system of thought that excludes others'. Eric Herring, 'Historical Materialism', in *Contemporary Security Studies, Second Edition*, edited by Alan Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 163. On the diversity of, and relationship between, non-positivist critical theories in IR, see Mark Neufeld, *The Restructuring of International Relations Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

[325] Joseph (2002), pp. 128-129.

Chapter 3

US Compulsory Power and the New Latin Left

Chapter 1 provides a brief account of the history of US imperialism and interventionism in Latin America. As noted in Chapter 2, the coercive, imperial element of US foreign policy fed into a broader hegemony, one that encompasses the myriad power relations found in international politics. This chapter examines US compulsory power in Latin America. In contrast to the other forms of power identified in Barnett and Duvall's taxonomy (institutional, structural and productive), compulsory power works through the (direct or proximate) interactions of fully-constituted actors. It generally implies a level of intentionality. Compulsory power is about the deployment of national resources to elicit a certain response, change a given behaviour, realise a specific outcome or gain leverage over another actor in the international system. Borrowing from Dahl's famous formulation, compulsory power asks: How does State A get State B to do something it wouldn't otherwise do? This is the 'high politics' of statecraft. The directness here implies the development of specific geostrategic frameworks and the deployment of foreign policy resources. It also implies some degree of *conflict* between State A and State B.

In many ways, compulsory power represents the logical starting point for an analysis of US hegemony. The US enjoys a tremendous advantage in military and strategic resources, not only in the Western hemisphere, but globally.[326] As the 'purest' form of compulsory power in international relations, the 'hard power' of military coercion is central to the command logic at work here. Ultimately, military force doesn't have to be *exercised* to have a direct, tangible impact. Because power is social, for State A to reap the benefits of its advantage in military resources—for it to enjoy the *leverage* provided by its ability to project its physical power to compel—State B only need be aware of State's A advantage. This allows State A to transform its strategic resources into desired outcomes without resorting to violent confrontation. US-Latin American relations have long been defined by the asymmetrical military might of the United States, which made possible the profusion of interventions carried out by Washington during the twentieth century. 'Speak softly', cracked Teddy Roosevelt, the most imperialist of American presidents, 'and carry a big stick'.[327] As the famous quote suggests, the coercive power of military force is always deployed against a broader political backdrop.

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[326] See for example, Barry R. Posen, 'Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony', *International Security*, Vol. 28 No. 1 (2003), pp. 5-46. As noted by Ikenberry, Mastanduno and Wohlforth, among other scholars, 'the United States now likely spends more on defense than the rest of the world combined'. G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno and William C. Wohlforth, 'Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences', *World Politics*, Vol. 61 No. 1 (2009), p. 6. Under Obama, the US has placed greater emphasis on conserving military resources and scaling-back military spending. However, DoD documents indicate that the US remains committed to its primacy in the global commons even as it reduces its overall military capacity. Moreover, the US remains committed to being the 'security partner of choice' worldwide, including in Latin America. See US Department of Defense, 'Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense', January 2012.

[327] Theodore Roosevelt's Big Stick ideology was associated with numerous interventions in the Caribbean basin during his tenure (1901-1909). Many of these incursions were rationalised under the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which sought to justify US interventionism on the basis of quelling conflicts between European and Latin American countries. On the Big Stick ideology, see for example, Schoutlz (1998), pp. xvi-xvii; and Gilderhus (2000), pp. 23-30.

In the era of the New Latin Left, the US's deployment of compulsory power grew more contested. The use of military resources remained central to Washington's foreign policy agenda after the Cold War. Both anti-neoliberal and reformist NLL governments demonstrated deep scepticism (if not open hostility) toward the US's continuing military presence in the region. This chapter investigates US efforts to reconstitute its compulsory power in Latin America amidst on-going opposition to its coercive reach. After outlining the transition from Bush's War on Terror to Obama's so-called 'smart power' approach, I analyse the shifting deployment of compulsory power through the US Southern Command (Southcom), the Pentagon's unified command structure for Latin America. Specifically, I look at the reconstitution of a Navy fleet for the region and changes to Southcom's basing posture. Finally, I examine the diplomatic side of compulsory power through an analysis of the US response to the 2009 military coup in Honduras, which deposed the 'populist' government of Zelaya and consolidated the country's position as a vital outpost of US military capacity in Central America.

Deploying Compulsory Power: From the War on Terror to 'Smart Power'

George W. Bush entered office pledging to place Latin America at the centre of his foreign policy agenda. As mentioned in Chapter 2, however, following the 9/11 attacks, Latin America was put on the backburner. Washington was quickly consumed by events in the Middle East. The strategic de-prioritisation of Latin America actually contributed to the militarisation of US policy in the region, which came under the influence of the War on Terror. Colombia's guerrilla groups quickly became 'narco-terrorists' in the dominant depiction of that country's conflict. The 'ungoverned spaces' of South America were securitised as potential incubators of Islamist extremism. For several years, considerable attention was given to the remote and supposedly 'lawless' tri-border region between Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay, home to a large community of Muslim émigrés.[328] Perhaps most importantly, however, both the White House and Congress ceded much of their traditional responsibility over the direction of US policy to the Pentagon. DoD had the capacity to act as the main interlocutor with the region at a time when the US's geostrategic focus was elsewhere. In other words, the US's compulsory power was channelled increasingly through its immense and unrivalled military apparatus. This 'hardening' of US policy occurred as the region was beginning to assert greater autonomy from Washington.

Obviously, the US military was no stranger to Latin America. The War on Drugs ensured that, even after the Cold War, Washington was committed to maintaining a robust military presence in the region. The Bush presidency witnessed the further militarisation of US policy. This was seen in, among other things, the changing makeup of US foreign aid in the late-1990s/early-2000s, as documented by a consortium of non-governmental organisations.[329] In short, there was a tilt away from development and humanitarian aid towards military and police assistance. In 1997, US economic and development aid to Latin America and the Caribbean equalled more than twice the amount of military and police aid (with approximately 589 million USD in economic and social assistance set against 269 million USD in military and police aid for that fiscal year). By 2007, however, that gap had

[328] James Hill, Commander of US Southern Command, 'Building Regional Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere', 3 March 2003: http://www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/2003/03-12.htm. The DoD eventually recanted its position that this tri-border area represented a security threat to the US.

[329] This pattern actually began with Plan Colombia, a series of counter-narcotics/counter-insurgency policies implemented by the Clinton administration in Colombia in the late-1990s. The Bush administration expanded Plan Colombia soon after Bush assumed office through the passage of the Andean Counterdrug Initiative.

narrowed substantially, with economic assistance outpacing military aid by approximately one-third (with 1,196 million USD in total economic and social aid contrasted with 794 million USD in military and police assistance).[330] The overall uptick in foreign aid from 1997-2007 demonstrates that, contrary to the views of some, the Bush administration did not simply 'ignore' Latin America after 9/11.

This militarisation trend was also reflected in the various training programmes carried out by the US. The training of Latin American military forces has a long and controversial history, particularly in relation to the School of the Americas facility.[331] Traditionally, the State Department had nominal control over a number of programmes. During the Bush presidency, however, DoD was given greater control over the training and equipping of military and police forces. One consequence was the 'blurring of lines' between the training of military and police forces in the region, which was criticised by the Latin America-focused NGO and human rights community in Washington. One report stated: 'Traditional civilian-military roles are being blurred not only overseas, through programs for Latin American militaries, but here at home, in the formation of foreign policy. Resources and responsibilities are shifting from the State Department to the Pentagon, and the clout and profile of the US Southern Command are increasing as a result'.[332] Specifically, Section 1206 of the 2006 National Defense and Authorization Act provided DoD with the authority to train and equip foreign military forces through funds appropriated for such purposes. According to a Congressional report, the Pentagon viewed State Department security assistance programmes as 'too slow and cumbersome'. Section 1206 pertained to the training and equipment of foreign military forces for two purposes: counterterrorism operations and support for 'military and stability operations in which US armed forces participate'.[333] Because there is greater Congressional oversight of State (as compared to DoD),[334] Section 1206 effectively strengthened the military's flexibility in this key policy area.

As stated in one NGO report, 'the Defense Department has been gradually increasing its control over military training and equipping programs for the last two decades, spanning

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[330] Center for International Policy, Latin America Working Group Education Fund, Washington Office on Latin America. 'Below the Radar: U.S. military programs with Latin America, 1997-2007' (March 2007), pp. 2-3.
[331] See for example, Ruth Blakeley, 'Still Training to Torture? US training of military forces from Latin America', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 27 No. 8 (2006), pp. 1439-1461; Lesley Gill, *The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004). The School of the Americas is now known as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation.
[332] Center for International Policy, Latin America Working Group Education Fund, Washington Office on Latin America. 'Blurring the Lines: Trends in U.S. military programs with Latin America' (September 2004), p. 1.
[333] Congressional Research Service, 'CRS Report for Congress: Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006: A Fact Sheet on DoD Authority to Train and Equip Foreign Military Forces', Updated April 9, 2008.
[334] As stated in a report by the Center for International Policy, Latin America Working Group Education Fund, and Washington Office on Latin America: 'State Department-funded military aid and training programs are overseen by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the foreign operations subcommittees of the appropriations committees. Many of these committees' members have a strong interest in international affairs. In addition, since foreign aid is unpopular in some quarters, these committees usually pay strict attention to how these funds are spent. Military aid and training programs are an important part of the... budget they review. For these reasons, these committees' oversight is relatively strong'. In contrast, 'Congressional oversight of foreign military assistance in the defense bill... is minimal'. State did not resist DoD's encroachment on this issue. Center for International Policy, Latin America Working Group Education Fund, Washington Office on Latin America, 'Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy: How the Pentagon's role in foreign policy is growing, and why Congress—and the American public—should be worried' (March 2008), p. 5.

Democratic and Republican administrations'.[335] It may be unsurprising, then, that a strong emphasis on military power continued under the Obama administration, despite Obama's early overtures to a hemispheric agenda of change, punctuated by his pledge at the 2009 Summit of the Americas that the US would seek an 'equal partnership' with the countries of the region.[336] The continuity with the Bush White House was seen in Obama's (attempted) military base agreement with Colombia and his administration's ambiguous response to the coup in Honduras, both of which are addressed in subsequent sections of this chapter. In a powerful, if anecdotal, reminder of the recent militarisation of US policy in Latin America, the Pentagon announced in June 2012 that Southcom was for the first time acquiring remotely piloted aircraft (drones) no longer needed in the Afghan theatre.[337] In October 2012, the Pentagon released a Defense Policy Statement specifically for the Western hemisphere. It stated that the US would strive to be the 'security partner of choice' in Latin America through an 'innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint' approach.[338] In concert with the Obama administration's broader geostrategic re-think, it outlined a 'smarter' approach to the deployment of compulsory power resources in the region. This was seen in the document's emphasis on synergy, partnership and multilateral cooperation.[339]

'Smart Power' in Latin America

Amidst broader continuities in the objectives of foreign policymaking, the Obama administration evidenced adjustments to the strategic deployment of US compulsory power in Latin America. Whereas Bush's approach was dominated by the War on Terror, the Obama administration framed its foreign policy around the concept of 'smart power'. Though it wasn't formulated exclusively or even primarily with the Americas in mind, the framework fit the hemispheric context as a response to the emergence of NLL governments. In a key report on smart power by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the authors noted that, in Latin America, US leadership was under duress from 'a new generation of populist leaders... tapping into old threads of anti-Americanism' to challenge US-led economic globalisation.[340] Under the leadership of Admiral James Stavridis, Southcom thoroughly embraced the smart power framework.[341] In the main, the idea was to better fuse hard power with soft power. On the surface, then, it represented a 'softening' of US policy through a greater reliance on multilateralism, economising, cost-sharing and the ideational legitimation of US actions and objectives. But, as the analysis below makes clear, despite being packaged in a soft shell, it most definitely had a hard core. Washington did not simply abandon the leverage afforded it by its asymmetric advantage in geostrategic resources, including the command capabilities of its military. Efforts at hegemonic reconstitution would begin with the 'smarter' use of compulsory power.

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[335] Center for International Policy, Latin America Working Group Education Fund, Washington Office on Latin America. 'Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy: How the Pentagon's role in foreign policy is growing, and why Congress—and the American public—should be worried', (March 2008), p. 1.

[336] The White House, 'Remarks by the President at the Summit of the Americas Opening Ceremony', 17 April 2009: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-the-Summit-of-the-Americas-Opening-Ceremony.

[337] *National Defense Magazine*, 'Air Force Chief: Some Drones Won't Be Coming Home after Afghanistan', 20 June 2012: http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=815.

[338] US Department of Defense, 'Western Hemisphere Defense Policy Statement', October 2012, p. ii.

[339] Ibid., pp. 2, 4, 10.

[340] Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 'CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America', co-chairs, Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 2007, p. 22.

[341] My view of Stavridis' enthusiasm for smart power is based in part on my discussions with policy experts in Washington (see Appendix 1). In addition, Stavridis publically referenced smart power on numerous occasions, and in his writings, as discussed below.

As a strategic framework, 'smart power' was developed to redress concerns over the legitimacy of US hegemony in the wake of Bush's neoconservative unilateralism.[342] It originated in the work of Joseph Nye, an IR scholar with sway in the Democratic Party and US foreign policy circles. Nye's work famously differentiates hard and soft power, the two halves of his smart power framework. The former is the 'command power' that rests on inducements ('carrots') and/or threats ('sticks'),[343] while the latter is 'the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments'.[344] Hard power has both military and economic manifestations, whereas soft power 'arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies', and has much to do with the legitimation of a state's behaviour 'in the eyes of others'.[345] It involves co-optation, persuasion and cultural/ideological seduction. The importance of soft power for Nye is that it can reduce the costs associated with carrots and sticks, the tools over which states have more direct control.[346] He maintains that soft power has grown in importance, but he is careful to remind his readers of its limits. Nye stresses that international leadership is *not* 'synonymous with the soft power of attraction'. Rather, 'effective leadership requires a mixture of soft and hard power skills', which he dubs '*smart power*'.[347] Following Obama's election, the concept migrated from the think tank community into the heart of the executive branch. In her confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Clinton said the Obama administration would be guided by smart power, which she defined as the US using 'the full range of tools at (its) disposal—diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural—picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation'.[348] Secretaries of Defense Robert Gates and Chuck Hagel were also proponents of smart power.[349]

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[342] The 2007 CSIS report began soberly by acknowledging that 'much of the world today is not happy with American leadership', adding that 'America's reputation, standing, and influence are at all-time lows'. CSIS (2007), pp. 3, 17. Even so, the report argued, the time was ripe for a 'big idea' that could restore legitimacy to American leadership and 'preserve American pre-eminence as an agent for good'; pp. 4-6. This big idea was smart power. CSIS defined it thusly: 'Smart power is neither hard nor soft—it is the skilful combination of both. Smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power. It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand American influence and establish the legitimacy of American action'; p. 7.

[343] Joseph Nye. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

[344] Joseph Nye. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. x.

[345] Nye (2004), p. x. He elaborates on this by writing, 'The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).' Nye (2004), p. 11. Notions of legitimation and consent in the Gramscian sense clearly underpin Nye's ideas on soft power, even though the Gramscian tradition is silenced in much of Nye's more recent writings. In *Bound to Lead*, Nye cites the insights of Robert Cox in stating: 'Soft co-optive power is just as important as hard command power. If a state can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow'. Nye (1990), p. 32.

[346] Nye writes that 'when you can get others to admire your ideals and to want what you want, you do not have to have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction. Seduction is always more effective than coercion, and many values like democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities are deeply seductive'; Nye (2004), p. x. What Nye's theory seems to miss, however, is that 'seduction' is intersubjective. The seductiveness of something like 'democracy', for example, will depend entirely on the identities of seducer and seduced—of the former's understanding of democracy and the latter's receptiveness to it. This involves rather diffuse processes of historical and social construction.

[347] Joseph Nye. *The Powers to Lead* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. x. Italics in original.

[348] US Department of State, 'Nomination Hearing to Be Secretary of State: Testimony: Hillary Rodham Clinton', 13 January 2009: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/01/115196.htm. Clinton referred to smart power in numerous speeches throughout her tenure as Secretary of State. In her farewell address, Secretary Clinton again returned to smart power, saying that it had guided the administration's approach 'from day one'.

To be sure, the concept is fairly banal. When would a hegemon *not* use 'the full range of tools at its disposal' to achieve a desired outcome? Indeed, even Clinton herself referred to it as 'old-fashioned common sense'.[350] At the same time, however, smart power *did* impact the regenerative efforts of US hegemony. Under Obama, it represented a means of retooling the coercive capabilities of US foreign policy, but in a more image-conscious way. In contrast to the heavy-handedness of the War on Terror, the smart power framework signalled a more considerate foreign policy, one that—contrary to the 'dumbness' of the Bush years—would supposedly feature pragmatic restraint when necessary. As seen in the CSIS report, smart power was devised in response to declinist anxieties.[351] In Latin America, both anti-neoliberal and reformist NLL governments were deeply sceptical of (if not openly hostile to) US policy. The abrasive style of the Bush administration aggravated these views. Smart power discourse went hand-in-hand with Obama's pledge for a 'new era' of 'true partnership'. To the degree that this 'new' approach masked a reconstituted military presence in Latin America, however, the 'hard core' of US compulsory power remained a source of contestation among NLL governments. This was shown in the controversies that erupted over the positioning of US compulsory power resources, as addressed below.

According to Secretary Clinton, smart power translated into concrete policy formation through cooperation with partners; principled engagement with those who disagree with US policy; the notion of development as a core pillar of US power; the integration of civilian and military action; and the leveraging of multiple sources of American power.[352] Based on the wider smart power discourse, as well as the ways in which it has been utilised in Latin America, I maintain that the framework's impact has been concentrated in four overlapping thematic areas: *partnership*, *image*, *integration* and *leverage*. Below, I provide further detail on these four aspects of the smart power framework before turning my attention to their application under Bush and Obama, including in Southcom's basing posture.

- Partnership: Cooperation is part and parcel of the smart power approach.[353] This entails the cultivation of US allies as more active participants in the pursuit of joint objectives. Partnership is crucial as a means of buttressing US soft power while at the same time conserving hard power resources. The focus on partnership implies a more

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US Department of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, 'Remarks on American Leadership at the Council on Foreign Relations', 31 January 2013: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2013/01/203608.htm.

[349] In a speech in January 2008, Robert Gates noted that his endorsement of smart power struck many as unusual given his position as head of the US military. As Gates noted, this created a 'man-bites-dog' phenomenon regarding several of his earlier speeches, in which he called for increased funding for the State Department and heightened attention to US soft power capabilities. US Department of Defense, 'Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Washington, DC, Saturday, January 26, 2008': http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1211. Chuck Hagel, US Secretary of Defense during Obama's second term, was also a proponent of smart power. He gave a keynote speech at a CSIS conference on 'Smart Power in the Obama Administration' in May 2009, which can be viewed online at: http://blip.tv/csis/smart-power-in-the-obama-administration-2153819.

[350] US Department of State, Hillary Clinton, 'Foreign Policy Address at the Council on Foreign Relations', 15 July 2009: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/126071.htm.

[351] CSIS (2007), pp. 3, 17.

[352] US State Department, Hillary Rodham Clinton, 'Foreign Policy Address at the Council on Foreign Relations', 15 July 2009: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/126071.htm. For Nye's views on Obama's smart power policies, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 'Obama and smart power', in *US Foreign Policy, second edition*, edited by Michael Cox and Doug Stokes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 97-107.

[353] See for example, Joseph S. Nye Jr., 'Security and Smart Power', *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 51 No. 9 (2008), p. 1353.

enduring form of cooperation in place of alliances built solely on expediency or short-term gain. Thus, smart power calls for a greater emphasis on diplomacy and multilateralism than under the Bush administration.

- Image: Smart power is highly attentive to the image(s) of US policy, as seen in the creation of new public diplomacy initiatives.[354] This involves augmenting the attractiveness of US policy through the careful management of messaging and its delivery. Nye has called for the US to develop case-specific 'narratives' appropriate to multilateral hard power missions.[355] The image of an active US foreign policy (backed by the image of an 'engaged' military) serves to fortify the image of American leadership. In this vein, US military documents repeatedly emphasise the need for 'strategic communication'.[356]

- Integration: The smart power strategy calls for the integration of hard and soft power into a unified whole.[357] Not only should separate governmental agencies work with one another, there should be a level of inter-institutional integration that allows them to synergistically leverage the resources of their partners. For example, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review made multiple references to 'integrating all elements of national power'.[358]

- Leverage: The notion of leverage has a straightforward meaning in the broader strategic vision. CSIS notes plainly: 'maintaining US military power is paramount to any smart power approach'.[359] What smart power adds to the equation is the idea that the leverage afforded the US based on its military clout can be augmented if Washington uses its coercive apparatus in a more image-conscious way, and with the backing of multilateral partners. The smart power approach has heightened the focus on the flexibility, agility and manoeuvrability of US forces and their partners,[360] often referred to as 'lift' in strategic jargon.

US Southcom and the New Latin Left

In 1963, the Pentagon created the US Southern Command (Southcom) out of the Caribbean Defense Command, which oversaw US military missions in the Caribbean basin during World War II. The name-change reflected Southcom's expanding role, which grew

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[354] CSIS (2007), p. 47.

[355] *The Diplomatic Courier*, 'Interview with Dr. Joseph Nye, Jr.', January 2012: http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/diplomacy/720.

[356] See for example, US Department of Defense, 'Quadrennial Defense Review Report' (February 2010). In testimony before Congress, Stephen Hadley, one of the co-chairs of the bipartisan QDR panel, echoed Robert Gates' calls for stronger 'soft power' capabilities on the part of the US military. US Department of Defense, 'QDR Panel Calls for More Force Structure Changes', 4 August 2010: http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=60303.

[357] See for example, CSIS (2007), p. 65.

[358] US Department of Defense, 'Quadrennial Defense Review Report' (February 2010), pp. iv-v; 9.

[359] CSIS (2007), p. 62.

[360] For example, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review calls for more flexible and versatile aircraft; the use of information and other technologies to improve the flexibility of US forces; and the creation of more flexible response forces in the context of the military's support for domestic civil authorities; pp. x-19. Connecting this to broader smart power themes, the QDR report states: 'America's leadership in this world requires a whole-of-government approach that integrates all elements of national power. Agile and flexible US military forces with superior capabilities across a broad spectrum of potential operations are a vital component of this broad tool set, helping to advance our nation's interests and support common goals', p. 1.

even more pronounced in the 1980s. Following the Cold War, Southcom shifted its focus to counter-narcotics operations and humanitarian missions.[361] The emergence of the NLL and the rise of 'radical populism' gave Southcom 'new threats' to contemplate,[362] as Latin American countries expanded ties with China, Russia and Iran.[363] In 2008, Southcom reframed its command strategy around the theme of partnership, a cornerstone of the smart power discourse. Its ten-year strategic framework was subtitled 'Partnership for the Americas'. Under the stated goal of ensuring hemispheric security and stability (which included maintaining the ability to operate from the global commons onto the Western hemisphere), the document read: 'Partnerships are critical to the success of the USSOUTHCOM mission, the US, and the nations of South and Central America and the Caribbean. As a result, every command activity, event, and task must focus on developing and strengthening enduring partnerships'.[364] This was consistent with the posture for the Western hemisphere enumerated in other documents, such as the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review and the Western Hemisphere Defense Policy Statement.[365]

The rhetoric on partnership shaped the wider image of the US military in the region.[366] In an interview on 'US Smart Power in Latin America', Stavridis, Southcom's director from 2006-2009, challenged its characterisation as a 'proconsul to the empire'. He stated that, rather than launching missiles, Southcom was responsible for 'launching ideas' related to international cooperation, interagency coordination and the provision of humanitarian services.[367] Stavridis developed this 'ideas as missiles' metaphor in his writings on regional strategy, which linked smart power to a 'marketplace of ideas' in the 'shared home' of the Americas. Southcom, he wrote, needs 'to be relentless in searching for and developing new vehicles and methods of delivery to communicate our strategic message—*we care about you*'.[368] Its efforts were attuned to the need to cultivate soft power resources and improve the perception of US policy; officials were well-aware of the worsening views of the US in Latin American opinion polls.[369] In terms of policy initiatives, Southcom's soft side was apparent in the humanitarian missions of the *Comfort*, a medical ship that treated thousands of individuals in the region, and in the organisation of baseball tournaments,

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[361] Southcom, 'About Us: History': http://www.southcom.mil/aboutus/Pages/History.aspx.

[362] The impact of 'radical populism' on US policy toward Latin America is dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 6. Certainly, the Venezuelan government has been at the centre of Washington's shifting geo-strategic concerns. See for example, Max G. Manwaring, 'Latin America's New Security Reality: Irregular Asymmetric Conflict and Hugo Chavez', Strategic Studies Institute, August 2007; and Hal Brands, 'Dealing with Political Ferment in Latin America: The Populist Revival, the Emergence of the Center, and Implications for U.S. Policy', Strategic Studies Institute, September 2009. For critiques of Washington's security policy vis-à-vis the NLL, see William M. LeoGrande, 'From Red Menace to Radical Populism: U.S. Insecurity in Latin America', *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 22 No. 4 (2006), pp. 25-35; and Tom Barry, '"Mission Creep" in Latin America—U.S. Southern Command's New Security Strategy', International Relations Center (IRC), July 2005.

[363] See R. Evan Ellis, 'China-Latin American Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position', Strategic Studies Institute, August 2011; Alex Sánchez, 'A COHA Report: Russia Returns to Latin America', Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 14 February 2007: http://www.coha.org/russia-returns-to-latin-america/; and Cynthia Arnson, Haleh Esfandiari and Adam Stubits, editors, 'Iran in Latin America: Threat or "Axis of Annoyance"?' Woodrow Wilson Center Reports on the Americas No. 23, 2009.

[364] Southcom, 'United States Southern Command 2018: Partnership for the Americas', December 2008, p. 11.

[365] US Department of Defense, 'Quadrennial Defense Review Report' (February 2010), pp. 68-69; US Department of Defense, 'Western Hemisphere Defense Policy Statement', October 2012, pp. 4-5.

[366] Southcom insisted that partnership was 'more than a motto'. United States Southern Command (2008), p. 16.

[367] *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 'US Smart Power in Latin America: An Interview with James G. Stavridis', Vol. 32 No. 2 (2008), pp. 45-52.

[368] James G. Stavridis, *Partnership for the Americas: Western Hemisphere Strategy and US Southern Command* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2010), pp. 202-203. Italics in original.

[369] Stavridis (2010), p. 50.

among other initiatives.[370] As 'soft' manifestations of compulsory power, these state-to-state policies were nevertheless based on the US's economic-military resources. As strategy, Southcom's 'soft power' fed into the command function that defines the compulsory logic.

Indeed, behind Southcom's partnership discourse sat a well-defined hard power rationale. Here is where 'smart power' thinking comes into focus. Closer cooperation with allies enhanced Southcom's ability to 'work through politico-military and diplomatic channels to enhance US military freedom of movement throughout the Western Hemisphere', as stated in its 2008 strategy document.[371] As Stavridis wrote, Southcom remained fundamentally 'a military organization conducting military operations... in Central America, the Caribbean, and South America in order to achieve US strategic objectives'.[372] Its 'Command Strategy 2020' document states:

> We will continue to focus on synchronizing words and actions, ensuring deeds mirror thoughts, and doing so across all elements of national power. The way we tell our story needs to be viewed as a vital extension of national policy, and that this story is never ending and always changing... To facilitate and perpetuate this environment of collaboration and teamwork, we need to better communicate, to our various audiences not only what we are doing, but also *why* we are doing it. We will instill communication assessment into our processes, developing tools to determine how well we are supporting the United States government's strategic objectives.[373]

Southcom documents made numerous references to the interagency component of its evolving mission. A typical passage read: 'We envision a future organization that has a regional focus seen through an interagency lens. This organization would have the capability to reach across traditional government stovepipes and help create interagency partnerships to develop holistic solutions'.[374] Building on the integration theme, the framework aimed to 'improve synchronization of operations and activities between Southcom and other US government organizations... to create a collaborative, effective, and efficient command'.[375] The document claims that Southcom's efforts to utilise 'all instruments of national capability'—including military, diplomatic, economic, informational, financial, intelligence and legal resources—would have a 'synergistic effect' on the protection of security and stability in the Western hemisphere.[376] Based on this discourse, it seems clear that Southcom implemented a smart power approach even before the transition from Bush to Obama.[377] This proved opportune mainly because, under Bush, Southcom was given an increasingly important role in the formation of Washington's overall approach to the region, as noted above. Of course, the ability of the US to deploy compulsory power resources (via Southcom's geographic access and manoeuvrability) was dependent on the receptiveness to US forces. The contextual conditions shifted with the rise of the NLL.

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[370] Ibid., pp. xix, 218.
[371] Southcom (2008), p. 12.
[372] Stavridis (2010), p. 175.
[373] Southcom, 'Command Strategy 2020', July 2010, p. 9. Italics in original.
[374] Southcom (2008), p.15.
[375] Ibid.
[376] Ibid., pp.13-14.
[377] According to Stavridis, Southcom's focus on partnership was made a cornerstone of its formal strategic objectives in 2006. Stavridis (2010), p. xix.

US Navy Re-establishes Fleet for Latin America

At the tail end of the Bush administration, the Pentagon announced in April 2008 that it was formally re-establishing the Fourth Fleet to coordinate all US Navy ships, aircraft and submarines operating in the Caribbean and in South American waters. Dormant since 1950, when it was decommissioned after patrolling the Atlantic during World War II, the fleet was re-established 'to address the increased role of maritime forces in the US Southern Command area of operations, and to demonstrate US commitment to regional partners', according to a DoD press release.[378] Largely an organisational move, the decision to re-formulate the fleet thus served a signalling purpose in the deployment of the US's compulsory power resources. One Southcom official told reporters that the reestablishment of the fleet would send a message to the entire region, and not just prominent adversaries like Venezuela.[379] The DoD named Rear Adm. Joseph D. Kernan head of the Fourth Fleet, the first Navy SEAL to serve as a numbered fleet commander.

In a detailed report on the Fourth Fleet released in February 2009, CSIS referred to it as a tool of US engagement in the Americas, linking it directly to Southcom's smart power approach.[380] The smart power aspect of the fleet was supposedly manifest in its interagency coordination function and in the recognition that '"trust and cooperation (amongst partners) cannot be surged" but instead take long-term engagement'.[381] In its recommendations for hemispheric strategy, the report stated:

> The Fourth Fleet can contribute to the pursuit of a smart power strategy for the United States. It brings together the training and skill of the US Navy to provide a wide range of security activities in the Western Hemisphere while also serving as a complement to US civilian support for humanitarian activities throughout the Caribbean and South America. Coordination among agencies—the Department of State, Homeland Security, and Defense—over integrated missions of the Fourth Fleet will ensure that this military asset fulfils its stated missions.[382]

For CSIS, the re-activation of the fleet was little more than a 'benign rebranding'. Yet it generated a considerable amount of controversy in the region. Not only did the news attract negative attention from a number of leaders in Latin America, it also 'provided part of the rationale for the creation of a South American Defense Council under the leadership of Brazil'.[383] The CSIS report repeatedly emphasised the need for a public diplomacy campaign specific to the Fourth Fleet, to dispel unease amongst Latin Americans wary of military diplomacy. If the creation of the Fourth Fleet was a reconstitution of compulsory power resources, it seemed to be aimed squarely at 'the rise of populist governments... antagonistic to US policies', as stated by CSIS. This included the Venezuelan state, which had developed close military ties with Russia.[384]

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[378] US Department of Defense, 'Navy Re-Establishes US Fourth Fleet', 24 April 2008: http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11862.
[379] Bloomberg, 'US Navy Reviving Fleet for Latin America, Caribbean', 24 April 2008: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a094x7Qa8Qeo.
[380] Center for Strategic and International Studies, 'The Fourth Fleet: A Tool of US Engagement in the Americas', February 2009, p. 1.
[381] Ibid., p. 8.
[382] Ibid., p. 13.
[383] Ibid., p. 3.
[384] Ibid., p. 1.

The re-creation of the Fourth Fleet was opposed by many in Latin America. It elicited a great deal of suspicion throughout the region. Brazilian President Lula, for example, warned that the recreation of the fleet might be geared toward the country's newly-discovered offshore oil reserves.[385] This represented a genuine concern of Brazilian military officials.[386] Other leaders were much more forceful in their condemnation of the fleet's reestablishment, including Chávez (who responded by underscoring Venezuela's cooperation with Brazil over the creation of a South American Defense Council) and Morales (who dubbed it 'the Fourth Fleet of intervention').[387] It is unclear if this level of disapproval was anticipated by US policymakers,[388] but it certainly seemed to counteract the smart power brand. Devised with hindsight, CSIS's call for a public diplomacy campaign specific to the Fourth Fleet appeared trivial. In the context of the US's advantage in compulsory power resources, any reorganization of US forces was likely to be interpreted as a flexing of military muscle. Statements that such moves would 'send a message' to the region only intensified this effect.

Southcom's Basing Posture and the NLL

The geo-strategic projection of compulsory power is contingent on the requisite territorial architecture. Military bases act as 'symbolic markers of US power and credibility'.[389] Crucial to the physical deployment of coercive capabilities, they are 'normalized through a commonly circulating rhetoric that suggests that their presence is natural and even gift-like rather than the outcomes of policy choices made in keeping with the aim of pursuing a certain imperial vision of US self-interest'.[390] And yet, naturalised as a military necessity, bases can become a political liability. As seen in Ecuador and Colombia (detailed below), bases have the potential to generate political blowback that can hamper the ability of the US to realise its compulsory power advantage. This is just the type of conundrum that the 'smart power' framework was meant to address. In this section, I examine recent changes to Southcom's basing posture, analysing their impact on the compulsory power of US hegemony in Latin America.

As the US rose to superpower status after World War II, it developed a global 'empire of bases',[391] with the total number in the several hundred (at least) for most of the second half of the twentieth century. This period witnessed the further development of basing

[385] Reuters, 'New fleet may mean US covets Brazil's oil: Lula', 18 September 2008: http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/18/us-brazil-oil-usa-idUSN1827567620080918.

[386] According to documents released by Wikileaks (specifically classified emails of Stratfor, a global intelligence firm that counts US government agencies among its clients), the Brazilian military was deeply concerned with the prospect of the Fourth Fleet encroaching on Brazil's 'pre-salt' offshore oil fields. See for example, Wikileaks email-id document 1092740, dated 5 January 2011, released 27 February 2012: http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/1092740_insight-brazil-defense-matters-.html.

[387] Nikolas Kozloff, 'US Fourth Fleet in Venezuelan Waters', Counterpunch, May 2008: http://www.counterpunch.org/2008/05/24/u-s-fourth-fleet-in-venezuelan-waters/.

[388] US cables demonstrate the level of opposition to the Fourth Fleet among NLL governments, as well as US actions to counteract this political opposition. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08BUENOSAIRES1068, 'A/S Shannon Engages with GOA Officials at U.S.-Argentine Bilateral Consultations', 04 August 2008; Wikileaks Reference ID: 08BRASILIA1487, 'Scenesetter for the November 20 Bilateral Defense Working Group', 14 November 2008; Wikileaks Reference ID: 08CARACAS1573, 'Venezuela Media Highlight Benefits of Fourth Fleet', 13 November 2008.

[389] Catherine Lutz, 'Introduction: Bases, Empire, and Global Response', in *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against US Military Posts*, edited by Catherine Lutz (London: Pluto Press, 2009), p. 23.

[390] Ibid., pp. 20-21.

[391] Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Owl Books, 2004). Johnson wrote that there were more than 725 US military bases spread around the world as of the early 2000s (p. 167). Estimates vary considerably depending on what counts as a 'base'.

infrastructure in the US's overseas and neo-colonial possessions in Latin America (including Cuba and Panama). As the Cold War came to a close, political pressures emerged in Washington to reform and streamline the US's military garrisons—both to save money and to address the political and diplomatic controversies that swirled around many of the larger bases.[392] Oftentimes, the mere presence of these 'Little Americas' (as one historian referred to them) had a tendency to stimulate nationalist and anti-imperialist opposition within host countries, movements that generally grew more pronounced during periods of high-profile conflict (e.g. the wars in Vietnam and Iraq).[393] In the post-Cold War context, the Bush administration reformed its military basing posture to reflect new geo-political realities.[394] Under its smart power framework, the Obama administration reinforced the turn to a more flexible, 'small-footprint' posture.[395]

Commensurate with its evolution as a hemispheric hegemon, the history of US military bases in Latin America goes back many decades. The now-notorious base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, for example, dates to a 1903 lease agreement (still contested by the Cuban government), and continues to be one of the US's most prominent overseas military complexes.[396] Of particular importance to inter-American relations were outposts in Panama and Puerto Rico, as they were operationally critical to the numerous interventions carried out by US forces following the acquisition of Spain's imperial vestiges in the war of 1898. As the twentieth century came to a close, the facilities in Panama and Vieques (Puerto Rico) proved too problematic to maintain,[397] setting in motion a series of twists and turns that have accompanied US basing strategy in the era of the NLL. As addressed in this section, the rise

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[392] See for example, C. T. Sandars, *America's Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 303-331.

[393] Anni P. Baker, *American Soldiers Overseas: The Global Military Presence* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), pp. 53-79; see also, Lutz, editor (2009). Of course, the conduct of soldiers stationed at the bases has also contributed to their potency as symbols/manifestations of US imperialism and militarism. In one infamous example, the 1995 rape of a schoolgirl by US servicemen in Okinawa, Japan fuelled a massive anti-base movement in that country (Baker [2004], pp. 136-150). Furthermore, as documented in the work of Cynthia Enloe, the gendered, day-to-day aspects of foreign military bases (their association with prostitution, for example) can also make them targets of public reproach, particularly in the Third World, where such dynamics take on a racialised (and thus more visible) angle. *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 65-92.

[394] In announcing the changes to the US military's global posture in 2004, then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated that US troops 'should be located in places where they are wanted, welcomed, and needed', noting the problems caused when 'the presence and activities of (US) forces grate on local populations and... become an irritant for host governments'. Citing the need to make US forces more 'agile', Rumsfeld also stated that 'American troops should be located in environments that are hospitable to their movements'. US Department of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, 'Positioning America's Forces for the 21st Century', September 2004: http://www.defense.gov/home/articles/2004-09/a092304b.html.

[395] See for example, US Department of Defense, 'Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense', January 2012, p. 3.

[396] The US naval base at Guantánamo is the oldest US base on foreign territory. The base and the terms of the 1903 lease agreement have long been opposed by the Castro government. See for example, Sandars (2000), pp. 142-145.

[397] As documented by John Lindsay-Poland, the US was compelled to give up its military bases in Panama at the behest of nationalist Panamanian politicians and citizens, many of whom had opposed US control of the Panama Canal Zone, which was returned to Panama by the US in a 1979 treaty. The US left the Zone (and its bases) in 1999. A similar dynamic was witnessed in regards to the US base on the Puerto Rican island of Vieques, which became a flashpoint for Puerto Rican social movements in the 1990s-2000s. The US Navy pulled out of Vieques in 2003. Puerto Rico, of course, is officially part of the US, though not a state. As summarised in Figure 3, the Pentagon continues to possess a considerable amount of real-estate in Puerto Rico as a whole. John Lindsay-Poland, 'US Military Bases in Latin America and the Caribbean', in *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against US Military Posts*, edited by Catherine Lutz (London: Pluto Press, 2009), pp.71-95.

of the NLL 'upset' the status quo in regards to the Pentagon's Latin American outposts. This resulted in a greater strategic reliance on Colombia, the US's main ally in the region. It also facilitated the turn to a more flexible basing strategy—one in which the 'footprint' of US compulsory power was less-visible.

John Lindsay-Poland has identified nine purposes served by US military bases in Latin America: 'police interventions; tropical sanitation; Panama Canal defense, which was interpreted liberally; troop training; tests of weapons and other materiel; environmental engineering, particularly of the tropical environment; counter-insurgency warfare; counter-drug operations; and intelligence and communication tasks'.[398] Officially, the US military's property portfolio included 666 sites in non-US territory as of fiscal year 2012, in addition to 94 sites in its overseas (but nominally 'US') territories.[399] As summarised in the table below, as of FY 2012 there were 63 sites in Latin America and the Caribbean directly controlled by DoD (41 of which were located in US territories in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands). These figures do not include bases outside of the Pentagon's 'real property inventory', meaning that the number of overseas bases/sites to which the US military has access (through defense cooperation agreements, joint task force agreements or other arrangements) is substantially larger.[400]

Figure 3: US DoD Sites in Latin America and the Caribbean – FY 2012

Country/Territory	No. of sites	No. of major sites*	PRV (USD)**
Antigua and Barbuda	1	1	110 million
Aruba	1	0	3 million
Bahamas	6	2	396 million
Colombia	7	0	30 million
Costa Rica	1	0	.4 million
Cuba	1	1	3,312 million
Dominican Republic	1	0	.4 million
El Salvador	1	0	.6 million
Netherlands Antilles (Curacao)	1	1	78 million
Peru	2	1	15 million
Puerto Rico (US)	35	25	3,612 million
US Virgin Islands	6	3	86 million
Total	**63**	**34**	**7,643.4 million**
Source: US Department of Defense: 'Base Structure Report: Fiscal Year 2012 Baseline'			
* Major overseas (non-US) sites are those that are larger than 10 acres and/or have a PRV greater than $10 million; major sites in US territories are larger than 10 acres with a PRV greater than $10 million.			
** PRV indicates total Plant Replacement Value for all facilities (buildings, structures and linear structures). This represents the calculated cost to replace the physical plant(s) for each country/territory.			

US Loses Access to Base at Manta, Ecuador

In 1999, as a response to the closure of its military bases in Panama, the US formalised an agreement with Ecuador giving the US Southern Command access to an Ecuadorian air force base outside the coastal city of Manta. The stated purpose of the

[398] Lindsay-Poland (2009), pp. 73-74.
[399] US Department of Defense: 'Base Structure Report: Fiscal Year 2012 Baseline' (September 2011), p. 7.
[400] The sites included in the Base Structure Report correspond to a 'physical (geographic) location that is or was owned by, leased to, or otherwise possessed by a DoD Component'. The report states: 'A site may exist in one of three forms: land only – where no facilities are present; facility or facilities only – where there the underlying land is neither owned nor controlled by the government; and land with facilities – where both are present'. US Department of Defense: 'Base Structure Report: Fiscal Year 2012 Baseline' (September 2011), p. 4.

agreement, which covered a ten-year span, was to 'intensify international cooperation for aerial detection, monitoring, tracking and control of illegal narcotics activity'.[401] The Forward Operating Location (FOL) was widely seen as one of the US's most valuable military assets in Latin America. However, the Manta FOL grew increasingly controversial with the Ecuadorian public as it became apparent that the US military presence had the potential to draw the country into the conflict in neighbouring Colombia.[402] Additionally, Washington paid no rent to the Ecuadorian government for use of the base (though DoD invested over 70 million USD in various improvements to the facility over the years).

Campaigning in 2006, Rafael Correa came out strongly against a continued US military presence in Ecuador, helping propel him to victory. The US lease on the Manta airbase ended in November 2009. The Correa government chose not to renew the lease, and the base was formally closed as an FOL. Ecuador's foreign minister remarked that the closure of Manta marked a 'moment of deep transformation and Latin American vision'.[403] Correa did not actually 'eject' the US from the base; he merely demurred on renewing the agreement which would have allowed US forces to stay. But, officially, the loss of the FOL left a 'major surveillance gap in the eastern Pacific Ocean region'[404] (a gap not immediately filled by the subsequent base agreement with Colombia, discussed below). Opposition to the arrangement reflected a strong current of opinion in Ecuador, which was based on concerns over sovereignty, transparency and the potential overreach of US interdiction efforts.[405] The nationalism of Correa and his supporters played off these concerns. As the US moved out of Manta, Venezuelan and Chinese capital moved into the city to invest in the area and develop its port facility.[406]

In the US, the 'eviction' of Southcom from Ecuador was taken as proof of the increasingly 'anti-American' features of Latin America's left-leaning presidents.[407] The US media linked the decision to close the base to 'Chávez's anti-US movement'.[408] Much was made of Correa's oft-repeated quip that Ecuador would consider renewing the agreement if

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[401] 'Agreement of Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ecuador Concerning United States Access to and Use of Installations at the Ecuadorian Air Base in Manta for Aerial Counter-Narcotics Activities', 1999. Available at: http://www.forcolombia.org/sites/www.forcolombia.org/files/US-EcuadorAgreementofCooperation.pdf.

[402] These concerns were demonstrated to be well-founded when, in 2008, the Colombian armed forces, in pursuit of FARC guerrillas, made an incursion into Ecuadorian territory, setting off a highly-charged diplomatic crisis in the Andean region. This episode is detailed in Chapter 4. The Correa government alleged that the attack showed that the US military was using the Manta base in conjunction with its support for the Colombian government in its prosecution of the war. (FARC is the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the largest guerrilla force in that country's longstanding civil war.)

[403] Cited in John Lindsay-Poland, 'Retreat to Colombia: The Pentagon Adapts its Latin America Strategy', *NACLA Reports*, Vol. 43 No. 1 (2010), p. 22.

[404] Stephen Kaufman, 'Loss of Ecuador Base Leaves Gap in Counternarcotics Surveillance', State Department, 9 November 2009: http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2009/November/20091109103908esnamfuak0.8177912.html?CP.rss=true.

[405] Washington Office on Latin America, 'The US Forward Operating Location in Manta: the Ecuadorian Perspective', 30 March 2007. The WOLA report also pointed out that Ecuador received very little in the way of economic benefits from the US presence at Manta.

[406] See for example, Joshua Partlow, 'Ecuador Giving US Air Base the Boot', *Washington Post*, 4 September 2008. In July of 2008, the Venezuelan government announced the financing of an oil refinery near Manta. Meanwhile, a Hong Kong-based company is constructing a major deep-water port facility in the city.

[407] See for example, Joshua Partlow, 'Ecuador Giving US Air Base the Boot', *Washington Post*, 4 September 2008.

[408] See for example, Stephan Küffner, 'Ecuador Targets a US Air Base', *Time*, 14 May 2008: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1779434,00.html.

the US allowed Ecuador to maintain a military base in Miami. Although the Ecuadorian discussion surrounding Manta centred mostly on the trade-offs associated with the US military's presence in the country, it was taken by Washington as stemming from the 'anti-American' ideology of the country's president. Ecuadorian concerns about US actions inside Ecuador were incidental, or secondary; the 'real' motive was the festering 'anti-*Yanqui*' sentiment amongst the region's people and politicians. Washington was deeply attuned to the political controversies surrounding the base,[409] but there is little doubt that Southcom would have preferred to maintain access to the FOL had it been able to persuade the Ecuadorians to extend the lease. Leaked cables show that US officials devised a 'strategic plan to influence Ecuadorian public and political opinion to create an environment more favorable to the possibility of negotiations to renew the FOL agreement'.[410] DoD officials continued to negotiate with their counterparts in Quito even after Correa came to power.[411] Evidently, Washington was unable to override Correa's political commitments, forcing the Obama administration to look to Colombia to replace Manta.[412]

US-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement

Following the loss of the Manta FOL, the Obama administration signed an agreement with Álvaro Uribe, Colombia's right-wing president, giving the US military access to seven bases in Colombian territory. The deal, finalised in October 2009, was slated to provide Southcom with access to three air force bases, two naval bases and two army installations, but was nullified by Colombia's Constitutional Court in August 2010. The court's decision, which ruled the agreement invalid because it wasn't legislated in Congress, was delivered amidst a climate of controversy extending throughout much of Latin America. Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos, who initially supported the deal, subsequently declined to submit it to the legislature for approval. Reports indicate that 'of the seven bases specified in the October 2009 agreement, the United States was already using all of them, except possibly the Palanquero air base', the largest of the seven facilities.[413] The Pentagon continued to pour millions of dollars into Colombia to upgrade the country's base facilities even after the court's verdict.[414] The collapse of the deal obstructed Washington's attempt to expand its

[409] US embassy documents released by Wikileaks show that US officials were closely monitoring the impact of the FOL on political debates within Ecuador. A cable pertaining to the closure of the base noted that 'the Manta FOL continues to be a highly political issue within Ecuador'. It encouraged a 'smooth exit strategy' to help 'improve the USG's overall image in Ecuador' and 'ensure that the FOL stays out of Ecuador's political debate in the lead-up to the 2009 elections'. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08QUITO1161, 'Embassy Quito's Manta FOL Recommendations', 19 December 2008.

[410] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07QUITO642, 'Manta FOL: Request for DOS and DOD Financial Support for Media Outreach and COMREL Activities', 20 March 2007.

[411] Lindsay-Poland (2009), p. 89.

[412] On the direct relationship between the loss of Manta and the turn toward Colombia, see Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09QUITO704, 'FM Falconi on Ecuador-Colombia Relations, US Base Access in Colombia', 7 August 2009.

[413] John Lindsay-Poland and Susana Pimiento, 'US Base Deal for Colombia: Back to the Status Quo', Foreign Policy in Focus, 14 October 2010: http://www.fpif.org/articles/us_base_deal_for_colombia_back_to_the_status_quo.

[414] DoD contracts acquired by the Fellowship of Reconciliation, a US-based human rights organisation, revealed that US military agencies spent four times as much on construction costs at Colombia's Tolemaida, Larandia and Malaga bases in fiscal year 2010 than they did in the previous four years combined. The contracts were signed in September 2010, after the court's ruling against the DCA, and totalled nearly 5 million USD for the fiscal year: John Lindsay-Poland, blog post: http://forusa.org/blogs/john-lindsay-poland/pentagon-building-bases-central-america-colombia/8445. The contracts included funds for an 'Advanced Operations Base' for SOCSOUTH, Southcom's special operations unit. These contracts are available online at: http://forusa.org/sites/default/files/uploads/tolemaidasocsouth-i.pdf.

military manoeuvrability in the region following the loss of Manta, but it did not constitute a major setback for US compulsory power capabilities in South America.

Negotiated through a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), the language of the accord highlighted the bilateral nature of the partnership, consistent with the smart power approach. According to a US government fact sheet, the DCA aimed to 'facilitate effective bilateral cooperation on security matters in Colombia, including narcotics production and trafficking, terrorism, illicit smuggling of all types, and humanitarian and natural disasters'. Washington was careful to state that the DCA did not permit the establishment of a US base in Colombia, and that it did not signal an increase in the presence of US personnel in the country.[415] This did not prevent controversy from erupting over the agreement, however, which was heavily criticised by Latin American leaders.[416] As was the case with the reestablishment of the Fourth Fleet, the deal generated a regional firestorm, as it came at a fragile time in Colombia's relations with Venezuela and Ecuador. Opposition to the DCA came from across the political spectrum in Latin America, but was particularly acute within the NLL. Leaked documents reveal that the US (via Uribe) leaned on Brazilian President Lula to dampen down the furore unleashed by the agreement amongst Brazil's 'more left-leaning neighbors', in the words of the US embassy. Highly image-conscious in their classified communications, US officials viewed the tumult as a 'disinformation campaign' to portray the accord 'as an attempt to militarize the region'.[417]

President Obama stated that 'there have been those in the region who have been trying to play this up as part of a traditional anti-Yankee rhetoric', adding: 'We have had a security agreement with Colombia for many years now. We have updated that agreement. We have no intent in establishing a US military base in Colombia'.[418] Officials insisted that operations stemming from the bases would be limited to Colombian territory. However, DoD documents acknowledged that the Palenquero Air Base was regional in scope. The US Air Force's budget estimate for Palenquero referenced its importance to 'full spectrum operations throughout South America', which it called a 'critical sub region... where security and stability is under constant threat from narcotics funded terrorist insurgencies, anti-US governments, endemic poverty and recurring natural disasters'.[419] The document touched on the smart power themes of integration and partnership. A typical sentence reads: 'Palanquero will provide joint use capability to US Army, Air Force, Marine, and US Interagency aircraft and personnel in addition to building partner capacity of the Columbian (sic) forces'.[420] As pointed out by Garry Leech, 'nowhere in the agreement (did) it actually state that US military

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[415] US Department of State, 'US-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement', Fact Sheet, 18 August 2009: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/aug/128021.htm.

[416] See for example, Juan Forero, 'South American Leaders Assail US Access to Colombian Military Bases', *The Washington Post*, 29 August 2009. On the widespread opposition to the DCA by NLL governments, see also: Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09QUITO704, 'FM Falconi on Ecuador-Colombia Relations, US Base Access in Colombia', 7 August 2009; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09MADRID944, 'Andean Presidents Chavez, Morales Discuss U.S. with Spain', 22 September 2009; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09USUNNEWYORK908, 'Bilateral with Colombian President Uribe', 14 October 2009; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 10BUENOSAIRES109, 'Argentina: CODEL Engel Addresses Bilateral Relations', 24 February 2010.

[417] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09BRASILIA1041, 'Brazil's Thinking on Colombia-US Defense Cooperation Agreement', 20 August 2009, released 30 August 2011.

[418] Cited in John Otis, 'US Military Base Plan Puts Colombia in Hot Water', *Time*, 12 August 2009: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1915825,00.html.

[419] US Department of the Air Force, 'Military Construction Program, Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Budget Estimates', submitted to Congress May 2009: http://www.justf.org/files/primarydocs/091104pal.pdf.

[420] US Department of the Air Force (2009).

operations launched from the Colombian bases (were) to be restricted to Colombia'.[421] Cables illustrate the degree to which officials attended to the need to 'sell the agreement to the Colombian public and the region as simply an extension of our existing cooperation, rather than as a major escalation in US engagement'. Officials said explicitly that the proposed agreement should 'avoid the use of the word "base"'. [422]

Southcom's 'Lily Pads'

In 2004, President Bush announced the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) to reform the Pentagon's basing posture, with input and oversight from the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States (also called the Overseas Basing Commission). It was the most significant realignment of overseas forces since the 1950s. The product of a multi-year posture review process, the changes reflected the needs of a 'more agile and more flexible force'. Between 60,000-70,000 troops were brought back from Europe and Asia, with thousands more redeployed to newer sites to better handle the 'emerging' and 'uncertain' threats of the twenty-first century. Washington stressed the budgetary savings to the US as it consolidated and closed those overseas bases 'no longer needed to face the threats of our time'.[423] Shifts in the strategic positioning of US forces were reflected in the discourse surrounding the issue. As one analyst wrote, 'new names are being used to suggest that a military base is less significant or permanent or externally controlled than a base is typically assumed to be... The term "base" has been used only to refer to those installations in which the United States exercises full control over the military location rather than the many in which it shares that power with another nation'.[424]

In its 2005 report, the Overseas Basing Commission concluded that the 'expansion of cooperative security locations (CSL) and forward operating sites (FOS)[425] in key strategic locations around the globe adds to operational flexibility, preserves presence abroad, and serves to strengthen alliance relationships'. It defined FOS as 'expandable "warm facilities" maintained with a limited US military support presence and possibly prepositioned equipment'. CLS were defined as 'facilities with little or no permanent US presence. Instead they (are) maintained with periodic service, contractor, or host-nation status'.[426] In contrast to 'main operating bases', as the larger, more traditional bases are called, these newer expeditionary outposts enhance the mobility of US forces, thus providing for additional 'strategic lift'.[427] Military facilities that conform to this new posture are colloquially known as *lily pads*, conjuring images of US troops hopping effortlessly from point-to-point to access inauspicious platforms of strategic penetration. Lily pads can be useful alternatives 'to large, expense, and politically vulnerable fixed bases. Part of the rationale of lily pads is that they provide the US military the capacity to expand its presence on short notice, should a

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[421] Garry Leech, 'US Military Documents Show Colombia Base Agreement Poses Threat to Region', *Colombia Journal*, 6 November 2009: http://colombiajournal.org/u-s-military-documents-show-colombia-base-agreement-poses-threat-to-region.htm.

[422] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08BOGOTA4083, 'Colombian Counterproposal to U.S. Defense Cooperation Agreement', 12 November 2008.

[423] US State Department, 'Bush Announces Largest US Force Restructuring in 50 Years: Troops to move to strategic locations with 70,000 fewer overseas', 16 August 2004: http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2004/August/20040816174727frllehctim0.490597.html.

[424] Lutz (2009), p. 19.

[425] These are also called 'forward operating locations' (FOL), as was the air base at Manta, Ecuador.

[426] Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, 9 May 2005, p. ii and footnote 1.

[427] Ibid., p. 30.

"contingency" arise requiring mobilization'.[428] They require—and reinforce—a deeper level of partnership with allied forces. A certain degree of control over the sites must be ceded to non-US personnel, but because they are less conspicuous, lily pads are politically less risky.

Southcom has operationalised the lily pad approach in recent years, stating in its 2012 posture statement: 'As we look to the future, we will continue to seek innovative ways to support interagency coordination; streamline programs and initiatives; and replicate the success of our highly effective, small-footprint approach that bolsters the security capacity of regional militaries and ensures the multi-layered defense of the United States'.[429] Southcom sees its small-footprint approach as complementing its focus on flexibility. Lily pads also foster partnerships and reduce costs associated with larger bases.[430] The small-footprint approach is wrapped-up in Southcom's smart power framework; as noted above, Southcom's strategic documents are laden with references to interagency cooperation, military-to-military partnerships and strategic communication. As discussed in the following section, the construction of new forward bases in Honduras demonstrates the US military's penchant for a small-footprint approach to address 'emerging threats' (such as the changing routes of narco-traffickers, uncertainties associated with 'radical populist' governments, and so on).

According to the Southcom website, as of 2012 the US military had two Cooperative Security Locations in Latin America and the Caribbean, covering three separate facilities. The CSL are 'strategic, cost-effective' locations in Comalapa (El Salvador) and Aruba and Curacao (the Netherlands Antilles). These facilities 'are the result of cooperative, long-term agreements between the United States and the host nations', says Southcom, but they are 'not bases', even though Southcom oversees the operation of the CSL from its headquarters in Florida.[431] Notwithstanding the limited transparency surrounding the creation of these bases, media reports indicate that the US has recently sought to create or upgrade small-footprint sites across the region, from Central to South America. In 2012, Southcom gained access to a site in the Chilean city of Concón through negotiations with the conservative Piñera government.[432] However, similar arrangements were rejected by the (NLL) governments of Paraguay and Argentina.[433] Southcom's increased presence in Guatemala (which includes access to at least one Pacific-coast base) came under controversy in 2012 when reports surfaced of renewed human rights abuses by Guatemalan forces, including the fatal shooting of several indigenous demonstrators.[434] The US military's presence in Honduras has also been cause for controversy.

Similar to a FOS/FOL, Southcom maintains a joint task force agreement with Honduras for that country's Palmerola Air Base (also known as the Soto Cano Air Base). The headquarters of the Honduran Air Force and Naval Academy, Palmerola hosts between 500

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[428] Lindsay-Poland, *NACLA Reports* (2010), p. 26.
[429] Posture Statement of General Douglas M. Fraser, United States Southern Command, 6 March 2012, p. 4.
[430] Ibid., p. 14.
[431] US Southern Command, Cooperative Security Locations: http://www.southcom.mil/ourmissions/Pages/Cooperative-Security-Locations.aspx
[432] Nikolas Kozloff, 'What's behind Obama's new military base in Chile?' Al-Jazeera, 2 June 2012: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/05/20125261635126361 23.html.
[433] David Vine, 'The Lily-Pad Strategy', Tom Dispatch, 15 July 2012: http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175568/.
[434] Randal C. Archibold, 'Guatemala Shooting Raises Concerns about Military's Expanded Role', *The New York Times*, 20 October 2012, p. A9.

and 600 US military personnel.[435] It was central to US counter-insurgency efforts in Central America in the 1980s (including covert operations). In the late-2000s, the Honduran government of Manuel Zelaya set in motion a plan to convert Palmerola into a civilian airport with Venezuelan funding.[436] President Zelaya was deposed in a coup d'état before the end of his term, however, sparking a diplomatic firestorm in Latin America. Despite the protests of his supporters and the efforts of Latin American governments (led by Brazil), he was not returned to power. The post-coup government emerged as a major strategic ally of the US, with DoD investing in several new 'lily pad' bases there. Washington's ambivalent response to the coup represents an enlightening case study of the diplomatic component of the US's compulsory power in Latin America, and its relationship to military force in the era of the New Latin Left.

Compulsory Power and Diplomacy: The US and the Honduran Coup

During the Cold War, the US leveraged its compulsory power in Latin America through foreign aid programmes, military interventions, covert operations, counter-insurgency practices, proxy armies, and support for highly-repressive anti-communist governments, many of which engaged in state-directed terrorism to quash guerrillas and political opponents. Coercion remained a pillar of US compulsory power after the Cold War, as displayed in interventions in Haiti, Panama and elsewhere; in military support for allied governments in the War on Terror and/or the War on Drugs; and in the US's military outposts in the region. Of course, there is a diplomatic element to the command function underlying compulsory power, which is defined by the directness of state-to-state interaction. The policy of the US toward the extra-judicial overthrow of elected presidents is related to US compulsory power whether or not US actions are among the proximate *causes* of the coups. Diplomatic or financial support from Washington can enable extra-legal actions, or allow for the consolidation of post-coup regimes, with or without an explicit quid pro quo.[437]

As discussed in Chapter 1, the New Latin Left, as a regional trend, reinforced existing processes of democratisation. Administrations of the left and centre-left have sought to remake the institutions of liberal democracy, in some cases through constitutional referenda, but all have been duly elected through open and contested elections. Several of these governments have faced illegal, extra-legal and/or quasi-legal challenges, including military coups. In 2002, an alliance between the opposition and elements of the Venezuelan military deposed Hugo Chávez for a period of two days before he was returned to office by supporters and pro-Chávez military officials. The coup was enthusiastically endorsed by the Bush administration. Researchers have documented the ways in which the US state provided financial support to anti-Chávez groups, but few argue that Washington was the decisive factor in his brief ouster.[438] Similarly, in 2004, Haitian President Aristide was driven from office by paramilitary groups comprised of former military officials (Aristide had disbanded the Haitian military, which initially ousted him in a 1991 coup). Washington welcomed

[435] Global Security, 'Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras': http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/soto-cano.htm.

