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The Negotiation of Future Actions and Interpersonal Relations.  
Resisting and Insisting through Deontic, Epistemic and Affective Stances.

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of requirements for the degree of Doctor of  
Philosophy

to

Department of Modern Languages and Linguistics  
Division of Arts and Humanities  
University of Kent, Canterbury

By Isabella Reichl

October 2021

## Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I want to thank my supervisors Dr. Eleni Kapogianni and Dr. Christina Kim for their guidance – academic as well as personal – particularly at the beginning of this project and their trust in me later on. I also want to thank all other members of staff in ELL – past and present – for warmly welcoming me (in)to the department and supporting me in my role as GTA. At the (former) school level, I want to thank Jacqui Martlew and Charles Young for always having answers and solutions to my admin and it queries.

Thanks also go to the ‘im/politeness gang’: Alba Milà-Garcia, Jessica Marsh, Lara Weinglass and Liz Marsden. Thank you for providing a space for processing, sharing and venting about the experience of doing a PhD/being an ECR in our little sub-discipline; for the gossip and the giggles; for the conference companionship. May there be many more opportunities for in-person shenanigans in the future.

Finally, all the thanks go to the people who were part of precarious@kent and/or Thursday club: Betsy Porritt, Claire Hurley, Jane Hartshorn, Kat Peddie, Martha Schulman, Pantxo Ramas, Rosa Rogers, Sam Holden and the Teds. Thank you for sharing the joy and the anger and everything in-between. Most importantly: Betsy, Kat and Martha, I love you dearly. Thank you for being inspiring women in your unique ways.

P.S.: Kat and Sam, thanks for all the fish.



## Abstract

This thesis examines how participants in future-action negotiations simultaneously insist on or resist future courses of action, on the one hand, and interpersonal claims, on the other. For this qualitative study, data was extracted from two pre-existing corpora of naturally-occurring conversations. Drawing on previous research on (parts of) future-action negotiations from two distinct research traditions – Speech-Act-theoretical Pragmatics and Conversation Analysis – this thesis takes an interactional approach and is positioned within the field of Interpersonal Pragmatics. It was demonstrated that deontics, epistemics and affect represents an effective triadic model of analysis for future-action negotiations in terms of two aspects: the actual negotiation of future courses of actions, on the one hand, and participants' interpersonal relations. This constitutes a more comprehensive alternative to the traditional way of examining proffers and refusals within Speech-Act-Theory-based im/politeness research and integrates Conversation-analytical research on individual interpersonal facets into an approach which views participants' deontic, epistemic and affective rights and obligations as key resources for the negotiation of face and interpersonal relations.

The analysis shows that a distinction can be made between primary stances and secondary stances depending on whether the claimed (lack of) power, knowledge or affect conveys an argument for/against the future action or not. Despite a close link between the verbal actions being investigated and the deontic

facet, it was demonstrated that participants also negotiate future actions and who they are to one another by orienting to epistemic and affective rights and obligations. Stances can be accepted or challenges with regard to the distribution of rights and obligations they convey. Nevertheless, this does not automatically mean that an utterance is treated as interpersonally unproblematic or problematic, respectively. In addition to how participants orient to a prior speaker's stances, the overall dis/preferred turn design, the individual stances within the turn and the specific formats used to implement them are important resources for relational work. Overall, there are three possible grounds for treating an utterance as interpersonally problematic: the stance it expresses, the verbal action it implements and/or the future action it puts forward.

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## 1. Introduction

This thesis examines future-action negotiations (henceforth FA negotiations): interactions between two or more people in which some future course of action by at least one of the present parties is put forward and is not immediately accepted or agreed upon. In lay terms, we can say FA negotiations occur when someone refuses for instance suggestions, invitations or requests. Throughout this thesis, the term 'proffers'<sup>1</sup> is used as an umbrella term for verbal actions which can lead to a refusal – and consequently an FA negotiation. Refusing is one of the more delicate actions we engage in on a daily basis. It expresses that we cannot or do not want to participate in an FA proffered by another person, thereby signalling a conflict of goals, intentions or interests. Yet, the act of saying 'no' – though frequently not performed with that exact word – rarely escalates into interpersonal discord. It appears that humans are generally adept at walking the tightrope that is getting our way without causing offence. This observation has led to a vast body of linguistic research into how speakers manage to successfully navigate this interpersonal minefield. In addition, researchers have been increasingly interested in instances in which things do in fact go wrong, examining what causes such situations and how interactants deal with it.

Linguistic studies examining (parts of) FA negotiations broadly fall within two

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<sup>1</sup> The term is adapted from Edmondson (1981, 87).

fields: Pragmatics, specifically the sub-disciplines of im/politeness research and Speech Act Theory (henceforth SAT), on the one hand, and Conversation Analysis (henceforth CA) on the other. Historically, there has been a disconnect between these camps, demonstrated by distinct research foci, methodologies and terminologies. Only recently have we seen attempts to reconcile the two traditions within the field of Interpersonal Pragmatics, with academics employing conversation-analytic concepts and methods for the investigation of im/politeness and other interpersonal effects. The present thesis aims to contribute to this growing field by bridging the gap between the two research traditions and bodies of literature. In doing so, this study will lead to a better understanding of how speakers (fail to) balance interpersonal goals, on the one hand, and goals pertaining to future courses of action, on the other.

The remainder of this introductory chapter is organised into three sections. In section 1.1., I briefly outline the theoretical foundations of and methods employed in the present thesis. The main aims and claims of this study are summarised in section 1.2. Finally, section 1.3. gives an overview of subsequent chapters.

## **1.1. Theoretical framework and methods**

This thesis is positioned within the field termed 'Interpersonal Pragmatics' by Locher & Graham (2010) only a decade ago. It broadly encompasses "examinations of the relational aspect of interactions between people that both affect and are affected by

their understandings of culture, society, and their own and others' interpretations" (Locher & Graham 2010, 2). Haugh, Kádár & Mills (2013, 2) more specifically conceptualise Interpersonal Pragmatics as "a pragmatic perspective on interpersonal aspects of communication and interaction". It is important not to view this field as a competitor to other approaches such as Interactional Sociolinguistics or Conversation Analysis (Locher & Graham 2010, 1-2). Instead, Haugh, Kádár & Mills (2013, 2) insist that it should be

conceived of as inherently interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary in nature, and thus its aims are to build interfaces or bridges between the fields of pragmatics and communication and other related fields, not create yet further disciplinary boundaries.

Interpersonal Pragmatics is primarily concerned with two<sup>2</sup> interconnected areas: interpersonal relations, on the one hand, and interpersonal attitudes, emotions and evaluations, on the other. The former encompasses "mutual social connections amongst people that are mediated by interaction, including power, intimacy, roles, rights and obligations" (Culpeper & Haugh 2014, 197). In other words, interpersonal relations concern the question of who people are to one another and are therefore bidirectional. The latter area, by contrast, pertains to individual people's views of and

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<sup>2</sup> Haugh, Kádár, & Mills (2013, 4) split them into three areas: 1) relations, 2) attitudes and emotions and 3) evaluations. In Culpeper & Haugh (2014, 197), by contrast, relations and attitudes are named as the two core areas, with emotions and evaluations considered addition factors closely associated with the latter. I decided to group attitudes, emotions and evaluations together since a), in contrast to relations, they are all one-directional and b) I do not consider the distinction between attitude and emotion clear cut.

perspectives on others. It includes “value-laden and emotionally charged” attitudes such as “like/dislike, disgust, fear and anger”, “embodied feelings or states of mind” (Culpeper & Haugh 2014, 197), and “appraisals or assessment of persons, or our relationships with those persons” (Kádár & Haugh 2013, 61).

The present study encompasses both these closely connected perspectives, examining how speakers’ (perceptions of their) own and others’ rights and obligations affect their attitudes, emotions and evaluations – and vice versa. In order to address interpersonal aspects in the context of FA negotiations – and in keeping with the interdisciplinary nature of Interpersonal Pragmatics –, I critically employ a range of theoretical tools and notions. For the conceptualisation and categorisation of proffers, refusals and other types of verbal actions involved in future-action negotiations, I draw on SAT as well as CA. For the analysis of interpersonal aspects of interactions, my main theoretical foundations are:

1. an interactional perspective which views meaning, social actions and relationships as co-constructed by participants. Both the conversation-analytic approach and various strands of Interpersonal Pragmatics employ such a perspective. This allows me to view interpersonal aspects as fluid rather than static and to examine how participants simultaneously negotiate their relationships and future actions (see section 2.1. and chapter 4.).
2. the notion of face: first proposed by Goffman (1967, 5), it refers to “the positive social value a person effectively claims for [themselves] by the line others assume

[they have] taken during a particular contact. Face is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes" (see section 4.1.).

3. the concept of relational work: the term refers to "all aspects of the work invested by individuals in the construction, maintenance, reproduction and transformation of interpersonal relationships among those engaged in social practice" (Locher & Watts 2008, 96). The concept of face is at the centre of relational work, emphasising the mutually constitutive nature of self (image) and interpersonal relationships. The ways in which a person's face "is presented or taken up is what constitutes relational work" (Locher 2013, 147) (see chapter 4.).
4. the notions of deontic, epistemic and affective statuses and stances: power, knowledge and emotions are considered core organising facets of both interpersonal relations and social (inter)actions (e.g. Couper-Kuhlen 2012; Heritage 2012; Heritage & Raymond 2005; Kent 2012; Raymond & Heritage 2006; Stevanovic & Peräkylä 2012, 2014). They concern participants' rights and obligations with respect to a) determining future actions, b) what they know about a topic and c) the emotions they express. Based on previous research examining these three facets independently of one another, Stevanovic & Peräkylä (2014) propose a unified triadic model of analysis. Within each facet, a distinction can be made between 'status' and 'stance'. The former refers to socio-cultural aspects which determine who participants are to one another. The deontic, epistemic and affective rights and obligations a person has furthermore determine which courses of action they are allowed to decide about, the things

they can or have to know and the feelings and opinions they may have and express. Stances, by contrast, are displays of (more or less) power, knowledge and affect. These displays can but do not have to be congruent with a speaker's status. Stances are participants' ways of interactionally constructing who they are vis-à-vis their co-participants. The epistemic, deontic and affective facets can therefore be considered three key aspects of a person's face as well as participants' interpersonal relations (see section 4.3.).

This theoretical framework allows me to examine how participants in FA negotiations simultaneously insist on or resist proffered courses of action, on the one hand, and interpersonal (i.e. deontic, epistemic and affective) claims, on the other hand. For the analysis, a qualitative approach was chosen. A corpus of naturally occurring future-action negotiations was created by extracting relevant interactions from two pre-existing English language source corpora.

## **1.2.Aims, claims and scope**

As previously stated, the purpose of this thesis is broadly to provide new insights into the simultaneous negotiation of future actions and participants' interpersonal relationships. More specifically, my aims are the following:

- i. to systematically analyse utterances in future-action negotiations in terms of

the deontic, epistemic and affective stances they express;

- ii. to provide an alternative to the traditional way of examining proffers and refusals within SAT-based im/politeness research, namely to focus on in/directness; and
- iii. to expand Stevanovic & Peräkylä's (2014) triadic model of analysis.

The main claims of this thesis are consequently of empirical as well as theoretical nature. It is shown that:

- i. deontics, epistemics and affect provide a comprehensive lens for the examination of how participants in FA negotiations insist on and resist not only proffered courses of action but also interpersonal claims (see part II);
- ii. we can distinguish between two types of stances within FA negotiations depending on whether the claimed (lack of) power, knowledge or affect conveys an argument for or against the FA (primary stance) or not (secondary stance; see chapter 6. for definitions of these notions and subsequent chapters for their application);
- iii. participants can accept a prior speaker's stances, express no-contest or challenge them with regard to the distribution of rights and obligations they claim (see part II);
- iv. participants also treat a prior speaker's talk as either interpersonally problematic or unproblematic; by this I mean they orient to the talk as a

violation of their own deontic, epistemic or affective rights. (See chapter 6. for definitions of these notions and subsequent chapters for their application.);

- v. challenging a stance does not necessarily treat it as interpersonally problematic and an utterance can be treated as problematic without the stance it expresses being challenged (see part II); and
- vi. there are three possible grounds for treating an utterance as interpersonally problematic: the stance it expresses (e.g. a claim of deontic authority), the verbal action it implements (e.g. a request) and/or the future action it puts forward (see part II);

Before we move on to the overall structure of this thesis, its scope and limits need to be addressed. The present study builds on and contributes to research demonstrating that deontics, epistemics and affect are universal facets of human social relations and interactions. Cross-cultural differences are therefore not examined here, despite my data set including two different varieties of English (one American, the other Irish). Moreover, despite increasing research on prosody and embodied actions as resources for interaction and relational work, these areas are outside the scope of the present thesis. In addition, negotiations of immediate verbal actions such as requests for information were not examined.

### 1.3. Organisation



This thesis consists of two parts. Part I provides the theoretical background as well as an overview of the methodology and data used. In chapter 2., I outline the object of study. Beginning with a review of the speech-act-theoretical and conversation-analytical conceptions of verbal actions, I subsequently discuss how different kinds of proffers as well as refusals are distinguished in the literature and which approach is taken in the present thesis. The chapter also introduces a number of additional parts which can occur within FA negotiations and outlines the possible sequential unfoldings of such interactions. Chapter 3. takes a closer look at individual kinds of verbal actions within FA negotiations. Specifically, I review literature examining the forms such actions can take and highlight SAT's preoccupation with in/directness. In chapter 4., we will look at how these various forms have been analysed in terms of their interpersonal implications. The chapter first summarises the focus on 'im/politeness' evaluations and imposition (mitigation) within traditional Pragmatics before reviewing CA research examining people's rights and obligations. Here, we return to the key theoretical notions introduced in section 1.1.; I outline how I incorporated face and relational work, on the one hand, and the deontic, epistemic and affective facets, on the other, into an interactional perspective for the analysis of negotiations at various levels. The last chapter in part I (chapter 5.) presents the data used and methodology employed in the empirical part of the present thesis.

Part II constitutes the qualitative analysis of FA negotiations. After a brief overview of stances in my data (chapter 6.), each subsequent chapter focuses on one particular group of utterances with respect to the primary stance they express.

Beginning with the deontic facet, chapters 7. and 8. demonstrate how FA negotiators claim to lack or have deontic authority, respectively. Next, we move on to primary epistemic stances, examining participants' claims of knowledge (chapter 9.) and lack thereof (chapter 10.). Chapters 11. and 12. subsequently focus on claims of negative and positive affect, respectively. Lastly, chapter 13. demonstrates that some utterances do not express a primary stance at all but may convey a secondary deontic, epistemic or affective claim. In each chapter, I discuss not only how participants express different stances but also how their co-negotiators treat them, i.e. whether a stance is challenged or accepted and whether the utterance which implements it is treated as interpersonally problematic or unproblematic.

The final chapter of this thesis (chapter 14.) summarises the main findings presented in part II and discusses their implications for future research.

## Part I

## 2. The object of study: future-action negotiations

The aim of this chapter is to define and describe the phenomenon I am examining in the present thesis: future-action negotiations. A number of preliminary questions have to be answered before we move on to analysing them. How are FA negotiations structured? Where – and how – do they begin and end? What kinds of verbal actions can we find within a negotiation? And what even is a verbal action? I will begin with this latter question, which is discussed in section 2.1. As we will see, SAT and CA scholars take two very different approaches to defining the things we do when we use language to communicate. Next, I address one of the core parts of FA negotiations, namely proffers. As stated in the introduction, I use the word ‘proffer’ as an umbrella term for the various verbal actions which can elicit a refusal. However, lumping them all together is not useful for the subsequent analysis. In section 2.2., I therefore outline how SAT and CA researchers distinguish different proffer types as well as explain the categorisation employed in the present thesis. Finally, we will look at the big picture; section 2.3. describes the structure of FA negotiations and the types of verbal actions they can contain.

### 2.1. Conceptualising verbal actions

The underlying assumption of linguistic investigations of (parts of) FA negotiations is that ‘speaking’ is ‘doing’. This idea is shared by SAT and CA; however, the two

traditions differ significantly in their conceptualisation of verbal actions. The present thesis adopts the conversation-analytic notion of speech actions (cf. e.g. Sacks 1967a, 1967b; Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974; Schegloff & Sacks 1973). Nevertheless, it is important to address the SAT perspective for two reasons: first, it has methodological implications for the study of verbal actions which are still noticeable in some SAT-inspired research today. When I review previous work on the forms of proffers and refusals in chapter 3., it will be useful to keep this in mind. Second, early research on interpersonal aspects, i.e. first-wave politeness research, was significantly influenced by SAT's theoretical assumptions, including its conceptualisation of verbal actions. Again, it is important to remember this when we look at approaches to relational work in chapter 4. In addition, my own analysis builds on but diverges from SAT-based studies of proffers and refusals. It is therefore important to be aware how my approach differs.

Let us begin with SAT. Its founding father and language philosopher John L. Austin (1962, 5) coined the notion of 'performative utterances', or simply 'performatives', noting that these:

- a) "do not 'describe' or 'report' or constatae anything at all, are not 'true or false'; and"
- b) that "the uttering of [a performative] is, or is a part of, doing of an action, which again would not normally be described as saying something."

If we consider the kinds of verbal actions we are concerned with here, we can easily see that these two conditions hold. In uttering a sentence such as 'let's go to the pub'\*<sup>3</sup>, for instance, I am not merely conveying information and the content of the sentence cannot be described as true or false. Rather, I am doing some other verbal action. Austin (1962, 101) calls this the illocutionary act: the "performance of an act in saying something as opposed to the performance of an act of saying something", the latter being the 'locutionary act'. Different illocutionary acts have different functions or 'illocutionary forces' (Austin 1962, 99). An utterance that functions as an offer, for instance, is said to have the illocutionary force of an offer.

How, then, does an utterance qualify as, say, a request within SAT? Austin (1962, 14-15) proposes a number of very general necessary conditions which must hold in order for any illocutionary act to be felicitous, i.e. successful. In short, the act must be conventionally accepted,<sup>4</sup> sincerely performed in appropriate circumstances by a person who has the right to perform it and recognised by addressees as that particular act. Despite discussing numerous examples of how these conditions apply to specific illocutions, the author does not do so systematically. Nevertheless, Austin's conditions include a crucial aspect which is central to the SAT understanding of verbal actions: the speaker's intention. The importance of intention is apparent in two ways. First, as stated above, addressees must interpret an utterance as the

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<sup>3</sup> Asterisks denote that the example is invented.

<sup>4</sup> If a culture has no notion of e.g. 'apologizing', speakers cannot perform that act.

illocutionary act intended by the speaker for it to be successful, i.e. to count as that illocutionary act. "I cannot be said to have warned an audience unless it hears what I say and takes what I say in a certain sense" (Austin 1962, 115). Second, the effect of an utterance, its 'perlocution', does not determine what kind of illocution was being done (or was attempted). Austin (1962, 109) insists that the perlocution

must somehow be ruled out as irrelevant to the sense in which an utterance, if the issuing of it is the 'doing of an action', is a performative, at least if that is to be distinct from a constative. For clearly any, or almost any, perlocutionary act is liable to be brought off, in sufficiently special circumstances, by the issuing, with or without calculation, of any utterance whatsoever, and in particular by a straightforward constative utterance (if there is such an animal).<sup>5</sup>

A person praising a restaurant to a friend, for instance, may have the effect of convincing them to try it out themselves. Nevertheless, this does not make the first person's utterance an act of convincing. Rather, within SAT, the illocution is independent of the perlocution and depends on intention. The praiser may have intended to merely inform their friend of the restaurant's quality of food.

Within CA, by contrast, the addressee's understanding of a verbal action is given a significant amount of importance. This is due to the pioneers of the field, sociologists Harvey Sacks, Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson (e.g. Jefferson 1972; Sacks 1967a, 1967b; Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974; Schegloff 1968; Schegloff & Sacks 1973), adopted a data-driven, bottom up methodology which stands in stark contrast to the philosophical, top-down approach of SAT. Conversation analysts do

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<sup>5</sup> Austin (1962) later concludes that there is not, in fact, such an animal.

not conceptualise verbal actions as that which the speaker intends them to be but as interactionally co-constructed – potentially even disputed – by interlocutors.

Consequently, a distinction is made between ‘action formation’ and ‘action ascription’. The former term describes the speaker’s perspective and “the ways in which turns at talk are designed and produced so as to be recognizable as actions of a particular kind” (Heritage 2012, 2). The latter refers to the assignment of an action to a turn by a listener “as revealed by [their response in the next turn], which, if uncorrected in the following turn(s), becomes in some sense a joint ‘good enough’ understanding” (Levinson 2013, 104).

This leads us to a further difference between CA’s and SAT’s understanding of verbal actions. The conversation-analytic approach is particularly explicit about actions not occurring in a vacuum. Rather, they are part of interactions, being responses to and/or inviting actions by another person. In addition, verbal actions are frequently part of an ‘(interactional) project’ (Levinson 2013, 127). The notion of projects refers to a “course of conduct [which is] developed over a span of time” (Schegloff 2007, 224) or a ‘plan of action’ “that at least one participant is pursuing, which may at first be opaque to others then retrospectively discernible [...] and then prospectively projectable” (Levinson 2013, 122).

Let us have a look at an example. The excerpt in 1 occurs during a conversation about which books the two participants read to their children.

Example 1: a proffer project (SWDA sw\_0318)



1 A: Uh but I read you know there's this Doctor Seuss sleep book.  
 2 Have you ever seen that yet?  
 3 B: Sleep book no.  
 4 A: Yeah it's called a sleep book and uh you ought to get it. Uh  
 [...]

A tells<sup>6</sup> B that they are reading a particular Dr. Seuss book, followed by the question whether B knows that book. After B's answer in the negative, A re-informs B of the book's title at the beginning of line 4. So far, the exchange appears to be a simple sequence of providing and requesting information. In the second part of line 4, however, A states that B "ought to get" the book. Although it may not have been obvious initially, A's first turn can retrospectively be seen as being part of the bigger project of making a suggestion or recommendation. Line 1 is not merely an act of informing, but sets the scene by introducing the book. In line 2, A does not ask an innocent question; they are testing the waters to find out whether B already knows – or possibly even owns – the book. Only after B's response does A nominate, i.e. explicitly refer to, an FA. This example illustrates that a verbal action may serve multiple functions within a project. As Levinson (2013, 126) puts it, "it is doing something local, which governs its response types, but also part of something more global, which, as soon as it is recognizable, also plays a role in fashioning responses".

As stated at the beginning of this section, the present study employs the CA rather than the SAT notion of actions. On a practical level, this is because speaker intention is not directly accessible and therefore does not constitute a suitable

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<sup>6</sup> The terms used to describe actions in this section are not technical terms.

criterion for the identification of specific verbal actions. On a more theoretical level, the view that verbal actions are interactionally co-constructed is more appropriate for a study interesting in the *negotiation* of future actions and interpersonal relations.

## 2.2. Distinguishing proffer types

In the previous section, I asked what makes an utterance a specific verbal action, such as a request. The answers were, for SAT and CA, respectively:

- the speaker intends it to be a request; and
- the addressee interprets it as a request and the speaker does not object to that;

While we said that the latter approach is more practical and appropriate for the present thesis, it does not, on its own, help us distinguish different kinds of proffers. In other words, the presence of a refusal alone does not tell us whether what is being refused is a request or recommendation, for example. Thinking about types of proffers raises a number of questions. How can we differentiate between them? How many are there? And should we use them all in our analysis? In this section, I critically review a number of approaches to defining and categorising verbal actions, particularly proffers. We will once again begin with SAT and its felicity conditions, since the majority of studies examining specific kind of proffers (as well as refusals)

draw on this approach – at least in theory. After highlighting some problems regarding the SAT approach, I discuss attempts to establish broad, but practical, proffer categories for the analysis of naturally occurring data. In particular, we will look at how proffers can be categorised based on the nature of the future action being proffered.

As mentioned in the previous section, Austin (1962) did not systematically provide felicity conditions for individual verbal actions. What the author did do, however, is attempt to group them according to their general function. This effort was continued by fellow language philosopher John R. Searle (1969, 1975, 1976, 1985), who proposed the probably most influential revision of Austin's work. Not only did Searle adapt Austin's broad categorisation, but the former also proposed a more detailed list of criteria by means of which illocutionary forces could be distinguished.

Within Searlean SAT, verbal actions are grouped into five classes, two of which are relevant here. Proffers fall into two broad categories: commissives and directives (Searle 1976).<sup>7</sup> The former are verbal actions which commit the speaker to a future action, such as offering, threatening or promising. The latter, by contrast, are verbal actions by means of which the speaker attempts to get the hearer to perform some future action, such as ordering, begging or permitting. Searle (1976) postulates three conditions or dimensions which serve to categorise illocutionary forces into five classes: 'illocutionary point', 'direction of fit' and 'sincerity conditions'. The

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<sup>7</sup> Not all commissives are proffers, however, as we shall see shortly.

illocutionary point (Searle 1976, 2-3) generally determines the purpose of an action. There are five different illocutionary points – one per category. As stated above, the illocutionary point of a commissive is to commit oneself to doing something, that of a directive is to try to get someone else to do something. Next, the direction of fit is “always a consequence of the illocutionary point” and determines the relationship between the propositional content of an utterance and the world (Searle 1976, 3-4). There are two types of fit: words-to-world, i.e. making the words match the world, and world-to-words, i.e. getting the world to match the words.<sup>8</sup> Both commissives and directives have the latter direction of fit since they aim to achieve some change in the world in the form of a future action. Lastly, classes of verbal actions differ in terms of their sincerity conditions (Searle 1976, 4-5, although in Searle 1985 the notion of sincerity conditions has been revised and is no longer a key criterion for the distinction of class of illocutionary forces), which refer to the speaker’s psychological state or attitude towards the propositional content. The sincerity condition of commissives is intention, that of directives is want.

The fact that both these classes have the same direction of fit, i.e. are concerned with bringing about some future action, has discontented scholars since the beginning of SAT. Even Searle was unhappy with the commissive/directive distinction and would have liked to “show that they are really members of the same category”, considering their separation an “inelegant solution” (Searle 1976, 12). There is, however, a further issue with this distinction. Although Searle & Vanderveken (1985,

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<sup>8</sup> The five classes have either one, both or none of these directions of fit.

53) maintain that commissives have a "hearer based" and directives a "speaker based world to word direction of fit", Austin (1962, 155) already noted that some verbal actions simultaneously commit oneself and direct others. There are two kinds of such hybrid acts: first, actions such as offering or inviting constitute a give-and-take type situation (Hancher 1979). If I invite you to a party, I am trying to get you to attend but also committing myself to letting you into the house. Second, people can also proffer joint future actions in which speaker and hearer engage in the same activity, such as going for a drink together (Leech 2014, 137).

Even if we accept that there are hybrid actions in addition to 'pure' commissives and directives, we still have not tackled the issue of micro-level distinctions. In order to answer the questions of how many different kinds of illocutions there are and what distinguishes, say, requesting from begging, we have to take a look at how Austin and Searle arrived at their lists of verbal actions. Austin's (1962) approach was to go through a dictionary and select all 'performative verbs', i.e. verbs which, in the first person singular present indicative active form, make explicit the illocutionary force of a sentence. This yielded over 1000 verbs (Austin 1962, 149). However, Searle (1976, 2) emphasises that not every 'illocutionary verb' does indeed correspond to a distinct illocutionary force. Since forces are considered "natural kinds of uses of language" but verbs are language-specific, not all forces can be expressed by a verb in every language and sometimes multiple non-synonymous verbs express the same illocutionary force (Searle & Vanderveken 1985, 179). It appears, then, that we do not know how many different kinds of illocutionary forces there are.

Nevertheless, SAT-scholars have attempted to determine and define verbs which do indicate illocutionary forces. Even though their semantic analysis of English illocutionary verbs is by no means exhaustive, Searle & Vanderveken (1985, 192-205) list the following:

- commissives: commit, promise, threaten, vow, pledge, swear, accept, consent, refuse, offer, bid, assure, guarantee, warrant, contract, covenant and bet;
- directives: direct, request, ask, urge, tell, require, demand, command, order, forbid, prohibit, enjoin, permit, suggest, insist, warn, advise, recommend, beg, supplicate, entreat, beseech, implore and pray;

As mentioned earlier, not all commissives are proffers. In fact, we now see that Searlean SAT considers responses to proffers (i.e. accepting, consenting and refusing) commissives as well.<sup>9</sup> For now, we will focus on proffers. In addition to the illocutionary point and direction of fit, which they use to define the broad classes of illocutionary forces, Searle & Vanderveken (1985, 15-20) propose six conditions or dimensions according to which individual forces differ from one another. These are:

- degree of strength of the illocutionary point: this determines how strongly a

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<sup>9</sup> However, Barron (2003, 127) argues that offer refusals, specifically, are directives since “we are dealing with requests by the speaker for the hearer not to do a future act *x* which the hearer has offered to do”.

speaker is committing themselves to something (commissives) or attempting to get someone else to do something (directives). To suggest, for instance, is less strong than to insist.

- mode of achievement: specific conditions which must apply for certain illocutionary forces to be achieved. Commanding, for instance, can only be achieved if the speaker has, and invokes, authority over the hearer.
- propositional content conditions: restrict the content of illocutionary acts. In the case of directives and commissives, the content has to relate to a future action performed by the hearer or speaker, respectively. Furthermore, this dimension distinguishes e.g. promising from threatening on the basis of whether the content of the future action is to the hearers benefit or detriment.
- preparatory conditions: specific states of affairs which have to apply and which the speaker presupposes do apply in order to successfully perform an illocutionary act. Urging differs from requesting, for instance, in that the former "has the additional preparatory condition that the speaker has reasons for the course of action urged" (Searle & Vanderveken 1985, 200).
- sincerity conditions: psychological state expressed with an illocutionary act. The general states for directives and commissives are want and intention, respectively.
- degree of strength of the sincerity condition: intensity of wish or intention. To beseech or beg, for instance, has a greater degree of strength of the sincerity condition (i.e. want) than to request.

Within SAT, then, a vast range of different verbal (i.e. illocutionary) actions are distinguished by means of minute details and based on the analysis of illocutionary verbs. While this fine-grained differentiation may be useful in theory, researchers soon realised that it was not practical when working with naturally occurring data. Aijmer (1996, 134), for example, who applied SAT to corpus data, states “that it is difficult to know when we should assign a new illocutionary function to an indirect request and when a request is simply more tentative (polite), or direct, performed from a new perspective, etc.”

Rather than using a language’s full inventory of terms describing verbal actions, then, many linguists – both those inspired by SAT and those in the CA tradition – work with a small set of broader technical categories. Various criteria have been suggested for the division of proffer types, particularly by SAT-researchers who attempted to revise the Searlean taxonomy by means of commissive and directive sub-categories (see Vanparys 1996, 68-69 for a comparison of taxonomies and criticism of their arbitrariness). The subsequent review of such attempts will focus on two criteria pertaining to the content of the proffered action: the agent or benefactor of the future action, on the one hand, and its beneficiary, on the other. These two dimensions do not only constitute a practical approach to distinguishing proffers in naturally occurring data for the researcher; as we will see shortly, conversation-analytic studies have shown that participants in conversations, too, rely on these criteria when producing and interpreting proffers.



The criterion of agent/benefactor can already be found in Austin's and Searle's classifications. Rather than seeing, as Searle (1976, 2-3) does, the illocutionary point as the distinguishing factor between commissives and directives, we can differentiate them based on who is to perform the proffered FA. The additional recognition that there are commissive/directive hybrids further highlights that the agent(s) of the future action constitutes an important distinguishing factor. The question of who benefits from the proffered action, by contrast, entered the picture as a categorisation criterion a little later. Over the decades, various SAT scholars have proposed revisions of the Searlean taxonomy, frequently by introducing sub-categories. The beneficiary aspect is one among many that have been used by researchers, as illustrated in table 1.<sup>10</sup>

Table 1: comparison of sub-categorisations of directives, taken from Vanparys (1996, 69)

<b>Partridge (1982)</b> authoritatives dare-type request-type advice-type	<b>D'Andrade &amp; Wish (1985)</b> request for attention request for direct action request for commitment request for agreement  forceless vs. forceful	
<b>Bach &amp; Harnish (1979)</b> requestives questions requirements prohibitives permissives	<b>Allan (1986)</b> directives  authoritatives	requestives questions requirements prohibitives permissives

<sup>10</sup> Two further noteworthy criteria are: the nature of the future action (questions versus requestives and all of D'Andrade & Wish's (1985) distinctions); the power relation between speaker and hearer (e.g. authoritatives, permissives and prohibitives vs. requestive).

advisories		advisories
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Partridge (1982), Bach & Harnish (1979) and Allan (1986) distinguish ‘advisories’ or ‘advise-type’ directives from other types of directives. This is clearly based on the fact that advisories, in contrast to other directives, proffer actions which are for the hearer’s benefit. As Bach & Harnish (1979, 49) put it: “as for *advisories*, what the speaker expresses is not the desire that *h* do a certain action but the belief that doing it is a good idea, that it is in *h*’s interest”.

While the above categorisations are theory-based, top-down attempts at grouping proffers, researchers working with naturally occurring data, too, use the agent/benefactor and beneficiary criteria – and they do so more rigorously. Table 2 illustrates the similarities and differences between three applications of the agent/benefactor-beneficiary heuristic. All three scholars agree on distinct categories for future actions by the speaker for the hearer, by the hearer for the speaker and by the hearer for themselves. However, Leech (2014) differentiates two kinds of ‘s for h’ actions; Edmondson (1981) two kinds of ‘h for h’ actions. According to Leech (2014, 184-185), offers differ from undertakings in that the former give the hearer an option as to whether to accept or not. Similarly, Edmondson’s (1981, 143) licenses are acts of giving permission or making invitations, which, in contrast to suggests, require the speaker’s cooperation.

Table 2: comparison of categorisations employing the agent/benefactor-beneficiary heuristic

	Aijmer (1996)	Edmondson (1981)	Leech (2014)
<b>S for H</b>	Offer	Willing	Offer or undertaking
<b>H for S</b>	Requestive	Request	Request
<b>H for H</b>	Advisory	Suggest and license	Other-oriented suggestion
<b>S &amp; H for mutual benefit</b>		Propose	Suggestion

Both of these distinctions relate to the issue of power rather than the content of the proffered actions. Yet, the two authors do not draw on power in the same way.

Edmondson (1981) is concerned with speakers' factual relative power regarding some matter. In the case of licences, the speaker does in fact have authority with regard to whether the hearer may perform some future action. Leech (2014), on the other hand, distinguishes offers from undertakings based on the linguistic means by which a proffer is expressed, i.e the amount of power claimed by an utterance (e.g. 'I'll get you coffee'\* versus 'Would you like some coffee'?\*).

The comparison of these three classifications further illustrate that there are two possible interpretations of the agent/benefactor-beneficiary heuristic: one is based on the de-facto benefactor and beneficiary, the other on who is nominated as the agent. While both Edmondson (1981) and Leech (2014) include a category 's and h for mutual benefit' which captures the nature of the proffered action, Aijmer (1996, 135) rules out such a category; instead, the scholar analyses cases nominating both the speaker and the addressee as instances of "defocalization strategies or impersonalization device". Although it could be argued that Aijmer unjustly discounts proffers of genuinely mutually beneficial actions, this approach highlights that

researchers need to carefully distinguish the de-facto benefactor and beneficiaries of an action from how that future action is presented by the speaker. As Edmondson (1981, 142) notes, speakers can conceal the true beneficiary by means of the realisation strategy employed.

So far, we have seen that linguists frequently draw on the agent/benefactor and beneficiary criteria when they categorise verbal actions. However, the usefulness of these two dimensions goes beyond analytical practicality. Conversation analyst Couper-Kuhlen (2014) has shown that they are also important resources for action ascription, meaning that interactants broadly distinguish proffers based on who is meant to do something for whom. Analysing data from conversational American English, the author found that interactants differentiate between four kinds of proffers, presented in table 3.

Table 3: types and dimensions of proffers, taken from Couper-Kuhlen (2014, 634) <sup>11</sup>

	<b>Agent of future action</b>	<b>Beneficiary of future action</b>
<b>Proposal</b>	Self & other	Self & other
<b>Offer</b>	Self	Other
<b>Request</b>	Other	Self
<b>Suggestion</b>	Other	Other

As mentioned above, speakers can be transparent about these dimensions, or they can format proffers in ways which obscure the prospective beneficiary. To account for this difference, Clayman & Heritage (2014) propose a distinction between

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<sup>11</sup> Since requests and offers concern the transfer of goods or services (Couper-Kuhlen 2014, 632), strictly speaking, the proffered action often involves both speaker and hearer (cf. also Hancher 1979). The ‘agent’ column therefore more accurately describes the benefactor.

'benefactive stance', i.e. the linguistically conveyed distribution of cost and benefit, and the 'benefactive status', i.e. the nexus of

underlying conditions for the action, including such matters as whether a service will be rendered that is of actual benefit to its recipient, whether the performer of the service is able and willing to perform it, whether the cost to the performer is high or low, and whether the service is to be performed immediately (a 'proximal' service) or at some later time (a 'distal' service). (Clayman & Heritage 2014, 58)

Based on Couper-Kuhlen's (2014) work, Clayman & Heritage (2014) conducted a closer examination of the formation and ascription of requests and offers in terms of benefactives. They conclude that, usually, benefactive stance and status are congruent, "mak[ing] turn design a broadly reliable indicator of benefactive status" (Clayman & Heritage 2014, 83); in the case of incongruence, however, "it is benefactive status that trumps stance in action ascriptions" (Clayman & Heritage 2014, 82).

To conclude, researchers do not need to use a large inventory of illocutionary verbs and felicity conditions when distinguishing proffer types. Not only is the benefactive heuristic a practical tool when working with naturally occurring data, but it also is the key resources interactants draw on in the processes of action formation and ascription. For these reasons, proffer types are categorised based on benefactives in the subsequent analysis.

### 2.3. Beyond proffers: the structure of future-action negotiations

After focusing on one specific group of verbal actions in the previous section, we will now look at the big picture. In this section, I discuss the overall structure of FA negotiations based on previous CA research: how they begin and end as well as what can happen in-between. In particular, we will see that 'acceptance' and 'refusal' are not the only two possible verbal actions a speaker can produce in response to a proffer and that there are, in fact, two different kinds of refusals.

First, some key conversation-analytic notions have to be introduced. The main underlying assumption of CA is that social interaction, including language use, is structured (Stivers & Sidnell 2013, 2). One major research focus of the field is, consequently, how interactions are organised. Organisation can be found at various levels. One is the order of speakers' verbal actions, such as proffers and refusals, which is referred to as 'sequence organisation'. This refers to

the organization of courses of action enacted through turns-at-talk – coherent, orderly, meaningful successions or 'sequences' of actions[, which] are the vehicle for getting some activity accomplished. (Schegloff 2007, 2)

A further level relates to what is called 'preference organisation'. In the scholar's spring 1971 lectures, Sacks (1992, 410-415) first described this in the context of polar questions, stating that a speaker asking such a question can prefer (i.e. be looking for) either a yes or a no answer and can design their question accordingly. Preference organisation therefore manifests in two ways (Schegloff 2007, 62; see also Pomerantz

& Heritage 2013): first, at the level of sequence structure, some responding verbal actions are 'preferred' over others based on whether they further or accomplish the activity set in motion by the proffer. In the case of proffers, refusals are generally dispreferred because they block the proffer. Second, in terms of turn design, preferred and dispreferred responses are frequently designed in distinct ways, featuring specific characteristics that mark a turn as preferred or dispreferred.

Conversation analysts have identified various building blocks of interactions. Speakers' turns are made up of one or more units, called 'turn-constructual units' (henceforth TCUs) and first described by Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson (1974). These can consist of a clause, a phrase or a single lexical item and "constitutes a recognizable action in context" (Schegloff 2007, 4). At a larger level, the basic unit of organisation at the core of many sequences are 'adjacency pairs', first described by Sacks (1967a, b) and Schegloff (1968). Schegloff & Sacks (1973, 295-296) characterise them as follows:

- A) they consist of two turns;
- B) each turn is performed by different speakers;
- C) they are adjacently placed, i.e. the second turn immediate follows the first;
- D) the two turns are ordered in a certain way, i.e. the first utterance is a 'first pair part' (henceforth FPP) the second one a 'second pair part' (henceforth SPP);
- E) they form a specific 'pair-type', i.e. the FPP determines which kind of SPP should follow;

A request, for instance, can function as an FPP and 'makes relevant' or 'projects' (see e.g. Antaki & Widdicombe 1998, 4-5) specific kinds of SPPs. While some action types, such as refusals, can only be in second position, others can be used as both FPPs and SPPs, for example greetings (Schegloff 2007, 14). Importantly, the relationship between an FPP and an SPP operates both forwards and backwards (Schegloff 2007, 16): the FPP "makes relevant a limited set of possible [SPPs]"; the SPP subsequently "display[s] its speaker's understanding of the prior [turn]". While some FPPs project one specific type of SPP (e.g. greetings project a greeting in return), most make relevant two alternative types of responses (Schegloff 2007, 58-59). Proffers belong to that latter group, making relevant acceptances and refusals.

As mentioned earlier, refusals are considered dispreferred responses, whereas acceptances are preferred. Importantly, the CA notion of dis/preference does not relate to participants' preferences, in a psychological sense, but to structural properties (Schegloff 2007, 61-62). Alternative response types differ in terms of their alignment with the FPP; in general, acceptances align with proffers, whereas refusals constitute disalignments.<sup>12</sup> Dis/preference can furthermore manifest in the shape a turn takes and a number of features have been identified as characteristic for preferred and dispreferred responses, respectively (cf. e.g. Couper-Kuhlen 2012; Pomerantz 1984; Sacks 1987). Common features of dispreferred responses such as

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
<sup>12</sup> However, this is not always the case, as Schegloff (2007, 60) notes: "Some offers ('Would you like the last piece of pie?') may more cogently be understood as preferring rejections (and may be termed 'pro forma' accordingly)."



refusals include delays – either by postponing the dispreferred response within the SPP or by delaying the SPP altogether –, mitigation, elaboration (including accounts and excuses), turn-initial ‘default’ preferred responses and pro-forma agreements, inter-turn gaps or turn-initial hedges. These are not mandatory, however. As Schegloff (2007: 63) points out: “not all the features occur on each occasion, and it can happen that a preferred SPP is delivered with some feature characteristic of dispreferred turn types and vice versa”.

Although acceptances and refusals are the two responses made relevant by a proffer, i.e. the action types which complete an adjacency pair started by a proffer, they are not the only kinds of verbal actions which can follow a proffer. Recipients of proffers have two further options: they can delay the SPP – whether that be an acceptance or a refusal – to a later turn or they can replace it entirely. Delay happens when a speaker, instead of producing an SPP, launches what is called an ‘insert expansion’. As previously noted, adjacency pairs are the basic units of sequences. Yet, such ‘base pairs’ (Schegloff 2017), e.g. a proffer-refusal pair, can be expanded. As the name suggests, insert expansions are inserted into another adjacency pair (see figure 1). Such expansions a) consist of additional adjacency pairs, b) form insert sequences and c) are inserted between the base FPP and the base SPP (Schegloff 2007, 97).

Figure 1: base pair and insert expansion, adapted from Schegloff (2007, 26)



Insert sequences postpone the SPP "to address matters which need to be dealt with in order to enable the doing of the base second pair part" (Schegloff 2007, 99). Two types of insertion sequences can be distinguished (Schegloff 2007, 100-109; Stivers 2013, 194-196):

- post-first insert sequences: backward-looking repair sequences, ostensibly addressing issues regarding hearing or understanding;
- pre-second insert sequences: forward-looking, "ostensibly to establish the resources necessary to implement the second pair part which is pending" (Schegloff 2007, 106);

Although these insertion sequences can be followed by an acceptance, the postponement of the SPP projects a dispreferred response, e.g. a refusal. As previously mentioned, delay is one characteristic feature of dispreferred responses. While post-first 'repair sequences' may be employed in order to resolve genuine issues regarding hearing or understanding, they are frequently "harbingers of dispreferred base second pair parts" (Schegloff 2007, 102). Pre-second insert sequences in future-action negotiations, by contrast, often aim at eliciting additional information related to the proffered action. The potential presence of insert expansions means that we have to carefully distinguish between sequences, projects and actions. As Levinson (2013, 127) puts it, "[s]equences are in the service of

projects: they implement them, but projects are not reducible to sequences". In the case of future-action negotiations, speakers may launch insert sequences as part of a refusal project. Utterances can therefore have dual functions, doing some local job (e.g. asking for more information regarding a proffered FA) while simultaneously serving a purpose in the greater scheme of a project (e.g. drawing attention to potential obstacles in the way of accepting and projecting an upcoming refusal).

In addition to postponing the base SPP, Schegloff (2007) argues, speakers can replace it. This means that, "before (or without) responding with an SPP to the just completed FPP, the same FPP (or a closely related modification of it) is redirected to the one who just did it" (Schegloff 2007, 17). Such an action is called a 'counter'. In the case of future-action negotiations, the addressee of a proffer can counter it with a proffer of their own. Counters therefore "reverse the direction of the sequence and its flow; they reverse the direction of constraint" (Schegloff 2007, 17). 'reversing the direction of constraint' here means that the recipient of the FPP, instead of performing an SPP which conforms to the constraints made relevant by the FPP, directs those same constraints back at the speaker of the FPP, who is now put in the position of accepting or refusing (Schegloff 2007, 19-21).

Overall, there are therefore three ways – structurally speaking – in which a participant can (verbally) response to a proffer: a) with an SPP (preferred or dispreferred), b) by launching an insertion sequence or c) by countering. In addition to the matter of the direction of the sequence and the kinds of responses they make relevant, I argue that these three options can also be differentiated in terms of

dis/alignment – although not in the sense in which it is used by Schegloff (2007). As was discussed earlier, SPPs either align with or disalign from the proffer, resulting in an acceptance or refusal, respectively. However, we can also look at whether utterances within a future action negotiation align with or disalign from the future action being discussed. Consequently, we can say that an SPP also expresses dis/alignment with regard to a future action. I henceforth use these terms in this latter sense. This allows us to differentiate between SPPs, counters and insertion sequences launched by refusers. The latter express neither alignment nor disalignment but are often refusal-implicating, serving for instance to delay the subsequent refusal. FPPs and counters, by contrast, do convey dis/alignment. Both dispreferred SPPs and counters disalign from the previously proffered FPP. However, the latter do not only express disalignment; they also align with some alternative future action which is not simply the negation of the original proffered FA. Edmondson (1981, 88) conceptualises the difference between counters and dispreferred SPPs, which the author calls ‘contras’, as follows: “a contra counts interactionally as an attempt on the part of [its producer] to cause his [sic] conversational partner to withdraw the preceding [FPP]”. Counters, by contrast, are “attempt[s] by a speaker to cause the content of a preceding [turn] to be amended, qualified, or withdrawn<sup>13</sup> in the light of the content of the [c]ounter” (Edmondson 1981, 89). In other words, contras/dispreferred SPPs reject a proffered FA; counters

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<sup>13</sup> The ‘withdrawal’ of the previous turn is confusingly stated as a goal of both the contra and the counter by Edmondson.

reject one proffered FA and put forward a different one.<sup>14</sup> Despite these differences, both kinds of responses to a proffer express a clear stance towards the future action being negotiated. Because they constitute disalignments, I consider both of them refusals – albeit different kinds – and will henceforth use the term ‘refusal’ to generally refer to utterances which express disalignment from an FA (alignment with some alternative action being optional). Together with refusers’ alignment-neutral and refusal-implicating utterances such as insert expansions, contras and counters constitute forms of proffer resistance.<sup>15</sup>


Up to this point, we have examined the structure of future action negotiations from the initial proffer to the addressee’s first refusal (see figure 2). Contras can constitute the end of the negotiation, but do not have to. Counters, on the other hand, can make relevant at least one further turn by the initial profferer, if the counter constitutes a request, offer, proposal or suggestions. There is one counter type, however, for which this does not apply: counter intendings. As we shall see in the analysis part of the present thesis, refusers can put forward a countering FA to be performed by themselves, for themselves. Such an FA does generally not require the initial proffer’s approval in my data and therefore does not make relevant an acceptance or refusal. Nevertheless, I consider such intendings counters in terms of their dual dis/aligning nature. In fact, we will see that counter intendings can also be resisted by initial profferers, although not refused in the way other proffer types can.

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<sup>14</sup> As we will see throughout the subsequent analysis, counters can range from minor adjustments of, for instance, the time of an FA to a complete reversal of the benefactives.

<sup>15</sup> We will encounter other alignment-neutral responses later.

Figure 2: responses to initial proffer



Next, we will look at how negotiations may continue after a contra or counter, respectively. Let us begin with the former. Additional turns occurring after an SPP are called 'post-expansions' and they are particularly frequent after dispreferred SPPs (Schegloff 2007, 117). Such sequences can fulfil a variety of functions and can be divided into two broad groups: minimal and non-minimal post-expansions (Schegloff 2007, 117-168). So called minimal post-expansions are "designed not to project any further within-sequence talk beyond [themselves]" and may function as 'sequence-closing thirds' (Schegloff 2007, 118). In other words, they signal that the initial profferer accepts the refusal – or at least does not wish to oppose it at this point. Non-minimal post-expansions, by contrast, differ "in that the turn following [the SPP] is itself a first pair part, and thereby projects at least one further turn – its responsive second pair part" (Schegloff 2007, 149). By projecting a further turn rather than closing the sequence, non-minimal post-expansions frequently express dissatisfaction with the preceding (dispreferred) SPP, i.e. refusal.

Schegloff (2007) distinguishes three types of non-minimal post-expansions which are of particular interest for the present thesis. The first one is the 'disagreement-

implicated other-initiated repair' (Schegloff 2007, 151-155). Put simply, these are adjacency pairs which problematize aspect of the preceding SPP. Just like the previously discussed insertion repair sequences, they may be triggered by genuine issues regarding hearing or understanding, but they often hint at upcoming opposition. The second type takes the form of an overt rejection or challenge of the SPP (Schegloff 2007, 159-161), for instance by means of criticism. Such rejections may be accepted or themselves challenged by the addressee. Finally, non-minimal post-expansions can consist of 'reworkings' of the FPP in light of the SPP (Schegloff 2007, 162-168). Reworkings can range from repetitions of the FPP to modification and inducements and may, once again, be accepted or rejected by the addressee. Since the rejection of a rejection can further be rejected (and so on), participants can produce sequences with multiple post-expansions.

Schegloff's (2007) distinction between rejections and reworkings is not without problems, however. The interaction reproduced in example 2 is discussed by the author in relation to reworkings.

