From the Borders of Normativity to the Normativity of Borders

Outline of the Conditions for

a Realist Case for Free Movement

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Abstract

This thesis addresses three central questions. The first is: how should one approach ethics of immigration? My answer to this question involves arguing that a key – perhaps the key – element underpinning differences amongst approaches is the underlying account of practical normativity. Thus, a way of developing a fruitful approach involves exploring debates on practical normativity. The second question becomes how should practical normativity be understood? In answer to second question, I argue that practical normativity should be understood in a Humean fashion: practical normativity is underpinned by desires. I specify this further by defending Bernard Williams's reasons internalism. I argue that reasons internalism, in spite of much criticism, is a robust and accurate account of the way practical normativity works. This leads to the third and final question: how could reasons internalism inform political ethics and the problem of first-admissions in the ethics of immigration? In answer to this last question, I argue that reasons internalism should make us sceptical of cosmopolitanism, but it also gives reason to be sceptical of Rawlsian statism and similar moralising and legalistic approaches to political ethics. Given this, I characterise an internalist political theory as a form of political realism. I then develop an internationalist and internalist approach to political ethics by drawing on insights from the tradition of political realism, Rousseau scholarship, and virtue ethics. I argue that this approach need not undermine the case for free movement, for which several attractive arguments have been put forward by thinkers from a range of different traditions. Rather, it constrains the way the case should be made, lending much-needed direction and clarity to the case for free movement and suggesting a way for defenders to move the case beyond a primary focus on moral or ethical argument. The thesis culminates by outlining the conditions for a realist case for free movement in the form of five guiding principles for free movement advocates.

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Introduction

Immigration raises pressing political and ethical problems; problems that go beyond weighing the costs and benefits of immigration for the host nation against the costs and benefits for immigrants; problems such as whether there is a duty to admit immigrants even if this costs the hosts; problems such as whether there is a right to exclude immigrants or if there is a right to immigrate; whether our moral principles require us to admit more, all, or no immigrants. The increasing importance of these problems is reflected in the trickle of literature prior to the 1980s and then cascade of literature on the subject since then, and particularly so in the last few years, likely brought about by a burst of migration crises across the globe.[1]

One of the central problems for normative political theorists working on the ethics of immigration and citizenship is 'first-admissions': whether and under what conditions a state may exclude immigrants who wish to enter and reside in that territory. This is, of course, not the only problem such scholars may work on. As Veit Bader shows, they may focus on normative questions concerning the root causes of emigration; they may ask once immigrants have arrived whether, to what extent, and under what conditions immigrants should be granted citizenship; they may respond to problems such as whether and to what extent residing immigrants ought to be integrated into and/or naturalised in the receiving society's culture;[2] and outside of these three stages in some migrants' journeys, they may focus on more conceptual questions such as how migrants are categorised and what these implications these categories have morally, legally, and politically or on what a right to exclusion actually is and means.[3]

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[1] See the comments of Sune Lægaard, 'What Is the Right to Exclude Immigrants?', *Res Publica* 16, no. 3 (1 October 2010); Veit Bader, 'The Ethics of Immigration', *Constellations* 12, no. 3 (2005); Peter C. Meilaender, 'Liberalism and Open Borders: The Argument of Joseph Carens', *The International Migration Review* 33, no. 4 (1999). Examples showing this recent rise in the last couple of years include: Alex Sager, 'Immigration Enforcement and Domination: An Indirect Argument for Much More Open Borders', *Political Research Quarterly* 70, no. 1 (2017); Christopher Freiman and Javier Hidalgo, 'Liberalism or Immigration Restrictions, but Not Both', *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* 10, no. 2 (2016); David Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016); Javier Hidalgo, 'The Case for the International Governance of Immigration', *International Theory* 8, no. 1 (March 2016); Sarah Fine and Lea Ypi, eds., *Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Alex Sager, ed., *The Ethics and Politics of Immigration: Core Issues and Emerging Trends* (London; New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2016); Caleb Yong, 'Immigration Rights and the Justification of Immigration Restrictions', *Journal of Social Philosophy* 48, no. 4 (2017); Kieran Oberman, 'Immigration and Equal Ownership of the Earth', SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 1 June 2017).

[2] Bader, 'The Ethics of Immigration'.

[3] Rosemary Sales, 'The Deserving and the Undeserving? Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Welfare in Britain', *Critical Social Policy* 22, no. 3 (1 August 2002); Stephen Castles, 'Why Migration Policies Fail', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 27, no. 2 (1 March 2004): 211; Roger Zetter, 'More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of Globalization', *Journal of Refugee Studies* 20, no. 2 (1 June 2007); Lægaard, 'What Is the Right to Exclude Immigrants?'

This thesis has as its ultimate concern the problem of first-admissions rather than normative problems concerning the later stages. There are three reasons for this. One is that the problems are closely bound together because an answer to whether and whom a state may exclude may hinge on whether the state is to any extent responsible for creating conditions forcing others to move and whether they meet obligations to remedy the causes of immigration. Another is that there is a sense in which the problem of first-admissions is lexically prior to questions of citizenship: without having some kind of answer to who is allowed to enter in the first place, we can say little about what is owed to them and what they owe to the state and the citizens of the state. This is due to two factors. First, answering normative questions concerning the citizenship status of residing immigrants without exploring the problem of first admissions leaves open the question of whether the state's admissions policy is morally legitimate. Arguably, an approach that takes for granted the state's right to exclude immigrants without critically analysing such a policy may end up inadvertently legitimising a policy which is unjust through its omission.[4] Second, the normative conclusion one draws with regard to the problem of first admissions will likely have a strong bearing on the answers one gives at the further stage of immigration. A final reason for focusing on admissions-first is that more conceptual problems like the categorisation of migrants is also likely to be bound up with answers to admissions-first problems: if we decide that the state has different rights of exclusion for different types of migrants, then we must say what the morally relevant features of those different types of migrants are. Conversely, if we argue that the state has no right to exclude any migrant (or most of them) then presumably for that purpose migrant categories are irrelevant (or require minimal work).

Historically, answers to the 'first-admissions' problem have generally relied on the principle of state sovereignty to claim that states an absolute or almost absolute right to exclude prospective immigrants if they so wish.[5] Although there has been a number of notable works that have a bearing on the problem of first-admissions, systematic treatment of such issues did not arise until the publication of Henry Sidgewick's *The Elements of Politics* where he claims that although the state ultimately does have a near absolute right to exclude this may be limited by distributive justice and practical requirements.[6] Outside of some exceptions,[7] the modern debate in normative political theory really began in the 1980s with a series of responses to Michael Walzer's

[4] Joseph H. Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*, Oxford Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
[5] David Miller, 'The Idea of Global Citizenship', in *Varieties of Sovereignty and Citizenship*, ed. Sigal R. Ben-Porath and Rogers M. Smith (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012); Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration*; Bader, 'The Ethics of Immigration'.
[6] Henry Sidgwick, *The Elements of Politics*, 3rd edition (London: Macmillan, 1908); Bader, 'The Ethics of Immigration', 334.
[7] Peter G. Brown and Henry Shue, *Boundaries, National Autonomy and Its Limits* (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981).

1983 treatment of immigration in *Spheres of Justice*,[8] which broke 'the "eardeafening silence" or nearly complete neglect of problems of membership and exclusions in predominant liberal theories of justice.'[9] Walzer defended a state's right to control its borders but also claimed that justice requires citizenship and naturalisation for those who arrive through guest worker programmes.

This argument inspired a number of critical responses, the most prominent of which was Joseph Caren's 1987 article titled 'Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders'.[10] In that piece, Carens gives two arguments. The first is that three distinct theories rooted in the liberal tradition (Rawlsian, Nozickean, and utilitarian political theories) all lead towards arguments in favour of open borders.[11] He notes that these theories all share the premises that the individual is morally prior to the community and that individuals are morally equal, making them liberal theories.[12] In the second argument, Carens turns towards Walzer's communitarian arguments in favour of the state's right to restrict immigration (an argument that, according to Carens, considers the community as prior to the individual) and considers whether Walzer makes a good case for this right to exclude whilst still respecting the fundamental liberal belief in the equal moral worth of all people. He argues it does not by challenging Walzer's arguments concerning community and freedom of association and pointing out that freedom of association has worrying implications for equality; that liberalism's internal logic is to expand towards universalism; and that paradoxically Walzer must start from our own universalist liberal culture in order to make his argument, which means, if Carens's first argument is correct, that Walzer should support open borders.

Since the publication of Carens and Walzer's early work on first-admissions, there has been a proliferation of arguments responding to and developing this problem.[13] Much of the writing focuses on either defending or attacking the right to exclude by showing that it either violates or is coterminous with liberal principles, predominantly referring to the principle of moral equality.[14] Scholars mostly agree that governments

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[8] Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (New York: Basic Books, 1983).

[9] Veit Bader, 'Citizenship and Exclusion: Radical Democracy, Community, and Justice. Or, What Is Wrong with Communitarianism?', *Political Theory* 23, no. 2 (1995): 213.

[10] Joseph H. Carens, 'Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders', *The Review of Politics* 49, no. 2 (1987); Joseph H. Carens, 'A Reply to Meilaender: Reconsidering Open Borders', *The International Migration Review* 33, no. 4 (1999); Joseph H. Carens, 'Open Borders and Liberal Limits: A Response to Isbister', *International Migration Review* 34, no. 2 (1 June 2000); John Isbister, 'A Liberal Argument for Border Controls: Reply to Carens', *The International Migration Review* 34, no. 2 (2000); Meilaender, 'Liberalism and Open Borders'.

[11] Carens, 'Aliens and Citizens'.

[12] Carens.

[13] Paulina Ochoa Espejo, 'The Ethics of Immigration', *Contemporary Political Theory* 16, no. 1 (1 February 2017): 151.

[14] Michael Blake, 'Immigration and Political Equality', *San Diego Law Review* 45 (2008); Michael Blake, 'The Right to Exclude', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 17, no. 5 (3 September 2014); Phillip Cole, 'Taking Moral Equality Seriously: Egalitarianism and Immigration Controls', *Journal of International Political Theory* 8, no. 1–2 (1 April 2012); Phillip Cole, 'Beyond Reason: The Philosophy and Politics of Immigration', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 17, no. 5 (3 September 2014); Isbister, 'A Liberal Argument for Border Controls'; Jonathan Seglow, 'The Ethics of Immigration', *Political Studies Review* 3, no. 3 (1 September 2005); see Shelley Wilcox, 'The Open Borders Debate on Immigration', *Philosophy Compass* 4, no. 5 (2009) for an overview.

– particularly wealthy Western governments – should do more. But on what 'do more' means there is little agreement: it could mean alleviating the conditions causing the most vulnerable to leave their homes;[15] it could mean admitting more of the neediest immigrants;[16] it could mean making the immigration process fairer;[17] it could mean all the above and more – open borders – or it could mean much less than that. We sense that on immigration there is anything but a consensus. Consider the right to exclude immigrants: David Miller, Michael Walzer, Christopher Wellman, and others argue in line with the general common-sense view that such a right is justifiable;[18] Joseph Carens, Philip Cole, Arash Abizadeh, and others argue that it is not;[19] and many others fall somewhere in between, arguing that there are grounds for the right, but it is limited if the state fails to meet its duty to not cause the conditions leading people to move and its obligation to alleviate them as they are now.[20]

The positions in the debate are usually placed on a spectrum between defending a strong right to close borders with some caveats (like not violating basic human rights),[21] a slightly stronger 'fairly open borders' argument where there may be cases in which the liberal state may restrict immigration but which is tempered by stronger obligations (stemming, for example, from distributive justice or egalitarian commitments),[22] and arguing that there is no morally justified right to close borders.[23] However, the conceptualisation of positions in terms of a spectrum greatly oversimplifies things both in terms of positions in the debate and variations amongst even seemingly similar views and no dominant perspective has emerged. Moreover, even with these three broad groupings, there is a certain amount of variation in terms of the method or approach taken to reach the conclusion.

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[15] Kieran Oberman, 'Poverty and Immigration Policy', *American Political Science Review* 109, no. 2 (May 2015); John Isbister, 'Are Immigration Controls Ethical?', *Social Justice* 23, no. 3 (65) (1996); Thomas W. Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights* (Polity Press, 2008).

[16] Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration.*

[17] Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration*; Blake, 'Immigration and Political Equality'; Walzer, *Spheres of Justice.*

[18] Ben Saunders, 'Immigration, Rights and Democracy', *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory* 58, no. 129 (2011); Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration*; David Miller, 'Justice in Immigration', *European Journal of Political Theory* 14, no. 4 (1 October 2015); Walzer, *Spheres Of Justice*; Christopher Heath Wellman and Phillip Cole, *Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is There a Right to Exclude?*, Debating Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Christopher Heath Wellman, 'Immigration and Freedom of Association', *Ethics* 119, no. 1 (2008).

[19] Arash Abizadeh, 'Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders', *Political Theory* 36, no. 1 (1 February 2008); Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*; Carens, 'Aliens and Citizens'; Phillip Cole, *Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immigration* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000); Cole, 'Taking Moral Equality Seriously'; J.L. Hudson, 'The Philosophy of Immigration Hudson', *The Journal of Libertarian Studies* 8, no. 1 (1986).

[20] Michael Blake, 'Immigration, Jurisdiction, and Exclusion', *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 41, no. 2 (2013); Isbister, 'Are Immigration Controls Ethical?'; Seglow, 'The Ethics of Immigration'.

[21] Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration*; David Miller, 'Is There a Human Right to Immigrate?', in *Migration in Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

[22] Bader, 'The Ethics of Immigration'; Blake, 'The Right to Exclude'; Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*, chaps 2–8; Isbister, 'Are Immigration Controls Ethical?'; Seglow, 'The Ethics of Immigration'.

[23] Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*, chaps 9–11; Cole, 'Taking Moral Equality Seriously'; Cole, 'Beyond Reason'.

The differences can be expressed very broadly (and with the caveat that these are sometimes closely related) along two fault lines: empirical disagreements, omissions, and mistakes, and normative disagreements. The former, while it is important, difficult, and interesting, will not be considered here since it falls outside the primary disciplinary focus of normative political theory. The normative fault line, on the other hand, is interesting and in the ethics of immigration – and no doubt elsewhere – one need not inspect the line very closely to see that it, too, contains many deep fissures. Consider the starting position theorists take when addressing the first-admissions problem. There is a split between whether to start from within a Rawlsian approach or to start from a non-Rawlsian approach like utilitarianism or communitarian theory. Within both Rawlsian and non-Rawlsian theories, there is a further branching out between those who work within a cosmopolitan approach or non-cosmopolitan approach. Then again, one sees more lines between approaches that start from the perspective framework of global justice or domestic justice and then more that run between types of justice, which itself breaks into distinctions between distributive justice, social justice, and other kinds.[24] One may start from the position that sovereignty is an unhelpful and morally suspect starting place, or one may start from the perspective that it is *the* starting point. A similar position, and which does not completely map that debate, divides between positions on whether the state and state-system to be the appropriate (because it is normatively 'best' or because it is just what we happen to have). Then again one may think that the proper starting point for the ethics of immigration is, in fact, legitimacy rather than justice or sovereignty. Other positions are informed by, for instance, a Lockean property-rights approach, concerns for social-democratic welfare states, Marxism, ideal theory, non-ideal theory, political realism, international relations theory realism, or critical geography. The debate has even ruptured over the question of whether immigration is a political problem or an ethical problem.[25] No doubt there are more positions.

There is now a bewildering array of positions within the debate – and no doubt this applies to other fields. While the overarching concern of this dissertation is to develop a response to the first-admissions problem, surveying the debate suggests this is a complicated task. Picking a favoured or 'pet' approach and using that to generate a response to the first-admissions problem – for instance by applying one's favourite Lockean, Millian, or republican theory of justice to the debate – seems unsatisfactory since, to my mind, what matters is

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[24] For example, Blake, 'The Right to Exclude'; Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration*; Wellman and Cole, *Debating the Ethics of Immigration*; for an overview of the distributive justice postion, see Seglow, 'The Ethics of Immigration'.
[25] For the former argument see Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration*; Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*; Cole, 'Beyond Reason'.

surely whether and which of these perspectives gets matters right.[26] Given this, a first aim of this dissertation is to clarify and suggest a way through this debate in order to develop a stance on the first-admissions problem.

Research Questions

Given the above, this thesis addresses three central questions. The first is **(1) how should one approach the ethics of immigration?** Part of my answer to this question involves arguing that a key, and perhaps the key, element underpinning differences amongst approaches is its underlying account of practical normativity. Thus, a fruitful approach to cutting through the debate is to explore debates on practical normativity. Given this, the second question becomes **(2) how should practical normativity be understood?** In answer to this second question, I argue that practical normativity should be understood in a Humean fashion as underpinned by desires. I specify this further by defending Bernard Williams's 'reasons internalism' as robust and accurate account of the way practical normativity works. This then leads to the third and final question: **(3) how could reasons internalism inform political ethics and the problem of first-admissions?** In answer to this last question, I argue that reasons internalism should make us sceptical of at least most cosmopolitanism, but it also gives reason to be sceptical of at least Rawlsian statism, too. Given this, I develop an internationalist and internalist approach to political ethics by drawing on insights from the tradition of political realism, Rousseau scholarship, and virtue ethics. I argue that this approach need not undermine the case for free movement, for which several attractive arguments have been put forward by thinkers from a range of different traditions. Rather, it constrains the way the case should be made in an attractive way, lending some much-needed direction and clarity to the case for free movement, and suggests a way for defenders to move the case beyond a focus on moral argumentation.

Overview

This dissertation is divided into three parts primarily each corresponding to one of the three central research questions. Part I of the dissertation comprises two chapters that, together, supply a map of the debate and suggest a way through it in order to answer the first research question.

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[26] And indeed, the prior question of what it means or if it is even coherent to think a normative position can be 'right'.

In chapter one, I begin by mapping out some important distinctions between the positions in the debate. These distinctions become important later since the realist approach to political ethics I develop out of internalism and other sources rejects and renders problematic certain positions, namely arguments that states have no 'right to exclude', and no borders and open borders positions. However, as I later show, this need not rule out free movement as a defensible position. In the remainder of the chapter, I further review the literature on first-admissions, exploring the kinds of arguments that have been offered and responses. I end by highlighting that one important underpinning that can account for many differences between arguments is the account of normativity within a theory – perhaps for obvious reasons and especially so in ethics and normative political theory. However, in the ethics of immigration this is not treated explicitly and so factors as an unstated assumption subsumed within a wider ethical orientation – Rawlsianism, utilitarianism, or communitarianism for example. Yet, different accounts of normativity yield vastly different conceptions of what is possible and warranted within an ethical approach and indeed what ethics is or could be.

Chapter two explores this further. A categorisation scheme common in the literature and which appears to align well with the different accounts in the ethics of immigration is a distinction between cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan approaches. Thus, focusing on exploring cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan accounts of normativity suggests one way of determining an overall approach to the ethics of immigration. However, an immediate obstacle to this way of categorising things is the argument, given by Michael Blake and David Miller, that there is nothing distinguishing about cosmopolitanism anymore because: 'we are all cosmopolitans now'. Miller and Blake both argue that moral cosmopolitanism, if it is to be plausible, is something so widely accepted as to lack any value as a label capturing anything distinct about the position. In fact, the moral beliefs said to be at the heart of cosmopolitanism seem to be the basic requirements of contemporary morality. Against this view, I argue that it consists in a critical approach to various forms of special relationship that lessens the ethical significance of those relationships and emphasizes agent-neutral considerations. Both elements seem to be necessary and sufficient to label an approach 'cosmopolitan.' The argument of this chapter thus provides a useful way of placing positions in the debate and, moreover, it begins to suggest the sorts of normative and conceptual disagreements that, worked through, begin to provide a basis for deciding amongst approaches.

Part II of the dissertation is comprised of three chapters. In part II, I respond to the second research question by outlining and defending a Humean account of practical normativity and then making the case, more specifically, for Bernard Williams's construal of Humeanism as reasons internalism.

In chapter three, I begin by considering the question of what the correct descriptive account of normativity is likely to be. I start by noting that the debate over the source of normativity – the question of where normativity comes from and thus what it consists in – seems to be at an impasse between the two main positions: rationalists who hold that the source of normativity is belief, and Humeans who hold that the source of normativity is desire. I suggest a way out of the impasse by resolving a trilemma formulated by Scott Sturgeon. The trilemma is based around the seeming incompatibility of three attractive theses: the idea that normative judgements are belief-like or forms of belief, the idea that normative beliefs are necessarily coupled with desires, and the idea that beliefs and desires may come apart. The resolution to the trilemma leads to the view that normative judgements are asymmetrical: that is, one may have the desire with a normative judgement, the belief and the desire, but one cannot properly make a normative judgement and have the belief but not the corresponding desire. I argue that the asymmetry thesis supports Humeanism about normativity as well as the Humean Theory of Motivation and reject an alternative position based on the notion of a 'besire': the combination of a belief and desire as one distinct state.

Chapter four outlines and defends Williams's reasons internalism, a useful elaboration of the general Humean picture defended above. In the first section, I outline in some detail Williams's reasons internalism and clarify what it is saying and what it is not. In the remainder of the chapter, I consider and respond to two of the main objections that have been levelled against Williams's reasons internalism: the Too Many and Too Few Reasons objections. On the former, I consider an influential version of the objection developed by Warren Quinn. In response, I argue that Williams's thesis is robust enough to withstand the objection once one understands the centrality of a specific understanding of action to Williams's thesis. As it turns out, the case Quinn levels against Williams, 'the Radioman', fails to credibly be described as acting in any sense, and so the case fails. Moreover, I argue that an independently plausible account of a distinction between desires and urges can handle further versions of the objection. I then to consider the Too Few Reasons objection. Against this objection, I argue that the cases usually offered to criticise Williams's theory, from the perspective of the theory, in fact look like cases in favour of it making the objection fairly weak. I argue the objection can only succeed if one assumes an alternative to reasons internalism more attractive and coherent than Williams's view.

In chapter five, I consider four more criticisms of reasons internalism that are separate from criticism of the Humean Theory of Motivation and which either purport to offer a coherent and more attractive position than Williams's view, or which criticise Williams's internalism on grounds other than the Too Few and Too Many

Reasons objections. I first consider two different arguments that aim at attacking Williams's distinction between internal and external reasons, due to S.L. Hurley and J. David Velleman. I then consider Susan Mantel's argument against the explanatory constraint Williams uses to build his case for internalism. Lastly, I consider Maria Alvarez's argument against psychologism – a view often attributed to Williams. I argue that each argument misconstrues Williams's position. Moreover, in the case of the last three of Williams's critics (Hurley's argument is only critical), their own positions fail to stand up to scrutiny.

Part III of the dissertation is comprised of three chapters. In them, I turn towards the third research question and explore internalism in relation to political ethics, culminating in an internalist and realist normative political theory.

In chapter six, I consider the question of whether it is possible that a Humean theory like Williams's could produce the kinds of agent-neutral reasons I argued in chapter one are partly constitutive of cosmopolitanism. Mark Schroeder, in *Slaves of the Passions,* purports to offer just such a Humean account that he calls 'hypotheticalism'. Hypotheticalism provides a framework that consequently makes the kinds of agent-neutral reasons cosmopolitanism requires very likely and which, Schroeder argues, also retains what is compelling about Humeanism more generally. I outline in some detail Schroeder's view and defend Williams's view from Schroeder's objections that it results in counter-intuitive conclusions in several thought experiments. Moreover, I argue that Schroeder's hypotheticalism fails to provide a compelling alternative since its account of normative weight is circular or regressive, rests on unpersuasive assumptions, and itself struggles to explain one of the cases it raises against internalism. I conclude that agent neutral practical reasons are still very hard to come by.

In chapter seven, I continue the theme of considering reasons internalism in relation to cosmopolitanism and spell out more directly the challenge internalism presents to cosmopolitan views of various stripes. A strand of previous criticism of cosmopolitanism has centred on versions of what has been called the motivational objection. This is the view that cosmopolitanism is in some way motivationally deficient. I highlight two versions of this objection: an easy to dismiss empirical version that argues cosmopolitanism would or does in fact fail to motivate sufficient people to get cosmopolitan projects off the ground, and a normative version on stronger ground that argues cosmopolitanism would undermine the motivation underpinning important goods. Cosmopolitans have responded to both. However, internalism lays the foundation for a new form of the motivational objection – one which, if internalism is true, points to a problem with the normative structure of

cosmopolitanism. If internalism is right, cosmopolitanism is highly unlikely to be able to meet the conditions of justification implied by the account of reasons constitutive of the approach due to their normative scope. In making this case, I outline an internalist theory of justification that rebuts some possible cosmopolitan responses. If this argument is right, in addition to necessarily relying on a faulty structure and externalist conception of reasons, this argument also suggests that cosmopolitanism runs the risk of producing unjustified but strong 'normative warrants' that in some cases should be worrying. I then argue that similar problems affect Rawlsian statist alternatives to cosmopolitanism in spite of their more restricted account of scope. However, I end on a positive note by suggesting how aspects of statist and 'communitarian' approaches can usefully inform an approach to normative political theory that takes internalism seriously.

In chapter eight, I turn towards the task of specifying and making the case for what I take an attractive internalist approach to normative political theory to look like. I also consider this in relation to some important topics in the debate on first-admissions and the ethics of immigration more generally. I argue that internalism aligns with political realism in that it can and does affirm the political as an ontologically distinct (real) dimension of social life. The concerns of political realism, in spite of the tradition's wide plurality, then supply a useful orientation for an internalist political theory. I then develop a position inspired some aspects of Rousseau's political theory, as interpreted by Steven Affeldt. I argue that these two elements – realism and Rousseau – coupled with some insights from a particular interpretation of virtue ethics, provide a useful and attractive framework for thinking through the ethics of immigration and can accommodate what I think is an attractive and nonetheless radical case for freedom of movement, while remaining compatible with popular sovereignty, the state, a right on the part of citizens to decide – and without falling into the pitfalls of cosmopolitanism.

I conclude by bringing the argument together to outline the conditions such a realist case for free movement must meet in the form of five guiding principles for advocates of free movement. These principles function as a blue print for future work on the ethics of immigration and the problem of first-admissions directly tackling the case for free movement.

The thesis then overall supplies a normative architecture for this later work. The problem the thesis highlights and then raises is that of the normative foundations of other theoretical approaches, a problem discovered initially by a sense of absence of discussion of – and then perplexity at – the potential variations in the underlying base of how theorists understand normativity and its relation to practical theory. The normative architecture defended in this thesis, I argue, is sturdier than that of alternative approaches to normative political

theory prevalent in the ethics of immigration. The internalist political theory defended in this thesis thus allows us to reframe the debate over first-admissions, the case for free movement, and the problems such a case would confront. The thesis does not resolve these new problems and questions. However, the problems and questions that come out of this more politically realistic approach make better sense than older ones, at least in virtue of offering what I have argued is a more accurate understanding of normativity. Thus, I believe these new problems or questions (or the new gloss on old ones) bring the theoretical debate on the ethics of immigration in a more fruitful direction. As a result, the approach I develop brings the theoretical discussion closer to the real debate and concerns of people and in doing so opens up the possibility for progress.

Part I: Mapping the Debate

1 The Normativity of Borders

In this chapter I present a literature review for the ethics of immigration. I begin by mapping out some important distinctions between the positions that different theorists argue for. In the remainder of the chapter, I further review the literature on first-admissions, exploring the kinds of arguments theorists have offered in support of their positions. I have two aims in this review: the first is to give the reader a sense of what has been argued for in the debate and by whom in order to relate my position to the various positions and arguments offered within the debate. The second is to begin exploring the source of disagreement and agreement within the literature to locate a point around which one can begin to reason about how to approach the ethics of immigration and political ethics more generally. I show that these disagreements and similarities can be expressed in terms of two (sometimes related) differences: differences over empirical matters – for instance, over the likely effects immigration would have or how feasible open borders would be, disagreements over efficacy and, for instance, theorists who otherwise agree on the goal of political ethics and approach disagree on whether open borders should be used as a means for achieving equality or fairness – and differences in terms of deeper disagreements about the very nature of normativity and normative concepts and thus how to approach political theory and philosophy.

It is this last species of disagreement that is of most interest for political ethics and that provides the most fruitful route for evaluating ethical positions. I conclude by considering what initially seems to be a fruitful way of initially categorising this normative disagreement: in terms of cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan views. I argue that this distinction could usefully capture some broad similarities and differences in the underlying accounts of normativity that underpin the varying positions in the debate, not only because theorists characterise their own positions in these terms, but because the non-cosmopolitan/cosmopolitan typology captures why the primary disagreement in some debates in the literature appear to be over efficacy, empirics, and feasibility, while in others there appears to be a deeper methodological disagreement over how to understand the nature of normative concepts and their authority and thus how to apply them – disagreements over what matters and why it matters. Thus, cosmopolitanism as an approach to political ethics, because it suggests a distinct and somewhat unified position on such matters, merits further exploration.

1.1 Borders, Rights, and Movement

Different positions in the debate over the ethics of border control are often located on a continuous line running from what appear to be the two extreme positions in the debate, a line running from the position of 'open borders'[27] to the position of 'closed borders'[28] with 'fairly open borders' located in between.[29] But this over simplifies things a little. Instead of a continuous line running from two extremes – where the 'reasonable' or realistic approach seems to be to place oneself somewhere between the two extremes[30] – locations in the debate are perhaps better seen as constellations of ideas that amount to a more or less whole position on a host of issues concerning border control where the boundary drawn around each of these constellations may overlap with others on certain shared ideas, and where they may depart on others, and where the overall shape of the constellation depends on where exactly the constellation is located in normative space.

For example, while two or more positions may agree that free movement across borders is in some way attractive, the positions may differ on questions of whether this is because categorically there is a moral right to immigrate or no right on the part of states to exclude immigrants[31] or because of a conditional claim that it is economically attractive or contributes to what overall would be the best outcome.[32] They may differ on whether this is because there should be no borders – implying that even jurisdictional boundaries between states are in some way unjust or illegitimate – or because borders should merely be open while states retain jurisdictional discretion on other matter.[33] They may differ on whether free movement across borders is necessitated by the

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[27] While few endorsing an open borders position take the view that open borders mean there can be no restrictions on migration whatsoever – public health and harm caused by migration are often cited as cases where movement may justifiably be restricted – as the name implies a combination of the presence of a right to immigrate and the absence of the right to exclude create a *prima facie* constriction on a state's ability to morally restrict migration. See, for example, Alex Sager, *Against Borders: Why the World Needs Free Movement of People* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2020), 12–19.

[28] Closed borders positions, conversely, argue for few constraints on the state's ability to restrict immigration – although it should be added that the major thinkers labelled advocates of a closed border position argue that there are moral obligations on the part of states in some scenarios, such as when a restriction would cause major harm, to admit migrants. See Cole, 'Beyond Reason', n. 9; David Miller, 'Authority and Immigration', *Political Studies*, 20 September 2021.

[29] The subtitle of Ryan Pevnick's book indicates this line of thinking in *Immigration and the Constraints of Justice: Between Open Borders and Absolute Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Shelly Wilcox, in an overview of the debate, divides views between 'open borders' and 'the conventional view' with non-ideal approaches laying inbetween in 'The Open Borders Debate on Immigration'; Veit Bader, amongst others, endorses 'fairly open borders' in 'The Ethics of Immigration'. This form of conceptualising positions is regularly implied within the debate.

[30] Veit Bader, 'Fairly Open Borders', in *Citizenship and Exclusion*, ed. Veit Bader (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1997); David Bartram, 'International Migration, Open Borders Debates, and Happiness', *International Studies Review* 12, no. 3 (1 September 2010); Joseph H. Carens, 'Realistic and Idealistic Approaches to the Ethics of Migration', *The International Migration Review* 30, no. 1 (1996); Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration*; Jonathan Seglow, 'Immigration Justice and Borders: Towards a Global Agreement', *Contemporary Politics* 12, no. 3–4 (1 December 2006); Sarah Song, *Immigration and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

[31] For example, Cole, *Philosophies of Exclusion*; Michael Huemer, 'Is There a Right to Immigrate?', *Social Theory and Practice* 36, no. 3 (2010); Kieran Oberman, 'Immigration as a Human Right', in *Migration in Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

[32] Philippe Legrain, *Immigrants: Your Country Needs Them* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2014); Jonathon Moses, *International Migration: Globalization's Last Frontier*, 1st edition (London: Zed Books, 2006), chap. 6; Sager, *Against Borders*, 15; Wellman and Cole, *Debating the Ethics of Immigration*, 105–15.

[33] Sager, *Against Borders*, 13–16.

concerns of distributive justice,[34] coercion and democratic legitimacy,[35] intuitions about rights,[36] utility,[37] or because it makes good economic sense.[38] Thus, there is much they may differ on and more and because of this while two positions may appear to be complimentary because they are located at the same end of the spectrum, the oversimplification of a continuum masks that seemingly similar positions may in fact be incompatible and may in fact conceive of problems and thus their solutions in the ethics of migration and border control in rather different ways. Moreover, at the risk of over-stretching an already stretched metaphor, the ideas making up a particular constellation determine in part which further lines can be drawn to other ideas.[39] Some ideas are too far from each other to connect together and so the shape and location of a particular constellation determines what its expansion could look like, the resources it can employ, and the problems it may confront. Indeed, as I shall argue later in this chapter, one absolutely key factor that underlies such differences – one that is more like the vast, hidden bottom of an iceberg than its visible tip – is the conception of normativity underpinning one's conception of and approach to political and ethical theory.

In what follows, I provide a broad map of the debate showing why positions within the debate are best conceived not as being placed on a line running from closed through to open borders. Rather, positions in the debate should be seen as more diverse where two positions that appear to have a similar outcome – for example more free movement for people – may not be as complimentary as it first seems. My aim in remapping in a messier way is to provide a wide-angle view of the debate, showing that the possible approaches stretch beyond the heavy emphasis on proceduralism, and showing that possible positions are more subtle than the choice between closed, fairly open, or open borders prevalent in the philosophical literature.

Positions within the ethics of border control are often taken up solely with the question of the movement of people. Yet people are not the only things to pass between borders; money, goods, services and – in some views – ideas pass between them too. While this emphasis is understandable, given the seeming real

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[34] Nathan Basik, 'Open Minds on Open Borders', *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 7 July 2012; Nils Holtug, 'Global Equality and Open Borders', in *Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy Volume 6* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 118–21; Alex Sager, 'The Implications of Migration Theory for Distributive Justice', *Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric* 5 (2012); Juan Carlos Velasco, 'Open-Border Immigration Policy: A Step towards Global Justice', *Migraciones Internacionales* 8, no. 4 (2016).

[35] Abizadeh, 'Democratic Theory and Border Coercion'; Chandran Kukathas, 'Why Open Borders', *Ethical Perspectives* 19, no. 4 (2012).

[36] Cole, *Philosophies of Exclusion.*

[37] Carens, 'Aliens and Citizens'.

[38] Bryan Caplan and Vipul Naik, 'A Radical Case for Open Borders', in *The Economics of Immigration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Legrain, *Immigrants*; Moses, *International Migration*, chap. 6.

[39] I have in mind here something like what MacIntyre says about differing traditions of enquiry, although perhaps without the world-historic overtones implied by MacIntyre's notion of tradition. The thought above can be taken further with MacIntyre's argument that some questions do not even come up according to some traditions of enquiry. MacIntyre means this in a broad sense, but it is perhaps not difficult to see how there are questions that come up for, say, a utilitarian approach that do not under some other approach. See Alasdair MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy and Tradition*, Reprint edition (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992).

world ease with which other elements pass through borders in comparison with people,[40] failure to highlight these other factors can lead to distorted views,[41] as if the question of border controls and the position on the matter – open borders, etc. – merely concerned the movement of people. Conversely, it can appear that a position advocating for open borders endorses the free movement of all these other things as well.[42] Some recognise that there is more to border control than the movement of people, arguing by analogy or disanalogy between two or more of these elements that the other should have the same or different considerations applied to it.[43] Similarly, the debate over 'brain drain' – the filtering out of skilled and valuable workers from a poor country to a wealthier one – hints that there is a tighter link between these factors than is sometimes recognised, as people with important skills (a link between ideas, people, and services) may complicate the question of how open or closed borders may be.[44] Similarly, money, the type of person with money (wealthier people tend to save), and where people place their money (like the wealthy buying houses and driving up house prices), not to mention businesses all move across borders – and all have ethical import, all have significant impact on people's lives, and thus all concern more fully the ethics of border control.

While each of these factors is clearly important, and bringing these other factors into view can reveal problems or incoherence in views that consider only one, the main focus here is on the movement of people, immigration, understood as referring to people's movement across borders to obtain residence or membership.[45] Thus, in the following, talk of border control and the ethics of border control, unless otherwise indicated, should be understood to refer to immigration restrictions and the ethics of immigration restriction. Likewise, free movement should be understood to refer to the free movement of people.

A related issue in the debate, and one that appears to have been growing in prominence within the philosophical literature on it, is the issue of how exactly to conceptualise borders and border control.[46] Broadly, this involves the question of where borders are located, the degree to which they are physical or ideational, and what exactly constitutes them in the first place. The significance of this debate is claimed to lie in the way

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[40] Robert E. Goodin, 'If People Were Money', in *Free Movement: Ethical Issues in the Transnational Migration of People and of Money*, ed. Brian Barry and Robert E. Goodin (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992).

[41] Higgins touches on this issue in 'Open Borders and the Right to Immigration', *Human Rights Review* 9, no. 4 (1 December 2008).

[42] Angela Nagle, 'The Left Case against Open Borders', *American Affairs* 2, no. 3 (Winter 2018).

[43] See, respectively, Goodin, 'If People Were Money'; Branko Milanovic, *Capitalism, Alone: The Future of the System That Rules the World* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2019).

[44] For an argument purporting to refute the brain drain argument, see Kieran Oberman, 'Can Brain Drain Justify Immigration Restrictions?', *Ethics* 123, no. 3 (2013). For a response, see Peter Higgins, 'The Ethics of Immigration and the Justice of Immigration Policies', *Public Affairs Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (2015).

[45] Lægaard, 'What Is the Right to Exclude Immigrants?', 248.

[46] Amy Reed-Sandoval, 'The New Open Borders Debate', in *The Ethics and Politics of Immigration: Core Issues and Emerging Trends*, ed. Alex Sager (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 13–14; Sager, *Against Borders*, 3–12.

different perspectives on these matters serve to distance ethical questions related to border control from people's minds, the way different perspectives suggest different possibilities, and the way different perspectives raise or cover over different ethical questions.[47] Alex Sager, for example, argues that borders are a process constituted and reconstituted through the practices of people and the ideas that sustain them, that borders are more than just a line on a map or in our minds but are a technique of power dependent on recognition, and that '[m]any borders are more like doors than walls', and are located in a more dispersed way than as a contour around a location through airports, biometric scanning, deportation, and so on.[48] Sager's aim is to be to avoid the hardening of the border into something seeming to be immutable and to show it is less distant than perhaps ordinarily thought, and rather to see the border as a product of human will and action, and thus as something that is a product of a choice that could be chosen otherwise.[49]

The debate on the ethics of border control is also typically presented as a debate over rights: whether there is or should be a human right on the part of people to immigrate and whether there is a sovereign right on the part of states to exclude. Different positions may defend one or the other right – in tension as they clearly are – or some balance of both, detailing the conditions under which either right may be exercised. The right to exclude and the right to immigrate have been approached from several different angles, usually in tension with each other. For example, theorists have approached it from the perspective of sovereignty, asking whether the right to exclude is a necessary part of a legitimate state's claim to political authority over a territory; from the perspective of distributive justice, asking whether distributive justice requires a human right to immigrate; or whether the right to exclude may be exercised in support of principles of distributive justice; and from the perspective of democratic legitimacy, asking whether the right to exclude is acceptable for or even necessary for an democratically effective and legitimate state or whether, in fact, democratic legitimacy will likely require more open arrangements.[50] On the other hand, Sune Lægaard has argued that the right to exclude is

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[47] Sager, *Against Borders*, 3–12.

[48] Sager, 10–12. I should add that I'm rather sceptical of this complexification of things. No doubt, this other stuff matters. What I am doubtful of is the equating of a border as something as more than a line which, obviously, is an idea. This other stuff, it seems to me, is a set of effects and processes that spring out of and are made possible by the presence of the line along with other factors. Nor is it all that clear that state borders and the illegality they produce and which Sager is concerned with persists simply because people fail recognise that they are a product of human artifice.

[49] Sager, 13.

[50] For an overview, see: Lægaard, 'What Is the Right to Exclude Immigrants?'; Wilcox, 'The Open Borders Debate on Immigration'; Sarah Fine, 'The Ethics of Immigration: Self-Determination and the Right to Exclude', *Philosophy Compass* 8, no. 3 (2013). For consideration of the right to exclude from the perspective of state sovereignty, see A. John Simmons, 'On the Territorial Rights of States', *Noûs* 35, no. 1 (2001); see also a response in Cara Nine, 'Do Territorial Rights Include the Right to Exclude?', *Politics, Philosophy & Economics* 18, no. 4 (1 November 2019). For analyses of the right to immigrate and exclude from the perspective of distributive justice, see Michael Blake, 'Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy', *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 30, no. 3 (2001); Blake, 'The Right to Exclude'; Oberman, 'Poverty and Immigration Policy'. For perspective considering these rights from the perspective of democratic legitimacy, see Abizadeh, 'Democratic Theory and Border Coercion'; Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration*; Miller, 'Is There a Human Right to Immigrate?', 27–30.

conceptually and thus normatively distinct from rights stemming from concerns over distributive justice, democratic legitimacy, and state sovereignty.[51] Positions that approach the right to exclude from this angle thus conceptually and normatively distort the discussion of the right, creating confusion. What is claimed by states as the right to exclude is for Lægaard instead, if anything, a kind of territorial right and it is from this basis that its justification ought to be considered.[52] Various conflicting arguments have been produced considering the right from this angle and territorial rights more generally – considering it and other territorial rights justified if a people contribute value to a territory,[53] as a kind of property right,[54] a necessary component of sovereignty,[55] and as simply a difficult to justify species of territorial right.[56]

Rights-based perspective in the debate tends to emphasise a focus on institutional constraints and balances which favours a proceduralist vision of political theory which has implications alternative perspectives have questioned. For example, a common outcome of the focus on rights – both by defenders of a more open borders position and defenders of a more discretionary position – is that rights to immigration or exclusion should be managed and enforced by institutions above the state. This is explicit in many arguments.[57] But it is perhaps also implicit in others when one recognises that principles and rights – to be effective and particularly when, as so many theorists stress, are widely ignored – need to be enforced or inculcated somehow.[58] However, if we broaden our lens a little to focus on political and international political theory outside of the debate on the ethics of immigration, we find views sceptical of international institutionalism – and the kinds of institutions theorists in the migration debate favour as models: the UN and human rights, the EU, and international governance more generally – and we find views sceptical of the language of and philosophical implications of much of the discussion of moral rights in the first place, views sceptical, for example, of the legalistic direction

[51] Lægaard, 'What Is the Right to Exclude Immigrants?'
[52] Lægaard.
[53] David Miller, 'Territorial Rights: Concept and Justification', *Political Studies* 60, no. 2 (2012).
[54] Blake, 'The Right to Exclude'; Pevnick, *Immigration and the Constraints of Justice*.
[55] Simmons, 'On the Territorial Rights of States'.
[56] Lea Ypi, 'A Permissive Theory of Territorial Rights', *European Journal of Philosophy* 22, no. 2 (2014); Lea Ypi, 'Territorial Rights and Exclusion', *Philosophy Compass* 8, no. 3 (2013).
[57] Abizadeh, 'Democratic Theory and Border Coercion'; Bader, 'The Ethics of Immigration', 353–54; Rainer Bauböck, 'Global Justice, Freedom of Movement and Democratic Citizenship', *European Journal of Sociology* 50, no. 1 (2009); Simon Caney, *Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 169; Cole, 'Taking Moral Equality Seriously', 132; Cole, 'Beyond Reason', 514; Satvinder S. Juss, 'Free Movement and the World Order', *International Journal of Refugee Law* 16, no. 3 (1 July 2004); Onora O'Neill, *Bounds of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Joy M. Purcell, 'A Right to Leave , but Nowhere to Go: Reconciling an Emigrant's Right to Leave with the Sovereign's Right to Exclude', *The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review* 39, no. 1 (2007): 203–5; Seglow, 'The Ethics of Immigration', 329–30; Seglow, 'Immigration Justice and Borders'; Tiziana Torresi, 'On Membership and Free Movement', in *Citizenship Acquisition and National Belonging: Migration, Membership and the Liberal Democratic State*, ed. G. Calder, P. Cole, and J. Seglow (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 25; Wellman and Cole, *Debating the Ethics of Immigration*, 224–25.
[58] Pavel Dufek, 'Why Strong Moral Cosmopolitanism Requires a World-State1', *International Theory* 5, no. 2 (July 2013); Luke Ulaş, 'Cosmopolitanism, Self-Interest and World Government', *Political Studies* 64, no. 1 (1 April 2016).

of approaches running in the dominant Rawlsian and Kantian mode.[59] However, there are alternative approaches to the procedural focus entailed by the principle/rights-based approaches above and there are more fine-grained differences between ultimate positions in the debate amongst any approach. Utilitarian approaches and related economic approaches to migration are alternatives that often run in tension with the deontological underpinnings of the above approaches. One area where they can and do differ is over the categorical or hypothetical nature of the justification of rights, and utilitarian and economic views may not even consider the topic and may differ on the reason for why borders should be open or closed.[60] Indeed, even when they seem to concur with another approach on some issue, somewhere down the chain of reasoning that follows from the initial premises of one's arguments such views are likely to depart on some issue.

In terms of ultimate positions, 'no borders' is a position that, while on the surface may appear to be the same as open borders, in fact entails something more radical. No borders is the position that all borders should be done away with. No borders has been associated with anarchist positions and Marxist arguments for the eventual dissolution of capitalism and the withering away of the state.[61] It is also associated with some arguments for world government and world citizenship. In contrast with open borders, it implies changes to or the ultimate dissolution to the state system, while the open borders position seeks not – not immediately in any case – to challenge the state system or to challenge jurisdictional divisions between states (apart from over immigration – for example, the EU could be taken as a model for this view).[62]

A contrast between the economic/utilitarian argument and the no borders position suggests that the question of whether there should be free movement – that is to say, the position that people should be free to move across borders, seek work, seek residence – is separable from the main question that has dominated the

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[59] Of the former, see Gilles Deleuze, 'On Human Rights: From L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze, Avec Claire Parnet, Vidéo Éd. Montparnasse, 1996.', 1996, https://www.generation-online.org/p/fpdeleuze10.htm; Costas Douzinas, *The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century* (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000); David Chandler, 'Contemporary Critiques of Human Rights', in *Human Rights: Politics and Practice*, ed. Michael Goodhart, 3rd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Philip Cunliffe, *Cosmopolitan Dystopia: International Intervention and the Failure of the West* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020); Alex Gourevitch, 'Are Human Rights Liberal?', *Journal of Human Rights* 8, no. 4 (17 November 2009); Samuel Moyn, *Last Utopia*, Reprint edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012). Examples of the latter include Raymond Geuss, *Outside Ethics* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2005); Raymond Geuss, *Philosophy and Real Politics* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2008); Alasdair MacIntyre, *Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity: An Essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning, and Narrative*, 1st Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), see especially 77-78; Bernard Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 2011); Bernard Williams, *In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument*, ed. Geoffrey Hawthorn (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2005).
[60] For a utilitarian approach to border control, see Herbert Brücker, 'A Utilitarian Approach for the Governance of Humanitarian Migration', *Analyse & Kritik* 40, no. 2 (2018). Martin Ruhs and Ha-Joon Chang, 'The Ethics of Labor Immigration Policy', *International Organization* 58, no. 1 (2004) analyses and creates a framework based around consequentialism in labour immigration policy. For criticism of utilitarianism in the ethics of immigration, see Robert L. Chapman, 'Immigration and Environment: Settling the Moral Boundaries', *Environmental Values* 9, no. 2 (2000); Sager, 'Immigration Enforcement and Domination', 15. For this version of the challenge to utilitarian thought, see John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 19–24.
[61] Sager, *Against Borders*, 13–16.
[62] Sager, 13–16.

philosophical debate thus far: the question of whether there is or should be a right to exclude and the question of whether there is or should be a right to immigrate. What the utilitarian, economic, and no borders positions show is that a case can be made for or against free movement independent of the question of whether this should be conceived of as a right. Indeed, the question of whether it would be overall better to have free movement or more free movement is shown by these approaches to be something that can be answered independent of the question of whether states or individuals have the right to do so. That is to say, independent of approaching the case for free movement in terms of working out a set of prior moral and eventual legal or quasi-legal constraints on what states (and individuals) can and cannot do. While the question of what rights there may be is important, the focus on working out an overarching set of constraints implied by the rights-based approach obscures from view alternative ways a more direct case for or against free movement can be made and thus obscures important options in the debate. It sets aside views with, perhaps, a more *political* understanding of what a right is, views which may well point to metaphysical assumptions implicit in the focus on rights that from some perspectives appear incomplete, false, or overly idealistic.[63] From the perspective of much realism (both the kinds associated with international relations theory and political theory), the emphasis on a priori moral-procedural constraints on the behaviours of states may well look a bit odd.[64] Both the economic and utilitarian positions and some no borders positions show that this need not be the only way to approach the debate. Indeed, as I aim to show, a case for free movement can be made independent of the question of whether states have a right to exclude outsiders and independent of the international institutionalist and constraint-based framework inherent to much theorising in the ethics of immigration – positions which, as will emerge in the following chapters, can only appear strange to the normative and political position I outline.

What we have in the debate over border controls, or the ethics of immigration more generally, are not positions located on a line between and up to closed and open borders. Rather, what we have are a host of importantly different positions that, while they may share one feature making them appear superficially similar – say, that people should, generally, not be prevented from moving where they want to go – are in fact in disagreement on a range of substantial issues: whether this implies the management of migration through an international or supranational organisation, whether states retain jurisdiction in other areas, whether this

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[63] Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 3rd ed. edition (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 66–70; Sean Molloy, *Kant's International Relations: The Political Theology of Perpetual Peace* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2017), 165–75; Williams, *In the Beginning Was the Deed*, chap. 1.
[64] Sean Molloy, *The Hidden History of Realism: A Genealogy of Power Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 71–72; Williams, *In the Beginning Was the Deed*, chap. 1.

implies that states have no right to exclude or whether it is matter of prudence or 'best overall', whether this implies the dissolution of the state system and borders, or whether this can be retained, amongst others. Furthermore, here we have only been concerned with first admissions. There is a host of further distinctions amongst positions over questions relating to the various stages of the migration process – rights to exit, rights to enter, naturalisation, integration, citizenship rights, residency rights, family rights, welfare, taxation, and so on – but these will be set aside here. In what follows, we explore what arguments are given in order to account for these differences.

1.2 The Case for Closure

David Miller and Michael Walzer are probably the two most notable defenders of the right to exclude in the ethics of immigration. For proponents of free movement, Walzer and Miller are often taken to be the main philosophical representatives of the conventional view.[65]

Walzer's defence of right to exclude others from entering a state by first is linked to his intuitively appealing principle that the meaning of a good ought to be constitutive of the principle for how the good is to be distributed. Walzer gives several examples of the appeal of the principle and how it works. To get the gist of Walzer's argument, consider the goods of love and friendship: part of the meaning of love and friendship is generally that it is something freely chosen and given and cannot be bought. Thus, we generally think such goods should not be distributed via money.[66] Walzer describes membership to a political community as a 'primary social good': it determines who accesses the goods produced within the political community, who has obligations to whom, and the extent of those obligations. Walzer argues that the meaning of membership and thus the principle for its distribution is determined by the extant members of a political community. It follows that the members of the political community ought to be able to control who becomes a member of the political community.[67] In other words, the community should get to decide who is to become a member so it can uphold its self-interpretation, standards, and distribution of goods. This distribution is not without some limits: Walzer later provides a thin theory of justice to outline the conditions in which the aims of communities can be pursued and in which membership can be distributed without leading to domination.[68] But so long as it does not lead to

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[65] John Exdell, 'Immigration, Nationalism, and Human Rights', *Metaphilosophy* 40, no. 1 (2009); Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*.
[66] Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 100–102.
[67] Walzer, 31–33.
[68] Michael Walzer, *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad* (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Pess, 1994), chap. 2.

domination or what are undoubtedly grievous harms, membership may be distributed as the community sees fit.

Walzer further bolsters his view by arguing that a world state or global libertarian scenario – in both of which the question of excluding others from entering a territory would be irrelevant because each person would be free to go where he or she pleases – would be unattractive and so migration should not be controlled from an entity above the state, nor should there be open borders.[69] Walzer sets aside the argument that open borders under global libertarianism would harm the poor and the world state would lead to global authoritarianism. Instead, he accepts for the sake of argument that open borders would be beneficial to the poor and accepts that even if the world state was necessarily authoritarian, it is possible that the citizens of the world state might prefer this situation.[70] Walzer claims that were the world state or global libertarianism actual, they would both paradoxically lead to more closure than under the modern state system – it would be a world of 'a thousand petty fortresses.'[71] Walzer begins his case by suggesting that people become attached to specific places and so would become resentful of outsiders who might undermine 'the local politics and culture' and who might try to benefit from locally provided and produced goods.[72] For Walzer, this means that that under global libertarianism people will end up defending their neighbourhood from outsiders and preventing them from entry. This is one reason why a state – or something like it – would be necessary for maintaining a degree of openness, since '[i]t is only the nationalization of welfare (or the nationalization of culture and politics) that opens the neighborhood communities to whoever chooses to come in'.[73] For Walzer, the closedness that he claims would occur under global libertarianism would be intolerable for those who value free choice and 'modern democratic politics and culture' and both depend on the openness of neighbourhoods within and guaranteed by the state's jurisdiction.[74] Walzer then grants that under a world state this will probably not be an issue: neighbourhoods could be forced to remain open through intervention. Instead, Walzer claims that the problem with the world state is that the forced openness it maintains in the name of open borders would undermine cultural distinctiveness: people would come and go and over time the cohesiveness required for culture to develop would disappear. Instead, Walzer concludes that '[t]he distinctiveness of culture and groups depends on closure'

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[69] Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 34.
[70] Walzer, 37–38.
[71] Walzer, 39.
[72] Walzer, 38.
[73] Walzer, 38.
[74] Walzer, 39.

and so '[i]f this distinctiveness is a value, as most people … seem to believe, then closure most be permitted somewhere'.[75]

Miller's work is in part a modification and extension of arguments inspired by Walzer and takes a similar form.[76] Miller argues that cases for open borders based on arguments from common ownership of the earth, equal opportunities, or an argument for human rights each fail. The joint ownership argument, for Miller, is only plausible in the form offered by Hugo Grotius, who interprets this to mean that property claims over the earth are limited by a basic right of people to take what they need to sustain themselves: a right of necessity. Miller claims that under this conception, however, although someone driven by necessity would have a right to enter a territory, this does not go all the way to implying open borders.[77] Other versions include joint ownership, in which each person jointly owns the earth and an equal division conception of ownership. The issue with the former, for Miller, is that it is implausible in the absence of an overarching administrative authority establishing legitimate use of the earth's resources and so, since no such authority exists, it is irrelevant. The latter runs into issues in determining how exactly to value and then to parcel out heterogenous land.[78]

The argument for open borders from equality of opportunity, Miller argues, runs into similar problems with value, measurement, and practical applicability when applied at the global level. One issue is that culturally heterogenous states may provide and value different kinds of opportunities such that it is very difficult to compare the overall degree of opportunity provided in one place over another and thus to determine if and when opportunities are equal.[79] Another issue is in terms of how to understand equality of opportunity itself. Miller notes that if the idea is understood as expressing the value of providing an adequate range of opportunities, then strictly speaking it is not a principle of equality but sufficiency, and this latter principle does not lead to open borders but 'only that people living in subthreshold states can make a claim to migrate to places where opportunities are greater'.[80] In addition, the opportunities available in one place 'will depend to a large extent on decisions taken locally about, for example, rates of economic growth and the provision of public services' which would require an overarching authority to determine in order to maintain comparable opportunities in different places.[81] Furthermore, strict equality of opportunity may imply that levelling down is

[75] Walzer, 39.
[76] Exdell, 'Immigration, Nationalism, and Human Rights'; Peter Higgins, *Immigration Justice* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013).
[77] Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration*, 40.
[78] Miller, 40–44.
[79] Miller, 45–47.
[80] Miller, 47.
[81] Miller, 47.

the best way to achieve this, but this is intuitively unattractive.[82] Even if these issues could be tackled, Miller

argues, open borders may not be the best means of achieving inequality since those who can more are more

likely to be better off relative to their poorer compatriots and may have valuable skills and so while inequality

may be reduced between immigrants and the citizens of the state they move to, inequality would be increased

relative to those who must remain in the state of origin.[83]

Lastly, Miller responds to and rejects three arguments for a human right to migrate: the direct strategy,

the instrumental strategy, and the cantilever strategy. The direct strategy appeals to the interests that justify

other human rights and argues similar considerations underpin a human right to immigrate. The direct strategy,

then, appeals to important human interests that may be sufficient to generate a human right to migrate, such

as moving to work, for religion, or for reasons of love. Miller argues instead that all that is needed for these

interests to be satisfied is a sufficient level provision rather than absolute provision, since if any particular

interests were sufficient to generate a human right, 'the roster of rights would proliferate uncontrollably.[84] The

instrumental strategy holds that for the internationally recognised right to exit a state to be properly

instantiated, there must be a complimentary right to entry that amounts to a right to immigrate. For Miller,

while there are good reasons behind the right to exit, all it requires is adequate provision and not open borders

(which, he adds, might lead to brain-drain).[85] The cantilever strategy argues that the reasons for holding a

domestic right to free movement are the same as the reasons for favouring an international right to free

movement. Miller argues that this approach is flawed in two ways. First, domestic free movement does not lead

to as drastic costs as an international right would and so the reasons underpinning each are not equivalent.

Second, domestic free movement plays an important protective function in maintaining equality between

citizens and protecting individuals and groups from being unfairly restricted as has occurred under the South

African apartheid regime, the creation of Jewish Ghettos in Europe, and forced resettlement in the Soviet

Union.[86] While the state can discriminate against outsider groups (although Miller argues this would be unjust,

especially in liberal states, since it implies a lack of equal respect for citizens who are members of a discriminated

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[82] Miller, 47–48.
[83] Miller, 48.
[84] Miller, 51.
[85] Miller, 52–53.
[86] Miller, 54–55.

group, generally undermining liberal values), this is not as grievous as when it discriminates against people within the state, since the former will not be trapped and may exercise their rights elsewhere.[87]

Miller's own justification for the state's right to close its borders begins by defending weak cosmopolitanism over strong cosmopolitanism on the ground that the latter is implausible because it rules out special concern and duties to those close to us.[88] Miller defines strong cosmopolitanism as at the fundamental duties one owes to others are the same to all humanity regardless of who they are.[89] Weak cosmopolitanism is the view that one must always consider the effects of one's actions on another no matter who one's actions affect, and in the absence any relevant difference amongst people they should be given equal moral consideration.[90] Miller further elaborates his understanding of weak cosmopolitanism by outlining a theory of 'associative obligations' derived from his account of moral psychology. The theory of associative obligations is the view that a constitutive feature of special relationships such as friendship and family is that we recognise special duties towards those to whom we stand in such relationships. Thus, those to whom a person is closest, those with whom a person works towards a common project or goal – families, friends, colleagues – generate special duties.[91] Miller argues that citizenship is one such relationship in view of the mutual benefits that arise from belonging to a community of citizens and the responsibilities citizenship entails.[92] Miller adds that shared national identity is an additional source of the value of citizenship and thus another source further associative obligations in virtue of the solidarity it generates and things such solidarity makes possible, such as greater support an extensive welfare state.[93] Given this, some compatriot partiality is justified. However, given weak cosmopolitanism, this does not mean there are no obligations toward others. Miller outlines these general obligations in terms of human rights: states and their citizens are under a general obligation to observe human rights. This involves refraining from actions that undermine the basic needs of any person and taking actions under a scheme of fair distribution of responsibility to protect and promote the rights of outsiders in which states are under a duty not to go beyond the requirements of fairness without the consent of citizens.[94] For

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[87] Miller, 56.
[88] Miller, 23.
[89] Miller, 22–23.
[90] Miller, 23.
[91] Miller, 25–27.
[92] Miller, 26–27.
[93] Miller, 27–28.
[94] Miller, 30–37.