[436] Nikolas Kozloff, 'The Coup and the US Airbase in Honduras', *Counterpunch*, 22 July 2009: http://www.counterpunch.org/2009/07/22/the-coup-and-the-u-s-airbase-in-honduras/.

[437] For Barnett and Duvall, compulsory power can include 'symbolic and normative resources', such as norms, rhetoric and shaming tactics, which actors can use to press for their agenda and compel others to follow suit. Barnett and Duvall, 'Power in Global Governance', in *Power in Global Governance*, edited by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 15. Thus, diplomatic pressure can be a form of compulsory power.

[438] On the 2002 coup in Venezuela, see for example Gott (2005), pp. 223-244 and Kozloff (2006).

Aristide's violent overthrow, quickly recognising the forces that drove him from office as the legitimate government in Port-au-Prince.[439]

Although several neoliberal, 'pro-Washington' presidents were forced from office in recent decades amidst violent social upheaval,[440] it is notable that, since 2000, those heads of state toppled by coercive methods were members of the NLL (Chávez, Aristide, Zelaya and Paraguayan President Lugo). In Ecuador, Rafael Correa confronted a police uprising that threatened the stability of his government, and which he and others labelled an attempted coup.[441] Lugo's removal in 2012 was generally referred to as an impeachment (Lugo maintained it was a 'parliamentary coup').[442] The overthrow of Zelaya in Honduras was a more conventional coup d'état, but even in the Honduran case, the *golpistas* ('coupsters') attempted to present a legal rationale for his forced dismissal. Zelaya was removed by the military after aligning his government with the NLL's anti-neoliberal, 'pro-Chávez' bloc, and for subsequently calling for constitutional reform. In analysing the role of the US in the Honduran crisis below, I do not aim to downplay the agency of local actors or the (compulsory/institutional) power of Latin American states, as is clear from the following discussion. Washington was responding to events as much as driving them.

The Military Coup against the Zelaya Government

Manuel 'Mel' Zelaya was elected president in 2005 as a candidate of the Liberal Party, one of Honduras's two dominant political parties. Seen early on as a relatively traditional politician, Zelaya's campaign focused on enhancing citizen involvement, augmenting transparency in government and modestly strengthening existing social programmes.[443] Over the course of his truncated presidency Zelaya moved to the left. This cost him support from members of his own party, which encompassed both progressive and centre-right ideological elements. Though he came from a wealthy landowning family, Zelaya began to rail against the country's oligarchy. His positions became increasingly, if mildly, anti-neoliberal. A supporter of CAFTA during the campaign, Zelaya gradually aligned himself with the country's labour unions while bringing more left-leaning Liberal Party officials into his cabinet.[444] His transformation was summarised by the US Congressional Research Service:

> Zelaya... was generally regarded as a moderate when he was inaugurated to a four-year term on January 27, 2006. As his term progressed, however, President Zelaya advanced a number of populist policies. These included free school enrolment, an increase in teachers' pay, a

[439] Hallward (2007).

[440] Including Ecuador's Jamil Mahuad, ousted in 2000 via a popular rebellion and subsequent coup, and Bolivia's Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, who resigned amidst widespread protests in 2003.

[441] Simon Romero, 'Standoff in Ecuador Ends with Leader's Rescue', *The New York Times*, 30 September 2010: p. A4. International institutions, including the OAS and UNASUR (the Union of South American Nations), also referred to the events (which began as a police strike) as an attempted coup d'état.

[442] Lugo's popularity had dwindled considerably over his time in office, and he was widely seen as a weak executive. Though Paraguay's Congress voted overwhelmingly for his dismissal, the speed with which his impeachment took place led many to label his ouster undemocratic. See for example, the Washington Office on Latin America, 'WOLA: Paraguayan President Lugo's Removal is Undemocratic', 24 June 2012: .... Lugo had distanced Paraguay from its traditionally-strong relationship with the US military. See for example, Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA), 'The Paraguay Imbroglio: A Disconcerting Endgame', 3 August 2012: http://www.coha.org/the-paraguay-imbroglio-a-disconcerting-endgame/.

[443] US Congressional Research Service, 'Honduran-U.S. Relations', 23 November 2009, p. 1.

[444] See for example, J. Mark Ruhl, 'Honduras Unravels', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 21 No. 2 (2010), pp. 93-107.

reduction in fuel costs, and a 60% increase in the minimum wage. Zelaya also forged closer relations with Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, joining Petrocaribe and the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) in 2008.[445]

The political crisis that would precipitate his ouster began when Zelaya issued an executive degree calling for a popular referendum on convening a national assembly to draft a new constitution. Although the referendum was non-binding, it was opposed by much of the country's political elite, with the opposition arguing that Zelaya would use it as a means of running for re-election.[446] Following months of legal wrangling, on June 28, 2009, the day of the referendum, the Honduran military arrested Zelaya and flew him into exile in Costa Rica. Although officials from the newly-installed government of Roberto Micheletti claimed Zelaya's removal was consistent with constitutional procedure, it was condemned by Zelaya's supporters and the international community as a coup d'état. 'On July 4, the OAS unanimously voted to suspend Honduras for an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order in accordance with Article 21 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter'.[447] In the immediate aftermath of the coup the UN, the EU and a number of other regional bodies (such as CARICOM [Caribbean Community] and UNASUR [Union of South American Nations]) sought to isolate the Micheletti government by applying diplomatic and financial pressure. In this context, Washington's approach to the crisis, as discussed below, struck a discordant note. Its nominal commitment to democracy and the rule of law was blunted by a deep ambivalence toward Zelaya's 'populism'.

The coup elicited spirited protests from unions, peasant groups and civil society organisations in Honduras, which fuelled the already-pervasive international condemnation. 'After the coup, security forces committed serious human rights violations, killing some protesters, repeatedly using excessive force against demonstrators, and arbitrarily detaining thousands of coup opponents'. To consolidate its rule, the de facto government 'imposed unreasonable and illegitimate restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and assembly'.[448] As documented by Human Rights Watch, these violations persisted after the January 2010 inauguration of Porfirio Lobo, Micheletti's successor. Freedom House, which downgraded Honduras from 'electoral democracy' to 'partly free' status as a result of Zelaya's ouster, highlighted the numerous attacks against journalists following the post-coup election.[449] The coup and its aftermath exacerbated the chaotic socio-economic situation in the country. Organised crime and street violence increased amidst the political repression.[450] A report released in June 2010 by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR, part of the OAS) expressed 'deep concern over the continuation of human rights violations' in the context of the post-coup environment,[451] undermining claims by Honduran officials (and Washington) that the situation had returned to normal.

In contrast to the staunch condemnation of the coup in Latin America, the response of the Obama administration was much more nuanced—even ambiguous. Whereas Latin

[445] US Congressional Research Service, 'Honduran-U.S. Relations', 23 November 2009, p. 1.
[446] Ibid., p. 2.
[447] Ibid., p. 6.
[448] Human Rights Watch, 'After the Coup: Ongoing Violence, Intimidation, and Impunity in Honduras', December 2010, p. 1.
[449] See Freedom House's webpage on Honduras: http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/honduras.
[450] See for example, James Bosworth, 'Honduras: Organized Crime Gaining Amid Political Crisis', Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, December 2010.
[451] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 'Preliminary Observations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on its Visit to Honduras, May 15-18, 2010', 3 June 2010, p. 1.

American leaders were uniform in their insistence on Zelaya's return, Washington—while nominally condemning his ouster—was evasive on the matter. There was some public criticism of Zelaya's removal, which was (eventually) backed-up by bilateral action, including the suspension of tens of millions of dollars in US foreign assistance funds. Crucially, however, the Obama administration never labelled the action a *military* coup, which would have triggered the termination of a much greater portion of the US's total foreign assistance to the country.[452] Classified cables released via Wikileaks demonstrate that, contrary to the administration's public equivocations, US policymakers had no doubts as to the illegality of the coup itself.[453] Although the State Department backed negotiations that would have returned Zelaya to office, it quickly undercut the agreement by stating that Washington would recognise the new government regardless of whether Zelaya's reinstatement was implemented.[454] Ultimately, the timing of the administration's adoption of a more forceful stance proved decisive. Human Rights Watch wrote that, 'unfortunately', the US 'waited more than two months before imposing effective sanctions—including freezing the visas of military and political actors—to press the de facto government to restore democratic rule'.[455] Washington's calculated foot-dragging ensured that Zelaya would not be returned to power before the November 2009 elections.[456]

Washington was virtually alone in recognising the legitimacy of the post-coup elections, which were boycotted by Zelaya's supporters and by most international election observers. The US subsequently went to great lengths to normalise Honduras's foreign relations. Obama welcomed Lobo to the White House in October 2011, stating that his 'commitment to democracy' had restored the constitutional order in the country, paving the

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[452] See for example, US Congressional Research Service, 'Honduran Political Crisis, June 2009-January 2012', 1 February 2010, p. 13. As noted by the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR), in terms of suspending/terminating foreign aid contracts, the US was much more lenient on Honduras than it was on the governments of Mauritania and Madagascar, both of which experienced coups d'état in the year leading up to the Honduran coup. In both of the African cases, and in contrast to the Honduran case, contracts administered by the Millennium Challenge Corporation were suspended just days after the military coups. Center for Economic and Policy Research, 'The Millennium Challenge Corporation and Economic Sanctions: A Comparison of Honduras with Other Countries', Issue Brief, August 2009.

[453] On July 24, 2009, just weeks after the coup, the US embassy in Tegucigalpa sent a cable to Washington with the subject 'Open and Shut: The Case of the Honduran Coup'. In the document, the embassy asserted that 'there is no doubt' that the events of June 28 'constituted an illegal and unconstitutional coup'. In keeping with precedent, the cable did not reference any difference between a 'coup' and a 'military coup', a distinction that was made hence by State Department officials. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09TEGUCIGALPA645, 'TFHO1: Open and Shut: The Case of the Honduran Coup', 24 July 2009. See also, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09TEGUCIGALPA591, 'Honduran Coup: Is There a "Pink Team"?' 14 July 2009. Documents illustrate that the US embassy was aware of the deteriorating human rights situation in the country following the coup. See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 10TEGUCIGALPA66, 'Scenesetter for USG Delegation to Presidential Inauguration', 26 January 2010. In this unclassified cable, the US embassy maintains that the US was unequivocally *opposed* to Zelaya's ouster, despite evidence to the contrary.

[454] See for example, Kevin Casas-Zamora, 'The Honduran Crisis and the Obama Administration', in *Shifting the Balance: Obama and the Americas*, edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal, Theodore J. Piccone and Laurence Whitehead (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), p. 123.

[455] Human Rights Watch, 'After the Coup: Ongoing Violence, Intimidation, and Impunity in Honduras', December 2010, p. 11.

[456] A US Congressional report implicitly acknowledged the US's oscillation: 'Following the ouster, President Obama immediately expressed deep concern about the situation and called on all Hondurans to respect democratic norms and resolve the dispute peacefully. The Obama administration *later* condemned the events more forcefully, declaring them illegal, and asserting that the United States views Zelaya as the legitimate president of Honduras'. US Congressional Research Service, 'Honduran-U.S. Relations', 23 November 2009, p. 13. Italics added.

way for its re-admittance to the OAS.[457] Although several Latin American countries followed the US's lead in quickly re-establishing ties with the Lobo government, Washington's overall approach to the crisis struck many in Latin America as unilateralist. According to Kevin Casas-Zamora of the centrist Brookings Institution, 'President Obama's credibility in the region (was) seriously weakened. In a matter of five months, his administration's position on the coup (went) from indignation to indifference to confusion to acquiescence'.[458] Casas-Zamora, a critic of Zelaya's 'brash populist style',[459] wrote that there was 'uneasiness with the idea of having a close ally of Hugo Chávez... as the direct beneficiary of US sanctions'. This explains why sanctions were weak 'when compared with those genuinely feared in Tegucigalpa: the freezing of Honduran bank accounts in the United States and the imposition of commercial sanctions against the country'.[460] The (apparent) inconsistency of the Obama White House masked a persistent desire to see the crisis resolved in a way that prevented Zelaya's return, thus depriving Chávez of an ally while undercutting 'populist authoritarianism' in Central America. Through the US's shifting diplomatic rhetoric, and because the coup was allowed to stand, the episode suggested that 'populist' politicians could be held partly responsible for their forced removal from office. Some analysts saw parallels in the extra-constitutional impeachment of Fernando Lugo, Paraguay's centre-left President, in June 2012. Lugo, who, like Zeyala, had lost support from within his own governing coalition, denounced his sudden removal as a 'parliamentary coup'.[461]

Domestic politics played a key role in shaping the White House's views on Honduras. Obama was challenged by conservative Republicans in Congress who were quick to link Zelaya to Chávez. In response to Obama's tepid 'support' for Zelaya, Republicans in the Senate temporarily blocked the administration's nominees for Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs (Arturo Valenzuela) and Ambassador to Brazil (Thomas Shannon). Although US policy was undoubtedly set by the White House, the debate was impacted by the Cuban American contingent in Congress, which continues to have incredible clout within Republican foreign policy circles. Knowing the political landscape in Washington, the Honduran backers of the de facto government lobbied intensely to persuade members of both the executive and legislative branches that Zelaya's removal from office was legal.[462] The Business Council of Latin America, a right-wing lobby group, hired prominent lawyer Lanny Davis to conduct a public relations campaign against Zelaya's

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[457] The White House, 'Remarks by President Obama and President Lobo of Honduras Before Bilateral Meeting', 5 October 2011: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/05/remarks-president-obama-and-president-lobo-honduras-bilateral-meeting. Honduras was readmitted to the OAS in June 2011 by a vote of 32 to one, with Ecuador the lone 'no' vote.

[458] Quoted in Ginger Thompson, 'Region Finds U.S. Lacking on Honduras', *The New York Times*, 27 November 2009: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/28/world/americas/28honduras.html.

[459] Casas-Zamora (2011), p. 114.

[460] Ibid., p. 122. On Washington's perceptions of the links between Zelaya and Chávez, see for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09CARACAS833, 'Chavez: Indirectly, US is Still to Blame', 1 July 2009.

[461] Peter Orsi, 'Does Paraguay risk pariah status with president's ouster?' *Associated Press*, 24 June 2012.

[462] A memorandum defending Zelaya's removal was assembled by the de facto government and/or its supporters to be circulated widely in diplomatic circles. Among other items later determined to be factually incorrect, the memorandum stated that Zelaya had resigned from office. The document, dated June 29, 2009 and with the subject heading of the 'legal situation of the transition government of Honduras', was first made public by Wikileaks:
http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Legal_description_of_the_Hondurian_%22coup%22_against_President_Manual_Zelaya,_29_Jun_2009.

reinstatement. Davis, a personal friend of the Clintons, later accepted a position lobbying on behalf of the Lobo government.[463]

There is scant evidence that the Obama administration was an instigator of the coup in Honduras, despite reports that US policymakers met with Honduran military officials in the weeks leading up to Zelaya's arrest.[464] Although Zelaya's ouster called to mind covert interventions of previous eras, only the loosest of comparisons can be made with Guatemala in 1954 or Chile in 1973.[465] The administration's defenders even argued that Obama's sensitivity to the history of American interventionism prevented him from taking a harder line in calling for Zelaya's reinstatement. Then again, there is no doubt that the administration's position was at odds with the consensus in Latin America, as expressed both by the OAS and in the bilateral actions of the region's governments. The effective 'whitewashing' of the coup heightened tensions with NLL governments (not just the likes of Venezuela and Bolivia, but also Brazil and Argentina) while seriously corroding the image of Obama as an agent of change in US foreign policy.[466]

The Geopolitics of the Obama Administration's Response to the Honduran Coup

Why should events in a small Central American country have such an outsized impact on inter-American relations? And, given that Washington did not appear to be directly responsible for the coup, what did it have to do with the US's compulsory power in the region? This section addresses US diplomacy toward the Honduran coup in the context of Washington's wider geostrategic/geopolitical approach to Latin America and the NLL.

On the surface, the controversy surrounding the coup swirled around the figure of Zelaya himself. At a deeper level, of course, were the policy implications of his political shift to the left. As a moderate turned 'populist', Zelaya's overtures to the NLL (as encapsulated by his decision to bring Honduras into ALBA) implied that the US was in the process of 'loosing' Honduras to the 'populist', 'pro-Chávez' camp. Wikileaks cables indicate that, prior to the coup, US officials identified Zelaya as inimical to US interests. According to Charles Ford, the US ambassador, Zelaya had a 'sinister' side, as evidenced by his advisors' ties to Venezuela, Cuba and organised crime. He was a 'caudillo' who acted like a 'rebellious

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[463] *The Hill*, 'Former Clinton aide hired by Honduran government', 2 December 2010: http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/131579-former-clinton-aide-hired-by-honduran-government. The Lobo government was widely seen as a close ally of the US. An embassy cable summarising Lobo's inauguration speech concluded that it 'could have been written by us, touching on all the points we believe essential to moving Honduras forward'. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 10TEGUCIGALPA92, 'President Lobo Urges National Reconciliation and Pledges Improved Quality of Life', 29 January 2010.

[464] The State Department acknowledged that US officials had met with opposition groups and/or members of the military in the weeks leading up to Zelaya's removal. However, US officials stated that they had attempted to dissuade these parties from carrying out extra-constitutional actions. US State Department, 'Background Briefing on the Situation in Honduras', 1 July 2009: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/125564.htm.

[465] As mentioned in Chapter 1, the US was actively engaged in both of these infamous military coups.

[466] As stated by Mark Weisbrot, the Obama administration's response to the coup 'deeply alienated Brazil, Argentina and [other countries] in South America. These governments... were very angry and disappointed. They thought Obama was going to be different'. Quoted in Jeremy Kryt, 'The Known Unknowns in Honduras', *In These Times*, 14 January 2011: http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/6842/the_known_unknowns_in_honduras/. On the negative reactions to the US's Honduras policy by Latin American leaders, see also, Greg Grandin, 'Muscling Latin America', *The Nation*, 8 February 2010. This sentiment was expressed in bilateral meetings as well as in the OAS and in public discourse. See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 10BUENOSAIRES109, 'Argentina: CODEL Engel Addresses Bilateral Relations', 24 February 2010; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 10SANTODOMINGO35, 'Zelaya and Fernandez Arrive in DR', 29 January 2010.

teenager'. He harboured nationalist and anti-American views and opposed the US military's presence at the Soto Cano Air Force Base.[467] Some observers have speculated that US officials were worried that the constitutional reform process put in motion by Zelaya could have outlawed the presence of foreign troops in the country.[468] As noted above, Zelaya had already set in motion plans to convert Soto Cano into an exclusively civilian airport. In other words, the US's compulsory power capabilities in Central America were put at risk by Zelaya's 'transformation'. The protest movement that emerged following the coup represented a continuation of that threat. By 2012, Honduran opposition groups had coalesced under the umbrella of the National Front of the People's Resistance to challenge the country's established political parties.

Similar to its important position in the 1980s,[469] Honduras (re-)emerged as the geographic fulcrum of the United States' militarised counter-narcotics strategy in Central America, partly as a function of Zelaya's overthrow. In 2011, Honduras received more than 50 million USD in Pentagon contracts, which represented 62 per cent of all DoD funds slated for Central America for that fiscal year. This included 24 million USD for improvements to the Soto Cano base.[470] Additionally, in recent years the US built three new forward bases in Honduras (located at Mocoron, Puerto Castilla and El Aguacate, the last of which features an airstrip used by the CIA during the 1980s).[471] As part of the 'small footprint' strategy that seeks to expand the US military's geographic assets 'under the radar' of public notice, the creation of these bases necessitated close cooperation with the country's post-coup governments. As of 2012, the interagency mix of programmes needed to construct and maintain these 'lily pads' was supported by approximately 200 US Special Forces soldiers who, among other duties, were actively training their Honduran counterparts.[472] The White House's proposed budget for 2013 doubled police and military funds to the country.[473]

The US did not directly force Zelaya from office. Once he was gone, however, the Obama administration did use a mix of tools to augment its overall compulsory power position in the region. Economic sanctions were applied to the post-coup government, but in a manner that would ensure their 'ineffectiveness' in restoring the ousted president. Diplomacy was geared toward diffusing the crisis without rectifying the illegality of the coup or its social or political consequences. Rhetorically, Washington sought to have it both ways. It criticised Zelaya's removal as undemocratic, but it refused to label it a military coup. At times, the US appeared to support the regional and multilateral consensus on Honduras, as when it voted to temporarily expel the country from the OAS. In fact, the US consistently

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[467] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08TEGUCIGALPA459, 'President Jose Manuel Zelaya Rosales: Personal', 15 May 2008.

[468] Jeremy Kryt, 'The Known Unknowns in Honduras', *In These Times*, 14 January 2011. It should be noted that the newly-rewritten constitution of Ecuador explicitly disallowed the establishment of foreign military bases in Ecuadorian territory.

[469] On the centrality of Honduras to the US's counter-insurgency activities in the 1980s, see for example, Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1984), especially pp. 261-265; and Philip L. Shepherd, 'Honduras', in *Confronting Revolution: Security Through Diplomacy in Central America*, edited by Morris J. Blachman, William M. LeoGrande and Kenneth Sharpe (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), pp. 125-155.

[470] Dana Frank, 'Honduras: Which Side is the US On?' *The Nation*, 22 May 2012: http://www.thenation.com/article/167994/honduras-which-side-us.

[471] Thom Shanker, 'Lessons of Iraq Help U.S. Fight a Drug War in Honduras', *The New York Times*, 5 May 2012: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/world/americas/us-turns-its-focus-on-drug-smuggling-in-honduras.html?pagewanted=all.

[472] Ibid.

[473] Frank (2012).

undermined this very same consensus, to the consternation of Brazil, the ALBA countries and leaders from across Latin America. To highlight one example, the State Department recognised the elections administrated by the de facto government while the OAS did not. Although the vote was carried out under highly-repressive conditions, the US maintained that the election allowed Honduras to 'turn the page' and re-join the hemispheric community of democracies.[474]

The journalist Eva Golinger linked Honduras with the Obama administration's smart power approach. What it achieved, she wrote, 'was a way to disguise Washington's unilateralism as multilateralism'.[475] Had Obama backed Micheletti's regime unambiguously, it could have been highly deleterious to the US's image in Latin America, particularly given past US support for military coups. But the multilateral disguise wasn't entirely plausible. The administration hoped it could retain this superficial posture while transforming Honduras into a veritable garrison of US hard power in Central America. The OAS, meanwhile, had staked out a very different approach. By signifying a tolerance for putschist measures against 'populist' governments, Washington's acceptance of the coup may have served to put other NLL politicians 'on notice'. This is consistent with the coercive logic of compulsory power. At the same time, the actions of the OAS, so central historically to US institutional power in the region, were ineffectual; it was unable to return Zelaya to power.[476] Ultimately, the episode strengthened efforts to build alternative mechanisms of regional cooperation that excluded the United States. Although the resolution of the Honduran crisis augmented US compulsory power in a number of ways, then, it damaged the US's institutional power in Latin America, as discussed further in Chapter 4.

Conclusion

Compulsory power represents a logical starting point for an analysis of US hegemonic reconstitution in Latin America. The post-Cold War hegemony of the US in the region, as outlined in the previous chapter, sprang from earlier waves of imperialism and interventionism. In effect, the command capabilities of the US—evident in its significant military advantages—undergirded the asymmetries of the Washington Consensus era, even if the ideational facets of such a consensus were never wholly reducible to the coercive reach of the hemispheric hegemon. From the standpoint of traditional (read rationalist) IR theory, the logic at work here is fairly intuitive. That said, even this most 'traditional' form of power is bound-up with the other forms of power in the international relations of the Americas. The interpenetrating character of the different forms of power will become more pronounced as the thesis progresses. For now, and as hinted at in the preceding analysis, we can see that compulsory power is deployed within broader political contexts (which it helps to shape). If used 'smartly', in the discourse of the Obama administration, compulsory power can allow a hegemon to gain leverage over subordinates, or realise an outcome at odds with the interests/motives of others, without resorting to actual force. But the directness of this interaction, as well as the implicit conflict between actors, suggests coercion all the same.

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[474] Alexander Main and Daniel McCurdy, 'The US Double Standard on Elections in Latin America and the Caribbean', *North American Congress on Latin America*, 22 December 2011: https://nacla.org/news/2011/12/22/us-double-standard-elections-latin-america-and-caribbean%20.

[475] Eva Golinger, 'Honduras: A Victory for "Smart Power"', Global Research, 3 November 2009: http://www.globalresearch.ca/honduras-a-victory-for-smart-power/.

[476] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 10SANTODOMINGO35, 'Zelaya and Fernandez Arrive in DR', 29 January 2010.

As the most direct, state-to-state form of power in international politics, compulsory power would seem to rest mainly on the material (and, in particular, military) resources of hegemonic states. This chapter examined US military strategy toward Latin America in the age of the New Latin Left. Amidst broader continuities in the goals of its foreign policy, Washington has shifted tack while attempting to protect and, where possible, augment its military access and manoeuvrability in the region. This was seen in the reconstitution of the US Navy's Fourth Fleet; in the changes to Southcom's basing posture; and in the consolidation of the post-coup government in Honduras. In the wake of the Bush administration's War on Terror (and the much-longer War on Drugs), the Obama administration has (re-)focused on the overall image of the US military via its 'smart power' framework. As illustrated in Pentagon documents and Southcom's official discourse, and in the continued search for partners and military bases, the rise of the NLL did not lead to strategic retrenchment by the US; on the contrary, the US remained committed to its 'hard power' capabilities in Latin America, repositioning its military resources to adjust to new hemispheric realities. This had complex implications for inter-American relations. For starters, the reconstitution of US compulsory power adversely impacted its institutional power. As explored in the following chapter, Latin American countries moved away from the OAS to address important security issues. Changes to the institutional makeup of inter-American relations impacted the structural power of the US as it sought to shore-up the Post-Washington Consensus trade regime, the subject of Chapter 5. And, as hinted at above, Washington's shifting strategy was related to the threat of 'radical populism', the meaning of which was closely connected to US productive power, as analysed in Chapter 6. I do not want to suggest that this was a linear process. As we will see, these forms of power overlap, and they must be examined together. If compulsory power represents an intuitive analytical starting-point, it is but one component of a more expansive hegemony.

Chapter 4

Institutional Power: The Organization of American States and Regional Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere

Like compulsory power, institutional power involves the interactions of fully-constituted actors. However, institutional power operates in a more indirect fashion. Barnett and Duvall define it as 'actors' control over socially distant others'.[477] Institutional power is 'in effect when... states design international institutions in ways that work to their long-term advantage and to the disadvantage of others'.[478] The Organization of American States (OAS), created in 1948 and based in Washington, has long served as the Western hemisphere's leading inter-governmental body. It continues to facilitate diplomatic cooperation amongst the countries of North, Central and South America and the Caribbean on a range of issues. The US was instrumental in the formation of the OAS, and it has long been seen as a 'tool' of US hegemony. In the 2000s, however, the organisation was also transformed into a site of heightened geopolitical competition. Washington's influence within the institution was challenged by the reformist and counter-hegemonic currents of the New Latin Left (NLL). At the same time, new international forums and initiatives appeared on the scene, undermining the OAS's status as the centre of international cooperation in the Western hemisphere.

This chapter analyses Washington's efforts to reconstitute its institutional power in Latin America. After providing background on the relationship between the US and the OAS, I examine the impact of the NLL on the inter-American system. This includes a section detailing Latin America's 'new regionalism', as expressed in three forums: ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC.[479] Created in 2004, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (*Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América*, ALBA) is an economic and trade bloc led by Venezuela. It coordinates the policies of the region's anti-neoliberal governments.[480] The Union of South American Nations (*Unión de Naciones Suramericanas*, UNASUR), like ALBA, has achieved a degree of institutionalisation, including through its South American Defense Council, which brings together military officials from 12 South American states. The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (*Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños*, CELAC), created in 2010 out of the pre-existing Rio Group, was envisioned by some as a potential replacement for the OAS.[481] Collectively, these new regional arrangements undermined the OAS's importance to the institutional landscape. Thus, this chapter analyses US efforts to shore-up the status of the OAS in relation to wider processes of hegemonic reconstitution, including reform of the OAS itself.

If compulsory power is fundamentally about force, institutional power is about the rules, norms, procedures and mechanisms internal to institutions that work—prism-like—to

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[477] For their explication of institutional power, see Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, editors, *Power in Global Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005a), pp. 15-17; and, 'Power in International Politics', *International Organization*, Vol. 59 No. 1 (2005b), pp. 51-52.

[478] Barnett and Duvall (2005a), p. 3.

[479] To an extent, this 'new regionalism' is also expressed in an expanded Mercosur, as discussed in Chapter 5. Unlike ALBA, UNASUR or CELAC, however, Mercosur, often defined as a customs union, is largely an economic arrangement. Moreover, it was created in 1991, well-before the emergence of the NLL.

[480] ALBA has stimulated a great deal of analysis, much of it focused on its direct challenge to US hegemony and its anti-neoliberal character. ALBA was founded as an alternative to the US-led Free Trade Area of the Americas. Its project of economic integration is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 5.

[481] See for example, Ximena de la Barra and R. A. Dello Buono, 'From ALBA to CELAC: Toward "Another Integration?"' *NACLA Report on the Americas*, Vol. 45 No. 2 (2012), pp. 32-36.

refract the interests and actions of members. In other words, states work *through* institutions, which are sites of both cooperative and competitive behaviour. Barnett and Duvall write that international organisations (IOs) reflect 'frozen configurations of privilege and bias'.[482] Institutions *mediate* between states, but in ways that tend to benefit the architects. Importantly, this conceptualisation of institutional power differs from those that emphasise the agency of international organisations. Although IOs do have *some* autonomy from the resource-holding actors that birth them, in most cases they remain bound to their state benefactors. This is certainly true of the OAS, which has been funded mainly by the United States over the course of its history. As stated by Alberto Lleras Camargo, the first Secretary General of the OAS, the body is 'what the member governments want it to be and nothing else'.[483] The logic of institutional power is such that states use institutions to *guide*, *steer* or *constrain* the (non-)actions of other states. Andrew Hurrell writes that institutional mechanisms privilege hegemonic architects through things like agenda-setting, self-insulation and self-restraint.[484] Institutions can thus serve to legitimate hegemonies.

Whether or not IOs function merely as 'tools' of dominant states, hegemons can use a rules-based system to pursue discrete foreign policy objectives. This instrumentalist side of institutional power coexists with the logic of interdependence that is implicit in institutional arrangements, as states converge to bind themselves to one another through a formal agreement of some sort. Often, states employ institutions to foster cooperation or enhance coordination—to realise outcomes that benefit their collective well-being. But this process is always uneven, if only because those states with greater material and normative resources have a disproportionate ability to define the rules, norms, procedures and mechanisms at the heart of institutional action. They also have more 'weight' in defining collective goals. Even under conditions of formalised cooperation between states, there are 'winners' and 'losers'.[485] As analysed in this chapter, although the US may be 'winning' in the OAS less than it used to, the organisation remains central to its broader efforts to reconstitute its hegemony in the Americas. The following section provides background on the OAS and US policy.

The Organization of American States (OAS) and US Foreign Policy

That the OAS could present challenges to Washington is a novel idea. It was the purported fear of Communist encroachment in the hemisphere that provided much of the impetus for the organisation's formation. During the Cold War, with the region often dominated by rightist governments backed by the US, the OAS generally acted as a 'rubber stamp' for the actions and priorities of its most powerful member. The unanimous expulsion of the Cuban government in 1962 epitomised its subservience to Washington's geopolitical interests. For decades, the OAS seemed an almost perfect reflection of US dominance, with few notable exceptions.

The OAS of the early 21st Century appeared altogether different. The political environment surrounding the OAS had shifted, impacting the operation of the institution. In a 2012 report, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) examined the various changes confronting the OAS and the US position therein, stating:

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[482] Barnett and Duvall (2005a), p. 16.
[483] Quoted in Congressional Research Service, 'Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress', 31 July 2012, p. 27.
[484] Andrew Hurrell, 'Power, institutions, and the production of inequality', in Barnett and Duvall (2005a).
[485] Barnett and Duvall (2005a), p. 17.

> Since the organization's foundation, the United States has sought to utilize the OAS to advance critical economic, political, and security objectives in the Western Hemisphere. Although OAS actions frequently reflected US policy during the 20th Century, this has changed to a certain extent over the past decade as Latin American and Caribbean governments have adopted more independent foreign policies. While the organization's goals and day-to-day activities are still generally consistent with US policy toward the region, the United States' ability to advance its policy initiatives within the OAS has declined.[486]

The report went on to highlight the differences between the US and the OAS over a host of issues. This included US efforts to strengthen the Inter-American Democratic Charter to counteract efforts by some states to 'roll back liberal democracy', in the words of CRS.[487] In summarising the debates over the OAS in the US Congress, the report revealed a strain of thinking that viewed the OAS not as an anachronistic obstacle to hemispheric consensus, but as an institution that was actively undermining Washington's interests and objectives. The 'anti-OAS' camp grew more strident following the Republican victory in the 2010 midterm elections, which saw prominent conservatives take control of several committees in the US House of Representatives.

In actuality, the OAS has remained at the core of the US's institutional power in Latin America. As traced through the diplomatic and policy documents of the Bush administration, the Obama administration and the US Congress, and part and parcel of its broader efforts at hegemonic reconstitution, the US has attempted to reassert greater control over the OAS while protecting its status as the principal site of international cooperation in the hemisphere. Notwithstanding the various threats against OAS funding from Congress, the US has continued to utilise the body to promote polyarchic democracy in Latin America (through its election monitoring missions and human rights bodies); to address security issues (in a manner that reflects the US's geopolitical concerns); and to stem the tide of 'Chávez-style populism' in the region. Before delving into the analysis, the following paragraphs provide important historical background.

Background: The US and the Construction of the OAS

Created out of the aegis of the Pan-American Union following World War II, the OAS is the centrepiece of the inter-American system that was formalised by the 1947 Rio Treaty. The OAS Charter, signed in 1948, pledged to 'strengthen the peace and security of the continent' and 'promote and consolidate representative democracy' in the region.[488] The new organisation was headquartered in Washington, just blocks from the White House. It was designed to replace and/or subordinate all pre-existing regional interstate institutions, some of which dated to the 1880s,[489] thus allowing the OAS to bill itself as 'the world's oldest regional organization'.[490] Founded by the United States and 20 Latin American countries, it was expanded to include Canada and the Commonwealth countries of the Caribbean. As of 2013, 'the OAS brings together all 35 independent states of the Americas and constitutes the main political, juridical, and social governmental forum in the Hemisphere. In addition, it has granted permanent observer status to 67 states, as well as to the European Union (EU)'. The

[486] Congressional Research Service, 'Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress', 31 July 2012, p. ii.
[487] Ibid., p. 2.
[488] Organization of American States, The Charter of the Organization of American States: http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-41_Charter_of_the_Organization_of_American_States.htm.
[489] G. Pope Atkins, *Latin American and the Caribbean in the International System: Fourth Edition* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999) pp. 212-213.
[490] Organization of American States, 'Who We Are': http://www.oas.org/en/about/who_we_are.asp.

OAS's mission is concentrated in four key areas: democracy, human rights, security and development.[491]

Speaking at the UN in 1964, Ernesto 'Che' Guevara famously derided the OAS as the US's 'Ministry of Colonies'. In an address to the General Assembly, Guevara protested the use of the OAS to justify coordinated acts of aggression against Cuba, including the economic blockade of the country.[492] The OAS had expelled the country in 1962, proclaiming Marxism-Leninism to be 'incompatible with the principles and objectives of the inter-American system'.[493] The irony that Latin America was bloated with US-backed dictatorships was not lost on Guevara, who used his UN speech to call for the liberation of the region 'from the colonial yoke of the United States'.[494] Cuba's expulsion from the OAS led the vast majority of its member states to cut diplomatic ties with the country, isolating the island from trading partners and hastening its alliance with the Soviet Union. As Latin America descended deeper into the Cold War morass, Cuban officials routinely lambasted the OAS as a 'puppet' of the US, a charge levied against the institution more recently by Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez.[495] Even Cuba's recent rapprochement with the regional body (discussed below) could do little to temper Fidel Castro's disdain for the organisation. In a 2009 newspaper column, the former Cuban president called the OAS 'vile', arguing that it had produced '60 years of betrayal of the people of Latin America'.[496]

The statements by Guevara, Castro and Chávez may be hyperbolic, but the basic characterisation of the OAS as a facilitator of US hegemony is well-founded. The notion that the establishment and operation of the OAS reflected the US's geopolitical dominance of the region is firmly entrenched in the academic literature on the history of US-Latin American relations.[497] This is true despite the fact that the OAS always enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy from its most powerful patron. On occasion, the OAS mediated against US interests. For instance, the OAS sided with Argentina during its 1982 conflict with Great Britain over the status of the Falklands/Malvinas islands.[498] In the Nicaraguan conflict of the late 1970s, the US was unable to win agreement for a US-led 'peacekeeping force', widely

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[491] Ibid. Its work in the area of development pales in comparison to that of its sister organisation, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), also based in Washington.

[492] Che Guevara Internet Archive, 'Colonialism is Doomed', speech delivered before the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 11, 1964: http://www.marxists.org/archive/guevara/1964/12/11-alt.htm.

[493] OAS Official Records, 'Eighth Meeting of Consultations of Ministers of Foreign Affairs', January 1962, p. 14: http://www.oas.org/columbus/docs/OEASerCII.8Eng.pdf . The OAS had passed previous resolutions. against the influence of communism in the Americas. In Caracas in April 1954, for example, the OAS adopted a resolution barring international communism from the hemisphere. It was passed largely to provide a semblance of legitimacy to the US's invasion of Guatemala, under the dubious pretext that the reformist Arbenz government represented a beachhead for Soviet influence. See for example, Abraham F. Lowenthal, *Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), p. 27.

[494] Che Guevara Internet Archive, 'Colonialism is Doomed', speech delivered before the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 11, 1964: http://www.marxists.org/archive/guevara/1964/12/11-alt.htm.

[495] BBC, 'Colombia takes Venezuela rebel accusation to OAS', 18 July 2010: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-10674859.

[496] Reuters, 'Castro says Cuba doesn't want to rejoin "vile" OAS', 15 April 2009: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/04/15/us-cuba-castro-oas-sb-idUKTRE53E07K20090415.

[497] Lowenthal wrote that the creation of the Inter-American System and the OAS 'institutionaliz(ed) US dominance' in the hemisphere. Abraham F. Lowenthal, *Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), p. 27. See also, Harold Molineau, *U.S. Policy Toward Latin America: From Regionalism to Globalism* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), p. 28.

[498] The vote was 17-0 in favour of Argentina, with the US and several other countries abstaining.

seen as an attempt to pre-empt the Sandinista revolution.[499] A unified Latin American contingent also rebuffed the US in 1960, when the organisation condemned the dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo, an ally of the US, following a conflict with Venezuela in which Trujillo's forces violated Venezuelan sovereignty. The OAS even implemented sanctions against the Dominican Republic despite Washington's opposition.[500]

In 1965, however, when the US invaded the Dominican Republic to prevent the potential emergence of a Castroist government there, it was able to secure the backing of the OAS, even though the military occupation was in blatant violation of the Charter's principles of non-invention.[501] Additionally, in cases in which the US was unable to obtain the approval or acquiescence of the OAS, the organisation was virtually powerless to prevent or protest Washington's imperial behaviour. That the US sought but was denied a clear OAS mandate for its 1954 overthrow of the Árbenz government in Guatemala was evidence of this. Tellingly, Árbenz, a reformer whom the US accused of communism, wanted to move the multilateral discussion of US interference in Guatemala to the UN Security Council. Washington insisted that the dispute be handled in the OAS, where it held more sway.[502] From the 1950s through the 1980s, the OAS's security agenda was overwhelmed by the fear of communist encroachment in the Americas, a concern that united Washington and its regional allies. Once Cuba was expunged from the OAS, the US used the organisation to expand multilateral sanctions against the country in the mid-1960s.

If, as Shaw writes, there has been an 'ebb and flow of US dominance' in the OAS,[503] the Cold War represented the apex. This dominance was not owed entirely to the structure of the inter-American system. Historically, Washington's influence within the organisation had more to do with broader geopolitical trends than it did with the make-up of the institution itself. For instance, the consensus mechanism that sits at the core of OAS decision making can be a hindrance to US influence within the organisation as much as an enabler. Moreover, the principle of non-intervention enshrined in the OAS Charter was included at the behest of Latin American states wary of their more powerful northern neighbour. All OAS members are granted 'equal' status under its rules and procedures. Although the US was certainly the major force behind its formation, and although the US provided the bulk of the OAS's funding over the years,[504] it never fully *possessed* the institution. This is perfectly consistent with the logic of institutional power. The OAS functions to *guide* and *constrain* the actions of member states, but not in equal measure.

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[499] Carolyn M. Shaw, *Cooperation, Conflict, and Consensus in the Organization of American States* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 121-129.
[500] Ibid., pp. 116-121.
[501] Ibid., pp. 103-111. The Johnson administration used a liberal interpretation of OAS resolutions to argue that it was acting in accordance with the OAS's position on the Dominican Republic. Overall, Atkins notes, the US departed from the non-intervention principle (of the OAS Charter) on at least eight separate occasions, according to a minimal definition of intervention. These were: Argentina (145-46); Guatemala (1954); Cuba (1961); the Dominican Republic (1965); Chile (1970-73); Grenada (1983); Nicaragua (1984); and Panama (1989). G. Pope Atkins, *Latin American and the Caribbean in the International System: Fourth Edition* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999) p. 227.
[502] Shaw (2004), pp. 78-80.
[503] Ibid., pp. 95-132.
[504] Shaw (2004) writes that, although US hegemony within the OAS is far from absolute, the US is given a decided advantage within the OAS's institutional decision making processes because of its financial resources and contributions to the organisation; pp. 30, 37.

The OAS and US Foreign Policy Objectives in Latin America

In accordance with the rise of the NLL, the OAS was increasingly perceived as weakened by geopolitical divisions and/or neglect. As stated by the Council on Foreign Relations, 'while the organization has been recognized for its value in providing information and serving as a forum for high-level discussion, it has also come under fire for the weakness of its political power, ineffectiveness in decision-making, and inconsistency in applying its democratic principles to states'. Additionally, 'ideological polarization and mistrust of the OAS have prompted doubts over its relevance in the region, spurring the creation of alternative platforms for regional integration'.[505] The sense was that the US had 'lost control' of the organisation; that it had been captured by those elements who wished to directly challenge US hegemony or, at the very least, de-link themselves from US power.

And yet, the OAS, as the most important venue for multilateral cooperation in the Western hemisphere, remained critically important to US foreign policy. As stated by the United States Permanent Mission to the OAS (abbreviated in diplomatic jargon as 'USOAS'), the US is 'committed to strengthening and working with the organization'. The support of the State Department and the USOAS 'reflects the US Government's determination to make optimal use of multilateral diplomacy to resolve regional problems and to engage its neighbors on topics of hemispheric concern'.[506] This includes: regional agenda-setting through the Summits of the Americas; promoting representative democracy; addressing security concerns; and protecting human rights. This expansive agenda hints at the ways in which US institutional power overlaps other forms of US power in the Americas, from security issues (closely tied to compulsory power) to economic issues (structural power, detailed in Chapter 5). Insofar as the OAS was utilised to dampen down 'populism' in the region, US institutional power is bound-up with its productive power. As examined below, OAS mechanisms have been pivotal in Washington's efforts to reinforce polyarchic governance in the Americas.

Setting the Regional Agenda: The Summit of the Americas: The OAS organises the Summits of the Americas, 'institutionalized gatherings of the heads of state and government of the Western Hemisphere where leaders discuss common policy issues, affirm shared values and commit to concerted actions at the national and regional level to address continuing and new challenges faced in the Americas'.[507] During the first Summit in Miami in 1994, the US laid out its plans for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), a major focus of subsequent gatherings. The Fourth Summit of the Americas, however, held in Mar del Plata, Argentina in 2005, was widely seen a public relations disaster for the US. It featured massive demonstrations against the Bush administration, and was held alongside a counter-summit in which Chávez, Morales and others proclaimed the 'death' of the FTAA. President Obama used the Fifth Summit of the Americas (in Trinidad and Tobago) to deliver a speech calling for a 'new era of partnership' in US-Latin American relations. Meanwhile,

[505] Council on Foreign Relations, 'The Organization of American States', http://www.cfr.org/americas/organization-american-states/p27945.
[506] The United States Permanent Mission to the Organization of American States, 'About Us': http://www.usoas.usmission.gov/about-us.html.
[507] The Organization of American States, Summits of the Americas Secretariat: http://www.summit-americas.org/default_en.htm.

the Sixth Summit, held in Colombia in 2012, failed to yield a final statement of consensus, leading to speculation as to the future of the agenda-setting process.[508]

Democracy Promotion: The United States regards democracy promotion as a core objective of the OAS. In September 2001, member states adopted the Inter-American Democratic Charter. Washington viewed it as an important step in strengthening the OAS's role in advancing representative democracy in the region, including through electoral observation missions.[509] As summarised by the United States Permanent Mission, the Democratic Charter 'defines the essential elements of representative democracy in very specific terms'. This includes: 'free and fair elections; a pluralistic system of political parties and organizations; separation of powers; independence of the branches of government; freedom of expression and of the press; and constitutional subordination of all state institutions to the legally constituted civilian authority'. The USOAS strongly supports the organisation's observation missions 'as guardians of free and fair elections'. They are also a means of fostering 'adherence to clear, universal, guidelines'.[510] In the era of the NLL, the US has valued the OAS's ability to 'oversee' elections, while, at times, questioning the organisation's capacity to challenge electoral processes that Washington views as problematic. As analysed below, this is about protecting liberal democracy from 'populism', which the US likens to authoritarianism. Thus, the institutional power of the OAS is intertwined with the productive power of US diplomacy, which, as discussed in Chapter 6, delegitimises anti-neoliberal governments as undemocratic.

Security: The Secretariat for Multidimensional Security, created in 2005, promotes cooperation between OAS member states, inter-American and international organisations, and entities such as the United Nations and its subsidiaries, to 'analyze, prevent, confront and respond to security threats'. It is composed of three principal directorates: the Department of Public Security; the Executive Secretariat of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission; and the Executive Secretariat of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism.[511] With a strong focus on crime, drug trafficking and terrorism, the OAS's security agenda has largely reflected US concerns. The organization adopted the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism in 2002, 'a powerful indication of (the) region's resolve to fight terrorism in all its forms' (one that greatly coincided with US objectives in the GWOT).[512] The focus on security issues within the OAS was heightened as a result of the 2003 'Declaration on Security in the Americas', which dealt with 'new' and 'non-traditional' threats, including terrorism.[513] However, the OAS's leadership on regional security issues has been challenged by the formation of new forums for intra-Latin American cooperation.

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[508] Amongst renewed disagreements about the status of Cuba, media coverage of the Sixth Summit of the Americas noted that the US appeared increasingly 'isolated' in the region. See for example, Brian Ellsworth, 'Despite Obama charm, Americas summit boosts U.S. isolation', *Reuters*, 16 April 2012: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/17/us-americas-summit-obama-idUSBRE83F0UD20120417; See also, Jackie Calmes and William Neuman, 'Americas Meeting Ends with Discord over Cuba', *The New York Times*, 6 April 2012, p. A6.

[509] The Organization of American States, 'The Inter-American Democratic Charter', September 2001.

[510] The United States Permanent Mission to the Organization of American States, 'Democracy Promotion & Human Rights': http://www.usoas.usmission.gov/democracy.html.

[511] The Organization of American States, Secretariat for Multidimensional Security: http://www.oas.org/en/sms/sms_secretaria.asp.

[512] United States Permanent Mission to the Organization of American States, 'Fostering Hemispheric Security and Protecting the Democratic State': http://www.usoas.usmission.gov/hemispheric-security.html (accessed 21 October 2012).

[513] The Organization of American States, 'Declaration on Security in the Americas', 28 October 2003: http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/DeclaracionSecurity_102803.asp.

The Hemispheric Human Rights Regime: As instilled in the OAS Charter, the organisation is committed to the protection of human rights, including 'the rights to free speech, to political participation, to a free and transparent system of justice, and others'.[514] The organisation's human rights regime consists of two bodies: the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Both are autonomous in the broader structure of the OAS. The legal status of the inter-American human rights system is based on the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man[515] and the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights,[516] the latter of which places greater emphasis on economic, social and cultural rights. (Washington signed the American Convention on Human Rights in 1977, but never ratified it.) Although USOAS does name 'development' as one of its goals, the OAS's focus on human rights has reflected the prioritisation of so-called 'first generation' civil and political rights. In this vein, the US opposed recent efforts to create a Social Charter (which emphasises social and economic rights) within the OAS.

A 'Left-Turn' in the Inter-American System? The OAS and the NLL

Like all inter-governmental organisations, the OAS is a contested space as well as an instrument of international cooperation. This sentiment was expressed in a report on OAS reform by the Washington-based Inter-American Dialogue, which noted: 'The US government views the OAS as a mechanism for building alliances with Latin American nations, gaining support on critical issues, and exerting leadership in hemispheric affairs'. Meanwhile, the report read, 'Latin Americans see the organization, in part, as a means to moderate and contain Washington's power and influence in the region'.[517] As the region moved to the left in the 2000s, the left turn spilled over into the internal politics of the OAS. The election of José Miguel Insulza as the ninth Secretary General of the OAS signalled the beginning of a new era in the organisation's history.

Insulza's Election as Secretary General

In May of 2005, Insulza defeated two competitors to fill the post of Secretary General, which was vacated when the previous OAS chief, Miguel Ángel Rodríguez, resigned over a corruption controversy stemming from his tenure as president of Costa Rica. Insulza, who served in the Chilean government of Salvador Allende in the early 1970s, was the preferred candidate of the region's left-leaning governments (including both the 'moderates' and 'radicals'). A Socialist, his election was one of the first signs that the political shifts in Latin America would bear directly on the OAS. He assumed the reins of the secretariat from Acting Secretary General Luigi Einaudi, a career diplomat in the US State Department.[518] In the early rounds of voting Insulza came in ahead of Francisco Flores Pérez, a former president of El Salvador and the US's favourite for the position. Washington subsequently shifted its

[514] The Organization of American States, 'Human Rights': http://www.oas.org/en/topics/human_rights.asp.
[515] The Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 'American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man', 1948: http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic2.American%20Declaration.htm.
[516] The Organization of American States, Department of International Law, 'American Convention on Human Rights: Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica', B-32.
[517] The Inter-American Dialogue Task Force on the Organization of American States, 'Responding to the Hemisphere's Challenges', June 2006, p. 6.
[518] Organization of American States, 'Chilean Interior Minister Jose Miguel Insulza Elected Secretary General of the OAS', 2 May 2005: http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-091/05. Insulza's official biography can be found at: http://www.oas.org/en/about/secretary_general.asp.

support to another candidate, Luis Ernesto Derbez, Mexico's foreign minister, who was likewise unable to garner enough votes to defeat Insulza. The US engineered Derbez's withdrawal from the race to break an incipient diplomatic stalemate (several countries had remained undeclared in their support, and elections are traditionally by consensus). It was the first time in the OAS's history that a candidate initially opposed by the US was elected to lead the organization.[519]

Insulza's victory over two US-backed candidates marked a major diplomatic defeat for Washington.[520] Publically, the Bush administration downplayed its significance. Privately, however, the administration's concerns were palpable. The US had spent considerable diplomatic energy in an attempt to influence the vote. Leaked cables reveal that the State Department had counted on the backing of Caribbean and Central American nations to ensure a victory for Flores.[521] Speaking with Undersecretary of State Douglas Feith days after Insulza's election, Colombian President Uribe agreed that it was a setback for the US and Colombian governments, stating: 'We can put the best face on it, but no amount of make-up can disguise that it was a defeat'. Chávez's ability to marshal support for Insulza was particularly worrisome given Venezuela's status as a 'threat to regional stability and to US and Colombian interests', according to Feith.[522]

Washington would eventually warm to Insulza's leadership,[523] partly because his Socialist credentials enhanced the credibility of the OAS as an 'independent' instrument of regional cooperation. As an affiliate of South America's 'moderate' left, Insulza occupied the middle ground between the 'radical' governments of the Andean region and the United States and its allies. But many US officials maintained that, over the course of his tenure, Insulza's unwillingness to criticise 'populist' governments showed his true sympathies. Despite several acerbic diplomatic exchanges with Chávez, Insulza remained cordial with the Venezuelan delegation. His office maintained a positive rapport with other leaders from the ALBA bloc, such as Morales and Correa. For policymakers in the US, this trend reinforced the 'weakness' of the OAS as an institution.

Insulza's first row with Chávez occurred in 2007, when the Venezuelan government revoked the broadcast licence of RCTV (*Radio Caracas Televisión Internacional*), a television station partial to the anti-Chávez opposition. The OAS strongly condemned the move against RCTV through its Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chávez lashed out at the Secretary General in response, calling for his resignation. The episode was monitored by the State Department, which saw the decision as part of a 'systematic and authoritarian effort to cow media critical of the government into submission'.[524] The US embassy in Caracas dubbed the controversy a 'battle royale' that pitted the OAS against the

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[519] Larry Rohter, 'OAS to Pick Chile Socialist US Opposed as its Leader', *New York Times*, 30 April 2005. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CE6DF1E31F933A05757C0A9639C8B63.

[520] Congressional Research Service, 'Organization of American States: A Primer', 11 May 2005.

[521] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05TEGUCIGALPA697, 'OAS SYG: GOH Believes Derbez and Insulza have Solid CARICOM Support, but USG Can Still Sway Outcome', 31 March 2005.

[522] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05BOGOTA4360: 'Under Secretary Feith Meets with President Uribe', 10 May 2005.

[523] The Congressional Research Service, for example, described Insulza's priorities of strengthening democratic governance, enhancing the human rights system, balancing democracy-building with integral development efforts, and tackling the public security crisis associated with organised crime as 'relatively consistent with the Obama Administration's policy toward the region', (2012), pp. 7-8.

[524] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07CARACAS15, 'The Gloves are Off: Chavez says he will close RCTV', 4 January 2007.

Chávez government. It called attention to Chávez's personal attacks on Insulza, which stemmed from the Secretary General's statement that there would be 'political repercussions' over the station's closure.[525] Similar spats occurred in 2010 and 2011 over human rights issues, leading Chávez to denounce OAS 'interference' in Venezuela.[526]

For the Bush administration, the flap over RCTV was a rare occurrence of the OAS's willingness to criticise the Chávez government. In general, the administration continued to view the OAS as 'soft' on Chávez and his 'populist' allies. Speaking with Canadian representatives, for example, Hector Morales, US Permanent Representative to the OAS, stated that both Insulza and the OAS itself were 'unbalanced', and that they did not fairly represent North American constituencies. One cable 'highlighted the importance the US placed on improving OAS efficiency and effectiveness, citing the need to prioritise its work and to review its more than 800 mandates, with a medium-to-long term view of pruning some of them'. Ambassador Morales also warned against OAS efforts to include Cuba in the Summit of the Americas process, while stating that newly-created sub-regional organisations should complement the OAS and IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), rather than compete with them. Meanwhile, his Canadian counterpart lamented that the OAS '"tiptoed" around key issues—such as democracy in Venezuela'.[527]

Insulza was re-elected by acclamation to serve a second five-year term in March of 2010. In light of the Obama administration's avowed 'tensions' with Insulza over Cuba, Honduras and other issues, the State Department had hinted in 2009 at 'vetoing' his re-election (by blocking a consensus vote in his favour).[528] However, Secretary Clinton later offered nominal support for his bid, a shift that came as Insulza was drawing heightened criticism from Republican lawmakers and elements of the US press.[529] *The Washington Post*, for example, published an editorial calling on Obama to replace Insulza, whom it criticised as 'unabashedly cater(ing) to the region's left-wing leaders', which, according to the editorial, 'frequently meant ignoring the democratic charter'. In addition to codling 'authoritarian leaders' in Venezuela and Nicaragua, the piece denounced Insulza 'for the lifting of Cuba's ban from the OAS, even though there has been no liberalization of the Castro dictatorship'.[530] With the NLL now firmly represented in the halls of the OAS, it was the disputed status of Cuba, the old-left stalwart, which signalled a change of direction in the institution's agenda.

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[525] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07CARACAS53, 'To the Mat: Chavez Takes on Insulza and Church over RCTV', 9 January 2007.

[526] In 2010, the OAS published a human rights report critical of constraints on protest and free expression in Venezuela. See Juan Forero, 'Organization of American States report rebukes Venezuela on human rights', *The Washington Post*, 25 February 2010: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/24/AR2010022401884.html. In 2011, Insulza criticised an enabling law that gave Chávez the power to rule by decree as 'completely contrary' to the Inter-American Democratic Charter. *BBC*, 'Chavez condemns OAS "interference" in Venezuela', 10 January 2011: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12147834.

[527] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08OTTAWA1028, 'Exchanging Views on the OAS and the Summit of the Americas with Canada', 1 August 2008.

[528] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09SANTIAGO672, 'Chile Media Report', 16-17 July 2009.

[529] With Insulza already securing enough votes to win re-election, Secretary of State Clinton sent a letter to Insulza expressing US support in March 2010 (thus obviating the need for a roll call vote). *Merco Press*, 'Hillary Clinton announces US Support for Insulza's OAS re-election', 23 March 2010: http://en.mercopress.com/2010/03/23/hillary-clinton-announces-us-support-for-insulza-s-oas-re-election.

[530] *The Washington Post*, 'Mr. Obama should press for change at the OAS', 10 February 2010, p. A16. *The Washington Post's* editorial board staked out a relatively 'hard line' approach to the NLL, particularly given the fact that the newspaper is viewed as being to the left of centre in US public opinion.

Cuba Readmitted to the OAS on Conditional Basis

As noted above, the decades-long exclusion of Cuba from the OAS served as an enduring reminder of the organisation's subservience to Washington. In the 2000s, the status of Cuba re-emerged as a 'hot-button' issue within the organisation, one that pitted Washington against the overwhelming majority of the body's membership. The NLL governments transformed the debate over Cuba into one of the signature topics of the OAS-sponsored Summits of the Americas. Disagreements over the status of Cuba came to dominate the agenda of the General Assembly, crowding-out other issues. With new regional institutions in the making (e.g. ALBA, CELAC), Cuba's exclusion seemed to symbolise the OAS's ossification. It reminded Latin Americans that the institution had frozen in time the privileges and biases of the US's Cold War security agenda, and that it remained above all a manifestation of *US* (institutional) power.

On June 3, 2009 the Cuba issue was (temporarily) resolved in favour of the country's provisional re-admittance to the OAS. During its third plenary session, the General Assembly passed a resolution nullifying the 1962 act that excluded Cuba from participation in the organisation. However, this did not finalise Cuba's rapprochement. At the urging of the US, additional language was included in the resolution, which stated: 'The participation of the Republic of Cuba in the OAS will be the result of a process of dialogue initiated at the request of the Government of Cuba, and in accordance with the practices, purposes, and principles of the OAS'.[531] Secretary of State Clinton was integral in helping to secure the consensus resolution, which, as noted by the US ambassador to the OAS, allowed 'Cuba to reintegrate into the OAS *only after* it complie(d) with the practices, purposes and principles of the OAS' (which were left unspecified).[532] The Obama administration viewed the consensus resolution as a victory for its diplomacy and an important achievement for the OAS.[533] Conservatives in the US Congress viewed it as a capitulation to the Castro regime.

The 2009 resolution highlighted the impact of the shifting geopolitical environment on the inter-American system, even if Cuba's reinsertion into the OAS was far from settled. Washington was constantly playing defence on the issue, particularly in the context of the dialogue in Latin America to expand to the Rio Group into what would become CELAC, which includes Cuba but excludes the US and Canada.[534] Cuba's isolation had become something of an embarrassment for the US. Documents show that US officials were aware that Latin American delegations opposed Cuba's continued exclusion, with some representatives calling the policy 'anachronistic', 'callus', 'unjust', and 'violent'.[535] During the 2009 General Assembly meetings, for example, 'every speaker except for Canada and the United States voiced their enthusiasm for real hemispheric dialogue and cooperation, which many claimed had been jeopardized by the 1962 resolution' barring Cuba.[536] The effort that Washington put into preventing the (Raul) Castro government's re-integration into the OAS

[531] Organization of American States General Assembly, Thirty-Ninth Regular Session, Proceedings, Volume 1, 'Resolution on Cuba', June 2009, p. 12.
[532] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09STATE61676, 'OAS General Assembly: U.S. Diplomacy Prevails on Cuba', 15 June 2009. Emphasis added.
[533] Ibid.
[534] Alternative efforts to reintegrate Cuba into the inter-American system (including through the Rio Group) were referenced explicitly by Latin American diplomats in their conversations with US officials at the OAS General Assembly in 2009. See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09STATE64971, '2009 OAS General Assembly Wrap-up Report', 23 June 2009.
[535] Ibid.
[536] Ibid.

system illustrated the degree to which the US valued the institutional power provided it by the OAS.[537] Moreover, that the Obama administration was able to pre-empt Cuba's unconditional reinsertion into the body demonstrates the degree of US influence *within* the institution, even at a time when its traditional leadership of the body was being challenged through a new configuration of elected governments in Latin America.