#### Example 2: adapted from Schegloff (2007: 165)

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2 Ava:   FPP   Maybe you wanna come downtuh school see what
3         the new place looks like,
4         (0.5)
5 Bee:   SPP   Yih may:be. (N)a:[h, b't I hadn' -]
6 Ava:   FPP           [You c'n come innoo] a cla:ss
7         with m[e.
8 Bee:   SPP   [I haven' thought about that la(h)tely hh huh
9         eh-[huh!
10 Ava:  FPP   [why donch[a I mean you won' haftuh do any]thing,
11 Bee:  FPPins      [ .hh You know I wu-u-u          ] I wonder
12         if Do:nna went back tuh school i'z
13         I wz curious tuh know,
```

Schegloff (2007, 166) argues that Ava's utterances in lines 6 and 10 both constitute reworkings; the scholar considers the former a modification of the initial proffer in line 1 and the latter a repetition of said modification. Nevertheless, if we look at these verbal actions in terms of dis/alignment again, we can see that they are not the same. Ava's initial proffer expresses alignment with a specific future action, let us call it 'FA1'. In line 6, however, the action that is put forward is not FA1. Instead of only visiting the campus, Bee is now meant to sit in on a class (FA2). Here, Ava disaligns from the future action currently under negotiation (FA1) and aligns with an alternative action (FA2). In line 10, then, Ava re-aligns with FA2. This demonstrates that the contra/counter distinction can be applied not only to refusals but also responses to refusals. Indeed, Edmondson's (1981) own approach takes into account sequences of multiple contras and/or counters. I henceforth refer to profferers' contras/repetitions which express re-alignment with a previously proffered FA as a re-proffer. If a profferer amends the FA, however, I call this a counter like in the case of refusers' counters.

Repair expansion sequences and sequence-closing thirds can also be distinguished from re-proffers in terms of dis/alignment. Like their cousins in insertion-position, the FPP of a repair expansion does not express dis/alignment but may be re-proffer-implicating. Sequence-closing thirds, by contrast, can explicitly accept the refusal, thereby disaligning from the action under negotiation. As we shall see in the subsequent analysis, however, they can also be more ambiguous and alignment-neutral, acknowledging (aspects of) the refusal rather than accepting it.




These can be heard as insufficiently strong and may lead to further disaligning talk from the refuser. In addition, profferers can back-track from such weak (ostensible) closing thirds and produce a further re-proffer.

As we have seen so far, the addressee of a proffer has a range of options for their response and the initial profferer, in turn, can react to that response in a variety of ways. Figure 3 maps the possible structure of FA negotiations from the initial proffer to responses to the initial refusal. Insertion sequences after the initial proffer are optional and refusal-implicating, but do not express disalignment. The recipient of the proffer can either produce an acceptance or a refusal; proffers which are immediately accepted are outside the scope of the present thesis. In terms of refusals, there are two options: a contra or a counter. Contrasts do not project any further turns from the initial profferer, but they may respond nonetheless. Expansion repair sequences do not express dis/alignment, but hint at further opposition by the initial profferer. Closing thirds often signal that the speaker will not pursue the issue any further and can constitute the end of the negotiation. Alternatively, the profferer can resist the refusal with either a re-proffer or a counter. Both options make relevant a further response from the initial refuser. If the initial refuser produces a counter at any point, the tables are turned (except in the case of intendings) and the initial profferer now has to accept or refuse. The response options to a counter are the same as those to a proffer.<sup>16</sup>

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
<sup>16</sup> The recipient of a proffer or counter may, of course, also choose not to respond at all, but this means they refuse to even negotiate.

Figure 3: structure of future action negotiations



With the exception of closing thirds, at the point of the profferer's second turn we have a sequence of at least three turns in which the participants express mutual opposition – or, at least, a lack of agreement. This constitutes what conversation analysts refer to as a 'conflict sequence'. Such a sequence is defined as consisting of at least three turns "in which participants mutually challenge one another" (Norricks & Spitz 2008, 1663; cf. also e.g. Gruber 1998; Millar, Rogers & Bavelas 1984; Schiffrin 1985). At the upper end, there is no limit to the length of a conflict sequence. It "continues as long as the participants insist on their own standpoints" (Norricks & Spitz 2008, 1664). Four main kinds of conflict sequence conclusions are distinguished in the literature (see e.g. Deutsch 1973; Levya & Furth 1986; Messmer 2003; Stein & Bernas 1997; Vuchinich 1990) as summarised by Norrick & Spitz (2008, 1668-1669) and illustrated in figure 4.

Figure 4: conflict sequence outcomes, taken from Norrick &amp; Spitz (2008, 1669)



The authors point out that only reaching a compromise constitutes an 'equitable resolution'. In the context of FA negotiations, this would involve a counter all parties can accept. In the case of stand-offs and withdrawals, no agreement is reached; the former is characterised by a – frequently abrupt – topic change, whereas the latter ends with one party leaving the interaction. Since these do not resolve the conflict, it may resurface again, leading to a new conflict sequence. Finally, submission involves one participant giving up their initial position and accepting that of their co-participant. This means that one party reverses their dis/alignment: from alignment to disalignment in the case of acceptances of refusals or from disalignment to alignment in the case of proffer/counter acceptances. In addition to these frequently described conclusions, Norrick & Spitz (2008) propose that humour can be used to end conflict sequences. At any point in the negotiation, one of the participants can produce a humour attempt, which can be responded to in a number of ways (Norrick & Spitz 2008, 1669-1670): if it is rejected, the conflict spiral simply continues.

Acceptance of the attempt – either in the form of responding laughter or by means of a reciprocal humorous utterance –, by contrast, shifts the interaction. This can lead to a topic change (stand-off) or, alternatively, to a continued discussion of the topic at hand, albeit with the tension having been defused.

The structure of future action negotiations presented so far involves only two parties. However, additional interactants can participate, and this participation can take one of two forms. First, a proffer may be addressed at more than one person. In such cases, there are multiple potential refusers. Second, interactions can involve third-party interventions from someone who is not directly affected by the potential FA. According to Vuchinich (1990), dominant third-party intervention in the context of conflict sequences leads to a special type of submission. Instead of the initial profferer or the refuser submitting to the respective other, “both submit to [a] third party”, commonly someone who is in a position of power over the other participants (Vuchinich 1990, 125). This type of intervention can take the form of either a demand to cease the conflict sequence or of the third party’s siding with one of the negotiators, thereby exerting power and ending the conflict in favour of one participant (Vuchinich 1990, 125-126). As we will see in the subsequent analysis, however, third-party intervention does not have to be dominant. Rather, once a negotiation is underway between two people, third parties can insert themselves with their own opinions or side with one interactant without exerting power.

### 3. Action form(ation)s

The previous chapter introduced the various kinds of verbal actions we can find within an FA negotiation with regard to their sequential position, the job(s) they do and how they orient to the FA(s) being negotiated. Now, we will look at some of these actions in more detail, focusing on the forms they can take. Researchers working within the SAT tradition, in particular, have been interested not just in creating an inventory of the various linguistic means by which a request, for instance, can be made; they often also categorise these forms. In this chapter, I discuss such classifications. We will see that in/directness is a key criterion across the field but that there is disagreement regarding what actually constitutes in/directness. In addition, the literature review shows that some scholars draw on aspects related to the deontic facet in order to categorise proffer formats – if not necessarily doing so systematically. We will begin with initial and re-proffers in section 3.1. before moving on to refusals and other non-acceptances in section 3.2.

#### 3.1. Proffers

Proffers – in particular requests – have been studied extensively with regard to the forms they can take. Inventories and categorisations of such forms are more common within the SAT-based Pragmatic tradition than CA. This section compares a number of those taxonomies and highlights some theoretical and methodological

limitations. We will see that the distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' proffers is adopted across the Pragmatics literature. This has often lead to a bias in favour of more direct over less direct forms. In addition, most studies focus only on initial proffers without examining re-proffers. Although some scholars (e.g. Leech 2014; Markkanen 1985; Trosberg 1995) do also draw on aspects related to deontics (obligation and optionality) for (parts of) their classifications, epistemics and affect are generally not considered to be key resources for making a proffer. CA studies, by contrast, focus less on inventories of formats and more on the sequential unfolding of negotiations. As we shall see at the end of this section, they primarily provide insights into what might prompt a re-proffer.

Of the different proffer types, requests<sup>17</sup> are the by far most extensively studied one within SAT-based research. Various inventories and taxonomies of forms or 'realisation strategies' have been proposed over the decades both for individual kinds of proffers and for larger clusters of proffers. A comparison of such classifications quickly reveals that, as Aijmer (1996, 131) points out, "there is [...] little agreement about how many strategies there are and which they are". One thing they tend to have in common, however, is that a basic distinction is made between direct and indirect strategies. This is due to the influence of SAT, in particular Searle's (1975) account of 'indirect speech acts'. 'Direct' speech acts are "those in which the speaker utters a sentence and means exactly and literally what he [sic] says" (Searle 1975, 59). The use of performative verbs is a typical way of uttering a direct speech

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<sup>17</sup> In the Searlean sense.

act, but different syntactic categories, too, are considered to inherently express specific illocutionary forces: declaratives express assertive force, imperatives and interrogatives directive force. (cf. e.g. Leech 1983, 114-115; Searle 1968, 411-412). Yet, proffers are not always performed 'directly' by means of performatives or imperatives. As Searle (1975, 60) points out, an illocutionary act can be performed indirectly "by way of performing another":

For example, a speaker may utter the sentence *I want you to do it* by way of requesting the hearer to do something. The utterance is incidentally meant as a statement, but it is also meant primarily as a request, a request made by way of making a statement. (Searle 1975, 59)

Searle (1975) categorised (invented) sentences which conventionally express indirect directives or commissives and found that most groups relate to felicity conditions. In addition to sentences concerning the agent's ability and intention, as well as the beneficiary's desire, indirect proffers can also refer to the agent's willingness – which is not a felicity condition, but the FA happening is, of course, dependent on it – and reasons for the proffered action (see table 4).

Table 4: conventional ways of expressing indirect directives and commissives, adapted from Searle (1975)

	<b>Directives</b>	<b>Commissives</b>
Preparatory condition	Statement that or question whether H is able to do A; e.g. 'Can you reach the salt?', 'You could be a little more quiet.'	Statement that or question whether - S is able to do A; e.g. 'Can I help you?' - H wants S to do A; e.g. 'Would you rather I came on Tuesday?'

Propositional content condition	Statement that or question whether H will do A; e.g. 'Aren't you going to eat your cereal?'	Statement that or question whether S will do A; e.g. 'Shall I give you the money now?'
Sincerity condition	Statement that S wants H to do A; e.g. 'I hope you'll do it.'	Statement that S intends to do A; e.g. 'I intend to do it for you.'
Agent's willingness	Question whether H is willing to do A; e.g. 'Would you mind not making so much noise?'	Statement that S is willing to do A; e.g. 'I want to be of any help I can.'
Reasons for a	Statements that or questions whether there are reasons for doing A; e.g. 'You ought to be more polite to your mother.', 'Why don't you try it just once?'	Statements that or questions whether there are reasons for doing A; e.g. 'I think I had better leave you alone.'

Searle's (1975) work on indirect proffers and the distinction between direct and indirect verbal actions had a huge impact on later SAT-based research on the forms of proffers. The, to this date, most widely used taxonomy of request strategies (see e.g. Ahangari & Shoghli 2011; Al-Marrani & Sazalie 2010; Dubinina & Malamud 2017; Kuhi & Jadidi 2012; Thuruvaan & Yunus 2017; Yu 2011), proposed by Blum-Kulka & Olshtain (1984) as part of the cross-cultural study of speech act realization patterns (CCSARP) project, follows Searle's distinction. Yet, Blum-Kulka & Olshtain (1984, 201) further differentiate between conventionally and non-conventionally indirect strategies. They define these three broad levels of directness as follows:

- direct or explicit: utterance is syntactically marked as a request by means of



e.g. imperatives or performatives;

- conventionally indirect: utterances which refer to preconditions, the forms of which are conventionalised;
- non-conventionally indirect: open ended in form, can make "reference to object or element needed for the implementation of the [future] act" or rely on contextual clues.

Overall, Blum-Kulka & Olshtain's (1984) classification consists of nine sub-levels of strategies on a scale from most to least direct, as illustrated in table 5. Strategy types 1 to 5 are considered direct, types 6 and 7 as conventionally indirect and the last two as non-conventionally indirect (Blum-Kulka 1989). The inclusion of types 4 and 5 in the direct rather than the conventionally indirect category is unusual given that they "derive their relative transparency [...] from conventions regarding the semantic contents which, by social convention, count as potential requests" (Blum-Kulka 1987, 134). Scope stating, in particular, is listed as an indirect realisation by Searle (1975).

Table 5: types of request strategies, adapted from Blum-Kulka &amp; Olshtain (1984)

<b>1 Mood derivable</b>
The grammatical mood of the verb in the utterance marks its illocutionary force as a request. 'Leave me alone'
<b>2 Explicit performatives</b>
The illocutionary force of the utterance is explicitly named by the speakers. 'Aveksex lo lehaxnot kan et haoto (I'm asking you not to park the car here)'
<b>3 Hedged performative</b>
Utterances embedding the naming of the illocutionary force. 'Tisma, hayiti roca levakes mimxa setak- dim et haharcaa selxa besavua (I would like you to give your lecture a week earlier)'
<b>4 Locution derivable</b>
The illocutionary point is directly derivable from the semantic meaning of the locution. 'Madam, you'll have to move your car'
<b>5 Scope stating</b>
The utterance expresses the speaker's intentions, desire or feeling vis-à-vis the fact that the hearer do X. 'I really wish you'd stop bothering me'
<b>6 Language specific suggestory formula</b>
The sentence contains a suggestion to X. 'Why don't you get lost?' 'How about cleaning up?'
<b>7 Reference to preparatory conditions</b>
Utterance contains reference to preparatory conditions (e.g. ability or willingness, the possibility of the act being performed) as conventionalized in any specific language. 'Could you clear up the kitchen, please?'
<b>8 Strong hints</b>
Utterance contains partial reference to object or to elements needed for the implementation of the act (directly pragmatically implying the act). 'You've left this kitchen in a right mess'
<b>9 Mild hints</b>
Utterances that make no reference to the request proper (or any of its elements) but are interpretable through the context as requests (indirectly pragmatically implying the act). 'I'm a nun (in response to the persistent boy)'

Regarding the rationale behind the particular order of types within the three broad

classes, Blum-Kulka (1987, 133) states that

[t]he scale is based on postulating degrees of illocutionary transparency. In other words, the concept of (in)directness, when applied to speech acts, is taken to equal the relative length of the inferential path needed to arrive at an utterance's illocutionary point. Thus, the more 'indirect' the mode of realization, the higher will be the interpretive demands on the hearer.

That the "length of the inferential path" and, with it, the order of strategies, is based on the authors' own intuitions is clear from the results of Blum-Kulka's (1987) perception study. The author asked 24 native speakers of American English to rate five<sup>18</sup> examples for each strategy type regarding their directness on a nine-point scale (1 being most direct) and found that only strategies at the upper and lower ends of the scale matched Blum-Kulka & Olshtain's (1984) order.

As table 6 shows, mood derivables were rated most direct, whereas participants consider hints distinctly less direct than all other types. Discussing the results, Blum-Kulka (1987, 138) states that lower ratings for performatives and hedged performatives than for obligation and want statements were expected

since we assumed that overt marking of requestive force by mood or [illocutionary verbs] plays a more important role in motivating directness than the semantic device used. The results suggest that actually the two factors are equally important.

Regarding suggestory formulations being, contrary to expectations, rated less direct

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<sup>18</sup> Each one included a description of a different situation, resulting in participants rating one example representing each strategy type for each of the 5 situations.

than query preparatory examples, the author speculates that the former are not characterised by strong syntactic or semantic conventions. If we look at the six central strategies, however, we notice how close together their ratings are: ranging from a mean of 1.9 to 2.8, the difference between them is less than a full point on the scale. This suggests that a) the boundary between direct and conventionally indirect strategies is fuzzy; and b) that in/directness may not be the best classification criterion. The arbitrariness of assigning levels of in/directness is further evidenced by the fact that, while some scholars (e.g. Economidou-Kogetsidis 2013; Félix-Brasdefer 2012; Le Pair 1996; Pan 2012) follow Blum-Kulka & House (1989) in coding want and need statements as direct realisations, others code the former as conventionally indirect (e.g. Rinnert & Kobayashi 1999; Trosborg 1995) and the latter as non-conventionally indirect (e.g. Rinnert & Kobayashi 1999; Weizman 1993). Nevertheless, Blum-Kulka (1987, 141-143) concludes that the distinction between direct, conventionally direct and non-conventionally indirect strategies should remain. Indeed, the CCSARP taxonomy and variations of it are applied to this day.

Table 6: mean directness ratings for nine request types in five situations, adapted from Blum-Kulka (1987, 137)

Strategy type	Category mean
Mood derivable	1.6
Obligation statements	1.9
Performatives	2.5
Want statements	2.5
Hedged performatives	2.6
Query preparatory	2.7
Suggestory	2.8
Strong hints	5.12

Mild hints	6.40
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Distinguishing different directness levels– and disagreement about these levels – has implications for quantitative examinations. Biesenbach-Lucas (2006), for instance, compares the impact of the two ways of coding want and need statements on the overall frequencies of direct and non/-conventionally indirect strategies. A more significant consequence is that there is a general bias in favour of more direct formats over less direct ones. Overall, researchers using this coding scheme conclude that conventionally indirect strategies are the most frequent ones. Blum-Kulka & House (1989) found that the most common form used by British English speakers is questioning the addressee's ability ('can/could you'). This is generally supported by later studies looking at British and American English (e.g. Aslan 2017; Economidou-Koetsidis 2013; Félix-Brasdefer 2012; Leopold 2015, Yazdanfar & Bonyadi 2016), all of which attest that references to the preparatory conditions are among the top three most frequent strategies. Other commonly found realisations are mood derivables and want (i.e. scope) statements. What is noticeable, however, is the absence of hints (with the exception of Félix-Brasdefer 2012, but here hints only make up 7%). This is a result of the CCSARP coding practice. Blum-Kulka & Olshtain (1984) and researchers following them distinguish between the 'head act' and 'adjuncts' to the head act, illustrated in example 3. According to the authors, utterance A (reference to willingness) constitutes the head act, whereas utterance B (strong hint) is an adjunct.

Example 3: head act and adjunct, taken from (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984, 200)

utterance A	utterance B
A: Would you mind cleaning up the kitchen? / You left it in a mess last night.	
B: OK, I'll clean up.	

The authors state that, while indirect realisations can function as requests when they occur on their own, the strong hint in this example “serve[s] only to strengthen or support an act realized by other verbal means[.] Thus, utterance B is redundant from a strictly illocutionary point of view” (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 198, 200). However, the decision to consider utterance A rather than B the head act is based solely on their respective directness levels. Multiple heads are only possible if an utterance contains a sequence of two or more realisations “at the same level of explicitness” (Blum-Kulka & House 1989, 275). Yet, considering that head acts are defined as “the minimal unit which can realize a request” (Blum-Kulka & House 1989, 275), there is no reason why less direct realisations should not be considered head act as well. It is consequently important to remember that reported frequencies in studies taking the CCSARP approach are often frequencies of the head act realisation only. Any utterances which are less direct than the head act are considered ‘adjuncts’ or ‘supporting moves’. Economidou-Kogetsidis (2013), Leopold (2015) and Félix-Brasdefer (2012), for instance, do not look at adjuncts at all, therefore potentially overlooking hints co-occurring with more direct realisations. Aslan (2017), by contrast, did examine adjuncts and found that 73% (n = 66) of supportive moves were ‘grounders’. These are adjuncts which expresses a reason for the request

(House & Kasper, 1981, 169). In other words, they are utterances which would be considered hints if they occurred on their own. The most common head act realisation found by Aslan (2017), references to the preparatory conditions, occur 44 times. This means there are one third more 'grounders' than preparatory strategies in their data, but they were not counted as requests proper.

Overall, then, many studies in this research tradition show a bias in favour of more direct utterances due to SAT's focus on 'illocutionary transparency'. Less direct utterances are treated as second-class realisations if they occur with more direct ones. As Culpeper & Archer (2008, 79) point out, "the assumed primacy of the head act compared with support moves (as implied by the labels 'head' and 'support'), may not be correct, particularly if we are concerned with explicitness as opposed to directness in Searle's sense." In the context of FA negotiations, in particular, such a distinction does not seem useful for two reasons: first, if proffers frequently consist of multiple TCUs of, in SAT terms, different directness levels, this is in itself a significant sequential feature. Second, since I view verbal actions as interactionally co-constructed rather than based on an illocutionary force which must be decoded by the hearer, in/directness is not a reasonable criterion for what counts as, e.g., a request proper.

Nevertheless, so called supportive moves raise an interesting question regarding which formats can – on their own – be heard by a recipient as a proffer. I previously defined proffers as verbal actions which are hearable as putting forward and aligning with a future action. We also saw that a turn – for instance one which implements a

proffer – can consist of one or more TCUs. However, a look at the various kinds of supporting moves found in the literature shows that they are quite varied in nature. The CCSARP coding scheme (Blum-Kulka & House 1989; Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984; adapted from Edmondson 1981; Edmondson & House 1981; House & Kasper 1981) includes the following supporting moves for requests:

- preparator: prepares the addressee for the upcoming request, e.g. by means of utterances such as 'I'd like to ask you for a favour'\* or by checking the addressee's availability;
- getting a pre-commitment: e.g. 'Can you do me a favour?';
- disarmer: reference to potential objections the addressee may have;
- promise of reward
- imposition minimiser: e.g. 'but only if you have time';
- insult
- threat
- moraliser: reference to (perceived) moral principles;

Of these, at least the first two make it absolutely clear that the speaker is embarking on a proffer project – even if they have not nominated the FA yet. Insults, by contrast, are not limited to FA negotiations. Whether such an utterance is hearable on its own as aligning with an FA may depend on the situational and interactional context.

Various researchers have furthermore proposed additional adjuncts such as:



- expanders or reiterations: repetitions or modification of words and phrases or use of synonyms (Achiba 2003, 137; Sifianou 1999, 188-189);
- 'please': often used as a politeness marker, but also "found in emotionally loaded situations" (Sifianou 1999: 189);
- option givers (Achiba 2003, 139-140) and considerations (Schauer 2006, 162): similar to the above imposition minimiser;
- smalltalk (Schauer 2006, 162) and discourse-oriented moves (Woodfield & Economidou-Kogetsidis 2010, 92);
- appreciators (Schauer 2006, 162) and giving thanks (Pan 2012);

As previously stated, the present study does not categorise utterances based on their in/directness or distinguish between head acts and supportive moves. Instead, the subsequent analysis looks at which formats can be heard (and treated) as aligning with an FA – even if the FA is not nominated. As we will see, a turn which implements a (re-)proffer can consist of multiple aligning TCUs. It may also contain TCUs which would not, on their own, be hearable as proffers but which nevertheless contribute to the proffer project. Both kinds of TCU will be examined in part II.

As previously mentioned, there is some disagreement about which request formats are direct and which are (conventionally) indirect. A further point of contention concerns what actually constitutes indirectness. Unlike Blum-Kulka (1987, 133), Leech (1983, 2014) sees a close connection between in/directness and (lack of)

optionality. The author states that “the degree of indirectness [of an utterance] correlates with the degree to which [the addressee] is allowed the option of not performing the intended action” (Leech 1983, 109). Distinguishing between conventional indirect declaratives and interrogatives, Leech (2014, 148-156) argues that the latter overall express a greater degree of optionality, but that there is also an optionality gradient within the former group. The author ranks conventionally indirect strategies from least to most optional as follows:

- prediction statements with the modal ‘will’
- strong obligation statements, e.g. with ‘must’ or ‘have to’
- weak obligation statements, e.g. with ‘should’ or ‘need’
- volition statements, e.g. with ‘want’
- ability/possibility statements, e.g. with ‘can’

Although the author does not employ the notion of deontic stances, that is clearly one underlying factor of this ordering as well as the distinction between declarative and interrogative formats. Talking about strong obligation statements, for instance, Leech (2014, 149) explains that these can express “the personal authority of the speaker”. Interrogatives, by contrast, “are making a show of consulting [the addressee]: indeed, they are apparently handing over the decision to [the addressee]” (Leech 2014, 152). Within the CCSARP scheme, the difference between interrogatives and declaratives is addressed only briefly by stating that the former can function as

'syntactic downgraders', which minimise the imposition of the request (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984).

Leech is not the only scholar who addresses the notion of optionality. Markkanen (1985), for instance, groups 'conventional expressions of directives' (i.e. excluding hints) based on syntactic categories. Again, imperatives are considered the most 'direct' way of performing directives (Markkanen 1985, 35). Although the author does not explicitly state so, they furthermore appear to consider interrogatives generally less direct than declaratives. What seems to motivate Markkanen's (1985) distinction is the realisation that querying the addressee's ability, willingness or obligation is fundamentally different from asserting it. Trosborg (1995, 205), by contrast, splits conventionally indirect request realisations into a hearer-oriented group (interrogatives concerning ability, willingness, permission and suggestory formulae) and a speaker-oriented group (statements of wish, desire and need). This distinction is based not just on in/directness, but also on whether the strategies convey authority or optionality: "requests that are 'hearer-oriented' convey that the hearer is in a position of control to decide whether or not to comply with the request" (Trosborg 1995, 197). In their discussion of obligation and necessity statements, the author furthermore states that they are direct by virtue of being assertive: "the speaker exerts either his/her own authority, or he/she refers to some authority outside the speaker (institutions, brute facts, etc.)" (Trosborg 1995, 204). In a similar vein, Aijmer (1996, 140) states that "[t]he most direct or assertive requests are those expressing the speaker's wishes directly, without considering the hearer. Requests are

tentative if the hearer's wishes and options are considered."

While all of the above scholars focus on requests, Schneider (2003) and Barron (2005) categorise suggestion and/or offer formats – and they, too, make a distinction which appears to relate to optionality at first glance. Looking at both 'suggestions'<sup>19</sup> and offers, Schneider (2003) distinguishes between 'preference questions' and 'execution questions'. The former, the scholar argues, highlight the conditional nature of offers and suggestions by asking about the addressee's wanting the proffered action to happen (e.g. 'would you like...' or 'do you want...'; Schneider 2003, 183). However, Schneider (2003, 194) attributes this conditionality to the reference "to the antecedent of the condition on which the future action depends" – i.e. the preparatory felicity condition of the hearer's want – rather than (just) the sentence type. With regard to execution questions such as 'can I...' or 'shall we...', by contrast, Schneider (2003, 183) states that these emphasise the commissive aspect of offers and the joint action involved in suggestions. In other words, the author's distinction is not actually about whether the format expresses optionality or not. This becomes even more obvious in Barron's (2005) adapted classification of conventionalised offer formats. As table 7 shows, the preference and execution strategies include not only interrogatives but also declarative constructions.

Table 7: Barron's (2005, 152-153) offer strategies and super-strategies

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<sup>19</sup> Schneider (2003) uses the term to refer to proffers of FAs to be performed by both the speaker and the addressee at a cost to and for the benefit of both. In the present study, these would be considered proposals.

Preference strategies	Execution strategies	Directive strategies
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Question future act of hearer</li> <li>• Question desire</li> <li>• Question need</li> <li>• State need</li> <li>• Suggestory formula</li> <li>• Question wish</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Request permission</li> <li>• State future act of speaker</li> <li>• Question future act of speaker</li> <li>• State ability</li> <li>• Question ability</li> <li>• State wish</li> <li>• State speaker's obligation</li> <li>• State willingness</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Imperative</li> <li>• State permission</li> </ul>

Overall, in/directness remains a popular distinguishing feature for proffer formats despite scholars' disagreements regarding what actually constitutes in/directness and where the boundaries between direct and conventionally indirect lie. In addition, aspects related to the question of deontic authority are often discussed in relation to in/directness: obligation, optionality and conditionality. Nevertheless, these are usually not applied consistently. As I argue in part II of the present thesis, not all formats said to express a lack of optionality by the above scholars do in fact make a claim of the speaker's deontic authority: obligation may, for instance, stem from an external deontic source (cf. Leech 2014, 152; Trosborg 1995, 204); stating that an FA ought to be done is a claim of knowledge rather than power; and references to the speaker's want/wish, claim affective (i.e. desire) not deontic, rights.

While proffer realisations are a popular research subject within the SAT tradition, they are understudied from a CA perspective. Heritage (2012, 2) points out that the systematic account of utterance forms has largely been left to SAT researchers, partially due to "a certain skittishness toward the topic following the impasses faced by the Searlean program of speech-act analysis"; in particular, the

question how an utterances can serve multiple functions – e.g. being a question and an offer simultaneously – was troublesome to SAT researchers and was dealt with, as we saw earlier, in terms of indirect illocutionary acts. Heritage (2012, 2) holds that these “paradoxes and difficulties encountered by speech-act analysis undoubtedly had a chilling effect on ca’s approach to first actions”. As a consequence, proffers, specifically,

were primarily addressed by considering second or subsequent responses to them. Their character as actions was either treated as transparent or became largely a matter of ad hoc stipulation “in the midst” of analysis and not a systematic topic of empirical research. Thus, for many of the more significant first pair-parts, action was examined through the lens of reaction, and the consideration of sequential position took precedence over examination of the composition of the turns themselves (Goffman, 1983). By the 1980s, all the main players had effectively abandoned the question of first actions and their formation [...] in the aftermath, the question of first actions and their constitution became effectively a dormant topic. (Heritage 2012, 2-3)

Nevertheless, the last decade has seen renewed interest in action formation and turn design. A key study is Couper-Kuhlen’s (2014) paper investigating both the formation and ascription of proffer types. Analysing data from conversational American English, the author found that a small number of lexico-syntactic patterns are used to realise the majority of proffers and that different action types ‘prefer’<sup>20</sup> different formats (see table 8). Although some constructions may occasionally be used for proffers for which they are not ‘preferred’, ten of the thirteen formats meet the scholar’s (random) 8% mark for the realisation of just one specific action type.

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<sup>20</sup> Not in the conversation-analytic sense.

Only imperatives, negative imperatives and the form 'why don't you X' are frequently used for multiple kinds of proffers.

Regarding the question which specific features of these formats make them effective for particular kinds of proffers, Couper-Kuhlen (2014, 640-641)

hypothesises:

It is perhaps not irrelevant that the crucial aspects of the formats identified here – subjecthood (you or me as agent?), interrogativity (are you asking me or telling me?), conditionality (is this a hypothetical or not?), modality (ability, willingness or necessity?) and imperativity (is non-compliance an option or not?) – all make themselves apparent, at least in English, at the outset of the turn.

Table 8: most frequent ( $\geq 8\%$ ) formats per proffer type, adapted from Couper-Kuhlen (2014, 638)

	Request	Offer	Suggestion	Proposal
You should/ought to/have to/'d better X			✓	
I/we will X				✓
I would X			✓	
I/we can/could X				✓
I/we want/wish/need X	✓			
If you want/wish/need X		✓		
(you ) X-imp Don't (you) X	✓	✓	✓	
Will/would you X	✓			
Can/could you X	✓			
Do you need/want X		✓		
Why don't you X			✓	✓
Why don't I/we X				✓

Once again, obligation and optionality seem to be of importance. As we will see in the subsequent analysis, interrogativity, conditionality, modality and imperativity all

contribute to the stance expressed by utterances within FA negotiations.

Before moving on to refusals, there is one more point I want to address. The above studies focus mostly on initial refusals; how these differ from re-proffers and how re-proffers relate to the prior turn is often not explored within the SAT tradition. Nevertheless, there are some exceptions. Barron (2005, 150), for instance, found that, in over 50% of cases, participants produced re-offers after an initial refusal. Although the author does not provide much detail regarding the forms of these turns, Barron (2005, 151) states that they "are to a large extent ritual since they are realized via pragmatic routines, such as *are you sure?*, *if you're sure?* and *(are you) positive?*". These are not formats we find in an initial offer. Kasper (2006a), too, proposes a 'discursive pragmatic' approach, which applies CA to the study of speech acts. Kasper's (2006b) study of multiple requests for information examines both initial requests (and their internal structure) as well as re-requests in the context of oral proficiency interviews. The author found that re-requests occur in two different environments and follow certain patterns:

- In response to the requestee's initiation of repair, conventionally indirect initial forms are replaced by direct re-requests;
- As a repair initiation if the initial answer was not satisfactory the re-request either stays conventionally indirect but is less mitigated or is replaced by a direct re-request;

In the specific case of requests for information, then, re-proffers "are occasioned by the candidate's problems in understanding the first request, or by responses that



diverge from the interviewer's agenda" (Kasper 2006b, 343). The increase of directness and/or decrease of mitigation therefore aims at resolving a misunderstanding.

Conversation analysts, too, have provided us with insights into how and when re-proffers are produced. Labov & Fanshel (1977), for instance, distinguish various ways in which requesters can continue the negotiation after the refuser's first response. However, the authors' discussion remains very general, pointing out that, in addition to accepting a refusal, the profferer can reinstate the request, mitigate it or aggravate it. Davidson (1984) looked at sequences containing re-proffers<sup>21</sup> in response to 'potential' or 'actual' refusals. Being primarily interested in what triggers a re-proffer rather than how they are designed, the scholar merely states that re-proffers can take a wide range of forms. However, subsequent proffers are produced in light of potential "inadequacies of that initial formulation that may be adversely affecting its acceptability" (Davidson 1984, 104). In other words, re-proffers are designed to make the FA more attractive to the addressee. Lindström, Lindholm & Laury (2016, 15), by contrast, found that certain responses to requests "indicate uptake without commitment, rather than acceptance"; such an "at best rather weak compliance" can motivate a proffer to produce subsequent 'accounts', i.e. reasons for the proffer.<sup>22</sup> This matches Stevanovic & Peräkylä's (2012) finding that participants produce accounts following refuser's 'mock' information-receipts in joint action negotiations.

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<sup>21</sup> Subsequent versions of 'offers', 'invitations', 'requests' and 'proposals'; these categories are not defined, however.

<sup>22</sup> See the subsequent section for a discussion of such weak response tokens.

Interestingly, the authors associate accounting with a lack of deontic authority:

To exercise authority is not to have to offer reasons, but to be obeyed or believed merely because of one's authority. Hence, claiming deontic authority means that the speaker announces her decision without accounting for it—without alluding to the possibility that the decisions might, in the end, be contingent on the recipient. And on the other hand, offering an account for what is announced, involves a downgrading of the authority claim (Stevanovic & Peräkylä 2012, 311);

As I demonstrate in the subsequent analysis, however, accounts do not only signal a lack of deontic authority – they do, in fact, often claim epistemic or affective rights. That profferers' turns can express affective stances has been shown by Couper-Kuhlen (2012). Looking at request and proposal sequences, the author found that "there is a specific sequential location for displays of affect [...], namely in response to turns which flatly reject the [proffer]" (Couper-Kuhlen 2012, 457). Such displays can express either disappointment or irritation. Although the study examines prosodic features of "turn[s] ostensibly claiming not to contest the matter further" (Couper-Kuhlen 2012, 461), the analysis in part II shows that negative affect can also be expressed linguistically and that such affective stances can constitute re-proffers.

### **3.2. Refusals and other non-acceptances**

Refusals have received considerable attention within the field of Pragmatics (e.g. Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz 1990; Bella 2014; Chen, Ye & Zhang 1995; Félix-

Brasdefer 2003, 2008; Guo 2012; Kwon 2004). Like proffers, they have been extensively examined from a SAT-based Pragmatics perspective. The present section reviews the most widely used classifications of refusal formats and discusses some subsequently proposed alterations. In addition, we will look at some of the (limited) CA literature on proffer response forms.

The most influential study to date was conducted by Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz (1990). Using discourse completion tests (DCTs), they elicit refusals of four types of speech acts: requests, invitations, offers and suggestions. Based on their findings, the scholars established a taxonomy of refusal strategies or 'semantic formulae' (table 9). As with many of the previously discussed classifications of proffer strategies, the SAT influence is obvious; the taxonomy distinguishes between direct and indirect strategies, and furthermore includes adjuncts to refusals. Interestingly, however, the authors consider statements of negative ability or willingness direct realisations, alongside performatives and 'no'. This stands in contrast with the body of research on proffers, which considers references to preparatory conditions conventionally indirect. Instead, no distinction is made between conventionally and non-conventionally indirect refusal realisation. A closer look at the group of indirect refusal strategies reveals that they tend to be highly context-dependent and have no conventions of form. Since refusals are responding actions, reference to the FA, for instance, is less imperative than in the case of (initial) proffers. A further difference to many proffer studies is that Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz (1990) do not distinguish between head acts and supporting moves on the basis of in/directness; instead, they

look at sequences of strategies within a turn. Their 'adjuncts' are units which are not hearable as refusals on their own.<sup>23</sup> In addition, it is noteworthy that the classification includes different types of refusals or non-acceptances. The majority of strategies constitute *contras*, i.e. utterances which express (only) disalignment. Category D 'statements of alternative', by contrast, refers to counters. In addition, avoidance strategies (K) such as silence, repetition of part of the request or topic switch are refusal-implicating and alignment-neutral.

Both Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz's (1990) classification and their study design are still used in Pragmatics research today. Many scholars base their analysis of refusals on the above taxonomy (e.g. Allami & Naeimi 2011; Babai Shishavan & Sharifian 2016; Bella 2014; Félix-Brasdefer 2003, 2008; Guo 2012; Lee 2013; Nikmehr & Jahedi 2014; Sattar, Lah & Suleiman 2011; Siebold & Busch 2015) and/or replicate (modified versions of) their DCTs (e.g. Abed 2011; Chang 2011; Chen, Ye & Zhang 1995; Hashemian 2012; Kwon 2004; Yamagashira 2001). Only few modifications or additions to the classification have been suggested over the years. Frequently, differences in classifications are due to merging or splitting of categories. Newly added strategies include, for instance, requesting information about the proffered action (Félix-Brasdefer 2003), return invitations/suggestions (i.e. a different type of alternative/counter) (Babai Shishavan & Sharifian 2016) and sarcasm (Salazar Campillo 2009). Salazar Campillo (2009, 144), in particular, aims for a classification

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<sup>23</sup> Although pause fillers might be equally refusal-implicating as some of the avoidance strategies in category K.

which "[accounts] for a discourse perspective on the study of refusal behaviour". Yet, most of the included categories are identical to, or merged versions of Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz (1990). A significant re-organisation based on discourse features is not obvious. This may be due to the fact that Salazar Campillo's (2009) paper is purely theoretical in nature, i.e. the proposed taxonomy is neither based nor tested on data.

Table 9: classification of refusal strategies (Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz 1990, 71-73)

I. Direct
A. Performative (e.g., "I refuse")
B. Nonperformative statement
1. "No"
2. Negative willingness/ability ("I can't." "I won't." "I don't think so.")
II. Indirect
A. Statement of regret (e.g., "I'm sorry..." "I feel terrible...")
B. Wish (e.g. "I wish I could help you...")
C. Excuse, reason, explanation (e.g., "My children will be home that night."; "I have a headache...")
D. Statement of alternative
1. I can do X instead of Y (e.g., "I'd rather..." "I'd prefer...")
2. Why don't you do X instead of Y (e.g., "Why don't you ask someone else?")
E. Set condition for future or past acceptance (e.g., "If you had asked me earlier, I would have...")
F. Promise of future acceptance (e.g., "I'll do it next time"; "I promise I'll..." or "Next time I'll..." – using "will" of promise or "promise")
G. Statement of principle (e.g., "I never do business with friends.")
H. Statement of philosophy (e.g., "One can't be too careful.")
I. Attempt to dissuade interlocutor
1. threat or statement of negative consequences to the requester (e.g., "I won't be any fun tonight" to refuse an invitation)
2. guilt trip (e.g., waitress to customers who want to sit a while: "I can't make a living off people who just order coffee.")
3. criticize the request/requester, etc. (statement of negative feeling or opinion); insult/attack (e.g., "Who do you think you are?"; "That's a terrible idea!")
4. request for help, empathy, and assistance by dropping or holding the request.
5. let interlocutor off the hook
6. self defense (e.g., "I'm trying my best." "I'm doing all I can do." "I no do nutting wrong.")
J. Acceptance that functions as a refusal
1. unspecific or indefinite reply
2. lack of enthusiasm
K. Avoidance
1. nonverbal
a. silence
b. hesitation
c. do nothing
d. physic departure
2. verbal
a. topic switch
b. joke
c. repetition of part of request, etc. (e.g., "Monday?")
d. postponement (e.g., I'll think about it.)
e. hedging (e.g., "Gee, I don't know." "I'm not sure.")
Adjuncts to refusals
1. Statement of positive opinion/ feeling or a ("that's a good idea"; "I'd love to...")
2. Statement of empathy (e.g., "I realize you are in a difficult situation.")
3. Pause fillers (e.g., "uhh"; "well"; "oh"; "uhm")
4. Gratitude/appreciation

Conversation-analytic examinations of refusals are, by contrast, rare. Only few researchers have looked at how speakers form their refusals in interactions and, to my knowledge, there are no studies dedicated to the action ascription of refusals. This is particularly surprising if we consider that refusals are frequently studied within a range of Pragmatics sub-disciplines. In a monograph on refusals in English and

Spanish, Félix-Brasdefer (2008, 46-50) provides a summary of research on refusals, listing 51 studies with a variety of foci. Of those 51, only eight studies examine naturally occurring data – and not all of them from a CA perspective. Moreover, in their very brief mention of CA with regards to dispreferred responses, Félix-Brasdefer (2008, 51) refers to research on disagreements rather than refusals. Although the author's review is by no means exhaustive, it paints a picture of refusals being comparatively understudied within CA.

A rare exception is Wootton's (1981) research on parent-child request negotiations. While the scholar's findings confirm that refusals are generally designed as dispreferred actions – a fact further supported by many SAT-based studies, which report that accounts, i.e. Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz's (1990) category 'excuses, reasons, and explanations', are (one of) the most commonly used strategies in English (cf. also Al-Shboul & Huwari 2016; Babai Shishavan & Sharifian 2016; Eshreth 2015; Félix-Brasdefer 2008; Guo 2012; Kwon 2004; Morkus 2014; Nikmehr & Jahedi 2014) – Wootton (1981, 72) found one exception to this rule: in longer negotiations, parents sometimes want "to make it clear to the child that further appeal is not worthwhile". This is achieved by "sequential moves toward more negative forms" and/or the absence of dispreferred features (Wootton 1981, 75). In extreme cases, parents may also employ topic shifts or non-verbal strategies (i.e. leaving the room or turning away) after explicit refusals as a means to end the negotiation.

One particular type of proffer response regarding which conversation analysts

have provided us with interesting insights are utterances which, at first glance, look like acceptances. This diverse range of small tokens have been labelled (and grouped in) a variety of ways: back-channelling tokens (Gardner 1997; 1998; Tottie 1991), minimal responses (Fishman 1978; Stubbe, 1998; Zimmerman & West 1975), 'discourse markers' (Schiffrin 1987) or listener responses (O'Keefee & Adolphs 2008). Research on tokens such as 'mm-hmm' and 'yeah' generally focuses on their role as indicators that the person uttering them is paying attention to and following what the other person is saying. Gardner (1998), for example, distinguishes five types of back-channelling based on their functions: acknowledgment, brief agreements and continuers ('yeah', 'mm-hm'), news-marking items ('oh, really'), evaluative items ('wow', 'how terrible') and clarification requests (i.e. repair sequence initiations). In the context of proffers, however, such utterances often do something different. Drawing on Pomerantz' (1975) discussion of 'weak agreements' in dis/agreement sequences, Davidson (1984, 112) argues that tokens such as 'hm', 'uh-huh' and 'yeah' may be treated as refusal-implicating. In a similar vein, Gardner (1997, 23) considers 'mm' a "weak acknowledgement token" and states that 'yeah' is "stronger, more aligning/agreeing". The same function/interpretation applies to certain discourse markers (e.g. 'well') and hesitation markers ('uh' and 'uhm') (Davidson 1984, 110; cf. also Pomerantz 1975 and Jefferson 1974, respectively).

Overall, SAT-based studies of refusals are less diverse than those of proffers with regard to the categorisation of formats. Once again, however, this body of research is more extensive than conversation-analytic examinations. The taxonomies



discussed in this and the previous section served as a starting point for the analysis presented in part II of the present thesis. As with proffers, I argue that different refusal can express deontic, epistemic and affective stances.

## 4. Negotiating the interpersonal

As briefly outlined in the introduction, the present thesis examines the negotiation of interpersonal relations in the context of FA negotiations. This means it looks at how participants in such interactions do relational work: “the work invested by individuals in the construction, maintenance, reproduction and transformation of interpersonal relationships among those engaged in social practice” (Locher & Watts 2008, 96).

The research area examining these relational aspects has been referred to as Interpersonal Pragmatics for only a decade (Locher & Graham 2010). Yet, it is much older than that – albeit with a narrower focus –, originating from politeness research of the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century. While the field has expanded since then, one core notion has remained firmly at its centre: ‘face’. The first section of the present chapter (4.1.) provides an overview of different conceptions of face and how it relates to the interpersonal, including but not limited to im/politeness. In section 4.2., I discuss the connection between SAT and early im/politeness theories and why, consequently, in/directness and face have been closely associated in much research on proffers and refusals. Finally, section 4.3. brings us back to the deontic, epistemic and affective interpersonal facets. I review CA work which examines the role of these aspects for FA negotiations and outline how I conceive of the connection between the three facets, on the one hand, and face as well as interpersonal relations, on the other.

### 4.1. Face and the interpersonal

The notion of face was first proposed by Goffman (1967, 5) and refers to "the positive social value a person effectively claims for [themselves] by the line others assume [they have] taken during a particular contact. Face is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes". The first – and most influential – scholars employing the concept for the study of politeness were Brown & Levinson (1978; 1987). In contrast to Goffman, they conceptualise face as wants and propose a typology of faces. More specifically, they postulate that a person's face consists of two aspects (Brown & Levinson 1987, 61):

- negative face: the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction - i.e. to freedom of action and freedom from imposition;
- positive face: the positive consistent self-image or 'personality' (crucially including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) claimed by interactants;

On the basis of Grice's (1975) conversational maxims and cooperative principle (CP), Brown & Levinson (1987) set out to account for why speakers deviate from the most efficient way of communicating; face maintenance, they argue, is the answer. Given that speakers have face, that face is vulnerable and can be damaged, and that speakers are, as Brown & Levinson (1987, 58-61) assume, rational agents, "it will in general be to the mutual interest of two [interactants] to maintain each other's face". Politeness is therefore conceptualised as strategic face-maintaining and face-saving

behaviour.

Over the decades, different scholars have defined politeness – and face – in different ways, however. (For overviews of the development of im/politeness research and Interpersonal Pragmatics, see for instance Culpeper & Terkourafi 2017; Kádár & Haugh 2013; Mills 2011; 2017; Sifianou 2010; Watts 2010). Brown & Levinson's (1987) approach is part of what Culpeper (2011b) refers to as the first wave of politeness research.<sup>24</sup> Overall, the first wave represents a pragmatic view of politeness which is focused on politeness maxims or strategy. Here, politeness is primarily seen as means of minimising conflict and maintaining harmonious social relations (Kasper 1990, 194). The second wave of politeness research, by contrast, represents a socio-cultural view of politeness and expresses severe criticism of the former group. One of the main points of contention concern the claims of universality of first wave theories. Brown & Levinson (1987), in particular, were criticised for their negative/positive face distinction (Watts 2010, 47-48) and its Anglo-centrism (Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2013, 1; cf. also Félix-Brasdefer 2008, 15-20; Kasper 1990, 194; O'Driscoll 1996, 29). Ide and colleagues (Hill et al. 1986; Ide 1989) furthermore adapted Brown & Levinson's (1987) conception of politeness by adding the culture-specific notion of discernment. Locher (2004, 60) considers this what Fraser (1990) referred to as the 'social norms' view of politeness:

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<sup>24</sup> Other influential proponents of this group are Lakoff (1973) and Leech (1983), although neither of the two uses the notion of face.

Each society has a particular set of social norms consisting of more or less explicit rules that prescribe a certain behaviour a state of affairs, or a way of thinking in a context. A positive evaluation (politeness) arises when an action is in congruence with the norm, a negative evaluation (impoliteness = rudeness) when action is to the contrary. (Fraser 1990: 220)

A further issue – and development – concerns the distinction between first-order and second-order politeness. After criticising the general lack or vagueness of definitions of ‘politeness’ in the field, Watts, Ide & Ehlich (2005 [1992], 2-3) called for scholars to be more transparent about what they mean by the term. They state that they:

take first-order politeness to correspond to the various ways in which polite behaviour is perceived and talked about by members of socio-cultural groups. It encompasses, in other words, common sense notions of politeness. Second-order politeness, on the other hand, is a theoretical construct, a term within a theory of social behaviour and language use. (Watts, Ide & Ehlich 2005 [1992], 3)

In a similar vein, Eelen (2001, 76-86) distinguishes between emic and etic politeness. Emic notions are ‘insider’, bottom-up concepts, acquired through socialisation whereas etic notions are ‘outsider’ descriptions and categories. However, unlike first-order politeness, the emic aspect includes not only lay people’s evaluations of what is ‘polite’ – i.e. meta-pragmatic comments – but also their practices, i.e. ‘politeness-in-action’ (Eelen 2021, 32-35, 76-78).

The questions of universality and how researchers define politeness are related issues for Watts (2005, xiv-xix); the scholar asks how politeness can be (claimed to be) a universal phenomenon if scholars are not even clear – or in agreement about –

what politeness is. As a consequence, Watts (2005, xvii) considers first-wave theories 'modernist' views of politeness which attempt "to promote [universals of human behaviour] to the scientific status of objects of knowledge lying outside individual experience". Postmodernist approaches, by contrast, tend to take into consideration the historical and cultural relativity of the phenomena under investigation (Watts 2005, xxii-xxvii). Nevertheless, Watts (2005, xviii) does not "deny that there is something universal about politeness", namely face (Watts 2005, xviii-xix). Not, however, Brown & Levinson's (1987) notion of face.

Over the years, various adaptations of the positive/negative face distinction have been proposed. Lim & Bowers (1991), for instance, differentiates two aspects of positive face: the want to be included (fellowship face) and the want that one's abilities be respected (competence face). Spencer-Oatey (2000), by contrast, has proposed three aspects of face: a) quality face, the desire to have one's skills, abilities and other characteristics to be evaluated positively; b) identity face, the desire to have one's social or group roles and identities acknowledged; and c) relational face, which relates to the "self in relationship with others" (Spencer-Oatey 2008, 14). Many other researchers have called for a reframing of the two aspects into connectedness/belonging/involvement, on the one hand, and individuality/separation/independence, on the other (e.g. Arundale 1993; 2006; O'Driscoll 1996; 2007; Scollon & Acolon 2001; cf. also O'Driscoll 2017, 105-107). While there is no consensus regarding how many aspects to face there are and what they pertain to, the early 2000s generally saw researchers advocating for a more

Goffmanian understanding of face – and a broader framework for studying interpersonal effects. Scholars began looking at ‘rapport management’, ‘relational work’ or ‘face-constituting theory’ more broadly; these approaches “include the study of politeness phenomena but are not restricted to them” (Locher 2012, 44). As a consequence, the field also saw a rise in research on impoliteness and rudeness (Bousfield 2008; 2010; Bousfield & Locher 2008; Culpeper 2008; 2010; 2011; Locher & Bousfield 2008; Schnurr, Marra & Holmes 2008).<sup>25</sup> As Locher (2012, 44) summarises, studies on aggressive (verbal) behaviour “point out that a theoretical approach to the interpersonal aspect of language in use should really be able to discuss face-maintaining, as well as face-enhancing and face-damaging behaviour”.

Many postmodernist studies of interpersonal aspects can be described as taking a discursive approach. This involves a move away from the study of first-order im/politeness as defined by Watts and towards a focus on what Eelen calls ‘[im/]politeness-in-action’. In a review of discursive approaches to im/politeness, Mills (2011) uses the term broadly synonymously with post-modernist approaches. The author states that, although “many of the theorists [referred to in the] essay do not themselves consider their work or analytical approach to be post-modern or discourse-oriented” (Mills 2011, 26), researchers such as Arundale (2010), Terkourafi (2001; 2005a; 2007), Locher (2006; also Locher & Watts 2006; 2007), Watts (2003), Bousfield (2008) and Christie (2007) share certain theoretical and methodological

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<sup>25</sup> While there are earlier studies on impoliteness (e.g., Culpeper 1996; Kienpointner 1997; Lachenicht 1980), these are methodologically and theoretically closer to first-wave approaches to politeness, establishing general impoliteness strategies in analogy to Brown & Levinson (1987).

views which distinguishes them from first-wave research. In general Mills (2011) argues, they agree that im/politeness or other interpersonal effects are not residing in utterance, they focus on the relationship between the individual and society, and they consider politeness and other evaluations/norms as co-constructed.

Both Culpeper (2011b) and Kádár & Haugh (2013), by contrast, point out that not all second-wave approaches are necessarily discursive. The former, for instance, draws a distinction between discursive, relational and frame-based (Terkourafi 2001; 2002; 2003; 2005a; 2005b) approaches, although these are not mutually exclusive. Relational approaches are such as the aforementioned investigations of 'relational work' (Locher & Watts 2005), 'relational practice' (Holmes & Schnurr 2005) or 'rapport management' (Spencer-Oatey 2000; 2005). As Kádár & Haugh (2013, 50) point out, "[s]ome of these approaches have remained more closely aligned with the underlying theoretical commitments of first-wave approaches to politeness". Research by Locher, Watts or Arundale, by contrast, can be considered both relational and discursive (Kádár & Haugh 2013, 50; Culpeper 2011b).

A consequence of the generally broadened perspective of interpersonal phenomena and a return to a more Goffmanian notion of face is that face(-work) has come to be seen by some researchers as relating to more than just im/politeness. One particular emphasis has been on the connection between face and identity (Gao 2009; Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2013; Joseph 2013; Kozin 2009; Labben 2017; Marquez-Reiter, Ganchenko & Charalambiou 2016; Ruhi 2009; Spencer-Oatey 2007; 2009). Indeed, this link is already pointed out in Goffman's (1967, 5) definition of face



as an “image of self”. However, face is not purely individualistic but is intrinsically relational. A person’s face is “delineated in terms of approved social attributes” (Goffman 1967, 5). In other words, it is subject to other people’s evaluation and consequently depends on social relations. As Arundale (2006, 202) puts it, “face is an interpreting that a participant forms regarding ‘persons-in-relationship-to-other-persons’”. Locher (2012, 46) summarises the connection between face, identity and interpersonal relations as follows:

‘face’ is linked to identity construction and relational work, which allows us to read it as a metaphor which can be culturally filled at need. Face is here seen as a shorthand for the process of dynamically negotiating relationships in situ. Maintaining, enhancing or challenging face are fundamental activities that interactants engage in during their lives as social beings when negotiating relationships. We claim that relationships are dynamically constructed in interaction by the participants in specific, situated contexts.

If we conceive of face is relational, it furthermore has to be interactional.

Conceptualizing face as a relational phenomenon, together with framing communication in terms of an interactional achievement model (Arundale, 2008), positions one to conceptualize face as endogenous in talk-in-interaction, that is, as a conjoint, social outcome of two individual’s reciprocal affording and constraining of one another’s interpretations of a given utterance. (Arundale 2010, 2087-2088)

Just like social actions and meaning more generally, face is not a fixed entity which exists outside of social interactions. Instead, “it emerges through interaction as a joint accomplishment of interlocutors” (Haugh 2009, 6).

Following these arguments, I consider face both a relational and interactional phenomenon. Face is interactionally co-constructed by participants as a matter of who they are in relation to one another. Face is therefore central to both areas of interpersonal pragmatics: interpersonal relations, on the one hand, and interpersonal attitudes, emotions and evaluations, on the other (cf. section 1.1.). As previously mentioned, the present study is interested in both these aspects. With regard to the latter, however, the subsequent analysis does not attempt to identify evaluations such as 'polite', 'rude' or 'impolite'. Instead, I demonstrate that participants treat each other's (linguistic) behaviour as either interpersonally problematic or unproblematic by (not) enhancing, maintaining or aggravating each other's face.

## **4.2. Im/politeness and speech act theory**

The notion of face has been central to SAT-based examinations of proffers and refusals ever since Brown & Levinson (1978; 1987) proposed their theory of politeness. As mentioned in the previous section, they grounded their approach on Grice's work. There is, however, a second theoretical foundation, namely (Searlean) Speech Act Theory. At its core, the face-saving approach to politeness is a speech-act theoretical indirectness approach (see e.g. Held 2005, 140; Mills 2011, 21-22). According to Brown & Levinson (1987, 65), some speech acts intrinsically threaten face, i.e. they are 'face-threatening acts', because they "run contrary to the face wants of the addressee and/or of the speaker". The prevalence of what Searle (1975) calls

indirect speech acts, as a deviation from Grice's (1975) CP, is seen as motivated by a need to mitigate the face threat of such acts. Proffers – including offers – are considered threats to the addressee's negative face by virtue of their "indicating (potentially) that the speaker (S) does not intend to avoid impeding H's freedom of action" (Brown & Levinson 1987, 65). While refusals are not discussed by the authors specifically, they appear to fall under threats to the addressee's positive face. This included offers, which the authors state constitute an impediment with regard to imposing a choice (acceptance or refusal) onto the addressee. These threats include verbal action which "[indicate] (potentially) that the speaker does not care about the addressee's feelings, wants, etc. — that in some important respect he [sic] doesn't want H's wants", for instance by expressing disapproval or disagreement (Brown & Levinson 1987, 66).

Leech (1983, 104-105), by contrast, distinguishes between four types of verbal actions based on how a speaker's 'illocutionary goal' relates to the "social goal of establishing and maintaining comity". Most proffers, the scholar argues, are 'competitive' acts, meaning the illocutionary goal competes with the social one. Such acts are considered intrinsically 'discourteous' and require mitigation in order to "reduce the discourse implicit in the competition between what *s* wants to achieve, and what is 'good manners'". Once again, refusals (at least of requests) are not discussed, but they also appear to fall into this category. What is interesting, however, is that 'offering' and 'inviting' are considered 'convivial' rather than competitive actions by Leech (1983). Here, the illocutionary goal is seen as coinciding with the

social goal and convivial acts are considered intrinsically 'courteous'. (This might also apply to offer refusals).

Both Brown & Levinson (1987) and Leech (1980) postulate formulae to determine the weightiness of a face-threatening act and the amount of politeness or 'tact' required for the performance of a proffer, respectively. The former argue that the weightiness of a face-threat can be calculated by adding values for a) the social distance between speaker and addressee, b) the amount of power the addressee has over the speaker and c) the degree of imposition involved in the verbal action (Brown & Levinson 1987, 76). Consequently, as the calculated weightiness increases, "a rational agent would tend to choose to use the higher-number strategy" (Brown & Levinson 1987, 83) on the following five-step scale (Brown & Levinson 1987, 69):

- 1) do face-threatening act on record, without redressive action;
- 2) do face-threatening act on record, with redress to positive face;
- 3) do face-threatening act on record, with redress to negative face;
- 4) do face-threatening act off record;
- 5) do not do the face-threatening act;

Redress to positive or negative face can be achieved in various ways and Brown & Levinson (1987) propose a number of positive and negative politeness strategies, summarised in figures 5 and 6, respectively.

Figure 5: positive politeness strategies (Brown & Levinson 1987, 102)

Positive politeness Do FTA on record plus redress to: H wants [S wants H's wants]	Claim 'common ground' (S & H ∈ {A} who want {X})	Convey 'X is admirable, interesting'	1. Notice, attend to H (their interests, wants, needs, goals)
		Claim in-group membership with H	2. Exaggerate (interest, approval, sympathy with H)
		Claim common $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{point of view} \\ \text{opinions} \\ \text{attitudes} \\ \text{knowledge} \\ \text{empathy} \end{array} \right\}$	3. Intensify interest to H
	Convey that S and H are cooperators	Indicate S knows H's wants and is taking them into account	4. Use in-group identity markers
		Claim reflexivity $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{If H wants (H has X) then} \\ \text{S wants (H has X)} \\ \text{If S wants (S has X) then} \\ \text{H wants (S has X)} \end{array} \right\}$	5. Seek agreement
		Claim reciprocity	6. Avoid disagreement
	Fulfil H's want (for some X)		7. Presuppose/raise/assert common ground
			8. Joke
			9. Assert or presuppose S's knowledge of and concern for H's wants
			10. Offer, promise
			11. Be optimistic
			12. Include both S and H in the activity
			13. Give (or ask for) reasons
			14. Assume or assert reciprocity
			15. Give gifts to H (goods, sympathy, understanding, cooperation)

Figure 6: negative politeness strategies (Brown &amp; Levinson 1987, 131)

Negative politeness Do FTA x	(a) on record	Be direct	Be direct	1. Be conventionally indirect
	(b) plus redress to H's want to be unimpinged upon	Don't presume/ assume	Make minimal assumptions about H's wants, what is relevant to H	2. Question, hedge
		Don't coerce H (where x involves H doing A)	Give H option not to do act	Be indirect
			Don't assume H is able/willing to do A	3. Be pessimistic
		Minimize threat	Assume H is not likely to do A	4. Minimize the imposition, R,
			Make explicit R, P, D values (i.e. rate of imposition, power, social distance, respectively)	5. Give deference
	Communicate S's wants to not impinge on H	Dissociate S, H from the particular infringement		6. Apologize
	Redress other wants of H's, derivative from negative face			7. Impersonalize S and H: Avoid the pronouns 'I' and 'you'
				8. State the FTA as a general rule
				9. Nominalize
				10. Go on record as incurring a debt, or as not indebted H

Leech (1983, 132) by contrast, argues that there are two politeness maxims relevant to Searlean commissives and directives, each of which consists of two parts:

- 1) Tact maxim
  - a) minimise cost to addressee
  - b) maximise benefit to addressee

2) Generosity maxim

- a) minimise benefit to self
- b) maximise cost to self

It is due to the consideration of cost and benefit of an FA that Leech views offers as intrinsically polite verbal actions. The author consequently proposed the following summative equation regarding the required degree of mitigation for directives (Leech 1983, 127):

- i. The greater the cost of the fa to the addressee,
- ii. the greater the horizontal social distance of the addressee from the speaker,
- iii. the greater the authoritative status of the addressee with respect to the speaker,
- iv. the greater will be the need for optionality and correspondingly for indirectness, in the expression of a directive, if it is to observe the tact maxim.

Although, like Brown & Levinson's (1987) equation, this formula takes into account the horizontal and vertical distance between participants, the imposition of the verbal action is replaced with the cost of the FA.

As discussed in chapter 3., SAT-based studies of proffers adopt a distinction between direct and indirect realisations. It will, by now, have become apparent that this is not an autotelic exercise but is done for the purpose of investigating how polite or impolite different formats are. If we consider Brown & Levinson's (1987) five

broad groups of (not) doing a face-threatening act, bald on record corresponds to 'direct' strategies; conventionally indirect strategies are considered negative politeness strategies (see figure 6, output strategy 1); hints/non-conventionally indirect strategies are off-record. Since proffers are considered inherently threatening to the addressee's negative face, negative politeness, i.e. the mitigation of imposition, is seen as more important than positive politeness in this context.<sup>26</sup> It is for this reason that obligation and optionality have received some attention in relation to indirectness. A look at figure 6 reveals that 'do not coerce H' is a major super-strategy within the group of negative politeness strategies. For Leech (2014, 147), by contrast, this does once again not apply to proffers which put forward an FA to the addressee's benefit; here, an imperative, for instance, can be polite if the speaker insists on some FA that is beneficial to the addressee.

Even with regard to requests, however, researchers have emphasised and demonstrated that there is no linear relationship between increased indirectness and increased politeness. Blum-Kulka (1987) found that participants did not consider the most indirect request strategies the most polite ones. Native speakers of American English rated 'query preparatory' strategies, i.e. a conventionally-indirect form, as most polite on a nine-point scale (see table 10). Weak and strong hints are only in second and third place, respectively. Blum-Kulka (1987, 143-144) explains this in

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<sup>26</sup> Note, however, that other scholars have pointed out the Anglo-centric nature of this assumption; Sifianou (1992), for instance, has demonstrated that Greek culture puts more emphasis on positive rather than negative face, meaning proffers are not considered inherently face-threatening and the imposition does not need to be mitigated to the same degree.

terms of the length of the inferential process involved in conventionally and non-conventionally indirect utterances:

Between two postulated inferential processes, the shorter one is considered the more polite. However, it also should be noted that the shortest path, namely the use of direct strategies is deemed impolite. Thus the most polite way of making a request is by *appearing* to be indirect without burdening the hearer with the actual cost of true indirectness.

That indirectness does not necessarily equate to politeness is furthermore evidenced by work on impoliteness strategies in analogy to Brown & Levinson's (1987) politeness strategies (Culpeper 1996; 2011a; 2015; Lachenicht 1980).

Table 10: mean politeness ratings for nine request types in five situations (Blum-Kulka 1987, 137)

Strategy	Mean rating
Query preparatory	7.10
Weak hints	5.33
Strong hints	5.23
Hedged performatives	5.09
Suggestory	4.25
Performative	4.0
Want statements	3.54
Obligation statements	2.84
Mood derivale	2.09

As stated in the previous section, the present thesis is concerned with how face – amongst other aspects – is negotiated in the context of FA negations; however, I do not consider proffers or refusals as inherently face-threatening or 'impolite'. Nor do I consider any format participants may use to implement such an action inherently



im/polite or face-aggravating/enhancing. In the next section, I outline how we can connect the negotiation of face and interpersonal relations, on the one hand, to deontics, epistemics and affect, on the other.

### **4.3. Deontics, epistemics and affect**

In the previous sections, we saw that the notion of face is central to much research on interpersonal relations and evaluations. I also stated that this applies to the present study as well, and that I consider face to be both a relational and an interactional phenomenon. In addition, the review of politeness theories and SAT-based research on proffers and refusals has shown that the mitigation of imposition via indirectness is a – if not the – key concern with this body of literature. The present section, by contrast, focuses on how we can analyse negotiations of interpersonal relations in the context of FA negotiations by examining the deontic, epistemic and affective facets of social relations. I review research which has demonstrated the relevance of one or more of these aspects with regard to FA negotiations. In particular, I address some issues and discrepancies in studies which look at negotiators' (claimed) deontic rights. Finally, I outline how Stevanovic & Peräkylä's (2014) triadic model of analysis was adapted for the subsequent analysis.

The deontic facet is the one most obviously connected to proffers and refusals and, therefore, the most frequently examined one. As Stevanovic & Peräkylä (2012, 298) point out, deontic authority, like Searle's (1976) 'world-to-word' direction of fit

"is about *determining* how the world 'ought to be' (the ancient greek word *deon*, 'that which is binding')". In the previous section, I showed that what Stevanovic & Peräkylä (2014) call deontic status, i.e. participants' vertical social distance, is a key factor both in Brown & Levinson's (1987) and in Leech's (1980) formulae regarding how much politeness/indirectness is required when proffering. We also saw that giving the addressee the option of not doing the FA is one of Brown & Levinson's (1987) negative politeness strategies; in chapter 3, I furthermore showed that some scholars categorise proffer formats with regard to whether they express obligation or optionality.

Within CA research, the deontic aspect of FA negotiations has received some attention in recent years. Nevertheless, there appear to be a number of conceptual issues – even in Stevanovic's own work. As briefly outlined in the introduction, Stevanovic & Peräkylä (2014, 190) differentiate between a person's deontic status, i.e. "the position that a participant has in a certain domain of action, relative to his/her co-participant(s)" and deontic stances, i.e. "speakers' public ways of displaying how powerful they are—something that is expressed by the linguistic form of the utterance" (Stevanovic & Peräkylä 2014, 191).

While, in institutional settings, a person's relative deontic status (i.e. the institutional power they have to dictate courses of actions) may be fairly fixed, deontic rights in other settings can be open to negotiation. This is achieved by participants claiming – by means of deontic stances – a certain degree of deontic rights and recipients of such claims accepting or challenging the suggested

distribution of deontic authority. In other words, a person's deontic status regarding a certain course of action pertains to the relative degree of power they have been granted by an institution, society and/or their co-participants. A strong deontic stance that an FA ought to happen consequently only translates to a strong deontic status if that claimed deontic right is not challenged.

Stevanovic (2013) reviews conversation-analytic literature (supposedly) examining speakers' deontic statuses. The author states that

Ervin-Tripp (1976), for example, has ordered different directive forms with regard to the relative power relationship between the participants that they *imply*. On the basis of her findings, we may assume that 'need statements' (I need a match), for instance, *suggest* a relatively asymmetrical distribution of deontic rights between the participants; (Stevanovic 2013, 24, emphasis mine)

However, what Ervin-Tripp (1976) actually does is rank forms according to whether speakers using them generally have more, less or equal power vis-à-vis the addressee. Regarding 'need statements', they point out that these occur "between persons differing in rank" (Ervin-Tripp 1976, 29). In other words, they look at participants' deontic statuses, not stances. Stevanovic (2013, 24-25) then goes on to discuss Heinemann's (2006) and Curl & Drew's (2008) studies on displays of 'entitlement' as examples of examinations of deontic stances. (Haugh 2017, 184, too, conflates entitlement with deontic rights.) I would argue, however, that (claimed) entitlement is not the same as (claimed) deontic rights. Furthermore, the term 'entitlement' itself is used by researchers to refer to rights on different plains.

Heinemann (2006), for instance, talks about entitlement to having a service provided, i.e. the speaker is entitled to the FA being requested. Curl & Drew (2008), by contrast, are less clear about what they mean. Throughout the paper, the authors speak of: "entitlement to having a request granted" (e.g. page 141), "entitlement to the requested action" (also page 141), "entitlement to the requested objects or actions" (page 142) and "entitlement to make a request" (page 145). While I would argue that entitlement to a service or good is not a form of deontic authority at all, a speaker's entitlement to make a request appears to correspond to what Stevanovic (2015, 86) calls 'proximal deontic rights' rather than 'distal deontic rights': rights pertaining to verbal actions, such as "the right to impose the task of deciding about a particular matter [...] on their co-participants and to include it into the participants' local interactional agenda." That claims of entitlement/proximal deontic right to make a request, for instance, are not the same as claiming the right to dictate the addressee's distal future actions is apparent from Couper-Kuhlen & Etelämäki's (2015) study of requests in Finnish. They argue that the Finnish equivalent of 'could you' constructions express a strong deontic stance, which they equate with the 'right to request' (again, proximal rather than distal). However, they admit in a footnote that this format "does not treat [the addressee's] doing [the FA] as a foregone conclusion" (Couper-Kuhlen & Etelämäki 2015, 10, fn2). In other words, they concede that 'could you' interrogatives frame the FA as contingent on the addressee's cooperation (literally, on their ability). In the subsequent analysis, I argue and demonstrate that it is therefore crucial to distinguish between a) participants' distal deontic stances, i.e.

the authority they claim over their own or others' actions, b) the right to proffer, i.e. proximal deontic rights and c) speakers' orientations to their own or others' entitlement to a good or service. Displays of (lack of) entitlement are not a main focus of this thesis, but we will see throughout part II that entitlement and proximal deontic rights are closely connected. I furthermore draw a strict distinction between participants' stances and statuses – something which is sometimes lost even within Stevanovic's approach. For instance, the scholar states that imperatives

represent the most stereotypical way of issuing orders and commands [...] and thus constitute a central practice for claiming deontic authority. However, imperatives can also be used to perform actions that have little to do with deontic authority, like instructing someone towards the means of achieving something, or making an offer or an invitation; (Stevanovic 2013, 19)

While it is, of course, true that imperatives can be used by speakers who do not have a strong deontic status vis-à-vis the addressee, I subsequently argue that they can nevertheless express a strong deontic stance in such situations. In fact, Stevanovic (2013, 27) point out that a speaker's deontic stance is not always congruent with their deontic status:

Since deontic status increases the probability of others' cooperation, highly authoritative speakers rarely need to command. Instead, speakers with low authority, who cannot rely on other people's readiness to cooperate in the desired ways, may sometimes try to inflate their authority with more assertive directives. The notion of deontic status allows us to account for these kinds of situations, or any other situations where there is a *discrepancy between the linguistic design of an utterance and its deontic strength*—for example, when an imperative is heard as an offer or a piece of advice. [emphasis mine]

Unfortunately, however, even within this plea to differentiate between status and stance, the author appears to conflate the two when talking about the “discrepancy between the linguistic design of an utterance and its deontic strength”.

Some discrepancies can also be found in Landmark, Gulbrandsen & Svennevig’s (2015) investigation of Swedish doctor-patient interactions. They argue that formats used by doctors “set up deontic gradients that give the patient a certain degree of authority in making the decision” (Landmark, Gulbrandsen & Svennevig 2015, 56) and conclude that presenting a treatment option as a possibility conveys a ‘shallower’ gradient, whereas framing it as a necessity conveys a ‘steeper’ gradient (Landmark, Gulbrandsen & Svennevig 2015, 66). This means they consider both options to express a certain amount of deontic rights on the part of the doctor, although less so in the case of the former kinds of constructions. However, the authors continue by stating that “[a]t the same time, physicians conferred deontic rights and responsibility to patients through invitations to decide” (Landmark, Gulbrandsen & Svennevig 2015, 66). This claim that doctors can simultaneously yield deontic rights regarding a decision to the patient while also claiming a certain degree of deontic rights – if only one a shallow gradient – appears to be contradictory. Again, there might be some conflation of deontic stance and status; or, perhaps, of deontic stance and epistemic stance.

The above study furthermore illustrates an interesting trend within examinations of deontic statuses. Researches tend to put formats on a deontic scale reminiscent of what we see regarding in/directness in SAT-based studies. Stevanovic (2013, 25), for

instance, states that imperatives constitute a “blunt claim of deontic authority” whereas interrogatives such as ‘would you x’ “conveys a mitigated stance on deontic rights”, framing the FA “as something that is contingent on the recipient’s choice to comply”; a declarative ‘hint’ such as ‘it’s cold in here’\*, by contrast, “claims a relatively weak deontic stance: it is entirely up to the recipient to sort out the implications that the speaker’s utterance has on the recipient’s own future actions”. Similarly, Couper-Kuhlen & Etelämäki (2015), looking at requests and proposals, conclude that constructions which “[nominate] a necessary/desirable action with certainty and also [nominate] the other as the agent who is to carry it out by using explicit or understood person marked forms” ‘display’ deontic asymmetry between participants; this “implies strong rights to decide the future on the part of the directive speaker coupled with weaker rights on the part of the recipient” (Couper-Kuhlen & Etelämäki 2015, 23). Formats which do not nominate an agent such as ‘hints’, by contrast, “display weaker deontic rights, because by not nominating the agent they give the recipient a chance to nominate him/herself as agent” (Couper-Kuhlen & Etelämäki 2015, 23). As I argue in the subsequent analysis, however, not expressing a strong deontic stance is not the same as expressing a weak deontic stance. In addition, utterances which do not express a strong deontic stance may express strong rights pertaining to the epistemic or affective facet.

Regarding the epistemic facet, too, a distinction can be made between status and stance. Heritage (2012, 4) defines a speaker’s epistemic status as “an inherently relative and relational concept concerning the relative access to some domain [of

knowledge] of two (or more) persons at some point in time” and an epistemic stance as “the moment-by-moment expression of these relationships, as managed through the design of turns at talk” (Heritage 2012, 6). The connection between the epistemic order and FA negotiations has been addressed by numerous conversation analysts. Research on treatment decisions in medical contexts, for instance, has highlighted the importance of (lacking) knowledge for the decision-making process (cf. e.g. Landmark, Gulbrandsen & Svennevig 2015; Lindström & Karlsson 2016; Lindström & Weatherall 2015; Stivers et al. 2018; Womack 2013). In fact, Stevanovic & Peräkylä (2012, 317) argue that a person’s deontic rights can be grounded on epistemic rights:

It seems that participants with an epistemic domain of expert knowledge use this as a basis to defend their deontic rights [...]. However, deontic rights based on epistemic rights appear to be vulnerable in that they can be trumped by straightforward presentations of future courses of actions as ‘decisions.’

Elsewhere, the authors point out that accounts, i.e. justifications, can mitigate a prior strong deontic stance (Stevanovic & Peräkylä 2014, 196).

A further context in which epistemics has been shown to be important is advice giving. Advice giving is the verbal action by which the speaker “describes, recommends, or otherwise forwards a preferred course of future action” (Heritage & Sefi 1992, 368). Conversation analysts have demonstrated that the actions of seeking and giving advice inherently position the advisee and adviser as, respectively, lacking or having knowledge/competence regarding a certain domain (Hepburn & Potter 2011; Heritage & Sefi 1992; Mikesell et al. 2017; Shaw & Hepburn 2013; Shaw, Potter



& Hepburn 2015).

The relevance of the affective order in FA negotiations has received the least attention to date. Stevanovic & Peräkylä (2014, 192) use the term 'emotional' status to refer to "the socially shared expectations regarding experiencing, expressing, and sharing of emotions, arising from the position that a participant has in a certain domain of experience relative to his/her co-participant(s)". 'Emotional' stances, by contrast, refer to "the valence and the relative strength of emotional expression directed to a co-present or absent target" (Stevanovic & Peräkylä 2014, 193). In the present thesis, I employ the term 'affective' instead of 'emotional' in order to highlight that this facet involves not just feelings but also opinions and evaluations (e.g. dis/like). My category of affective stances therefore includes expressions of (lack of) desire, an aspect sometimes referred to as boulomaic modality (cf. e.g. Kiefer 1987).

While Stevanovic & Peräkylä (2014) look at affect orientations in joint-action negotiations, they are primarily concerned with action recognition. With regard to epistemic/affective ambiguities, they state that recipients often have to determine "whether an utterance is primarily about sharing knowledge (orienting to the epistemic order) or about sharing emotion (orienting to the emotional order)". More interesting for the present thesis is the question how participants orient to their own or others' affective rights for the purpose of securing or resisting an FA. To the best of my knowledge, this aspect has hitherto remained unexplored. As mentioned in section 3.2., however, Couper-Kuhlen (2012) found that profferers can prosodically

display negative affect which orients to the FA negotiation itself, namely by expressing disappointment or irritation in response to refusals. As we will see in the subsequent analysis, affective stances can also be expressed by linguistic means and participants can argue for or against an FA based on their affective rights.

Before moving on, I want to summarise how (claimed) deontic, epistemic and affective rights relate to face and participants' interpersonal relations. As stated in the introduction, Stevanovic & peräkylä (2014, 185-186) argue that these three facets are 'omnirelevant' and 'anchor' social interaction and relations, i.e. who participants are to one another. However, their aim is to show that participants orient to these aspects for the purpose of action recognition. The subsequent analysis demonstrates, by contrast, that this triadic modal of analysis can also be applied to the study of how FA negotiators insist on or resist proffered future courses of action as well as claimed distributions of rights and obligations. In part II of the present thesis, I argue that negotiators express stances which claim that the speaker either has or lacks a) the deontic authority to make a decision about an FA, b) knowledge relevant to the decision-making process and c) feelings or opinions pertaining to the FA negotiation. Such strong and weak stances position the participants vis-à-vis one another in certain ways, for instance as more or less knowledgeable regarding what constitutes a reasonable course of action. Like the FAs being negotiated, speakers' stances – and the interpersonal relation they attempt to construct – are themselves subject to subsequent negotiation. Participants' utterances do not just attempt to secure or resists an FA, they also orient to prior stances in certain ways. As I subsequently

demonstrate, speakers can convey no contest to a stance, they can challenge a stance or they can accept it. This, I argue, can constitute not just a form of relational work, but also of face-maintenance, aggravation and enhancement.

## 5. Data and methodology

This chapter provides an overview of the data used in the present study and the method employed to analyse it. In section 5.1., I introduce the source corpora used and explain how FA negotiations were extracted from them. Section 5.2. outlines the data clean-up and analysis process. Finally, section 5.3. describes the structure and composition of my data set.

### 5.1. Source corpora and data extraction

At first, it is worth explaining the processes through which this project was shaped. The initially envisioned project involved a mixed-method approach including a detailed quantitative analysis alongside the qualitative one presented in part II. Although the scope was gradually changed and narrowed, the original plan influenced the data selection. Given the initially intended quantitative analysis, it had to be ensured that a substantive dataset was available. This led to the question how a large number of relevant interactions – namely negotiations of FAs which do not immediately result in an acceptance – could be collected. One possible way is, of course, recording and transcribing conversations. However, given that this is a very time-consuming process which is not guaranteed to yield the large number of FAs negotiations required for the initial intended quantitative analysis, it was decided to use already existing data. For this reason, two source corpora, both annotated for verbal actions, were chosen in order to extract relevant interactions from a large

collection of conversations in a (relatively, as we shall see) straightforward fashion: the *SPICE-Ireland* corpus (Kirk et al. 2011b) (henceforth SPICE) and the *Switchboard Dialogue Act Corpus* (henceforth SWDA) (Jurafsky, Shriberg & Biasca 1997).

SPICE is based on the spoken part of the *ICE-Ireland* corpus (Kirk et al. 2011a) and “has been annotated to display aspects of pragmatics, discourse, and prosody” (Kallen & Kirk 2012, 1). Data collection for *ICE-Ireland* happened in two phases: 1990-1994 and 2002-2003 (Kallen & Kirk 2008, 4). Spice consists of 300 texts, divided into two categories: dialogues and monologues. Of the former (180 texts) the sub-set of private face-to-face conversations was chosen, which consists of 90 text files. For the pragmatic annotation, the team based their categories of verbal actions on Searle’s (1969; 1976) speech act classification (Kallen & Kirk 2012, 28).

SWDA consists of a subset of texts taken from the *Switchboard-1 release 2* corpus (Godfrey & Holliman 1997). The latter, compiled in the USA in 1990 and 1991, comprises about 2,500 telephone conversations and amounts to over 250 hours of recordings (Godfrey, Holliman & Mcdaniel 1992, 517). The context of the compilation can be said to have been semi-controlled, since the participants were paired to talk to people they did not know, about a topic assigned to them.

A computer-driven robot operator system handled the calls, giving the caller appropriate recorded prompts, selecting and dialing another person (the callee) to take part in a conversation, introducing a topic for discussion and recording the speech from the two subjects into separate channels until the conversation was finished. About 70 topics were provided, of which about 50 were used frequently. Selection of topics and callees was constrained so that: (1) no two speakers would converse together more than once and (2) no one spoke more

than once on a given topic. (Linguistic Data Consortium)

For the SWDA corpus, a subset of 1,155 conversations (average length of 5 minutes) “comprising 205,000 utterances and 1.4 million words” (Jurafsky, Shriberg & Biasca 1997) from the original *Switchboard* corpus were tagged for discourse acts. The final tag set, SWBD-DAMSL, consists of 42 clustered labels and is based on the Discourse Annotation and Markup System of Labeling (DAMSL) tag set (Allen & Core 1997).

According to Stolcke et al. (2000, 340), a dialogue act

represents the meaning of an utterance at the level of illocutionary force (Austin 1962). Thus, a DA is approximately the equivalent of the speech act of Searle (1969), the conversational game move of Power (1979), or the adjacency pair part of Schegloff (1968) and Saks [sic], Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974).

Initially, a decision was made to extract relevant interactions by focusing on annotations corresponding to the act of refusing. The immediate co-text of a relevantly tagged utterance was then examined to determine whether it was indeed part of an FA negotiation as well as where the negotiation begins and where it ends. In the case of SPICE, I searched the files for four tags: ‘commissive’, ‘expressive’, ‘declarative’ and ‘indeterminate conversationally-relevant utterance’ (ICU). The selection of commissives is straightforwardly based on Searle’s categorisation of refusals. Expressives, which convey feelings (Searle 1976, 12), were included in the search based on Reichl’s (2018) finding that exclamations and interjections may express a speaker’s negative affective stance and opposition towards a proffer, thereby constituting or signalling a refusal. Indeed, the SPICE annotators adhere to

an “interpretive principle of contextual effects [which] extends the expressive category beyond the core examples of Searle's (1976) definition” (Kallen & Kirk 2012, 32). In addition to classic Searlean expressive acts such as apologising or thanking, SPICE annotators therefore also included expressions of surprise and other cognitive/emotional states under this category. The class of ‘declarations’ as Searle (1976, 23-24) defines it would not be an obvious one to include when searching for refusals. Yet, the annotators of SPICE expanded the definition of this class as well, considering every performative speech act a ‘declarative’, as illustrated by example (4), taken from the SPICE coding manual (Kallen & Kirk 2012, 33).<sup>27</sup>

Example 4: a performative annotated as a ‘declarative’