Miller, this scheme has the result that states must consider the claims of migrants but whether they should be admitted and under what conditions depends on the costs and benefits of doing so.[95]

Miller then turns to question the conditions a state legitimately acquires and exercises a right to exclude outsiders. Miller argues that a state's right to exclude is part of its right to exercise jurisdiction over its territory. A state rightfully claims jurisdiction over a territory when it effectively and sufficiently maintains social order and human rights in that territory; when it legitimately represents the inhabitants of the territory (thus excluding the situations where control over territory is achieved without consent and arbitrarily); and when the people it represents are rightful occupants of a territory and the rightful occupants of a territory are not forcibly removed by state to place its own subjects there.[96] Under these conditions, the state has a right to jurisdiction over its territory in order to maintain social order and human rights.[97] As yet, Miller concedes, the jurisdictional argument does not imply more than a very minimal right to control border flows.[98] Miller thus adds that the citizens of a state have interests in self-determination by deciding on the direction of public policy and which has value in part because it allows people to make long-term plans and as an expression of the various values the people of a state hold (within weak cosmopolitan limits).[99] Miller then claims that this gives three key reasons for a state's right and interest in controlling border flows: a state that must admit large bodies of immigrants of different cultural backgrounds may find that the policy options available to it are narrowed to policy options that can accommodate a diversity of interests; there is evidence to suggest that states that end up with a high degree of cultural variation and difference within their borders have lower levels of trust which affects the functioning of democratic institutions by undermining the possibility of reaching deliberative consensus, leading to self-interested bargaining and changing balances of power, and thus undermining the provision of public and general redistributive policies; and the size of a population in a state itself throws up various issues in public policy (for reasons of under and over population) which mean a state will have an interest in controlling its numbers.[100]

Miller defends his view from three objections: that liberal culture is already diverse and so excluding on the basis of a threat to that culture would be illiberal; that citizens' interest in self-determination is less

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[95] Miller, 37.
[96] Miller, 59–60.
[97] Miller, 60–62.
[98] Miller, 62.
[99] Miller, 62–63.
[100] Miller, 64–66.

important than the interest immigrants may have in entry; and that border controls are coercive and thus require the agreement of those they affect to be legitimate. Against the first, Miller argues that while liberal societies are often in fact culturally heterogenous, the *public* culture as opposed to the private culture of individuals is distinctively liberal and requires protecting if a large volume of immigration would threaten that culture. Moreover, specific cultural groups need to be included within the wider culture in order to avoid alienation and the formation of separate enclaves.[101] Against the second, Miller points to historical evidence showing what people have been willing to risk to achieve self-determination, pointing to decolonial and other movements for national self-determination as evidence and invokes the theory of weak cosmopolitanism and associative obligations to argue that citizens can weight their own interest in self-determination greater than the interests others may have in entering their territory (granted the baseline set by weak cosmopolitanism is met).[102] Against the view that border controls are coercive and so require consent, Miller argues that it is not clear that coercion always requires democratic legitimation – for instance when someone requires protection from themselves or when a person poses a risk to others. Moreover, Miller argues that while border enforcement (as with deportation) is undoubtedly coercive, this involves people who have already tried to evade a rule, the exclusion itself by erecting of a barrier (Miller imagines a state putting up an impenetrable barrier) is better thought of as preventative rather than coercive for which the reasons Miller gives for the state's right to exclude and its exercise justify.[103]

Michael Blake also argues that immigration restrictions can be compatible with moral equality because essentially political equality does not necessarily require equal treatment. Like Miller, Blake argues that there is an important non-arbitrary difference between citizens and non-citizens. Blake emphasises that this non-arbitrary difference is that citizens find themselves in a scheme of mutual responsibility toward each other because the citizens live under and participate in a scheme of mutual coercion through the political institution of and institutions in the state, for instance through taxation and the making and enforcing of public policy. There is also a difference between immigrants and other non-nationals in that the former voluntarily place themselves at the behest of a coercive political authority. Given these differences, moral equality does not require treating each of these three categories equally. It also means that each of these three different

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[101] Miller, 67–68.
[102] Miller, 68–71.
[103] Miller, 72–75.

categories possesses different bundles of rights.[104] In general, immigrants seek to access a bundle of rights they do not yet have (although, as Blake notes, the case is different with migrants like refugees who have prior pressing moral claims).[105] Thus, the right to exclude is justified with reference to the legitimately employing coercion to prevent the unjust acquisition of goods. However, moral equality means 'that a just state has an obligation to treat such prospective immigrants as equal to one another'.[106] The exercise of the right thus requires extensive factual justification to a prospective immigrant which no person could reasonably reject and requires a strong principle of against discrimination on morally arbitrary grounds.[107]

More recently, Blake has criticised views like Walzer's and Miller's that imply that the right to exclude can be grounded by the argument that 'there are some goods that can be produced only within bounded societies.'[108] Rather, he argues that arguments for the right to exclude premised on the idea that individuals have rights 'in virtue of their moral rights of association or property' are built on firmer ground.[109] However, these views fail to take into account 'the juridical nature of the modern state'.[110] These two features underpin Blake's view that 'the right to exclude is grounded in the right to avoid becoming the agent charged with the defence of another's human rights – unless there is some independent moral reason one ought to become so charged.'[111] His argument is that while there is a general obligation to protect and promote human rights individually and by setting up institutions that do so, the more burdensome aspect of this obligation – setting up institutions and acting to protect and promote human rights – mainly applies within the boundaries of a state since the state is a locus of responsibility and coercion, although there is a general obligation to respect the rights of others elsewhere. This means the institutions of a state must promote, fulfil, and respect the rights of those who enter its jurisdiction, but this can be costly and burdensome and so a state (and its citizens), when there is no direct and pressing moral claim, must be able to consent to becoming burdened. Thus, there is a right to not become responsible for protecting and fulfilling others' rights. The right to exclude is then justified as a means of creating the conditions in which a state and its institutions can consent or not consent to becoming

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[104] Blake, 'Immigration and Political Equality', 966–69.
[105] Blake, 969.
[106] Blake, 970.
[107] Blake, 972–79.
[108] Blake, 'The Right to Exclude', 521.
[109] For instance, Ryan Pevnick argues that we acquire ownership over our political institutions through the contributions we make to them and from which we acquire the right to exclude others from benefitting from those institutions in *Immigration and the Constraints of Justice*, 33–45. Christopher Heath-Wellman argues that we have a right to freedom of association which entails a right to not associate with others should we so choose in 'Immigration and Freedom of Association', 109; *Debating the Ethics of Immigration*, 13.
[110] Blake, 'The Right to Exclude', 521.
[111] Blake, 521.

responsible for the promotion and protection of the rights of noncitizens.[112] As above, it does not mean anything goes. For instance, Blake adds that this argument only works if outsiders' rights are protected within their own state, although this does not necessarily create a direct obligation on one state to admit them, which may involve other considerations like burden sharing.[113]

1.3 Controls under Cosmopolitan Conditions: Fairly Open Borders

Veit Bader criticises communitarian arguments concerning citizenship, arguing that views such as Walzer's have 'exemplary difficulties' in dealing with four paradoxes of modern citizenship: that internal citizenship is universally inclusionary whilst externally exclusionary; that noncitizens and denizens are gaining what were traditionally citizenship rights; that different levels or spheres of citizenship are emerging and becoming important at a suprastate level, whilst democratic citizenship remains wedded to the state and nationhood; that due to migration, EU unification, diversification, and multiculturalism there is increasing pressure to disentangle citizenship from ethnicity, race, culture, and nation along with a reactionary move to assert the opposite. Instead, Bader defends 'low threshold concepts of citizenship' which entail disentangling democratic political citizenship from particularist conceptions and thereby attacks the defence of exclusion on communitarian grounds.[114] In a later article, Bader puts forward his own approach to the open borders question. He explores the case for and against open borders from universalist and particularist perspectives. After arguing that both positions have weaknesses and merits, Bader argues in favour of a Global Moral Obligation (GMO) proviso in which states must meet their obligations to reduce poverty and inequality. For Bader, the GMO would conditionally allow for (fairly) closed borders only in cases where states meet this. Thus, so long as states meet the GMO, then some closure on the grounds of protecting a national culture would be permissible.[115]

Isbister presents a different conception of the conditionality of immigration restrictions. Starting from the liberal premise that all people are of equal moral worth, Isbister outlines the intuition that protection of privilege – particularly when the protection of privilege would further disadvantage those lacking it – is the main problem with unequal treatment and thus with immigration control.[116] There are thus two reasons for a presumption against immigration controls: immigration controls give people who are equal moral worth unequal

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[112] Blake, 'Immigration, Jurisdiction, and Exclusion', 108–15.
[113] Blake, 119–29.
[114] Bader, 'Citizenship and Exclusion'.
[115] Bader, 'The Ethics of Immigration'.
[116] Isbister, 'Are Immigration Controls Ethical?', 55–57.

rights and immigration controls are often used to protect privilege and make the less privileged worse off.[117]

Given this, Isbister argues that the only compelling argument for immigration restriction is made on the ground that controls may be necessary to protect the American poor from potentially harmful immigration if more immigration would worsen their situation.[118] This leads to a conditional claim compromising between a right to move for needy migrants and the right to protection for the domestic poor: immigration restriction is justified: '(1) if restrictions are accompanied by a major national commitment to improve the quality of life of the U.S. poor and (2) if, in the absence of restrictions, the flow of immigrants would be too great to allow that program to be successful'.[119]

In 'Migration and Poverty', Thomas Pogge argues on pragmatic grounds that political effort should be placed on getting more funds from wealthy governments to tackle global poverty rather than concentrating on the admission of needy foreigners. He stresses that his argument does not mean that needy foreigners should not be admitted. Rather, his claim is that to address global poverty the focus should be on pressuring wealthy governments to supply and effectively distribute wealth. He gives several reasons for this: those able to move, whether political refugees or economic migrants, are generally better off than those they leave behind, being wealthier and better off in terms of their education and capabilities; given that they are better off, any remittance they send back will likely go to a family that is better off and so there is less chance their money will be distributed effectively amongst the poor; it is difficult to get governments to admit more needy foreigners in the first place, while it is more feasible to get governments to spend more money on poverty eradication where a few million dollars would improve the lives of many; similarly, efforts to reduce poverty through foreign aid will be more effective at confronting the problem of global poverty than more open immigration policy.[120] Pogge does not consider the question of whether there is a right to immigrate generally or whether free movement would be good, but instead presumes a more conventional view on the matter. Elsewhere, however, Pogge defends a vision of the world in which sovereignty is dispersed through several levels between 'neighborhood, town, county, province, state, region, and world at large'.[121] Within this scheme Pogge defends the view that immigration control would, at least partially, operate at the level of the neighbourhood. He writes that while

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[117] Isbister, 57.
[118] Isbister, 63.
[119] Isbister, 64–65.
[120] Thomas W. Pogge, 'Migration and Poverty', in *Citizenship and Exclusion*, ed. Veit Bader (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1997).
[121] Thomas W. Pogge, 'Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty', *Ethics* 103, no. 1 (1992): 58.

Walzer is right to claim that the value of protecting cohesive neighborhood cultures is better served by national immigration control than by no control at all. But it would be much better served still if the state were constrained to admit only immigrants who are planning to move into a neighborhood that is willing to accept them. Moreover, since a neighborhood culture can be as effectively destroyed by the influx of fellow nationals as by that of immigrants, neighborhoods would do even better, if they had some authority to select from among prospective domestic newcomers or to limit their number. Finally, neighborhoods may often want to bring in new members from abroad-persons to whom they have special ethnic, religious, or cultural ties-and they would therefore benefit from a role in the national immigration control process that would allow them to facilitate the admission of such persons.[122]

Pogge thus shares general liberal and cosmopolitan moral principles with free movement advocates such as Carens, yet at the same time partially agrees with the likes of Michael Walzer over the necessity and value of protecting culture.

Jonathan Seglow draws a similar conclusion to both Pogge and Bader's. He rejects open borders on the grounds of self-determination and 'democratic association' argued for by Miller and Walzer.[123] He also criticises the open borders argument as a means to achieve equal opportunities and reduce global poverty for reasons similar to Pogge and Miller: either it could lead to greater inequality or it burdens the poor with the task of moving.[124] Seglow also criticises other fairly open borders views for failing to take into account of the problem that placing a condition of open borders on states who fail to meet their redistributive duties may create more inequality rather than less. Specifically, the problem is that well-off migrants 'able to make substantial economic contributions can reap substantial rewards (capital and investment), while imposing harsh measures on vulnerable people left outside – economic rents and an end to welfare risk-pooling.'[125] On the other hand, a scheme of admitting many poorer immigrants would risk undermining self-determination and cultural distinctness.[126] Instead, Seglow endorses the view that there ought to be a regime of global redistributive justice

[122] Pogge, 61.
[123] Seglow, 'The Ethics of Immigration', 324; Seglow, 'Immigration Justice and Borders', 236–37.
[124] Seglow, 'The Ethics of Immigration', 328; Seglow, 'Immigration Justice and Borders', 236.
[125] Seglow, 'The Ethics of Immigration', 328.
[126] Seglow, 328; Seglow, 'Immigration Justice and Borders', 236.

in order to tackle the causes of economic migration in which states have substantial duties to admit migrants managed through a burden-sharing quota system.[127] Both are to be determined by fair criteria. Seglow later argues fairness excludes selection on communitarian grounds of nationality, culture, ethnicity, religion, or way of life because they are 'arbitrary from a moral point of view.'[128] Instead, the amount and kinds of immigrants a state must admit would be determined roughly by the GDP, population density, and infrastructure of a state and, although states will have some leeway to select according to their economic needs, 'richer states should discriminate in favour of migrants from poorer states, and against those from other rich states.'[129]

1.4 Free Movement in Principle: Ideal Theory and the Case for Free Movement

Throughout his work Joseph Carens has held a conception of political theory in which arguments can be located on a spectrum between ideal (or what he calls 'just-world') theory and non-ideal theory, where at the latter end of the spectrum one's argument is based upon more realistic or non-ideal assumptions and at the former end one's premises are based on more ideal assumptions, depending on one's purposes. Ideal theory, while its meaning and value is heavily contested, is understood here very broadly to refer to a form of argument which deliberately abstracts from certain features of the present world – such as immorality, irrationality, or feasibility – in order to theorise a set of arrangements that is in some sense ideally just.[130] The conception of the ideally just society or international order developed by ideal theory is then either or both meant to function as a critical measure of the real world and as a blueprint for the eventual goal to aim at.[131] On this conception, non-ideal theory is then understood to be the theory of how to transition to a fully just or a better set of arrangements.[132] However, non-ideal theory has also been adopted as a label for views critical of this understanding of theory,

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[127] Seglow, 'The Ethics of Immigration', 330.
[128] Seglow, 'Immigration Justice and Borders', 240.
[129] Seglow, 240.
[130] Carens, 'A Reply to Meilaender'; Carens; Jacob T. Levy, 'There Is No Such Thing as Ideal Theory', *Social Philosophy and Policy* 33, no. 1–2 (2016); Zofia Stemplowska, 'What's Ideal About Ideal Theory?', *Social Theory and Practice* 34, no. 3 (2008); Laura Valentini, 'Ideal vs. Non-Ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map', *Philosophy Compass* 7, no. 9 (2012).
[131] Carens, 'Open Borders and Liberal Limits'; Zofia Stemplowska and Adam Swift, 'Ideal and Nonideal Theory', in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy*, ed. David Estlund (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
[132] Valentini, 'Ideal vs. Non-Ideal Theory'. Carens later rejects the terminology of ideal-non-ideal-theory, writing that in his book, *The Ethics of Immigration*, 'I never refer to the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory, and the absence is deliberate. … I came to feel that the ideal/nonideal distinction was too limiting, that it drew our attention away from the many different possible frameworks within which we might want to conduct a normative analysis, and that the categories of ideal theory and nonideal theory rested upon presuppositions that I did not share and did not find helpful as a framework for analysis. … [Instead,] I speak about an approach that pays explicit attention to the inevitability of presuppositions in any theoretical discussion, that tries to identify the presuppositions one is adopting for a particular purpose, and that is open to examining the consequences of shifting those presuppositions. In my view, this approach leaves space for many of the sorts of considerations that Rawls was bringing into view with his ideal/nonideal distinction but the approach provides much greater analytical flexibility, including, as we shall see the possibility of providing a much more helpful framework for thinking about how to act in the real world' in 'Replies to My Interlocutors', in *Joseph Carens: Between Aliens and Citizens*, ed. Matthias Hoesch and Nadine Mooren (Cham: Springer Nature, 2020), 261.

arguing for various reasons that it presents an unrealistic or obfuscating conception of political theory.[133] Importantly, ideal theory differs from non-ideal theory in that an ideal theory does not usually aim to be a currently relevant policy recommendation,[134] may never be fully instantiated,[135] and may not aim to be directly action-guiding for here and now.[136] Others have framed modes of approaching the topic of border control in these terms.[137]

Carens has also throughout his work directly or indirectly challenged several of the main prongs of the defence of the right to exclude. He claims that self-determination is not morally relevant for the critique of immigration policy and institutions, because those who use it to ground the right to exclude confuse 'the question of who ought to have the authority to determine a policy with the question of whether a given policy is morally acceptable'.[138] Thus, for Carens the argument from self-determination forecloses the question of whether an immigration policy or institution is morally justifiable. In addition, Carens buffers his argument on self-determination by claiming that a liberal democratic state is not permitted by way of its own principles – freedom and equality – to preserve its national culture when that undermines these principles, and so it may only preserve those principles and promote a public culture congruent with them.[139] For Carens, this would rule out exclusions based on 'race, ethnicity, religion, or any of the other characteristics we consider discriminatory'.[140] But to Carens, this seems to mean that only legitimate threats to freedom and equality may justify exclusion. He also argues that those who defend the right to exclude on welfarist grounds – like Miller does regarding population control and some consequentialists – present a false choice between welfare and freedom of movement, because resources are available to support both.[141]

As noted in the introduction, Carens's 1987 article 'Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders' has been key in setting the terms of much of the debate over the ethics of immigration. To recap, Carens argues that liberal theories – as such rooted in the idea that the individual is prior to the community – when followed to their logical conclusion support open borders. He demonstrates this by arguing that utilitarianism, Nozickean

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[133] Colin Farrelly, 'Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation', *Political Studies* 55, no. 4 (1 December 2007); Edward Hall, 'How to Do Realistic Political Theory (and Why You Might Want To)', *European Journal of Political Theory* 16, no. 3 (1 July 2017); Charles W. (Charles Wade) Mills, '"Ideal Theory" as Ideology', *Hypatia* 20, no. 3 (2005).
[134] Carens, 'Open Borders and Liberal Limits'.
[135] G. A. Cohen, 'Expensive Taste Rides Again', in *On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, and Other Essays in Political Philosophy* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011), 104; Laura Valentini, 'On the Apparent Paradox of Ideal Theory*', *Journal of Political Philosophy* 17, no. 3 (2009): 335–36.
[136] Stemplowska and Swift, 'Ideal and Nonideal Theory'.
[137] For example, see Reed-Sandoval, 'The New Open Borders Debate'; and Wilcox, 'The Open Borders Debate on Immigration'.
[138] Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*, 6.
[139] Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*.
[140] Carens, 284.
[141] Carens, 284.

libertarianism, and Rawlsian liberalism all support open borders.[142] Carens's approach of producing an internal

critique of various ethical views has been influential, and several other theorists have framed their arguments

in terms of what liberalism or democratic principles require with regard to immigration.[143]

With regard to Nozickean theory, Carens argues that the theory cannot employ the argument that the

territory of a state is collectively owned to restrict entry into a state. A defining principle of the theory is the idea

that the state is merely there to enforce the natural rights individuals have in a state of nature, particularly

individual property rights. This applies to citizens and non-citizens equally, and the Nozickean state should make

no distinction between them; it ought merely to serve the equal protection of individual natural rights. This

means the state should not be used, for instance, to redistribute goods according to the wishes of the majority,

for instance for welfare reasons. While this may allow communities to come together to collectively rule

themselves, and they may restrict and grant membership as they please, it does not allow the state to do so on

their behalf. What this means, on the Nozickean theory, is that the state itself is not permitted to restrict entry

into a territory on the ground that the territory of a state is collectively owned. The state can merely enforce the

rights of individual owners against others. Individuals and the communities they freely form may thus restrict

membership of their community, but on this theory '[t]he state has no right to restrict immigration'.[144]

With Rawlsian theory, Carens makes the move of applying the argument from the original position to

the global level, this extension of scope he claims is warranted by the very purpose Rawls develops the original

position for: to create the conditions for fully fair reasoning. Thus, Carens argues, whether one will be a citizen

of a rich or a poor state should not enter into one's reasoning when thinking about justice at a global level, since

it may bias the conception of justice developed in the original position.[145] Carens assumes that under these

conditions parties would choose the two principles of justice Rawls claimed they would in his original theory:

the most extensive system of basic liberties available to all and for inequalities to be arranged so that they

benefit the least advantaged and positions are open to competition under equal opportunity. Assuming ideal

theoretical conditions which would allow 'some of the reasons for defending the integrity of existing states [to]

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[142] Carens, 'Aliens and Citizens'.

[143] For an example of the former, see Freiman and Hidalgo, 'Liberalism or Immigration Restrictions, but Not Both'; and for the latter see Abizadeh, 'Democratic Theory and Border Coercion'; David Miller, 'Why Immigration Controls Are Not Coercive: A Reply to Arash Abizadeh', *Political Theory* 38, no. 1 (1 February 2010); Arash Abizadeh, 'Democratic Legitimacy and State Coercion: A Reply to David Miller', *Political Theory* 38, no. 1 (1 February 2010); Saunders, 'Immigration, Rights and Democracy'; for a neo-republican version, see Sarah Fine, 'Non-Domination and the Ethics of Migration', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 17, no. 1 (2 January 2014).

[144] Carens, 'Aliens and Citizens', 254.

[145] Carens, 256.

disappear', Carens argues that because the ability to move across borders 'might prove essential to one's life plan' – for instance for reasons of love, religion, or cultural opportunities – the right to move freely across borders would be counted as a basic liberty for reasons similar to why Rawls includes rights to religious freedom.[146] Furthermore, he argues that since this argument is a form of ideal theory, we can assume that mass migration would be fairly limited and so other important liberties would not be at risk from threat of unjust behaviour, the likelihood of which would itself be dampened by an international difference principle (for instance redistribution mitigating problems of inequality).[147]

Under non-ideal conditions, Carens grants that the reasons to support state sovereignty and to restrict immigration become stronger due to threats from other states, because the problem of mass migration risks undermining state capacity and public order, and because under such conditions open borders may contribute to greater inequality or brain drain.[148] Carens claims, however, that even under these conditions there would only be very limited restrictions on immigration: restrictions on the ground that it would economically worsen the situation of current citizens would remain immoral if there are immigrants aiming to move whose own situation is worse and moving would improve their lot. In any case, Carens argues, basic liberty in Rawls's argument has lexical priority over the problem of economic inequality: it rules out the argument that immigration could be restricted for cultural reasons so long as basic liberal democratic values are not undermined; and it rues out the argument that those born in a territory are more entitled to the benefits of being born in that territory, which would be morally arbitrary from the Rawlsian point of view.[149] Carens's case for why utilitarianism would lead to open or more open borders is fairly brief. While he allows that on some versions of utilitarianism there may be more room for including within the calculus reasons to restrict immigration stemming from, say, a racist's discomfort over increased immigration, on his preferred theory in which not every preference counts and under current conditions of inequality and oppression, 'it seems hard to believe that a utilitarian calculus which took the interests of aliens seriously would justify greater limits on immigration than the ones entailed by the public order restriction implied by the Rawlsian approach.[150] Carens then turns to critique Walzer's communitarianism by arguing that its reliance on arguments from free association and community have worrying implications for equality. Even so, he argues, that Walzer's theory, because it

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[146] Carens, 258.
[147] Carens, 259.
[148] Carens, 260–61.
[149] Carens, 261–62.
[150] Carens, 264.

must itself embrace the liberal culture Walzer is embedded in, would have the same conclusions due to liberalism's universalist, egalitarian, and individualist basis.

Carens recognises that his arguments may merely be taken to illustrate 'the inadequacy of liberal theory, especially its inability to give sufficient weight to the value of community'.[151] In response, Carens claims while this itself 'may or may not be correct ... my findings about immigration primarily rest on assumptions I think no defensible moral theory can reject: that our social institutions and public policies must respect all human beings as moral persons and that this entails recognition, in some form, of the freedom and equality of every human being'.[152] Thus, each of Carens's arguments relies on the priority of the individual over the community and the assumption of the moral equality of each person which he uses to make the case for open borders.

Carens later develops his position through a more general perspective of liberal egalitarianism, arguing that liberal egalitarianism under ideal conditions also supports open borders, while under non-ideal conditions it presses for much more open migration regime, particularly on the part of wealthy states.[153] In particular, Carens likens being born into a poorer country along with restrictions on moving from one place to another to feudal birthright privilege and claims that the interests that underpin the wide acknowledgement of free movement within a state as a basic human right are as important as the interests that underpin reasons to move across state borders: to find a job, for love, for religion, and for cultural opportunities.[154] Both these ideas underpin Carens's later arguments.

Isbister and Peter Meilander both critically responded to Carens's early arguments.[155] Isbister argues that, accepting Carens's two presuppositions of equal moral worth and the priority of the individual, there is a plausible liberal case against open borders. He first argues that that equal moral worth does not imply equal treatment because equal treatment in immigration may be impossible to do, requires overly exacting moral requirements on individuals, and because moral obligations are connected through networks of reciprocity in which we may own more to some than others. Given this, he claims, there are reasons stemming from the liberal account of justice that show there are moral reasons for the state's right to restrict immigration: citizens within

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[151] Carens, 265. Espejo makes a similar point with regard to his later theory: that it may merely point to the inadequacy of liberal theory to justify the conditions liberalism requires for its own maintenance: borders in Espejo, 'The Ethics of Immigration'.
[152] Carens, 'Aliens and Citizens', 265.
[153] Joseph H. Carens, 'Migration and Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective', in *Free Movement: Ethical Issues in the Transnational Migration of People and of Money*, ed. Brian Barry and Robert E. Goodin (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992).
[154] Carens, 'Aliens and Citizens', 27–29.
[155] Isbister, 'A Liberal Argument for Border Controls'; Meilaender, 'Liberalism and Open Borders'.

a state are divided between rich and poor and uncontrolled immigration would harm the poor, since the state also has prior obligations to its own citizens, there should generally be a right to restrict immigration even if, Isbister grants, immigration policy should be more open than it actually tends to be in wealthier state.[156] Meilaender, on the other hand, points out that there are two possible interpretations of Carens' argument in order for it to make sense: since it relies specifically on liberal assumptions, it either appeals directly to fellow liberals claiming that liberal principles and commitments lead to open borders – which means Carens's interpretation of liberalism and its values remains unargued for and so is unlikely to be compelling to other liberals who interpret liberalism differently – or Carens is directly making the case for open borders. In either case, Carens must argue that his interpretation liberalism is the correct interpretation and that it is something which others must hold.[157]

In response to Isbister, Carens argues that Isbister's claim that equal moral worth does not imply equal treatment (which Carens agrees with) does not necessarily apply to immigration. This is because when designing institutional rules, preferential treatment (for instance of friends and family members) is usually explicitly ruled out on egalitarian grounds, and so the idea that there are networks of reciprocity amongst individuals in virtue of their relationships is not applicable at this level of institutional design. Carens then agrees that 'it might be true that simply abolishing border controls in the blink of an eye would lead to chaos and would be self-destructive'.[158] However, he claims it is 'not plausible to claim that it is impossible for rich states to admit many more immigrants'.[159] Similarly, Carens agrees that his argument is morally exacting and does 'defy common sense', but that was the point: '[i]t aims to challenge the conventional understandings and background presuppositions of our moral world', noting that this is the point of the ideal nature of the argument: it is not directly meant as policy advice or a guide to practical reasoning.[160] Rather, it is a critical heuristic intended to morally delegitimise right to exclude and encourage us to think about moral legitimacy our social arrangements. Lastly, Carens argues that claims such as Isbister's concerning poverty – that poverty in the host nation is one reason for the state's right to control borders may (if true, which Carens doubts) – distracts from the real problem of the general unequal distribution of wealth.

[156] Isbister, 'A Liberal Argument for Border Controls'.
[157] Meilaender, 'Liberalism and Open Borders'.
[158] Carens, 'Open Borders and Liberal Limits', 639.
[159] Carens, 639.
[160] Carens, 639.

In response to Meilander, Carens further specifies his approach to ideal and non-ideal theory by claiming there is a spectrum between non-ideal and ideal theories of justice along which one can 'shift' their presuppositions – for example about what is and is not feasible – to make moral arguments for different purposes. He then claims that this has implications for the two main criticisms Meilaender puts forward. On the first, he claims that his critique is aimed at the affluent in the West (the worst offenders) and not at those who fall outside of that group. Instead, his argument to be the start of conversation with other cultures, which would more fully require finding out what their presuppositions lead to on the question of borders for proper dialogue to start.[161] Thus, Carens states, while 'my open borders argument starts from liberal presuppositions', 'I would be delighted to remove these presuppositions in order to engage with people who do not share them in a discussion about what a just world requires, particularly with regard to migration'.[162] This last would involve a 'search for some other shared presuppositions, including some moral presuppositions'.[163] In any case, he claims, '[i]t is not the case … that an argument that rests upon liberal presuppositions can only lead to conclusions about the moral obligations of liberals', because arguments with (necessarily) particularistic sources can (like Carens's) have universal reach.[164] Carens points to the thin universalistic elements underpinning communitarian and relativistic views like Walzer's, to suggest liberalism leads (at least to some degree) towards universalism.[165] In his later work, Carens emphasises the case for open borders in more explicitly universalistic terms, retaining also the idea of a spectrum between ideal and non-ideal forms of argument which aim at different things.

In *The Ethics of Immigration*, Carens offers the following ideal-theory argument for open borders. First, he takes three things to be true: that there is no natural social order, and so all hierarchies are created and can be changed; all human beings are of equal moral worth; and all restrictions on human freedom require a justification.[166] While Carens admits that these are ideas that are derived from liberal presuppositions, as are the values Carens employs to make his arguments throughout the book, these are also ideas that 'undergird the claim to moral legitimacy of every contemporary democratic regime', making the argument more general than in its earlier version.[167] He then goes on to argue that free movement would have three benefits: it would reduce social and economic inequality; it would contribute to better equality of opportunity; and it would contribute to

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[161] Carens, 'A Reply to Meilaender'.
[162] Carens, 1094.
[163] Carens, 1094.
[164] Meilaender, 'Liberalism and Open Borders', 1095.
[165] Meilaender, 1095.
[166] Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*, chap. 11.
[167] Carens, 227.

individual autonomy. He goes on to argue that free movement itself is an intrinsically valuable liberty to the degree that it should be regarded as a human right. This gives a *prima facie* case for open borders. Carens goes on to argue that various cases for restrictions on free movement fail.[168] Carens claims that his argument justifies a human right to immigrate 'regardless of the cultural commitments of the society where they live, their own moral views, or the views of their political authorities'.[169]

1.5 Free Movement in Practice: Non-Ideal Theory and the Case for Free Movement

While the ideal-theory argument has been challenged by those who endorse something closer to the conventional view on freedom of movement, they have also been challenged by those who otherwise largely agree with the attractiveness of free movement.[170] In particular, they challenge the framing of the case for open borders as an ideal theory-type argument and accompanying claim that open borders is not currently feasible such as Carens's claim that '[f]rom a political perspective, the idea of open borders is a nonstarter'.[171] They argue that treating the case for free movement in ideal theoretical terms as a problem of moral theory or as a tool for developing a distant critical heuristic reinforces the view that open borders is unfeasible thereby weakening the case and making it a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Philip Cole, for instance, notes that there is a recurring pattern through Carens' work: 'that what the ethical arguments demand is not necessarily what we should argue for, because context makes a difference.'[172] For Cole, this suggests a tension between Carens's pessimistic and optimistic arguments when we turn to the question of what is to be done: it seems 'we have two Joseph Carens speaking to us.'[173] On the one hand, Carens endorses realistic and modest proposals for more open immigration policy in Europe and North America. On the other, there is a radical argument for open borders. Cole notes that the reason Carens splits things this way is because he believes pushing for the radical arguments may be harmful to the prospects of the success of what the argument is a case for or harmful in other ways. Thus, the more realistic argument focuses on what can be

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[168] Carens, chap. 12.
[169] Carens, 308.
[170] For a recent defence of this approach, see Carens, 'Replies to My Interlocutors'. For an interesting critical-theory defence, see Harald Bauder, 'Open Borders: A Utopia?', *Justice Spatiale - Spatial Justice* 5 (December 2012). Bauder argues that the positive articulation of a utopia required by a nonideal approach presents a vision that closes off the necessary dialectical process of working towards something in the real world, foreclosing as yet unseen options for open borders.
[171] Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*, 229. Although it should be added that Carens never claims that it is impossible, nor that it should not be the direction that we eventually push for.
[172] Phillip Cole, 'At the Borders of Political Theory: Carens and the Ethics of Immigration', *European Journal of Political Theory* 14, no. 4 (1 October 2015): 504.
[173] Cole, 509.

achieved under present conditions. But for Cole, this raises the question of what the more radical argument is meant to be for: if making an argument for open borders now would be harmful, then the case for open borders should not be made.[174] In any case, for Cole, it is the more radical case that he finds most compelling.[175]

Cole also challenges Miller's defence of liberal nationalism. Cole makes the case that the nation seems to defy rational justification, and so we have three options: to reject the idea of the nation, to accept its irrationality, or to argue for its rationality. David Miller attempts the third option, but Cole contests that Miller's defence of the nation is a failure.[176] Cole argues that Miller's use of ethical particularism to ground his argument collapses into what Cole terms moral communitarianism – which Cole takes to be incoherent meta-ethical relativism – that the moral principles can only be distributed and justified within a community; outsiders are due no justification.[177] But on Cole's view, liberalism requires that its decisions be justifiable to all those they impact, and because Miller defends liberal nationalism, Cole thinks that he must be able to justify their exclusion.[178] Thus, because he cannot provide these justifications, Miller's argument descends into irrationalism.[179] Cole also claims that Miller gives no ground for judging what an ethical community is. To Cole, Miller asserts that the nation is an ethical community but does not argue for it, and so, because he fails to define the ethical community, Miller cannot criticise racialist interpretations of the nation, which leads toward amoralism.[180] Thus, for Cole this is another variant of irrationalism.

Cole instead uses strategies similar to Carens to argue for a human right to mobility on the ground of a symmetry between internal and external movement, but Cole adds that the reasons for a right to emigration also compliment a right to immigration.[181] More generally, Cole argues for a right to mobility on the ground of such a right's significance to human agency, both as an important support for other rights and the ability of a person to be the 'author of their own life' – particularly for the poor – and as a means of avoiding domination.[182] Cole also offers several arguments against the right to exclude, amounting to a case for open borders. This culminates in Cole's view that normatively and practically a right to immigrate should be treated much the same

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[174] Cole, 508–9.
[175] Cole, 510.
[176] Cole, 'Beyond Reason'; Phillip Cole, 'Embracing the "Nation"', *Res Publica* 6, no. 3 (2000).
[177] Cole, 'Embracing the "Nation"'.
[178] Cole.
[179] Cole.
[180] Cole.
[181] Cole, *Philosophies of Exclusion*, chap. 3.
[182] Wellman and Cole, *Debating the Ethics of Immigration*, 298–300.

as the right to emigrate: as a prima facie right which can be restricted in emergency scenarios and treated in the same legal framework, constraining the ability of states to curtail people's movement.[183]

Amy-Reed Sandoval distinguishes between a 'classical' and a 'new' debate on open borders – not necessarily marked by temporal sequence – but where the former tend to be framed in terms of ideal or institutional theory, tend to be abstract and based on discussions of principles and rights, tend to be utopian in that they are not presented as viable policy proposals or politically feasible, and tend not to refer to particularities such as concrete identities or specific border regimes. The new debate, on the other hand, instead looks at the topic from the perspective of non-ideal or non-institutional theory, 'may draw conclusions from particularities' (including particular borders and identities), and may attempt to 'flesh out' the open borders position (when defended) in a way that engages with and connects to 'other applied areas of immigration philosophy.'[184] She argues that one of the advantages of reading the classical debate in the light of the new debate is that it helps overcome the abstraction and disconnection from practical action accompanying the classical debate and thereby makes open borders more feasible and can increase the appeal of political philosophical debates on the matter to activists and those working in other disciplines.[185]

Alex Sager takes a similar position. In the 2016 book *Against Borders*, Sager states: 'I think open borders are a feasible goal and that philosophical arguments for open borders should also serve as a call to political action.'[186] Moreover, the problem with presentation of open borders as

> unrealistic often evokes an emotional response, rather than encouraging a clearheaded investigation into reality. It biases us in favor of dominant perceptions of the status quo. The infeasibility of open borders is more frequently assumed than argued and the appeal to "realism" is too often a rhetorical trick to dismiss, rather than rebut, opponents … History and political sociology also, in my view, provide support for the possibility of open borders. The current border regime is a recent invention and the degree to which many immigrants are viewed as a security issue and criminalized is even more recent. The study of history teaches us that institutions are contingent and radical change is possible. Moreover, there are many

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[183] Wellman and Cole, 303–6.
[184] Reed-Sandoval, 'The New Open Borders Debate', 13–14.
[185] Reed-Sandoval, 26–28.
[186] Sager, *Against Borders*, 4.

examples of open borders at the local and regional levels, as well as between states in the European Union (EU), Australasia, and South America. The possibility of bringing them about entails a moral imperative to support open borders.[187]

He also challenges Carens's ideal theory in another way, arguing that Carens's use of a moral consensus over democratic principles is overly idealised in two senses: the consensus is unrealistic and, since his approach fails to explore the extent to which moral principles themselves may mask non-moral or immoral interests, uncritical.[188]

Nicholas Southwood and Robert Goodin also challenge the idea that open borders is in fact infeasible and thus that its infeasibility is a 'normative argument-stopper' – in other words, that the 'fact' of the infeasibility of open borders means it should be taken off the table of serious ethical and political consideration.[189] They argue that under the most plausible account of feasibility open borders falls clearly within the bounds of the feasible. Given this, opponents of open borders should frame their arguments in terms more agnostic and ambivalent about the feasibility of open borders, and so too 'should a hesitant proponent of open borders whose hesitation is based solely on worries about its infeasibility', offering Joseph Carens as 'one such example, [of a theorist who] thinks that the principled case for open borders would be compelling except for the unfortunate matter of its manifest infeasibility',[190] implying that Carens's separation of the issues into real-world and just-world may need (at least modest) revision, bringing borders in line as a feasible goal.

In contrast to the ideal-theory approach, Teresa Hayter, an author and activist, draws on anarchist, Marxist, and green strands of left-wing thought to make a direct case for no borders. She argues that the historical instantiation of immigration controls in the UK have racist origins, raising the question of their legitimacy. She argues that given their unjust origins, given that historically the world has functioned without borders – noting that immigration control in the UK is a relatively recent phenomenon with the Aliens Act 1905 – and given the high monetary cost of control, their harmful effects on migrants and particularly asylum seekers, and the benefits of migration, immigration control should be resisted, while moves to reduce inequality should be promoted. Moreover, she argues that immigration controls have proved fairly ineffective, claiming that in

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[187] Sager, 4–5.
[188] Valeria Ottonelli et al., 'Reactions & Debate II', *Ethical Perspectives*, no. 4 (2014): 591–600.
[189] Nicholas Southwood and Robert E. Goodin, 'Infeasibility as a Normative Argument-Stopper: The Case of Open Borders', *European Journal of Philosophy* n/a, no. n/a, accessed 13 December 2021.
[190] Southwood and Goodin, 19.

spite of rising costs of immigration control and difficulty of entering a country, neither have deterred people from getting in and may even increase their attempts to immigrate. In particular, it has created a lucrative market for people-smugglers and others aiding illegal immigration, who now have incentives to encourage people to immigrate so they can line their own pockets.[191]

Michael Huemer has defended a right to immigration with restrictions only in exceptional circumstances.[192] He is also a self-confessed 'utopiaphobe' who has recently criticised ideal theory as an approach to political philosophy because it invites three kinds of error: generating norms that fail to identify an agent they apply to; generating counter-intuitive 'crazy standards' for people to follow; and a reliance on abstract philosophical reasoning that the history of philosophy shows 'in general tends to be wrong.'[193] Instead, he prefers an intuitive, analogical approach to argumentation:

> suppose that I am reasoning about immigration policy. I have an argument that nearly all restrictions on immigration are unjust, with restrictions on migration from poor countries to wealthy countries being especially harmful and unjust. This argument rests on ethical intuitions about cases; it does not rest on a theory about the perfectly just society. Should I withhold judgment on the issue, or hold off from advocating relaxed immigration laws, on the grounds that easing immigration restrictions might somehow prevent perfect justice from being attained someday? With no concrete reason to think that this would be the case, and no account of how it would be the case, the answer is no.[194]

Rather than strictly challenging Carens's claims about feasibility, this argument challenges more directly Carens's shifting presuppositions method which, as we have seen, relies on abstract reasoning in two ways: it involves abstracting from one's overall views for the purposes of ethical argument and it relies on abstract principles. Carens's argument also appears to generate agentless norms in the absence of an argument to bring open borders into practice.

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[191] Teresa Hayter, *Open Borders: The Case Against Immigration Controls*, 2nd edition (London: Pluto Press, 2004); Teresa Hayter, 'Open Borders: The Case against Immigration Controls', *Capital & Class* 25, no. 3 (1 October 2001).
[192] Huemer, 'Is There a Right to Immigrate?'
[193] Michael Huemer, 'Confessions of a Utopiaphobe', *Social Philosophy and Policy* 33, no. 1–2 (2016): 226–30.
[194] Huemer, 220.

In Huemer's case for a right to immigrate, he primarily considers the case from the perspective of the US and wealthy states and their obligations to migrants. Huemer argues that immigration restrictions are coercive in a harmful way. Since people have a general right to be free from this kind of coercion, there is a prima facie right to immigrate. Furthermore, Huemer claims that while there may be some circumstances in which movement may be restricted, the right is not overridden (1) due to negative effects on the labour market, (2) due to the burden of providing social services to migrants, (3) due to a state's having special obligations to its own (even poor) citizens, or (4) due to any a cultural threat presented by migrants.[195] Huemer uses a series of thought experiments to draw out and reflect on the various moral intuitions that underpin his claims. Huemer defends (1) on the ground that the moderate to mild disadvantage faced by citizens of a wealthy market is outweighed by the severe disadvantage to be free from 'extremely harmful coercion.[196] (2) is defended on the ground that immigrants need not require full citizenship rights and thus access to social services to be granted access or residency in a territory.[197] (3) on the ground that, while it may be true that a state should give priority to the poor, few should agree that it should do so by violating the rights of foreigners and, moreover, since coercive law should be justified to others, it is unlikely that prospective immigrants will find it justified to be excluded for the benefit of domestic citizens.[198] Lastly, (4) is defended on the ground that states like the US are not likely to be at risk of losing its culture through immigration, nor does 'the avoidance of cultural change … seem an adequate justification for harmful coercion against innocent others.'[199] Huemer also argues that fears over catastrophically large amounts of immigration into a place like the US are largely unfounded, and in any case could be managed by a gradual shift toward open borders over time and buffered at the point (if it is reached) where immigration may cause serious harm.[200]

Sager makes a case for open borders using several strategies derived from other arguments on border control. He follows Carens and Philip Cole in arguing that there is a symmetry in the moral case for free movement within a state and free movement across state borders: the reasons for favouring one a largely the same as the reasons for favouring another and concurs with Arash Abizadeh that border controls are coercive and thus require justification to and by those they coerce, which would likely lead to an open borders position.[201]

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[195] Huemer, 'Is There a Right to Immigrate?', 458.
[196] Huemer, 437–39.
[197] Huemer, 443.
[198] Huemer, 444–47.
[199] Huemer, 447–50.
[200] Huemer, 447–54.
[201] Sager, *Against Borders*, chap. 2; Abizadeh, 'Democratic Theory and Border Coercion'.

He also argues that open borders would contribute towards important goals of distributive justice, improving well-being overall, and achieving moral equality.[202] Lastly, Sager argues that border controls are a form of structural violence that only open borders can sort out.[203] After considering objections, Sager suggests that, practically, the argument for open borders justifies resistance and the pushing of policy gradually and further in the direction of open borders and to continually resist and challenge the legitimacy of immigration enforcement.[204] Javier Hidalgo draws a similar conclusion to Sager, arguing that if it is true that open borders is what justice requires then this creates a duty to resist immigration law through non-compliance and disobedience and so, contra Carens and others, open borders requires more than tolerating aspects of the conventional view.[205]

In a different vein, Julien Müller argues from the perspective of non-ideal theory that the case for free movement should be made in terms of a two-tier approach to political philosophy. The two-tier approach draws a distinction between a more traditional form of moral argumentation in political philosophy where (under nonideal conditions) the moral values of one's audience are appealed to and reasoned about in order to make the case for X, and a more instrumental approach to morality in which an appeal is made less to moral reasons and more to reasons of mutual benefit, incentives, and enlightened self-interest. While these two approaches are usually taken to be in opposition, the two-tier approach takes them to be complimentary and to apply under different circumstances: the moral approach when there is a 'shared moral history' amongst one's audience, making one's appeals more likely to be effective; the instrumental approach when this shared moral background is absent.[206] Müller argues that the latter approach is more appropriate for advancing global justice in the ethics of immigration where calls for more open borders run up against several problems, such as lack of empathy. Thus, more free movement can be achieved by appealing to instrumental morality rather than couching arguments in primarily moral terms without necessarily needing to deny the moral argument, which sets the end-point for justice.[207] Müller argues that Charter-cities partly overseen by international organisations (such as a UN agency) rather than open borders would be a good way of advancing global justice in this manner.

[202] Sager, *Against Borders*, chap. 3.
[203] Sager, chap. 4. Reece Jones, geographer and advocate of open borders, has drawn similar conclusions for his open borders advocacy, see Reece Jones, 'In Defense of Free Movement', in *Open Borders: In Defense of Free Movement*, ed. Reece Jones (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2019), 264; for arguments on the militarisation and violence of border control, see Reece Jones, *Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move* (London: Verso Books, 2016).
[204] Sager, *Against Borders*, chap. 7.
[205] Javier Hidalgo, 'The Duty to Disobey Immigration Law', *Moral Philosophy and Politics* 3, no. 2 (1 January 2016).
[206] Julian F. Müller, 'Advancing Justice by Appealing to Self-Interest: The Case for Charter Cities', *Moral Philosophy and Politics* 3, no. 2 (1 January 2016): 233–35.
[207] Müller, 238–41.

Moreover, if global aid fails they would provide a way of making space for a right to immigrate without undermining others' right to stay – violations of which may occur, as Kieran Oberman argues, were migration policy used as a means to address global poverty[208] – without needing to rely on the goodwill of wealthy states and while creating a mutually beneficial arrangement: for the poorer countries that would host such cities, they benefit in the form of fees for leasing land and services, good, and taxes; for migrants, they benefit from having an opportunity to move and improve their lives; and for the international community, charter cities would provide a means of confronting migration crises.[209]

1.6 Conclusion

Thus far, I have mapped out several different positions in the debate over first-admissions, outlining the subtle differences between final positions and possible final positions that could argued for – no borders, open borders, closed borders, fairly open borders, the right to immigrate, the right to exclude, and so on. I then provided an outline of some of the arguments offered in political philosophy and theory in favour for some of these positions, no doubt broadly and imperfectly conceived – as is necessarily the case when attempting to generalise. My aim has been to outline the sense of variety in the kinds of arguments that have been offered and positions taken on the question of first-admissions. To conclude, I want to begin making sense of what underpins the differences and similarities between thinkers on the ethics of immigration by locating the source of these differences.

One obvious source is in part disagreements about empirical matters, for instance about the likely effects of more migration: David Miller argues that there is empirical evidence that trust can be undermined by more immigration, while Ryan Pevnick argues this can be challenged on empirical and normative grounds; (some) non-ideal theorists disagree with (some) ideal theoretical arguments on the ethics of immigration over the feasibility of the case for free movement.[210] I want, however, to leave the question of disagreements over empirical matters or feasibility aside, since empirical matters can be resolved empirically and questions of feasibility are, as Southwood and Goodin argue, fairly murky: some state of affairs, X, may appear to be unfeasible to bring about now. But state of affairs Y and Z that both increase the feasibility of X may both be

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[208] Oberman, 'Poverty and Immigration Policy'.
[209] Müller, 'Advancing Justice by Appealing to Self-Interest', 236–38, 241–43.
[210] Ryan Pevnick, 'Social Trust and the Ethics of Immigration Policy', *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 17, no.2 (13 April 2009): 146–167.

themselves be feasible goals. Thus, the important question is whether and why X would be good to bring about. Instead, my focus is on the subject matter generally constitutive of ethics: the normative itself.

While there has been a focus on difference so far, at this stage it is also possible to note some similarities amongst individual arguments. Both Walzer and Miller share communitarian concerns, specifically a concern with self-determination and the importance of culture and community and the bearing both of these have on public policy and thus the distribution of goods and rights within a state.[211] For both, conceptions of justice and morality are plural, generated through and as a product of the lived-experience of individuals and the communities of which they are part, and thus gain their normative authority for individuals through communitarian means. Miller and Walzer thus have a less demanding conception of the degree to which the interests of individuals have moral priority over communal interests, since for both of them some communal interests can have precedence over the interests of individual immigrants when the basic needs of immigrants are not at stake. Carens, while openly endorsing some features of Walzer and Miller's approach to political philosophy by accepting that justice and morality are contextual, takes a different approach by granting that liberalism has particularist origins – and so its authority is in part relative – but also arguing that liberalism properly understood has within it a universalism and hints, as we have seen, that this universalism should be understood as authoritative per se. Thus, for Carens the idea that the individual takes priority over the community inherent within liberal thought applies generally and so undermines the idea that immigrants can be excluded for communitarian concerns. This rejection of communitarian concerns, and thus the communitarian understanding of the normative weight of individual interests when compared with communal interests, runs through the debate: Philip Cole rejects it for embracing a form of moral relativism instead of universalism; Sager endorses a generalist theoretical position concerned with overall well-being; Abizadeh on the ground that it undermines the coercion principle. Fairly open borders theorists accept varying degrees of communitarian concerns: Pogge makes substantial allowances for self-determination but within a framework of a series of vertical authorities in which sovereignty is dispersed at multiple levels; Bader rejects communitarian concerns taking precedence over global moral concerns for the well-being of individuals, but allows limited partiality so longs as general obligations to account for these needs are met; Seglow offers a similar argument; and Isbister allows only partiality on the ground of meeting obligations towards poor citizens.

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[211] David Miller, *Principles of Social Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

One way of capturing these normative differences and the approach to ethics and political theory they entail is in terms of cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan approaches. Robert Audi has provided a typology attempting to capture this by distinguishing between cosmopolitan and more particularist views in terms of the differing weight they place on partiality for compatriots versus general concerns – in other words, in terms of the weight assigned to individual over communal concerns.[212] The idea is that in situations where there is conflict between general individual interests and reasons of special relationships – for instance, reasons stemming from obligations to one's compatriots – cosmopolitan positions are characterised by the degree to which they claim the general reason overrides more particular communal concerns. There are various ways this overridingness can be conceived depending on how reasons stemming from special relationships and reasons stemming from a more expansive grouping – like the interests of humanity, or rational beings, or beings per se – relate in the argument. Cosmopolitan arguments can thus be placed on a spectrum:[213]

(1) Strong Cosmopolitanism: reasons stemming from the preferences, wants, or interests of humanity always override reasons stemming from the preferences, wants, or interests of particular groupings when they conflict.

(2) Moderate Cosmopolitanism: reasons stemming from the preferences, wants, or interests of humanity sometimes override reasons stemming from the preferences, wants, or interests of more particular groupings when they conflict.

(3) Weak Cosmopolitanism: reasons stemming from the preferences, wants, or interests of humanity occasionally override reasons stemming from the preferences, wants, or interests of more particular groupings when they conflict.

Views such as Carens's can thus be placed under the heading of Strong Cosmopolitanism, while Miller places himself in the third category. Fairly open borders advocates are best located in the second. The typology is thus

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[212] Robert Audi, 'Nationalism, Patriotism, and Cosmopolitanism in an Age of Globalization', *The Journal of Ethics* 13, no. 4 (2009).
[213] I have modified the spectrum offered by Robert Audi slightly by describing what Audi calls 'Extreme Cosmopolitanism' as Strong Cosmopolitanism to do away with emotive language and the negative connotations associated with something's being extreme. See Audi, 'Nationalism, Patriotism, and Cosmopolitanism', 366–75.

useful since it seems to capture real similarities in otherwise diverse approaches. However, it tells us little about what accounts for those normative differences. Moreover, the typology has the result that practically every ethical position seems to be cosmopolitan. While this could be the case, there are those who reject the label.[214]

The question then becomes what is it about the cosmopolitan understanding of normativity that captures the similarities between, for instance, Carens, Sager, and fairly open borders advocates like Pogge and Bader and that makes the disagreements between them tend merely to be disagreements over efficacy, while the disagreement between these views and views such as Miller's and Walzer's seems to run deeper into more basic normative questions about how to understand the nature of justice, morality, and the task of political philosophy itself? In the following chapter, I explore this issue further by offering a definition of cosmopolitanism in terms of the conception of normativity that constitutes the position, a conception of normativity that I argue captures something distinct about how cosmopolitans understand normativity that helps make sense of the broad trend towards cosmopolitanism in the literature, despite disagreements over efficacy amongst some of them, and that helps make sense of the normative disagreements between cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan positions on the ethics of immigration. Thus, one way to cut through the debate will be to turn more directly to the question of how to understand practical normativity, rather than to the back and forth between positions within the ethics of immigration, which will then aid in evaluating approaches to the ethics of immigration.

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[214] See for instance the views outlined in Gillian Brock, ed., *Cosmopolitanism versus Non-Cosmopolitanism: Critiques, Defenses, Reconceptualizations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

2 What Is Cosmopolitanism?

'We are all cosmopolitans now', according to Michael Blake.[215] The claim is critical, intending to imply that the label 'cosmopolitan' has little practical worth. Scholars making this claim argue that the idea proponents and opponents often claim underpins cosmopolitanism – moral egalitarianism – is now so widely accepted that it forms the basic presupposition of moral thought.[216] The statement seems certainly to ring true for academic ethicists: as we have seen, even thinkers defending a version of nationalism or the liberal state's right to close its borders have claimed the label.[217] However, it is not clear that we all really are cosmopolitans: others resist the idea and some cosmopolitan thinkers argue that the term still denotes something distinct.[218] A host of thinkers have been identified as opponents of cosmopolitanism and something seems odd about labelling the likes of Alasdair MacIntyre or Michael Walzer 'cosmopolitan' – even minimally so – given their emphasis on the significance of relatively well defined communities and the local for ethics.[219] In fact, some of the so-called 'communitarians' (like MacIntyre) argue both that the good is prior to the right[220] and that there are inevitable and intractable disagreements amongst traditions and their conceptions of the good are unlikely to even be able to conceive of things in terms of cosmopolitan theory. Moreover, outside of theoretical politics, it is hard not to view nativism in Europe and elsewhere as a rejection of cosmopolitan principles.

However, the difficulty of saying what cosmopolitanism is and identifying its distinctiveness is compounded by the fact that there is a range of cosmopolitanisms that do not on the surface seem to share a clear common core. Cosmopolitans have endorsed and rejected the state; they have endorsed and rejected patriotism; they have endorsed and rejected minority rights, the value of culture, and the value of tradition; we

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[215] Michael Blake, 'We Are All Cosmopolitans Now', in *Cosmopolitanism versus Non-Cosmopolitanism*, ed. Gillian Brock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); David Miller, *National Responsibility and Global Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

[216] Blake, 'We Are All Cosmopolitans Now'.

[217] Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration*, 37.

[218] Thomas W. Pogge, 'Cosmopolitanism: A Defence', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 5, no. 3 (2002): 86–91; Thomas W. Pogge, 'Concluding Reflections', in *Cosmopolitanism versus Non-Cosmopolitanism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 294–98.

[219] See Brock, *Cosmopolitanism versus Non-Cosmopolitanism* for non-cosmopolitan positions.

[220] In other words, the view that the particular ideas people have about what is good overall, encompassing metaphysical beliefs, values, and so on is what makes authoritative the right: the rules about permissible and impermissible behaviour and what may be claimed of others and from political institutions. This is in contrast to the Rawlsian view that the right has priority over the good, meaning a more or less general and abstract conception of the right constrains what is allowed in terms of particular conceptions of the good. For discussion see Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, *Liberals and Communitarians*, 2nd edition (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 1996); Michael J. Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

also find both Kantian and utilitarian cosmopolitans; and cosmopolitans who defend world government and cosmopolitans who reject it. Thus, at first it appears that using cosmopolitanism as a means of zooming in on and better conceptualising the source of normative disagreement between different views in the ethics of immigration is a mistake. My aim in this chapter is to argue that there is in fact a precise unifying element in cosmopolitan thought that distinguishes it from other views.

Section 2.1 begins by reviewing the debate between those who argue that cosmopolitanism is distinctive and those who deny the claim. I argue that one plausible position in that debate stems from the idea that cosmopolitanism entails a 'global impartiality requirement' (GIR). However, I argue that is construed too broadly and so applies to obvious critics of cosmopolitanism. In section 2.2, I outline a more precise notion of cosmopolitanism as centrally containing forms of agent-neutrality coupled with a rejection of special relationships or their relevance. I then apply this to cosmopolitanism and defend it from objections. In section 2.3 and 2.4, I argue this definition can distinguish cosmopolitan from non-cosmopolitan but nonetheless liberal perspectives and unite what seem to be conceptions of cosmopolitanism different from the usual Rawlsian variety. In section 2.5, I consider another argument denying the theoretical distinctiveness of cosmopolitanism in terms of a virtue and argue that it is inadequate. I conclude drawing out the usefulness of this definition for understanding and this eventually evaluating specifically normative disagreement in the ethics of immigration.

2.1 The Global Impartiality Requirement

Cosmopolitanism has been characterised as a belief in three core premises: individualism, universality, and generality.[221] Individualism premises means that the well-being of individual human beings is the ultimate standard by which actions and institutions are judged by, rather than groups, such as states, nations, tribes, and so on. Universality means that this moral attaches to all people equally. Generality means that this status is authoritative for everyone: each person is an object of moral concern for every other person and not just for some of them. This is the position that has been criticised as too vague to provide a definitive notion of what cosmopolitanism is.

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[221] Charles R. Beitz, 'Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice', *The Journal of Ethics* 9, no. 1/2 (2005): 11–27; Patrick Hayden, 'Cosmopolitanism Past and Present', in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Ethics and International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2010), 45; Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights*, 169.

The argument is that these core principles simply amount to moral egalitarianism, but moral egalitarianism – which, in this sense, means that every person holds the same moral status – is something that almost everyone holds in its basic sense, even those who cosmopolitans have seen as critics of cosmopolitanism.[222]

The debate between cosmopolitans and their opponents often revolves around the question of whether individuals may express partiality towards certain others and so count their interests as weighing more than the interests of others. It starts by noting that cosmopolitanism can only reject such forms of partiality towards, say, one's own children, friends, and family on pain of becoming implausible. Because of this, forms of partiality can be incorporated into a moral egalitarian worldview. The next step is to argue that those who seem to deny cosmopolitanism merely express a preference for those of the same cultural origins abroad – sharing that same moral egalitarian worldview.[223] But because they can do so, there seems to be nothing particularly distinctive about cosmopolitanism 'with the exception of a few die-hard racists and national chauvinists who hold that the needs or interests of some human beings have more weight than those of others.'[224] One response has been to argue that, although this may be the case, the difference lies in what cosmopolitans think morality entails: the GIR.[225]

The GIR can be explained by way of some examples. It was noted above that cosmopolitanism seemingly becomes implausible if it rules out a parent's partiality towards their own children. However, context matters. Let us imagine that the parent is the head of a school that their children also attend. Let us also imagine that they use that position to provide their children with advantages relative to and at the expense of others. For most of us, such behaviour ought to be subjected to criticism and perhaps more. The parent's position as a head of school requires that they behave impartiality. Another example given is of a US President who favours his or her own state, say, California, over others. Again, the context here requires that the individual behaves impartially.[226] The argument is that cosmopolitanism requires in the global context (when 'global rules, practices, or organisations' are considered[227]) that one must consider the interests of every human being impartially. In

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[222] Michael Blake, 'We Are All Cosmopolitans Now'. Blake points to Michael Walzer's *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (Basic Books, 1984) as an example someone who defends cultural and national forms of partiality within moral egalitarian worldviews.
[223] Blake, 'We Are All Cosmopolitans Now'.
[224] Pogge, 'Concluding Reflections', 296.
[225] Pogge, 'Concluding Reflections'.
[226] Pogge.
[227] Pogge, 298.

other words, in the global context 'agents ought to be guided exclusively by agent-neutral considerations.'[228]

This account seemingly rules out positions expressing some form of partiality in the global context. It also seems to link up with the views of other notable cosmopolitans.[229]

However, it is notable that the main examples here are drawn from real-world conduct in international affairs. And its defence has been made through examples of national partiality amongst official in organisations like the WTO and UN and the US government's effort to install the presidency of the World Bank with an American.[230] This fails to give much consideration of whether and to what degree cosmopolitanism forms a distinct moral framework in the academy. The argument ultimately reads like it only distinguishes cosmopolitanism from real-world instances of nepotism and self-interest at the expense of others in the global context. But is not clear that moral egalitarianism and non-cosmopolitan positions do not entail something similar.