As the US and Latin American states jousted over Cuba's isolation from the inter-American system, it remained unclear whether the Cuban government was interested in re-joining the OAS under Washington's compromise. The US's 'success' on this issue was attributable to the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which gave the US Permanent Mission the leverage to tie Cuba's eventual readmission to the OAS to a form of political liberalisation that Washington would recognise as democratic. Ultimately, the US could expect to make little headway on 'reforming the OAS' with the Cuba issue festering. The island's status remained unsettled even after the 2009 declaration. Similar controversies emerged in regards to Venezuela, Cuba's close ally. Working through various OAS channels, the State Department routinely used the institution to push its case that the Chávez government was not committed to the Democratic Charter,[538] with limited success. As addressed below, Chávez's domestic politics and regional influence became major focal points of USOAS activity during the consolidation of the NLL in the mid- to late-2000s. Venezuela championed alternatives to the OAS, but it would not do so alone.

Latin America's New Regionalism: A Challenge to the OAS Security Agenda?

Just as Washington's influence within the OAS was challenged by the rise of the NLL, the US's institutional power in the hemisphere was also undermined by the emergence of new forums, initiatives and organisations that were constructed without US input and that largely excluded US participation. While the OAS remained the preeminent institution of hemispheric cooperation, its centrality was diluted by the creation and utilisation of alternate forums, fashioned precisely because the OAS was dominated by the US.[539] This dynamic was particularly acute in the realm of security cooperation and conflict resolution.[540] The various forms of power in international politics are entwined. As alluded to in Chapter 3,

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[537] Cuba remains an important domestic political issue in the United States. The Cuban-American community has traditionally favoured a 'hard line' approach to the Castro government. The influential Cuban-American lobby remains a potent force both in Congress and in Florida, an important 'swing state' in US presidential elections. The presence of the lobby has undoubtedly made it more difficult for the executive to 'soften' Washington's approach to Cuba. This is seen in the decades-old embargo against the island. But US policy toward Cuba was never driven exclusively by domestic political concerns. There was a geopolitical logic in 'punishing' the Cuban revolution for its example of independence from the US. For a historical analysis of this dynamic, see Lars Schoultz, *That Infernal Little Cuban Republic: The United States and the Cuban Revolution* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009).

[538] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07STATE154674, 'Demarche on Democracy in Venezuela', 9 November 2007.

[539] This point is widely acknowledged in mainstream analysis of US-Latin American relations. See for example, Abraham F. Lowenthal, 'Obama and the Americas', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89 No. 4 (2010), pp. 110-124.

[540] Following 9/11, the US used to OAS to advance its security agenda in the region. However, since the early 2000s, the US security agenda has diverged from that of Latin America, which came to focus more on criminal violence than international terrorism. As noted by the Inter-American Dialogue in 2006, 'the great majority of Latin American countries (including Mexico) are deeply critical of the U.S. international security strategy and how Washington is pursuing it'. This contributed to OAS security instruments becoming 'outmoded'. The Inter-American Dialogue Task Force on the Organization of American States, 'Responding to the Hemisphere's Challenges', June 2006, pp. 17-19. Traditionally, the OAS was seen as ineffectual on security issues partly because of the difficulties in coming to consensus regarding the meaning of 'security' itself. Needless to say, this continued during the 2000s.

Washington's efforts to reconstitute US compulsory power negatively impacted US institutional power in the region.

The South American Defense Council

As discussed previously, recent efforts by the US to 'harden' its military posture vis-à-vis Latin America hastened on-going efforts in South America to formulate a collective defense council. Part of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the South American Defense Council (*Consejo de Defensa Suramericano*, or CSD) was formally inaugurated in 2009 in the context of the heightened militarisation of US policy towards the region.[541] Although Brazil was the driving force behind the CSD, the Chilean government of Michele Bachelet also provided key leadership. And although Brazil 'sold' the new forum to the US as a means of countering the Chávez government, the project came to fruition through support from the Bolivarian bloc, as well as Colombia, a more reluctant participant. As written by COHA, 'a driving force behind the group's formation was a concern with developing a uniquely South American approach in the face of an unattractive US vision based on its impunity for regional affairs'.[542]

The South American Defense Council is not a military alliance, but a forum for military cooperation that includes all 12 of the UNASUR countries of South America. It creates space to address, among other things, the lingering tensions in the Andean sub-region following the crisis of 2008 (see below). As enumerated in the Santiago Declaration, its founding document, the CSD's core objectives are to: consolidate South America as a zone of peace through democratic stability and development; construct a South American defence identity for regional unity; and generate consensus for regional cooperation in matters of defence. The document also laid out an action plan detailing four specific areas of cooperation: firstly, in defence policy, the creation of a network to share information; secondly, in military cooperation, the strengthening of joint capacity to address humanitarian crises; thirdly, in industry, the promotion of bilateral and multilateral initiatives for technological cooperation; and fourthly, in education and training, the creation of academic centres for intellectual exchange in the field of defence studies.[543]

On the whole, the State Department was surprisingly receptive to the CSD. Some cables noted that the US 'welcomed' the formation of the organisation, to work alongside existing multilateral bodies.[544] Paradoxically, since it excluded the US, Brazil's leadership on the issue appeared to offer Washington a means of developing closer military ties with Brasilia. Once the CSD became operational, Washington did express concerns that it could facilitate 'anti-Americanism' (in regards to the US-Colombia base agreement, for

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[541] On the importance of US militarisation to the formation of SADC, see Jorge Battaglino, 'Defence in a Post-Hegemonic Regional Agenda: The Case of the South American Defence Council', in *The Rise of Post-Hegemonic Regionalism: The United Nations Series on Regionalism*, Vol. 4 (2012), pp. 81-100.

[542] Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 'The Paradox of South American Integration: The Founding of a Defense Council', 12 March 2009: http://www.coha.org/the-paradox-of-south-american-integration-the-founding-of-a-defense-council/.

[543] The South American Defense Council, the Union of South American Nations, 'Declaración de Santiago de Chile', March 2009, available at: www.unasurcds.org.

[544] Washington developed a positive stance on SADC in part because it saw the potential for the organisation to eventually assume peacekeeping duties in Latin America. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08BRASILIA429, 'Thoughts on the Visit of the Defense Minister Jobim to Washington', 31 March 2008. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09SANTIAGO254, 'Brazil, Chile Led Effort to Create New UNASUR Defense Council', 17 March 2009.

example).[545] And despite some hints at a US-CSD dialogue,[546] Brazilian officials were clear that, in the words of Nelson Jobim, Brazil's Defense Minister, 'there is no possibility of (full) participation by the United States because the council is South American'.[547] While outwardly expressing support for the project, then, the State Department was careful to argue that it should not get in the way of 'true' hemispheric cooperation, as represented by the OAS.[548] For their part, US military analysts expressed slightly more unease with the prospect of a South American military forum closed-off to US input.[549] Furthermore, in their internal communications US officials spoke of Brazil's argument that the CSD could help to 'bring Chávez into the mainstream' as 'impractical' given Chávez's support for the project.[550] The momentum behind the defence council gathered pace following Colombia's 2008 military attack on insurgents in neighbouring Ecuador, an event that had profound implications for Latin America's new regionalism.

The Andean Crisis of 2008: A Rio Group Resolution

On March 1, 2008, Colombian military forces crossed into a remote jungle area of neighbouring Ecuador to carry out an operation against a guerrilla encampment of the FARC, Colombia's oldest insurgent group. Colombian forces killed 24 people in the bombing raid, including Luis Edgar Devia (Raúl Reyes), a high-level FARC commander. The episode set-off a diplomatic crisis in the Andean region, which witnessed the governments of Ecuador, Venezuela and Nicaragua terminate diplomatic ties with Colombia. Ecuadoran President Correa staunchly protested the violation of his country's sovereignty. Chávez dispatched troops to the Venezuelan-Colombian border in support of Correa. President Uribe accused both Chávez and Correa of supporting the FARC, claiming that computer files uncovered in the raid proved that the leftist leaders had financial ties to the insurgent group.[551] According to one US military analyst, it was 'the worst crisis in Inter-American diplomacy' in a decade.[552] War between Colombia and its neighbours seemed a distinct possibility.

Just days later, however, the crisis was resolved, and largely outside of OAS channels. On March 7, the heads of state of the Rio Group met in the Dominican Republic for its

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[545] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09QUITO703, 'Ecuador's UNASUR Agenda: An Anti-American Tone?' 7 August 2009.

[546] Just the Facts, 'What is the South American Defense Council?' 9 June 2010: http://justf.org/blog/2010/06/09/what-south-american-defense-council.

[547] James Suggett, 'Venezuela and Brazil Advance on South American Defense Council', Venezuelanalysis.com, 15 April 2008: http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/3361.

[548] US Department of State, 'Secretary of State Rice: Remarks with Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim', 13 March 2008: http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/03/102228.htm.

[549] See for example, Craig A. Deare, 'Time to Improve U.S. Defense Structure for the Western Hemisphere', *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Vol. 53 No. 2 (2009), pp. 35-36; John A. Cope and Frank O. Mora, 'Hemispheric Security: A New Approach', *Current History*, Vol. 108 No. 715 (2009), p. 68. As a reflection of this unease, the Pentagon sent Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen to Mexico, Chile, Peru, Colombia and Brazil in the week leading up to SADC's creation at the Santiago summit. US Department of Defense, 'Latin American Engagement Requires New Thinking, Says Mullen', 4 March 2009: http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=53323.

[550] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08BRASILIA236, 'Ambassador's Meeting with Minister of Defense Jobim', 20 February 2008.

[551] Juan Forero, 'Latin American Crisis Resolved: Colombia Apologizes at Regional Summit', *The Washington Post*, 8 March 2008, p. A09.

[552] Gabriel Marcella, 'War without Borders: The Colombia-Ecuador Crisis of 2008', US Strategic Studies Institute, December 2008, p. v.

annual summit.[553] The gathering provided an opportunity for the leaders of the region to address the conflict over Colombia's incursion into Ecuadoran territory, as well as the various claims and counterclaims made by Correa, Chávez and Uribe. The proceedings were televised live throughout much of Latin America, and they concluded with the dramatic image of the three presidents shaking hands and embracing. The heads of state of the Rio Group issued a declaration that collectively 'denounce(d) (the) violation of the territorial integrity of Ecuador' while noting, 'with satisfaction, the full apology' offered by President Uribe. The declaration reiterated states' 'respect for sovereignty, abstention from the threat or use of force, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states', while also committing signees to 'counter threats to the security of all states... from the action of irregular groups'.[554] The agreement ignored the allegations that Chávez and Correa had links with the FARC, but, by the end of the summit, all parties to the conflict had re-established full diplomatic and commercial ties.

The United States firmly backed Colombia throughout the crisis. The Bush administration unambiguously supported Colombia's 'right to self-defense' over Ecuador's claims to sovereignty and non-intervention.[555] Correa and Chávez argued that the US had attempted to use the controversy to undermine their respective governments (by linking them to the FARC, officially a terrorist group under US law). In this context, the Bush administration encouraged Colombia and Ecuador to take the incident to the OAS, which convened its permanent council on March 4. The following day, the OAS issued a declaration reaffirming the principles of territorial integrity and non-intervention (but without textually condemning the raid).[556] These actions failed to defuse the tensions. As noted above, it took the Rio Group summit (fortuitously scheduled well in advance of the March 1 attack) to ultimately bring about a resolution. Because Washington was a sponsor of Colombia's counter-insurgency policies, and because the US has traditionally dominated the OAS, it is unlikely that OAS actions alone would have successfully quelled the hostilities.[557] That said, the Rio Group declaration did reference Articles 19 and 21 of the OAS charter (which established non-interventionism as a principle of the inter-American system).[558]

In the weeks following the raid, the US pushed for an OAS resolution that balanced national sovereignty against the need for states to 'take collective action against international

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[553] The Rio Group, not to be confused with the Rio treaty, was created in 1986. Its membership was eventually extended to include 24 Latin American and Caribbean countries. It did not develop a secretariat, and, considering its wide membership, remained a relatively minor player within Western hemispheric affairs. In contrast to CELAC, which grew out of the Rio Group forum, the latter advocated the strengthening of the OAS. See G. Pope Atkins, *Latin American and the Caribbean in the International System: Fourth Edition* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999) pp. 195-196.

[554] Rio Group, 'Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the Rio Group on the recent events between Ecuador and Colombia', 7 March 2008.

[555] Marcella, 'War without Borders' (December 2008), p. 8.

[556] US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 'Playing with Fire: Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela', 28 April 2008, Appendix I, 'Resolution of the March 2008 Meeting of the Organization of American States', 5 March 2008.

[557] According to leaked embassy documents, US officials expressed dismay that Correa did not view the OAS actions as sufficient in resolving the crisis: 'Correa made it clear that, while he appreciated the OAS decision that Ecuador's territory had been violated, he would not be content until Colombia had received an "international condemnation" for breaching Ecuadorian sovereignty and added that Ecuador would "exhaust every diplomatic means" to see the aggressor condemned'. US officials were also concerned that Correa and Chávez would attempt to shift the blame for the attack onto the United States, Colombia's ally. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08CARACAS325, 'Chavez and Correa', 7 March 2008.

[558] Rio Group, 'Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the Rio Group on the recent events between Ecuador and Colombia', 7 March 2008.

terrorism', in the words of the Heritage Foundation, a right-wing think tank. On March 17, the OAS passed a resolution that largely mirrored its earlier statement on the crisis. 'The US joined the consensus that passed the OAS resolution but caveated its vote by inserting a clear reference to the obligation of states not to support international terrorism'.[559] Washington's language here was a condemnation of Chávez and Correa as much as it was a defence of its Colombian client. A US Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on the crisis made reference to the potentiality of Venezuela as a 'state sponsor of terrorism', a designation that carries the automatic implementation of targeted economic sanctions.[560] The report recommended the development of various regional security and border-protection plans to prevent the recurrence of crisis. These were to be developed (exclusively) through the OAS. As an added benefit, these plans would help constrain Venezuela, and in a manner that would avoid overt intervention by the US. The report concluded:

> It is better for the United States' long term interests in the region to be seen as respectful of the on-going process established in the OAS, which up to now has been beneficial in defusing tensions. On this occasion, rather than "speaking softly and carrying a big stick" the better posture for the USG to assume is one of speaking with gentle persuasion, and wise counsel, and letting those "sticks" that may need to be wielded be ones of a multi-lateral rather than a unilateral nature... This does not mean that support for terrorism is accepted, or that US interests should be made vulnerable to the timetable or whims of the collective will of Latin nations.[561]

Its response to the Andean crisis of 2008 did much to dilute the accepted centrality of the OAS to security cooperation in the Americas. It is instructive that, in the wake of the attack, Correa proposed the creation of an OAS without the US,[562] presaging the efforts to transform the Rio Group into CELAC in 2010. Nicolás Maduro, then Venezuela's foreign minister, argued that the episode revealed the OAS's 'historic limitations'. He called for 'more clarity and precision' in regional organisations.[563] Meanwhile, the State Department saw the crisis as detrimental to the institutional status quo. Secretary of State Rice wrote that 'the easing of tensions stemming from the Rio Group Summit in Santo Domingo came as a surprise to OAS delegations and generated uncertainty as to the OAS role'.[564] It was the actions of the Rio Group that put pressure on the OAS to again take-up the Colombia-Ecuador dispute after its initial declaration failed to end the hostilities.[565] Through Canadian interlocutors, US officials understood that, for Latin American heads of state, the absence of the US and Canada from the Rio Group meetings made them 'more open and frank than OAS meetings'.[566]

Nevertheless, the US continued to press for an OAS resolution on the matter, mainly as a means of bolstering Colombia's counter-insurgency policy. The US used the discussion

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[559] Ray Walser, 'The Crisis in the Andes: Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela', The Heritage Foundation, 2 May 2008, p. 6.
[560] US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 'Playing with Fire: Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela', 28 April 2008, p. 10-11. Venezuela was not added to the US list of state sponsors of terrorism.
[561] Ibid., p. 12.
[562] Marcella, 'War without Borders' (December 2008), p. 21.
[563] Quoted in Kiraz Janicke, 'OAS Rejects Colombia's Military Incursion into Ecuador', Venezuelanalysis.com: 19 March 2008: http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/3284.
[564] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08STATE25971, 'Colombia-Ecuador Dispute: OAS Resolution 930', 12 March 2008.
[565] Ibid.
[566] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08SANTODOMINGO373, 'FM Morales and OAS Rep on Rio Group, OAS Ministerial, HR Report', 13 March 2008.

to lean on some countries to publically 'soften' their criticisms of Colombia's actions.[567] Working through the OAS, US representatives pressured Colombia to take a tougher stance in defence of its own security policies, noting that Washington 'did not agree that Colombia's actions constituted a violation of international law'.[568] Although the US did not block the adoption (by consensus) of an OAS resolution criticising Colombia's incursion, it attached a proviso to the agreement that defended the right to self-defence as established in the OAS charter.[569] By relying on the institution to protect Uribe's counter-insurgency policy, the Bush administration was able to, in Secretary Rice's words, score a 'clear win' for the US and Colombia in the OAS General Assembly.[570]

The episode demonstrated that, while the OAS remained relevant, its centrality in the institutional space had been undermined. US institutional power had been diluted, and with direct bearing on its other forms of power in the international relations of the Americas. Outside of the OAS framework, Washington had less capacity to impact regional mediation. The Rio Group cum CELAC excluded US participation, as did the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR, which also excluded Canada, Mexico and the Central American and Caribbean countries on geographic grounds). UNASUR was brand-new when, in 2008, the governments of South America used the forum to address an emerging conflict in Bolivia, one that threatened to destabilise the government of Evo Morales.

Political Violence in Bolivia: UNASUR Takes Charge

On September 11, 2008, at least 19 Bolivian peasants were massacred in the department of Pando, with dozens more injured and hundreds forced to flee the area. The incident, which became known as 'the Pando massacre', was one of the most violent episodes in a low-intensity conflict between supporters and opponents of the MAS (Movement toward Socialism) government of Evo Morales, Bolivia's leftist president. The dynamics of the conflict overlaid the traditional geographic divisions in Bolivia between the poorer highland—Morales's support base comprised of an indigenous peasant majority—and the wealthier, lowland departments, which had long controlled Bolivia's lucrative natural gas industry. Amidst MAS's efforts to rewrite the Bolivian constitution, the lowlands departments (called the *media luna*, or half-moon, because of their crescent-like shape in the eastern part of the country) had pushed for increased autonomy from the central government. This was designed in part to maintain elite control over the region's natural resources. (On May 1, 2006, Morales nationalised Bolivia's natural gas fields.) As stated by Human Rights Watch, 'the violence (was) rooted in an on-going dispute between President Morales and prefects from five of Bolivia's departments over the allocation of authority and control of

[567] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08STATE25971, 'Colombia-Ecuador Dispute: OAS Resolution 930', 12 March 2008.

[568] Ibid. Secretary of State Rice added: 'USOAS expressed concern to the Colombian delegation about Colombia's apparent acceptance that it had violated international law and urged Colombia to consider alternative language and/or cite OAS articles and other international instruments permitting action taken in self defense'.

[569] Organization of American States, 'Resolution of the Twenty-Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs', 17 March 2008. This material stated: 'The United States supports this resolution's effort to build confidence between Colombia and Ecuador to address the underlying crisis. The United States is not prepared to agree with the conclusion in operative paragraph 4 in that it is highly fact-specific and fails to take account of other provisions of the OAS and United Nations Charters; in any event, neither this resolution nor CP/RES.930 (1632/08) affects the right of self-defense under Article 22 of the OAS Charter and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter', footnote p. 1.

[570] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08STATE64684, '38th OAS General Assembly: Colombia Scores a Win', 16 June 2008.

natural resources'.[571] Clashes were not limited to Pando, but occurred across the *media luna* departments. According to the Bolivian government and human rights groups, the instigators of the violence were often vigilante groups opposed to the MAS administration.[572] The massacre 'took place in the context of a demonstration by *campesinos* [peasant farmers] who were concerned about possible backtracking in land distribution and the management of other natural resources'.[573]

The Pando massacre came at a fragile time for Morales. He had strengthened his governing position through the results of a 2008 recall referendum, in which he won a greater share of the vote than in his initial election in 2005 (he increased his support from 53 per cent to 67 per cent nationally). Yet he was under duress from the country's well-financed opposition, and the small-scale clashes between his supporters and the separatist elements of the country's elite threatened to erupt into a wider conflagration. Additionally, the opposition had the backing of the United States, which regarded Morales as a radical populist hostile to US interests. La Paz accused the Bush administration of attempting to organise a 'civic coup' against Morales, leading to the ejection of the US ambassador from the country. Embassy documents show that staff met routinely with members of the opposition, leading some analysts to speculate that Washington was orchestrating an extra-legal attempt to remove the democratically-elected Morales from power.[574]

In the days after the massacre, president Michelle Bachelet of Chile called an emergency meeting of UNASUR, a multilateral group comprising the 12 nations of the region, which was formalised in May 2008 (to function alongside existing regional groups such as Mercosur and the Andean Community of Nations). Bachelet was pro tempore president of UNASUR at the time. The resulting 'Declaration of La Moneda', singed by the heads of state of all UNASUR countries, proclaimed the group's full support for the constitutional government of Evo Morales. The leaders 'energetically rejected' all civic coups and any attempts at the 'rupture of the institutional order that could compromise the territorial integrity of Bolivia'. UNASUR also created a commission to investigate the Pando killings.[575]

In the months following the Moneda declaration, Bolivia's political opposition fractured, with some elements returning to dialogue with the Morales government over the new constitution. The dialogue was actively supported by UNASUR, leading to a period of relative calm in the country. UNASUR's management of the conflict, and its support for Morales's democratic mandate, may have prevented the civic coup that La Paz insisted was in the making. 'Morales's ability to reverse an escalating wave of violence and remain in power was in no small measure due to the international intervention performed by

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[571] Human Rights Watch, 'Bolivia: Investigate Killings in Pando', 17 September 2008: http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/09/16/bolivia-investigate-killings-pando.

[572] Ibid. See also, Washington Office on Latin America, 'WOLA, Dismayed at Bolivian Violence, Calls for Reconciliation', 12 September 2008: http://www.wola.org/news/wola_dismayed_at_bolivian_violence_calls_for_reconciliation.

[573] Amnesty International, Press Release, 'Bolivia: Victims of the Pando massacre still await justice', 9 September 2009: http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/bolivia-victims-pando-massacre-still-await-justice-20090909.

[574] Roger Burbach, 'The United States: Orchestrating a Civic Coup in Bolivia', Transnational Institute, 18 November 2008: http://www.tni.org/archives/burbach_boloviacoup.

[575] Michelle Bachelet, Presidencia Pro-Tempore de UNASUR, S.E. Presidenta de La República de Chile, 'Informe de la Comisión de UNASUR sobre los Sucesos de Pando: hacia un alba de justicia para Bolivia'. November 2008.

UNSASUR', wrote one researcher. 'The intervention was therefore a turning point not only for Bolivia but for the region as a whole'.[576]

The United States, meanwhile, condemned the Morales government while remaining silent on the issue of opposition violence.[577] Following the expulsion of the US ambassador, and without referencing the UNASUR declaration, the Bush administration announced in September 2008 that it was suspending the Andean Trade Preference Act for Bolivia, ostensibly because, as stated by President Bush, the country had 'failed to cooperate with the United States on important efforts to fight drug trafficking'. The move was detrimental to Bolivia's textiles industry, and was criticised by Bolivian officials as 'discriminatory and political'.[578] The Obama administration doubled-down on the 'decertification' of Bolivia's drug control efforts in September 2009.[579]

There were definite similarities between the resolution of the conflict in Bolivia and that between Ecuador and Colombia. From Washington's vantage, the ability of South America to manage its own conflicts (including through the regional leadership of Brazil in forums like UNSAUR and CELAC) was partially beneficial to US objectives in the region. At the same time, the formation of these bodies chipped away at the centrality of the OAS in hemispheric mediation.[580] Congressional researchers noted that, although the capacities of these organisations remained limited, they 'contribute(d) to the region's increasing independence'. This was true despite the fact that the newer groups lacked some of the formal mechanisms possessed by the OAS.[581] In the analysis of one Bolivian military officer, it was the 'overbearing relationship' of the US within the OAS that provided the impetus for the creation of UNASUR in the first place; its value as a forum for South American cooperation lay in the fact that it excluded US participation,[582] disabling Washington's ability to play 'spoiler' on issues like the conflict in Bolivia. The US had less capacity to steer mediational

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[576] Juliana Bertazzo, 'A Watershed in South American International Relations', *IDEAS Today*, 4 July 2011. See also, Raúl Zibechi, 'UNASUR Puts Out its First Fire in Bolivia: Brazil Makes the Difference', Center for International Policy, 5 December 2008: http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/1584.

[577] Center for International Policy, 'The Bolivian Crisis, the OAS, and UNASUR', 30 September 2008: http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/1526. Cables released by Wikileaks show that the US embassy was closely monitoring the situation in Pando, including through both government and opposition interlocutors. In the US interpretation of events, MAS exploited the violence as a means of projecting its power into opposition strongholds in the 'media luna'. This account was contradicted by the Bolivian government, NGOs and other outside observers, such as UNASUR. See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08LAPAZ2178, 'Pando Massacre Disputed; Hints of Prefect's Release', 8 October 2008; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08LAPAZ2374, 'Bolivia: Big Trouble in Little Pando', 5 November 2008.

[578] Joshua Partlow, 'U.S. Trade Move Shakes Bolivia', *The Washington Post*, 19 October 2008: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/18/AR2008101801883.html.

[579] Washington Office on Latin America, Andean Information Network, 'US Decertification of Bolivia: A Blast from the Past', 17 September 2009: http://www.wola.org/news/us_decertification_of_bolivia_a_blast_from_the_past.

[580] In 2007, following violence between MAS supporters and anti-government separatists in the department of Sucre, the opposition called for an OAS investigation into the clashes, which had resulted in three deaths and hundreds of injuries. The US and Canadian governments encouraged the Bolivian opposition in this endeavour, though all parties were aware that the Bolivian government was resistant to OAS intervention. Opposition leaders hoped to work through the OAS as a means of gaining international legitimacy for their cause, while also developing closer links with the US State Department. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07LAPAZ3092, 'Bolivia: Sucre, Without Any Police, on the Edge', 26 November 2007; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07LAPAZ3151, 'Evo's Approval Drops; Expect New Initiatives', 30 November 2007.

[581] US Congressional Research Service, 'Brazil-US Relations', 5 March 2010, p. 8.

[582] Omar Cordero, Lieutenant Colonel, Bolivian Army, 'UNASUR and its Future Impact on the Americas', US Army War College, 2009, p. 4.

processes toward outcomes that were consistent with its broader efforts at hegemonic reconstitution.

In the case of the Pando massacre, US officials were openly displeased with UNASUR's vindication of the Bolivian government's position. Embassy documents repeatedly place scare-quotes around the word 'massacre', indicating that, for the US, 'both sides' were to blame for the violent confrontation (in contrast to the prevailing opinion of outside observers). Officials saw Morales's use of the UNASUR intervention as a means of criticising the US for its support of the opposition. Cables noted that Morales found it 'encouraging that "South American countries could solve their own problems", a nod to on-going Morales complaints about undue US influence in the OAS and UN'. The US embassy also questioned the impartiality of the UNASUR report. Members of Bolivia's opposition lobbied the US embassy for 'other international institutions to do a separate report'. Ultimately, US officials concluded that 'UNASUR's first foray into member state investigation (was) a supreme disappointment, favoring an Evo lovefest fuelled by political interests instead of honestly trying to deconstruct a complicated violent conflict'.[583] US officials also expressed concerns that the OAS was effectively side-lined as a result of UNASUR's handling of the crisis, a trend that represented an 'ideological' challenge to the US. As the US embassy in Chile quoted one of its contacts: 'the successful UNASUR summit marked the decline of the OAS, an organization with a US apellido, or last name'.[584]

Promoting Polyarchy: The Continued Relevance of the OAS to Washington's Agenda

During the Cold War, security issues dominated Washington's interests in the inter-American system. In the post-Cold War era, greater emphasis was placed on democracy promotion, culminating in the signing of the Inter-American Democratic Charter in 2001. As argued by William Robinson, however, and as discussed in Chapter 2, the US agenda of democracy promotion is best conceptualised as the promotion of polyarchy—elite-led representative democracy amenable to processes of socio-economic neoliberalisation.[585] This remained the case during the backlash against the Washington Consensus, which saw anti-neoliberal forces make inroads across the region. It was evident in Washington's efforts to protect the status quo in the OAS's human rights regime, which included opposition to the OAS Social Charter, as discussed in this section. The polyarchic underpinnings of the US's OAS agenda were also on display during the organisation's debate over 'decentralisation'. USOAS successfully steered the Inter-American Network on Decentralization toward a 2005 declaration that defined democracy based on representativeness, the rule of law and constitutionalism, as opposed to more 'participatory' or decentralised models, which it linked to Chavismo.[586]

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[583] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08LAPAZ2543, 'UNASUR Endorses Evo's Version of Pando "Massacre"', 5 December 2008.

[584] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08SANTIAGO853, 'Chileans Generally Upbeat on UNASUR Outcome', 18 September 2008. See also, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08SANTIAGO852, 'UNASUR's Road Ahead after Emergency Bolivia Summit; Kirchner Likely UNASUR Leader', 17 September 2008. According to a Bolivian defense attaché who met with US officials around the time of the 2008 crisis, the OAS was unlikely to have the capacity to resolve the conflict between pro and anti-Morales forces: Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08ASUNCION661, 'Bolivian DATT Concerned about Regional Politics', 22 September 2008.

[585] William I. Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[586] According to one cable, the final 'Declaration of Recife' of the Inter-American Network on Decentralization contained a number of references that advanced the views of the US government, whereas 'counter-productive "Chavista" rhetoric was rejected'. The document reads: 'With co-sponsorship from Canada, Mexico, Colombia,

As the NLL was consolidated in the mid- to late-2000s, the US continued to view the OAS as playing an important (but diminished) role in maintaining the integrity of (neo)liberal democracy. Through its election monitoring programmes and human rights bodies, the OAS problematized the reputedly 'authoritarian' tendencies that Washington viewed as part and parcel of the statist populism of Chávez, Morales, Correa and others. Generally speaking, when electoral outcomes went the way of Washington's favoured candidate, the OAS's election oversight was deemed 'useful'. In cases in which 'populist' politicians won, however, the organisation's monitoring of the elections was often seen as ineffectual, rendering the organisation 'weak' on democracy. This amplified calls from US officials to strengthen the Inter-American Democratic Charter, as discussed in the final section of this chapter.

OAS Election Monitoring: For the US, Both a Weakness and a Strength

On its website, USOAS highlighted some of the problems it sees with the OAS election observation regime, which it described as 'a key element in OAS efforts to strengthen democracy in the Hemisphere'. The missions 'are not infallible and pose significant challenges for the OAS and its credibility in ensuring the transparency of the (democratic) process'. Specifically, the key challenges the OAS faced on this front included: 'the integrity of voter information, corrupt registries, the politicization of electoral authorities, threats to media, civil society, and democratic institutions in some countries, and weak political parties'. In Washington's view, it was important that the OAS enhance its longstanding reputation for impartiality and technical competence in electoral oversight through 'evolving, strident standards'.[587] Although the OAS does not observe all elections in Latin America, its efforts in this area have been reasonably thorough.[588]

Regarding Venezuela, US officials developed a somewhat schizophrenic position on the OAS's election monitoring practices. On one hand, US officials clearly valued the oversight provided by OAS-sponsored observers.[589] On the other hand, and more prominently, the US criticised these efforts as being weak or inadequate, with the implication that this weakness benefited Chávez's Bolivarian movement. There was the sense that the OAS did not commit sufficient resources to guarantee effective election observations missions in Venezuela.[590] Embassy cables around the time of the 2006 election (which saw Chávez win 63 per cent of the vote) show American officials supportive of OAS challenges to 'violations of campaign regulations' (specifically those regulations prohibiting the use of

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and Nicaragua, the US inserted several applicable passages from the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC) that support US concepts of representative democracy, democracy essential to economic development, civil society, and rule of law'. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05RECIFE147, 'OAS Ministerial Concludes with Declaration of Recife on Decentralization', 3 November 2005.

[587] The United States Permanent Mission to the Organization of American States, 'Democracy Promotion & Human Rights': http://www.usoas.usmission.gov/democracy.html. To this end, the US was integral in getting the OAS to endorse the 'Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers', completed via the United Nations in 2005. The document can be found at: http://www.ndi.org/files/1923_declaration_102705_0.pdf.

[588] An electoral observation mission must be invited by the host country. A list of OAS election observation missions through 2010 can be found at: http://oas.org/sap/espanol/txt_cooperacion_publicaciones_misiones.html.

[589] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06CARACAS3518, 'Corrected Copy: State of Venezuelan Electoral Observation Efforts', 1 December 2006.

[590] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06CARACAS3571, 'Venezuelan Elections Wrap Up: Observers Endorse Results', 8 December 2006.

government funds and employees to indirectly campaign for pro-government candidates). However, US officials were deeply sceptical of the OAS's capacity to combat the supposed bias of the country's National Electoral Council.[591] One US embassy cable concluded that the lack of OAS criticism of Venezuela's electoral council 'suggests the OAS is more concerned about sparking (Chávez's) ire than providing a fully accurate and useful report' (on the 2006 vote). It continued: 'The OAS' feeble performance in this instance must be factored into a decision on whether to support future OAS observation missions in Venezuela'.[592] Finally, the US was also critical of what it called 'the Venezuelan intervention issue'. Officials decried the OAS for not addressing Venezuela's alleged attempt to influence election outcomes in Peru, Mexico and Nicaragua in 2006.[593]

This contradictory position extended to the OAS's oversight of elections involving other 'populist' governments/candidates, particularly in the Andean region. In Peru, the US viewed the OAS as playing an important role in the 2006 election, which saw Ollanta Humala, the 'pro-Chávez candidate', defeated by Alan García. At the same time, however, US officials described the OAS observers as 'ineffectual'.[594] In Ecuador, the US supported the OAS's oversight of the 2006 election with the understanding that the organisation's monitors would preserve the credibility of the results should Correa lose and then claim fraud.[595] In this context, the US's self-defined 'role in supporting the election process (was) indirect, accomplished through support to the OAS and civil society electoral watchdog groups'.[596] In the 2009 elections in Bolivia, the US embassy in La Paz accused the governing MAS coalition of 'cheating' in the vote over a constitutional referendum in order to achieve a landslide victory. The opposition denounced the OAS to the US embassy after the OAS provided a clean bill of health to the constitutional process. Even before the election, US officials speculated that there was 'likely' to be 'some amount of fraud in a referendum the MAS seems likely to win legitimately anyway'.[597] Similarly, following Correa's 2006 victory in Ecuador, cables show that, as was the case in Bolivia, the US assumed that Ecuadorian authorities were either unwilling or unable to enforce campaign laws during the elections to draft a new constitution. This uncertainty gave 'increased importance' to OAS efforts to oversee the vote.[598] A comparable situation emerged in Nicaragua, where the US robustly supported OAS observation missions to discourage what was viewed as the likelihood that Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega would manipulate events in his favour.[599]

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[591] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06CARACAS3598, 'Venezuelan Elections: Issues for Future International Observers to Watch', 11 December 2006. In this cable, the US embassy stated that Chávez's wide margin of victory in the 2006 contest was due in part to advantages gained through Venezuela's non-compliance with the recommendations of international election observers.

[592] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06CARACAS1231, 'OAS EOM Final Report on Venezuela Elections—Weaker Still', 8 May 2006.

[593] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06LIMA2314, 'OAS Monitoring Documents a Free and Fair Second Round Election, but with Some Need for Fine Tuning', 9 June 2006.

[594] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06LIMA1549, 'Embassy's Assessment of OAS Monitoring of Peruvian Elections', 24 April 2006.

[595] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06QUITO2808, 'Elections: Dead Heat after Correa Surge', 15 November 2006.

[596] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06QUITO2450, 'Elections: Potential for Post-Electoral Conflict', 5 October 2006.

[597] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09LAPAZ96, 'Bolivia's Referendum: Margin of Victory Matters', 23 January 2009. In 2008, US officials called into the question the utility of the OAS monitoring Bolivian elections, stating that 'further OAS participation might only serve to support Evo's quest for legitimacy'. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08LAPAZ1839, 'Evo Takes a Page from Chavez, Rules by Decree and Referenda', 29 August 2008.

[598] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07QUITO1791, 'Ecuador Constituent Assembly Elections: Not Clear if Electoral Tribunal Up to Challenge', 8 August 2007.

[599] See for example: Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06MANAGUA565, 'OAS Mission Leader: Political Stakes Much Higher in November National Election', 13 March 2006; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06MANAGUA2286, 'OAS

The Inter-American Human Rights System: US Defends the Status Quo

In relation to its support for polyarchic democracy, the United States views the promotion of human rights as a critical objective of the OAS. The functioning of the inter-American human rights system grew increasingly contested as new left governments attempted to expand the human rights agenda to include social and economic rights. The Bolivarian governments in particular were suspicious of the OAS human rights bodies, which, on occasion, levelled criticisms against the status of civil and political rights in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua. These tensions came to a head during the 2012 General Assembly meeting, when the ALBA countries called for an overhaul of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and the Inter-American Human Rights Court. They threatened to abandon the OAS system if reforms were not met.[600] Although the reform effort was led by the ALBA bloc, representatives from Brazil, Argentina and Mexico reaffirmed the call to 'modernise' the organisation's human rights bodies.[601] In response, the US, though not a party to OAS human rights bodies, staunchly opposed major changes to the existing system.[602]

On January 25, 2012 the OAS Permanent Council approved the 'Report of the Special Working Group to Reflect on the Workings of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) with a View to Strengthening the Inter-American Human Rights System (IAHRS)'. As summarised by the OAS, the report assesses 'the operation of the Inter-American System and makes recommendations on: its challenges and objectives, precautionary measures, procedural matters, criteria for the development of Chapter IV of the Annual Report of the IACHR,[603] friendly settlements, promotion of human rights, and financial strengthening of the System'. The report identified a number of challenges to reform, including: 'the need to achieve universality of the IAHRS; ensure full compliance with the recommendations and decisions of its organs; achieve a better balance between promotion and protection of all human rights; increase efficiency and expediency in the processing of petitions and cases, and move toward greater transparency in the management of the IACHR'.[604] Although the report itself was relatively opaque on issues of transparency, it unambiguously called for greater universality in the application of its human rights reporting. It also called for greater consideration of 'not only civil and political rights but also economic, social and cultural rights'.[605]

EOM Positive on Nicaraguan Elections Preparations', 17 October 2006; and Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06MANAGUA2518, 'The Tortoise and the Hare—Why Ortega Won the Race', 14 November 2006.

[600] Jim Wyss, 'OAS rights body slammed at annual meeting', *The Miami Herald*, 5 June 2012: http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/06/05/v-print/2834901/oas-rights-body-slammed-at-annual.html.

[601] *Reuters*, 'Thorny human rights reform put off at OAS meeting', 6 June 2012: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/06/06/uk-latam-rights-idUKBRE85505Y20120606.

[602] The US (along with several other countries) does not recognise the jurisdiction of the human rights court or its power to enforce rulings. NGOs such as Human Rights Watch were also critical of any changes to the OAS system that would undermine the protections provided to citizens in countries with weak judiciaries. Ibid.

[603] Chapter IV of the 2011 IACHR report pertained to the human rights situations in Colombia, Cuba, Honduras and Venezuela, countries the IACHR believed warranted special attention.

[604] Organization of American States, press release, 'OAS Permanent Council Approved the Report of the Working Group to Strengthening the Inter-American Human Rights System', 25 January 2012: http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-018/12.

[605] Organization of American States, document GT/SIDH 13/11, 'Report of the Special Working Group to Reflect on the Workings of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with a view to Strengthening the Inter-American Human Rights System for consideration by the Permanent Council', 13 December 2011, p. 14.

From Washington's perspective, the implementation of the report threatened to weaken the OAS human rights system rather than strengthen it. As written by Stephen Johnson, the Director of the Americas Program at CSIS, representatives from Venezuela and Ecuador 'insisted on recommendations opening the door to reducing the transparency and independence of the Commission, as well as burdening it with mandates to monitor new "social" and "economic" rights unrelated to basic freedoms'. Although the push was spearheaded by ALBA governments, Johnson expressed concern that Secretary Insulza and other member states were willing to let the 'authoritarian' minority 'gut a core OAS institution'. Meanwhile, the US and Canada acted to delay further deliberation on the proposed changes to the OAS human rights regime.[606] Indeed, as noted in press reports, the US and Canada were the strongest defenders of the status quo regarding the inter-American human rights regime. However, Washington's position was seemingly hampered by the US's longstanding refusal to ratify the American Convention on Human Rights (also called the Pact of San José), which established the human rights bodies under question.[607] The US deployed a similar diplomatic strategy with respect to the Social Charter, another project aimed at refocusing the OAS's agenda on social and economic rights.

The OAS Social Charter

On June 4, 2012, the OAS General Assembly formally adopted the Social Charter of the Americas. The document, which stemmed from a 2001 Venezuelan initiative (formally taken up by the OAS in 2005), was drafted by a working group of the OAS Permanent Council and the Permanent Executive Committee of the Inter-American Council for Integral Development (CEPCIDI).[608] The project had the strong support of many NLL governments, who sought to use the Social Charter to shift the hemispheric agenda toward issues of development and social and economic justice. The Charter's draftspersons referred to it as a 'humanistic model' of development in opposition to the prevailing 'neo-liberal model'.[609] Although eventually approved by acclamation, the Social Charter drew the ire of the US, which sought to steer the project away from its Chavista/Bolivarian origins. According to Venezuelan officials, the Social Charter was 'seriously opposed by representatives of the US government', who were 'very aggressive' in attempting to 'block' its adoption.[610]

The Social Charter begins by recognising that 'the people of Americas have a legitimate aspiration for social justice and their governments have the responsibility to promote it. Development with equity strengthens and consolidates democracy, in that they are interdependent and mutually reinforcing'. The document places a strong emphasis on so-called 'second generation' human rights. Through the Charter, states pledged themselves 'to promoting and achieving progressively the full realization of the economic, social and cultural rights and principles through policies and programs that we consider most effective

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[606] Stephen Johnson, 'Time to rethink the OAS?' Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 June 2012: https://csis.org/blog/time-rethink-oas.

[607] Jim Wyss, 'OAS rights body slammed at annual meeting', *The Miami Herald*, 5 June 2012: http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/06/05/v-print/2834901/oas-rights-body-slammed-at-annual.html.

[608] The Organization of American States, Press Release, 'OAS Adopts Social Charter of the Americas', 4 June 2012: http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-206/12.

[609] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05LIMA2751, 'Venezuelan Embassy's Seminar on the Social Charter of the Americas', 21 June 2005.

[610] Tamara Pearson, 'Venezuela's Proposed Social Charter Approved by OAS after 11 Years', Venezuelanalysis, 5 June 2012: http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/7036.

and appropriate to our needs, in accordance with our democratic processes and resources'.[611] As of 2012, the Social Charter was still working its way through the OAS system.[612] It is unclear how and to what extent the Charter will be made actionable/operational. In a 2012 letter to the relevant Joint Working Group, the US Permanent Representative to the OAS called for 'realism' in the Social Charter action plan, while pointing to the 'budgetary constraints' confronting the OAS.[613]

During the debate over the Social Charter, the US insisted that its adoption be strictly by consensus.[614] This gave the US a de facto veto over the language of the document and the timing of its eventual adoption. Numerous US embassy cables reference the US's 'displeasure' and/or 'misgivings' over the Venezuelan-led effort to draft the Social Charter, which was described variously as 'ideologically driven', 'unacceptable' and 'harmful'.[615] Although the US eventually offered nominal support to the initiative, US diplomats emphasised the need to 'work constructively with other countries to develop a realistic, non-polemical charter and action plan'.[616] Although leaked documents provide few specifics as to the US's objections to the Social Charter as it was originally conceived, the notion that it was 'unrealistic' was pervasive in US discourse. So too were concerns that efforts to endorse the Social Charter would distract from the other issues on the agenda at the Summits of the Americas. Perhaps more to the point, however, US officials were critical of the Social Charter's socio-economic agenda, which seemed to contradict the 'central point' of the US's message at the 2005 Summit: 'that the key to poverty reduction is private-sector and SME-led (small and medium enterprises) growth, not state sector programs'.[617]

In his comments on the Social Charter in 2005, Ambassador Maisto, US Permanent Representative to the OAS, emphasised that member states should not let the process 'become a "feel-good" flow of words... whose final product is a series of lofty promises that everyone knows will go unfulfilled'. Rather, the Charter should be grounded in representative democracy, the rule of law, free markets and the existing social agenda. Development, Maisto explained, was best left to the Washington-based IFIs.[618] Evidently, the anti-neoliberal character of the Social Charter was the basis of its 'loftiness'. Of particular concern was the

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[611] Organization of American States, Press Release, 'OAS Permanent Council Refers Draft Social Charter of the Americas to the General Assembly of Cochabamba', 16 May 2012: http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-177/12.

[612] Organization of American States, Joint Working Group of the Permanent Council and the Inter-American Council for Integral Development on the Draft Plan of Action of the Social Charter of the Americas: http://www.oas.org/consejo/workgroups/CPCEPCIDIcarta%20social.asp#background.

[613] Amb. Carmen Lomellin, the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the Organization of American States, letter to OAS, 3 October 2012: http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2012/CP29404E.pdf.

[614] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05QUITO2008, 'FM Parra to Caracas Social Charter Event: Not to Resign', 26 August 2005. There were some discussions about the possibility of the OAS abandoning its historical consensus mechanism in its decision-making for the Social Charter issue. The US was opposed to this. See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05LIMA1176, 'Demarche on OAS Social Charter (Peru)', 9 March 2005.

[615] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05OTTAWA537, 'Canada: Response to Demarche on OAS Social Charter', 18 February 2005; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05TEGUCILGALPA1776, 'Honduras Demarched on Chavez Social Charter Event; GOH to be Represented by OAS Permrep', 26 August, 2005; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05OTTAWA2650, 'Canadian Views on Chavez and the Social Charter', 2 September 2005.

[616] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05PANAMA388, 'Panama: Demarche Delivered Seeking Support for US Views in OAS Social Charter', 18 February 2005.

[617] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05LIMA4644, 'Foreign Minister on Summit of the Americas Issues', 28 October 2005.

[618] US Department of State, 'Remarks on Hurricane Katrina and the Social Charter of the Americas: Ambassador John F. Maisto, U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States', 1 September 2005: http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2005/53049.htm.

Joint Working Group's apparent inattentiveness to 'sound economic policies', according to the US Permanent Mission. The re-articulation of the development agenda away from the Washington Consensus defined the Social Charter for US officials, who reiterated that 'economic freedom' was the basis of social development and sustainable growth. In reaffirming the neoliberal programme, USOAS emphasised, inter alia, free trade, foreign investment and the elimination of 'excessive regulations'.[619] Although officials spoke of clearly-defined property rights, economic and social rights were largely absent from the documents submitted by the US in relation to the Social Charter.[620]

Officially, and rhetorically, the strengthening of the OAS human rights regime remained an important objective of US policymakers, one that fuelled broader discussions on reforming the organisation as a whole. This did not mean extending the inter-American human rights system to address those rights based in the economic, social and cultural spheres. As Washington contemplated the reconstitution of its institutional power in Latin America, initiatives like the Social Charter became proof that the OAS would have to be 'pruned' to be reformed. As alluded to throughout this chapter, the wider task of 'strengthening' the OAS was made more pressing because of its newly-created competitors.

Strengthening the OAS amidst Competing Hemispheric Initiatives

In US discourse on Latin America, it was commonplace to hear that the OAS was 'nearing irrelevance'.[621] As the analysis in this chapter makes clear, however, the rise of the NLL made the OAS *more* relevant to US hegemony. As an established institution, the OAS helped the US 'manage' and 'coordinate' its variegated diplomatic response to the region's changing geopolitical realities. Even as the OAS seemed to be escaping Washington's grasp, the US worked through the organisation to pursue its international objectives. This was displayed by Washington's use of OAS channels to lobby against Venezuela's 2006 bid for a seat on the UN Security Council.[622] Additionally, although the 2005 Summit of the Americas in Argentina was an unmitigated public relations disaster for the US, and although recent Summits have ended without formal agreements, Washington has continued to see the Summits as a way of making the agenda-setting process more amicable to US interests. This has meant cultivating a more 'US-friendly' atmosphere at the multilateral gatherings.[623] Washington also attempted to use the OAS to 'exploit Chavez's gaffes' and 'drive a wedge

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[619] Permanent Mission of the United States to the Organization of American States, 'Democracy and Social Development: Principles and Priorities', document presented to the Joint Working Group of the Permanent Council and CEPCIDI on the Draft Social Charter of the Americas, 14 October 2005, pp. 5-6.

[620] With the lone exception of labour rights, articulated without reference to the broader category of 'social, economic and cultural rights'.

[621] See Anthony Depalma, 'Is the OAS Irrelevant?' *Americas Quarterly*, Summer 2011: http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/2756; Jaime Darenblum, 'As Venezuela Crumbles, Will the OAS Respond?' *The Weekly Standard*, 29 March 2010: http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/venezuela-crumbles-will-oas-respond.

[622] Leaked embassy cables demonstrate the degree to which US officials used OAS-related meetings and discussions to advocate against Venezuela's attempt in 2006 to secure a rotating seat on the UN Security Council. Although the US preferred that Guatemala win the seat, Panama eventually emerged as a compromise candidate. The Bush administration viewed keeping Chávez off the UN Security Council as a 'vital' issue of 'great seriousness' to US national security. See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06SANTIAGO1058, 'OAS Perm Rep Maisto Discusses OAS General Assembly with MFA Officials, Civic Society Representatives', 18 May 2006; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06BUENOSAIRES1181, 'OAS Perm Rep Maisto's Discussion in Argentina', 24 May 2006.

[623] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06SANTODOMINGO238, 'Dominicans Organising Pre-OAS-Assembly Presidential Summit; FM on Venezuela; Aleman Investigation', 23 January 2006.

between Chavez and the region'.[624] Venezuela's support for Brazilian-led initiatives like CELAC and UNASUR showed that this strategy was only partially successful.

Assessing Latin America's New Regionalism: OAS Reform in Context

In a 2010 op-ed, Senators John Kerry (Democrat-Massachusetts) and Robert Menendez (Democrat-New Jersey) called for the US to 'make the OAS relevant' again. They wrote that a strong OAS was in the interests of the US and that the 'core of the OAS program should concentrate on efforts to consolidate democracy, monitor elections and improve public security'. The Senators' efforts to 'improve the OAS' (detailed below) were prompted by CELAC, the creation of which set off 'alarms bells' in Washington, according to Kerry and Menendez.[625] Efforts to strengthen and/or reform the OAS were clearly driven by the emergence of the NLL, which coincided with the establishment of new forums. Taken collectively, these bodies challenged the centrality of the OAS to hemispheric cooperation.

Although Latin America's most recent 'wave' of regionalism began during the Bush presidency (with ALBA and its affiliated initiatives), it picked up pace during Obama's first term (with the formation of CELAC and the solidification of UNASUR and its defense council). The OAS was adrift amidst a proliferation of new regional forums. Although the Obama administration was on record as welcoming UNASUR, it was adamant that the OAS remain the 'foremost multilateral organisation in the hemisphere'.[626] Even a cursory reading of internal communications during the Bush and Obama years reveals anxieties over the impact of burgeoning inter-state cooperation outside of the OAS system. This is not to say that Washington viewed these initiatives as *threats*. Rather, in most cases, they were impediments to US objectives. Institutional power, remember, is social control at a distance; states use multilateral bodies to guide the behaviour of others. With the OAS under duress (its monopoly on agenda-setting challenged; its role in conflict resolution diminished), the US lost the ability to realise desirable outcomes through the post-war institutional mechanisms it constructed.

To be sure, the three main regional initiatives that emerged in the 2000s were distinct. They were not given equal weight by the Bush and Obama administrations, or by Congress. In general, ALBA was treated with the greatest suspicion. Launched by Chávez as a means of fostering economic integration amongst Latin America's anti-neoliberal governments, ALBA was seen as the most precarious (and ideological) of the new regional groupings, dependent as it was on Venezuelan oil revenue. Publically, the Bush and Obama administrations downplayed ALBA, partly to deprive Chávez of the rhetorical exchanges that nurtured his anti-imperialist image. However, Washington did express some alarm at the expansion of ALBA,[627] which began exclusively as a Venezuelan-Cuban partnership. As stated in one

[624] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06CARACAS1169, 'Is Chavez Losing It?' 3 May 2006.
[625] Sen. John Kerry and Sen. Robert Menendez, 'Make the OAS Relevant', *The Miami Herald*, 17 March 2010, reprinted at: http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/1380.
[626] See for example, US State Department, Hillary Rodham Clinton, 'Address to the Organization of American States General Assembly', 7 June 2010: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/06/142804.htm. In a similar vein, the Inter-American Dialogue has reiterated the centrality of the OAS to the inter-American system, writing in its 2012 report that the OAS had the 'singular capacity' to tackle critical issues of democracy, human rights and freedom of the press. While new forums such as UNASUR and CELAC may have important roles to fulfil, 'no institution can yet match the normative frameworks developed over decades by the OAS'. Inter-American Dialogue, 'Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America', April 2012, p. 17.
[627] For example, Secretary of State Clinton expressed concerns that President Lugo of Paraguay would bring his country into ALBA. He never did. Lugo was removed from power by the country's legislature in an extra-legal

cable, 'the ALBA bloc is an increasingly vocal and coordinated grouping that demands attention in international fora, both inside and outside the Hemisphere'.[628] And as analysed in Chapter 3, Honduras's membership in ALBA contributed to the portrayal of Zelaya as a Chávez-style populist.

With CELAC, Washington's concerns were mitigated initially by the perception that it was rife with divisions and lacking in details and organisation. The foundational ceremony of CELAC, for instance (held in Cancún, Mexico), was pilloried by the US diplomatic corps. One cable stated that the Cancún declaration was 'a bulging rhetorical exercise that reflect(ed) the lack of agreement' among states, featuring 'general and non-specific language'. It added that the outcome of the Cancún summit was 'directly contrary to hopes for a new more operational mechanism for the region'.[629] Others, however, including members of Congress, saw the formation of CELAC as ominous for US foreign policy. Two years prior to the official formation of CELAC, US officials in Brasilia noted that the discussions over 'the creation of a Latin America/Caribbean forum so close in membership to... the OAS serves to some extent to undermine the ideal of a united Western Hemisphere of democratic nations, while advancing the notion that there is a divide in the hemisphere between the two wealthiest nations and everyone else'.[630] This incongruity over CELAC mirrored divisions in Latin America. While some understood it as a prospective replacement for the OAS, others viewed it as a complementary institution.[631] If CELAC was an uncertainty, UNASUR, another Brazilian-led initiative, was more substantive, owing in part to its institutionalisation via the South American Defense Council.

To the degree that the US viewed CELAC and UNASUR as fairly benign, it was because of Washington's complex partnership with Brazil. The US acknowledged the country's geopolitical rise to prominence.[632] Nevertheless, the US-Brazil relationship remained more competitive than cooperative, with UNASUR, like CELAC, positioned more as a competitor to the OAS than its partner or subordinate. (The economic implications of

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'coup' in 2012. On Clinton's request for information on Lugo and ALBA, see Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09STATE52767, 'Additional Reporting Request: Paraguay's Political Situation and New Foreign Minister', 22 May 2009.

[628] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 10MANAGUA115, 'Ortega and the US: New-found True Love or Another Still-born Charm Offensive', 25 February 2010. Iran, an observer nation in ALBA, has used the forum to establish closer ties with members such as Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, including in the energy and minerals sectors.

[629] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 10MEXICO127, 'Mexico's Latin American Unity Summit—Back to the Future?' 26 February 2010.

[630] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08BRASILIA1301, 'Brazil's Latin America/Caribbean Summit: Concentric Circles or Circling the Wagons?' 1 October 2008. US officials concluded that the new forum was unlikely to present immediate challenges to the Summit of the Americas as the hemisphere's leading forum.

[631] Leaked embassy cables reveal the extent to which the differences of opinion over CELAC's potential played out in diplomatic discussions surrounding the creation of the initiative. These differences did not always track the ideological divide in Latin America. The CELAC project gained strong support from centre-right governments, such as Mexico, as well as centre-left governments, including Brazil. In general, the leftist governments of the Andean region were most supportive of the notion that CELAC should, and could, replace the OAS in due course. The centre-right government of Chile, however, was careful in suggesting that CELAC was not a replacement for the OAS. See for example: Wikileaks, Reference ID: 10SANTIAGO49, 'Scenesetter for Secretary Clinton's March 1-2 Visit to Chile', 25 February 2010; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 10SANTIAGO51, 'Chilean Perspectives on Rio Group Summit in Cancun and Insulza Reelection', 25 February 2010; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 10SANSALVADOR97, 'El Salvador Supports U.S. OAS Priorities', 26 February 2010.

[632] See for example, Julia E. Sweig, 'A New Global Player: Brazil's Far-Flung Agenda', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89 No. 6 (2010), pp. 173-184. Under the Obama and Rouseff administrations, US-Brazil relations were recast through the framework of a 'global partnership dialogue'.

US-Brazil relations are dealt with in more detail in Chapter 5.) In Washington's view, this represented a deliberate strategy on the part of the Brazilians, who consistently emphasised South-South cooperation under the Workers Party governments of Lula and Rousseff. Echoing the more 'radical' members of the NLL, Brazilian officials privately expressed to their American counterparts that the OAS was an outmoded organisation dominated in practice by the United States.[633] At the same time, Brazil remained more supportive of the OAS than Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua or Cuba. Brasilia was content to use the more established inter-American system to press for certain causes, such as the (failed) reinstatement of Honduran president Zelaya.

US Reform Proposals: Executive Pressure and Congressional Threats

In her address to the OAS General Assembly in June 2010, Secretary of State Clinton called for the urgent financial and political restructuring of the OAS, saying there was 'serious work to be done to bolster the institution'. Clinton criticised the organisation's 'proliferation of mandates' and called for the organisation to refocus on its core mission, democracy promotion. In stark contrast to its role in the debate over the Social Charter, then, the US sought to strengthen the targeted application of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. As stated by Clinton, this would involve the development of detailed Plan of Action as well as the creation of a Special Rapporteur for Democracy.[634] With the Honduras case in mind, Clinton called on the OAS to 'consider more precise guidelines for what constitutes an unconstitutional alteration'. As she advocated for the re-admittance of Honduras to the OAS, she said that the organisation needed to better 'address the conditions like those that led to the coup... before they turn into crises'.[635] For representatives of the NLL, the weakness of the OAS in respect to democracy was evident in the organisation's muted response to the 2002 coup against Chávez, as well as its inability to achieve Zelaya's reinstatement. For the Bush and Obama administrations, however, the coups were ancillary to the populist, illiberal processes of constitutional reform that preceded them.

Clinton's remarks reiterated the US's position that, while the OAS should do *less* in the areas of development and social and economic rights, it should do *more* to counter the challenges to the Democratic Charter. The US executive has consistently pushed the OAS to widen and deepen its enforcement of polyarchic principles while simultaneously scaling-back its work in other areas. The Bush and Obama administrations routinely leaned on the OAS to challenge the supposedly *caudillo*-like tactics of figures like Chávez and Zelaya. But the State Department was careful to avoid an overly-strident posture, recognising that the indirectness of institutional power offered the US cover from charges of heavy-handed interventionism. (Such bellicosity would fall to members of Congress.) Indeed, its frustrations with Insulza notwithstanding, the State Department consistently positioned the US to work through the OAS to pursue American interests. This was summarised by the US Congressional Research Service in 2012:

> As the organization's largest financial contributor and the hemisphere's most powerful nation, the United States remains influential within the OAS. The organization's objectives in the region are largely consistent with those of the United States, and many of its activities

[633] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09BRASILIA95, 'Brazil's Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor on Relations with New USG', 22 January 2009; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09BRASILIA1369, 'Brazil's Involvement in Conflict between Colombia and Venezuela', 25 November 2009.

[634] As of 2012, neither the plan of action nor the special rapporteur for democracy had come to fruition.

[635] US State Department, Hillary Rodham Clinton, 'Address to the Organization of American States General Assembly', 7 June 2010: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/06/142804.htm.