```
<P2B-050$A> <#> <dec> 1I 'm therefore 1invItIng 1pEOple% <,> 1invItIng
people to 1begIn to 1plAn for the 2fUture% 1withIn the 2parAmeters% which
are 1contAIned in this 2bUdget% 1As set out the government's 1prOgramme%
</dec>
```

According to Searlean SAT, this utterance would be considered a directive rather than a declaration (cf. the classification of ‘invite’ in Searle & Vanderveken 1985, 39). In order to avoid missing performative instances of refusals, the ‘declarative’ tag was searched for as well. Lastly, ICUs were included simply to rule out relevant interactions slipping through the net. Unfortunately, first searches quickly showed that the above listed annotations were not covering all refusals. The search for ‘commissives’ yielded results such as the last line in example 5.

---

<sup>27</sup> The authors also call this class ‘declaratives’ rather than ‘declarations’.

### Example 5: re-suggestions and refusals annotated as ‘representatives’

```

<P1A-010$A> <#> <dir> Have the soup </dir> <#> <dir> You can eat anything
after that <,> seriously </dir>
<P1A-010$E> <#> <rep> Soup 's boring </rep>
<P1A-010$A> <#> <rep> Yeah but it lines your stomach </rep> <xpa> and <{>
<[> <unclear> several sylls </unclear> </[> </{> </xpa>
<P1A-010$B> <#> <rep> <[> It 's good for you </[> </{> </rep>
<P1A-010$D> <#> <dir> Get a salad </dir>
<P1A-010$A> <#> <rep> It 's it 's quite nice <,,> </rep>
<P1A-010$?> <#> <xpa> <unclear> 2 words </unclear> sandwich </xpa>
<P1A-010$A> <#> <dir> Just have soup and a main course </dir>
<P1A-010$E> <#> <com> I 'll get toasted ham and cheese </com>

```

While the utterance “I’ll get toasted ham and cheese” is indeed a refusal of the suggestion to get soup (first line), various re-suggestions and refusals in between are not annotated as directives and commissives, respectively. Instead, they are tagged as ‘representatives’ (see utterances in bold typeface), most likely because they take the form of declarative sentences (instead of imperatives) and do not nominate any action. Representatives make up the majority of annotated units in face-to-face conversations – both for the Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland subset (see table 11). To examine each of them in order to determine whether they are in fact a proffer or request would in effect have amounted to reading through the entire sub-corpus. It was therefore decided to instead include ‘directives’ in the search. This allowed me to extract a considerable number of proffers, which were subsequently examined in terms of whether they were part of an FA negotiation. Unfortunately, this means that I most likely was not able to identify all refusals in these transcripts. Negotiations consisting entirely of indirect proffers and refusals may have remained undetected.

Table 11: numbers and percentages of speech act notations within face-to-face



conversations in SPICE; taken from Kallen & Kirk (2012, 94).

	Rep	Dir	Com	Exp	Dec	K	ICU	Soc	XPA	Total
NI	7430 (60%)	2732 (22%)	138 (1%)	230 (2%)	1	11	1088 (9%)	25	757	12412
RoI	8096 (60%)	3116 (23%)	116 (1%)	286 (2%)	4	24	1057 (8%)	1	758	13458

In the case of SWDA, the extraction of relevant interactions was not without its challenges either. After familiarising myself with the annotation scheme, it was decided to search the corpus for seven tags which were likely to yield – or lead me to – refusals. As table 12 shows, those categories appear extremely infrequently, which significantly narrowed down the number of utterances which had to be checked manually. The selected discourse act ‘clusters’ are differentiated into two broad classes based on their communicative function: forward looking and backward looking. Both groups were expected to include cases of refusals (contras and counters), while the former were also considered likely to direct me to adjacent refusals.

Table 12: discourse act categories searched for with percentages of occurrence in the corpus, taken from Stolcke et al. (2000, 340)

Communicative function	Super-categories of discourse acts	Discourse act clusters	Example	%
Forward looking function	Influencing addressee future action	Action directive	Why don't you go first	0.4%
	Committing speaker future action	Offers, options, commits	I'll have to check that out	0.1%
Backward looking function	Answer	'no' answer	No	1%
	Answer	Negative non-	Uh, not a	0.1%

		'no' answer	whole lot	
	Answer	Dispreferred answer	Well, not so much that	0.1%
	Agreement	Reject	Well, no	0.2%
	Agreement	Maybe/ accept-part	Something like that	<0.1%

Once again, indirect refusals appear to have posed a problem for annotators and the complex tag set consisting of 42 categories appears to have led to inconsistencies as well, as examples 6 and 7 illustrate.

Example 6: proffer coded 'y/n-question' and refusal coded 'statement non-opinion', SWDA sw\_0083

```

qy          A.1 utt1:  You want to go first?  <chiming>.  /
nn          B.2 utt1:  <Static> No,  /
sd^e       B.2 utt2:  you can start <laughter>.  /

```

Example 7: refusal coded 'statement non-opinion', SWDA sw\_0269

```

o          A.1 utt1:  Okay,  /
ad^t       A.1 utt2:  do you want to go first?  /
sd^t       B.2 utt1:  {D Well, } I could barely hear what the switchboard
operator was saying as what was the topic.  /

```

If we look at the utterances by speakers A<sup>28</sup> in both extracts, we see that they produce proffers which are syntactically realised in the same way ("[do] you want to go first"). Yet, in 6 it is coded as a y/n-question (see tag 'qy' at the beginning of the line), in 7 as an action directive. Since, in the former example, the utterance is considered a y/n-question, it is accurate – in terms of the coding manual – to code B's first utterance as a 'no'-answer rather than a reject. However, this clearly shows a

---

<sup>28</sup> These are not necessarily the same participants.

degree of inter-coder inconsistency. The interaction was only detected because I included 'no'-answers in my search. Without this utterance, it would have remained undetected because the proffer was annotated as a question which does not attempt to influence the addressee's future action (see super-category of 'action directive' in table 12). The second part of the refuser's response, which I consider a counter, was furthermore coded as a 'statement-non-opinion'. This also applies to B's response in example 7, despite A's preceding talk being annotated as a directive. The category of statements is meant to be similar to 'representatives' in SPICE, covering utterances which do not express commitment (or lack thereof) or attempt to influence the addressee. However, this is exactly what they do in the above examples. Once again, this meant there was a possibility that FA negotiations remained undetected if annotators tagged the proffer as a question or statement and the refusal as a statement as well. Since, like representatives in SPICE, 'statement-non-opinion' and 'statement-opinion' make up 36% and 13%, respectively, of utterances in SWDA, it was once again decided that looking at all of them would be unfeasible.

The decision to extract data from these existing source corpora lead to two limitations. First, the searches most likely did not yield all instances of FA negotiations in SPICE and SWDA and my final data set might be biased in favour of more 'direct' forms of proffers and/or refusals. Second, using existing corpora meant that I was restricted to the transcripts and did not have access to the audio recordings. As a result, I could not take prosody into account in my analysis. Nevertheless, drawing on SWDA and SPICE allowed me to extract a considerable number of examples from a

large collection of naturally occurring conversations in a relatively straightforward way. While the inability to draw on prosodic clues is unfortunate, it did not considerably hinder my analysis, which focuses on the form and content of participants' utterances.

## 5.2. Data clean-up and analysis process

Once an FA negotiation was found in one of the source corpora, the excerpt was copied and pasted into an excel spreadsheet, including the text file information. Throughout the analysis process, the original transcripts were consulted for the wider context of the negotiations. Every analysed unit was contained in a separate row. These units correspond to the conversation-analytic notion of TCUs; they can consist of a clause, a phrase or a single lexical item and "constitutes a recognizable action in context" (Schegloff 2007, 4). In the case of both SPICE and SWDA, the annotated units tend to match my own units of analysis. In SWDA, every unit is already represented on a separate line (see repeat of example 7), which made the transfer to excel straightforward. However, participants' turns sometimes contain parts which are outside the scope of this study. On the spreadsheet, they were then combined into one row with a preceding or subsequent utterance I was interested in so as not to lose any part of a speaker's turn.

Example 7 repeated: transcript structure, SWDA sw\_0269

```

o          A.1 utt1:  Okay,  /
ad^t       A.1 utt2:  do you want to go first? /
sd^t       B.2 utt1:  {D Well, } I could barely hear what the switchboard
operator was saying as what was the topic. /

```

In SPICE, by contrast, multiple annotated units within one speaker's turn are not represented in separate lines (see example 8). This had to be done manually on the spreadsheet.

#### Example 8: transcript structure, SPICE P1A-010\$A

```

<P1A-010$A> <#> <dir> Have the soup </dir> <#> <dir> You can eat anything
after that <,> seriously </dir>
<P1A-010$E> <#> <rep> Soup 's boring </rep>

```

Overlapping speech is also dealt with in different ways in the two source corpora. In SWDA, it is indicated by hashtags ('#') and the speaker's talk after the overlap is shown in a subsequent, separate line – even if it constitutes a continuation of an utterances overlapping with someone else's talk (see example 9).

#### Example 9: overlaps in SWDA, sw\_0632

```

%          B.7 utt1:  {F Uh, } I ju-, <throat_clearing> - /
ad         B.7 utt2:  go ahead,  /
sd         B.7 utt3:  I'll stop eating.  /
sd         B.7 utt4:  # I just barely got # --
%          A.8 utt1:  # No it's, # -/
+          B.9 utt1:  -- home from the university. /

```

In SPICE, by contrast, the turn of the participant already talking when the overlap occurs is continued and the other person's overlapping talk is shown after that turn ends. This is indicated by square brackets ('[...]'); if one speaker's turn contains

multiple instances of overlapping speech, these overlaps are numbered (see example 10). Since this approach does not represent speakers' talk in a chronological order, such cases were reordered in my analysis spreadsheet to match the SWDA transcripts.

#### Example 10: overlaps in SPICE, P1A-085