Moral egalitarianism entails that like cases are treated alike (in fact, basic rationality seems to require this) and that each person is a subject of equal moral status, but one could also add – since this seems to be another basic requirement of rationality – that it entails that one avoids harming others where there is no good reason to do so and where this can be avoided. It seems clear that an agent's acting on behalf of their own national interest at the expense of others – in other words, in not appropriately taking into the account the interests of everyone affected – ought to be morally condemned for doing so. Thus, the argument that cosmopolitanism fails to be distinct seems to have opened to it a similar means of moral criticism which it seems it is the purpose of the GIR to make available.

If the GIR is really what separates non-cosmopolitans from cosmopolitans, then it implies a rather uncharitable reading of non-cosmopolitans. Take, for example, Michael Walzer. When Walzer claims that a state may prefer the interests of others who are culturally similar, have shared interests and a shared history, it seems reasonable to read this as legitimate for Walzer only to the extent that it is not done to the extent that the preferential behaviour harms the interests of others or generally makes the world worse off.[231]

Does this count as considering the interests of others impartially? If by this it means considering the harms an action may cause and whether this could be justified, perhaps yes. One may argue that actions in line

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[228] Pogge, 298.

[229] For example, Peter Singer in *One World: The Ethics of Globalization* (Yale University Press, 2002).

[230] See for example Pogge, 'Concluding Reflections', 294–301.

[231] Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*; Walzer in *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press), 9-11.

with those seemingly advocated for by, say, communitarians, do in fact make the world worse off or harm the interests of others. But then the argument is being made on empirical rather than normative grounds. In any case, that acting on self-interested reasons even in the relevant sphere is wrong when such acts unjustifiably harm the interests of others seems to be a position available both to cosmopolitanism and its critics. This, in fact, includes a number of those who it seems would form cosmopolitanism's most obvious opponents – realists in theories of international relations.[232]

It seems, in fact, that most would agree that officials acting impartially and to the interests of all in global affairs would be better; the main points of contention leading to differences here seem to be feasibility regarding the constraints under which agents act, such as security, the availability of resources, the likely intentions of other agents, as well as what acting in the best interests of all actually amounts to in practice. However, if the GIR's agent-neutrality requirement entails that one discount any consideration of preferential weighting in the global context apart from a needs-based criterion, then the GIR does imply a distinctive position. However, this raises a question over the adequacy of this position.

Agent-relativity need not express partiality. Commonly, a rule prohibiting killing is thought to express a form of agent-relativity. But such a rule could be conceived in a way that is universal. Does this mean that considerations such as these are not the relevant considerations for cosmopolitanism when judging in the global context? Is the GIR argument thus misconceived? Not quite, on both counts. Cosmopolitanism can include agent-relative considerations in the global (and other) contexts. But there is another problem: how is such a position to make sense of cultural cosmopolitanism, where global ethics need not form any part of its subject matter?[233] My argument is that it can with some modifications and further exploration of the notion of agent-neutrality and that this holds interesting implications for cosmopolitanism when viewed alongside other universalist positions.

2.2 Cosmopolitanism, Agent-Neutrality, and Agent-Relativity

2.2.1 Agent-Neutrality and Relativity

In order to outline what agent-neutrality and relativity entail in more precise terms, we must digress into a discussion of deontology and consequentialism. It is also commonly noted that while deontology and

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[232] Molloy, *The Hidden History of Realism*.
[233] See the distinction made in Samuel Scheffler, 'Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism', *Utilitas* 11, no. 3 (November 1999): 255–57.

consequentialism are often distinguished between their accounts of the right and the good, another perhaps more useful way of conceiving the distinction is between agent-neutrality and agent-relativity.

It is typically held that deontology is agent-relative while consequentialism is agent-neutral. A way to understand these distinctions is through types of reasons. A reason is agent relative if it contains an essential and non-trivial reference to an agent, while it is agent-neutral if it does not.[234] That I should promote my own welfare is an agent relative reason. That welfare should be promoted is an agent neutral one. Another way to put this is through aims: agent neutrality gives each of us a common aim, while agent relativity gives each of a distinct aim even if that aim is the same for each agent.[235] Constraints are agent-relative and provide a clear example of how deontology differs from consequentialism. Let us explore agent-relativity with a simple variant of consequentialism: act consequentialism. This is the view that 'the right action is the one that produces the most value (best state of affairs, which may include the act itself).'[236]

In a situation where one is faced with the choice of killing one person to prevent the killing of two, or not killing that person and letting the other two be killed, then a deontological constraint against killing would tell you to do the latter. A basic act consequentialist argument might say that the best situation would be brought about by killing one to prevent the killing of two, because (let us imagine[237]) the theory claims that the best state of affairs. Here, since the reason is agent-neutral it makes no essential reference to an agent. In terms of aims, it gives common aims.

The example shows how this can be: on a consequentialist reading of the case, we have the common aim to prevent killing and bringing about the best situation gives an agent-neutral reason. Deontology only gives the agent-relative aim that *I* do not kill, since I ought not to kill one to prevent two killings. Thus, constraints on an action in the pursuit of the good are agent-relative. They concern only what that agent should do. An agent-relative theory can give each person the same aim not to kill (and so be general), but it gives a distinct aim to each agent that *they* do not kill--not the agent-neutral aim to prevent killing.

We have seen that one important difference between consequentialism and deontology is that deontology places restrictions on the pursuit of the good through agent-relative constraints. Another key

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[234] Thomas Nagel, *The View from Nowhere* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 152–53.
[235] David McNaughton and Piers Rawling, 'Deontology', in *The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory*, ed. David Copp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 426–27.
[236] McNaughton and Rawling, 424. The following largely follows the outline provided by their account of agent-relativity and neutrality.
[237] I use this naïve case for the purposes of illustration only. A more sophisticated argument might rule out the killing.

difference is the argument that consequentialism does not recognise the underived moral value of our special relationships, whereas (some) deontological perspectives can.

Ordinarily, we view ourselves as holding in special relationships with others: the relationship between parent and child, or friends, for instance. We typically hold that we owe special duties to those within our special relationships. But in a scenario where greater overall value can be brought about by giving food to a starving stranger over our starving child, the simple consequentialist view says to give to the stranger. But this does not accord with many of our deepest moral intuitions, so some deontological perspectives make room for these special relationships which act as constraints on the pursuit of value. Additionally, they argue that the value of these relationships is not derived from any higher, agent-neutral value. If we ask: why do I hold this special relationship with my child? The consequentialist answer that it contributes to overall value is likely to be unsatisfactory. Instead, deontologist argue that the most plausible answer is simply to hold that the relationship has intrinsic value.[238] But such relationships are agent-relative: they provide reasons and aims for particular agents only, and the value of such relationships is derived only relatively.

This picture is complicated somewhat by versions of consequentialism that make the space for agent-relative considerations, like rule and motive consequentialism. Rule consequentialism holds that we should select the best set of rules to feasibly bring about the best state-of-affairs, motive consequentialism that we opt for the best set of motives. Each may be able to justify having special duties to others due to our special relationships, because the best set of rules or motivations may be ones that protect and require such special relationships. However, in these cases agent-relative values are only valuable because their value is derived from an agent-neutral value.[239] Here, the main difference is that in the deontological version, these values are underivative – intrinsic – while in the consequentialist theories they derivative.

This should suffice to give a clearer idea of what agent neutrality and agent relativity entail, but this complicates the picture of agent-neutrality given by the GIR argument and raises further tricky questions.

2.2.2 Agent-Neutrality, Teleology, and Cosmopolitanism

It would seem, here, that the GIR argument with its agent-neutrality requirement would rule out deontology as a cosmopolitan perspective. Or it would at least entail that, to be a cosmopolitan, one needs to be a

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[238] McNaughton and Rawling, 'Deontology'.
[239] McNaughton and Rawling.

consequentialist in the global context and set aside deontological considerations. But this seems incorrect. The basic definition of cosmopolitan morality at the middle of the debate over cosmopolitanisms distinctiveness entails that 'all persons stand in certain moral relations to one another: we are required to respect one another's status as ultimate units of concern--a requirement that imposes limits upon our conduct and, in particular, upon our efforts to construct institutional schemes',[240] which shows a concern with constraints on consequentialist reasoning. Let us explore this further.

Within moral cosmopolitanism[241] there is a distinction between interactional and institutional moral cosmopolitanism. The institutional view concerns principles of justice applied to institutional schemes. It holds that individuals ought not to support unjust institutional schemes without making appropriate reparations to the victims of those schemes. In this sense, it is indirect in that it applies to human practices and not directly to individual conduct.[242] The interactional view, in contrast to the institutional view, is direct. Regarding human rights (or some other moral scheme) it applies directly to individual conduct. Individuals are directly responsible for fulfilling, upholding, and promoting rights.[243]

Let us focus on institutional cosmopolitanism and return to the interactional view later. One prominent version of the institutional view defines the justness of institutions as whether they effectively promote and sustain human rights. The argument is that human rights are subject to a wide overlapping consensus and so are less controversial than other possible conceptions of justice. There are two limitations to the institutional view. One is that the relevance human rights are contingent on the existence of institutions, since otherwise we would be in a kind of state of nature. In the absence of institutions, we would need an additional moral conception of human rights in order to criticise conduct.[244] Second, the global force of human rights only becomes activated when a 'global scheme of social institutions' emerges, triggering 'obligations to promote any feasible reforms of this scheme that would enhance the fulfilment of human rights'.[245] In the absence of such a global institutional scheme, '[s]o long as there is a plurality of self-contained cultures, the responsibility for such violations does not extend beyond their boundaries'.[246]

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[240] Pogge, 'Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty', 48.
[241] As opposed to legal cosmopolitanism, which, according to Pogge, entails an ideal that every person ought to be subject to the same laws within an overarching global legal order, as 'fellow citizens of a universal republic' 49.
[242] Pogge, 50.
[243] Pogge, 50.
[244] Pogge, 51.
[245] Pogge, 51.
[246] Pogge, 51.

At first, it might seem that the two limitations violate generality, but this is mistaken.[247] This is because, first, one still has a duty to every person not to impose unjust institutions on them and so is general in that respect. Second, this view only generates human rights obligations to those who participate in the same institutional scheme or are affected by that scheme because the rule only refers to practices, which means that in principle not everyone may be affected by them, although a key part of the cosmopolitan argument here is that such a practice exists at the global level. However, this is still general in that it 'is analogous to how the duty to keep one's promises is general even while it triggers obligations only vis-a-vis the person to whom one has actually made a promise'.[248]

We can note here the way in which this view is deontological and thus contains substantial agent relative elements: the duty not to impose an unjust institutional order on others forms a deontological constraint. It rules out imposing an unjust order on one group of people even if this brought about greater overall value. Does this mean that the GIR argument misconstrues cosmopolitanism? Yes, it appears so. Perhaps what this argument means to rule out is simply the notion of special relationships in the global sphere rather than all agent-relative considerations in judgement. Agent-relativity seems compatible with the institutional conception of cosmopolitanism, at least.

If this is the case, then agent-neutrality in the global sphere is not what makes cosmopolitanism distinct, but rather that it rules out one kind of agent-relative considerations – special relationships. The terminology appears to have been mistaken. However, when we look further, rather than ruling out agent-relativity, it seems cosmopolitanism always requires some form of agent-neutrality coupled with a denial of special relationships. Differences amongst cosmopolitans seem to be a matter of degree and context, but each seems to rely upon this combination of features to make their arguments. The institutional view of cosmopolitanism, though it does not deny all forms of agent-relativity, does seem to include a substantial agent-neutral component and the denial or special relationships.[249]

The institutional view has been claimed to be superior to the interactional view because the latter seems to require controversial positive duties, while former does not. An example given is slavery and a human right not to be enslaved.[250] On the interactional view, third parties like institutions would have no duty to protect

[247] Pogge, 'Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty'.
[248] Pogge, 51.
[249] Pogge, 51 footnote 9.
[250] Pogge, 'Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty'.

people from slavery, but simply not to enslave anybody itself. They simply have to refrain from enslaving anybody, even if other parties under the institution do. It would require a positive duty to protect and rescue people from slavery in order to prevent slavery within its institutional purview. But positive duties are philosophically controversial. The institutional view can broaden responsibility for slavery without the need for a conception of positive duties. Here, anyone who permits slavery within the institutional scheme violates a negative duty. Even if individuals do not own slaves but collaborate in the institution allowing slavery in some way, they are still in violation of the negative duty. Since individuals form and sustain institutions and we read the institution itself as being what violates the negative duty, positive obligation to reform or abandon the institution for individuals who collaborate in the institution is generated out of the negative duty not to violate the human right to be enslaved.[251] So far, so agent-relative. But when the questions of how to assess our institutions and in what direction to reform the institution arises, we enter the domain of agent-neutral value.

It is in the assessment of institutions that the institutional view becomes agent-neutral: 'it leads us to aim for the feasible global institutional scheme that produce the best pattern of human rights fulfilment, irrespective of the extent to which this pattern is established or engendered'.[252] Human rights generate negative duties not to violate the right and create positive obligations to fulfil them. Institutional schemes are the level at which rights are enforced and protected. Individuals who form and participate in institutions are responsible for what institutions do. Those institutions ought to fulfil human rights. When they do not, those individuals must change those institutions so that they do. We cannot violate rights in order to set up an institution that better fulfils human rights generally, and this sets a constraint on agent-neutral aims. But within this framework, the agent neutral element is supplied through the promotion of human rights, rather than the rights themselves.

Deontology need not rule out any and all agent-neutral considerations. What it does is place constraints on the pursuit of agent neutrality. Deontological theories may also make some substantial agent neutral consideration mandatory,[253] or they might propose more minimal agent-neutral aims through options, or make room for the supererogatory where the pursuit of the best state of affairs is praiseworthy, but not mandatory.[254]

Here, an interesting question and test case arises. If, as I will argue, cosmopolitanism requires an agent neutral element in addition to some form of denial of special relationships, then it seems that a purely

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[251] Pogge.
[252] Pogge, 54.
[253] Such as W.D. Ross. See David McNaughton and Piers Rawling, 'On Defending Deontology', *Ratio* 11, no. 1 (1998): 42.
[254] McNaughton and Rawling, 'Deontology'.

deontological (containing no agent-neutral/consequentialist element) cosmopolitanism is not possible. But, as noted earlier, purely agent relative considerations can be general and universal and some cosmopolitan positions might be read as purely agent relative. Here though, explaining why a purely deontological conception of cosmopolitanism is not possible gives space to clarify the necessary role agent-neutrality plays in cosmopolitan and brings us closer to a more precise formulation of cosmopolitanism's distinctiveness.

2.2.3 Is a Purely Agent-Relative Cosmopolitanism Possible?

An argument for what seems to be purely deontological cosmopolitanism suggests itself in another debate on the distinctiveness of cosmopolitanism. The argument follows the same pattern: either cosmopolitans defend a weak cosmopolitanism which is plausible but so widely accepted that the label is useless, or they defend a strong cosmopolitanism which is a distinctive position but not at all realistic.[255] The response is to argue for an 'intermediate' view that is more distinctive and substantial than the weak view, but which does not go as far as the strong view by making room for special obligations to one's family members and one's compatriots.[256]

The response defends a stripped-down version of the institutional conception of cosmopolitanism. This is the view that there is a negative duty not to impose an unjust institutional order on any other person. It is argued that this view is compatible with certain special duties or obligations, as negative duties generally are.[257] For instance, the negative duty not to kill has the same force whether it is my own kin or a stranger. We are not given more reason not to kill one or the other, but simply not to kill. But this is compatible in other instances where we might give food to a needy stranger or a needy friend and we favour our friend over the stranger, even if the food would benefit the stranger more, so long as we do not violate any negative duty toward either. The same applies to the intermediate position. The negative duty not to impose an unjust institutional order on another is compatible with such special duties. So, we may favour our own friends or family, and even compatriots, and we have special obligations to them so long as in doing so we do not violate our fundamental negative duties.

At the national level, such a view is generally accepted: though we may legitimately favour our friends and family and owe particular things to them, this is not to be done if we violate the negative duty towards

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[255] David Miller, 'Two Ways to Think About Justice', *Politics, Philosophy & Economics* 1, no. 1 (1 February 2002); Pogge, 'Cosmopolitanism'.
[256] Pogge, 'Cosmopolitanism'.
[257] Pogge.

fellow our citizens. Where this cosmopolitanism differs from weak cosmopolitanism is that it makes no distinction between compatriots and foreigners regarding this negative duty. Where presumably weak cosmopolitanism sees the negative duty not to impose an unjust order on compatriots as stronger than any duty not to do so toward foreigners, this view argues that there is no difference. The duty is equally stringent: 'all persons have a negative duty of very high stringency toward every human being not to collaborate in imposing an unjust order upon him or her.'[258]

One problem here is that this position seemingly fails the distinctiveness test. It is unlikely that many would deny the claim that we should not impose an unjust order on anyone, regardless of who they are, when there is a feasible alternative. It is open to any of the communitarians mentioned early. It would seem that we still are all cosmopolitans. But what if this is combined with the empirical claim that the current global order is unjust, that we all (or most of us in wealthy countries) participate in it, and that there is a feasible alternative available?

It would seem in doing so cosmopolitanism retains its distinctiveness. However, this seems to result in defining cosmopolitanism in an overly narrow way. Not every cosmopolitan position seems to require the empirical global interconnectedness thesis. A consequentialist cosmopolitanism need not accept that actions at home have drastic consequences elsewhere, or that we are all part of a global institutional order. But it might, because it maximises value, entail strong cosmopolitan obligations like giving to a global charity fund, since this would bring us closer to the best possible world.

Still, the pure deontology argument raises an issue with my claim that cosmopolitanism is best thought of as a kind of moral position reliant on a substantial agent-neutral element. The problem is that it presents the intermediate cosmopolitanism as a purely negative and thus agent-relative position. It seems that a purely deontological conception of cosmopolitanism is possible, and so the link lies in something other than agent neutrality. It may be that this view requires nothing other than a kind of restraint in what I do. It might not capture every cosmopolitan position, but it would be enough to show agent-neutrality account fails.

However, as we saw earlier, when combined with the empirical claim that there is an unjust global institutional order, the purely agent-relative conception of moderate cosmopolitanism creates a general duty not to participate in an unjust order. But it would be strange if that was all it did and is not obviously or

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[258] Pogge, 89.

necessarily cosmopolitan. It seems cosmopolitanism needs to be combined with a positive obligation to create a just order as well if it is not to lapse into a form of libertarianism.[259]

Here, then, is where the agent-neutrality comes in: what counts as a just order is decided by an agent-neutral value or set of values. The claim that the better promotion of X rights determines which order is to be supported gives a common aim and is thus agent neutral. In this case, a purely deontological view concerned only with not participating in a particular order, with no other obligation to change that order, would become merely a version of libertarianism.[260] But this does not seem to accord with intuitions over what cosmopolitanism is: a view that could tolerate global injustice so long as it does not affect me and I avoid contributing to it is not, at least insofar as moral cosmopolitanism is conceived in the present day, a view that is recognisably cosmopolitan.

Another issue is whether positive duties might supply this additional element. Recall the interactional view. Whether one thinks it is plausible or not, it is hard to deny that it is a cosmopolitan position. There, we gave the example of consequentialism as a version of the interactional view, but we could conceive of what on the surface seems to be a deontological version as well. Here, the positive element to do something could be provided through the notion of universal positive duties. In this case, the plausibility of the agent-neutrality thesis hinges whether a scheme of positive and negative duties is necessarily agent-relative and coherent, or whether positive duties are to be construed as agent-neutral.

First off, it might seem that positive duties cannot be conceived of as constraints, since they tell us to do, rather than not do, something. However, McNaughton and Rawling helpfully clarify that even positive duties to help someone 'curtail our freedom of action' and so plausibly can be construed as constraints.[261] But in this case the agent-neutral aim to maximise the good could also be construed as a constraint on action: we are not allowed to do that which does not maximise the good. Rather, the question of whether a positive duty is construed as agent-relative seems to turn upon the question of whether the duty is required even if it does not produce the best possible state of affairs (a sub-optimal or worse one) and is not in itself derived from some notion of the best state of affairs.

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[259] In some of his earlier work Pogge seems to recognise this. See for example, Pogge, 'Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty'.
[260] See for example Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (Oxford: Basic Books, 1974).
[261] McNaughton and Rawling, 'Deontology', 425.

Such a notion seems coherent. To take an example from the literature, say two children and a baby are drowning. I can either save the baby or the two children. A positive, but agent-relative duty might tell us to save the baby over the two children.[262] While in this scenario it seems highly implausible to me that we could have anything like a positive duty in this scenario, because it seems like an absolutely tragic case where any one course of action is no more morally praiseworthy or required than the other, this does serve to illustrate what a positive, but agent-relative duty would look like. How might a purely agent-relative interactional cosmopolitanism look?

Here the picture becomes blurry. As noted, the interactional view requires positive duties in order to prevent slavery. But here it is unclear why preventing slavery is cosmopolitan unless it generates a duty to prevent slavery generally so that I have a general positive duty to bring about a world where slavery is no longer a thing. This is cosmopolitanism, even if demanding. Where things become difficult is that this seems to lapse into a consequentialist position: it gives everyone the common aim of preventing slavery, and so is agent neutral. Perhaps we prevent slavery even if it makes things worse overall. But what would justify this if not the claim that a state of affairs without slavery is better?

Another example: let us imagine that someone tells us that each of us has a duty to give to a global fund for the poor, even if this does not bring about a better state of affairs for the poor or generally. What could possibly justify such a position without reference to an agent-neutral consideration? Who could possibly will such an action, let alone will that everyone behaves that way? Perhaps it could come from a divine commandment, so that it need not be justified according to our standards of rationality. But this seems too far-fetched a notion. In any case, its justification rests on an agent-neutral value that we enact God's will and so are implicitly concerned with bringing about a state-of-affairs. Since I cannot imagine a purely agent-relative cosmopolitanism, I leave it up to another to outline a coherent version of such a view.

So far, I have argued that one plausible way of construing moral cosmopolitanism is as a position where the individualism, generality, and universality aspects of morality are understood to require a substantial agent-neutral aspect and a scepticism or rejection of special relationships in certain spheres. This can take deontological and consequentialist forms. This view so far can, I shall argue, capture even cosmopolitans who appear to be quite distant from one another otherwise. However, the cosmopolitan treatment of special relationships has still yet to be discussed and a key issue is that there are non-cosmopolitan liberal views who

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[262] Michael S. Moore, 'Patrolling the Borders of Consequentialist Justifications: The Scope of Agent-Relative Restrictions', *Law and Philosophy* 27, no. 1 (2008): 41.

seem to be captured under this umbrella – John Rawls is a notable example. In discussing this latter issue, the former can be elaborated.

2.3 Cosmopolitanism, Liberalism, and Liberal Nationalism

Cosmopolitanism's opponents also seem to have agent-neutrality at the core of their ideas, so what is the difference? Liberals appear to be committed to what seem to be various different agent-neutral values, like equality and liberty, and often hold commitments to a universal conception of morality and other ideals. Generally, they hold liberal values to be the best set of values there is. But if this is the case, then it would seem that they are committed to the view that liberal values and the social and political organisation that best supports them are values that should be affirmed anywhere.

The difficulty is only apparent. The difference between cosmopolitans and their opponents lies in the role that special relationships play in cosmopolitan and statist liberal thought. The seemingly agent-neutral values liberal opponents of cosmopolitanism endorse are bound by a prior agent-relative notion of special relationships limiting the scope of these values. Because of this, what appear to be agent-neutral aims, reasons, and values that these opponents of cosmopolitanism propose become agent-relative. But this does not mean that cosmopolitanism's liberal opponents do not believe that the values are objective. They can affirm that they are the best set of values and should be affirmed by everyone, but actions these values prescribe or prohibit supply only agent-relative considerations.

To see this, let us consider a notable debate on the difference between cosmopolitans and statist liberals: the debate between Rawls and his cosmopolitan critics. In what follows, I assume the reader's familiarity with the gist of Rawls's version of liberalism. The crux of the debate between Rawls and his cosmopolitan interlocutors is over the question of whether Rawlsian ideas like the original position and the principles that stem from it should be applied to the global context and to what extent they should be so applied.[263] Rawls argues that '[t]here are certain "relations between individuals to one another which set the stage for questions of justice"'.[264] Here, the questions of justice concern how those relations between individuals ought to be governed and justice applies to institutions that govern those relationships.[265] Rawls assumes for the sake of

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[263] Joseph Carens, for example, argues that Rawlsian principles favour open borders rather than the more closed system Rawls presumes. See Carens, 'Aliens and Citizens'; Pogge also defends a broader version of a similar idea. See Thomas W. Pogge, *Realizing Rawls* (Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), 240–80.
[264] Pogge quoting Rawls in *Realizing Rawls*, 241.
[265] Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 3–10.

argument a closed social system in order to avoid focusing on questions of international justice and so generates

principles of justice for that society by arguing for an 'overlapping consensus' using the method of the original

position.[266] Rawls's agent-relativity comes out clearly here, when we discover later that his argument is meant

only to appeal to his fellow American citizens and that something different might apply elsewhere.

However, this does not mean that Rawls's approach could not be applied at the global level; in his

earlier work, Rawls himself applies the original position in order to generate a 'law of nations'.[267] His argument

is that domestic justice needs first to be determined before an international conception of justice can be.[268]

Rawls conceives of the international version justice as being decided by representatives of nations suitably

deprived of certain kinds of knowledge about their situation. While Rawls acknowledge that his list is likely

incomplete, he derives six principles:

1. Peoples/nations are equal,

2. Fundamental equal rights analogous to citizen's rights in the domestic conception,

3. Self-determination,

4. Self-defence,

5. Treaties are to be kept, so long as the other principles are not violated, and

6. Limits on the conduct of war.[269]

It is noteworthy that each of these principles are most plausibly construed as agent-relative, particularly when

we note that Rawls assumes the self-sufficiency of states.[270] Each of these principles simply tells nations what

they may not do to other nations. It contains no obvious agent-neutral requirement. Part of this is because the

overall agent-neutral goal Rawls's contractualism gives to agents is the just society itself. Our present, non-ideal

society should approximate Rawls's version were we to follow the decision procedure. The other part is because

Rawls's original position applied globally yields only constraints on action rather than any positive idea of what

global order should be like. Here, Rawls's prior argument that a special relationship holding in the domestic

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[266] Rawls, 7, 340.
[267] Rawls, 331–32.
[268] Rawls, 93.
[269] Rawls, 331–32.
[270] See Charles R. Beitz, 'Rawls's Law of Peoples', *Ethics* 110, no. 4 (2000).

sphere – the relationship where a fuller conception of justice applies – limits what can be said at the global level. At this latter level, Rawls resembles the libertarian position outlined earlier.

Whether aware of it or not, Rawls's early cosmopolitan interpreters supply the international theory of justice with agent-neutral considerations by arguing that the domestic sphere is more analogous to the global one than Rawls supposed. One argument is that he fails to consider conflicts over resources under the original position, which would require global redistribution even with Rawls's ideal theory assumption of self-sufficient states: resources are distributed unevenly over the earth, affecting the prospects of nations differently; thus, in the original position, the parties would agree to a redistributive principle.[271] This, however, presents a kind of agent-neutral ideal to be aimed at on the global level: a world where resources are distributed fairly amongst nations. And the argument does so by way of a notion of what is shared amongst nations: the earth's resources, functioning to lessen the distinction between the different agents (the parties) and so the relevance of the special relationship.

Other arguments go further, however, and argue that the self-sufficiency assumption itself does not make sense against a backdrop of global interdependence.[272] This would further deepen the application of Rawls's theory of justice since global society starts to more closely resemble the domestic case. Here, because interactions on the global level can have large negative and positive consequences for the participants, this position claims that Rawls's difference principle should come into play with the more stringent distributive requirements it entails.[273]

In Rawls's later work, *The Law of Peoples*, he includes two more principles stemming from the international conception of the original position, a principle that human rights be honoured, and a duty of assistance to societies burdened to the extent that it prevents them attaining a just or decent society.[274] The first of these principles can still be read as agent-relative. The latter, however, can be clearly read as agent-neutral, because it suggests an ideal to be brought about – a world where societies are able to become just or decent, bringing him somewhat more in line with cosmopolitanism. However, cosmopolitan criticisms of his argument remain.

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[271] Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1999); Beitz, 'Rawls's Law of Peoples'.
[272] Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations*; Pogge, *Realizing Rawls*.
[273] Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations*.
[274] John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples: With "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited"* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 37; Seyla Benhabib comments, however, that 'the sources of that 'duty' are left unclear by Rawls and speculates that a minimal notion of equality might be behind it in *The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 97 fn.9.

Beitz distinguishes between cosmopolitan liberalism and what he calls Rawls's 'internationalist' version of social liberalism in the later work. The main difference he suggests is between the internationalist view that domestic societies are responsible for the interests of the individuals within those societies, and the cosmopolitan view that 'principles for the relations of societies should be based on a consideration of the fundamental interests of persons.'[275]

Beitz argues that the internationalist perspective means that human rights are drawn in such a way that they are in the interest of the units called peoples rather than individuals: the justification of rights is based on promoting international stability which the representatives of peoples would opt for in the original position. On Beitz's interpretation of Rawls, a state's human rights violation against its citizens is not necessarily a reason for others to do anything if it does not affect international stability on the ground of his conception of a special relationship (peoples). But a conception of human rights that has less regard for individual rights violations is not acceptable from Beitz's cosmopolitan standpoint. He writes:

> one must recognize that human rights serve not only as minimum conditions for international recognition, but also, as the declaration's preamble puts it, ''as a common standard of achievement'' for the guidance of ''every individual and organ of society.'' Human rights function as standards of conduct for governments and in the policies of various international institutions and development agencies, as shared goals of political reform among international nongovernmental organizations (the elements of an emergent global civil society), and as focal points for domestic social movements in nondemocratic societies.[276]

He also argues against Rawls's more minimal conception of the duty of assistance. Although ambiguous, Rawls seems to include the duty in order to promote the conditions for stability.[277] It thus has a fairly minimal threshold – the point at which peoples can create a just or decent society.

Beitz criticises this on two levels, both of which lessen the relevance of the distinction between the domestic and international case, and so the relevance of Rawls's notion of peoples for generating different kinds

[275] Beitz, 'Rawls's Law of Peoples', 677.
[276] Beitz, 687–88.
[277] Beitz, 'Rawls's Law of Peoples'.

of reasons about what ought to be done internationally. Here, I gloss over the details of Beitz's argument. It is enough to note that at one level, Beitz argues that the notion of peoples would be insufficient in the international version of the OP and that individuals ought to be the main parties in the OP.

At the second level he argues that even if peoples are maintained to be the relevant parties, the international sphere due to reasons of interdependence, shared resources, and so on is much closer to the domestic sphere than previously thought. This then justifies considerably more stringent requirements of international distributive justice than Rawls supposed.

The interesting thing to note is that at both levels, in lessening the relevance of the distinction between individuals and peoples, the form of reasons for action in the international sphere change. If we opt for the individual level, valid reasons for action become agent-neutral ones that take into account the interests of each individual, rather than the agent-relative reasons that concern the interests of a people. If the notion of a people is maintained, the interdependency argument and other arguments showing that the domestic and international case are similar has the effect that agent-relative forms of reason need to be set aside in favour of agent-neutral reasons that take more into account the interests of the societies of other peoples. Others criticise Rawls's conceptions of a 'people' and the law of nations on similar grounds.[278]

We can see also see this concern play out more clearly in the debate between cosmopolitans and liberal nationalists. Philip Cole attacks David Miller for arguing that the scope of justification is bound to a particular community. Cole denies this, arguing that justification must be general. That X be justified to someone else is taken to be agent-neutral, whereas Miller takes something that would otherwise be agent-neutral and argues that it ought to be bounded by way of the agent-relative consideration of special relationships. And this could be argued for on the grounds of a universal conception of rationality, or fairness, harm, or something else.[279]

Must non-cosmopolitans be committed to denying weak cosmopolitanism? No. The term itself should be abandoned, and the label 'cosmopolitanism' reserved for something like the view I am outlining. It is widely agreed that most of us are in fact weak cosmopolitans. While it might serve to distinguish between 'bigots and racists', we do not ordinarily label ourselves something else in response to racism or bigotry. We simply label what they say as bigoted or racist and retain the assumption that non-racist, non-bigoted views are the default.

[278] Benhabib, *The Rights of Others*; Thomas W. Pogge, 'An Egalitarian Law of Peoples', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 23, no. 3 (1994); Thomas W. Pogge, 'Moral Universalism and Global Economic Justice', *Politics, Philosophy & Economics* 1, no. 1 (1 February 2002).
[279] Cole, *Philosophies of Exclusion*, 90–104.

The main difference between cosmopolitanism, then, and the liberal nationalist and statist counterparts, appears to be over the role of special relationships. These opponents of cosmopolitanism use some form of special relationship which functions to validate agent-relative forms of reasons, aims, and values in their arguments. Cosmopolitans, in one sense or another, deny the relevance of such relationships and so insist on the validity of agent-neutrality in the international sphere.

2.4 Accounting for Cultural Cosmopolitanism

Here, we apply my general theory of cosmopolitanism to some different forms of cosmopolitans. We know it captures liberal versions of justice cosmopolitanism, such as Beitz's and Pogge's from the preceding argument. Others also endorse the agent-neutral aspect.[280] We can also take it for granted that it captures utilitarian and strictly consequentialist variants, since these rely at the bottom on forms of agent-neutrality and the general irrelevance of special relationships for moral and ethical thought. The view also seems to be able to differentiate cosmopolitanism clearly from non-cosmopolitan rivals. The communitarians each defend some form of special relationship that either leads to a general denial of agent-neutrality or converts what would otherwise be agent-neutral values, reasons, and aims into agent-relative forms. We see this clearly with Walzer, who repeatedly emphasises reasons *for* a particular culture or group of people over other forms of reason. He writes: 'Morality is thick from the beginning, culturally integrated, fully resonant, and it reveals itself thinly only on special occasions, when moral language is turned to specific purposes.'[281] And even with regard to this thin morality 'minimalism is neither unobjective nor unexpressive. It is reiteratively particularist and locally significant, intimately bound up with the maximal moralities created here and here and here, in specific times and places.'[282]

Let us take a divergent forms of cosmopolitanism that does not appear to fit neatly within the framework I have outlined to see if it manages to capture a kind of essence to cosmopolitan thought. The view I consider is cultural cosmopolitanism. We have seen why the cultural view can be tricky. Cultural cosmopolitanism is the view that individual well-being, identity, or agency is not dependent on 'membership in a determinate cultural group whose boundaries are reasonably clear and whose stability and cohesion are

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[280] Richard J. Arneson, 'Extreme Cosmopolitanisms Defended', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 19, no. 5 (2 September 2016): 562–63; Veit Bader, 'Reasonable Impartiality and Priority for Compatriots. A Criticism of Liberal Nationalism's Main Flaws', *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 8, no. 1–2 (April 2005): 83–84; Julia Driver, 'Cosmopolitan Virtue', *Social Theory and Practice* 33, no. 4 (2007): 596–98, 607; Lukas H. Meyer, 'Liberal Cosmopolitanism and Moral Motivation', *Global Society* 14, no. 4 (October 2000): 632; Jeremy Waldron, 'Particular Values and Critical Morality', *California Law Review* 77, no. 3 (1989).
[281] Walzer, *Thick and Thin*, 4.
[282] Walzer, 7.

reasonably secure'.[283] Although justice cosmopolitanism and cultural cosmopolitanism appear to be distinct views, they are not mutually exclusive.[284] But the reverse may be true as well: cultural cosmopolitanism and justice cosmopolitanism need not entail one another. Is this true? If so, what unites these views?

In the essay, 'Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative', Jeremy Waldron argues for cosmopolitanism as a particular view of the self, one which is made up of a variety of different cultures, histories, and influences.[285] He criticises communitarian conceptions of the self, arguing that the cosmopolitan vision is more realistic than the communitarian vision and avoids the distortions and ethical problems associated with it. This undermines the notion that cultures and traditions should be protected through rights and other provisions, such as rights to resources, rights to close themselves off from the influence of others, and rights to keep their own members confined within their own sphere.[286] An obvious shared feature is the denial of the relevance of special relationships, that much is clear.

What sets Waldron's view apart from a radical libertarianism or even egoism is the way in which the negative argument is deployed: he uses it to ultimately make the case for inter-dependency and dependency 'on larger social and political structures that goes far beyond the particular community with which we pretend to identify ourselves'.[287] We see this when Waldron equally attacks the view that we are 'self-sufficient atoms, and behave as if we are supposed to behave in the fantasies of individualistic economics'.[288] The interdependency argument ends up feeding into a larger normative argument resembling the earlier cosmopolitan argument.

We later see that the urgency of this cosmopolitan view of interdependence is stressed given global conflict and crisis. So here it seems we have a similar pattern – the denial of special relationships and an affirmation of agent-neutral concerns (in this case, by way of the interdependence thesis). Here, it seems that the critique of the special relationships without an emphasis on inter-dependency or some other agent-neutral conception leads to what might well be egoism or libertarianism rather than cosmopolitanism. It seems that cultural cosmopolitanism follows a similar pattern as above and does end up running into the justice cosmopolitan position.

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[283] Scheffler, 'Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism', 256.
[284] Scheffler, 'Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism'.
[285] Jeremy Waldron, 'Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative', *University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform* 25, no. 3 & 4 (1992): 788–92.
[286] Waldron, 'Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative'.
[287] Waldron, 780.
[288] Waldron, 779.

2.5 An Alternative: Cosmopolitanism as the Name of a Virtue

One way of construing what unites cosmopolitan moral and political positions is the view that cosmopolitanism should be seen instead as a virtue or set of virtues.[289] At least one these scholars does so in response to the difficulty of ascribing any unified theoretical or doxastic element in cosmopolitanism.

The argument takes the position that cosmopolitanism is a widely-claimed and applied label but one which 'does not appear to refer to anything like a unified perspective'.[290] In fact, 'cosmopolitanism should not be regarded as a normative thesis at all. Two individuals with cosmopolitan virtue can make very different recommendations that depend in complex ways on empirical information, feasibility, contextual matters, and the relative priorities of the values at stake'.[291] While a commitment to moral universalism might be enough to distinguish it from its more morally particularist or relativist rivals, liberal nationalists, culturalists, and patriots all adhere to some version of moral universalism, 'even if there are significant differences concerning how the basic universalistic entitlements are conceptualised.'[292] Instead that cosmopolitanism is better thought of as a kind of 'corrective virtue' instead of a 'thesis-based normative theory'.[293]

What the virtue corrects is people's tendency towards having a dangerous or distorting attachment to large political entities such as culture, nations, and religious groups, entities which foster a kind of partiality towards other members of that entity. The main difference between cosmopolitanism and its rivals is then that their rivals view these attachments as more benign than their cosmopolitan counterparts. It is claimed that this can then account for differences between cosmopolitans and their moral universalist and moral particularist interlocutors.

The virtue-based argument is demonstrated by showing that in two cases of what appears to be differing cosmopolitan arguments – the cosmopolitanism of Jeremy Waldron and the cosmopolitanism of Simon Keller – the virtue-based account of cosmopolitanism can show what each of these thinkers share despite their apparent differences. The main difference between the two is that Waldron focuses on attachments culture, while Keller focuses on attachment to countries. We have seen Waldron's argument. Keller, on the other hand,

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[289] M. Victoria Costa, 'Cosmopolitanism as a Corrective Virtue', *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 19, no. 4 (1 August 2016); Stan Van Hooft, 'Cosmopolitanism as Virtue', *Journal of Global Ethics* 3, no. 3 (1 December 2007); William Smith, 'Cosmopolitan Citizenship: Virtue, Irony and Worldliness', *European Journal of Social Theory* 10, no. 1 (1 February 2007); Bryan S. Turner, 'Cosmopolitan Virtue, Globalization and Patriotism', *Theory, Culture & Society* 19, no. 1–2 (1 April 2002).
[290] Costa, 'Cosmopolitanism as a Corrective Virtue', 999.
[291] Costa, 1000.
[292] Costa, 1001.
[293] Costa, 999.

argues that argues that there is no need for patriotic attachment for one to be a good citizen and that patriotic attachment should generally be regarded with scepticism.

There are several ways in which this argument could be challenged. Here, I outline some challenges that should suffice to suggest that defining cosmopolitanism as a virtue is neither sufficient for characterising cosmopolitanism, nor to show alternative ways of construing cosmopolitanism have failed. First, leaving aside the issue of whether there in fact is some shared theoretical property (or its absence) that resembles something like a thesis-based argument – a proposition or set of propositions – the virtue-based argument has its own problems.

One issue is that in casting cosmopolitanism as a virtue it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that critics of cosmopolitanism simply lack virtue: the idea that cosmopolitan virtue has both epistemic and moral benefits suggests as much. Again, if we follow what seems to be a plausible conclusion to draw from her argument, it is hard to avoid seeing it as the view that cosmopolitanism is synonymous with what is good. While this seems to me to be a bizarre conclusion that cannot make sense of the debate between cosmopolitans and their critics and so cannot be right, the argument could simply be rejected on pragmatic grounds. A definition of cosmopolitanism that defines it as being simply what is good and true (or as a good and true worldview) seems like it will inevitably encourage bad faith and an uncritical attitude towards one's own views.

Another problem is that the virtue argument involves redundancy. If cosmopolitanism is a virtue simply because it corrects certain human tendencies towards injustice to do with one's relationship with a large political entity, for example 'dangerous or distorting attitudes towards … one's country',[294] then one question that may be asked is why other virtues, say, truth, honesty, prudence, and benevolence alone are not sufficient to perform this task. There does not appear to be a reason why they do not. One might counter this by agreeing, but then claim that cosmopolitanism is then just a name for a certain configuration of these virtues. But then we simply run the risk of defining cosmopolitanism as what is good or what a good person does and this, as mentioned, fails to make sense of many important things: theoretical disagreement, concern over cosmopolitan arguments, concern over cosmopolitan attitudes being harmful, amongst other kinds of disagreement.

Another issue surfaces in Costa's demonstration of the utility of the argument by showing how it unifies Waldron and Keller's versions of cosmopolitanism. A major problem is that it does not spell out the differences

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[294] Costa, 1001.

between Waldron and Keller's views. There is nothing obviously incompatible and no clear difference in principle between Waldron and Keller's views, since they deal with different subject matters. The virtue-based account suggests that what unites Waldron and Keller is a concern with 'undue partiality',[295] yet in the absence of any obvious theoretical differences and given the similarity between Waldron's and Keller's arguments – albeit regarding slightly different subject matter – we might ask for the theoretical expression of their views on undue partiality, outside of anything so vague as saying that it is a result of an apparently redundant virtue.

Lastly, it is notable that while the virtue-based argument refers to and cites Blake's argument against the distinctiveness of cosmopolitanism as he construes it, it fails to refer to Pogge's GIR-based response in the same collection of essays.[296] But, as I have argued, this response does offer a response to the claim that cosmopolitanism is not distinct (although Pogge's case is not well made). Indeed, if it is true that cosmopolitans all share a commitment to moral universalism but that there are significant disagreements with their fellow universalists over how this universalism is conceptualised, then one should explore whether cosmopolitans' understanding of moral universalism is itself something unique and relatively unified within cosmopolitanism.

The question that arises is whether there is a fairly distinct and unified cosmopolitan approach to moral universalism that characterises their view. We ought to then at least explore whether it is this particular cosmopolitan vision of moral universalism that their moral universalist rivals are questioning, if we wish to avoid prematurely abandoning the project of being able to characterise cosmopolitanism in an appropriate way. In this chapter, I have argued that there is, and this is a moral universalism that entails a denial of the significance of special relationships in the interest of promoting a form of agent-neutrality.

2.6 Conclusion

I have argued that cosmopolitanism is a distinct position characterised by the promotion of agent-neutral reasons and the denial of the relevance of special relationships. To return to the degrees-of-cosmopolitanism model outlined in the conclusion of the previous chapter,[297] the differing strengths of cosmopolitanism can be understood in terms of the degree to which reasons stemming from the interests, wants, preferences of a particular grouping will be overridden by some agent-neutral concern. Thus, with Strong Cosmopolitanism an

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[295] Costa, 1005–8.
[296] Costa, 1001.
[297] Section 1.6.

agent-neutral consideration practically always overrides the reasons of a particular grouping, while Moderate Cosmopolitanism allows the reasons of some more particular grouping to sometimes take precedence. I have argued that the Weak Cosmopolitanism of Rawls and David Miller (and thus by extension Michael Walzer) is not a helpful label and it is better to think of their positions and statist positions more generally as forms of non-cosmopolitanism due to their embrace of the relevance of special relationships. Michael Blake, although he rejects the defence of the right to exclude on communitarian grounds – for reasons of cultural protection and identity – can also be considered a non-cosmopolitan thinker, defending the significance of a special relationship in terms of a political relationship characterised by mutual coercion and responsibility.

It seems now that the major dividing line between positions within the ethics of immigration in terms of normativity is in terms of whether to take a cosmopolitan or non-cosmopolitan approach to political ethics. We have seen Philip Cole embrace a form of cosmopolitan reasoning and it should be clear from the above that Thomas Pogge, despite not advocating for open borders, is a moderate cosmopolitan. The other fairly open borders advocates who embrace a notion of global moral obligations can be included under the label, taking a general agent-neutral concern to have precedence over more local concerns or arguing for closure on merely general prudential grounds rather than grounds derived from special relationships. Joseph Carens and Alex Sager, for example – and despite Sager's scepticism about Carens's ideal/non-ideal theory divide – both embrace a cosmopolitan approach, taking a general approach to the question of open borders through an overarching argument concerned with human interests generally.[298] This explains why the disagreements between and amongst many of the open borders advocates and fairly open borders advocates appears primarily to be in terms of efficacy – in terms of how to achieve a prior agreed upon goal, while their disagreements with non-cosmopolitan thinkers seem to run deeper to the nature of justice and morality and thus how to think about political theory in the first place.

In what follows, I will take the divide between non-cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitanism over agent-neutrality and relativity and the relevance of special relationships to be a key, if not the key, factor in distinguishing between approaches in the ethics of immigration, granting that empirical matters and the effectiveness of particular arguments within the overall normative framework are important and that differences over these latter issues can lead to very different outcomes in an argument. I shall understand the

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[298] See sections 1.4-1.5.

divide between cosmopolitanism and non-cosmopolitanism to be a disagreement over the nature of normativity more generally, for reasons that will be become clear as the argument progresses. My strategy in evaluating the differing positions within political ethics will be, rather than to proceed directly to the topic of agent-neutrality and relativity, to turn instead to the more general and fundamental questions about the nature and source of normativity itself and then, after an answer has been worked out there, I return to the debate between cosmopolitanism and non-cosmopolitanism in political ethics.

Part II: The Humean Account of Normativity and Reasons Internalism

3 The Borders of Normativity: Desire and the Source of Normativity

How we understand normativity bears significantly on the kind of arguments we give in ethics; it bears on which kind of considerations bear most weight and how we formulate and understand the basic problems we ask and answers we give to them. Yet, in the ethics of immigration and political theory the topic is rarely (if ever) considered explicitly. Instead, it seems to operate in the background as an assumption of which one may or may not be aware. In this chapter, I offer a partial answer to the question of what I take the source of normativity to be. I argue that the key aspect of what makes a feature normative is that one possesses the relevant desire. Thus, the source of normativity in a descriptive sense is related to desires and desiring.

I begin by exploring normativity in the first person, before defending a general descriptive account of normativity. Section 3.1 outlines some preliminary reflections on how normativity appears to us. These preliminary reflections lead to a narrowing down of the potential sources of normativity, at least for the descriptive account I aim to supply here. In section 3.2, I outline how a debate between proponents of the view that belief is the source of normativity and proponents of the view that desire is the source, a debate between rationalists and Humeans respectively, seems to be at an impasse, before suggesting a way out of the impasse by resolving a trilemma formulated by Scott Sturgeon. In section 3.3, I consider the trilemma in more detail and make the case for its three horns and endorse a resolution offered by Scott Sturgeon. The trilemma is based around the seeming incompatibility of three attractive theses: cognitivism about normative beliefs: that normative judgements are belief-like or forms of belief, the link thesis: that normative beliefs are necessarily coupled with desires, and Humeanism: that beliefs and desires may come apart. The resolution to the trilemma leads to the view that normative judgements/beliefs are asymmetrical: that is, one may have the desire with a normative judgement, the belief and the desire, but one cannot properly make a normative judgement and have the belief but not the corresponding desire. In section 3.4, I consider and reject the notion of a 'besire' – a potential alternative to the desire-based view of normativity. I conclude in section 3.5 by outlining how the asymmetry thesis supports Humeanism about normativity – that the source of normativity is in desires – over rationalism about normativity – that the source lies in belief.

3.1 The Source of Normativity: A Preliminary Investigation

The terms 'norm', 'normative', 'normativity' are terms that have been taken by philosophers and social science to mark off a realm of values distinct from a realm of facts, of a realm of ought distinct from a realm of is, of a world-to-mind relation distinct from a mind-to-world relation, However, each distinction has been challenged.[299] As a preliminary way of getting at the phenomena, we can construe the notions as picking out a property or set of properties possessed actions, emotions, state-of-affairs, beliefs, or just plain things, abstract and otherwise by normative judgements – a property or properties in virtue of which the object appears to have a kind of 'should-be-done-ness' about it.[300] In other words, it is a property or set of properties singled out by a normative judgement in virtue of which it should be regarded in some way, believed, or done.

Normativity, at least in the practical sense, seems bound up with the notion of choice. It is not obvious that an object considered independent of any action or possible action, that is independent of anything we might do with that object, can be normative: a rock is just a rock, but a rock that I could choose to employ to prop open the door I want open seems in some sense normative. Actions, attitudes, emotions, and other states of being – all these also appear to be capable of having a kind of 'oughtness' or 'reason-givingness' or goodness about them. But their capacity to be normative is again related to the way they present themselves as potential options. Indeed, common disagreements over what is capable of being normative may well be due to disagreements over what's under one's control. Some emotions, for instance, might well be outside of one's control and one may disagree that some specific emotion could be normative. We need only to attend to the prevalence in law and moral discourse of intentionality in culpability and appeals to the principle 'ought implies can' to see the relevance of choice to normativity.

It seems then that the normative applies where something might be broadly intentional or semi-intentional. That is, it seems to apply in cases where something could be under one's control. Of course, this is a matter of degree. Certain situations we might think are normative even if we cannot now bring the about or perhaps could never bring them about. But even here, it seems the notion is a hypothetical choice: if we could bring X about, then it would be good. Whether or not the notion of choice is inherent in all discussions of normativity is another matter, but since practical normativity relates to the things we might do, the notion of

[299] See for instance: Kim Frost, 'On the Very Idea of Direction of Fit', *The Philosophical Review* 123, no. 4 (1 October 2014); MacIntyre, *After Virtue*; Hilary Putnam, *The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays*, Revised ed. edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Nick Zangwill, 'Besires and the Motivation Debate', *Theoria* 74, no. 1 (2008).
[300] Here I follow the outline given in Stephen Darwall, 'Normativity', in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2001); and also, Stephen Finlay, 'Recent Work on Normativity', *Analysis* 70, no. 2 (1 April 2010).

choice is closely linked in at least this domain of normativity. How then do specific things appear normative to us? Why does *this* object or course of action rather than *that* object or course of action appear normative to us? At least part of this can be explained through instrumental rationality.

There is a clear link between whatever end, goal, or purpose one has, the course of action that appears normative, and the particular features of things that seem to be normative. For example, something only seems to become normative for me, that is become reasons for me or give reasons to do certain things, when I have some goal. I have no reason to walk to the kitchen, open the fridge, and eat the sandwich in there if my current aim isn't to eat but to quench my thirst. Furthermore, it does seem to be the goal that supplies normativity and not the sensation of hunger or thirst. This is because we can imagine a situation where the sensation itself gives us no reason to appease it, but a reason to ignore or suppress it, because we have some other goal. Dieting is an example. Hunger seemingly gives a reason to eat and confers reasons upon the various scenarios we find ourselves in to do that which will lead to eating. But if I'm on a diet then that I'm hungry appears to give no reason to eat. It seems that the relevant factor generating this kind of normativity is the end rather than the sensation because whatever goal we have is the lens through which we interpret such sensations. This means different goals will alter things like the polarity, weight, and options some sensation might have. Similarly, in going to the fridge to take a bite to eat because you're hungry, it appears to be the purpose – to eat – that generates reasons and not the mere sensation of hunger.

We tend to say on occasion that this or that object is good, giving us or highlighting reasons to think about it in a specific way and act in certain ways towards it. The notion of our goals or ends can make a great deal of sense of this. What makes a pen a good one of its kind? Very briefly, we might say that some of the qualities of a good pen are that writes well and doesn't hurt your hand when you use it for a while. These seem to be the elements that anyone would include in their description of a good pen. But in light of what do these become relevant factors rather than, say, conducting electricity or making a noise when pressed? The answer is that we generally derive the features of a good pen from the task it was created for: writing. And we can see this for a great range of objects. A good winter coat keeps us warm and insulated. A good car drives well, keeps the driver safe, and so on.

From this we can understand when we get reasons to choose one thing over another. Let's say I sit down to write a long paper and I have two options: a pen that writes well in the way just described and a pen that is writes badly but conducts electricity. If my goal is writing, then the first pen's properties fit my purpose

and gives me a reason to prefer the first pen over the second. But one can see how one's goal makes what might be a property irrelevant to the thing's being a good one of its kind normative. If I need to complete an electrical circuit and I have only the two pens on me, then the properties of the second pen make choosing that one normative.

Perhaps all this is obvious. What has been shown so far is that certain ends seem to make certain properties relevant as means to that end. This doesn't quite tell us much about the source of normativity; it just describes how, when we decide to do something, certain factors become relevant. But here we might ask, what makes our goals themselves normative? What we need is to pinpoint a more specific notion or set of notions underlying whichever goals we have. Scholars have offered up desires, beliefs, or even just simple willing or endorsement as candidates. For instance, Ruth Chang and Christine Korsgaard have located the source of normativity in the will.[301] Humeans and others imply that desires, or the desire to desire, or desires under certain conditions are the source.[302] Others have located the source of normativity in the first-personal sense in belief.[303] However, we shall see that this can be reduced to just two: desire and belief. Let us then focus on willing/endorsement first. Since, in my view, it is a crucial part of any descriptive account of normativity but one which, alone, is not enough to undermine either belief or purpose.

To endorse an action, object, or a goal is a little more than just viewing it as worthwhile or good. It is a kind of personal stamp of approval, or an act of will in choosing or preferring this rather than that. Think for instance of a Prime Ministerial candidate. You might think another candidate is good, but Smith is the candidate you endorse. Furthermore, you might endorse Smith without doing much besides endorsing them. When the time comes, say in a vote or a conversation, your endorsement means that you'll likely act in a specific way in these situations. But endorsement still appears to be too vague to make sense of normativity. In light of what do you endorse Smith? For what reason?

One answer might be that these qualities, properties, or outcomes just so happen to be the ones that you endorse. But again, it seems reasonable to suppose that it is in light of something else that those things are

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[301] Ruth Chang, 'Grounding Practical Normativity: Going Hybrid', *Philosophical Studies* 164, no. 1 (2013); Christine M. Korsgaard, *The Sources of Normativity*, ed. Onora O'Neill, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[302] Mark Schroeder, *Slaves of the Passions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Neil Sinhababu, *Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Harry G. Frankfurt, 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person', *The Journal of Philosophy* 68, no. 1 (1971); Bernard Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons', in *Moral Luck* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Bernard Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (London: Fontana Press, 1993), 19.

[303] Jonathan Dancy, *Practical Reality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 12–14; Don Locke, 'Beliefs, Desires and Reasons for Action', *American Philosophical Quarterly* 19, no. 3 (1982); T.M. Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 7–8.

what's endorsed. When pushed, if someone asks me why I endorse something, it seems that I am compelled to give a reason for it. If I cannot give a reason for it, it seems to be ground to at least start questioning my endorsement of that thing. It seems that the response will likely be to highlight properties or qualities Smith possesses or some positive outcome that might happen if Smith gets elected, rather than just: because I will it--which appears arbitrary at best. But then we can ask again: what is it that activates those properties or that outcome as normative? Typically, the answer will be one of how the properties or qualities of the candidates will help some goal of mine and, if I'm trying to convince another that they too should endorse the candidate, some goal of theirs or, rather, ours as well. I might tell a story of how I think Smith's support for more funding for schools will mean teachers are better paid and better able to do their jobs, which I think will lead to better educated citizens, which I think will help keep the economy and society in good shape, which I think means that my children and friends and family and others I care about will be able to live lives that I believe are in some sense better. That, perhaps, is the kind of story we'd tell.

Presumably, we endorse these goals or the overall goal of living well in this story because, without the notion of endorsement, first-person normativity does not make sense: we couldn't even discuss it. Rather, endorsement is generally something which we do for reasons or in light of something else. But those reasons come from some goal of ours that itself seems to be endorsed in light of something else. It seems to me that I do not have reasons because I endorse something, but rather that I endorse something in light of the reasons it seems to give to me. It seems endorsement alone does not shed much light on which ends or goals are normative or why because the notion is too vague. It may be that my goals are simply given to me and that is why I endorse them. Perhaps I endorse something because I desire it or believe it to be good. But if either belief or desire, or both, then it would seem that that is the source of normativity rather than endorsement alone. Let us then try to get a clearer handle on the underlying notions.

3.2 Belief or Desire?

3.2.1 An Intractable Debate?

So far, we have considered where normativity comes from in the first-person, phenomenological perspective by considering how the properties of various objects become normative, how the properties of some purpose become normative, and how particular courses of action become normative. The suggestion there, was that it is our purpose or goal that in a way 'activates' certain properties as normative in an instrumental way. We then

came to the view through a discussion of the relation between intent and purpose that the relevant kind of purpose is one that is endorsed by the agent. If it's not endorsed, then it doesn't appear to be properly normative for the agent. Finally, we considered the question of where the particular purposes we endorse come from, suggesting that an answer to this is an answer to the question of where the source of normativity in the first-person perspective is. The candidate notions we are considering are belief and desire. Let us then try to get a handle on the differences between belief and desire in order to understand the debate between proponents of either view.

We might be able to separate these views out in a more precise way by following on from Hume and thinking of desire in terms of a 'passion'. Here we understand desire to be something closely linked to a feeling that arises within us and the endorsement part to be a kind of 'rational' belief about what it would be good to do, a kind of perception of what some situation requires. This view is not without merit in the literature. Jonathan Dancy, John McDowell, and Thomas Nagel all provide the resources for thinking of belief as a kind a perception, and indeed normative belief as a kind of perceptual faculty as well.[304] We could then understand the question here as asking us to decide between a 'Humean' view of normativity – that we have within in us non-rational passions which the rational part of ourselves works out how to satisfy them, so the aim of living well might be thought of as some innate but complex desire made up of the various desires/passions we just so happen to have – or a 'rationalist' view – a view that posits the rational endorsement part as dominant. So rather than desires being what gives us the goal, and so being the source of normativity, it would be a kind of belief over what we ought to do that supplies the purpose, irrespective of whatever passion arises in us. So here, beliefs – subject as they are to different evaluative concerns than passions, as outlined here – would be the source of normativity. The agreement in the views is then that one's purpose at some time – and indeed a purpose that one endorses in some way – confers normativity onto particular properties, and this is just means-end rationality. However, the main issue between the two views is what the source of that endorsed purpose is. If we answer that question, and nothing else lies behind that, then it seems we will have gone some way toward answering the question of what the source of normativity is, at least from the first-person point of view.