> complement US efforts. At the same time, OAS actions (or the lack thereof) do not always align with the organization's stated objectives, and the United States' ability to advance its policy initiatives in the organization has declined over the past decade. These conflicting tendencies are likely to continue in the coming years, spurring on the congressional debate over the utility of the OAS for advancing US interests in the Western Hemisphere.[636]

Indeed, there was a flurry of legislative activity on the OAS following the Republicans' capture of the House of Representative in the 2010 mid-term elections. Although Congress determines the level of funding provided to international organisations, it is unable to dictate budgetary changes in US foreign policy. That said, because the US is the largest contributor to the OAS, and because the organisation has in recent years been in a state of financial fragility,[637] the various reform proposals floated in the House and Senate acted as threats to the autonomy of the institution itself. By earmarking US financial contributions for specific OAS programmes, members of Congress have the capacity to provide incentives for the prioritisation of activities that are perceived to be firmly in the US's national interest. But efforts to turn the OAS into a more overt 'tool' of the US can work against the indirectness that defines institutional power. There is a delicate balance to be struck. As noted by Mauricio Cárdenas, 'any reform to the OAS that begins in Washington, especially in the US Congress, can have the potential to backfire'.[638]

In March 2010, prior to the Republican takeover of the House, Senators Kerry and Menendez introduced a bill (S. 3087) 'to support revitalization and reform of the Organization of American States'.[639] The measure called for the reprioritization of the defence of 'representative democracy'. This would come with a more thorough review of core functions and a reduction in the overall number of its mandates.[640] The bill also endorsed the OAS's status as the 'primary multilateral diplomatic entity for regional dispute resolution'.[641] Kerry and Menendez called for the 'increased use' of the OAS by the US executive, including as a forum for publicising the US's hemispheric initiatives.[642] The bill was introduced just months after the publication of a Senate report by the office of Senator Richard Lugar (Republican-Indiana) entitled, 'Multilateralism in the Americas: Let's Start by Fixing the OAS'. The Lugar report called attention to the OAS's financial precariousness while arguing that it had failed to address the erosion of democratic institutions in places like Venezuela and Honduras (in the run-up to the respective coups in the countries in 2002 and 2009).[643] It criticised the consensus mechanism as a hindrance to the application of the Democratic Charter.[644] It also criticised Insulza, accusing him of focusing more on politics

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[636] Congressional Research Service, 'Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress', 31 July 2012, pp. 27-28.

[637] According to Secretary General Insulza, the OAS has been systematically de-funded over the last 20 years or so in real terms, so much so that it can be compared to a 'sinking ship'. As a result, 'the staff of the OAS has been reduced by one-third in the past decade'. With a budget in 2010 of approximately $90 million (in its 'regular fund'), Insulza stated that, 'if the OAS were receiving the amount of money received in 1990, it would be receiving around $120 to $130 million'. The Brookings Institution, transcript, 'Latin America's New Political Landscape and the Future of the Organization of American States', Washington, DC, 15 March 2010, p. 38.

[638] The Brookings Institution, transcript, 'Latin America's New Political Landscape and the Future of the Organization of American States', Washington, DC, 15 March 2010, p. 34.

[639] US Senate, 111th Congress, 2nd Session, S. 3087, 8 March 2010.

[640] Ibid., pp. 2-5.

[641] Ibid., p. 4.

[642] Ibid., p. 8.

[643] US Senate, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 'Multilateralism in the Americas: Let's Start by Fixing the OAS', 26 January 2010, pp. 4-7.

[644] Ibid., p. 15.

than on the efficacy of the organisation.[645] In response, Insulza wrote a letter to Lugar in which he defended joint US-OAS efforts to strengthen the OAS and (potentially) improve the financial situation of the organisation. Insulza also defended the independence of the OAS while alluding to the challenges presented by the newly-created regional groups. He wrote:

> I have tried to reopen the OAS as the best forum for debate and dialogue in the Americas, in which everybody can engage and participate. I think this is the only way for the OAS to be relevant and to avoid being set aside in favor of other institutions that coexist with her in the Americas. The diversity that characterizes our hemisphere today means that no single Member State can impose its beliefs or try to 'own' the OAS. That worked in the past, but will not work today. Rather, I have advocated a strong adherence to our common principles and a preference for trying to convince, rather than impose.[646]

The threats to the OAS by US lawmakers grew more strident following the capture of the House of Representatives by the Republican Party in the 2010 midterms. In July 2011, Congressman Connie Mack (Republican-Florida), the Chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee in the House of Representatives, introduced a bill (H.R. 2542) that threatened to withhold portions of US funding for the OAS. Specifically, the bill called for the withholding of 'twenty percent of United States assessed and voluntary contributions to the Organization of American States (OAS) for every permanent council meeting that takes place where Article 20 of the Inter-American (Democratic) Charter is not invoked with regard to Venezuela's recent constitutional reforms'.[647] In defending the bill, Mack argued that the OAS had 'failed to stand with the people of Venezuela and Nicaragua, while... hypocritically punishing Honduras within days of that country's decision to stand on the side of freedom'. Mack stated that the OAS was unable to take concrete actions to fix its flaws without outside pressure. He concluded that, 'if the OAS finds that it is unable to make itself effective, there remains no reason for its continued existence'.[648]

Similarly, the House Appropriations Committee's version of the fiscal year 2013 budget for the State Department (H.R. 5857) required the State Department to report on its efforts 'to push the OAS to uphold all aspects of the (Inter-American Democratic) Charter'.[649] In June 2012, Representative Ileana Ros-Lethinen, a prominent Cuban-American from Miami, introduced H.R. 6067, the Western Hemisphere Security Cooperation Act. Among other initiatives, the bill called on the Secretary of State to transfer 50 per cent of US funds for the OAS to voluntary contributions for the funding of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, Fund for Strengthening Democracy, Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism and Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission.[650] A previous bill (H.R. 2410) included provisions to establish a 'Fund to Promote Multilateralism in the Americas'. This piece of legislation would have specified voluntary contributions to the OAS 'to carry out programs and activities that support the interests of the United States'.[651]

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[645] Ibid., p. 16.

[646] Organization of American States, Secretary General José Miguel Insulza letter to Senator Richard Lugar, 16 February 2010. http://lugar.senate.gov/issues/foreign/lac/OAS/pdf/OAS3.pdf.

[647] US Congress, 112th Congress, 1st Session, H.R. 2542, 14 July 2011. Article 20 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter calls on the Permanent Council to foster the restoration of democracy in a member state in the event that said member unconstitutionally alters its democratic order.

[648] Opening Statement, Chairman Connie Mack, Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, Markup on H.R. 3401 and H.R. 2542, December 15, 2011.

[649] Congressional Research Service, 'Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress', 31 July 2012, p. 20.

[650] US Congress, 112th Congress, 2nd Session, H.R. 6067, 29 June 2012.

[651] Congressional Research Service, 'Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress', 31 July 2012, p. 27.

In July 2011, the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, chaired by Representative Ros-Lethinen, voted along party lines to cut off all US funding for the Organization of American States. The $48.5 million annual US contribution represented more than half of the OAS budget. Though the measure had little chance of becoming law, its message was clear. Ahead of the vote, Congressman David Rivera (Republican-Florida) stated: 'the OAS is an enemy of the US and an enemy to the interests of freedom and security'.[652] As the Committee's debate meshed with the broader policy discourse, criticisms were once again levelled at Insulza, Cuba, and Venezuela, as well as the consensus approach to decision-making within the OAS and the institution's treatment of liberal democracy in general.[653] Meanwhile, as one analyst wrote, 'the real problem with this anti-OAS sentiment (was) that it (was) motivated by a desire to exercise greater regional hegemony'. Opponents of the funding exaggerated Chávez's importance while 'conflating political outcomes in democratic contests that they dislike(d) with the collapse of democracy'.[654]

Conclusion

Constructed at the behest of the US, the Organization of American States served US hegemony from the early stages of the Cold War through the post-Cold War period. By of the end of the 2000s, however, the OAS shared the institutional space with several rival projects. Spurred by NLL governments in Brazil and Venezuela, initiatives such as CELAC and UNASUR bridged ideological divisions in the region, while ALBA helped to coordinate the foreign and economic policies of those countries most directly at odds with US hegemony. Although these organisations were but new competitors to the OAS, their emergence stimulated discussions in Washington on the utility of the more established inter-American system. The need to strengthen the OAS was realised once it had escaped US influence and was beset with competition from newer multilateral institutions constructed without US input. 'In the longer term', wrote Tussie, 'what we are seeing is the slow and partial unravelling of the age-old tug of the US's hegemony in the region, which has been propelled in opposite directions by elite alignment and societal resistance. As the relationship begins to dim, nascent projects, imbued with a range of strategic objectives, mark new directions in still fuzzy, winding ways'.[655] The US sought to protect the centrality of the OAS to inter-state cooperation while reinforcing the OAS's commitment to polyarchic democracy, all while attempting to reassert greater influence over the organisation itself. The reconstitution of the US's institutional power in the Americas remained, like US hegemony, an open-ended prospect, realisable but contested.

As the United States works through international institutions to pursue its foreign policy objectives, the maintenance of an amenable institutional landscape becomes an objective in and of itself. In the Western hemisphere, the OAS remained critical to US institutional power, which was nevertheless diminished in two respects: firstly, within the OAS, as a reflection of the left turn in Latin American politics; and secondly through the

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[652] Quoted in Josh Rogin, 'House Panel Votes to Defund the OAS', *Foreign Policy*, 20 July 2011: http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/07/20/house_panel_votes_to_defund_the_oas.

[653] See for example, Anthony DePalma, 'US House Goes "Animal House" on the OAS', *Americas Quarterly*, 20 July 2011: http://www.americasquarterly.org/user/14343.

[654] Daniel Larson, 'The OAS Is Not the Enemy', *The American Conservative*, 20 July 2011: http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-oas-is-not-the-enemy/.

[655] Diana Tussie, 'Hemispheric Relations: Budding Contests in the Dawn of a New Era', in *Inter-American Cooperation at a Crossroads*, edited by Gordon Mace, Andrew F. Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 25.

creation of new regional forums that exclude the US altogether, and which erode the US's ability to operate via the inter-American system to pursue mediated outcomes in its self-described national interest. As noted in Chapter 3, Washington's efforts to reconstitute its compulsory power in Latin America negatively affected its institutional power in the region, as Latin American states, led by NLL governments, worked to build alternate forums of security cooperation and conflict management. The changing institutional terrain was to have a major impact on the structural power of the US as well, the subject of Chapter 5. Groups like ALBA helped to coordinate opposition to the FTAA while proposing alternative means of economic integration against the Washington Consensus. Meanwhile, the OAS was used by the US to expose, and challenge, 'populist' governance on the part of 'radical' leftist governments. The ideological side of US productive power is analysed in Chapter 6. Thus, as the preceding analysis illustrates, US institutional power was, and is, bound-up with other forms of power in the international relations of the Western hemisphere. The inter-penetrating character of the various forms of social power comes into greater focus.

Chapter 5

Structural Power and US Trade Policy in the Americas: From the Free Trade Area of the Americas to the Trans-Pacific Partnership

Chapter 2 outlined the relationship between the Washington Consensus, neoliberalism and US hegemony in Latin America. Free trade, a pillar of the Washington Consensus, remained a prominent part of the Post-Washington Consensus landscape. As emphasised in this chapter, formalised free trade regimes encompass much more than the reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to the exchange of goods and services. 'Free trade' has played a pivotal role in opening up markets to the penetration of foreign capital through processes of privatisation and deregulation.[656] In facilitating the neoliberalisation of the hemispheric political economy, free trade agreements (FTAs) between the US and Latin American countries sit at the core of US structural power in the region. FTAs provide a means of 'locking in' processes of neoliberal restructuring, enhancing the mobility of transnational corporations and improving the conditions for foreign investment. This is done through the construction of legal regimes designed to protect 'free market' economic policies from the political backlash engendered by their effects in the social sphere.

To flesh out the reconstitution of US structural power in the Americas, this chapter traces US trade policy from the dawn of the New Latin Left to the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Building on the discussion from the previous chapter, it examines the role of regional institutions (ALBA and Mercosur) in coordinating opposition to Washington's economic agenda. With the hemispheric route closed down via the collapse of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), US trade policy shifted to sub-regional and bilateral tracks. This piecemeal strategy was successful insofar as it produced the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and various bilateral accords. However, it was limited in scope, generating an 'inefficient and cumbersome trading system' of criss-crossing rules and regulations.[657] As analysed below, the TPP is an attempt to reconstitute a broader free trade consensus while harmonising existing trade agreements. If realised, it would link Latin American members to North American and participating East Asian markets via a single free trade regime. Highly secretive, the future of the TPP remains uncertain. Hanging in the balance is the structural power of the US in Latin America. This power is inexorably interlinked with neoliberalisation—or 'competitive liberalisation' in the parlance of the Bush

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[656] The quotation marks around 'free trade' used in this chapter denote that trade policies in the contemporary global economy generally involve much more than just the cross-border exchange of goods. Mark Rupert's work offers a trenchant critique of US free trade policies from a historical materialist perspective. See for example, Mark Rupert, *Ideologies of Globalization: Contending Visions of a New World Order* (New York: Routledge, 2000); Mark Rupert and Scott Solomon, *Globalization and International Political Economy: The Politics of Alternative Futures* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006). For a defense of free trade policies in the context of economic globalisation, see for example Jagdish Bhagwati, *In Defense of Globalization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); and Martin Wolf, *Why Globalization Works, Second Edition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005). There is some disagreement over the desirability and implications of free trade within academic debates surrounding the Post-Washington Consensus. See for example, Jeffrey A. Frankel, 'The World Trading System and Implications of External Opening', and Martin Khor, 'The World Trading System and Development Concerns', both in *The Washington Consensus Reconsidered*, edited by Narcis Serra and Joseph E. Stiglitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

[657] Congressional Research Service, 'US-Latin American Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues', 8 February 2011, p. 6.

administration.[658] Free trade helps constitute a neoliberal capitalist economy which is itself constitutive of the US as a hegemonic actor atop the regional geo-economic hierarchy.

In Barnett and Duvall's taxonomy, social structures assign agents the capacity to act in the social world.[659] This constitutive element of structural power is, by definition, *direct*, as agents are enabled and constrained through the internal relations of pre-existing structures. However, structures do not allocate social capacities in equal measure. Structures position actors in relation to one another, meaning they necessarily differentiate between agents. In other words, structural arrangements are always hierarchical.[660] They privilege actors in different ways, assigning competing interests to different actors in the process. Moreover, structural power shapes the subjectivities of differentiated actors. Ideologies thus emerge from the interests and imperatives of structural relationships, even if ideational phenomena cannot be wholly reduced to structures in the final analysis. As implied in the name, it is the structures themselves that take precedence. The work of Susan Strange highlights this point. In much of her writing, changes in the international system are traced back to various structural shifts in areas such as security, production, credit and knowledge.[661] Structures give rise to economic imperatives that alter markets, patterns of production, financial flows and the international division of labour in ways that feed back into the structures themselves—through the mediation of individual agents. States are embedded in the structural milieu of the global economy but have the (limited) capacity to shape said structures through things like economic policymaking.

Analyses of structural power in IR/IPE are typically associated with Marxian approaches.[662] (This is not exclusively the case, as demonstrated by Strange.) For historical materialists, economic production underpins all forms of power. For states to implement coercive and institutional tools they must first possess the requisite material capabilities. Ultimately, it is the 'structure of global capitalism (that) determines the capacities and

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[658] The phrase 'competitive liberalization' was used frequently by Robert Zoellick, US Trade Represenative (USTR) during the first term of George W. Bush (2001-2005). According to Evenett and Meier, there were three objectives to Bush's strategy of competitive liberalization. 'First, to induce competition for access to the large US market, thereby encouraging foreign countries to open their economies to US companies and farmers. Second, to encourage the adoption abroad of US-style market-friendly business laws and regulations, or at least the adoption of regulations that US businesses can accommodate more easily… The third objective is to encourage other nations to support US foreign policy and military objectives and, more broadly, what might be termed US values'. Simon J. Evenett and Michael Meier, 'An Interim Assessment of the US Trade Policy of "Competitive Liberalization"', *The World Economy*, Vol. 31 No. 1 (2008), p. 31. Using so-called 'fast track' authority to negotiate trade agreements with minimal Congressional oversight, Bush's 'competitive liberalization' approach led to the formation of 'an unprecedented number of FTAs' during his tenure. Congressional Research Service, 'Free Trade Agreements: Impact on US Trade and Implications for US Trade Policy', 18 June 2012, p. 4.

[659] Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, 'Power in Global Governance', in Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, editors, *Power in Global Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005a), pp. 18-20.

[660] In addition to Barnett and Duvall, and as noted in Chapter 2, my understanding of the power of social structures has been informed by Jonathan Joseph's theorisation of the structural element of hegemony; Joseph (2002).

[661] See Susan Strange, *States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988), especially pp. 43-134; John M. Stopford and Susan Strange, *Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), especially pp. 32-64; and Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[662] Barnett and Duvall (2005a), p. 11; see for example, Cox (1996). As a perspective on international power, then, this conceptualisation of structure is distinct from Waltzian neorealism, which stresses the implications of the anarchical structure of the inter-state system. In its emphasis on the co-constitution of agents and structures, Wendtian constructivism points to a similar ontology, as noted by Barnett and Duvall.

resources of actors' and 'shapes their ideology'.[663] Gramscian scholars tend to link the structural bases of hegemony to dominant ideologies. As highlighted in this chapter, the structural power of free trade regimes functions alongside other forms of power.[664] Employing Barnett and Duvall's categories, Mark Rupert writes of the 'dialectical interdependence of structural and ideological-discursive or productive forms of power, as well as their enactment in institutional contexts and exercises of compulsory power among concretely situated agents'.[665] In this vein, it is worth reiterating that neoliberalism is both a model of capitalist political economy and the ideological expression of the Washington Consensus policies used to shape this structural arrangement.[666] To a degree, processes of neoliberal globalisation are contingent on institutional arrangements, including trade agreements (which mediate outcomes through 'distant' mechanisms, whether IOs, such as the WTO, or multilateral treaties, like CAFTA).

Although structural power can operate as a kind of domination (e.g. master-slave relations), processes of structural (re)production are not set in stone.[667] Rupert writes: structures 'are (re)produced or transformed only through the mediation of historically concrete agency'. Theorising structural power does not negate agency because it does not imply that purposive action is reducible to structural domination.[668] Analysis of structural power in international relations requires an accounting of the constitutive properties of pre-existing political-economic arrangements, including the differentiated ways in which these arrangements enable and constrain state actors. But analyses of structural power must also account for the role of states in reinforcing and/or challenging those very same arrangements. In this sense, we can talk about the structural power of given states. This includes hegemons who, in accordance with their structurally-allocated position, have a greater capacity to (re)shape structures than do other actors. Although 'free trade' creates winners and losers within and across national economies, it has, on the whole, enabled the expansion of US firms and investors in a way that feeds back into the structural power of the United States as a national actor. In other words, it allocated material resources in a manner that reinforced existing (structural) hierarchies in inter-American relations.

US Trade Policy at the Dawn of the New Latin Left: The FTAA and CAFTA

Washington has pursued free trade through several 'tracks' corresponding to different levels of international political-economic relations: global, regional, bilateral. Following the

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[663] That is, in the Marxian view. Barnett and Duvall (2005a), p. 19.

[664] However obvious, it should be noted that 'political considerations are also a motivation to form FTAs', as acknowledged explicitly by the Congressional Research Service. 'Free Trade Agreements: Impact on US Trade and Implications for US Trade Policy', 18 June 2012, p. 3. FTAs can serve as rewards for supporting the US's geopolitical or geo-economic agenda. From Washington's perspective, FTAs strengthen alliances that may exist primarily to serve geopolitical or security-related interests.

[665] Mark Rupert, 'Class powers and the politics of global governance', in Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, editors, *Power in Global Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 210.

[666] In other words, neoliberalism is both a theory and a politico-economic project. This point, drawn here from David Harvey but made by a number of critical theorists, is discussed in further detail in Chapter 2. See for example, David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 2-19.

[667] Of course, Latin American states can abstain from free trade agreements with the US. However, the pull of the massive US market provides Washington with tremendous structural leverage. This is part of the logic of structural power in the international political economy. For policymakers in Latin America, an FTA with the US represents a means of attracting foreign investment. Meanwhile, the US uses its existing advantage to protect certain key industries from market competition within the free trade negotiations. This is demonstrated, for example, by the unwillingness of the US to discuss the liberalisation of its agricultural sector.

[668] Rupert (2005), p. 209.

Cold War, the US utilised multilateral negotiations to establish a global, rules-based trading system, transforming the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) into the more comprehensive World Trade Organization (WTO). The Doha Round of WTO negotiations, launched in 2001, stagnated over the following decade.[669] The US was thus compelled to stake out other paths to market liberalisation. Regional agreements, such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), were seen as the next best option. Like the WTO talks, however, the agenda and scale of these proposed agreements presented problems. Negotiations for the hemispheric FTAA ground to a halt in the early 2000s. Turning to the sub-regional track, the US finalised the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) in 2005 but was unsuccessful in establishing a similar agreement with South America's Andean countries. The bilateral track bore more fruit in Latin America, where the Bush and Obama administrations signed and implemented FTAs with Chile, Peru, Panama and Colombia. Finally, the US also made use of a unilateral track: 'Under this approach, the United States threatens retaliation, usually in the form of restricting trade partners' access to the vast US market, in order to get the partner to open its markets to US exports or to cease other offensive commercial practices and policies'.[670]

Recent FTAs were patterned on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which went into effect on January 1, 1994. Joining the US, Canada and Mexico, NAFTA comprises the world's second-largest free trade zone, after the EU. For policymakers in Washington, NAFTA, a manifestation the Consensus proclaimed by economist John Williamson in 1989, was widely (if not universally) heralded as a success. Yet, years after entering into force, NAFTA remained controversial with the US public.[671] The unpopularity of NAFTA portended the growing opposition to free trade in general, which undercut support for FTAs in Congress. Likewise, free trade and other Washington Consensus policies fuelled intense opposition in Latin America. With the emergence of the New Latin Left (NLL), this opposition gained expression in the region's electoral politics. In a few short years, the Washington Consensus on trade liberalisation gave way to a set of contentious negotiations spread across the various tracks of the US's free trade push. This dissensus was most evident at the hemispheric level, as seen in the collapse of the FTAA.

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[669] The official website of the World Trade Organization (WTO) provides background details and updates on Doha Round negotiations: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/update_e.htm (accessed 10 January 2013). The Doha Round, launched in Doha, Qatar in November 2001, is also referred to as the Doha Development Agenda. The Doha Round was dealt a severe blow during the 2003 ministerial, held in Cancún, Mexico, when talks failed to produce a comprehensive agreement. This setback had echoes of the WTO's failed 1999 conference. Famously dubbed the 'Battle in Seattle', those negotiations collapsed amidst protests by unions, environmentalists and 'anti-globalisation' groups, which brought considerable public attention to 'free trade' in the US and elsewhere. For a critique of the WTO and free trade more broadly, see Lori Wallach and Patrick Woodall, *Whose Trade Organization?* (New York: The New Press, 2004). For a neoliberal defence of the US's free trade policies in the WTO and elsewhere, see Kenneth W. Dam, *The Rules of the Global Game* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

[670] Congressional Research Service, 'Free Trade Agreements: Impact on US Trade and Implications for US Trade Policy', 18 June 2012, p. 3. This unilateral approach was widely used against Japan in the 1980s and 90s.

[671] In 2008, the Bush administration even felt it necessary to issue a defence of NAFTA's record. The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), 'NAFTA – Myths vs. Facts', March 2008. As noted by Public Citizen, a Washington-based public interest NGO that tracks global trade issues, NAFTA emerged as a 'hot button' issue in the 2008 campaigns. Public Citizen refuted the Bush administration's claims on NAFTA, arguing that the agreement led to an increased US trade deficit, a loss in US manufacturing jobs, stagnating wages, growth in Mexican immigration to the US, a decline in Mexico's rate of economic growth, and a closure of policy space throughout North America. Public Citizen, 'Debunking USTR Claims in Defense of NAFTA: The Real NAFTA Score 2008'.

The Collapse of the Free Trade Area of the Americas

With NAFTA secured, the United States turned its attention southward. In 1994, the Western hemisphere's heads of state gathered in Miami to discuss the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), a US-designed proposal for the world's largest free trade zone. Although it enjoyed support from Latin American leaders for much of the 1990s, by 2005, its original target date for completion, the hemispheric accord was no longer tenable. Following a spate of economic crises, the region saw numerous candidates of the centre-left win power, many of whom campaigned against the FTAA. In this context, Washington set its sights on the finalisation of an agreement with its Central American allies as a kind of consolation prize.

As of January 2013, the official website of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) remained up and running. A message noted that the website was last updated on June 21, 2006, but its links were active, providing the inquisitive visitor with an abundance of official documents in addition to governmental contact points for all 34 of its prospective member states (Cuba was excluded).[672] The immense scope of the FTAA was evident in its cornucopia of drafts and declarations, even as the dense, official discourse of the treaty process hid its relationship to neoliberal restructuring behind a wall of trade jargon and legalese. The FTAA was widely—and accurately—attributed to the hegemonic designs of the US, as an attempt by Washington to extend NAFTA to the entire hemisphere.[673] Its breakdown denoted the collapse of the Washington Consensus at the regional level, diverting Washington's free trade ambitions to bilateral and sub-regional tracks.

The FTAA's phantasmal online presence was eerily apropos. Even in 2008, several years after the cessation of formal talks, the Congressional Research Service wrote that the US remained committed 'to forge a solution to the impasse'.[674] CRS stated that 'getting the FTAA back on track (was) one of the major challenges to US-Latin America trade policy', but it acknowledged that 'recent political realignments in Latin America suggest that this task may only become more difficult'.[675] Indeed, the ascendency of NLL governments complicated the FTAA negotiations. President Lula's election in 2002 was a turning point, and Brazil's unease with the FTAA process proved to be its greatest hurdle. Lula had campaigned against the free trade area, though, as president, his position was more nuanced. Additionally, following the collapse of Argentina's economy in 2001-2002, the Kirchner government moved the country decisively away from Washington's 'free trade' agenda.[676] In the Andes, Venezuela's staunch opposition to US-backed trade deals would soon be shared by Bolivia and Ecuador.

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[672] The official website of the Free Trade Area of the Americas is located at: http://www.ftaa-alca.org/alca_e.asp (accessed 6 January 2013). In Spanish, the agreement is known as the *Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas* (ALCA). The website remained active in its English, Spanish, French and Portuguese versions.

[673] Claudio Katz, 'Free Trade Areas of the Americas: NAFTA Marches South', *NACLA Report on the Americas*, January/February (2002), pp. 27-45. Katz described the FTAA as a 'strategic project aimed at consolidating US supremacy in the region by means of increased US exports, more investment controls and sophisticated financial-flow monitoring methods'; p. 27. As a boon to US commercial interests, the FTAA, which selectively protected US agribusiness, was characterised by Katz as an 'imperialist, neocolonialist project for Latin America'; pp. 30-31.

[674] Congressional Research Service, 'A Free Trade Area of the Americas: Major Policy Issues and Status of Negotiations', updated 15 July 2008, p. 5.

[675] Congressional Research Service, 'A Free Trade Area of the Americas: Major Policy Issues and Status of Negotiations', updated 15 July 2008, p. 6.

[676] On Nestor Kirchner's 'solidarity' with Brazil's position to prioritise Mercosur ahead of the FTAA, see Wikileaks, Reference ID: 03BRASILIA1321, 'Brazil Continues to Debate Trade Policy on Eve of USTR Zoellick's Visit', 20 May 2003.

From the start, the FTAA was unquestionably a US project.[677] As stated by CRS, 'The United States has led the FTAA effort in expectation that it not only would open markets for US goods and services, but would provide benefits to the entire region by: 1) increasing Latin American trade with the large US market; 2) fostering reciprocal trade among Latin American countries; and 3) encouraging more foreign direct investment in Latin America'.[678] The idea of a hemispheric free trade area extending from Alaska to the Tierra del Fuego began with the Reagan administration. In 1990, the incipient plan was given a name by the George H. W. Bush administration: the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. It was Bill Clinton who would make the free trade vision a reality, starting with NAFTA. The implementation of the North American agreement fuelled momentum for the hemispheric pact, which would be modelled on NAFTA.

In 1994, the newly-christened 'Free Trade Area of the Americas' was placed on the regional agenda during the inaugural Summit of the Americas, held in Miami under the auspices of the OAS. In addition to the Summit's Declaration (the free trade section of which is reproduced in Appendix 2), the heads of state also signed an action plan designed to position the FTAA process alongside existing GATT/WTO talks. It pledged to 'maximize market openness' in a wide range of areas: 'tariffs and non-tariff barriers affecting trade in goods and services; agriculture; subsidies; investment; intellectual property rights; government procurement; technical barriers to trade; safeguards; rules of origin; antidumping and countervailing duties; sanitary and phytosanitary standards and procedures; dispute resolution; and competition policy'. The action plan also called for the liberalisation and progressive integration of capital markets, and for an increased role for the multilateral development banks.[679] These proposals were fleshed-out at the second Summit of the Americas in Santiago, Chile, in 1998, where the FTAA process was given a more formal structure.[680] Through the creation of a Trade Negotiations Committee, working groups were set up along the NAFTA model, with the goal of privatising and deregulating key sectors. Subsequent drafts of the agreement were adopted at the Quebec City Summit in 2001, the Quito ministerial in 2002 and the Miami ministerial in 2003,[681] with negotiations breaking down soon thereafter.

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[677] Katz (2002); Paulo S. Wrobel, 'A Free Trade Area of the Americas in 2005?' *International Affairs*, Vol. 74 No. 3 (1998), pp. 547-561. The US leadership of the FTTA process persevered despite the creation of a tripartite commission to oversee the talks consisting of the OAS (which formally conducted the Summits of the Americas), the IDB and the United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). As noted by Wrobel, the US 'initiated the proposal for an FTAA and conducted the negotiations, even though not every country in the Americas... perceived a free trade area as serving its best interests' (even in the 1990s); p. 560. See also, Mario E. Carranza, 'Mercosur, the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and the Future of U.S. Hegemony in Latin America', *Fordham International Law Review*, Vol. 27 No. 4 (2003), pp. 1029-1065; and José Briceño Ruiz, 'Strategic Regionalism and Regional Social Policy in the FTAA Process', *Global Social Policy*, Vol. 7 No. 3 (2007), pp. 294-315.

[678] Congressional Research Service, 'A Free Trade Area of the Americas: Major Policy Issues and Status of Negotiations', updated 3 January 2005, p. 2.

[679] First Summit of the Americas, Summit of the Americas Plan of Action, December 1994: http://www.summit-americas.org/miamiplan.htm.

[680] Second Summit of the Americas, Summit of the Americas Plan of Action, April 1998: http://www.summit-americas.org/chileplan.htm.

[681] Congressional Research Service, 'A Free Trade Area of the Americas: Major Policy Issues and Status of Negotiations', updated 3 January 2005, p. 2.

The FTAA was scarcely about trade.[682] The US aimed to set in motion an integrative process to reinforce the structural power of neoliberal capitalism—to deepen existing processes of neoliberalisation. NGOs noted that the agreement would have 'locked-in' the regional structural adjustment programmes implemented in the 1980s-90s, including through the creation of additional legal measures to enforce neoliberal rules.[683] According to the Peterson Institute, a neoliberal think tank, 'by "locking in" open access to markets, free trade pacts help reduce uncertainty about the future course of trade and regulatory policies and thus facilitate business planning and investment'. In this context, the FTAA, which was 'the most ambitious free trade initiative of the postwar trading system', would have deadbolted 'the conduct of overall economic policy in and economic relations among the participating countries', thus yielding, as noted by its proponents, 'both economic and foreign policy benefits'.[684] For Washington, the FTAA was geo-economic *and* geopolitical, and the two went hand in hand. Indeed, the Bush administration—a more enthusiastic set of 'free traders' than even the Clinton team—went so far as to link trade to the US's security agenda, arguing that, as a manifestation of 'freedom' itself, 'free trade' would help combat terrorism.[685] In its 2002 National Security Strategy, the White House reiterated its commitment to finalising the FTAA by 2005.[686]

From the outset, the FTAA was a single undertaking; to come to fruition, all parties would have to agree to the entire set of requirements in the final text. The sheer scope of the agreement made this exceedingly difficult.[687] In 2003, the US and Brazil, by then the two co-chairs of the FTAA negotiations, steered the talks toward a 'two-tier' framework comprised of 1) a set of 'common rights and obligations' for all participating countries, and 2) a set of plurilateral arrangements with country benefits related to voluntary commitments. Called the 'FTAA-lite' (an outcome of the 'Miami compromise'), the move sparked widespread debate over the direction of the broader process. Did the changes give Latin American countries the

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[682] Wrobel wrote that, 'under US pressure', the FTAA aimed to 'go beyond the traditional issues of removing tariff and non-tariff barriers'. It included things like 'services, investment, competition, intellectual property and governmental procurement'. For the US, then, the 'trade' negotiations in the Americas were even more far-reaching than those being carried out at the global level; that is, the FTAA agenda was considerably broader than the GATT/WTO agenda then under discussion. Wrobel (1998), p. 555. See also, Mario E. Carranza, 'Mercosur and the end game of the FTAA negotiations: challenges and prospects after the Argentine crisis', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 25 No. 2 (2004), pp. 319-337. For Carranza, 'the opening up of the neoliberal model' was 'the ideological foundation of the FTAA', p. 320.

[683] See for example, Global Exchange, 'Frequently Asked Questions about the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)', 2000. The FTTA would have included provisions modelled on NAFTA's Chapter 11, which allows corporations to sue governments in 'courts' set up by the free trade regime. As noted by Carranza (2004), the US 'aimed to use the FTAA as an "insurance policy" against new protectionist impulses in Latin America by locking in domestic reforms through international obligations, and thus substantially raising the cost of policy reversals', p. 324.

[684] Jeffrey Schott, 'Does the FTAA Have a Future?' Institute for International Economics, November 2005, pp. 1-7. (The organisation is now known as the Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics.)

[685] See for example, Laura Altieri, 'NAFTA and the FTAA: Regional Alternatives to Multilateralism', *Berkeley Journal of International Law*, Vol. 21 No. 3 (2003), pp. 847-877. The Bush administration's post-9/11 security strategy included a section calling for the creation of 'a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade'. The White House, 'National Security Strategy of the United States of America', September 2002, pp. 17-20.

[686] The White House, 'National Security Strategy of the United States of America', September 2002, p. 18.

[687] This erosion of consensus was summarised by US Congressional researchers as such: 'When the FTAA negotiations began, they were predicated on the assumption that all countries could gain from a comprehensive and inclusive agreement, one that addresses everything from market access to trade remedies and rules-based issues. In now appears (in 2005) that few countries may be ready to accept such deep obligations'. Congressional Research Service, 'A Free Trade Area of the Americas: Major Policy Issues and Status of Negotiations', updated 3 January 2005, p. 4.

policy space they desired? Was the new structure a step toward a final agreement, or a step back from Washington's goal of a more thoroughly neoliberalised hemisphere?[688] In effect, the two-tier framework provided individual countries (including the US) the option of withdrawing from certain commitments, allowing them to protect chosen industries/sectors. As delegates debated the merits of the two-tier system behind closed doors, the streets of Miami were inundated with 'anti-globalisation' activists.[689] The demonstrations were more monumental two years later, when a chorus of politicians, activists and celebrities led by Hugo Chávez ceremoniously 'buried' the FTAA at a 'People's Summit' held alongside the 2005 Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata, Argentina. By that point, the multilateral trade talks had ground to halt. President Bush's visit to Argentina provoked an outpouring of opposition. In the streets and boardrooms, it was obvious that the two-tier framework had yielded neither a consensus nor a way forward.[690]

Brazil's wariness regarding the FTAA was fuelled by the perception that it was an attempt by the US to co-opt Mercosur, an important component of Brazil's gambit for increased influence in Latin American (and global) affairs.[691] In this context, Brazil pivoted to a '3-track' proposal on trade policy: disaggregating the Mercosur, FTAA and WTO negotiations.[692] Additionally, Lula, who downplayed his anti-neoliberalism from 2002 onward, had staked his presidency on the PT's social agenda. The country's social movements, which backed Lula's candidacy, continued to resist the FTAA talks,[693] even as

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[688] The conventional wisdom held that the 'FTAA-lite' framework was a victory for Brazil and a setback for the US, as Washington valued a more comprehensive agreement. See for example, Congressional Research Service, 'A Free Trade Area of the Americas: Major Policy Issues and Status of Negotiations', updated 3 January 2005, p. 5. Others noted that, insofar as the changes in the Miami compromise made a final agreement more likely, it was beneficial to US objectives. Moreover, the two-tier framework facilitated Washington's on-going turn toward the bilateral FTA track, which would ultimately substitute for the failed FTAA. See for example, Kristin Simpson, '"FTTA Lite:" A Victory?' *NACLA Report on the Americas*, January/February 2004, pp. 5-6.

[689] According to some analysts, the 2003 protests served to symbolically reinforce the emerging resistance to the US delegation on the part of South American delegates within the FTAA ministerial. See for example, Joel Wainwright and Rafael Ortiz, 'The battles in Miami: the fall of the FTAA/ALCA and the promise of transnational movements', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, Vol. 24 (2006), pp. 349-366. The US had planned for the city of Miami to serve as the site of the permanent FTAA secretariat. See Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05BRASILIA1067, 'Presidential Chief of Staff Dirceu on FTAA and Potential Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals', 20 April 2005. On the broader anti-FTAA movement and its origins, see Gary Prevost, 'Contesting Free Trade: The Development of the Anti-FTAA Movement', *Pensamiento Propio*, Vol. 18 (2003), pp. 113-133.

[690] US officials in Brasilia summarised the 'Miami compromise' in a 2005 cable: 'During the FTAA Ministerial in Miami in November 2003, the US and others agreed to a new framework for negotiations to accommodate the sensitivities of Mercosul countries, principally Brazil. The compromise allowed countries to assume different levels of commitments, but guaranteed that there would be a common set of rights and obligations covering all the original areas of negotiation. Following the Miami Ministerial, negotiations to define the "common set" have not been successful'. The document continued: 'The process has not moved forward, in part due to Mercosul's continued interest in pressing for US-Mercosul negotiations'. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05BRASILIA1974, 'Scenesetter Cable for Visit of Secretary Snow', 22 July 2005.

[691] Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, 'Brazil as a Regional Power and Its Relations with the United States', *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 33 No. 3 (2006), p. 21.

[692] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 03BRASILIA2364, 'No Public Sign of Retreat from FTAA Proposal', 28 July 2003.

[693] These groups, including the peasant-based Landless Workers' Movement, built transnational coalitions targeting the FTAA process. See for example, 'MST Leads People's Consultation to Say "No" to the FTAA', *NACLA Reports on the Americas*, July/August 2002, pp. 45-46. The first World Social Forum, held in Brazil in 2001, served to coordinate those Latin American movements working against the FTAA. See José Correa Leite, *The World Social Forum: Strategies of Resistance* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2005). The US monitored the protest movement against the FTAA in Brazil. See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05BRASILIA1317, 'Brazil Landless Activists Stage Large March in Brasilia', 18 May 2005.

the PT toned-down its anti-FTAA rhetoric and moved toward orthodox macroeconomic policies. Washington understood that Brazil would 'reinvigorate' its commitment to South American integration (via Mercosur).[694] The PT retained a level of commitment to its traditional socialist platform, elements of which it tried to incorporate into the FTAA talks themselves (a nonstarter for the Bush administration).[695] Additionally, Lula's efforts at replacing the FTAA process with one based on bilateral and/or sub-regional commitments (i.e. Mercosur) were rebuffed by the US, which pushed for a comprehensive treaty by attempting to reassure Brazilian officials that Washington was 'not afraid of the PT and its social agenda', in the words of Otto Reich.[696] Brazil clearly saw the FTAA as involving much more than trade. For the PT, the agreement had the potential to seriously compromise its social, environmental and technological policies.[697] US officials lamented that 'Brazil's political goals, which include a leadership role in South America along with a strong focus on development and the social agenda, sometimes clash in its pursuit of certain national economic interests'.[698]

Why would the centre-left government of South America's largest economy entertain the notion of a trade pact with the US? We come back to the logic of structural power. In the context of transnational capitalism, Brazil was compelled to join the FTAA process to gain favourable access to the massive US market. With its exports in mind, it consistently pushed for such an outcome in the 'common set' element of the FTAA's two-tier structure. 'For Brazil', one US cable read, 'the bottom line is improved access to the US market for its agricultural and industrial goods, not regional rules for attracting foreign direct investment'.[699] Agriculture proved to be a major issue for both sides. Brazil unsuccessfully campaigned against US farm/agribusiness subsidies in the negotiations. Meanwhile, the US was unable to persuade Brazil to discuss the liberalisation of its services sector.[700] Lula himself stated publically that the US 'only want(ed) to negotiate on matters that serve its interests, such as services', and not on matters important to Brazil, such as agriculture.[701]

In general, US officials were pleasantly surprised that Lula's team remained outwardly committed to the FTAA process. 'Despite campaign rhetoric asserting that the FTAA would result in Brazil's "annexation" to the United States', read one cable, Lula

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[694] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 03BRASILIA1321, 'FTAA/WTO Continuity Despite Ascendance of Regional Integration within INTAMARATY', 29 January 2003. The US embassy concluded that, 'despite a clear emphasis on Mercosul and wider regional integration, the importance of FTAA negotiations (did) not appear to have diminished for the GOB' in Lula's early years.

[695] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 03BRASILIA1066, 'Brazilian FTAA Coordinator on a Social Agenda for the Negotiations', 3 April 2003. This included issues like employment, the environment, small and medium enterprises, poverty, family agriculture and cultural values. Following his successful 2002 campaign, Lula felt compelled to move forward with his pledge to consult the public on trade issues, leading to increased input on the part of NGOs into the Brazilian position on the FTAA. The US embassy noted that 'Brazilian civil society may not be… easily co-opted', though the input of NGOs was often ignored in Brazil's negotiating positions.

[696] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 02BRASILIA4227, 'A/S Reich's Meeting with Lula', 22 November 2002.

[697] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 03BRASILIA2364, 'No Public Sign of Retreat from FTAA Proposal', 28 July 2003. Brazilian lawmakers were also attuned to the historical asymmetries that existed between the US and Brazil, which continued to impact economic relations. This required Brazil to safeguard its vulnerable industries, according to one strain of thought in the Brazilian government. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 04BRASILIA3047, 'Ambassador Discusses FTAA and Other Issues with Brazilian Legislators', 14 December 2004.

[698] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 03BRASILIA2233, 'What's Behind Brazil's FTAA Policy', 18 July 2003.

[699] Ibid.

[700] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 04BRASILIA862, 'FTAA: Initial Buenos Aires Fallout in Brasilia', 8 April 2004.

[701] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05BRASILIA1067, 'Presidential Chief of Staff of Dirceu on FTAA and Potential Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals', 20 April 2005.

'quickly committed to continuing negotiations in good faith', even as 'radicals' within his party pushed for a public referendum on the free trade proposal.[702] Internal documents reveal a fairly optimistic attitude amongst US officials following the 2003 compromise.[703] Although there were signs of divisions within the Brazilian government, officials reassured their American counterparts that Lula and Foreign Minister Amorim wanted a hemispheric agreement.[704] To maintain momentum, the US sought to carefully 'massage' Brazil's status as the leader of the South American bloc. One cable written just before the 2003 ministerial concluded:

> Whatever construct the USG decides to pursue for the negotiations in Miami, it would be wise to orchestrate it in a way that amicably leaves the door open for greater participation of Brazil in the future; not only to enable the USG to continue to strive for the larger goal of a totally integrated hemisphere, but also to minimize the opportunity for anti-FTAA factions within Brazil to lay the blame for 'failure'... at the feet of the USG. A consistent message from other countries in the region that their interests do not coincide with Brazil's will be key to helping with the latter.[705]

By 2004, it was clear that the gulf was in fact widening in the wake of the Miami compromise. The tone of the US's internal communications grew more pessimistic. The Bush administration began entertaining the possibility of advancing a hemispheric free trade area through an 'alternate process' (outside of existing declarations).[706] Cables indicate that US officials viewed the FTAA process as 'fraught with uncertainty' due to Lula's wavering. It didn't help that Brazil's commercial lobby failed to overcome the 'ideological hurdles' of the PT government, which ensured that the FTAA was seen as a 'US-led initiative'.[707] As Amorim and others clarified that Brazil viewed the FTAA as 'desirable' but 'not essential', the US chaffed at Brazil's prioritisation of its 'geopolitical partnerships' over trade.[708] A 2005 cable stated that, 'because the GOB looks at the world through an outdated third world "North-South" lens', US-Brazil relations were 'often difficult... across a range of issues'. As US officials encouraged Brazil to 'stay the course with its orthodox economic program', they fretted over Lula's budding alliance with Chávez.[709] Brazil's commitment to Mercosur grew

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[702] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 03BRASILIA1321, 'Brazil Continues to Debate Trade Policy on Eve of USTR Zoellick's Visit', 20 May 2003.

[703] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 04BRASILIA526, 'Brazilian Response to FTAA Demarche', 5 March 2004.

[704] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 03BRASILIA3459. 'Can ITAMRATY'S Stranglehold on FTAA Policy be Broken?' 27 October 2003. As discussed in this cable, US officials were concerned in 2003 that those elements of the Brazilian government most hostile to the FTAA were in charge of trade policy. However, the cable also stated that 'there is substantial support for an FTAA within the GOB'.

[705] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 03BRASILIA3459. 'Can ITAMRATY'S Stranglehold on FTAA Policy be Broken?' 27 October 2003.

[706] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05OTTAWA2671, 'Demarche Request: Summit of the Americas Declaration and Plan of Action', 1 September 2005. As the Bush administration considered an alternate process, US officials were cautiously optimistic for much of 2005 that they could give 'new momentum to trade talks' with Brazil, and that the passage of CAFTA could reignite this momentum. According to the US embassy in Brasilia, however, the Lula government rebuffed US efforts to build momentum. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05BRASILIA2146, 'Secretary Snow's August 1-3 Meeting in Brazil—Trade Themes', 12 August 2005.

[707] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 04BRASILIA2468, 'Scenesetter: The Secretary's Visit to Brazil, 4-6 October 2004', 29 September 2004. The framing of Brazil's opposition to the FTAA as 'ideological' was commonplace in US embassy cables emanating from Brasilia in 2003-04.

[708] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05BRASILIA212, 'Brazil's 2005 Trade Agenda: More of the Same', 24 January 2005. As this and other cables make clear, Brazil continued to see Mercosur as a greater priority than the FTAA. The issue of Brazilian access to US markets in agriculture and finished goods remained a sticking point.

[709] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05BRASILIA1974, 'Scenesetter Cable for Visit of Secretary Snow', 22 July 2005. In February 2005, Brazil and Venezuela signed a 'strategic alliance' in energy, infrastructure and defence cooperation.

more apparent. As the FTAA process stalled, Mercosur expanded its trade ties with those South American countries outside of its existing customs zone—namely Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Chile and Bolivia.[710]

For the US, the FTAA had gone the way of the WTO's Doha Round, where talks withered amidst the competing interests of the North-South divide. In South America, however, opposition appeared more 'ideological'. By the time that Chávez could taunt Bush at Mar del Plata, the broader regional trend had been set. If, in 1994, there had been an elite consensus regarding the desirability of 'free trade' as defined by the United States, by 2005 it had evaporated.[711] The rise of the NLL peaked just as FTAA negotiations reached a head. Adding to the concerns of free traders in Washington, domestic support for FTAs was waning. In July 2005 the Central American Free Trade Agreement was passed by the US House of Representatives by a razor-thin vote of 217-215. Although the Bush administration hoped it would jump-start the hemispheric agenda,[712] this proved farfetched. CAFTA was comprised of small countries with far less bargaining power than Brazil or Argentina. In the end, it was less a stepping stone in the direction of the FTAA than a (temporary) step back in Washington's hemispheric designs. CAFTA was essentially a consolation prize on the path to a more limited agenda.

The Central American Free Trade Agreement: The Consolidation of a Sub-Regional Agenda

The Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR [sometimes DR-CAFTA]) encompasses the US, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. It was signed in May 2004 and 'passed through the US House of Representatives by one vote in the middle of the night by the US Congress' (in July 2005).[713] What was supposed to be a 'slam dunk' turned into one of the most closely-contested Congressional votes of the 109th Congress. The Bush White House twisted many arms to get CAFTA approved.[714] Although the economic stakes were low, wrote *The Economist*, 'the

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[710] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05BRASILIA1974, 'Scenesetter Cable for Visit of Secretary Snow', 22 July 2005. On Brazil's Mercosur policy, and Brasilia's (unsuccessful) efforts to steer trade negotiations with the US onto a US-Mercosur track, see also Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05BRASILIA2146, 'Secretary Snow's August 1-3 Meeting in Brazil—Trade Themes', 12 August 2005.

[711] The economic crises that beset the region fed the scepticism of policy elites in regards to the Washington Consensus, problematizing 'free trade' over the 1994-2005 period. See for example, Francisco Panizza, *Contemporary Latin America: Development and Democracy Beyond the Washington Consensus* (London: Zed Books, 2009). In addition to the Mexican peso crisis of 1994, the Brazilian crisis of 1998-99, and the Argentine crisis of 2001-2002, Ecuador and Bolivia both experienced major socio-political crises in the early 2000s. The turmoil in the Andean region was connected to macroeconomic conditions and neoliberal economic policy. See also, Bandeira (2006), pp. 22-23.

[712] See for example, Altieri (2003), p. 865. See also, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05BRASILIA2146, 'Secretary Snow's August 1-3 Meeting in Brazil—Trade Themes', 12 August 2005.

[713] Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch webpage, 'CAFTA: Part of the FTAA Puzzle': http://www.citizen.org/trade/cafta/. The July 2005 vote was on 'implementing legislation' that was required for the agreement to go into effect under US law. Since CAFTA was not technically a treaty, it did not require a two-thirds majority to pass the US Senate.

[714] In the weeks prior to the vote on the implementation legislation for CAFTA, the Congressional Research Service released a report stating that, following the Senate's approval of the trade agreement, 'the House (was) expected to act on similar legislation (H.R. 3045) in July 2005'. Congressional Research Service, 'DR-CAFTA: Regional Issues', 8 July 2005. The Bush administration's difficulty in passing CAFTA through the House of Representatives thus came as something of a surprise to many trade watchers in Washington. On the efforts of the Bush administration to sway Congressional support ahead of the CAFTA vote, see Edmund L. Andrews, 'How CAFTA Passed House by 2 Votes', *The New York Times*, 29 July 2009: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/29/politics/29cafta.html?pagewanted=all

politics were intense. Turn your backs on this agreement', the administration warned lawmakers, 'and your country's Central American allies might opt instead for the "Bolivarian alternative"'. With a sizeable number of protectionist Republicans joining staunch Democratic opposition, the clash over CAFTA demonstrated that the longstanding bipartisan trade consensus in Washington had faded.[715] Meanwhile, Latin America's left turn had deepened, and the geopolitical arguments for the accord were brought to the forefront of the debate.[716]

As a reciprocal trade agreement, CAFTA replaced the unilateral trade preferences of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (begun in 1983). Although opposition to the accord was strong across many parts of Central America, it was eventually ratified by all seven countries, entering into force for the US, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua in 2006, for the Dominican Republic in 2007, and for Costa Rica on January 1, 2009. Together, the CAFTA-DR countries represent the third largest US export market in Latin America (behind Mexico and Brazil). From 2006-2010, US exports to the CAFTA countries grew by 43 per cent, compared to 25 per cent growth during the five years (2001-2005) before the agreement. US exports to individual CAFTA-DR countries experienced significant growth over this period, led by Guatemala and Nicaragua (both up 57 per cent), followed by Costa Rica (44 per cent), Honduras (42 per cent), Dominican Republic (39 per cent) and El Salvador (32 per cent).[717] In 2010, CRS summarised the various objectives behind CAFTA-DR:

> Many supporters have viewed (CAFTA-DR) as a stepping stone toward completing a Free Trade Area of the Americas. US negotiators hope to assist US firms and workers by reducing tariffs on US merchandise exports, and by reducing barriers to e-commerce, services, and intellectual property trade. The US also hopes to use the agreement to improve the participants' commitment to the World Trade Organization's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and to define better the rules on transparency. The Central American participants are aiming to deepen their already strong trade relationship with the United States and to improve access for their textile and apparel products to the US market.[718]

CAFTA's neoliberal agenda was about much more than trade—particularly for the US.[719] Although US exporters stood to benefit from reduced barriers, and while the Central Americans were aiming for duty-free access to the US market, CRS noted that, 'equally important for the United States were enhanced rules covering multiple disciplines'. These included: trade in services, intellectual property rights, sanitary and phytosanitary regulations,

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[715] *The Economist*, 'A small victory for free trade as CAFTA passes', 28 July 2005: http://www.economist.com/node/4221299.

[716] As COHA wrote in May 2005, 'One of the White House's greatest fears is that Central America and Mexico may decide to join South America's spreading coalition of new left-leaning governments, which now includes Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Venezuela. With much of the hemisphere moving to isolate the US, Washington feels immense pressure to bolster its regional assertiveness and the Bush administration sees CAFTA as its vehicle to exert masterful authority in a part of Latin America closest to the continental US'. Larry Birns and Sarah E. Schaffer, 'CAFTA and its Discontents', Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 31 May 2005: http://www.coha.org/cafta-and-its-discontents/.

[717] Export.gov, 'Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR)': http://export.gov/FTA/cafta-dr/index.asp (accessed 18 December 2012).

[718] Congressional Research Service, 'Trade Agreements: Impact on the US Economy', 11 March 2010, p. 5.

[719] CAFTA originally included a related infrastructure project to facilitate the neoliberalisation of the region, called the Plan Puebla-Panama (PPP). Backed by the Mexican government and announced in 2000, the PPP failed to materialise, in part because of popular opposition. On the neoliberal characteristics of CAFTA and the PPP, see for example, Beatrice Edwards, 'Selling Free Trade in Central America', *NACLA Report on the Americas* (March/April 2004), pp. 8-9.

government procurement, and labour and environmental regulations.[720] Though the impact of CAFTA would vary from country to country, the pattern was unquestionably one of liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation, with the goal of 'opening up' Central American economies to the free movement of transnational capital.[721] By deepening existing processes of economic neoliberalisation, CAFTA bolstered the structural power of the US in Central America, despite the fact that post-agreement trends in trade were mixed.

As of 2013, the US remained the dominant trade partner with the countries of the region, but its proportion of the total had actually fallen as trade with Mexico and China increased.[722] Additionally, 'growth in US exports (had) outpaced US imports, resulting in a US trade surplus each year since CAFTA-DR entered into force'.[723] Moreover, 'there has been little real growth in US imports from the region in most cases'.[724] The US witnessed strong growth in its agricultural exports after CAFTA-DR entered into force, with further increases expected. In contrast, US agricultural imports from the region grew 'modestly' over the same period.[725] CAFTA's record has also been mixed in regards to FDI, with the bulk of foreign investment flows going to Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic. Trade amongst the Central American states themselves has also grown.[726]

Ostensibly, the desire to attract new inflows of foreign investment was a key objective for Central America's neoliberal governments. But as noted by Kevin Gallagher, CAFTA's investment provisions restrict 'the ability of signatory countries to require that foreign firms adhere to performance requirements, such as local content standards and technology transfer requirements'. What is more, CAFTA set 'broad rules regarding what constitutes an expropriation, as well as the compensation due to investors if expropriation does indeed occur'. Gallagher wrote that the agreement created the possibility that ad hoc investment tribunals could interpret social and environmental regulations as a kind of 'indirect expropriation' in certain cases. Despite these measures, the foreign investment coveted by the Central American states 'may not come' as result of CAFTA. Gallagher cited numerous studies that indicate that free trade agreements were not major factors in attracting foreign investment.[727] Mark Weisbrot, an economist with the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR), argued that, as the US trade deficit was likely to decline along with the value of the US dollar, the CAFTA countries were unlikely to see a substantive increase in

[720] Congressional Research Service, 'The Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR)', 2 April 2012, p. 2.
[721] A US government report on Costa Rica's investment climate captures this sentiment in parsimonious fashion: 'The January 1, 2009 entry-into-force of CAFTA-DR in Costa Rica unambiguously improves Costa Rica's investment climate… State enterprises have enjoyed monopolies in the sectors of wireless telephony, data telecommunications, and insurance; however, CAFTA-DR opens these specific sectors up to market competition'. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 10SANJOSE90, '2010 Investment Climate Statement: Costa Rica', 19 January 2010.
[722] Congressional Research Service, 'The Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR)', 2 April 2012, p. 5.
[723] Ibid., p. 8.
[724] Ibid., p. 9.
[725] Ibid., p. 13.
[726] Ibid., pp. 14-15.
[727] Kevin Gallagher, 'CAFTA', Center for International Policy, Americas Program, 26 September 2005: http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/1355.

their exports to the US over time. He noted that, while the agreement lowered some trade barriers, it increased others, such as those on patented pharmaceutical drugs.[728]

In addition to gaining access to the US market, Central American countries hoped to use the CAFTA negotiations to push Washington on the issue of immigration reform. In 2005, there were an estimated 2.5 million foreign-born Central Americans living in the US (up from 2 million in 2000), many of whom were undocumented.[729] That year, US remittances to CAFTA-DR countries totalled $11.5 billion. The legal status of undocumented workers in the US became a major issue for Central American governments, one with serious economic implications. In El Salvador, for example, remittances comprised over 17 per cent of the country's GDP.[730] Representatives from the Central American states also used the CAFTA talks to advocate tax incentives for US businesses to invest directly in the region, based on a US programme that existed for Puerto Rico in the 1960s. Neither of these suggestions (on remittances or tax incentives) gained traction.[731] Given the tremendous economic asymmetries that existed in the proposed free trade area, the ability of Central American governments to influence negotiations was constrained, to say the least.

On the US side, domestic interest groups weighed in on CAFTA's rules and regulations. Although some US industries (e.g. sugar, cotton) opposed the agreement, the American business lobby as a whole supported it with vigour. With the FTAA, APEC and WTO talks floundering, CAFTA took on added importance. The Chamber of Commerce spearheaded advocacy on behalf of CAFTA.[732] Support from US apparel manufacturers was also crucial to its passage. The business lobby was opposed by labour unions, environmentalists and human rights groups. UNITE HERE, a union representing workers in the textile and apparel industry, lobbied against CAFTA, as did the larger AFL-CIO federation. The rules of the agreement, labour argued, were designed to facilitate and protect foreign investment by multinational corporations. CAFTA would effectively enable corporations to be more mobile and thus less accountable to local communities, 'dramatically shifting the balance of power' away from elected governments toward private firms, 'increasing the bargaining power of employers vis-à-vis their workers'.[733] According to the AFL-CIO, CAFTA allowed the 'enormous legal obstacles' confronting Central American workers to 'remain in place, making it nearly impossible for workers in the region to win a

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[728] Mark Weisbrot, 'CAFTA Falls Short on Economic Arguments', Center for Economic and Policy Research, 16 April 2005: http://www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-columns/op-eds-&-columns/cafta-falls-short-on-economic-arguments/.

[729] Pew Hispanic Center, 'Who Are the Immigrants? A Statistical View of the Foreign-Born Population at Mid-Decade', 17 October 2006: http://pewresearch.org/pubs/261/who-are-the-immigrants.

[730] Inter-American Development Bank, Multilateral Investment Fund, 'Remittances 2005', Washington, DC, March 2006.

[731] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 03TEGUCIGALPA2467, 'Scenesetter for Secretary Powell's Visit', 22 October 2003. This cable stated: 'The Honduran delegation has also been seeking, in the context of the CAFTA agreement, a temporary entry program for unskilled laborers; this would be unacceptable to the US delegation, because of its inherent change to immigration policy and strong US Congressional opposition'. The cable also stated that Honduran interlocutors had made repeated requests that the US 'fold into CAFTA some incentives for US companies to invest in Central America, such as incentives provided to companies in the 1960s to invest in Puerto Rico'. This request was made by officials from other countries as well. Based on my reading of leaked US cables from this period, there is no indication that US officials seriously considered the inclusion of either immigration reform or tax incentives as part of the CAFTA negotiations.

[732] US Chamber of Commerce, press release, 'US Chamber Hails Final Passage of DR-CAFTA', 28 July 2005.

[733] Congressional Research Service, 'DR-CAFTA, Textiles, and Apparel', 20 May 2005, p. 6.

real voice at work and bargain for fair wages and decent working conditions'.[734] A 2004 Human Rights Watch report condemned CAFTA's labour provisions for, among other things, their lack of enforceability.[735]

Central American opposition to CAFTA reflected a related set of concerns. Across the region, criticism came primarily from unions, environmentalists, indigenous and peasant groups and the Catholic Church. As written, its opponents alleged, CAFTA had woefully inadequate labour and environmental provisions. Critics maintained that CAFTA would unfairly pit subsidised US agricultural interests against subsistence farmers. Examining the legacy of NAFTA, they charged that the agreement would exacerbate socio-economic inequality, that it would limit access to much-needed generic drugs and that certain provisions would hasten the privatisation of state-run programmes.[736] Violent protests against CAFTA flared-up in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala in 2004 and 2005. In Nicaragua, the Sandinista party galvanised opposition. Political and grassroots opposition to CAFTA was monitored closely by US embassies,[737] which, on at least one occasion, contributed resources to the policing of anti-CAFTA demonstrations.[738] In general, US officials were dismissive of the criticism of the accord by labour unions, human rights monitors and legislators.[739] Politically, the antagonism needed to be addressed to ensure the finalisation of the accord.

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[734] AFL-CIO, 'Statement of AFL-CIO President John Sweeney on Bush Administration CAFTA and Labor Proposal', 10 June 2005: http://www.aflcio.org/Press-Room/Press-Releases/Statement-of-AFL-CIO-President-John-Sweeney-on-Bus. The AFL-CIO is the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, the US's largest union federation.