```
<P1A-085$A> <#> <rep> <[> Oh* </[> </{}> nothing to do with cream </rep> <#>
<rep> <{1> <[1> I want like* something like a chocolate cake </[1> </rep>
<#> <dir> Don't worry about that </dir> <#> <com> We 'll do that </com> <#>
<rep> Like* I I 'm talking about <{2> <[2> just want that a </[2> big
chocolate cake </rep>
<P1A-085$C> <#> <dir> <[1> I know but to write on or icing to write on the
</[1> </{1> </dir>
<P1A-085$C> <#> <xpa> <[2> You just literally want </[2> </{2> </xpa>
```

For easy of reading, the original annotations and most mark-ups were removed for all subsequent examples. In addition, speakers' talk is represented in numbered lines which do not necessary correspond to one analysed unit.

After the clean-up, the negotiations were analysed qualitatively. This process was largely inductive and, in the early stages, explorative. The first annotation category concerns the role of the speaker in the negotiation (see image 1). There are two possible codes for SWDA interactions and three for SPICE interactions:

- 1: the initial proffers: the person making the initial proffer. Even when a refuser counters and with, for instance, a request, thereby putting the initial profferer in a position to either accept or refuse, this code remained consistent within the negotiation;

- 2: the initial refuser(s): the addressee(s) of the initial proffer. Some initial proffers can be addressed to multiple participants, in which case the negotiation has multiple initial refusers. Again, the code remains the same for a speaker for the duration of the negotiation;
- 3: third party(/ies): participants who are neither the initial profferer nor an initial refuser. Often, third parties operate as co-profferers, supporting the initial profferer in their attempts to secure an FA or putting forward counters of their own. Since SWDA interactions consist of phone conversations between two people, third party participants only occur in SPICE negotiations;

Image 1: screenshot of analysis spreadsheet showing speaker roles

text file	role	data	
1078	1	ad	B.56 utt1: {F Oh, } {D well } I'll let you go
1078	1		if you want to go ahead and take that, /
1078	2	ar	A.57 utt1: No, /
1078	2	ar^r	A.57 utt2: no, /
1078	2	sd	A.57 utt3: I don't care about that, /
1078	2	sd	A.57 utt4: she'll be on the phone all night. /

In image 2, we see the annotations concerning the form and function of units used for the final analysis. The first one, 'utterance type', specifies the general function of a unit within the structure of a negotiation. I distinguish 5 categories:

- proffers: the first turn by the initial profferer;
- contras: utterances which resist an FA (refusals which are not counters) or which re-proffer an FA;

- counters: utterances which put forward a new FA to be negotiated;
- minimal responses
- insertion sequences

Image 2: screenshot of analysis spreadsheet showing utterance annotations

data	utterance type	format	facet	stance	project
ad B.56 utt1: {F Oh, } {D well } I'll let you go	proffer	permis	D	D-	offer
if you want to go ahead and take that, /	proffer	query_wish	D	D-	offer
ar A.57 utt1: No, /	contra	no_refuse	D	D+	offer_refusal
ar^r A.57 utt2: no, /	contra	no_refuse	D	D+	offer_refusal
sd A.57 utt3: I don't care about that, /	contra	reason	A	Aneg	offer_refusal
sd A.57 utt4: she'll be on the phone all night. /	contra	reason	E	E+	offer_refusal

Since the resolution of FA negotiations is outside the scope of this thesis, any eventual acceptances were not included and annotated. Any unrelated interfering talk was removed as well.

Next, we have formats; this category specifies the syntactic form and/or the content of an analysed unit. My categories (see next section for a full overview) draw heavily on previous classifications of different proffer types as well as refusals (primarily Aijmer 1996; Barron 2005; Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz 1990; Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984). However, some were modified or newly added based on the data. The 'facet' annotation specifies which interpersonal aspect an utterance primarily orients to. In addition to the D(eontic), E(pistemic) and A(ffective) categories, there is also a category 'X', which denotes that an analysed unit does not primarily orient to any of these three facets. The 'stance' column specifies the strength (weak or strong) of deontic and epistemic stances as well as the valence (positive or negative) of affective stances. In the case of utterances annotated as X in



the 'facet' column, the stance column contains the unit's secondary stance.<sup>29</sup> Finally, utterances were categorised in terms of the project they are pursuing or resisting. Following Couper-Kuhlen (2014), I distinguish between the proffer types request, offer, proposal and suggestion. In addition, the data made it necessary to add the category 'intendings'; these are refusers' counters which put forward an FA by the speaker, for the speaker. Any of the above annotation categories can furthermore be annotated as U(nclear).

### 5.3. Data structure and composition

In the course of this doctoral project, the qualitative analysis became the main focus of my thesis. Nevertheless, I want to give the reader a general sense of the composition of my dataset and the structure of the FA negotiations it contains. This is the purpose of the present section. The subsequent numbers are entirely descriptive and are not intended as generalisations beyond the analysed data set.

Overall, I extracted 123 negotiations from the two source corpora. The decision to examine a large number of small snippets of interaction rather than a smaller number of whole encounters was made due to the focus of this thesis and the corresponding need to fully demonstrate and explore every type of stance – even if this meant that other aspects remained under-examined. Of the extracted negotiations, 61 begin with an initial suggestion, 29 with an offer, 25 with a request and 8 with a proposal. A

---

<sup>29</sup> See chapter 6. for a definition of primary and secondary stances.

negotiation consists of at least two units: one initial proffer and a response which does not constitute a firm acceptance. As outlined in section 2.3., I distinguish three types of verbal non-acceptances in response to proffers: *contras*, i.e. disaligning SPPs; *counters*, i.e. proffers of alternative FA; and *refusal-implicating insertion sequences*. Not every utterance between the initial proffer and the final acceptance or topic change was analysed, however. For one, acceptances themselves were not included, as previously mentioned. For another, intervening talk which is not related to the FA negotiation was ignored as well. Sometimes a negotiation is not resolved within one sequence; a refuser may, for instance, change the topic for a certain amount of time before the profferer returns to the FA. In such cases, only utterances which are part of the FA negotiation were analysed and annotated – unrelated talk in-between related sequences was not. Even within the turns which are part of a negotiation, some TCUs are outside the scope of this study. I did, for instance, not treat hesitation and objection markers ('uh', 'well') as separate units. These decisions resulted in a total of 1195 annotated units for the 123 negotiations – although there are more TCUs than that. Negotiations consist, on average, of 9.7 analysed units. Those which begin with an initial proposal show the highest average number of units with 17.5. This figure is skewed by one negotiation consisting of 60 units, however; without it, the average drops down to 11. Negotiations beginning with a suggestion show the second highest average number with 11.8 units, whereas initial requests and offers only lead to an average negotiation length of 6.5 and 6.1 units, respectively.

Overall, the 1195 units are evenly distributed between profferers and third party

participants (590 tokens, 49%), on the one hand, and refusers (605 tokens, 51%), on the other. Table 13 shows the number of units which are uttered in the service of securing an FA by group of negotiators and proffer type. Unsurprisingly, profferers and third parties produce the majority of these, namely 531 of the 623 tokens. Most of these are in the service of (re-)suggesting, which matches the aforementioned high number of initial suggestions.<sup>30</sup> Intendings are only uttered by refusers in counters and they make up the majority of units these negotiators utter in the service of securing an FA.

Table 13: number of units in the service of securing an FA by group of negotiators and proffer type

	Intending	Offer	Proposal	Request	Suggestion	Total
Profferers & third parties	0	71	54	69	337	531
Refusers	59	10	8	7	8	92
Total	59	81	62	76	345	623

Table 14: number of units in the service of resisting an FA by group of negotiators and proffer type

	Intending resistance	Offer resistance	Proposal resistance	Request resistance	Suggestion resistance	Total
Profferers & third parties	23	3	6	0	3	35
Refusers	0	89	51	70	269	479
Total	23	92	57	70	272	514

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<sup>30</sup> It has to be noted, however, that a negotiation which begins with an initial suggestion, for instance, does not necessarily remain a suggestion negotiation throughout. A participant may do a counter of a different proffer type.

In table 14, we see the number of units which are in the service of resisting an FA without putting forward a counter by group of negotiators and proffer type. Here, the picture is reversed, with refusers producing the majority of units. Again, utterances resisting suggestions are the most frequent ones and only profferers and third parties produce units resisting intendings. In addition, 58 units were categorised as 'unclear'.

Table 15: list of formats including frequencies and examples

	Profferers & third parties	Refusers	Total	Example
ANSWER	33	28	61	"Sunday night" in response to the INFO-REQUEST "what night is it?" (SPICE P1A-075)
APOLOGY	3		3	'sorry', 'excuse me'
BACK-CHANNELLING	85	79	164	'yeah', 'uh huh', 'oh really?'
CONFIRM-REFUSAL		4	4	"yeah" in response to the DOUBLE-CHECK "Are you sure you don't want a chair?" (SPICE P1A-007)
CONCESSION	18	18	36	"It's actually not a boring soup. <b>It's not that big wow like</b> but it was nice." (SPICE P1A-010)
CONTEMPLATE	3	2	5	"Have you thought about uh leasing?" (SWDA sw_0165)
CRITICISM	7	12	19	"Would you give my head peace" (SPICE P1A-008)
DOUBLE-CHECK	8		8	See CONFIRM-REFUSAL
ELLIPSIS	10	4	14	"Or a sandwich?" after a prior "Will you have another cup of tea?" (SPICE P1A-067)
EXCLAMATION	8	16	24	'och', 'oh my god', 'excuse me'
GRATITUDE		12	12	'thanks'
IMPERATIVE	32	4	36	"Don't go in the winter" (SWDA sw0068)
INDEFINITE		15	15	'maybe', 'I might try that', 'we could see'
INFO-REQUEST	27	32	59	See ANSWER
KNOWLEDGE		1	1	'I know'
MENTION	9	3	12	" <b>Christmas.</b> I'm home at Christmas for at least three." (SPICE P1A-016)
NEG-ABILITY		2	2	'I couldn't'
NEG-FUTURE		7	7	"I will not take a cigarette." (SPICE P1A-060)
NEG-WANTS		4	4	"I don't want to go." (SPICE P1A-031)
NO	1	59	60	'no', 'no way', 'not a chance'
OFF-HOOK		2	2	"No that's fine" after "Do you want the margarine?" (SPICE P1A-052)

Table 15 continued

	Profferers & third parties	Refusers	Total	Example
PERFORMATIVE	1		1	"I would just encourage you to do a little traveling, though, before you get married." (SWDA sw_0421)
PERMISSIVE	4	2	6	"You can take two from my house." (SPICE P1A-038)
REASON	135	193	328	"Well you ought to come to North Carolina. <b>It's a big change.</b> " (SWDA sw0602)
REPAIR	12	9	21	"What if they pay for it?" After the QUERY-REPAIR "Excuse me?" (SWDA sw_0112)
STATE-EXIST	8		8	"Uhm does anybody want to hear Lesley Garrett? <b>She's on now at half eight.</b> " (SPICE P1A-033)
STATE-FUTURE	4	12	16	"No. <b>I'll sit here in the corner.</b> " (SPICE P1A-081)
STATE-POSSIBILITY	15	1	16	"You can teach them" (SWDA sw_0511)
STATE-SITUATION	8		8	"You're in a very oul flippant mood this evening." (SPICE P1A-050)
STATE-WANT		3	3	"I want to do it meself." (SPICE P1A-088)
STRONG-NECESSITY	12		12	"You need to put that on there, seriously." (SWDA sw_0269)
THREAT	5		5	"He's going to ring back and none of us are going to say that you're not in." (SPICE P1A-031)
WEAK-NECESSITY	22		22	"You really should go to Europe." (SWDA sw_0421)
WHIMPERATIVE	6		6	"Why don't you buy some yourself?" (SPICE P1A-050)
WH-SUGGESTORY	5		5	"How about a treat?" (SPICE P1A-060)
QUERY-FUTURE	20		20	"Are you going to make invos up?" (SPICE P1A-085)
QUERY-REPAIR	10	20	30	See REPAIR
QUERY-WISH	26	1	27	"I'll let you go <b>if you want to go</b>

				<b>ahead and take that.”</b> (SWDA sw_1078)
QUERY-SITUATION	1		1	“Have you no pepper in this?” (SPICE P1A-031)
QUERY-POSSIBILITY	2		2	“Could we get a calligraphy pen or something and?” (SPICE P1A-085)
Unclear	50	60	110	

The qualitative analysis of utterance led to a total of 41 format categories. These are listed alphabetically in table 15 along with the number of tokens per format for both groups of negotiators and examples. As the table shows, many formats are used both by profferers/third parties and by refusers. They are discussed in detail throughout the subsequent qualitative analysis in part II of this thesis.

## Part II



## 6. <sup>31</sup>Walking the interpersonal tightrope of FA negotiations – an overview

The present thesis examines the negotiation of two things: the future course of action of one or more participants, on the one hand, and the participants' interpersonal relations, on the other. Both can be studied by looking at the utterances negotiators produce – or do noticeably not produce – and the stances these express. However, these two negotiations are not merely co-occurring as parallel business items on the interactional agenda. Instead, the subsequent chapters will demonstrate that participants' utterances can be analysed in terms of their deontic, epistemic and affective stances as they relate - or do not relate – to the FA being negotiated. I will argue that utterances occurring within FA negotiations may express two distinct types of stances:

- a) primary or foregrounded stances: these express that a speaker has weak or strong deontic, epistemic or affective rights pertaining to an FA. Participants can claim to have or lack the deontic authority to unilaterally decide whether an FA will happen; they can have or lack knowledge of arguments in favour or against an FA; and they can have positive or negative feelings regarding an FA or aspects related to it. Utterances which express a primary stance are always aligning or disaligning.

- b) secondary or backgrounded stances: these deontic, epistemic and affective claims do not convey weak or strong rights in relation to an FA. They can be responded to in the affirmative (and sometimes negative) without this constituting an acceptance (or refusal) of the FA and/or an acceptance of an argument in favour or against it.


This does not mean, however, that secondary stances are less consequential than primary ones. In fact, as the subsequent analysis demonstrates, they constitute import resources for relational work. If an utterance expresses both a primary and a secondary stance, for instance, this may allow recipients to positively/affirmatively respond to the latter before refusing or re-proffering. In addition, refusers may entirely ignore a primary stance, instead treating the utterance as not having deontic implications at all.

As previously explained, the main focus of the present study is: which kinds of utterances express which stances, who utters them and when? Before answering these question in more detail in the subsequent chapters, let us take a look at the general frequencies and distributions of stances. The 123 negotiations extracted from my source corpora amount to a total of 1195 units of analysis. Of these, 110 were considered 'unclear' in terms of format and/or stance, leaving 1085 units. Table 16 and figure 7 give an overview of the frequency of the different kinds of primary stances.

Table 16: overall frequency of stances

	D-	D+	E+	E-	Aneg	Apos	X	Total
Profferers & third parties	84	42	156	2	50	17	189	540
Refusers	3	109	149	4	56	18	206	545
Total	87	151	305	6	97	35	404	1085

Figure 7: overall proportions of stances



It may surprise the reader that the majority of units in FA negotiations do not express a primary deontic stance – whether weak or strong. Only 16% and 8% of profferers’/third parties’ units convey a D- or D+ stance, respectively. In refusers, the proportion of D- claims is negligibly small with less than 1%; instead, 20% of their utterances express a strong deontic stance. Regarding all other kinds of primary stances, the two groups of negotiators show similar proportions with differences of less than 3% per type of stance. Most notably, both produce a considerable amount of utterances which do not express a primary stance at all (X): 35% in the case of profferers, 38% in the case of refusers.

The remainder of part II is organised by types of primary stances. Organising the analysis in this way (instead of, for instance, according to type of proffer) serves to highlight my focus on deontics, epistemics and affect rather than in/directness as key resources for relationship work, which is the major methodological contribution of this thesis. Starting with the deontic facet, we will first look at utterances which claim a lack of right to unilaterally make a decision (chapter 7.) before examining claims of

deontic authority (chapter 8.). Next, we will move on to primary epistemic stances. Chapters 9. and 10. address utterances which argue for or against an FA by foregrounding that the speaker either has or lack certain knowledge, respectively. The last interpersonal facet we will explore is the affective one. In chapter 11., we will focus on expressions of negative feelings or evaluations related to an FA; chapter 12. discusses positive feelings or evaluations. Finally, chapter 13. looks at utterances which do not express any primary stance at all. Each chapter will address the following questions:

- Which formats express the primary stance in question? Are there differences between profferers and refusers?
- Which formats express secondary stances and what are the types of secondary stances?
- How are stances responded to? What do overall turn designs of responses as well as the individual stances within them tell us about whether a prior speaker's utterance is treated as interpersonally problematic or unproblematic?

By 'unproblematic', I mean the recipient of an utterance does not orient to it as aggravating their face due to either infringement on their (distal) deontic, epistemic or affective rights and/or the speaker's overstepping their proximal deontic rights.

'Problematic', by contrast, means that an utterance is treated as aggravating the

recipient's face in one or more of these ways. I henceforth use the terms 'problematized' and 'unproblematized' synonymously with 'treated as problematic' and 'treated as unproblematic', respectively. Put simply, a problematized utterance is one that is treated as being out of line.

Throughout the subsequent analysis, I argue that examining participants' deontic, epistemic and affective claims provides insights into the simultaneous negotiation of future actions and interpersonal relations that go beyond what we can learn from focusing on in/directness and the mitigation or aggravation of imposition. More specifically, I show that:

- strong deontic claims are by no means the only stances treated as interpersonally problematic;
- D+ stances are in fact frequently treated as unproblematic, even when they are incongruent with the speaker's deontic status;
- stances can be challenged without this necessarily problematizing them;
- benefactives play an important role regarding which formats/stances negotiators utter – and are not problematized; and
- the linguistic behaviour of profferers and third parties is more prone to being problematized than that of refusers;

## 7. Primary weak deontic stances

The first kind of primary stance we will focus on is weak deontic claims. An utterance is considered to express a D- stance if it foregrounds the speaker's lack of deontic authority to unilaterally decide whether the FA being negotiated will happen or not. D- utterances make up just 8% (87 tokens) of the 1085 units assigned a stance (see table 16). There is, however, a dramatic difference between profferers/third parties and refusers: the former produced 84 out of 87 D- stances in my data. The three remaining instances uttered by refusers all implement counter offers.

Profferers' and third parties' D- utterances, too, are only used in the service of securing an FA – rather than resisting one. However, they are, unsurprisingly, more varied in terms of where they occur. Figure 8 shows that half of the D- stances occur in offer negotiations, followed by suggestions with 26% of instances. As pointed out earlier, however, suggestion negotiations are the most prominent type of proffer negotiation in my data. Figure 9 shows the proportions of profferers' D- utterances within the different proffer types. Here, we can see that D- stances do in fact make up the majority (62%) of units in the service of offers. Suggestion negotiations, by contrast, produce the smallest proportion of weak deontic stances from profferers (7%). This means that profferers and third parties show a strong tendency for claiming primary D- stances when offering, but not for the other proffer types. The comparatively low proportion of D- request units may be particularly surprising, considering that 'conventionally indirect formats' are generally considered the most

common way of requesting. However, the reader has to remember a number of points. First, my data set does not include requests (or any proffers) which are immediately accepted. This means the source corpora may contain many more D-requests. Second, I am also looking at utterances after the initial proffer and do not distinguish between 'head acts' and 'supportive moves'. As discussed in chapter 3., the vast majority of SAT-based studies focus only on initial proffers and prioritise more direct formats over less direct ones. Finally, although there is some overlap, my distinction between weak deontic and other kinds of stances does not neatly fall along the line of in/directness.

Figure 8: distribution of profferers' and third parties' D- utterances across proffer types





Figure 9: proportions of profferers' and third parties' D- utterances within proffer types





Which formats used by profferers express a primary weak deontic stance, then?

Table 17 provides an overview, including the number of tokens found in my data.

Most of these formats are traditionally considered to be conventionally indirect.

SUGGESTORIES correspond to some of Blum-Kulka & Olshtain's (1984) category

'language specific suggestory formula';<sup>32</sup> STATE-POSSIBILITIES, QUERY-FUTURES and

QUERY-WISHES are all 'references to preparatory conditions'. The remaining

categories are not included in the CCSARP request taxonomy. In addition, a number

of D- formats relate to what Barron (2005) – following Schneider (2003) – considers

offer 'preference strategies': DOUBLE-CHECKS<sup>33</sup>, WH-SUGGESTORIES, QUERY-

FUTURES and QUERY-WANTS. According to Schneider (2003, 183 and 194), such

'preference questions' highlight the conditional nature of offers and suggestions by

<sup>32</sup> The authors include utterance of the kind 'Why don't you...?' in their category. I consider this construction a separate category of WHIMPERATIVES (see section 9.1.).

<sup>33</sup> Barron (2005) does not consider these a separate category, but lists 'Are you sure you won't...' and 'Are you sure you don't want...' under 'question future act of hearer' and 'question desire', respectively.

asking about the addressee's wanting the proffered action to happen. Interestingly, however, Barron (2005) lists 'state ability' utterances (corresponding to my STATE-POSSIBILITIES) under execution strategies and 'state permission' (i.e. PERMISSIVES) under directive offer strategies together with imperatives. The former group, Schneider (2003, 182-183) argues, emphasises the commissive component of offers – but not optionality – , the latter the directive one. Not all formats traditionally considered 'conventionally indirect' express a primary D- stances and vice versa, then.

Table 17: formats used by profferers and third parties to express a primary weak deontic stance

Format	#
CONTEMPLATE	2
DOUBLE-CHECK	8
ELLIPSIS	6
PERMISSIVE	3
STATE-POSSIBILITY	16
WH-SUGGESTORY	5
QUERY-FUTURE	16
QUERY-WISH	26
QUERY-POSSIBILITY	2

As I demonstrate in the subsequent sections, D- utterances in the service of securing a proffer are perhaps the least interpersonally risky type of primary stance. For one, my data does not contain any examples in which refusers challenge a D- claim by expressing that the profferer does have the right to unilaterally decide. In fact, such a challenge appears to be impossible within the context of refusing; instead, it would constitute an acceptance of the proffer. For another, when profferers' D- utterances are problematized, the weak deontic stance itself is never the source of interpersonal trouble.

The subsequent analysis of weak deontic stances is organised as follows: first, we will look at D- utterances which are treated as interpersonally unproblematic by recipients (section 7.1.). This section illustrates why the above formats foreground the speaker's lack of deontic authority as well as what the designs of refusers' responses tell us about the recipients' perception of the D- utterances. In 7.2 , we will look at examples in which profferers D- utterances are problematized and examine how and

why this is done.

### **7.1. No power – no problem! Profferers' unproblematic utterances**

In this section, we will look at how a) profferers and third parties foreground a lack of deontic authority when (re-)proffering and b) refusers treat these utterances as interpersonally unproblematic. In addition to outlining why the formats discussed in this chapter express a primary D- stance, I demonstrate that:

- some D- formats express a secondary stance, which recipients can respond to independently of the primary one;
- recipients design their responses to D- utterances in certain ways in order to treat them as unproblematic;<sup>34</sup>
- treating an utterance as unproblematic often – but not always – involves maintaining or enhancing the co-participant's face;
- sometimes, however, refusers challenge their co-participants' (claimed) rights or lack of obligations. This may aggravate the profferer's face – and could therefore be treated as interpersonally problematic in a subsequent turn – but does not necessarily problematize the profferer's linguistic behaviour; and
- the response design may furthermore be influenced by a) the proffer type and b) the specific format being responded to;

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<sup>34</sup> This and the subsequent points do in fact apply to all utterances, not just those expressing a primary D- stance.

Let us begin with QUERY-FUTURES. These formats refer to the futurity/actualisation of an FA. By either asking whether an FA will happen or using a conditional construction ('if you X'), the speaker frames the FA as contingent on the addressee's volition. This foregrounds the speaker's lack of deontic right to unilaterally dictate that the FA happen. My analysis of these formats is therefore in line with traditional politeness approaches which point out the optionality conveyed with this and other 'conventionally indirect' constructions (Brown & Levinson 1987; Leech 2014).<sup>35</sup> The subsequent three examples do not only illustrate the use of this format but also show the impact of the proffer type being negotiated on the overall response design. More specifically, we see that offer refusals tend to look considerably different from refusals of other proffer types.<sup>36</sup>

Example 12 shows a QUERY-FUTURE utterance which implements a suggestion. The interaction occurs during a conversation about A's upcoming birthday party, which leads to speaker B asking whether A is "going to make invos up?".

Example 12: 'Invos', SPICE P1A-085 (suggestion)

1 B: Are you going to make invos up?

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<sup>35</sup> See Brown & Levinson's (1987, 172) negative politeness strategy 'give H option not to act' via 'do not coerce' and Leech's (2014, 152) discussion of conventionally indirect interrogative strategies, which the author argues "are making a show of consulting [the hearer]: indeed, they are apparently handing over the decision to [the hearer]". Barron (2005, 152-153) interestingly distinguishes first person from second person constructions, considering the former an 'execution strategy', which highlight the commissive aspect of offers, and the latter a 'preference strategy', which highlight the conditional aspect of offers.

<sup>36</sup> The analyses of the following examples are perhaps the most detailed ones in this thesis since I first introduce and explain various concepts and demonstrate my analysis rationale.

2 A: I don't know. It's such a it's such a money racket seriously.  
 3 Like Dermot's going to ask this printer at work does he have any.  
 4 I mean it's such a <unclear 4 sylls>  
 5 E: Well we could make invitations.  
 [...]

Before we move on to analysing this negotiation, there are two important questions to be addressed in relation to B's utterance in line 1. One: why consider it a proffer rather than an 'innocent' request for information? Three pieces of evidence were used to determine whether a speaker was in fact putting forward a future action, not just inquiring whether the addressee had certain future plans: first, if the action in question is an immediate one (as opposed to a 'deferred' one, cf. Lindström 1999), the situational context makes it clear that the speaker is looking for a decision (acceptance or refusal) rather than just an answer. Second, QUERY-FUTURES – as well as other formats – may occur after talk about some (perceived) problem or status quo which may necessitate remedying future actions to be taken. Third, after an initial (negative) response, profferers or third parties often continue the sequence with talk that conveys they consider the matter one requiring further negotiation. In the above interaction, for instance, speaker E subsequently offers to help A in making invitations (line 5). Question two is: does this mean QUERY-FUTURES express a secondary unknowing (i.e. E-) stance? As stated in chapter 6., I define secondary stances as stances which can be responded to in the affirmative without this constituting an acceptance. This is not the case in example 12 or in any other instances of QUERY-FUTURE in my data.

Let us now look at how speaker A responds to B's suggestions. Recipients of

QUERY-FUTURES – and other D- formats – often respond with a D+ stance, thereby confirming/accepting the deontic asymmetry. However, the way in which this is done is crucial, both in terms of the specific format used to express the D+ stance and the turn design overall. In the case of suggestions, requests and proposals, refusers often avoid D+ formats which bluntly and definitively negate the FA (such as NOS and NEG-FUTURES). This also applies to A's refusal in lines 2-4 above. The turn consists of four analysed units: an INDEFINITE response ("I'm not sure"), a REASON, a counter intending in the form of a STATE-FUTURE (line 3) and a partially unclear utterance which appears to be a repetition of the REASON. All formats used by A would be considered indirect refusal strategies according to Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz's (1990) taxonomy.<sup>37</sup> Within Brown & Levinson's (1987) framework, they might even be considered off-record since A does not explicitly state that they will not do the suggested FA.<sup>38</sup>

Contra to this conceptualisation, I argue that the refuser's utterances do in fact express a number of interpersonal claims. First, both the INDEFINITE response and the countering STATE-FUTURE foreground a strong deontic stance. Although the former expresses uncertainty or indecisiveness on A's part, it nevertheless conveys that the refuser is the one to decide – and that this decision may be against the FA.

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<sup>37</sup> The INDEFINITE response corresponds to their category J.1 'acceptance that functions as a refusal'; REASONS to C. 'excuse, reason, explanation'; and the counter to D. 'statement of alternative'. Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz (1990) do, however, not take into account the format such an alternative takes.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. their off-record strategies 'invite conversational implicatures' as well as 'be vague or ambiguous (Brown & Levinson 1987, 213 and 225).

The second D+ stance does not only resist the FA but also puts forward a counter action. By echoing B's QUERY-FUTURE with a STATE-FUTURE, speaker A again claims deontic authority vis-à-vis the profferer. In addition to the D+ units, the refuser also provides REASONS. They constitute a 'convention of means' rather than a 'convention of form' (Clark, 1979, 433), and are perhaps the most versatile format discussed in this thesis. In general, they convey an argument or justification. As we shall see throughout the analysis, they are used by profferers/third parties as well as refusers, can express either alignment or disalignment and occur in all types of proffer negotiations. REASONS can furthermore express a variety of primary stances: weak and strong epistemic as well as positive and negative affective (see the respective chapters for further discussion, including how REASONS are treated by recipients). Finally, their content can relate to a wide range of aspects concerning the FA being negotiated, such as potential obstacles, the (lack of) necessity or possibility of the FA or the speaker's personal dis/preference for an FA. As a consequence of this versatility, speakers can use REASONS both to treat prior utterances as problematic and to treat them as unproblematic. At a general level, A's REASONS introduce an obstacle, namely that invitations are expensive. Assertions of this kind tend to be ambiguous in terms of the stance they convey. One might say that A expresses knowledge regarding the price of invitations, therefore making a strong epistemic stance. However, I argue that they do more than that: they also negatively evaluate the price by referring to it as a "money racket".<sup>39</sup> In other words, the refuser disaligns

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<sup>39</sup> Aneg stances do not always rely on explicitly negative evaluative language, however (see



from the initially suggested FA on the basis of negative feelings concerning an aspect related to the FA. This constitutes a claim of primary negative affective rights, i.e. the right to negatively evaluate something. To summarise then, despite the 'indirect' – and perhaps even 'off-record' – nature of the refusal, A expresses various stances; and strong stances at that. They claim deontic authority vis-à-vis the profferer and furthermore express the right to negatively evaluate aspects of the FA.

What, then, are the interpersonal implications of these stances? Is the refuser problematizing speaker B's suggestion? Or is A themselves acting in a way that is (potentially) interpersonally problematic? Does the fact that A claims both strong deontic and affective rights mean the 'indirectness' of the refusal is inconsequential? To answer these questions, we have to look at more than just the stances. The following aspect are of importance:

- how the stances relate to those stances in the previous speaker's turn;
- whether stances are (treated as) congruent or incongruent with the participants' statuses;
- the benefactives of the FA being negotiated;
- the specific form and content of the different units; and
- the overall design of the turn, including the order of units;

Let us address these points in turn. By the end of this discussion we will see not

only the relevance of these factors for relational work but also that A's refusal treats the prior turn as interpersonally unproblematic – despite the D+ and Aneg stances. As previously stated, the refuser's strong deontic stances accept or confirm the D-stance expressed by B. The Aneg stances, by contrast, do not relate to any prior utterance. This means that none of the refuser's stances challenge a prior stance by the profferer. In addition, all stances are congruent with the speakers' statuses. The participants in my data do usually not have the right to unilaterally decide others' actions, meaning the profferer does in fact lack deontic authority whereas the refuser has the right to determine their own actions. Affective statuses are slightly less obvious; however, speakers generally have the right to negatively evaluate aspects of the FA if they have epistemic access to the target (see chapter 11.). This, too, applies to the refuser: they can reasonably be expected to know how much invitations cost. In addition, the co-participants do subsequently not challenge A's access to the target nor do they disagree with the negative affective stance. The benefactives involved in the FA are important as well. In the case of suggestions and offers, the refuser declines (potential) benefit for themselves; in the case of requests and proposals, by contrast, the refuser (also) denies the profferer of a certain benefit. A refuser's deontic rights (not to do something) may therefore clash with a profferer's entitlement to something. Refusals of different proffer types can therefore be considered more or less egoistic or altruistic – just like the proffer types themselves. In the above example, speaker A refuses a suggestion and does therefore not deny any benefit to B. As a consequence, A's disalignment based entirely on

subjective/egoistic factors does not challenge B's rights or entitlements in any way.

So far, then, we can say that the stances themselves do not aggravate the profferer's face. If we look at the form and content of the refuser's utterances, we see that the turn design does in fact do face-maintaining work. As pointed out earlier, neither of the D+ utterances state that A will definitely not do the suggested FA. In doing so they treat the FA as not categorically objectionable. The INDEFINITE response, in particular, orients to the suggested FA as an acceptable possibility. In fact, it is not the act of making/sending invitations which A has a problem with; rather, as their REASONS point out, they are objecting to spending (too much) money on them. This is further emphasised by the counter intending, which implies that they do want to send invitations if they can get free ones. Although the REASONS speaker A gives also frame the (potential) refusal as their choice, the fact that they do provide a justification is significant. As discussed in section 3.2., reasons, excuses and justification have previously been found to be a common refusal strategy for all proffer types. From a classical politeness theory perspective, A's reasons can be analysed as doing relational work by being indirect – potentially even off-record – on the one hand, and by conveying that the participants are cooperators, on the other (cf. positive politeness strategy 'give or ask for reasons' in Brown & Levinson 1987, 128-129). Correspondingly, CA research has shown that the act of refusing, in contrast to accepting, is generally treated as an action which requires an account (e.g. Drew 1984; Heritage 1988; Labov & Fanshel 1977; Peräkylä 1998; Wootton 1981). As previously mentioned, such accounts are one way in which refusals are designed and

treated as dispreferred actions. In fact, it has been argued that accounts are an institutionalised norm – both for proffers and refusals –, the absence of which is noticeable and has interpersonal implications (Heritage 1988, 138; Labov & Fanshel 1977, 64)<sup>40</sup>. Heritage (1988, 136) furthermore points out that the content of accounts may be crucial as well. The author states that refusers often make reference to inability. This expresses ‘no fault’ and therefore does not “[implicate] a lack of willingness to respond in the proposed way, or [challenge] the other’s rights in the situation”. While the REASONS given by speaker A above do not express the refuser’s inability to comply, the blame is nonetheless transferred to external factors: the price of invitations.

To summarise, the refuser’s D+ and Aneq stances are congruent with their status and do not challenge any prior claims by the profferer. Due to the proffer type in question, A’s claimed deontic authority does also not clash with or challenge any entitlement of B. In addition, A treats their refusal as a dispreferred action, particularly by providing REASONS and having a turn-initial INDEFINITE response. This adherence to the socially expected norm for suggestion refusals signals ‘business as usual’. Finally, A maintains B’s face by treating the proffered FA as a reasonable and appropriate course of action which is (potentially) refused only due to factors beyond A’s control. Overall, then, A’s response is designed in a way which

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<sup>40</sup> Both Labov & Fanshel (1977) and Heritage (1988) point out that not providing accounts may be a sanctionable offence. As we shall see later on, however, this is not necessarily the case. In section 7.1., I show that an absence of REASONS may not just be a lapse in judgement but a deliberate way of problematizing a profferer.

treats the profferer's D- utterance and the suggestion it implements as interpersonally unproblematic. The above analysis has, however, also highlighted the two-directional nature of relational work: refusals may be designed as dispreferred actions not only to treat the prior turn as unproblematic but also to avoid violating the socially expected norms and such behaviour subsequently being problematized. We will come back to this issue in section 7.2.

Moving on to example 13, we see a similar avoidance of blunt D+ stances in the context of a request.<sup>41</sup> Prior to the extract, the participants are discussing a local theatre production. After B discloses the dates of the production, they request that C "come down for it" during that period, presumably so they can go see it together.

Example 13: 'Weekend', SPICE P1-072 (Request)

1 B: Seventh eighth and ninth. Will ye come down for it will ye?  
 2 C: Oh I wasn't going to come home that weekend.  
 [...]

As in the first example, the proffer is formatted as a QUERY-FUTURE. This time, the refusal – delayed by a turn-initial 'oh' – comes in the form of a NEG-FUTURE. This utterance foregrounds a strong deontic stance by orienting to the speaker's intention. Crucially, however, it is not a standard simple future construction ('I won't\*'), but a future-in-the past. This, I argue, is done to avoid aggravating B's face and treat the request as unproblematic. Despite the D+ stance, the utterance does

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<sup>41</sup> The proffer is considered a request, because they are negotiating C's 'coming down' specifically for the play, not their joint attending of the play (which would be a proposal).

not express a definitive 'no' or treat the FA as objectionable. In addition, this specific NEG-FUTURE construction allows C to distance themselves from the decision. The utterance conveys that, up until this point, C had not intended to visit during the weekend in question. This frames C's (potentially) not visiting as a decision which was made prior to, and entirely independently from, the proffered FA. Although the NEG-FUTURE expresses the speaker's deontic authority, the specific future-in-the-past format implies a no-fault account. Despite being clearly based on C's volition rather than external factors, the obstacle is temporally removed from the current situation as if C no longer has any control over it. This is perhaps more important here than in the previous negotiation. In refusing the request, C denies B of attending the play together. C's (claimed) deontic authority to decide their own actions may therefore challenge B's entitlement to the requested benefit. Overall, the refusal is designed to avoid such a challenge, treating the FA as non-objectionable and the D- request as interpersonally unproblematic.

In contrast to suggestions and requests, (QUERY-FUTURE) offers are generally treated as unproblematic in different ways. Here, refusals do in fact bluntly negate the proffered FA, namely in the form of NOS. Although offer refusals, too, contain REASONS, these do not shift blame to external factors. Instead, refusers orient to their own (lack of) wants and needs, expressing that the proffered action is not necessary. This is illustrated in example 14.

Example 14: 'Tea', P1A-067 SPICE (offer)

- 1 A: [...] Will you have another cup of tea?  
 2 C: No no I've plenty enough Anne.  
 3 A: Are you sure? Or a sandwich?  
 4 C: No no I've plenty <unclear 6 sylls>

The initial offer in line 1 enquires whether the addressee 'will have' tea (QUERY-FUTURE). In line 3, we see a re-proffer in the form of a DOUBLE-CHECK followed by an ELLIPSIS (of the QUERY-FUTURE) which implements a counter-offer<sup>42</sup>. Like the initial offer, both foreground the profferer's lack of deontic authority. Both responses from C are formatted in the same way: turn-initial NOS and a subsequent REASON (E+, informing A why the FAs are not necessary). In contrast to the previous interactions, then, the refuser does not express uncertainty, instead emphasising their disalignment (and deontic authority) by repeating the NOS.

As discussed in section 3.2., previous research shows that the use of NOS in offer refusals is not unusual; this also applies to my own data. The common occurrence of NOS in offer refusals suggests that this constitutes a socially acceptable way of refusing offers which is neither problematizing nor treated as problematic. This can be explained in terms of benefactives. By refusing an offer, the speaker does not only decline benefit for themselves but also cost to the hearer. In contrast to request refusals, then, offer refusals are altruist. There is consequently no danger of challenging the profferer's entitlement to the FA. Rather, C's REASONS orient to a lack of need, implying a lack of obligation on the profferer's part. They express a primary strong epistemic stance, informing the addressee of the speaker's

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<sup>42</sup> Speaker A counters their own initial offer in light of C's refusal.

physical/psychological state. Like all other stances we have encountered so far, this one is also congruent with the refuser's epistemic status and does not challenge A's (presupposed) lack of knowledge. This is because A does not have epistemic access to how C feels or what they might want/need. In other words, the profferer cannot be expected to know that C has "plenty enough".

So far, I have argued that QUERY-FUTURES foreground the speaker's lack of deontic authority and that various responding formats – despite their 'indirectness' – claim strong deontic, epistemic or affective rights. This latter point, in particular, highlights the importance of examining FA negations in terms of more than just in/directness and the mitigation or aggravation of imposition. In addition, I have shown that, in order to fully grasp the interpersonal implications of utterances, we have to consider a range of aspects: from the relation between stances and statuses over benefactives to the overall turn design. However, it is not just the analyst who pays attention to these points; I hope to have demonstrated that the participants do so as well. By designing their responses in particular ways, refusers orient to their own and others' rights and obligations as well as the benefactives involved in the negotiation. How they do this – the stances they express, the form and content of TCUs and the turn design overall – tell the co-participants and us whether an utterance is treated as interpersonally problematic. The remainder of this section addresses further D- utterances, illustrating why they foreground a weak deontic stance as well as discussing any secondary stances they may express. We will see that some secondary stances allow refusers specific ways of maintaining the profferer's



face. Finally, I demonstrate that even when refusers (potentially) aggravate the face of a co-participant, this does not necessarily problematize the profferer's/third party's linguistic behaviour.

In example 14, we saw that refusers can disalign from an offer by expressing an E+ stance pertaining to the speaker's lack of wants/need. Participants' epistemic asymmetry regarding one person's want and needs is in fact a commonly employed resource for making (pr)offers, namely in the form of QUERY-WANT constructions. By either asking whether the recipient wants/needs an object/service/action or using a conditional ('if you want'), speakers foreground their own lack of deontic authority in the matter. Like QUERY-FUTURES, QUERY-WANTS have been described as conventionally indirect strategies which convey optionality (see section 3.1.). And, like the previously discussed format, they do not express a secondary unknowing stance.

As previously stated, QUERY-WANTS tend to implement offers.<sup>43</sup> The following

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<sup>43</sup> They can, however, also be used to make other types of proffers. Examples 15a and 15b show a common feature of SWDA interactions: the initial negotiation of how to proceed and who 'goes first'. The question of who begins is not immediately transparent in terms of benefactives. Profferers may attempt to use this grey area to their advantage by designing their proffers in typical offer formats. This gives refusers two choices: either responding in a way which suggests a different assessment of the benefactives (example 15a shows a refusal format more typical for requests than offers) or deliberately going with the offer reading and beating the profferer at their own game.

Example 15a: 'Go ahead', SWDA sw\_0128

- 1 A: You want to go ahead and start? <noise>
- 2 B: Uh I was hoping that you would but [oh]
- 3 A: [oh] <laughter>
- 4 B: <laughter> In social changes is that uh [...]

Example 15b: 'Go first', SWDA sw\_0447

two examples do not only illustrate this aligning format but also two response formats unique to offer refusals: OFF-HOOKS and GRATITUDES. In addition, we will see a lack of REASONS. This, I argue, is due to the proffer format.

Example 16: ‘Margarine’, SPICE P1-052 (offer)

1 A: Do you want the margarine? Do you want margarine?  
2 B: No that's fine. [...]

Example 17: ‘Dad’, SPICE P1A-078 (offer)

1 A: I've a couple over now. Do you want one Dad?  
2 D: No thanks.

The offers in examples 16 and 17 both enquire whether the addressee ‘wants’ some good. As in the previously discussed offer negotiations, the refusers respond with turn-initial NOS. Once again, this format accepts/confirms the deontic asymmetry, expressing a (congruent) strong deontic stance; and, again, the decisive D+ refusals are licensed by the proffer type and its benefactives. Nevertheless, there are some semantic differences due to the literal meaning of QUERY-WANTS. Instead of negating that the refuser will ‘have’ the offered good, here ‘no’ strictly speaking negates their wanting it. The orientation to want rather than futurity in the offer appears to have consequences for the response design: refusers can omit REASONS which convey their lack of want/need. This might be due to the fact that NO, in

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1 A: You want to go first <chiming>?  
2 B: <Static> No you can start <laughter>.  
3 A: Okay. Uh one of the things they talked about was [...]

response to a QUERY-WANT format, already orients to the speaker's lack of want/need and, therefore, to the FA not being necessary. In other words, the justification is implied in the NO in these cases. The above interactions contain one other unit uttered by the refuser, respectively. In 16, speaker B follows up the NO with the utterance "that's fine". At first glance, this unit may look like REASONS just like "I've plenty" in example 14. However, I argue that this constitutes an OFF-HOOK, which foregrounds the refuser's deontic authority. Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz (1990) consider 'letting the interlocutor off the hook' an indirect refusal and a sub-category of the more general strategy 'attempt to dissuade interlocutor'. As previously stated, REASONS foreground the epistemic or affective facet. While they do of course have deontic implications, disaligning REASONS provide justifications for refusing. OFF-HOOKS, by contrast, do not justify the refusal. While "I've enough" expresses disalignment on the basis of something the refuser knows (and the profferer does not know), 'that's fine' relieves the profferer of the obligation to provide the offered good, thereby foregrounding the refuser's deontic authority.

In example 17, by contrast, speaker D combines their NO with a GRATITUDE (X/Apos). Like OFF-HOOKS, they occur only in response to (ostensible) offers. Nevertheless, expressions of GRATITUDE are not restricted to refusals; in fact, an unaccompanied 'thanks' might constitute an acceptance. This format does therefore not express disalignment, but can nevertheless occur in the service of resisting a proffer (cf. Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz 1990, who consider such expressions 'adjuncts to refusals'). As a consequence, the positive affective stance GRATITUDES

convey vis-à-vis the addressee is considered a secondary rather than a primary one.

This format further differs from most other affective stances in that it expresses affective obligation instead of affective rights. Motivated by the benefactives of offers, GRATITUDES convey positive feelings which are owed to the profferer, namely appreciation. This, of course, enhances the addressee's face and contributes to treating the D- offer as unproblematic.

Unlike other D+ utterances, one format frames the FA as optional but contingent on the profferer's approval: PERMISSIVES. Constructions convey such as 'I'll let you ...' and 'you can...' (in the sense of 'may') convey that the profferer gives the addressee permission to do something if they so wish. One such example is illustrated in 18. Just before the extract, A tells B that they do not have enough chairs for an upcoming event. This display of a problem triggers an offer from B.

Example 18: 'Foldaway chairs', SPICE P1A-038 (offer)

1 B: You can take two [from my] house.  
 2 A: [Got some]  
 3 Have you any foldaway chairs or?  
 4 B: No they're just the big wooden ones.  
 5 A: Yeah. Then there's no point then.  
 6 No I don't want you carrying it. I just maybe I'll ask upstairs.  
 [...]

In line 1, speaker B states that A "can" borrow two of their chairs. The modal verb expresses what is called 'deontic possibility' (Huddleston et al. 2017, 182-184), i.e. permission. This conveys that the profferer has the authority to allow or prohibit a certain FA. Despite this, I argue that PERMISSIVES claim a weak deontic stance with

regard to the FA happening; B yields the decision to speaker A. After an initial INFO-REQUEST (X/E-) in line 3, A subsequently refuses the offer by providing REASONS why the FA is not a good idea: the chairs are too heavy/unwieldy and A does not want B carrying them. This justification once again treats the proffer as interpersonally unproblematic.

The next format to be discussed in this section are CONTEMPLATIONS. Although infrequent, they are interesting because the primary stance they express depends on the specific construction, who utters it and the dis/alignment conveyed. In addition, when designed as interrogatives, they can also convey a secondary weak epidemic stance to which to recipient can respond. CONTEMPLATIONS are in effect modifications of QUERY-FUTURES, STATE-FUTURES or WEAK-NECESSITIES (see section 9.1.1.) Which embed a reference to the refuser's thinking about or considering an FA. To the best of my knowledge, this format has not received any attention in previous research, probably due to its low frequency and the fact that it might be subsumed under other formats. I subsequently argue that they express a primary weak deontic stance when referring to futurity. By framing the FA as something the addressee might consider, they foreground the profferer's lack of deontic authority.

The first of these interactions occurs during a conversation about cars. After B disclosed that they are always either paying off one car or saving for the next, A suggests leasing as an alternative.

Example 19: 'Leasing', SWDA sw\_0165 (suggestion)

1 A: Have you thought about uh leasing?  
 2 B: Well uh I have thought about it  
 3 but leasing wouldn't  
 4 you know I don't use it for my business.  
 5 A: I see.  
 [...]

Instead of asking, for instance, whether B will lease a car instead of buying, the profferer asks whether B has "thought about" it. The utterance therefore refers to two actions: the (past) act of considering leasing and the act of actually leasing in the future. Once again, the refuser's response is designed as a dispreferred action; it begins in line 2 with dispreferred features: an objection marker 'well' and a hesitation 'uh'. In response to proffers, both serve to delay the disalignment and are refusal-implicating (Davidson 1984, 110; cf. also Jefferson 1974 and Pomerantz 1975). The third TCU in line 2 is also alignment-neutral; the utterance "I have thought about it" constitutes a responding CONTEMPLATION (X/E+) which confirms that B has in fact considered leasing. The unit is interesting because it constitutes an affirmative response to the profferer's prior turn without accepting the proffer. This, I argue, is because A's interrogative CONTEMPLATION expresses a secondary weak epistemic stance regarding the addressee's past actions. As a consequent, B is able to respond to the secondary E- stance independently from the primary D- stance.<sup>44</sup> In this

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<sup>44</sup> CONTEMPLATIONS can also foreground D- stances when in declarative format. In such cases, they do not express a secondary stance, as example 20 illustrates:

Example 20: 'Beans', SWDA sw\_0833 (suggestions)

1 A: So you might uh think about that.

regard, the profferer's CONTEMPLATION differs from QUERY-FUTURES and QUERY-WANTS, which cannot be treated in this way. The secondary stance is noteworthy because it opens up a specific opportunity for the refuser to do relational work. By confirming that they have thought about the FA, B immediately treats the prior turn as unproblematic; the proffer format allows them to emphasise a point of convergence (i.e. 'we agree that leasing is an option worth considering') and frame the FA as a reasonable and appropriate course of action.

Only after the initial delays and attending to the secondary E- stance does B express disalignment. Forgoing a claim of deontic authority, they instead resist the suggestion by means of REASONS. In line 3, they begin to say that "leasing wouldn't" but then do not complete the sentence. Instead, they launch a new REASON in line 4, stating that they "don't use [the car] for business". The first REASON may have been abandoned in order to avoid potential face-aggravation by framing the FA in a negative way. We do not know what B meant to say, but it might have been something along the lines of leasing not being a good idea or solution. Instead, the refuser does not complete the utterance and provides a REASON explaining *why* leasing would not work/be a good idea. The disalignment is thereby expressed in a more implicit way. This second REASON furthermore conveys a primary E+ stance regarding an epistemic domain A is not expected to know about: B's usage of the car. It therefore does not treat A's lack of knowledge as a violation of their epistemic obligation.

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2 B: I might try that.

The next format we will look at also expresses a secondary stance: STATE-POSSIBILITIES. In the analysis so far, I have argued that refusers treat (D-) proffers as unproblematic by treating the FA a reasonable/appropriate option to be considered – or at least by not treating it as unreasonable/inappropriate. The issue of reasonability is crucial to all proffers but most apparent in STATE-POSSIBILITIES. Within SAT, the possibility of an FA is considered a ‘preparatory condition’ for the felicitous performance of commissive and directive speech acts. In other words, an utterance cannot count as a felicitous (i.e. serious and successful) commissive or directive speech act if the speaker knows that the action they are putting forward is impossible. Moving away from what ‘counts as’ a proffer, it seems a fair generalisation to say that proffers presuppose the speaker’s belief that the FA is not impossible or unreasonable/inappropriate (cf. Stevanovic 2015, 84).

STATE-POSSIBILITIES are a further ‘conventionally indirect’ format (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984). Unlike QUERY-POSSIBILITIES, however, they are considered ‘rude,’ ‘peremptory’ and ‘presumptuous’ when implementing a request<sup>45</sup> without modification by means of negation and tag question or hedging (Brown & Levinson 1987, 135-136). This, Brown & Levinson (1987, 136) argue, is because the utterance assumes that the addressee is willing and able to perform the FA. Barron (2005) considers ‘state ability’ construction with a first person singular subject an ‘execution strategy’, which highlight the commissive nature of offers. In the subsequent analysis as well as in section 7.2., I show that STATE-POSSIBILITIES express a primary D- stance

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<sup>45</sup> Brown & Levinson (1987) do not discuss these forms in the context of other proffer types.



as well as a secondary E+ stance irrespective of the proffer type they implement. I further argue that any (potential) interpersonal trouble is due to the secondary rather than the primary stance. Once again, recipients can positively respond to the secondary stance without accepting the proffer. However, in contrast to the above CONTEMPLATE, the backgrounded claim is a strong rather than weak epistemic one. This means a negative response to the secondary stance constitutes a) a challenge of the utterance's content and b) a disalignment.

Let us first look at an unproblematic STATE-POSSIBILITY suggestion. Example 21 shows the start of a long negotiation about whether speakers A and C will get curtains or a screen for their living room window. Just prior to this extract, speaker A discloses that they might get a screen. This prompts an unsolicited suggestion from speaker B.

**Example 21: 'Curtains', SPICE P1-013 (suggestion)**

1 B: Or you could [ just get uhm ]  
 2 A: [And get the <unclear 2 sylls>]  
 3 B: curtains that when you pull them back they go right back.  
 4 Means like [during the day]  
 5 A: [ Yeah ] aye but it's still you know  
 6 I sort of li- I'd want the view.  
 [...]

In lines 1 and 3, speaker B suggests that A and C “could get” curtains. By pointing out what can or could happen, STATE-POSSIBILITIES primarily express the speaker's lack of deontic authority, thereby conveying a D- stance. However, I argue that the formats do more than that. This is due to the semantics of the modals ‘can/could’. Within the literature on modality, the above instance of ‘could’ is sometimes

described as conveying 'dynamic modality' (Palmer 2014, 83-88). Dynamic uses of 'can/could' express that something is possible without the speaker claiming power regarding the matter (i.e. they are not giving permission in the sense of 'you may' like in example 18 above). A more fine-grained distinction can be made between (Huddleston et al. 2017, 184-185):

- i. expressing ability, e.g. 'She can run the marathon in under three hours'.
- ii. expressing what is reasonable or acceptable, e.g. 'You can always say you're too busy'.
- iii. expressing what is circumstantially possible, e.g. 'Water can still get in'.
- iv. expressing what is sometimes the case, e.g. 'These animals can be dangerous'.

The above STATE-POSSIBILITY is closest in meaning to senses ii and iii, conveying that getting curtains is circumstantially possible and reasonable/acceptable. This, I argue, means that the utterance expresses a secondary knowing stance regarding the feasibility of the proffered FA – something which is only presupposed by other proffer formats.

As in the case of the previously discussed CONTEMPLATION, recipients are able to respond to this secondary E+ stance. After B finishes the STATE-POSSIBILITY in line 3 – and while beginning an additional REASON in line 4 –, speaker A responds: first with two agreement tokens 'yeah' and 'aye' (BACK-CHANNELLING, X/X), then with REASONS (the first one abandoned, the second one expressing an Apos stance

orienting to the speaker's personal preference). Although 'yeah', like 'mm', can function as a mere acknowledgement of what was previously said, the former carries "implications of agreement or affirmation" which the latter lacks (Gardner 1998, 213). Agreements occur frequently in FA negotiations, both as stand-alone utterances and as turn-initial 'pro-forma' (Schegloff 2007, 69-70) agreements followed by disalignment. Nevertheless, such agreements do not constitute an acceptance of the proffered FA. Previous research on agreement tokens shows that, as stand-alone responses, they are insufficient to be heard as proffer acceptances and may even be refusal-implicating (Davidson 1984, 112; Lindström & Weatherall 2015). This is further evidenced by instances of agreement tokens preceding a disalignment like the example above.

Regarding their interpersonal implications, Félix-Brasdefer (2008, 81) states that 'partial agreements' accompanying refusals generally "express involvement with the point of view of the interlocutor by showing initial interest in [a proffer]". However, I argue that, following a STATE-POSSIBILITY, they are inevitably heard as agreeing with the possibility/reasonability of the FA. In such cases, they do not only "express interest" but also confirm the profferer's secondary E+ stance – in terms of both the accuracy of the content and co-participant's epistemic rights. The double agreement uttered by A above emphasises that they are confirming the epistemic claim rather than merely acknowledging it. This furthermore treats the STATE-POSSIBILITY suggestion as interpersonally unproblematic. The face-maintaining work done in this way may be particularly important in example 21 since B's suggestion is unsolicited;

A did not ask for advice and there was no discussion of a (latent or explicitly addressed) problem which would need a solution. In fact, the suggestion was uttered in response to A's disclosure of contradictory plans (getting a screen). B may therefore be perceived as overstepping their proximal deontic rights, i.e. the right to make a suggestion.<sup>46</sup> The design of A's response ensures, however, that any potential violation on the part of B are treated as interpersonally unproblematic.

Instead of confirming that something is possible/reasonable/appropriate, refusers can also challenge the secondary epistemic stance conveyed by a STATE-POSSIBILITY. Nevertheless, this does not automatically treat the utterance as problematic, as example 22 illustrates. The excerpt below occurs during a lengthy negotiation of an initial proposal that B and C attend an event together with A. After it transpires that B's plans are dependent on what their partner is doing on the weekend in question, speaker A makes an (embedded) suggestion intended as a solution to the issue.

Example 22: P1075 SPICE (suggestion)

[...]  
 33 A: You can bring him.  
 34 B: <unclear several sylls>  
 35 C: You could bring him.  
 36 B: He's might be working  
 37 A: Oh okay don't bring him. <laughter>  
 [...]

While the initial suggestion is ambiguous between a PERMISSIVE and a STATE-POSSIBILITY, C's re-proffer in line 35 is definitely the latter. Again, the format conveys

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<sup>46</sup> See section 7.1. for a detailed discussion of profferers' proximal deontic rights.

not only the speaker's lack of deontic authority but also knowledge that the FA is circumstantially possible and reasonable/appropriate. This time, the secondary stance is not confirmed but rather challenged. B responds with a REASON which points out a potential obstacle: their partner "might be working". Like the disaligning REASON in example 19 ('leasing'), the unit expresses a strong deontic claim. In this case, however, it directly challenges the accuracy of the secondary stance expressed by the STATE-POSSIBILITY: it may not be possible for B to bring their partner. Nevertheless, there are no grounds to treat C's incorrect/lack of knowledge as problematic; the work schedule of B's partner is not within C's expected domain of knowledge and their not knowing does therefore not violate their epistemic obligation. In addition, while the circumstantial possibility of the FA is challenged, its theoretical possibility (perhaps on a different weekend) and reasonability are not. Despite challenging aspects of C's secondary E+ claim, then, the refuser's utterance does not aggravate their co-participants face or treat the STATE-POSSIBILITY suggestion as interpersonally problematic.

Now that we have seen that a) STATE-POSSIBILITIES explicitly assert what other proffer formats only presuppose and that b) the possibility of an FA – whether asserted or presupposed – can be confirmed or challenged, let us focus on the aspect of reasonability a little more. I have so far demonstrated that confirming the reasonability of an FA (or at least not challenging it) is one major way of doing face-maintaining work and treating a (D-) proffer as unproblematic. The final example in this section will show that refusers may even treat an FA as unreasonable – but not

inappropriate – without this treating the prior utterance as interpersonally problematic. In addition, it will illustrate a D- format we have not encountered yet: WH-SUGGESTORIES.

WH-SUGGESTORIES are utterances in the form of ‘how about...’ or ‘what about...’ interrogatives which usually only name the central object of the FA rather than the action itself. Considering them a further ‘conventionally indirect’ strategy, Brown & Levinson (1987, 111-112 and 270-271) argue that their elliptical nature expresses positive politeness (via ‘use in-group identity markers’ and ‘claim common ground’), which overrides the negative politeness aspect of conventional indirectness. Schneider (2003, 183 and 194; also Barron 2005), on the other hand, notes the conditional quality of WH-SUGGESTORIES offers and suggestions. My analysis of this format’s primary stance once again corresponds to the latter point. I argue that these constructions foreground the speaker’s lack of deontic authority by inviting the addressee’s judgment/decision. Example 23 illustrates a WH-SUGGESTORY used to implement a suggestion. The excerpt is part of a long negotiation about what speaker A will wear to an upcoming event. B’s (embedded) suggestion in line 11 comes as a potential solution to an issue blocking a different FA; B previously suggested A wear a specific dress, which A argues is too long. The negotiation about shoes is meant to solve this problem.

Example 23: ‘Clothes’, P1A-063 (suggestion)

[...]  
11 B:      What about your shoes?

12 A: Oh God I hate them.  
 13 B: Yeah [ but yeah and then it'd be ]  
 14 C: [You'd look taller like in the in the heely] shoes uhm  
 15 the dress wouldn't look as long and you wouldn't be tripping on it.  
 [...]

The refuser's response to the WH-SUGGESTORY differs significantly from what we have seen so far. Although A does not express a D+ stance and/or explicitly state that they will not wear the shoes in question, the refusal seems blunt. The turn consists of an initial exclamation (Aneg, see section 11.2.1.) followed by a REASON. While the former is not included in Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz's (1990) taxonomy, the latter once again falls under the 'indirect' strategy or 'justifications'. Yet, it is a justification unlike what we have seen so far; the unit expresses the speaker's personal dislike of the proffered object, thereby expressing negative affective rights. In terms of its interpersonal implications, then, it diverges from the traditional conception of refusal justifications as face-maintaining. As previously mentioned, Brown & Levinson (1987, 128-129) claim that giving a reason is a positive politeness strategy. Speaker A's REASON, however, does not convey that the participants are cooperators. Nor does it provide a 'no-fault' justification.

The face-aggravating potential of such a REASON has in fact been pointed out by Heritage (1988, 138), who states that a speaker "who fails to provide a no-fault account can be constructed as hostile or insinuating or, at the least, careless of the face of a co-interactant". Indeed, speaker A bases their disalignment entirely on subjective feelings regarding the object in question and – by extension – the suggested FA. Although the Aneg stance a) is congruent with the refuser's affective

rights (they have epistemic access to the target and therefore the right to evaluate it), b) does not challenge a prior stance by the profferer (e.g. an explicit positive evaluation of the shoes) and c) cannot treat the profferer's lack of knowledge regarding A's feelings as problematic (they have no epistemic obligations), it (potentially) aggravates B's face. This, I argue, is because it challenges – or disagrees with – the presupposed reasonability of the suggestion. According to Culpeper (1996, 357), 'seeking disagreement' is a positive impoliteness strategy, damaging the recipient's want to be approved of. In the above example, the divergent judgments regarding the shoes more specifically frame B as someone who makes bad suggestions.

Why, then, do I hold that A is not treating B's utterance as interpersonally problematic, i.e. out of line? As previously explained, I consider utterances to be (treated as) interpersonally problematic if the addressee orients to an infringement on their deontic, epistemic or affective rights and/or the speaker's overstepping their proximal deontic rights. Neither is the case in the above example. First, B does not infringe on or challenge A's rights in any way. The stance they express does in fact foreground their lack of distal deontic authority vis-à-vis A. Regarding the second aspect, we have to consider what B's proximal deontic rights are grounded on. As previously stated, a person can either claim the right to suggest or they can be granted that right by the addressee. In the former case, I argue, speakers are (treated as) licensed to make a suggestion if they have knowledge regarding what constitutes an appropriate solution to a (perceives) problem or an action which otherwise



benefits the addressee. This applies to B's suggestion; the refuser's challenge regarding the FA's reasonability is based entirely on subjective taste. They do not, however, challenge its general appropriateness or that it would solve the problem of the dress being too long. In fact, both B and C subsequently defend the suggestion by pointing out the latter point (lines 13-15). In conclusion, then, A's orientation to their personal dislike treats B as having bad judgement regarding taste – and potentially aggravates B's face – but not as being out of line for suggesting the shoes.

To summarise, this section has demonstrated that:

- the examination of participants' primary and secondary stances provides a fruitful lens for the analysis of relation work in FA negotiations;
- participants pay attention to their own and other's deontic, epistemic and affective rights and obligations as well as the benefactives being negotiated; by orienting to these aspects in particular ways, they do relational work; and
- as researchers, we therefore have to consider not only speaker' stances themselves but also how they relate to the previous speaker's turn, whether they are congruent, how they relate to the benefactives being negotiated, which formats are used to express them and which other TCUs accompany them;

With respect to profferers' D- utterances, we saw that:

- some formats traditionally considered conventionally indirect proffer strategies do more than minimising imposition and/or convey optionality. A number of D- utterances express secondary knowing or unknowing stances in addition to foregrounding the speaker's lack of deontic authority;
- secondary stances can be responded to in the affirmative (and sometimes negative) without this constituting an acceptance (or refusal);
- this opens up specific opportunities for relational work to the recipient of such D- utterance;

Regarding refusers' responses to D- utterances, it was furthermore shown that:

- refusal forms traditionally considered indirect or off-record strategies do in fact express a range of stances – including even strong deontic ones in the case of indefinite responses and counters in the form of, for instance, STATE-FUTURES
- treating a D- utterance as unproblematic often – but not always – involves maintaining or enhancing the addressee's face. This can be achieved in a range of ways, many of which have previous been described in the literature (e.g. shifting blame to external factors);
- however, the ability to respond to secondary stances expressed by D- utterances as a resource of relational work in FA negotiations has hitherto not

received specific attention;

- secondary stances can be responded to in the affirmative without constituting an acceptance, thereby maintaining the addressee's face; however, if no secondary stance is conveyed, even weak agreements are avoided in order to not be (mis-)heard as accepting the FA. This is particularly true for interrogative formats such as QUERY-FUTURES or QUERY-WANTS;
- refusers may also challenge the possibility or reasonability of an FA, which is generally presupposed by proffers but can also be asserted by secondary E+ stances. Yet, this does not necessarily aggravate the recipient's face and/or problematize their linguistic behaviour;
- if the (circumstantial) possibility of an FA is challenged with an obstacle the profferer cannot be expected to know about, this does not aggravate the profferer's face or orient to a violation of their epistemic obligation; and
- if the reasonability of an FA is challenged based on the refuser's personal preference/taste, this may aggravate the profferer's face but does not threaten their utterance as problematic;

## **7.2. No power? No problem? Profferers' problematized utterances**

As I have previously stated, weak distal deontic stances do not in and of themselves provide grounds for being problematized – at least not in the context of refusing.

The previous section has furthermore demonstrated that not knowing about

obstacles which are not within the profferer's expected epistemic domain and proffering something that the refuser considers unreasonable due to personal taste/judgment are not interpersonal offences. Nevertheless, D- utterances can be treated as interpersonally problematic. In this section, we will see that profferers' and third parties' linguistic behaviour can be problematized if they overstep their proximal deontic rights. I argue that:

- the right to proffer is grounded on a number of other rights and obligations which depend on the proffer type;
- the violation of one or more of these aspects constitutes an interpersonal offence;
- if refusers do in fact treat the offence as interpersonally problematic, they do this by orienting to the specific right or obligation that has been violated; and
- in addition, refusers diverge from normalised turn designs, which constitutes a deliberate absence of face-maintenance and signals that it is not, in fact, business as usual;

In order to recognise that a refuser is treating a co-participant's overstepping their proximal deontic rights as problematic, it is first necessary to consider what those rights to make a proffer are actually grounded on. As stated in section 4.3., research on what licenses the making of a proffer is scarce. Let us begin with a proffer type that has received some attention in this regard: suggestions. In the previous section, I

claimed that a person's right to make a suggestion is grounded on knowledge regarding what constitutes an appropriate solution to a (perceives) problem. Example 24 illustrates that refusers can challenge a suggester's epistemic authority, thereby also challenging their proximal deontic right to make the suggestion and problematizing this behaviour. The negotiation occurs during a conversation about B's financial situation. In the course of this discussion, C suggests that B get a loan.

Example 24: 'Loan', SPICE P1015 (suggestion)

1 C: But sure you can get a loan out.  
 2 B: I know.  
 [...]

The suggestion is implemented by a STATE-POSSIBILITY. This means the profferer's epistemic authority regarding what constitutes a possible, reasonable and acceptable solution is not merely presupposed – it is explicitly claimed by the secondary E+ stance of the utterance. In fact, C even upgrades their knowing stance with 'sure', emphasising their certainty regarding the matter (Palmer 1990, 67-68). B responds with a transparently epistemic claim of their own: a statement of KNOWLEDGE. On the surface, the refuser confirms that getting a loan is possible/reasonable. Yet, the specific way in which they do this differs markedly from the weak agreements we saw in the previous section. Looking at responses to advice, Mikesell et al. (2017, 273-274) found that advisees may use the phrase 'I know' to "[reject] the action of advising as unnecessary (or epistemically incongruent) and thereby [resisting] it, moving to terminate the advice sequence". Unlike other formats which may be used

to confirm or agree with the content of the epistemic assertion, statements of KNOWLEDGE emphasise the speaker's prior and independent knowledge (cf. Heritage & Raymond 2005, 19). This, I argue, is made possible by the secondary E+ stance expressed by the STATE-POSSIBILITY. A response which conveys prior knowledge regarding some epistemic domain logically requires a preceding assertion of knowledge regarding said domain. Since it does not disalign from the FA, the expression of KNOWLEDGE therefore conveys an X/E+ stance. I furthermore hold that the response problematized the profferer's overstepping their proximal deontic rights by challenging the grounds upon which those rights are based. Although B does not challenge the appropriateness of the FA – in fact they confirm it –, they challenge A's (claimed) epistemic authority regarding what constitutes an appropriate course of action. In conclusion, B conveys that they know themselves what could be done, that A is not more knowledgeable and that A therefore has no right to make the suggestion. They therefore orient to the profferer's linguistic behaviour as interpersonally problematic without treating the FA itself as problematic.

In contrast to suggestions, requests are licensed not by epistemic authority regarding what constitutes an appropriate solution to a problem, but by the speaker's entitlement to a good or service. The impact of entitlement on request design has been attested by, for instance, Curl & Drew (2008) and Heinemann (2006; 2007), both of which look at institutional settings. In the context of informal conversations between a child and its parents, Wootton (1997) furthermore found that whether a requested action serves a joint project/activity or not licenses

different request formats. Yet, (lack of) entitlement does not only influence how a request is designed; it also determines whether a request is treated as problematic or not, as example 25 demonstrates. The interaction occurs after B, who is a vegetarian, notes that there is a piece of ham on the pizza they ordered. After removing it, they state that their pizza still tastes of meat (line 1) before asking whether A wants “a taste of that pizza” (line 2).

Example 25: ‘Pizza, SPICE P1A-022 (request)

- 1 B: There's something there is a taste of that unless I'm paranoid yeah yeah.
- 2 Do you want a taste of that pizza?
- 3 A: I don't want to taste it.

As previously stated, QUERY-WANTS are typical offer formats, but they can be used to implement other proffer types. In the above negotiation, speaker B uses this format to implement what really is a request in an attempt to disguise the benefactives. Given the context of the interaction, it appears that B wants A to try the pizza in order for them to confirm that it tastes of meat. In other words, B is requesting a favour rather than offering goods.

Speaker A's response differs markedly from both the offer and request refusals we saw in the last section. It is implemented by a format we have not encountered yet: a NEG-WANT. Within Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz's (1990, 72-73) refusal taxonomy, this would fall under ‘direct’ strategies (B. statement of negative ability or willingness). As previously shown, ‘direct’ refusals in response to QUERY-WANT offers are the norm. However, even then, NEG-WANTS are avoided in favour of NOS. In fact,

I argue that NEG-WANTS differ from NOS in that they express a primary Aneg stance, not a D+ stance; the format expresses disalignment based on the speaker's aversion to the FA rather than their deontic authority. Moreover, there is a noticeable absence of formats we would expect from a refusal of either an offer or a request and a lack of face-maintaining work. In section 7.1., I mentioned that deviations from the norms of refusal design may constitute an interpersonal offence (Heritage 1988, 138). Yet, such deviations are not necessarily a lapse in judgment on the refuser's part. Instead, I argue that they may orient to a (perceived) offence committed by the addressee. Although speaker B above yields deontic authority to the refuser, the very act of requesting presupposes that they are entitled to the FA. In response, A foregrounds their affective right to feel and express aversion to what B is asking for. Instead of shifting blame onto external factors, then, A conveys that their not wanting to do the FA for B is a sufficient justification. This challenges B's entitlement to the requested favour and, consequently, their proximal deontic right to make the request, thereby treating it as interpersonally problematic.

Moving on to offers, it may be difficult to think of this particular proffer type as potentially problematic. Perhaps this is why, to the best of my knowledge, there is no research on what licenses a speaker to make an offer. I argue that, as with suggestions, knowledge is the crucial factor. Although offers, like suggestions, can be made in response to some (perceived) problem (e.g. offers of assistance), they may also be unsolicited. In such cases, the key epistemic domain concerns the question of what benefits the addressee. As example 26 shows, participants' linguistic behaviour



may be problematized for offering goods/services which the refuser considers detrimental to them rather than beneficial.

Example 26: ‘Treat’, SPICE P1A-060 (offer)

1 B: How about a treat? [Do you want] a fag?  
 2 A: [What?]  
 3 No I will not take a cigarette. I have given up cigarettes.  
 4 No way. It's a [hard choice] but I've managed it. No I've managed it now.  
 5 B: [So have I.]  
 [...]

B begins their proffer with a WH-SUGGESTORY, offering a “treat”, before specifying and offering a cigarette with a QUERY-WANT construction. Speaker A’s response in lines 3-4 begins like most unproblematic offers: with a NA. However, it differs in many other ways. First, the refuser does not produce a GRATITUDE, OFF-HOOK or REASONS conveying (why) the FA is not necessary. In other words, they are not orienting to B’s lack of obligation. Second, the turn contains unusual D+ utterances: in line 3, the turn-initial NO is followed by a NEG-FUTURE; line 4 begins with the utterance “no way”, which was categorised as a variation of NO. Although both expresses a decisive D+ disalignment like (standard) NOS, they diverge from what we usually see in offer refusals, thereby further signalling that something is afoot. Third, the REASONS speaker A does provide challenge the beneficial quality of what N is offering. They convey that having a cigarette would go against the refuser’s (recent) decision and accomplishment of giving up smoking. However, the overall turn design suggests that the refuser is not informing the profferer of this for the first time. Rather they appear to be reminding them of something they (ought to) know. This is

supported by the fact that, as it transpires throughout the transcript, the participants know each other closely and B must have been aware of A's quitting cigarettes. In addition, B does not respond to the REASONS as if they convey new information. While the design of A's turn overall hints at interpersonal trouble, it is the REASONS which specify the source of the problem: B knowingly offered something which is in fact not to A's (long term) benefit. By framing the FA as detrimental and orienting to B's violation of their epistemic obligations, A therefore challenges their proximal deontic rights to make the offer and problematizes their doing so.

Finally, we will turn to proposals. Again, the grounds for making a proposal (outside institutional settings) have hitherto been unexplored. I subsequently argue and demonstrate that, given the mixed benefactives – both speaker and hearer are benefactor and (ostensible) beneficiary – the right to make a proposal is based on both a speaker's knowledge regarding what is (mutually) beneficial as well as their entitlement to the addressee's participation in the action. This is illustrated in example 27. A's QUERY-FUTURE proposal to go out together appears out of the blue; it is a complete change from what the participants were discussing just prior. Nowhere in the transcript do they talk about going out. Since the format of the proffer, particularly the lexeme "definitely", suggests C previously stated they were not going out, this must have occurred prior to the recording.

#### Example 27: 'Going out', SPICE P1A-027 (proposal)

- 1 A: [...] Are you definitely not going out tonight?
- 2 C: No definitely not. I'm going to do some work.

[...]

C's refusal consists of three units, all of which express a D+ stance and definitive disalignment. This differs once again from the norms of refusal designs demonstrated in the previous section, particularly refusals of (QUERY-FUTURE) suggestions and requests. There, we saw that refusers design their turns as dispreferred actions and provide (no-fault) justifications even when refusing suggestions – which does not deny the profferer any benefit. It has to be noted, however, that C's two initial units – both NOS – may be licensed by the design of A's proposal. By asking whether B is "definitely not" going out rather than whether they are, the question format projects, i.e. anticipates, a negative response (cf. Boyd & Heritage 2006; Heritage 2002a; 2010, 51-52). In fact, C's use of "definitely" is an echo of A's utterance. The turn-initial NOS may therefore not be (solely) due to interpersonal trouble.

The same cannot be said for C's turn-final counter intending (STATE-FUTURE), by contrast. Here, C continues the pattern of definitive D+ disalignment. Although the refuser is not preventing A from going out on their own, they convey that they will pursue an alternative course of action to their sole benefit instead of engaging in the proposed joint activity. Overall, C bases their refusal entirely on their strong deontic right to determine their own action. While the D+ stances are congruent with the speaker's deontic status, this turn design also expresses that C is prioritising their own benefit from that of the profferer. This challenges A's (presupposed) belief that

going out is beneficial to both parties as well as their entitlement to C going out with them and threatens the act of proffering as interpersonally problematic.

To summarise, although D- utterances do not claim distal deontic authority, the very act of proffering generally conveys that the speaker has the right to do so. Refusers, in turn, may problematize such verbal behaviour if they perceive a proffer as inappropriate in some way. In this section, I have demonstrated that:

- depending on the proffer type, there are two grounds for making as well as problematizing an act of proffering: (lack of) knowledge and entitlement;
- refusers treat profferers' overstepping their proximal deontic rights as interpersonally problematic by orienting to the source of the offensive; and
- they furthermore diverge from the norms of refusal designs;

## 8. Primary strong deontic stances

The next kind of primary stance we will examine are strong deontic claims. An utterance is considered to express a D+ stance if it foregrounds the speaker's deontic authority to unilaterally decide whether the FA being negotiated will happen or not. D+ utterances make up 14% (151 tokens) of the 1085 units assigned a stance (see table 16). However, refusers utter about twice as many D+ stances as profferers and third parties: 20% (109 tokens) and 8% (42 tokens), respectively. Unlike in chapter 7, we will therefore look at primary strong deontic stances of both groups of negotiators. The present chapter is organised as follows: beginning with profferers' and third parties' D+ utterances, sections 8.1.1. and 8.1.2. focus on interpersonally unproblematic and problematic instances, respectively. Sections 8.2.1. and 8.2.2. subsequently examines refusers' unproblematic and problematic D+ utterances, respectively.

### 8.1. Profferers' D+ stances

My data contains 42 units uttered by profferers and third parties which foreground a D+ stance, making up 8% of these speakers' analysed utterances. 41 of these tokens are in the service of securing an FA, whereas one is made in an effort to resist a refuser's counter offer. In the subsequent analysis, we will therefore focus on those D+ utterances which aim to further a proffer project. The distribution of profferers'

D+ stances across proffer types differs from that of D- utterances; the majority (66%) implement suggestions, followed by 22% within request negotiations (figure 10). In comparison, 50% of D- utterances in my data implement offers. This difference between D- and D+ units is also reflected in the proportions of stances within the different proffer types, as figure 11 shows. Primary strong deontic stances are most commonly used in the service of requests (14%) rather than suggestions (8%) or offers (6%). However, this figure also shows that D+ are in fact not considerably more frequent in suggestion negotiations than in other types.

Figure 10: distribution of profferers' and third parties' D+ utterances across proffer type




Figure 11: proportions of profferers' and third parties' D+ utterances within proffer types




Table 18 lists the formats profferers use to express primary D+ stances. That IMPERATIVES are included in the list is probably not surprising; they are, after all, considered the direct way of expressing a directive illocutionary force (Leech 1983, 114-115; Searle 1968, 411-412). Nevertheless, I subsequently argue and demonstrate that they are not the only way in which profferers can claim the right to unilaterally decide an FA.

Table 18: formats used by profferers and third parties to express a primary strong deontic stance

Format	#
ELLIPSIS	1
IMPERATIVE	32
STATE-FUTURE	4
STRONG-NECESSITY	3
QUERY-FUTURE	1

As I demonstrate in the subsequent sections, D+ utterances in the service of securing

a proffer are not necessarily as interpersonally risky as one might think. Despite, as previously stated, profferers generally having weak deontic statuses vis-à-vis refusers, their incongruent D+ stances may be licensed by other factors. In addition, we will see that untangling the interpersonal implications of primary D+ stances from speakers' proximal deontic rights (i.e. the right to proffer) is difficult.

### **8.1.1. Getting away with being bossy: unproblematic utterances**

This section focuses on how a) profferers and third parties foreground their deontic authority when (re-)proffering and b) refusers treat these utterances as interpersonally unproblematic. In addition to outlining why the formats discussed in this chapter express a primary D+ stance, I demonstrate that:

- no D+ formats express a secondary stance; refusers therefore avoid even weak agreements;
- by challenging a profferer's (incongruent) D+ stance with a responding D+ claim of their own, refusers do not necessarily problematize the profferer's utterance; and
- profferers' D+ stances can be licensed by factors other than a strong deontic status;



As with D- proffers, we of course have to look at how a response is designed overall in order to determine whether the refuser is problematizing the D+ utterance or not.

Let us begin with interactions in which profferers' primary strong deontic stances are challenged by refusers with D+ claims of their own. In section 7.1., I showed that refusers frequently respond to D- utterances with D+ stances, thereby confirm the deontic asymmetry conveyed by the profferer. In the case of D+ proffers/counters, by contrast, such a response constitutes a challenge of the profferer's D+ claim.

Interestingly, although refusers generally have a strong deontic status regarding their own future actions, they often avoid such a challenge. Crucially, however, such a challenge is not necessarily problematized, as examples 28 and 29 illustrate. The two negotiations furthermore exhibit the pattern we previously saw in refusals of unproblematic D- proffers: frequently blunt and definitive D+ disalignment in the case of offers but not the other proffer types. The suggestion in 28 occurs after speaker B disclosed that their children are moving to Toronto and that they are looking forward to visiting. This triggers A's unsolicited suggestion not to go to Toronto in the winter (line 7).

#### Example 28: 'Toronto', SWDA sw\_0068 (suggestion)

- 1 B: [...] Now my kids are moving to Toronto
- 2 so we're going to be able to go up there.
- 3 A: Oh that will be nice.
- 4 B: So I'm kind of looking forward to that except I hate to see them go.
- 5 A: Oh sure.
- 6 B: But
- 7 A: Sure. Well go in don't go in the winter.
- 8 B: And I I think it's I think I'll try to stay away
- 9 except my my second grandchild will be born in <breathing>
- 10 in the winter in January.
- 11 A: Oh.

- 12 B: So that will be hard to stay away from.  
 13 A: Well th- there are exceptions made for special occasions like that.  
 14 B: Yeah.  
 15 A: But the ordinary thing is to stay out of the north in the winter  
 16 and get out of Texas in the summer so  
 17 B: Isn't that the truth.

The initial proffer is designed as a (negative) IMPERATIVE. This format conveys that the FA as non-contingent on A's approval and foregrounds the speaker's right to unilaterally determine A's future actions (cf. e.g. Antaki & Kent 2012; Craven & Potter 2010). Although A's D+ stance is incongruent with their deontic status, speaker B treats the proffer as unproblematic; this is once again achieved by the overall turn design and the individual TCUs employed. After a false start, B produces an INDEFINITE response. As previously discussed, these formats convey indecision, thereby treating the proffered FA as a reasonable option. This is followed by an E+ REASON which shifts blame to external factors: B's grandchild will be born in the winter. Since this justification is outside A's expected domain of knowledge, it does not orient to A violating their epistemic obligation. Overall, the design of B's turn treats the profferer's unsolicited D+ suggestion as unproblematic. Yet, this does not mean that the refuser does not challenge the profferer's D+ stance. The imperative claims a deontic asymmetry in favour of A. B's indefinite response, by contrast, conveys that, even though the refuser is uncertain about which course of action they will take, the eventual decision is theirs. In responding to the D+ proffer with a D+ stance, the refuser therefore challenges the profferer's strong deontic claim. Crucially, however, this challenge does not problematize A's linguistic behaviour; as I have just outlined, B maintains the profferer's face and signals that the prior turn is

unproblematic.

This raises two questions: why does A get away with an incongruent D+ claim and why is B able to challenge it without this treating it as interpersonally problematic?

Classic politeness theory has focused a great deal on imperatives, pointing out that the im/politeness of this format depends on various factors. Brown & Levinson (1987, 95-101), for instance, explain that circumstantial factors such as great urgency can license imperatives and that offers in this format are in fact polite because they invite the addressee to infringe on the profferer's negative face. Leech (2014, 147), furthermore states that "imperative directives are variable in politeness, according to the vertical and horizontal distance factors and the cost-benefit factor". Like Brown & Levinson (1987), Leech (1983) proposes a summative equation to account for the level of "optionality and indirectness" required for a proffer to be polite. The scholar argues that:

- i. the greater the cost of [the FA] to [the hearer],
- ii. the greater the horizontal social distance of [the hearer] from [the speaker],
- iii. the greater the authoritative status of [the hearer] with respect to [the speaker],
- iv. the greater will be the need for optionality and correspondingly for indirectness, in the expression of an impositive, if it is to observe the tact maxim. (adapted from Leech 1983, 127)

However, Leech (2014, 138) concedes that such equations are too simplified. CA research shows that imperative requests are commonly used – and therefore appear to be licensed – if the requested FA serves an ongoing joint activity (Rossi 2012; Wootton 1997) or the cost for the beneficiary/level of imposition is low (Biesenbach-Lucas 2007; Félix-Brasdefer 2012; Rossi 2012). Looking at offers made during phone calls, Curl (2006) furthermore found that imperatives and ‘I will’ constructions are used in response to prior talk about an overt problem, but not if there is only a latent or potential problem. It also has to be noted that Leech’s (1983) prediction that higher deontic authority on the part of the profferer requires a lower degree of optionality partially contradicts Stevanovic’s (2013, 27) assertion that people with strong deontic statuses do not need to use strong deontic stances; by contrast, “speakers with low authority, who cannot rely on other people’s readiness to cooperate in the desired ways, may sometimes try to inflate their authority”.

Returning to the above suggestion negotiation, we see a mixed picture in terms of the factors which may license a D+ proffer. Although the FA is for the sole benefit of B, they are simultaneously the benefactor. In addition, the suggestion is unsolicited and does not follow talk about an overt problem. Even if we accept that the benefit to B alone licenses the profferer’s strong deontic claim, this does not explain why A’s D+ stance can be challenged without it being treated as unproblematic. I therefore argue that A’s proximal deontic rights are the key factor; more precisely, I hold that a) strong proximal deontic rights may license a strong distal deontic stance and that b) challenging an incongruent D+ stance is not problematizing as long as the

profferer's proximal deontic rights are not challenged. As previously stated, a person's right to make a suggestion is grounded on knowledge regarding what constitutes an appropriate solution to a (perceives) problem. In addition, I have demonstrated in section 7.2. that suggesters can be sanctioned for claiming – or presupposing – to be more knowledgeable than the refuser. In example 28, B challenges neither the appropriateness of the FA nor A's epistemic status. In fact, the relevant epistemic domain – when one ought (not) to visit Toronto – becomes the topic after B's refusal. In line 13, A accepts B's disalignment and their justification for it by stating that "there are exceptions made for special occasions like that". This foregrounds a knowing epistemic stance not only regarding what constitutes a reasonable exception, but also what the rule is. After a weak agreement from B, A explicitly spells out that rule which motivated the suggestion: "the ordinary thing is to stay out of the North in the winter and get out of Texas in the summer" (lines 15-16). In conclusion, the profferer's incongruent D+ stance is – although challenged – not treated as unproblematic because a) it is grounded on their proximal deontic right to make the suggestions rather than distal deontic authority and b) the refuser does not challenge their proximal deontic rights.

The next negotiation shows that offer refusals differ from that of other proffer types – even if the proffer expresses a D+ stance. In addition, example 29 illustrates a further format which I argue foregrounds the speaker's deontic right to unilaterally make a decision: STATE-FUTURES. We have previously seen this format in refusers' counter intendings. Here, it implements an offer. Just prior to the extract, the

participants are asked to discuss the school system. After A discloses that their wife is a teacher (line 1), B states that “[they]’ll walk softly”.

Example 29: ‘School’, SWDA sw\_0800 (offer)

1 A: My wife's a school teacher so <laughter>.  
 2 B: Well then I'll uh I'll walk softly.  
 3 A: <Laughter> No. [You go right ahead because I]  
 4 B: [ <Laughter> ]  
 5 A: have a lot of strong opinions on it too.  
 6 My wife teaches seventh grade and you know  
 7 there is a lot of serious things wrong with the school system today  
 8 and the teaching system. I think the  
 9 I don't think the teachers get enough support quite honestly.  
 10 B: Yeah.

According to Barron (2005), first person singular STATE-FUTURE offers are ‘execution strategies’ and highlight the commissive aspect of offers. However, by predicting a future course of action, they also frame the FA as non-negotiable (cf. (Stevanovic & Peräkylä’s 2012 discussion of Finnish ‘assertions’ on the form of declaratives in the indicative mood). This means they express primary strong deontic rights. Due to this predictive quality, they furthermore cannot be responded to in the affirmative without also accepting the proffer. STATE-FUTURES do therefore not express a secondary stance. Before looking at how speaker A responds to the D+ offer, a word about the FA: the proffered future action is unusual in that it does not obviously involve the refuser. Often, offers involve some kind of transfer and at least imply that the addressee is to physically receive something (e.g. goods to consume) or be part of an activity for their benefit (e.g. getting a lift). Here, however, B offers a certain kind of (restrained) verbal conduct which does not require A to do anything. As a

consequence, the profferer's D+ stance is – unusually – congruent with their deontic status.

In terms of the benefactives involved, the utterance in line 2 on its own is ambiguous between an intending (S for S) and an offer: walking softly may be for A's own benefit, so as to avoid a faux pas, or for B's, in the sense of treating them gently. However, I argue that B orients to it as the latter and that A accepts this. Intentings presuppose that A is entitled to the FA and its benefits. Disaligning from an intending would be akin to disaligning from a request: both deny the profferer a beneficial action. Such an action would therefore require relational work similar to what we see in refusals of unproblematic requests. Instead, A expresses blunt and decisive disalignment before providing a justification which orients to the FA's not being necessary: a NO, an IMPERATIVE counter offer<sup>47</sup> and REASONS (lines 3 and 5-9). As in the previous example, the refuser's D+ stances challenge those of the profferer but do not problematize them. By adhering to the norms of offer refusals, A treats B's utterance as interpersonally unproblematic. While, in this particular case, the profferer's D+ stance is in fact (also) licensed by their strong distal deontic status, the refuser once again makes sure not to challenge B's profferer's proximal deontic rights.

Despite the possibility of challenging a primary strong deontic stance without treating the utterance as problematic, refusers sometimes avoid responding D+

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<sup>47</sup> Although speaker A will not perform any action for B, the counter reverses the benefactives of the initial proffer. If we accept that B's proffer is an offer ('I will walk softly for your sake'), A's counter is also an offer ('I will let you voice your opinion freely').

claims altogether. Instead, they may express disalignment based entirely on epistemic and/or affective grounds. In the case of suggestions, in particular, this may frame the FA as a bad idea. Nevertheless, refusers can once again treat the D+ proffers as unproblematic by not challenging the appropriateness of the FA, the profferer's entitlement (in the case of requests and proposals) or their proximal deontic rights. This is illustrated in example 30. The negotiation occurs in the context of a conversation about C breeding turkeys – either with their father or on their own. This leads speaker A to align with the latter option.

Example 30: 'Do it yourself', SPICE P1A-069 (suggestion)

[...]  
 3 A: Well then you should do it yourself. Forget about your da.  
 4 C: Sure I won't be there to feed them or anything.  
 5 A: Aye I suppose so. You give him the money for it.  
 [...]

The profferer's utterance in line 3 consists of a WEAK-NECESSITY (E+) and an IMPERATIVE (D+). The refuser responds with a REASON which introduces an obstacle, thereby foregrounding an E+ stance. Most noticeably, C does not express a primary deontic stance and does therefore not challenge A's D+ claim directly. However, they challenge the presupposed reasonability of the FA. Although C has primary access/rights to the obstacle they refer to – i.e. whether they will be in town or not –, A (as a friend of C's) can also be expected to know about this. In fact, they confirm their prior knowledge of the obstacle in line 5; this also constitutes an admission that, despite knowing about it, they had not considered the fact that C might not be



around before making the suggestion. Nevertheless, C's refusal does not frame the FA as inappropriate or detrimental. While it conveys that the suggestion may not be a good one, it does not treat it or the act of suggesting as interpersonally problematic. The avoidance of a decisive D+ disalignment contributes to C's response not being heard as problematizing the proffer.

So far, we have looked at D+ stances occurring in initial proffers. There are, however, also rare instances of D+ stances in re-proffers in my data. Even rarer are cases in which profferers 'upgrade' to a D+ stance. By this, I mean they make a D+ stance in a re-proffer despite not having done so when first putting forward the FA. In other words, profferers sometimes insist on and claim deontic authority regarding an FA after a non-acceptance from the recipient. Although uncommon, D+ re-proffers occur – and are not problematized – in specific environments: one, in response to offer refusals (see example 31 in section 8.2.1.); or two, in response to (suggestion) resistance which either does not contain any disaligning units at all or which convey indecision. The latter is illustrated in example 32. The initial suggestion is unsolicited, occurring after talk about the participants' holiday and travelling experiences. In the course of the conversation, B also learns that A is a 20-year-old university student. Without any prior talk about A's plans after they finish university or mention of a partner, B suggests a travel more before getting married.

Example 32: 'Traveling', SWDA sw\_0421 (suggestion)

1 B: I would just encourage you to do a little traveling though  
2 before you get married.

3           Because when you  
 4 A:       You think?  
 5 B:       get married you won't have the money or the time.  
 6 A:       I know.  
 7 B:       So just you know don't don't be in any hurry.  
 8 A:       I'm not I'm not.

B's initial proffer is formatted as a PERFORMATIVE employing the verb 'encourage' and a REASON, both of which express an E+ stance.<sup>48</sup> Speaker A responds with BACK-CHANNELLING tokens, which are alignment-neutral (lines 4 and 6). It is this absence of a disalignment, I argue, which leads to – and licenses – B's upgrading to a D+ stance in the form of an IMPERATIVE in line 7. I have previously discussed profferers' proximal deontic rights with regard to initial proffers/counters. In the case of re-proffers, the speaker does not only claim the proximal deontic right to put forward an action but also to insist on it despite an initial non-acceptance or even resistance. Such an insistence generally has to be justified, for instance by providing additional arguments in favour of the FA. An IMPERATIVE, by contrast, provides no justification; it is therefore licensed only if no (definitive) disalignment has previously been expressed by the refuser. This is the case in the above example. As a consequence, A treats the re-suggestion as interpersonally unproblematic in line 8; the confirmation that they are not in a hurry conveys that the FA – at least the rephrased version – is reasonable.<sup>49</sup> As we shall see in the next section, D+ upgrades in response to (firm) disalignment are instead problematized.

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<sup>48</sup> The verb 'encourage' frames B as someone who knows what is reasonable and advisable. The utterance therefore foregrounds a strong epistemic stance.

<sup>49</sup> In fact, B's rephrasing of the suggestion from 'travelling before marrying' to 'not being in a hurry' allows A to respond in this way.

The final point I want to address in this section are weak agreements in response to D+ (re-)proffers – or rather their general absence. Since D+ formats to not express a secondary E+ stance, recipients cannot produce any affirmative responses that are entirely risk free. Although, as previously stated, weak agreements have been shown to often be treated as refusal-implicating and insufficient as firm acceptances, there is a danger of being (deliberately) misheard as accepting the FA. This is particularly true for immediate proffers. In addition, combining a weak agreement, even if pro-forma, with an utterance that conveys firm disalignment may be construed as contradictory if the weak agreement is not hearable as orienting to an epistemic stance. For those reasons, I argue, refusers avoid weak agreements in response to D+ utterances. In fact, my data contains only one such instance and it is noteworthy in two ways: first, the FA being negotiated as a deferred action rather than an immediate one; second, the weak agreement is combined with INDEFINITE responses, i.e. a format that conveys indecision. Let us look at example 33.

Example 33: ‘Financial assistance’, SPICE P1A-063 (suggestion resistance)

- 1 B: Did you go in and ask about the financial assistance?
- 2 A: No. I don't know whether I will or not.
- 3 I don't know whether I'm entitled to it as a repeat student.
- 4 B: Yeah but the thing is go in and ask.
- 5 A: Yeah maybe. If things get much worse maybe.

The negotiation shows a further instance of an upgraded D+ re-proffer, this time in response to the refuser's display of uncertainty. Speaker B's suggestion in line 1 is triggered by a discussion about a's financial difficulties. After A's first refusal, which conveys that A is not sure how to proceed, B re-proffers with an IMPERATIVE (D+)

after an initial BACK-CHANNELLING token (line 4). In line 5, the refuser now responds with the only weak-agreement to a D+ proffer found in my data. Crucially, however, it is neither the only TCU nor is it accompanied by utterances which express a definitive refusal. Instead, A follows it up with INDEFINITE responses. This overall turn design ensures that the weak agreement token cannot be (mis-)heard as a firm acceptance of the FA and that the refuser cannot be accused of being contradictory.

To summarise, the above analysis of D+ formats has demonstrated that:

- imperatives are not the only format which express a primary D+ stance;
- D+ formats do not express secondary stances; even weak agreements are therefore generally avoided;
- profferers' D+ stances may be incongruent in terms of their deontic status, but they may be (treated as) licensed by their proximal deontic rights;
- a refuser's challenge of a profferer's D+ stance does therefore problematize the utterance if the profferer's proximal deontic rights are not challenged; and
- re-proffers in the form of D+ stances (particularly imperatives) are treated as unproblematic if the refuser has not previously expressed a (firm) disalignment;

### **8.1.2. Bossy much? Problematized utterances**

In the previous section, I demonstrated that refusers treat profferer's (incongruent)

D+ stances as unproblematic by not challenging their proximal deontic rights. This suggests that the latter license D+ claims even if the speaker has a weak deontic status. In section 7.2., I furthermore showed that a (perceived) lack of proximal deontic rights can be problematized. Since, D- stances themselves are not problematic, it was clear that the interpersonal trouble was caused by other factors. With regard to D+ utterances, however, the picture is less clear. A profferer's D+ utterance may be problematized not (just) because the act of proffering itself is perceived as interpersonally problematic but (also) because the D+ stance is. I subsequently argue that the two factors amplify one another. In addition, this section demonstrates that:

- in the case of requests, refusers problematize initial D+ proffers; and
- in the case of suggestions, by contrast, refusers only problematize D+ re-proffers – and only if they follow after a decisive disalignment;<sup>50</sup>

First, we will look at requests. As previously discussed, D+ requests (particularly IMPERATIVES) may sometimes be licensed despite the benefactives of the FA. Previous research has shown that this is the case if a request serves an ongoing joint activity or the amount of cost/level of imposition is low (Biesenbach-Lucas 2007; Félix-Brasdefer 2012; Rossi 2012; Wootton 1997;). None of the D+ requests in my data meet the former criterion. Regarding the latter, the subsequent two negotiations

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<sup>50</sup> My data does not contain any problematized D+ offers or proposals.

illustrate that cost and level of imposition may either not be a relevant factor after all or may be a matter of subjective judgment. Either way, refusers problematize profferers' linguistic behaviour by challenging their entitlement to the requested FAs despite those involving (objectively) relatively little cost to the refuser. In example 34, this is achieved by means of a D+ counter suggestion. The negotiation also showcases a D+ format we have not encountered yet: STRONG-NECESSITIES. These consists of utterances which state that the addressee 'has to', 'must' or 'needs to' do the FA. Depending on the context, they can foreground either a D+ or an E+ stance (see section 9.1.). As we shall see, unlike STATE-POSSIBILITIES, D+ STRONG-NECESSITIES do not express a secondary E+ stance.

Example 34: 'Remind me', SPICE P1-066 (request)

- 1 C: Lads you've got to remind me to meet Emma at five o'clock next Tuesday.
- 2 B: Write it down.
- 3 C: She's going to Spain on Friday.

C's requests that B and a further present party remind them of an upcoming meeting by stating that they "[ha]ve got to" do the FA. Similar to declarative constructions with 'can', 'have (got) to', 'must' and 'need to' are ambiguous. While they all expresses strong necessity or obligation (Huddleston et al. 2017, 180-182; Palmer 1990, 69-132)<sup>51</sup>, there are two possible sources of that necessity (cf. Leech 2014, 152; Trosborg

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<sup>51</sup> Huddleston et al. (2007) only include 'must' and 'need' in their discussion of strong deontic modals and do not address 'have (got) to'. Palmer (1990), on the other hand, considers only 'must' a strong deontic modal, stating that 'need' and 'have to' always express external, dynamic (rather than deontic) necessity. As I argue in my analysis, however, the latter modals can in fact be used to foreground the speaker's strong deontic authority.

1995, 204): either it originates from the profferer or it stems from some external source, meaning the speaker is merely informing the recipient about what is necessary according to a third-party authority.<sup>52</sup> In the above interaction, speaker A does not conceivably orient to some external source which obligates B to go on a cruise. Rather, the expressed necessity originates from A themselves. If the speaker is the source of the expressed necessity, a STRONG-NECESSITY can foreground either a primary strong deontic or epistemic stance depending on whether the utterance orients to the addressee's obligation or not. In the above example, the format implements a request, which presupposes the profferer's entitlement and the speaker's obligation. The STRONG-NECESSITY does not only orient to those aspects but emphasises them. I therefore argue that C's utterance frames the FA as non-negotiable and foregrounds a primary strong deontic stance.

Unlike with unproblematic requests, B's disalignment is immediate, decisive and unjustified: they counter C's request with an IMPERATIVE suggestion. The benefactive

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<sup>52</sup> My data contains only one instance of a declarative 'have to' which orients to an external source of deontic authority. In the 'Clothes' negotiation, it is used by the refuser to justify why they cannot wear trousers. Since this utterance express knowledge regarding an external obstacle that prohibits the FA, the utterance is considered a REASON which foregrounds an E+ stance while also expressing a secondary D- stance (i.e. the refuser has no right to decide).

Example 35: 'Clothes', P1A-063 (suggestion)

[...]  
 B: Are you definitely going wearing a skirt or [dress to it]?  
 A: [Oh I have to wear a dress.] I can't wear jeans.  
 [...]

changes this counter implements are self-serving; while C remains the beneficiary, B rejects the role of benefactor. In addition, it expresses a strong deontic stance, challenging that of C. This decisive refusal orients to C's lack of entitlement and B's lack of obligation to do the requested FA; it is framed as being based entirely on the refuser's deontic authority to do as they please. In addition, the responding D+ stance conveys that B's deontic authority trumps that of C: not only does B have the right to not do the initially requested FA, but they also claim the right to tell C what to do in order to solve C's problem. Overall, the refuser does not maintain or enhance C's face. Instead of treating the FA as reasonable, they foreground their own deontic authority and challenges C's entitlement. This, in turn, challenges the profferers proximal deontic right to make the request. By orienting to C's lack of entitlement and foregrounding a D+ stance, B furthermore treats the FA as an infringement on their distal deontic rights. The perceived offence at the level of proximal deontic rights therefore appears to be linked to the offence at the level of distal proximal deontic rights. While we cannot be certain that the same request in a D- format, for instance, would still have been treated as problematic, I argue that the STRONG-NECESSITY amplifies the offensiveness of the presupposed entitlement. The format conveys that the proffer has the right to tell the recipient to do the FA because they are entitled to it. As a consequence, their linguistic behaviour is problematized.

A different – yet related – way of problematizing a (D+) request is by questioning the profferer's grounds for making the request. While this does not directly challenge the profferer's strong distal deontic claim, it challenges their proximal deontic rights.



This is illustrated in example 36. While we cannot tell from the transcript what exactly speaker D is doing, we do know that B requests they “stop doing that”.

Example 36: ‘Furniture’, SPICE P1A-015 (request)

- 1 B: Stop doing that.
- 2 D: Why?
- 3 A: Because you're wrecking our furniture.

The initial proffer is implemented by a negative IMPERATIVE and requests that the addressee cease an action. Such a request to stop doing something may be even more delicate than other requests, since it implies a critique of the recipient’s current behaviour. In response, D initiates a repair insertion sequence with a QUERY-REPAIR by asking “why”. Like the previously discussed INFO-REQUESTS, this format is alignment-neutral and expresses a secondary E- stance. However, repairs such as this one are post-first rather than pre-second insertion sequences. They look back at the previous turn and orient to some issue relating to it (Schegloff 2007, 106). Often, they (ostensibly) address a problem regarding hearing, in which case recipients tend to repeat or rephrase what they said. In the above example, by contrast, the issue speaker D orients to is an ostensible lack of obvious reasons for B to make the request. This challenges the grounds for the proffer, i.e. B’s entitlement to the FA. Put differently, the refuser treats B’s strong deontic stance and the presupposed entitlement as insufficiently convincing to warrant an acceptance.<sup>53</sup> Instead of

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<sup>53</sup> Note that speaker A subsequently defends B’s right to make the request and problematizes D’s linguistic behaviour in return.

challenging the profferer's strong deontic stance, D undermines it. As in the previous example, then, the distal and proximal deontic facets are closely interwoven.

In contrast to requests, refusers in my data do not problematize initial D+ suggestions – even when they are unsolicited. Rather, it is re-suggestions which may be treated as problematic. In the previous section, I demonstrated that D+ re-suggestions are licensed if the refuser does not express (firm) disalignment, e.g. by way of alignment-neutral utterances. Example 37, by contrast, illustrate the opposite; here, the profferer's insisting on the FA and claiming strong primary deontic rights despite the refuser's clear disalignment is treated as problematic.

Example 37: 'Your man', SPICE P1A-031 (suggestion)

1 A: [...] So are you going to go out with your man tonight or not Denise?  
 2 C: I think you should.  
 3 B: No I'm not.  
 4 A: Go to the cinema and we'll [all go] with youse.  
 5 C: [Yeah.]  
 6 B: I don't want to go.  