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[304] Dancy, *Practical Reality*; John McDowell, *Mind, Value, & Reality* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Thomas Nagel, 'Universality and the Reflective Self', in *The Sources of Normativity*, ed. Onora O'Neill, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

To make sense of the Humean case, we might understand it as claiming that all that's needed for normativity is that the individual possesses a set of desires with different weights attached to them. These then might provide purposes and account for differences between people. For example, they might have a set of three intrinsic/innate desires, A, B, and C, where they prefer desire A over B, but C is stronger than both. We might say that different constellations of such desires underpin different conceptions of living well and that their variability between people and the different contexts in which people find themselves leads to different manifestations of these desires. This might account for a key issue raised by the belief-based account that seemed to undermine the Humean one: namely, that we must still in some sense decide whether to act on this or that impulse or passion, where it seemed the deciding factor was what one already believed. Perhaps, instead, what determines overall whether one acts on this or that is one's overall set of desires combined with different features of the context one finds oneself in, making this rather than that course of account feasible or possible. This might then account for the main issues the belief argument raises for the Humean position and still maintain that desires are the ultimate source of normativity.

How would such an account look? Let's take the example of dieting. Perhaps one diets because one desires to be healthy. We might come across another person who has no desire to be healthy. For the first, their desire to eat when they are hungry is overridden by their desire to be healthy. For the second, because they lack the desire to be healthy, they perhaps would not be interested in going on the diet. Here, belief is still relevant to the extent that the person believes dieting to be one of the best or most effective ways to attain the goal of health. So, to that effect, we might also have two individuals with the same desire to be healthy, but one believes dieting will lead to that while the other believes dieting is not the best means to that and opts for some other route. One's beliefs would be normatively relevant but not a direct source of normativity in this case. There may be that individual who lacks the desire to be healthy altogether, which in this case directly affects what that person views as normative. A view like this might then be able to account for the purpose we have and the choices we make and even the beliefs we have about what is good in terms of the set of desires we ultimately have, conceived as innate and not subject to direct, voluntary control. That is, they are non- or a-rational. How then could we go about deciding between this kind of view and the belief-based view on the source of normativity?

The difference is between the question of whether this set of desires leads to people's beliefs or conceptions of what is good, or whether it could be that our conceptions, beliefs, or perceptions of what is good

lead to some or all of those desires, and whether the extent to which the conception of good changes independently those desires – or how we respond to and weight those desires – changes along with it. A simpler way of putting it is: to what extent are those posited innate desires really innate and ultimately unchangeable through changes in belief? Showing that wholly new desires can form out of the acquisition of new beliefs would then favour the rationalist view.

Joshua May uses an example given by Stephen Darwall to consider this issue, using it to defend and explicate a version of the rationalist view. May presents the examples as follows:

> Roberta grows up in a comfortably small town, which presents her with a congenial view of the world and her place in it. On going to a university she sees a film that vividly presents the plight of textile workers in the southern United States. Roberta is shocked and dismayed; she comes to believe she has a moral obligation to help such causes. Because of this belief, she decides after the film to donate a few hours a week to promote a boycott of the goods of one company that has been particularly flagrant in its illegal attempts to destroy the union.[305]

May argues that this example shows that rationalism should be preferred because it is the simpler option than Humeanism. However, May is partly right and partly wrong to suggest that rationalism is simpler than the Humean theory. In quantitative terms, rationalism appears to be more ontologically simple: it posits only a belief to make sense of the case, whereas the Humean story would ultimately posit an instrumental belief and a desire. But from another angle it appears to be ontologically less simple: it posits a particular kind of belief along with a set of rational faculties that need to be functioning properly in order to effectively respond to one's perceptions. It presents a kind of belief that represents and motivates when one's rational capacities are in order. And in this sense, since it posits a type of thing that is perhaps a little harder to accept than belief and desire in the Humean sense – which, as I shall argue later, both seem less controversial – and since both can account for Roberta and Jaqueline, it seems the argument from simplicity is in the Humean's favour. Just because an ontology seems simple in one way does not mean that it is necessarily simpler overall: quantitative simplicity

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[305] Joshua May, 'Because I Believe It's the Right Thing to Do', *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 16, no. 4 (1 August 2013): ??; see also Stephen Darwall, *Impartial Reason* (Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).

may be traded for qualitative complexity.[306] Without a good reason to accept the new kind of entity and reject the old one, it seems the Humean argument wins out over May's rationalism in terms of simplicity. I thus disagree with May when he argues that the common-sense presumption should be in favour of rationalism as the simplest and most ordinary explanation in cases like these: that Roberta's beliefs changed and so she formed a new desire. The first thing to note is that from the Humean perspective, such an example seems easily explainable in terms of desires. Roberta reacts with 'shock and dismay' at what she had seen, and for Humeans such a thing would seem to be easily accounted for by Roberta's having a desire to alleviate the suffering of others, or at least an aversion to seeing others suffer. And we should note that such an aversion or desire would plainly be dormant or not activated before Roberta saw the film, since she was not directly or only distantly aware that such suffering existed. And here we should also note that desire seems to be a phenomenon that is affected by distance and the vividness with which one imagines the attainment or thwarting of the desire or aversion.[307] For instance, my fear of sharks is only dimly activated when, from my office in England, I imagine a shark far away in New Zealand, but it is more vividly activated when I imagine swimming with one, and more vivid still when I am swimming and I can see a shark near me. This would be readily explained by the Humean in terms of an antecedent desire.

We could even imagine a parallel case that would seem to account for why the desire would be antecedent to the new belief, and so would be something we suspect was not created anew:

> Jacqueline, Roberta's twin sister, grew up in the same town at the same time as Roberta. She reads the same news and has roughly the same experience of the world as Roberta. Jacqueline also attends the same university as Roberta and goes with her to watch the same film. Jacqueline's response to the film is flat. Nothing in the film movers her and so she carries on as she did before.

The Humean here might be able to explain Jacqueline's lack of motivation in terms of a lack of an aversion to suffering. Jacqueline might be said to lack a desire to help others and so fails to respond as Roberta did. This is a fairly clear explanation of Jacqueline's actions. If we assume that Jacqueline formed the same belief as Roberta,

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[306] Chris Daly, *Introduction to Philosophical Methods* (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2010), chap. 4.
[307] Neil Sinhababu, *Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 28–29.

the content of which is: currently, some textile workers in the southern United States are working being treated poorly, then an explanation of the difference in terms of different sets of desires and aversions would seem to fit the case well and quite elegantly. The rationalist might question whether they really do form the same belief and, unfortunately, since this is a hypothetical case, it cannot be tested. The point is that the rationalist can explain Jacqueline's reaction or rather non-reaction in terms of a failure to form an evaluative belief.

What Jacqueline lacked was the rational capacity to form the judgement in this case, and so was unable to form the relevant desire. If that were the case, it would be due to the inability to form the belief that led to the inability to be moved by the film. What the example shows is that both Humean and rationalist perspectives are live options in this case. Perhaps Roberta's shock and dismay and subsequent motivation to act is due to some rational mental process (i.e., her rational faculties are fully functioning) and a simple disposition to feel in accordance with this process (i.e., one's belief forming process). What seems to be the case is that in examples such as this by adding and subtracting desires the expected outcome of viewing the movie changes. In psychological terms, the Humean theory makes sense: it's at the basis of how we generally explain and understand other people's actions.

For some, the problem for Humeans is that they need to posit forms of antecedent desires in cases like this of the form *Roberta desires to do whatever she thinks is right/good* that then lead to Roberta's desire to help.[308] However, for May, all that would be needed is that Roberta believes that it is right to help the workers and so desires to help. The issue is that Humeans must posit a kind of overall desire governing Roberta's actions, like a desire to be moral, while rationalists posit a more direct and specific desire to help formed out of her perception that the workers need it. The issue, according to May, is that Humeans would need to explain how Roberta came to have this desire, whether the desire they apparently must posit is universal, and account for its differences in strength amongst people – all without relying on an explanation that ultimately posits that Roberta came to that desire through a process of reasoning. The desire itself must be either intrinsic or instrumental but rooted in other intrinsic ones.[309] This problem is not in itself decisive – difficult perhaps – but

[308] Darwall, *Impartial Reason*; Michael Smith, *The Moral Problem* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 1994); Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other*; May, 'Because I Believe It's the Right Thing to Do'; for an overview see Nir Ben-Moshe, 'An Adam Smithian Account of Moral Reasons', *European Journal of Philosophy* 28, no. 4 (2020); for a defence of the Humean view, see Neil Sinhababu, 'The Humean Theory of Motivation Reformulated and Defended', *The Philosophical Review* 118, no. 4 (2009).
[309] May, 'Because I Believe It's the Right Thing to Do', 797.

not impossible to respond to.[310] Rationalists face an equally difficult problem in this regard: to explain why people's normative beliefs vary so greatly. Either way, May's argument is far from decisive one way or another.

A slightly different rationalist argument given by R. Jay Wallace attempts to more directly argue for rationalism by showing that new desires can form out of beliefs.[311] Wallace's argument draws on a distinction made by Thomas Nagel between motivated and unmotivated desires to argue that Humeans need to give a compelling a priori account of why all the desires we seem to form after evaluative judgements need themselves to be rooted in an antecedent unmotivated desire. Wallace conceives of a motivated desire as a desire we have for a reason. More specifically, he argues that these desires are open to what he calls 'rationalizing explanations'.[312] The point behind this notion is that for certain desires, these can be explained in terms of a set of evaluative beliefs. I shall adapt an example used originally due to Nagel and used by Wallace to illustrate the point.

If I decide to go to the shop to buy some food, in some sense I view food shopping and eating the food I buy as desirable or good. So, what's happening here? To explain it, the following factors seems relevant:

        (a) I view food shopping (and in the future eating the food) as in some sense desirable.

        (b) I see going to the shop as the best means to do this,

        (c) so, I go to the shop.

(b) is obviously not what's relevantly at issue between the two views discussed here. Rather, it is (a). And (a) is, perhaps, complex: one may view buying food as desirable for a number of reasons – perhaps it is simply that one is now or will be hungry and so one views eating when hungry as in some sense prima facie desirable. Wallace's point is that in the first premise we can reduce this down to a kind of evaluative belief – that X is desirable – which itself can be reduced down to a principle: when I am hungry, it is prima facie desirable/acceptable/good that I eat, which itself may be held due to other rationalising beliefs the agent has. Unmotivated desires, in contrast, are desires which do not admit of these rationalising explanations. That is, they are not reducible down to beliefs in certain kinds of principles. He suggests that it is then not a big leap to

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[310] See for example Sinhababu, 'The Humean Theory of Motivation Reformulated and Defended'; Sinhababu, *Humean Nature*.
[311] R. Jay Wallace, 'How to Argue about Practical Reason', *Mind* 99, no. 395 (1990); R. Jay Wallace, *Normativity and the Will: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
[312] May draws on the same notion in 'Because I Believe It's the Right Thing to Do'.

suppose that in some cases an agent has a desire only because they endorse the rationalising belief – for example, the principle it was based on. Something like this was hinted at earlier with the suggestion that whether or not we act on a desire seems dependent on whether we accept some other principle that directs how we regard that desire.[313]

Returning to Roberta, then, the rationalist could explain the case by arguing that, yes, Roberta had some pre-existing evaluative belief, for example: when someone suffers, I should help out when I can, that itself is sufficient to explain Roberta's aversion and subsequent action. The new data she receives from the film about suffering resulted in Roberta seeing that this combined with her principles in some way and so, as a result, she forms a new desire and intention to help however she can. But note also in this example that Roberta does not acquire a new principle. The rationalist explanation presupposes that Roberta already had one in the form of her principles (or desires, if one is a Humean). If this is the case, it does not resolve the issue between Humeans and rationalists.

What both sides agree on is that Roberta has acquired a new 'descriptive' belief or a new, or more vivid representation of how the world is, the belief that these workers are suffering right now. The rationalist can argue that she has a new desire, however, and a new desire as a result of the new descriptive belief. And the rationalist can also claim that Jacqueline was not moved because she lacked the relevant evaluative belief, or she lacked the desire. But this is equally plausibly explained by the Humean: she acquired a new descriptive belief, yes, but she already had a desire that Jacqueline did not. On the face of it, the rationalist seems to have more tools available to explain Jacqueline's lack of movement on the issue: it could have been due to the lack of a desire, the lack of the relevant evaluative belief, or both. The problem is that nothing in the rationalist argument suggests the Humean argument is not the case, which is equally compelling as an explanation.

This is because the Humean argument does not claim that descriptive beliefs are dependent on some antecedent desire. The Humean claim is only that evaluative beliefs are so dependent and that an evaluative belief is either itself a desire or a belief, but not both. Generally, this will be the position taken here – that an evaluative belief is just that: a kind of belief. Note where we've gotten to with the rationalist view: so far, we've seen how the rationalist explanation of Roberta says only that she develops a desire out of a change in her descriptive beliefs, not her evaluative ones. The argument was that these evaluative beliefs are reducible to

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[313] Gal Yehezkel, for example, agrees with this view in 'Can Desires Determine Ends?', *Philosophical Psychology* 30, no. 8 (17 November 2017).

rational principles/rationalising beliefs, as we've explained. It was then claimed that it would simply be plausible or common-sense to hold that from these principles alone an agent endorsing them can form a new desire. But what this implies is that one can acquire new evaluative beliefs, such as new principles, independent of any prior desire itself. And this is precisely what the Humean denies. Indeed, the Humean could argue further that one cannot hold the principles one has without them being rooted in a desire.

The issue is unresolved by considering cases like Roberta's. What the Humean would need to show is that the acquisition of new evaluative beliefs is always dependent on some prior desire. If this were the case, the rationalist rejection based on rationalising explanations of motivated desires would not work, since it could be shown that one's holding the principles – the evaluative beliefs – would itself be dependent on some kind of desire. The issue is not some much that normative beliefs are reducible to principles one holds, but whether the principles themselves are held based on prior desires or principles and whether new principles lead to new desires (or motivations) independent of some prior desire at the bottom of it all.

3.2.2 A Way Out of the Debate

My argument will draw on the work of Scott Sturgeon to argue that while beliefs and desires are separable – one can hold a belief without the desire and vice-versa – when it comes to normative judgements, this separability is asymmetrical.[314] So one could possess the desire that might correspond to a normative judgement and so be moved to act without having the belief, or rather the concept that 'X is right/desirable/good'. But the separability does not work in the other direction, so one cannot in the relevant motivating and strong sense have the normative judgement without having the corresponding desire. If one claims to have the belief that X is right or desirable without actually having the corresponding desire, then one has not made the normative judgement and in a sense relevant to the discussion here does not really possess the belief. Rather, one is perhaps mistaken about what they believe, insincere, telling a lie, kidding themselves, or some variant of these. If successful, this presents a problem for the rationalist argument because it entails that something like this is not the case with normative judgements.

In outline, my argument is as follows: (1) There are good independent reasons for thinking that normative judgements are only one-way separable. One of those reasons is that in denying this one is faced with

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[314] Scott Sturgeon, 'Normative Judgement', *Philosophical Perspectives* 21, no. 1 (2007).

the task of making sense of the idea of the anormativist – a figure forms normative judgements but fails to be moved by them – an idea which, I point out, is unintuitive and incoherent. So, you can have a desire without its being a normative judgement but not the reverse: one cannot have the belief without the desire and still be making a normative judgement or be attributed as having a normative belief in the sense relevant to first-person normativity. (2) Rationalism entails that normative judgements are two-way separable: you can have a belief without a desire and a desire without a belief. (3) Humeanism is agnostic with regard to the separability of normative judgements. Some variants of Humeanism accept the asymmetry thesis, others accept the symmetry thesis. (4) To the extent that (1) is the case then we should reject (2) and prefer variants of (3) compatible with the asymmetry thesis. (5) Versions of (3) compatible with (1) result in the view that normative beliefs cannot exist without the presence of a desire. This means in the first-person perspective desires are the source of normativity.

3.2.3 Descriptivism, the Link Thesis, and the Grain of Belief

First some terminology: 'normative judgement' refers to judgements like: X is right, desirable, or good.[315] Normative judgements have been described by some as kinds of desires, others as beliefs, and yet others as 'besires', which we have already put to the side here.[316] So there are disagreements about what exactly a normative judgement is. Part of the problem is that normative judgements appear to have two directions of fit.[317] When we make a normative judgement, we seem to describe an object or state of affairs as desirable and so it has a descriptive or world-to-mind direction of fit. But we also use normative judgements to express ways in which the world should be changed and so it also seems to have a mind-to-world direction of fit as well.

I will assume normative judgements are best explained by cognitivism and semantic factualism. I cannot argue for either, but both are accepted by many rationalists and some Humeans.[318] Combined, factualism and

[315] Throughout, I shall use the terms normative judgement and normative belief to mean roughly the same thing. Although it's not strictly the case, one does follow the other: to judge that X is good is roughly the same as representing X as good. The difference is that we ordinarily think of a judgement as occurring at the end of a chain of reasoning, but with belief it need not be so. Either way, it does not seem that this issue matters much for this argument. Something like this seems roughly to capture what a normative belief is about: a representation of something as being in some sense normative.

[316] The first two respectively by cognitivists and non-cognitivist. The last, prominently, has been suggested by McDowell, *Mind, Value, & Reality*.

[317] G. E. M. Anscombe, *Intention*, 2nd edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Onora O'Neill, 'Applied Ethics: Naturalism, Normativity and Public Policy', *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 26, no. 3 (2009).

[318] For some related considerations in favour see Michael Nelson, 'Descriptivism Defended', *Noûs* 36, no. 3 (2002); Ralph Wedgwood, *The Nature of Normativity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Ralph Wedgwood, 'Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms', *The Philosophical Review* 110, no. 1 (2001); see both Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, 'A Humean Explanation of Acting on Normative Reasons', *Synthese*, 17 July 2020 and; Neil Sinhababu, *Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) for Humean defences of cognitivism.

cognitivism about normative judgements is called descriptivism.[319] Normative judgements express a belief-like

state of mind that 'aims at endorsing that the world is as described by them', that is, 'they portray the world as

being a certain way', namely cognitivism.[320] Also, normative judgements 'are correct or incorrect as a function

of whether the world is as they describe', namely semantic factualism.[321] Normative judgements do seem to

function like this: when we claim something is good we are open to the possibility being wrong and revising the

initial judgement when further features that would undermine the initial judgement are recognised.

This understanding of normative judgements is open to rationalism and Humeanism. The version of

rationalism I consider here claims new desires can form out of normative beliefs, suggesting that we apprehend

facts, form normative judgements from those facts, and normally then form the relevant desires alongside the

normative judgement. So normative judgements in rationalism are descriptive in that sense.[322] Humeanism has

a range of variants, non-cognitivist and those that deny semantic factualism, but it is also compatible for some

with cognitivism.[323] My view is that Humeanism is most plausible when it construes normative judgements as

descriptivist.

Normative judgements also seem to form a necessary link with desires.[324] When one makes the

judgement 'X is desirable,' this seems to go hand-in-hand with a corresponding desire. As I have suggested, there

are good reasons for holding such a link between normative judgements and desires. I call this the link-thesis.

Combined with cognitivism this means that normative judgements are beliefs or belief-like, but they come

coupled with desires. A key difference between rationalism and Humeanism is over the way desire and belief

are linked in normative judgements. Humeanism claims a desire is present before the judgement and rationalists

that a desire can form after the judgement.

The distinction between fine- and coarse-grained belief highlights different ways of attributing a belief

to someone. Coarse-grained belief 'uses only a belief relation and objective truth-conditions' to ascribe belief.[325]

[319] Sturgeon, 'Normative Judgement'.
[320] Sturgeon, 571.
[321] Scott Sturgeon, 'Normative Judgement', *Philosophical Perspectives* 21, no. 1 (2007): 571. Note also that descriptivism is compatible with every normative judgement being systematically wrong. That is, this view is compatible with and even underpins certain accounts of error-theory such as J. L. Mackie, *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong* (Penguin UK, 1990).
[322] See Dancy, *Practical Reality*; McDowell, *Mind, Value, & Reality*; Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Wallace, *Normativity and the Will* for variants of descriptivism held by different kinds of rationalist views.
[323] For example, Mark Schroeder, *Slaves of the Passions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Neil Sinhababu, *Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
[324] See Fredrik Björklund et al., 'Recent Work on Motivational Internalism', *Analysis* 72, no. 1 (2012) for an overview.
[325] Sturgeon, 'Normative Judgement', 579.

Fine-grained belief includes further conditions. Perhaps the best way to explain this idea is with an example.[326] I begin with coarse-grained belief.

Becky points to a yellow object and tells us: 'this is yellow.' It seems we would be justified in attributing to Becky the belief that the object is yellow. Becky might also have been wrong about her initial judgement. She might have claimed or simply thought or perceived that the object is yellow when in fact it was orange. From this we can begin to make sense of the coarse-grained view: it is a way of attributing belief when we perceive a person is in a believing relation to the world which entails something perceived by someone about that world in light of that relation which could be true, false, or neither, which is to say that it has a truth value.[327]

This way of attributing beliefs is generally effective. If we witness someone make all the inferences associated with 'yellow' and in the presence of yellow things we witness them consistently suggest that they were yellow, we would usually attribute to them possession of the concept YELLOW and in the presence of yellow objects the belief that they are yellow. But, even if they claim an object is yellow when it is actually orange, even though they are mistaken we could still attribute to them the (mistaken) belief the object is yellow. This is the coarse-grained view of belief.

The fine-grained view suggests something missing from the coarse-grained picture. It is possible that Becky, despite claiming the yellow object is yellow, does not experience yellowness. Suppose she is colour-blind and has been all her life. Does she really possess the concept yellow? On the fine-grained view, not completely: she also needs to experience yellowness and apply the concept with regard to that experience. Suppose we meet Becky and she describes a yellow book as yellow. Great. Suppose we meet her again, but this time she describes an orange book as yellow and then a green one as yellow. Now we have reason to doubt Becky possesses the concept yellow because it seems either she doesn't actually experience yellowness, or she thinks the term 'yellow' picks out the things we normally label 'books'. But imagine that Becky says, 'yes, I know this is a book and that thing over there is a newspaper, but this *book* is yellow'. Yellowness is then the issue. In light of this, the fine-grained view adds in a further condition for belief attribution by pointing to what Sturgeon calls its 'realisation conditions in thought'.[328]

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[326] Drawn mainly from Scott Sturgeon, 'Normative Judgement', *Philosophical Perspectives* 21, no. 1 (2007); with additions drawn from Ned Block, 'Max Black's Objection to Mind-Body Identity', in *Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism*, ed. Torin Alter and Sven Walter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); and David Chalmers, 'The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief', in *Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives*, ed. Quentin Smith and Aleksander Jokic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
[327] Donald Davidson, 'The Problem of Objectivity', *Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie* 57, no. 2 (1995).
[328] Sturgeon, 'Normative Judgement', 579.

These realisation conditions can and do go beyond conditions like *believing that you believe that P*. In the case of the belief that X is yellow, to attribute possession of the concept YELLOW and the belief, not only do we need to posit the belief relation and property of yellowness in the object, but also that one possesses the concepts such that they 'appear in thought only when they are realised by the very phenomenal states for which they stand'.[329] The phenomenal state need not be the direct experience of yellowness, but simply a perception in the mind like an imagining. The fine-grained view thus holds that attributing a belief to someone entails the belief-relation, the truth conditions, as well as possessing the concept in the way just outlined. I will follow Sturgeon's view that a distinction like this applies to normative judgements.

3.3 The Asymmetry of Normative Belief

3.3.1 The Trilemma and the Case for the First and Third Horns

Sturgeon argues for the asymmetry of normative judgement because it resolves a trilemma. I already noted that both Humeans and rationalists can and do often accept descriptivism about normative judgements and beliefs and noted that part of what constitutes descriptivism is the view that normative judgements presuppose a cognitivist psychology. That is, normative judgements express beliefs or something that is belief-like. Cognitivism leads to one part of the trilemma. We have also already touched upon the other two parts of the trilemma: the link thesis and what Sturgeon calls Humeanism and what I shall call the separability thesis, so as not to confuse it with the more specific Humean view I defend here. The separability thesis is the claim that one can have a desire without a belief, a desire and a belief, or a belief without a desire. The link thesis is the claim that when we make a normative judgement, there is a necessary link between the belief, namely, the normative judgement itself, and the corresponding desire or 'desire like elements of mind'.[330]

Cognitivism about normative judgements says that normative judgements are belief-like. The link thesis says that when we make normative judgements, those normative judgements are internally and so necessarily linked to desire or desire-like aspects in the mind. But the separability thesis says that desire and belief are independent of each other and they can always come apart. They are distinct phenomena and one can have one without the other. But if this is the case then we cannot hold all three of these theses at once, or so it seems.

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[329] Sturgeon, 579.
[330] Sturgeon, 574.

To avoid the trilemma, one could deny cognitivism and so reformulate the link thesis since normative judgements would no longer necessarily combine belief and desire. Normative judgements might be thought to be expressive of kinds of desires, instead. One could then retain the link thesis because normative judgements just are desires, as well as the separability thesis, since beliefs and desires can still come apart. Another way to avoid the trilemma is to deny the separability thesis. Here, one could retain descriptivism and the link thesis, but do away with the idea that belief and desire are always necessarily separable concepts. One could posit something like a besire to get around the problem. However, I have already ruled out opting for the route out of the trilemma that follows the path of rejecting descriptivism and the path that posits a besire to reject the separability thesis. Another strategy is to retain cognitivism but reject the link thesis. This, as Sturgeon mentions, is a common descriptivist move. Normative judgements are then kinds of beliefs, but there is nothing necessary that links them with desire. One could have a normative judgement without the desire. Instead desire just tends to go along with a normative judgement. Sturgeon describes this view as based on the idea that 'judgement happens to go along with such [desire-like] elements, that correlation between normative judgements and desire is a matter of psychological law, or natural tendency, or some such'.[331] So why not reject the link thesis?

3.3.2 The Case for the Second Horn

There is an obvious parallel between the status of the link-thesis and debates over judgement externalism or internalism. Judgement externalism is the view that there is no necessary connection between motivation and normative judgement. One may judge that they ought to Φ, or that Φ-ing is desirable in some way and, all else being equal and without irrationality or some other psychological problem affecting motivation, not form the motivation to Φ. Judgement internalism is the view that there is a necessary connection between motivation and normative judgement: if one judges that one ought to Φ, all else being equal and assuming one's psychology suffers no problems, then they will form the motivation to Φ. Given these descriptions, we can see how the link thesis seems to imply judgement internalism. The difficulty with defending the link thesis derives from the apparently intractable nature of the debate over judgement internalism and externalism.

Part of the problem is that the necessity or non-necessity of the link is interpreted differently. Some give irrationality or motivational impairment such as brain damage and depression as supporting judgement

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[331] Sturgeon, 576.

externalism, but judgement internalists have incorporated these into their views.[332] What I say here is unlikely to resolve much, but my aim is to present reasons that favour judgement internalism at least when it comes to normativity, if not morality, but to do so while retaining key intuitions behind judgement externalism. What, then, is the case against the link-thesis?

Obvious examples come when we consider the application of some system of thought or theory to a problem. Legal judgements might be an example. Another might be the application of a moral theory like utilitarianism to a practical problem. Steven Ross, in a critical comment on judgement internalism, expresses the idea:

> Consider 'deserves'. It seems very obvious that one could say 'yes, I can see that Smith deserves the raise, but I am just not interested in giving it to him.' This certainly does not seem very hard to imagine to me. Or: 'it is very compassionate of Peter S. to give to the poor as he does, no doubt about that, but I just do not have that interest.' Consider also the application of normative terms in art, or the law. So, when we see that (or come, as a result of our deliberations given the testimony and the facts, to judge that) the nightclub owner was negligent, what follows motivationally? Absolutely nothing. When a musician says, yes, Debussy's late piano work is very expressive, but I do not respond very deeply to that genre -- do we feel he cannot possibly be using the word correctly, cannot know what he is talking about, cannot really understand the concept in play? I do not think so.[333]

The issue Ross raises is that it seems possible, common even, to judge that Φ-ing is the right thing to do, but not be motivated to Φ. Someone could read Kant, come to believe his moral theory is right, accurately derive practical conclusions from it, but not form the corresponding motivation. These examples suggest that whether motivation accompanies normative judgement is contingent. It may be that the pervasiveness of normative motivation is due to something general although still contingent, like a tendency to feel discomfort at the suffering of others.[334]

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[332] See, for instance, the overview given in Connie S. Rosati, 'Moral Motivation', in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, (Winter 2016).
[333] Steven Ross, 'Review of Impassioned Belief, by Michael Ridge', *Essays in Philosophy* 16, no. 1 (2015): 132.
[334] Sturgeon, 'Normative Judgement'; Russ Shafer-Landau, 'A Defense of Motivational Externalism', *Philosophical Studies* 97, no. 3 (2000).

The problem for judgement externalism is that these examples are hazy with ambiguity: perhaps the lack of motivation is due to a competing normative judgement, maybe their judgements are insincere, or maybe they form the desire but competing desires override it. That the examples, barring the musician,[335] rely on external systems of thought compounds the problem. This can be explained by analogy: one could, on some bogus scientific theory, generate predictions from that theory without believing it. But if this is the case, whether or not one really believes the theory is irrelevant to whether they can apply it. The same applies to normative theories or systems of thought. But what judgement internalism says is that when one forms a genuine and internal normative judgement, in the absence of any interfering factors, necessarily the motivation will be present. Imagine having a friend enthusiastically telling you they've come to believe a Kantian view that lying is always wrong, but you witness them telling a lie to avoid some trouble or embarrassment. Perhaps they're irrational or they misunderstood the theory, but suppose there's no evidence of irrationality elsewhere and they reliably form other judgements in line with Kantianism. It seems reasonable to suspect that perhaps they don't *really* believe the theory. Self-deception is possible and complex, as is residual doubt, partial belief or uncertainty, or simply being mistaken about what one believes.[336] This is acknowledged in a variety of theories of belief. The notion that one might be mistaken about what one believes only seems implausible if one accepts a simple dispositionalist theory of belief – the view that one believes if they are disposed to describe themselves as having a particular belief, they have the belief: 'believing that one believes that P'.[337]

Examples such as those given above cannot fully conclude in one way or the other on the issue, as Ross notes, 'like most analytic claims, it is not easily engaged by experience'.[338] However, that these examples relate to external systems of thought is relevant to understanding where the problem with judgement externalism is. The discussion around judgement internalism and externalism often revolves around the topic of morality.[339] But morality is something which is usually systematised into a system or procedure for thought in moral theory or folk morality and confronted as external to the individual through customs, rules, and laws--something taught

[335] Irrelevant because it is explainable by internalists in terms of differing tastes.
[336] For an overview, see Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, 'Self-Deception, Akrasia and Irrationality', in *The Multiple Self*, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
[337] For discussion, see Eric Schwitzgebel, 'Knowing Your Own Beliefs', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 39, no. sup1 (1 January 2009); for a nuanced account of dispositionalism see also Eric Schwitzgebel, 'A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief', *Noûs* 36, no. 2 (2002).
[338] Ross, 'Review of Impassioned Belief, by Michael Ridge', 133.
[339] For examples, see Russ Shafer-Landau, 'Moral Judgement and Moral Motivation', *The Philosophical Quarterly* 48, no. 192 (1 July 1998); Mark van Roojen, 'Humean and Anti-Humean Internalism About Moral Judgements1', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 65, no. 1 (2002); for an overview and criticism see Voin Milevski, 'The Challenge of Amoralism', *Ratio* 31, no. 2 (2018); Michael Ridge, 'Internalism: Cui Bono?', in *Motivational Internalism*, ed. Gunnar Björnsson et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Michael Ridge, 'Internalists Relax: We Can't All Be Amoralists!', *Philosophia* 47, no. 3 (1 July 2019).

by and learnt through others.[340] And the most common and intuitively appealing case against judgement internalism relies on the possibility of the genuine amoralist or moral sceptic.[341]

The amoralist in one formulation makes moral judgements that appear sincere, but is not motivated by them.[342] In others, the amoralist says, 'yes, I know Φ-ing is the morally right thing to do, but why should I Φ?'.[343] However, we must read the amoralist as making the judgement without the motivation and not as proposing some alternative action for the case against internalism to work.[344] It would seem that judgement externalism is on more solid ground than internalism if indeed such a case is possible, but it's not clear that it is.

Reading the amoralist as proposing an alternative, 'non-moral' course of action is more readily comprehensible than the case of someone who is genuinely unmotivated. That is, where morality is understood as an external system of thought competing with the amoralist's competing system of normative thought, the amoralist case makes sense. The alternative is that the amoralist's complaint is that they are unmotivated even by their own deeply held judgements. But this is like saying to someone: 'do whatever you want to do', and they ask: 'but why should I do what I want to do?' Or: 'do whatever you think you should do', and their response is: 'why should I do what I think I should do?' This would just be puzzling. This last difficulty for the case against internalism is clearer when we exclude the possibility that what the amoralist is objecting to is thought that confronts the individual externally by considering the more basic case of the anormativist.[345]

The anormativist is a considerably less plausible character. But it seems an anormativist should be plausible if this kind of argument is to undermine the link thesis since the thesis concerns practical normativity. The anormativist makes a normative judgement and, without being under conditions of irrationality, and still fails to form the relevant motivation. But this would be bizarre. It's hard, if not impossible, to imagine someone unmotivated by anything they see as in any way normative. We can imagine someone who is hungry and opens their fridge to find some food they like. They are rational and not suffering from any psychological defects and indeed judge that it would be good to eat the food. Further, they judge that there is no good reason not to eat the food. But they remain unmotivated. They can't deny that they think eating the food is good. They suffer no

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[340] Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, 'Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation', *The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)* 45, no. 178 (1995).
[341] Ridge, 'Internalism: Cui Bono?'; Ridge, 'Internalists Relax'.
[342] Milevski, 'The Challenge of Amoralism', 253.
[343] See for example Philippa Foot, *Natural Goodness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
[344] In considering the amoralist, Foot suggests this is the only way of coherently understanding the problem.
[345] Ridge, 'Internalism: Cui Bono?'; Ridge, 'Internalists Relax'.

psychological defect. And the case would have to be explained without positing a competing desire or normative belief for the example to work against the link thesis. But I can find no way of making it intelligible.

Rejecting the link-thesis seems to burden oneself with the task of explaining how a case like this is intelligible or finding some other route to rejecting the link-thesis. For this reason, the link-thesis should not be given up hastily.

3.3.3 Resolving the Trilemma with Asymmetry

Let's then return to the trilemma. We have cognitivism in normative judgements, the link thesis, and the separability thesis. We outlined earlier how they do not all seem compatible: cognitivism says normative judgements are beliefs or belief-like, the link thesis says these judgements are necessarily linked with desires, the separability thesis says desires and beliefs can come apart. How do we escape the trilemma? We do so by invoking the distinction between fine- and coarse-grained belief.

We use the concept of a coarse-grained belief at the level of the separability thesis to make sense of those claims, showing how desire and belief are ontologically distinct and that they can indeed come apart in two-ways when the belief is coarse-grained, showing also at some level someone can make something like a normative judgement without having the desire present. We use the concept of a fine-grained belief at the level of the link-thesis to explain why when one makes a full-blooded normative judgement there is a necessary link between belief and desire. Full normative judgements are beliefs in the cognitivist sense, but ones that necessarily come coupled with a desire to be what they are – normative judgements. We have then a degrees-of-belief understanding of normative judgement where one can make sense of something like a normative judgement in which desires and beliefs can come apart in that one may have the 'belief' without the desire, that is indeed a kind of belief albeit of a weaker kind, and that one may have a desire without a corresponding belief, as both sides in the discussion agree. And we can make sense of how in normative judgements, on some level, there ultimately must be a necessary link between the belief and desire aspects.

More specifically, we put forward the idea that at the coarse-grained level of belief, desire is not a necessary part of what constitutes the normative judgement. Instead, other factors like the disposition to self-ascribe the belief, the belief that you believe it, or representational content are present but not the desire and so it is not quite a full-blooded normative judgement. To be a normative judgement in the full sense, the desire must be present. This may not be surprising since, as Eric Schwitzgebel has argued, self-knowledge about one's

own beliefs and so belief-ascription more generally might be pluralist in nature.[346] For full belief it seems multiple aspects need to be present. But partial forms of belief are possible according to the presence of the different features of holding a belief. There is no reason to think this is not the case for normative beliefs too. This is why it is reasonable to think that normative judgements are asymmetrical. At the level of coarse-grained normative belief desire and belief aspects can come apart, but it's not the same with fine-grained normative belief. Instead, the desire must be present. So, at the fine-grained level a desire may be present without the corresponding belief, but one does not have a normative judgement or have a normative belief without the corresponding desire. Given this, I have now characterised normative judgements at the fine-grained level as a belief necessarily coupled with a desire, and so one may wonder if at the fine-grained level I have not ended up with a besire, something I initially ruled out. Recall that a besire is something combining the belief-like elements of belief with the desire-like elements of a desire.

3.4 Why the Fine-Grained View of Normative Belief Is not a Besire

There are ways of understanding normative belief that make desire necessary for, but not strictly a part of, normative belief. Multiple options are available.[347] I outline the view I prefer due to the options it opens up and the way it can clarify the discussion so far. This view is Jon Tresan's internalist-cognitivism which suggests that normative belief[348] must, to be a *normative* belief, must necessarily stand relation to something outside of itself.[349]

Tresan gives other examples of things that work this way: wishful belief, tourist map, planet, propaganda film all do. Here, I'll follow Tresan by focusing on 'planet' and 'wishful belief' to explain. A thing can only be called a planet if it orbits a star. In this sense, there is a kind of necessity partly constitutive of the concept 'planet': it orbits a star. But the star is not the same as or part of the planet, even if orbiting a star is necessary to the idea of a planet. This can be put in terms of de dicto and de re necessity: roughly, the difference between a kind of necessity in the thing itself (de re) and what is said about the thing or, as I'm interpreting it, the concept or idea of the thing. Tresan gives two sentences, one true and de dicto, the other false and de re:

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[346] Schwitzgebel, 'Knowing Your Own Beliefs'.

[347] For an overview of options, see Michael Ridge, *Impassioned Belief*, *Impassioned Belief* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

[348] Tresan uses the term 'moral belief', but his thoughts, as I show, apply to normative belief seems to work just as well.

[349] Jon Tresan, 'De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism', *Noûs* 40, no. 1 (2006).

(1) Necessarily, planets are accompanied by stars.

(2) Planets are necessarily accompanied by stars.

(1), the de dicto version, is true for the reason given above: part of the criteria for being a planet is that of 'being accompanied by a star'. But why is the de re version false? It is false because some particular thing we call a planet (that is, the thing itself) does not necessarily require being accompanied by a star to be what it is. It is still possible for it to be the particular constellation of elements of this shape, mass, and type without orbiting a star, so (2) is false. We have then two different kinds of necessity. From this we can see how something can both be necessary for X to be what it is, but not itself part of X. This is how something not the same as or of the object itself can still be necessary for what it is. For another intuitively appealing example, think of the relation between sunburn and the sun.[350] Similar considerations apply to an example closer to normative belief: wishful belief.

A wishful belief is obviously not the same thing as an ordinary belief: namely, simple representational content about the world. Tresan gives the example of believing that you are healthy because you wish it were so despite evidence to the contrary. As Tresan explains, it is a wishful belief because it has some relation to something external to itself, although it is still a kind of belief: wishful beliefs have a relation to conations. That is, if a person does not wish for something their belief is not partly a result of wishing – which is a form of desiring or in other words a kind of conative state – then we cannot attribute to that person a wishful belief. However, the content of the belief does not need the conation. The central point behind this can be shown again though a de dicto and a de re reading of the issue. Tresan gives us:

(1) Necessarily, wishful beliefs are accompanied by conations.

(2) Wishful beliefs are necessarily accompanied by conations.

Again, the de dicto reading (1) is true and the de re (2) false. That the de dicto reading is true should be clear, but why is the de re reading false? Suppose that the content of the belief is that *I am healthy*. This particular belief seems not to require any accompanying conation to hold it. All it needs is that the content of the belief is

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[350] This example is borrowed from Ridge, *Impassioned Belief*, 86.

such, so (2) is false. The belief itself is just that *I am healthy*. The content of any particular belief does not require

the conations, but for it to be a wishful belief it must be accompanied by conations.[351]

As we have seen above, with wishful thinking the belief itself – i.e., the content – can be understood to

be the same in the de re and de dicto readings. But what made the belief wishful was its relation to something

external to itself. If this is so, then the same can be said of moral beliefs. Let us suppose then that the content

of some moral belief is, again to use an example of Tresan's, that racism is morally wrong.[352] To understand my

point, suppose also that this is a simple utilitarian reading of 'morally wrong' so that:

(1) racism is morally wrong,

Corresponds with:

(2) racism contributes to an overall reduction in happiness.

Recall, then, that when we compared the de re and the de dicto reading of wishful beliefs, on both readings the

content of the belief stays the same. But to be a wishful belief it needed to be coupled with a conation. The

same seems to hold for a normative belief. One could believe (2) with or without the accompanying desire but,

without it, it is not a moral belief. It is possible for people to hold the content of the normative belief, the

representation, without it being a normative belief in the full sense. The belief ordinarily falls under the topic of

morality – itself a subset of normativity. But that does not qualify it as a normative belief.

Understanding normative beliefs in this way avoids construing them as besires. To correctly attribute a

normative belief to someone they need the corresponding desire. But the desire remains distinct from the actual

belief. It is thus not a desire which posits a distinct entity with both belief-like and desire-like elements. We can

draw on the de re and de dicto distinction to suggest a further, complementary way of accounting for the

distinction between judgement internalism and judgement externalism underpinning the discussion of the link

thesis earlier.

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[351] Tresan, 'De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism'.
[352] Tresan.

The form of rationalism considered here claims a non-instrumental belief alone can generate a new intrinsic desire. This means the desire may not be the product of a previous desire and a new instrumental belief. The asymmetry thesis presents a problem for this view because if a desire's presence is a necessary element of the normative belief, then it's difficult to see how a change in the belief alone could lead to the formation of a new desire. If desires and beliefs are tightly linked, if forming a normative belief proper requires the presence of desire and belief, then it seems a change in the belief aspect alone could not occur without also changing the desire, if the overall normative belief or judgement is to change. One would have to hold that at the fine-grained level beliefs and desires are separable – that the belief can be present without the desire – so that the belief itself can occur and then lead to a change in the desire. And this is what the asymmetry thesis denies. One may of course doubt this, so let's consider an example.

Suppose that one goes from believing a simple egoistic theory to an altruistic one. Suppose the egoistic theory says:

(1) The best way to live is to do whatever makes me happy,

But the altruistic one says:

(2) The best way to live is to do whatever makes others happy, regardless of how happy this makes me.

Perhaps this shows that the shift in belief from (1) to (2) leads to a new desire to make others happy. For rationalism to work, we would have to suppose that this desire was not present when (1) is what was believed. Further, we would have to suppose that (1) and (2) are not beliefs instrumental to another desire like a desire to live the best life I can, otherwise Humeanism stands. So, there are some obstacles to this view that begins to lead back to problems of intractability outlined earlier. In any case, coming to the conclusion that (2) according to rationalism here seems to imply the possibility of forming a belief not yet normative – from the representation that X is Z to Y is Z where X and Y cannot both be Z – and then having it become normative when the corresponding desire forms after the belief. But then how and why such a desire would form out the view that Y is Z would be mysterious. But it is less mysterious if the reason why the direct desire implied by (1) to do

whatever makes me happy changes into (2) to do what makes others happy was explained by the fact that (1) and (2) express instrumental beliefs about how to attain a prior desire: to live the best life I can.

3.5 Conclusion

The asymmetry thesis suggests that the source in the descriptive sense is a desire or at least something like a desire, rather than a belief. This is because just what it is for something to be a normative belief in the full sense – that is, just what it is for someone to hold a normative belief, rather than a belief about something that usually comes under the subject-heading 'normative' or 'moral' – is that it comes necessarily coupled with a desire. Indeed, some sense of the normative might even be present for a person – that is, some things, actions, properties may well appear normative to that person without them even holding a corresponding belief –the representational content – about what is good, right, or desirable: those objects may well just appear immediately normative without much thought being given about those objects. Think of the structure of the asymmetry thesis: if a desire can be present without a belief, and this can generate certain kinds of normativity for a person, then normativity is present. We can also have the belief and desire forming a normative belief and so normativity is again present for that person. And we can have the content of the belief without the desire, but no normativity would be present for the agent. Thus, from the first-person point of view, desire is the source of normativity and not belief and so cases where one desires what they believe is not desirable could and perhaps should be read in one of the many ways Humeans have explained them: in terms of competing desires, the contrasting strength and vividness of desires, one's confidence in being able to attain some goal, in terms of negative psychological states, or even in terms of degrees-of-confidence in one's instrumental beliefs.[353]

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[353] As argued by Sinhababu in *Humean Nature*.

4 Normativity from Within: Reasons Internalism and the Normative Constraint

The account so far concludes that desire confers normativity on beliefs, judgements, and actions from an agent's perspective. However, this yields the conclusion that whatever an agent desires is normative for them. But what an agent desires could be immoral or wrong. Is cruelty normative for one who desires to be cruel? What about desiring self-destruction or even suicide? The desire-based account of practical normativity still has much to account for. A view facing similar issues is Bernard Williams's reasons internalism. Reasons internalism is the position that something cannot be a reason for an agent to Φ if after sufficient deliberation the agent cannot form a motivation to Φ.[354] Williams's reasons internalism bares a close similarity to the desire-based account of practical normativity in the way it ties the normative (reasons) to what motivates (desires).

Rejection of Williams's reasons internalism is widespread.[355] Some still defend it, but it is indicative of this trend that some philosophers are willing to use consensus positions seemingly dismissive of reasons internalism as undefended premises in their arguments.[356] Humeans sometimes distance themselves from Williams's formulation.[357] Others, purportedly building on Williams's view, develop new models which result in a gulf between the old and the new version to address its apparent shortcomings.[358] However, I argue in this chapter and the next that the rejection of Williams's reasons internalism is premature. Consequently, reasons

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[354] Bernard Williams' now (in)famous case against the existence of external reasons appeared first in a paper titled 'Internal and External Reasons', in *Moral Luck* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). He further elaborated, refined, and applied his argument across an additional two papers, a reply, and a brief commentary on the original paper in Bernard Williams, 'Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame', in *Reason and Moral Judgment, Logos, Vol. 10*, ed. William J. Prior (Santa Clara University, 1989); Bernard Williams, 'Replies', in *World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams*, ed. J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Bernard Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons, with Postscript', in *Varieties of Practical Reasoning*, ed. Elijah Millgram (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2001); Bernard Williams, 'Values, Reason, and the Theory of Persuasion', in *Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline* (London: Routledge, 2006).

[355] For instance, Derek Parfit, in *On What Matters* (OUP Oxford, 2011), 73–110, notably used this apparent outcome of Williams's theory as spring-board for his defence of an externalist and objectivist moral rationalism. Jonas Olsen and Frans Svensson object to Williams' internalism on the grounds that 'common sense urges us to recognise that agents may have reasons to act so and so whether they desire to do so or not, or that agents ought to act so and so irrespective of their actual or hypothetical desires' 'Regimenting Reasons', *Theoria* 71, no. 3 (2005): 207, motivating them conceive an alternative desire-belief model of action that can accommodate criticisms of the model by those such as Dancy in *Practical Reality*.

[356] Maria Alvarez, 'Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality', *Synthese* 195, no. 8 (2018): 3296.

[357] Mark Schroeder, *Slaves of the Passions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Neil Sinhababu, *Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[358] See Philip Pettit and Michael Smith, 'External Reasons', in *McDowell and His Critics*, ed. Cynthia MacDonald and Graham MacDonald (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006); and McDowell's comments in the same volume in 'Response to Philip Pettit and Michael Smith', in *McDowell and His Critics*, ed. Cynthia MacDonald and Graham MacDonald (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006).

internalism provides a framework for developing and defending the desire-based view. By using Williams's reasons internalism as a model for the desire-based view and then exploring prominent criticisms of the former, the viability of the latter can be assessed on the ability of the former to withstand these criticisms.[359] In this chapter and the next, I elaborate, develop, and defend Williams's reasons internalism.

In this chapter I clarify the underlying argument for reasons internalism and show its alignment with the desire-based view (section 4.2). In 4.2.1-4.2.5, I explain each of the main premises and show how the argument fits together. I then turn to address the species of criticism I began with: that reasons internalism fails to yield normative conclusions. That is, it fails to meet the normative constraint.[360] 4.3 introduces two influential forms of this objection: The Too Many and Too Few Reasons objections. 4.4 considers the Too Many Reasons objection by considering and responding to Warren Quinn's influential 'Radioman' thought experiment.[361] Through this thought experiment, Quinn presents a case of an atypical desirer designed to show that Humean internalism is incoherent or implausible. Quinn argues that the case pulls in the direction of objectivism or externalism instead (4.4-4.4.1). In 4.4.2-4.4.3, I develop a strategy for warding off cases like the Radioman, by explicating and building on the centrality of action to reasons internalism. I argue that what the Radioman does cannot coherently be understood as an instance of action and so it the thought experiment ceases to tell against reasons internalism. On the back of this, I develop a theory of the urges (4.4.3) that can meet further issues the Too Many Reasons objection raises. In 4.5, I consider the Too Few Reasons objection. I argue that the fact that Williams raises the objection against himself and did not just bite the bullet but showed that the examples motivating the Too Few Reasons objection speak in favour of reasons internalism, suggests it is an inherently weaker objection than the Too Many Reasons. I explore Williams's thoughts on the issue and conclude that the force of this objection resides in the success of alternatives to reasons internalism and requires the rejection of one or more of the premises on which Williams's reasons internalism is built.

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[359] The focus on reasons might seem to prematurely limit the field of questions about practical normativity: why think a discussion of reasons overlays questions about normativity? The answer is that it might not. While many do understand reasons to be the foundation for other normative concepts, such as Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other*; Parfit, *On What Matters: Volume One*. To them, reasons internalism is directly concerned with normativity. This is at least initially plausible: if a conception of justice, for instance, never gives reasons to think or do anything, it is difficult to say that it is normative. Others disagree, such as Judith Jarvis Thomson, *Normativity* (Open Court, 2015); J. David Velleman, *Foundations for Moral Relativism: Second Expanded Edition* (Open Book Publishers, 2015). Williams himself occasionally seems to favour the latter view when he explains one possible meaning behind an external reason statement as: 'things would be better if the agent had so acted', suggesting that good/better might have a normativity independent of an agent's reasons 'Internal and External Reasons', 111; 'Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame', in *Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers 1982-1993* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 39. However, this should be taken with a large pinch of salt, as we shall see, since Williams' comment was given in the context of providing one possible meaning behind a claim which is ultimately false. We shall set this issue aside for now.
[360] I first encountered this term in Eric Wiland, *Reasons* (London: Continuum, 2012).
[361] I follow Michael Smith in 'Four Objections to the Standard Story of Action (and Four Replies)', *Philosophical Issues* 22 (2012) in calling the individual in Quinn's case the 'Radioman'. My solution to the case also follows a similar general strategy, although my account of action, urges, and desires differs significantly, and perhaps has more in common with the picture of Aristotle's theory of practical reasoning painted by Jessica Moss in *Aristotle on the Apparent Good: Perception, Phantasia, Thought, and Desire* (OUP Oxford, 2012).

4.1 Bernard Williams's Reasons Internalism

Williams's argument runs as follows:

(1) Internalism: a reason statement is falsified by the absence of a motivation in the agent where 'absence of motivation' should be taken to mean the absence of a motivation formed after sufficient deliberation. If the agent cannot form the motivation entailed by the reason statement after deliberation, then the reason statement is false.

(2) Externalism: a reason statement is not falsified by the absence of a motivation in the agent before or after deliberation.

(3) The Explanatory Constraint: a single reason can both explain and justify an action. A plausible theory of practical reasoning must explain how this is possible.

(4) The Humean Theory of Motivation and Reasons:

    (4a) The Humean Theory of Motivation: an agent can only form new motivations through deliberation from existing motivations or through a non-rational process such as conversion.

    (4b) The Humean Theory of Reasons: a reason explains an action by citing the relevant motivation and belief.

(5) Reason statements consistent with externalism (2) are incompatible with the Humean Theory of Motivation and Reason (4) because these reasons cannot be the agent's motivation unless they rely on an implausible theory of motivation. Because externalist reason statements are incompatible with (4), they are incompatible with the Explanatory Constraint (3).

Therefore, externalism is an implausible theory of practical reasoning.

4.1.1 The Distinction between Internalism and Externalism

Williams's focus in his case for reasons internalism is on what falsifies reason statements, statements of the form 'A has a reason to Φ'[362] or 'there is a reason for A to Φ'. He notes that there are at least two ways of interpreting these statements. One is as claiming that 'A has some motive that will be furthered or served by [their] Φ-ing'.[363] This interpretation implies that the absence of a motive in A renders the statement untrue. The other is to understand these statements as lacking this condition: the absence of a motive in A would not necessarily make the statement untrue. The first interpretation expresses reasons internalism, the latter reasons externalism.

Given these definitions, Williams builds his model of practical reasoning from a more basic form of internalism he calls the 'sub-Humean model'. The definition of internalism, that a reason statement is falsified by the absence of a motivation in the agent, is the first proposition Williams establishes on reasons internalism. Through his critique of this model, he establishes three further propositions expressing his early model of reasons internalism.

The sub-Humean model holds that the immediate absence of a motive in A's 'subjective motivational set' – symbolised as the agent's 'S' – is sufficient for falsifying a reason-statement.[364] The subjective motivational set, or S, can be roughly understood as the collection of desires an agent has. However, Williams adds that 'desires' should be understood as a formal expression of 'such things as dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and various projects … embodying commitments of the agent'.[365] Furthermore, this entails 'no supposition that the desires or projects of an agent have to be egoistic'.[366] The sub-Humean model claims that 'any element in S gives rise to an internal reason'.[367] Williams indicates several problems with the model showing that it fails to be normative or provide an account of practical reasoning.

The first is that it ignores false belief over the way Φ-ing serves A's S. The issue is that an agent could be mistaken in their belief that Φ-ing serves D, an element of their S. Williams illustrates this through the example of an agent who wants a gin and tonic, sees what they believe is a glass of it, but which is really a glass of petrol. While the sub-Humean model can explain what happened should we later find the person coughing and spluttering – thus the model offers a weak justification: they thought the glass contained gin – it fails to

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[362] Williams's expression is often written as 'A has a reason to X' and sometimes as a reason to Φ. For the sake of consistency and for ease of reading, in all quotes where the author has used a symbol such as X to represent an action or potential action, I have replaced it with Φ.
[363] Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons', 101.
[364] Williams, 102.
[365] Williams, 105.
[366] Williams, 105.
[367] Williams, 102.

produce a reason for the agent because it suggests they were right to try what was in the glass. This leads to one of Williams's four propositions about internal reasons: 'A member of S, D, will not give A a reason if either the existence of D is dependent on false belief, or A's belief in the relevance of Φ-ing to the satisfaction of D is false'.[368]

The second flaw is that 'A might not know some true internal reason statement about [themselves]'.[369] Here, A is unaware of an accessible fact that were it known would have led to a disposition to Φ.[370] To grasp this, imagine there is a second glass next to the petrol-filled one containing gin. The agent, having sniffed the glass with petrol, falsely assumes the other also contains petrol and so does not mix it. Yet here the agent does have a reason to mix what is in the second glass.

A third flaw is that A could be unaware of some element in their S that would be served by Φ-ing and so fail to Φ. As before, Williams stipulates that the element must be fairly accessible to A to provide a reason for A to perform the relevant action. Some subconscious desires may be insufficient to give A a reason to Φ. The condition on the unknown elements supplying a reason to Φ is expressed by Williams as the condition that: 'a project to Φ could be the answer to a deliberative question formed in part by D [the 'unknown' element in A's S]'.[371] This can be understood to imply the following: had A deliberated prior to forming an intention to Φ, A could have raised a question bringing D to the fore which would be served by Ψ-ing rather than Φ-ing. An unconscious or deeply subconscious D might never arise in deliberation or might only arise after a degree of reflection that would undermine action and choice. Limiting the reason-givingness of implicit elements of S to what could have come up on deliberation coheres with Williams's emphasis on the role of deliberation as constitutive of practical reasoning. The second and third flaws lead to the third proposition, containing two parts: 'A may falsely believe an internal reason statement about himself' and 'A may not know some true internal reason statement about himself.'[372]

The last flaw is that the sub-Humean model obscures the role of reasoning in practical reasoning. The agent's 'reasoning' consists in matching immediate ends to appropriate means. Against this view, Williams claims that 'the mere discovery that some course of action is the causal means to an end is not in itself a piece of

[368] Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons, with Postscript', 79.
[369] Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons', 103.
[370] Williams, 103.
[371] Williams, 103.
[372] Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons, with Postscript', 79.

practical reasoning'.[373] Williams's alternative picture of practical reasoning is deliberately rough. It can take many forms, including balancing elements in one's S, and reflecting on the veracity of one's beliefs. But it also involves non-instrumental forms of reasoning,[374] such as reflection on what constitutes the satisfaction of a desire (potentially resulting in the loss or reordering of the S), time-ordering, sorting through conflicts within the S, and perhaps even imagining new courses of action and outcomes adding new[375] desires to one's S.

Williams's reason for this sketchy portrayal of practical reasoning is that '[t]here is an essential indeterminacy in what can be counted a rational deliberative process'.[376] The point is to emphasise a multitude of ways in which a decision to Φ could be formed and to stress that agents can have multiple reasons in one moment with no clear hierarchy. For Williams, this just is an intractable feature of practical reasoning; there is no way of understanding it as 'algorithmic'.[377] This leads to the final proposition: 'internal reason statements can be discovered in deliberative reasoning'.[378]

Early on, Williams considers the four propositions sufficient for expressing his model of reasons internalism.[379] However, later formulations are in tension with the earlier one. The formulation changes little in later writings besides minor changes to wording or shifts between first- and second-person according to the context of discussion. Reasons internalism becomes: 'A could reach the conclusion that he should Φ (or a conclusion to Φ) by a sound deliberative route from the motivations that he has in his actual motivational set'.[380]

The difference this later formulation has with the earlier is that the first proposition is either false or obfuscating from the perspective of the later formulation. The first proposition is that the absence of the relevant element in A's S falsifies a reasons statement. The issue is that this appears not to be entailed by the later formulation. Under the later formulation, the direct absence of an element in A's S does not *necessarily* falsify an internal reasons statement. The later formulation seems to allow that an agent can reason from their present S to S' containing a new element, D' or to a loss of D in the original set. This could occur through imagining new scenarios or imagining satisfying a present element of S which unexpectedly results in D' or the

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[373] Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons', 104.
[374] Non-instrumental because they can modify one's S or constitute something like the selection of ends.
[375] As I indicate later, this 'new' must be understood in a specific way.
[376] Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons', 101.
[377] Williams, 'Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame', 35–38; Williams, 'Values, Reason, and the Theory of Persuasion', 109–10. However, Williams does add that reasons internalism, within certain Humean limits, can accommodate more ambitious conceptions of practical reasoning in 'Internal and External Reasons', 101.
[378] Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons, with Postscript', 80.
[379] Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons'.
[380] Williams is not forthcoming about the reason for his reformulation. See Williams, 'Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame', 1995, 35.

loss of D and so a modification to S. The tension with the former model is that the former implies the absence of D' from S falsifies any reason statement relevant to D', but the later formulation suggests the absence of D' in S may not falsify a reason statement concerning D'.

The later formulation may well have been developed to resolve this contradiction. On the other hand, the first proposition could be understood as cohering with the later expression of reasons internalism if S is interpreted as dynamic rather than static as implied by Williams's early comments. Even if not false, the first proposition at least muddies things. What needs clarification in the early formulation is the condition under which the absence of a motivation on the part of A falsifies a reason statement.

This means that the correct formulation of internalism is not, as Williams first writes, that 'A has some motive which will be served or furthered by his Φ-ing, and if this turns out not to be so the sentence is false'.[381] Rather, the more appropriate formulation is:

> (1) Internalism: a reason statement is falsified by the absence of a motivation in the agent where 'absence of motivation' should be taken to mean the absence of a motivation formed after sufficient deliberation. If the agent cannot form the motivation entailed by the reason statement after deliberation, then the reason statement is false.

Externalism can be expressed as the denial of the internalism:

> (2) Externalism: a reason statement is not falsified by the absence of a motivation in the agent before or after deliberation.

4.1.2 The Explanatory Constraint

The next premise is:

> (3) The explanatory constraint: a single reason can both explain and justify an action. A plausible theory of practical reasoning must explain how this is possible.

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[381] Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons, with Postscript', 77.

It is widely taken to be the case that reasons have explanatory and justificatory roles.[382] Williams is no exception. To Williams, in opposition to some scholars, this does not mean there are two ontologically distinct kinds of reason, one explanatory, the other normative.[383] Rather, the same reason plays both roles. When asked: 'why are you rummaging through the fridge?' giving the reason: 'because I am hungry' explains the behaviour and is also a form of justification for the behaviour.