[735] Human Rights Watch, 'CAFTA's Weak Labor Rights Protections: Why the Present Accord Should be Opposed', March 2004. The accord, wrote Human Rights Watch, failed to require compliance 'with even the most basic internationally recognized labor rights norms', and specifically failed 'to protect women workers against discrimination'. Although it calls on countries to uphold their own labour laws, 'which may or may not be consistent with international standards, it provides a weak enforcement mechanism for that limited commitment'. Moreover, the agreement 'fails to require that parties' enforcement of their labor laws include procedural guarantees and provide for adequate remedies to redress any violations'. Additionally, because of funding issues, there is no guarantee that CAFTA's labour cooperation/capacity building mechanism will operate adequately; pp. 1-2. Embassy cables show that, once the agreement became law, US officials did monitor labour conditions in CAFTA countries. However, they tended to report that little progress had been made in improving conditions. See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09SANTODOMINGO715, 'Assessing Labor after Two Years of CAFTA-DR', 26 June 2009; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09GUATEMALA1102, 'USG Delegation Addresses CAFTA Labor Submission', 19 October 2009.

[736] On the criticism of CAFTA and opposition to it within Central America, see for example, Congressional Research Service, 'DR-CAFTA: Regional Issues', 8 July 2005, pp. 3-6.

[737] One cable from the US embassy in Costa Rica, for example, dissected the various estimates of the size of anti-CAFTA rallies in an attempt to gauge the level of support/opposition to the agreement. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06SANJOSE2431, 'Anti-CAFTA Protest in Costa Rica: Tactical Victory for GOCR', 31 October 2006. See also, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05SANJOSE2215, 'Students, Labor Unions Stage Anti-CAFTA Marches', 22 September 2005. Regarding protests in Guatemala and Honduras, US officials expressed some mild concern, but concluded that the actions did not represent popular opinion in those countries. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05GUATEMALA699, 'Guatemalan Anti-CAFTA Demonstrators Incite Violence, Vandalism', 17 March 2005; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05TEGUCIGALPA493, 'Honduras Ratifies CAFTA', 4 March 2005.

[738] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07SANJOSE361, 'Costa Rica: Next Anti-CAFTA Protest on 26 Feb', 23 February 2007. The cable notes that the US embassy helped to improve the ability of police to respond to the protests by donating resources and facilitating training programmes.

[739] In Honduras, US embassy staff was contemptuous of labour leaders' opposition to the agreement, stating that their concerns showed their 'ignorance' of the issues and that of their constituents. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05TEGUCIGALPA364, 'Honduran Labor Leaders' Opposition to CAFTA: More Ideological than Informed', 14 February 2005. US officials did express some concern in Costa Rica when, in 2006, the country's Human Rights Ombudswoman announced her opposition to CAFTA. However, they did not feel her opposition warranted particular attention as the issues she raised in her report had already been 'debated and addressed'. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06SANJOSE762, 'Human Rights Ombudswoman Slams CAFTA-DR', 7 April 2006.

In Costa Rica, opponents nearly defeated CAFTA in a public referendum, delaying its ratification until October 2007. Activists expressed concerns that its rules would gut the country's highly-regarded environmental laws and force the privatisation of its telecommunications system.[740] In the end, however, 51.6 per cent of Costa Rican voters endorsed CAFTA, a victory for Washington. A leaked memo from the Costa Rican government showed that had the 'No' vote been ascendant, the administration of president Oscar Arias was contemplating a more forceful public relations strategy, one linking the 'No' campaign to Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro. The leaked memo forced the resignation of its author, vice president Kevin Casas-Zamora. 'A month after the memo scandal', wrote one observer, 'the Bush administration threatened to eliminate Costa Rica's (existing) trade preferences in textiles, tuna, and other sectors if its voters rejected CAFTA'.[741] Meanwhile, the US media kept up a steady pro-CAFTA drumbeat.[742]

The ratification of CAFTA was not the end of the story. The implementation of its regulations remained a major policy undertaking. Embassy cables demonstrate that US officials were active in attending to CAFTA's implementation in Central America.[743] Of particular concern to the US were the agreement's investment rules; regulations on intellectual property; and the countries' adherence to CAFTA's arbitration mechanism.[744] Where CAFTA was approved without difficulty (as in the Dominican Republic, for instance), the US hoped the ease of its legislative victory would facilitate implementation at the national level.[745] Elsewhere, as in Costa Rica, Washington needed to actively press for its finalisation. This included bringing the agreement into force as quickly as possible so as to 'up the pressure on the GOCR to move CAFTA-DR forward expeditiously', in the words of a November 2005 cable.[746] In this context, following a meeting with Bush, pro-CAFTA politicians felt compelled to state publically that the administration was *not* pressuring San José to hasten the approval process.[747] Meanwhile, in El Salvador, the US Agency for

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See also, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06SANSALVADOR515, 'FMLN Challenges CAFTA in Court', 2 March 2006.

[740] See CAFTA-DR within Central America, see for example, Congressional Research Service, 'DR-CAFTA: Regional Issues', 8 July 2005, p. 3.

[741] Dan Beeton, 'The Media Need More TLC in CAFTA Reporting', *NACLA Report on the Americas* (March/April 2008), pp. 47-48.

[742] Ibid. See also, Fred Rosen, 'The *New York Times* on NAFTA and CAFTA: No Alternative', *NACLA Report on the Americas* (January/February 2008), pp. 51-52.

[743] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08SANSALVADOR1133, 'Country Team Assessment of Salvadoran Electoral Landscape', 26 September 2008. See also, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08MANAGUA579, 'Nicaragua: AUSTR Eissenstat Promotes CAFTA-DR', 9 May 2008.

[744] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09SANSALVADOR158, 'El Salvador: 2009 Special 310 Input', 20 February 2009; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08GUATEMALA1036, 'Guatemala's Telecoms CAFTA Dispute', 13 August 2008; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08SANJOSE823, 'Costa Rica Staggers Into Second Round CAFTA Extension', 15 October 2008. This cable referred to Costa Rica's drawn-out implementations process as a 'tortuous struggle' that was ultimately worth it 'given CAFTA's importance to USG policy in the region in general'. As clear from these cables, US officials used the CAFTA framework to benefit US companies

[745] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05SANTODOMINGO425, 'Dominican Republic Ratifies DR-CAFTA', 7 September 2005.

[746] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05SANJOSE2664, 'Jan. 1, 2006 Entry into Force Helps CAFTA-DR in Costa Rica', 15 November 2005.

[747] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05SANJOSE2611, 'Discussion of CAFTA-DR by Presidents Bush and Pacheco at Summit of the Americas', 8 November 2005.

International Development (USAID) had financed an implementation programme 'long before CAFTA-DR ratification'.[748]

On March 18, 2006, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Shannon met with the US ambassadors to El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Belize and Panama to discuss regional integration, CAFTA-DR implementation and other pressing issues. Shannon expressed concerns regarding the perception of US trade policy. He noted that the US experienced 'difficulty in packaging what we do'. While governmental support for CAFTA was stable, 'populism' appeared to be on the rise. The ambassadorial group concluded that it needed to better coordinate its outreach on CAFTA implementation, including through the sharing of best practices.[749] As was the case in the pre-ratification period, much of the Bush administration's work on CAFTA was in public relations. Its messaging was geared toward 'countering the myth that "CAFTA-DR" is bad for Central America', to quote one document.[750]

For Washington, the solidification of CAFTA was jeopardised by political trends in the region, though, in hindsight, its implementation was never seriously threatened at the regional level. Latin America's left-turn would soon make its presence felt in Central America, with the election of Ortega in Nicaragua, Colom in Guatemala and Funes in El Salvador. Additionally, Honduran president Zelaya, elected in 2005, transformed himself from a pro-US free trader into a 'Bolivarian'. Had the national votes on CAFTA been a few years later, it is possible the agreement would have gone the way of the FTAA. Once it was in place, though, both the 'populists' and moderates in Central America could do little to challenge it. As the manoeuvrings of the Zelaya administration demonstrated (see below), the best they could do was to try and circumvent its rules where possible.

Both Colom and Funes supported CAFTA,[751] the latter with some reservations and in a conscious attempt to bolster his 'pragmatism', thus putting his government on a better footing with the US.[752] In conversations with US officials, representatives of Funes' FMLN party (the majority of which opposed the deal) stated that they wanted to make 'adjustments' to the agreement, 'but backed away when (the embassy) suggested how difficult that would be'.[753] Ortega, on the other hand, seemed to relish blasting CAFTA in speeches, frequently calling it an 'unfair' manifestation of Yankee imperialism. As noted by US officials, Ortega's

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[748] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05SANSALVADOR2541, 'CAFTA Brings Hope to Sluggish Salvadoran Economy', 13 September 2005.

[749] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06SANSALVADOR963, 'US Ambassadors Outline Agenda for Central America', 11 April 2006.

[750] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05TEGUCIGALPA765, 'Congressional Staffers Visit Honduras, Question CAFTA-DR's Impact on the Poor', 8 April 2005.

[751] Not only did Colom support CAFTA, he included in his cabinet some of the trade pact's strongest Guatemalan proponents. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08GUATEMALA33, 'Colom Announces His Cabinet', 11 January 2008. In 2009, Colom's neoliberal centrism was put in sharp relief by the arrival of a new 'populist' and 'pro-Chávez' (and, electorally speaking, marginal) political party, the New Republic Movement, which was highly critical of CAFTA. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09GUATEMALA406, 'Guatemala's New Left: The New Republic Movement (Part 1 of 3)', 29 April 2009.

[752] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07SANSALVADOR2406, 'Funes Offers Pragmatic, Left-of-Center Approach', 14 December 2007; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08SANSALVADOR689, 'FMLN Candidate Identifies Problems, Offers Few Solutions', 11 June 2008; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08SANSALVADOR980, 'FMLN Convention: Will Pledged Reform and Moderate Overtones Win Centrist Voters?' 20 August 2008.

[753] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08SANSALVADOR915, 'FMLN Pushes Pragmatism', 31 July 2008. In this same cable, the embassy concluded that, despite 'the FMLN's relatively benign statements', it did 'not accept their claims of pragmatism and willingness to cooperate with the US at face value'.

government faced a dilemma. It needed to attract capital investment, but wanted simultaneously to curb Nicaragua's economic dependence on the US and the IFIs.[754] During his inauguration, Ortega stated that he would 'revisit' certain elements of the agreement, before calling for a 'comprehensive renegotiation' the following year.[755] From Washington's view, CAFTA was a macroeconomic success, boosting Nicaragua's exports to the US, fostering a competitive investment environment and opening up key sectors (including telecommunications) to privatisation.[756] For the Sandinista government, however, CAFTA's rules had restricted its manoeuvrability in a host of areas, from Nicaragua's minimum wage laws to its ability to impose liability on foreign companies who manufactured or used chemical pesticides in the country.[757] The regional accord was never renegotiated in any meaningful way.

Given this closure of policy space, why would a government led by former Marxist revolutionaries choose to remain wedded to Washington's free trade accord—one that was signed into law by a rival party it defeated in an election? The true value of CAFTA for its proponents was that Nicaragua, like other countries, remained 'locked-in' to its neoliberal strictures. Yes, Ortega could use the agreement as a rhetorical punching bag, but withdrawing from CAFTA outright would create interminable legal, financial, economic and geopolitical problems for a country with a GDP equivalent to a moderately-sized US city. Even with the 'Bolivarian alternative' up and running, the costs of leaving CAFTA would simply be too great. Like the Nicaraguans, Honduran policymakers also found themselves structurally-embedded in a less-than-desirable set of 'trade' rules. Following CAFTA's ratification, Washington used the framework to persuade Honduras to pass and enforce a new telecoms law aimed at opening the industry to private competition.[758] As his term progressed, Honduran president Zelaya found his administration hamstrung by CAFTA, particularly in regards to food security and fuel imports. His efforts to circumvent CAFTA in these areas signalled a shift in the ideological orientation of his government, one that would culminate in his ouster, as discussed in Chapter 3.

Zelaya began his term as an advocate of free trade and IMF lending policies. The US saw him as an ally, though it regarded him as 'torn in different directions' by his 'populist' advisors.[759] He would occasionally exhibit leftist tendencies that were 'wildly contradictory'

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[754] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07MANAGUA2223, 'Subject: Nicaragua: An Economic Perspective on Eight Months of Ortega Rhetoric', 28 September 2007.

[755] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07MANAGUA106, 'Ortega Blaims (sic) "Neo-liberalism" for Nicaraguan Poverty at Inauguration', 17 January 2007. In this as in many other cables, 'neo-liberalism' is placed in scare-quotes. For US officialdom, neoliberalism is little more than a code word used by leftist politicians to criticise US policy. See also, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08MANAGUA1317, 'Nicaragua: Rhetoric Aside, Exports are Booming', 28 October 2008.

[756] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07MANAGUA522, 'Nicaragua: CAFTA Update', 27 February 2007. See also, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09MANAGUA1343, 'Nicaragua Telecom Sector: Market Open, but Competition "Slim"', 5 June 2009.

[757] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08MANAGUA1213, 'Tripartite Agreement over Minimum Wage Raise, but Reform Still Looms', 26 May 2009; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09MANAGUA1084, 'Nicaragua: Input for the 2010 National Trade Estimate', 30 October 2009.

[758] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07TEGUCIGALPA1337, 'Honduras: "Lizzie Law" Falls Victim to Corruption', 8 August 2007.

[759] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06TEGUCIGALPA526, 'Zelaya Administration's First 45 Days – Pro-US Zelaya often Torn in Different Directions by Advisors', 16 March 2006. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05TEGUCIGALPA2420, 'Part III: What Does a Liberal Party Victory Mean for the Honduran Economy and US Economic Interests?' 30 November 2005.

to his avowedly free market stance.[760] In 2008, Zelaya enacted a 'consumer protection law' to fix prices for essential goods (including food) via 'emergency declaration' (to circumvent CAFTA rules on price fixing). The move was condemned as 'statist' by the US, reflecting 'a distrust of markets'.[761] Honduras's decision to 'nationalise' its fuel imports also caused alarm in Washington, in part because it was facilitated via Venezuela's Petrocaribe initiative. In a leaked US cable from October 2006, the embassy in Tegucigalpa wrote: 'Our aggressive public and private interventions have significantly reduced the chances that this process will result in a political and economic alliance of GOH with Venezuela under a Petrocaribe arrangement'. But, in this and other cables, US officials asserted that Zelaya's energy policies were non-compliant with CAFTA.[762] Less than two years later, Zelaya announced that Honduras was indeed joining ALBA. Citing US farm subsidies and regional free trade policies, he criticised the US over Honduras's food crisis. In response, the US endeavoured to 'remain out of the public fray', no doubt aware that criticism of Zelaya's decision could stoke nationalist sentiments. However, the embassy emphasised that it expected Honduras 'to honor its obligations under CAFTA, which, unlike ALBA, has a formal legal text, has been approved by both our legislatures and contains clear rules, rights, obligations and procedures for resolving disputes'.[763] When Zelaya was deposed in a coup, he and other regional leaders suggested that Honduras be suspended from CAFTA as part of a broader sanctions regime. Evidently, this was never on the table in Washington.[764]

Regional Integration against the FTAA: Mercosur and ALBA

The trade policies of the US serve its structural power by deepening processes of economic neoliberalisation. As discussed above, the structural power of the US is co-constituted via its agential capacities, as expressed in the construction of multilateral free trade regimes, which go beyond mere trade in goods to re*structure* national economies. This agency, of course, is itself contingent on the pre-existing structures of transnational capitalism, which are in turn dialectically (re)produced through the foreign economic policies of the US state and the other actors in the system. The most consequential of these actors are (the states of) the major economies of Latin America: Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, Peru and Ecuador, in descending order of nominal GDP. With the election of NLL leaders in Brazil, Argentina and elsewhere in the 2000s, the landscape of inter-American trade relations changed considerably. This section highlights the intersection of institutional and structural forms of (counter-)power, as well as their relationship to the Washington Consensus ideology.

In October 2003, Lula and Kirchner signed 'the Buenos Aires Consensus'. The agreement formalised the budding alliance between Brazil and Argentina on matters of international economic policy. The 20-point declaration consolidated a common approach on

[760] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06TEGUCIGALPA1816, 'President Zelaya's UNGA Speech Long on Leftist Rhetoric, Short on Substance', 26 September 2006.
[761] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08TEGUCIGALPA722, 'Consumer Protection Law Reflects Statist Mentality', 4 August 2008.
[762] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06TEGUCIGALPA1881, '(S) Honduras Under CAFTA: After Six Months, Little to Show', 4 October 2006. See also, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07TEGUCIGALPA1818, 'GOH Pursuing PetroCaribe Deal', 26 November 2007.
[763] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08TEGUCIGALPA718, 'Zelaya Announces at Petrofood Summit he is Joining ALBA', 31 July 2008.
[764] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09STATE92655, 'Secretary's Meeting with Honduran President Zelaya', 5 September 2009; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 10SANTODOMINGO35, 'Zelaya and Fernandez Arrive in DR', 29 January 2010.

foreign debt, IMF negotiations, economic growth, trade, wealth redistribution, taxation, social policy and the strengthening of Mercosur. Though imprecise in its proposals, the declaration was a forceful rejoinder to the Washington Consensus.[765] It included rhetoric on 'reaching a satisfactory agreement' on the FTAA by 2005. But its anti-neoliberal tinge was evident in its insistence that the state play a more active role in encouraging equitable and sustainable economic growth. Additionally, the Buenos Aires Consensus helped Brazil and Argentina repair the damage done to bilateral relations when Lula failed to issue a strong public statement of support for Kirchner's confrontational approach to IMF negotiations. (In 2003, Argentina was attempting—successfully, in the end—to include a 'social clause' in its IMF agreement, whereby the fiscal surplus used for debt repayment was subordinated to social indicators, including wealth redistribution and poverty rates.) As noted by one analyst, 'Lula had chosen not to seem rebellious before the IMF, knowing that Brazil's own delicate negotiations would soon be under way'.[766] The most concrete impact of the alliance was in the countries' relations with the Bretton Woods institutions. In 2004, the leaders signed a follow-up agreement calling on the IMF to reform its 'rules of engagement' with debtor nations. Lula and Kirchner wanted to ensure that the repayment of IMF loans did not jeopardise economic growth and infrastructure investment.[767] At the time, the two countries' debt accounted for nearly 50 per cent of the IMF's loan portfolio. 'By joining forces', wrote CSIS, Brazil and Argentina were 'sending a message to the international community that, together, they have much leverage and are in a position to bargain with the international financial institutions'.[768]

The Lula-Kirchner agreement can be traced back to an earlier 'Buenos Aires Consensus', drawn up in 1998 by social democratic leaders and thinkers from across Latin America. Featuring the likes of Ricardo Lagos, who would become Chile's president, Jorge Castañeda, and Lula himself, the 1998 meeting assessed Latin America's future 'after neoliberalism', according to its final proclamation. As stated by William Robinson, 'while the document called for "growth with equity" and a greater role for the state in assistance to the poor it was explicit that the logic of the market must not be challenged'.[769] For Ellner, the 1998 consensus was largely the product of Castañeda's strategising, in which 'leftists woo "centrists" away from the right on the basis of an alternative program to neoliberalism'. This alliance-based approach was distinct from more radical or overtly anti-neoliberal paths, which threatened to alienate key sectors of the elite, thus spurring capital flight and/or outright reaction from more conservative elements.[770] According to Robinson, the Lula-Kirchner alliance, built on the earlier Buenos Aires Consensus, represented a 'mildly

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[765] Tony Smith, 'Argentina and Brazil Align to Fight US Trade Policy', *The New York Times*, 21 October 2003. The 'left-leaning statement of intent', in Smith's words, was designed primarily to maintain the Brazil-Argentina alliance on trade issues, which was forged during the WTO negotiations in Cancún, Mexico earlier that year. Both countries had played a key role in 'pressing for more equitable trade for farmers in developing countries' during those talks. On the continuity between the WTO talks in Cancún and the Lula-Kirchner alliance, see also, Gary Prevost, 'Contesting Free Trade: The Development of the Anti-FTAA Movement', *Pensamiento Propio* 18 (2003), pp. 114-115.

[766] Julian Massaldi, 'Buenos Aires Consensus', ZNet, 20 November 2003: http://www.zcommunications.org/buenos-aires-consensus-by-julian-massaldi.

[767] The Bretton Woods Project, 'Lula and Kirchner want IMF to relax grip', *The Bretton Woods Update*, Number 40, May/June (2004), p. 3.

[768] Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Hemisphere Highlights: Americas Program*, Vol. 3 Issue 4, (April 2004), p. 6.

[769] William I. Robinson, *Latin America and Global Capitalism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), p. 270.

[770] Steve Ellner, 'Leftist Goals and the Debate over Anti-Neoliberal Strategy in Latin America', *Science & Society*, Vol. 68 No. 1 (2004), pp. 11-15.

reformist path for regional integration into global capitalism'. This was in contrast to ALBA, a genuinely counter-hegemonic project of regional economic development.[771]

There was little alarm amongst US policymakers over the Lula-Kirchner pact. Argentina was recovering from economic catastrophe, and Lula had proved to be a restrained and pragmatic figure in the eyes of Washington. However, the Buenos Aires Consensus did indicate that even the more reformist strains of the NLL would prioritise South American integration over the discredited policies of the Washington Consensus. One could argue that it aided in the creation of new regional forums and institutions. After all, the Buenos Aires Consensus predated UNASUR, CELAC, the Bank of the South and even ALBA, which would be announced by Chávez the following year. Moreover, as noted above, Brazil and Argentina sought the reinvigoration of Mercosur as a counterweight to the FTAA, and the Lula-Kirchner alliance provided much-needed momentum toward this objective. A more dynamic Mercosur would be realised, they hoped, through its expansion outside of the Southern Cone. Thus, Mercosur would come to include Venezuela as a full member, even as Chávez pursued his own project of regional integration known as the 'Bolivarian alternative'. Together, the multilateral forums provided space for coordinating opposition to the FTAA.

The Common Market of the South (Mercosur): An FTAA Roadblock

With the NLL in ascendancy, the dynamics of regional economic cooperation shifted. On one side sat the US and its network of bilateral and sub-regional free trade regimes (NAFTA, CAFTA-DR and the various bilateral FTAs detailed below), collectively advancing the neoliberalisation of the Washington Consensus. On the other side sat the Mercosur countries, governed mainly by centre-left parties, which united in one pact the majority of the Western hemisphere's opposition to the FTAA.[772] Politically and ideologically, the opposition of the Mercosur bloc was surpassed by that of the 'Bolivarian' governments of ALBA, themselves closing ranks with the Mercosur nations. From Washington's perspective, efforts at integration had been overtaken by an 'ideological' turn in the region. US trade policy, once put on the defensive, sought to manage and deflect the opposition to the FTAA, which was coordinated through Mercosur and ALBA. But these configurations offered more than a rejection of Washington's policies. They offered alternative paths of integration devoid of the asymmetry imposed by the inclusion of the United States in a hemispheric accord.[773] Here, as with the IFIs, we see the intersection of institutional and structural power in the international political economy.

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[771] Robinson, *Latin America and Global Capitalism* (2008), pp. 350-352.

[772] Congressional Research Service, 'A Free Trade Area of the Americas: Major Policy Issues and Status of Negotiations', updated 15 July 2008, p. 6. In some respects, this division is geographical, with Mexico, Central America and much of the Caribbean integrated into Washington's free trade sphere, while the bulk of South America remains committed to a separate vision of regional economic integration. Nicolas Grinberg, 'Where is Latin America Going? FTAA or "Twenty-first-Century Socialism"?' *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 30 No. 1 (2010), pp. 185-202. For Grinberg, the opposition of countries like Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela to the FTAA was not primarily political, but reflective of the structural imperatives of capital accumulation in much of South America. He writes that opposition to the FTAA 'arises from the recovery of the amount of ground rent available for appropriation and its capacity to sustain industrial production for the protected domestic/regional markets. It therefore rests on weak foundations.'; p. 198. On the importance of Mercosur to the collapse the FTAA, see also, Carranza (2003), Carranza (2004) and Briceño Ruiz (2007).

[773] Of course, these trade forums did feature asymmetries associated with including larger national economies (e.g. Brazil and Argentina) alongside smaller countries (e.g. Uruguay and Paraguay).

The Common Market of the South (Mercosur; Mercosul in Portuguese) predated the rise of the NLL. As the period of South America's military dictatorships came to an end in the 1980s, the 'new' democracies were presented with opportunities for closer multilateral cooperation. In 1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay singed the Treaty of Asunción, formally creating the Common Market. Inspired by the EU,[774] Mercosur was a project of economic integration wrapped around political objectives, including the cessation of the traditional rivalry between Argentina and Brazil. With the import substitution industrialisation (ISI) model becoming obsolete, Mercosur embraced 'open regionalism' aimed at liberalising South American economies in concert with processes of 'globalisation'. Inter-governmental rather than supranational, Mercosur was an attempt to steer these processes toward economic development and 'social justice'.[775] 'Its objectives are to create a common market with free movement of goods, services and productive factors; adopt a common external policy; coordinate common positions in international forums; (and) coordinate sector and macroeconomic policies'.[776] Mercosur is often referred to as a customs union. It features a Common External Tariff (CET), which covers approximately 85 per cent of intra-regional trade.[777] As noted below, the CET has been a source of contention throughout the organisation's history.

Mercosur is undoubtedly complex. Whereas some scholars view its origins as essentially protectionist, others see it as a thoroughly neoliberal institution. From a certain vantage, Mercosur's formation *contributed* to the structural power of the US. Writing on the tenth anniversary of its founding, Cammack characterised Mercosur as an 'agent of discipline' in the construction of a more globalised capitalism. Much like other trade agreements, Mercosur fostered a market-led approach to development. And much like the IMF and World Bank, Cammack argued, Mercosur internalised the role of surveillance and enforcement of neoliberal macroeconomic reforms. This was done through, among other things, proposed limits on public spending, as well as IFI-related country assistance strategies, which facilitated new loans from the Bretton Woods institutions.[778] Similarly, Mecham wrote that Mercosur's developmentalist project was undermined by its neoliberal limitations.[779] Trade may have increased during its first decade, but so did poverty and inequality. Mercosur's institutional structure was shaky and uneven. The adoption of the CET, for example, a core objective of the customs union, 'was imperfect, riddled with exemptions and lacking in transparency'.[780] At the same time, Mercosur had other objectives. Partly a response to globalisation and US hegemony, it was also a political initiative aimed at advancing cooperation in the Southern Cone. A failed development project, perhaps, but Mercosur would soon be utilised to consolidate the 'South American position' in global trade

[774] On the vision of the EU as a model for Mercosur, see for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 04BUENOSAIRES2291, 'Former President Duhalde on Kirchner, FTAA and Venezuela', 10 August 2004; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 04BRASILIA3100, 'Deputy National Security Advisor Shirzad's Nov 22-23 Meetings with Brazilian Economic Policymakers and Private Sector Contacts', 17 December 2004.
[775] Mercado Común del Sur, Tratado de Asunción. Available at: http://www.rau.edu.uy/mercosur/tratasp.htm.
[776] Renato Baumann, 'Integration in Latin America—Trends and Challenges', Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC/CEPAL), January 2008, p. 3.
[777] Ibid.
[778] Paul Cammack, 'Dependent and Disciplinary Regionalism', in *Ten Years of Mercosur*, edited by Pitou van Dijck and Marianne Wieisbron (Amsterdam: Centre for Latin American Research and Documentation, 2002), pp. 85-96.
[779] Michael Mecham, 'Mercosur: a failing development project?' *International Affairs*, Vol. 79 No. 2 (2003), pp. 369-387.
[780] Mecham (2003), p. 378.

talks. As stated succinctly by the Council on Foreign Relations: 'Mercosur played a key role in the failure of the Free Trade Agreement (sic) of the Americas (FTAA)'.[781]

By 2000, some observers were asserting that Mercosur was on the verge of collapse. The Brazilian *real* experienced a maxi-devaluation in January 1999, upsetting the balance of trade between member states. The countries were unable to agree on a uniform regime for trade in automobiles and auto parts. The liberalisation of the bloc's services sector was nowhere in sight, despite earlier pledges. Even the common external tariff (CET) remained a point of contention.[782] But, as noted above, Mercosur was never an exclusively economic project. By the time Lula and Kirchner announced the Buenos Aires Consensus, a degree of normalcy had returned to the customs union, just as Washington was heightening its efforts to finalise the FTAA. In an indirect manner, the FTAA process allowed for a 'reinvigoration of purpose' for Mercosur, which had been riddled with institutional crises since the mid-1990s. Under the stewardship of the PT and Peronist governments, Mercosur was presented (if not fully consolidated) as an alternative to the 'deep integration' proposed by the Bush administration. This was a political decision. As stated by Emir Sader, Lula's 'decision to prioritise the regional process of integration led Brazil to veto the FTAA, opening the space for Mercosur to be revived from its state of inactivity, and almost inexistence'.[783] Argentina, for its part, was also invested in a more dynamic Mercosur, as was Venezuela, which wanted to join the bloc as a full member. Despite their differences, the leaders of South America's NLL governments were enthusiastic about the possibilities of a renewed Mercosur.[784]

The Kirchner government was integral in bringing Venezuela into the Common Market. For Washington, the Kirchner-Chávez relationship was worrisome, and not only because the inclusion of Chávez threatened to 'politicise' the forum.[785] It also demonstrated that Kirchner was prone to 'populism', contributing to the US's understanding of him as a borderline 'anti-US' politician. At times, Kirchner was highly critical of US trade policy, particularly on the FTAA and agricultural subsidies.[786] In a 2006 cable summarising his

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[781] Council on Foreign Relations, 'Mercosur: South America's Fractious Trade Bloc', 31 July 2012: http://www.cfr.org/trade/mercosur-south-americas-fractious-trade-bloc/p12762.

[782] Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, 'Recent Developments Affecting the MERCOSUR Economic Integration Project', *Thunderbird International Business Review*, Vol. 42 No. 1 (2000), pp. 1-7.

[783] 'The Lula Government's Foreign Policy: An Interview with Emir Sader', *NACLA Report on the Americas*, March/April 2011, pp. 32-33.See also, Bandeira (2006).

[784] Unsurprisingly, and in contrast with Lula, Kirchner and Chávez, centrist/centre-right opposition politicians in NLL countries were less sanguine on Mercosur. They tended to advocate a broader approach to free trade that focused on finalising the hemispheric FTAA. See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06SAOPAULO1069, 'Alckmin as President: The End of Ideology', 6 October 2006; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06CARACAS3313, 'Rosales Foreign Policy Platform-Chiding Chavez', 6 November 2006. This 'opposition' to Mercosur was shared by some business groups in the Southern Cone. In consultations with the US embassy in Brasilia, for example, 'senior executives of key Brazilian and multinational companies questioned Brazil's continued membership in Mercosur (in its current configuration as a customs union), noting that Argentina, in particular, is preventing Mercosur from entering into meaningful trade agreements'. The groups called for a more traditional focus on free trade, including through the FTAA process. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 04BRASILIA3100, 'Deputy National Security Advisor Shirzad's Nov 22-23 Meetings with Brazilian Economic Policymakers and Private Sector Contacts', 17 December 2004.

[785] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06BRASILIA661, 'Mercosur Turns 15 – A Somber Quinceanera', 5 April 2006. In conversations with US government officials, representatives from the American Chamber of Commerce expressed their concerns that the inclusion of Venezuela in Mercosur cast doubt onto the future of the trade bloc. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06BUENOSAIRES2292, 'AUSTR Eissenstat Visit to Argentina', 12 October 2006.

[786] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06BUENOSAIRES1176, 'Argentina: Kirchner Interviews Likely Warm-up for May 25 Speech', 24 May 2006.

tenure, the US touted Kirchner's ability to bring economic stability to Argentina, while also criticising his foreign policy as 'erratic'. His administration's focus on regional integration meant little more than the 'strengthening of relations with Venezuela and Brazil'. This included the integration of Venezuela into Mercosur during Argentina's pro tempore presidency of the trade bloc. 'Kirchner's top officials', wrote the US embassy, 'have repeatedly told Embassy officials that the GOA's relationship with Venezuela is based on economics and Mercosur. Kirchner sees Venezuela as a solution for Argentina's energy and financing problems'.[787] In the early- to mid-2000s, the Venezuela-Argentina relationship hinged largely on Chávez's financing of Argentinean debt, which allowed Buenos Aires to sever ties with the IMF. As noted in one leaked cable, 'the GOV has been (a) major purchaser of Argentine bonds and continually holds out the promise of helping Argentina resolve its serious long-term energy shortages'.[788]Additionally, Argentina, Brazil and the other Mercosur countries supported Chávez's 2006 bid to win a temporary seat on the UN Security Council, riling the Bush administration.[789] Nevertheless, Washington repeatedly leaned on the Kirchner government to act as a 'moderating' influence on Chávez.[790]

In 2004, Venezuela applied to become Mercosur's fifth member. It won approval from Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay in 2006, but the ascension process dragged on until July 2012. Its completion was made possible by the suspension of Paraguay over the legislative 'coup' against president Lugo, which Mercosur dubbed an 'interruption in the democratic order'.[791] Chávez's inclusion alongside Lula, the Kirchners, Uruguayan presidents Tabaré Vásquez and José Mujica, and, for a time, Paraguay's Lugo, gave Mercosur a decidedly left-leaning bent. During the 2006 summit, the leaders reiterated their position that Mercosur was a viable alternative to US-led free trade agreements. Chávez asserted that the bloc would become a 'common front against US free trade deals', and that Venezuela's inclusion was a 'victory against Washington's imperialistic plans for the hemisphere'.[792] At the 2007 summit, Chávez called for Mercosur to be 'decontaminated of neoliberalism'.[793] The Lula and Kirchner governments were generally more muted, insisting that Mercosur's development need not endanger economic cooperation with the US. Bolivia and Ecuador were subsequently invited to apply for full membership, adding two more 'Bolivarian' voices to the group. As of 2013, Ecuador was an associate member of Mercosur (along with Chile,

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[787] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06BUENOSAIRES1594, 'Argentina: Kirchner at Three Years', 18 July 2006.
[788] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06BUENOSAIRES1176, 'Argentina: Kirchner Interviews Likely Warm-up for May 25 Speech', 24 May 2006.
[789] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06BUENOSAIRES2458, 'US-Argentine Bilateral Relationship; US Elections; Brazilian Elections' 10/31/06', 2 November 2006.
[790] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06BUENOSAIRES1176, 'Argentina: Kirchner Interviews Likely Warm-up for May 25 Speech', 24 May 2006. This was done by the US in a nuanced manner, according to the cable. The document implies that the Brazilian government was also gently persuaded by the Bush administration to try to moderate Chávez and his policies.
[791] For a new member to gain admittance to Mercosur, the legislatures of all member states must agree. Paraguay's senate had held up Venezuela's accession for a number of years. However, Paraguay was suspended from Mercosur following the rapid impeachment against centre-left president Fernando Lugo in July 2012 (which some have called a 'coup'), paving the way for Venezuela's formal accession to the group. See *Reuters*, 'Mercosur welcomes Venezuela, suspends Paraguay', 29 June 2012: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/29/us-mercosur-idUSBRE85S1JT20120629.
[792] Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA), 'COHA Report: MERCOSUR Presidential Summit Concludes with High Hopes', 25 July 2006: http://www.coha.org/coha-report-mercosur-presidential-summit-concludes-with-high-hopes/. Mercosur's members made Fidel Castro a surprise guest at the group's 2006 gathering. Castro praised the South Americans for challenging US-designed integration plans and for pursing a trade agreement with Cuba.
[793] Council on Foreign Relations, 'Mercosur: South America's Fractious Trade Bloc', 31 July 2012: http://www.cfr.org/trade/mercosur-south-americas-fractious-trade-bloc/p12762.

Colombia and Peru).[794] In December 2012, Evo Morales signed the requisite incorporation protocols, paving the way for Bolivia's ascension to full membership.[795]

The rhetorical focus on 'unity' did not mean that the tensions within Mercosur were insignificant. Nor did it mean that South America as a whole had embraced the Mercosur agenda. Venezuela's departure from the Community of Andean Nations (CAN),[796] another multilateral forum, left CAN institutionally weakened at a time when Washington was actively pursuing free trade deals with several of its members, including Peru and Colombia. The gradual movement of Bolivia and Ecuador away from CAN and toward Mercosur further reduced the relevancy of the Andean body, which had generally been more open to the prospect of free trade with the United States.[797] In addition to the controversy over Paraguay's 2012 suspension, Uruguay was at odds with Mercosur for much of the late-2000s. And, although Mercosur nominally promotes free trade, Argentina and Brazil continued to limit each other's imports.[798] The percentage of intra-group exports among the five members actually declined from 1997 to 2011 (partly as a result of the commodities boom of the 2000s). Mercosur's detractors asserted that it was becoming protectionist and politicised.[799] The bloc was unable to finalise trade agreements with the EU (despite extensive negotiations),[800] China, or, for that matter, the US.

As noted in the above discussion on the Buenos Aires Consensus, Mercosur also facilitated cooperation on financial issues, including in regards to the IFIs. Brazil and Argentina parted ways with the IMF in the early 2000s.[801] One important project in this area was the Bank of the South, 'a monetary fund and lending organization established in September 2009 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela

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[794] Associate members do not enjoy fully voting rights in Mercosur forums, nor do they enjoy complete access to the markets of the group's full members. However, they do receive tariff reductions. Associate members are not required to impose the custom union's common external tariff (CET), which applies exclusively to Mercosur's full members. Bolivia's application to become a full member is controversial partly because the country maintain lower tariffs than those of Mercosur. Council on Foreign Relations, 'Mercosur: South America's Fractious Trade Bloc', 31 July 2012: http://www.cfr.org/trade/mercosur-south-americas-fractious-trade-bloc/p12762.

[795] *Merco Press*, 'Bolivia signs Mercosur incorporation protocol and becomes sixth member', 8 December 2012: http://en.mercopress.com/2012/12/08/bolivia-signs-mercosur-incorporation-protocol-and-becomes-sixth-member.

[796] The Community of Andean Nations is also a free trade zone. Venezuela officially left the CAN upon joining Mercosur. Bolivia's Morales has criticised it as being beneficial only to the wealthy. See for example: Council on Foreign Relations, 'Mercosur: South America's Fractious Trade Bloc', 31 July 2012: http://www.cfr.org/trade/mercosur-south-americas-fractious-trade-bloc/p12762.

[797] Following CAFTA, the US was planning on negotiating a sub-regional FTA for the Andean region, to include Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, but excluding Venezuela. The negotiations process was facilitated through the Community of Andean Nations (CAN). The talks did not result in an Andean FTA, though the US would later finalise bilateral agreements with Peru and Colombia. See for example, Wikileaks: Reference ID: 05LIMA4774, 'A New Andean Dialogue', 8 November 2005.

[798] *Reuters*, 'Mercosur welcomes Venezuela, suspends Paraguay', 29 June 2012: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/30/us-mercosur-idUSBRE85S1JT20120630.

[799] See for example, *The Economist*, 'South American Integration: Mercosur RIP?' 14 July 2012: http://www.economist.com/node/21558609.

[800] See for example, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 'COHA Report: The EU and Mercosur—Can the EU Get its Foot in the Door of Mercosur, Latin America's Most Dominant Market?' 27 April 2007: http://www.coha.org/coha-report-the-eu-and-mercosur-can-the-eu-get-its-foot-in-the-door-of-mercosur-latin-america%E2%80%99s-most-dominant-market/.

[801] *The Economist*, 'Argentina, Brazil and the IMF: Kirchner and Lula: different ways to give the Fund the kiss off', 20 December 2005.

with an initial capital of $20 billion'.[802] Conceived of as a development bank that could (potentially) act as a monetary stabilisation fund, it was pushed as an alternative to the IMF and World Bank.[803] Reflecting, perhaps, the lack of consensus over the purpose of Mercosur-based integration, there were noticeable disagreements over the structure of the new bank,[804] which led to a delay in its creation (the idea was first proposed in 2007). To a degree, these disputes were attributable to the fissures within the NLL,[805] differences that cut across both Mercosur and ALBA—which proposed a similar, if smaller, development institution. That said, the creation of the Bank of the South showed a concerted effort on the part of NLL countries to challenge the Washington Consensus beyond the issue of trade. It addressed the conditionality attached to the lending practices of the Bretton Woods institutions. It emphasised the revival of the public sector through loans to state-owned companies and in partnership with state-owned banks.[806] As noted by one observer: 'Privately, insiders at the IFIs are beginning to see more immediate financial competition from the Bank of the South, but even greater recognition of the symbolic damage the initiative has inflicted on the flagging relevance of their own institutions'.[807] To promote 'the convergence and complementarity of economic integration processes', membership in the Bank of the South was extended beyond Mercosur to include all UNASUR countries.[808] In the wake of the 2008 global economic crisis, however, the Bank continued to face challenges to its institutionalisation.[809]

How did the United States internalise Mercosur's evolution, and what impact did it have on US structural power? A confidential cable from 2006 offers a glimpse into Washington's position on the changes in Mercosur:

> Over the past couple of years, Mercosur has evolved from a benign trading bloc into a political union with a robust foreign policy agenda. More often than not, this agenda has clashed with some USG objectives—particularly since Venezuela became its fifth member. A prime example of Mercosur's politicization was manifested by its unflinching support for Venezuela's bid for a semi-permanent seat on the UNSC. Earlier examples include Mercosur's anti-FTAA posture at the Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata and the 2005 accord binding members not to sign Article 98 agreements with the US. The unpredictability of two Mercosur leaders (Argentina's Nestor Kirchner and Venezuela's Hugo Chavez) have further complicated Mercosur politics. There's been recent talk about bringing Bolivia into the bloc, adding the fiery Evo Morales into the Mercosur mix.[810]

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[802] Council on Foreign Relations, 'Mercosur: South America's Fractious Trade Bloc', 31 July 2012: http://www.cfr.org/trade/mercosur-south-americas-fractious-trade-bloc/p12762.

[803] See for example, Vince McElhinny, 'Bank of the South: Info Brief', Bank Information Center (BIC) (November 2007).

[804] See for example, Martin Hart-Landsberg, 'Learning from ALBA and the Bank of the South', *Monthly Review* (September 2009): http://monthlyreview.org/2009/09/01/learning-from-alba-and-the-bank-of-the-south-challenges-and-possibilities. He writes: 'The creation of the Bank of the South owes much to a common concern for regional independence by two different groups of South American countries: those led by governments that embrace a more radical project of social transformation (Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador) and those led by governments that are largely committed to a capitalist project but believe success requires financial independence from the United States (Brazil and Argentina)'.

[805] Brazil, for example, maintained its own national development bank. See Hart-Landsberg (2009).

[806] McElhinny (2007), p. 6.

[807] Ibid., p. 19.

[808] Bank of the South, Founding Charter, available at: www.bicusa.org/proxy/Document.11292.aspx.

[809] Bretton Woods Project, 'The Bank of the South: the search for an alternative to the IFIs', 26 September 2008: http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-562433; Bretton Woods Project, 'Latin America: Return to the IMF or reinforce alternatives?', 17 April 2009: http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-564201.

[810] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06MONTEVIDEO1097, 'How Mercosur Has Changed', 16 November 2006. Article 98 agreements pertain to the International Criminal Court (ICC). They prevent the ICC from prosecuting

The document also criticised Mercosur's broader trade agenda as 'little more than a failure'. Specifically, it highlighted uncertainties over the CET and the group's inability to move forward on its 4-1 process to negotiate a trade deal with the US. 'In light of these developments', the cable read, 'a re-examination of our overall relationship with Mercosur may be warranted'.[811] Saddled with various political and economic tensions, the bloc nevertheless managed to solidify itself as a major obstacle to the FTAA. Insofar as the US maintained a strategy directed at Mercosur, it was fairly incoherent.[812] But the US's broader objectives in the international economy remained in place. With the FTAA in tatters, the US free trade agenda jumped to the bilateral track. 'In response to a question on why the US has chosen to pursue bilateral agreements with Latin American nations rather than the hemispheric FTAA', the US Assistant Trade Representative 'explained that the US continues to pursue all available multilateral, regional and bilateral opportunities to lower trade barriers and promote international commerce'.[813] These opportunities would be further restricted by the consolidation of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA).

ALBA and the FTAA

Originally known as the 'Bolivarian *Alternative* for Our Americas', ALBA was created as a substitute for the US-led FTAA. Later the 'Bolivarian Alliance', the Venezuelan-led group represented a multifaceted configuration of Latin America's leftist governments, with participation by a number of smaller Caribbean countries.[814] In contrast to Mercosur, ALBA challenged US hegemony head-on; it was created to compete directly with the various manifestations of the US's free trade agenda, from CAFTA-DR to bilateral FTAs.[815] Although ALBA began as an alliance between Venezuela and Cuba, it quickly became a regional project. 'Intended to be a counter-point to the FTAA', read a 2005 US cable, 'ALBA has yet to be more than a rallying theme for radical Latin American "socialists" and anti-systemics'. In recounting the newly-announced trade agreements between Venezuela and Cuba, the document quoted Chávez's criticism of the FTAA: 'it is integration to destroy us'. ALBA, Chávez stated, 'must go beyond Cuba and Venezuela'. The forum's social mission, he surmised, would 'declare war... on misery, on sickness, on exclusion'. Fidel Castro praised the inchoate integration scheme. The US embassy concluded that the 'barely defined counter-proposal to the FTAA' was largely a means of funnelling subsidised oil to Cuba.[816]

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an individual located in an ICC member state if said prosecution would cause the state to violate the terms of other treaties to which it is a party. They are also referred to as bilateral immunity agreements. The Bush administration sought Article 98 agreements as a way of protecting US military personnel from potential ICC prosecution. The US is not a party to the ICC.

[811] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06MONTEVIDEO1097, 'How Mercosur Has Changed', 16 November 2006.

[812] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06BRASILIA661, 'Mercosur Turns 15 – A Somber Quinceanera', 5 April 2006. This particular cable concludes with the embassy eliciting views from other Mercosur posts with the aim of starting an on-going discussion over the changes in Mercosur to construct a response.

[813] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06BUENOSAIRES2292, 'AUSTR Eissenstat Visit to Argentina', 12 October 2006.

[814] The official name of the group was originally *La Alternativa Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América*. The acronym ALBA means 'dawn' in Spanish.

[815] See for example, Thomas Muhr, 'Nicaragua Re-visited: From Neo-liberal "Ungovernability" to the Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA)', Centre for Globalisation, Education and Societies, University of Bristol (2008). See also, 'Counter-Hegemonic Regionalism and Higher Education for All: Venezuela and the ALBA', Centre for Globalisation, Education and Societies, University of Bristol (2010).

[816] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05CARACAS1359, 'Chavez Visit to Havana Leaves Plethora of Economic Agreements', 4 May 2005. 'The central focus of the deals', according to the cable, 'appears to be oil, with the establishment of PDVSA-Cuba and the acknowledgement of an increase in oil shipments to Cuba from 53

Since 2004, when Venezuela and Cuba signed their first ALBA exchange agreement, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Dominica, Ecuador, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Antigua and Barbuda have joined the bloc as full members.[817] Honduras was briefly a member. Suriname and St. Lucia were granted accession to ALBA in 2012, with Haiti gaining observer status.[818] The more 'moderate' NLL governments have largely kept their distance from ALBA proper, though Brazil and Argentina joined ALBA's Petrosur initiative, which facilitates cooperation amongst South America's state-run energy firms. Additionally, the Telesur television network, which is funded by Argentina, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Venezuela, is coordinated through ALBA. Outside of these initiatives, much of the activity of the alliance has been bilateral in nature. This includes the so-called 'People's Trade Agreements', which employ a kind of bartering system (e.g. Venezuelan oil traded for Cuban doctors and teachers). Additionally, ALBA members created an integrated trade and currency zone backed by the Sucre, a new regional currency that exists largely as a virtual unit of account. The further institutionalisation of the Sucre would scale back the use of the US dollar for intra-Latin American trade.[819] Member states also created an ALBA Bank to promote development (separate from the Bank of the South, a similar project discussed above), which was originally capitalised at 1 billion USD.[820] There have also been discussions for an ALBA defense council, as distinct from UNASUR's South American Defense Council (detailed in the previous chapter).[821]

Inspired by values of solidarity and complementarity, ALBA's loosely Third Worldist ideology obscures its more concrete achievements,[822] many of them bilateral. Economic cooperation is viewed as a means of furthering social (and geopolitical) objectives. ALBA's counter-hegemonic properties lie primarily in its cooperative model of economic integration, which can be contrasted with the FTAA's focus on 'competitive liberalisation'.[823] The

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thousand bpd (barrels per day) to between 80 and 90 thousand bpd'. In exchange, Cuba increased the number of doctors it sent to Venezuela (from 17,000 to 30,000). Numerous US embassy cables, including some from after 2005, define ALBA as a 'counter proposal to the FTAA'. See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08CARACAS683, 'Venezuela: Title III of Libertad Act', 19 May 2008.

[817] Honduras was a full member of ALBA from August of 2008 until January of 2010, when the county's conservative post-coup government removed it from the alliance. However, Honduras did remain a member of ALBA's Petrocaribe initiative after the coup.

[818] *El Universal*, 'ALBA summit ends with entry of guest countries', 6 February 2012: http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/120206/alba-summit-ends-with-entry-of-guest-countries.

[819] Steven Mather, 'Venezuela Pays for First ALBA Trade with Ecuador in New Regional Currency', Venezuelanalysis, 7 July 2010: http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/5480. See also, Hart-Landsberg (2010), p. 15.

[820] The Bank of ALBA piqued the interest of US officials, in part because, along with the Bank of the South, it represented an apparent challenge to the influence of the IMF, World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank in Latin America. See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08CARACAS118, 'Not Much Substance at the VI ALBA Summit', 30 January 2008. The 2008 ALBA Summit also saw the inauguration of the Trans National Energy Company, designed to stabilise the supply of petroleum products to Latin American markets.

[821] On the discussions over an ALBA defense council, see Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09BUENOSAIRES1141, 'Media Reaction: Obama Foreign Policy; ALBA Summit; The Fight on Drug Trafficking; 10/19/09 Buenos Aires', 10 October 2009.

[822] Mohsen Al Attar and Rosalie Miller, 'Towards an Emancipatory International Law: the Bolivarian reconstruction', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 31 No. 3 (2010), pp. 347-363.

[823] Hart-Landsberg, for example, highlights the 'cooperative development' strategy at the heart of the ALBA project. Martin Hart-Landsberg, 'ALBA and the Promise of Cooperative Development', *Monthly Review* (December 2010). The Argentine scholar and critic Claudio Katz has also analysed the 'cooperative advantage' of ALBA, which he views as an anti-imperialist integration scheme. See for example, Richard A. Dello Buono, 'Book Review: El rediseño de América Latina: ALCA, MERCOSUR y ALBA [The Redesign of Latin America: FTAA, MERCOSUR, and ALBA]', *Critical Sociology*, Vol. 33 No. 4 (2007), pp. 767-774. For Kellogg, ALBA is 'a direct challenge to neoliberalism (and) a partial challenge to capitalism'. Paul Kellogg, 'Regional

organisation promotes nonmarket-shaped structures through new regional public enterprises as well as the expansion of partnerships between existing state enterprises. Among other things, ALBA initiatives have helped members strengthen planning capacity, modernise industrial and agricultural operations and provide much-needed social services, including the establishment of medical centres and literacy programmes. ALBA is state-centred and 'designed to enhance the ability of participating governments to meet the needs of their working-class majorities'.[824]

ALBA is financed almost entirely by Venezuela. Though observers view Venezuela's dominance of ALBA as problematic, the organisation has drawn support from an array of Latin American and Caribbean countries. The Petrocaribe programme, for example, which has provided subsidised oil to over a dozen Caribbean and Central American countries, is coordinated through ALBA. Even prior to the oil boom of the mid-2000s, Chávez was upfront about the use of petroleum as a foreign policy tool. Running for office in 1998, he called oil a 'geopolitical weapon' while criticising Venezuela's political class for neglecting the country's power as a major oil-producer.[825] For its proponents, ALBA is about leveraging Venezuela's oil wealth into a counter-hegemonic project of transnational cooperation that extends beyond the energy sector itself. In addition to subsidised oil, for instance, Petrocaribe has financed aerial and maritime transport development across the Caribbean basin. Robinson writes that 'ALBA envisions a regional economic development plan for Latin America and the Caribbean involving solidarity with the weakest national economies so that all can cooperate and benefit from regional exchange networks and development projects'.[826]

Petroleum is vital to Venezuela's national wealth and regional influence, and Petrocaribe is ALBA's signature initiative. The programme provides petroleum products to signatories (as many as 14 countries have participated in Petrocaribe and Petroamerica projects) under generous financing terms, and includes the option of making partial payment in goods and services. The programme also contains a social development component (the ALBACaribe Fund). 'Under Petrocaribe', notes one US cable, 'Venezuela will only deal directly with state entities, rather than the private sector'. To a degree, then, as the FTAA aimed to 'lock-in' neoliberal rules and regulations, Petrocaribe effectively locks-out international oil companies (IOCs), despite the fact that IOCs remained active in Venezuela's hydrocarbons sector over the course of Chávez's tenure. In order to carry out its commitments under Petrocaribe, PDVSA, the Venezuelan state oil company, created an affiliate, PDV Caribe, which then formed joint ventures with participating member states.[827] The programme increased the visibility and popularity of ALBA in the Caribbean basin.[828]

Integration in Latin America: Dawn of an Alternative to Neoliberalism?' *New Political Science*, Vol. 29 No. 2 (2007), pp. 187-209. Kellogg acknowledges that UNASUR has the potential to challenge US hegemony in Latin America. However, he writes that 'if there is to be an alternative to US hegemony in the region that can challenge capitalism as well as neoliberalism, it will be in relation to the ALBA initiative, not that of UNASUR', p. 189.

[824] Hart-Landsberg (2009).

[825] Nikolas Kozloff, *Hugo Chávez: Oil, Politics, and the Challenge to the U.S.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 7.

[826] Robinson (2008), pp. 351-352. He adds: 'ALBA rejects the notion of intellectual property rights and rejects any trade agreements that would undermine the use of public policies to regulate the economy and redistribute wealth'.

[827] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06CARACAS1712, 'Update on Petrocaribe', 12 June 2006.

[828] From Washington's perspective, the increased visibility of Petrocaribe had 'destabilizing' geopolitical effects in the Caribbean. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09KINGSTON514, 'Jamaica: Frustration Grows Over Freedom of Movement, Non-tariff Trade Barriers in CARICOM, Growth of ALBA and OECS', 30 June 2009.

ALBA's pan-Latin Americanist discourse challenged the FTAA while helping to institutionalise the bloc's economic agenda. Bolivarianism is both an expression of Venezuelan nationalism and of '21st Century Socialism', which gave ALBA a wider, regional appeal. US policymakers were attuned to these dynamics and the broader ideological challenges that ALBA represented. Bolivarian discourse was a key part of Chávez's ability to wage 'a media battle to defeat the FTAA initiative'.[829] To quote one US document, ALBA, through its various summits, 'provided Hugo Chavez a platform to rail against capitalism and the United States'.[830] He used ALBA to criticise the World Bank and IMF, to link the IFIs to 'savage capitalism' and 'US imperialism', and to 'trumpet' ALBA's tangible projects, many of them funded by Venezuelan foreign aid.[831] At the intersection of its productive and structural forms of power, the US would denigrate this as 'populism'. This deflated the appeal of the Bolivarian model to bolster the prospects for US-led free trade (see Chapter 6).

An embassy cable titled 'Chavez and the Rhetoric of Hate' provides insight into Washington's views on *Chavista* discourse. The cable stated that, as of 2006, Chávez was increasingly 'crafting his rhetoric of hate for international audiences', never failing to 'hawk his anti-imperialist diatribe in international fora'. In addition to pitting poor against rich and capitalism against socialism, one important 'cut of hate rhetoric is between imperialism and Bolivarianism'. The cable added: 'Chavez uses "Bolivarian" as a loose synonym for anti-imperialism. He paints his Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas... as the morally pure version of the FTAA, which in Chavez' words is an attempt to colonize Venezuela'. The document concludes that 'Chavez' strategic audiences are the majority pro-Chavez poor, the opposition (mainly the rich and middle class), and the international community'[832] (leaving one to question whether anyone falls outside of the target audience). As discussed in other cables, the US's approach to this confrontational discourse generally involved ignoring provocative comments so as not to 'dignify them with a response'.[833] The strategy denied Chávez the tit-for-tat exchanges he relished. It also denied Washington the opportunity to respond to some of the challenges presented by ALBA's anti-imperialist message.

Washington was of two minds concerning ALBA. On the one hand, the bloc was dismissed as irrelevant—its populistic plans were 'grandiose', its projects 'incompetent' and 'muddled'.[834] There was the sense that, without greater participation from Mercosur members,[835] it would fail to move beyond its status as a loose collection of 'anti-American' governments and smaller states seeking closer energy ties with Venezuela. Although, for the US, ALBA may have played a role in galvanising opposition to the FTAA, it never had hemispheric potential. On the other hand, and as mentioned in Chapter 4, officials characterised ALBA as an 'increasingly vocal and coordinated grouping that demands attention in international fora, both inside and outside the Hemisphere'.[836] Some expressed

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[829] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09BUENOSAIRES1141, 'Media Reaction: Obama Foreign Policy; ALBA Summit; The Fight on Drug Trafficking; 10/19/09 Buenos Aires', 10 October 2009. The quote in the cable is from an Argentine news outlet.

[830] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08CARACAS118, 'Not Much Substance at the VI ALBA Summit', 30 January 2008.

[831] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07CARACAS444, 'Likely Chavez Rants in Argentina and Bolivia', 2 March 2007.

[832] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06CARACAS1789, 'Chavez and the Rhetoric of Hate', 19 June 2006.

[833] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07CARACAS444, 'Likely Chavez Rants in Argentina and Bolivia', 2 March 2007.

[834] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06CARACAS1712, 'Update on Petrocaribe', 12 June 2006.

[835] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06PRETORIA3202, 'South Africa: Seminar on the Foreign Policy of Hugo Chavez and the FTAA', 4 August 2006.

[836] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 10MANAGUA115, 'Ortega and the US: New-found True Love or Another Still-born Charm Offensive', 25 February 2010. According to the US Congressional Research Service, Chávez used

concern that ALBA undermined the authority of the IFIs by offering alternative sources of funding.[837] Although data on ALBA's economic arrangements is largely unattainable, trade between its members increased as the bloc expanded.[838]

For many of its smaller states, participation in ALBA presented a difficult balancing act when it came to bilateral relations with the US. An exchange in 2009 between Orlando Gómez, a Sandinista diplomat, and the US embassy in Managua provides insight into this dynamic:

> Gomez expected ties with Venezuela and Bolivia and other ALBA states to deepen in the coming years. In part, this is because free trade, particularly CAFTA-DR, did not deliver the expected results for Nicaragua and new models were needed to expand social and economic development in the country. CAFTA-DR, he claimed, has not produced results in employment and the trade has only benefitted certain sectors, 'making only a few rich'. ALBA projects and trade, however, would create new sources of employment and generate other improvements in the productive bases of Nicaragua's economy. ALBA, however, should not be viewed as contradictory to or competitive with CAFTA-DR and US trade. In Gomez's views, ALBA would help develop Nicaragua in ways that trade with the US had not, while leaving space for 'continued improvement' with the US.[839]

Gomez told his American interlocutors that Latin America's 'new revolutions' would be realised not by arms but by 'democratic mechanisms, as demanded by the US and Europe'. For Washington, this 'skewed Sandinista worldview', as the cable put it, seemed to be less threatening than mistaken,[840] barely worthy of serious consideration. However, even if ALBA proved in the long-run to be little more than a propaganda tool powered by Venezuelan oil, the damage was done. Though Mercosur's opposition was crucial, ALBA's coordination of the region's anti-neoliberal, 'anti-US' governments also played an important part in stunting the momentum for the FTAA. With the hemispheric accord off the table, and with CAFTA completed, the Bush administration focused on the promotion of bilateral free trade agreements with those Latin American governments still committed to the Washington Consensus. This scaled-back strategy proved successful on its own terms. Obama, after campaigning against these FTAs, marshalled several of them through Congress. Indeed, structural power, as the name implies, involves structural imperatives that can supersede the political commitments of elite agents promising 'change'. Transformed from outsider candidate to head of state, the senator who pledged to 'fix NAFTA'[841] ended up extending the model to Colombia and Panama, thus picking up where Bush left off (in Chile, Peru and Central America).

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subsidised oil to entice countries to join ALBA and adopt its 'confrontational approach' to trade. 'Although (the ALBA deals) are neither deep nor comprehensive trade agreements', wrote CRS, 'they do signal a political will to consolidate regional bargaining interests in juxtaposition to the US-designed FTAA'. Congressional Research Service, 'US-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues', 8 February 2011, p. 6.

[837] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08TEGUCIGALPA799, 'Honduras the Day After ALBA: The Economic Response', 29 August 2008. In this cable, US officials stated that Zelaya may have tried to use ALBA 'as an excuse to let the IMF Standby Agreement fail by refusing to approve the presentation of substantive monetary policy revision to the IMF board'. However, it concluded that Zelaya was likely to continue to seek financial assistance from both the US government and the IFIs, even after joining ALBA.