 7 A: Go on.  
 8 B: No.  
 [...]

Speaker A's initial suggestion in line 1 – supported by C in line 2 – occurs after some unrelated talk and is unsolicited. Formatted as a QUERY-FUTURE (D-), the profferer suggests that B go out with 'their man'. The refuser's response is designed as a dispreferred action, conveying interpersonal trouble; it consists of a turn-initial NO and a NEG-FUTURE, both of which claim strong deontic rights and express a firm disalignment. Despite B not leaving any doubt about their intended future course of action, A utters a re-suggestion, upgrading to a strong deontic stance in the form of

an IMPERATIVE (line 4). This does not only challenge B's prior congruent D+ stance but also does not provide any justification for A's insistence. As a result, the profferer's behaviour is problematized: in line 6, the refuser expresses a further disalignment in the form of a NEG-WANT. As previously discussed (section 7.2.), this construction highlights the speaker's affective rights in terms of personal dispreference and expresses a negative stance towards the proffered FA. Designed, furthermore, as a preferred action, the re-refusal targets the FA as unwanted and unappreciated. By shifting from the D+ stances in the initial refusal to an A<sub>neg</sub> stance, B furthermore emphasises their right to make a decision based solely on subjective grounds. In addition, framing the FA as undesirable challenges the presupposition that the suggested FA is for the benefit of the addressee and therefore A's proximal deontic rights. Nevertheless, speaker A utters a further D+ re-suggestion in line 7. This time, B reverts back to responding with a strong deontic stance in the form of a bare NO. In conclusion, the profferer's insistence on a course of action despite a previous firm refusal oversteps their own rights and infringes on the refuser's. This is amplified by the fact that no justifications for the re-suggestions are provided; B simply insists by way of D+ stances. The refuser consequently problematized speaker D's behaviour by forgoing all face-maintenance, foregrounding their own (deontic and affective) rights and orienting to the FA as undesirable.

To summarise, this section has further demonstrated the connection between profferer's proximal deontic rights and primary D+ stances. Not only can the former

license the latter, but – in the case of a violation of rights – unlicensed claims of proximal and distal deontic rights amplify each other. We furthermore saw that there are differences between proffer types. Specifically, I showed that:


- in the case of requests, refusers problematize initial D+ proffers on the grounds of lacking entitlement; and
- in the case of suggestions, refusers problematize D+ re-proffers for unjustified insistence despite prior decisive disalignment;

## 8.2. Refusers' D+ stances

So far, we have only looked at how profferers' primary deontic stances – both weak and strong – are treated. Now, we will turn to refusers' D+ utterances. My data contains 109 such utterances. Most of them, namely 92 units, are made in the effort of resisting a proffered FA whereas the remaining 17 are in the service of securing a counter FA. Let us look at those counters first. As figure 12 shows, more than 53% of D+ counters implement intendings. Given that the overall majority of refusers' counters constitute intendings (59 out of 92 units), this is unsurprising. Due to the low number of other kinds of counters (ten or fewer cases per proffer type), I do not compare stance distributions within the different proffer types.

Figure 12: distribution of refusers' D+ utterances in the service of securing a counter

across proffer type



The main formats refusers use to make D+ counters are familiar from the previous section: IMPERATIVES and STATE-FUTURES (see table 19). However, they may also implement a counter – specifically a counter intending – by means of a CONTEMPLATE. Although this occurs only once in my data, it represents a D+ format uniquely available to refusers but not profferers.

Table 19: formats used by refusers to express a primary strong deontic stance when countering

Format	#
CONTEMPLATE	1
ELLIPSIS	2
IMPERATIVE	4
STATE_FUTURE	10

Turning to D+ utterances resisting an FA without attempting to secure another, 52% of the 92 units are produces in response to offers, followed by suggestions with 33%

(figure 13). In terms of the stance distribution within the different kinds of proffer resistance, however, refusers have a strong tenancy to make strong deontic claims only when resisting offers (56%, see figure 13). This mirrors the high proportion (61%) of profferers' D- stances in the service of offers and reflects that offers can – and often are – refused by means of decisive D+ utterances without this being problematizing. With respect to the other three kinds of proffer resistance, D+ stances only make up between 11% and 13%.

Figure 13: distribution of refusers' D+ utterances across types of proffer resistance





Figure 14: proportions of refusers' D+ utterances within types of proffer resistance



There is, perhaps surprisingly, a considerable variety of formats refusers use to resist an FA while claiming deontic authority. According to Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz's (1990) seminal taxonomy of refusals, only performatives, statements of negative ability or willingness and 'no' are considered 'direct' strategies. As already demonstrated in the discussion of profferers' deontic stances, strong and weak claims do not neatly fall along the lines of in/directness. This also applies to refusers' utterances. We have already seen that INDEFINITE responses and OFF-HOOKS, for instance, foreground the speaker's right to unilaterally make a decision. In addition, the authors consider putting forward an alternative action, i.e. countering, an indirect refusal strategy without taking into account the specific construction such a counter might take. As table 20 shows, refusers' counters can be implemented by, for instance, IMPERATIVES. My list of resisting D+ formats furthermore includes categories not included in Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz (1990), such as CONFIRM-

REFUSALS, which only occur after DOUBLE-CHECKS.



Table 20: formats used by refusers to express a primary strong deontic stance when resisting an FA

<b>Formats</b>	<b>#</b>
CONFIRM-REFUSAL	4
CONTEMPLATE	1
OFF-HOOK	2
INDEFINITE	15
NEG-ABILITY	2
NEG-FUTURE	7
NO	59
STATE-FUTURE	2
STATE-POSSIBILITY	1

As I demonstrate in the subsequent sections, refusers' D+ utterances are almost unproblematic. Due to their (generally) strong deontic statuses, there are few grounds for treating D+ refusals – whether simple resistances or counters – as interpersonally problematic. We will also see that, although profferers and refusers can challenge D+ stances without problematizing them, they often abandon the deontic facet in re-proffers.

### 8.2.1. You're the boss (but...): unproblematic utterances

In this section, we take a closer look at how a) refusers foreground their deontic authority when refusing and b) profferers and third parties treat these utterances as interpersonally unproblematic. Most of the ways in which refusers can express a D+ stance have already been discussed in the analysis so far. While I address formats we have not encountered yet in more details than those we are already familiar with, the main aim of this section is to demonstrate that:

- there are no resisting D+ utterances which express a secondary stance;
- profferers and third parties can accept refusers' D+ stances with or without also accepting the refusal;
- profferers and third parties can challenge refusers' D+ stances without problematizing them – although such a challenge can subsequently be problematized itself;
- more commonly, they insist on an FA by abandon the deontic facet in favour of other stances, usually strong epistemic ones; and
- since refusers generally have a strong deontic status, there are few possible grounds for problematizing their D+ utterances;

We will begin by looking at acceptances of refusers' D+ utterances before moving on to challenges and finally responses which do not orient to the deontic facet at all.

Participants can explicitly convey that they defer to a D+ utterance – both in terms of the stance and the disalignment. In doing so, they treat the utterance as unproblematic. This is illustrated in example 38; the profferer first explicitly accepts A's refusal of the initial proffer before putting forward an alternative counter offer.

Example 38: 'Tea or coffee', SPICE P1A-059 (offer resistance)

- 1 B: [...] Would you like a cup of tea?
- 2 A: Uh no thank you.
- 3 B: <laughter> Okay coffee?

In line 2, speaker A refuses B's QUERY-WANT (D-) offer of tea with a delayed NO (D+) and a GRATITUDE (X/Apos). B responds with an "okay", a sequence-closing third which conveys that they fully accept the disalignment and the grounds on which it is made: A's deontic authority. This is followed by a counter offer of coffee (D- ELLIPSIS). While the counter continues the overall negotiation of A having something to drink, it signals that B does not contest the refusal of the initial offer. Such sequence-closing thirds and alternative counters can also occur without the respective other.<sup>54</sup> Given that (definitive) D+ refusals are most frequent in response to offers, this pattern of accepting the first D+ refusal is common for offer negotiations.

Perhaps more interesting than such instances are negotiations in which profferers or third parties do not accept a disaligning D+ utterance. The remainder of this section will focus on a number of ways in which this can be achieved without treating the refusal as interpersonally problematic. Participants have three broad options: insisting on the FA by challenging the refuser's D+ stance with a strong deontic claim of their own; insisting on the FA while (ostensibly) accepting the D+ stance; and

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<sup>54</sup> Alternatively, profferers can simply change the topic. In example 39 speaker B offers to end the phone call after they hear a sound on the line indicating that someone else is calling speaker A. After they refuse with NOS and additional REASONS, B simply returns to the topic they were discussing just prior to the offer.

Example 39: 'On the phone', SWDA sw\_1078 (offer resistance)

- 1 B: Oh well I'll let you go if you want to go ahead and take that.
- 2 A: No no I don't care about that.
- 3 She'll be on the phone all night.
- 4 B: <laughter> Yeah it seems if you watch what kind of crowd
- 5 that start running around with
- 6 and kind of keep up with who their friends are

insisting on the FA by orienting to a different interpersonal facet, usually the epistemic one.

Refusers' D+ stances are not challenged often. In section 8.1.1., I argued that profferers can get away with D+ re-suggestions if the refuser's previous turn does not contain a (firm) disalignment. Let us look at another such instance. In example 40, the refuser does express a D+ disalignment; however, it is formatted as an INDEFINITE response and therefore licenses a D+ re-suggestion. Let us examine why this re-proffer challenges the refuser's D+ stance without treating it as interpersonally problematic. Speaker B's suggestion is triggered by a discussion about A's financial difficulties.

Example 40: 'Financial assistance', SPICE P1A-063 (suggestion resistance)

- 1 B: Did you go in and ask about the financial assistance?
- 2 A: No. I don't know whether I will or not.
- 3 I don't know whether I'm entitled to it as a repeat student.
- 4 B: Yeah but the thing is go in and ask.
- 5 A: Yeah maybe. If things get much worse maybe.

Speaker A refuses the initial suggestion<sup>55</sup> with INDEFINITE response (D+) and a REASON (E-) in lines 2-3. Both convey uncertainty: not only is A not sure if they will do the FA, they are also not certain whether their reason for potentially refusing holds. B responds with an initial BACK-CHANNELLING token, acknowledging A's REASON and its potentially being an obstacle, before re-suggesting with an

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<sup>55</sup> Implemented by an INFO-REQUEST (X/E-). A's response begins with an ANSWER to the secondary E- stance.

IMPERATIVE. The latter unit directly challenges the refuser's prior D+ stance. Crucially, however, this challenge does not treat the refusal as interpersonally problematic. In fact, there are no conceivable grounds for problematizing A's linguistic behaviour: first, their D+ stance is congruent; second, the refusal does not deny the profferer benefit; and third, the refusal does not problematize the profferer, meaning B has no reason to problematize A's utterance in return. The challenge of the refuser's D+ stance is therefore not motivated by (perceived) aggravation of B's face. Instead, I argue it conveys that B cares about A and their (financial) well-being. The suggested FA might be a solution to a genuine and serious problem A is facing – something that the refuser does in fact not challenge. B's insistence on the FA does therefore not require a justification in the form of, for instance, an E+ reason. Overall, B's challenge of A's D+ utterance treats it as insufficient grounds for refusing but not interpersonally problematic. Their insistence by way of foregrounding a strong deontic stance is motivated – and licensed, as we can tell from line 5 – by B's concern for A in light of a serious problem.

In the case of offers, we can find similar sequences despite refusers expressing a firm D+ disalignment. Once again, the benefactives involved in offers mean that a) a challenge of a D+ refusal is not (heard as) problematizing and b) such a challenge is itself not problematized. This is illustrated in example 31.

Example 31: 'You have to take it', SPICE P1A-008 (offer resistance)

- 1 B:     [<unclear several sylls>]
- 2 C:     [<unclear several sylls>}

- 3 D: No no Gemma thank you very no no.  
 4 B: No excuse sorry you have to take it.  
 5 C: <unclear several sylls>  
 6 B: But saying that Lauren it was the receptionist this  
 7 I said to the receptionist here on the desk  
 8 <quote> is he gone in to visit </quote>  
 9 She says <quote> yes his mother </quote>. So that's how I know it.

While we do not know how B's initial proffer was formatted, we can see that A responds with a turn design typical for offer refusals: a series of NOS (D+) and a GRATITUDE (X/Apos). However, this refusal is not accepted by B, who responds with an equally firm re-proffer consisting of an objection marker 'no', APOLOGIES (X/Aneg, see section 13.1.1.) And a STRONG-NECESSITY (D+)<sup>56</sup>. The latter challenges A's prior congruent D+ stance. As in the previous example, however, the re-proffer does not treat the refusal as problematic. It is once more an act of insisting the refuser accept an FA to their benefit – and, this time, even at the cost to the profferer. B has no grounds for problematizing D's utterance and the refuser appears to non-verbally accept the re-offer.

Instead of challenging a D+ utterance, profferers can also defer to a refuser's (claimed) deontic authority without accepting the refusal itself. This can be achieved by means of either D- re-proffers or D- counters to refusers' counters. While this still contests the refusal, it accepts the co-participant's D+ stance and treats the refusal as unproblematic. This is demonstrated in the subsequent two examples. Regarding D-

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<sup>56</sup> Unlike the STRONG-NECESSITY suggestion we previously saw, this one does not express a secondary E+ stance.

re-proffers, there is only one format which allows a participant to insist on an FA while foregrounding a lack of deontic authority: DOUBLE-CHECKS. In addition, DOUBLE-CHECKS make available a specific way of resisting an FA, namely CONFIRM-REFUSALS. Both formats only occur in offer negotiations, as example 41 illustrates.

Example 41: ‘Chair’, SPICE P1A-007 (offer resistance)

1 E: <offers chair to B>  
 2 B: Oh no I'm quite happy here.  
 3 E: Are you sure you don't want a chair?  
 4 B: Yeah no no I'm fine. <unclear several words>  
 [...]  
 5 E: Pat are you sure you don't want a chair?  
 6 A: No I'm fine thank you Jessie.  
 7 E: Are you sure?  
 8 B: Yeah.

In line 2, speaker B refuses E's non-verbal offer of a chair with a typical offer refusal turn design: a NO and a REASON. E re-proffers with a DOUBLE-CHECK, asking whether B is sure. Similar to a QUERY-WANT, DOUBLE-CHECKS frame the FA as contingent on the recipient's wish/volition, thereby foregrounding a weak deontic stance.<sup>57</sup> The same format is subsequently used in lines 5 and 7. Although this format clearly does not accept the preceding refusals, it does not challenge E's strong deontic stances; instead B (ostensibly) defers to E's deontic authority. In doing so, they treat the refusals and the stances they contain as unproblematic. DOUBLE-CHECKS furthermore make available a specific disaligning format: CONFIRM-REFUSALS. While the former are included in Barron's (2005) offer classification under

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<sup>57</sup> In lines 3 and 5, a reference to the refuser's want is in fact embedded in the DOUBLE-CHECK; in line 7, it is not.

'preference strategies' – which highlight the conditional nature of offers –, CONFIRM-REFUSALS are not part of Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz's (1990) refusal taxonomy.

This format constitutes an affirmation of the refuser's lack of want/need/volition that functions analogously to NOS in response to QUERY-WANTS or QUERY-FUTURES. In addition, they confirm the deontic asymmetry conveyed by the preceding DOUBLE-CHECK, thereby foregrounding a strong deontic stance. We see this in lines 4 (in combination with other units) and line 8. To conclude, both DOUBLE-CHECKS and CONFIRM-REFUSALS accept the deontic stance they respond to, thereby treating the prior utterance as unproblematic.

Profferers can also produce a D- counter in response to refusers' D+ counters. This resists the FA put forward by the refuser but does not challenge the strong deontic stance they express. Example 42 shows such a sequence in the course of a proposal negotiation. What is particularly interesting about this interaction is that the participants' deontic statuses are entirely symmetrical. The proposed FAs would benefit an absent third party, meaning neither negotiator stands to gain anything and the cost is equally distributed.

#### Example 42: SPICE P1Aneg005 (proposal counter)

- 1 A: We should maybe sort of ride down.
- 2 C: Slip him ten euro for the bedding he said.
- 3 A: Ah we'll do more than that. We'll give him twenty or something
- 4 and buy a box of chocolates or something nice wee card or something.
- 5 C: Or we could get him uh uhm a [ bottle from the ]
- 6 A: [Easter egg sort of] thing.
- 7 He might not drink for all I know. Well he does.
- 8 Does he drink? I can't remember.



The initial proposal relevant here occurs in line 2 – A's utterance in line 1 is included for context. Although it appears, at first glance, that C's proposal is implemented by an imperative, I argue that it is in fact an ELLIPSIS of A's prior WEAK-NECESSITY: "[we should] slip him ten euro for the bedding". This is supported by the fact that both A and C subsequently refer to their compensating the absent third party as a joint activity, using the pronoun 'we'. An IMPERATIVE, by contrast, would nominate only A as an agent.<sup>58</sup> Irrespective of the format and stance of C's initial proposal, we can see that speaker A counters it by putting forward FAs of their own in lines 3-4. Although the refuser displays uncertainty about the specifics of what to get for the absent party, their STATE-FUTURES and ELLIPSES express certainty and deontic authority with regards to "do[ing] more" than just giving them ten euro.

In line 5, C now produces a counter as well; unlike, their co-participant, however, they express a primary weak deontic stance by means of a STATE-POSSIBILITY. In addition, they are not countering A's proposal to "do more", but are merely proposing alternative specifics of what to get. This, in itself, conveys that they are not treating A's refusal in the form of a counter as problematic. By foregrounding a D- stance, C furthermore confirms A's claim of deontic authority. This is interesting because the refuser does not actually have a strong deontic status vis-à-vis the profferer in this context. Both parties have equal rights to decide how to proceed. This right is furthermore not grounded on entitlement to some benefit but only on the

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<sup>58</sup> Confusingly, the utterance is coded as a 'representative' in SPICE, which must be an annotation error – A's prior and subsequent utterances are coded as directives and commissives, respectively.



A refuses B's suggestion, which was categorised as 'unclear', with a NO variation that negates the proffered object (D+). Despite this decisive disalignment, B re-proffers in lines 18 and 19. However, they do not orient to the deontic facet; instead, their turn consists of a turn-initial weak agreement (BACK-CHANNELLING token) – here 'no' agrees with A's prior negation – and two E+ REASONS. The first REASON conveys B's judgment that the docs would be a reasonable solution, the second provides an incentive by pointing out that one "wouldn't even see them" under the dress. Although B's claim of epistemic authority does not challenge A's deontic stance (or status), it constitutes an attempt to trump deontic power with knowledge/reason. In other words, the re-suggestion conveys that A's refusal based entirely on strong deontic rights may be ill-considered.<sup>59</sup> Nevertheless, A's D+ refusal is not treated as interpersonally problematic. Although the refuser does not enhance B's face, the profferer does not – and has no grounds to – orient to any infringement on their rights or face-aggravation. In fact, B's re-proffer is not even reprimanding, i.e. treating the refusal/refuser as unreasonable. We will see examples of reprimands in the subsequent chapters.

In summary, this section has shown that refusers' D+ utterances can be responded to in a variety of ways which either accept, challenge or attempt to trump the strong deontic claim. I have demonstrated that:

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<sup>59</sup> Such attempts at persuading a refuser by claiming epistemic authority may or may not be treated as interpersonally unproblematic.

- resisting D+ utterances do not express secondary stances;
- profferers and third parties can accept refusers' D+ stances with or without also accepting the refusal;
- profferers and third parties can challenge refusers' d+ stances without problematizing them – although they may themselves be problematized for doing so;
- profferers and third parties can try to trump the refuser's (claimed) deontic authority with epistemic authority; and
- since refusers generally have a strong deontic status, there are few possible grounds for problematizing their D+ utterances;

### 8.2.2. Who's the boss? Problematic utterances

Refusers' D+ utterances are rarely problematized. In fact, my data contains only one such instance. As stated in the previous section, participants have few possible grounds for problematizing a refuser's linguistic behaviour. The subsequent example illustrates one of them: selfish behaviour. I demonstrate that:

- denying a benefit to the proffer is a potential interpersonal offence that may be treated as problematic; and
- such a (perceived) infringement on the profferer's entitlement can be amplified by the refusal design similar to what we saw in the case of

problematic D+ proffers;

Let us revisit the previously discussed negotiation 'Going out', this time focusing not on how the initial proposal but the initial refusal is treated.

Example 44: 'Going out', SPICE P1A-027 (proposal resistance)

- 1 A: [...] Are you definitely not going out tonight?
- 2 C: No definitely not. I'm going to do some work.
- 3 A: Och come on. You can still swing it like.
- 4 C: No I can't. Tomorrow would be totally wasted if I -  
[...]

In section 7.2., I argued that C's refusal in line 2 treats A's proposal as problematic by challenging their entitlement as well as judgement regarding what constitutes a mutually beneficial course of action. Speaker A now responds to this problematization with two EXCLAMATIONS (Aneg) before uttering an E+ REASON<sup>60</sup>. The former are of particular interest here; both 'och' and 'come on' express a primary negative affective stance – annoyance or frustration – towards C's refusal to go out. This means A claims the affective right to be irritated by C's disalignment and to consequently insist on their proposed FA. Although the refuser's D+ claim is congruent with their deontic status in terms of their own actions, refusing the proposal does in fact impact speaker A. Even though they are not prohibiting A going out themselves, it denies them the joint activity (and benefit) of going out

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<sup>60</sup> "You can still swing it like" is considered a REASON rather than a STATE-POSSIBILITY, because the FA it aligns with is going out/not doing work that night. Put differently, it provides a justification why C does not have to work.

together. In addition, the refuser not only disaligns from the initial proposal but also counters it with an intending. The benefactive change this counter implements is entirely self-serving, i.e. it benefits C but not A. This conveys that C prioritises their own benefit to that of A. As previously argued, the counter, in particular, treats the proposal as interpersonally problematic by orienting to A's lack of entitlement. This linguistic behaviour is now itself treated as problematic. The profferer's *Aneg* stances target the refusal and challenge C's entitlement to act selfishly. In doing so, they defend their own entitlement to the initially proposed FA<sup>61</sup>. The refuser's problematization of the profferer is thereby also treated as unjustified.

Once again, it is difficult to untangle the action from the format, i.e. proximal from distal deontic rights. Nevertheless, I argue that the way in which C designs their initial refusal amplifies the (perceived) infringement on A's entitlement. Both the act of disaligning from the proposal/aligning with a counter intending as well as the formats used to do so emphasise C's lack of concern for A's benefit and face. This self-centred behaviour provides ample grounds for a reciprocal problematization.

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<sup>61</sup> Note, however, that C's subsequent REASON may be an attempt at damage-control.

## 9. Primary strong epistemic stances

So far, we have looked at utterances which express primary stances orienting to the deontic facet and how recipients respond – or no not respond – to deontic claims. In this chapter, we move on to the epistemic facet. An utterance expresses an E+ stance if it foregrounds a speaker's knowledge regarding which future course of action ought (not) to happen or why an FA is (un)reasonable, (in)appropriate, (im)possible or (not) beneficial. As previously addressed, SAT-based research on proffers and refusals tends to focus on the aspects of imposition and optionality. However, the analysis so far has demonstrated that FA negotiations are not all about weak and strong deontic claims – or statuses. Speaker's (claimed) epistemic authority constitutes a further important resource for securing/resisting an FA and doing relational work. In fact, E+ utterances make up almost a third (305 tokens, 28%) of the 1085 units assigned a stance (see table 16). Unlike weak and strong deontic claims, these are distributed relatively evenly between profferers/third parties and refusers with 156 tokens (29% of their overall units) and 149 tokens (27% of their overall units), respectively.

The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: beginning once again with profferers' and third parties' utterances, sections 9.1.1. and 9.1.2. look at interpersonally unproblematic and problematic E+ stances, respectively. Section 9.2.1. then focuses on refusers' unproblematic primary strong epistemic stances. My data does not contain any interpersonally problematic instances of E+ utterances produced by refusers.

## 9.1. Profferers' E+ utterances

My data contains 156 utterances by profferers and third parties which foreground an E+ stance, making up 30% of these speakers' analysed units. Of these, 152 are in the service of securing an FA whereas 4 resist a refuser's counter. The latter all take the form of REASONS. I therefore focus on E+ stances in the service of proffers. With 78%, most E+ units in my data once again occur in the service of securing a suggestion (figure 15). As we know by now, however, this distribution is skewed by the overall dominance of suggestion negotiations. Nevertheless, figure 13 shows that primary strong epistemic stances do in fact play a major role in profferers' attempts to secure suggestions. With 37%, they are more frequent than D- and D+ stances combined. Baring units which do not express a primary stance (X), E+ utterances also make up the most common kind of stance in the service of proposals (23%) and requests (23%). While the token count for these proffer types is low (11 and 15 E+ units, respectively), there nevertheless appears to be a clear difference between offers, on the one hand, and the other proffer types, on the other. In addition, the high proportion of E+ stances in the service of suggestions further supports that a) the act of suggesting presupposes the profferers epistemic authority and that b) suggesters draw on this authority by expressing E+ stances.

Figure 15: distribution of profferers' and third parties' E+ utterances across proffer



type





Figure 16: proportions of profferers' and third parties' E+ utterances within proffer types



Perhaps unsurprisingly, the majority of profferers' E+ utterances constitute REASONS (table 21). Nevertheless, a number of additional formats can express a primary strong epistemic stance. Most notable, perhaps, are PERFORMATIVES, QUERY-FUTURES<sup>62</sup>,

<sup>62</sup> Once again, the specific construction determines the stance this format expresses.

STRONG-NECESSITIES, WEAK-NECESSITIES and WHIMPERTIVES. The first of these formats is traditionally considered a direct strategy. However, I argue that the stance expresses by such an utterance depends on the main verb it contains.<sup>63</sup> The latter four formats are usually considered conventionally indirect strategies and tend to be discussed in terms of their non-assertiveness. As I argue in the subsequent section, however, these utterances differ from the proffer formats discussed in chapter 7. in that they do more than (ostensibly) leaving the decision to the addressee; they foreground the speaker's epistemic authority.

Table 21: formats used by profferers and third parties to express a primary strong epistemic stance

Format	#
CONCESSION	15
CONTEMPLATE	1
ELLIPSIS	3
INFO-PROVIDE	2
PERFORMATIVE	1
QUERY-FUTURE	3
REASON	94
STRONG-NECESSITY	9
WEAK-NECESSITY	22
WHIMPERATIVE	6

In the subsequent sections, we will see that attempting to secure an FA by means of strong epistemic stances has advantages as well as disadvantages – for both groups of negotiators. Since most of profferers' E+ claims are (treated) as congruent with

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<sup>63</sup> In the instance in my data, the verb is 'encourage'.

their statuses and do not challenge refusers' (generally congruent) strong deontic stances, the E+ stances themselves often do not provide any grounds for being treated as interpersonally problematic. However, more so than D- and D+ stances which express a secondary strong epistemic stance, certain E+ formats allow refusers to ignore the deontic implications entirely.

### 9.1.1. Knowledge as power: unproblematic utterances

This section focuses on how a) profferers and third parties foreground their epistemic authority when (re-)proffering and b) refusers treat these utterances as interpersonally unproblematic. As previously stated, SAT-based work on proffers is mostly concerned with the deontic facet, i.e. imposition and optionality. Considering that proffers are verbal actions which primarily have – or seek to have – deontic implications, this is not surprising. Unfortunately, this focus has meant that less attention has been paid to utterances which express neither a strong nor a weak primary deontic stance and the relational work they do. While some scholars have pointed out that 'hints' generally display weak – distal and proximal – deontic rights (Couper-Kuhlen & Etelämäki 2015, 23; Haugh 2017, 184; Lindström 2005; Stevanovic & Peräkylä 2012), little attention has been paid to the fact that they do actually express certain strong claims as well. The analysis so far has demonstrated not only that some D- formats express secondary epistemic stances but also that various refusal formats foreground stances other than deontic ones. Unlike politeness

scholars working within a SAT framework, CA researchers have long been interested in the negotiation of epistemic rights and obligations in different contexts – including FA negotiations. In particular, epistemics have been shown to be relevant to the action of proffering in three ways: first, as previously discusses, work on advice giving highlight that such an activity presupposes/constructs an asymmetrical distribution of epistemic authority in favour of the advisor. Second, participants often accounting for their verbal actions. So far, we have seen this behaviour in refusers; this section will show that the same applies for profferers and third parties, particularly in the context of re-proffering. Third, some proffer formats are ambiguous in terms of the action they implement (i.e. between proffering and merely informing, cf. Stevanovic & Peräkylä 2014, 186). In addition to outlining why the formats discussed in this chapter express a primary E+ stance, I therefore demonstrate that:

- there are two types of E+ formats: those which foreground the speaker's knowledge that an FA ought (not) to happen and those which foreground knowledge regarding why an FA is (un)reasonable, (in)appropriate, (im)possible or (not) beneficial;
- despite expressing a primary epistemic stance, only one format belonging to the former group can be responded to in the affirmative without orienting to the utterance's deontic implications while still acknowledging them;
- the latter type allows refusers to entirely ignore the deontic implications of profferers' utterances while still engaging with it;

- initial proffers/counters in e+ format which do not nominate the FA require strong contextual clues to be hearable as having deontic implications;
- profferers' E+ utterances do not express secondary stances; and
- refusers can trump a profferer's E+ stance with either a strong deontic or a strong epistemic stance without challenging their co-participant's claim or treating the utterance as interpersonally problematic;

Let us begin with formats which foreground a profferer's knowledge/judgment that an FA ought (not) to happen. This can be conveyed – explicitly or implicitly – by STRONG-NECESSITIES, WEAK-NECESSITIES, NEGATIVE INTERROGATIVE QUERY-FUTURES, WHIMPERATIVES as well as some CONTEMPLATIONS. Although they do not foreground the deontic facet, they tend to nominate the FA. As I subsequent demonstrate, this means that recipients cannot ignore the deontic implications of such formats and treat them as mere informings. We will furthermore see that most E+ formats of this group cannot be responded to in the affirmative without this being heard as also orienting to the utterance's deontic implications. This constitutes a risk of being (mis-)heard as (weakly) accepting. Refusers therefore generally – but not always – avoid doing so. This does not mean that refusers never utter (weak) agreements in response to E+ proffers. However, refusers appear to only do so if an acceptance would be inconsequential, i.e. in the case of deferred suggestions which do not address a genuine problem and which are made by participants to whom refusers are not accountable in case of not following through. This is illustrated in

example 45. Following A's disclosure that they have never been to the East Coast, B suggests that A will "just have to plan a vacation" there. The below extract therefore also demonstrates how STRONG-NECESSITIES, which we previously encountered in chapter 8., can foreground an E+ stance.

Example 45: 'Plan a vacation', SWDA sw\_0572 (suggestion)

1 B: Well you'll just have to plan a vacation some time  
2 A: Yeah I guess so.

Unlike STRONG-NECESSITIES which foreground a D+ stance, this instance does not orient to A's obligation. This is due to two factors: the benefactives of the proffered action and the fact that the FA is deferred rather than immediate. Although B expresses that the FA is strongly necessary, this is grounded on the profferer's judgment that visiting the East Coast would be reasonable and enjoyable. I therefore argue that STRONG-NECESSITIES foreground the speaker's epistemic authority in such circumstances.

In response, A produces two weak agreement units without accompanying disaligning utterances. The alignment-neutral units weakly agree with the necessity of the FA, thereby treating the profferer's utterance as unproblematic. However, by not also expressing (definitive) disalignment, A avoids potentially being heard as contradictory or even unreasonable. Unlike with possibility, agreeing that an FA has to or needs to happen is implicative of an acceptance; it constitutes a strong argument in favour of the future action. I therefore argue that (firmly) refusing a

proffer despite agreeing to the strong necessity of the FA is inconsistent and might subsequently be targeted. Nevertheless, the lack of disalignment is inconsequential here; the FA does not require an immediate decision to be made, there is no genuine problem that may need a solution, and B – being a stranger to A – has no way of policing whether the refuser does in fact go on a holiday. As a consequence, the refuser is able to risk a (weak) agreement without also expressing disalignment, thereby treating the E+ proffer as unproblematic.

There is one E+ format of the first group which can be responded to in the affirmative without the risk of being heard as also (weakly) agreeing to its deontic implications: WEAK-NECESSITIES. WEAK-NECESSITIES are, as the name suggests, weaker versions of STRONG-NECESSITIES. They state that an FA ‘should’ or ‘ought to happen’, thereby foregrounding the speaker’s epistemic authority regarding what constitutes a reasonable, appropriate and beneficial course of action. As example 46 illustrates, this format allows recipients to agree with the weak necessity of the FA by means of a CONCESSION without committing to doing it. Such a confirmation is stronger than weak agreement tokens but nevertheless poses no risk of being (mis-)heard as accepting the proffer. The below extract occurs during a lengthy negotiation concerning A’s bad nutrition in the course of which speakers B and C make a series of suggestions.

Example 46: ‘Eating habits’, SPICE P1A-080 (suggestion)

[...]  
10 B:     You should you should substi- if you're not going to eat properly

11           you should [take vitamin] tablets or something.  
 12 A:                 [ I know but ]  
 [...]

In lines 10-11, B makes the suggestion that A take vitamin tablets, implemented by an abandoned WEAK-NECESSITY, an Aneq REASON ("if you're not going to eat properly", see section 11.1.1.) and a further WEAK-NECESSITY. The modal 'should' expresses that the FA is the right, sensible or reasonable thing to do (cf. Huddleston et al. 2017, 186). Since this is a matter of epistemic rather than deontic authority, this format foregrounds a strong a E+ stance. In Blum-Kulka & Olshtain's (1984) taxonomy, WEAK-NECESSITIES are categorised as 'locution derivables (together with D+ STRONG-NECESSITIES). Aijmer (1996, 132-134), by contrast, distinguishes strong from weak necessities, stating that the latter express what is appropriate and constitute an 'advisory' rather than a 'requestive' strategy.

The refuser, overlapping with B's talk, responds by stating that "[they] know but". Unlike the utterance 'I know' we saw in section 7.2., this one is not problematizing and confirms rather than challenges the profferer's epistemic claim – thereby maintaining rather than aggravating their face. Instead of conveying that A has prior, independent knowledge and therefore does not need B to make suggestions, the utterance constitutes a CONCESSION<sup>64</sup>. CONCESSIONS can foreground epistemic or affective stances. They admit to a factor which may go against the overall goal the speaker is trying to achieve. Profferers may admit to arguments against the FA they

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<sup>64</sup> This is supported by the subsequent objection marker 'but'.



are trying to secure; refusers, by contrast, may admit to arguments in favour of the FA they are trying to resist. The latter is what we see in the above negotiation. Crucially, however, a CONCESSION does not constitute an acceptance. Speaker A's "I know" serves a similar purpose to pro-forma weak agreements: delaying the disalignment and expressing convergence. However, while tokens such as 'yeah' may be heard as also agreeing with the deontic implications of the WEAK-NECESSITY, the format of A's response avoids this. In conclusion, WEAK-NECESSITIES allow the refuser to agree with the profferer's judgement that an FA ought to happen, thereby maintaining their face – by confirming their primary epistemic claim and proximal deontic rights – and treating the E+ utterance as unproblematic. However, CONCESSIONS are not entirely risk-free; while weak necessity constitutes, unsurprisingly, a weaker argument than strong necessity, conceding that an FA ought to happen while still refusing may be treated as irrational or a flaw in one's reasoning. In fact, in the negotiation 'Eating habits', the refuser concedes to WEAK-NECESSITIES on numerous occasion and furthermore admits that their nutrition is in fact bad. This may be one of the contributing factors why speakers B and C continue their attempts to secure an FA as well as why they reprimand the refuser (see section 9.2.1.).

In contrast to STRONG- and WEAK-NECESSITIES, one E+ format licenses a blunt negative response without being heard as problematizing: negative interrogative QUERY-FUTURES. In chapter 7., I argued that QUERY-FUTURES foreground the profferer's lack of deontic authority to unilaterally make a decision. Now, I demonstrate that this does not apply to negative interrogative constructions. Instead,

they foreground the speaker's knowledge that an FA ought to happen. This is illustrated in example 47. The interaction occurs just after it transpires that A intends to travel to their home town to attend a party without informing their mother about it. This triggers a suggestion from speaker B.

Example 47: 'Tell her', SPICE P1A063 (suggestion)

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1  B:   Are you not going to tell her?
2  A:   No. I was thinking I told you last night this is this is what I might do.
3       Thumb home on Saturday or get the bus home on Saturday.
4       Come home. Stay in Noreen's. Go to the twenty-first. Stay in Noreen's.
5       Get up Sunday and go on the bus <unclear 7 sylls>
6  B:   What about if [you start thumbing] home and you get stuck half-way?
7  C:           [<unclear 4 sylls>]
8  C:   Well I'm going to have to be down home on Friday night
9       so she'll be asking why what reason.
10 A:   Yeah she'll be wondering why I'm home again.
[...]
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Unlike positive interrogatives, their negative counterparts have been found to be marked forms (cf. e.g. Heinemann 2006; Heritage 2002b; Heritage & Raymond 2005). Heritage (2002b, 1428), for instance, states that closed "negative interrogatives are treated as accomplishing assertions of opinion rather than questioning". Looking at Danish data, Heinemann (2006) found that negative interrogative requests orient to the profferer's entitlement, whereas positive interrogatives index a lack of entitlement. Huddleston et al. (2017, 880) explain this in terms of what they call epistemic and deontic bias: they state that a negative interrogative such as the one in line 1 above shows a negative epistemic bias towards what is the presumed answer (i.e. 'You are not going to tell her.') but a positive deontic bias towards what ought to be the right answer (i.e. 'You ought to tell her.'). For this reason, Brown & Levinson

(1987, 135) as well as Leech (2014, 155-156) consider negative interrogative requests as less polite than positive ones. With regard to suggestions, by contrast, the former scholars state this construction is 'ok'; discussing offers, Leech (2014, 182) argues that

the negation of volitional *will* [...] has a persuasive force, because it pays lip service to [the addressee's] reluctance (usually for reasons of politeness) to accept the offer. This arises from the special force of English negative questions [...] by which [the speaker] acts as if to persuade [the hearer] to abandon a negative inclination, and to adopt a positive one.

In the above example, the refuser treats this E+ QUERY-FUTURE as unproblematic; and it is what Huddleston et al. (2017) call the epistemic bias of the negative interrogative that licenses a turn-initial D+ NO. Although the action implemented by the utterance prefers a positive response i.e. an acceptance, the question design projects a negative answer. In other words, A's NO confirms B's assumption that they are not going to tell their mother. This is therefore less likely to be heard as a problematization than a negative response to a positive interrogative. The refuser furthermore produced a counter intending in the form of an abandoned CONTEMPLATE ("I was thinking"), an uncertain STATE-FUTURE ("this is what I might do") and a series of ELLIPSES. Although all of these units foreground the speaker's deontic authority, they are not challenging a prior D+ stance from B. They also do not challenge the profferer's E+ claim. For one, the QUERY-FUTURE only implies rather than asserts that the FA ought to happen; the refuser does not challenge the profferer's judgment concerning the reasonability or appropriateness of the FA. For

another, A expresses indecision regarding their counter intending. This lack of uncertainty further conveys that the refuser is not challenging A's claimed epistemic authority and that they are treating the suggestion as interpersonally unproblematic. In fact, B subsequently defends their epistemic authority. Together with third party C, they trump A's deontic authority with knowledge by presenting REASONS why the initial FA is more reasonable than the refuser's plan (lines 6 and 8-9). This eventually secure an acceptance from A.

So far, we have seen that refusers can respond to E+ proffers with non-committal utterances or by expressing disalignment based on their deontic authority. However, they often make strong primary epistemic claims themselves. As demonstrated in the previous chapters, E+ REASONS account for the act of refusing and frequently deflect blame onto external factors. This maintains the addressee's face, treating their prior utterance as unproblematic and may also ward off a reciprocal problematization. In example 48, we see an instance of knowledge trumping knowledge without this treating the profferer's E+ utterance as problematic or challenging the strong epistemic claim. The negotiation furthermore showcases a format we have not encountered before: WHIMPERATIVES. These are utterances in the form of 'Why don't I/you/we...' or 'Why not...'. Like negative interrogative QUERY-FUTURES, they imply that the nominated FA ought to happen and foreground a strong epistemic stance. The below unsolicited suggestions occur after speaker A tells B about some ideas they have for improving the school system.

Example 48: ‘Pretty good ideas’, SWDA P1A- 0083 (suggestion<sup>65</sup>)

- 1 B: That's uh some pretty good ideas.  
 2 Why don't you do something with those? [ <laughter> ]  
 3 A: [ <laughter> Well]  
 4 I've done about all I can do which is get the manuscript in good shape  
 5 so that it can be published and read by a lot of people.  
 6 B: Uh-huh. Well you should uh run for a school board position.  
 7 A: I've got a lot of things to keep me busy.  
 8 B: Uh-huh. [That]  
 9 A: [Have] you done anything like that? Anything political?

Speaker B's initial suggestion in lines 1-2 consists of an Apos REASON and a WHIMPERATIVE. On the surface, the latter may look like a mere request for information. As argued by Sadock (1971, 1974), however, such interrogatives constitute instructions rather than innocent question. In other words, WHIMPERATIVES are heard as having deontic implications. Blum-Kulka & Olshtain (1984) categorise them as 'language specific suggestory formulae' together with 'how about' (cf. also Aijmer 1996, 132-133). According to Brown & Levinson (1987, 128), "indirect suggestions which demand [...] reasons are a conventionalized positive-politeness form" in English; they assume "(via optimism) that if there are no good reasons why H shouldn't or can't cooperate, he [sic] will." Leech (2014, 205-206), by contrast, argues that this construction is a face-threatening form of suggestion, despite its indirectness: "the negative *don't* seems to imply that [the addressee] is not doing something that [the speaker] believes is in [the hearer's] best interest; hence the formula hints at something lacking in [the hearer's] attitude or

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<sup>65</sup> These suggestions are somewhat unusual in that the proffered actions are less for the benefit of the refuser and more for the greater good. However, since the profferer is not among the potential beneficiaries, I consider the proffers more a suggestion than a request.

behavior.” Although the scholar does not come to this exact conclusion, Leech’s point appears to touch upon the strong primary epistemic stance expressed by WHIMPERATIVES. I do, however, not agree with the implication that this format is inherently – if implicitly – criticising the addressee.

In fact, we can tell from A’s response that they do not treat the proffer as problematic. Their turn adheres to the norms of suggestion refusals: they first echo B’s laughter, produce a delaying objection-marker and disalign by means of E+ REASONS which shift the blame away from themselves. More specifically, they state that they have already “done about all [they] can do” and explain the actions they have taken. This conveys that A is not able to do any more and, therefore, cannot accept. Since the REASONS do not challenge the (implied) reasonability and appropriateness of the FA or the profferer’s epistemic obligation, they also do not challenge B’s claimed epistemic authority regarding what ought to be done. After this initial refusal, the profferer produces a counter suggestion in line 6. Implemented by a WEAK-NECESSITY, they now proffer a specific action, namely running for a school board position. Once again, A responds with an E+ REASON outside of B’s expected domain of knowledge which refers to external obstacles: they are too busy. Overall, the refuser trumps knowledge with knowledge without challenging the profferer’s strong epistemic stances or problematizing their linguistic behaviour. This is because their utterances concern different domains of knowledge. B claims epistemic authority regarding what constitutes appropriate and reasonable courses of action; this is not challenged by A. Instead, they claim epistemic authority regarding external

(circumstantial) obstacles the profferer cannot be expected to know about.

So far, we have looked at E+ formats which convey that an FA ought to happen. Now we will turn to the format which foregrounds the speaker's knowledge regarding arguments in favour or against an FA: REASONS. As demonstrated above, some E+ formats that nominate an action can be responded to in the affirmative (with weak agreements or CONCESSIONS) without this constituting a firm acceptance. Nevertheless, such responses clearly acknowledge the deontic implications of the prior utterance. REASONS, by contrast, allow recipients to entirely ignore those deontic implications and treat them as mere informings. In this way, refusers can engage with profferers' utterances while avoiding engagement with the proffer itself. This is illustrated in the following two examples. In example 49, we see a refuser engaging with a profferer's REASON but ignoring the preceding unit which nominates an FA.

Example 49: 'North Carolina', SWDA sw\_0602 (suggestion)

1 B: Well you ought to come to North Carolina. It's a big change <laughter>.  
 2 A: It is?  
 3 B: Yeah.  
 4 A: <Laughter>  
 [...]

B's initial, unsolicited suggestion consists of two utterances: a WEAK-NECESSITY and a REASON. Both express an E+ stance; the former regarding what A ought to do, the latter about a possible incentive to do it. Since the REASON itself does not nominate any FA, the refuser is able to respond to this second unit as if it had no deontic

implications.<sup>66</sup> In line 2, A utters a BACK-CHANNELLING follow-up question, which conveys an unknowing stance regarding the just received information (X/E-) and also engages with the prior turn (O’Keeffee & Adolphs 2008, 16). Yet, what exactly A is engaging with here is crucial. The utterance echoes and responds to “It’s a big change”, expressing that the refuser has no prior knowledge of this. The response does not, however, orient to a potential FA in any way. Instead, B’s turn design allows A to avoid a disalignment from – and, in fact, any engagement with – the actual suggestion. That A wants to end the negotiation becomes even clearer in line 4; after B produces a BACK-CHANNELLING confirmation, A only responds non-linguistically with laughter.

A different way of ignoring deontic implications while still engaging with the prior turn is by uttering an INFO-REQUEST. These formats can be employed not only to postpone a disalignment but also to steer the conversation away from an FA negotiation entirely. This is made particularly easy by E+ reasons, as example 50 shows.

Example 50: ‘Traveling’, SWDA sw\_0421 (suggestion)

[...]  
 9 B: You really should go to Europe.  
 10 I went to Europe for six weeks after I graduated from college  
 11 and that was just.  
 12 I I mean I could have had that or a down payment on a new car  
 13 and I took the trip. And  
 14 A: And it was great?  
 15 B: Uh I traveled with a group of sixteen other students.  
 16 Actually they there was two other graduating seniors besides myself  
 17 and we just had a ball. We stayed at  
 18 A: How long did you get to stay there?

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<sup>66</sup> Its deontic implications arise from its sequential position, however.



19 B: Uh six weeks.  
 20 A: Oh really?  
 21 B: Yeah. It was wonderful so you should think about doing something like that.  
 22 A: Uh huh. I just had a friend that got back from Europe  
 23 and she was there like all winter semester.

In line 9, B utters an (embedded) suggestion in the form of a WEAK-NECESSITY. This is followed by a series of E+ REASONS in which B describes their own positive experience of visiting Europe (lines 10-13). In line 14, speaker A makes an INFO-REQUEST (X/E+), asking for more information about B's trip. As previously discussed, INFO-REQUESTS are alignment-neutral but refusal-implicating, often delaying a disalignment. In this particular example, A uses the design of B's turn to their advantage. As in the last example, they ignore the WEAK-NECESSITY and proffered FA.<sup>67</sup> Instead, they only engage with B's REASONS. In doing so, A confirms B's claimed epistemic authority concerning the domain of their past Europe trip while ignoring the E+ claim regarding what A ought to do. That A is attempting to derail the conversation and entirely avoid a disalignment rather than postpone it is apparent from the subsequent turns: in line 18, they make another INFO-REQUEST pertaining to the trip; in line 20, they utter a change-of-state token ("oh") and a follow-up question, both of which convey an E- stance regarding the information provided by B; and, in lines 22-23 – after B redirects the conversation with a further WEAK-NECESSITY–, A responds with a weak agreement before shifting the topic.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> It is perhaps no coincidence that both examples are from the SWDA corpus and contain unsolicited suggestions which do not in fact require an (immediate) acceptance or refusal.

<sup>68</sup> B's REASONS in lines 10-11 may themselves be triggered by an absence of immediate response from A after the initial WEAK-NECESSITY.

Throughout this entire sequence, A avoids disaligning from the proffered FA. In fact, the only unit which can be heard as an engagement with the proffer at all is the turn-initial weak agreement in line 22. Nevertheless, B's E+ REASONS allow A to engage with some parts of B's talk.

As the above examples show, REASONS tend to occur either with an additional unit that nominates the FA or in a re-proffer after the FA has been nominated. In the latter case, the sequential order of FA negotiations means that these utterances are hearable as having deontic implications. REASONS may also implement initial proffers/counter without accompanying formats which nominate the FA. However, this is not common in my data set – and is even rarer for initial proffers than initial counters. There are two possible reasons for this: one, without making explicit an FA, the interpretation of an utterance as having deontic implications relies on contextual clues. This means speakers might avoid initial proffers which do not nominate the FA for the sake of disambiguation. Second, this difference may be due to methodological limitations. As stated in section 5.3., the extraction of data from the source corpora revealed problems with regard to the annotation of utterances. It may therefore be the case that SWDA and SPICE contain more instances of initial proffers formatted as E+ REASONS than I retrieved, but that they were not annotated as commissives or directives. Exactly that is the case in example 51 below: C's initial proffer is annotated as a representative; the interaction was only detected because B produces a counter annotated as a commissive – probably because it is formatted as a STATE-FUTURE (D+). This negotiation illustrates two things: first, strong situational

clues are required for unaccompanied E+ REASONS to be heard as initial proffers; second, similar to WEAK-NECESSITIES, R+ REASONS make available CONCESSIONS which are not (mis-)hearable as acceptances.

Example 51: ‘For Stephanie’, SPICE P1A-054 (request)

- 1 C: That's probably for Stephanie.
- 2 B: Probably but I'll get it anyway.

C's request appears to be triggered by a ringing phone or someone at the door (and potentially B moving to answer it). This provides a sufficient situational clue for B to hear C's utterance as having deontic implications: the phone call/doorbell/knock is probably for an absent third party and B therefore ought not to answer it. Both participants seem to have epistemic access/rights to this argument. B's echoing 'probably', which constitutes a CONCESSION, does in fact convey equal epistemic rights. However, it does not problematize C's utterance. By agreeing that what C is saying is accurate, they confirm their strong epistemic claim with regard to the content of their REASON. In addition, the CONCESSION delays the disalignment. Although B subsequently disregards C's utterance as a pressing argument against answering the phone/door, they do not verbally challenge it. Instead, they trump epistemic authority with deontic authority without problematizing the proffer.

To summarise, in this section we have seen that (claimed) epistemic authority plays a key role in FA negotiations. In addition to illustrating which formats used by profferers foreground a strong epistemic stance, I have demonstrated that:

- there are two types of E+ formats: those which foreground the speaker's knowledge that an FA ought (not) to happen and those which foreground knowledge regarding why an FA is (un)reasonable, (in)appropriate, (im)possible or (not) beneficial;
- despite expressing a primary epistemic stance, the only format nominating the FA which can be responded to in the affirmative without orienting to the utterance's deontic implications are WEAK-NECESSITIES. In response to this format, refusers can concede that the FA ought to happen;
- E+ REASONS, by contrast, allow refusers to entirely ignore the deontic implications while still engaging with the utterance;
- initial proffers/counters in E+ format which do not nominate the FA require strong contextual clues to be hearable as having deontic implications;
- profferers' E+ utterances do not express secondary stances;
- challenging an E+ stance does not necessarily treat it as interpersonally problematic; and
- refusers can trump a profferer's E+ stance with either a strong deontic or a strong epistemic stance without challenging their co-participant's claim or treating the utterance as interpersonally problematic;

### 9.1.2. Know your rights: problematized utterances

As previously stated, profferers' and third parties' E+ stances are almost always (treated as) congruent with the speaker's epistemic status. This is particularly true for E+ reasons. In this section, I demonstrate that:

- claims that an FA ought to happen, by contrast, are more susceptible to challenge and problematization;
- similar to problematic D+ proffers, such claims amplify the perceived offence if the proffer is considered inappropriate; and
- unlike with D+ proffers, refusers can problematize profferers' violating their proximal deontic rights without challenging the accuracy of the E+ utterance's content;

First, we will look at a negotiation in which the content of the proffer is treated as inappropriate. Since, as outlined in section 7.2., profferers' proximal deontic rights are grounded on knowledge regarding what constitutes an appropriate course of action, such a violation is amplified by a claim that the FA ought to happen. Example 52 occurs in the context of a discussion about bottles not being allowed inside the library reading areas. After speaker A discloses they were "too lazy" to go down to the café area, C suggests taking the lift instead.

Example 52: 'Lift', SPICE P1A-053 (suggestion)

- 1 A: Yeah I was dying for a drink the other evening  
 2 and I was just too lazy to go down the stairs.

- 3 C: Girls you should use the lift.  
 4 D: We're not [   handicapped people.   ]  
 5 A: [It's for disabled people.]  
 6 C: Hmm <laughter>  
 7 D: Yes have you an opinion on this? Do you know what the girl  
 8 C: Your throat is disabled.

C's suggestion in line 3 is implemented by a WEAK-NECESSITY, which expresses an E+ stance regarding what ought to be done. In their subsequent turn, D challenges this claim, treating the FA as inappropriate, as well as C's proximal deontic rights to make this suggestion. Their response takes the form of a REASON which foregrounds an Aneg stance:<sup>69</sup> instead of merely informing or reminding C of an obstacle, it implicitly evaluates the FA as out of line (see section 11.2.1.). For one, the REASON orients to knowledge both parties have equal access to and which C can be expected to know.<sup>70</sup> For another, it appears to object to the perceived implication that the refusers should use the lift because they are handicapped. Speaker D thereby problematized C's linguistic behaviour on the grounds of not only knowingly making an inappropriate suggestion but also claiming epistemic authority contra to what they ought to know.

Refusers can also treat E+ utterances as interpersonally problematic without challenging their content or the appropriateness of the FA. In such cases, it is the act of proffering – usually (re-)suggesting – itself that constitutes the source of the offence. This is similar to the problematization of a STATE-POSSIBILITY suggestion we

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<sup>69</sup> REASON such as this one also express a secondary knowing stance, which can be responded to independently. This is what C is doing in lines 6 and 8.

<sup>70</sup> A's REASON in line 5, by contrast, is more readily hearable as foregrounding an E+ stance, informing C of something they do not know.

saw in section 7.2. Example 53 once again occurs during the negotiation 'Eating habits'. At this point in the interaction, both C and B have made various suggestions that A ought to change their diet. After the refuser attempts to end the negotiation (lines 30 and 32), C (supported by B) continues with a new counter suggestion.

Example 53: 'Eating habits', SPICE P1A-080 (suggestion)

[...]  
 30 A:       Anyway.  
 31 C:       Let's quickly change the [subject]  
 32 A:                               [Change] the subject there topic change and all that.  
 33 C:       I think you should get a good iron tonic into you.  
 34 B:       I do think [     so.     ]  
 35 A:                               [Okay mommy].  
 [...]

Despite the refuser's clear inclination to end the negotiation, C utters a further WEAK-NECESSITY suggestion in line 33, echoed by B (ELLIPSIS) in line 34. Speaker A responds with a CRITICISM (X/Aneg, see section 13.2.) in the form of sarcastic irony. Neither C nor B are in fact A's mother; the utterance therefore implies that C and B are acting like a mother and treating A like a child. This conveys a negative evaluation of C's and B's verbal behaviour and problematizes their acts of re-suggesting. In other words, A orients to a violation of proximal deontic rights on the part of C and B. Unlike in the previous example, however, the content of the suggestion itself is not treated as inappropriate. In fact, as previously mentioned, the refuser concedes to their bad eating habits and the reasonability of the various suggestions throughout the negotiation. In this instance, then, we can detangle the profferer's and third party's stances from the proximal deontic rights they claim by way of (re-)suggesting:

speaker A does not challenge their co-participants claimed knowledge regarding what they ought to do; they only challenge their rights to continuously tell A what they ought to do in light of the refuser's previous disalignment and attempt to change the topic.

So far, we have only looked at formats conveying what ought to be done which implement suggestions. There are, however, rare instances in which they are used for other proffer types. In example 54, the profferer produces a WEAK-NECESSITY re-request. In contrast to suggestions, such a request claims knowledge regarding the addressee's obligation vis-à-vis the speaker, therefore also claiming entitlement. Unsurprisingly, such a claim amplifies the perceived offence if the refuser considered the profferer not to be entitled to the FA. In this respect, WEAK-NECESSITY requests appear to be just as risky as D+ STRONG-NECESSITY ones (see section 8.1.2.). The below extract occurs during a lengthy negotiation beginning with the initial request that A and C do the dishes. This has led to the profferer's linguistic behaviour being problematized on numerous occasions. Nevertheless, they continue making requests.

Example 54: 'Housework' SPICE P1A-025 (request)

[...]  
 24 D: You should be busy working doing the housework.<sup>71</sup>  
 25 A: Aye right whatever you think. <Laughter>  
 [...]

Like in the previous example, the refuser responds with CRITICISM (Aneg) in the form

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<sup>71</sup> D's utterance is annotated as a quotation in the source corpus, but it is not clear who they are quoting. The utterance does not appear anywhere else in the transcript.



of sarcastic irony. Unlike the above CRITICISM, however, these ones also target the content of the profferer's utterance and challenge their E+ claim. A's turn negates, via irony, the claim that they "should be busy" doing housework. The negative affective stance is therefore a primary one; it implies a justification for disaligning (see section 11.2.1.). The refusal therefore challenges D's primary strong epistemic stance regarded A's obligations and, in turn, their own entitlement. As a consequence, the profferer's utterance is problematized on the grounds of violating their proximal deontic rights by request an FA they are not entitled to. This offence, I argue, is once again amplified by the format employed to implement the proffer and the stance it expresses.

Strong epistemic claims regarding what ought to happen are not the only E+ utterances that can be treated as interpersonally problematic. In the context of an already ongoing interpersonal conflict – i.e. if the profferer's linguistic behaviour has already been problematized – even an utterance in the form of a congruent E+ REASON can be treated as problematic. In example 55, we return to the negotiation 'Your man'. As I argued in section 8.1.2., speaker B problematizes the profferer's utterances in lines 6 and 8 for insisting on the FA without providing additional arguments despite the refuser's firm disalignment. Let us now look at what happens after that.

Example 55: 'Your man', SPICE P1A-031 (suggestion)

1 A: [...] So are you going to go out with your man tonight or not  
Denise?

2 C: I think you should.  
 3 B: No I'm not.  
 4 A: Go to the cinema and we'll [all go] with youse.  
 5 C: [Yeah.]  
 6 B: I don't want to go.  
 7 A: Go on.  
 8 B: No.  
 9 A: He's not going to bite.  
 10 B: I don't care.  
 [...]

Even after their utterances have been treated as interpersonally problematic twice, speaker A produces a re-suggestion. However, in line 9 they now provide a REASON (E+) why A ought to go on the date: B's "[man]'s not going to bite". Unlike what we have previously seen, the refuser bluntly dismissed this argument, stating that they "don't care". This Aneg CRITICISM treats A's REASON as irrelevant and, consequent, insufficient justification for a re-suggestion. However, the response does not challenge the content of A's REASON and therefore also not the profferer's corresponding knowing stance; put differently, B does not express that A's REASON is incorrect. Instead, it is A's implied judgement that their REASON constitutes a relevant argument in relation to the FA which is being challenged. The refuser therefore problematizes the profferer E+ re-proffer without challenging the E+ stance itself.

To summarise, although profferers' E+ claims are almost always (treated as) congruent with the speaker's epistemic status, such utterances are not immune to being problematized. In this section, I demonstrated that:

- claims that an FA ought to happen are more susceptible to challenge and

problematization than E+ REASONS;

- similar to problematic D+ proffers, the former amplify the perceived offence if the proffer is considered inappropriate; and
- unlike with D+ proffers, refusers can problematize profferers' violating their proximal deontic rights without challenging the accuracy of the E+ utterance's content;

## 9.2. Refusers' E+ utterances

In contrast to D- and D+ utterances, refusers produce E+ units to a similar extent as profferers and third parties. Of the 149 tokens in my data, 122 resist an FA whereas 26 are in the service of securing a counter FA. As figure 17 shows, most of the latter group of units (65%) occur in the service of counter intendings. Refusers' E+ utterances resisting an FA occur mostly in response to suggestions (71%, see figure 17). Although the dominance of suggestion negotiations once again skews this distribution, figure 18 shows that – analogous to profferers' E+ units – refusers produce E+ utterances most frequently to resist suggestions (32%). This further supports that, more than any other proffer type, suggestions are predominantly negotiated in terms of participants' knowledge rather than (lack of) deontic authority. Interestingly, E+ stances are least common within resistances to requests. This contradicts the commonly reported finding that excuses and reasons are a main request refusal common strategy (see section 3.1.). We have to remember, however,

that these studies largely rely on data from Discourse Completion Tests. These are usually designed to elicit 'polite' refusal and would therefore not include problematized responses. As we have seen throughout the analysis so far, E+ REASONS are generally absent from refusals of problematic proffers, which would lower the overall proportion of refusers' E+ utterances in my data. In addition, request negotiations have a lower average length (5 turns per negotiation) than suggestion (8 turns per negotiation) or proposal negotiations (13 turn per negotiation). This means that refusers get – or need – more opportunities to provide an E+ REASON when resisting suggestions or proposals than requests. Once, again data from Discourse Completion Tests tends to focus only on initial refusals, not subsequent turns. Finally, Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz (1990) and those who use their taxonomy do not differentiate between different kinds of reasons based on the stances they express. As we have seen in the analysis so far and will continue to do, REASONS can also foreground affective stances.

Figure 17: distribution of refusers' E+ utterances in the service of securing a counter across proffer type




Figure 18: distribution of refusers' E+ utterances across types of proffer resistance





Figure 19: proportions of refusers' E+ utterances within types of proffer resistance



As tables 22 and 23 show, the majority of refusers' E+ utterances – resisting as well as countering – take the form of REASONS, followed by CONCESSIONS. Interestingly, refusers do not claim epistemic authority regarding what ought to be done, even when countering an FA.

Table 22: formats used by refusers to express a primary strong epistemic stance when resisting an FA

Format	#
CONCESSION	10
ELLIPSIS	1
REASON	110
REPAIR	1

Table 23: formats used by refusers to express a primary strong epistemic stance when countering

Format	#
CONCESSION	2
REASON	24

Throughout the analysis so far, we have seen many examples of refusers expressing E+ stances, particularly REASONS, in resistance to FAs. In the subsequent section, we will focus on how these are treated by profferers and third parties. Most notably, we will see that my data does not contain any instances in which a refuser's E+ utterance is treated as interpersonally problematic. Once again, this is because participants have relatively few grounds for problematizing refusers' linguistic behaviour. Nevertheless, refusers can become the subject of critique in a different way: they can be reprimanded for being unreasonable.

### 9.2.1. Know-it-all: unproblematized utterance

Having discussed refusers' E+ REASONS throughout the previous chapters, this section focuses primarily on how – and why – profferers and third parties treat these utterances as interpersonally unproblematic. I will subsequently demonstrate that:

- E+ REASONS can express a secondary weak deontic stance;
- profferers and third parties can accept refusers' E+ stances with or without also accepting the refusal;
- profferers and third parties can challenge refusers' E+ stances without problematizing them;
- since refusers generally have a strong deontic status and their E+ stances are almost always (treated as) congruent, there are few possible grounds for

problematizing their e+ utterances. In fact, no such instance occurs in my data; and

- refusers can nevertheless be reprimanded for disaligning based on E+ REASONS which are (perceived) to be unreasonable or insufficient;

We will begin with instances in which participants confirm a refuser's claimed primary epistemic stance. This can happen either implicitly – by dropping the FA being negotiated – or explicitly by means of a responding epistemic stance. In the latter case, a speaker can either claim equal knowledge or accept the refuser's epistemic authority by conveying no prior knowledge. Neither of these two options necessarily constitutes an acceptance of the refusal, however. In other words, a profferer may express that they agree with an argument or that they did not know about it while nevertheless producing a re-proffer. The subsequent negotiations illustrate various combinations of accepting a REASON with or without accepting the refusal. In examples 56 we return to an interaction we previously encountered in section 8.1.1. There, I argued that C's disaligning REASON in line 4 refers to an obstacle the profferer can be expected to know about without problematizing A's prior utterance. Let us now focus on A's response.

Example 56: 'Do it yourself', SPICE P1A-069 (suggestion resistance)

[...]  
 3 A: Well then you should do it yourself. Forget about your da.  
 4 C: Sure I won't be there to feed them or anything.  
 5 A: Aye I suppose so. You give him the money for it.  
 [...]



In line 5, A produces two agreements which also function as refusal acceptances<sup>72</sup> before signalling that they are dropping the initial FA by producing a counter suggestions. The former conveys three things: first, the REASON given by C is not new information for A; second, the REASON is accepted as factually accurate; and third, the REASON constitutes a sufficient justification for C's disalignment. Together, this confirms the refuser's E+ stance, accepts the refusal and treats the utterance as unproblematic.

In example 57, by contrast, the profferer orients to a refuser's REASON as new information. This interaction furthermore illustrates a rare instance of an E+ REASON which expresses a secondary weak deontic stance. The negotiation occurs during a conversation about gardening.

Example 57: 'Weeds', SWDA sw\_0674 (suggestion resistance)

- 1 A: Yeah but you know you ought to get him to g- pull the weeds.  
 2 B: Well he won't pull weeds. He says he'll spray them but he won't pull them.  
 3 A: Oh.  
 [...]

Implemented by a WEAK-NECESSITY (E+), speaker A suggests in line 1 that B get their husband to pull out weeds. B responds with a (delayed) REASON, stating that "he won't pull weeds". Like many previously discussed REASONS, the refuser expresses a knowing stance regarding an external obstacle. However, the nature of

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<sup>72</sup> Since these constitute acceptances, they are not included in the 1198 units categorized in this study.

the obstacle in this example means that B is also expressing a secondary weak deontic stance. They frame the FA as not possible due to an external, third-party authority: the husband. In other words, B conveys that they themselves lack deontic rights in the matter.<sup>73</sup> The presented obstacle is furthermore one outside the profferer's expected domain of knowledge. This is confirmed by A's responding X/E-BACK-CHANNELLING token, the news-marker "oh" (Gardner 1998), which conveys no prior knowledge of the B's reason. The response accepts not only the refuser's strong epistemic rights but also an epistemic asymmetry. Once again, the E+ REASON is not challenged in any way and B's utterance is treated as unproblematic.

The next example (58) shows a profferer accepting the content of a refuser's REASON and their corresponding strong epistemic stance without also accepting the refusal. As discussed in section 7.1., B presents external obstacles the profferer cannot know about and treats their initial suggestion as unproblematic.

#### Example 58: 'Leasing', SWDA sw\_0165 (suggestion)

1 A: Have you thought about uh leasing?  
 2 B: Well uh I have thought about it  
 3 but leasing wouldn't  
 4 you know I don't use it for my business.  
 5 A: I see.  
 6 B: My wife uses hers just for pleasure.  
 7 and I use mine just to go back and forth to work.  
 8 A: Right. But if you are rolling it over every three years.  
 9 B: Yeah I guess. Uh.  
 10 A: You know typically you if you purchase your own car  
 11 you tend to make uh the best returns after you pay it off.  
 [...]

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<sup>73</sup> As does the profferer.

Similar to the previous example, the profferer responds with an X/E- BACK-CHANNELLING token, conveying their prior lack of knowledge regarding B's REASONS (line 5). In lines 6-7, the refuser then elaborates by providing further E+ REASONS. While speaker A once again expresses a secondary unknowing stance at the beginning of line 8, they then produce a re-proffer by also giving an E+ REASON (also in lines 10-11). This means the profferer does not accept B's REASON as a sufficient justification for disaligning. More specifically, they convey that the supposed obstacles may not in fact prevent the refuser from leasing and that the FA is not impossible or circumstantially unreasonable after all. While A fully accepts the content of B's REASON and their corresponding (claimed) epistemic rights with their BACK-CHANNELLING tokens, they do not accept the refusal and the justification for it. Crucially, however, this does not treat the refuser's E+ utterances as problematic. For one, given the benefactives being negotiated, A has no grounds for problematizing B's act of refusing. For another, A is not responding to a prior problematization they may want to retaliate for. In addition, the profferer designs their re-suggestions in a way which do not infringe on the refuser's deontic or epistemic rights.

Participants may resist refuser's E+ REASONS in stronger ways than the previous example. They may even reprimand refusers for being unreasonable – both regarding the act of refusing itself and the E+ REASONS they give for doing so. This is illustrated in the next two examples. Although reprimands treat the refuser as unreasonable – potentially aggravating their face and leading to responding

problematizations –, I argue that they do not orient to interpersonally problematic behaviour on the part of the refuser. Put differently, refusers can get told off, but not because they have infringed on their co-participants' rights or aggravated their face. In example 59, we see a refuser being reprimanded for not accepting food.

Example 59: 'Give my head peace', SPICE P1A-008 (offer resistance)

1 D: <offers food to A>  
 2 A: Oh no no I couldn't.  
 3 C: Young or old?  
 4 A: No Gemma that was lovely.  
 5 C: <unclear several sylls> have this one here.  
 6 ?: <unclear 5 sylls>  
 7 A: I'm not not that long after my dinner.  
 8 C: Och would you give my head peace.  
 9 A: And not only that I had tea before I took my dinner as well.  
 10 C: Look stop bumming and blowing about what you've ate  
 11 would you for goodness sake.

The negotiation begins with a non-verbal initial offer from D (line 1), which A refuses with NOS (D+) and a NEG-ABILITY (D+). This appears to be followed by a non-verbal (re-)offer, since A utters a further refusal in line 4, consisting of another NO and an expression of GRATITUDE (X/Apos). In line 5, then, C makes a verbal re-offer of unclear format.<sup>74</sup> This time, A forgoes the D+ stance and provides an e+ REASON instead (line 7). Their justification that they have had dinner not long ago is not accepted by C, however. In line 8, they respond with two primary negative affective stances: an EXCLAMATION and a CRITICISM. Both convey annoyance at A for refusing – and perhaps their justification for doing so – as well as that C does not

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<sup>74</sup> The utterance “have this one here” might be an IMPERATIVE or part of a construction such as a WHIMPERATIVE.

accept the refusal. While C does not challenge A's REASON in terms of its factual accuracy, they challenge the validity of the REASON for the negotiation. Put differently, they convey that A's justification is not sufficient to warrant a refusal. The same is repeated in lines 9-11: again, A gives an e+ REASON; and, again, C responds with a CRITICISM followed by an EXCLAMATION. The formats of the profferer's re-offers treat A's refusal as unreasonable. Crucially, however, this does not treat A's linguistic behaviour as interpersonally problematic. Neither the act of refusing nor how it is done infringe on the profferer's rights or aggravate their face. I therefore argue that C is not orienting to an interpersonal offence; rather, reprimands are motivated by a concern for the refuser's well-being.

A further instance of such a reprimand is illustrated in example 60, this time in the context of a suggestion. This negotiation furthermore contains a rare case of an E+ REASON being challenged in terms of its accuracy. Let us return to the negotiation 'Eating habits'.

Example 60: 'Eating habits', SPICE P1A-080 (suggestion resistance)

[...]  
 53 B: There's no calories in those.  
 54 A: Ah there's something like twenty-five calories.  
 55 C: Yeah there isn't enough.  
 56 B: So wh- like you'd have four a day?  
 57 A: No I used to e- I used to eat about say  
 58 I could eat about a good eight in a day, plenty of water as well.  
 59 That's when [I was a bit silly.]  
 60 B: [ That that's ] two hundred calories [Michelle.]  
 61 A: [ I know ]  
 62 but then like I  
 63 B: You're supposed to eat a [thousand.]  
 64 A: [ I know ] but I'm not  
 65 I'm eating a thousand now.  
 66 I'm eating [about fifteen hundred two two thousand.]  
 67 B: [ You're not. I doubt it. ] I doubt it.

[...]

At this point, the negotiation has continued for a considerable time and the refuser (speaker A) has attempted to change the topic on numerous occasions. One such attempt – and possibly also an effort to convince the co-participants that their current eating habits are much better – involves a talking about their past eating habits. Just prior to the above extract, they disclose that they “used to live on [...] rice crackers”. After pointing out that rice crackers do not have enough calories (lines 53 and 55), B states that one is “supposed to eat a thousand” calories a day (E+ REASON). Speaker A responds with a CONCESSION (“I know”) before providing an E+ REASONS as to why there is no need to change their diet: they are eating enough calories now (lines 65-66). In lines 67, B challenges the factual accuracy of A’s E+ utterances. Their first unit (“you’re not”) is a direct contestation of A’s claim.

Considering that A has primary epistemic rights regarding how much they eat, this incongruent E+ stance from B is unusual and outstanding. However, B is not so much claiming equal or primary epistemic rights than accusing A of lying. In other words, they are not saying that they know better than A but that they do not believe them. This is further supported by B’s subsequent “I doubt it”; these TCUs do not claim knowledge regarding A’s calorie intake but still express scepticism regarding the factual accuracy of A’s REASON. Since this inaccuracy is moreover perceived to be deliberate, B is not merely correcting A that they might be wrong about their assumed calorie intake; rather, they are reprimanding them for an unreasonable

refusal. As in the previous case, this is motivated by a concern for A.

To summarise, this section has focused on refusers' E+ REASONS and how co-participants treat them as sufficient or insufficient grounds for a disalignment. In particular, I have demonstrated that:

- E+ REASONS can express a secondary weak deontic stance, conveying that neither the speaker nor the profferer have a say in the matter;
- profferers and third parties can accept refusers' E+ stances with or without also accepting the refusal;
- profferers and third parties can challenge both the content and the relevance of refusers' E+ stances for the negotiation without problematizing them;
- since refusers generally have a strong deontic status and their E+ stances are almost always (treated as) congruent, there are few possible grounds for problematizing their E+ utterances. In fact, no such instances occur in my data; and
- refusers can nevertheless be reprimanded for disaligning based on E+ REASONS which are (perceived) to be unreasonable or insufficient; such reprimands convey a concern for the refuser rather than an interpersonal offence;

## 10. Primary weak epistemic stances

In this chapter, we will look at a rare – and perhaps surprising – type of primary stance: weak epistemic claims. An utterance expresses an E- stance if it foregrounds a speaker's lack of knowledge regarding whether a future course of action ought (not) to happen or why an FA is (un)reasonable, (in)appropriate, (im)possible or (not) beneficial. Such units are nevertheless uttered in the service of securing or resisting an FA. In my data, profferers only produce two E- units, making up 0.4% of their overall utterances in the service of securing an FA. Both occur in suggestion negotiations; one takes the form of a REASON, the other a CONCESSION. Refusers produce four E- utterances, all of which are REASONS. Two instances resist a suggestion, one a proposal and the forth is in the service of securing a counter intending. Within the group of refusers' utterances resisting an FA, E- units makes up 0.7% overall.

Although it may seem intuitively risky to argue in favour or against an FA by foregrounding one's lack of knowledge, none of the instances in my data are treated as interpersonally problematic. The precarious nature of such utterances may be one reason why they occur infrequent. A further explanation, I demonstrate, is that E- REASONS constitute weak justification for doing or not doing something. In sections 10.1. and 10.2., we will look at profferers' and refuser' unproblematicized primary weak epistemic claims, respectively.



## 10.1. Ignorance is ... acceptable: profferers' unproblematic utterances

In this section, we will look at a) how it is possible to attempt securing an FA while claiming a lack of knowledge and b) why this is not (treated as) interpersonally problematic. I will demonstrate that:

- profferers' E- stances do not necessarily violate their proximal deontic rights; and
- when they do, E- utterances may in fact pre-empt challenges of the proffered FA's appropriateness;

In example 61, we see an initial suggestion implemented by an E- REASON. Like E+ REASONS, the utterance does not nominate the FA and therefore depends on contextual clues in order to be hearable as a proffer. Here, it is the prior talk which provides those clues. The negotiation occurs during a conversation about A's upcoming birthday party. After A discloses their intending to ask an unnamed third party (henceforth Z) to make a chocolate cake (lines 1-2 and 5-6), C proffers a different course of action.

Example 61: 'Cake', SPICE P1A-085 (suggestion)

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1  A:      She could make like a big s- <laughter>
2          she could make like a big square one or something.
3  B:      The cake?
4  C:      Yeah.
5  A:      I'm talking about like
6          I wanted a chocolate [         cake.         ]
7  C:      [Well I don't know] if she

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8 she's skilled in the old cream design or anything you know [just]  
9 A: [ Oh ]  
10 nothing to do with cream.  
11 [ I want like something like a chocolate cake. ]  
12 C: [I know but to write on or icing to write on the]  
13 A: Don't worry about that. We'll do that.[...]  
[...]

In lines 7-8, C states that they “don’t know if [Z]’s skilled” in making cream designs.

While such utterances might be subsumed under ‘hints’ or ‘off-record’ strategies, there is, to the best of my knowledge, no research focusing on claimed lack of knowledge within the SAT-based proffer (or refusal) literature. Within CA and corpus research more generally, some attention has been paid to weak epistemic stances in FPPs (Kärkkäinen 2003; Weatherall 2011) and/or ‘I don’t know’ + complement construction. (Both Aijmer 2009 and Kärkkäinen 2003 report on the frequencies of these constructions, but do not focus on their functions). A notable exception is Park (2012), who found that ‘I don’t know’ + if/wh-complement constructions can be used to initiate advice-seeking sequences. In the above example, I argue, speaker C is not attempting to seek advice but rather providing it; instead of soliciting a suggestion, they are making one. In this specific context, the utterance is an attempt to dissuade A from the course of action they have in mind.<sup>75</sup> As with REASONS, neither the FA nor the agent are nominated. Instead, the utterance provides a potential argument against A’s intending – potential in that C claims not to know whether the obstacle

<sup>75</sup> A's plan constitutes an intending; it does not make relevant an acceptance or refusal. However, participants can attempt to dissuade someone from an intending, which is what C is doing. Since A is not proffering an FA for C to accept or refuse, C's suggestion is considered the initial proffer – albeit triggered by an intending – rather than a counter here. As a consequence, I consider the suggestion to align with the FA of Z not making the cake.

does in fact exist. While C is not specific about an alternative to Z making the cake, they are suggesting that Z do not make it. Like E+ REASONS implementing initial proffers without accompanying units, it is the interactional context which ensures that A hears – and treats – C’s utterance as having deontic implications.

It is obvious from A’s response that they do in fact hear the E- REASON as implementing a suggestion; and that they do not consider it to be interpersonally problematic. There is, however, a misunderstanding arising from the opacity of C’s utterance: A believes C is suggesting a cream cake, but C clarifies that they are talking about icing decoration. After this has been corrected, A disaligns in the form of an OFF-HOOK (D+) and E+ REASON (line 13).<sup>76</sup> Overall, the refuser frames the suggested FA as not necessary – similar to many offer refusals – and dismisses C’s concern on which their suggestion is grounded. In addition, A does not problematize the profferer’s linguistic behaviour for assuming that A may want icing decoration. Although A’s wishes are outside of C’s epistemic domain, it transpires that C was correct (line 13). The refuser does also not orient to the profferer’s unknowing primary stance as a violation of their epistemic obligations. In fact, they do not orient to it at all. Overall, the design of A’s refusal suggests that they treat the suggestion as unproblematic in a similar way one would an offer.

Given that the proximal deontic right to make a suggestion is grounded on knowledge, why does C get away with implementing their suggestion with an E-

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<sup>76</sup> The utterance “We’ll do it” is considered a contra REASON rather than a STATE-FUTURE counter, because it expresses a justification why the suggested FA is not necessary: A is not concerned about Z doing icing decorations, because they will do that themselves.

REASON? I argue that this is because the epistemic domain C claims to lack knowledge in is not a domain on which their proximal deontic rights are grounded.<sup>77</sup> As previously demonstrated, the right to suggest depends primarily on knowledge that the FA in question is appropriate and beneficial to the addressee; C's unknowing stance does not directly orient to either aspect. Instead, it expresses uncertainty about a) the possibility of A's intending (provided that A wants decoration, Z may not be able to deliver the cake A wants) and therefore b) the necessity of the suggested FA (if A wants decoration and Z cannot do that, someone else may have to make the cake). This is similar to offers, where profferers are not expected to know whether the FA is required. It may be for this reason that A responds to C's proffer with a turn design more typical of offer than suggestion refusals. In addition, the relevant epistemic domains – that the FA is appropriate and beneficial if it is indeed necessary – are once again presupposed by the very act of suggesting. C's E- stance does therefore not violate their proximal deontic rights and does not constitute grounds for treating it as interpersonally problematic.

My data also contains one case of an E- CONCESSION. As previously stated, this format admits to a factor which may go against the overall goal the speaker is trying to achieve. The instance in example 62 concedes to a possible argument against the FA the profferer is suggesting. This may seem potentially even more risky than the above E- REASON. Nevertheless, I argue that the utterance, while indeed violating

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<sup>77</sup> It also does not violate their epistemic obligations, since C cannot be expected to know whether Z can make icing decorations. Nevertheless, proximal deontic rights are the key aspect here.

the profferer's proximal deontic rights, serves to pre-empt a potential challenge of the FA's appropriateness and consequent problematization. The below negotiation occurs during a conversation about B's plans regarding their fish pond.

Example 62: 'Catfish', SWDA sw\_1021 (suggestion)

1 A: [...] You might put some like some yellow catfish in there.  
 2 I do not know if they would live very well up in New York  
 3 but they get huge.  
 4 And uh they routinely use them for bait for uh goldfish for bait  
 5 B: Oh okay.  
 6 A: for yellow catfish.  
 7 B: Well, we would want to put some small ones in  
 8 so they do not eat the big guys the goldfish too. <laughter>  
 [...]

In line 1, A states that B "might put some [...] Yellow catfish" in their pond ('unclear' format, D- stance). This suggestion is continued with E+ REASONS in lines 3-4 and 6.

In line 2, however, the profferer states that they "do not know if [catfish] would live very well up in New York" where B lives. On the surface, this looks similar to the E-REASON from the previous example. Yet, this utterance does not express a lack of knowledge regarding the necessity of the FA but rather regarding its appropriateness. In other words, A concedes that there might be an argument against the FA they are suggesting. This does indeed violate C's proximal deontic rights: they admit to not knowing whether their suggesting is appropriate and beneficial. Nevertheless, B does not problematize this; the refuser does not respond immediately after the CONCESSION but only after A provides some more E+ REASONS. When they do respond line 4, B accepts A's epistemic authority claimed by their REASONS (X/E-BACK-CHANNELLING tokens) but does not orient to the CONCESSION. In lines 6-7,

they produce a refusal designed as a dispreferred action (objection marker, STATE-WANT (Apos) counter intending and E+ REASON), once again not orienting to the CONCESSION.

Considering, then, that suggesting a potentially inappropriate and detrimental FA is indeed a violation of a speaker's proximal deontic rights, why is C's linguistic behaviour not treated as interpersonally problematic? I argue that there are two reasons: first, the inappropriateness of the FA is not certain – this is exactly what the unknowing primary stance orients to; second, by admitting to the potential issues concerning the FA, the speaker pre-empts a problematizing for making a detrimental suggestion: better to be safe than sorry. As the example shows, such a defensive move can indeed be treated as interpersonally unproblematic.

To summarise, this section has looked at a rare and potentially risky but interesting type of primary stance: weak epistemic claims. I have demonstrated that:

- profferer's E- stances do not necessarily violate their proximal deontic rights since they may orient to the necessity rather than appropriateness of the FA; and
- when they do violate proximal deontic rights, E- utterances may in fact pre-empt challenges of the proffered FA's appropriateness and a consequential problematization;

## 10.2. Who knows: refusers' unproblematic utterances

In this section, we will look at how a) refusers foreground a weak epistemic stance when refusing and b) profferers and third parties treat these utterances as interpersonally unproblematic. I demonstrate that:

- E- refusals do not necessarily violate the speaker's epistemic obligation;
- profferers and third parties can accept refusers' E- utterances without accepting the refusal; and
- in fact, E- REASONS constitute a weak justification that may easily be trumped;

Example 63 shows a negotiation we have encountered before. In section 8.1.1., I argued that the profferer's D+ suggestion in line 4 is licensed by the refuser's prior display of uncertainty. Let us now focus on A's -E REASON.

Example 63: 'Financial assistance', SPICE P1A-063 (suggestion resistance)

- 1 B: Did you go in and ask about the financial assistance?
- 2 A: No. I don't know whether I will or not.
- 3 I don't know whether I'm entitled to it as a repeat student.
- 4 B: Yeah but the thing is go in and ask.
- 5 A: Yeah maybe. If things get much worse maybe.

In line 2, A produces an INDEFINITE response (D+), which conveys that they are not certain about which course of action they will take. This indecision is then justified by a REASON in line 3. However, this REASON, too, expresses uncertainty – albeit at the epistemic level: their indecision is rooted in their lack of knowledge regarding

whether they are entitled to financial assistance. Like all four E- REASONS produced by refusers in my data, the unknowing stance does not violate the speaker's epistemic obligation; here, A cannot be expected to have this information. In fact, B does not challenge A's claimed lack of knowledge. Rather, their initial BACK-CHANNELLING token in line 4 acknowledges the potential obstacle A refers to. Nevertheless, this example shows that E- REASONS may be weak justification for a disalignment and might easily be trumped. Accepting A's weak epistemic stance, the profferer subsequently urges the refuser to take steps to verify or falsify whether the obstacle does exist. Put differently, B treats the potential obstacle as not sufficient to warrant not doing the FA. In fact, they effectively use A's lack of knowledge as an argument in favour of the FA.

This section has demonstrated that:

- E- refusals do not necessarily violate the speaker's epistemic obligation;
- profferers and third parties can accept refusers' E- utterances without accepting the refusal; and
- in fact, E- REASONS constitute a weak justification that may easily be trumped;



## 11. Primary negative affective stances

Perhaps more so than the epistemic facet, the affective aspect of FA negotiations is another understudied area. In this chapter, we focus on primary negative affective claims. An utterance expresses an Aneg stance if it foregrounds the speaker's negative feelings or evaluation regarding an FA or aspects related to it and those feelings/evaluations convey – explicitly or implicitly – an argument against or in favour of an FA. Aneg utterances make up 9% (97 tokens) of the 1085 units assigned a stance (see table 16). As in the case of E+ stances – and perhaps surprisingly –, these Aneg units are distributed fairly evenly between profferers/third parties and refusers (41 tokens making up 8% and 56 tokens making up 10%, respective).

The present chapter is organised as follows: sections 11.1.1. and 11.1.2. focus on profferers' unproblematicized and problematicized Aneg utterances, respectively. With respect to refusers' Aneg utterances, my data does once again not contain problematicized instances. We will therefore only look at unproblematicized cases in section 11.2.1.

### 11.1. Profferers' Aneg utterances

My data contains 50 utterances by profferers and third parties which foreground an Aneg stance, making up 9% of these speakers' analysed units. Of these, 44 are in the service of securing an FA whereas 6 resist a refuser's counter. The latter take the form

of REASONS (3 tokens) and CRITICISMS (3 token). I once focus on Aneq stances in the service of proffers. With 57%, most Aneq units in my data occur in the service of securing a suggestion (figure 20). However, figure 21 shows that primary negative affective stances are most frequent within requests. In fact, with 17%, Aneq utterances make up a higher proportion of units in the service of requests than D+ utterances (14%). This may be particularly surprising since requests are generally considered the riskiest proffer type due to the benefactives involved. As we will see in the subsequent section, however, primary negative affective stances do not always target the addressee and they are not always treated as interpersonally problematic.

Figure 20: distribution of profferers' and third parties' Aneq utterances across proffer type





Figure 21: proportions of profferers' and third parties' Aneq utterances within proffer types



As table 24 shows, we have previously encountered a number of formats used by profferers to express a primary Aneg stance (BACK-CHANNELLING tokens, CONCESSIONS and REASONS), showing the versatility of these forms in terms of the stances they can express. While, as previously mentioned BACK-CHANNELLING tokens, CONCESSIONS, CRITICISMS and EXCLAMATIONS are not included in the CCSARP request taxonomy, REASONS, STATE-SITUATIONS and QUERY-SITUATIONS are generally subsumed under 'hints' (Blum-Kulka & House 1989).<sup>78</sup> This highlights once again that this broad category is quite diverse – not just in terms of what exactly such utterances refer to (e.g. mentioning the object, reference to precondition such as reasonability of the FA) but also in terms of the stances they foreground.

<sup>78</sup> There is one instance in which a speaker uses an utterance that would usually be categorized as a QUERY-FUTURE based on the construction (convention of form). However, this utterance contains additional negative evaluative language (internal lexical modifiers 'expletives' in Blum-Kulka & House 1989, 285-286; 'lexical intensification' in Trosborg 1995, 215), which means it foregrounds an Aneg stance rather than a D- stance. It was therefore decided to consider the utterance an Aneg REASON because it implies the speaker's motivation for proffering.

Table 24: formats used by profferers and third parties to express a primary strong epistemic stance

<b>Format</b>	<b>#</b>
BACK-CHANNELING	1
CONCESSION	2
CRITICISM	7
EXCLAMATION	8
REASON	23
STATE-SITUATION	8
QUERY-SITUATION	1

As we will see in the subsequent sections, profferers' Aneg utterances do not necessarily warrant a problematization – nor are they always used to problematize the refuser. In addition, I argue that participants' affective statuses are less stable and pre-determined than their deontic and epistemic statuses and that untangling primary affective rights from proximal deontic rights is once again difficult.

#### 11.1.1. A voice of affective reason(s): unproblematized utterances

This section focuses on how a) profferers and third parties foreground negative affective stances when (re-)proffering and b) refusers treat these utterances as interpersonally unproblematic. Once again, the formats included in this section have, if previously studied at all, been discussed primly in terms of 'hints' displaying weak deontic rights (see Couper-Kuhlen & Etelämäki 2015, 23; Haugh 2017; Lindström 2005; Stevanovic & Peräkylä 2012). While some scholars have furthermore noted the 'impoliteness' of certain formats (see subsequent analysis), such examinations do not

address that the utterances claim affective rights and that they are not necessarily treated as interpersonally problematic. As we will see, Aneg utterances are extremely versatile in terms of the jobs they can do within FA negotiations. In this section, I demonstrate that:

- the negative affective stance expressed by an utterance can arise either from explicit evaluative language or from contextual factors, most notably the participants' epistemic statuses;
- Aneg utterances which convey a negative evaluation only implicitly express a secondary epistemic stance (see also section 11.1.2.);
- Aneg utterances can have a range of targets, including the speaker themselves as well as the addressee;
- in the latter case, Aneg utterances can – but do not necessarily have to – problematize the refuser's linguistic behaviour; they can also reprimand the refuser;
- profferers' affective statuses are partially grounded on epistemic rights/access regarded the target of the evaluation;
- profferers' Aneg utterances can be licensed by the threat of harm or damage to others, oneself and one's belongings; and
- refusers do not always agree with profferers' negative evaluations and they can challenge (aspects of) Aneg utterances without treating it as interpersonally problematic;

First, we will look at Aneg utterances which implement initial proffers or counters without accompanying units that nominate the FA. As in the case of E+ and E- stances, they depend on the context to be hearable as proffers. The most common way of making an initial proffer that foregrounds a negative affective stance is with a STATE-SITUATION. This format can, but often does not, contain explicit evaluative language, as the subsequent negotiation illustrates. state-situations are utterances which assert (or presuppose) a status-quo and imply that said situation ought to be changed. This foregrounds the speaker's right to (implicitly) negatively evaluate the status-quo and, by extension, the person responsible for it. Example 64 shows that a) such initial Aneg proffers tend to target the refuser, conveying that some non-verbal behaviour is detrimental and ought to change; b) if the negative evaluation does not arise from explicit evaluative language, Aneg utterances express secondary epistemic stances which can be confirmed without also accepting the accuracy of the negative evaluation; and c) refusers can challenge (the accuracy of) an Aneg stance without challenging the profferer's affective rights or problematizing them. Returning once again to the negotiation 'Eating habit', let us look at how the initial suggestion is designed and responded to. It is triggered by A disclosing what they ate for lunch.

Example 64: 'Eating habits', SPICE P1A-080 (suggestion resistance)

- 1 C: Oh [my God Michelle <unclear 1 word> you're a] vegetarian
- 2 B: [ That's a starter I take it. ]
- 3 C: you don't balance out your diet though.
- 4 A: [ I don't balance out my diet at all no. But uhm ]
- 5 B: [You should have more vegetables. No you don't. It's terrible.]



expressing “feelings of discontent about some state of affairs, for which responsibility can be attributed to ‘someone’ (to some person, organization or the like)”. But, given that C’s STATE-SITUATIONS do not contain explicitly evaluative language, how do we know that what C is doing in lines 1 and 3 is in fact a noticing of a negative event or failure? The answer, I argue, relates to the participants’ epistemic statuses. The profferer has weak epistemic rights vis-à-vis the refuser regarding the refuser’s eating habits, i.e. they do not have the right to know better than A that they are a vegetarian without a balanced diet. This means C could not possibly be informing A of something they do not already know; even the purpose of reminding A is unlikely – and would overstep C’s epistemic rights. Based on this clear asymmetry of epistemic access/rights in favour of the refuser, we can therefore conclude that the profferer is not merely claiming knowledge regarding a status-quo; rather they are evaluating it – negatively.

Regarding the second question, we can draw on previous literature as well as evidence within the interaction. According to Schegloff (1988, 122), complaints can make relevant ‘offers of remedies’ as an SPP. While this is not what we see above, this nevertheless suggests that certain complaints are heard as orienting to a need for action and, therefore, as having deontic implications. In fact, STATE-SITUATIONS have been addressed in work on requests. Discussing of declarative requestive ‘hints’, Leech (2014, 158) describes utterances which “refer to the situation, usually in the present, that calls for the future action”. We therefore know that assertions of a negatively evaluated status-quo have the potential to implement a proffer. In



example 64, this is confirmed by subsequent utterances which do in fact nominate an FA, for instance in line 5. We can therefore conclude that C's talk in lines 1 and 3 foregrounds an Aneq stance targeting B's diet and that this has deontic implications.

Considering, then, that C is not only suggesting A change their eating habits but also criticising them, how does the refuser treat these utterances? As previously stated, 'hints' and their interpersonal implications are often only discussed with regard to in/directness. Even when scholars address utterances considered STATE-SITUATIONS in the present thesis, they do not necessarily acknowledge their affective aspects. Weizman (1989, 1993), for instance, discusses different hint sub-strategies including 'references to the addressee's involvement' such as 'You've left the kitchen in a mess'. However, the author's focus is entirely on the relative level of opacity of hints. Other researchers have pointed out that hints which frame the addressee as responsible for a negative situation differ from other kinds of hints. Yet, these (usually brief) comments tend to focus on the perception of these utterances rather than the affective rights they claim. Leech (2014, 158), for instance, describes them as "accusatory" and therefore "brusque" and "not particularly polite". In a similar vein, Sifianou (1997, 177) states:

Some such utterances can even be rude, as, for instance, to say, 'This soup's a bit bland' to the person who prepared it or to request salt in his or her presence. Even common, conventional requests of this type like 'It's hot in here' can be heard as impolite if the addressee is taken to be responsible for the unpleasant situation.

Contra these assertion, I argue that accusing the recipient of a negative status-quo is not inherently interpersonally problematic. In addition, my analysis provides an explanation both for why STATE-NECESSITIES are accusatory (see above) and why this may or may not be treated as an infringement on the addressee's rights or aggravation of their face. Let us return to the above example. In line 4, the refuser echoes and confirms C's assertion that they do not balance their diet. This CONCESSION is followed by a series of disaligning E+ REASONS in lines 6 and 8-9 which convey that A is not suffering from any negative effects due to their bad nutrition. Overall, the response is designed to treat the Aneg utterance as unproblematic while challenging the negative evaluation. The initial CONCESSION, I argue, orients to the secondary strong epistemic stance expressed by the STATE-NECESSITIES rather than the primary Aneg one. A confirms the factual accuracy of C's assertion and therefore also their secondary E+ stance. However, they claim primary rights/access by not only echoing but upgrading the utterance with the phrase "at all". As with other secondary knowing stances, an affirmative answer does not constitute an acceptance of the proffer. The subsequent REASONS, by contrast, orient to the primary Aneg stance and challenge the implication that their diet is detrimental and, consequently, the implied need for action. Yet, while A disagrees with C's negative evaluation of their eating habits, this does not challenge the profferer's affective or proximal deontic rights. First, by confirming C's secondary strong epistemic stances, the refuser conveys that they have the right to have an opinion about A's diet. Previous research has shown that affective rights imply and

are grounded on epistemic rights, i.e. one cannot assess something one has no knowledge or experience of (see, for example, C. Goodwin & M. H. Goodwin, 1992; Heritage, 2002d; Heritage & Raymond, 2005; Pomerantz, 1975; 1984a). As mentioned above, A does not challenge the accuracy of C's secondary epistemic claims and therefore also not their claimed epistemic rights (although they claim primary rights for themselves). Second, the challenge of the implied Aneq stance is achieved by providing E+ REASONS which are outside of C's primary domain of knowledge. In other words, the refuser conveys that C's negative affective stances are unfounded or unnecessary because of factors C does not – and cannot be expected to – know. Overall, A treats the Aneq utterances as interpersonally unproblematic by accepting the profferer's secondary strong epistemic claims and avoiding any face-aggravation.

Refusers can also challenge the accuracy of the secondary epistemic claim without problematizing it. This is what happens later in the same negotiation, as example 65 shows.

Example 65: 'Eating habits', SPICE P1A-080 (suggestion)

[...]  
 50 C: It's hardly surprising considering you live on hot water and crackers.  
 51 A: I don't live on hot water and crackers  
 52 but that's quite a nice meal actually. <laughter>  
 [...]

The extract occurs just after B and C have told A that they are looking very pale and unhealthy. In line 50, C utters another STATE-SITUATION, asserting that A "live[s] on hot water and crackers". Once again, this expresses a negatively evaluated status-quo

and targets the refuser for their eating habits. This time, A does not confirm the accuracy of the secondary knowing stance conveyed by the utterance. Instead, they refute it with an E+ REASON stating that they “don’t live on hot water and crackers”. The utterance challenges not only the factuality of the STATE-SITUATION but also C’s claimed epistemic rights to know (better than A) how much A eats. This, in turn, also challenges C’s claimed affective rights: they cannot evaluate something based on knowledge they do not have or which is incorrect. Nevertheless, the overall response design suggests A is not problematizing C’s incongruent Aneg stance. After the REASON, A produces an (‘unclear’) utterance which appears to be an attempt at humour. According to Norrick & Spitz (2008, 1669-1670), humour is a powerful tool in conflict situations which has the potential of easing tension. The utterance might therefore be an attempt to shift the (tone of the) conversation entirely, reframing – in the sense of Goffman (1974) – the interaction from a conflictual FA negotiation to a humorous conversation without deontic implications; and/or it might be an act of damage control by counter-balancing the potential face-aggravation of their prior REASON. Either way, the refuser seems to be interested in defusing the situation rather than problematizing C’s linguistic behaviour. To conclude, the profferer gets away with numerous negative assessments of A’s eating habits, even when the Aneg stances violate the speaker’s epistemic and affective rights. This, I argue, is because the Aneg utterances as well as the suggestions they implement are motivated by a concern for the refuser’s well-being. Once again, this demonstrates that reprimands can be licensed if they are made with the recipient’s best interests at heart.

STATE-SITUATION can also be used as post-hoc justifications for and defence of a proffer in the face of a refuser's problematizing the profferer. This is illustrated in example 66. The negotiation also demonstrates that such formats can contain evaluative language, in which case they do not express a secondary stance that can be responded to independently. As discussed in section 8.1.2., D treats B's request as problematic by challenging their proximal deontic rights. This results in a reciprocal problematization.

Example 66: 'Furniture', SPICE P1A-015 (request)

- 1 B: Stop doing that.
- 2 D: Why?
- 3 A: Because you're wrecking our furniture.

After D questions B's entitlement to the requested FA, speaker A enters the negotiation as a third-party participant in line 3. Their utterance takes the form of a STATE-SITUATION, pointing out a negatively evaluated status-quo. This provides the justification for making the request demanded by D and defends the proffer. Unlike in the previous example, the utterance contains a negative evaluate term, namely 'wrecking'. While it is conceivable that D is not aware their behaviour is damaging the furniture and they might therefore respond with an X/E- utterance ('Oh, I didn't realise'\*), the STATE-SITUATION is nevertheless not hearable as a pure primary E+ stance due to the lexically coded evaluation. This also means that it does not express a secondary strong epistemic claim that can be responded to independently of the Aneg stance. Unlike in the previous example, the refuser would not be able to

confirm the content of the STATE-SITUATION without also confirming the negative evaluation. In fact, D does not respond at all. Considering the absence of a subsequent re-request, it appears that they physically comply. While the lack of verbal acceptance might imply that they are doing so begrudgingly, the (assumed) compliance in itself constitutes an acknowledgement of the profferer's entitlement. In addition, the lack of response may also indicate that D has no further grounds for resisting the FA and/or challenging A's strong negative affective claim. Unlike in the previous examples, however, these Aneq stances are not licensed by a concern for the refuser's well-being. Instead, I argue, they are licensed by the speaker's right not to have damage done to their own person or their belongings.

STATE-SITUATIONS – and Aneq stances more generally – do not always target the addressee, however. In example 67, the profferer uses this format to orient to their own short-comings.

Example 67: 'Wolfing away', SPICE P1A-031 (offer)

1 A: Sorry Martin [I've been wolfing] away at this and [ you wanted some. ]  
 2 B: [You're a liar]  
 3<sup>79</sup> [unclear 3 sylls]  
 4 It's yours. You finish it if you want to.  
 [...]

A's utterance, which may be accompanied by a non-verbal offer, consists of a turn-initial APOLOGY (X/Aneq, see chapter 13.) and a STATE-SITUATION which negatively evaluates the profferer themselves for "wolfing away" at food despite B wanting

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<sup>79</sup> This utterance is a response to a third party's prior talk.

some of it. As in the previous examples, this expresses a negative affective stance regarding a status-quo that ought to be amended. Here, however, it serves the purpose of implementing an offer. While we do not know how speaker B begins their response, the remaining units adhere to the norm of offer refusals: an E+ REASON and a counter offer (D+ IMPERATIVE and D- QUERY-WANT). This treats the Aneg utterance as unproblematic.

Finally, profferers' Aneg utterances can also express a CONCESSION to a negative evaluation expressed by the refuser. In example 68, it is in fact solicited by the format of the refuser's Aneg stance. The proposal negotiation concerns A and B paying for an absent third party's horse jumping lessons.

Example 68: 'Jumping lessons', SPICE P1A-001 (proposal)

[...]  
 12 A: Do you not think we're paying enough?  
 13 B: I do <laughter>. But Stephanie says <quote> that's for the club  
 14 the pony club although outsiders can jump in it </quote>  
 15 but that there's a riding school pony league  
 16 starting at the end of September for anybody.  
 17 A: Right.  
 [...]

In line 12, speaker A disaligns from the proposed FA by means of an Aneg/E- REASON (see Heritage 2002, 1428 for a discussion of negative interrogatives as assertions). This format both expresses a negative evaluation, namely that the participants are paying enough already, and invites a (affirmative) response from B. Indeed, B expresses an Aneg CONCESSION, confirming that they share A's feelings.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Unlike the refuser's CONCESSION in example 64, this one cannot be heard as confirming merely the factual accuracy of the prior utterance without also confirming its evaluation.

However, this does not constitute an acceptance of A's refusal. Instead, B continues to align with the proposed FA by providing a series of E+ REASON. They are consequently attempting to trump REASONS based on subjective arguments with objective ones. Given that the profferer's Aneg stance is solicited and does not target the refuser, A has no grounds for problematizing the utterance. Their response in line 17 does not orient to the CONSESSION at all, merely accepting the subsequent information B provides with an X/E- BACK-CHANNELLING token.

In summary, this section has shown that profferers' Aneg utterances are not necessarily treated as interpersonally problematic – even when they target the refuser. I have demonstrated that:

- the negative affective stance expressed by an utterance can arise either from explicit evaluative language or from contextual factors; in the latter case, participants' epistemic statuses make utterances hearable as Aneg rather than mere E+ stances;
- Aneg utterances which convey a negative evaluation only implicitly also express a secondary epistemic stance which can be confirmed without also confirming the negative evaluation or accepting the proffer;
- Aneg utterances can have a range of targets, including the speaker themselves as well as the addressee;
- in the latter case, Aneg utterances can – but do not necessarily have to – problematize the refuser's linguistic behaviour; they can also reprimand the



refuser;

- profferers' affective statuses are partially grounded on epistemic rights/access regarded the target of the evaluation; by challenging the latter, refusers also challenge the former;
- profferers' Aneg utterances can be licensed by the threat of harm or damage to others, oneself and one's belongings; and
- refusers do not always agree with profferers' negative evaluations and they can challenge (aspects of) Aneg utterances without treating them as interpersonally problematic;

### 11.1.2. Adding insult to insistence: problematized utterances

In the previous section, we saw that profferers' Aneg utterances can be licensed if there is a threat of harm to the speaker's or others' well-being or damage to their belongings. Let us now turn to instances of primary negative affective claims which are treated as interpersonally problematic. I demonstrate that:

- profferers' Aneg utterances are problematized if there is no threat of harm/damage to a person or object;
- profferers' Aneg utterances may be problematized despite attempting to prevent harm to the refuser;
- profferers' Aneg statuses are only partially grounded on epistemic

rights/access; a speaker's claimed affective rights may be challenged – and the speaker's behaviour problematized– even if they have access to/knowledge of the target of the evaluation; and

- detangling primary affective rights from proximal deontic rights is once again difficult and Aneq stances can amplify a profferer's offence;

We will begin with another STATE-SITUATION suggestion. In contrast to what we saw in the previous section, however, the profferer in example 69 is immediately problematized for their Aneq stance as well as the act of suggesting.

Example 69: 'Studying', SPICE P1A-050 (suggestion)