Not every reason given fully justifies an action even if it explains it. Rather, good reasons justify actions and explain those actions when agents act for them. However, the link between reasons, explanation, and justification implies, according to Williams, that any viable account of practical reasons must give a plausible account of how one reason can justify and explain an action.[384] This condition is the Explanatory Constraint on theories of practical reasons.

4.1.3 The Humean Theory of Motivation and Reasons

The Humean theory of motivation claims that action is explained by belief-desire pairs. Beliefs are motivationally inert, while desires move the agent. Williams's understanding of motivation appears somewhat broader than this. However, I shall argue that they have more in common than initially appears. Specifically, they agree on a crucial issue: new motivations are acquired through a non-rational process or are based upon previous motivations and not through the acquisition of new motivations that are wholly due to new beliefs.

Two apparent differences between the Humean Theory of Motivation and Williams's stand out. One is that Williams allows that it *might* be possible for a belief to constitute a motivation. However, he adds that this would be wrapped up with 'certain dispositions to action, and also dispositions of approval, sentiment, emotional reaction, and so forth'.[385] The other is that Williams tends to refer to motivations rather than to desires specifically. The reason for the latter difference is that Williams allows for a potentially narrower

[382] There is resistance to this view, such as Joshua Gert, 'Internalism and Different Kinds of Reasons', *The Philosophical Forum* 34, no. 1 (2003); Joshua Gert, 'A Functional Role Analysis of Reasons', *Philosophical Studies* 124, no. 3 (1 June 2005); Joshua Gert, 'Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons', *The Philosophical Review* 116, no. 4 (2007) who argues that we can functionally distinguish between different kinds of reasons. Others, such as Alvarez, 'Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality' suggest there are at least three kinds of reasons: normative, motivating, and explanatory.

[383] I expand on this in the following chapter.

[384] Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons'.

[385] Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons, with Postscript', 83.

construal of desires as one kind of conation amongst others situated in an agent's S if that is one's theoretical preference and so this issue can be set aside.[386]

Regarding the first difference, Williams's comments on belief suggest that the central point of his seemingly broader conception of motivation and the Humean theory remains the same. I refer specifically to his sceptical comments on the possibility of a new belief by itself creating a new motivation and endorsements of Hume.[387] Williams concedes that 'reason, that is to say, rational processes, can give rise to new motivations, as we have seen in the account of deliberation.[388] However, he adds that 'the external reasons theorist must conceive *in a special way* the connexion between acquiring a motivation and coming to believe the reason statement'.[389]

Williams lists several ways agents may discover motivations that were previously hidden: they may form new motivations or lose old ones by exercising their imagination, specify the attainment of desires by thinking about what constitutes their satisfaction, and an agent even 'might be so persuaded by … moving rhetoric that he [she, or they] acquired both the motivation and the belief'.[390] For each of these, however, Williams stipulates that the agent reasons from existing motivations to new ones.[391] This places Humean limits on what the agent can be motivated by.

For Williams, this constraint raises problems for the externalist. To explain actions, the special way that externalists must understand the relationship between belief and motivation must be that 'the agent should acquire the motivation *because* he comes to believe the reason statement'.[392] The issue Williams raises for externalism is the same as the one I raised in chapter three for belief-based theories of normativity: 'there is no motivation for the agent to deliberate *from,* to reach this new motivation'.[393] Thus, despite surface differences, Williams's view is premised on the Humean theory.

Williams's argument thus has the following two-part premise:

(4) The Humean Theory of Motivation and Reasons:

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[386] Williams, 81. However, Williams's frequent use of the symbol, D, gives us one clue that Williams means desires in the more general sense similar to the one I gave the term I used in chapter one, as I shall argue.
[387] Williams, 84–85.
[388] Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons', 109–10.
[389] Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons, with Postscript', 84.
[390] Williams, 84.
[391] Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons', 109–10.
[392] Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons, with Postscript', 84.
[393] Williams, 85.

(4a) The Humean Theory of Motivation: an agent can only form new motivations through deliberation from existing motivations or through a non-rational process such as conversion.

(4b) The Humean Theory of Reasons: a reason explains an action by citing the relevant motivation and belief.

The latter part of the premise is present because, to explain an action, the Humean theory implies reasons cite belief-desire pairs. Without reference to what moves an agent, the action would be mysterious. Likewise, the belief element would also be necessary: without an account of the agent's understanding of the situation – how Φ-ing would serve D – the agent's actions would also be puzzling.

4.1.4 The Problem with Reasons Externalism

Williams rejects external reason statements because 'no external reason statement could *by itself* offer an explanation of anyone's action'.[394] This is due to the third and fourth premises. The Explanatory Constraint ties reasons to the explanation of actions. When coupled with the Humean Theory of Motivation and Reasons, this rules out the possibility of external reasons.

External reason statements give reasons independent of whether someone could be motivated by that reason after deliberation. Externalism can be illustrated through an example: a person, B, claims A has a reason to Φ. B insists on this irrespective of A's S and independent of whether A could reach the motivation through deliberation.[395] If, however, B believes the reasons appeals to A's S or possible S, then B offers what they think is an internal reason. In this case, if A cannot form the relevant motivation, then B fails to offer a reason to A, even if they try to do so in the internalist fashion. Given this, it is impossible for A to act for a reason they are not motivated by. A could not be motivated by an external reason if Williams is correct, since if they are motivated by what looks like an external reason statement, it necessarily turns out to be an internal reason instead. Thus, a genuinely external reason runs up against the Explanatory Constraint.

This does not imply that when B claims A has a reason to Φ in the external sense that A cannot be brought to Φ. B might threaten or shame A into Φ-ing, for example, or B might be an authority for A, provided

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[394] Williams, 82.
[395] Williams, 77.

that the avoidance of shame, fear of B, or some other consequence of not Φ-ing is sufficient to motivate A to

Φ.[396] However, A cannot Φ for the reason given in a genuinely external sense.[397] That reason – the reason that

A Φs for what appears to be an external reason – is that A fears B's, is coerced, doesn't want to feel shame, or

even A falls in love with B, perhaps modifying their S.[398]

To see this, consider Williams's discussion of an external reason statement given to Owen Wingrave by

his father.[399] Owen's father claims Owen has a reason to join the army. Owen hates the army and military life.

Suppose there is nothing in Owen's S that could lead even after sufficient deliberation to a motivation to join

the army. Williams further specifies the reason his father gives: 'that his family has a tradition of family

honour'.[400] According to internalism, this cannot be a reason for Owen to join the army because he cannot be

motivated by the reason his father gives. Modifying Williams's example, Owen's father is temperamental and

violent. Owen fears him. Owen is now moved to join the army out of fear, but he is not moved by the reason his

father gives. In this sense, Owen does have a reason to join the army: to avoid his father's wrath.[401] However,

this is not then an external reason. The reason his father gives, the external reason statement, would not explain

Owen's subsequent actions – that would be his father's temper.

Coercion, or coercion-related examples like this, arguably might not be reason giving in a primarily

normative sense even if given an internalist reading, so the example can be modified to exclude coercion.[402]

Owen's father again gives family honour as the reason for Owen to join the army. Owen is still unmoved.

However, this time Owen deeply respects and loves his father. This is sufficient to move Owen to join the army.

Here again, however, Owen is not moved by the reason his father gives. Rather, Owen's reason is his love and

respect for his father. This is what would explain his action, not his father's reason. His action is explained by the

internal reason and not the external one.

The issue for externalism is not whether 'there is some reason or other for [A] to Φ' but that the agent

'believes of some determinate consideration that it constitutes a reason for him to Φ'.[403] The externalist might

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[396] Williams discusses such possibilities at length in 'Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame', 1995, 41–44; 'Values, Reason, and the Theory of Persuasion', 114–18.
[397] Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons, with Postscript', 82.
[398] For the last, see Williams, 'Values, Reason, and the Theory of Persuasion', 116.
[399] A discussion Williams draws from the short story, *Owen Wingrave*, by Henry James or at least from the opera based on the story.
[400] Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons, with Postscript', 83.
[401] In a way: this is plausibly a case of compulsion rather than reason-giving.
[402] Williams's expression 'subjective motivational set' suggests he rules out coercion as reason giving, appearing to be a form of external 'motivation' instead. This external motivation could plausibly be argued to not count as motivation, but as a form of force and so bares a complicated relationship with reason-givingness.
[403] Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons, with Postscript', 83.

be generally right to say that A has a reason to Φ (where Φ-ing is, say, joining the army). But when we consider determinate reasons, externalism runs into difficulties due to the Explanatory Constraint. In the examples given above, we have seen that Owen is unmoved by his father's reason and that when they are moved it is either through compulsion or for something about which internalism is true. Thus, we have:

(5) Reason statements consistent with externalism (2) are incompatible with the Humean Theory of Reasons and Action (4) because these reasons cannot be the agent's motivation unless they rely on an implausible theory of motivation. Because externalist reason statements are incompatible with (4), they are incompatible with the Explanatory Constraint (3).

4.2 The Normative Constraint: The Too Many and Too Few Reasons Objections

Scepticism of reasons internalism often stems from the conclusion that it yields implausible conclusions in hard cases. Steven Finlay expresses this thought when he writes 'conflicts with the first-order judgements that people – and even internalists themselves – are disposed to make'.[404] The issue is motivations: by themselves, some argue, they appear incapable of rationally justifying actions.

Michael Smith gives the example of someone who after losing at squash feels an urge to hit their opponent with the racket.[405] Finlay presents a driver who has the urge to ram the driver who just cut them up. Eric Wiland and others refer to a case Williams himself raises of a husband unable to be moved to be kinder to his wife.[406] Douglass Portmore writes that internalism 'implies (implausibly, I believe) that a person who is kicking her pet dog may have no reason to stop doing so'.[407] Nir Ben-Moshe gives a case where 'Mary witnesses an incident in which John has been hit by a car. Mary has no desire to help John but simply desires to make it to the movie on time', finding internalism objectionable because it appears to validate Mary's behaviour.[408]

The first two cases raise the issue that urges, impulses, emotions or irrational desires might, according to internalism, give reasons to do what there seems to be no reason to for. The next three use individuals with repugnant motivational sets to show that internalism struggles to say why these people have a reason to do

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[404] Stephen Finlay, 'The Reasons That Matter', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 84, no. 1 (1 March 2006): 4. Finlay later seems to nuance his understanding of reasons internalism, even if he does not outright endorse it. See Stephen Finlay, 'The Obscurity of Internal Reasons', *Philosophers' Imprint* 9, no. 7 (2009).
[405] Michael Smith, 'Internal Reasons', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 55, no. 1 (1995).
[406] Simon Blackburn, 'The Majesty of Reason', *Philosophy* 85, no. 1 (January 2010); Wiland, *Reasons*.
[407] Douglas W. Portmore, *Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 29.
[408] Ben-Moshe, 'An Adam Smithian Account of Moral Reasons', 1074.

something more reasonable. Together, they imply that internalism yields too many reasons – the squash player, the driver – and too few reasons – the husband, animal abuser, Mary – and thus fails to be normative.

Both issues raise the same basic problem: whether desires can justify actions. However, my response to each form of the problem is different. I begin with the Too Many Reasons problem. Warren Quinn presents an especially challenging and influential version of the problem with his Radioman thought-experiment.[409] In my response to Quinn, I develop a wider response to other instances of the objection.

4.3 Too Many Reasons: The Radioman Versus the Subjectivists

Quinn's Radioman is a person who has an urge to turn on radios for no other reason that the sake of it. As Quinn puts it, the Radioman's 'disposition is … basic rather than instrumental'.[410] He may derive some pleasure from turning on radios and resistance may cause discomfort for him.[411] Besides that there is no other reason for why he turns on radios. Radioman himself does not necessarily view his urge to turn on the radio as normal. However, Quinn stipulates that the Radioman could still be perfectly happy with his attitude towards radios.[412]

The problem Quinn raises for 'subjectivists'[413] is that common sense suggests the Radioman's actions are not rationalisable. Subjectivists are committed either to an implausible claim or to bringing their view in line with common sense. However, the latter route means they either commit to further implausibilities or abandon subjectivism for Quinn's view: a reason aims at something good or avoids something bad.[414]

As we have seen, reasons internalism places an explanatory constraint on reasons. Quinn identifies the constraint with subjectivism and understands it as requiring that a functional state – disposition, urge, motivation – rationalises action.[415] Furthermore, subjectivists must understand the justificatory role played by functional states to be basic: the functional state cannot point beyond itself to the fact that Φ-ing is (for instance) pleasurable or good because this denies that the functional state alone justifies, thus undermining subjectivism.

Quinn does not deny that desire could rationalise or justify action. Rather, he claims that the subjectivist account of them cannot. This is because the subjectivist account must equate desire or preference to whatever

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[409] Warren Quinn, 'Putting Rationality in Its Place', in *Morality and Action*, ed. Philippa Foot (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Ulrike Heuer, 'Reasons for Actions and Desires', *Philosophical Studies* 121, no. 1 (October 2004); Sabine A. Döring, 'Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation', *Dialectica* 61, no. 3 (2007).
[410] Quinn, 'Putting Rationality in Its Place', 236–37.
[411] Quinn, 237.
[412] Quinn, 239–40.
[413] A term he somewhat misleadingly applies to Williams.
[414] Quinn, 'Putting Rationality in Its Place', 234.
[415] Quinn, 234–35.

moves the agent to act, due to the priority of the explanation of action in their account of reasons and the reliance on the belief-desire model of action. This means that subjectivism claims whatever in fact moves the agent to act must be whatever they desire. This, for Quinn, is why subjectivists must view desire as a mere functional state and this raises problems.

Radioman's motivation is to turn on radios. He gets some pleasure from this and some displeasure from resisting. He is perfectly happy doing so. Subjectivists seem to be committed to labelling his motivation a desire since it is what moves him. However, it is difficult for the subjectivist to argue that this desire rationalises his action: even Radioman fails to see much reason in what he does. If the subjectivist claims pleasure rationalises his action, they have abandoned subjectivism because it is not the functional state that rationalises his action. Rather, it is the pleasure.[416] If they suppose that Radioman has a higher order disposition, such as Harry Frankfurt's desire to desire,[417] such that subjectivists deny he can be happy with it, then it implies that he must view the lower order disposition to turn on radios as being in some sense bad. The higher order disposition now has authority over the lower one, but now the subjectivist must explain the authority of the higher order disposition over the lower without going beyond the functional state itself.[418] That is, without reference to evaluative concepts like good or bad. Even if this is granted, the subjectivist must still, however implausibly, see the lower order disposition as having something to speak in favour of it, giving a weak kind of reason to perform the action though even the Radioman sees no reason for what he does.[419]

4.3.1 Subduing the Radioman: Some Strategies

If Williams's reasons internalism aligns with the subjectivism Quinn attributes to it, then it faces a dilemma. Several scholars take the Radioman thought experiment as sufficient to reject Williams's internalism. Finding the explanatory constraint to be compelling, Ulrike Heuer uses the Radioman to reject the centrality of the desire-belief model in explaining action.[420] Instead, she proposes that values can explain and justify action. Furthermore, since her preferred model of the explanation of action uses value-descriptions – which, according to Heuer, can be true or false – and since what motivates someone and what is valuable can separate, Heuer

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[416] Quinn, 240.
[417] Frankfurt, 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person'.
[418] Quinn, 'Putting Rationality in Its Place', 238–40.
[419] Quinn, 238–40.
[420] Heuer, 'Reasons for Actions and Desires', 51–55.

occupies an externalist position.[421] Sabine Döring also uses the Radioman case to reject the desire-belief model while retaining the explanatory constraint, but develops an alternative form of internalism.[422] Döring instead cites the role of emotions in action, arguing that they are distinct from beliefs and desires, but remain cognitivist and motivating.[423] However, it is internalist because Döring allows that some can without fault have different emotional reactions to the same object.[424]

Both strategies reject a key part of Williams's internalism: the fourth premise. Both object to the use of desire, understood as a generic functional state, to explain action. Instead, they propose alternative accounts of action to meet Quinn's challenge. To do so, they attempt to identify a specific kind of state that can move agents and rationalise their actions. Strictly, they do not reject the belief-desire models of action because it cannot explain action. Indeed, with a functional definition of desire it is trivially true that desire explains action since whatever moves an agent to act is what explains it. Döring and Heuer individuate different kinds of motivation underpinning different kinds of action. These different forms of action require correspondingly different forms of explanation. This enables them to argue that a specific kind of motivational state can help rationalise action. For instance, compulsion is a kind of functional state resulting in certain kinds of behaviour. The explanation for this kind of behaviour may require a psychoanalytic explanation rather than the teleological form used for ordinary actions.[425]

Other strategies have been developed that attempt more directly to preserve subjectivism. Simon Rippon also responds to the problem by distinguishing between kinds of functional state. One kind, urges, appear to the agent as rationally impotent by default. The other, desires, have normative weight.[426] Regan Reitsma argues that desire-based personal ideals such as fatherhood resolve the problem by conferring rational weight on different desires.[427] Simon Blackburn argues that one's whole set of desires determines the rational status of particular desires.[428] Each strategy, although promising, faces difficulties.

[421] Heuer, 50–51.
[422] Döring, 'Seeing What to Do'.
[423] Döring.
[424] Döring, 381-382. There is, however, some ambivalence in Döring's claim that her account is internalist. Her discussion of the emotions appears to be externalist to me. I discuss this more below.
[425] Döring, 'Seeing What to Do'.
[426] Simon Rippon, 'On the Rational Impotence of Urges', *European Journal of Analytic Philosophy* 10, no. 1 (2014).
[427] Regan Lance Reitsma, '"Yes, the Theory Is Abstemious, but...": A Critique of Yehezkel', *European Journal of Analytic Philosophy* 13, no. 1 (2017); Regan Lance Reitsma, 'How a Modern-Day Hume Can Reject a Desire Categorically: A Perplexity and a Theoretically Modest Proposal', *European Journal of Analytic Philosophy* 9, no. 2 (2013).
[428] Blackburn, 'The Majesty of Reason'.

Reitsma's approach clearly runs into the issue of pointing beyond desires to value or relying on a mysterious second-order desiring to resolve the issue, a response Quinn already accounts for.[429] Rippon's strategy then looks more appealing. However, to work it requires a compelling argument by which urges can be distinguished from desires: an element missing in Rippon's account so the distinction looks ad-hoc.[430] This raises a further issue: if the distinction is on the basis of the agent's dis-endorsement of the urge (desires being endorsed or identified with), one can ask in virtue of what do they endorse it? Answering with anything other than the desires – that it is pleasurable, valuable, seen to be good, and so on – also leads into Quinn's dilemma.

Blackburn's approach aligns with Williams's claims on what practical reasoning is like: balancing various desires and possibilities, time ordering, constitutive and imaginative thinking, and so on. However, without supplement it still implies that in cases like the Radioman or more disturbing dispositions[431] there is still something to be said for these dispositions. An independently plausible account of urges could help. Supplying this in addition to Blackburn's strategy forms one part of my approach to getting around Quinn's dilemma.

The second part of my approach is to acknowledge that the strategy pursued by Döring and Heuer raises what initially appears to be a problem for Humeanism but in fact contains within it the solution. Döring and Heuer are correct in highlighting that the kind of motivational state matters for the rationalisation and explanation of behaviour. However, Döring and Heuer overlook that Humean reasons internalism can itself point to a more specific functional state underpinning action by specifying what action is. Combined, these two aspects give the Humean reasons internalist a robust response to the Too Many Reasons problem.

4.3.2 Does the Radioman Act?

The Too Many Reasons objection implies that the various objectionable behaviours subjectivists supposedly have problems with are cases of action. However, it is plausible to deny this. Taking this line forces the Humean to agree that the Humean Theory of Action does not apply in such cases – not because the theory is mistaken, but because these cases do not represent actions. If successful, Humeans can respond by showing their opponents commit a category error. Humeans need not explain pathologies, urges, impulses, reactions, and so

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[429] For a critical take on this strategy, see Rippon, 'On the Rational Impotence of Urges'.
[430] Rippon asserts the distinction, writing: 'once it is accepted that a desire's position within a person's motivational structure can affect its normative weight, there is no reason to deny that there is a certain position within a person's motivational structure – the position that urges occupy – that carries no normative weight whatsoever.' In the context of Rippon's paper, which aims to show Reitsma's argument could imply such a view which would undermine the one Reitsma gives, the assertion makes sense. For the purposes of this chapter, asserting that there just is such an entity will not do. Instead, an argument is needed to make the notion of an urge compelling.
[431] We have seen some of these above. Quinn adds the example of a self-hating pyromaniac to emphasise his point.

on in the same way they explain action because they are different things. To do so is like explaining why someone sneezes, why someone with Tourette's syndrome beats their chest, or even why someone was blown off a bridge, through belief-desire pairs. The Humean theory of action is clearly inappropriate in these cases, but this does not undermine the theory.

We ordinarily distinguish action from other behaviour. Sneezes are clearly different from action. A similar thought applies to habits, compulsive behaviour, emotional reactions, and physical reactions. Evidence of this is that different degrees of responsibility get attached to different forms of behaviour. Someone who lashes out because they can't control their anger is usually chastised for this lack of control, but at a certain point they might be referred to an anger-management programme. However, our response is usually different for someone who deliberately beats someone to further a goal of theirs.

A viral video from a few years ago captures the idea. In the video, a high-school student is being interviewed. Another student is hiding in a bin ready to frighten the student being interviewed. He jumps out and the victim immediately plants a hard right-cross on the prankster. The prankster falls back into the bin, and the 'victim' backs away, horrified.

There is difficulty applying the desire-belief model of action in this example. The victim's punch is a reaction prompted by his surprise. It is similar to a sneeze in that it is an uncontrolled response to an external stimulus. If we imagine a scale running from a sneeze to full-blooded action the reactive punch is not exactly on the same point as the sneeze, but neither is it at the top of the scale. There is a sense in which the punch is more controllable than a sneeze because the victim could (say) train himself not to react in that manner or the experience might induce him to act otherwise should a similar situation occur.[432] Similarly, the reactive punch is lower on the scale than a pre-meditated attack. Radioman, to the extent that we can make any sense of him, seems like somebody in the grip of an especially peculiar compulsion.[433]

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[432] This suggests further possibilities for internalism not discussed in Williams's articles on the topic related to personal moral and ethical development, although it is implied in Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, 2011. It is, however, explicit in the experientialist form of internalism outlined by Elijah Millgram in *Ethics Done Right: Practical Reasoning as a Foundation for Moral Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[433] Particularly if we suppose he has any other regular desires. I doubt that we really can make sense of Radioman – does he have no other desires whatsoever? If he does, it is difficult to see how he could view his urge as benign. At best it would be an irritant. If he does not view his urge as benign, then it would seem his other desires are explaining the urge's irrationality. Showing Radioman is an impossibility would involve showing that there is no possible world in which he could exist with all of the attributes Quinn gives to him, although I am unsure quite what this would involve. What I am more sure of is if Radioman had one and only one 'desire' – wanting to turn radios on – then there is no possible world in which he could exist and be described as an agent – as one who can give and respond to reasons – since the only thing he could respond to is the status of radios and not even to that which might sustain his behaviour – eating, sleeping, and so on.

To make sense of the distinction between degrees of action and mere behaviour, I argue that part of what it is to be an action is that it occurs due to prior practical reasoning. The desire that explains an action on the internalist account is a conclusive desire, a desire that summarises the conclusion of practical reasoning. This specifies the functional state explaining an action: not just any desire, but the desire formed after and through the process of practical reasoning. Action, to be action, is a movement that results from practical reasoning.

A consequence of this theory is that one can act with and on a compulsion by deciding to succumb to it. But a compulsion that creates a movement without or against practical reasoning is not an action. This could be because one desires to Φ but ends up Ψ-ing due to their compulsion.

This makes sense of why compulsions are alien and unwanted: they prevent genuine action. It also gives a sense to the common supposition that actions express agency: constitutively, actions occur through practical reasoning. Viewed through this lens the Radioman's behaviour can look rational on some occasions and compulsive on others. Furthermore, this reveals what is wrong with Quinn's example of the Radioman: there's no clear sense in which the Radioman acts because no reasoning occurs in the case. All we know is that he has an urge and that it is relatively benign. As a result, the reasons internalist cannot provide a response to the case – and nor need they – beside pointing out that we do not yet know if the Radioman acts. This shifts the burden to those who invoke the Radioman and similar cases to show that these cases involve instances of action and not some other irrelevant behaviour. Can this strategy escape Quinn's dilemma and does it cohere with Humeanism?

The strategy starts with an analysis of action before identifying the state which underpins it: the conclusive desire issuing from practical reasoning. The conclusive desire explains action. This is a functional state underpinning agent's movement, allowing for teleological explanation. The resulting theory has little trouble incorporating beliefs. Thus, the theory coheres with the Humean theory of action.

The theory makes use of second-order desiring, but this is the agent's whole set of desires. This is where the authority of the second-order desire comes from. This is neither mysterious nor based in something other than desire. The theory does, however, still have difficulty avoiding the implication that alienated dispositions give weak reasons. It still gives Too Many Reasons. This is because it does not distinguish urges from desires. Although the strategy pursued here refers to the conclusive desire as what underpins action, the individuated desires (amongst other things) that one may consider in practical reasoning are currently indistinguishable from

urges. In what follows, I pursue an eliminative strategy to bolster Rippon's suggestion that an account of urges can rescue reasons internalism from the Too Many Reasons objection.

4.3.3 A Phenomenology of Urges and Desires: A Primordial Difference

I begin by offering a set of what I take to be true statements about urges and desires. Phenomenally, my desire to try some tasty food and my urge to sneeze around cats have different qualities. Likewise, from the Radioman's perspective, we should expect a difference between a desire to taste food and a 'desire' to turn on radios.[434] The turning on of radios appears[435] not identical to, but similar to, the sneeze. My sneeze is often something my body happens to do, while my desire to eat food is something I happen to want. 'Wanting' appears to be related differently to a desire than to an urge.

A desire might arise unwanted, but desires are still wanted in a way that urges are not. A desire to try tasty food might be an example. However, my contention is that what is really unwanted is to, say, put on weight. The set of desires might make one desire unwanted. However, the sense of constitutive 'wantedness' in this desire is retained since it is plausible to claim that under ideal conditions one could satisfy the desire and not put on weight. The idea can be expressed as follows: if there is some possible world in which all of my desires could be satisfied, then I would prefer to occupy that world than to be rid of my immediate desire. Desires can be, on their own and as part of a set, contradictory, but wantedness, I claim, is part of what makes a desire. Conceptually, urges can be understood as entailing the opposite or absence of wantedness: if there was a possible world in which I was rid of the urge then, all else equal, I would prefer to occupy that world over one in which I had it.[436] This expresses what I call the primordialist position on the distinction between desires and urges. Since it claims the distinction is primordial, support for the position depends on the failure of other positions. In the following, I explore a handful of other potential strategies for making the distinction to motivate the primordialist position. I begin with the position that urges can only be distinguished by the set of desires.

If the set of desires distinguishes what counts as an urge and what counts as a desire, modifications to the set of desires could change which elements are desires and which are urges. However, it is unlikely that with

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[434] Recall that the Radioman himself implies that he registers this kind of difference: he sees no reason to do what he does.
[435] I use the term 'appears' here not to express uncertainty, but to indicate phenomenal qualities.
[436] Can people become reconciled to their urges and even learn to love them? Yes, I believe this is possible. However, the term 'reconciliation' implies that this was once not the case and so this possibility does not undermine the distinction.

an urge like the Radioman's modifying, restricting, or expanding the set of desires to accommodate would turn it into a desire. It would still be coherent, whatever the set of desires, to treat the urge as unwanted.

Objectivist strategies also struggle. Take harm for instance. As we have seen, an urge need not harm me or be particularly troubling, so harm does not work. Nor do strategies relying on notions of the good or the good life fare any better. The urge can be fairly benign and it seems a stretch to suggest someone with an urge who occasionally succumbs to it is barred from living a fully good life. Perhaps someone who lives a good life free of the urge lives a marginally better life than someone who lives a good life with it, but this is doubtful: why not just say that they both live good lives?

A hedonist theory might be thought to work better. However, the urge need not create displeasure to not want it. As Quinn suggests, it might be easy to satisfy and even bring great pleasure. Suppose switching on radios is, for Radioman, easily satisfiable and he finds it very pleasurable. It is not impossible to imagine the Radioman still wishing to be rid of the urge. If this holds, the hedonist theory cannot account for the urge.

Perhaps instead an urge is something that does not make sense, is irrational or unintelligible. This raises the possibility of a sense/nonsense criterion separating urges from desires. This approach also has difficulties. This is because some desires, aside from their presence in one's motivational set, are not the kinds of things for which a sense/nonsense distinction is appropriate.[437] Take any situation in which one Φs because it is pleasurable. There is a desire for pleasure that Φ-ing satisfies. Does this desire have any sense beyond *that I desire it*? It seems no is the answer if we recall that urges could also create pleasure. If the sense/nonsense criterion does not apply to this desire (or any other desire), then it cannot supply the distinction.

The holistic, objectivist, and sense/nonsense strategies do not seem to provide the distinction, because it seems one can consistently want to be rid of an urge for no other reason than it confronts one already as an urge. The primordial distinction is promising: desires and urges appear in consciousness[438] already as desires and urges. This allows the Humean to agree that there is nothing to be said for alienated dispositions.

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[437] I suspect all desires are this way since sense/nonsense distinctions seem already at least partly dependent on one's set of desires. Moreover, since sense/nonsense seems relative to some context or goal, we could also ask the question: makes sense according to what? That there's no clear answer to this speaks to my scepticism of such an attempt to distinguish urges from desires by this criterion.

[438] And perhaps also to the subconsciousness. However, it does not make sense to discuss the 'appearance' of something unconscious, since by definition nothing appears to the unconscious. Unconscious drives might be sorted out in consciousness to the extent that it becomes aware of them in the form of urges and desires.

4.3.4 Taking Stock of the Too Many Reasons Objection

Recall the examples given by Smith and Finlay's with which Williams's reasons internalism is supposed to struggle. These were:

> (a) After suffering a humiliating defeat in squash, the loser feels a strong urge to smash their racket into the winner's face. To avoid this, instead of shaking the winner's hand they walk away.

> (b) After being cut up by another car, a driver feels an urge to ram the car of the driver responsible. Instead, they continue driving because they see no reason to do this.

Each example was meant to show that internalism is committed to the counter-intuitive conclusion that agents have at least some reason to succumb to their urges even if they do not see it that way. We can now see why this is not so.

In both cases the urge arises prior to practical reasoning. An action has not yet occurred, but after thinking about it, the squash player and the driver decide not to act on their urge.[439] Their overall set of desires constrain their action. However, had the driver rammed the car or the squash player hit their opponent, we would first need to determine whether they act or react. If no reasoning occurred, then it is not strictly speaking an action but a reaction. In the latter case, the internalist is not committed to saying they had a reason for it. The explanation of the behaviour would refer to an emotional state – they were angry – and maybe their character – they cannot control their impulses – but they need not refer to desire or imply there is a practical reason for what they did. The internalist can argue that if they had reasoned sufficiently about their actions, they would see they have no reason to do what they did or would at least try to point to an aspect of their S indicating an alternative. This leaves open the issue of whether the internalist is committed to saying either urge has something to speak for it. For this, the Humean can refer to the rational impotency of urges.

A difficult problem now arises. It is possible in cases like Smith's and Finlay's that the agent has a set of desires which would not constrain their action. The thought of hitting the other player might not be an urge but

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[439] Smith, 'Internal Reasons', 111; Finlay, 'The Reasons That Matter', 4.

a sadistic desire to hurt another. The squash player would without regret hit their opponent if they thought they could get away with it. It seems possible that the squash player could form a conclusive desire to hit the other player. In this instance, the internalist could not deny that their behaviour is action. Internalists now seem committed to saying that the squash player has no reason to act otherwise. This is the Too Few Reasons objection.

4.4 The Success of the Too Few Reasons Objection

Williams raises the Too Few Reasons objection against himself in discussing the Heartless Husband. That Williams concludes the case does not undermine internalism but speaks in favour of it raises the issue of the objection's force.

The Too Few Reasons objection alone struggles to topple internalism. This is because biting the bullet, as Williams does, is not obviously an unreasonable response to the objection. I shall argue that biting the bullet in some cases is intuitively plausible. Furthermore, the success of the objection depends on the plausibility of the alternative to internalism which requires rejecting one or more of the premises of Williams's internalism.

Williams discusses the Heartless Husband in relation to internalist and externalist theories of advice and blame. Williams writes:

> Suppose for instance, I think someone … ought to be nicer to his wife. I say, 'You have a reason to be nicer to her.' He says, 'What reason?' I say, 'Because she is your wife.' He says - and he is a very hard case - 'I don't care. Don't you understand? I really do not care.' I try various things on him, and try to involve him in this business; and I find that he really is a hard case: there is *nothing* in his motivational set that gives him a reason to be nicer to his wife as things are.[440]

Williams notes that in such cases it seems obvious that 'we can blame a man (we may think) for neglecting his wife even though he has no motivation to be concerned about his wife': blame seems to require external reasons, otherwise the notion of blame is rendered 'suspect'.[441] However, the concept of blame is also underpinned by the principle: ought implies can. Blame and advice are usually deemed inappropriate if the agent

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[440] Williams, 'Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame', 1995, 39.
[441] Williams, 41.

could not act or have acted otherwise.[442] Williams reads the connection between 'ought to have' and 'could have' as implying internalism. Williams aims to show that blame, despite an apparent connection with externalism, is best understood through internalism. This leads Williams to the view that cases like the Heartless Husband support rather than undermine internalism.[443]

Williams's case against the externalist understanding of blame and advice has three prongs. The first is that hard cases like the Heartless Husband can reflect reality. We should and do readily acknowledge such cases. The second is that there is a fundamental indeterminacy built into the nature of blame and advice that internalism makes sense of but which is unintelligible on the externalist account. The third is that externalist conceptions of blame and advice have limited ethical resources as a result of the underlying conception of reasons.

Blame is often already applied to people who (we think) already have the relevant item in their S. From the standpoint of the blamer, the blamee is blamed because they didn't appropriately consider this element. This need not result from a deliberative failure. In such instances, Williams's internalism is clear about how blame or advice works: A could get to the motivation underpinning the reason raised by the blame or advice by deliberating from their S. The purpose is to call A's attention to this element.

On occasion, the relevant element in S may be missing. There are also situations where there is another aspect of A's S to which blame indirectly appeals. The desire to be esteemed by others might be such an aspect. This might be sufficient to give A a reason to have Φ-ed (when they Ψ-ed), even if A lacks the direct motivation at which blame points.[444] Thus, blame can pull on other dispositions, not just the direct motive underpinning the reason presented for Φ-ing.[445] The internalist conception of advice is similar in that it functions not just by suggesting how to achieve or conceive of some stated aim, but also by highlighting features of A's S that might suggest other actions.

While internalism understands advice and blame as aiming to the agent's S as indicated above, we noted cases where the relevant elements seem (and may be) absent, like the Heartless Husband. As Williams

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[442] Williams, 40.
[443] He writes: 'it is a support for an account along these lines, that it is precisely people who are regarded as lacking any general disposition to respect the reactions of others that we cease to blame, and regard as hopeless or dangerous characters rather than thinking that blame is appropriate to them' in 'Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame', 43.
[444] Williams, 41.
[445] Here, there is a sense in which 'there is a reason for A to Φ' is true, even if the reason stipulated in a full expression of the reason is not the same as the one which moves the agent to Φ. Recall the earlier discussion of Owen Wingrave: from the standpoint of Williams's internalism, this is not sufficient to prove externalism, which requires a specific understanding of motivation.

puts it: 'there are some hard cases, people who lie beyond any such mechanism'.[446] We could say he is mean, selfish, cruel, sexist, and so on, but if Williams is right, we cannot say what the externalist wants us to say: he has a reason to be nicer to her.[447] To Williams, there really are people in the world with abnormal desire sets. These people cannot have what we want them to have as a reason. This is plausible: serial killers and psychopaths might be examples. Williams takes the existence of such unreasonable people as favourable for internalism.[448] This is because such individuals reveal the obscurity in what the externalist says to such individuals when they direct blame toward them in the externalist mode.[449]

From the perspective of internalism, between hard and straightforward cases there is considerable indeterminacy. We have seen an example of this: 'there is a reason for A to Φ' could be true, but the route from S is indirect. Indeterminacy has at least two further sources: an agent's S is obscure to the agent, and agent's Ss are obscure to their interlocutors. Often, there is no prior way of knowing whether blame or advice will succeed. Confronted with real hard cases and given general knowledge of what people are like, it is difficult to know in advance whether something like 'he has a reason to be nicer to her' is really false.

To Williams, this vagueness entailed by internalism 'matches … a vagueness or indeterminacy that is a genuine feature of our practice and experience', while externalism 'merely obscure[s] what account it gives of the phenomena'.[450] This means externalist conceptions of blame and advice seem to lack ethical resources because they leave no way of focusing on agent's motivations: they cannot get the agent to *do* something.[451] The problem externalism has is showing 'in psychologically realistic terms, how focussed blame can be a distinctive ethical reaction … that it is something rather than nothing at all'.[452] By abandoning the tie to motivation, the externalist view leaves blame seemingly practically inert and lacking a point aside from catharsis or self-congratulation, leaving internalism the only option.

The likely reality of hard cases and the indeterminacy of advice and blame bares appears to deflect the Too Few Reasons objection. However, Williams's embrace of hard cases and indeterminacy may have been

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[446] Williams, 'Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame', 1995, 43.
[447] Williams, 39.
[448] He writes: 'it is precisely people who are regarded as lacking any general disposition to respect the reactions of others that we cease to blame, and regard as hopeless or dangerous characters rather than thinking that blame is appropriate to them' Williams, 43.
[449] Williams's point be illustrated as follows: imagine watching a horror movie where the victim, about to be murdered, stops and says to the oncoming psychopathic killer: 'Wait, hang on a minute. Did you know what you're doing is wrong? This doesn't maximise happiness!' (Or is irrational, expresses vice, or doesn't respect the Categorical Imperative, and so on). Whatever the victim could mean by this, it is hard to see how this could be a reason for the killer. Externalism seems not to make much sense in this context.
[450] Williams, 'Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame', 1995, 43.
[451] Williams, 44. We might qualify this with: except by accident or through coercion.
[452] Williams, 44.

premature. Eric Wiland suggests that the ambiguity of such cases tells neither for nor against internalism. Coupled with a coherent alternative, hard cases turn against Williams.[453] So one option is to develop an alternative to internalism. Another option is to bite the other end of the bullet: perhaps reasons need not, to be what they are, appeal to motivation.

Blackburn adopts the latter strategy. He posits a conception of external reasons which may be dependent on internal reasons for their motivating force, but their function is not necessarily to motivate. Their function is instead to express condemnation; they only motivate when the target has the right S.[454] The issue with this is view is that it is difficult to see why one should lament the conclusion that hard cases may not have a reason for acting pro-socially. It is not unreasonable to think that serial killers, sociopaths, and other horrid individuals have no reason to do other than they do. Furthermore, the function of condemning is to express condemnation; reason-giving seems an entirely different activity. Suppose I say, 'what you're doing is awful' to an individual whom I know does not care one iota what I think. On Blackburn's scheme, what I say meets the criteria of an external reason as he characterises it: I express condemnation of what he is doing and it does not motivate. But it should be clear that what I have said is not in the mode of reason-giving: I know he will not listen. More plausibly, I am simply expressing my attitude or astonishment. It seems for what I say to be in the reason-giving mode, I have to believe the individual could listen to me and so the mode of speech must take the form of reasons internalism. Taking the expressivist route in defending external reasons seems to allow normativity to wash out of the practice of reason-giving and to needlessly obfuscate matters.

Given the problems and ambiguity that remain with Blackburn's biting the other end of the bullet, it seems the success or failure of a challenge to Williams's view must in some way undermine the argument on which it is built: attacking the premises on which Williams's argument rests to pave way for a coherent alternative to Williams's reasons internalism.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have provided an outline of Williams's reasons internalism and explained the steps Williams takes in making his argument. I then turned to two types of an objection to Williams's reasons internalism which claims that it fails to meet the normative constraint, and so Williams's reasons internalism ultimately fails to

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[453] Eric Wiland, 'Theories of Practical Reason', *Metaphilosophy* 33, no. 4 (2002); Wiland, *Reasons*.
[454] Blackburn, 'The Majesty of Reason'.

yield normative conclusions. These were the Too Many and Too Few Reasons objections. I argued that the Too Many Reasons objections fails because there are compelling resources Williams's internalism can use to meet the objection and the objection itself, when pushed, is obscure. While I do not argue that the Too Few Reasons objection directly fails, it is by its nature ambiguous whether or not the problem it indicates counts for or against Williams's internalism. My conclusion is that opponents of Williams's reasons internalism would be better served by directly attacking the premises on which Williams builds his argument.

5 Normativity from Without: Objections to Williams's Reasons Internalism

The arguments against Williams's internalism can be arranged according to the challenge they pose to its main premises. First, there are arguments defending a position straddling the distinction or that claim there is a problem with the distinction itself.[455] Second, there are attacks on the explanatory constraint.[456] Lastly, there are rejections of the Humean Theory of Motivation and Reasons.[457] Recently, Christopher Cowley has defended Williams's internalism from three prominent critics – John McDowell, Michael Smith, and Tim Scanlon – by showing internalism has not been properly understood or refuted.[458] This chapter supports this view by showing it can withstand four recent, further objections.[459]

The first, from S.L. Hurley, challenges the distinction between internalism and externalism. Hurley argues that Williams cannot rule out certain views, such as Platonism, that he aims to challenge. While not

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[455] J. David Velleman, 'The Possibility of Practical Reason', *Ethics* 106, no. 4 (1996); S. L. Hurley, 'Reason and Motivation: The Wrong Distinction?', *Analysis* 61, no. 2 (2001); Christopher Tollefsen, 'Basic Goods, Practical Insight, and External Reasons', in *Human Values: New Essays on Ethics and Natural Law*, ed. David S. Oderberg and Timothy Chappell (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2004), 33.

[456] Joshua Gert, 'Brute Rationality', *Noûs* 37, no. 3 (2003); Gert, 'Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons'; Patricia Greenspan, 'Practical Reasons and Moral "Ought"', in *Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume II*, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Matthew S. Bedke, 'Practical Reasons, Practical Rationality, Practical Wisdom', *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 11, no. 1 (2008): 103; Blackburn, 'The Majesty of Reason'; Susanne Mantel, 'No Reason for Identity: On the Relation between Motivating and Normative Reasons', *Philosophical Explorations* 17, no. 1 (2014); Susanne Mantel, 'How to Be Psychologistic about Motivating but Not about Normative Reasons', *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 93, no. 1 (2016); Susanne Mantel, 'Worldly Reasons: An Ontological Inquiry into Motivating Considerations and Normative Reasons', *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 98, no. S1 (2017); Susanne Mantel, *Determined by Reasons: A Competence Account of Acting for a Normative Reason* (London: Routledge, 2018), 174.

[457] Talbot Brewer, 'The Real Problem with Internalism about Reasons', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 32, no. 4 (2002); R. Wedgwood, 'Practical Reason and Desire', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 80, no. 3 (September 2002); William J. FitzPatrick, 'Reasons, Value, and Particular Agents: Normative Relevance without Motivational Internalism', *Mind* 113, no. 450 (2004); Heuer, 'Reasons for Actions and Desires'; Rowland Stout, 'XI – Internalising Practical Reasons', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 104, no. 1 (2004); Olson and Svensson, 'Regimenting Reasons'; McDowell, 'Response to Philip Pettit and Michael Smith'; Döring, 'Seeing What to Do'; David B. Wong, 'Emotion and the Cognition of Reasons in Moral Motivation', *Philosophical Issues* 19 (2009); Markus E. Schlosser, 'Taking Something as a Reason for Action', *Philosophical Papers* 41, no. 2 (2012); Wiland, *Reasons*; May, 'Because I Believe It's the Right Thing to Do'; Joshua May, *Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Alvarez, 'Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality'.

[458] Christopher Cowley, 'A New Defence of Williams's Reasons-Internalism', *Philosophical Investigations* 28, no. 4 (2005). Other defences of internalism include Vila Mitova's defence of truthy psychologism about reasons in 'Truthy Psychologism about Evidence', *Philosophical Studies* 172, no. 4 (1 April 2015). Sharon Street defends a naturalistic, constructivist, and Humean theory of reasons that is ultimately internalist in 'In Defense of Future Tuesday Indifference: Ideally Coherent Eccentrics and the Contingency of What Matters', *Philosophical Issues* 19 (2009); 'Coming to Terms with Contingency: Humean Constructivism about Practical Reason', in *Constructivism in Practical Philosophy*, ed. James Lenman and Yonatan Shemmer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); 'Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Rethink It', in *Oxford Studies in Metaethics: 11*, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). Hille Paakkunainen also outlines and defends further assumptions in Williams's account against other internalist views in 'Internalism and Externalism about Reasons', in *The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity*, ed. Daniel Star (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). Yonatan Shemmer, 'Desires as Reasons', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 75, no. 2 (2007) presents an interesting elaboration of Williams's internalism in terms of non-alienated desires. Alan H. Goldman, 'Desire Based Reasons and Reasons for Desires', *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 44, no. 3 (2006) defends a coherentist view of Williams in terms of desire-based reasons.

[459] Each of the four objections attacks different aspects of each of the premises underpinning internalism. The four objections have been chosen for novelty, persuasiveness, recency, and because they appear to be independent of questions over the Humean Theory of Motivation already defended in chapter three.

recent, Hurley's argument has been overlooked in the literature on internalism but, as I show, it offers a serious challenge. The second objection, given by J. David Velleman, also attacks the distinction in a different way. Velleman argues that practical and theoretical reasoning have both internalist and externalist features. The third challenge by Susanne Mantel attacks the explanatory constraint by undermining the Identity Thesis – the claim that when an agent acts for a normative reason their motivating reason is identical with it – that internalism appears to presuppose. The last challenge is Maria Alvarez's defence of factualism – the view that reasons are facts – over 'psychologism' – the view that reasons are mental states. I find that each argument misconstrues Williams's underlying argument.

5.1 Hurley on the Ambiguity of Williams's Distinction

The issue Hurley raises in her paper, 'Reasons and Motivation: The Wrong Distinction?' is that when 'taken at face value' Williams' distinction between internalism and externalism actually runs together two other distinctions.[460] Consequently, it seems that Williams's cannot indicate whether reasons or motivations are metaphysically basic and his portrayal of the debate is misleading. Furthermore, if correct, the distinction collapses meaning that views Williams would call externalist remain within the internalist constraint.[461]

5.1.1 A Distinction that Fails to Correctly Carve at the Joints?

Hurley begins by outlining Williams's view as the claim that 'there is a reason for A to Φ' 'entails some claims about A's actual or hypothetical motivation to Φ' where 'hypothetical motivation may be conditional on A's knowledge of the truth or on her rationality'.[462] Hurley designates 'there is a reason for A to Φ' as R and any 'favoured schematic statement about A's actual or hypothetical motivation to Φ' as M.[463] Thus Williams's view can be schematised as: R entails M. Hurley also notes that '"R entails M" is logically equivalent to "not-M entails not-R"'.[464] Thus, as Hurley puts it, 'The view that R entails M schematically expresses what Williams calls "the internal interpretation" of claims about reasons'.[465] So, for Hurley, the distinction can be written as:

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[460] Hurley, 'Reason and Motivation', 151.
[461] Hurley, 152.
[462] Hurley, 151.
[463] Hurley, 151.
[464] Hurley, 151.
[465] Hurley, 151.

(1) Internalism/externalism distinction:

(1a) Internalism: R entails M. Therefore, not-M entails not-R.

(1b) Externalism: possibly (R and not-M).

Hurley argues that R entails M cuts across other distinctions because two views may agree that R entails M but for different reasons, leading to different metaphysical possibilities. Hurley points out that the Platonic view 'that you cannot truly know the good without loving it' also says R entails M because 'M is true in virtue of R'.[466] But Humeanism also holds R entails M but because 'R is true in virtue of M'.[467] Both disagree on why R entails M but agree that 'not-M entails not-R' and 'R entails M'.[468]

The difference between these views is whether reasons or motivations are metaphysically basic: one claims reasons come from motivations; the other that motivations come from reasons. However, 'both views agree that R entails M and hence not-M entails not-R' because 'entailment and contraposition are logically equivalent'.[469] Thus, Hurley claims that the distinction 'fails to carve at the relevant joints'.[470] We can express this as:

(2) There are at least two possible views that hold R entails M but for different reasons of metaphysical dependence:

(2a) Williams' Humeanism: Not-R is true in virtue of not-M

(2b) Platonism: M is true in virtue of R

It is clear that Platonism was not something Williams intended to count as internalist for, as Hurley notes, this means 'internalism would allow anything the externalist could want'.[471] So we can add,

(3) Williams intended to rule out Platonism (2b) as counting as a form of internalism.

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[466] Hurley, 151.; Christine Korsgaard also defends a version of internalism that is close to the Platonic view Hurley suggests in 'Skepticism about Practical Reason', *The Journal of Philosophy* 83, no. 1 (1986); 'Kant's Analysis of Obligation: The Argument of "Foundations I"', *The Monist* 72, no. 3 (1989); *The Sources of Normativity*.
[467] Hurley, 'Reason and Motivation', 151–52.
[468] Hurley, 152.
[469] Hurley, 152.
[470] Hurley, 153.
[471] Hurley, 152.

Therefore, due to (3), Williams' distinction (1) fails to carve across the relevant metaphysical joints (2). Hurley adds that the same applies to the view that 'M entails R'. This view could be held for the Humean reason that 'R is true in virtue of M', which could be an implication of Williams's view,[472] or a strong thesis of charity in interpretation: 'not-M is true in virtue of not-R'.[473]

5.1.2 Internalism Dismembered

Is Hurley right? One issue is whether 'R entails M' is an adequate schematisation of internalism. There may be some ambiguity in the term 'entails' – which Williams does not use to express internalism. It might seem that Hurley's argument only works by making Williams's distinction imprecise, bringing Platonism and Humeanism together so that they both say the same thing: R entails M. I characterised Williams's internalism as the view that:

> Internalism: a reason statement is falsified by the absence of a motivation in the agent where 'absence of motivation' should be taken to mean the absence of a motivation formed after sufficient deliberation. If the agent cannot form the motivation entailed by the reason statement after deliberation, then the reason statement is false.

Does this distinction have the entailment that R entails M? The answer appears to be yes: 'not-M falsifies R' is the same as 'not-M entails not-R' which is equivalent to R entails M.[474] So the issue is not resolved by drawing the distinction in terms of falsification: both Platonism and Williams agree that 'not-M entails not-R', that 'R entails M', and thus that 'not-M falsifies R'.

It might instead be fruitful to consider the differences between Platonism and Williams's internalism. One is that on Williams's theory two agents may both deliberate sufficiently but end up with different Ms. Thus, R may be true for one but not the other. For Hurley's Platonism, this is not the case. This means for Williams the following is possible:

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[472] R, that one has a reason to Φ, is true in virtue of being motivated to Φ after sound deliberation, M. See Williams, 'Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame', 1995, 35–36 for a suggestion that he holds this view, although he recognises internalism may only be a necessary and not sufficient condition for saying an agent has a reason and so is cagey about fully endorsing the view.
[473] Hurley, 'Reason and Motivation', 152–53.
[474] Note that it is not the same as M entails R, since R entails M and M entails R are not logically equivalent.

(4) A has S which leads to M which entails R

B has S* which leads to M* which entails R*

For B, not-M is the case. Therefore not-R

For A, not-M* is the case. Therefore not-R*.

If we read Platonism as a monist theory of reasons so there is one set of reasons such that those who are sufficiently rational can discern them, we can see how it could rule out (4). For this version of Platonism, R still entails M since M is understood as ideal. Thus, if an ideally rational agent is not motivated to Φ, there is no reason to Φ so not-R. In cases like (4), if we assume R is a genuine reason and R* is false, Platonism distinguishes itself from Williams's internalism by maintaining that A is sufficiently rational, correctly forming M in virtue of R, while B is insufficiently rational and so fails. If B was sufficiently rational, they too would perceive that R and thus form the right M.

Drawing the distinction in terms of conceptions of rationality might then be fruitful. However, Hurley claims that this approach – drawing the distinction in terms of procedural and substantive conceptions of rationality as, for instance, as Derek Parfit does – still fails. Hurley expresses this as:

(5) 'A has a reason to Φ entails that, if A knew the relevant facts and were fully *substantively* rational, A would be motivated to Φ.'

And

(6) 'A has a reason to Φ entails that, if A knew the relevant facts, and deliberated in a way that was *procedurally rational*, A would be motivated to Φ'.[475]

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[475] Hurley, 'Reason and Motivation', 154.

This maps onto the discussion on (4): internalists like Williams deny that there is such a thing as (5), a substantive account of rationality expresses what Platonism is claiming. Such internalists affirm only (6), a minimal rationality where two agents can be procedurally rational but have different reasons. Hurley's response, however, is that while this distinguishes Williams's internalism from this form of Platonism, it fails to establish whether reasons ground motivation.

Hurley demonstrates this by offering an altered schematisation for (6) representing the rationality-based version of the distinction:

(6*) 'R entails that, at all close worlds, (if PR then M)'.[476]

(6*) is equivalent to 'at some close worlds (PR and not-M) entails not-R'.[477] This altered schematisation is still ambiguous about grounding: (if PR then M) might be true in virtue of R, or not-R might be true in virtue of (PR and not-M). That is, one may hold that if someone is procedurally rational then they will be motivated in virtue of having a reason, or one may hold that one does not have a reason in virtue of being procedurally rational and not forming the relevant motivation.

We can see the issue clearly in cases like (5). One view could claim that for all agents relevantly like A, R is a reason and thus they are so motivated. For all agents like B, R* is a reason for them, but not R, and thus they are so motivated, so A and B have differing Ms in virtue of their differing Rs. This view could hold this because it claims that reasons can be relative to agents depending on their attributes. Alternatively, another view might claim that A has R and not-R*, while B has R* and not-R in virtue of their differing Ms, as per Williams's internalism.

A solution to Hurley's challenge lies in seeing Williams's whole argument and not just the distinction as definitive of his internalism. Hurley abstracts from the Williams's wider' argument and presuppositions. This is understandable: Williams does not make this clear and assumes the Humean Theory of Motivation and Reasons. The distinction alone cannot establish the grounding relation. Williams himself notes that the distinction alone does not rule out views like Platonism.[478] However, understanding Williams's internalism in terms of the whole

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[476] Hurley, 155.
[477] Hurley, 155.
[478] Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons, with Postscript', 84–85.

argument clearly establishes the grounding relation. If it were true that motivation forms in virtue of reasons then the Humean Theory of Motivation underpinning Williams's view would have to be rejected along with Williams's internalism.

5.2 Velleman on Theoretical and Practical Reasoning

Velleman's argument in 'The Possibility of Practical Reason' is based upon the way the substantive aim of an activity constitutes the activity, forming the rules one is subject to when engaging in the activity. Certain reasons then apply to an individual because they are engaged in that activity. Velleman argues that the same thought applies to practical reasoning.[479]

The substantive aim of practical reasoning is agency. Since all practical reasoners are agents, there could be reasons independents of agents' varied motivations. However, while these appear to be external reasons, their rational force still depends on an 'inclination' and so they also look internalist, but the inclination is present in agents as such.[480]

Velleman offers two arguments, one on theoretical reasoning, the other on practical reasoning. Vellemans's claim is that theoretical reasoning also straddles internalism and externalism.[481] In the following I present both, drawing out a disanalogy between them that reveals a way to unravel Velleman's argument.

5.2.1 The Internal-External Distinction and Constitutive Goals

Both arguments take the following as premises:

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[479] Velleman, 'The Possibility of Practical Reason', 1996; J. David Velleman, *The Possibility of Practical Reason* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[480] Velleman's argument and position, termed 'constitutivism', has parallels with a number of other constitutivist arguments, but it is not without its detractors. Amongst the former is Christine Korsgaard's (somewhat obscure) Kantian argument based on agency and an apparently universal commitment to one's identity as a 'Citizen in the Kingdom of Ends' in *The Sources of Normativity*; see also Herlinde Pauer-Studer, 'Korsgaard's Constitutivism and the Possibility of Bad Action', *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 21, no. 1 (2018). There are also arguments drawing on the work of Elizabeth Anscombe on the constitutive aims and implicit goal of action, such as Katharina Nieswandt, 'Anscombe on the Sources of Normativity', *The Journal of Value Inquiry* 51, no. 1 (2017). Connie Rosati has been (mistakenly) associated with the view: Connie S. Rosati, 'Agency and the Open Question Argument', *Ethics* 113, no. 3 (2003); Connie S. Rosati, 'Agents and "Shmagents": An Essay on Agency and Normativity', in *Oxford Studies in Metaethics: 11*, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). Velleman's account of the 'externalism' of practical reasoning is similar to Ruth Chang's description of voluntarist account of normativity in 'Voluntarist Reasons and the Sources of Normativity', in *Reasons for Action*, ed. David Sobel and Steven Wall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Chang herself defends a hybrid realist/voluntarist account of normativity in 'Grounding Practical Normativity'. Of the latter, perhaps most notable objection is David Enoch's 'shmagency' objection in 'Agency, Shmagency'; and 'Shmagency Revisited', in *New Waves in Metaethics*, ed. Michael Brady, New Waves in Philosophy (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2011).

[481] Velleman, 'The Possibility of Practical Reason', 1996, 705–16.

(1) Internalism is the view that considerations 'count as reasons for someone only by virtue of his antecedent inclinations' and externalism is the view that at least some 'count as reasons for someone independently of his inclinations'.[482]

(2) The goal of an enterprise, which has both a formal and a substantive element, partly constitutes the enterprise and gives it a standard of success or failure. This generates the normative force of reasons within the activity. The standards and reasons supplied by the enterprise's goals have normative force only to the extent some is engaged in the enterprise.[483] That is, to the extent that they possess the relevant inclination.[484]

In (1), Velleman does not explicitly discuss falsification. However, we can see that this is not an issue if we consider it in terms of dependency relations. 'R is true in virtue of M' can be read into Velleman's definition of internalism, while externalism is 'possibly (not-M and R)'. There is, however, an issue with Velleman's distinction to do with the term 'inclination' to which I will return.

(2) is compelling and can be understood through Velleman's example of chess. An enterprise has a formal and a substantive object The formal object is its goal. The substantive object is 'a goal that is not stated solely in terms that depend on the concept of being the object of that enterprise'.[485] The formal goal of chess is to win. The substantive goal encompasses the rules of chess and establishes what counts as winning, which constitutes the activity of chess. For a chess player the rules partly determine what is a good reason to move this piece here rather than there. Of course, if one plays against a beginner to teach them chess, the weighting of reasons might differ, so more than just the substantive goal affects the normative force of reasons within chess. However, as Velleman notes, while this changes the weighting of reasons, this must still be done with respect to the substantive goal: losing the game to teach a lesson is still done with an understanding of what a good reason for moving the piece here rather than there is.[486] Indeed, teaching is its own enterprise with

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[482] Velleman, 696.
[483] Velleman, 704–7.
[484] Velleman, 700–701.
[485] Velleman, 700–701.
[486] Velleman, 713.

standards relative to its goal. The only way reasons of chess lose their force is when someone is not really playing chess, for instance by moving the pieces randomly.[487]

5.2.2 The Argument on Theoretical Reasoning

The argument on theoretical reason develops as follows. Granted premises (1)-(2):

(3) The substantive goal of theoretical reason is truth and its activity is believing.[488]

(4) Believing can be distinguished from other propositional attitudes, for example imagining or assuming, by its overarching goal: the acceptance of propositions because they are (or appear) true.[489]

(5) The truth of a proposition is dependent on its 'indicators of truth' which are reasons for belief in the proposition.[490]

Therefore,

To the extent that someone has the inclination underpinning theoretical reason, the inclination toward the truth, reasons for belief get their normative force for that individual due to this inclination.[491] Therefore, theoretical reason is internal and external.

Premises (3)-(5) also look compelling. (3) states what theoretical reasoning aims at: truth, and how we do that: forming beliefs. (4) explains how its goal distinguishes the activity of theoretical reason, belief, from other propositional attitudes thus constituting the activity. For instance, imagining involves envisioning things if a proposition were true, maybe or entertainment or to consider the proposition's implications. This differs from believing, which is to accept a proposition as true. (5) establishes what success in theoretical reasoning depends

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[487] Velleman, 713.
[488] Velleman, 704–6.
[489] Velleman, 709.
[490] Velleman, 712.
[491] Velleman, 706–12.

on: indicators of truth, which are reasons for believing; the truth of the proposition *this apple is red* could be indicated by perceiving the apple as red; the truth of the Pythagorean theorem could be indicated by mathematical proofs.