[838] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09MANAGUA1164, 'The "Visible" Hand: Nicaraguan Exports to Venezuela', 13 November 2009. The document notes, 'since Nicaragua joined (ALBA), exports to Venezuela have increased from $2 million for all of 2006 to $102 million for just the first ten months of 2009'.

[839] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09MANAGUA520, 'Nicaragua's Foreign Ministry – Patience Running Out for Obama Administration', 22 May 2009.

[840] Ibid.

[841] Obama for America, 'A New Partnership for the Americas', 2008: http://obama.3cdn.net/f579b3802a3d35c8d5_9aymvyqpo.pdf.

The Bilateral Turn: Promoting 'Free Trade' amidst Regional Dissensus

As highlighted in this chapter, multilateral institutions had a significant impact on the political economy of the Americas during the rise of the NLL, illustrating, again, the ways in which the various forms of power in international relations are mutually imbricated. Whereas institutional power involves the indirect mediation between pre-constituted states, structural power entails the constitution of agents in the structural milieu, which, in turn, is shaped by the agency expressed in states' foreign economic policies. Free trade is not an end in and of itself; rather, it is a means of restructuring economies so as to bolster a neoliberal capitalism that is constitutive of the material asymmetries of US hegemony in inter-American relations. As US institutional power eroded, it turned to bilateral relations as a means of shoring-up the structural power of its neoliberalisation drive.

In late 2003 and early 2004, with the FTAA talks deteriorating, the Bush administration launched formal negotiations for bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs, also called 'trade promotion agreements' [TPAs]) with Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Panama and Peru. Under Bush's 'competitive liberalisation' strategy, these would be pursued alongside the CAFTA, FTAA and WTO talks, and would be modelled largely on the US-Chile FTA, which was completed in June 2003. The election of NLL governments (and future ALBA members) in Bolivia and Ecuador effectively ended US trade discussions with those countries, but the proposed FTAs with Colombia, Panama and Peru would eventually come to fruition (the Dominican Republic was brought into CAFTA-DR). This part of Chapter 5 outlines the US's bilateral agreements with Latin American countries. It also examines Washington's pursuit of a bilateral trade and investment treaty with Uruguay.

There was a political pattern to the US's procurement of bilateral FTAs in the Americas, but it wasn't as clear-cut as one might suppose. Yes, Colombia's right-wing government, the US's closest ally in South America, was 'rewarded' with an FTA. And the Bolivarian countries were out of the question. But the US was able to negotiate an FTA with the Socialist government of Chile, its first in Latin America. The US also flirted with pursuing an FTA with the centre-left government of Uruguay. In Peru, US efforts to secure an FTA were jeopardised during the country's 2006 presidential election, when both leftist candidate Ollanta Humala and centrist candidate Alan García campaigned against the agreement, which was signed by outgoing president Alejandro Toledo in June 2006, just before García's inauguration. Soon thereafter, García reconsidered his position, and he entered office a tepid backer of the FTA process.[842] That Humala (in a more moderate guise) would win Peru's presidency in 2011 demonstrated the value of the FTA for its proponents in Lima and Washington: in 2006, Humala panned the FTA,[843] but by 2011, once it had entered into force, his administration was obliged to accept it. Partly a political move to appeal to

[842] Public Citizen, 'Fair trader wins in Peru... again. Will US respect the outcome?' 12 April 2011: http://citizen.typepad.com/eyesontrade/2011/04/fair-traders-win-in-peru-again-will-us-respect-the-outcome.html.

[843] In his 2006 campaign manifesto, titled the Great Transformation, Humala outlined 'a greater role for the central government in guaranteeing a more autarkic economic model for the country', as stated by US officials. In Humala's platform, 'the pro-FTA, pro-globalization model for development favoured by the US (was) portrayed as negative, leading to: denationalization of resources, diminution of the local wages, a deluge of foreign imports, and the dilution of national culture'. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06LIMA893, 'Humala's Revealing "Great Transformation" Campaign Platform', 7 March 2006.

moderate voters, Humala's about-face was also aimed at curbing capital flight and preventing a drop in foreign investment if/when he assumed office.[844]

The situation confronting Humala was similar to that confronting the Ortega and Funes governments in regards to CAFTA, as described previously. Bilateral FTAs, like their multilateral counterparts, lock-in neoliberal reforms by increasing the costs associated with dismantling those policies most likely to engender political opposition.[845] The move toward bilateral FTAs was largely strategic, in that it did not signal any changes in the goals of Washington's foreign economic policy. As quoted above, the US would continue to 'pursue *all available multilateral, regional and bilateral opportunities* to lower trade barriers and promote international commerce'.[846] In the absence of broader agreements, 'smaller FTAs accomplish the goal of liberalization and the expansion of markets for US goods', wrote the Council on Foreign Relations, while providing a 'better climate for US investors'.[847] With the FTAA moribund, and with the Andean region cracking at the seams of its political and ideological cleavages, the bilateral option, though less-than-ideal, was better than nothing.

Washington had planned for a multilateral, CAFTA-style agreement for the Andean region. In 2003, Robert Zoellick, the US Trade Representative (USTR), clarified that Latin American countries would be in danger of losing access to the US market should they buck FTA talks. According to a press release: 'The USTR noted that trade between the United States and (the Andean region) is currently conducted under the framework of the recently renewed and expanded unilateral trade preferences of the Andean Trade Preference Act' (also called the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act [ATPDEA]). Zoellick said that, 'while the ATPA, which expires in 2006, has been a "positive force" in creating jobs and opportunity in the region, the negotiation of a US free trade agreement with the Andean nations is the next logical step in securing market access on a "more mutual and more permanent basis"'.[848] The threat was only partially effective. The rise of Morales and Correa, both of whom campaigned against free trade, helped sink the plans for an Andean FTA. Closer to home, the White House's difficulties in getting CAFTA through Congress translated into a loss of flexibility in the Andean talks.[849] Even so, the US was able to leverage the discussion over the Andean FTA into bilateral agreements with Peru and Colombia,[850] both modelled on an existing agreement with Chile.

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[844] Council on Foreign Relations, 'Peru's Moment of Opportunity', interview with Michael Shifter, 7 June 2011: http://www.cfr.org/peru/perus-moment-opportunity/p25216.

[845] Even the proponents of free trade often use the terminology of 'locking in' neoliberal reforms to describe the supposed benefits of bilateral FTAs. See for example, the Council on Foreign Relations, 'The Rise in Bilateral Free Trade Agreements', 13 June 2006: http://www.cfr.org/trade/rise-bilateral-free-trade-agreements/p10890.

[846] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06BUENOSAIRES2292, 'AUSTR Eissenstat Visit to Argentina', 12 October 2006. Italics added.

[847] Council on Foreign Relations, 'The Rise in Bilateral Free Trade Agreements', 13 June 2006: http://www.cfr.org/trade/rise-bilateral-free-trade-agreements/p10890.

[848] US Department of State, 'USTR Announces Intent to Initiate FTA Talks with Andean Nations', 18 November 2003: http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2003/November/20031118153511rellims0.867428.html.

[849] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05LIMA2720, 'Visit of Peruvian Ministers to Discuss the FTA', 17 June 2005. The proposed Andean FTA had also begun to attract civil society opposition within Andean countries. See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05LIMA1272, 'FTA and Culture: Peruvian Response', 15 March 2005.

[850] US cables indicate that policymakers in the US, Peru and Colombia had hoped to negotiate a multilateral agreement as part of an 'Andean FTA'. This proved to be unfeasible for practical and political reasons, leading the Peru FTA to be completed prior to the Colombian agreement. Considerations revolved around the uncertainties associated with Peru's 2006 presidential election. See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05LIMA3888, 'The Toledo-Uribe Meeting and Peru's Game Plan for US-Andean FTA', 8 September 2005.

The US's Bilateral FTAs in Latin America

The following paragraphs briefly review the US's bilateral trade agreements with Latin American countries. In each case, the analysis is geared toward relating the FTAs to the structural power of the neolibearalisation process in inter-American relations.

The United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement

In 1994, the Clinton administration expressed interest in incorporating Chile into NAFTA. The two countries began bilateral negotiations in 2000, with the FTAA process still in full swing. The final agreement was signed in June 2003. The accord was heralded as a 'roaring success' by the United States,[851] serving as a model for future bilateral agreements in the region. According to the US government, the agreement 'provides favorable access for US service suppliers and guarantees of protection to US investors and US copyrights, trademarks and patents registered in Chile. In addition, Chile has opened up significant government procurements to US bidders'.[852] The US State Department wrote that, from January 2004, when the FTA went into force, through 2011, US exports to Chile increased by 488 per cent to $16 billion. Foreign investment was a different story, with new US investment in Chile hitting a ten-year low in 2005. Although US officials attributed this to Chile's failure to implement adequate rules on intellectual property rights (IPRs), one embassy cable found it 'difficult to draw a direct correlation between the decline in new US investment and the lack of IPR protection'.[853]

For the Bush administration, the finalisation of a trade agreement with a centre-left government showed it could work with ideological adversaries in the pursuit of common objectives. Chile's ruling Concertación coalition, though led by the Socialist Party, had unceremoniously shed whatever nationalist inclinations it once shared with Salvador Allende's experiment. Though a win for Washington, US officials were critical of Chile's implementation of the agreement, including in regards to IPRs and pharmaceutical patents. A 2008 cable said the US needed to 'keep up the pressure' on Chile to follow through with the full implementation of the agreement.[854] Another document noted that 'American companies are directly affected by patent violations', and that, in this context, the US embassy had 'pressed hard on the issue privately and publicly'.[855] Chile was placed on the 'Special 301 Priority Watch List', which is maintained by the USTR. The designation can result in sanctions.[856] Like multilateral agreements, the bilateral FTA provided the US with a legal framework to press for the interests of US corporations. As seen with CAFTA, US diplomacy was geared toward inducing Chile's compliance with the FTA's liberalisation procedures in accordance with Washington's interpretation of the agreement.

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[851] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06SANTIAGO957, 'Scenesetter for AETC/CC Visit to Chile (U)', 8 May 2006; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07SANTIAGO267, 'With FTA, U.S.-Chile Trade Grows 133 Percent in Three Years', 15 February 2007.

[852] Export.gov, 'The U.S.—Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA)' (accessed 15 December 2012): http://export.gov/fta/chile/index.asp

[853] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06SANTIAGO2031, 'Trade Agreement Compliance and Monitoring—U.S.-Chile FTA', 27 September 2006.

[854] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08SANTIAGO167, 'Chile: Post Recommends Chile Remain on Priority Watch List', 21 February 2008.

[855] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06SANTIAGO957, 'Scenesetter for AETC/CC Visit to Chile (U)', 8 May 2006.

[856] Sanctions were not applied to Chile as a result of its inclusion on the USTR list. The list largely functions as a warning or legalistic threat against the countries given the designation.

The United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement

After being signed by presidents Bush and Toledo in 2006, the US-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) was passed by the US Congress in November 2007. Entering into force in February 2009, the accord eliminated tariffs on 80 per cent of US industrial and consumer exports to the country, to be phased out entirely by 2019. As stated by the US government, the agreement 'also provides favorable access for US service suppliers, as well as guarantees of protection to US investors and US copyrights, trademarks, and patents registered in Peru. In addition, Peru has opened up significant government procurements to US bidders'.[857] In a compromise with Congressional Democrats, the final text of the document included 'reforms' on labour and environmental standards (initially opposed by the Bush administration) based on those in the NAFTA and CAFTA agreements. As summarised by Public Citizen, a Washington-based NGO active in trade policy, within one year of implementation it was clear that 'environmental and labor conditions in Peru (had) deteriorated rapidly'. The García government used powers of decree to pass several controversial FTA-related implementations that undermined Peru's laws on unionisation and weakened existing protections of the country's rainforests.[858]

The politics behind bilateral trade were stark in the Peruvian case, particularly because Humala, a nationalist military officer, was viewed as a 'protégé' of Chávez.[859] Toledo described himself as being, alongside Uribe, the South American leader 'most opposed to Chavez's ideology, initiatives, and methods', as was clear from Toledo's promotion of 'free markets, foreign direct investment, a free trade agreement with the US, and private-sector-led growth'. For the US, Peru remained relatively receptive to the FTA, even as polls indicated that public support for it declined in the mid-2000s.[860] In the words of one cable, the US embassy sought to 'emphasize to Peruvian officials that they need to address the dichotomy between their desire for Free Trade Agreements with the US and the EU on the one hand, and Venezuela's approach to regional development' on the other.[861] The link between Humala and Chávez likely cost Humala the 2006 election.[862] For his part, García, who stated that he wanted to 'revise' the FTA during the campaign, privately pushed for it to be approved as soon as possible.[863] According to some Peruvian insiders, even had Humala won in 2006 he would have been unlikely to withdraw from the FTA.[864]

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[857] Export.gov, 'The U.S.—Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA)', (accessed 15 December 2012): http://export.gov/FTA/peru/index.asp.

[858] Public Citizen, 'A Year after Implementation of Peru Free Trade Agreement, US and Peru Left with Broken Promises and No New Trade Model', 1 February 2010: http://www.citizen.org/documents/PeruFTA-OneYear.pdf.

[859] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07LIMA2009, 'Ollanta Humala One Year Later', 8 June 2007.

[860] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05LIMA4983, 'Countering Chavez in Peru', 22 November 2005.

[861] Ibid.

[862] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06LIMA2315, 'Why Garcia Won and Humala Lost', 9 June 2006. The cable states that García won 'by appealing to metropolitan voters' fears that Humala would be a pawn of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez'. García's strategy successful goaded Chavez to comment on the presidential race in the final weeks, giving García the opportunity to highlight Chávez's connections with Humala. As stated in the cable, 'Chavez showed that he did not have the self control to avoid taking Garcia's bait'.

[863] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06LIMA2323, 'President-Elect Garcia Wants the US-Peru FTA', 9 June 2006. In the 'comment' section, the cable states, 'Garcia has told us that (he) wants the FTA signed, sealed and delivered before he takes office... He knows he cannot renegotiate the deal'.

[864] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06LIMA1358, 'New Vice Foreign Minister Lobbies Ambassador for Humala', 7 April 2006.

US officials were integral to the finalisation of the FTA text.[865] They crafted outreach events to promote the agreement.[866] As stated in one cable, 'the Ambassador and the Embassy play(ed) a key role in facilitating the PTPA, promoting the agreement to Peruvian audiences, and securing its passage by the Peruvian Congress on June 28, 2006'. It described the US embassy as being 'very active' in the process, maintaining 'an open door policy for US businesses' and 'meet(ing) regularly with the relevant ministries and regulatory agencies'.[867] Over the course of García's term, the US remained engaged on the implementation of the accord, monitoring the opposition.[868] García was granted the authority to legislate by decree on various issues related to the implementation of the free trade act.[869] The US embassy hosted training programmes in compliance, monitoring and standards, while also sending Peruvian officials to training conferences in the US.[870]

The United States-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement

On October 21, 2011, President Obama signed the Panama, Colombia and South Korea FTAs into law. The US-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement went into effect on October 31, 2012. Approximately 87 per cent of US industrial goods exports became duty-free immediately thereafter. Other benefits highlighted by the US government included access to Panama's $20.6 billion services market, including its financial and telecommunications sectors. The agreement created significant opportunities for US businesses in Panama's major infrastructure projects, which included an on-going USD 5.25 billion Panama Canal expansion.[871] Indeed, for both sides, the canal was crucial to the FTA. For Panamanian officials, the agreement was 'about investment, not trade'. In consultation with the US, they 'touted the FTA for its positive effects on procurement and contracting as the main lever to get foreign financing for (the) Canal expansion', the largest infrastructure

[865] Public Citizen notes that Bush administration officials travelled to Peru to draft and finalise at least 35 new Peruvian laws designed to expedite the implementation of the FTA's rules and regulations. Public Citizen, 'A Year after Implementation of Peru Free Trade Agreement, US and Peru Left with Broken Promises and No New Trade Model', 1 February 2010, p. 4 and footnote 31.

[866] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06LIMA1099, 'Peru Labor Leaders on Lourdes/Humala, FTA, Labor's Woes', 21 March 2006; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06LIMA1286, 'Business Community Lined Up On FTA Campaign', 1 April 2006.

[867] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06LIMA3804, 'Post's Active Trade Agreement Compliance Efforts', 26 September 2006. US officials also promoted the FTA in the countryside. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06LIMA1594, 'Ambassador Promotes FTA, Economic Development in Junin', 25 April 2006. Officials routinely reminded their Peruvian counterparts that the country's trade benefits under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) would run out in 2006, and that the benefits would be maintained through the FTA. See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05LIMA4184, 'Peru: Updated Textile and Apparel Information', 27 September 2005.

[868] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07LIMA2009, 'Ollanta Humala One Year Later', 8 June 2007; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09LIMA924, '"Evo Marles is our President": The Anti-System Project', 26 June 2009. As stated in the second cable, 'Peru remains fertile territory for anti-system radicals seeking to take advantage of an opportunity turn the tables around, and to convert Peru from the camp of pro-growth pragmatism to that of vague "21st century socialism" a la Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador'. The US had also monitored anti-FTA activism prior to the passage of the agreement. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06LIMA2075, 'Anti-FTA March has Little Turn-Out, Low Impact', 25 May 2006.

[869] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07LIMA3887, 'Peru Pursues Vigorous FTA Implementation Strategy', 26 December 2007. The US embassy supported the legislative move to grant García the ability to legislate by decree, in contrast to similar laws in Venezuela, which were criticised by US officials.

[870] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06LIMA3804, 'Post's Active Trade Agreement Compliance Efforts', 26 September 2006.

[871] Export.gov, 'The U.S.—Panama Trade Promotion Agreement' (accessed 16 December 2012): http://export.gov/fta/panama/index.asp.

project in the Americas.[872] For Washington, the canal added to Panama's geopolitical importance.[873] Under the presidency of Martín Torrijos (son of the former nationalist leader, Omar Torrijos), Panama emerged as 'the kind of progressive, trade and investment-friendly, socially conscious ally and friend that the US is seeking in the region', according to the US embassy.[874] However, the country's status as an offshore tax haven presented unique problems to the finalisation of the accord.[875]

The US-Panama FTA was touch-and-go for several years. With ratification delayed in the US, policy elites in Panama complained of 'FTA exhaustion'.[876] Officials warned their US counterparts that a failure to finalise the accord would represent a 'big blow to one of America's staunchest allies in the region'.[877] In the context of CAFTA, the Panamanian government was concerned that the country would 'lose out' to its neighbours on foreign investment. For Torrijos, noted one cable, 'the FTA represents a vehicle to lock in the status quo or better... improve market access for Panama in niche areas (e.g., banking, maritime, and sugar), and most importantly to attract "good US investment"'. The FTA would 'mitigate against future leftist-populist tendencies' while solidifying positive relations with the US. It would also ensure Panama remained competitive with CAFTA's 'low wage' countries.[878] In

[872] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 04PANAMA1015, 'Panama: Who is President-Elect Martin Torrijos and How Will He Govern?', 3 May 2004. The US agreed that trade was not the main focus of the FTA. As one cable stated, 'in the end, this FTA is not centrally about trade: while the agreement brings duty-free access for U.S. goods, what little Panama sells the U.S. already enters duty-free. For the Torrijos administration, the FTA is primarily an investment in a partnership with the U.S.'.Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09PANAMA326, 'Endgame: Torrijos's Bottomline on the FTA', 22 April 2009.

[873] The US was 'heavily involved' in the planning of the canal's expansion. For Washington, the FTA put the US in an excellent position to offer advice to Panama on securing financing from commercial lenders. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 04PANAMA1116, 'Panama: Implications of the Torrijos Victory for the United States', 7 May 2004.

[874] In this cable, US embassy staff made the case that Torrijos was 'pro-US' despite his overtures of cooperation with the Venezuelan government on an oil pipeline. The cable argues that Torrijos wanted to assume the mantle of an interlocutor between the US and the region's leftist governments. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05PANAMA235, 'Panama President Torrijos Touts Political Value of FTA, Emphasizes Panama's Frienship with US', 1 February 2005. On the pro-US characteristics of the Torrijos government and the importance of the canal expansion project to bilateral relations, see also: Wikileaks, Reference ID: 04PANAMA2105, 'Scenesetter: The Secretary's Visit to Panama's September 1, 2004 Presidential Inauguration', 18 August 2004.

[875] See for example, Public Citizen, 'Panama FTA Would Undermine U.S. Efforts to Stop Offshore Tax-Haven Abuse and Regulate Risky Financial Conduct', April 2009. The US pushed for a Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA) as part of the FTA. Panama demurred. By making the TIEA appear as though it was a pre-existing obligation, however, it was included in the talks in a manner that allowed Panama to save face and 'fend off political attacks' from those opposed to the deal. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09PANAMA367, 'Torrijos Briefs Martinelli as TIEA Threatens FTA Passage', 6 May 2009. According to the cable, the US goals for the TIEA were increased transparency and enhanced revenue collection in the US. According to Public Citizen, Panama's ratification of the TIEA did not fully address the country's problems with tax evasion and money laundering. The agreement allowed Panama to 'refuse a tax information request "where the disclosure of the information requested would be contrary to the public policy" of Panama'. Public Citizen, 'Panama's Ratification of a Loophole-Ridden Tax Agreement Does Not Make U.S.-Panama Trade Deal Acceptable', 14 April 2011: http://citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.cfm?ID=3319.

[876] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09PANAMA329, 'Panama: Domestic Politics Haunt FTA', 23 April 2009. Though the political class in Panama largely supported the FTA, citizens in rural parts of the country were concerned about the impact of lower agricultural tariffs on their livelihoods. The negotiations over the bilateral FTA were nearly postponed in 2006. According to the Panamanians, this was due to a lack of political will in Washington. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06PANAMA147, 'VP/FORMIN on Evo Morales and U.S.-Panama FTA Mood', 24 January 2006.

[877] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06PANAMA533, 'GOP Struggles to Resolve FTA Stumbling Blocks', 24 March 2006.

[878] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 04PANAMA648, 'U.S.-Panama FTA Negotiations – Thoughts on Timing and Issues', 19 March 2004. On the importance of the FTA 'locking in' the neoliberal economic model, see also:

part, the slow pace of the ratification of the Panama and Colombia agreements was attributable to the eroding consensus on trade in the US Congress. However, the logistics of constructing a network of overlapping FTAs began to wear on US policymakers. Instead of one accord, Washington had to negotiate agreements on a case-by-case basis. In 2006, the US ambassador told Panamanian officials that the Bush administration hoped to 'close the deal... despite enormous demands Washington faces with a multitude of FTAs in the works'.[879] It would be five years until the deal was completed.

The United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement

The United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement was the most controversial of the US's bilateral agreements in Latin America, largely because of the human rights issues associated with Colombia's decades-old internal conflict. Negotiations were concluded in 2006, but the FTA did not pass the US Congress until the Obama administration sent it to lawmakers in October 2011. The agreement was implemented on May 15, 2012. Similar to the Peru accord,[880] under the Colombia agreement over 80 per cent of US industrial goods exports became duty-free. This encompassed key sectors for US exporters, such as construction equipment; building products; aircraft and parts; fertilizers; information technology equipment; medical and scientific equipment; and wood. Over half of US agricultural commodities exported to Colombia were also made duty-free. The accord heightened the enforcement of IPRs in the country. It 'increased access to Colombia's $180 billion services market for highly competitive American companies'.[881] As with other FTAs, the text was written with input from the US corporate sector.[882]

The Colombian government under Uribe and Santos was a reliable ally of the US. Although opposition to the FTA existed in both countries,[883] pro-free traders used a range of political, economic and security-related arguments to press for its implementation. A confidential 2007 cable reads: 'Uribe considers FTA ratification essential for Colombia to receive long-term investment, increase economic growth, create jobs, and boost government revenues'. At the time, Uribe was concerned that the US Congress would force a

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Wikileaks, Reference ID: 04PANAMA929, 'Scenesetter: AUSTR Vargo's Trip to Panama for the First Round of U.S.-Panama FTA Negotiations (April 26-30)', 22 April 2004.

[879] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06PANAMA629, 'FORMIN Weighs USG Demarche on Venezuela UNSC Bid, Vents over Stalled FTA', 6 April 2006. As noted in this cable, Panamanian officials reminded their US counterparts that Panama had stood with the US on the issue of the hemispheric FTAA.

[880] As the Peru FTA came first, it provided a model for the drafting of the bilateral agreement between the US and Colombia. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05BOGOTA11615, 'Colombia's Reaction to U.S.-Peru FTA', 14 December 2005. As was the case with Peru, the US used the expiration of the Andean Trade Preference and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) to gain leverage in the negotiations for a reciprocal free trade agreement with Colombia.

[881] Export.gov, 'The U.S.—Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement' (accessed 16 December 2012): http://export.gov/fta/Colombia/index.asp?dName=Colombia.

[882] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 04BOGOTA1280, 'Colombian Private and Public Sector Preparations for FTA Negotiations: On the Right Track, But Still a Ways to Go', 9 February 2004.

[883] Colombia's labour unions were opposed to the agreement. In discussions with US officials, union representatives called attention to the human rights violations against union leaders and activists, including assassinations. They criticised the labour stipulations within the text, and urged US lawmakers to block its ratification. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07BOGOTA790, 'Trade Confederations Send Anti-FTA Letter to US Congress', 6 February 2007. Unions criticised the FTA process and argued that the agreement would worsen labour and social conditions in Colombia. In its discussion with Colombian unions, the US embassy maintained that the FTA would reduce poverty, and that, while the US valued the input of Colombian labour groups, the FTA, as finalised in 2006, would not be renegotiated. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06BOGOTA10236, 'A/S Sullivan Assures Trade Confederations on FTA', 2 November 2006.

renegotiation of the text. The document stated that 'US failure to approve the FTA soon would be a major domestic and regional political blow to Uribe. It would also boost Venezuelan President Chavez' alternative Bolivarian economic model'.[884] With the deal languishing two years later, Vice President Santos warned the US that its failure to pass the FTA before Colombia's 2010 election would 'send the wrong message at a critical time that it was not worth working with the United States'. He argued that Washington's inaction was 'isolating' Colombia and steering investment away from the country,[885] even as Bogotá pursued an expansive trade agenda designed to diversify its exports away from the 'erratic' Andean markets. To this end, the country sought 9 FTAs with 45 countries by 2010.[886]

Colombia was meant to be part of an Andean FTA that would replace the expiring ATPDEA, a 'mechanism of solidarity' ostensibly favouring Andean economies, designed to bolster their support for US-backed counter-narcotics efforts.[887] Washington preferred the multilateral route, though it proved unworkable in the end. While other Andean countries pushed for an extension of ATPDEA preferences, Uribe believed that the 'FTA would provide longer term investor security in Colombia'. Rather than simply extending the existing trade benefits for its Andean partners, the Bush administration prioritised the Colombia and Peru FTAs. However, Assistant Secretary of State Shannon told Colombian officials in 2007 that 'the US was also considering establishing a forum of countries that had FTAs with the US that would promote broader economic integration among interested countries'. This idea was welcomed by Colombia, which had a 'vision of a Latin Pacific coast network of free trade agreements among like-minded countries'. The forum could include all of Latin America's 'FTA-aspirant' countries, including Caribbean states.[888] This idea would be semi-formalised as the 'Arc of the Pacific Initiative' (or 'Pacific Rim Initiative'), with Peru's Alan García leading the project. According to confidential US documents, 'the original purpose of the Arc was to help counteract the isolation that Peru and Colombia face as moderate, centrist governments in a region susceptible to populism'. The multilateral forum attracted interest from Mexico, Chile, Canada and the US, with the 'eventual goal of creating a "free trade area"'.[889] The Arc of the Pacific Initiative held several ministerial meetings in 2007 and 2008. It portended Latin American interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which brings together a similar grouping of states, albeit in an Asia-centric, US-led initiative.

The United States-Uruguay Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA)

The US does not have a free trade agreement with Uruguay. However, in 2005 the two countries signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), which was expanded into a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in 2007. Similar to an FTA, the TIFA addressed 'intellectual property rights, regulatory issues, information and communications technology and electronic commerce, trade facilitation, trade and technical capacity building, trade in services, government procurement, and cooperation on sanitary and phytosanitary

[884] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07BOGOTA1472, 'Scenesetter Checklist for Visit of President Bush to Colombia', 5 March 2007.
[885] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09BOGOTA2585, 'Vice President Santos Pitches FTA Passage', 17 August 2009.
[886] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09BOGOTA3309, 'Colombia Pushes Forward with Ambitious Trade Agenda', 5 November 2009.
[887] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05LIMA4504, 'Toledo and Uribe Encourage President to Support FTA', 18 October 2005.
[888] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07BOGOTA670, 'WHA A/S Shannon and FM Araujo Discuss Plan Colombia, Human Rights, Free Trade, and Ecuador', 31 January 2007.
[889] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08LIMA564, '"Arc of the Pacific" Initiative Quietly Progresses', 2 April 2008.

measures'.[890] The TIFA created a forum to pursue the liberalisation of bilateral trade and investment, but, unlike an FTA, it did not create a binding set of rules to further this end.

A TIFA often serves as a precursor to the creation of a bilateral free trade agreement. Leaked documents indicate that both the US and Uruguay considered this option. However, Uruguay is a founding member of Mercosur, and a US-Uruguay FTA would have serious implications for the trade bloc, for diplomatic relations in the Southern Cone and for Washington's relationship with Brazil. The case of Uruguay, then, demonstrates the limits of the US's bilateral free trade track. Although Washington hoped for closer economic ties with the country, it could not risk the costs of 'cherry picking' Uruguay out of Mercosur and damaging South America's integration effort.[891] It is likely that the Uruguayan government used the talks to gain leverage within Mercosur.[892] As its smallest member, Uruguay had grown frustrated with Mercosur over several issues, including market access, its influence within the forum and a dispute with Argentina over a controversial paper mill project.[893]

Characterised by the US as a leftist, President Vásquez told US officials in 2006 that he wanted to pursue an FTA. He stated that he was not opposed to joining the regional FTAA if 'conditions were right' on agricultural subsidies (publicly, the *Frente Amplio* [FA, Broad Front] had rejected the hemispheric accord). Vásquez's endorsement of free trade made an impression on US officials, and was taken as evidence of his 'intellect, common sense and sincere motives'. For the US embassy in Montevideo, he was 'a leader worth cultivating', one who was 'useful in spreading a moderate message in the region'.[894] With Vásquez on board, US officials wrote in 2006: 'FTA negotiations between Uruguay and the US would affect the dynamics of Mercosur and may break down the Summit of the Americas' anti-FTAA "consensus"'. Surely this was desirable. Why the hesitation?

The US believed that, in the end, Uruguay was almost certain to remain in Mercosur, meaning a fully-fledged bilateral FTA was unlikely. Although the US *wanted* an FTA with Uruguay, 'this (was) not possible because Mercosur bylaws ban country-members from making such bilateral arrangements'.[895] Whatever its difficulties within Mercosur at the time, the FA government was unlikely to remove itself entirely from the Common Market, even as it pushed for more freedom of action in international trade negotiations.[896] Lula and Kirchner had stated that Uruguay was free to pursue talks with the US. However, in private, the South Americans reiterated their position that a bilateral FTA would run afoul of Mercosur, and

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[890] Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR), 'U.S., Uruguay Hold Trade and Investment Council Meeting', June 2009: http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2009/june/us-uruguay-hold-trade-and-investment-council-meeting.

[891] Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 'Uruguay Signs a TIFA with the U.S.: Will this Mean an Unraveling of Mercosur or is Montevideo Manoeuvring to be Left Out in the Cold?' 1 February 2007: http://www.coha.org/uruguay-signs-a-tifa-with-the-us-will-this-mean-an-unraveling-of-mercosur-or-is-montevideo-maneuvering-to-be-left-out-in-the-cold/.

[892] This was the view of Thomas Shannon. See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06TOKYO2008, 'WHA A/S Shannon's April 10 Consultations with MOFA Latin Affairs DG Sakaba: Afternoon Session', 13 April 2006.

[893] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06MONTEVIDEO254, 'Mercosur – Love it or Leave it? Uruguay's Quandary', 14 March 2006.

[894] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06MONTEVIDEO229, 'Vasquez says he wants a Free Trade Agreement', 7 March 2006.

[895] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07BUENOSAIRES2155, 'Media Reaction; Argentine President-Elect Cristina Kirchner Challegnes; US-Peruvian FTA; 11/01/07', 1 November 2007.

[896] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06MONTEVIDEO254, 'Mercosur – Love it or Leave it? Uruguay's Quandary', 14 March 2006.

would precipitate Uruguay's dismissal.[897] Montevideo had grown frustrated with the Mercosur framework, but it was not prepared to forfeit its membership in the group for closer ties with the US. As Washington probed the porosity of the Common Market for ways of advancing its free trade objectives, its deference to Brazil ultimately rendered an FTA with Uruguay unfeasible. The bilateral route appeared to have run its course in Latin America.

Reconstituting Consensus? The Americas in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)

The George W. Bush years were deleterious to the US's free trade goals, despite the passage of CAFTA-DR and the bilateral FTAs. Not only did the FTAA collapse on Bush's watch, so too did the WTO's Doha Round. The head of the Brookings Institution's Global Economy and Development programme wrote that the 'competitive liberalisation' of the Bush administration had devolved into 'competitive finger pointing'.[898] By 2009, the libertarian Cato Institute was working assiduously for the restoration of the 'pro-trade consensus'. Citing falling support for globalisation and trade deals in opinion polls, Cato voiced 'grave concerns about the direction of US trade policy'.[899] Meanwhile, the 2008 financial crisis cast a shadow over Washington's seemingly boundless enthusiasm for 'free markets'. Mired in a severe recession, US economic policy turned inward, towards bailouts and fiscal stimulus. In the context of economic contraction, growing trade deficits and the persistent loss of manufacturing jobs, free traders were put on the defensive.[900] The executive branch lost its 'fast track' authority to negotiate trade deals without legislative input when Congress refused to grant either the Bush or Obama administrations trade promotion authority (TPA).[901] (Although fast track is not required to begin or conclude trade negotiations, its renewal signifies legislative support for specific agreements.[902]) From the perspective of inter-American relations, the antimonies of neoliberal capitalism had (further) destabilised the US's structural power, already challenged by the NLL. Of those Latin American countries without FTAs with the US, none were open to the prospect.[903] The

[897] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06BUENOSAIRES2061, 'Argentine Foreign Trade Secretary: Why Uruguay Can't Sign an FTA', 11 September 2006.
[898] Lael Brainard, 'U.S. Shares Blame for Trade Talk Collapse', *The Washington Post*, 28 July 2006: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/27/AR2006072701257_pf.html.
[899] Daniel Ikenson and Scott Lincicome, 'Audaciously Hopeful: How President Obama Can Help Restore the Pro-Trade Consensus', Cato Institute, April 2009, pp. 1-2.
[900] According to the Cato Institute, the bipartisan model that had dominated Washington since World War II 'collapsed entirely during the 110th Congress' (2007-2009): *Cato Handbook for Policymakers, 7th Edition* (Cato Institute: Washington, DC, 2009), pp. 611-623.
[901] Under fast track, Congress grants the executive the ability to enter into reciprocal trade agreements in a manner that expedites their implementation (by avoiding undue legislative procedures, provided the president observers certain statutory obligations). Fast track expired in July 2007. The inability of the Bush and Obama administrations to win fast track authority slowed executive efforts at revamping Washington's traditional free trade agenda. On the history of fast trade authority in US trade policy, see Public Citizen, 'The Rise and Fall of Fast Track Trade Authority', 2008. The executive's lack of fast track authority could impact the TPP, which deals with issues not covered in previous FTAs. These new issues include 'the treatment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), new regulatory cooperation and review guidelines, effects of trade on small- and medium-sized businesses (SMEs), and the implications of FTAs on global supply chains'. Congressional Research Service, 'Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy', 9 August 2012, p. 16.
[902] Congressional Research Service, 'Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy', 9 August 2012, p. ii.
[903] Congressional Research Service, 'US-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues', 8 February 2011, p. 1.

collapse of the free trade consensus was more pronounced in Latin America than in Washington.[904]

Although Obama campaigned against free trade, he later reversed course, finalising FTAs with Panama, Colombia and South Korea. This is consistent with the logic of structural power, which can override the agency of political forces nominally committed to change. If Obama's flip-flop was predictable, the pro-free trade consensus of previous decades remained elusive. The bilateral route allowed the US to press for 'competitive liberalisation' in the absence of a regional consensus. But bilateral FTAs also act as roadblocks to broader liberalisation regimes.[905] The common metaphor here is the 'spaghetti bowl'. The Western hemisphere saw the emergence of an 'expansive system of disparate bilateral and plurilateral agreements', which, according to CRS, were 'widely understood to be a second best solution for reaping the benefits of trade liberalization'.[906] They promoted an inefficient and cumbersome trading and investment system.[907] In this context, US trade policy increasingly aimed for *convergence*;[908] for a way of harmonising the overlapping layers of trade agreements completed in recent decades. A reconstitution of Washington's free trade consensus would entail a reinvigorated commitment to liberalisation, but in a manner that tied-up the loose strands of existing agreements to give the mangled spaghetti bowl a more coherent shape. With this in mind, some observers deemed the TPP a replacement for the FTAA.[909] In its structure as an open, 'living' agreement, the TPP recognises the geopolitical realities of an NLL-led Latin America. Nevertheless, in jump-starting the US's hemispheric neoliberalisation drive, it represents an attempt to reconstitute US structural power in inter-American relations.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership: A 'Living Agreement'

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is the cornerstone of the Obama administration's trade policy. Bush formally brought the US into TPP negotiations in 2008. The Obama team recommitted the US to the multilateral talks in December 2009.[910] Obama's backing brought with it support from the Democratic Party, which endorsed the TPP in its 2012 platform.[911] Some lawmakers, however, viewed the TPP as a continuation of the discredited NAFTA model. They suggested that, if the TPP failed to break with past agreements (in regards to its

[904] See for example, Kevin Casas-Zamora, 'Why the Discomfort Over Free Trade', Brookings Institution, 12 February 2008: http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2008/09/12-free-trade-casaszamora.

[905] This is the position of prominent free trade economist Jagdish Bhagwati. See for example, his *Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Bhagwati, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, is influential in US policy circles.

[906] Congressional Research Service, 'US-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues', 8 February 2011, p. ii.

[907] Ibid., p. 6.

[908] Antoni Estevadeordal, 'Economic Integration in the Americas: An Unfinished Agenda', in *The Road to Hemispheric Cooperation: Beyond the Cartagena Summit of the Americas* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2012), p. 27.

[909] Ibid., p. 28.

[910] Office of the US Trade Representative, 'Trans-Pacific Partnership Announcement', December 2009: http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2009/december/trans-pacific-partnership-announcement. As stated by the USTR in February 2012, the US was 'moving full speed ahead' with TPP negotiations. However, the Obama administration was unable to reach its goal of concluding talks by the end of 2012. Office of the US Trade Representative, 'Testimony by US Trade Representative Ron Kirk Before the House Committee on Ways and Means', 29 February 2012: http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/speeches/transcripts/2012/february/testimony-us-trade-representative-ron-kirk.

[911] Democratic National Committee, 2012 Democratic National Platform, 'Moving America Forward': http://assets.dstatic.org/dnc-platform/2012-National-Platform.pdf.

investment provisions, for example) it would generate a public backlash.[912] It remains to be seen whether the TPP reflects a renewed domestic consensus on trade.[913] As of 2013, questions swirled around the incipient accord: How is it different from previous FTAs? Does it isolate China? Will it lead to further economic liberalisation in Latin America? And what, specifically, is included in the proposed TPP? This section analyses the TPP by focusing on its potential impact in the Americas. Although, for Washington, the TPP is mainly about the large East Asian economies (South Korea, Japan and China), its strategic value lies in its ability to connect East and West and reinvigorate the global trade agenda. It is the 'most comprehensive agreement in terms of breadth and depth of commitments undertaken by the United States'.[914] If finalised, it would be the US's largest FTA.

The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement was signed by Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore in 2005. It aimed to achieve an open trade and investment area in support of APEC's wider liberalisation process.[915] The proposed TPP represents an expanded version of the existing regime, which went into effect in 2006. As of January 2013, the TPP included the US, Australia, Peru, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mexico and Canada, in addition to the original four members. South Korea and Japan also expressed interest in joining the negotiations, as did Colombia and Costa Rica. The TPP is designed to remain open to new signatories as the process evolves. According to CRS:

> The TPP serves several strategic goals in US trade policy. First, it is the leading trade policy initiative of the Obama Administration, and is a manifestation of the Administration's 'pivot' to Asia. It provides both a new set of trade negotiations following the conclusion of the bilateral FTAs with Columbia (sic), Panama, and South Korea and an alternative venue to the stalled Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO. If concluded, it may serve to shape the economic architecture of the Asia-Pacific region by harmonizing existing agreements with US FTA partners, attracting new participants, and establishing regional rules on new policy issues facing the global economy—possibly providing impetus to future multilateral liberalization under the WTO.[916]

The endgame is a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP, which is also connected to APEC; the TPP would evolve into the FTAAP). Although it was launched by four small countries, with its 2008-2009 endorsement(s) of the negotiations the United States became the linchpin in the TPP process.[917] For Washington, the TPP represents the 'middle ground' between the stalled WTO talks and the worn-out bilateral track.[918] Instead of adding another

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[912] Rep. Linda Sanchez (D-Calif.) and Rep. George Miller (D-Calif.), 'Obama's trade opportunity', *The Hill*, 15 June 2010: http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/103281-obamas-trade-opportunity-rep-linda-sanchez-and-rep-george-miller. See also, Bernard K. Gordon, 'Trading Up in Asia', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91 No. 4 (2012), pp. 17-22. Gordon notes that the Obama administration hopes to make the deal palatable to small and medium-sized enterprises, so as to build domestic support for trade.

[913] The Cato Institute, for example, while supportive of the TPP, did not see it as sufficiently ambitious to warrant the notion that it marked a real commitment to free trade on the part the Obama administration. For Cato, this was due to the fact that the US already had FTAs with many of the countries within the TPP. Cato Institute, Free Trade Bulletin, 'Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership Worth the Fuss?' 15 March 2010.

[914] Congressional Research Service, 'The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress', 5 September 2012, p. 45.

[915] Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, 2005. Available at: http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/trade-agreement/transpacific/main-agreement.pdf.

[916] Congressional Research Service, 'The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress', 5 September 2012, p. ii.

[917] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09SINGAPORE295, 'Singapore Trade Minister Pushes for Robust US Trade Agenda', 30 March 2009; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09WELLINGTON275, 'Trade Minister on TPP – The Hour is Not Yet Here', 18 September 2009.

[918] Gordon (2012).

strand to the tangled spaghetti bowl, it holds the potential to disentangle the web of bilateral agreements (by superseding them on things like market access). This is related to the TPP's capacity to broaden over time, a new feature in the accord.

CRS describes the TPP as a 'living agreement'. It is open to new members willing to adhere to its various commitments and to new issues as they emerge.[919] There is no formal accession process by which prospective states join the TPP. Rather, each aspiring country needs only the nominal approval of the other parties. This approval is gained if prospective members are able to adequately demonstrate a willingness to discuss sensitive issues. As negotiators move toward the conclusion of the agreement, officials have been directed to 'continue talks with other trans-Pacific partners that have expressed interest in joining the TPP in order to facilitate their future participation'.[920] CRS wrote that 'it is conceivable that other countries or trade blocs beyond the Pacific shores could link up to the agreement in the future'.[921] This open arrangement is what makes the TPP so valuable. The US already has FTAs with a number of the TPP signatories (e.g. Canada, Mexico, Chile and Peru, among others), but the TPP's 'docking' feature would allow new members to sign up. 'It is the first non-customs union trade agreement with the avowed purpose—and potential—of transforming into a large, plurilateral free trade agreement'.[922] It puts the US at the centre of an expanding liberalisation regime connecting the Asia-Pacific to the Americas. It gives Washington a leadership role in the harmonisation of existing trade rules. And it is structured to bring additional countries into the fold if and when the timing allows.

The Obama administration portrays the TPP as a model for future trade agreements.[923] Its 26 chapters feature several novel elements, including horizontal issues designed to cut-across pre-existing accords. 'According to the USTR', writes CRS, 'this initiative stems from the proliferation of regulatory and non-tariff barriers, which have become a major hurdle for businesses gaining access to foreign markets'.[924] Additionally, at the behest of US negotiators, the text includes rules on state-owned enterprises, hitherto excluded from most FTAs. These provisions would regulate the subsidies, low cost credit and preferential access to government procurement enjoyed by state-owned enterprises.[925] Another new area is e-commerce. The TPP framework would adjust and synchronise various impediments to e-trade, such as customs duties, the digital environment, authentication of electronic

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[919] Congressional Research Service, 'The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress', 5 September 2012, p. 43. On the issues involved in TPP expansion, see for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09KUALALUMPUR957, 'AUSTR Weisel Discusses Trans-Pacific Partnership and Trade Policy in Malaysia', 27 November 2009. On the prospects for the future inclusion of Japan and South Korea, see Wikileaks, Reference ID: 10WELLINGTON65, 'DAS Reed Engages on TPP, UN Reform, Environmental Cooperation, Fiji, APEC and Bilateral Issues with New Zealand', 19 February 2010.

[920] Administration of Barack Obama, 2011, 'Joint Statement by Trans-Pacific Partnership Leaders', 12 November 2011.

[921] Congressional Research Service, 'The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress', 5 September 2012, p. 43. As one leaked cable stated: 'The US intends to increase participating countries in the TPP for the purpose of shifting the TPP to the realization of the FTAAP in the future'. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09TOKYO157, 'Eminent Persons' Group Suggests a New Framework for US-Japan Economic Dialogue', 23 January 2009.

[922] Meredith Kolsky Lewis, 'The Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?' *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review*, Vol. 34 Issue 1 (2011), p. 29.

[923] Administration of Barack Obama, 2011, 'Remarks During a Meeting on the Trans-Pacific Partnership in Honolulu, Hawaii', 12 November 2011.

[924] Congressional Research Service, 'The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress', 5 September 2012, p. 37.

[925] Ibid., pp. 38-39.

transactions and localisation requirements.[926] Moreover, the TPP would liberalise supply chains by addressing trade in intermediate goods (inputs in the production of final goods).[927] Finally, the TPP features a chapter on small- and medium-sized enterprises. It will reportedly enhance their capacity to take advantage of the market opportunities created by the trade agreement.[928] The full extent of the TPP's liberalisation regime is yet to be determined, and remains shielded from public view.

The TPP came under intense criticism from lawmakers and civil society groups over its lack of transparency.[929] Though approximately 600 corporations (and some unions, such as the AFL-CIO) have access to the text, it has been kept from legislators.[930] Several chapters of the text have been leaked by stakeholders. According to the leaked intellectual property chapter, there is to be a four-year lag *from the close of the negotiations* on the declassification of all TPP documents.[931] In August 2012, Congressman Walter Jones (R-North Carolina) introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives protesting Congress's denial of access to the TPP text.[932] A similar piece of legislation introduced in the Senate was rebuffed by federal negotiators. When challenged over the TPP's lack of transparency, USTR Kirk recalled that, following the release of the FTAA text in 2001, that particular deal could not be completed. 'In other words', wrote Lori Wallach, 'the official in charge of the TPP says the only way to complete the deal is to keep it secret from the people who would have to live with the results'.[933] A former US trade official stated: 'This is the least transparent trade negotiation I have ever seen'.[934]

The United States sees the TPP as leading to the establishment of a larger free trade area (the FTAAP) centred on, but not limited to, the Asia-Pacific. It views the construction of the TPP as dependent on US leadership.[935] Despite several new aspects, the TPP is wedded to the same neoliberal thinking that has dominated US trade policy for decades, meaning it is not about trade per se. As Kevin Gallagher emphasised, the TPP represents 'Obama's extension of the Bush-era doctrine of "competitive liberalization"'.[936] The leaked text demonstrates that the TPP would limit the ability of signatory counties to regulate foreign firms operating in their jurisdiction. It would give companies the right to sue national governments and skirt domestic laws on finance, health and the environment. Public Citizen has delineated the TPP's investment provisions, which, as the NGO points out, are very similar to NAFTA's investment chapter. They include, among other provisions: the right to

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[926] Congressional Research Service, 'The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress', 5 September 2012, p. 39.
[927] Ibid., pp. 39-40.
[928] Ibid., p. 41. See also Gordon (2012).
[929] See for example, Gordon (2012).
[930] Matt Stoller, 'The Trans-Pacific Partnership: The biggest trade deal you've never heard of,' *Salon.com*, 23 October 2012:
http://www.salon.com/2012/10/23/everything_you_wanted_to_know_about_the_trans_pacific_partnership
[931] Trans-Pacific Partnership, Intellectual Property Rights Chapter, Draft, 10 February 2011.
[932] 112th Congress, 2nd Session, H. Res. 767, 'Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives relating to increased transparency in the negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement, and for other purposes', 2 August 2012.
[933] Lori Wallach, 'TPP: NAFTA on Steroids', *The Nation*, July 16/23, 2012, p. 9.
[934] Quote from Gary Horlick, trade lawyer, as cited in Lori Wallach, 'A Stealth Attack on Democratic Governance', *The American Prospect*, April 2012, p. 15.
[935] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08TOKYO2951, 'AUSTR Cutler Discusses Bilateral Trade and Regional Architecture with Japanese Counterparts', 22 October 2008; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08CANBERRA1111, 'DAUSTR Bell's Australia Meetings: TPP, WTO, and FTAs', 3 November 2008.
[936] Kevin P. Gallagher, 'Not a Great Deal for Asia', *The American Prospect*, April 2012, p. 19.

challenge capital controls and other regulations that promote financial stability; an overarching definition of 'investment' that goes well beyond 'real property'; the provision of procedural rights to foreign investors (not available to domestic investors) to sue governments outside of national legal systems; and the creation of tribunals staffed by private sector lawyers who rotate between serving as corporate representatives and acting as 'judges'. Under the TPP, various domestic policies pertaining to both foreign and domestic firms can be construed as violations of investors' rights. In general, the agreement does not provide exceptions to safeguard health, labour, environmental or consumer protection laws.[937] There are particular concerns that it will curb developing countries' access to generic medicines and undermine the US's Medicare and Medicaid health programmes.[938]

The Geopolitics of the TPP: Latin America and the Asia Pivot

The TPP brings together several of Washington's most important allies/partners in Latin America (Mexico, Colombia, Chile and Peru). Chile, a founding member of the TPP, sees value in the agreement's ability to harmonise existing free trade agreements. Chilean trade officials have emphasised that the TPP could be a 'profound agreement' if successfully implemented. It held the capacity to 'return order to the "spaghetti bowl"' of agreements currently criss-crossing the Americas and the Asia-Pacific region.[939] Peru, a leader of the Pacific alliance forum, was somewhat hesitant to join the TPP, choosing to base its decision on the accession of other countries and in consultation with the US.[940] Peru's centre-left government remained outwardly committed to the talks. Colombia was invited by Chile to join the TPP in 2008, and has been actively seeking membership since 2009.[941] Colombia's interest took a back seat to the finalisation of its FTA with the US, a process that complicated its efforts to formally join the TPP.[942] With the June 2012 announcement that Mexico was entering the fray, the USTR stated: 'Mexico has assured the United States that it is prepared to conclude a high-standard agreement that will include issues that were not covered in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)'.[943] As of 2013, then, interest in the TPP among Latin America's neoliberal governments was increasing.

Washington was forthright about the TPP's connection to its vaunted 'strategic pivot'. Obama's decision to pursue the TPP was announced during his first trip to Asia in November 2009. 'An expanded TPP could lead to a different path toward Asian economic integration, would have neither ASEAN nor the three major East Asian economies (China, Japan and South Korea) as its driver, and which would instead have the United States as the central

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[937] Public Citizen, memo, 'Public Interest Analysis of Leaked Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Investment Text', 13 June 2012. The full text of the leaked TPP investment chapter can be accessed at: http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/tppinvestment.pdf

[938] Public Citizen, memo, 'Proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership rules could undermine Medicare, Medicaid and Veterans' Health, hurting seniors, military families and the poor', 14 June 2012; Congress of the United States, House of Representatives, 'Letter to the Honorable Ron Kirk', 19 October 2011.

[939] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09SANTIAGO1198, 'Chilean Reaction to President Obama's Announcement on TPP', 10 December 2009.

[940] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 08LIMA1606, 'Peru on Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement', 3 October 2008.

[941] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09BOGOTA3359, 'Is Asia Colombia's Next Economic Frontier?' 12 November 2009. On Colombia's desire to join the TPP, see also, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 09BOGOTA15, 'Colombian Trade Agenda: Major Achievements in 2008, Big Plans for 2009', 6 January 2009.

[942] Wikileaks, Reference ID: 10BOGOTA217, 'FTA with US is Blocking Colombia's Global Trade Policy, Says Trade Minister', 11 February 2010.

[943] Office of the US Trade Representative, 'US Trade Representative Kirk Welcomes Mexico as a New Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiating Partner', 18 June 2012: http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2012/june/ustr-mexico-new-tpp-partner.

participant'.[944] By most accounts, the US wants to bring Japan and South Korea into the agreement, and the two countries have registered their interest. China, it would seem, is another story. Some have speculated that the TPP is a 'security alliance disguised as a trade negotiation', and that it is aimed squarely at countering China's rise.[945] Indeed, there is a vibrant debate over the degree to which the TPP 'targets' China, and the Obama administration has sent mixed messages in this regard.[946] During the 2012 presidential debates, Obama alluded to the TPP as a way of pushing China to adopt international standards.[947] In May 2012, however, Kirk stated that the US 'would love nothing more' than for China to eventually join the TPP.[948] However, China's inclusion would have to garner the support of existing TPP members. It would also depend on China's willingness to participate in a comprehensive, US-led regime. 'With the agreement's focus on expansion throughout the region', noted CRS, 'the current negotiating partners may wish to establish disciplines now on certain aspects of the Chinese and other Asia-Pacific economies. This may, in part, explain the push for potential new disciplines on state-owned enterprises within the TPP'.[949]

So what of the TPP's impact on US hegemony in the Americas? For some analysts, it has the potential to be a transformative agreement.[950] According to the Inter-American Dialogue, the TPP provides a way for the US to 'remake' its economic relationship with Latin America. The TPP illustrates how the US 'can deeply engage with nations intent on becoming more important global players'.[951] It provides a mechanism for Washington to consolidate the free trade bloc of countries in the Western hemisphere, including through the tackling of new commercial and juridical issues not covered in previous FTAs. This process would be facilitated by the TPP's harmonisation of existing rules. Through the building of structural links to East Asian markets, the agreement provides extra incentive for countries who may be 'on the fence' regarding the procurement of an FTA with the US.[952] In the words of one analyst, the TPP would allow the US to construct 'an FTAA of the willing'.[953] Its

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[944] Kolsky Lewis (2011), p. 39. ASEAN is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

[945] *The Economist*, 'Partners and Rivals: Another ambitious trade agreement gets bogged down', 22 September 2012.

[946] As remarked by Clyde Prestowitz, Obama stressed in his 2011 APEC speech that the 'neither the (Asia) Pivot nor the TPP is aimed at any particular country—which, of course, meant that it is. The country is China'. Clyde Prestowitz, 'The Pacific Pivot', *The American Prospect*, 13 March 2012: http://prospect.org/article/pacific-pivot.

[947] The White House, 'Remarks by the President and Governor Romney in the Third Presidential Debate', 23 October 2012: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/10/23/remarks-president-and-governor-romney-third-presidential-debate. Obama stated: 'We believe China can be a partner, but we're also sending a very clear signal that America is a Pacific power, that we are going to have a presence there. We are working with countries in the region to make sure, for example, that ships can pass through, that commerce continues. And we're organizing trade relations with countries other than China so that China starts feeling more pressure about meeting basic international standards. That's the kind of leadership we've shown in the region. That's the kind of leadership that we'll continue to show'.

[948] *Reuters*, 'UPDATE 1-USTR Kirk sees better chance for farm trade reform', 8 May 2012: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/08/usa-trade-kirk-idUSL1E8G8C3M20120508.

[949] Congressional Research Service, 'The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress', 5 September 2012, p. 7.

[950] For various perspectives on the transformative potential of the TPP, see C. L. Kim, Deborah Kay Elms and Patrick Low, editors, *The Trans-Pacific Partnership* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[951] The Inter-American Dialogue, 'Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America', April 2012, p. 14.

[952] Of course, by including large economies like Japan and South Korea, it adds another layer of economic asymmetry to the mix, potentially deterring smaller Latin American countries from entering into the negotiations.

[953] Juan Carlos Hidalgo, 'Building a Free Trade Area of Most of the Americas', Cato Institute, 31 October 2012: http://www.cato.org/blog/building-free-trade-area-most-americas.

docking feature effectively leaves the door open for future members.[954] Should it come to fruition, it may outlast the NLL. If the political pendulum swings back toward the right, the TPP, or its successor, would remain an option for those governments looking to lock-in neoliberal reforms and forge closer economic ties with the US.

Given the prominence of Obama's Asia pivot, Latin America is quite clearly of secondary importance to the Trans-Pacific Partnership. However, the region was more than a strategic afterthought in the United States' decision to take on the leadership of the TPP negotiations. By addressing new areas of 'trade', and through its novel structure as a 'living agreement', the TPP may jump start Washington's drive for 'competitive liberalisation' in the Americas. This drive had stalled under the Bush and Obama administrations. The US's most recent trade agreements in Latin America, the Colombia and Panama FTAs, took over six years to gain entry into force following the completion of bilateral negotiations. The documentary record makes it clear that the US preferred a hemispheric regime to a network of lesser agreements. This was only feasible, of course, with Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela on board. Using Mercosur and ALBA to coordinate opposition to the FTAA, NLL governments scuttled Washington's plans for a hemispheric free trade area. In this context, Washington probed the region for ways of advancing its free trade objectives using other 'tracks', with some success. The TPP offers Washington a way out of the bilateral/sub-regional cul-de-sac. It holds the potential to integrate participating Asian, North American and Latin American markets into a single trade regime, while bringing new countries into the fold. As an added geo-strategic benefit, the TPP may serve as a vehicle to isolate China. The TPP, however, is far from a done deal. It sits at the centre of an on-going tug-of-war over US structural power in the Americas, and beyond.

Conclusion

Insofar as this chapter focused on Washington's trade policy, it would seem to tilt more toward an agential rather than structural analysis. However, structures are co-constituted and maintained through agency, and it is in this sense that we can discuss the structural power of particular states. The US's 'leadership role' in the formulation of free trade regimes is an outcome of its historically-allocated, structurally-determined position in the political economy of the Americas. As the largest economy in the Western hemisphere by a wide margin, the US enjoys considerable structural leverage over other states. As this chapter showed, the rules and regulations codified in trade accords are determined largely by US negotiators. The US used multi-track trade negotiations to push for greater mobility for transnational capital, safer opportunities for US investors and a general opening of markets through privatisation and deregulation. In an era of burgeoning post-neoliberalism, the Bush and Obama administrations re-committed the US to neoliberalisation under the NAFTA model. Though FTAs are not institutions as such, the opposition to this model was coordinated via institutions, namely Mercosur and ALBA. And, as expressed in the Buenos Aires Consensus and Bolivarian anti-imperialism, there were ideological and discursive challenges to US trade policy as well. The ability of US hegemony to internalise ideological opposition is the subject of the next chapter, which examines the construction of 'populism' in US discourse. As detailed in the following analysis, one of the hallmarks of 'populism' is 'statist' opposition to 'free trade'.

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[954] Along with the CAFTA-DR countries, Uruguay and Paraguay come to mind as perhaps the most likely candidates, depending on the future of Mercosur. Uruguay, as documented elsewhere in this chapter, has experienced some tensions with its Mercosur partners. Following the legislative ouster of leftist bishop Fernando Lugo as president of Paraguay, the country was temporarily suspended from the Mercosur bloc.

As illustrated in Chapters 3 and 4, the New Latin Left challenged the compulsory and institutional power of the US in Latin America. NLL governments curbed the manoeuvrability of the US military in the region while challenging Washington's dominance of the OAS and creating new avenues of regional cooperation. US policy sought to respond in kind. A similar give-and-take phenomenon was evident in regards to US structural power, which emanates from a political economy that reinforces existing material hierarchies. As addressed in Chapter 1, the NLL has problematised neoliberalism. US trade policy has pressed for continued neoliberalisation to reinforce existing structural asymmetries, despite various forms of counter-hegemonic opposition. In the context of the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic dialectic, then, this chapter showed how the forms of power in international relations are attached to concomitant counter-powers. Furthermore, it clarified the ways in which the forms of power taxonomised by Barnett and Duvall are mutually imbricated. The structural power of the US in the hemispheric political economy may not be wholly contingent on institutional mechanisms. However, this power is often expressed through institutional arrangements, which codify and shape economic structures (of trade, production, investment and so on). Additionally, structural power is inexorably interlinked with the ideas and representations that help to constitute the US and its Latin American partners (and adversaries) as particular kinds of actors in the global political economy. It is to this notion of productive power to which we now turn our attention.