```
1  A:      It's after half seven and you're not studying.
2  C:      I've studied. Excuse me. I've been home since three o'clock.
3          Some of us have studied.
[...]
```

Once again, the negative evaluation of A's utterance in line 1 arises from a clash between epistemic access and the (secondary) epistemic stance: C may not exactly know what time it is, but they will certainly be aware of the fact that they are not currently studying. The refuser's response shares some similarities with the initial refusal in the negotiation 'Eating habits': first, C does not challenge the content of the secondary E+ stance; second, they provide E+ REASONS outside of A's expected domain of knowledge conveying that the status-quo, although accurate, does not constitute a problem and that no FA is therefore needed. However, this is where the similarities end. While not challenging the content of the STATE-SITUATION, they do

not express an acceptance of A's secondary E+ claim either. In addition, the response contains two negative affective stances which target the profferer: an X/ANEG EXCLAMATION ("excuse me") and an Aneg REASON ("some of us have studied"). The former appears to object to the profferer's linguistic behaviour as a whole instead of orienting to (an argument against) the FA, for instance by framing it as a bad idea. It is therefore considered to express only a secondary negative affective stance. The REASON, by contrast, both targets speaker A and justifies why the FA is not necessary. Unlike the turn-initial E+ REASON, it is doing more than just informing A (again) that they have already studied. The phrase "some of us" emphasises the difference between C – who has studied – and other people, namely A, who has not. This conveys a reciprocal negative evaluation and targets the profferer not only for not having studied but also for accusing C of something they themselves are guilty of. Overall, I argue that, by treating the profferer's Aneg stance as problematic, C also challenges their proximal deontic right to make the suggestion. Although they do not challenge A's presupposed knowledge/judgment regarding the FA's being appropriate and beneficial to the refuser, they challenge their epistemic authority vis-à-vis the refuser. Put differently, C problematized A's linguistic behaviour not just for reprimanding them but also for making a suggestion on the basis of the incorrect assumption that the refuser's behaviour is objectionable and ought to be remedied. Comparing this negotiation with the beginning of 'Eating habits', then, this Aneg suggestion is not licensed by a threat to the refuser's (academic) well-being. In fact, A strongly objects to the implication that their behaviour is detrimental to them. While,

in example 64, the refuser claims the same (stating that they are healthy), they nevertheless concede that they do not balance their diet. Even if that has no negative effects 'yet', it may damage their health in the future if the bad behaviour continues.

Before moving on, there is one more point I want address concerning the profferer's affective status. The above example demonstrates that speakers' affective rights do not only depend on access to/knowledge about the target of their evaluation. Speaker A appears to be correct about the fact that A is not currently studying. They may even be considered correct about their evaluation, based on experience, that not studying (enough) can have negative consequences. Nevertheless, C problematizes their Aneq stance. I therefore argue that, contra Stevanovic & Peräkylä (2014, 186), participants' affective statuses consist of two aspects which are fairly independent of each other: the right to have an opinion about something, grounded on one's access/knowledge, on the one hand; and the right to voice that opinion, on the other. The former appears to be as stable as deontic and epistemic rights in so far as participants (outside of institutional settings) generally have the right to determine their own actions but not those of others and either have or lack certain knowledge. The right to voice one's opinion, by contrast, appears to be much more context-dependant and, as the above example shows, more easily challenged. This is evidenced not only by the fact that profferers are sometimes problematized for targeting the refuser despite having knowledge of their behaviour but also by a lack of profferers' Aneq utterances expressing a personal dislike for an FA in my data. As we will see in sections 11.2.1. and 12.2.1., refusers do

orient to their own dis/preference and dis/like – and this is not problematized.

In example 70, by contrast, the profferer's Aneg suggestion is not immediately problematized; only after multiple reprimands and a challenge of the refuser's own affective rights do they treat an Aneg utterance as interpersonally problematic.

Example 70: 'Headache', SPICE P1A-016 (suggestion)

- 1 B: I've got a headache again.
- 2 A: Through all the coffee you drink.
- 3 B: See my eyesight's going
- 4 A: Do you wear glasses? Do you have glasses?
- 5 B: I do have glasses but I don't like wearing them.
- 6 A: Och Michael. Sort them out.
- 7 C: <unclear several sylls> headaches <unclear 2 sylls>
- 8 A: Well no wonder he's got headaches if he doesn't wear his glasses.
- 9 B: Leave me alone.

The initial suggestion is triggered by B's disclosure that they have "a headache again" (line 1). Speaker A responds with a STATE-SITUATION in line 2: "through all the coffee you drink". Considering that B has primary epistemic rights to how much coffee they drink, this utterance once again foregrounds an Aneg stance rather than an E+ one. In addition, it claims that B's coffee consumption is the cause of their headaches. Unlike in the previous examples, then, this STATE-SITUATION is a response to an admitted negative status-quo. This initial Aneg suggestion is treated as unproblematic. B's E+ REASON in line 3 resists the assertion that coffee is the cause of their headache but challenges neither A's claimed knowledge of B's coffee consumption nor the evaluation that too much coffee is potentially detrimental. The content of the REASON is noteworthy as well; although it implicitly disagrees with A's assessment of the cause of B's headaches, the refuser does not explicitly state that B

is wrong. In addition, the refuser's utterance orients to knowledge outside of A's expected epistemic domains. Overall, the design of the initial refusal avoids aggravating the profferer's face, thereby treating the Aneg suggestion as unproblematic.

This does not apply to the subsequent Aneg utterances, however. In line 4, the profferer aligns with an alternative counter suggestion, namely that B get or wear glasses (see section 13.1.1. for a discussion of INFO-REQUESTS). Once again, B refuses, this time by means of an Aneg REASON that conveys their personal dislike of wearing glasses. In line 6, A now reprimands B for this refusal by means of an X/Aneg EXCLAMATION<sup>81</sup> and a D+ IMPERATIVE re-proffer. The former frames A's refusal and their justification for it as unreasonable, thereby challenging A's right to act according to their personal preferences. This is further emphasised by the profferer's incongruent D+ claim, which attempts to trump the refuser's Aneg REASON. Speaker B does not immediately respond to this turn. After some unclear talk from speaker C, the profferer then produces an Aneg REASON which once again targets B – this time for not wearing glasses (line 8). Although this utterance seems to be addressed at C – referring to B in the third person –, the refuser is nevertheless present to hear this negative evaluation. It therefore also constitutes a further alignment with the FA. Now, B does respond, namely with an X/Aneg CRITICISM: in line 9, they tell A to "leave [them] alone". The unit targets the recipient for their linguistic behaviour but

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<sup>81</sup> Like the refuser's EXCLAMATION in the previous example, the speaker targets the addressee's linguistic behaviour, in this case the act of refusing.

does not orient to (an argument for or against) the FA. By bluntly telling speaker A to discontinue, B treats their prior utterance as interpersonally problematic. Once again, it is difficult to untangle the (challenge of the) profferer's affective rights from the proximal deontic rights. However, I argue that speaker A's continued Aneg stances amplify the (perceived) offence of insisting on the FA despite B's definitive refusal. Despite the fact that the profferer is attempting to dissuade B from detrimental behaviour, there appears to be a limit as to how much reprimanding and insisting a refuser will tolerate.

Finally, let us look at an Aneg utterance which implements a request. In the previous section, I argued that Aneg (re-)requests are licensed if the addressee's behaviour is damaging to the profferer or their belongings. Example 71 shows that profferers are problematized if this is not the case and they are not entitled to what they are requesting.

Example 71: 'Pepper, SPICE P1A-031 (request<sup>82</sup>)

- 1 A: Have you no pepper in this?
- 2 B: No and you're not putting pepper in it either.
- 3 Take a bit out and put pepper in your own bit then.

Speaker A's (opaque) request in line 1 is implemented by a format we have not encountered yet: a negative interrogative QUERY-SITUATION. Similar to STATE-SITUATIONS, it refers to a status-quo which is evaluated negatively. However, instead

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<sup>82</sup> Although speaker A is both the agent and beneficiary of what B interprets the FA to be, the refuser clearly treats the FA as being to their detriment/cost and something the profferer is not entitled to. For this reason, the proffer is considered a request.

of pointing out the undesired situation, QUERY-SITUATIONS ask whether it is the case. Once again, the negative interrogative format is marked, implying that A is not merely asking for information. The utterance nevertheless expresses a secondary E-stance, which B does in fact respond to at the beginning of their turn. The utterance 'no' here is not a refusal but an ANSWER that confirms the absence of pepper in the food. Since this 'no' is not disaligning and constitutes the preferred response to the negative interrogative in terms of the question design, it is not in and of itself problematizing. The subsequent units, by contrast, are not. The NEG-FUTURE foregrounds a D+ stance and prohibits A from putting pepper in the food. The turn-final counter implemented by an IMPERATIVE also expresses a D+ claim. Overall, the response is designed as a dispreferred action, lacking justifications and claiming deontic authority over the addressee's actions. This challenges their entitlement to the requested FA as well as their proximal deontic rights.<sup>83</sup> Considering the profferer's perceived lack of entitlement, their Aneg utterance, which expresses a complaint about the lack of pepper, amplifies their offence.

In summary, Aneg stances are not entirely risk-free. In this section, I have demonstrated that:

- profferers' Aneg utterances are problematized if there is no threat of harm/damage to a person or object;

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<sup>83</sup> Note, however, that the turn-final counter is perhaps reconciliatory to some degree. It concedes that A is entitled to having some of the food and to putting pepper in their own portion.



- profferers' Aneq utterances may be problematized despite attempting to prevent harm to the refuser, particularly if profferers continuously reprimand the refuser and insist on an FA;
- profferers' Aneq statuses are only partially grounded on epistemic rights/access; the right to voice an opinion is less stable than the right to have an opinion and is highly context dependant. A profferer's claimed affective rights may therefore be challenged – and the speaker's linguistic behaviour treated as problematic– even if they have access to/knowledge of the target of the evaluation; and
- detangling primary affective rights from proximal deontic rights is once again difficult and Aneq stances can amplify a profferer's offence;

## 11.2. Refusers' Aneq utterances

Refusers produce slightly more Aneq stances than profferers and third parties in my data. Of the 56 tokens, 7 are in the service of securing a counter FA (4 intending and 3 requests). The remaining 49 units resist proffered FAs, once again mostly suggestions, as figure 22 shows. However, the highest proportion of Aneq utterances within types of proffer resistance occurs in response to requests (19%, figure 23). In fact, Aneq stances are the most common kind of primary stance (excluding X units) in resistance to requests. As stated in section 9.2., this perhaps surprising result may be

due to a number of factors, including the use of naturally occurring data in the present study. In addition, the subsequent sections show that Aneg utterances do not always target the addressee, i.e. they are not necessarily an indicator of interpersonal conflict.

Figure 22: distribution of refusers' Aneg utterances across types of proffer resistance





Figure 23: proportions of refusers' Aneg utterances within types of proffer resistance



Looking at table 24 we see a number of differences regarding the formats refusers use to express an Aneg stance compared to profferers and third parties. While STATE-SITUATIONS and QUERY-SITUATIONS are exclusively used by the former group of negotiators (they are not used by refusers to implement counters either), Aneg CRITICISMS and NEG-WANTES are only used by refusers. In addition, the subsequent section shows that refusers' Aneg REASONS often express the speaker's personal dislike of a proffered object or action; profferers do not do this in my data. As previously mentioned, Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz (1990) do not distinguish between different kinds of excuses and justifications based on the stances they express. However, unlike classifications of proffer strategies, their refusal taxonomy does include a category which inherently orients to the negative affective domain: criticism, attacks and insults (under 'attempt to dissuade the interlocutor'). This roughly corresponds to my category CRITICISM, although I do distinguish between primary Aneg and secondary X/Aneg stances in the case of CRITICISMS as well as

EXCLAMATIONS; the former convey an argument against an FA in some way, the latter only target the addressee's verbal behaviour.

Figure 24: formats used by refusers to express a primary negative affective stance when resisting an FA

<b>Format</b>	<b>#</b>
CONCESSION	1
CRITICISM	2
ELLIPSIS	1
EXCLAMATION	4
NEG-WANT	4
REASON	37

Throughout the analysis so far, we have seen that Aneq utterances can be used by refusers to problematize their co-participants' linguistic behaviour but that they may also express the speaker's personal dis/preference without being problematizing. In the subsequent section, we will focus on how both these uses are responded to by profferers and third parties. Most notably, we will see that my data does once again not contain any instances in which refusers' Aneq utterance are treated as interpersonally problematic. This suggests that, similar to the deontic facet but in contrast to the epistemic one, the affective right to express negative feelings and evaluations is not equally distributed between the two groups of negotiators.

### 11.2.1. Not feeling it? Unproblematized utterances

Having discussed the various formats used by refusers to express primary negative

affective stances throughout the previous chapters, this section focuses primarily on a) the various jobs Aneg utterances can do in FA negotiations and b) how – and why – profferers and third parties treat these utterances as interpersonally unproblematic. I subsequently demonstrate that:

- Aneg utterances can have a range of targets, including aspects of the FA as well as the addressee;
- unlike profferers and third parties, refusers often orient to their own subjective like of a proffered object or action. The right to do so is grounded not just on epistemic access to the evaluated target but also a strong deontic status;
- refusers' Aneg utterances can – but do not necessarily have to – problematize the addressee;
- profferers and third parties can accept refusers' Aneg stances with or without also accepting the refusal;
- profferers can challenge (aspects of) Aneg utterances without problematizing it; they may, however, reprimand refusers for Aneg refusals which are perceived as insufficient or unreasonable;
- as with profferer's Aneg utterances, the negative affective stance can arise either from explicit evaluative language or from contextual factors, most notably the participants' epistemic statuses; and
- in the latter case, the Aneg utterance conveys a secondary E+ stance similar to STATE-SITUATIONS;

In section 11.1.1., we saw that refusers do not express agreement with profferers' primary Aneg stances even when those are treated as unproblematic – although they may agree with/confirm an Aneg utterance's secondary epistemic stance. Refusers' negative evaluations, by contrast, are sometimes responded to with (weak) agreements or acceptances; the latter implicitly conveys that the profferer accepts the Aneg utterance as grounds for refusing. The subsequent two extracts illustrate these different ways of accepting an Aneg stance. As example 72 shows, however, (weak) agreements do not necessary treat the negative evaluation as sufficient grounds for disaligning. The interaction occurs at a restaurant, where the participants are having lunch. Based on evidence in the transcript, speaker E appears to have been out drinking the night before and is hungover. In line 1, they disclose that they are not sure what they are able to eat, triggering a suggestion from A.

Example 72: 'Soup', SPICE P1A-010 (suggestion resistance)