To Velleman, theoretical reason's internalism lies in the idea that reasons for belief have normative force for someone to the extent that they have the inclination to believe what is true. This follows from the definition of internalism given in (1): a reason for belief's status as a reason *for* someone depends on that person's inclination. However, Velleman maintains that theoretical reason is also externalist because reasons for belief also have a rational status independent of any believer's contingent inclinations. They are 'reasons of a kind whose universe of application is the set of potential believers, who are constitutively truth inclined'.[492] Thus, the varying motivations of potential believers does not alter which reasons for belief count.

5.2.3 Why the Argument on Theoretical Reasoning Fails

To Williams, theoretical and practical reasons have both an explanatory and a justificatory function. Velleman does not dispute this. Thus, following Williams, indicators of truth play this explanatory and justificatory role for beliefs. So, a reason explains a belief by citing the indicator(s) of truth the agent finds sufficient to believe that P. That the apple looks red to A is A's reason for believing the apple is red. The apple can also look red to A independent of whatever their S is and A could also be mistaken. Therefore, it is reasonable to think that an indicator of truth is independent of A's contingent motivations.

However, theoretical reason can look internalist but this is mistaken. Say A has a visual impairment and so is mistaken: the apple is actually green. Here, with no further information, the statement: *A has a reason to believe that the apple is red* is true. It would not be sufficient, as an external observer, to say that the apple is actually green so A has no reason to believe it is red: the apple still looks red to her, so for all she knows it is red. It would be irrational for her to think it was green with no indication that it was, so reasons for belief can be relative to an informational context, as Velleman notes.[493] Nor need they establish the truth of a proposition: they could be probabilistic. However, if A is aware of their impairment and has a reliable source informing her that the apple is green, the statement that *A has a reason to believe that the apple is red* is false and *A has a reason to believe that the apple is green* is true.

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[492] Velleman, 712.
[493] Velleman, 712.

What gives A the reason to now believe that the apple is green is information about the world that they can now access. What initially gave her a reason to believe the apple was red was what they perceived to be information about the world. Thus, what now falsifies the reason statement *A has a reason to believe that the apple is red* has little to do with A's motivations. Wanting or wishing the apple is red is irrelevant to whether they have a reason to believe it is so: what explains and justifies A's reason for now believing (rightly) that the apple is green is to refer to information A now has. A, of course, might believe what they have no good reason to believe, and *this* might be due to their motivations, as with wishful belief. Still, 'externalist' is an appropriate description of theoretical reasoning: by citing the relevant standard, information about the world, we can say that A has no reason to continue their belief that the apple is red. Indicators of truth, therefore, presuppose an external standard. The question is then whether theoretical reason is also internalist. Velleman answers positively, but there is an issue with Velleman's use of the term 'inclination' in defining internalism.

For Velleman, the 'inclination' includes motivations but also faculties of belief-formation. This is evident in Velleman's claim that the 'inclination toward truth' need not be as an agent actively willing to believe what is true but can be due to the automatic functioning of their cognitive faculties, independent of any of the agent's direct aims.[494] It follows that an individual lacking those cognitive faculties also lacks the inclination to believe since they cannot believe and so cannot have reasons for belief.[495] The externalist about theoretical reasons can accept all this: the term 'agent' presumes a subject capable of believing. No externalist about theoretical reason need claim that there are reasons for belief for individuals without the capacity to believe. Thus, it is reasonable to presume externalism about theoretical reason refers to the subset of individuals with the capacity to believe and so with the inclination toward truth. Instead, for theoretical reason to be also internalist, the reason-status of indicators of truth would somehow be dependent on an agent's S.

It is now less plausible to think that theoretical reason is internalist. Velleman inadvertently suggests as much when he claims even indifference to the truth of one's own belief would not make one 'insensitive to the associated reasons for believing'.[496] Velleman gives no reason to be sceptical of the intuitive view that agents, whatever their motivations, have reasons to believe propositions if they have access to indicators of its truth, even if their motivations can make this access difficult. In fact, it is common to believe things running counter to

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[494] Velleman, 710.
[495] Velleman, 709–10.
[496] Velleman, 711.

the ends in one's S.[497] Therefore, in Williams's terms, theoretical reason is not obviously internalist. Velleman's claim only appears plausible because he equivocates on 'inclination' and so introduces cognitive faculties into Williams's narrower S.

5.2.4 The Argument on Practical Reasoning

The argument regarding practical reason follows a similar structure. Granted premises (1)-(2):

> (6) The substantive goal of practical reason is autonomy and its activity is action or deciding which action to perform.[498]

> (7) Action is distinguished from other forms of behaviour by its overarching goal: autonomy.[499] Autonomy is the higher-order activity of controlling basic activity; the two combined constitute action.[500] Autonomy involves accepting a proposition to make it true: conscious control of one's own behaviour.[501]

At this stage it seems the conclusion should be that autonomy generates standards creating reasons for individuals with the inclination, as Velleman's discussion of chess and emphasis on an analogy with theoretical reason implies. However, while he does claim autonomy is a standard for practical reasoning, he argues that autonomy confers the status of 'being a reason' on prospective action which itself does not generate specific reasons like with the standards of chess or theoretical reasoning. Instead, the standard is to be autonomous and thus to act for reasons by deliberately choosing a course of action. Thus:

> (8) Acting for a reason is accepting a proposition and conforming one's behaviour to it.[502] Thus the goal of autonomy is achieved by accepting a proposition and conforming to it.

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[497] The fact of a partner's infidelity, for instance: we might think it is, and it might actually be better, to not know.
[498] Velleman, 699–705.
[499] Velleman, 716–722.
[500] Velleman, 717–718.
[501] Velleman, 719–722.
[502] Velleman, 723–725.

Therefore,

> To the extent that anyone has the inclination towards autonomy,[503] reasons for action have
>
> their status as reasons to that individual due to this inclination. Therefore, practical reason is
>
> internal and external.

The conclusion probably requires explanation: for Velleman, practical reason is internalist because someone can

only act for reasons to the extent that they have the inclination to accept propositions and comport themselves

to make it true. Practical reasoning is *not* externalist because specific reasons apply independent of contingent

motivations. Rather, its externalism lies in how it the link between an agent's motivations and their reasons.

Velleman's conception of practical reasoning means it is not that motivations or desires itself create a

reasons, but that the prior autonomous acceptance of propositions (perhaps desires manifested as propositions)

creates reasons and raises the movement that follows to the status of an action – something done for a

reason.[504] If Velleman is right, it creates the possibility that 'the same influence is available to considerations

that aren't based on desires at all'.[505] Thus, desire or (mostly) S independent considerations would only have to

'engage your inclination toward autonomy' to be reasons for which you can act.[506] Thus, externalism is made

possible by a feature of every agent's S.

5.2.5 Why the Argument on Practical Reasoning Fails

When interpreted as a refutation of Williams's internalism, the force of Velleman's argument is weak. Velleman's

use of the term 'perhaps' in reference to the possibility of actions disconnected from an agent's desires indicates

this. It remains possible that autonomous choice is based on desire.[507] The apparently 'unwanted' desires[508]

individuals might have – desires like those for junk food or nicotine – might then be thought of as obstacles to

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[503] This should not be thought of as something that requires the agent's will to apply. Velleman, 705 notes that all practical reasoners are agents, and all agents are practical reasoners, so to be an agent is to be autonomous. Thus, the reasons that one can derive from agency apply to all practical reasoners. So, like theoretical reasoning, to the extent that an individual possesses the faculty of agency, the reasons apply. It follows that those lacking the capacity to exercise agency also lack the requisite inclination and so reasons of agency do not apply to them.

[504] Velleman, 724–726.

[505] Velleman, 726.

[506] Velleman, 726.

[507] Something like Freud's understanding of the unconscious in relation to consciousness would make sense of this view. See Sigmund Freud, *The Unconscious* (London: Penguin UK, 2005). So would Lacan's development of it in the claim that the ego is shot through with desire. See Jacques Lacan, 'Some Reflections on the Ego', in *Influential Papers from the 1950s: Papers from the Decades in International Journal of Psychoanalysis Key Papers Series*, ed. Andrew C. Furman and Steven T. Levy (London: Routledge, 2003). Likewise, so could Schopenhauer's theory of freedom in *Essay on the Freedom of the Will*, trans. Konstantin Kolenda (New York: The Bobs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1960), 99.

[508] Recall the discussion in the previous chapter: I have argued that there is a particular sense in which a desire is but can still remain a desire.

autonomy. In this sense, (7) could be interpreted so that what autonomy means is the realisation of non-alienated desires rather than a distance from desire. If this interpretation is correct, the argument becomes straightforwardly internalist. Unless Velleman can show that the agent can fully detach themselves from their desires, Velleman fails to refute Williams's argument.[509]

Relatedly, it is notable that something analogous to what makes theoretical reason externalist – indicators of truth – is missing in Velleman's conception of practical reasoning, something like a reason-generating standard independent of the Agent's S. However, Velleman expresses scepticism towards the idea that such an S-independent standard could be supplied.[510] Given that this notion of an overarching standard is generally what Williams has in his sights, it is again questionable whether Velleman's view is a challenge to Williams's.

The above means that Velleman's argument is premised on an implicit denial of the Humean Theory of Motivation. This raises an issue if we take Velleman's view to be a refutation of Williams's, because Williams explicitly uses the theory to place a burden of proof onto positions such as Velleman's. To refute or undermine Williams's view, Velleman must assume what needs to be shown: that the agent can form new motivations by selecting among possible actions without this being informed by something prior, namely one's S.

5.3 Mantel on Explanation and the Ontology of Reasons

Across several works Mantel aims to show how agents can act for normative reasons – which she claims are non-psychological entities (factualism) – when what motivates agents to act, their motivating reasons, are psychological (psychologism).[511] The problem, for Mantel, has been overlooked because many rely on what is called the Identity Thesis. This is the view that when an agent acts for a normative reason, it is identical with their motivating reason. Consequently, two views have emerged: motivating reasons and normative reasons are either both non-psychological, or they are both psychological.[512] This issue overlaps with the debate on

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[509] Velleman does argue for something like this in 'What Happens When Someone Acts?', *Mind* 101, no. 403 (1992). He argues that an agent may opt for weaker motive when motives clash, suggesting motives themselves might be subject to rational constraint. This, however, leads to a major difficulty: in opting for the 'weaker motive' it rather difficult to determine after the fact that it really was the 'weaker' of the two motives, given that opting for it implies that one's motivation to do that was stronger.

[510] Velleman, 'The Possibility of Practical Reason', 1996, 698–700.

[511] Mantel, 'No Reason for Identity'; Mantel, 'How to Be Psychologistic about Motivating but Not about Normative Reasons'; Mantel, 'Worldly Reasons'; Mantel, *Determined by Reasons*, 2–3.

[512] Dancy is a notable proponent of the former in *Practical Reality*. Williams and other Humeans are often taken to hold the latter view, for example Donald Davidson, 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes', *The Journal of Philosophy* 60, no. 23 (1963): 686; Eric Wiland, 'Psychologism, Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error', *The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)* 53, no. 210 (2003): 68. For an overview of the debate with respect to motivating reasons, see Eric Wiland, 'Psychologism and Anti-Psychologism about Motivating Reasons', *The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

internalism and externalism: if both kinds of reasons are non-psychological, then the Humean Theory of Motivation and Reasons is not right. If psychological, then this seems to support Williams's internalism. Recall the Humean Theory of Reasons:

> *The Humean Theory of Reasons*: a reason explains an action by citing the agent's motivation and belief about the way the action will serve the agent's motivation.

Belief and motivation are both psychological states, but anti-psychologist views generally claim we need not refer to belief-desire pairs to explain action but only directly to states of affairs.[513] This opens up the view that at least some reasons are external since states of affairs can give agents reasons perhaps independent of their motivational make-up.[514]

While anti-psychologists often adhere to the Explanatory Constraint, Mantel's argument, if correct, requires a rejection or reformulation both of the Humean Theory of Reasons and the Explanatory Constraint. Recall the Explanatory Constraint:

> *The Explanatory Constraint*: a single reason can both explain and justify an action. A plausible theory of practical reasoning must explain how this is possible.

Mantel's formulation of the Identity Thesis refers to two kinds of reasons: motivating and normative reasons. Motivating reasons are what moved the agent to act. Normative reasons 'determine which action ought to be done'.[515] Already this implies a rejection of the Explanatory Constraint: one reason explains the action and the other justifies it. However, if the Identity Thesis holds, then so does the constraint since when an agent acts for a normative reason, it is also their motivating reason: the two are identical and so the same reason can explain and justify.

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[513] For example, Frederick Stoutland, 'The Real Reasons', in *Human Action, Deliberation and Causation*, ed. Jan Bransen and Stefaan E. Cuypers (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1998).
[514] For example, Rudiger Bittner, *Doing Things for Reasons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Maria Alvarez, 'Reasons and the Ambiguity of "Belief"', *Philosophical Explorations* 11, no. 1 (2008).
[515] Mantel, *Determined by Reasons*, 14.

Mantel argues that motivating reasons and normative reasons are ontologically distinct.[516] Normative reasons are anti-psychological while motivating reasons are psychological. However, for Mantel, both play explanatory roles. Thus, when an agent acts for a normative reason, two reasons are in play. If Mantel is right, a theory of practical reasoning need not show how one reason can explain and justify an action. The Explanatory Constraint would then require reformulating as follows:

The Dual Reasons Theory Explanation: Motivating and normative reasons are ontologically distinct. Motivating reasons psychologically explain why actions are done. Normative reasons non-psychologically explain why they are right or what the agent should do.

Now theory needs to show how when an agent acts for a normative reason they also act for an ontologically distinct motivating reason. The task is to reveal how the two relate. For Mantel, the relation is correspondence, akin to the relationship between truth-makers and propositions.[517]

Mantel's argument also undermines the Humean Theory of Reasons, although Mantel indicates it is compatible with the Humean Theory of Motivation.[518] The issue is that when an agent acts *for* a normative reason, the normative reason itself must figure non-accidentally in the explanation of the agent's action. Since motivating reasons conform to the Humean Theory of Reasons, the challenge for Mantel is to show how an agent is motivated by a desire-belief pair but acts *for* the state of affairs that is the normative reason. To meet the challenge, the normative reason must have been represented by the agent in the right way to avoid the problem of deviant causal chains, which refer to instances where an agent's actions appear to correspond with a normative reason but really do not: that Alex is in pain is a normative reason to ask her if she is okay, and an agent respond by asking her if she is okay, but we can imagine the agent only asks this to satisfy their sadism and so they do not act for the normative reason. Mantel's solution is to argue an action is right, so the agent acts for a normative reason, when they act due to a state of affairs represented by the agent in virtue of dispositions that track normative reasons: their normative competence. We can express her view as:

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[516] Mantel, chaps 6–9.
[517] Mantel, chaps 6–9.
[518] Mantel, 76.

The Normative Competence Theory of Reasons: A motivating reason explains an action by citing the agent's motivation and belief about the way the action will serve the agent's motivation. A normative reason explains why the agent's action was right by citing the state of affairs represented in virtue of the agent's normative competence.

5.3.1 Mantel's Case against the Identity Thesis

There is evidence that Williams is wary of accepting a distinction between motivating and normative reasons, suggesting Mantel's claim that he seems to accept the Identity Thesis is open to question.[519] Despite its popularity, the status of the distinction has also been questioned.[520] Furthermore, although Mantel argues that normative and motivating reasons are ontologically distinct, Mantel assumes from the start that there are at least two kinds of reasons, and attempting to derive the distinction from their ontological distinctness results in question-begging. To see why, consider Mantel's case against the Identity Thesis which features the ontological distinction:

(1) Normative reasons are individuated more coarse-grainedly than motivating reasons. This is because they are states of affairs.

(2) Motivating reasons are individuated more fine-grainedly than normative reasons. This is because they are Fregean propositions.

(3) Propositions are individuated more fine-grainedly than states of affairs.

(4) If one thing is individuated more fine-grainedly than another, then those things are ontologically distinct from each other.

Therefore,

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[519] Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons, with Postscript', 93; Mantel, *Determined by Reasons*, 93, 129.
[520] Maria Alvarez, for instance, argues that there are more kinds of reasons but they are all ontologically the same in 'How Many Kinds of Reasons?', *Philosophical Explorations* 12, no. 2 (2009).

(5) normative reasons are ontologically distinct from motivating reasons. And so, since the Identity Thesis claims that when an agent acts for a normative reason it is identical to their motivating reason, it is false.[521]

The above premises cannot supply an argument for the distinction without begging the question: it can always be asked why it is appropriate to call some state of affairs a reason – and likewise for propositions – so an independent argument for the quantitative distinction is required.

Doubtless, the distinction is intuitively appealing: someone who wants a glass of gin sees what they think is one on the table, but it's really petrol. Unaware, they drink it. The proposition, *there is a glass of gin on the table*, represents the agent's motivating reason, but since the agent wants to drink gin, what is in the glass is not a reason drink it: it is not a normative reason. But when there is gin in the glass the agent does have a reason to drink it. This example seems to support Mantel's claim that the normative reason, the right-maker, is a state of affairs.[522] It is also compatible with the view that motivating reasons are kinds of propositions: the agent's belief *that P*, like the belief that *there is gin in that glass*. What makes this distinction intuitively appealing is the thought that the reasons we think we do have are often revealed in hindsight to be not normative for us, so it seems what is normative is separate from what we think we have reason to do.[523] We also sometimes (seem to) act for really normative reasons and so our reasons for actions are vindicated. In light of this, it is plausible to suppose that there are reasons which motivate us and reasons which are normative and these can come apart when we act wrongly and coincide when we act rightly. However, I argue that this intuitively appealing distinction is far from straightforward.

5.3.2 For Quantitative Minimalism in Practical Reasons

The idea that if an agent acts rightly, they act for a motivating and a normative reason seems to lead to a strange outcome. It seems the successful agent acts for one reason too many. Consider the agent who rightly drinks the gin. There are at least three elements that make up their reason(s) for action:

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[521] Mantel, *Determined by Reasons*, 111–12.
[522] That there is in fact gin in the glass and that the agent in fact wants to drink gin – the agents' subjective wants – Mantel claims, should be understood in such instances to be states of affairs.
[523] Mantel, 3.

(a) that the agent believes there is gin in the glass

(b) that the agent wants gin

(c) that there is gin in the glass (and perhaps also the fact that the agent wants gin)

(a) and (b), a belief and desire, are minimally required for explaining the agent's action.[524] (c) explains why the action was right, but only given (a) and (b) since, given the absence of either, (c) is incapable of explaining the rightness of the action: the absence of (a) makes the action accidental or irrational, while the absence of (b) means the agent has no aim to which (c) contributes.

It follows from the above that when an agent fails to act for a normative reason, they act for one less reason than an agent who acts for a normative reason. The agent who rightly drinks the glass with gin acts *for* two reasons – (a-b) and (c) – while the agent who wrongly drinks petrol acts for only a motivating reason: (a-b). There is something metaphysically strange about thinking that one agent acts *for* two different kinds of entity while the other acts for only one. This strangeness is alone insufficient to reject this view even if, to paraphrase J.L. Mackie's case against objective moral properties, it is difficult to point to an analogous phenomenon.[525] However, this raises the question of whether (c) counts as a separate kind of reason for action, particularly when, as I argue, the right-making feature can be understood without implying there are two kinds of reasons.

To see why, note that it's reasonable to think that, in cases of acting rightly or wrongly, when asked why they so acted agents answer with something easily classified as a belief: *that it was raining*, *that there is gin in the glass*.[526] What separates the agents in the gin case is that one's belief is true and the other's is false. Here, there seems to be little difficulty in holding each acts for one reason each: the belief *that there is gin in the glass*. We could then distinguish between the reason *for which* the agents acted and the reason why one acted rightly and the other wrongly. We could then say each agent acts for only one reason although there are still two kinds of reasons but with new roles: the reason moving the action and the reason why it is good or bad. We would

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[524] At least according to the Humean account. Here, I assume the Humean Theory of Motivation is correct since Mantel does not discount it and because I offered a defence in an earlier chapter.
[525] See the argument from queerness in Mackie, *Ethics*, 38–42.
[526] And perhaps also, when not speaking in an elliptical manner, the agent's belief about what their desire is.

then preserve between the agents since the state of affairs making a reason for action good or bad applies in both instances in a similar way, rather than resulting in a multiplication of reasons. The state of affairs, rather than figuring as a separate reason for action that one agent acts for and the other doesn't, plays the role of a modifier for the status of a reason for action by altering the valence of the reason. We can further ask whether a state of affairs can be a reason without some other element: (c) alone is not a reason to do anything without an accompanying desire and belief, while (a-b) alone are sufficient to say an agent has a reason. (c) cannot function as giving a standalone reason, while (a-b) plausibly could.

There is an issue with my argument so far: the agent who acts rightly does seem to respond to a state of affairs – this is why they are right – but the one who is wrong doesn't. This is because we appear to be committed to saying that these agents act for different kinds of things if they are indeed ontologically distinct: the agent acting for the normative reason acts for a state of affairs and the other merely a belief, and this surely isn't right. Perhaps a true belief or true proposition *is* a state of affairs, as the Identity Theory of Truth has it, but this raises issues about the grain of motivating and normative reasons: both are either kinds of beliefs or propositions, so we would expect their grain to be that of propositions or beliefs.[527] So, if we think the true belief is just an accurate representation of a state of affairs, but a belief nonetheless, we can avoid these difficulties.

The idea behind the view that there is just kind of reason while the state of affairs functions as truth-maker rather than as a reason is not an unfamiliar idea. A parallel debate on theoretical reasoning concerns the question of whether reasons for belief are states of affairs or psychological entities.[528] The latter position aligns with mine: the corresponding state of affairs makes a reason for belief a good or a bad one but is not itself the reason; states of affairs feature as truth-makers for reasons for belief, so beliefs are true when they correspond with states of affairs; while it seems when asked, what is a reason for the belief that P, the reason given will be the state of affairs. But since we don't obviously have straightforward access to states of affairs, it's not obvious that states of affairs are directly reasons for belief. Rather, what point to things that indicate the belief is true: *it looks red to me, John says it is red we ran an experiment showing that the object's wavelength frequency is in the same region as for other red objects*, etc. What distinguishes true from false belief are what indicates which is true, the state of affairs, but arguably the state of affairs is separate from a reason for belief. The analogous

[527] My point here is that true belief cannot, strictly speaking, be the states of affairs because the grain of states of affairs must exceed the beliefs about it: this is water is true, this is H20 is also true, but these are not identical beliefs. The state of affairs making these non-identical beliefs true is therefore greater than true belief.
[528] See Marian David, 'The Correspondence Theory of Truth', in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2020) for an overview.

view to Mantel's in reasons for belief would be where we say an agent who truly believes something, and so has a normative reason equivalent to a state of affairs, also believes for one more reason than the agent who mistakenly believes. The psychologistic view denies this.

My aim here has not been to resolve the issue, but to suggest there is an equally plausible view that reasons for action are ontologically one kind, not two.[529] My claim is that this view avoids some metaphysical strangeness which either requires a demonstration of its necessity or shown to be not so strange. It is equally plausible to hold that when agents act for reasons that are right, the belief embedded in the reason corresponds with the state of affairs, but this is not different from a motivating reason. In terms of form, they are the same thing, but one is right and the other wrong due to their correspondence with the state of affairs.

A response is to ask whether Mantel can argue for an alternative view: that one agent only acts for a normative reason and the other a motivating reason, so each acts only for one reason. However, this does not appear to be what Mantel wishes to say. Mantel's goal is to explain the relation between two ontologically distinct things, claiming it is not the relation is not identity but correspondence. This answer is plausible when the state of affairs is understood as the reason why the agent was right. However, Mantel also suggests the goal is to say that the agent who acts rightly acts *for* the normative reason and the motivating reason.

If it was the case that each agent acts for only one reason, then one could say in response to the view I propose that one acts for the state of affairs and the other acts for belief: one correctly perceives a state of affairs and the other does not. However, this avoids one kind of metaphysical strangeness while embracing another: if we maintain Mantel's ontological distinction, then we must also maintain that one agent's reason is individuated with a coarser grain than the other's reason but when asked for their reasons each will answer with beliefs – which have the same grain. Perhaps this is defensible, but to my mind the simpler and thus more attractive strategy is to accept that both agents act for the same kind of thing, a reason, and to see theory's task as explaining why one agent perceives the better reason. Mantel's competence account could explain this but multiplying reasons to do so seems superfluous. It is simpler to produce an account of why one agent's competence enables them to see reasons responsive to states of affairs.

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[529] Much of this depends on differing theories of truth and so the main issue may well turn on this issue. The correspondence theory of truth, for instance, seems to lean towards the view I have just outlined: true beliefs are not themselves facts, but representations of states of affairs. The Identity Theory of Truth seems to run against it, since versions claim that true propositions are states of affairs making it possible that true beliefs are states of affairs as well. This is not an issue I can resolve here.

5.3.3 Williams and the Identity Thesis

Recall that the Identity Thesis says:

> *The Identity Thesis*: When an agent acts for a normative reason, the normative reason is identical with their motivating reason.

I have argued Williams need not accept two ontologically distinct kinds of reason, nor Mantel's Identity Thesis. It is equally plausible to say that agents act for one kind of thing. When agent acts badly, normative and motivating reasons do not come apart; they act for a bad reason or no reason at all, and the reverse holds when they act well. Thus, the Explanatory Constraint can stay intact. If this is correct, we need not accept the Dual Reasons Theory of Explanation. The Dual Reasons Theory can be set aside because there is no need to draw an ontological distinction between motivating and normative reasons. Mantel's account of competence is, however, useful for avoiding the problem of deviant causal chains. It can help explain why some agents generate good reasons and others do not. It is also not ruled out by Williams's account since the idea that agents can reason well or poorly is an assumption on which the account is built.

We can reformulate Mantel's Normative Competence Theory of Reasons in a way compatible with the unitary conception of reasons for action:

> *The Humean Competence Theory of Reasons:* A reason explains an action by citing the agent's motivation and belief about the way the action will serve the agent's motivation. A good reason explains why the agent's action was right by citing the agent's accurate belief formed in virtue of the agent's competence.

5.4 Alvarez on Factualism and Psychologism about Reasons

Maria Alvarez, in contrast to Mantel, adheres to the idea that reasons are ontologically unitary and defends the view that all practical reasons are factualist.[530] This appears to challenge the view Williams seems committed to: that reasons consist in desire-belief pairs and so seems to target the Humean Theory of Reasons. With

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[530] Alvarez, 'Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality'.

factualism, to explain an action, a reason only needs to cite the fact the agent perceives and not the agent's belief or desire-belief pair.

5.4.1 Alvarez's Case Against Psychologism

Alvarez defines psychologism as the view that reasons are mental states and factualism as the view that reasons are at least sometimes facts. These positions differ on whether an agent's reasons consist in *the fact that they believe* something or *the fact* that the agent believes, so:[531]

Factualism: Reasons are facts about all sorts of things.

Psychologism: Reasons are psychological facts about the mental states of agents.

Alvarez discusses psychologism in terms of beliefs rather than belief-desire pairs.[532] This is likely because in an earlier paper Alvarez argues that 'I want', a desire-statement, is not a premise in practical reasoning and so is not a reason.[533] Rather, practical reasons are identical to theoretical reasons but with different goals.

Alvarez does agree with the distinction between normative and motivating reasons and introduces a third: explanatory reasons. Alvarez defends this by claiming that we can ask three kinds of questions about actions corresponding to these categories and get three different answers: the motivating reason could differ from the normative reason, and the explanation of the action might be a different reason from both.[534] Thus:

Normative reasons: reasons that favour acting

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[531] Alvarez, 3294–3295.

[532] She writes: 'Psychologism is sometimes expressed with the slogan "reasons are beliefs"' Alvarez, 3295. However, one might think that much of the crux of the psychologistic view that reasons are mental states is built around the claim that reasons are desire-belief pairs or at least that reasons are dependent on desires to be what they are. Elizabeth Radcliffe those reasons, 'A Humean Explanation of Acting on Normative Reasons' explicitly endorses the view that reasons are desire-belief pairs. I shall argue that one has the option as a Humean/internalist of viewing reasons either of these ways, or even in terms of factualism, depending on what turns out to be the most plausible view on the ontological status of reasons.

[533] Maria Alvarez, *Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

[534] Alvarez does, however, grant that 'at least in contexts of intentional actions, we do not need to distinguish between motivating and explanatory reasons' in 'Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality', 3297. Thus, in cases of intentional action what motivates the agent and what explains their action are the same reason, so this might make it seem like there are only two categories of reason. The obvious case, then, where what motivates an agent and what explains their action comes apart is in cases of unintentional action, although Alvarez seems to think the distinction holds beyond this.

Motivating reasons: a reason for which someone acts: a reason someone takes to favour acting and in the light of which they act.

Explanatory reasons: a reason why someone acts.

Despite claiming there are three kinds of reasons, Alvarez avoids the metaphysical problem Mantel's argument confronts. This is because Alvarez emphasises that the distinction is based only on the role reasons play and not necessarily on ontological difference.[535]

Alvarez goes on to answer the question whether factualism or psychologism applies for each of the three kinds of reasons. For normative reasons, Alvarez appeals to an apparent consensus they are factualist and offers no further argument. Next, Alvarez argues that while 'explanatory reasons are often psychological facts' they need not be.[536] She argues that to explain an action one could refer to the fact that moves the agent (when acting rightly): *that it is raining*, *that P*. She responds to the psychologistic objection that while, *that P*, might be what the agent gives as their reasons, and so appears to explain it, the agent is speaking elliptically: that *that it is raining*, is a stand-in for what really explains the action: their *belief that it is raining*. Alvarez concedes that for the proposition *that P* to explain an agent's action requires the agent to stand 'in some epistemic relation to p'.[537] However, Alvarez invokes Jonathan Dancy's argument to the effect that 'psychological facts may be part of the pragmatics of explanation without being part of the explanation itself', so the believing of P functions as an 'enabling condition' for the explanation.[538]

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[535] Alvarez, 'How Many Kinds of Reasons?'; Alvarez, *Kinds of Reasons*; Alvarez, 'Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality'. Alvarez writes: '[t]he fact that one and the same reason can be a normative and a motivating reason does not obscure the difference between those two roles that reasons can play' Alvarez, 3297. Given Alvarez's tripartite distinction between kinds of reasons, Alvarez then claims that 'it should now be clear that the question [of whether factualism, psychologism, or neither holds] needs to be examined separately for normative, explanatory and motivating reasons, respectively' (Ibid., p. 3298). However, it is not clear that it is quite right to examine the question separately for each kind of reason. This is for the reason that if it turns out in the investigation factualism holds for one kind of reason, psychologism another, but psychologism and factualism differ in their ontological account of what a reason is, then because Alvarez (rightly, in my view) maintains that ontologically a reason is only one kind of thing, an investigation that has this result must be mistaken. Instead, the question we should ask is which view, if either, correctly identifies a form for reason that can potentially play all three roles. Alvarez might side-step this issue since she seems to discuss the question of whether reasons are all of one kind of fact, psychological, or broadly, factualist. However, we should bear in mind that if something like Mantel's view applies to what would be called a reason under the factualist view then it would be individuated differently from what would be called a reason on the psychologistic view (if facts are individuated more coarse-grained than propositions). Alvarez's framing of the question by leaving it open that they could be different would then be misleading. In any case, the present framing masks an implicit constraint on what the answer to the factualist-psychologist question requires: that the conception of reason must be of such a kind that one thing can play all three roles, if it is possible for the same reason to occupy all three roles. Of course, it is open to Alvarez to deny Mantel's ontological argument and claim that facts and psychological facts are individuated in the same way.
[536] Alvarez, 'Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality', 3299.
[537] Alvarez, 3299.
[538] Alvarez, 'Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality', 3299; Dancy, *Practical Reality*, 127. Alvarez's argument is, however, inconclusive, hinging on an almighty 'perhaps': 'perhaps the fact that they know such things is simply a necessary condition for p to be the explanans in a reason explanation' Alvarez, 'Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality', 3299. Much of Alvarez's argument, however, due to the ontological constraint outlined earlier turns on the ambiguous status of explanatory reasons.

Acknowledging that this issue is ambiguous, Alvarez moves on to acknowledge that in cases of acting from false belief, the explanation is always psychological, so explanatory reasons might all be psychological. This is because Alvarez holds to the reasonable view that when an agent acts on false belief we cannot claim that they are acting for a kind of fact. Alvarez gives the example of Othello's killing Desdemona because he falsely believes she has been unfaithful. Factualism seems committed to saying that the fact *that Desdemona was unfaithful* explains Othello's actions. Dancy defends this by claiming that action-explanations need not be factive.[539] Alvarez resists this conclusion, instead concurring with the intuitive view that Othello's false belief explains his actions.

However, this raises an issue for Alvarez's claim that reasons are factualist, since then it seems to follow that what motivates an agent is what explains action. However, Alvarez claims this is no issue because:

> even if Psychologism is right for explanatory reasons ... it does not follow that Psychologism is right for motivating reasons because ... these reasons need not be the same ... so we can hold that a reason that explains why Othello kills Desdemona by rationalising his action is the psychological fact that he believes that she has been unfaithful, while resisting the conclusion that Othello's (motivating) reason for killing Desdemona is the fact that he believes that she has been unfaithful – that is, by eschewing Psychologism about motivating reasons.[540]

For Alvarez, psychologism about motivating reasons need not follow from psychologism about explanatory reasons. While error-case explanations are necessarily psychological for mistaken action, what explains and what motivates it are different. What motivates it is only an *apparent* reason, while in right action the motivation and explanation coincide: *that P*.

Alvarez's support for the claim that factualism holds for motivating reasons is that agents rarely refer to the fact *that they believe that P* when giving reasons but directly to facts or putative facts: *that P*. Thus, while some motivating reasons are psychological facts in rare cases,[541] ordinary language in practices of reason-giving seems to support factualism.[542] Alvarez's argument can be outlined as follows:

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[539] Dancy, *Practical Reality*.
[540] Alvarez, 'Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality', 3301.
[541] Alvarez suggests cases of psychological illness affecting our beliefs can be cases where psychological facts can be motivating and normative reasons to, for example, see a doctor, 3301.
[542] Alvarez, 3301.

(1) Factualism and Psychologism:

    (1a) Factualism: reasons are facts about all kinds of things.

    (1b) Psychologism: reasons are psychological facts about the mental states of agents

(2) Reasons are factualist when they are considered to be the contents of beliefs and not the beliefs themselves. Reasons are psychologist when they are the belief itself.

(3) There are three kinds of role a reason can play, distinguished by the questions we can ask about practical reasons:

    (3a) Normative reasons: reasons that favour acting

    (3b) Motivating reasons: a reason for which someone acts: a reason someone takes to favour acting and in the light of which they act.

    (3c) Explanatory reasons: a reason why someone acts.

(4) Although there are three roles a reason can play, ontologically there is only one kind of reason. A theory of practical reasoning must show how the same kind of reason can occupy all three roles.

(5) There is a consensus that normative reasons are factualist.

(6) Explanatory reasons are sometimes psychologist, but there is a case that could be made that they are factualist because it is sufficient for a reason to play the explanatory role for action that it cites the content of the agent's belief showing what the agent saw in the action and not the fact of belief itself. This latter is because beliefs are often 'enabling conditions' for explanations and are not part of the explanation itself.

(7) Even if all explanatory reasons are psychologist, it does not follow that motivating reasons are, because motivating and explanatory reasons might be different.

(8) Motivating reasons are factualist because we typically respond to the contents of beliefs and not the beliefs themselves when referring to reasons.

Therefore,

(9) Reasons are best understood as factualist.

5.4.2 A Modification

As it stands, Alvarez's conclusion does not necessarily follow from its premises, and (4) and (7) are incompatible. If all explanatory reasons are psychologist, then not all reasons are factualist. (4) and (7) then are incompatible because if all explanatory reasons are psychologistic, Mantel is right that psychologistic and factualist reasons are individuated differently, and normative and motivating reasons are indeed factualist, then there would be two kinds of reasons, so (4) would have to be rejected.[543]

Since Alvarez expresses a commitment to the ontological unity of reasons, the argument is made coherent by abandoning (7), while (6) should claim that explanatory reasons are factualist (which encompasses the view that they may on occasion be psychological facts, but not solely so).

Premise (2) also needs modification due to Alvarez's view that in error-cases an agent acts only under an apparent reason to preserve factivity. This enables Alvarez to claim that in cases of false belief explanation is psychologistic even if reasons proper are not. This means it is not accurate to distinguish factualism from psychologism in that one understands reasons to be the contents of belief and the other belief itself. This is because, as we have seen, the contents of beliefs are still what moves agents to act in error cases. Yet the Apparent Reasons view claims the agent is not acting for a reason, but an apparent reason, so the claim that 'reasons are factualist when they are considered to be the contents of beliefs and not the beliefs themselves' is slightly misleading. The tidied argument is:

(1) Factualism and Psychologism:

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[543] Alvarez does not consider the question of the difference between the grain of factualist or psychologistic reasons.

(1a) Factualism: reasons are facts about all kinds of things.

(1b) Psychologism: reasons are psychological facts about the mental states of agents

(2) Reasons are factualist when they are considered to be the contents of true beliefs and not just beliefs themselves. Reasons are psychologist when they are the beliefs themselves.

(3) There are three kinds of role a reason can play, distinguished by the questions we can ask about practical reasons:

(3a) Normative reasons: reasons that favour acting.

(3b) Motivating reasons: a reason for which someone acts: a reason someone takes to favour acting and in the light of which they act.

(3c) Explanatory reasons: a reason why someone acts.

(4) Although there are three roles a reason can play, ontologically there is only one kind of reason. A theory of practical reasoning must show how the same kind of reason can occupy all three roles.

(5) There is a consensus that normative reasons are factualist.

(6) Explanatory reasons are sometimes psychologist but can be factualist as well because it is sufficient for a reason to play the explanatory role for action that it cites the content of the agent's belief showing what the agent saw in the action and not the fact of belief itself. This latter is because beliefs are often 'enabling conditions' for explanations and are not part of the explanation itself.

(7) Motivating reasons are factualist because we typically respond to the contents of beliefs and not the beliefs themselves when referring to reasons.

Therefore,

(8) Reasons are best understood as factualist.

5.4.3 Psychologism about Reasons: Ontological or Relational?

Alvarez's third premise is built on a distinction between three variations in answers to three questions about practical reasons. Unintentional action cannot form the basis of a distinction between practical reasons, since intentionality separates action from other behaviours. Thus, to maintain the distinction between explanatory and motivating reasons, Alvarez needs to show an agent's motivating reason might not be the reason that explains their behaviour while maintaining that explanatory reasons are practical reasons and forms of theoretical reasons which may or may not be ontologically different.[544]

In another paper, Alvarez gives three examples of where explanation and motivation comes apart without relying on cases of unintentional action:

> (1) The reason that explains why Fred gives a lot of money to charities may be that he's a generous man; but that he's a generous man is not the reason that motivates Fred to give money to charities (it is not what he takes to make his action of giving money good or right).

> (2) The reason that explains why Sarah bought a new mobile phone is that she thought that her phone had been stolen but the reason that motivated her was not that she thought that her phone had been stolen.

> (3) The reason why Angie didn't go to the party may be that she forgot, but that she forgot is not a reason that motivated her not to go to the party.

However, the explanatory reason in (1) is not clearly a practical reason (which is the relevant case here since, as I have argued, Williams's argument applies to practical reasons and not theoretical reasons, so internalism

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[544] This is because it is not clear that a reason for belief needs to be the same kind of thing as a reason for action. I have already suggested one is more plausibly externalist than the other. This runs against Alvarez's claim in 'How Many Kinds of Reasons?' that *all* reasons are ontologically all of one kind. It seems clear to me that some kinds of reasons metaphysically behave differently than others, namely in that some kinds (theoretical reasons) are sorts of things for which we can never act. Given these reasons behave differently, we can surmise that they are ontologically distinct.

implies a clear distinction between the two which the distinction between motivating and external reasons seems to ignore[545]): 'I am a generous man' would not confront many as a reason for acting except in a fetishistic scenario. (1) is thus not usually a practical reason so much as it is something like a theory of Fred. Meanwhile, Fred's motivating reason, whatever it is, would explain his action just as well as the 'explanatory' reason.

On the other hand, (2) is difficult to comprehend. If Sarah thinks her phone is stolen, and this explains her buying a new phone, then the idea that something else motivated her to buy the phone without explaining her action is difficult to understand. Perhaps the thought that the phone was stolen created the condition for her motivation to buy a new one which is, say, to call her friend. This could make sense of why her thought explains her actions, while her desire is what motivated her. However, here the distinction between motivation and explanation is forced. Without the phone being stolen, her desire to call her friend would not result in buying a new phone and, without the desire, neither does the theft of the phone. Only both together make Sarah's actions comprehensible, so the distinction between what explains and what motivates Sarah is not clear and there appears to be no reason to bifurcate reasons here. Lastly, (3) is merely a failure to act, so the explanatory reason, 'that she forgot', is not a practical reason: the example is irrelevant to practical reasons.

What this shows is that explanatory reasons can be things for which an agent cannot act. Thus, while all motivating reasons can be explanatory reasons and (I take it) all normative reasons can be motivating reasons and vice-vera, explanatory reasons are different: some explanatory reasons cannot occupy either role.[546] The only relevant explanatory reasons in considering internalism then are those that are identical with motivating reasons and so our interest here is with two reasons, not three: motivating and normative reasons.[547]

As an argument against internalism, the obvious target of Alvarez's factualism would be the Humean Theory of Reasons. Alvarez claims reasons explain action by citing the contents of an agent's belief, but not the belief itself. This seems to suggest that, since reasons are facts, a reason statement citing a fact need not be

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[545] Note that Alvarez implies there is no distinction between theoretical and practical reasons. For Alvarez, in 'How Many Kinds of Reasons?', they are all the same kind of thing. However, this view does not seem sustainable. External reasons can potentially be things which are such that no agent at all could ever act for them. Motivating and normative reasons are kinds of things which there must be at least some agent that could act for them, by definition. This difference suggests a distinction between theoretical and practical reasons is justified.
[546] Indeed, it may be that what ultimately explains actions are natural-scientific explanations that do not strictly coincide with what motivates from the first-person perspective.
[547] It is common when speaking of practical reasons to distinguish between two kinds of reason rather than three, motivating and normative or explanatory and justifying Alvarez, 'How Many Kinds of Reasons?'. Note also that others who make the distinction are rather clear in stating that motivating and explanatory reasons come apart in cases of unintentional action or non-agential cases, and otherwise as the reasons explaining the cause of a motivation, but what they do not do is present them as practical reasons. Susanna Rinard is explicit about the fact that explanatory reasons are a different order of reason entirely. She writes: 'Another way to see the difference between explanatory and motivating reasons is to notice that in the case of motivating reasons, it makes sense to ask whether the reason in question was a good one – one that could help justify the agent's doing what they did – whereas in the case of explanatory reasons, it doesn't make sense to ask this question' 'Believing for Practical Reasons', *Noûs* 53, no. 4 (2019): 764, see also 763-765.

falsified by the absence of a motivation and beliefs themselves are only reasons in rare occasions or they are apparent reasons. Note, however, that the Humean Theory of Reasons does not claim that the reason itself needs to *be* a belief: it only needs to refer to a belief and a motivation to be compatible with the Explanatory Constraint and the Humean Theory of Motivation, so the notion that a belief is merely an enabling condition and not a part of action-explanations seems forced.

Others agree. Veli Mitova suggests the factualist conclusion as results from a hasty dismissal of extreme psychologism.[548] Wayne A. Davis agrees that reasons are facts but challenges the idea that beliefs and desires do not need to feature in the explanation of action and so reasons do not need to cite beliefs and desires to explain actions. For Davis, a reason is only what it is if there is a corresponding belief and desire, so citing a reason ultimately indicates a belief-desire pair.[549] If this is right, then reasons still explain actions through belief-desire pairs. Others suggest similar views.[550] Both views suggest there is some room to question Alvarez's argument in terms of its challenge Williams's internalism.

According to Williams's internalism, whether R is a reason for A to Φ depends on whether A could form the motivation to Φ, so R's status as a reason depends on a psychological fact about A. However, contrary to Alvarez's construal of psychologism, this does not necessarily mean that reasons are those same psychological facts nor that reasons are belief-desire pairs or beliefs alone: reasons could still be the true contents of beliefs and this can keep with internalism. If we follow Alvarez's view that beliefs and motivations are only the background conditions for explanations and reasons to be possible, but keep with internalism's premises, then explaining an action by citing the agent's reasons still ultimately cites a belief and motivation because they are still necessary for the presence of the reason. Although citing the contents of a belief may be sufficient for the reason-explanation, that the agent even has a reason depends on a belief and motivation. Thus, reasons could be facts but still ultimately gesture to a belief and motivation that explains the action, so internalism can remain intact. The idea is that even if reasons are facts, a particular feature of the world, a fact, still requires that the agent *can* form the background motivation and belief necessary for that fact to become a reason. The Humean Theory of Reasons would then remain intact: reasons do explain actions by indicating the presence of a motivation and belief even if reasons themselves are not beliefs or belief-desire pairs. The result of this view

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[548] Veli Mitova, 'Clearing Space for Extreme Psychologism about Reasons', *South African Journal of Philosophy* 35, no. 3 (2016); Veli Mitova, ed., 'Extreme Psychologism about Reasons', in *Believable Evidence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
[549] Wayne A. Davis, 'Reasons and Psychological Causes', *Philosophical Studies* 122, no. 1 (2005).
[550] John Turri, 'The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons', *Noûs* 43, no. 3 (2009) also raises similar doubts in terms of epistemic reasons, as does Eric Marcus, *Rational Causation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 109–12.

would be that internalism is now a thesis claiming to constrain *which* facts can be reasons for whom. This shows that what factualism needs in order to undermine reasons internalism is more than a rejection of the *version* of psychologism Alvarez rejects. The attack on the Humean Theory of Reasons needs to show that an agent's reasons are not *at all* dependent on motivations and beliefs, that reasons do not depend on the S.

Given this, we can question Alvarez's construal of the distinction between factualism and psychologism. Some scholars, factualist and psychologistic alike, seem to construe psychologism more broadly as the claim that status of a reason depends on the mental states of agents.[551] It seems there are two different kinds of psychologism. The version Alvarez discusses is more directly a claim about ontological status of a reason: that it is a psychological fact/mental state. I call this ontological psychologism about reasons. The other kind of psychologism can agree with the view opposing ontological psychologism, Alvarez's factualism, but still maintains that for a fact to be a reason a certain relation must hold between the agent and the fact. It highlights a three-part relation: agent – fact – reason. For a fact to be a reason, the fact must relate in the way internalism indicates to the agent's motivations (and beliefs). I call this relational psychologism about reasons. If internalism corresponds with relational psychologism about reasons but is non-committal with regard to ontological psychologism about reasons – which is what I have argued – then Alvarez's argument, if correct, only rejects the ontological version of psychologism but not internalism itself.

To illustrate the view a little more, this version of internalism based on relational psychologism allows Alvarez's factualism about the ontological status of reasons, but enquires as to which facts can be reasons and when. Alvarez gives no answer because she only appeals to a consensus that treasons are facts. The internalist, however, has a clear answer: which facts can be reasons for action are subject to the internalist constraint. The internalist can concur with this consensus about normative reasons but maintain internalism through relational psychologism. An internalist can accept a kind of factualism about the ontological status of reasons and retain all the internalist could want from a theory of practical reasoning. Those who attempt to reject Williams's internalism on the grounds of its psychologism, therefore, need to be attentive to which version they mean and what is needed to refute it.

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[551] Wiland registers the ambiguity: 'It seems that most philosophers hold that a person's reasons for action either are or essentially depend upon the psychological attitudes of the person whose reasons they are' in 'Psychologism and Anti-Psychologism about Motivating Reasons', 199. An implication of my argument is that, if it is right, Wiland (amongst others) makes a mistake when he fails to register that there are important differences between seeing reasons as psychological attitudes and seeing them as dependent upon psychological attitudes.

5.5 Conclusion

I have argued that four recent or novel attacks on Williams's internalism misconstrues the underlying argument. Williams's reasons internalism is thus more robust than its critics have recognised. In the process, I have clarified the nature of Williams's internalism, construing it as a form of relational psychologism about reasons which is compatible with what Alvarez says about the factualist nature of reasons. To undermine Williams's internalism, the focus should be on the Humean Theory of Motivation. But, as I try to show in chapter three, there are good reasons to think that the Humean Theory of Motivation gets things right. I take it then that Williams offers a compelling and defensible account of (at least) practical normativity. I thus take the Humean position on normativity as the foundation of political ethics. In what follows, I return to the topic of cosmopolitan versus non-cosmopolitan approaches to political ethics by considering reasons internalism in relation to agent-neutrality.

Part III: Internalism and Normative Political Theory

6 Thinking Hypothetically: On the Possibility of Humean Cosmopolitanism

Reasons internalism seems problematic for cosmopolitanism because internalism seems to make agent neutral reasons of a practical kind hard to come by. To say there are agent-neutral reasons from within internalism would require defending the idea that there is a reason or set of reasons that every agent (or every moral or reasonable agent) can and should be moved by from within what are varied motivational sets. Yet, it is not necessarily the case that internalism or Humeanism does rule out agent-neutral reasons. In this chapter, I explore this further by asking whether a theory with Humean presuppositions like internalism could be compatible with cosmopolitanism. In *Slaves of the Passions*, Mark Schroeder offers such an account. Schroeder defends a conception of Humeanism he calls hypotheticalism, which he argues allows for a Humean account of agent-neutral reasons. A consequence of hypotheticalism is that, in contrast to internalism, valid agent neutral practical reasons appear to be fairly straightforward to generate. Thus, Schroeder's view could serve as the basis for a Humean cosmopolitanism.

In what follows, I outline and critically analyse Schroeder's view an along the way consider the differences between his view, which he terms 'Hypotheticalism', and my defence (and version of) Williams's reasons internalism and their implications for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. In section 6.1, I outline Schroeder's view. In section 6.2, I outline the main contrasts between Schroeder's view and reasons internalism. I clarify in what way the internalism I defend is a version of a view Schroeder refers to as proportionalism, which reveals some mistaken assumptions on Schroeder's account about proportionalism and which I argue is more robust than Schroeder takes it to be and moreover that Schroeder's own account of proportionalism results in regression or circularity. I then consider a final objection from Schroeder, arguing that the objection rests on an unattractive understanding of how reasons work and that Schroeder's own account, in fact, suffers from the problems he claims ails internalism. I conclude that internalism remains the better Humean account of reasons and, particularly when combined with proportionalism, agent neutral reasons remain very hard to come by from the perspective of reasons internalism.

6.1 Hypotheticalism: A Humean Theory of Agent-Neutral Reasons?

Hypotheticalism, at its core, is the view that:

> For R to be a reason for A to Φ requires that A has a desire whose object her Φ-ing promotes.[552]

Hypotheticalism's Humeanism lies in the idea that it is an expression of the Humean Theory of Reasons: the idea that the reasons an agent has are rooted in their desires. In defending and developing this view, Schroeder rejects several other Humean views that make it difficult or impossible to generate agent-neutral reasons. Schroeder argues that they are separate from the Humean Theory of Reasons and are implausible in their own right. In particular, reasons internalism and positions that seem to follow reasons internalism are amongst his targets.

6.1.1 Schroeder's Agent-Neutral Reasons and Hypotheticalism

Schroeder's conception of agent-neutral reasons slightly differs from the version used here in chapter two and that of several others.[553] Here, agent-neutral reasons were defined as reasons giving the same aims to a group of agents. These differ from agent-relative reasons which give distinct aims to agents. Meanwhile, distinctly cosmopolitan reasons were defined as a kind of agent-neutral reason with a scope unbound by special relationships. Thus, the viability cosmopolitanism depends on more than the status of universalism; it depends on the status of a specific form of universalism: agent-neutrality. In contrast, Schroeder defines an agent-neutral reason as a two-place relation joining facts with action-types while what he calls 'agent-relational' reasons are three-place relations between facts, action-types, and specific agents.[554] According to Schroeder, agent-neutral reasons are elliptical versions of agent-relational reasons referring to a set of agents, where context clarifies to whom the reasons refer and which can extend to everyone as is usually the case with moral reasons.[555] Schroeder's differing conception of reasons seems to create a risk of talking at cross-purposes due to differences

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[552] Schroeder, *Slaves of the Passions*, 108.

[553] Compare Mark Schroeder, 'Reasons and Agent-Neutrality', *Philosophical Studies* 135, no. 2 (1 September 2007) with; Matthew Hammerton, 'Distinguishing Agent-Relativity from Agent-Neutrality', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 97, no. 2 (3 April 2019); McNaughton and Rawling, 'On Defending Deontology'; Nagel, *The View from Nowhere*; Parfit, *On What Matters: Volume One*; Bryan R. Weaver and Kevin Scharp, *Semantics for Reasons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

[554] In contrast to other views, Schroeder distinguishes between agent-relational, agent-relative, and agent-neutral reasons. See 'Reasons and Agent-Neutrality'.

[555] Schroeder.

in what is extensionally captured by his position and the one used here, yet Schroeder's hypotheticalism is interesting due to its strong potential for grounding cosmopolitanism reasons.

This possibility is indicated by the kinds of substantive reasons Schroeder tries to account for. Schroeder suggests the following as a kind of reason hypotheticalism can make sense of:

That Katie is in pain is a reason to help Katie.

For Schroeder, this reason is agent-neutral. This means it has three features: it applies to all agents; its universality is not contingent on any particular feature agents happen to possess; and it applies to any agent even if one agent did not possess a direct desire to help Katie.[556] This kind of reason has a shape suggestive of a capacity to serve as the basis for cosmopolitan reasons: on Schroeder's reading, if valid it would apply to all agents regardless of the relationship in which they stand to Katie. It would be only a small step, then, to frame such reasons in terms of states of affairs to be brought about.

Schroeder claims hypotheticalism can make sense of the three features of agent-neutral reasons, which Schroeder calls their universality, weak modal status, and strong modal status. More specifically, the universality of agent-neutral reasons means they have a scope that extends to all agents. Their weak modal status consists is the idea that their universality is non-contingent: agent-neutral reasons should not be thought of as universal because people accidentally value what underpins the reason. The strong modal status is the idea that agent-neutral reasons exist for everyone even if they do not directly possess a desire to do what the reason requires. Schroeder also sets his theory a fourth task: to make sense of moral reasons which could be 'equally weighty' for everyone, even for someone with little or no motivation to do what moral reasons require or for someone with a stronger motivation to do otherwise.[557]

6.1.2 Accounting for Agent-Neutral Reasons

To show how hypotheticalism accounts for agent-neutral reasons, Schroeder reconsiders the Too Many and Too Few Reasons objections that Humean theories have struggled with. In contrast to my approach, Schroeder bites the bullet on the Too Many rather than Too Few Reasons objection: for Schroeder, reasons are over-determined.

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[556] Schroeder, *Slaves of the Passions*, 105–6.
[557] Schroeder, 105–6.

Schroeder achievess this by arguing that using negative existential intuitions – the method of using intuitions to reason about what does not exist – to rule out reasons is unreliable because such intuitions are easy to explain away. Applied to reasons, this has the result that there are many reasons. It is just that they are often so normatively weak that our intuitions seem to tell us that they did do not exist when in fact they do; they are just very weak. To illustrate, Schroeder claims that the iron content of your car is however, very weak reason to eat your car. However, someone who tried to eat their car would be 'crazy' because the reason has practically no normative weight, so 'something would already be going wrong if you even considered it.'[558] Thus, Schroeder claims Aunt Margaret does actually have a reason to build her spacecraft. But it has little weight because the action is costly, unlikely to succeed, and she likely has other more probable desires that would be undermined if she undertook to enact her desire to build the spaceship.

The claim that reasons are vastly overdetermined is key for how Schroeder gets to agent-neutral reasons. Schroeder's hypotheticalist account of agent neutral reasons is as follows:

> *Hypotheticalist agent-neutral reasons:* there are some actions that promote any possible desire. So, the reasons to perform these actions are reasons for anyone, no matter what she desires. This accounts for the strong *and* weak modal statuses of agent-neutral reasons.[559]

The over-determination of reasons means anything which promotes a desire is a reason. Given this, Schroeder wagers that it is likely that there are reasons that would promote any action. Thus, there are reasons which are reasons for any agent – accounting for their universality.

To show how hypotheticalism accommodates the strong and weak modal status of agent-neutral reasons, Schroeder's contrasts hypotheticalism with Velleman's constructivism.[560] Velleman claims that each agent has aims without which they would not be agents. To Schroeder, this implies that there is some desire that each agent necessarily has.[561] Thus, Velleman can make sense of the universality of agent-neutral reasons because, in virtue of this desire each agent has, there are reasons relating to the desire that are reasons for each

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[558] Schroeder, 96.
[559] Schroeder, 121.
[560] Schroeder, chap. 5.
[561] It seems worth noting that Schroeder and I interpret Velleman's view differently – I take it that Velleman's view is more subtle than Schroeder has it. In my view, Velleman tries (and fails to) account for the possibility that agents can form desires *in virtue of what they take to be a reason*, which, as I hope to have shown in the previous chapters, goes right to the heart of the debate over reasons, motivation, and reasons internalism.

agent. Velleman can also make sense weak modal status since the desire is constitutive of agency and so any reasons stemming from that desire is non-contingent. However, Schroeder claims Velleman cannot account for the strong modal status of agent-neutral reasons: it cannot show that agents would have an agent-neutral reason even if the desire was absent. Schroeder also points to difficulty of arguing that there is a desire that agents necessarily have in virtue of being an agent. In contrast, Schroeder claims hypotheticalism can account for strong modal status because it only requires that agents have a desire, rather than a specific desire, since hypotheticalism claims agent-neutral reasons relate to actions that promote virtually any desire.[562] Thus, agent-neutral reasons no longer need to be conceived of as contingent on the presence of any particular desire.

6.1.3 Weight! What's Wrong with Proportionalism?

For Schroeder, a significant issue with other Humean views is that they entail a proportionalist theory of normative weight. Proportionalism is the view that:

> The strength of an agent's reason to Φ is proportional to the strength of the agent's desire and the degree to which Φ-ing promotes the desire.

Proportionalism complicates agent-neutral reasons. The link between strength of desire and strength of reason implies that an agent with little or no desire to do what any prospective reason calls for has no reason to do it, so agent-neutral reasons become hard to come by. This would be so even if there is a desire every agent possesses,[563] since it implies there could be variability in the strength this underlying desire has for different agents complicating its strong modal status.[564] To have agent-neutral reasons with proportionalism each agent would need to have the same desire with an overriding strength. But the existence of such a desire is doubtful and nonetheless remains contingent on desire, undermining the supposed weak modal statuses of agent neutral reasons.

Schroeder challenges proportionalism in two ways. The first is related to Schroeder's acceptance of 'reasons basicness': the view that reasons are the foundational normative unit in terms of which other normative

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[562] Schroeder, *Slaves of the Passions*, 109.
[563] Perhaps in virtue of being an agent, as Velleman argues in 'The Possibility of Practical Reason', 1996.
[564] Schroeder, *Slaves of the Passions*.

concepts can be analysed. Given reasons basicness, Schroeder claims proportionalism fails to correctly analyse the weighting of reasons because the weight of reasons is a normative matter. Because it is a normative matter, an answer to the question must be supplied in terms of reasons. However, proportionalism reduces the strength of reasons to what is, in Schroeder's view, a non-normative property: the strength of an agent's desire or desires. While this might explain the weight people do place on reasons, it does not explain why they are correct to do so and thus fails to explain the real (normative) weight of reasons.[565] The second is that proportionalism fails to get its account of the extension of reasons correct. To explain why, Schroeder applies proportionalism to the following scenario:

> *Aunt Margaret*: 'My Aunt Margaret wants to reconstruct the scene depicted on page 78 of the November 2001 *Martha Stewart Living* catalogue on Mars. In order to do this, she needs to construct a Mars-bound spacecraft – for no one is going to give her one. Nevertheless, intuitively, Aunt Margaret still ought not to build her Mars-bound spacecraft'.[566]

For Schroeder, Humean theory relying on proportionalism yields counter-intuitive results in this case. With proportionalism, if building the spacecraft is what Aunt Margaret most desires it seems to follow that she has a strong reason to build it, but Schroeder claims this is counter-intuitive. To combat this unwelcome consequence, Schroeder notes that Humeans have tried to modify their account of how desires give reasons, for instance by suggesting that only desires that would survive cognitive psychotherapy, reflective equilibrium, or which are central to an agent's life projects actually give reasons.[567] However, Schroeder points that Aunt Margaret's desire could survive reflective equilibrium or something like it and could be central to her life project, and so proportionalism fails to yield the 'intuitive' result that she should not start building her spacecraft.[568]

6.1.4 The Recursive Account of Weighting

To avoid the problems Schroeder discerns in proportionalism, Schroeder constructs an alternative account of weight to underpin hypotheticalism: the 'recursive' account of weighting. Schroeder begins his model with the

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[565] Schroeder, 100–102.
[566] Schroeder, 84.
[567] Schroeder, 84–85.
[568] Schroeder, *Slaves of the Passions*.

assumption that 'there is an agent-neutral reason to place more weight on reasons than on non-reasons'.[569]

Schroeder then builds his model on five premises:

> (1) *Ought*: For it to be the case that an agent ought to Φ is for it to be the case that the set of reasons for the agent to Φ is weightier than the set of reasons for the agent not to Φ.