Chapter 6

US Productive Power and the Discursive Construction of NLL 'Populism'

References to populism are sprinkled throughout this thesis. As seen in Chapter 3, Washington views the phenomenon as a threat to its compulsory power in Latin America. Chapter 4 highlights populism's supposed challenge to liberal democracy and the OAS's Democratic Charter. And as noted in Chapter 5, opposition to US-backed 'free trade' is also portrayed as populist. Indeed, for some observers, it is populism itself that best explains the rise of the new left in Latin America. However, 'populism' is not an objective condition. Rather, it is a discursive construction; an ideological manifestation of US hegemony. In other words, as examined in this chapter, Latin American 'populism' is part and parcel of the US's productive power in the region. Productive power works on discursive and ideational planes to construct meanings as the basis of social interaction. It is ideological in that it legitimates the actions of more powerful actors—those with the greater capacity to shape the meanings embedded in discursive and representational practices. As this chapter demonstrates, the depiction of (some) NLL agents as 'populists' facilitates the reconstitution of US hegemony by affixing certain meanings to the region's anti-neoliberal, counter-hegemonic governments. The construction of 'populism' represents a move to recoup the productive power lost amidst the ideological ascendency of 'nationalist', 'leftist', 'Socialist', 'Bolivarian', 'pan-Latin Americanist' and 'anti-imperialist' ideas.

For Barnett and Duvall, productive power works through diffuse and constitutive social processes 'that are effected only through the meaningful practices of actors'. This involves 'the discursive production of the subjects, the fixing of meanings, and the terms of action, of world politics'.[955] Productive power runs *through* those discursive phenomena that produce identities, ideas and knowledge. Like structural power, it involves the constitution of subjects. Again, however, there is a focus on contingency—on the ability of subjects to (re)ascribe meaning to themselves and the world around them through language practices and knowledge production.[956] Barnett and Duvall define discourses as 'the social processes and the systems of knowledge through which meaning is produced, fixed, lived, experienced, and transformed'.[957] Transformation is important here, as it suggests an active role for agents in on-going and inter-subjective processes. In this way, we can talk about the productive power of states. The productive power of the US runs *through* the wider discourse on populist governance, which is shaped by the discursive practices of the US. This invariably takes place in the context of the pre-existing meanings of 'populism'.

Through a discourse analysis of speeches, official documents and embassy cables,[958] this chapter examines the implications of the populist construct for the reconstitution of US

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[955] Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, 'Power in Global Governance', in Barnett and Duvall (2005a), pp. 20-21.

[956] This is seen clearly in David Campbell's influential discussion of US identity construction, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992). Although Campbell's poststructualism is at odds with the theoretical thrust of this thesis, *Writing Security* demonstrates how the subjectivities of US policy flow from discourses that are themselves shaped by the agency and language practises of US policy elites. See also, Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

[957] Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, 'Power in Global Governance', in Barnett and Duvall (2005a), p. 20.

[958] Following Hansen's modelling, the discourse analysis carried out in this chapter was limited to official documents and the wider foreign policy debate over Latin American populism within the US government and foreign policy establishment (excluding media output, popular culture and marginal discourses, but including

hegemony in Latin America. As alluded to in Chapter 1, my discourse analytic approach is broad-brushed and pluralistic.[959] It blends Milliken's predicate analysis with the theoretical commitments of Fairclough's critical discourse analysis (CDA), which maintains that texts should be studied in relation to extra-discursive structures.[960] For Milliken, predicate analysis is one way of uncovering the productive power of discourses, as expressed in, among other things, the use of binaries and the definitional language practices of privileged actors.[961] The word 'populist' conveys a certain set of meanings to those it is attached to; it *represents* them in a certain way, setting the conditions of action in the international relations of the Americas. But, as noted by Neumann, 'not all representations are equally lasting', not all discourses are equally fluid and 'meaning and materiality must be studied together'.[962] The construction of 'populism' in US productive power does not take place in a 'discursive echo chamber', as Stokes would have it, in which 'discourses constitute other discourses that in turn constitute other discourses and so on without any relationship to other social structures or indeed to any notion of political economy or national interests'.[963] Given the realist ontology of this project, it is important to emphasise that productive power is mutually imbricated with the other forms of power in the reconstitution of US hegemony.

Although discourse encompasses more than language (to include symbols, images and the like), this chapter adopts a 'thin' conceptualisation to focus primarily on the instrumentalist use of language within US foreign policy. Discourse here is largely rhetorical. The depiction of certain Latin American governments as 'populist' is (at least in part) a deliberate attempt to undermine the counter-hegemonic project they represent. The populist construct facilitated Washington's distinction between the 'good left' and the 'bad left' in Latin America; it animated the division between the responsible, forward-looking centre-left governments (e.g. Brazil, Chile) from 'dangerous' states implementing 'anachronistic' economic policies (Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador).[964] If 'populism' is a means by which policymakers in Washington make sense of the NLL, it also works to delegitimise certain NLL governments. Ideologically, in 'condemning' those who self-identify as 'Bolivarians' or socialists, the populist construct legitimises the compulsory, institutional and structural expressions of US power. It also shapes the interests of US foreign policy, which come to be defined in opposition to the proliferation of populist governance.

The first section of this chapter serves to denote the meanings embedded in the wider discourse on populism by outlining the two dominant approaches to the concept in the

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Congress and think tanks). Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (London: Routledge, 2006). My reading of US discourse corresponds to models 1 and 2 of her four models of foreign policy discourse analysis, which limit research to official speech/texts and those of the wider foreign policy debate. In contrast, models 3 and 4 of her typology focus on cultural representations and marginal political discourses, respectively.

[959] On the compatibility of various methodologies of discourse analysis used in IR, see especially Hansen (2006); and Iver B. Neumann, 'Discourse Analysis', in *Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide*, Audie Koltz and Deepa Prakash, editors (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 61-92.

[960] Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), and *Analysing Discourse* (London: Routledge, 2003).

[961] Jennifer Milliken, 'The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 5 No. 2 (1999), p. 229.

[962] Neumann (2008), pp. 73-74.

[963] Doug Stokes, 'Ideas and Avocados: Ontologising Critical Terrorism Studies', *International Relations*, Vol. 23 No. 1 (2009), p. 89.

[964] As noted in Chapter 1, Castañeda was one of the first to make this normative distinction. Jorge G. Castañeda, 'Latin America's Left Turn', *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 85 No. 3 (2006), pp. 28-43. Variations of this good left/bad left distinction were made by numerous commentators, academics and policymakers.

academic literature. I start with the view that populism—a notoriously vague concept—is best approached as a discourse that constitutes 'the people' as a unitary actor. I then look at how the meanings of populism have been shaped by the history of the 'populist model' in Latin America, from the 1930s through the Cold War to the post-Cold War period. The subsequent section uses discourse analytic techniques to uncover the meanings of populism in contemporary US discourse on the New Latin Left, which has challenged the ideology of US hegemony through the productive (counter-)power of various nationalist and anti-imperialist discourses. I examine the metaphor of the 'pied pipers of populism' in the language of the Bush administration's trade policy.[965] I then turn to two competing collocations (frequent conjunctions of words) in US discourse: 'radical populism' and 'false populism', teasing out the inconsistencies in their application to NLL leaders.[966] Finally, I examine the parameters of the populist construct by looking at the silences in the discourse; that is, the cases in which it was *not* applied (with regards to Colombian President Uribe, for example). The conclusion relates the ideological weight of US productive power to the other forms of power discussed in the thesis.

Approaches to 'Populism': The Latin American Context

The constitutive capacity of US productive power does not generate meaning 'out of thin air'. The pre-existing discourse(s) on populism provide(s) US hegemony with the ideational resources out of which the contemporary discourse on NLL-related populism is constructed. To an extent, these meanings are conditioned by the extra-discursive phenomena surrounding the populist construct; phenomena that give shape to the various forms of power in international relations. In Latin America, the expression of 'populist' ideas is wrapped-up in nationalist, anti-imperialist and 'Bolivarian' ideologies, which, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, challenge the compulsory and institutional power of the US in the region. Moreover, the 'populist' tag is applied almost exclusively to the anti-neoliberal faction of the NLL. This has implications for the reconstitution of US structural power in the political economy of the Western hemisphere, as left-leaning governments are dissuaded from pursuing 'statist' alternatives to US-backed 'free trade'.

In its various guises, populism is rooted in the cultures and societies that produce it. There is a large body of literature on populism in Latin America, much of which analyses both the discursive and extra-discursive elements of populist movements, governments and leaders in specific national settings. This section reviews the two dominant strands of the literature on populism: one which conceptualises it as a particular discursive style; and one which approaches it as a model of political-economic organisation. Though there are some tensions between the discourse-driven and historicist strands of the literature, they are not irreconcilable. In fact, they play off of one another, and most analyses of populism account for elements of both.[967] Importantly for this chapter, broad understandings of the concept influence US discourse on the NLL, which utilises 'populism' as a convenient epithet. The representation of certain states or leaders as 'populists' is deeply normative, but it stems from

[965] On the analysis of metaphors in IR, and its relationship to predicate analysis, see Milliken (1999), p. 235.

[966] Fairclough defines collocations as 'more or less regular or habitual patterns of co-occurrence between words'; Fairclough (2003), p. 213. The phrases 'radical populist' and 'false populist' became predictable in US public discourse on the NLL, as detailed in latter sections of this chapter.

[967] Some studies even make explicit reference to the relationship between the discursive and extra-discursive 'faces' of populism. Cammack, for example, analyses populism as a phenomenon that is shaped both discursively and by the structures and institutions of specific historical conjunctures. Paul Cammack, 'The resurgence of populism in Latin America', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, Vol. 19 No. 2 (2000), pp. 149-161.

the concept's significance as an analytical attribution. For instance, populism is 'undemocratic' because it runs counter to Washington's equation of democracy with polyarchy—that is, 'thin', elite-led democracy that is conducive to processes of socio-economic neoliberalisation.[968]

The Discursive Approach to Populism

The discursive construction of populism in US foreign policy is enabled by the looseness of the concept rather than any 'essential' characteristics. Populism is a notoriously vague term, yet it has been widely used in the Latin American context from the 1930s onwards. Although a renewed concern over populism has been a prominent part of US foreign policy toward the NLL, populism itself is hardly new. To quote Álvaro García Linera, the vice-president of Bolivia, 'populism is a bag into which they put everything they do not understand'.[969] But, although it may be poorly understood, populism provides US policymakers with a way of internalising the complex phenomena challenging US hegemony. It is a shortcut to understanding. In Washington's approach to the region, populism is viewed as inimical to liberal democracy, a deviation from responsible economic policymaking and a threat to US interests and security. These qualities are far from self-evident when we consider the literature on the concept, which highlights its deeply contested status.[970]

Ernesto Laclau writes that 'a persistent feature of the literature on populism is its reluctance—or difficulty—in giving the concept any precise meaning'.[971] For Laclau, populism is virtually synonymous with politics itself.[972] In his theorising, populism denotes a mode of articulation that constitutes 'the people' as such. It is the discourse of populism that allows this subject to make demands on an enemy—that is, the 'other' that is also discursively constructed through Laclau's logic of equivalence/difference.[973] Similarly, Panizza highlights the modes of identification and the processes of naming that allow for the emergence of populism as a dimension of politics.[974] He contends that 'while there is no scholarly agreement on the meaning of populism, it is possible to identify an analytical core around which there is a significant degree of academic consensus'.[975] Likewise for Panizza, this core is comprised of the identification of 'the people' as a unitary actor in an antagonistic relationship to a powerful 'other'—the oligarchy, the elite or a foreign power.[976] He writes: 'the notion of the sovereign people as an actor in an antagonistic relation with the established order, as the core element of populism, has a long tradition in the writings on the topic'.[977] For Laclau, Panizza and others, then, populism is fundamentally *discursive*. Carlos de la

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[968] William Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). For more on the US's promotion of polyarchy, see Chapters 2 and 4.
[969] Cited in Kirk A. Hawkins, *Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 50.
[970] See for example, Paul Taggart, *Populism* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000).
[971] Ernesto Laclau, *On Populist Reason* (London: Verso, 2005), p. 3.
[972] Ernesto Laclau, 'Populism: What's in a Name?' in Francisco Panizza (ed.), *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy* (London: Verso Press, 2005), p. 47.
[973] Laclau (2005), p. 34.
[974] Francisco Panizza, 'Introduction: populism and the mirror of democracy', in Francisco Panizza (ed.), *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy* (London: Verso Press, 2005).
[975] Ibid., p. 1.
[976] Panizza (2005); Laclau (2005); and Margaret Canovan, 'Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy', *Political Studies*, Vol. 47 No. 1 (1999), pp. 2-16.
[977] Panizza (2005), p. 4.

Torre, for example, defines populism as 'a style of political mobilization based on strong rhetorical appeals to the people and crowd action on behalf of a leader'.[978]

As Panizza notes, populism is unique in that, 'unlike other equally contested concepts, such as democracy, it has become an analytical attribution rather than a term with which most political actors would willingly identify'.[979] With few exceptions, leaders and political parties of all ideologies avoid association with the term, making it largely objectionable from a normative standpoint. Much of this has to do with the insinuation that the populist 'model' is top-down, anachronistic and autocratic. 'In Latin America', writes de la Torre, 'populism is generally viewed in negative terms. For most it implies an abnormality, an anomaly, and a passing phenomenon that will eventually, and hopefully, go away... Populism is also associated with leaders who manipulate, followers who are betrayed, and overall backwardness'.[980] Cammack notes that the conventional view on Latin American populism 'feeds off a literature critical of the dangers of forms of mass politics in which unscrupulous demagogues stimulate mob rule'.[981] Charismatic leaders are thus closely associated with the concept, particularly in Latin America, where there is overlap with the notion of the *caudillo*, or strongman.

In general, populism is ambiguous in terms of the left-right scale. As noted by Raymond Williams, populism denotes a kind of demagogic agitation in right-wing criticism, while, for left-wing critics, populism implies the subornation of socialist struggle to common and base-level prejudices, assumptions and habits, as displayed in some fascist movements.[982] In Latin America, populism has generally been associated with the left, as sketched out below. Insofar as it represents a discursive style, however, there is no reason why this should automatically be the case.[983] Moreover, there is disagreement about the degree to which populism is compatible with liberal democracy.[984] Despite its uneasy relationship with liberalism, populism need not be undemocratic. In Arditi's writing, populism functions as a spectre of the liberal order, as something that haunts democracy even as it accompanies it.[985] For some, populism's mobilisation of 'the people' against 'the powerful' bespeaks a direct democracy that puts the idea popular sovereignty in motion.[986] Even if the dynamics of populist mobilisation culminate in the leadership of a charismatic figurehead who skirts the protocols of established institutions, populism is more appropriately viewed as a *type* of democratic politics than an alternative to it. Also important is the sense of conflict that derives from the antagonism between the different poles of the socio-political hierarchy (the people vs. the oligarchy), which, in Latin America at least, has given the impression of populism as something born out of crisis. In this vein, populism can offer the promise of compromise—between the masses and the established order; or between revolutionary or

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[978] Carlos de la Torre, *Populist Seduction in Latin America: The Ecuadorian Experience* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2000), p. 4.
[979] Panizza (2005), p. 1.
[980] De la Torre (2000), p. ix.
[981] Cammack (2000), p. 149.
[982] Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (London: Fontana Press, 1983 [1976]), p. 238.
[983] Certainly in Europe, contemporary populism is more often associated with the political right.
[984] For some theorists, populism is fundamentally democratic. See Canovan (1999). It is worth pointing out that all of Latin America's new left leaders, 'populist' or otherwise, came to office through open and contested elections.
[985] Benjamin Arditi, *Politics on the Edges of Liberalism: Difference, Populism, Revolution, Agitation* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007).
[986] Canovan (1999).

anti-systemic movements and the reactionary forces of the status quo. The ambiguity of 'the people' is important here, as it can take on different meanings at different points in time.

Indeed, as argued by Cammack, the precise purpose of the appeal to 'the people' that constitutes the 'populist moment' unfolds in the context of structural changes in capitalist society.[987] Importantly, even a discursive approach to populism (such as that employed in this chapter) must contend with its relationship to the material/extra-discursive realm. As outlined below, the model of Latin American populism shifted with wider political and economic trends, as the purpose of the populist appeal seesawed from developmentalist to neoliberal and then anti-neoliberal over the course of Latin America's post-World War II history. This impacts US productive power because Washington's discourse *on* populism (i.e. debates over which leaders or governments are populists) is contingent on discourses *of* populism in the region (antagonistic rhetoric deployed by Latin American leaders against the oligarchy, elites or foreign powers). These discourses are themselves conditioned by structural shifts and the actions of other agents. Along these lines, nationalist leaders in Latin America have frequently targeted the US as an enemy of 'the people'. As discussed in Chapter 1, NLL figures such as Chávez, Morales, Correa and Ortega made anti-American and/or anti-imperialist appeals a major part of their campaigns. In this manner, 'populist', anti-neoliberal politicians problematised the ideology of US leadership in the Americas, with implications for the compulsory, institutional and structural power of the hegemon.

The Historical Dynamics of the Populist Model in Latin America

The focus on the discursive aspects of populism by the likes of Laclau and Panizza contrasts with a historicist literature that views populism as a distinct configuration of politico-economic forces that emerge at a particular stage in the modernisation process. From this vantage, populism is a *model of political economy* that involves a multiclass alliance in support of state-directed economic development.[988] This arrangement is held together by a strong executive, often headed by a charismatic leader who cultivates direct ties with his/her constituents. Even in this strand of the literature, 'populist' leaders are often defined by their rhetorical appeals to 'the people'. As discussed below, Latin American populism was traditionally viewed in relation to the region's mid-twentieth century industrialisation process. However, this depiction of populism was undermined by the neoliberalisation of the region beginning in the 1970s, which, as it gained momentum in the 1980s and 90s, accommodated populist political strategies. The 'metamorphoses' of Latin American populism during and after the Cold War called into question its conceptualisation as a singular model of 'statist' economic development.[989]

From the Great Depression through the early Cold War, Latin American populism was associated with the reformist, non-communist left. It was epitomised by a select group of influential, independent and nationalistic leaders, with Argentina's Juan Perón the paradigmatic example. Due to the conceptual leeway provided by its contested and amorphous status, however, it has been used to designate a diverse set of regimes,

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[987] Cammack (2000), p. 152.

[988] See for example, Alistair Hennessy, 'Latin America', in Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner (eds.), *Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pp. 28-61; Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, 'Macroeconomic Populism', *Journal of Development Economics*, Vol. 32 No. 2 (1990), pp. 247-277.

[989] Jolle Demmers, Alex E. Fernández Jilberto and Barbara Hogenboom, editors, *Miraculous Metamorphoses: The Neoliberalization of Latin American Populism* (London: Zed Books, 2001).

movements and individuals, from Mexico's PRI (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*) and Peru's APRA (*Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*) to the governments of Omar Torrijos and Fidel Castro, among many others. The origins of the populist model are often traced to the industrialisation period of the 1930s-60s, which saw widespread migration from the countryside to the cities. Featuring distinct urban and rural configurations, the model was, on the whole, mass-based and multiclass, mobilising not only industrial workers and marginalised city-dwellers but large swaths of the peasantry as well. Classical populism was deeply statist and would come to be associated with ISI policies. In addressing the governments of Perón and Brazil's Getúlio Vargas, Hennessy wrote that, 'in general, they (were) neo-socialist but emphasizing redistribution of wealth rather than increasing productive capacity. Salvation can only come from the state, which must protect national industries against foreign competition by protective tariffs, by nationalizing strategic foreign-owned companies and by stringent profit-remittance legislation'.[990] In this way, expressions of classical populism in Latin America challenged US power in the region. Ideologically, this was manifest in the 'anti-Americanism' of leaders like Perón.[991]

Originally, the economic component of Latin American populism was as important as its political side. 'The "old populism" of the post-war era emerged as a reaction to the failure of liberal political institutions and economic policies evident in the depression of the 1930s and the events that followed', fostering a 'state-centred matrix of economic development' that was interventionist and redistributive.[992] Populism, in this view, was a means of constructing a kind of 'embedded liberalism' in the Latin American context.[993] The model was uniquely corporatist and featured the clientelistic dynamics of patronage politics.[994] There was also a cultural element to classical populism. Hennessy pointed to 'the survival of the *caudillo* ethos' and the persistence of 'personalist relationships' in the region's mid-twentieth century industrialisation process. Moreover, the success of the populist leadership style, he wrote, was 'facilitated by the predominant Catholic ethos of Latin American societies, particularly through its popular expression in folk Catholicism where the relationship between believer and saint complements the patron-dependent relationship in secular society'.[995] A more common cultural understanding of the 'golden age' of populism focused on the nationalistic and anti-oligarchic language of populist movements and their ability to articulate an anti-establishment message to unite emergent blocs against the traditional land-owning elite.

The classical populism of Latin America gave way in the 1980s and 90s to a neoliberal variant. Populist discourse was articulated in the service of a more market-oriented and globalised capitalism.[996] This trend was driven by the socio-political necessities of the neoliberal turn in economic policy as much as the personal predilections of those leaders that

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[990] Hennessy (1969), p. 29.

[991] In one famous example, Perón campaigned under the slogan 'Perón or Braden', choosing to run not against his opponent but against Spruille Braden, the US ambassador to Argentina.

[992] Francisco Panizza, 'Editorial: New wine in old bottles? Old and New Populism in Latin America', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, Vol. 19 No. 2 (2000), pp. 145-147.

[993] The concept of 'embedded liberalism' is taken from John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order', *International Organization*, Vol. 36 No. 2 (1982), pp. 379-415. On embeddedness, see also, Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001 [1944]).

[994] See for example, Linn A. Hammergren, 'Corporatism in Latin American Politics: A Reexamination of the "Unique" Tradition', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 9 No. 4 (1977), pp. 443-461.

[995] Panizza (2000), p. 33.

[996] Cammack (2000), pp. 156-159; see also, Demmers, Jilberto and Hogenboom (2001).

defined this shift—a group that included Carlos Menem in Argentina, Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil and Alberto Fujimori in Peru. In other words, the practicalities of implementing a policy agenda that was opposed by the bulk of the so-called 'popular classes' (peasants and workers) required a strong executive able to use personalised appeals for change to counteract the vested interests of the developmentalist state. This represented a major departure from the statism of the classical model. In examining the case of Fujimori, who employed traditional populist rhetoric before implementing a neoliberal structural adjustment scheme, Roberts concluded that populism could be reconciled with its 'putative antithesis, neoliberalism'.[997] Contrary to widely held assumptions, Fujimori's government showed that a personalistic and top-down regime with an eclectic ideology and multiclass backing could pursue clientelistic economic policies in the service of a broader neoliberalisation project. Weyland's analysis corroborated this account, highlighting the ways in which appeals to the informal sector and a targeting of the political class as the new enemy factored into the emergence of what he dubbed 'neoliberal neopopulism'.[998] There was an anti-organisational strain of populism that made it conducive to what Tickell and Peck dubbed the 'roll-back' phase of neoliberalism,[999] an economic model which, among other things, actively 'seeks to protect the market from interference by special interests and rent-seeking groups', in Weyland's words.[1000]

Viewed as a model of politico-economic organisation, Latin American populism changed course again amidst the crises of the Washington Consensus era, returning to a more state-centric or neo-Keynesian posture. Much of the commentary and analysis on Latin America's 'left turn' focused on the ostensible upsurge of populism in the 2000s. Some observers viewed it as constitutive of the NLL, though they were generally careful to limit the classification to certain countries within this group.[1001] Roberts wrote that 'the explosive rise of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela demonstrated that even more traditional, statist variants of populism remained potentially potent in Latin America's neoliberal era'.[1002] He noted that Chávez 'symbolised the revival of populism's historic nationalist and anti-market thrust, as well as the renewed capacity of popular factions to mobilize politically against market-generated insecurities'. Following Chávez's election in 1998, 'mass protest movements toppled a series of pro-market presidents in Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia, and new left-of-center governments were elected into office throughout much of South America. Suddenly, and often unexpectedly, the Washington Consensus was in tatters, and a social backlash had repoliticized development policy, offering group solidarity, collective action, and an interventionist state as alternatives to the material insecurities of market individualism'.[1003] As defined in the historicist literature, Chávez's anti-elitist rhetoric and mass-based

[997] Kenneth M. Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case', *World Politics*, Vol. 48 No. 1 (1995), p. 83.
[998] Kurt Weyland, 'Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: Unexpected Affinities', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 3 No. 3 (1996), pp. 3-31. See also, Kurt Weyland, 'Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1999), pp. 379-401; Kurt Weyland, 'Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 34 No. 2 (2001), pp. 1-22; and Kurt Weyland, 'Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: how much affinity?' *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 24 No. 6 (2003), pp. 1095-1115.
[999] Adam Tickell and Jaime Peck, 'Making Global Rules: Globalization or Neoliberalism?' in Jaime Peck and Henry Wai-chung Yeung, editors, *Remaking the Global Economy* (London: Sage, 2003), pp. 163-181.
[1000] Weyland (2003), p. 1098.
[1001] Castañeda (2006); Michael Reid, *Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America's Soul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 16, 159-178; and Sebastian Edwards, *Left Behind: Latin America and the False Promise of Populism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).
[1002] Kenneth M. Roberts, 'Latin America's Populist Revival', *SAIS Review*, Vol. 27 No. 1 (2007), p. 4.
[1003] Ibid., p. 11.

organisational structure conformed to the traditional populist model.[1004] But populism did not return with Chávez. It had never gone away.

Nevertheless, for many, Chávez represented the quintessential populist politician.[1005] In the international relations of the Western hemisphere, the relevance of the NLL was owed to the fact that it extended well beyond Venezuela. Yet Chávez was widely viewed as embodying the broader trend. Given Venezuela's immense oil wealth, Chávez's bombastic style and his ambitions to counter US hegemony in the region, Washington's fixation on the Venezuelan leader and his Bolivarian movement was unsurprising. For US officials, the populist label was the simplest way of capturing the Chávez phenomenon; of distilling the complexity of his regime into an easy-to-grasp categorisation. Chávez was a 'radical populist', 'false populist' or 'pied piper of populism' before he was a 'revolutionary', 'nationalist', 'leftist' or 'socialist', although these adjectives were also present in the discourse.[1006] But Chávez was not alone. In 2007, a CRS report on Latin America sounded the alarm on a 'new form of populism in several countries', with the Andean subregion its epicentre.[1007] The regimes that Washington labelled populist were those that challenged neoliberalism in a manner that, from the perspective of the historicist literature, would seem to earn them the label (through, for example, the nationalisation of key industries and an increase in social spending for the poor). In addition to Chávez and his backers in Venezuela, Morales, Correa and Ortega were pigeonholed as populists. The national, anti-neoliberal projects associated with these leaders coalesced around the Venezuelan-led ALBA, which, as noted in Chapters 5, was depicted as a populist institution in US discourse. Other leaders, such as Zelaya in Honduras or the Kirchners in Argentina, would occasionally be classified as populists. Candidates running for office who were saddled with the populist tag included Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico and Ollanta Humala in Peru, both of whom lost close elections in 2006. For his part, 'Chávez himself resisted the label and referred to populism either as a pejorative or in terms of what (could be called) "economic populism"'.[1008] Given the meanings associated with the concept, it was not a term that leftist politicians, or their supports, embraced.

'Populism' in US Discourse on the New Latin Left

Together, the discursive and extra-discursive dynamics of populism—at least in its 'classical' sense—fostered understandings of the concept as coupling an antagonistic political style with a statist model of economic development. These understandings provided the ideational resources underpinning the US's productive power vis-à-vis Latin American governance at the time of the NLL's rise. As outlined by Cammack, Roberts, Weyland and others, structural shifts in the extra-discursive realm altered the characteristics of populism in

[1004] Kenneth M. Roberts, 'Populism, Political Conflict, and Grass-Roots Organization in Latin America', *Comparative Politics*, Vol 38 No. 2 (2006), pp. 127-148.

[1005] See for example, Hawkins (2010); Anthony Peter Spanakos, 'New Wine, Old Bottles, Flamboyant Sommelier: Chávez, Citizenship, and Populism', *New Political Science*, Vol. 30 No. 4 (2008): pp. 521-544.

[1006] See for example, Congressional Research Service, 'Venezuela: Issues in the 111th Congress', 8 February 2010. This document, which provides an excellent overview of the Chávez administration from the perspective of the US government, begins with a summary of his 'populist rule' and its impact on the various challenges confronting US-Venezuela relations.

[1007] Congressional Research Service, 'Latin America and the Caribbean: Issues for the 110th Congress', 31 August 2007.

[1008] Hawkins (2010), p. 51. Hugo Chávez defiantly proclaimed: 'I'm not a populist, I'm a socialist'. See for example the online video of a Chávez press conference uploaded on 15 April 2008 (accessed 6 June 2013): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FQcu6Fn9Kg4.

Latin America. Politicians' discursive appeals to 'the people' took on different meanings during the rise of the NLL than they did during the Washington Consensus era, when charismatic leaders implemented policies to open-up or 'globalise' their economies. These policies were often controversial, and occasionally clientelistic.[1009] Yet, importantly, neoliberal presidents were rarely classified as 'populists' by US officials. In contrast, Chávez, Morales, Correa and Ortega were routinely given that label in official US discourse. Moreover, these leaders were constructed as certain *kinds* of populists via US productive power—'radical', 'false', 'authoritarian', and so on.

Washington's approach to the various governments of the NLL was developed by the 'hard-liners' of the Bush administration.[1010] Therefore, the discourse analysis carried out in this chapter focuses primarily on the diplomatic speech and official texts, documents and reports of the Bush administration. After President Obama assumed office he sought to rhetorically 'reset' US-Latin American relations,[1011] in part to bolster the US's flagging image. Obama was less likely to evoke populism in his speeches. However, the Obama administration continued to perceive, discuss and address Latin American populism as a potential threat to US interests. This was evident in the shifting views on Honduran President Zelaya, for example, as detailed in Chapter 3. Additionally, in testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February of 2010, Dennis C. Blair, Obama's Director of National Intelligence, repeated many of the arguments made during the Bush administration regarding the dangers of the populist leaders of Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua. Under the heading 'Latin America Stable, but Challenged by Crime and Populism', Blair reiterated that 'elected populist leaders are moving toward a more authoritarian and statist political and economic model, and they have banded together to oppose US influence and policies in the region'.[1012]

Leaving aside the problematic assertion that elected leaders were pursuing an 'authoritarian' model, the 'populists' did present a definite ideological challenge to US hegemony. The Washington Consensus was no longer the dominant ideology that it was in the 1990s. In conjunction with the rise of the NLL, Bolivarian 'populism' fed off of nationalist, anti-imperialist and pan-Latin American discourses driven to undermine US compulsory and institutional power in the Americas. By articulating the political and social

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[1009] See for example, Demmers, Jilberto and Hogenboom, editors (2001).

[1010] Many of these figures were associated with so-called neoconservative ideas. The group included Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who articulated his concerns on populism during a trip to Latin America in 2005. Also influential in the Bush administration at this time were Otto Reich, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs and a staunch anti-Castro Cuban-American, and Roger Noriega, who succeeded Reich in this post. As discussed below, the Bush administration 'softened' its discourse on Latin America in Bush's second term under the guidance of Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Shannon. Whereas Rumsfeld, Reich and Noriega were viewed as ideologues by many Washington insiders, Shannon was seen as a more traditional and pragmatic diplomat. On this point, my interpretation was shaped by the interviews I conducted in Washington (see Appendix 1).

[1011] Speaking at the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago in April of 2009, President Obama called for a 'new era' of 'true partnership' in the US's relations with Latin America, using language that dates to his 2008 campaign. See for example, Barack Obama, 'A New Partnership for the Americas', Obama for America campaign document (2008): http://obama.3cdn.net/ef480f743f9286aea9_k0tmvyt7h.pdf.

[1012] Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, 'Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence', 2 February 2010, p. 30. Similarly, James R. Clapper, Blair's replacement as DNI, told Congress the following year that 'populist efforts to limit democratic freedoms' in Latin America were challenging the positive trends in the region. James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, 'Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence', 16 February 2011, p. 21.

rationale behind the anti-neoliberal project(s) (called '21st Century Socialism' by proponents), Latin American 'populists' also destabilised the structural power of the US (by coordinating opposition to US-backed free trade regimes). Through all of this, the legitimacy of US hegemony was increasingly called into question by the NLL and its more 'radical' elements. The reconstitution of US productive power would (attempt to) re-legitimate US hegemony by condemning counter-hegemonic actors as 'populist'. Discursively, 'populist' leaders were ascribed certain meanings that de-legitimated their political, economic and foreign policies. This was done through the deployment of binaries that represented these governments as undemocratic, backward and irresponsible.

Latin America's 'Pied Pipers of Populism'

The classical model of Latin American populism centred on a state-directed economy that protected domestic industries from foreign competition. This is antithetical to 'free trade'. Chapter 5 analysed the ways in which the US utilised formal trade agreements to lock in processes of neoliberal restructuring. As I further clarify in this section, Latin American states that opposed or challenged this agenda on ideological grounds were dubbed populists. 'Populism' functioned in opposition to liberal and democratic (polyarchic) values in the binaries constructed in US policy discourse. In one enlightening example, then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick argued in a 2005 speech on CAFTA:

> The region is setting its course for the future: down one path travel modern, democratic leaders who believe in economic reform, adaptations to the challenges and openings of the global economy, democracy, and better social conditions for all their peoples. Down the other travel the *pied pipers of populism*, who hold out the false promise of autarky achieved by the dangerous means of political authoritarianism and personalized power.[1013]

Zoellick's 'pied pipers' metaphor set up a modern/populist binary that flowed from, and reinforced, the US's identity as an open, democratic and non-populist hegemon. The discursive antagonism between populist 'autarky' and the modern promise of free trade was illustrated by the persistent deployment of the populist label amidst the debate over the bilateral FTAs with Peru, Panama and Colombia. In buttressing the US's self-image as a benevolent exemplar for the hemisphere, Zoellick's metaphor legitimated Washington's on-going efforts to neoliberalise the region's political economy through free trade. As a manifestation of US productive power, then, the populist construct was closely related to US structural power as well. Whereas the idea of populism allowed US policymakers the ability to comprehend the region's changing politics, the pied piper metaphor fastened certain meanings to these changes in the discursive sphere.

Zoellick's 'pied pipers of populism' were, quite plainly, Chávez and the other opponents of Washington's economic policies (a group that would include Morales, Correa, Ortega and, at times, other NLL figures). It was a turn of phrase that Zoellick used on multiple occasions, and not just to US audiences. In addressing the OAS General Assembly in June of 2006, for example, he told delegates that 'the pied pipers of populism will only lead people backwards, while globalization and the rest of the world looks ahead'.[1014] After

[1013] Italics added. Robert Zoellick, 'From crisis to commonwealth: CAFTA and democracy in our neighborhood', 16 May 2005:
http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2005/May/20050516171612GLnesnoM0.9063227.html.
[1014] Cited in US Department of State, 'Latin America Must Deepen Democracy, State's Zoellick Says', Bureau of International Information Programs, 6 June 2006:
http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2006/June/20060606111029ASrelliM0.859112.html.

leaving the Bush administration to join Goldman Sachs, Zoellick penned an editorial for *The Wall Street Journal* in which he called for the formation of an Association of American Free Trade Agreements. In defending the decades-old effort by Washington to liberalise trade in the Western hemisphere, Zoellick argued for the passage of the bilateral FTAs with Colombia, Peru and Panama, writing: 'The US cannot afford to lose interest in its own neighborhood. The pied pipers of populism in Latin America are taking advantage of the genuine frustrations, especially in indigenous communities, of people who have not been able to climb the ladder of opportunity. We should not let these populists dictate the debate'.[1015]

However alliterative or comical, Zoellick's 'pied pipers' metaphor keyed off of some of the uglier stereotypes embedded in the history of US-Latin American relations. In European folklore, the legend of the pied piper took a number of forms. In most versions, the story centred on a piper who rids a rat-infested town of their vermin by using seductive music to drown the pests in a river. After the townspeople refuse to pay the piper for his services, he enacts his revenge by luring away the children of the village. In contemporary usage, a pied piper is a metaphor for a fanciful, flamboyant figure ('pied' refers to his multi-coloured, jester-like garb) who leads his followers astray by making 'irresponsible promises', in the dictionary definition. The element of danger—indeed of impending doom—remains central to the picture of the pied piper as a spiteful predator. Zoellick's pied pipers of populism are wily politicians (mis)leading their people down the path of economic ruin for reasons stemming from their own fiendish personalities. In addition to the trope of Latin misrule, the evocation of the piper's followers as children conjures earlier images of the Latino-as-child, which were pervasive in the US press during the Spanish-American War and throughout the early part of the twentieth century.[1016] The childish followers of populist presidents invariably fall under the spell of the promise of a better lot in life; a promise that unites 'the people', implicates the powerful and, in contemporary Latin America, generally takes the guise of nationalistic, anti-imperialist or anti-neoliberal politics. In other words, they were easily duped by deceitful, *caudillo*-like demagogues.

As was the case with Zoellick's framing of CAFTA, the call to combat the burgeoning influence of populist leaders formed an important plank in the Bush administration's rhetorical efforts to secure the passage of the bilateral FTAs, as discussed in Chapter 5. Beyond the issue of trade, however, trepidation over the wider ramifications of Latin American populism also appeared in the administration's diplomacy and security policy. Zoellick's binary separating 'modern, democratic leaders' from dangerous, deceitful authoritarians would become well-worn in Washington's diplomatic approach to Chávez, Morales, Correa, Ortega and others. Populism was (and is) represented as inimical to liberal democracy, despite the elected status of those leaders harnessed with the populist label. The Bush administration also referred to the anti-free trade members of the NLL as 'false populists', apparently calling into question their mass-based appeal. This oft-repeated phrase coexisted with another collocation in the administration's speech: 'radical populism', which

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[1015] Robert Zoellick, 'Happily Ever AAFTA', *The Wall Street Journal*, 8 January 2007: p. A17.

[1016] As discussed by Hunt, the Latino-as-child imagery, the belief in Latin servility and misrule, and the myriad other negative stereotypes that nurtured US expansionism were the products of a racial hierarchy that placed English-speaking North Americans above the Spanish-speaking peoples of the hemisphere. Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009 [1987]), pp. 46-91. On the role of the imagery of inferiority and dependency in US hegemony, see also, Lars Schoutlz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); and Martha L. Cottam, *Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994).

surfaced frequently in the language of Defense Department officials, who portrayed the phenomenon as threatening to US security.

'Radical Populism' as a Security Threat

For military strategists, the rise of populism constituted a potential security threat to the US, particularly if it adopted 'radicalised' or 'anti-American' forms. As noted in Chapter 1, the anti-neoliberal faction of the NLL was represented as 'radical', a word which takes on highly pejorative terms in diplomatic discourse. As the left turn in Latin America deepened in the mid-2000s, 'radical populism' took its place alongside drugs, terrorism and gang violence as the most prominent 'non-traditional threats' to the US in the Western hemisphere.[1017] The combination of these issues gave the US military's Southern Command renewed purpose in a region that had witnessed the diminished likelihood of traditional armed conflict. Among other things, radical populism provided an ideological/ideational rationale for the changes to US military and security strategy analysed in Chapter 3—the reformation of the Navy's Fourth Fleet, changes in the DoD's basing posture, and so on. US productive power contributed to the construction of Chávez, Morales and others as 'extremist', and thus dangerous, including through the deployment of the 'radical populist' collocation. This facilitated the (attempted/on-going) reconstitution of US compulsory power in the Americas.

In testimony before the US Congress in 2004, General James Hill, Commander of Southcom, outlined the changing security environment confronting the US military in Latin America. In Southcom's annual posture statement, Hill juxtaposed an established set of threats (namely narco-terrorists, urban gangs and Islamist groups) alongside a nascent threat: 'radical populism'. Hill connected the emergence of radical populism to socio-economic developments. He stated:

> Traditional threats are now complemented by an emerging threat best described as radical populism, in which the democratic process is undermined to decrease rather than protect individual rights. Some leaders in the region are tapping into deep-seated frustrations of the failure of democratic reforms to deliver expected goods and services. By tapping into these frustrations caused by social and economic inequality, the leaders are at the same time able to reinforce their radical positions by inflaming anti-US sentiment.[1018]

Danger exists because populism lends itself to radicalism and anti-democratic manoeuvring. Radicalism here is manifest in the degree of opposition to the US, which becomes no more than a method of political manipulation—even if such anti-Americanism permeates the broader population, as Hill's testimony suggests. He continued:

> Populism in and of itself is not a threat. Rather, the threat emerges when it becomes radicalized by a leader who increasingly uses his position and support from a segment of the population to infringe upon the rights of all citizens. This trend degrades democracy and promises to concentrate power in the hands of a few rather than guaranteeing the individual rights of the many. Anti-American sentiment has also been used to reinforce the positions of radical leaders who seek to distract the populace from their own shortcomings. Anti-American

[1017] William M. LeoGrande, 'From the Red Menace to Radical Populism: U.S. Insecurity in Latin America', *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 22 No. 4 (2005/2006), pp. 25-35. See also, Tom Barry, '"Mission Creep" in Latin America: US Southern Command's "New Security Strategy"', International Relations Center, 11 July 2005.
[1018] Gen. James T. Hill, testimony in front of the US House Armed Services Committee, 24 March 2004: http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2004/March/20040325145251ASrelliM0.9962274.html.

> sentiment also troubles our partner nations as well, as elected leaders must take into account the sometime very vocal views of their constituents.[1019]

General Bantz Craddock sounded many similar themes in Southcom's 2005 posture statement. Referring to social movements in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, Craddock pointed to 'anti-US, anti-globalization, and anti-free-trade demagogues, who, unwilling to shoulder the burden of participating in the democratic process and too impatient to undertake legitimate political action, incite violence against their own governments and their own people'.[1020] Like Hill, Craddock related the emerging security threat to deteriorating socio-economic conditions. Stating that 'the roots of the region's poor security environment are poverty, inequality, and corruption', he added that 'the free market reforms and privatization of the 1990s have not delivered on the promise of prosperity for Latin America. Unequal distribution of wealth exacerbates the poverty problem'.[1021] Craddock concluded that populism was an indicator that Washington should bolster those countries amenable to responsible policymaking: 'We cannot afford to let Latin America and the Caribbean become a backwater of violent, inward-looking states that are cut off from the world around them by populist, authoritarian governments. We must reward and help those governments that are making difficult, disciplined choices that result in the long-term wellbeing of their people'.[1022]

In the 2008 threat assessment prepared by the intelligence community for the Senate Armed Services Committee, J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence (DNI), underscored the role of Venezuela in supporting and inspiring the leaders of Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador to strengthen their presidentialist systems, weaken civil liberties and pursue 'economic nationalism at the expense of market-based approaches', in McConnell's account.[1023] Foregrounding the socio-economic appeal of 'radical populism', he stated: 'the persistence of high levels of poverty and striking income inequalities will continue to create a potentially receptive audience for radical populism's message'. Again, the 'anti-US rhetoric' of the leaders of these states was taken as evidence of their radicalism.[1024] The collocation of 'radical populism' was present in the internal communications of the State Department, as well, as evidenced in leaked embassy cables. In this context, it was widely attached to leaders/governments in the Andean region.[1025] In the public discourse, however, US officials were relatively cautious in applying the label to specific figures, particularly when discussing radical populism as a security threat.[1026]

[1019] Ibid.

[1020] Posture Statement of General B Craddock, United States Southern Command, Senate Armed Services Committee, 15 March 2005: http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2005/March/20050316170548ASrelliM0.2706873.html.

[1021] Ibid.

[1022] Ibid.

[1023] J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, 'Annual threat assessment of the intelligence community for the Senate Armed Services Committee', 27 February 2008, p. 33.

[1024] McConnell (2008)

[1025] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 05SANTODOMINGO4606, 'Democracy Promotion Strategy-Dominican Republic', 12 October 2005; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06BUENOSAIRES689, 'Media Reaction US-Iran Iraq US-South American Ties Argentine Government's Decision to Rescind Aguas Argentinas Contract US Senator Grassley's Statements on US Farm Subsidies 03/22/06' , 23 March 2006; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 06QUITO2309, 'Ecuador Update: Correa Moves into Second Place', 15 September 2006; Wikileaks, Reference ID:06LIMA4698, 'Scenesetter for CODEL Reid', 15 December 2006; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07LIMA1591, 'Scene Setter for Deputy Secretary Negroponte', 1 May 2007; Wikileaks, Reference ID: 07BRASILIA2132, 'Iran-Russia-Venezuela Triangle Threatens Regional Stability', 13 November 2007.

[1026] See for example, Wikileaks, Reference ID: 04CARACAS1331, 'Media and GOV Make Hay Out of General Hill Statements', 20 April 2004. In this cable, officials allude to that fact that General Hill's April 2004

Radical populism also generated serious attention from the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). In a 2005 monograph, Steve Ropp detailed the implications of South American populism from the vantage of the US military's academicians. Ropp's concerns emanated from the uncertainty associated with populist politicians operating in the context of representative democracies. He focused on the stresses that generate 'bursts of populist turbulence', citing the 'harsh economic realities' experienced in South America as a result of 'the transition to open market economies in the 1990s', which 'increased income inequality in most countries, led to a rise in urban unemployment, and to a widening gap between the wages of skilled and unskilled workers'.[1027] Ropp also highlighted the possibility of Chávez's populism spreading, all the more troublesome because of Venezuela's massive oil and gas resources and Chávez's potential to disrupt the US energy supply through a 'petro-alliance' of populists.[1028]

Whereas Ropp explored populism as an outcome of liberal democratic practices set against a range of social stresses, SSI scholar Gabriel Marcella took populism to be a product of the 'authoritarian impulse' embedded in the Latin American psyche; an impulse produced by the combination of the preference for civic rebelliousness among Latin Americans (as opposed to voting) and the overall ineffectiveness of the Latin American state.[1029] For Marcella, contemporary Latin American populism strives for radical change. It is brought on by a 'culture of resentment' fed by 'social exclusion and persistent poverty'.[1030]

> The transnational culture of resentment is reshaping international security, creating alliances of opportunity between state and nonstate actors that cross borders. Much like revolutionaries and terrorists of the past, its members are motivated out of a profound sense of victimization by what they believe to be injustices perpetrated by some combination of capitalism, bad government associated with democracy, Western materialism, and modernity, and by the pervasiveness of American power, wealth, and influence. The sense of victimization needs an agent to make it politically powerful. In Latin America, that agent is authoritarian populism, which is always latent in the political culture of the region.[1031]

Marcella's borderline-essentialist account drew an even more explicit link between populism and the generalised backlash against the Washington Consensus than did Ropp, although, for Marcella, this had more to do with the supposed cultural resentment of America than the actual (material) impact of American foreign economic policy.[1032] Like Ropp, Marcella paid particularly close attention to the regional influence of Chávez, who came in for a rather hyperbolic appraisal. He wrote that 'an anti-democratic, deeply anti-American Venezuelan state that de facto supports drug trafficking is thus a growing problem for regional security'. The Chávez government was described as a 'personalistic and militarized authoritarian system' and a 'populist dictatorship' that was pursuing a 'primitive' form of socialism.[1033] There was little room for nuance in Marcella's condemnation, which

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statement on radical populism did not mention Chávez or anyone else by name, and that the media and other actors in Venezuela had 'manipulated' the words of a senior US official.

[1027] Steve C. Ropp, 'The Strategic Implications of the Rise of Populism in Europe and South America', Strategic Studies Institute, June 2005, p. 7.

[1028] Ropp (2005), pp. 12-13.

[1029] Gabriel Marcella, 'American Grand Strategy for Latin America in the Age of Resentment', Strategic Studies Institute, September 2007, pp. 9-15.

[1030] Ibid., p. 5.

[1031] Ibid., p. 6.

[1032] Ibid., pp. 17-22.

[1033] Ibid., pp. 39-43.

nevertheless conformed to, and contributed to, the populist construct underpinning US ideology. The basic shape of the arguments of the SSI strategists was found throughout the broader discursive terrain: the radicalism of populist governments was axiomatic; it was a security threat and a recipe for economic backwardness. In an SSI monograph, Hal Brands, for instance, contrasted radical populism with a 'post-radical' centre-left that adhered to market reforms and safeguarded democracy,[1034] refuelling the normative good-left/bad-left dichotomy.

The writings of the SSI analysts reinforced the binary between populism's backward and authoritarian tendencies and the modern democracy exemplified by the US. Yet there were inconsistencies in the broader populist construct—tensions which US discursive power could only partially smooth over. In placing anti-US leaders (as 'dictators') at the service of the few rather than the many, 'radical populism' cohered with the insincerity of the 'false populists' in the Bush administration's language on trade policy, as detailed below. However, the former implies that the governments of Chávez, Morales and Correa were *genuinely* populist, even vigorously so, and that their populism was therefore particularly pronounced in some significant way. In this sense, the two collocations were barely compatible. There was a further tension between the Pentagon's acknowledgement that contemporary Latin American populism has roots in the social and economic conditions of the Washington Consensus and the Bush administration's insistence that a failure to extend the neoliberal model (through the passage of the FTAs) would result in an emboldened group of populist demagogues. Where strategic discourse highlighted the increased levels of inequality and poverty that played into the populist appeal, on economic policy Washington advocated increased neoliberalisation to combat the rise of populism. As the US sought to recoup its productive power by denigrating the ideology of the NLL's 'Bolivarian' leaders, this re-constitutive process would remain on-going. The counter-hegemonic ideology of the 'populists' thrived off of Washington's expressions of condemnation, which fed into the productive (counter-)power of the NLL's anti-imperialist discourse.

The Turn toward 'False Populism' in US Discourse

The Bush administration was widely seen as softening its rhetoric toward the NLL during Bush's second term (2005-2009). A series of electoral victories for left-wing and 'anti-American' candidates in Bolivia (Morales in 2005), Ecuador (Correa in 2006) and Nicaragua (Ortega in 2006) demonstrated the growing appeal of the anti-neoliberal left. With the popularity of the US at an historic low,[1035] and with Chávez's influence on the rise, US strategy grew more conciliatory in tone. As acknowledged in a CRS report, 'the tenor of US political rhetoric changed in the second half of 2006'. Despite a series of verbal attacks by Chávez and others, 'President Bush ignored the taunts and US officials emphasised that they wanted to focus on a positive agenda of US engagement with Latin America'.[1036] Fallout from the Iraq war, among other considerations, ensured there was little momentum for retaining an openly aggressive posture in Latin America. With the legitimacy of US hegemony under duress, the reconstitution of US productive power would adopt a less-bellicose posture. 'Radical populists' became 'false populists' in Washington's discursive approach to the region.

[1034] Hal Brands, *Dealing with Political Ferment in Latin America: The Populist Revival, the Emergence of the Center, and Implications for U.S. Policy*, Strategic Studies Institute (September 2009), pp. 32-37.
[1035] See for example, Peter Hakim, 'Is Washington losing Latin America?' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85 No. 1 (2006), pp. 39-53.
[1036] Congressional Research Service, 'Venezuela: issues in the 111th Congress', 8 February 2010, p. 14.

Consider, for example, Washington's change of tack on Evo Morales. During Bolivia's 2002 presidential campaign, the US ambassador to the country stated publically that 'if Bolivians elected those who want Bolivia to become a major cocaine exporter again, the future of US assistance to the country (would) be put in jeopardy'.[1037] Referencing Morales, the former coca grower who vehemently opposed US eradication efforts, the comments actually provided a tremendous boost to his poll numbers. Although Morales lost in 2002, he would capture the presidency three years later. By then, the US was no longer threatening to cut off financial assistance or alter Bolivia's access to US petroleum and textile markets. As noted by James Dunkerley, Bush himself even made the obligatory telephone call congratulating Morales on his victory, no doubt aware that Bolivia's first indigenous president had referred to himself as '"Washington's worst nightmare". Even after the new government had (re)nationalised the hydrocarbons industry, halted the mandatory eradication of coca, and hosted three visits by Hugo Chávez in six months, the United States expressed little more than tight-lipped irritation'.[1038] Morales would soon be joined by Correa, Ortega and others in articulating the Bolivarian message of '21st Century Socialism'.[1039]

As the NLL took on a more ideological purpose, the collocation of 'false populism' emerged in the speech of administration officials, who often avoided attaching it to any politician or government in particular. Having determined that directly attacking Chávez, Morales, Correa and Ortega could be counterproductive, the charge of 'false populism' became a proxy for those leaders deemed hostile to Washington's interests. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was among the first to use the phrase. Rice's vision for US policy in Latin America, set out in a 2005 interview, signalled a heightened awareness that the administration's confrontational approach had failed to curtail Washington's geopolitical backsliding. Maintaining that the US would pursue good relations with 'governments from across the political spectrum', Rice praised the governments of Brazil and Chile, calling attention to their 'stable and sound economic policies'. In contrast, however, and without naming names, Rice stated:

> Now, there are places where people are giving easy answers, a kind of false populism, I'll call it, where there are easy answers: 'We can be out of poverty tomorrow if we'll just do these things'. That's not helpful. But when you have sound economic policies and people care about social justice and better lives for their people, the United States is going to be friends with those governments.[1040]

The 'false populism' line quickly became a hallmark of the administration's less bellicose diplomacy. During an address to the Council of the Americas in 2007, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns claimed that Washington's promotion of democracy, free markets and social justice was ecumenical: 'We impose no ideological litmus test on potential partners in the region', Burns said, 'and do not fear political

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[1037] Cited in Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian, *Electoral Rules and the Transformation of Bolivian Politics: The Rise of Evo Morales* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 148.

[1038] James Dunkerley, 'Evo Morales, the "two Bolivias" and the third Bolivian revolution', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 39 No. 1 (2007), p. 134.

[1039] On the appeal of '21st Century Socialism', see for example, Roger Burbach, Michael Fox and Fred Fuentes, *Latin America's Turbulent Transitions: The Future of Twenty-First Century Socialism?* (London: Zed Books, 2012); and Amy Kennemore and Gregory Weeks, 'Twenty-first century socialism? The elusive search for a post-neoliberal development model in Bolivia and Ecuador', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, Vol. 30 No. 3 (2011), pp. 267-281.

[1040] United States Department of State, 'Rice outlines US vision for Western hemisphere', 28 April 2005: http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2005/April/20050428155617asrellim0.2915308.html.

differences. We have forged productive relationships with governments from across the political spectrum, from the Lula administration in Brazil and the Bachelet administration in Chile to the Calderón and Uribe administrations in Mexico and Colombia'. In defending Plan Colombia, Washington's military aid package for the country, Burns stated: 'While some of its neighbors have embraced false populism and authoritarian leaders, Colombia has embraced democratic governance and open markets'. Burns added that a legislative defeat of the FTA 'would be a huge victory for those—like Hugo Chávez—who promote an authoritarian, populist highly personalized model of government, drawing upon the failed economic policies of decades past'.[1041]

President Bush grew to appreciate the 'false populism' line, using it in numerous speeches over his final years in office. It typically surfaced in the context of the debate over the US's then-pending bilateral FTAs with Panama, Peru and Colombia. According to Bush, the passage of these agreements would 'help counter the false populism promoted by hostile nations' in the hemisphere.[1042] Citing 'leaders like President Uribe of Colombia', he stated in November 2007 that:

> These friends of America are waiting to see what Congress will do with the trade agreements we have concluded with our neighbors in the region. People are watching the actions of the US Congress very carefully. Champions of false populism in the region are watching Congress. They will use any failure to approve these trade agreements as evidence that America will never treat democracies in the region as full partners.[1043]

Counterintuitive though it was, the notion that Latin American populists would use the failure of the bilateral FTAs as evidence of US fickleness became a persistent theme in the Bush administration's messaging. During Bush's remarks with Peruvian President García upon the signing of the US-Peru accord, for example, Bush repeated that 'those who espouse the language of false populism will use (the) failure of these trade agreements as a way of showing America doesn't—isn't committed to our friends in the hemisphere'.[1044] As the administration advocated the ratification of similar agreements with Colombia and Panama, Bush continued to position populism in opposition to the self-evident benefits of free trade and democracy. In his State of the Union address in 2008, Bush said of the Colombia FTA: 'If we fail to pass this agreement, we will embolden the purveyors of false populism in our hemisphere. So we must come together, pass this agreement, and show our neighbors in the region that democracy leads to a better life'.[1045]

But why *false* populism? Was this to say that the populism of Chávez and his allies was less than a fully-fledged version? And why the insinuation that the failure to ratify the bilateral FTAs would provide fodder to the US's populist adversaries, precisely those leaders who most vehemently opposed the 'free trade' of US foreign economic policy? These questions appeared all the more conspicuous when considering the collocation of 'radical populism', which both preceded the 'false populist' label and coexisted with it in US foreign

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[1041] Council of the Americas, 'Under Secretary Burns: promoting peace and prosperity in Colombia', 22 October 2007: http://www.as-coa.org/article.php?id=648.
[1042] Administration of George W. Bush, 2007, 'President's radio address: October 13, 2007', p. 1334.
[1043] Administration of George W. Bush, 2007, 'Remarks at the White House Forum on International Trade and Investment: November 6, 2007', p. 1462.
[1044] Administration of George W. Bush, 2007, 'Remarks with President Alan Garcia Perez of Peru on Signing the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act: December 14, 2007', p. 1589.
[1045] Administration of George W. Bush, 2008, 'Address before a joint session of the Congress on the state of the union: January 28, 2008', p. 119.

policy discourse.[1046] Here, the 'radical' prefix strengthened the dominant meaning of populism; radical signifies extremism, and, like the word 'populist' itself, conveyed meanings of danger and demagogy. In other words, both halves of the 'radical populist' collocation point in the same direction, whereas the deceptiveness implied by the 'false' adjective seems to undermine the dominant construction of these leaders as true populists. How were these apparent inconsistences in meaning dealt with in the productive power of US discourse vis-à-vis the NLL?

As discussed above, populism is seen as a mass-based movement or phenomenon that challenges the entrenched interests of the elite. To label it false is to deny that the leader, government or movement in question represents 'the people'. It suggests that those posing as populists do not, in fact, serve the interests of the many against the few. With the populism of charismatic leaders placed in opposition to liberal democracy, a paradox emerged in US discourse on Latin America. Those leaders striking an anti-US pose were constructed as populists as their commitment to democracy was made suspect, but they were *false* in that their commitment to the people was somehow ephemeral or misleading. This contradiction, which held that the US's adversaries can be populists and non-populists at the same time, was elided in Washington's normative shaming of the region's anti-neoliberal governments. Ultimately, the 'false populism' collocation removed the ambiguity that tends to envelop the term, giving 'populism' a decidedly negative flair. The 'radical' adjective does something similar. In diplomatic speech, a leader who is 'false', 'radical' or both is untrustworthy if not downright illegitimate. The populist construct is not an analytical device as much it is an attempt to *represent* NLL governments in a certain light.

The Parameters of the Populist Construct: Uribe as a Counterfactual

The treatment of Colombia's Álvaro Uribe in US foreign policy discourse poses an enlightening counterfactual to the ascribed 'populists' of the NLL. On issues of political style and governance, the presidency of the rightist Uribe had a number of parallels with that of the leftist Chávez. Like Chávez, Uribe's popularity enabled his supporters to spearhead a change in the Colombian constitution that allowed him to successfully run for re-election. The popularity of both leaders helped to reconfigure party politics in their respective countries. Uribe was embroiled in a major corruption scandal that called into question his commitment to the norms and institutions of liberal governance—a scandal that involved his family and the country's paramilitary forces. Weyland likened Uribe's political strategy to the neoliberal populists of the 1990s,[1047] while another analyst wrote that Uribe's failed bid for a third term constituted a 'populist push' that threatened the separation of powers in Colombia.[1048] Additionally, Uribe displayed a confrontational style in dealing with political opponents and cultivated a highly personalised method of governing, which included weekly neighbourhood council meetings that allowed him to establish direct links with the electorate.[1049] And yet, for

[1046] In contrast to 'radical populism', 'false populism' (or 'false populist') appears only once in the Wikileaks cables, in conjunction with the challenges facing the Peruvian government. Wikileaks, Reference ID: 10LIMA29, 'Scene Setter for Deputy Secretary Steinberg', 7 January 2010.

[1047] Weyland (2003), p. 1109. In examining Uribe's first campaign, Dugas concluded that, while Uribe's strategy incorporated elements of neopopulism, he was not a neopopulist. John C. Dugas, 'The emergence of neopopulism in Colombia? The case of Álvaro Uribe', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 24 No. 6 (2003), pp. 1117-1136. It is important to note that Dugas was writing prior to Uribe's successful effort to change the Colombian constitution to allow him to run for re-election in 2006.

[1048] Eduardo Posada-Carbó, 'Colombia after Uribe', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 22 No. 1 (2011), p. 150.

[1049] Ibid., pp. 138-139.

Washington, Uribe strode directly opposite the 'champions of false populism', in the words of Bush's 2008 State of the Union address.

Due to the unique complexities of Colombia's decades-long civil conflict, Uribe's heavy-handed, law-and-order project (which he labelled 'democratic security') was distinct in the region. As one would expect, his discourse never cohered with that of the NLL governments, meaning that his relationship to 'the people' did not involve mobilising the 'popular classes' against the oligarchy or US hegemony. What is more, Uribe's 'economic policies (were) orthodox and neoliberal in nature, aimed at reducing state spending (except on the state security forces) and with little in the way of redistribution to the poorer sectors of society'.[1050] It was Uribe's military efforts against insurgent groups that cemented his unshakeable 'friendship' with Washington, symbolised by Bush's decision to award him the Presidential Medal of Freedom.[1051] But Uribe's commitment to neoliberal policies factored into the alliance. In the early stages of his presidency, Uribe completed significant pension, labour and tax reforms, 'all of which disproportionality punish(ed) the poorest sectors of society'.[1052] In 2006, after two years of negotiations, he signed an FTA with the US. Its ratification in 2011 opened up the Colombian economy to a drastic influx of unregulated capital, as noted in the previous chapter. By aligning his government with Washington's objectives, Uribe demonstrated that populism—defined as a style of political mobilisation—could still be of service to US hegemony. This was demonstrated previously by Fujimori, Menem and other leaders in the 1980s and 90s. Any acknowledgment of this, however, would undermine the construction of 'populism' as synonymous with an irresponsible statism and a radical hostility to the US. Uribe's classification as a non-populist—as the antithesis of Chávez—demonstrates the degree to which Washington equates populism with anti-Americanism and anti-neoliberal economic policies. Leaked embassy cables contain dozens of references to populism in Latin American countries but not one reference to Uribe as a 'populist'. In fact, Uribe was constructed as a bulwark *against* populism.