```

1  E:      Just don't know what I can face.
2  A:      Have the soup. You can eat anything after that seriously.
3  E:      Soup's boring.
4  A:      Yeah but it lines your stomach and [<unclear several sylls>]
5  B:      [ It's good for you. ]
[...]
```

Speaker A's initial proffer in line 2 is implemented by an IMPERATIVE (D+) and a REASON (E+). The refuser's response conveys a depreciation of the suggested FA and does not do any work to maintain E's face but is not problematizing their linguistic behaviour. They provide an Aneg REASON, stating that "soup's boring". The specific form of this REASON is interesting. The negative evaluation clearly arises from lexical

means, namely the adjective 'boring'. Unlike an utterance such as "you're wrecking out furniture" (see example 66), however, the explicitly asserted negative quality is a matter of subjective judgment. Nevertheless, the refuser frames it as an objective fact (cf. 'I don't like soup.\*'). This frames the content of the Aneg REASON as a generally accepted evaluation and, thereby, challenges E's judgment regarding the reasonability of the FA. Yet, as previously discussed, treating an FA as unreasonable is not the same as treating it as inappropriate. The refuser frames the FA as a bad suggestion but not as interpersonally problematic. The profferer, in turn, responds by accepting the Aneg utterance but not the refusal itself. They first utter a BACK-CHANNELLING 'yeah' (X/X), which I argue is hearable not just as an acknowledgment but a (weak) agreement with the Aneg REASON. It accepts E's affective rights, the content of their utterance and that it constitutes an argument against the suggested FA. This (pro-forma) agreement is followed by a further E+ REASON. While this aligning unit does not challenge the refuser's claimed Aneg rights, it attempts to trump a subjective dislike with an objective reason and treats E's justification as insufficient.

In example 73, by contrast, an Aneg refusal is accepted in its entirety. The extract (once again from the negotiation 'Clothes') also illustrates an EXCLAMATION expressing a primary Aneg stance, implying an argument against the FA but not orienting to the profferer's behaviour as problematic.

Example 73: 'Clothes', SPICE P1A-06 (suggestion resistance)

[...]  
 36 C: What about your black dress that you had years ago?  
 37 A: Oh stop. I I think one leg'd fit into it now. <laughter>  
 38 C: Oh <unclear 5 sylls>  
 39 B: Are you definitely going wearing a skirt or dress to it?  
 [...]

In line 36, C makes a (counter) suggestion in the form of a WH-SUGGESTORY (D-).

Contrary to what we usually see, the refuser responds with what appears to be a preferred action turn designs. In turn-initial position, they produce an EXCLAMATION.

The utterance "Oh stop" itself conveys that A objects to C's prior talk in some way, but it does not tell us why. We cannot tell whether A is targeting C for the verbal action of suggesting or whether they are targeting the content of the proffer. In order to disambiguate this unit, we have to look at the rest of the turn. The second utterance in the turn is an E+ REASON which introduces an obstacle C does not have primary epistemic access to and cannot be expected to know about: the dress in question does not fit A any more. The way the justification is formulated does not shift blame onto an external source, however. Instead, A's REASON frames their own body rather than the dress as being at fault. Their justification for refusing is therefore self-deprecating, which is further conveyed by their turn-final laughter.

Overall, the REASON clarifies two things: first, the EXCLAMATION expresses objection to the suggested FA but not C's suggesting it. Its Aneg stance targets the reasonability of the FA (based on A's having gained weight) but not its appropriateness or C's linguistic behaviour. It is therefore unlike the utterance "leave me alone" we encountered in example 70. Second, this means that the response is



not problematizing the profferer's utterance.

Unlike Aneg REASONS, EXCLAMATIONS cannot be responded to with an agreement or acknowledgment. However, if, as in the above example, participants specify the target and justification for the Aneg stance, recipients can respond to these accompanying units instead. While we do not know the entirety of C's subsequent turn in line 38, we can see that they begin with the news-marker 'oh' (BACK-CHANNELLING token, X/E-). As previously mentioned, it conveys a secondary unknowing stance regarding the information provided in the prior turn. Here, C confirms that they did not know the dress does not fit A any more. In addition, the BACK-CHANNELLING token accepts the refuser's E+ REASON as the justification for their disalignment and expresses negative evaluation of the FA. This is further supported by the fact that C appears to drop their suggested FA and third party B making the next counter suggestion in line 39.

Profferers can also challenge refusers' Aneg utterances in various ways. While this never treats them as interpersonally problematic, it may reprimand the refuser for an unreasonable disalignment. In example 74, the refuser's Aneg REASONS are challenged in terms of their constituting sufficient grounds for the disalignment.

Example: 74: 'Chess', P1A-027 SPICE (suggestion resistance)

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1  B:    What about you? Why are you not playing?
2        <unclear 2 sylls> [You] just couldn't be arsed?
3  C:    [Ah]
4        No I don't like the game anymore.
5  B:    <laughter> What do you mean you don't like it?
6        [    You see Fintan why are you so    ] pretty much disillusioned?
7  C:    [You see you get pissed off. Too much]
8        Uh I had too much of it in a short space of time.
```

9 A: What do you mean? You played too [much like.] I don't know about that now.  
 10 C: [ Aye. ]  
 11 Ah it's it's alright like.  
 [...]

In line 4, C refuses B's (opaque) suggestion to continue playing chess (implemented by INFO-REQUESTS) with two Aneg REASONS: the utterance "no", although responding to B's INFO-REQUEST in line 3, implies a negative evaluation and justification for not playing (they "couldn't be arsed"); the utterance "I don't like the game anymore" is more readily recognisable as expressing a primary Aneg stance. Unlike the refuser's Aneg REASON in example 72, this one clearly frames the negative evaluation as a subject dislike.<sup>84</sup> Such Aneg REASONS are only used by refusers in my data, suggesting that profferers and third parties lack the affective right to proffer or insist on FA by orienting to their subjective dis/preference for a course of action<sup>85</sup>. This right, I argue, is grounded on a speaker's strong deontic status. If a participant has the deontic authority to determine an action, they also have the affective right to voice their preference.

The refusal is met with a QUERY-REPAIR (X/E-) and CRITICISM (Aneg) from B. The former, in particular, challenges C's negative assessment as a sufficient justification for not playing chess. It does not, however, challenge C's affective right to have and express negative feelings. As previously discussed, repair sequences address some problem regarding the prior talk. A participant may have genuine trouble hearing or

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<sup>84</sup> It would therefore not possible for a responding 'yeah' to be heard as a (weak) agreement. Rather, it would only be an acknowledgement.

<sup>85</sup> The same applies to STATE-WANTS and NEG-WANTS.

understanding an utterance, but a QUERY-REPAIR can also express that the utterance is an issue. For this reason, refuser's repair initiations are often refusal-implicating. In a similar way, a profferer's or third party's QUERY-REPAIR can orient to a prior refusal as a source of trouble. Schegloff (2007, 151-155) calls this 'disagreement-implicated other-initiated repair'. By questioning what the refuser means, B expresses that they do not follow or understand C's sudden dislike of chess and their consequential refusal. This differs from the previous examples. In line 6, the profferer goes even further, targeting C's perceived disillusionment and treating their expressed dislike for chess as well as its being grounds for disaligning as unreasonable. Overall the turn design reprimands – but does not treat as interpersonally problematic – the addressee for refusing, although not as harshly as we have previously seen. It is perhaps for this reason that their reprimand is not treated as interpersonally problematic. Instead, C continues justifying themselves (lines 7-8) as well as producing CONCESSIONS (line 11).

So far, none of the above Aneg utterances produced by refusers problematized the addressee's linguistic behaviour. In example 75, by contrast, this is exactly what is happening.

Example 75: 'Housework' SPICE P1A-025 (request resistance)

[...]  
 7 D: That's where women belong [ the kitchen sink. ] <laughter>  
 8 A: [Stick up for yourself]  
 9 That's shite. That's a load of balls.  
 [...]

24 D: You should be busy working doing the housework.<sup>86</sup>  
 25 A: Aye right whatever you think. <Laughter>  
 [...]

Returning to the previously discussed negotiation 'Housework', we see the refuser utter a number of CRITICISMS targeting the profferer for their insistence that A do housework. Despite various clues that D is being non-serious and deliberately annoying A (for instance their turn-final laughter in line 7), A treats their re-requests and justifications as interpersonally problematic. In line 9, the refuser explicitly evaluates D's prior E+ REASON ("That's where women belong the kitchen sink") as "shite" and "a load of balls". Since these CRITICISMS imply an argument against the FA – women do not belong in the kitchen – the Aneg stances they express are considered primary rather than secondary. The same applies to the subsequent CRITICISMS in response to D's WEAK-NECESSITY (see section 9.1.2.). Throughout the negotiation, none of the refuser's problematizing Aneg utterances are treated as interpersonally problematic themselves. However, the profferer does not accept the problematization either. Instead, they continue insisting on A doing housework and justifying their requests with sexist arguments. This undermines A's affective rights, treating their protest as inconsequential. As mentioned above, however, D appears to consider the interaction not entirely serious, which might explain why they seem unfazed by A's CRITICISMS.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> D's utterance is annotated as a quotation in the source corpus, but it is not clear who they are quoting. The utterance does not appear anywhere else in the transcript.

<sup>87</sup> The overall negotiation suggests that, unlike D, A is taking the interaction seriously for a considerable duration of it.

The final extract in this section shows that some Aneg REASONS produced by refusers express a secondary knowing stance which can be responded to independently of the negative evaluation. Let us take another look at the negotiation 'Lift' in example 76. In section 9.1.2., I demonstrated that D's REASON in line 4 problematizes A's suggestion as inappropriate. I now want to focus on how the profferer responds to this.

Example 76: 'Lift', SPICE P1A-053 (suggestion resistance)

- 1 A: Yeah I was dying for a drink the other evening
- 2 and I was just too lazy to go down the stairs.
- 3 C: Girls you should use the lift.
- 4 D: We're not [   handicapped people.   ]
- 5 A: [It's for disabled people.]
- 6 C: Hmm <laughter>
- 7 D: Yes have you an opinion on this? Do you know what the girl
- 8 C: Your throat is disabled.

Although D's REASON in line 4 does not contain any evaluative language, I previously claimed that it foregrounds a negative affective stance. This, I argue, is because it is similar to profferers' STATE-SITUATIONS which can be heard as Aneg utterances due to a clash between epistemic stance and epistemic status. Speaker D is not merely informing or reminding A of their not being handicapped; they are 'complaining' about C's perceived implication of a status-quo similar to how a profferer 'complains' about a status-quo by means of a STATE-SITUATION. This REASON therefore also expresses a secondary knowing stance. Although my data contains no examples of such Aneg/E+ REASONS in which the profferer confirms or agrees to the secondary stance without also accepting the primary one and its being a justification for

refusing, I argue that this would be possible (e.g. 'I know that you are not handicapped, but you can still use the lift'\*). In the above negotiation, the profferer does respond to the secondary E+ stance, namely by (non-seriously) challenging its factuality (lines 6 and 8). However, unlike a confirming response, such a negating response also negates the implied primary Aneg stance, i.e. that A's suggestion is problematic. Nevertheless, C does not reprimand the refuser or produce a reciprocal problematization. Instead, their utterances in lines 6 and 8 appear to be an attempt at humour in order to de-escalate the situation.

In summary, this section has demonstrated that refusers use Aneg utterances for more than just problematizing their co-participants' linguistic behaviour. In particular, I have demonstrated that:

- Aneg utterances can have a range of targets, including aspects of the FA as well as the addressee;
- unlike profferers and third parties, refusers often orient to their own subjective dislike of a proffered object or action. The right to do so is grounded not just on epistemic access to the evaluated target but also a strong deontic status. This means that refusers have more/greater affective rights than profferers and third parties;
- refusers' Aneg utterances can – but do not necessarily have to – problematize the addressee;
- profferers and third parties can accept refusers' Aneg stances with or without

also accepting the refusal;

- profferers can challenge (aspects of) Aneg utterances without problematizing them; they may, however, reprimand refusers for Aneg refusals which are perceived as insufficient or unreasonable;
- as with profferer's Aneg utterances, the negative affective stance can arise either from explicit evaluative language or from contextual factors, most notably the participants' epistemic statuses; and

- in the latter case, the Aneg utterance conveys a secondary E+ stance similar to

STATE-SITUATIONS;

## 12. Primary positive affective stances

The final type of primary stances is positive affective claims. An utterance expresses an Apos stance if it foregrounds the speaker's positive feelings or evaluation regarding an FA or aspects related to it and those feelings/evaluations convey – explicitly or implicitly – an argument against or in favour of an FA. Apos utterances are less common than Aneg ones in my data, make up 3% (35 tokens) of the 1085 units assigned a stance (see table 16). Like Aneg utterances, they are distributed evenly between profferers/third parties and refusers (17 tokens making up 3% and 18 tokens making up 3%, respective).

The present chapter is organised as follows: in sections 12.1.1. and 12.1.2., we will look at profferers' unproblematicized and problematicized Apos utterances, respectively. In the case of refusers' Apos utterances, my data does once again not contain problematicized instances. We will therefore only look at unproblematicized examples in 12.2.1.

### 12.1. Profferers' Apos utterances

My data contains 17 utterances by profferers and third parties which foreground an Apos stance, making up 3% of these speakers' analysed units. All of them are in the service of securing an FA and take the form of REASONS. With 65%, most Apos units in my data once again occur in the service of securing a suggestion (figure 25).



However, figure 26 shows that primary positive affective stances are most frequent within requests (6% of units in the service of requesting).

Figure 25: distribution of profferers' and third parties' Apos utterances across proffer type





Figure 26: proportions of profferers' and third parties' Apos utterances within proffer types



While one may intuitively think that positive affective claims could not possibly be interpersonally problematic, the subsequent sections will demonstrate that they do not always orient to the addressee in a positive way. In addition, we will see that, like

refusers' E+ REASONS, Apos REASONS allow refusers to ignore any deontic implications.

### 12.1.1. Every person to their taste: unproblematic utterances

This section focuses on how a) profferers and third parties foreground positive affective stances when (re-)proffering and b) refusers treat these utterances as interpersonally unproblematic. Like all REASONS, those which express an Apos stance fall under what Blum-Kulka & Olshtain (1984) call 'hints' and Brown & Levinson (1987) call 'off-record' strategies. As previously addressed, this group of utterances tends to be discussed mainly in terms of their indirectness and display of weak deontic rights. The subsequent analysis shows, however, that some REASONS foreground the speaker's affective right to evaluate something positively and voice that. In particular, I demonstrate that:

- unlike negative affective stances, positive stances appear to only arise from explicit evaluative language;
- profferers' Apos utterances can target aspects of the FA but are not used to evaluate either the speaker or the addressee; they also do not explicitly express that they 'want' an FA to happen; and
- like E+ REASONS, Apos REASONS allow refusers to entirely ignore the deontic implications of profferers' utterances while still engaging with them;

Profferers' Apos utterances are not as versatile as Aneg ones – neither in terms of the formats that can be used to express them, nor regarding the means of expressing it (explicitly or implicitly) or the jobs such utterances do within FA negotiations. All instances in my data target a course of action or aspects of it (e.g. the object being proffered), conveying a justification in favour of an FA. Example 77 illustrates an Apos REASON being uttered in response to – and as a challenge of – a refuser's prior negative affective stance.

Example 77: 'Silly curlers', SPICE P1A-059 (suggestion)

- 1 A: Will you please take those silly curlers out of your hair? <laughter>
- 2 You do that and you've a perm I don't understand.
- 3 B: The perm makes me look like Shirley Temple.
- 4 A: Yeah she's young and cute but. What what else do you want? <laughter>
- 5 Well ah
- 6 B: Well I've got to have my hair nice for tonight.

In lines 1-2, A suggests that B "take those silly curlers out of [their] hair" (Aneg REASON<sup>88</sup> and Aneg STATE-SITUATION). B refuses by providing an Aneg REASON of their own: they point out that their perm "makes [them] look like Shirley Temple". Given that they are apparently trying to undo the effect of their perm, this constitutes a negative evaluation. In line 4, the profferer makes use of the secondary E+ stance expressed by the refuser's Aneg REASON. They do not challenge that the perm makes B look like Shirley Temple but do disagree in terms of their evaluation; they point out that Temple is "young and cute" and imply that this is a desirable look

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<sup>88</sup> The utterance is considered an Aneg REASON rather than a D- QUERY-FUTURE due to the term 'silly' (internal lexical modifier). The negative evaluation implies a justification for the suggestion.

("what else do you want"<sup>89</sup>). These Apos REASONS are not accepted by B, however. After a turn-final objection marker, they provide another disaligning REASON, this time foregrounding an E+ stance. This constitutes an attempt to trump A's subjective positive evaluation with an objective justification. Although the refuser's response implies that they do not agree with the profferer, they do not challenge or problematize their Apos utterance either. Rather, they do not actually engage with it at all.

Refusers do not always ignore profferers' Apos utterances however. In fact, Apos REASONS, like E+ ones, can allow refusers to positively engage with the profferer's talk while ignoring its deontic implications. This is illustrated in example 78. The negotiation occurs during a conversation about the books the participants read to their children.

Example 78: 'Dr. Seuss', SWDA 0318 (suggestion)

[...]  
 4 A: Yeah it's called a sleep book and uh you ought to get it. Uh  
 5 B: We've got quite a few of Doctor Seuss' books.  
 6 A: Yeah. Well I think I think his sleep book is my favorite.  
 7 B: Oh really?  
 [...]

After an initial INFO-REQUEST and answer, the profferer nominates the FA in line 4, stating that B ought to get the Doctor Seuss Sleep Book. B responds with an E+

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<sup>89</sup> While this utterance does not contain any lexemes which specifically express positive affect, the phrase constitutes an idiomatic rhetorical question with fairly fixed meaning. The addressee, and we, do therefore not have to rely on a clash between epistemic stance and status to determine whether the utterance foregrounds an epistemic or affective stance.