> (2) *Correct*: For it to be correct to Φ is for it to be the case that the set of all the right kind of reasons to Φ is weightier than the set of all the right kind of reasons not to Φ.

> (3) *Right Kind of Reasons*; The right kind of reasons to Φ are reasons that are shared by everyone engaged in the activity of doing Φ, such that the fact that they are engaged in doing Φ is sufficient to explain why these are reasons for them.

> (4) *Weight Base*: One way for set of reasons A to be weightier than set of reasons B is for set B to be empty, but A non-empty.

> (5) *Weight Recursion*: The other way for set of reasons A to be weightier than set of reasons B is for the set of all the (right kind of) reasons to place more weight on A to be weightier than the set of all the (right kind of) reasons to place more weight on B.

This yields the view that:

> Set of reasons A is weightier than set of reasons B just in case it is *correct* to place more weight on A than on B.[570]

For Schroeder, premises Ought, Correct, and Right Kind of Reasons capture appealing intuitions. Ought captures the idea that we ought to do whatever we have most reason to do, which is for all the reasons in favour of an

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[569] Schroeder, 141.
[570] Schroeder, *Slaves of the Passions*.

action to outweigh the reasons against it. Correct further elaborates on this by capturing the idea that what one ought to do is what it is correct to do and the idea that the relevant kinds of reasons are reasons relevant to whatever activity the agent is engaged in. Right Kind of Reasons defines the 'right kind' of reasons by building on Velleman's practice-based account of reasons.

Schroeder illustrates how Weight Base and Weight Recursion work through an example of undercutting reasons. Suppose we saw (who we think is) Tom steal a book. Then suppose that Tom has an identical twin, Tim. This would be

> an undercutter for your visual evidence that Tom stole a book. But this undercutter can also be undercut. Suppose, for example, that this morning Mrs Grabit, the twins' mother, said that Tim is in Thailand this week (supposing, for clarity, that the library is not in Thailand). The fact that Mrs Grabit said this is not a reason for you to believe that Tom stole a book. What it does, is make it turn out that the fact that Tom has a twin is not such a great reason, after all, to be cautious about your visual experiences of Tom (at least this week).[571]

The idea is that new reasons can undercut old reasons and these reasons can be undercut by others altering the weight we place on them. This captures the idea behind Weight Base and Weight Recursion: the correct weight to place on a reason is the weight it has when undercutting defeaters run out – which turns out, eventually, to be what really happened. Weight Base then functions to prevent a regress of reasons.[572]

To see how this works, suppose that *there is a reason to help Katie because she is in pain* is an agent-neutral reason, so helping Katie promotes any desire.[573] Now suppose that Ryan really hates Katie. For Schroeder, the hypotheticalist model concludes that the agent-neutral reason to help overrides Ryan's direct desire not to help Katie. This is because Ryan's personal reason is the wrong kind of reason to place any weight on, while the agent-neutral reason is the right kind of reason to place weight on. This is because a

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[571]Schroeder, 137.
[572] Schroeder, 137–38.
[573] We might say something like a reason for having the attitude that helping someone in pain is an overriding reason to help that person is an attitude that creates an environment that leads to a better probability of realising anyone's desire since being in pain is an impediment to agency so, in a roundabout way, helping Katie is an action which in virtue of the attitude it implies is an action which promotes any desire, and so we assume that it is an agent-neutral reason.

reason has a certain weight just in case it is *correct* to place that much weight in it. And correctness is determined by reasons of the right kind. According to Right Kind of Reasons, that means that they must be reasons that everyone who is placing weight on reasons has, in virtue of being someone who is placing weight on reasons. But the activity of placing weight on reasons is just the activity of deciding what to do. So, it is simply the activity that every agent is engaged in. So then the right kind of reasons with respect to the correctness of placing weight on reasons are precisely the class of *agent-neutral* reasons. It follows that Ryan's idiosyncratic reasons to place less weight on his reason to help Katie are irrelevant, the wrong kind of reason to determine its weight.[574]

It follows that idiosyncratic reasons will always be outweighed by agent-neutral reasons when present. This is due to Schroeder's move to focus on the activity of placing weight on reasons as a general activity that everyone is involved in – following Velleman in an Anscombean move from activity to the correctness of kinds of reasons and thus the weight of reasons.[575] Agent-neutral reasons, on this view, are reasons of the right kind because there is an agent-neutral reason to place weight on agent-neutral reasons. We see this idea expressed in the Right Kind of Reasons premise, which stipulates that the right kind of reasons are shared by agents engaged in some activity. Thus, reasons stemming from idiosyncratic reasons are the wrong kind of reasons since all agents are engaged in the activity of deciding what to do. The right kind of reasons in general must be agent-neutral. This means no idiosyncratic reason alone can override the weight of agent-neutral reasons. This would require another agent-neutral reason to place weight on the idiosyncratic reason. Assuming there is no other agent-neutral reason defeating the reason to help Katie in favour of Ryan's idiosyncratic reason, there is no reason to place weight on Ryan's idiosyncratic reason since it's a reason of the wrong kind. On the other hand, there is a reason to place weight on the agent-neutral reason to help Katie, since (hypothetically) it *promotes* some desire of Ryan's and is a reason of the right kind.

Returning to Aunt Margaret, Schroeder claims that: '[i]t is relatively easy to imagine that if it is possible to explain agent-neutral reasons, it will be possible to explain an agent-neutral reason not to place weight on merely agent-relational reasons in favour of actions that merely promote enormously costly, fantastically

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[574] Schroeder, *Slaves of the Passions*, 143.
[575] Nieswandt, 'Anscombe on the Sources of Normativity'; Velleman, 'The Possibility of Practical Reason', 1996.

frivolous ends.'[576] Presuming such a reason can be explained, it seems to yield the conclusion that Aunt Margaret's idiosyncratic reason has no weight. Schroeder offers a suggestion for how this might work in Aunt Margaret's case: if she desires anything else and her endeavour would put this in jeopardy by placing weight on her frivolous activity, she has a weighty reason not to do so. In terms of an agent-neutral reason, this might read: that one would jeopardise one's other interests by placing weight on frivolous activities is a reason not to place weight on frivolous activities. Other agent-neutral reasons against may also be formulated: reasons of social cost and not performing highly improbable actions spring to mind.

It is easy to see how this could run in line with cosmopolitan reasons. The idiosyncratic reasons of special relationships could only be justified if there was a prior agent-neutral reason (or the absence of countervailing reasons) allowing weight to be placed on them. As I explained in chapter two, this is much the same way some cosmopolitans have attempted to justify placing weight on one's own familial relationships.[577] Moreover, the emphasis on impartiality within cosmopolitanism seems to match well with Schroeder's model, and so the model seems well-positioned to produce cosmopolitan reasons.

6.2 Hypotheticalism and Reasons Internalism Compared

Schroeder rejects 'existence internalism about reasons', a term he uses to designate what I call reasons internalism. This is partly because he rejects the classical argument for Humeanism – a version of the argument I have attributed to Williams and defended.[578] Internalism contrasts with Schroeder's project in several ways. Internalism undermines the strong modal status of agent-neutral reasons, leaving it possible that agents could deliberate sufficiently and still not form the motivation to perform the action Schroeder's model suggests they should. For internalism, as we have seen with the sociopath example, a person may have no reason to do something generally considered 'good'. But, for hypotheticalism, agent-neutral reasons outweigh whatever else someone might see themselves as having a reason to do, whether they could reach the reason through deliberation or not. Moreover, to return to the topic of reasons to eat your car, for internalism it is unlikely that this could turn out to be a reason, even a weak one with no weight. Thus, hypotheticalism and internalism differ over what reasons there are. Schroeder is also clear that he severs the link between reasons and motivation in

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[576] Schroeder, *Slaves of the Passions*, 143.
[577] See chapter two for discussion.
[578] Schroeder, 6–8.

their explanation. Schroeder manages this by distinguishing three 'senses' of reasons corresponding to the usual distinctions but with Schroeder's own gloss: objective normative reasons, subjective normative reasons, and explanatory reasons. Objective normative reasons are the reasons indicating overall what one should do, while subjective normative reasons are what we can perceive of the former, and explanatory reasons are the reasons which explain an agent's actions. Thus, if an objective normative reason says R is a reason for A to Φ then a subjective normative reason is A the content of A's (correct) belief that R is a reason for A to Φ.[579] These distinctions help Schroeder weaken the link between reasons and motivation because the role played by desire in the explaining reasons is now to explain why reasons happen to be normative rather than the additional role Williams gives it: to explain why reasons are motivating. Reasons internalism also, as I shall argue, aligns well with a version of proportionalism entailed by reasons internalism. In what follows, I defend internalism against Schroeder's position.

6.2.1 Internalism and Proportionalism

Schroeder outlines a distinction between atomistic and holistic theories of how reasons get explained by desires. For atomism, each individuated desire that could be promoted gives the agent reasons through the facts and actions that promote the desire. Thus, 'we need only one desire' to explain why one agent has a reason and another does not.[580] In contrast, holism holds that a difference between agents' reasons can only be explained by taking account of each agent's relevant desires. More specifically, an agent only has a reason to Φ if doing Φ satisfies all their desires on balance.[581] Schroeder argues holism is counter-intuitive and endorses the atomistic theory. Because Schroeder rejects holism for being counter-intuitive early in his argument, atomism underpins the conception of proportionalism Schroeder eventually rejects. This atomistic version of proportionalism appears to lead to the strange conclusions Schroeder claims proportionalism draws in cases like Aunt Margaret. Furthermore, internalism appears to be a variant of the holistic theory. For internalism, reasons are a product of the activity of trying to realise the S. However, I argue that Schroeder is too hasty in rejecting holism and relies on a false dichotomy between atomism and holism. Moreover, I argue that proportionalism is much more

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[579] Schroeder, *Slaves of the Passions*; Mark Schroeder, 'Having Reasons', *Philosophical Studies* 139, no. 1 (2008).
[580] Schroeder, *Slaves of the Passions*, 3.
[581] Schroeder, 3–4.

plausible when understood in holistic terms, and thus an internalist variant of proportionalism is on stronger footing than Schroeder recognises.

Schroeder's presentation of atomism and holism presents them as opposing views, but this is not necessarily the case. Internalism can, and indeed is, best read as accommodating both views. In contrast to Schroeder's view, the more plausible position is that holistic views capture what reasons an agent has overall. While atomistic theories capture reasons as considerations: the individual things we may consider while deliberating about what to do. A more accurate presentation of internalism would note that it incorporates both levels: atomism applies at the level of deliberation, holism at the level of judgement. A simple case can illustrate. Consider the question of whether to go to a party tonight. I might reason as follows:

> there's dancing at the party tonight and I love dancing, so that's one reason to go. But people will also be smoking and I'm trying to quit, so that will be a temptation that might be a reason not to go. I also don't like dancing when I can't also drink. But if I drink, knowing myself, I'll probably smoke. It's also early in my attempt to quit, so I still feel quite strong urges to smoke. I really want to quit though, so I think I'll stay in.

In this case, *that there's dancing at the party* is one reason to go. *That people will be smoking* is a reason not to go. Both considerations count for something, so there is a sense in which they are reasons. The conclusion, however, corresponds with the holistic view. At the deliberative, atomistic level what explains the reasons an agent has are, amongst other things, individual desires. At the level of the decision, the reason is explained by what would appropriately satisfy the S. This dual-level understanding of atomism and holism about desire adds an additional nuance to any form of proportionalism that might be coupled with it. I return to this point later. For now, I turn to Schroeder's case against holism.

Schroeder argues holism is open to obvious counter-examples. He provides two:

> Katie needs help, and intuitively that is a reason for Ryan to help her … [However, the] holistic version of the Humean Theory of Reasons tells us that this can be so only if helping Katie maximizes the satisfaction of Ryan's desires on balance. So intuitive counterexamples to the holistic theory are easy to come by. All we have to imagine is that Ryan cares more about his

own time than about Katie's welfare, and we have a case in which there is no reason whatsoever for him to help Katie.[582]

And:

> According to the holistic theory, if Ronnie desires to dance, but desires to hang out with Bradley *more*, the fact that there will be dancing at the part is no reason at all for Ronnie to go there. For Bradley predictably fails to be co-located with dancing. But that result is already wrong. On the face of it, even if Ronnie has *better* reasons *not* to go to the party, those reasons don't change the fact that he also has a reason to *go* – they merely *outweigh* it.[583]

However, in these cases Schroeder gives no reason for ruling out what I claim is an intuitively appealing dual-level theory. Yet holism can accommodate what is appealing about atomism when both are interpreted as part of a two-level theory. Holism is not obviously opposed to atomism: it can accept atomism at the level of deliberation. However, what this theory would be opposed to is Schroeder's hypotheticalism, competing with it at the level of how to understand what an agent should do overall.

The two-level holism leads to a different take on proportionalism than Schroeder's version. Due to his rejection of holism, Schroeder conceives of proportionalism atomistically: whichever of the agent's desires is strongest is what they have most reason to do. It is reminiscent of the sub-Humean view Williams rejects in developing reasons internalism. The reasons internalist need not hold this view. Importantly, the S itself is dynamic it can alter itself by acting on itself through the reflective and imaginative capacity of the agent. Deliberation and judgement, too, re holistic and atomistic: the agent considers what to do from the perspective of the S, not from the perspective of a single desire, even if a single desire with the S might be a consideration that counts for or against some action. This leads to:

> *Internalist Proportionalism*: the strength of an agent's reason to Φ is proportional to the strength of the relevant desire of S' and the degree to which Φ-ing promotes S'.

[582] Schroeder, 4.
[583] Schroeder, 4–5.

Internalist proportionalism captures what intuitively follows from reasons internalism and distances itself from the crude Humean view entailed by Schroeder's atomistic proportionalism. This is represented in the idea that not just the strength of any desire is relevant. Rather, what matters is the desire at S' and the desire and course of action that would be present after sufficient deliberation, which requires reflecting on the set of desires. However, this should be understood as coming with a caveat: for reasons outlined in chapter four, the S' should not be understood to reflect a fully ideal and once-and-for-all set of desires, implying a view like Michael Smith's.[584] Rather, it should be understood to refer to a range of sufficient options in internalist terms.

6.2.2 Properly Sizing-Up Proportionalism and Schroeder's Problem with Regress

Schroeder's case against proportionalism comes from Schroeder's claim to have built a stronger alterative and by showing proportionalism is counter-intuitive. However, some have questioned Schroeder's handling of proportionalism. Daan Evers, for instance, argues that Schroeder's rejection of proportionalism depends upon abstracting important elements from the proportionalism that allow it to handle intuitions about cases like Aunt Margaret. [585] Evers points out that Humeans do not think only the intensity of desire matters; the likelihood that Φ-ing raises probability of achieving the object of desire is also important. There is also an issue with Schroeder's treatment of proportionalism in an atomistic fashion: Humeans recognise that agents also have other desires which may vary in intensity.[586] This latter point suggests that Schroeder's own explanation of Aunt Margaret's case is available to the proportionalist once atomism is set aside or accommodated, as above, while including the probability of achieving the object of desire in the proportionalist picture means, as Evers notes, that '[t]he intuition that Aunt Margaret's reason is weak (even if her desire is strong) might be explained by the fact that she has very little chance of succeeding in her aim … After all, proportionalism makes the strength of a reason depend not just on the strength of your desire for p, but also on the extent to which p is probable given suitable action.'[587] Internalist proportionalism incorporates both these elements. Thus, when some action is unlikely and costly internalist proportionalism has available the claim that intuitions against such a course of action are

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[584] Smith, 'Internal Reasons'.
[585] Daan Evers, however, while defending a form of proportionalism – what he calls 'preferentialism' – argues that the promotion-relation used by Schroeder and this version of proportionalism leads to certain issues, since to promote a strongly felt desire need not be to promote an agent's preferred option. See Daan Evers, 'In Defence of Proportionalism', *European Journal of Philosophy* 22, no. 2 (2014): 317–18. I believe, however, that my response to the Radioman objection – that desires must in some fundamental sense be understood involving preference – and the focus on S' in my reformulation of proportionalism accounts for this: it already has built into it the idea of what an agent prefers, so I set Evers's worry aside.
[586] Evers, 313–14.
[587] Evers, 315.

explained by the unlikelihood of realizing the goal and because it would undermine the rest of the agent's S. Moreover, as Travis Rieder notes, that Aunt Margaret has a reason to start trying to build her spaceship looks less improbable if we knew that she might succeed and her desire is so strong she wants little else.[588]

In the case of Katie, Schroeder wants a Humean theory that can make sense of the idea that *that Katie needs help* is a reason for Ryan (or anyone) to help her and Schroeder uses intuitions drawn from the case to criticise proportionalism. However, this raises a question of whether moral reasons or agent-neutral reasons – often constituted conceptually at least in part through the idea that they have weight independent of desire – are the kind of things a Humean theory should try to accommodate.[589] The Humean theory often brings together several *other* features it claims are true of reasons, motivation, and action to suggest such things as moral reasons as they are usually conceived are questionable. Thus, as Rieder puts it, 'moral reasons … never seemed the most plausible candidates for a Humean explanation to begin with … because *Humeanism* seems less plausible in the case of moral reasons'.[590] And we can also add moral reasons seem less plausible in the case of Humeanism. Evers also uses the example of a psychopath in response to Schroeder's intuitions about cases like Katie to argue that such cases do not necessarily support the intuition that views like proportionalism yield counter-intuitive conclusions. Rather, Evers draws a similar conclusion to the one I drew in chapter three for internalism: that examples such as these can only lead to a choice between using them to motivate the view that reasons do not depend on the agent's desires or they view that they do and that such examples are ambiguous and do not suffice to dislodge proportionalism.[591]

Schroeder is then left with the claim that proportionalism cannot supply a coherent account of the *normative* weight of reasons: that at best, it repeats only what an agent really desires to do. We saw that for Schroeder the weight of reasons should be explained in normative terms. Thus, the weight of reasons has to be accounted for in terms of reasons and so proportionalism cannot make sense of a simple truism: that it is correct to place weight on reasons that have more weight. In response, it is unclear whether the simple truism is really simple or a truism, As Evers points out, even if it is a truism, it is not a truism that it alone does not preclude any particular account of what that weight is determined by.[592] A further assumption is needed to get what Schroeder wants: reasons basicness. However, it is not clear that normative weight must be understood in terms

[588] Travis N. Rieder, 'Why I'm Still a Proportionalist', *Philosophical Studies* 173, no. 1 (1 January 2016): 257.
[589] Rieder, 256.
[590] Rieder, 256–57.
[591] Evers, 'In Defence of Proportionalism', 315–16.
[592] Evers, 314.

of reasons. Moreover, reason basicness suggests tension in Schroeder's Humeanism. While Schroeder believes reasons confer weight on other reasons. He also believes that desires are background features that create the conditions for the existence of reasons. Given this latter feature, why not then surmise that desires confer normativity onto reasons and account for normative weight of reasons in terms of desires? It seems a natural extension of the Humean view: to confer normativity on something is to confer oughtness or shouldness onto it, and to confer oughtness onto something is just to say that it has normative weight. Indeed, if Schroeder thinks desires create the conditions for the existence of reasons without conferring normativity onto reasons – as reasons basicness claims – the question arises as to why desires are necessary for the constitution of a reason but themselves play no role in the normativity of the reason, which seems an odd position for a Humean view to take given that Humeans have typically insisted that desire plays a fairly direct role in normativity.[593] If the argument of chapter three is correct, the proportionalist can account for normative weight in terms other than those of reasons. The argument runs as follows: reasons are normative in virtue of desires; thus, they have the weight they do in virtue of the strength of desires; a desire is itself normative in virtue of a set of desires because the S is evaluated by and from within the S. It seems proportionalism, particularly the internalist version, can survive Schroeder's case against it. Moreover, Schroeder's own theory of weight faces problems.

Rieder argues, developing an argument of David Enoch's, that Schroeder's account really does have a problem with circularity and regress.[594] Specifically, he argues that Weight Base – meant to prevent regression – itself requires a recursive analysis. But now this means this recursive analysis itself now 'requires either circular reasoning or answer by *fiat*' to stop the argument continually moving backwards.[595] Recall that the idea behind Weight Base is that a non-empty set weighs more than an empty set. This is what was meant to stop the regress. But, as Enoch argues, this only works because we intuitively assume that something weighs more than nothing, and yet this already assumes that this something has weight.[596] In virtue of what does it have weight? Schroeder cannot argue that reasons come with a weight because it is the weight of reasons that the recursive account is supposed to explain.

[593] Evers, 'In Defence of Proportionalism'; David Sobel, review of Slaves of the Passions, by Mark Schroeder, 25 April 2009, https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/slaves-of-the-passions/.
[594] Rieder, 'Why I'm Still a Proportionalist', 261–65; see also David Enoch, 'On Mark Schroeder's Hypotheticalism: A Critical Notice of Slaves of the Passions', *The Philosophical Review* 120, no. 3 (1 July 2011).
[595] Rieder, 'Why I'm Still a Proportionalist', 261.
[596] Enoch, 'On Mark Schroeder's Hypotheticalism'.

Schroeder's response to the problem is to move to the assumption that there is a reason to place weight on reasons over non-reasons. Following Rieder, we can call this 'the Bottom Reason'.[597] Weight Base was supposed to stop the regress now the Bottom Reason stops it, but the Bottom Reason 'reintroduces reasons into the explanatory story, and so the regress begins anew'.[598] That is to say, we now have a reason which is meant to explain the weight of other reasons but the account moves into regress because we are then forced to ask: in virtue of what does this new reason have weight?[599] One way Schroeder attempts to avoid the problem is by suggesting that the Bottom Reason is an explanation of Weight Base. However, since Schroeder also assumes that it does not make sense to think that the Bottom Reason could have a competing reason to place weight on non-reasons – so the Bottom Reason is all there is – it turns out that the Bottom Reason is an instance of Weight Base. [600] Thus, the Bottom Reason cannot explain Weight Base because it would make the explanation circular: they are equivalent. There appears to be no other way of defending the recursive account and so Schroeder's argument is either regressive (if the Bottom Reason is explanatory) or circular (if the Bottom Reason is an instance of Weight Base).

6.2.3 The Factoring Account and an Unsuccessful Surprise Party

Schroeder's own theory of weighting is thus not a viable alternative to proportionalism. Schroeder's argument, however, does still present further problems for reasons internalism by challenging the argument that typically supports it: the classical argument for Humeanism, which 'infers [the Humean Theory of Reasons] from the Humean Theory of Motivation and Reasons Internalism'.[601] Rieder, a Humean, also finds Schroeder's view on this compelling, agreeing 'with Schroeder that this is not the best reason (in fact, not even a good reason) for adopting [the Humean Theory of Reasons].'[602] Schroeder's rejection of reasons internalism stems from his rejection of the classical argument for Humeanism. He treats the two as roughly equivalent and, as before, argues that the classical position yields counter intuitive conclusions in certain cases.[603]

Schroeder notes that reasons internalism must indicate what one may do to motivate another, otherwise the theory is under-specified and trivial. Thus, '[p]lausible but substantive versions of the thesis

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[597] Rieder, 'Why I'm Still a Proportionalist', 263.
[598] Rieder, 263.
[599] Rieder, 263–64.
[600] Rieder, 264.
[601] Rieder, 253.
[602] Rieder, 253–54.
[603] Schroeder, *Slaves of the Passions*, 165.

require that not just any motivation to do the action counts, but only motivation *for that reason*, and typically say that we are allowed to provide the agent with relevant true information, but not with false information'.[604] For Schroeder, this is usually thought to mean that 'there is some such set of circumstances that we can specify, such that in every case of a reason, there will be a non-trivially true subjunctive conditional about the agent's motivation to act for that reason'.[605] However, he is 'highly suspicious about whether plausible, non-trivial, subjunctive conditionals of the right kind can actually be formulated'.[606][603]

Schroeder makes his case through a couple of examples. The first example Schroeder gives is as follows:

> Nate loves successful surprise parties thrown in his honour, but can't stand unsuccessful surprise parties. If there is an unsuspected surprise party waiting for Nate in the living room, then plausibly there is a reason for Nate to go into the living room. There is certainly something that God would put in the 'pros' column in listing pros and cons of Nate's going into the living room. But it is simply impossible to motivate Nate to go into the living room for this reason – for as soon as you tell him about it, it will go away.[607]

The issue is that, with reasons internalism, to say *that there is a surprise party in the other room* is a reason for Nate to go into the other room, Nate should be moved by the proposition through deliberation. But as soon we entertain the idea that Nate deliberates about the proposition, we realise that he cannot be moved by it since to deliberate about it would be to ruin the surprise – something he can't stand and thus something that intuitively seems to be a reason for him to go disappears with the internalist account.

Schroeder considers a reply available to the internalist: that there isn't really a reason for Nate to go to the living room so the example is irrelevant. Schroeder's response is that this is ad hoc: there is no reason to think there is no reason for Nate to go – since negative existential intuitions are unreliable – 'other than an attachment to some theory to think that there can't be reasons that no one could ever act on. It's not as if such reasons don't matter, after all – they still play a role in determining what Nate ought to do – they still show up on God's list of pros and cons.'[608] Schroeder's response is, however, a little brusque. Several theorists have

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[604] Schroeder, 165.
[605] Schroeder, 165.
[606] Schroeder, 165.
[607] Schroeder, 165.
[608] Schroeder, 166.

defended the view that reasons must be things one *has* since reasons are what one deliberates with.[609] This would also be natural view for the internalist to take given the initial motivation for the theory: the Explanatory Constraint and the Humean Theory of Reasons, which together hold that a 'reason' that one could either never act on could never explain an action – but explaining an action is part of what reasons are supposed to do. Following Benjamin Kiesewetter,[610] there are plenty of things an internalist could say about Nate: it would be good if he went into the living room, it would make him happy, it would satisfy him, but there seems to be little pressure to say Nate has reason to go unless one already holds a competing theory of how reasons work.[611]

In his later work, Schroeder recognises the need to identify and reject the theory behind the view that reasons are things which an agent should be able to deliberate with. Schroeder calls this view 'the Factoring Account'.[612] Schroeder describes the Factoring Account (TFA) as a conjunctive account of reasons holding that:

> *The Factoring Account*: to say that and agent (A) has a reason (R) to Φ requires two things: (1) an account of why R is a reason for A to Φ and (2) an epistemic account of how A possesses R.[613]

In TFA the epistemic relation constrains what reasons there are for an agent. If the agent does not stand in the relevant epistemic relation, then one cannot say the agent has the reason, nor can one say that it is a reason for the agent. There are several versions of TFA. Here I want to concentrate on a simple version compatible with reasons internalism. It holds that the epistemic constraint on reasons is that the agent 'is in a position to know' that R is a reason for the agent to Φ.[614] For internalism this means the agent, minimally, is in a position to correctly perceive some fact and correctly perceive in light of this fact that there is an action which would serve an element of their S.

[609] See for instance Benjamin Kiesewetter, 'You Ought to ϕ Only If You May Believe That You Ought to ϕ', *The Philosophical Quarterly* 66, no. 265 (1 October 2016); Errol Lord, 'Having Reasons and the Factoring Account', *Philosophical Studies* 149, no. 3 (2010); Olle Risberg, 'Weighting Surprise Parties: Some Problems for Schroeder', *Utilitas* 28, no. 1 (March 2016); Kieran Setiya, 'Reply to Bratman and Smith', *Analysis* 69, no. 3 (1 July 2009): 538.

[610] Kiesewetter, 'You Ought to ϕ Only If You May Believe That You Ought to ϕ'.

[611] Schroeder in later work acknowledges a deliberative and an evaluative sense of 'ought' where 'the deliberative sense of "ought" relates agents to actions': It is unclear why, given this, such a response is not available to the internalist given that practical reasons are the internalist's domain. Mark Schroeder, 'Ought, Agents, and Actions', *The Philosophical Review* 120, no. 1 (2011).

[612] Schroeder, 'Having Reasons'.

[613] Schroeder; this formulation is adapted from Lord, 'Having Reasons and the Factoring Account', 284.

[614] This is a simplified versions of the one offered in Lord, 'Having Reasons and the Factoring Account'.

The problem Schroeder has with TFA is that it appears unable to supply a unified account of this kind of data such that there is only one relation an agent stands in to a reason. He uses Williams's gin case to claim that the only view that explains our intuitions about such cases is that there are two relations.[615] Recall the gin case: an agent, Bernie, receives what he believes is a glass of gin. However, the glass really contains petrol. According to Schroeder, in this case 'if he does take a sip, we don't think that he did it for no reason at all. On the contrary, we think there was a reason *for which* he took a sip. These are all the earmarks … of having a reason to do something. So surely Bernie *does* have a reason to take a sip', but TFA can't make sense of this intuition because there is nothing which could both be a reason for Bernie's having sipped and a reason Bernie has to take a sip.[616] In cases like Bernie's, to say that he has a reason TFA needs two things: (a) an account of how the reason is a reason for Bernie and (b) an account of how Bernie can know the reason. Thus, what occupies (a) and (b) must be the same thing in both positions. Schroeder offers two possible candidates for TFA:

(1) that Bernie believed the glass contained gin,

(2) or Bernie's belief that the glass contained gin.[617]

However, (1) is a poor candidate as a reason for Bernie. Moreover, Schroeder notes that a fully informed bystander would place on the 'against' side of a list of reasons for and against Bernie's drinking from glass the reason that *the glass contains petrol*. However, it would be odd if she included on the 'for' side the reason that *Bernie believed that there's gin in the glass*. What matters is what's in the glass. Schroeder also notes that (1) is a poor candidate for epistemic relation: there is something amiss in saying *that Bernie believes that there's gin in the glass* is something Bernie needs awareness of to have a reason. It seems untrue to say one must be aware that one has a belief – in the sense of having a second-order belief about one's own beliefs – to stand in a relevant epistemic relation.[618] Schroeder argues (2) fairs no better. For reasons now familiar,[619] the first-order belief is a poor candidate because the 'reason for' relation should be the true contents of a belief and not the belief itself. Moreover, Schroeder argues it is still the wrong kind of thing for the having relation. In a case where

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[615] Schroeder, 'Having Reasons'.
[616] Schroeder, 61.
[617] Schroeder, 'Having Reasons'.
[618] Schroeder.
[619] See chapter five section 5.4

Ronnie and Freddie both enjoy dancing, but Ronnie does not know there will be dancing at the party while Freddie does, we could say of Freddie that his reason is his belief that there will be dancing at the party, and that he *has* this reason because he has that belief. However, for Schroeder it is intuitively preferable to say both have the same reason to go to the party: that there is dancing there. But if belief is a constraint on the attribution of reasons, then it's not the sort of thing both Ronnie and Freddie can have.[620]

Schroeder's case against TFA can be summarised as the claim that there is linguistic data to suggest there are actually two separate reason-relations. *That there is dancing at the party* is a reason for both Ronnie and Freddie. At the same time, there is a relation in which Freddie stands to it, but Ronnie does not. For Schroeder, there are no plausible candidates to meet the TFA criteria and each candidate offered only works by rejecting linguistic data about reasons.[621] For Schroeder there are two different relations in which an agent can stand to a reason. We can say that R is a reason A has to Φ, where R is correctly perceived by A. We can say also that R is a reason for A to Φ, where R counts in favour of A's Φ-ing, but which A may not perceive. Schroeder calls this the distinction between objective normative reasons and subjective normative reasons. In cases like Nate's, the thought behind Schroeder's view is as follows: because there are two reason-relations, there is no restriction on the surprise party being a reason for Nate to go to the living room. It is an objective reason and there is no requirement that Nate must be capable of coming to know it for it to be a reason for him.[622]

In response, Errol Lord has offered a version of TFA for reasons which handles Schroeder's objections and provides for a more detailed and accurate account of the linguistic data. Lord's account of the TFA is as follows:

A has R to Φ that p iff (1) R fits the Reason Model and (2) A is in a position to know R.[623]

Φ stands in for 'believe' or 'intend' to generalise for theoretical and practical reasons. The 'Reason Model' stands in for whatever the correct analysis of reasons is. In TFA for belief (TFA-B), Lord suggests the Reason Model will be the following:

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[620] Schroeder, 'Having Reasons'.
[621] Schroeder.
[622] Schroeder; Schroeder, *Slaves of the Passions*.
[623] Lord, 'Having Reasons and the Factoring Account', 286.

> *Epistemic Model*: Necessarily, p is a reason to believe q iff (1) the probability of q given p is higher than the probability of q on its own and (2) p is true.[624]

For R to be a reason for belief it must be something that raises the probability of its object existing and itself be true. For example, to perceive an object as red usually raises the probability that the object really is red. However, to count as a reason to believe that the object is red, it must also be true that one really does perceive it as red and one doesn't actually perceive, say, something that is dark orange that one took for being red. Lord leaves the Reason Model open for practical reasons – being whatever the correct analysis of practical reasons is. However, as we shall see, the two models are closing linked.

Lord begins outlining how TFA-B explains Bernie's false belief that there is gin in the glass. He offers the following explanation:

> Bernie has several reasons to believe that the glass contains gin and tonic. For one, there is a clear liquid in his glass. Moreover, he ordered his drink from a bartender whom he has no reason to believe is unreliable. He is also at a cocktail party surrounded by people that he justifiably believes are drinking potable alcoholic beverages obtained from said bartender. This gives him strong reason to believe the bartender is reliable. If we were to spell out Bernie's case in more detail such that we confidently believed he was rational, more specific and tedious details would be elucidated … Because those true propositions sufficiently raise the likelihood of it being true that his glass contains gin and tonic and he is in a position to know those true propositions, it is plausible to think that his belief that the glass contains gin and tonic is rational.[625]

Bernie is in a position to know several other facts which make his belief rational. Given this, argues Lord, the reasons Bernie has to drink are the same reasons that make his belief rational. Lord further explains that in a case where Bernie and a friend, Billy, have both ordered gin and tonic, but where Bernie receives petrol and Billy's receives gin, their reasons for believing there is gin in the glass are the same: the liquid is clear, everyone

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[624] Lord, 285.
[625] Lord, 287.

else is drinking, the bartender is reliable, and so on. Furthermore, if Billy's glass contained gin and tonic that had, unbeknownst to Billy, been turned another colour with food colouring then, even if it contains gin and tonic, Billy has a reason to not drink it. Moreover, in cases like Ronnie and Freddie, Lord's TFA can say that while there is a reason *for* Ronnie to go – because it would please him if he knew – Ronnie does not *have* the reason but Freddie does.

Given the above, we can return to Nate and reconsider the problem it poses for reasons internalism. TFA says going to his surprise party is not a reason Nate has. The ambiguity for internalism is whether it can hold that *there is a surprise party in the other room* is a reason *for* Nate to go into the living room. What TFA shows, however, is that the internalist need not be committed to the view that the surprise party is something Nate must deliberate. Rather, it can maintain that the surprise party is a reason why it would please Nate to go into the other room, but the reasons Nate has – and thus the reasons he could deliberate with – might be something like the fact that Nate's friend, whom he trusts, told him to go because there is something he likes there, which is both a reason *for* and a reason Nate *has* to go.

Olle Risburg argues that the case of Nate's party in fact presents a problem for Schroeder similar to the one Schroeder raises for internalism: hypotheticalism also requires that agents be able to use reasons in deliberation.[626] Recall that the central idea Schroeder intends to capture is: 'that what you ought to do is what would be the result of correct deliberation from full information'.[627] In Nate's case, according to Schroeder's own theory, it appears that Nate has no reason, or a reason with no weight, to go to the surprise party. Hypotheticalism concludes that Nate should not do what he should do. If he deliberates correctly and with full information, what he ought not to do is go to the surprise party, since he would know that there is a surprise party waiting for him but Schroeder also wants to maintain that there is a reason for Nate to go and that reason has weight, yet that weight disappears as soon as Nate deliberates about it.[628]

Schroeder outlines another case against reasons internalism which can be dealt with. Schroeder attempts to show against internalism that an agent can fail to be motivated by what they have reason to do according to internalism. The example Schroeder gives is of Joel who loves a particular ice-cream he can only get in Madison, Wisconsin, but Joel lives in Los Angeles – a city which he loves as do his wife, kids and it is where

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[626] Risberg, 'Weighting Surprise Parties'.
[627] Schroeder, *Slaves of the Passions*, 140.
[628] Risberg, 'Weighting Surprise Parties'.

his job is. Schroeder claims that despite there being a reason for Joel to move to Madison, in virtue of his S, he is not in the slightest bit moved to move despite his extraordinary love of ice-cream. It is difficult to see how exactly this case poses a problem for reasons internalism unless Schroeder puts the cart before the horse. If Joel is not moved to move to Madison, then it is true given his S that he has no reason to move to Madison. It is unclear why internalism is committed to any other conclusion. Indeed, it is unclear why Joel, for internalism, has a reason to *move* and not to do something which makes a great deal more sense, like planning for a trip out there. His love of the ice-cream need not manifest itself as a reason to *move* there but simply as a reason to *go* there.

6.3 Conclusion

I have argued that Schroeder's hypotheticalism fails as a Humean attempt to make agent-neutral reasons easier to come by. Reasons internalism turns out to survive Schroeder's challenge while Schroeder's own position turns out to run up against several issues. Reasons internalism, moreover, generates a theory of normative weight which is a version of proportionalism – what I called internalist proportionalism which contributes to the challenge of generating agent-neutral reasons within internalism.

7 Taking Internalism Seriously: Internalism and Normative Political Theory

In this chapter, I continue the theme of considering reasons internalism in relation to cosmopolitanism and aim to spell out more directly the challenge internalism presents to cosmopolitan views of various stripes and to relate this argument to other objections to cosmopolitanism. One line of argument critics of cosmopolitanism have pursued centres on versions of what has been called the motivational objection to cosmopolitanism. This is the view that cosmopolitanism is in some way motivationally deficient. I highlight two versions of this objection: an easily dismissed empirical version that argues cosmopolitanism would or does in fact fail to motivate a sufficient amount of people to get cosmopolitan projects off the ground and a normative version on stronger ground that argues cosmopolitanism would undermine the motivation underpinning important goods. Cosmopolitans have produced responses to both. However, in this chapter I argue internalism lays the foundation for a new form of the motivational objection one which points to a problem with the normative structure of cosmopolitanism. If internalism is right, cosmopolitanism is highly unlikely to be able to meet the conditions of justification implied by the cosmopolitan reliance on agent-neutral reasons constitutive of the approach. In making this case, I outline an internalist theory of justification that rebuts some possible cosmopolitan responses. In addition to charging cosmopolitanism with necessarily relying on a faulty structure and externalist conception of reasons, this argument also suggests that cosmopolitanism runs the risk of producing unjustified but strong 'normative warrants' that should be worrying. I then argue that similar problems affect Rawlsian statist alternatives to cosmopolitanism in spite of their more restricted account of scope. However, I end on a constructive note by suggesting how aspects of statist and 'communitarian' approaches can usefully inform an approach to normative political theory that takes internalism seriously.

In section 7.1, I begin by reviewing previous criticisms of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan responses, focusing on the motivational objection to cosmopolitanism. I argue that cosmopolitans have managed to produce effective responses to the motivational objection because the objection is fairly ambiguous. In section 7.2, I present an outline of a new version of the motivational objection to cosmopolitan objection developed out

of internalism. This objection claims that the problem with cosmopolitanism is that, given reasons internalism, it is unable to meet its own justification requirements and so it is internally inconsistent and develops what will appear to a proponent of cosmopolitanism to be a strong normative warrant for far-reaching action that is unwarranted. Reasons internalism suggests that justification and its scope should be treated more carefully than cosmopolitanism allows. In section 7.2.2, I outline some important preliminary constraints that must be met is this internalist objections to cosmopolitanism is to be successful: that the objection must apply to some conception of a 'reasonable' person – it is not enough to point to the existence of sociopaths to show cosmopolitanism fails to be reason-giving to all – and that it must run deeper than merely pointing out that people disagree on normative matters. In section 7.3, I develop and apply this argument to cosmopolitanism. More specifically, 7.3.1 develops an internalist account of justification out of Williams's discussion of justification and the role life-projects play in generating the normative concerns people. 7.3.2 applies this to and rejects cosmopolitanism to by showing in what way cosmopolitanism relies on an externalist account of reasons and justification and argues that the internalist argument against cosmopolitanism meets the conditions outlined in 7.2.2. In section 7.4, I argue that the version of internalism defended here applies also to some non-cosmopolitan theories too, in this instance Rawlsian statism.

7.1 Cosmopolitanism: Reasons to Be Sceptical

In chapter two, I argued that cosmopolitanism can be distinguished from other approaches because it aims at generating a kind of agent-neutral reason. These must be *practical* reasons cosmopolitanism the approach is to be 'a normative, action-guiding theory, with a commitment to a concrete political ideal of the global order' and not a form of Cohenite utopianism.[629] It is an approach that aims at getting people to act. The latter, while interesting for other reasons, may be immune to my challenge but has issues on other grounds.[630]

Because cosmopolitanism aims at bringing about global change and purports to be universalist, it aims to be justified at an equivalent scale. Cosmopolitanism gives reasons to certain agents to bring about or support and at least provides reasons to those on the receiving end to accept it. Thus, despite differences amongst cosmopolitans over the scenario and extent to which the idea applies, cosmopolitanism expresses a

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[629] Lior Erez, 'Anti-Cosmopolitanism and the Motivational Preconditions for Social Justice', *Social Theory and Practice* 43, no. 2 (2017): 250.

[630] G. A. Cohen, 'Facts and Principles', *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 31, no. 3 (2003). Edward Hall, 'Political Realism and Fact-Sensitivity', *Res Publica* 19, no. 2 (May 2013).

commitment to the idea that the scope of justification is agent-neutral and thus gives agent-neutral practical reasons which apply beyond any special relationship. Pogge's GIR requirement, for instance, expresses a commitment to this idea. A particularly clear expression is given by Charles Beitz:

> cosmopolitanism stands opposed to any view that limits the scope of justification to the members of particular types of groups, whether identified by shared political values, communal histories, or ethnic characteristics. It also stands opposed to any view that allows the justification of choices to terminate in considerations about the nonderivative interests of collective entities such as states or social groups.[631]

Cosmopolitanism thus aims at producing valid practical reasons that are global in scope.

Criticism of cosmopolitanism is wide-ranging, and critics hold a variety of substantive political and theoretical commitments.[632] In international relations theory, classical realists, neo-realists, and Marxists have argued that cosmopolitan projects fail to account for power. Neo-realists claim this is due to overlooking structural considerations and Marxists due to ignoring global capitalism and class relations. These arguments each attack the feasibility or attractiveness of the cosmopolitan picture.[633] My own position is neutral with regard to the IR theory-based criticisms. Communitarian, statist liberal, and liberal nationalist criticisms of cosmopolitanism rely on the defence of special relationships.[634] These positions argue for a restriction in the scope of the cosmopolitan account of justice to the state or communal level due to problems with the cosmopolitan account of motivation.[635]

The motivational objection to cosmopolitanism is the claim that cosmopolitanism is unable to motivate people to perform the actions it requires. One version of the objection claims that attachments to a nation or state will inevitably outweigh an attachment to cosmopolitan ideals.[636] Benjamin Barber, for example, writes

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[631] Beitz, 'Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice', 17.
[632] For overviews, see Daniele Archibugi, 'Cosmopolitan Democracy and Its Critics: A Review', *European Journal of International Relations* 10, no. 3 (1 September 2004); Brock, *Cosmopolitanism versus Non-Cosmopolitanism*.
[633] See Richard Beardsworth, *Cosmopolitanism and International Relations Theory* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
[634] Blake, 'Immigration, Jurisdiction, and Exclusion'; Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*; Thomas Nagel, 'The Problem of Global Justice', *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 33, no. 2 (2005); Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*; Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration*.
[635] See also Will Kymlicka, 'Solidarity in Diverse Societies: Beyond Neoliberal Multiculturalism and Welfare Chauvinism', *Comparative Migration Studies* 3, no. 1 (17 December 2015) for a version of this argument stemming from liberal multiculturalism. Chandran Kukathas, 'The Mirage of Global Justice', *Social Philosophy and Policy* 23, no. 1 (January 2006) argues against the pursuit of justice at the global and domestic level and instead insists on a scheme of mutual toleration within the Westphalian model.
[636] Richard W. Miller, 'Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern', *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 27, no. 3 (1998).

that 'cosmopolitanism offers little or nothing for the human psyche to fasten on'.[637] Several other responses to

Martha Nussbaum's case for cosmopolitanism in *Love of Country* take up similar themes.[638] Patti Tamara Lenard

claims that '[c]osmopolitanism … has yet to wrestle with the motivational challenges it faces … [and] has yet to

fashion an account of itself to which individuals can and will commit'. She adds that 'cosmopolitan efforts to

motivate the duties we have towards others rely, often implicitly, on insights best captured by the liberal

nationalist thesis, that is, the thesis that national communities are the best vehicles, morally speaking, through

which individuals can carry out their obligations to others.'[639] Thus, the objection claims that cosmopolitanism

is too thin and its aims too distant and too abstract to move people to action.

Cosmopolitans have recognised the problem and responding to it animates much of the cosmopolitan

literature.[640] Their responses suggest that this objection that is not too difficult for cosmopolitan theory to

overcome. While experimental results suggest that 'thick' cosmopolitan approaches to motivation may be

counter-productive,[641] when the objection is understood as an empirical claim about the impossibility of

developing cosmopolitan forms of attachment and motivation it appears to be fairly weak. In response,

cosmopolitans have argued that individuals can develop and have developed attachments to identities above

the state or nation and so there are conditions where these identities have the capacity to motivate at least

some people.[642] This, combined with a move toward avant gardism and education provide cosmopolitans with

the response that there is nothing to say that their arguments cannot eventually appeal to a sufficient number

of people to get their proposals moving.[643] In general, it is difficult to rule out any political project a priori on the

ground that it will be unable to move people. In this vein, several cosmopolitan theorists point to empirical

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[637] Benjamin R. Barber, 'Constitutional Faith', in *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism*, by Martha C. Nussbaum, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), 33.
[638] See for example the replies from Nathan Glazer, 'Limits of Loyalty', in *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism*, by Martha C. Nussbaum, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996); Charles Taylor, 'Why Democracy Needs Patriotism', in *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism*, by Martha C. Nussbaum, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996); Michael Walzer, 'Spheres of Affection', in *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism*, by Martha C. Nussbaum, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996).
[639] Patti Tamara Lenard, 'Motivating Cosmopolitanism? A Skeptical View', *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 7, no. 3 (1 January 2010): 347.Lenard 2010, 347.
[640] Meyer, 'Liberal Cosmopolitanism and Moral Motivation'; James A. Chamberlain, 'Motivating Cosmopolitanism: Jürgen Habermas, Jean-Luc Nancy, and the Case for Cosmocommonism', *Contemporary Political Theory* 19, no. 1 (1 March 2020); John David Cameron, 'Communicating Cosmopolitanism and Motivating Global Citizenship', *Political Studies* 66, no. 3 (1 August 2018); David V. Axelsen, 'The State Made Me Do It: How Anti-Cosmopolitanism Is Created by the State', *Journal of Political Philosophy* 21, no. 4 (2013). Another notable response is 'thick' cosmopolitanism, arguing that there are and can be inculcated in people thick, communal sources of cosmopolitan motivation in Andrew Dobson, 'Thick Cosmopolitanism', *Political Studies* 54, no. 1 (1 March 2006).
[641] Nicholas Faulkner, 'Motivating Cosmopolitan Helping: Thick Cosmopolitanism, Responsibility for Harm, and Collective Guilt', *International Political Science Review* 38, no. 3 (1 June 2017).
[642] Pauline Kleingeld and Eric Brown, 'Cosmopolitanism', in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2019 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2019), sec. 3.3, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/cosmopolitanism/.
[643] See Chamberlain, 'Motivating Cosmopolitanism'; Lea Ypi, 'A Cosmopolitan Avant-Garde', in *Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political Agency* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

examples that indicate opportunities to move towards cosmopolitanism.[644] David Axelsen, moreover, points out that the motivational objection from national anti-cosmopolitan theory sometimes relies on premises that weaken its own objection. It relies on the idea that institutions and processes like the media, nation, and state create national identities able to motivate people 'to meet strong redistributive obligations towards people with whom they share a national identity' but these same processes lead people to be less moved by cosmopolitan proposals.[645] This means the inability of people to be moved by cosmopolitanism is something *created*. Given this, a priori claims that people will not be moved by cosmopolitan ideals are no longer available. Cosmopolitans can respond, as they have, that this just means social institutional processes that generate this motivation are needed, while those that undermine it should be removed.[646]

An anti-cosmopolitan response could be to claim that the motivational objection is about sufficiency, claiming that it is impossible to convince *enough* people to comply with cosmopolitan norms, so the ideal remains impossibly utopian.[647] This too seems to miss the mark. The question of whether enough people can be convinced of cosmopolitan ideals remains open. Graduates filtering into international organisation, charities, and NGOs and people sceptical of nationalism and populism suggest that may yet move many. One cosmopolitan thinker, James Chamberlain, points to Brexit as evidence that cosmopolitanism has not yet taken hold of the imagination of a significant amount of people, suggesting that cosmopolitanism is currently on the backfoot. However, the close nature of the final vote could equally be taken to imply that a significant amount of people perhaps do endorse a more cosmopolitan vision of the world.[648] There is then some support for the view that this version of the objection is unable to rattle cosmopolitanism.

Lior Erez suggests that rather than understanding the motivational objection as an empirical objection, it should be understood as a normative objection.[649] There are several versions of the normative objection. David Miller combines the normative objection with the empirical one, arguing that the state is a system of mutual

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[644] See for example Garrett Wallace Brown and Samuel Jarvis, 'Motivating Cosmopolitanism and the Responsibility for the Health of Others', in *The State and Cosmopolitan Responsibilities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019); Andrew Linklater, 'Distant Suffering and Cosmopolitan Obligations', *International Politics* 44, no. 1 (1 January 2007); Andrew Linklater, 'The Global Civilizing Role of Cosmopolitanism', in *Routledge Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies* (London: Routledge, 2012).
[645] Axelsen, 'The State Made Me Do It'.
[646] Axelsen. Of course, this raises the Rousseauian problem: if it is institutions that inform people's motivational make-up, but people create institutions at least somewhat in line with this make-up. The question is thus how to effect the change which would bring about the desired results. This is a problem that some have identified within Habermas's cosmopolitan theory and attempted to resolve, see for instance Chamberlain, 'Motivating Cosmopolitanism'; and Lilie Chouliaraki, 'Mediating Vulnerability: Cosmopolitanism and the Public Sphere', *Media, Culture & Society* 35, no. 1 (1 January 2013).
[647] Lior Erez offers a version of this argument, arguing that 'for a conception of justice to be fully justified, it needs to be stable' and the stability of an account of requires that people be motivated to act in accordance with it, but because cosmopolitanism's global account of justice would not meet this condition, it would not be justified in Erez, 'Anti-Cosmopolitanism and the Motivational Preconditions for Social Justice'.
[648] Chamberlain, 'Motivating Cosmopolitanism'.
[649] Erez, 'Anti-Cosmopolitanism and the Motivational Preconditions for Social Justice'.

benefit, a safety net for its people providing security, welfare, and other thin and thick goods. It is in virtue of this mutual benefit that the system places obligations on citizens.[650] Cosmopolitan institutions can neither provide these goods, nor can they secure the motivational preconditions to supply such goods.[651] This form of the normative motivational objection thus claims that cosmopolitan proposals cannot fulfil this role or directly undermine it. Another version claims that cosmopolitanism ultimately requires a world government that would result in a global despotism or be unmanageable.[652] However, some cosmopolitans have embraced the idea of a world state or government and others have argued that a process of expanding political integration will likely make up for the motivational and thus normative deficit.[653]

7.2 Internalism and the Normative Structure of Cosmopolitanism

My argument is a version of the motivational objection. However, instead of relying on the empirical or normative version of the motivational objection, it is primarily concerned with form. This structural argument looks through the lens provided by internalism to highlight an internal inconsistency in cosmopolitanism. It does not rest on the claim that cosmopolitan ideals are incapable of motivating a lot of people; evidently, they can. Rather, my argument is that it is unlikely an argument in favour of cosmopolitanism could be produced that appeals to a part of all relevant people's Ss – in other words, that respects the internalist constraint. Plenty of people also reject cosmopolitanism. My suspicion is that many will be unmoved through argument to support cosmopolitanism, given their S.

At first, this may not seem to be an issue, but given cosmopolitanism's aspiration to defend a transformative global ideal in which practically no person is exempt from its impact, and given its own theoretical commitments, cosmopolitanism must produce agent-neutral reasons counting overwhelmingly in its favour. Cosmopolitanism does not work on its own universalist grounds, if it cannot produce these agent-neutral reasons to support its vision. However, it could only generate such agent-neutral reasons by denying reasons

[650] Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration*; David Miller, 'Bounded Citizenship', in *Cosmopolitan Citizenship*, ed. Kimberly Hutchings and Roland Dannreuther (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1999).
[651] Miller, 'Bounded Citizenship'; David Miller, 'On Nationality and Global Equality: A Reply to Holtug', *Ethics & Global Politics* 4, no. 3 (1 January 2011); see also the reply from Gillian Brock, 'World Citizenship: David Miller versus the New Cosmopolitans', *International Journal of Politics and Ethics* 2, no. 3 (22 September 2002)
[652] For the view that cosmopolitanism requires something like world government, see Ulaş, 'Cosmopolitanism, Self-Interest and World Government'; see Kukathas, 'The Mirage of Global Justice' for an argument against this idea.
[653] See respectively William E. Scheuerman, 'Cosmopolitanism and the World State', *Review of International Studies* 40, no. 3 (July 2014); Luis Cabrera, 'Review Article: World Government: Renewed Debate, Persistent Challenges', *European Journal of International Relations* 16, no. 3 (1 September 2010).

internalism, but internalism is on firm ground. Thus, cosmopolitanism should be rejected because it relies on a faulty conception of reasons.

To clarify, my claim is not that every ambitious and far-reaching positive normative ideal needs agent-neutral reasons, but that cosmopolitanism specifically does. Furthermore, my purpose is not to produce a knock-down argument against cosmopolitanism. Rather, it is to suggest that cosmopolitanism is very unlikely to ever be able to meet its own justification requirements if reasons internalism is true. Rather, reasons internalists should look for an alternative theory. At the very least, the cosmopolitan claims of universal justificatory scope should be abandoned. This particularly so when one considers the strong moral warrant cosmopolitanism entails: cosmopolitanism typically requires far-reaching and fairly radical change which, from the perspective of internalism, is likely to be incapable of the justification such action would require. My argument is that it is easy to conceive of reasonable people who would not be moved by cosmopolitanism. Given the possibility of such people and given the have built-in justification requirements cosmopolitanism has, cosmopolitanism has an externalist structure. Through the internalist lens, we see that it tacitly or explicitly relies on reasons which can be motivating and thus normative only for some people, but requires for its justification reasons which are normative for all. Cosmopolitan forms of argument thus necessarily transcend the bounds of their own normative warrant.

7.2.2 Preliminaries for an Internalist Objection to Cosmopolitanism

Before I begin, I make two preliminary comments on how the case against cosmopolitanism must be made. The first is that it would be easy for cosmopolitans to dismiss objections based on people unreasonable Ss to challenge the universality of agent-neutral reasons. There's no good reason to think that cosmopolitanism would have to be capable of moving a sociopath who does not care for other people, who perhaps even sees discomfort or suffering positively. Thus, cosmopolitanism can legitimately limit the scope of justification to people with specific kinds of Ss to make their case.

The second is that another argument that will not work is the crude version of what has been called 'the argument from disagreement'.[654] The argument moves from the fact of deep and widespread disagreement

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[654] This is argument has been mistakenly attributed to J.L. Mackie in favour of his error theory of morality and also to arguments for moral relativism and value pluralism. See Richard T. Garner, 'On the Genuine Queerness of Moral Properties and Facts', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 68, no. 2 (1 June 1990); Chris Gowans, 'Moral Relativism', in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2021 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2021), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/moral-relativism/.

on morality to build the case against moral views like much cosmopolitanism. As David Brink has argued, this is a poor objection to monist or objective accounts of value or morality and suffers from the same weakness as the empirical motivational objection.[655] Just because people disagree over cosmopolitanism does not mean that they are right. Nor is it evidence that reasonable people could not be convinced by cosmopolitanism, and nor does it necessarily mean there is widespread disagreement over specific cosmopolitan claims. General strictures against harming for no good reason is one thing practically all cosmopolitans agree on and often, as we shall see, use as a basis for their arguments. Instead, the case against cosmopolitanism needs to be made on stronger ground than the mere fact of disagreement.

7.3 Cosmopolitan and Internalism in Tension

To make my case, I begin with an example taken from the ethics of immigration: Joseph Carens's case for open borders under ideal conditions, the point of which is to supply a future goal to approach from non-ideal conditions. Recall that Carens's argument starts from three premises he takes to be true:

(1) '[T]here is no natural social order.' This entails that our social order is one we have created and so we can work to change it.

(2) '[A]ll humans are of equal moral worth.' This does not entail that there are not important distinctions between people, but it rules out arbitrarily ignoring the interests of others on grounds that are objectionable in liberal democracies, like ethnicity, gender, religion.

(3) [R]estrictions on the freedom of human beings require a justification.'[656]

These three premises serve to restrict arguments that would justify inequalities based on immigration by claiming that it is part of a natural social order, it is deserved, or that unfreedom brought about through immigration restrictions simply are what they are and need not be justified. He adds three further premises:

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[655] David O. Brink, 'Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments from Disagreement and Queerness', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 62, no. 2 (1 June 1984). It follows that this applies to this form of objection against objective accounts of reasons, as well.
[656] Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*, 226–27.

(4) Freedom of movement contributes to individual autonomy.

(5) Freedom of movement contributes to better equality of opportunity.

(6) Freedom of movement reduces existing political, economic, and social inequalities.

For Carens, this amounts to a prima facie case for open borders. Leaving aside Carens's case for each of the premises, what this argument makes clear is the cosmopolitan scope of justification within his argument: an open borders world obviously applies globally and so requires justification to each person it would affect. The argument also functions to support practical reasons to bring the world to a position where such change could be brought about and these would be practical reasons for all, if the argument is right.

Given this, the argument already appears to be in tension with reasons internalism. Carens aims at the goal of bringing about a world better able to account for the interests of all.[657] At this general level, these reasons at first appear to be externalist given that it is easy to imagine people who benefit in some way from not having open borders and who would not and perhaps cannot be moved by this argument.[658] These reasons appear to be externalist in the same way that the reasons of utilitarianism often appear to be externalist: while the interests of people unmoved by the argument would be taken into account, what ought to be done overall and what they nonetheless should support is the overall position that emerges from the total sum of interests.

However, Carens is aware of problems related to the imposition of external standards – particularly of problems related to ethnocentrism.[659] An admirer of Walzer, Carens describes his approach to ethics and political theory as contextual. Carens explains that his arguments on immigration are to be understood as taking the values that underpin and uphold Western, liberal institutions and culture and thus represent the values that (at least purportedly, and not limited to) Western, liberal people do hold – namely, freedom, equality, and democracy – and showing what a full appreciation of those values commits their holders to. Carens's view thus

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[657] Carens, 227–28.

[658] One need not imagine this merely being wealthy, white, western individuals, who in fact often benefit from more open borders, at least for themselves, or nationalists or fearful workers: individuals concerned with the possible destruction of their way of life or the loss of talented individuals pooled around cosmopolitan cities even under more ideal conditions may well have an orientation towards life that means Carens's suggestions fall flat for them.

[659] See Joseph H. Carens, *Culture, Citizenship, and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*.

appears to be internalist in that it selects values that are already held by a group and then tries to show what their realisation requires. Thus, Carens's work could be understood as a form of advice. However, tensions remain when we turn to Carens's conception of justification. His argument is for a global state of affairs – something that effects everybody and not just the liberal West. It purports to be justified for everyone. A consequence of this is that Carens's argument appears to now claim that these are the values that all people should hold. Carens himself notes something like this issue and implies that his argument should be taken to claim these are the principles (and thus values) that people should have: 'I would be perfectly happy if my readers were persuaded that this account of what democrats ought to endorse is correct.'[660] Under this light, the begins to look like a form of externalism.