The silences in official US discourse on Latin American populism are as telling as the contemptuous evaluations of the false/radical populists themselves. Given the meanings assigned to populism, it is entirely logical (within US productive power) that the US would be free from any association with the pejorative term. This is despite the fact that several US initiatives could have been construed as populist-style pandering, with some similarities to the Venezuelan *misiones* ('missions', social programmes for the poor). For example, Washington deployed a naval ship, the *Comfort*, to administer free health services to residents in a number of countries. The Bush administration also announced a scholarship programme for Latin American students to study in the US. As noted by Southcom's Stavridis, these initiatives helped the US cultivate a 'softer' image in Latin America.[1053] Although one commentator derided 'the pale imitations of the Venezuelan and Cuban educational and health programs announced on President Bush's 2007 trip to Latin

[1050] Dugas (2003), p. 1117.
[1051] Manuel Roig-Franzia, 'Bush Awards Medals of Freedom to John Howard, Tony Blair and Alvaro Uribe', *The Washington Post*, 14 January 2009: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/13/AR2009011301710_2.html.
[1052] Dugas (2003), p. 1133. On the neoliberal characteristics of the Colombian state under Uribe and its relationship with US hegemony and security strategy, see also Doug Stokes, *America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia* (London: Zed Books, 2005).
[1053] James G. Stavridis, *Partnership for the Americas: Western Hemisphere Strategy and US Southern Command* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2010).

America,'[1054] the Bush White House chose to describe its efforts as part of a commitment to 'social justice'.[1055] 'Populism' defined the 'radicals' of the 'bad left'. Of course, the US was firmly outside of the classification. So too were its allies and partners, from conservatives like Uribe in Colombia and Calderón in Mexico to progressive governments in Chile, Brazil and Uruguay.

In 2007 and 2008, the Hudson Institute, a Washington think tank, held several forums on 'radical populism in Latin America', including one that featured a keynote address by Francis Fukuyama. In his comments, Fukuyama argued that any strategy for combating radical populism—which he described as a 'symptom' of a wider 'disease'—must engage with the various social issues downplayed during the Washington Consensus era, such as poverty and inequality.[1056] From this vantage, he praised the *Bolsa Família* and *Oportunidades* programmes of Brazil and Mexico, respectively. For Fukuyama, these conditional cash transfer programmes avoided the kind of patronage politics that typify radical populism. (As an example of the latter, he mentioned Venezuela's 'Cuban eye clinics', which he described as a tool of Chávez's 'demagogy'.[1057]) However, given the vagueness of populism, which Fukuyama left undefined, it was unclear exactly why the *Bolsa Família* and *Oportunidades* programmes escaped the populist stain. Both provided money to poor families in exchange for their cooperation in governmental efforts to boost participation in education and health services, and both have helped parties in power win allegiance from poor voters. This is made more puzzling by the fact that Fukuyama acknowledged that the popularity of *Oportunidades*, which was developed by the PRI but expanded under the government of Vicente Fox, may have been decisive in helping Felipe Calderón (from Fox's own party) narrowly defeat leftist Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico's 2006 presidential contest.[1058] The PRI, which retained power using a heavy dose of clientelism for many decades, had embraced neoliberalism in the 1980s and 90s. Fukuyama didn't need to remind his audience that the architects of these programmes were the pro-US, centre-right government of Mexico and the 'moderate', centre-left government of Brazil. Fox, like Uribe, had been a close and important ally of the Bush White House, particularly on economic policy (despite some key differences over the Iraq war). A former union leader, Lula had once been widely viewed as a 'populist' in Washington policy circles, including after his initial election to the presidency.[1059] However, in accordance with his fidelity to

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[1054] Abraham F. Lowenthal, 'Renewing Cooperation in the Americas', in Abraham F. Lowenthal, Theodore J. Piccone and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), *The Obama Administration and the Americas: Agenda for Change* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), p. 18.

[1055] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Advancing the Cause of Social Justice in the Western Hemisphere', 5 March 2007. On the Bush administration's use of social justice terminology in Latin America, see Rubrick Biegon, 'Hemispheric Hypocrisy', Foreign Policy in Focus, November 2007: http://fpif.org/hemispheric_hypocrisy/.

[1056] Hudson Institute, 'Radical Populism in Latin America', transcript by Federal News Service, Washington, DC, 6 November 2007, pp. 5-6.

[1057] Ibid., p. 8. This is a reference to *Misón Milagro*, a government health initiative staffed by Cuban doctors that provided free eye care clinics and eye surgery to Venezuelans.

[1058] Ibid., p. 9.

[1059] At the time of his election in 2002, Lula was viewed as a populist by many officials in Washington. See Juan Forero, 'Latin America's Political Compass Veers Toward the Left', *The New York Times*, 19 January 2003, p. A4. In 2003, CIA director George Tenet linked Lula directly to 'Latin America's rising populism', stating that he 'campaigned and won on an expressly anti-globalization populist platform'. However, Lula's fidelity to orthodox macroeconomic policies, along with his congenial relationship with Bush, meant that his government was eventually understood as 'moderate', and therefore not populist. George Tenet, DCI's Worldwide Threat Briefing, 11 February 2003: http://www.america.gov/st/washfileenglish/2003/February/20030211155557mkellerh@pd.state.gov0.5013697.html.

macroeconomic orthodoxy, Lula was eventually established as a pragmatic if lukewarm partner of the US on a number of issues, from energy to financial stability. The populist label was no longer appropriate, despite the continued admiration he received from large portions of the Brazilian electorate, including the poor. As an exemplar of the 'good left' in Latin America, his social programmes could not be 'populist', it seems, although they certainly fed into the popularity of his government and party.

Conclusion

The discursive construction of Latin American populism is by no means the only manifestation of US productive power in inter-American relations. This acknowledgment is in keeping with the diffuseness of productive power, which works indirectly by assigning meaning to actors and actions in the social world. The ideology of US hegemony is expansive and multifaceted, and discourses, by their nature, are fluid and overlapping. As discussed in Chapter 2, Gramscian IR/IPE has highlighted the ways in which the Washington Consensus functioned ideologically and discursively to normalise and legitimate the neoliberalisation of the region's political economy. As noted throughout this thesis, and as detailed in this chapter, 'populism' has played a major role in the reconstitution of US hegemony, just as the ideas and discourses subsumed under the construct (from nationalism to 'Bolivarian' socialism) challenged US primacy. Notwithstanding its conceptual haziness, populism gained a level of coherence within US diplomacy, security strategy and trade policy in the 2000s. It represented a means of distinguishing the more anti-neoliberal, 'anti-US' members of the NLL from its more reformist elements—of separating the 'good left' from the 'bad left'. More than that, it was a deliberate attempt to undermine 'bad' NLL governments through normative condemnation. Of particular importance was the undemocratic, backward and irresponsible nature of 'populist' governance. Despite its frequent use in official US discourse, the construct rested on tenuous foundations (e.g. the inconsistences in its application; the apparent contradictions between 'radical' and 'false' adjectives). The reconstitution of US productive power remained an on-going and contested process, not least because of the (counter-)powers of those dubbed populists in US discourse.

In arguing that populism is a discursive construct, I am not making the case that it 'doesn't exist' in the 'real world'. As the ideational aspects of the constitutive appeal to 'the people' intersect with changes in the politico-economic sphere, the discourse(s) of political leaders in Latin America is/are shaped by structural changes in the extra-discursive realm. But Washington's fixation on populism cannot be attributed to an objective increase in populist practices on the part of NLL governments. It must be seen in relation to populism's status as an amorphous idea, one that connects intellectual conjecture to the 'real world' of inter-American relations, in which the charge of populism functions largely as an epithet. In reinforcing the self-understandings of US foreign policy (as non-populist, democratic, forward-looking and so on), the construct legitimates the deployment of power in its compulsory, institutional and structural guises. The construct also *shapes* US interests, which emerge from the logic of hegemonic reconstitution; populist governments are not only imprudent when it comes to economic policy, they are autocratic and a potential threat to US security. Given the meanings embedded in 'populism', which were further extended and refined through the metaphors, collocations and silences of US discourse, Washington was positioned (and, more to the point, *positioned itself*) in opposition to the 'radical', 'Bolivarian' faction of the NLL, including, most prominently, the governments of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador. Obviously, the agency of these states played a role in this dynamic, including through the deployment of counter-hegemonic discourses. As we see, then,

productive power is mutually imbricated with the other forms of power in international politics, which, in the context of hegemonic reconstitution, exist in relation to the counter-powers of counter-hegemonic forces. These are recurring themes in this thesis, and they are given additional consideration and clarity in the concluding chapter.

Chapter 7

Conclusions

For decades, Latin America was known as the United States' geopolitical 'backyard', and with good reason.[1060] As detailed in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the literature on the international politics of the Western hemisphere points to a uniquely asymmetrical relationship between the world's leading superpower and its neighbours to the South. This is captured elegantly in the revisionist titles on the topic. Galeano, taking cues from the *dependistas*, wrote of the *Open Veins of Latin America* fuelling the prosperity of the imperial core.[1061] Peter Smith likened US policy to the *Talons of the Eagle* bearing down on those countries geographically and metaphorically *Beneath the United States*, in Schoultz's phrasing.[1062] LaFeber chronicled the *Inevitable Revolutions* that sprung from this asymmetrical relationship. In more recent works, Loveman's history of the Western hemisphere demonstrated that there was *No Higher Law* above the imperatives of American foreign policy,[1063] while Grandin documented the ways in which the region was transformed into the *Empire's Workshop*.[1064] Even the more orthodox accounts—including those emphasising the role of Latin American agency in the history of the Americas—generally begin by acknowledging the preponderant power of the United States.[1065] The weakening of the political left after the Cold War only deepened Washington's influence in the region.[1066]

During the 2000s, however, the narrative of US dominance was turned on its head. This was due largely to political trends in the region—namely, the rise of the New Latin Left, as detailed in Chapter 1. More than his ascendency to office, Hugo Chávez's ability to survive a US-backed coup attempt in 2002 seemed to portend a renewed defiance of Washington's agenda. That same year, Brazil elected Lula of the left-wing Workers Party to the presidency. In addition to Venezuela and Brazil, from 2000-2012 twelve other Latin American countries elected left-leaning presidents to replace leaders of a more conservative or 'pro-market' persuasion. In 2005, José Miguel Insulza, who had served in the Chilean government of Salvador Allende, was elected Secretary General of the OAS, despite opposition from the United States. Latin American countries created a series of new forums that limited US participation in regional cooperation. The FTAA collapsed. Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador began nationalising their energy and mineral resources. The neoliberal Washington Consensus—initially formulated with Latin America in mind—was declared

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[1060] See for example, Grace Livingstone, *America's Backyard: The United States and Latin America from the Monroe Doctrine to the War on Terror* (London: Zed Books, 2009); William LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America 1977-1992* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

[1061] Eduardo Galeano, *Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent* (New York: Monthly Review, 1973). *Dependistas* are dependency theorists, generally of a Marxist bent.

[1062] Peter H. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations, Second Edition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).

[1063] Brian Loveman, *No Higher Law: American Foreign Policy and the Western Hemisphere since 1776* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2010).

[1064] Greg Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York: Owl Books, 2006).

[1065] See for example, Robert A. Pastor, *Exiting the Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean, Second Edition* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001); Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).

[1066] Jorge G. Castañeda, *Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left After the Cold War* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).

dead.[1067] So too was the Monroe Doctrine (not for the first time).[1068] The Council on Foreign Relations, the US's most prominent foreign policy think tank, released a report in 2008 proclaiming a 'new reality' for the US and its dwindling influence in the region.[1069] Washington had 'lost' Latin America—or so it seemed.[1070] A new direction was needed.[1071]

In the conventional reading of contemporary US-Latin American relations, the US was content to turn the page on its long history of intervention in the region. Hoping to re-set diplomatic relations, Obama acknowledged that the US had 'sought to dictate (its) terms' in the past, that it had been 'disengaged', and that it had failed to fulfil the promise of true partnership.[1072] According to analysts and insiders, the US was either too distracted or too disinterested to fret over the prospect that it was losing control of the region.[1073] The site of intense superpower rivalry as recently as the 1980s, Latin America simply didn't matter that much anymore, at least from the perspective of US grand strategy. The War on Terror, Iraq, Afghanistan/Pakistan and the rise of China dominated Washington's global security agenda. Some alleged that the US had 'ignored' or 'neglected' the region,[1074] which had become fully autonomous from US hegemony.[1075] This thesis shows otherwise. The logic of hegemony as a social relationship means that the hegemon does not simply yield to political challenges 'from below'; it internalises counter-hegemony in an on-going dialectic of contestation and hegemonic reconstitution. As the core of this inquiry, I have endeavoured to understand and elucidate processes of change and continuity in the international relations of the Western hemisphere by asking: *How has the United States attempted to reconstitute its hegemony in Latin America following the rise of the New Latin Left?*

To answer this question, I broke US hegemony down to its 'moving parts', the multiple and overlapping forms of power that pattern the longstanding asymmetry in the geopolitics of the Western hemisphere. In this concluding chapter, I review the main arguments of the thesis as drawn from the empirical material examined in Chapters 3-6. I summarise the contributions of the thesis to the relevant IR/IPE literature on power and

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[1067] See for example, Francisco Panizza, *Contemporary Latin America: Development and Democracy Beyond the Washington Consensus* (London: Zed Books, 2009).

[1068] See for example, Daniel P. Erikson, 'Requiem for the Monroe Doctrine', *Current History*, Vol. 107 No. 706 (2008), pp. 58-64. As noted by Grandin, US policymakers had previously declared that the Monroe Doctrine was dead or irrelevant, most notably in the post-Vietnam climate of the 1970s. Greg Grandin, 'Losing Latin America; What Will the Obama Doctrine Be Like?' *Tom Dispatch*, 8 June 2008: http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/174941.

[1069] Council on Foreign Relations' Independent Task Force on U.S.-Latin America Relations, *U.S.-Latin America Relations: A New Direction for a New Reality* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2008).

[1070] See for example, Peter Hakim, 'Is Washington Losing Latin America?' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85 No. 1 (2006), pp. 39-53.

[1071] See for example, Washington Office on Latin America, 'Forging New Ties: A Fresh Approach to U.S. Policy in the Americas', September 2007.

[1072] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 'Remarks by the President at the Summit of the Americas Opening Ceremony', 17 April 2009: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-summit-americas-opening-ceremony.

[1073] Based on the elite interviews I conducted in 2011 and 2012 (see Appendix 1), there is a clear consensus in Washington (among Latin America experts) that the region is not as important for US foreign policy as it was in the past. In other words, the region was not high on the agendas of either the Bush or Obama administrations.

[1074] See for example, R. Guy Emerson, 'Radical Neglect? The "War on Terror" and Latin America', *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 52 No. 1 (2010), pp. 33-62; Arturo Valenzuela, 'Beyond Benign Neglect: Washington and Latin America', *Current History*, Vol. 104 No. 679 (2005), pp. 58-63.

[1075] See for example, Russell Crandall, 'The Post-American Hemisphere: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90 No. 3 (2011), pp. 83-95; Christopher Sabatini, 'Rethinking Latin America', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91 No. 2 (2012), pp. 8-13.

hegemony. The aim here is to bring further clarity to the application of Barnett and Duvall's taxonomy of power to critical perspectives in IR, with a particular focus on (neo-)Gramscian historical materialism (HM). I then acknowledge the limitations of the present project so as to highlight avenues for future research with regards to American foreign policy and the role of the US in the international system. Finally, and in this spirit, I briefly consider the implications of my findings for the future of US-Latin American relations.

Power, Hegemony, Resistance

My reading of the history of US-Latin American relations, outlined in Chapter 1, shaped the critical disposition underpinning this project. The imperialist interventions and militarised repression of the Cold War eventually gave way to a more consensus-based relationship in the 1990s and 2000s.[1076] Without question, however, the US remained hegemonic in the Western hemisphere. Definitions of hegemony abound. In realist and liberal paradigms, it is generally theorised as military preponderance and/or multilateral leadership. Beyond these conventional faces of hegemony, however, I maintain that it is more thoroughly conceptualised as an asymmetrical social relationship patterned by multiple and overlapping forms of power and counter-power. It encompasses a tenuous and ever-changing balance between force and consent, as realised in the military, institutional, economic and discursive 'planes' of international relations. Unlike imperialism, hegemony invites forms of resistance that track those forms of power which shape and reshape the social relationship between the hegemon and its subordinates. Indeed, it implies a counter-hegemony that is both constitutive of the hegemonic relationship and a potential threat to its durability.[1077] This means hegemony is a dialectical social process, not a static order. Its periodic reconstitution is contingent on the agency of hegemonic actors as well as the subaltern forces that manifest resistance through oppositional or revolutionary action.

As stated in the introduction, this thesis aimed to capture the fullness of the concept of hegemony as well as the tensions inherent in its actualisation. Building on the philosophical foundations of historical materialism, including its realist ontology, I positioned US hegemony in relation to global capitalism. The structural and ideological purchase of the neoliberal Washington Consensus was a major component of US hegemony after the Cold War, and, although the emergence of the NLL elicited talk of 'post-neoliberalism' in Latin America, US foreign policy remained committed to the liberalisation of the region's political economy. As analysed in this thesis, the 'Post-Washington Consensus' embodied the re-constitutive dynamic of hegemony in its multiple dimensions. US policy was actively rededicated to the protection and augmentation of on-going processes of neoliberalisation. As captured in Stokes' 'dual logic' argument,[1078] these processes served the interests of US national capital while simultaneously consolidating a regional political economy in the interests of international capital. Employing a (neo-)Gramscian understanding of hegemony inspired by Cox, Rupert, Robinson and others, I nevertheless sought to refocus the wider discussion on the agency of the United States. The research question on *US* hegemony was

[1076] Coercive force remained intrinsic to US foreign policy despite the wider turn to legitimation and consensus-based strategies in the post-Cold War period. See for example, Ruth Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009).

[1077] On this point, see Randolph B. Persaud, *Counter-Hegemony and Foreign Policy: The Dialectics of Marginalized and Global Forces in Jamaica* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001).

[1078] Doug Stokes, 'The Heart of Empire? Theorising US empire in an era of transnational capitalism', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26 No. 2 (2005), pp. 217-236; Doug Stokes and Sam Raphael, *Global Energy Security and American Hegemony* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), pp. 15, 35-38.

just that; it pertained to the power and position of the US *qua* national-actor in its relations with the countries of Latin America. There is contrast here with the neo-Gramscian emphasis on the agency on the transnational capitalist class, as found, for instance, in Robinson's writings on globalisation.[1079]

Power is no easier to define than hegemony. It qualifies as an essentially contested concept.[1080] Yet there is value in analysing the various forms of power in global politics. By operationalising power in different ways, we can, for instance, offer a deeper, more complete description of processes of hegemonic reconstitution. In this thesis, I used Barnett and Duvall's taxonomy of power to illustrate the 'moving parts' in the dialectic relationship between US hegemony and oppositional currents in Latin America, which I categorised as the New Latin Left. More than delineating different forms of power, Barnett and Duvall encouraged scholars to consider their conjunction.[1081] Indeed, their interlocutors routinely argued that the multiple forms of power must been seen together. This basic proposition was reinforced throughout the present project. At the same time, competing and even irreconcilable theoretical commitments would suggest that scholars deploy the taxonomy differently, perhaps emphasising one or more forms of power over others. That I made use of all four forms of power in this thesis was not an attempt to wipe away or circumvent the ontological and epistemological differences that split IR as a discipline. However much it limits the generalizability of the research, this integrative, pluralist spirit provided the basis for a 'better, richer, and fuller understanding'[1082] of the phenomena investigated in the preceding pages. This is not pluralism for the sake of it, but a broad-brushed attempt to answer my research question in full.

Although their edited volume focused on power in global governance, Barnett and Duvall also applied their taxonomy to the US empire debate. In an article in *International Organization*, they stated that, 'in general, any discussion of American empire should be attentive to all forms of power', not just compulsory power.[1083] As noted at the outset of Chapter 2, and as elaborated on below, this debate subsided somewhat, with scholars turning their attention instead to the (potential) erosion of American unipolarity. This thesis sought to move the broader discussion on US empire (back) toward hegemony by highlighting the forms of resistance that track power's 'polymorphous character'.[1084] Power and resistance are 'mutually implicated', Barnett and Duvall write, 'because the social relations that shape the ability of actors to control their own fates are frequently challenged and resisted by those on the "receiving end"'.[1085] The drive for hegemonic reconstitution is brought about by the (counter-)powers of those on the receiving end of the asymmetrical relationship. Although Barnett and Duvall highlight the resistance inherent to productive power,[1086] Chapters 3-6 demonstrate that this give-and-take is evident in the compulsory, institutional and structural settings of contemporary US-Latin American relations, as well as in the ideational/discursive

[1079] William I. Robinson, *A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, State and Class in a Transnational World* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004); *Latin America and Global Capitalism: A Critical Globalization Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008).
[1080] As acknowledged by W. B. Gallie. See Barnett and Duvall (2005b), p. 41.
[1081] Barnett and Duvall (2005b), p. 57.
[1082] Ibid., p. 45.
[1083] Ibid., p. 66.
[1084] Ibid., p. 40.
[1085] Barnett and Duvall (2005a), pp. 22-23.
[1086] Ibid., p. 23. They write: 'Because power in world politics is complex and takes many forms, so, too, is resistance'. However, their discussion on the nature of multifaceted resistance is not threaded-through their explication of the taxonomy itself.

sphere. Insofar as there is an 'outcome' on the horizon, however, it remains hazy. The dialectical process stays in motion; the moment of hegemonic reconstitution remains elusive.

On the Relationship between the Forms of US Hegemonic Power

As noted above, differing theoretical commitments suggest that scholars may deploy Barnett and Duvall's taxonomy of power in different ways, choosing, for example, to emphasise one or more forms of power over others. This does not mean that different views/forms of power are incommensurable; that there is a necessary sequence to their arrangement or application; or that one or more forms of power can or should be subsumed to a 'master' theory of the concept. Of course, 'the inevitable question, then, is how exactly should we think about the relationship between these forms of power?'[1087] Barnett and Duvall settle on an additive, pluralistic approach. In rejecting the 'gladiatorial' competition between theoretical schools in IR, they note that, in most contexts, all forms of power are operating simultaneously, and that to reject one outright would risk overlooking a fundamental element of the social relationship under investigation.[1088] Rigorous empirical analysis requires examining the ways in which the various forms of power in the international sphere shape one another in particular historical settings. As noted by Scott Solomon in a review of *Power in Global Governance*, the strength of Barnett and Duvall's approach is the flexibility of the taxonomy coupled with the 'distinctive nature of each type of power. The taxonomy thus creates an opportunity for analytical frameworks to utilize all four types of power',[1089] as I have done in this project.

Even so, questions of ontology, epistemology and methodology are vital and unavoidable. The meta-theoretical approach underpinning this project merits discussion, particularly given its impact on the ways in which the four forms of power were operationalised. Taking a Gramscian-inflected HM as my starting point, I positioned US hegemony in relation to global capitalism, which, from a critical realist perspective, has imbued US hegemony with a structural depth that transcends the foreign policy projects of specific administrations.[1090] The fortification of a neoliberal political economy was a longstanding objective of US foreign policy in Latin America, and the (Post-) Washington Consensus cut across much of the empirical analysis conducted in the foregoing chapters. The ideational and material importance of neoliberalism was seen from the outset. In Chapter 1, the NLL was typologised into two strands: the anti-neoliberals and the neoliberal reformers. It was principally the former ('Bolivarian') faction of the NLL that was securitised in Southcom's strategizing. Moreover, Latin American 'populism' was constructed to encapsulate and condemn the policies of anti-neoliberal, 'anti-American' governments in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador. The turn to the Post-Washington Consensus found expression in the shifting institutional landscape of the Americas. Although Chapter 5 (on the structural power of the US's free trade agenda) was the most expansive in the thesis, sections of Chapters 3, 4 and 6 also touched on the reconstitution of neoliberalism. At the same time, US hegemony was not—and is not—*reducible* to the (Post-) Washington Consensus. Hegemony encompasses the myriad forms of power that generate the differentiated capacity of the US to shape its own destiny relative to the disempowered countries of Latin America.

[1087] Barnett and Duvall (2005b), p. 67.
[1088] Ibid.
[1089] M. Scott Solomon, 'Power and the Politics of Global Governance', *International Studies Review*, Vol. 8 No. 2 (2006), p. 327.
[1090] On the structural element of hegemony from a critical realist perspective, see Jonathan Joseph, *Hegemony: A Realist Analysis* (London: Routledge, 2002).

The Interactive Dimensions of Power

Barnett and Duvall's taxonomy is based on an attempt to 'carve power at its joints'.[1091] They pinpoint two key dimensions: the expression of power through interaction or constitution; and the specificity of social relations. In general, the interactive dimensions of power are more conventional or traditional, and thus represent a 'natural' starting point for a research project on the policies of a pre-constituted actor. Despite the fact that the US did not articulate a sweeping foreign policy project in response to the political shifts in Latin America in the 2000s (i.e., there was no Alliance for Progress-type programme to combat the rise of Bolivarian 'populism'), Washington *did* react to these changes; agentially, the US reinforced its capacity to determine the conditions of its existence in the international relations of the Americas both *directly* and *indirectly*. For instance, as examined in Chapter 3, it recalibrated its military strategy in Latin America to attend to the region's shifting geopolitics. As analysed in Chapter 4, Washington also sought to reinforce the centrality of the OAS to the institutional environment of inter-American politics, thus giving the US greater capacity to influence events 'at a distance'.

Compulsory Power: Protecting the Coercive Leverage of US Military Capabilities

As the direct form of interactive power in international politics, compulsory power rests on the material and 'hard power' resources of specific states. Following Dahl's famous definition, there is a command or coercive logic at work here, even when physical force isn't actually exercised. Chapter 3 examined US military strategy toward Latin America in the age of the New Latin Left. Amidst broader continuities in the goals of its foreign policy, Washington shifted tack while attempting to protect and, where possible, augment its military access and manoeuvrability in the region. This was seen in the reconstitution of the US Navy's Fourth Fleet; in the changes to Southcom's basing posture; and in the consolidation of the post-coup government in Honduras. Following the Bush administration's War on Terror, the Obama administration shifted US strategy in accordance with its 'smart power' framework. But, as illustrated in Pentagon documents and in the search for new partners and military bases, the rise of the NLL did not lead to strategic retrenchment by the US; on the contrary, the US remained committed to its 'hard power' capabilities in Latin America, repositioning its military resources to adjust to new hemispheric realities. This had complex implications for inter-American relations. For example, the reconstitution of US compulsory power adversely impacted its institutional power. Latin American countries sought to distance the multilateral discussion on security issues away from the OAS, which had long been an instrument of US hegemony in the Americas.

Institutional Power: Reforming the OAS at the Centre of Regional Cooperation

Institutional power is the more diffuse form of interactive power. It involves the US working through favourable international institutions to pursue desirable outcomes. Because institutions produce 'winners' and 'losers' in international relations, the maintenance of an amenable institutional landscape is an objective in and of itself. As discussed in Chapter 4, the OAS was constructed at the behest of the US and was widely viewed as serving its geostrategic interests in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Under the influence of the NLL, however, the ability of the US to realise its geopolitical goals within the OAS had

[1091] Barnett and Duvall (2005b), p. 43.

diminished. Moreover, by of the end of the 2000s, the OAS shared the institutional space with several rival projects. Spurred by Brazil and Venezuela, initiatives such as CELAC, UNASUR and ALBA were widely embraced as nascent competitors to the OAS. Their emergence stimulated discussions on the utility of 'reforming' the more established inter-American system—in part to protect its centrality to hemispheric cooperation. A reconstitution of US institutional power would propel the OAS to reinforce polyarchic notions of democracy and further challenge 'populist' governance on the part of 'radical' leftist leaders in the Andean region. The changing institutional terrain was to have a major impact on the structural power of the US, as well. ALBA, along with an expanded Mercosur, helped coordinate opposition to the FTAA. These organisations also offered alternative means of economic integration against the Washington Consensus.

The Constitutive Dimensions of Power

Barnett and Duvall write: 'Productive power and structural power overlap in several important respects. Both are attentive to constitutive social processes that are, themselves, not controlled by specific actors. Both concern how the social capacities of actors are socially produced, and how these processes shape actors' self-understandings, and perceived interests'.[1092] On the surface, it may seem awkward to discuss the *constitutive* power of a given state. How can the US possess either structural or productive power, if these forms of social power operate prior to the constitution of actors, such as the US? At the same time, the notion of 'power to'[1093] suggests that states *act* in a certain way, even though this action is constrained or conditioned by pre-existing structures of economic production, systems of knowledge, discursive practices and so on. Ontologically, social structures are themselves co-constituted through the purposeful actions of the agents embedded in such structures; discourses likewise find expression in the rhetorical or symbolic *practices* of concretised actors. Given the research question underpinning this project, it was imperative to explore the structural and productive elements of *US* power, as expressed in the policies and practices of the hegemonic agent.

Structural Power: Deepening Neoliberalisation through a Reconstituted Free Trade Agenda

Structures assign agents the capacity to act in the social world.[1094] This constitutive element of structural power is, by definition, *direct*, as agents are enabled and constrained through the internal relations of pre-existing structures. However, states have a role to play in the co-constitution (and reconstitution) of the structures that condition their existence through, for example, economic policy. As chronicled in Chapter 5, the US used free trade agreements (FTAs) to facilitate the neoliberalisation of the hemispheric political economy, thus buttressing US structural power in the region. Negotiations resulted in greater mobility for transnational capital, safer opportunities for US investors and a general opening of markets through privatisation and deregulation. However, the FTAA, the centrepiece of this effort, collapsed amidst political opposition. NLL governments used institutional arrangements to problematise the accord and offer potential alternatives. The Bush and Obama administrations re-committed the US to 'free trade' in bilateral and subregional formats, finalising CAFTA-DR and several other agreements with Central and South American countries. The proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership aims to revamp the hemispheric agenda while putting the US at the centre of an expanding 'competitive liberalisation' regime

[1092] Barnett and Duvall (2005a), p. 20.
[1093] Ibid., p. 10.
[1094] Ibid., pp. 18-20.

connecting the Asia-Pacific to the Americas. It would harmonise existing trade rules and allow countries to be brought into the regime at a later date. Though geared primarily towards East Asia, the TPP would provide a mechanism for Washington to consolidate the 'free trade bloc' in the Western hemisphere, addressing commercial and juridical issues not covered in previous FTAs. But, as of this writing, the future of the TPP remains uncertain.

Productive Power: Constructing and Condemning 'Populist' Governance in the NLL

Productive power works through diffuse and constitutive social processes 'that are effected only through the meaningful practices of actors'. It involves 'the discursive production of the subjects, the fixing of meanings, and the terms of action, of world politics'.[1095] Productive power runs *through* the discursive phenomena that produce identities, ideas and knowledge. It encompasses the contingency of subjects, who can (re)ascribe meaning to themselves and the world around them through language practices and knowledge production. Insofar as they legitimate the actions of more powerful actors, discursive representations are ideological. The discursive construction of Latin American 'populism' facilitated the reconstitution of US hegemony by affixing certain meanings to the region's anti-neoliberal, counter-hegemonic governments. 'Populism' was a means of distinguishing the anti-neoliberal, 'anti-US' members of the NLL from its more reformist elements—of separating the 'good left' (Brazil) from the 'bad left' (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador). This invariably took place in the context of the pre-existing meanings of 'populism', which has a history both as a style of political mobilisation and a model of national economic development. Additionally, however, the populist construct functioned to undermine 'bad' NLL governments through normative condemnation. Populism, as explored in Chapter 6, has pejorative meanings in Latin American politics and diplomacy. It is associated with autocratic, backward and irresponsible policies. In other words, the populist construct was a move to recoup the productive power lost amidst the ideological ascendency of the NLL's 'Bolivarian' or anti-imperialist strain. In reinforcing the self-understandings of US foreign policy (as non-populist, democratic, forward-looking and so on), the construct legitimated the deployment of power in compulsory, institutional and structural guises.

Limitations and Paths to Future Research

There are limitations to any research project, owing to scope and design, as well as to the primary research question driving the inquiry. This section addresses some of the shortcomings of the present thesis. For starters, I have focused on the hegemony/counter-hegemony dialectic between the United States and the countries of Latin America. As such, the thesis excluded substantive consideration of actors from outside the hemisphere. Similarly, the thesis avoided drawing direct links between US foreign policy in the Western hemisphere and Washington's policy elsewhere, not to mention its broader strategic disposition (US 'grand strategy'). The following paragraphs situate contemporary inter-American relations in a wider context. In doing so, they open up avenues for future research.

The 'Rise of the Rest' and China's Role in the Western Hemisphere

While the NLL was emerging as a political force in the early 2000s, IR was fixated on the question of American empire. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq hinted at an unbridled power in the international arena. By the end of the decade, however, the debate had shifted to

[1095] Barnett and Duvall (2005a), pp. 20-21.

the durability (or fragility) of American unipolarity. Notwithstanding the obvious strategic drawbacks of the Bush administration's militarised unilateralism, much of this speculation was driven by the 'rise of the rest'.[1096] In 2001, Goldman Sachs proclaimed that the future of the world economy lay with the so-called BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India and China),[1097] and events afterward—including the 2008 financial crisis—reinforced this perception. According to Nye, transitions in the global economy indicate that power is being dispersed away from American primary. While the BRICs are ascendant, more established actors, including the European Union and Japan, also factor into the equation.[1098] The 'unipolar moment' is drawing to a close. As measured by the distribution of the world's economic resources, realists and liberals alike depict a world moving rapidly toward multipolarity.[1099] From this vantage, the US is likely to face growing constraints on its ability to shape the global order. Assuming the end of unipolarity is nigh, what then for US foreign policy? Although the debate over polarity is driven largely by neorealists, the inclusion of critical voices would help to elucidate the implications of these economic shifts for the future of global politics, and the direction of US foreign policy therein. More to the point of the research agenda initiated in this thesis, what would a multipolar world mean for the geopolitics of the Americas?

Brazil's inclusion as an 'emerging power' raises a number of questions in relation to this thesis. The country's rise has become an important subject in and of itself. In 2012, Brazil overtook the UK to become the world's sixth largest economy. It is projected to become a leading oil exporter as offshore reserves come online.[1100] 'Characterized by large and well-developed agricultural, mining, manufacturing, and service sectors, Brazil's economy outweighs that of all other South American countries (combined), and Brazil is expanding its presence in world markets'.[1101] Like other countries in Latin America, it was only marginally affected by the global financial crisis.[1102] Moreover, as discussed at several points in this thesis, Brazil has been extremely active in regional affairs,[1103] from the expansion of Mercosur to the creation of UNASUR. The PT governments of Lula and Rouseff, in office since 2002, have served as a kind of model for the 'moderate' left-wing leaders in the region. With the World Cup and Olympics approaching, the country's prestige is on the upswing. Some observers have suggested that Brazil is becoming hegemonic within South America. This is certainly debatable. Yet, it is important to consider the implications of Brazil's growing influence. As stated by Sweig, 'the new conventional wisdom suggests that

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[1096] See for example, Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World* (New York, W. W. Norton and Company, 2008); James F. Hoge, Jr., 'A Global Power Shift in the Making: Is the United States Ready?' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83 No. 4 (2004), pp. 2-7.

[1097] Jim O'Neil, 'Building Better Global Economic BRICs', Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper No. 66, 30 November 2001.

[1098] Joseph Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).

[1099] See Zakaria (2008); Nye (2011). For an alternative reading of the polarity debate, see Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

[1100] *The Guardian*, 'Brazil's economy overtakes UK to become world's six largest', 6 March 2012: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/mar/06/brazil-economy-worlds-sixth-largest.

[1101] Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Factbook, 2013: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html.

[1102] See for example, Simon Romero, 'Latin America Looks at West's Fiscal Crisis, and Sees its Own Past', *New York Times*, 27 January 2012: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/world/americas/latin-america-sees-own-past-in-wests-economic-crises.html?_r=0.

[1103] See for example, Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, 'Brazil as a Regional Power and Its Relations with the United States', *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 33 No. 3 (2006), pp. 12-27; Julia E. Sweig, 'A New Global Player: Brazil's Far-Flung Agenda', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89 No. 6 (2010), pp. 173-184.

Brazil is now poised to make its name on the global stage and balance the other power in its neck of the woods, the United States'.[1104] Inter-American relations may revolve increasingly around Washington's multifaceted partnership with Brasilia. But will Brazil's rise spell the waning of US hegemony in Latin America? Additional research is warranted.

As regards US unipolarity, the 'rise of the rest' is really about China.[1105] In addition to the European Union, Japan and Russia, China has made its presence felt in the Western hemisphere in recent years, with uncertain consequences for inter-American relations. In 2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao made a historic, high-profile trip to Latin America, visiting Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba. He signed a number of economic deals along the way, touring the region again in 2010. Hu's successor, Xi Jinping, visited Mexico, Costa Rica and the Caribbean in 2013.[1106] In 2006, China and Venezuela finalised a series of major cooperation agreements in trade, energy and infrastructure development. Chávez visited China six times to deepen bilateral ties. Chinese exports to Central and South America have boomed across a number of sectors, as has Chinese investment. Latin American exports to China—concentrated in a few commodities, such as copper, oil, soybeans, and iron ore—also grew steeply. Between 2000 and 2009, total trade between China and Latin America increased by over 1,000 per cent. China is now Brazil's single largest trading partner. Of course, China also represents a potential economic competitor to Latin American countries in the global export of manufactured goods.[1107] Meanwhile, the Chinese model of state-directed growth has generated considerable interest in Latin America as the countries of the region (attempt to) move away from the Washington Consensus. China's loans to Latin American countries have outpaced those made by US-based IFIs, and they generally include fewer policy conditionalities.[1108]

'In addition to expanding economic ties', writes Ellis in one of the few book-length studies on the topic, 'China is establishing an array of new political, social, and cultural links with Latin America'.[1109] The 'One China' policy and the status of Taiwan provided much of the impetus. The People's Republic of China has engaged in an intense contest with the Republic of China (Taiwan) over diplomatic recognition; a majority of the countries worldwide that extend recognition to Taiwan are in the Western hemisphere, concentrated mainly in Central America and the Caribbean. Beijing has been active in trying to win over small countries using foreign aid, with intermittent success.[1110] Tangential to the Taiwan issue, China has engaged with Latin American countries in the security realm, through arms

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[1104] Sweig (2010), p. 173.

[1105] On the rise of China and its impact on Sino-US relations, see for example, Aaron L. Friedberg, 'The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?' *International Security*, Vol. 30 No. 2 (2005), pp. 7-45; Thomas J. Christensen, 'Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia', *International Security*, Vol. 31 No. 1 (2006), pp. 81-126; Michael Beckley, 'China's Century? Why America's Edge will Endure', *International Security*, Vol. 36 No. 3 (2011), pp. 41-78; and Arvind Subramanian, 'The Inevitable Superpower', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90 No. 5 (2011), pp. 66-78.

[1106] *The Economist*, 'Xi Jinping in America's backyard: From pivot to twirl', 8 June 2013: http://www.economist.com/news/china/21579062-chinese-leader-tries-smooth-move-americas-backyard-pivot-twirl.

[1107] Kevin P. Gallagher and Roberto Porzecanski, *The Dragon in the Room: China and the Future of Latin American Industrialization* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).

[1108] Kevin P. Gallagher, Amos Irwin, and Katherine Koleski, 'The New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in Latin America', Inter-American Dialogue, February 2012.

[1109] R. Evan Ellis, *China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009), p. 3.

[1110] Daniel P. Erikson and Janice Chen, 'China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America', *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol. 31 No. 2 (2007), pp. 69-89.

sales, military exchanges and joint exercises.[1111] As summarised in a special issue of *Americas Quarterly*, 'for the first time since the Cold War, an extra-hemispheric power is challenging U.S. influence in the region'.[1112] The nominally-Communist state's emphasis on building 'South-South' cooperation helped facilitate ties with some of Latin America's left-wing governments, including Venezuela and Cuba, even as China insisted that its foreign policy in the region was non-ideological.

Washington took notice. According to a 2005 CRS report, 'some observers believe increased Chinese interest and economic linkages with Latin America constitute a significant future threat to U.S. influence and interests in Latin America'.[1113] The conservative elements of the US foreign policy establishment have proven particularly alarmist at times.[1114] But, on the whole, Beijing has been deferential to Washington's historical position in Latin America. As stated by Shixue Jiang, 'China understands well that Latin America is the backyard of the United States, so China has no intention whatsoever to challenge American hegemony in Latin America'.[1115] There is a consensus in the policy community that China's interest in the region is driven by economic imperatives rather than geopolitics, and that, despite the presence of key flashpoint issues, such as energy, there is unlikely to be an out-and-out 'rivalry' between Beijing and Washington.[1116] Although the emerging 'triangular relationship' between the US, China and Latin America may complicate the international relations of the Western hemisphere down the line, I would contend that China's growing presence in the Americas has not overridden the hegemony/counter-hegemony dialectic that constitutes the central theoretical problematic of this thesis. Nevertheless, future research should remain attentive to the evolution of this tri-partite dynamic. Assuming China emerges as a truly *global* power, the scope of its interests in the Western hemisphere may change, particularly if it views itself (or is viewed in Washington) as a peer competitor to the US.

A Hegemon in Decline? Implications for the 'Backyard' and Beyond

The rise of China and other emerging powers is closely related to the parallel debate over American decline, a speculative discussion that has recurred in waves. Prior to the end of the Cold War, Paul Kennedy's best-selling book *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* stimulated interest in the relative decline of the US, as brought about by 'imperial overstretch'. Kennedy wrote, 'decision-makers in Washington must face the awkward and enduring fact that the sum total of the United States' global interests and obligations is nowadays far larger than the country's power to defend them all simultaneously'.[1117] The collapse of the Soviet Union, of course, buried this discussion, which returned with a vengeance in the post-Iraq war, post-financial crisis climate. 'Decline' can be seen in a number of ways (as in the decline of American 'leadership', or the erosion of the legitimacy

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[1111] Gabriel Marcella, 'China's Military Activity in Latin America', *Americas Quarterly*, Vol. 6 No. 1 (2012), pp. 67-69.
[1112] *Americas Quarterly*, 'China's Global Rise: Special Issue: China and Latin America', Vol. 6 No. 1 (2012), p. 51.
[1113] Congressional Research Service, 'China's Growing Interest in Latin America', 20 April 2005, p. 5.
[1114] See for example, Stephen Johnson, 'Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America', The Heritage Foundation, No. 1888, Washington, DC, 24 October 2005.
[1115] Shixue Jiang, 'Three factors in the recent development of Sino-Latin American relations', in *Enter the Dragon? China's Presence in Latin America*, edited by Cynthia Arnson, Mark Mohr and Riordan Roett, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC (2006), p. 48.
[1116] See for example, Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz, editors, *China's Expansion in the Western Hemisphere: Implications for Latin America and the United States* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008).
[1117] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 515.

of US hegemony). As noted above, it is closely connected the debate on polarity, at least within the dominant rationalist paradigm in IR. To quote Layne, the end of unipolarity means the end of 'Pax Americana', and, though declinists may have jumped the gun previously, 'this time it's real'.[1118] However, leading scholars remain split on the implications of global economic trends. For Layne and others, the idea that the US can sustain its global hegemony is, at best, an illusion.[1119] In stark contrast, Wohlforth, Brooks and Mastanduno see the unipolar arrangement, and thus American primacy, as uniquely stable.[1120] Needless to say, there is considerable disagreement over the consequences of the changing distribution of material capabilities, both for state behaviour and for the international system itself.[1121] This has led to divergent interpretations of the US's role in the global order. Ikenberry's work, for instance, points to the utility of international institutions—the UN, NATO, the IMF, etc.—to the maintenance of the status quo. For Ikenberry, the US is a 'liberal leviathan', and it draws its strength from the security and durability of this institutional order, which, of course, it was instrumental in formulating.[1122] The political and economic interconnections that bind this system reinforce and legitimate US power. He writes: 'Ironically, the prospect of a decline in American relative power generates incentives for a renewed commitment by the United States to open and rule-based order. In the end, it is these liberal features of the international order that will slow down and mute the consequences of a return to multipolarity'.[1123]

Assuming the US is in decline (since the debate is largely one of timescale), what kind of decline will it be? Without question, US foreign policy, as shaped by its strategic vision, will have considerable bearing on the future of international politics. The contemporary debate over US grand strategy flows from the question of decline. Those who view decline as imminent have tended to advocate strategic retrenchment.[1124] Layne, for example, has long advocated 'offshore balancing'.[1125] By curtailing global commitments, he argues, such a strategy would insulate the US from future great power conflict. It would mitigate against relative decline by conserving resources, even as the US maintained an over-the-horizon military posture. It would lower the US's politico-military profile and end 'ideological crusading' on behalf of 'democracy promotion'.[1126] In the wake of

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[1118] Christopher Layne, 'This Time It's Real: The End of Unipolarity and the *Pax Americana*', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 56 No. 1 (2012), pp. 203-204.

[1119] Christopher Layne, 'The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise', *International Security*, Vol. 17 No. 4 (1993), pp. 5-51; Christopher Layne, 'The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality: A Review Essay', *International Security*, Vol. 34 No. 1 (2009b), pp. 147-172; Emmanuel Todd, *After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); David P. Calleo, *Follies of Power: America's Unipolar Fantasy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

[1120] Brooks and Wohlforth (2008); Michael Mastanduno, 'Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War', *International Security*, Vol. 21 No. 4 (1997), pp. 49-88; and William C. Wohlforth, 'The Stability of a Unipolar World', *International Security*, Vol. 24 No. 1 (1999), pp. 5-41.

[1121] G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, 'Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and System Consequences', *World Politics*, Vol. 61 No. 1 (2009), pp. 1-27.

[1122] G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).

[1123] Ibid., p. 156.

[1124] See for example, Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, 'Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment', *International Security*, Vol. 35 No. 4 (2011), pp. 7-44.

[1125] Christopher Layne, 'From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing', *International Security*, Vol. 22 No. 1 (1997), pp. 86-124.

[1126] Christopher Layne, 'America's Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 35 No. 1 (2009a), pp. 5-25.

neoconservatism's unceremonious demise,[1127] offshore balancing gained a certain élan in the foreign policy community.[1128] However, those who see American 'leadership' as desirable and durable—and US decline as overstated—have continued to push for a more activist grand strategy. For instance, Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth have called for 'deep engagement'. Among other things, such a strategy would help the US continue to 'underwrite the global economy in a general sense', while allowing the US 'to structure it in ways that serve the United States' narrow economic interests'.[1129] Deep engagement would maintain the leverage that the US enjoys through its various security partnerships. Similarly, Joseph Nye has argued that a strategy of 'smart power', in which Washington uses its foreign policy resources more wisely, would reverse the decline of American leadership, and thus help the country manage the global 'power shifts' on the horizon.[1130] Although Obama's foreign policy has been fairly restrained compared to Bush's heavy-handed unilateralism, his administration has, on the whole, remained committed to a 'traditional' (i.e. liberal, postwar) version of US hegemony.[1131] The vaunted pivot to Asia, for example, is not so much strategic retrenchment as strategic reorganisation. Although the focus may have shifted to the Asia-Pacific, the vision remains global. As demonstrated by the TPP, which seeks to bridge East and West, the US's objectives remain highly ambitious. 'Rather than pull back from the world', wrote Hillary Clinton in 2011, 'we need to press forward and renew our leadership'.[1132]

Debates over American decline and US grand strategy are sure to persist. As is clear from the preceding paragraphs, these debates are shaped largely by conventional scholarship. To date, they have been inattentive to the complexities and multifaceted nature of power in the international system. Critical voices could do much to invigorate and broaden the discussion. There are questions that go unasked, for example, on the functionality of the discourse of decline to US hegemony. Is an activist foreign policy an easier sell to a crisis-stricken population if the fading superpower is rumoured to be in decline? Does the rise of China and the BRICs help justify massive military budgets, the one area in which the US continues to enjoy an overwhelming strategic advantage? What does decline mean for the US's exceptionalist ideology?[1133] And what of global capitalism in the twilight of American hegemony? Moreover, decline may have a disproportionate impact on US-Latin American relations. It seems reasonable to ask whether multipolarity makes Latin America *more* relevant to US interests. Will the dwindling 'reach' of US foreign policy compel the US to refocus on the geo-economic and strategic importance of a region it still considers its 'backyard'?[1134] Do the markets and resources of Latin America matter more in the context of

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[1127] G. John Ikenberry, 'The End of the Neo-Conservative Moment', *Survival*, Vol. 46 No. 1 (2004a), pp. 7-22; Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).

[1128] See for example, Stephen M. Walt, 'A bandwagon for offshore balancing?' *Foreign Policy*, 1 December 2011: http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/01/a_bandwagon_for_offshore_balancing ; Christopher Layne, 'The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing', *The National Interest*, 27 January 2012: http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-balancing-6405.

[1129] Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, 'Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment', *International Security*, Vol. 37 No. 3 (2012), p. 42.

[1130] Nye (2011).

[1131] The Obama administration remains committed American pre-eminence. See for example, US Department of Defense, 'Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense', January 2012.

[1132] Hillary Clinton, 'America's Pacific Century', *Foreign Policy*, November 2011: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century.

[1133] On American exceptionalism, see Anatol Lieven, *America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

[1134] The trope of 'backyardism' continues to be deployed in US discourse, much to the chagrin of many in Latin America, as witnessed by the controversy over Secretary of State John Kerry's use of the term in April of 2013.

a geopolitical rivalry with China? If the US pulls back from the Middle East, for example, would retrenchment allow the declining hegemon to exert more force in its near abroad? Indeed, does the picture of hegemonic reconstitution in the Western hemisphere offer clues as to the direction of US grand strategy? What about for US foreign policy elsewhere in the Global South? There is much for critical IR research to sink its teeth into.

The Future of US-Latin American Relations

The continuity thesis of US foreign policy, introduced in Chapter 1, posits that the hegemonic objectives of US statecraft have remained relatively consistent over time. The notion of hegemonic reconstitution certainly reinforces this position. That said, hegemony is a contested social process, and the dynamism of international relations offers the prospect of progressive change. In this vein, critical IR theory implies a normative commitment not generally found in mainstream scholarship. In Marx's oft-cited passage, the point was not merely to interpret the world, but to change it. Critics of US foreign policy—IR scholars, revisionist historians, political commentators, public intellectuals, journalists, activists—have an extensive history of tackling issues of import to Latin America, partly because the region served as a laboratory for US imperialism for so long. Recently, these critics have found cause for optimism. In 2006, for example, Greg Grandin identified profound shifts taking hold in Latin America across both 'moderate' and 'radical' governments. He wrote that, 'more than just giving one another room to maneuver, Latin America's new leftists have produced over the last couple of years their own consensus, a common project to use the centrifugal forces of globalization to loosen Washington's unipolar grip'.[1135]

In a 2013 interview with the *Financial Times*, Noam Chomsky lauded the recent success of Latin Americans in addressing poverty and inequality. Chomsky stated: 'For the last couple of hundred years Latin America has been pretty much under the control of the imperial powers, first Europe, including England, later the US. In the past decade, in this millennium, Latin America for the first time in literally 500 years begun to break out of that system of domination, it has moved towards integration, haltingly but significantly. The countries have chosen their own paths independently of the demands of the great powers, particularly the US'. Although the US remained 'far and away the most powerful state', Latin America provided 'the most striking case' of the 'diversification of power in the world'. Notwithstanding coups in Haiti and Honduras, Chomsky noted that Washington had fewer options to dispatch unwanted governments than it did previously. True to form, however, he emphasised that these gains had not diminished Washington's desire to exercise control of the region.[1136] This sentiment—call it guarded optimism—is widespread among critics of US foreign policy, and it is not limited to North America.[1137] After all, it was the agency of Latin Americans themselves that posed the question of US hegemony at the present juncture.

Kerry had also likened Latin America to the US's 'neighborhood'. *Reuters*, 'Bolivia expels U.S. aid agency after Kerry "backyard" comment', 1 May 2013: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/01/us-bolivia-usaid-idUSBRE94013V20130501.

[1135] Greg Grandin, 'Latin America's New Consensus', *The Nation*, 1 May 2006: http://www.thenation.com/article/latin-americas-new-consensus#axzz2XE6kBi4O.

[1136] Matt Kenard, 'BB Interviews...Noam Chomsky', *Financial Times*, 15 February 2013: http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2013/02/15/bb-interviews-noam-chomsky/#axzz2X7ua3tqt.

[1137] The Brazilian intellectual Emir Sader, among other critical voices, has connected the rise of Latin America's 'new left' and its post-neoliberal alternatives to 'Latin America's growing importance in the world'. *The New Mole: Paths of the Latin American Left* (London: Verso, 2011), p. 156.

Indeed, from a variety of viewpoints, the countries of Latin America have exhibited increased confidence in regional and world affairs. In the title of his 2010 book, the Colombian writer Oscar Guardiola-Rivera provocatively asked: *What if Latin America Ruled the World?* He suggested that, as the US itself grew more 'Latinised', the South would 'take the North into the 22nd Century'. Referencing the newly-formed Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, Guardiola-Rivera even foresaw the potential for a 'United States of Latin America'.[1138] The peoples of the region are now authoring their own histories in an unprecedented manner, he asserted. One does not have to share Guardiola-Rivera's sanguinity to appreciate that Latin America has grown more autonomous in the early 21st Century. A great deal of mainstream and critical analysis has reached this conclusion. The staid Council on Foreign Relations went so far as to proclaim a 'new reality' in US-Latin American relations, one that signalled the end of US dominance.[1139] Reflecting this change in narrative, Obama has routinely pledged an equal partnership.[1140] And yet, there are questions of power and politics underlying this new consensus. Will the countries of Latin America continue to develop in an autonomous direction? What would this mean for US hegemony? In other words, from a theoretical view, at what point is hegemony overcome? When, where and how does the hegemony/counter-hegemony dialectic terminate, so to speak?

Masked by the din of current events, this thesis has pointed to deeper processes of hegemonic reconstitution. The leaders, movements and policies of the NLL have coloured Latin America's politics for a generation, with myriad implications for the citizens of the region—and for US foreign policy. But political trends are fleeting. Although the NLL problematised American pre-eminence, it seems premature to conclude that US hegemony has been eclipsed once and for all, if at all. We have been here before. Writing in *Foreign Affairs* in 1976, Lowenthal stated that 'the days of unchallenged U.S. control of the Western hemisphere are numbered, if not already past'.[1141] The conflagrations of the 1970s and 80s gave way to the Washington Consensus, in which US hegemony represented the 'end of history', a path cleared by the organised destruction of the left in many Latin American countries. Lowenthal had encouraged the US to do away with its 'hegemonic presumption'. This thesis demonstrates that, behind the platitudes of 'partnership', such a presumption persists. Just as importantly, however, hegemony contains structural drivers that pattern US policy. More than a project or a strategy, hegemony is a complex and multi-layered social relationship. It encompasses the deployment of power both directly and at a distance—through coercive force, multilateral institutions, economic policy and diplomacy. Further, US hegemony is inextricably interlinked with processes of structural and discursive production; that is, with power in its more constitutive forms. Yet hegemony is always contested. If, at present, US hegemony in Latin America is under (re)construction, the future of US-Latin American relations remains very much unwritten.

[1138] Oscar Guardiola-Rivera, *What if Latin America Ruled the World? How the South will Take the North into the 22nd Century* (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), p. 372.

[1139] The Council on Foreign Relations' Independent Task Force on U.S.-Latin America Relations (2008).

[1140] See for example Obama's speech to the Sixth Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia. The White House, 'Remarks of President Barack Obama -- As Prepared for Delivery -- Summit of the Americas Opening Plenary', 14 April 2012: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/14/remarks-president-barack-obama-prepared-delivery-summit-americas-opening.

[1141] Abraham F. Lowenthal, 'The United States and Latin America: ending the hegemonic presumption', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 55 No. 1 (1976), p. 199.

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Appendix 1

List of Interviews

Interview 1

Michael Shifter

Date: 2 June 2011

Title and Affiliation: President, Inter-American Dialogue

Location: Inter-American Dialogue, 1211 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 510, Washington, DC, 20036

Interview 2

Joy Olson

Date: 3 June 2011

Title and Affiliation: Executive Director, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)

Location: Washington Office on Latin America, 1666 Connecticut Ave NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC, 20009

Interview 3

Adam Isacson

Date: 9 July 2012

Title and Affiliation: Senior Associate for Regional Security Policy, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)

Location: Washington Office on Latin America, 1666 Connecticut Ave NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC, 20009

Interview 4

Larry Birns

Date: 11 July 2012

Title and Affiliation: Director, Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA)

Location: The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 1250 Connecticut Ave NW, Suite 1C, Washington, DC, 20036

Interview 5

Manuel Pérez Rocha

Date: 17 July 2012

Title and Affiliation: Associate Fellow, Institute for Policy Studies

Location: Institute for Policy Studies, 1112 16th St NW, Suite 600, Washington, DC 20036

Interview 6

Sanho Tree

Date: 17 July 2012

Title and Affiliation: Director, Drug Policy Project, Institute for Policy Studies

Location: Institute for Policy Studies, 1112 16th St NW, Suite 600, Washington, DC 20036

Interview 7

Ambassador (Ret.) Cresencio Arcos

Date: 18 July 2012

Title and Affiliation: Senior Political Advisor, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University

Location: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University, Ft. McNair, Washingotn, DC, 20319

Interview 8

Anonymous

Date: 20 July 2012

Affiliation: US State Department, formerly Foreign Service based in Central America

Location: US Department of State, Harry S. Truman Building, Washington, DC, 20520

Interview 9

Prof. Eric Hershberg

Date: 23 July 2012

Title and Affiliation: Director, Center for Latin America and Latino Studies; Professor, Department of Government, American University

Location: Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, 4545 42nd St., NW, Suite 308, Washington, DC, 20016

Interview 10

Eric Farnsworth

Date: 23 July 2012

Title and Affiliation: Vice President, Council of the Americas

Location: Council of the Americas (Washington office), Suite 250, 1615 L St, NW, Washington, DC, 20036

Interview 11

Kezia McKeague

Date: 23 July 2012

Title and Affiliation: Director, Government Relations, Council of the Americas

Location: Council of the Americas (Washington office), Suite 250, 1615 L St, NW, Washington, DC, 20036

Interview 12

Col. John (Jay) Cope

Date: 25 July 2012

Title and Affiliation: Senior Research Fellow, Western Hemisphere, Center for Strategic Research

Location: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Ft. McNair, Washington, DC, 20319

Interview 13

Anonymous

Date: 25 July 2012

Affiliation: High level official, Western Hemisphere Affairs, Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, US Department of Defense

Location: The Pentagon, Washington, DC

Appendix 2

Declaration of Principles – The First Summit of the Americas (1994)
'To Promote Prosperity Through Economic Integration and Free Trade'

Our continued economic progress depends on sound economic policies, sustainable development, and dynamic private sectors. A key to prosperity is trade without barriers, without subsidies, without unfair practices, and with an increasing stream of productive investments. Eliminating impediments to market access for goods and services among our countries will foster our economic growth. A growing world economy will also enhance our domestic prosperity. Free trade and increased economic integration are key factors for raising standards of living, improving the working conditions of people in the Americas and better protecting the environment.

We, therefore, resolve to begin immediately to construct the 'Free Trade Area of the Americas' (FTAA), in which barriers to trade and investment will be progressively eliminated. We further resolve to conclude the negotiation of the 'Free Trade Area of the Americas' no later than 2005, and agree that concrete progress toward the attainment of this objective will be made by the end of this century. We recognize the progress that already has been realized through the unilateral undertakings of each of our nations and the subregional trade arrangements in our Hemisphere. We will build on existing subregional and bilateral arrangements in order to broaden and deepen hemispheric economic integration and to bring the agreements together.

Aware that investment is the main engine for growth in the Hemisphere, we will encourage such investment by cooperating to build more open, transparent and integrated markets. In this regard, we are committed to create strengthened mechanisms that promote and protect the flow of productive investment in the Hemisphere, and to promote the development and progressive integration of capital markets.

To advance economic integration and free trade, we will work, with cooperation and financing from the private sector and international financial institutions, to create a hemispheric infrastructure. This process requires a cooperative effort in fields such as telecommunications, energy and transportation, which will permit the efficient movement of the goods, services, capital, information and technology that are the foundations of prosperity.

We recognize that despite the substantial progress in dealing with debt problems in the Hemisphere, high foreign debt burdens still hinder the development of some of our countries.

We recognize that economic integration and the creation of a free trade area will be complex endeavors, particularly in view of the wide differences in the levels of development and size of economies existing in our Hemisphere. We will remain cognizant of these differences as we work toward economic integration in the Hemisphere. We look to our own resources, ingenuity, and individual capacities as well as to the international community to help us achieve our goals.

Source: http://www.summit-americas.org/miamidec.htm (accessed 10 January 2013)