REASON, informing A that they already have some Doctor Seuss books and implying that they do not need more. Not giving up, A produces a BACK-CHANNELLING token and objection marker before uttering an Apos REASON which expresses their personal preference for this specific book. This differs from what we saw in chapter 11. While refusers express their dislike of an FA or the proffered objects, profferers and third parties never do this in my data. Crucially, however, speaker A only targets and refers to the object of the negotiation, not the FA (e.g. 'I want you to get the book'\* or 'I'm sure you'd love the book [if you got it]\*'). This means they are not claiming the right to determine the recipient's actions based on their own preference. As a further consequence of this format, B is able to positively engage with and accept the profferer's Apos stance without also engaging with its deontic implications. In line 7, they produce a BACK-CHANNELLING follow-up question (X/E-) which conveys a lack of prior knowledge about A's like of the book. It does not, however, orient to the FA in any way.

To summarise, this section has shown that some REASONS foreground a positive affective stance. I furthermore demonstrated that:

- unlike negative affective stances, positive stances appear to only arise from explicit evaluative language or idiomatic expressions;
- Apos utterances can target aspects of the FA but are not used to evaluate either the speaker or the addressee; they also do not explicitly express that they 'want' an FA to happen; and

- like E+ REASONS, Apos REASONS allow refusers to entirely ignore the deontic implications of profferers' utterances while still engaging with them;

### 12.1.2. One person's preference is another person's detriment: problematized utterances

In contrast to Aneg stances, Apos utterances may intuitively seem risk-free. In this section, we will see that they are not necessarily so; nor are they always produced with the refuser's best interest at heart. The subsequent analysis demonstrates that:

- profferers' Apos utterances can positively evaluate an FA which constitutes not only a cost to the refuser (i.e. request) but also detriment; and
- in such cases, the Apos stance amplifies the offence of insisting on an FA the profferer may not be entitled to, leading to a problematization;

Example 79 is the only instance of a problematized Apos (re-)proffer in my data; and it is perhaps not surprising that it occurs during a request negotiation. As we will see however, the profferer's insistence on an FA is not the only reason the Apos utterance is treated as interpersonally problematic. The target of the positive evaluation plays a crucial role.

Example 79: 'Shade', SPICE P1A-031 (request)

1 A: You're going to have to move Martin.

- 2 C: Why?  
 3 A: So I won't be in the shade < laughter>.  
 4 C: Shade. Well if you come any closer to me I'll be in the shade.  
 5 A: Good.  
 6 B: I think you should just both go inside.

In this negotiation, speaker A requests that C move so that A will not be in the shade (D+ STRONG-NECESSITY and Aneq REASON in lines 1 and 3, respectively). In line 4, the refuser disaligns with an Aneq REASON, stating that the requested FA would put them in the shade. The profferer now responds with the utterance "good". This obviously constitutes a positive evaluation, but the target is important: the Apos stance orients to the same argument presented by C in the prior turn. In other words, A positively evaluates C being in the shade. While all requested FAs involve a cost to the addressee, A's re-proffer goes even further than that. It expresses the right to positively evaluate and insist on an FA which has already been framed by the refuser as detrimental to them<sup>90</sup>. Although the profferer's REASON expresses a positive affective stance, it is therefore hostile towards C.

While the refuser does not respond, speaker B steps in as a third-party participant in line 6. Interestingly, unlike most third-party interventions in my data, B does not side with the profferer. Instead, they attempt to break up the negotiation and problematize both A's and C's behaviours by telling them they "should just both go inside". Since B is not a recipient of A's request or C's refusal, neither constitute an infringement on their own rights. Rather, B problematizes the two negotiators for

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<sup>90</sup> Note also that, in line 2, C questions A's entitlement and their REASON in line 4 disaligns based entirely on A's right not to be in the shade. Both turns therefore treat A's (re-)proffer as interpersonally problematic.



acting inappropriately – and overstepping their rights – vis-à-vis each other. C's silence may itself be a form of non-verbal problematization. As previously mentioned, exiting an interaction, either physically or by not responding, is one way of ending a conflict sequence recognised within the CA literature (see e.g. Deutsch 1973; Messmer 2003; Norrick & Spitz 2008; Vuchinich 1990).


To summarise, this short section has shown that profferers' Apos stances are not necessarily any less problematic than Aneg ones. In particular, I have demonstrated that:

- profferers' Apos utterances can positively evaluate an FA which constitutes not only a cost to the refuser (i.e. request) but also detriment; and
- in such cases, the Apos stance amplifies the offence of insisting on an FA the profferer may not be entitled to, leading to a problematization;

## 12.2. Refusers' Apos utterances

Refusers produce an almost equal amount of Apos utterances as profferers and third parties in my data. Of the 18 tokens, 8 are in the service of securing a counter FA (7 intending and 1 requests). The remaining 10 units resist suggestions. Overall, Apos utterances make up 4% of refusers' utterances resisting this proffer type (see figure 27).

Figure 27: proportions of refusers' Apos utterances within types of proffer resistance



Once again, REASONS are the most common format to express refusers' Apos stances – both when resisting an FA and when attempting to secure a counter FA (see tables 25 and 26). Apos counters, however, include a format used only by refusers in my data: STATE-WANTS.

Table 25: formats used by refusers to express a primary positive affective stance when resisting an FA

Format	#
CONCESSION	3
REASON	7

Table 26: formats used by refusers to express a primary positive affective stance when attempting to secure a counter

Format	#
REASON	5
STATE-WANTS	3

As with various other primary stances, my data once again does not contain instances in which refusers' Apos utterances are treated as problematic. The

subsequent section therefore addresses unproblematic examples and how they are responded to. We will see that, similar to Apos stances, refusers have more affective rights than profferers and third parties and that these rights are closely related to their deontic rights.

### 12.2.1. Do as you please: unproblematic utterances

In this section, we take a closer look at how a) refusers foreground a positive affective stance when refusing and b) profferers and third parties treat these utterances as interpersonally unproblematic. REASONS have already received a considerable amount of attention in the present thesis. In this section, we will see that they can also express primary positive affective stances. In addition, we will look at a format which always expresses an Apos stance and is only used by refusers: STATE-WANTS. I subsequently demonstrate that:

- as with profferers' utterances, positive affective stances appear to only arise from explicit evaluative language;
- unlike profferers, refusers do not only positively evaluate aspects of an FA but also explicitly express that they 'want' an FA to happen;
- while profferers' Apos utterances can be problematized, those of refusers can be problematizing;<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> It is, of course, conceivable that a refuser uses an Apos utterance to positively evaluate

- profferers generally avoid challenging refusers' Apos utterances, but they do not necessarily accept the refusal and drop the FA;
- profferers do not problematize refusers' Apos utterances, but they may reprimand them for disaligning based on what they 'want'; such a reprimand may, in turn, be problematized; and
- as with Aneg utterance, refusers appear to have greater affective rights than profferers and third parties. This is due to a close link between affective and deontic rights with regards to wanting or not wanting to do an FA;

Let us begin with instances of Apos stances which are neither challenged/reprimanded nor challenging/problematising a prior turn. Like profferers, refusers can argue for or against an FA by means of Apos REASONS. This is illustrated in example 80. The previously discussed negotiation 'Curtains' begins with an unsolicited suggestion to get curtains triggered by A's prior disclosure that they might get a screen for their living room window.

Example 80: 'Curtains', SPICE P1A-013 (counter intending)

1 B: Or you could [ just get uhm ]  
 2 A: [And get the <unclear 2 sylls>]  
 3 B: curtains that when you pull them back they go right back.  
 4 Means like [during the day]  
 5 A: [ Yeah ] aye but it's still you know  
 6 I sort of li- I'd want the [ view. ]  
 7 C: [Martina's] just anti-curtains.  
 8 A: Yeah I I'm not an [ <unclear several sylls> ]  
 9 B: [But your window might not be exactly] the same  
 10 if you get that done again it might not be the same shape.

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some detriment to the profferer similar to what we saw the profferer do in the previous section. This might be a problematisable offence. No such instances occur in my data, however.

[...]

In section 7.1., I argued that A's refusal in lines 5-6 treats B's suggestion as unproblematic. I now want to focus on the Apos REASON this turn contains. After a false start, the refuser states that "[they]'d want the view" (line 6), implying curtains would obscure it.<sup>92</sup> This provides a REASON not just against the suggested FA but also in favour of their original plan – getting a screen – and therefore constitutes a counter intending. While the utterance implies a negative evaluation of the former, this is not explicitly expressed; instead A conveys that a screen would have the advantage of providing something they want. While claiming affective rights, the REASON does not challenge the profferer's prior stances. B does not get the opportunity to immediately respond. Overlapping with A's REASON, co-refuser C produced a disaligning utterance (line 7), which leads to another turn from A. Only in lines 9-10 does B respond, uttering a re-suggestion in the form of E+ REASONS. While this is an attempt to trump A's affective rights with epistemic authority – just like the refusers tried to trump B's epistemic stances with affective ones –, it does not challenge A's Apos REASON or the subsequent Aneg ones. Instead, it conveys that, despite A's personal preference, there may be objective obstacles. Overall, neither the refuser's Apos utterance nor the profferer's next turn treat the respective prior talk as problematic or challenge their co-participants' claimed rights.

Example 81 illustrates a similar case. However, the refuser implements their

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<sup>92</sup> Although the utterance includes the verb 'want', this is not a STATE-WANT. See below for a discussion of STATE-WANTS.

counter intending with a STATE-WANT. Unlike the above Apos REASON, STATE-WANTS orient to and nominate an FA. By expressing that they want to do something, the speaker foregrounds a positive affective stance regarding their personal preference for a course of action. More so than affective stances targeting the proffered object, STATE-WANTS – as well as NEG-WANTS – demonstrate that refusers have greater affective rights than their co-participants. As I subsequently argue, this is connected to deontic rights.

Example 81: ‘Catfish’, SWDA sw\_1021 (counter intending)

1 A: [...] You might put some like some yellow catfish in there.  
 2 I do not know if they would live very well up in New York  
 3 but they get huge.  
 4 And uh they routinely use them for bait for uh goldfish for bait  
 5 B: Oh okay.  
 6 A: for yellow catfish.  
 7 B: Well, we would want to put some small ones in  
 8 so they do not eat the big guys the goldfish too. <laughter>  
 9 A: Uh-huh.  
 [...]

After A’s initial suggestion and a BACK-CHANNELLING response in line 4 (see section 10.1.), B produces a counter intending in lines 6-7. Their turn consists of an objection marker followed by a STATE-WANT and an E+ REASON. The former disaligning unit states that B “would want to put some small [fish] in” their pond instead of catfish. According to Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz’s (1990) classification of refusal strategies, this would once again be considered a statement of alternative without taking into account the format being used. In Blum-kulka & Olshtain’s (1984) taxonomy of request strategies, STATE-WANTS would be considered ‘scope stating’, i.e. utterances which express the profferer’s desire that the addressee do the FA.

Interesting, however, profferers and third parties never employ this format in my data. When it is used by refusers, it always implements an intending. In other words, STATE-WANTS in my data never convey that the speaker wants someone else to do something. As previously discussed and demonstrated, participants' affective right to evaluate something are grounded in epistemic access to the target; their right to voice the evaluation is more context-dependant and more easily challenged. In the case of STATE-WANTS and NEG-WANTS orienting to one's own actions, however, I argue that a different facet is crucial: the deontic one. Unlike STATE-FUTURES or NEG-FUTURES, they foreground the refuser's dis/preference for an FA rather than declaring a decision which foregrounds a strong deontic stance. Nevertheless, stating that one wants or does not want to do something can strongly imply one will (not) do it – if one has a strong deontic status regarding one's own actions. This is the case in the above example and, in fact, all other instances of STATE-WANTS and NEG-WANTS in my data. Having a strong deontic status means having authority over one's own actions. While this allows people to act as they please, it is generally not the cause for action; instead people often do things because they want to, enabled by the right to do so. It is therefore a refuser's strong deontic status which constitutes the grounds for their strong affective status concerning the wish (not) to do an FA. In the above example, this claimed affective right is not challenged by the profferer. They respond with a BACK-CHANNELLING acknowledgement (X/X) and do not pursue the suggested FA any further, thereby fully accepting B's refusal based on personal preference (as well as knowledge).

Since the affective stances expressed by STATE-WANTS in my data are always congruent with the refusers' affective statuses, they never constitute a problematizable offence. This does not mean, however, that a refuser cannot be reprimanded for such a claim, as we see in example 82. The negotiation occurs during a conversation about B's upcoming babysitting job. After B discloses they are not sure if they will babysit by themselves or share the job with another person, D suggest that B pick the latter option.

Example 82: 'Money', SPICE P1A-088 (counter intending)

1 D: Yeah why don't you do that then? You won't get as much money for it.  
 2 B: No I want to do it meself.  
 3 D: Ah you see I knew. Money money money. <laughter>  
 4 C: [Have you change for me? ]  
 5 B: [I need the money Arielle.]  
 6 D: Huh?  
 7 C: [Change?]  
 8 B: [I need] the money for [Mam and Christmas.]  
 9 D: [ Oh yeah. ]  
 10 I don't know how much though Agnes. Don't ask me yet.

As in the previous example, the refuser does a counter intending in the form of a STATE-WANT (line 2). In response, the profferer – perhaps not entirely seriously, given the turn-final laughter – calls out B for being greedy. While this specific intending to babysit on their own instead of sharing the job (and the money) intrinsically conveys a certain degree of selfishness, I argue that B's STATE-WANT emphasises this. As a consequence, D (teasingly) reprimands D for "want[ing] to do it [themselves]" and, by extension, for wanting more money. Given the refuser's strong deontic status, however, they also have the strong affective right to act according to their inclination



and the profferer has no grounds for problematizing them. In fact, B even objects to the reprimand, pointing out that they are not in fact acting selfishly but “need the money” for presents (lines 5 and 8). These REASONS are ambiguous between negative affective and strong epistemic stances. It is unclear whether the profferer has prior knowledge of B’s needing the money,<sup>93</sup> in which case the utterances are hearable as Aneq claims (i.e. ‘you know I need the money for presents and your reprimand is therefore inappropriate’) or whether B is informing D of something they do not know. What is noteworthy, however, is that the refuser does not echo D’s laughter in line 3; nor are they orienting to the prior utterance as humorous in any other way. This at least suggests that they treat D’s talk as serious and requiring a subsequent defensive (if not offensive) response.

Finally, and perhaps unexpectedly, refusers’ Apos utterances can also problematize some prior talk. This is illustrated in example 83, which shows a refuser resisting a suggestion without countering it. The negotiation occurs after the conversation turns to D’s hair, specifically their blond streaks.

Example 83: ‘Hair’, SPICE P1A-002 (suggestion resistance)

- 1 B: Aren't they a bit ridiculous?
- 2 D: No. I like them.
- 3 A: I like your roots.
- 4 B: I know. <laughter>
- 5 D: I I I don't see any problem [with them.]
- 6 A: [Yeah why] did you dye them darker than the rest [of them?]
- 7 B: [Yeah] <laughter>

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<sup>93</sup> They do not respond to B’s utterances in lines 5 and 8, instead seemingly ignoring them and interaction with speaker C instead.

The interaction contains a series of Aneg stances from the initial profferer B and third party negotiator A, both of who target D's hair (first the blond streaks, then their roots). B's initial suggestion in line 1 takes the form of a QUERY-SITUATION (Aneg/E-), conveying the speaker's judgment that the streaks are "a bit ridiculous". D's disagreement is immediate and strong, expressed by two Apos REASONS; not only do they negate that the streaks are ridiculous, but they also state that they like them. Both units challenge B's judgment as well as their right to voice a negative evaluation targeting D's appearance. In line 3, speaker A enter the negotiation and targets D's roots (Aneg REASON via sarcastic irony), which is supported by B (line 4). Once again, D responds with an Apos REASON, challenging their co-participants' evaluations and affective rights. In addition, there is a noticeable absence of laughter on D's part; they do not echo B's laughter in lines 4 or 7, thereby treating A's and B's talk as non-humorous. Overall, D does not join in to the (non-serious) attack. Instead, they forego all face-maintaining behaviour and challenge not only the co-participants' affective rights but also their proximal deontic rights. In other words, they problematize A and B for criticising their appearance as well as for the implied suggestion that D change their hair.

To summarise, this section has shown that, like profferers' Apos utterances, refusers' Apos utterances do not guarantee a negotiation free from interpersonal trouble. I have demonstrated that:

- as with profferers' utterances, positive affective stances appear to only arise

from explicit evaluative language;

- unlike profferers, refusers do not only positively evaluate aspects of an FA but also explicitly express that they 'want' an FA to happen;
- while profferers' Apos utterances can be treated as interpersonally problematic, those of refusers can be problematizing;<sup>94</sup>
- profferers generally avoid challenging refusers' Apos utterances, but they do not necessarily accept the refusal and drop the FA;
- profferers do not problematize refusers' Apos utterances, but they may reprimand them for disaligning based on what they 'want'; such a reprimand may, in turn, be problematized; and
- as with Aneg utterance, refusers appear to have greater affective rights than profferers and third parties. This is due to a close link between affective and deontic rights with regards to wanting or not wanting to do an FA;

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<sup>94</sup> It is, of course, conceivable that a refuser uses an Apos utterance to positively evaluate some detriment to the profferer similar to what we saw the profferer do in the previous section. This might be a problematizable offence. No such instances occur in my data, however.

### 13. No primary stance

The previous chapters focused on utterances which express primary stances, that is utterances which foreground one of the following: a) that the speaker has or lacks deontic authority to make a unilateral decision; b) that the speaker has or lacks knowledge concerning whether an FA ought or ought not to happen; c) that the speaker has or lacks knowledge concerning possible arguments in favour or against an FA; and d) that the speaker has negative or positive feelings or opinions which constitute arguments in favour or against an FA. There are, however, many utterances within FA negotiations which do not foreground any of these. In fact, about one third of analysed units in my data do not express a primary stance. Many of the formats falling into this group are traditionally not considered proffer or refusal strategies within the SAT-bases approach. In fact, X utterances in my data often do not express alignment or disalignment. Nevertheless, this does not mean that they are irrelevant; they occur within FA negotiations for a reason. CA research has demonstrated that such utterances do various jobs and we have seen these throughout the present thesis. They often deal with preliminaries – to nominating an FA, refusing an FA or providing a specific argument for or against an FA – or do relational work without expressing dis/alignment.

This final chapter focuses on such X utterances. Since most of them have been addressed throughout the analysis so far, I will not discuss each format in detail. Instead, I limit myself to highlighting a) why they do not express a primary stance, b)

that many nevertheless express a secondary stance of some kind and c) that, while most of them are neither problematizing nor problematized in my data, some X utterances do cause or address interpersonal trouble. In section 13.1.1., we will look at profferers' X utterances which are treated as unproblematic before moving on to problematized instances in section 13.1.2. Refusers' unproblematic and problematizes X utterances are subsequently discussed in sections 13.2.1. and 13.2.2., respectively.

### **13.1. Profferers' X utterances**

My data contains 189 units produced by profferers and third parties which do not express a primary stance. Of those, 162 are in the service of securing an FA, 24 are in resistance to a counter FA and 3 were categorised as unclear. The units resisting a counter occur primarily in response to intendings (75%, see figure 28) whereas most X utterances in the service of securing an FA occur within a suggestion project (72%, see figure 29).

Figure 28: distribution of profferers' and third parties' X utterances across type of proffer resistance






Figure 29: distribution of profferers' and third parties' X utterances across proffer type



A look at stance proportions within the different proffer types reveals, however, that profferers' X utterances are common among all kinds of proffer negotiations except for offers (13%), ranging from 22% in the case of requests to 46% in the case of proposals (figure 30). In fact, utterances which do not express a primary stance are the most common group in the service of proposal projects, beating E+ utterances (23%). Within suggestion projects, they tie with E+ utterances at 37% and they came second in the case of requests (22%, behind 23% E+) and offers (behind 62% D-claims). Profferers' utterances which do not express a primary stance consequently appear to be integral to FA negotiations irrespective of benefactives. We have to remember, however, that the token count is relatively low for all proffer types apart from suggestions.

Figure 30: proportions of profferers' and third parties' X utterances within proffer types



Utterances which do not express a primary stance may or may not express a secondary one. As figure 31 shows, 38% of X utterances do not make any secondary claim either. However, more than half of them orient to the epistemic domain, expressing either an unknowing (32%) or knowing (25%) secondary stance. X/Aneg and X/D+ utterances, by contrast, are infrequent and X/Apos or X/D- utterances are not produced by profferers at all.

Figure 31: distribution of secondary stances within profferers' and third parties' X utterances






Table 32 lists the formats used by profferers which do not express a primary stance and shows which secondary stances these express, if any. Only THREATS, which have not been discussed yet, express a secondary strong deontic stance; APOLOGIES convey negative affect. INFO-REQUESTS and QUERY-REPAIRS express an unknowing secondary stance, whereas responses to them (ANSWERS and REPAIRS) can be either knowing or unknowing, depending on whether the speaker is able to provide the requested information/repair. BACK-CHANNELLING tokens do not express any stance at all unless they convey a lack of prior knowledge. Finally, MENTIONS and STATE-EXISTS – two further formats we have not encountered yet – express no stance and a secondary strong epistemic stance, respectively. Together with INFO-REQUESTS, they are the only X formats which are used to implement initial proffers or initial counters without accompanying units. This means that they, together with threats – which implement re-proffers –, are hearable as aligning with an FA in their own right despite not expressing a primary stance.

Figure 32: formats used by profferers and third parties which express no primary stance

<b>Format</b>	<b>#</b>
APOLOGY (X/Aneg)	3
BACK-CHANNELLING (X/X or X/E-)	85
ANSWERS (X/E+ or X/E-)	31
INFO-REQUEST (X/E-)	27
MENTION (X/X)	9
QUERY-REPAIR (X/E-)	10
REPAIR (X/E+ or X/E-)	12
STATE-EXIST (X/E+)	8
THREAT (X/D+)	5

In the subsequent sections, we will take another look at some of the X utterances we have already encountered as well as those formats which have not been discussed yet. In particular, we will see that the absence of a primary stance neither hinders certain formats from being heard as a (re-)proffer/counter nor does it always ensure the recipients' treating it as unproblematic.

### 13.1.1. Unproblematic utterances

This section focuses on a) the various secondary stances profferers' and third parties' X utterances can express and b) how refusers treat these utterances as interpersonally unproblematic. I will demonstrate that:

- X utterances – even those (heard as) aligning with an FA – do not foreground the speaker's (lack of) deontic authority, (lack of) knowledge regarding

whether an FA ought (not) to happen, knowledge regarding an argument in favour or against the FA or feelings or opinions which convey an argument in favour or against the FA;

- X utterances can express a range of secondary stances, but may not express any stance at all;
- X utterances provide few grounds for a challenge or even problematization; and
- APOLOGIES are the only formats used by profferers which express an affective obligation rather than right;

Let us begin with X utterances which make secondary epistemic claims.<sup>95</sup> Unlike ANSWERS and REPAIRS, STATE-EXISTS always express a secondary knowing stance. In addition, they are not solicited by a refuser's question and therefore do not occur within insertion sequences. STATE-EXISTS express the speaker's knowledge that an object exists or is available. In example 84, we return to the negotiation 'Curtains'. Prior to the below extract, refuser A shifted the conversation away from negotiating the FAs (getting curtains versus getting a screen) to a recent experience they had at a store while looking for the latter. During this sequence, A disclosed that they are interested in getting a screen with a wooden frame and fabric interior. They also reveal that one screen they saw and liked was very expensive because it was made of

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<sup>95</sup> The only X format expressing a secondary deontic stance are THREAT. Since all instances are treated as problematic, they will be discussed in the next section.

silk (lines 50-52).

Example 84: ‘Curtains’, SPICE P1A-013 (suggestion)

[...]  
 113 A: [...] Well apparently it's Japanese or Chinese silk or something  
 114 that the actual material is [ you know and that's why it's ] so expensive.  
 115 C: [Aye the frame wasn't expensive.]  
 116 B: [<unclear several sylls> and all.]  
 117 A: Yeah [<unclear 2 sylls>]  
 118 B: [ Well I think ] uhm Spoils had them before. They're wood and paper.  
 119 A: Well we went [those Spoils] but they only had you know  
 120 B: [Castle Court.]  
 121 A: the sort of the the pine stuff the like the the wickerwork.  
 122 And they were charging about sixty pounds  
 123 for this very shabby-looking wicker type thing.  
 [...]

In line 112, the profferer now focused the conversation back to an FA negotiation.

Based on the new information regarding the kind of screen A wants, they state that a certain store did sell frames made of wood and paper at some point. These utterances express a knowing stance concerning the availability of a certain object.

Considering that the participants previously discussed A's and C's getting a screen and that A has disclosed their wanting a screen made of wood and fabric, this act of informing is not innocent. Instead, it is hearable as having deontic implications similar to other proffer formats which do not nominate the FA. Like other such opaque utterances, STATE-EXISTS have traditionally been considered hints/off-record strategies – or ‘supporting moves’ when they occur with more direct formats. In addition, they have been described as pre-proffers rather than proffers proper.

According to Schegloff (2007, 28-29), for instance, stating the availability of an object is a type of pre-offer. Such pre-sequences aim to anticipate potential obstacles in the

way of an acceptance. Aijmer (1996, 132-133), by contrast, categorises utterances such as "There are some scented rushes" as 'referring to a state of the world which needs to be changed' and considers them pre-requests. Agreeing with Tsui (1994), Aijmer (1996, 137-138) argues that these and various other types of utterances are pre-requestives because they "can be answered by a *yes* without a non-verbal action of compliance" and "may give rise to misunderstandings". While I agree that such utterances can be responded to in the affirmative without this constituting an acceptance, I argue – and have previously shown – that there is a difference between an affirmative non-acceptance response which treats the utterance as a proffer and an affirmative non-acceptance that (deliberately) treats it as a mere assertion or question that does not have deontic implications. In addition, I have demonstrated that refusers avoid even weak agreements in response to, for instance, STRONG-NECESSITIES in order to avoid being heard as accepting.

The above example demonstrates that STATE-EXISTS are not only hearable as preliminary to a proffer but can immediately be responded to with a refusal. This is what speaker A does in lines 119 and 121-123: they state that, when they last went to Spoils, they "only" had screens with wooden frames which were expensive and "shabby-looking". This response does not treat B's utterance as a mere informing; it does not simply accept/acknowledge it or convey prior knowledge of what the profferer is telling A – nor does it contradict the content of B's prior utterance. Instead, the refuser's utterances confirm that Spoils do indeed sell wooden screens but point out that they are not nice and cost too much. This is only relevant if B's

prior talk is heard as a suggestion to buy (or at least have a look at) a screen from Spoils. The refusal furthermore treats the proffer as unproblematic. The disalignment is delayed by a turn-initial objection marker, justified by subjective REASONS and does not challenge the STATE-EXIST. In fact, there is only one aspect of the format that could be challenged: the claim that Spoils sell wooden screens.<sup>96</sup> I argue that, unlike E+ REASONS, this does not constitute an argument in favour of the FA based on the profferer's knowledge and therefore does not express a primary strong epistemic stance. Similar to the secondary E+ stance expressed by STATE-POSSIBILITIES that something can/could be done, the mere existence or availability of an object is not a reason for doing an FA. In both cases, the knowing stances are therefore secondary rather than primary. Put differently, the profferer does not claim knowledge regarding why getting a screen from spoils might be advisable or beneficial; they only claim knowledge regarding its being a possibility.

INFO-REQUESTS can function in a similar way. I have so far addressed this format mostly in the context of refusers' responses to proffers. Nevertheless, profferers, too, use them – both within already ongoing negotiations (for instance before a re-proffer) and at the very beginning. Like STATE-EXISTS, they have been discussed either as pre-proffers (e.g. 'checking availability', Aijmer 1996, 132-133; Schegloff 2007, 28-29) or as hints and supportive moves (i.e. 'preparators', e.g. Blum-Kulka & House 1989; Leech 2014). INFO-REQUESTS can address all kinds of preliminaries, but,

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<sup>96</sup> The refuser might still challenge the profferer's proximal deontic rights if the implied FA is considered inappropriate.

depending on their content and the context in which they are used, they may also be hearable and treated as initial proffers/counter. This is illustrated in example 85. As discussed in section 11.1.2., A's initial (opaque) suggestion that B change their coffee consumption (line 2) is refused by B, who points out that their eyesight, not coffee causes their headaches. Let us now look at the profferer's next turn.

Example 85: 'Headache', SPICE P1A-016 (suggestion)

- 1 B: I've got a headache again.
- 2 A: Through all the coffee you drink.
- 3 B: See my eyesight's going.
- 4 A: Do you wear glasses? Do you have glasses?
- 5 B: I do have glasses but I don't like wearing them.
- [...]

In line 4, A asks whether B wears or even has glasses. Once again, the context in which these utterances occur means they are immediately hearable as doing more than innocent questions. These INFO-REQUESTS (ostensibly) seek to establish some preliminaries, possibly so that A can subsequently specify an FA depending on whether B already has glasses or not. However, the content and sequential position of A's utterances are sufficient to convey to B what kinds of FAs the profferer has in mind and might nominate next. Their response pre-empts this: in line 5, B first produces an X/E+ Answer, confirming that they do have glasses. This is followed by an Aneg REASON which disaligns from wearing them. This response nicely illustrates the difference between primary and secondary epistemic stances. B's statement that they have glasses does not constitute an argument for wearing them; in other words, they are not doing an E+ CONCESSION, which would admit that there is some factor

which would speak in favour of the FA. The Aneg REASON, by contrast, does convey an argument, namely one against wearing their glasses. In addition, this demonstrates that INFO-REQUESTS expresses only a secondary weak epistemic stance. In the case of the E- REASONS and E- CONCESSIONS discussed in section 10.1., the profferers' claimed lack of knowledge concerned potential arguments for or against an FA. Here, A's claimed lack of knowledge only concern the status-quo of the refuser's eyewear. As a consequence, a positive response does not agree with or concede that there is a (potential) reason for doing the FA. Overall, the refuser's response treats these INFO-REQUESTS as unproblematic. First, the stances they express are challengeable only by treating the profferer's claimed lack of knowledge as a violation of their epistemic obligations. This is not the case; instead, B accepts the epistemic asymmetry they convey by providing an informative ANSWER. While the Aneg REASON expresses B's subjective dislike of wearing glasses, it does not challenge the perceived implication of A's INFO-REQUESTS that wearing glasses is an appropriate and beneficial solution to B's headaches.

Not all INFO-REQUESTS or STATE-EXISTS are immediately hearable or treated as proffers, however. This is illustrated in example 86. The previously discussed negotiation 'Dr. Seuss' occurs during a conversation about books which the participants read to their children. In the absence of prior talk about a (potential) problem that might require an action, it is not instantly apparent that A's talk in lines 1-2 is part of a suggestion project.



Example 86: ‘Dr. Seuss’, SWDA 0318 (suggestion)

1 A: Uh but I read you know there's this Doctor Seuss sleep book.  
 2 Have you ever seen that yet?  
 3 B: Sleep book no.  
 4 A: Yeah it's called a sleep book and uh you ought to get it. Uh  
 5 B: We've got quite a few of Doctor Seuss' books.  
 6 A: Yeah. Well I think I think his sleep book is my favorite.  
 7 B: Oh really?  
 [...]

After a false start, speaker A produces a STATE-EXIST (line 1) and an INFO-REQUEST (line 2). These utterances introduce an object and enquire whether B is aware of its existence. B responds with an ANSWER, expressing that they do not know the book in question. Speaker A subsequently utters another STATE-EXIST at the beginning of line 4, reformulating the initial one. Up to this point, it is not apparent A's talk serves a proffer project. They may simply be introducing a new topic of conversation without deontic implications. Their second utterance in line 4, however, makes it clear that this is not the case; they implement a suggestion by means of a WEAK-NECESSITY, nominating the FA. Now, the previous STATE-EXISTS and INFO-REQUEST can retrospectively be understood as addressing preliminaries to a proffer. Considering B does not orient to the utterances in lines 1-2 as proffers and provides the requested information, A's first turn is treated as unproblematic; partially because B is not aware or pretends not to be aware of its deontic implications.

Moving on, one format expresses a secondary negative affective stance: APOLOGIES. Unlike utterances expressing a primary Aneg stance, they do not dis/align with an FA and do not claim affective rights. Instead, they express affective obligation, as example 87 illustrates.

Example 87: ‘Wolfing away’, SPICE P1A-031 (offer)

1 A: Sorry Martin [I've been wolfing] away at this and [you wanted some.]  
 2 B: [You're a liar]  
 3<sup>97</sup> [unclear 3 sylls]  
 4 It's yours. You finish it if you want to.  
 [...]

In line 1, speaker A's STATE-SITUATION offer is preceded by an APOLOGY. This utterance is not in and of itself a proffer, but it is part of A's project. That APOLOGIES are expressions of (negative) affect is not a new observation. Searle (1975) classifies this speech act as a 'expressives', which are utterances that "express the speaker's attitudes" about some state of affairs (Searle & Vanderveken 1985, 211). Blum-Kulka & Olshtain (1984, 206) specify that apologies orient to behaviour on the part of the speaker which constitutes a violation of a social norm and/or which negatively impacts the addressee (cf. also Robinson 2004, 292; Searle & Vanderveken 1985, 211). To apologise, then, is to implicitly evaluate one's behaviour negatively. However, APOLOGIES differ from other utterances in FA negotiations conveying negative affect in that they do not claim the right to voice an opinion. Instead, they express the speaker's affective obligation vis-à-vis the addressee to voice this negative self-evaluation. Like GRATITUDES (see section 13.2.1.), they have no argumentative value and have the sole purpose of enhancing the addressee's fact; in the case of APOLOGIES, this is achieved by conveying that the speaker owns a negative self-assessment to their co-participant. Similar to primary weak deontic stances, such a

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<sup>97</sup> This utterance is a response to a third party's prior talk.

secondary claim of affective obligation cannot itself be the cause of interpersonal trouble. Only the action the speaker is apologising for can be. As previously argued, the profferer's short-comings and offer are treated as unproblematic in this negotiation.

The final format I want to discuss in this section is one which expresses neither a primary nor a secondary stance: MENTIONS. They are similar so STATE-EXISTS, but their non-sentential form means they do not express a knowing stance. In example 88, we once again return to the negotiation 'Curtains'. Just prior to the below extract, A disclosed that they would like a screen made of wood and fabric so that it would let in light from outside.

Example 88: 'Curtains', SPICE P1A-013 (suggestion)

[...]  
 45 B: You know like uhm like those Japanese things  
 46 like those with the black and the white [ squares? ]  
 47 C: [We saw them] yes but they were  
 48 how much were they?  
 49 A: They were about seven hundred pounds [...]  
 [...]

In lines 45-46, B now introduces a specific type of screen matching A's requirement, namely "those Japanese things like those with the black and white squares".<sup>98</sup> As in many other aligning utterances which do not nominate the FA, B refers to the object of the proffer. However, they do not do any more than that; there is no evaluation of

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<sup>98</sup> It is apparent from the turn-initial phrase "you know" that B is not asking for clarification whether this is what A means. In addition, neither C nor A respond in a way that would suggest they are providing a clarification.

Japanese-style screens or even a statement regarding their availability. All B does is a MENTION. These non-sentential utterances do not only omit the FA but also do not express any stance at all. Nevertheless, they are clearly hearable as proffers in certain contexts. In lines 47-48, C confirms that they saw these specific screens but that they were – as A completes in line 49 – very expensive. These references to the price treats B's prior talk as a suggestion to get Japanese-style screens; it also treats it as unproblematic. The MENTION itself is not problematizable in terms of its content or stance. The implicit proffer itself is not treated as problematic either, since the refusers' E+ REASONS do not frame it as inappropriate.

To summarise, this section has shown that various formats uttered in the service of a proffer project do not in fact convey a primary stance, i.e. a stance which orients to the FA's (not) happening. I have demonstrated that:

- X utterances – even those (heard as) aligning with an FA – do not foreground the speaker's (lack of) deontic authority, (lack of) knowledge regarding whether an FA ought (not) to happen, knowledge regarding an argument in favour or against the FA or feelings or opinions which convey an argument in favour or against the FA;
- X utterances can express a range of secondary stances but may not express any stance at all;
- X utterances provide few grounds for a challenge or even problematization; and

- APOLOGIES are the only formats used by profferers which express an affective obligation rather than right;

### 13.1.2. Problematized utterances

As I argued in the previous section, profferers' X utterances provide fewer grounds for problematizing them than most utterances which foreground a primary stance.

The subsequent analysis demonstrates that:

- X utterances can nevertheless be treated as interpersonally problematic;
- the secondary stance itself may or may not be problematized; a perceived violation of the profferer's proximal deontic rights always is, however;
- X utterances can limit the addressee's linguistic options for problematizing them; and
- THREATS are the only X format which conveys a secondary D+ stance;

My data contains two kinds of X utterances treated as problematic: THREATS and uninformative ANSWERS. We will begin with the former. According to Blum- Kulka & House (1989, 287-288), threats are supportive moves rather than proffers proper. In my data, they only occur in the negotiation 'Your man', implementing re-suggestions without additional formats. In the subsequent discussion of example 89, I argue that THREATS do not express a primary stance, but they claim secondary strong deontic rights regarding the profferer's own actions.

Example 89: ‘Your man’, SPICE P1A-031 (suggestion)

[...]  
 9 A: He's not going to bite.  
 10 B: I don't care.  
 11 C: Well you never know <unclear several sylls>  
 12 A: He's going to ring back [and none of us are going to say that you're not in.]  
 13 B: [ I'm not I'm not going to be here. ]  
 14 Well then I'll just not be in.  
 [...]

The profferer's THREATS occur after various re-suggestion, which have been problematized by B. In line 12, A states that, when B's 'man' will ring back, they and C "are [not] going to say that [B]'s not in". This appears to be a reference to there being possible negative consequences should B not go on the date. THREATS are perhaps not straight-forward in terms of determining which stance they express. At first glance, they may appear similar to REASONS, providing a justification as to why the refuser ought to do the FA. However, the profferer is not merely informing the refuser of possible negative consequences which are out of the speaker's control. Rather, they are the source of those consequences. Speaker A is stating that they will (not) take certain actions in the future which seem to be to B's detriment. Such THREATS, I argue, do not express a primary stance. A is not arguing in favour of the FA by expressing knowledge or affect; nor are they claiming to have or lack the deontic authority to unilaterally decide that the refuser will go on the date. In fact, the utterance does not refer to the FA at all. Instead, it nominates possible future actions by the profferer. The THREAT therefore expresses a strong deontic stance regarding A's own actions, which would be detrimental or undesirable to B. Crucially, however,

this deontic stance is a secondary rather than a primary one in the context of the negotiation of A's going on a date. The potential persuasiveness of the THREAT does consequently not stem from any right on the part of the profferer to determine B's actions or epistemic or affective arguments; it stems from possible negative consequences. As we see from the refuser's response in line 14, however, A's attempts are once again unsuccessful: B states that they will themselves take actions to avoid the negative consequences threatened by A (categorised as 'unclear').

Let us now consider the refuser's response and how it orients to the THREAT. At first glance, it may not look like B is problematizing A's linguistic behaviour. However, I argue that the format of the re-proffer limit B's linguistic options. Among the problematizing responses we have previously seen from refusers were decisive and unaccounted disalignments, for instance NEG-FUTURES and NEG-WISHES. Considering that B's THREAT does not refer to an action by B, these formats are not available as a response. In fact, B cannot refuse or disagree with the content of B's utterance at all. Due to the lack of primary stance and the secondary D+ stance being congruent with the profferer's deontic status, the THREAT does not express any challengeable or problematizable stance either. Speaker A has the right to determine their own actions; it is only the purpose of these threatened actions which constitute an interpersonal problem. One previously discussed way of problematizing would be available to the refuser, but they choose – for whatever reason – not to use it: they might have expressed negative affect with EXCLAMATIONS and/or CRITICISM. Nevertheless, I argue that the response they do produce treats the B's utterance as

problematic as well. Their utterance appears to strike a similar cord to “I don’t care” in line 10. They are dismissive of the profferer’s persuasive/coercive attempts. In addition, B orients to their own deontic right to avoid A’s threatened actions. Considering, moreover, that the refuser does not attempt to maintain the profferer’s face and that A’s THREAT occurs after a series of previous problematizations, I argue that B’s talk in line 14 treats A’s prior utterance as a further interpersonal offence.

Moving on, we will now look at a profferer’s X/E- utterance which is treated as problematic. In sections 10.1. and 13.1.1, we saw unproblematized primary and secondary unknowing stances, respectively. Example 90 shows, however, that X/E- utterances can be treated as problematic, namely if they violate the speaker’s epistemic obligations. In contrast to the above THREAT, then, a secondary unknowing stance can be problematized and challenged in and of itself. In example 90, we see an uninformative REPAIR being treated as problematic in the context of already ongoing interpersonal tension.

Example 90: ‘Flippant mood’, SPICE P1-050 (request)

- 1 A: You're in a very oul flippant mood this evening.
- 2 C: What do you mean flippant?
- 3 A: I don't know.
- 4 C: I wish you wouldn't use big words like this <laughter>

In line 1, A utters an opaque request in the form of an Aneg STATE-SITUATION, pointing out that C is in a “flippant mood” and implying a need for this to change. C responds with a QUERY-REPAIR (X/E-), which asks A to clarify what they mean by ‘flippant’. This utterance challenges the profferer’s affective and proximal deontic



rights by requesting further explanation of/justification for the STATE-SITUATION. In this context of already surfacing interpersonal tension, A subsequently fails – or is unwilling – to provide such a response. Instead, their REPAIR in line 3 is uninformative, stating that they “don’t know”. Like in the case of INFO-REQUESTS and ANSWERS, the epistemic stances expressed by C and A are both secondary rather than primary: although, as previously discussed, refusers’ QUERY-REPAIRS are refusal-implicating, they do not convey that the speaker lacks knowledge regarding an argument against the FA (cf. E- REASONS and CONCESSIONS). The secondary unknowing stance expressed by the profferer’s uninformative REPAIR, then, violates their proximal deontic rights. Speaker A is, in effect, unable to justify their request and defend themselves against C’s challenge. As a consequence, their linguistic behaviour is subsequently problematized again. C responds with an X/Aneg CRITICISM<sup>99</sup>, targeting A in line 1 as well as conveying that their claimed lack of knowledge in line 3 violates their epistemic obligation and therefore also their proximal deontic rights. Put differently, A’s utterances are problematized for expressing criticism and an implied request which they cannot justify.

To summarise, this section has shown that profferers’ X utterances overall provide fewer grounds for problematization than utterances which express a primary stance. I have demonstrated that:

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<sup>99</sup> Note, however, that this Aneg stance is followed by laughter. C is sending mixed messages, potentially to avoid a further escalation despite their problematization.

- X utterances can nevertheless be treated as interpersonally problematic;
- the secondary stance itself may or may not be problematizable; a perceived violation of the profferer's proximal deontic rights always is, however;
- X utterances can limit the addressee's linguistic options for problematizing them; and
- THREATS are the only X format which conveys a secondary D+ stance;

### 13.2. Refusers' X utterances

Refusers produce 206 X utterances in my data: 179 utterances resist an FA, 23 are in the service of securing a counter FA and 4 instances are 'unclear'. Most of the countering X utterances (70%) are in the service of intendings (figure 33) and a majority of X utterances resisting an FA (54%) occur in response to suggestions (figure 34).

Figure 33: distribution of refusers' X utterances in the service of securing a counter across proffer type






Figure 34: distribution of refusers' X utterances across types of proffer resistance



As in the case of profferers, X utterances make up considerable proportions of analysed units within all kinds of proffer resistance with the exception of offers (19%). In the three other categories, they are the most frequent group of primary (non-)stances, ranging from 38% in the case of suggestion resistance to 62% within

proposal resistances.

Figure 35: proportions of refusers' X utterances within types of proffer resistance



As figure 36 shows, secondary weak and strong epistemic stances are once more the most common ones amongst X utterances with 35% and 16%, respectively. This is followed by X/Aneg and X/Apos utterances, which amount to 11% and 7%, respectively. The latter is a noteworthy difference to profferers' X utterances, which never express positive affect. Refusers, by contrast, do not produce any instances of X/D+ stances. Finally, about a third of X utterances (32%) express no stance at all.

Figure 36: distribution of secondary stances within refusers' X utterances




Table 37 lists the formats used by refusers which do not express a primary stance and shows which secondary stances these express, if any. Only GRATITUDES express a secondary positive affective stance and they are exclusively used by refusers; CRITICISMS and EXCLAMATIONS, by contrast, convey negative affect. While profferers do use these formats as well, their utterances always express a primary Aneg stance. Refusers also produce the one instance of a statement of KNOWLEDGE, which conveys a secondary knowing stance, as well as two X/E+ CONCESSIONS. The remaining formats correspond to profferers' X utterances, although refusers only produce informative REPAIRS.

Figure 37: formats used by refusers which express no primary stance

<b>Format</b>	<b>#</b>
ANSWER (X/E+ or X/E-)	28
BACK-CHANNELING (X/X or X/E-)	79
CONCESSION (X/E+)	2
CRITICISM (X/Aneg)	10
EXCLAMATION (X/Aneg)	11
GRATITUDE (X/Apos)	12
INFO-REQUEST (X/E-)	32
KNOWLEDGE (X/E+)	1
MENTION (X/X)	3
QUERY-REPAIR (X/E-)	20
REPAIR (X/E+)	8

In the subsequent sections, we will take a closer look at some of the X utterances we have already encountered as well as those formats which have not been discussed yet. In particular, we will see that refusers' X utterances primarily do relational work, either maintaining, enhancing or aggravating the recipient's face.

### 13.2.1. Unproblematized utterances

This section focuses on a) the various secondary stances refusers' X utterances can express and b) how profferers treat these utterances as interpersonally unproblematic. In particular, I demonstrate that:

- refusers' X utterances provide even fewer grounds for a problematization than profferers' since the former's proximal deontic rights are generally not challengeable;

- some formats used by refusers can express either a primary or a secondary stance, depending on what they are orienting to; and
- GRATITUDES are the only formats used by refusers which express an affective obligation rather than right;

First, we will look at X utterances which make secondary epistemic claims.

CONCESSIONS are one of the formats which can not only orient to different interpersonal facets but which may express either a primary or secondary stance depending on what the speaker is conceding to. In previous chapters, we have seen, for instance, E+ CONCESSIONS in response to E+ REASONS. Example 91, by contrast, shows a refuser conceding to the proffer's secondary epistemic stance.

Example 91: 'Practice drive', SPICE P1A-003 (request resistance)

[...]  
 3 D: You could take her out.  
 4 F: I could actually now cos I have my licence I've had it uh long enough.

In line 3, speaker D does a re-request in the form of a STATE-POSSIBILITY, pointing out that F "could" take a third party out for practice drives. As I argued in chapter 7., STATE-POSSIBILITIES foreground the speaker's lack of deontic authority by expressing a secondary knowing stance regarding what is possible and/or reasonable. In line 4, we see the refuser use this to their advantage by orienting only to the latter claim. They concede that they could indeed take people for practice drives because they have had their driver's license for a sufficient time. Unlike CONCESSIONS in response

to Aneg or E+ utterances, then, this one does not admit that there is a potential argument for an FA. Instead, since the possibility of an FA does not constitute a reason for doing the FA, the refuser is able to ignore the deontic implications of D's utterance entirely. This avoids a disalignment as well as the risk of aggravating the co-participant's face. F's CONCESSION is immediately followed by unrelated talk, meaning the requested FA is not pursued any further and the refuser's utterance is not treated as problematic.

Two further formats can make either a primary or secondary claim: CRITICISMS and EXCLAMATIONS. However, they always express negative affect. As I have argued throughout this thesis, refusers' CRITICISMS and EXCLAMATIONS foreground an Aneg stance if they explicitly or implicitly convey an argument against an FA. Yet, sometimes, these formats target the addressee's linguistic behaviour without conveying any such argument. This is illustrated in example 92.

Example 92: 'Headache', SPICE P1A-016 (suggestion resistance)

[...]  
 4 A: Do you wear glasses? Do you have glasses?  
 5 B: I do have glasses but I don't like wearing them.  
 6 A: Och Michael. Sort them out.  
 7 C: <unclear several sylls> headaches <unclear 2 sylls>  
 8 A: Well no wonder he's got headaches if he doesn't wear his glasses.  
 9 B: Leave me alone.

In section 11.2.1, I argued that the proffer, speaker A, is eventually being problematized for their Aneg re-suggestions. I now want to reiterate why the negative affective stance expressed by B's CRITICISM in line 9 is a secondary rather than a primary one. The key is its lack of orientation to the FA. B is, in effect, not



negotiating A's suggestion any more. They are not expressing negative affect towards the FA or some argument for it; they are therefore also not disaligning. Instead, B is signalling that A has gone too far and that this negotiation is over. For this reason, the Aneg stance is of the secondary kind. As in the previous example, the profferer implicitly accepts the refuser's X utterance by not pursuing the FA any further. To conclude, then, B's X/Aneg criticism is only negotiating the participant's interpersonal relationship, not the proffered FA.

The last format we will look at in this section are GRATITUDES. These are similar to APOLOGIES in that they express the speaker's affective obligation instead of right. However, they differ in terms of their valence and target, as example 93 illustrates.

Example 93: 'Dad', SPICE P1A-078 (offer resistance)

- 1 A: I've a couple over now. Do you want one Dad?
- 2 D: No thanks.

As previously discussed, GRATITUDES often occur in response to offers, which is what we see in this short negotiation. They are themselves alignment-neutral and can occur both with acceptances or refusals. It is for this reason that the stance they express is secondary: GRATITUDES do not argue for or against the FA. What is interesting about them, however, is that they convey the speaker's affective obligation vis-à-vis the addressee. They express positive feelings, i.e. appreciation, towards the profferer and their offer. Yet, like in the case of APOLOGIES, these feelings are not something the speaker has the right to express but rather something

they are – or feel to be – obligated to express. Like APOLOGIES, GRATITUDES are owed. As a consequence, they are not problematizable.

In summary, this section has examined some of refusers' X formats and the (mostly) relational work they do. I have demonstrated that:

- refusers' X utterances provide even fewer grounds for a problematization than profferers' since the former's proximal deontic rights are generally not challengeable. Put differently, they usually have the right to end an FA negotiation;
- some formats used by refusers can express either a primary or a secondary stance, depending on what they are orienting to; and
- GRATITUDES are the only formats used by refusers which express an affective obligation rather than right;

### 13.2.2. Problematic utterances

In the previous section, we saw that some X utterances produced by refusers are unproblematic since neither the secondary stances they express nor the refusers' proximal deontic claims constitute an interpersonal offence. There is, however, one situation in which this is not the case. In this section, I demonstrate that:

- refusers' X utterances which challenge a profferer's rights can be treated as

interpersonally problematic if the profferer perceives this challenge to be unfounded; and

- the refuser's secondary stance amplifies the offence caused by the act of challenging the profferer's rights;

My data contains two instances in which refusers' X utterances are problematized and both involve a QUERY-REPAIR. Example 94 shows one of them.

Example 94: 'Furniture', SPICE P1A-015 (request)

```
1 B:    Stop doing that.
2 D:    Why?
3 A:    Because you're wrecking our furniture.
```

As I showed in section 8.1.2., D's QUERY-REPAIR challenges B's entitlement, thereby treating the request as interpersonally problematic. In section 11.1.1., I furthermore argued that A's response in line 3 defends B's entitlement and initial request.

However, it also problematizes the refuser for not complying and challenging B's right to request. In addition, I hold that D's secondary unknowing stance (partially) violates their epistemic obligation and amplified the offensiveness of their challenge. Although D does not have primary epistemic rights/access to B's cognitive state, they can be expected to be aware of their own behaviour and the effect it has, as well as of peoples' rights not to have their property damaged. Their secondary unknowing stance regarding B's motivation for making the request therefore does not only challenge the proffer's entitlement but also violates their epistemic obligation. As a

consequence, D's QUERY-REPAIR is treated as problematic for the stance it expresses as well as the job it does within the negotiation.

To summarise, this section has shown that refusers' X utterances are not entirely immune to being problematized. I demonstrated that:

- refusers' X utterances which challenge a profferer's rights can be treated as interpersonally problematic if the profferer perceives this challenge to be unfounded; and
- the refuser's secondary stance amplifies the offence caused by the act of challenging the profferer's rights;

## 14. Conclusion

This thesis has examined how participants in FA negotiations simultaneously insist on or resist future courses of action, on the one hand, and interpersonal claims, on the other. It was demonstrated that the deontic, epistemic and affective triad constitutes a revealing lens for such an analysis. Drawing on previous research from the two main theoretical camps – SAT-based Pragmatics and CA – the present study is positioned within and contributes to the relatively young field of Interpersonal Pragmatics. The overall analytical approach of this qualitative examination can be described as an interactional one; meanings, social actions and relationships are seen as co-constructed by participants. While it was argued that some types of utterances – particularly those constituting conventions of forms – do, to a certain degree, inherently express specific kinds of stances, their interpersonal implications are highly context dependant and negotiated by participants.

The main findings of this study can be summarised as follows:

- i. In the context of FA negotiations, a distinction can be made between primary stances and secondary stances depending on whether the claimed (lack of) power, knowledge or affect conveys an argument for/ against the FA or not.
- ii. The deontic facet is by no means the only aspect negotiators orient to when insisting on or resisting future actions. In addition, the right to proffer or resist may be grounded on not only deontic rights but also epistemic or affective rights. A focus on deontics does therefore run the risk of overlooking key

aspects of how participants negotiate FAs – and their interpersonal relations.

- iii. Participants can accept a prior speaker's stances, express no-contest or challenge them with regard to the distribution of rights and obligations they claim. Participants furthermore treat a prior speaker's talk as either interpersonally problematic or unproblematic by designing their responding turn in specific ways. In addition to the overall dis/preferred turn design, the individual stances within the turn as well as the specific formats used to implement them are important resources for relational work. Challenging a stance does not necessarily treat it as interpersonally problematic and an utterance can be treated as problematic without the stance it expresses being challenged.
- iv. There are three possible grounds for treating an utterance as interpersonally problematic: the stance it expresses, the verbal action it implements and/or the future action it puts forward. Detangling proximal deontic rights from the stances speakers (are licensed to) express can be difficult and offences at one level often amplify an offence at another level.

In terms of its theoretical contribution, the present thesis demonstrates the following:

- i. The deontic, epistemic and affective triad is an effective model of analysis for future-action negotiations not just in terms of action recognition, as originally

proposed by Stevanovic & Peräkylä (2014), but also with regard to the actual negotiation of future courses of actions, on the one hand, and participants' interpersonal relations, on the other;

- ii. The triadic model constitutes a more comprehensive alternative to the standard way of examining proffers and refusals within SAT-based im/politeness research – namely to focus on in/directness and imposition – and integrates CA research on individual interpersonal facets into an interpersonal pragmatics approach which views participants' deontic, epistemic and affective rights and obligations as key resources for the negotiation of face and interpersonal relations;

At a larger level, the present study may also have implications for how we study and teach language learners' pragmatic competence.

Of course, this study has also had certain limitations and has raised a number of questions for further investigation. As stated in the introduction, neither prosody nor embodied actions were taken into consideration. Future research might examine how these aspects modify the stances expressed by linguistic means. Negotiations of immediate verbal actions (for instance requests for information) were also outside the scope of the present thesis. In addition, this study does not explore whether – and, if so, how – the stances expressed by participants impact the outcome of an FA negotiation. The present thesis has demonstrated that, while proximal deontic rights need to be distinguished from distal deontic as well as epistemic and affective rights,

these two aspects are connected and can be difficult to separate. More research is required in this regard. The review of existing literature also revealed that counters have previously received little attention. Further examinations of the forms they take, the benefactive changes they seek to implement and how they are treated by participants are needed. Nevertheless, the present thesis represents a step towards a more comprehensive picture of negotiations at various levels.



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