Coupled with a Cohenite argument about the nature of money and freedom, open borders could plausibly be interpreted as a restriction of freedom for someone who benefits monetarily from closed borders. Given the third premise in Carens's argument it then requires a justification. This justification would be externalist in structure if we hold that in light of the justification, the individual is incapable of being moved by it. The justification a cosmopolitan could offer could not simply be: it is justified to *you* because it is what *we* believe, which is merely an assertion of preference. Rather, the justification, if we imagine the cosmopolitan is endorsing the argument for open borders above, would take the form of that argument. They would have to claim something like: nonetheless, freedom of movement is better able to account for the interests of all, this is what matters, and this is what you should care about, even if you do not. In this instance, it seems Carens's argument relies on an external reason by pointing to an external standard: the interests of all.

In a general sense, it is difficult to see how to construe this form of justification in terms of internal reasons. In cases like the person who benefits from closed borders, internal reasons suggests that she may have no reason whatsoever to endorse Carens's proposal regardless of the argument. Moreover, Carens gives another indication that the externalist reading of the argument is correct. For Carens, the form that justification should take appeals 'to principles and arguments that take everyone's interests into account or that explain why the social arrangements are reasonable and fair to everyone who is subject to them'.[661] Thus, for Carens, even if this person is unmoved by the proposals, she has a reason to endorse them because they are reasonable and fair.

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[660] Ottonelli et al., 'Reactions & Debate II', 620.
[661] Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*, 227.

There is one route open to interpret Carens's argument in an internalist manner and that is to invoke the second of the preliminaries mentioned above. This is to allow that the reasons given by the argument are not reasons for someone who is irrational, unreasonable, or immoral. Rather, agents who care and who reason well – which is what all agents should aim to be – can see the appeal of Carens's argument. It is for these kinds of agents that an argument like Carens's is internalist in structure. Something like this presupposition underlies much ethical argument. There are, however, some complications that should push the internalist to resist certain interpretations of this presupposition. These complications are to do with scepticism about the conception of morality, rationality, or reasonableness implied by versions of this presupposition necessary to make the cosmopolitan argument work. These complications should also motivate scepticism over the account of justification required by cosmopolitanism.

7.3.1 Internalism and the Art of Justification

Bernard Williams's discussion of a fictionalised but plausible Gauguin-like artist in the essay 'Moral Luck' offers some interesting thoughts on the nature of justification and what a more nuanced and realistic understanding of it implies for how we should understand morality and related concepts. Williams outlines the figure of a

> creative artist who turns away from definite and pressing human claims on him in order to live a life which, as he supposes, he can pursue his art … [L]et us call him *Gauguin*. Gauguin might have been a man who was not at all interested in the claims on him, and simply preferred to live another life, and from that life, and perhaps from that preference, his best paintings came. That sort of case, in which the claims of others simply have no hold on the agent, is not what concerns me here … Let us take, rather, a Gauguin who is concerned about these claims and what is involved in their being neglected (we may suppose this to be grim), and that he nevertheless, in the face of that, opts for the other life. This other life he might perhaps not see very determinately under the category of realising his gifts as a painter, but, to make things simpler, let us add that he does see it determinately in that light – it is as a life which will enable him really to be a painter that he opts for it. It will then be clearer what will count for him as eventual success in his project – at least, some possible outcomes will be clear examples of

success (which does not have to be the same thing as recognition), however many others may be unclear.[662]

With this example, Williams explores the concept of justification by pointing to some of its more complex features. Williams shows that the artist's choice to live such a life will likely lead him to conflict in which he may not be able to justify himself to others. Williams argues that, ultimately, if his project is successful, the artist may at least have that to justify his choice, even if others may not, and rightly from their perspective, accept his justification. As Williams puts it even if, in this way, it turns out that

> Gauguin can be ultimately justified, that need not provide him with any way of justifying himself to others, or at least to all others. Thus he may have no way of bringing it about that those who suffer from his decision will have no justified ground of reproach. Even if he succeeds, he will not acquire a right that they accept what he has to say; if he fails, he will not even have anything to say.[663]

What is clear from Williams's discussion is that the artist is perhaps eccentric but not a sociopath or similar. With our Gauguin, the claims of others do concern him but he nonetheless makes the choice to pursue this project and live the life he does. The claims of others may generate a great deal of guilt and perhaps shame. We may even imagine that he tries to dampen their effect so he can get on with painting. Nor is there any clear and noncontroversial sense in which it can it be said that the artist is irrational. He may turn out to be successful after all and we may even imagine that it turns out in retrospect that he really needed to turn away from the claims others to achieve it.

In Williams's discussion of this case and in various other places, he draws on the notion of life-projects[664] which give direction to one's life. These life projects give the reasons one has to do one thing rather than another as well as the weight they may have. In a fairly literal sense, these 'grounding projects' give us a

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[662] Bernard Williams, 'Moral Luck', in *Moral Luck* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 22–23.
[663] Williams, 23–24.
[664] In one life there will in all likelihood be several such projects or a 'nexus' of them, as Williams puts it. I shall continue to refer to a singular 'life-project' for ease of expression throughout, but this should not be taken to imply only one project, or even a set of complimentary projects: I take it that it is possible for an individual to pursue multiple, conflicting projects where the boundaries and compatibility between them unclear to the agent. Williams, 'Moral Luck'.

reason to live.[665] They need not be particularly clear or worked out from the beginning, but they lend us with a purpose and structure our reasons. The projects can vary in size or grandiosity. A life project may be as local as raising one's child to be an independent and happy adult, as humble as to supporting one's family, or as small and seemingly trivial (from the outside) as painting and selling garden gnomes. But it may be as grand as dedicating one's life to ending poverty or serving humanity. Williams notes that the failure of such projects and the failure to form a new project in the wake of failure can also be absolutely crushing, adding that the thought that one's life is meaningless and the sense of hopelessness that accompanies it can drive people to suicide and may come from this absence or failure. The projects structure the reasons of one's life and so the projects, at least partially, express and are an expression of a person's underlying desires. Thus, in the structure of any one person's life such projects have a kind of absolute significance.

There is no good reason to think that there a clear and formulable rational basis for such projects with an objective procedural or impartial limit on what they can be. As Mari Ruti explains, they appear in the form of a calling[666] that emerges seemingly on a whim and pulls us in directions that have varying degrees of determinacy and are not constructed in advance.[667] Indeed, whatever one is aiming for may be unclear all the way up until one has achieved or failed to achieve it. A failed project may even remain unclear or inarticulable even after reflecting on it. In others, it may be fairly clear from the beginning. This is not to say the origins of such projects are totally mysterious and unconditioned: upbringing, personality and inherent dispositions undoubtedly play a role in their formulation. Necessarily they will be formed in response to the social space in terms of which one experiences and makes sense of the world. But, as Williams argues, outside of the eventual success or failure of the project, there is a limit to what for the agent could be said for or against a project while it is ongoing; there is no way in which an agent can view their project from the end and judge whether it is worth engaging in because the 'correct perspective on one's life is *from now*'.[668]

This is not to say that there are possible no limits. Someone who has never shown artistic talent or an interest in art who suddenly decides to go the route of our Gauguin may be brought by another to believe that they are behaving foolishly and should place their efforts elsewhere. From the standpoint of internalism, what

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[665] They can also conceivably require that at some point we die to achieve them or at least gain their sense from the fact that at some point we all will die. They thus run contrary to the idea that the preservation of one's life is the ultimate reason-giving for in any person's life. Williams, 12–14.
[666] What she refers to as a 'call of character' in Mari Ruti, *The Call of Character: Living a Life Worth Living* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).
[667] Ruti.
[668] Williams, 'Moral Luck', 13.

would be shown is (perhaps) that the agent is reasoning poorly because they rely on a false image of their capabilities and so their project is likely to fail. Trust is an important factor that may aid the prospective artist's interlocutor to persuade them that their endeavour is mistaken. Even so, the life of a contemporary of Gauguin's, Paul Cézanne, and others like him complicate matters.

New projects may arise that call on one to move one's life in a new direction, perhaps to the detriment or abandonment of one's other projects. This can lead to internal conflict and it is from the standpoint of one's other projects and concerns one assesses the merit of some particular new project that has arisen. A project can also change and become something else as one changes, grows, and learns during its course. However, outside of another project and outside of one's prior set of values and concerns, there seems to be no clear and formulaic way of placing prior rational constraints on what could or should a project for someone. Rather, it is more likely that these projects and the desires conditioning and conditioned by such projects give the substantive sense of what is or is not rational for any particular agent.

I have mentioned that one source of conflict might be another of one's projects and another is that one's projects can lead to conflict and may damage or undermine the projects of others. The project of the Gauguin-like artist leads to a neglect of others, others who may rightly from their perspective demand more of the artist and these demands might lead to a great sense of regret, guilt, and shame for him. Furthermore, even the altruistic and moral projects can lead to conflict with others, even with other altruistic projects, and even with impartial morality.[669] An example would be the breaking of a moral rule for what one believes will be better in the long run. From the standpoint of an agent the breaking of the rule would be justified by the morality of the project itself.[670]

To be clear about what is and is not being said here, I stress that the considerations above are not unique to the case of the artist. Nor should this be taken to necessarily imply an individualist ethic based upon liberal sensibilities. Nor should it be taken to imply that any one person must necessarily esteem or value the life-projects of others. Nor is conflict and struggle the only thing to emerge from these projects. Nor does it imply that the practice of justification is without worth. The considerations above are general and universally applicable: they apply across class lines, across time and space, across ethnic groupings, religions, cultures, and

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[669] As when the intended recipients of different altruistic projects differ in a way that creates conflict. For an interesting discussion of this and related issues, see William A. Galston, 'Cosmopolitan Altruism*', *Social Philosophy and Policy* 10, no. 1 (ed 1993). For the impartial morality, see *Moral Luck* Williams, 'Moral Luck'.
[670] Williams, 'Moral Luck'.

so on. Rather, these latter dimensions affect the form any one project can take – that is to say, they affect in complex ways what possibly could be a project for someone – and determine the means and obstacles one will likely have and face in its pursuit, the conflicts that will arise, and thus the reasons one may have. Similar considerations also apply to groups with a common project and collectivist or communalist projects. Some projects cannot but appear repugnant from some standpoints; some projects directly and profoundly conflict with others; and some projects are informed by and formed out of outright falsehoods – a project of racial supremacy does not just 'call' from the ether and can be criticised by the internalist on the grounds of the falsity of its underlying ideas. Moreover, projects are often best realised through cooperation, not to mention the fact that the means to one's ends are now almost always public. A concern with justification coherently remains a feature of our artist's worldview and a concern to justify oneself to others will be a feature of any (and I use this unhappy term quite loosely) 'normally' socialised – that is to say, moral – agent. A disposition toward justifying oneself to another is perhaps *the* constitutive feature of a moral agent.

This picture represents well the messy and complex nature of how justification works in the context of lived experience, but it also captures well a conception of justification that naturally accompanies reasons internalism's emphasis on the welcome obscurity of the practice of giving and receiving reasons. It indicates that justification to others is not always possible and one concrete source of justification is in a general sense the success or failure of the project. It indicates what the source of the absence of justification – and thus reasons – often is in the internalist picture and indicates that these conflicts are likely to be a common occurrence.

Internalism suggests that there is a certain limit to justification. Not every form of justification will fly for everyone. Outside of some of the considerations listed above, much of the source justification for an individual will stem from their projects and concerns and the justification of the project in its success or failure. From a second-person standpoint, justification of another's project will stem from their concerns and projects. Some outside of a project may deem it unacceptable. For internalism, justification is perspectival. There will be cases where consent to some unwelcome fall-out of some project cannot be had. These are considerations a minimally moral agent will take into account. However, even an agent who cares may well think it worth going ahead with the project even in the knowledge that they may not be able to justify to all others. Even if the project is successful, what could be said to those who suffer from or are irritated by it may be limited to an apology or perhaps reparations – if this is what is deemed appropriate – or to reiterate what one sees as the value of the project, for which there is no guarantee that those affected will see this as sufficient: what one party thinks is

acceptable may be seen as unacceptable or even harmful by another party.[671] Again, however, this does not mean norms of consent and the effort to reach an agreement are unimportant or insignificant – the view I develop in chapter eight provides an explanation for why.

7.3.2 Cosmopolitan Externalism

In light of the above, clear examples can be constructed in which someone fails to be moved by Carens's argument without obviously being an irrational or immoral person. A worker who lives and works to support her family might well be concerned that open borders would result in more competition She may make a probabilistic judgement prefer a closed border position. This need not imply she is immoral or 'beyond reason', as Philip Cole's essay on public debate over immigration seems to suggest.[672] She may experience regret, and perhaps even a great deal of regret, over the situation of struggling migrants. Still, Carens's argument would fail to be a reason for her to support it and would fail to meet its own justification demand. Examples can be added which might include alternative expressions and sets of the values that Carens draws on. Another individual might be concerned about the effects greater immigration would have on the culture they live in, supporting, as it does, her way of life and so again they may be unmoved by Carens's position. Nonetheless, they too may feel regret over the situation of soe migrants, but may perhaps feel something else should be done.

This is why Carens is right to push his argument in the direction of proposing to offer an account of the correct values and a correct set of values to hold and a correct interpretation of their meaning and requirements. It is what the scope and scale of his argument requires and real-world variability both in the set of values people hold and their interpretation complicates this. What would have to be said to such people to maintain the universally reason-giving status of the proposal is that they have gotten something wrong: they hold the wrong values or misunderstand their own. This brings us back to the second constraint on the argument: that the case needs to be made beyond simply indicating mere disagreement. However, my claim is more than the argument from disagreement. Rather, it concerns the orientation towards questions of value and morality that reasons internalism indicates.

Reasons internalism suggests that values and morality are not as this version of the cosmopolitan argument requires them to be: authoritative, impartial, independent, and capable of a once-and-for-all correct

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[671] Williams.
[672] Cole, 'Beyond Reason'.

specification. Rather, the considerations above suggest that whatever authority they do have is partly located within life projects and values are expressed by and specified from within them in the doings of individuals. This is more than the argument from disagreement: it's a claim that, given reasons internalism and the considerations above, morality and value must be conceived in a different, non-external way.

Cosmopolitanism seems clearly in tension with reasons internalism. Take for example Singer's preference-based utilitarianism. Although his view is grounded in the preferences people express, he argues that preferences should be considered equally and moves to create the conditions for maximum preference-satisfaction. The problem that internalism reveals with this is, however, that preferences cannot be considered equally because the valuation and weighting of preferences is always a valuation and weighting from somewhere. It is evident, even on Singer's own view, that not all preferences are in fact to be treated equally. Similarly, arguments that begin from an objective account of well-being and the attitudes and institutions it requires also rely on externalist values and morality, given that they must supply justificatory reasons to those who fail to be moved by such accounts. Likewise, cosmopolitan Rawlsian arguments fail to be internalist in just the same way that Rawlsian domestic arguments do: by relying on an abstract conception of the reasonable, moral person to ground an overarching impartial account of justice supposed justified to all those within a particular state, failing to recognise the way in which authority is not grounded in an abstraction but in the present and ongoing concerns of people.[673]

Some cosmopolitans recognise the difficulty with external standards of justification. Pogge points to an overlapping political and moral consensus to argue that there are actually held moral ideals around which otherwise differing points of view hold to and thus to lend his arguments normative authority. While initially this seems to accommodate internalist concerns, it still requires justification to a conceivable individual who might object, except now the consensus plays the role of external reason-giving standard. Things are similar with the global impartiality requirement, which functions as an extension on the scope of justification so that at least one thing can be said to those who remain unmoved: it is globally impartial.

There are also approaches, Pogge's included, that attempt to supply thin moral notions to supply their arguments with the required universality. Arguments for a global harm principle begin with observations about the universality of harm avoidance and base their claims on plausible intuitions based around the idea that, if

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[673] See Williams *Moral Luck* for more developed thoughts along these lines. Williams, 'Moral Luck'.

we culpably harm someone, then it is generally recognised that some compensation for that harm is required. Thus, they argue, there is a widely recognised negative duty not to harm which, when harm has occurred, triggers a positive duty to make amends. From this, the move is then to point to harms that do occur.[674] Thus, some cosmopolitan institution is required in order to create or enable compliance with these duties. Some, such as Richard Shapcott, recognise a difficulty with this kind of argument and acknowledge that there is a certain cultural thickness to the question of what counts as harm and which kinds of harm are treated as significant. However, Shapcott proposes that such difficulties can be overcome and transboundary harms avoided through dialogue between those affected supported by cosmopolitan institutions.

It seems unacceptable to think that with clearly grievous harms any person aptly described as moral would think they are of less importance than their life project.[675] A reasonable or moral person will under practically any description not have a project that could give them reasons to overlook or cause easily avoidable and egregious harms. Where internalism does raise doubts, however, is the moment these arguments become cosmopolitan, as something more than the harm principle and principle of mutual toleration recognised in many 'pluralist' and 'realist' accounts of international ethics.[676]

Shapcott describes international pluralists as arguing that 'that our obligations to humanity are best mediated through our state and through the society of states … that states have different ethics but can agree upon a framework … whereby they tolerate each other, do not impose their own views upon others, and agree on certain limited harm principles. In this view, the institution of sovereignty is the most appropriate ethical response to cultural diversity and normative disagreement', which for Shapcott amounts to a norm of non-intervention.[677] While there is more to sovereignty than this, for the sake of argument this definition will be accepted. Shapcott thinks this view is insufficient and so needs bolstering with a cosmopolitan approach to harm.

Shapcott is particularly concerned with how sovereignty appears to let transboundary harms slip under the radar. As he puts it, '[c]ommunities are more interconnected and more vulnerable to each other than ever before. Because of their assumption of limited interaction, pluralists are at best silent and at worst indifferent

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[674] Pogge, for example, refers to the imposition of an unjust institutional order in *World Poverty and Human Rights*.

[675] Such as the kind that involve a direct loss of agency, as argued in James Griffin, *On Human Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Shapcott includes identity-based harms under his harm principle, in 'Anti-Cosmopolitanism, Pluralism and the Cosmopolitan Harm Principle', *Review of International Studies* 34, no. 2 (2008).

[676] Even in his criticism of these view, Shapcott recognises pluralists and realists emphasise mutual toleration and avoidance of harm. Shapcott, 'Anti-Cosmopolitanism, Pluralism and the Cosmopolitan Harm Principle'.

[677] Richard Shapcott, 'Beyond Understanding: Comparative Political Theory and Cosmopolitan Political Thought, a Research Agenda', *European Journal of Political Theory* 19, no. 1 (1 January 2020): 191–92.

to the extent of transnational ethical problems that face modern communities'.[678] He lists environmental harms, acid rain, GHG, criminal activity, sex tourism, dumping hazardous products, unsafe employment practices and exploitative and forced labour in other countries as examples. Thus, '[t]he ethical challenge then is to decide upon how to manage this interaction'.[679] While Shapcott does not give a clear picture for exactly how this is to be managed, one thing it will involve is the acceptance of institutionalised global rules. Elsewhere, he argues that some such rules might even be written into domestic constitutions and a clear implication of the above is that such rules would in some cases justify a form of intervention.[680]

There is, however, a problem with the list of harms Shapcott offers. Sex tourism, for example, is not obviously a case of one state intervening in the affairs of another and it is difficult to see why sex tourism requires a blurring of sovereignty. Criminal activity is already by definition illegal. Environmental harms and GHGs are usually as much a self-inflicted harm as they are a transboundary harm, and transboundary efforts to respond to both of these problems without respecting sovereignty have themselves led to quite grievous harms in developing states, while the problem itself seems both larger than and separable from questions of sovereignty.[681] With regard to the dumping of hazardous products, there is already rather a lot of international law about the issue.[682] With regard to forced and unsafe labour, it's worth remembering the core of Shapcott's argument: what triggers the requirement for cosmopolitanism is the idea that if someone culpably harms another, we typically recognise that they should make up for it. Reading to the letter of this widespread norm implies that the responsibility for unsafe or forced work would fall on those who practice it rather than, as Shapcott argues, requiring some global harm principle backed up by the weight of international institutions, or a benevolent set of states. The idea behind Shapcott's proposal, given its Poggean origins, may be that labour malpractice is tied to the imposition of an unjust international order which then requires the imposition of a better one governed by a global harm principle. However, this implies that the problem is one allowed by international pluralism and realism's endorsement of sovereignty which, despite their endorsement of mutual toleration and non-intervention – as Shapcott states – apparently allows the unjust imposition of this by one community to another. Given this, Shapcott's case against pluralism and realism is contradictory: if the

[678] Shapcott, 191–92.
[679] Shapcott, 191–92.
[680] Richard Shapcott, 'From the Good International Citizen to the Cosmopolitan Political Community: A Constitutional Path', *International Politics* 50, no. 1 (1 January 2013); Richard Shapcott, 'The Responsible Cosmopolitan State', in *Institutional Cosmopolitanism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
[681] Michael Shellenberger, *Apocalypse Never: Why Environmental Alarmism Hurts Us All* (New York: HarperCollins, 2020).
[682] Olivier Barsalou and Michael Hennessy Picard, 'International Environmental Law in an Era of Globalized Waste', *Chinese Journal of International Law* 17, no. 3 (1 September 2018).

'transboundary harms' Shapcott highlights really are transboundary harms and result from the actions of one community on another, the pluralist and realist could with good reason argue that the solution is more non-intervention and more respect for sovereignty rather than less of it.

A response available to Shapcott may be to argue that the norm of sovereignty allows states or people in control of a state to do these wrongs to others within their own territory; it is this that sovereignty protects. Thus, a harm principle would allow international institutions or other states (presumably backed up by force or sanction) to intervene. This idea, however, moves well away from the intuitions that made the Poggean duty underlying the argument compelling. The intuitive appeal of the duty is the idea that *you* incur a duty to make up for the harm you caused to whomever *you* harmed. Instead, this view seems to imply that it justifies intervention by states or organisations who may not have much to do with the harm-causing situation, such as intervening to end harmful employment practices in another state. Given this, a much stronger principle than the intuitively appealing one is needed, perhaps, a principle to the effect that harm in general triggers a positive duty to respond to it, or a potentially long-winded argument based on a series of causal-chains claiming something to the effect that in previously interacting, such as trading, with such a state the duty is triggered because the previous interaction allowed for the bad behaviour.[683] From the perspective of the internalist theory, it is not difficult to see how the stronger principle – given its demandingness and the fact that such a principle is unlikely to feature in the S of any but the most morally neurotic of agent – is much harder to entertain as a requirement for a conception of a reasonable or moral agent.

7.4 Rawlsian Statism

The problem that reasons internalism poses for Rawlsian statism mirrors the above problem with cosmopolitanism, even if the scope of statist approaches is more limited. The main issue, I argue, stems from the approach to statist political theory rather than any particular problem with the state itself. The issue is that, in taking a moralised and legalistic approach, it relies on a reasons-externalist structure that cannot make sense of why – granting reasons internalism – if citizens who fail to be moved by the statist moral argument, they nonetheless ought not to oppose them. These issues also apply to other statist approaches.[684] They run into the

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[683] Something like this view is criticised in David Miller, 'Holding Nations Responsible', *Ethics* 114, no. 2 (1 January 2004).
[684] For instance, Blake 'The Right to Exclude'; Blake 'Immigration and Political Equality'; Pevnick *Immigration and the Constraints of Justice*; Wellman, 'Immigration and Freedom of Association', each of whom tend to reason from an overarching and legalistic rights-based framework.

same issue that can be illustrated by exploring Rawls's work through the lens of internalism: the attempt to work out an overarching conception of justice that applies within the state, generating the rules and duties meant to be authoritative, that end up as a form of externalism.

Rawls's main concern in *A Theory of Justice* was to define justice and show how it would organise society.[685] He begins by arguing that justice is the highest value when we organise our social institutions; it orders all other values. Rawls's work attempted to mirror Kant's by grounding principles of justice a conception of a rational self; the principles of justice are just those that a rational self, conceived independent of its conception of the good, would choose. Like Kant, Rawls also took the principles of justice derived from the choices of such a self to be categorical.[686] Rawls aimed to keep with the general scheme given by Kant without relying on transcendental idealism[687] by rethinking Kant's doctrine to meet Henry Sidgewick's objection: that Kant cannot show why a person who follows the moral law (freely, rationally, and so universally choosing principles) has made this choice independent of the laws of nature (determined, contingent, particular) or how this choice is freer than that of one who does not.[688] To achieve this goal, Rawls introduced the original position to show what such a rational self would choose for the principles of justice.

The original position is a well-known thought experiment, in which Rawls constructed a hypothetical situation in which the features of ourselves that make us less than rational (that make us choose in non-universal ways) have been removed, namely our comprehensive conception of the good and our position in society.[689] Rawls believed that we would agree to two principles of justice within the original position. First, that:

> '[e]ach person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.'

And second, that:

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[685] Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*; Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*.
[686] Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*.
[687] Rawls likely has in mind Kant's reliance on a series of oppositions between two realms: the rational realm noumena where things-in-themselves, rationality, and necessity exist together, and the 'real' realm of phenomena where there is contingency, appearances, nature, particularity, and so on. Kant's notion of rationality seems to hinge on this distinction being true, rather than demonstrating that it is so, and Sidgewick's objection to Kant's argument centres on this.
[688] Michael J. Sandel, 'The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self', *Political Theory* 12, no. 1 (1984); John Rawls, 'The Basic Structure as Subject', *American Philosophical Quarterly* 14, no. 2 (1977): 165.
[689] Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*.

> [s]ocial and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged … and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.[690]

These principles of justice then form the basis for the organisation of society and give justice its content, providing the basic framework for justice as fairness.

In his later work, Rawls amended his argument in response to criticism of *A Theory of Justice*, but the underlying argument and concern in Rawls's later work, *Political Liberalism*, remain largely similar.[691] Much of Rawls's modification of his earlier work stems from the idea that this work based itself on a 'comprehensive' understanding of liberalism, meaning that it was not adequately free from a conception of morality, the good, religion, or metaphysics. The later Rawls's now *political* conception of justice aimed at providing the answer of how to maintain a just and stable democratic society against a backdrop of reasonable pluralism, without relying on a comprehensive conception of liberalism to work. It attempts to supply the 'most reasonable' conception of justice: one which each reasonable citizen, from the perspective of their respective comprehensive doctrines, views 'as derived from, or congruent with, or at least not in conflict with, their other values'.[692] This is why, Rawls claims, it rests not based on any comprehensive philosophical, religious, or moral doctrines, but on a political basis. The political conception of justice, as with his earlier work, then organises and develops the 'basic ideas and principles' underlying the settled convictions of those living in modern liberal-democratic societies so that each reasonable citizen finds it is in accord or does not conflict with their comprehensive doctrine. The more determinate conception of justice Rawls arrives at is, once again, justice as fairness.

Rawls then extended the political conception of justice by supplying a conception of public reason (the type of reasoning by which individuals give and know which reasons are appropriate to give to each other when deciding publicly) from the political conception of justice to show which 'ideals and principles … citizens who share in equally in ultimate political power' must guide citizens' public reasoning 'so that each can reasonably justify his or her political decisions to everyone' under conditions of reasonable pluralism in a democratic society.[693] Thus, Rawls' conception of public reason shows the conditions under which citizens ought to offer

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[690] Rawls.
[691] John Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, Expanded edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*.
[692] Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 11.
[693] Rawls, 445–46.

and accept reasons and decisions as reasonable, despite their own comprehensive world-views, if they are to avoid intractable conflict. Public reason functions as a kind of language through which citizens committed to the political conception of justice can make sure their reasons are reasonable and intelligible to one another when they engage in public reasoning. Public reason not only defines which decisions are reasonable, it also places constraints on what reasons citizens committed to the political conception of justice ought to give to one another, as well as what their society can be like.

We see then, that under this conception Rawls relies on the notion of a consensus to derive the principles of society for a new conception 'political' conception of justice. It might seem then, that by removing the justification of justice by an appeal to what it is to be rational in the earlier version of justice as fairness, a potentially objectionable metaphysics from the perspective of moral and religious pluralism is removed. Likewise, Rawls attempts to make his conception of justice grounded in the question of stability rather than in morality, making it again political rather than moral with the effect that it seems more readily and widely agreeable. In the later version and, in *The Law of Peoples,* Rawls also accounts for communitarian concerns, accepting certain non-liberal societies as legitimate and developing a minimal framework for organising international relations. At first, this seems to suggest a different way of doing ethics from his earlier theory. Now, ethics and its rules and principles are to be derived the conception of public reason, the underlying political culture of a state, and the goal of stability, which lends the rules and principles their normative force via the overlapping consensus.

However, there remains an important similarity between Rawls's earlier and later work. This similarity resides in the approach they both take to political theory and political problems and is shared by Rawlsian cosmopolitans and statists. In both *A Theory of Justice* and *Political Liberalism*, political theory takes on a legalistic shape. Rationality, in its moralised understanding in his earlier work, and stability underpinning the conception of justice and public reason in the later version provide the basis to work out justice in advance which is then ironed smooth in reflective equilibrium and overlayed onto political problems to supply the rights, duties, rules and principles that determine how society should be organised, who owes what to whom, whether borders should be open or closed, what kinds of interventions are justified, and what generally one may or must do. Rawls's later theory is as rooted in morality as the earlier one – focused as it is on discovering overarching authoritative rules that stipulate the nature of obligation – now it rooted in the concept of stability rather than

abstracted personhood. Thus, much like his cosmopolitan interpreters[694] and their utilitarian rivals, the approach begins by working out a set of moral rules which then determine upwards to one's rights, duties, acceptable state constitutions, the structure of international order which are then to act like, and often be, law. Those who reject this vision of justice are unreasonable, irrational, immoral, rash, or dangerous.

The problem reasons internalism presents for cosmopolitanism is not overcome by statist approaches like Rawls's just through its narrower justificatory scope and political and moral ambitions limited, as they are, to within the state.[695] The problem is that it is what some call an 'ethics-first' approach to politics or, in the same vein, relies on what Macintyre calls Morality (with a capital M), both of which are meant to indicate that the approach entails answering social political questions by working out a prior set of universal and rational rules and principles that constrain and dictate action.[696] This is just the kind of thing that may set the internalist's alarm bell ringing, since it implies the idea that there is an authoritative standard that supplies a blanket set of agent-neutral reasons, even if now they apply only to a smaller grouping. To the internalist, it begins to look as though statist approaches like Rawls's thus rely on an externalist theory of reasons, whether through the abstract person of the original position or the reasons supplied by the overlapping consensus of the political conception of justice.

It might be objected that Rawls's approach, at least in its later formulation, is not externalist because of the overlapping consensus. The consensus, the objection runs, is only a consensus because it runs in line with the values people already hold and supports the projects they pursue. From this, it seems to follow that the political conception of justice, if correctly formulated, is something that can be reached to by any of the relevant kind of individual's S and the only barrier to this is their knowledge: they cannot see how it supports their goals. Perhaps, then, the political conception of justice is just an expression and rigorous formulation of the values a set of already hold or which are practically necessary to pursue the lives they already aim to lead. What this objection leaves out, however, is that some projects and ways of life seem to be ruled out by Rawls's argument as the projects of 'unreasonable persons' – projects perhaps like Marxism and anarchism.[697] Leaving that aside,

[694] Such as Beitz, 'Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice'; and Pogge, *Realizing Rawls*.

[695] Such as through Rawls's argument that the proper site and scope of justice is the state, Miller's national trust argument, or Blake's right-to-not-become-enburdened and jurisdictional argument. Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 11–12; Rawls, 'The Basic Structure as Subject'; Blake, 'Immigration, Jurisdiction, and Exclusion'; Patti Tamara Lenard and David Miller, 'Trust and National Identity', The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust, 29 March 2018; David Miller and Sundas Ali, 'Testing the National Identity Argument', *European Political Science Review* 6, no. 2 (May 2014).

[696] Williams, *In the Beginning Was the Deed*; MacIntyre, *Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity*.

[697] Heidi Hurd, 1996 822; Claudia Mills *The Idea of a Political Liberalism*, 192; Scheffler 1994, 9. Heidi M. Hurd, 'The Levitation of Liberalism', ed. John Rawls, *The Yale Law Journal* 105, no. 3 (1995): 822; Claudia Mills, '"Not a Mere Modus Vivendi": The Bases for Allegiance to the Just State', in *The Idea of a Political Liberalism: Essays on Rawls*, ed. Victoria Davion and Clark Wolf (London: Rowman

internalism suggests that such an overlapping consensus is unlikely to really be a consensus for the same reason that agent-neutral reasons – which themselves are grounded in the same kind of sharedness that constitutes a consensus – are rendered problematic by internalism. Instead, it can only be a preferential selection of views – Rawls's preference – treated as authoritative for all.[698]

Internalism suggests that justification, ethics, and the giving and receiving of reasons is a complex and messy business that undermines externalist solutions to the problems that arise from this messiness. Because of this, internalists should view Rawls's morality-first approach to political theory with scepticism. It yields an image of the state and citizenship unable to make sense of the conflictual and dynamic interplay of reasons, motivation, interests, and power that underpin moral and political reality. This is a result of the reasons-externalist structure implicit in Rawls's approach begins by figuring out moral principles and rules to work out in detail the ideal structure of the state, what rights and duties there are, what is acceptable and unacceptable, who is to be ignored and who has things right, and above all how things and people should be. This is then mapped over reality and to the extent that reality fails to match up to the ideal, so much the worse for reality. Gone is the messy and complicated nature of justification mentioned above; gone is also the question of what actually moves people; and gone is any genuine conflict and political, moral, or religious competition except in point of detail within the framework of Rawls's account of justice; and gone is the operation of power and control as it relates to the promotion of and conflicts between interests encapsulated in the projects people pursue.

7.5 Conclusion

I have argued that reasons internalism is a position that runs in tension with some of the major approaches to political ethics: cosmopolitanism and Rawlsian statism. The problem is perhaps visible with greater clarity in cosmopolitanism, but still notable in the latter. Both positions in some degree relies on some form of externalism to generate reasons for individuals. Where does this leave us in terms of developing a political theory which may be put to use towards more than just negative, critical purposes?

& Littlefield, 2000), 192; Samuel Scheffler, 'The Appeal of Political Liberalism', *Ethics* 105, no. 1 (1 October 1994): 9; Matt Sleat, 'Coercing Non-Liberal Persons: Considerations on a More Realistic Liberalism', *European Journal of Political Theory* 12, no. 4 (1 October 2013): 361.
[698] Raymond Geuss, criticising moralistic approaches to political philosophy such as Rawls who base their argument on the idea of a consensus, articulates a similar criticism: it seems highly unlikely that Rawls actually articulates a consensus, but instead his own interpretation and designation of a consensus which when explored further falls apart. Raymond Geuss, 'Liberalism and Its Discontents', *Political Theory* 30, no. 3 (2002); Geuss, *Philosophy and Real Politics*.

While reasons internalism is in tension to varying degrees with some paradigmatic statements of Rawlsian statism, aspects of statism and another position, 'communitarianism'[699] that can usefully inform an internalist approach that moves beyond scepticism. In the writings of both, ideas and concerns relevant to reasons internalism often peek through. Thus, insights from both can inform a more consistently internalist political and ethical theory. David Miller endorses an approach to theory that builds on ideas that seem at least adjacent to internalism. He writes,

[a] political philosophy that presents itself to any given society as realistically utopian must contain principles that members of that society could be brought to accept by reasoned discussion, which means that the principles cannot have implications that those citizens would find abhorrent. This doesn't mean that the principles must be accepted immediately as they are laid out. They may be unfamiliar, or they may be resisted simply because they impose sacrifices that many citizens are initially unwilling to make. Political philosophy should be in the business of changing political attitudes, of showing people what their convictions mean when applied consistently to political questions. It should not be constrained merely by political feasibility … But at the same time it implies more than technical feasibility, because many technically feasible proposals would fail the requirement that they be reasonably acceptable to present-day citizens.[700]

This statement, shorn of the Rawlsian concept of reasonableness, could be brought in line with Williams's concept of advice-giving in an internalist framework. An advisor's advice to the advisee aims to be something that can move the advisee. As such, it should be reachable from within the advisee's S. But there is an obscurity here, an obscurity in not-knowing for sure what could move the advisee. It may be possible to bring the advisee to be motivated to do something, eventually, that was outside of the horizon of options they would have considered otherwise. Miller provides a useful starting point for now internalism might be employed in political

[699] I use the quotes to indicate some reluctance to use the term, since those centrally grouped under the label – Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer – have with much justice rejected the label. I continue to use the label to mean 'them' without imputing to them any particular view about the nature or significance of the community other than to say it features, in some way, in their thought.
[700] David Miller, 'Political Philosophy for Earthlings', in *Political Theory: Methods and Approaches*, ed. David Leopold and Marc Stears (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 46–47.

theory. To be clear, I do not believe this implies cosmopolitanism remains a viable option. The problem with cosmopolitanism, I have argued, is its conception of morality and reliance on the external to produce normatively authoritative arguments and reasons that internalism suggests are based on a false understanding of reasons and normativity and thus their scope.

Statism's merit lies partly in its reduction of justificatory scope and its focus on an already existing political unit. This latter is something even some cosmopolitans endorsing 'statist cosmopolitanism', have also found attractive in an effort to work out an effective version of cosmopolitan theory.[701] The reasons behind this reduction in scope, to do with the nature and origin of the state and its effectiveness, suggests that agreement and the effective carrying out of a political project is more likely when directed amongst the citizens of a state. Similarly, statist theory raises the question of and can give more plausible answers to the issue of obedience and authority. Statist theory raises the question of why and when citizens should obey the state or any other entity claiming political or normative authority. This is a question that will necessarily arise and appear to be problematic for anyone who embraces internalism, since it may initially seem as if internalism will be unable to offer a coherent answer to the problem or embraces an unhappy and atomised answer to the next question. In the next chapter, I suggest resources from some strands of statist theory concerning the law and self-determination can help develop a persuasive internalist response.

Communitarianism lends a microscopic focus able to catch important nuance and detail. Communitarianism also, in spite of some countervailing tendencies, usually avoids appeal to an overarching moral framework or consensus, focusing instead on ethical life emerging organically in the life cycle of individuals and communities. Communitarianism's emphasis on the significance of communal structures – structures like religion, the family, the workplace, and the role these play in the upbringing and formation of individuals – is useful for understanding the life projects and ethical standards informing structures of reasons and thus what could be prospective reasons for people. It usefully highlights the conditions of the production of life as an important, if not the most important, site of political contestation. This area, because it concerns the conditions in which the motivational make-up of individuals is produced, must be central to an internalist political theory since it contains within it the possibility of an ambitious, progressive – and yet internalist – political theory.

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[701] Lea Ypi, 'Statist Cosmopolitanism*', *Journal of Political Philosophy* 16, no. 1 (2008); Garrett Wallace Brown, 'Bringing the State Back into Cosmopolitanism: The Idea of Responsible Cosmopolitan States', *Political Studies Review* 9, no. 1 (1 January 2011).

Internalism provides some of the tools for theory to grasp the messiness of social life and the complexity of ethics and motivation. It does not shy away from – and sharpens the image of – the role power, interests, and preferences, and the interactions between these elements play in social life. For example, it shows that even universalistic, altruistic, and egalitarian projects are unlikely to give reasons to all. Taking internalism seriously can prevent this fact from undoing far-reaching political projects – as occurs when such projects are situated within a cosmopolitan normative framework. Similarly, internalism suggests that the moral solutions to the political problem of bringing wayward individuals in line with the aims of a political project offered by cosmopolitan, statist, and communitarian theory are fictions that result in an inconsistency between the absolute reason-giving status of the moral ideal and its capacity to actually give reasons to individuals. Part of my task in the next chapter is to argue that internalism need not just play an uncovering role – risking missing the point of moral solutions to problems of authority, obedience, and coercion. Rather, it can form the basis of an interesting approach to political ethics.

8 Internalism, Political Normativity, and the Ethics of Immigration: Rousseau with Realism

Internalism is primarily a negative thesis. It seems at most to be a constraint on what practical theory might look like. As such, it seems to say very little about what may be said in positive terms. Its scepticism is part of its attraction: it purports to undermine domineering and presumptuous prescriptive approaches to political and ethical theory. However, stopping here runs the risk of merely outlining an apolitical and anti-ethical theory which though it may say something of relevance in both domains leaves us in a kind of inertia, able only to demolish rather than construct. Williams himself expressed deep scepticism of ethical and moral theory.[702] In contrast to a pessimistic interpretation of where reasons internalism leads, my aim is to outline an internalist political framework that makes space for an 'open', dynamic, and flexible orientation to ethics and politics. In particular, I aim to show that it does not on its own rule out a case for free movement, but instead places important and attractive constraints over how the case must be conceived.

In section 8.1, I argue that internalism should be taken to emphasise and affirm the political as a distinct dimension of social life. It thus aligns with political realism – a tradition of political theory generally based on the idea of the political as something ontologically real with features distinct from other dimensions of life – which shares a scepticism of ethics-first theories that dissolve the political within the moral. Political realism thus supplies a useful orientating framework for an internalist political theory. Additionally, the approach I offer is inspired in particular by the republican aspects (or what I think is an attractive interpretation of those aspects of) of Rousseau's political theory (section 8.2). I aim to show that these two elements – realism and Rousseau – coupled with some insights from a particular interpretation of virtue ethics, provide a useful and attractive framework for thinking through the ethics of immigration and can accommodate what I think is an attractive but nonetheless radical proposal that can move towards more freedom of movement (section 8.3). This pairing of

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[702] See for instance Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, 2011. The central question that frames Williams's work here is what he calls the ethical question: 'how should one live?' Recognising the importance and inescapability of the question in our lives, Williams sees a role for philosophy in contributing towards answers to the question. Still, Williams's work in the book and elsewhere attempts to undermine prescriptive ethical theory that gives rigid answers to practical questions highlighting specifically approaches based on a theory of obligation. Notable targets of Williams's view are utilitarianism and Kantian approaches to ethics.

virtue theory with reasons internalism can move beyond a view in which political and ethical questions are to be resolved simply through bargaining and compromise amongst individuals and groups with differing sets of desires.

8.1 Reasons Internalism and Political Realism

Reasons internalism can complement the understanding of the political endorsed by political realism. Political realism is a diverse tradition and political realists have varying and not necessarily compatible ontological, epistemological, and normative commitments. However, what unites this cluster of views is a vision of political theory attempting to take politics seriously by emphasising the messy and conflictual reality of the political and taking this as a starting point for theory.[703] For some realists, politics is a distinct and ontologically 'real' domain of existence and should not be reduced to another sphere [704] Thus, the political has its own characteristics setting it apart from other spheres. It is often contrasted with the sphere of the moral where what characterises that sphere is its emphasis on agreement, harmony, and consensus, whereas the political is characterised as a realm of disagreement, conflict, and ever-open contestation. The political is, to use a term associated with Chantal Mouffe's brand of political realism, agonistic.[705]

Realists are often opposed to moralising approaches to political theory. Realists like Bernard Williams and Raymond Guess both criticise such approaches for ignoring or presenting a distorted image of political reality, leaving out the hard nature of disagreement, competing interests, the complexity of justification, amongst other things.[706] In addition to Rawlsianism, utilitarianism is a frequent target, and they have placed various versions of cosmopolitanism and statism within their sights.[707] What these views share – and what often realists reject – is the effort to (dis)solve politics through an overarching and idealised morality or moral consensus then mapped onto and over the real world of power, conflict, and contestation, white-washing[708] this reality and leaving theory either an unhelpful and distorting influence or inert when facing the din of everyday political life.

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[703] Matt Sleat, *Liberal Realism: A Realist Theory of Liberal Politics* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), 2–3; Matt Sleat, 'Politics Recovered—on the Revival of Realism in Contemporary Political Theory', in *Politics Recovered: Realist Thought in Theory and Practice*, ed. Matt Sleat (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 3–8.
[704] Sleat, *Liberal Realism*, 145.
[705] Sleat, 145.
[706] Williams, *In the Beginning Was the Deed*; Geuss, *Philosophy and Real Politics*.
[707] Matt Sleat, 'The Value of Global Justice: Realism and Moralism', *Journal of International Political Theory* 12, no. 2 (1 June 2016); J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, *Utilitarianism: For and Against* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).
[708] In some views, almost literally. See for example C. Wright-Mills's criticism of ideal theory. Mills, '"Ideal Theory" as Ideology'; Geuss, 'Liberalism and Its Discontents'.

Internalism is also sceptical of just the sort of overarching authoritative moral consensus political realists criticise through its rejection of external reasons and through the difficulties it raises for the idea of attaining universal consensus via internal means. Reasons internalism suggests the possibility of a specifically political normativity based on navigating and accepting disagreement. For internalism, politics cannot be reduced to working out and adhering to a universal morality since internalism cannot but problematise the notion. Moreover, internalism is sceptical of all but those most general and basic of consensuses. For internalism, the conception of the political it suggests is one in which there are winners and losers and there are political programmes which are attractive to and move some and not others, and so not every successful political programme can give reasons to all those it affects. Internalism requires that we make no bones about this since things likely cannot be otherwise and requires that theory is constructed and framed in a manner that avoids neglecting this fact.

Williams's internalism is likely an expression of or underpinning to his own brand of political realism.[709] The emphasis on the complexity of justification in relation to the life-projects of people, and the way these life-projects lend the sense, structure, and force to values and reasons – as opposed to views that treat values as ideal and independent entities capable of a right way of being expressed – and the conflicts all this can lead to means internalism couples well with the realist tradition. Internalism suggests that there probably is not an external reason that can be derived theoretically then applied practically to rationally resolve disagreement and suggests that looking for one is probably wasted effort. Internalism makes ample space for the ontological reality of the political, which the internalist can claim lies in the inevitability of disagreement and conflict internalism predicts.

On the other hand, political realism can lend further shape to what a theory that takes reasons internalism seriously. Like some political realists, an internalist will find that at least some kinds of ideal political theory will have to be set aside. Ideal theory aims at working out the vision of the world that should be aimed for. It is unabashedly utopian, even if this usually follows the modest Rawlsian aim of outlining a 'realistic utopia' by accounting for the 'real' limits on what can be achieved. Its counterpart, or the opposing position for some political realists is non-ideal theory.[710] This approach starts from the question of how the world is rather than

[709] Sophie-Grace Chappell and Nicholas Smyth, 'Bernard Williams', in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2018 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018), sec. 5, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/williams-bernard/.
[710] For instance, Mills, '"Ideal Theory" as Ideology'. For an overview, see Matt Sleat, 'Realism, Liberalism and Non-Ideal Theory Or, Are There Two Ways to Do Realistic Political Theory?', *Political Studies* 64, no. 1 (1 March 2016).

what it should be. Some approaches to ideal theory require this an idealised set of motivations to work and so it must abstract from problematic motivations, emotions, and rational orientations that be present under non-ideal conditions. In other words, it must select from motivations and subtract 'unreasonable' ones that undermine the ideal vision and choose those that support it. In contrast, even in its advice-giving mode internalism requires to be effective that the present S of an individual or a group be kept in view since S and S' are closely linked. It requires knowledge of the various current projects and concerns of people – what moves them know – the conflicts these may lead to and the means and obstacles to the realisation of those projects, which may include present political structures. It thus does not primarily require the work and tools of moral philosophy, but the work and tools of the social sciences, history, psychology, and other fields helpful for understanding everyday political life.

Internalism suggests that we should take a political approach to politics and agreement and compromise is not always possible or even desirable from some perspectives. Some political projects maybe incapable of full justification, in the sense of giving a reason to all others in the mode of morality-first approaches. There may be no direct, reasoned way of moving some others to agree to some political project. Leverage, rhetorical persuasion, even force, may in *some* circumstances be necessary means to achieving some goal where the success of the goal can be the only thing that ultimately justifies after the fact the underpinning political project. This does not mean that 'the end justifies the means.' For one, this is not a principle that moves many people: someone espousing it is likely to be viewed with suspicion or hostility since they espouse something that has a high probability of endangering others and their projects. Indeed, the standards and rules people do endorse are important because they define what an acceptable political project is and this its chances of success. As several political realists emphasise and as follows from internalism, attention to context is crucial for a viable political theory.

Internalism's preservation of the complexity of the hustle and bustle of ordinary politics, of the distribution of interests and obstacles, on the non-algorithmic nature of political contestation, and the necessarily bound nature and scope of justification is an affirmation of the reality of the political and thus of the necessity of approaching politics politically. In affirming the reality of the political an internalist political theory can become politically realistic: by pointing towards an informed and action-guiding, dynamic, and flexible approach to theory wary of lure of the neat abstractions often prevalent in moralised political theory.

8.2 Rousseauian Realism: Internalism, Freedom, Popular Sovereignty, and the General Will

In chapter seven, I argued that one issue that will confront a political theory based on internalism will be the problem of political authority: how to justify allegiance or commitment to a political entity like the state and one's fellow citizens given internalism's rejecting of externalism. One interpretation of Rousseau's political theory offers an attractive solution that fits nicely with reasons internalism. The idea comes out of what Steven Affeldt claims is an exegetical correct interpretation of Rousseau's infamous words:[711] 'Whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than he will be forced to be free.'[712] The idea is that one's commitment to a state is warranted by the freedom created by the state's guarantee of punishment. This, Affeldt argues, is the general thrust of Rousseau's argument. It is this threat of punishment which guarantees personal independence. The idea behind being 'forced to be free' is therefore not that the state or anyone is warranted in forcing freedom upon others or that the state forces freedom upon people against their will. Rousseau was, as is generally recognised, greatly concerned with the significance of freedom and the desire to be free and thus places an emphasis on non-domination.[713] Rather, the idea is that the state, through its guarantee of personal independence via the threat of punishment, means people within an effective state – that is, a state considered to be legitimate through its guarantee of personal independence – cannot but be free, which guarantees personal independence. People within the state are thus made to be morally and politically self-responsible. This is the basis and justification of the state in the Rousseauian theory: the purpose of the state is to prevent enthralment to others preserve freedom.[714]

In line with this, reasons internalism can be interpreted as pointing towards an ethics of personal independence both as a consequence and presupposition of the theory. By personal independence I mean being uncoerced and unworried about being coerced by another person, rather than in the sense of being self-sufficient, although they can relate. It follows from internalism that each person has – because they cannot not have – a direct and immediate interest in pursuing and achieving what they have reason to do. I mean 'reason to do' in the direct sense in which Owen Wingrave has a reason to do something he is directly moved by, rather than his father's pushing for him to join the army. To get someone to behave in accordance with what is, for

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[711] Steven G. Affeldt, 'The Force of Freedom: Rousseau on Forcing to Be Free', *Political Theory* 27, no. 3 (1999).

[712] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract and The First and Second Discourses*, ed. Gita May (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 166. Importantly, my concern here is not whether Affeldt's is a correct interpretation of Rousseau. Rather, my interest is in something which comes out of how I interpret Affeldt's interpretation which I defend as a compelling position in its own right.

[713] Affeldt, 'The Force of Freedom'; Jonathan Marks, 'Misreading One's Sources: Charles Taylor's Rousseau', *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 1 (2005).

[714] Affeldt, 'The Force of Freedom'.

them, an external reason would in some sense to coerce or manipulate them. Reasons internalism suggests that at least part of what we ordinarily take to be the wrongness of coercion or manipulation is located in the lack of giving a direct internal reason to someone, which itself amounts to a failure to respect agency and autonomy. Reasons internalism can then explain what is wrong with enthralment and the creation of personal dependence in the sense Rousseau's theory responds to: it prevents individuals from pursuing their own lives, acting on their own reasons or the reasons they can see and amounts to domination.[715] Instead, they act in the interests and according to the reasons of another out of for instance fear of punishment, or loss rather than because they are moved by the reasons lay behind what they are compelled to do.

Of course, internalism does not make the moral claim that everyone has a reason to care about other people's reasons or about giving reasons to others. I have used several examples of people who just do not care to make the case for internalism and have stressed that there is a limitation on the extent to which in some scenarios a reason can be given that another affected by an action will find satisfactory. This is why for personal independence to be guaranteed it must come from an alienated source. What I mean by this is that the state and the law it enforces need not be there to enact any one person's reasons. The law may run contrary to whatever it is you most want to do, especially if you are like the sociopath and especially if your project involves directly and intentionally reducing the capacity of others to pursue their own reasons.

The law's punishment and the state force that backs it up, which anyone may run afoul of but which not everyone necessarily has a direct reason to follow – if they believe they can get away with something running counter to the law, for instance – is thus alienated. Yet it can guarantee personal independence because, in its alienation and because of the general possibility of punishment, each person may bring the law to bear on another who illegitimately tramples over their reasons. The law and thus the legitimate state is then justified because they are independent of any one person's will and through this independence guarantees personal independence, thereby allowing each agent to enact their reasons. This is how the justification coheres with internalism. There is thus a sound basis from within the framework of reasons internalism for viewing the state or a state-like structure as justified or even necessary even.

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[715] See Philip Pettit, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government*, Oxford Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) for fuller account fo domination that runs in line with what I have in mind here.

This is similar to Williams's claim regarding a Basic Legitimation Demand (BLD), but with a more republican emphasis.[716] Roughly, Williams's BLD refers to a requirement a state must meet in order be legitimate and not merely a coercive force. A state may not merely provide some form of order and security in a territory by any means, which is simply an instance of might makes right. To be legitimate, the state must offer an acceptable justification for its right to wield the authority and power it does to those subject to it. However, this solution need not be considered 'acceptable' from the standpoint of some transcendent or universal standard. Rather, it must be seen as acceptable from the standpoint of those subject to it – it thus admits of a degree of relativity and may not achieve perfect acceptability to all those subject to state power.[717] This view develops Williams's argument by more directly tying legitimacy to non-domination. In line with Williams's argument, the position I offer takes the view that what counts as domination and non-domination can be contestable and construed as partly historically relative and based on more general cosmological and normative ideas prevalent in a society.[718] It is also possible for ideas about what counts as non-domination to conflict. However, some formations, like those justifying slavery, are ruled out since under practically no valid description can slavery be construed as non-domination. The minimal requirement for the state and law's legitimacy is thus, on this view, that it guarantee personal independence through non-domination, but this guarantee is construed as variable, scalar, flexible, and contestable as Williams construes the BLD.[719]

There is thus a theory of state legitimacy and thus the legitimacy of civil disobedience and perhaps even revolt that falls out of this account. To express the general idea briefly, law-breaking may be warranted when it undermines personal independence, but to attempt to undermine the state in its general capacity as guarantor of law and thus personal independence is not. The guarantee of personal independence requires minimally that there is law, but an internalist based justification of the state and law does not mean anything goes: the law should not contradict its own guarantee of personal independence so, for example, laws based on the justified status of slavery must be ruled out as would laws that quite clearly worked to favour particular interests. While in general the fullest of this idea of legitimacy, I believe, requires liberal protections like freedom of religion and

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[716] Though some argue the republican emphasis is already there, for instance Thom Brooks, 'Bernard Williams, Republicanism, and the Liberalism of Fear: Problems and Prospects.', in *The Moral Philosophy of Bernard Williams*, ed. C. D. Herrera and Alexandra Perry (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013).

[717] Williams, *In the Beginning Was the Deed*.

[718] I emphasise this aspect of it, since I can see room for an argument for the state such as mine as potentially compatible with a constitutional monarchy: I think the reasons for rejecting a monarchy and for a stronger republicanism, while there, lie elsewhere). I have in mind here the arguments of Taylor on Imaginaries, MacIntyre on traditions, and Williams on the BLD. See MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry*; Charles Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries* (London: Duke University Press, 2004); Williams, *In the Beginning Was the Deed*.

[719] Williams, *In the Beginning Was the Deed*.

free speech and stretches up beyond formal equality before law (which is itself crucial) to a reasonable level of material equality to avoid the creation of dependency (which can also be defended on pragmatic grounds),[720] this may not always be necessary for a state to be legitimate. It may be enough that (a) the law is general and (b) there is sufficient justification within the general ideas held by the citizens of a state for that state to be legitimate for them. There is indeterminacy here, but again this indeterminacy should be embraced since it reflects the idea that questions of what the law ought to be and the appropriate degree of personal independence are always open to contestation and evolution and, moreover, that what is considered appropriate in a particular time and place can only ultimately be resolved by the people of a state or some grouping united in their subjection to and creation of the law.

Though it might seem that reasons internalism then warrants an extreme kind of individualism, the opposite is true: the state's guarantee of personal independence guarantees the functioning of a public sphere and the place and significance of genuinely communal life. Far from being atomistic, this guarantee creates the real conditions for togetherness and community. By preventing the community from crunching over the individual, by supplying the individual with the means to distance themselves from others, the conditions for a genuine, unforced association with others is established. Of course, other factors are involved in the flourishing of communal life, but it is only with the distance and independence created by the state that people can form genuine and thus internal commitments to a community independent of necessity and thus commitments that are uncoerced.

I have argued thus far that on Rousseauian grounds internalism requires a state that guarantees personal independence, but the Rousseauian argument goes farther – although for reasons of space I can only provide the general contours of the idea here. The idea is that the state's guarantee of personal independence – continuing in the Rousseauian spirit – also warrants compliance with the general will. Here, I argue that the general will should – within the limit of respect for personal independence outlined above and without requiring that an individual must suppress any alternative conception of the direction of society they may hold in favour of the prevailing direction – be understood in a mostly majoritarian fashion and that this is compatible with

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[720] See Frederick Neuhouser, 'Freedom, Dependence, and the General Will', *The Philosophical Review* 102, no. 3 (1993) for this interpretation of Rousseau's argument.

reasons internalism and which supports self-determination and thus underpins the importance of popular sovereignty. As Rousseau puts it, 'the vote of the majority always obligates'.[721]

Part of the general idea advanced thus far is that the state through the law and its threat of punishment guarantees personal independence, providing an important basis for individuals to pursue their own reasons. Reasons internalism and the Rousseauian state are thus both concerned with freedom. The notion of the general will and adherence to it further bolsters the way freedom can be advanced in the state. This stems from the general fact that individuals have an interest in the common good: not only are the means to one's ends almost always in the modern world public, but also practically everyone has social interests and thus an interest in the social – at the very least in terms of the circumstances they and everyone else lives in, the upbringing and circumstances of their children and family and friends, and specifically the exact character of the law meant to guarantee personal independence. Thus, individuals have a general interest in having a say on the common good. Moreover, whatever is said about the common good is necessarily said collectively and thus generally. According to one interpretation of Rousseau, the law's guarantee of personal independence through its generality is only one condition – a precondition – of the individual's freedom. Fully understood, the individual must view the constraints the law imposes on them as their own and thus as consistent with their own freedom. Thus, the individual must at a minimum be able to subjectively affirm for themselves that the law is their own.[722]

One attractive way of seeing this, I argue, is that individuals must be able to equally have a say in the formation of the law as a vehicle for the achieving an idea of the common good. The law cannot be settled by even a benevolent and highly liberal dictator since any law the liberal dictator produces would be one which the individuals subject to it could not affirm as a law given by themselves to themselves.[723] Thus, the individuals forming a political community ought at least to have a say in the laws and thus the common good of their own community and to see that will as a popular and not individual will. Indeed, only by having a say in the common good could the constraints it implies have the possibility of being seen by the individuals subject to it as emanating from their own will. And part of what constitutes the common good – given each individual's interest in pursuing their reasons and thus their interest in their own freedom – is that it is a means and embodiment of each individual's freedom. Part of what the common good is, is a situation in which each individual has a say on

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[721] Rousseau quoted in Neuhouser, 371 n. 8.
[722] Neuhouser, 'Freedom, Dependence, and the General Will'.
[723] Frederick Neuhouser, 'Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Origins of Autonomy', *Inquiry* 54, no. 5 (1 October 2011).

what the common good is. Decisions on the character of law should then be decided in a majoritarian fashion as the main means of registering collectively the idea of the common good held by a political community. Of course, however, there is a distinction between the general will and the merely majoritarian 'will of all', as Rousseau put it, which could lead from objectionable inequality, to domination, servitude, and to tyranny.[724] This should be understood as a constraint on the general will that it is consistent with the thoughts on the guarantee of personal independence outlined above. Thus, particular individuals and groups cannot be made independent or become political targets, for instance by rescinding citizenship rights. Nor should, as suggested above, the general right to express an opposing opinion on what the common good should be, be rescinded since it is another important condition for viewing a collective decision as part of the general will, and thus as consistent with one's own freedom. And nor should the laws of a state be put at the service of partial interests, which could not possibly be in the service of the common good.

8.3 Internalism, Internationalism, and Ethics

The Rousseauian case for adherence to the general will within bounds set by personal independence justifies adherence to legitimate political decisions consistent with internalism. Partly because of this, unlike cosmopolitanism, this conception of political ethics need not have as strict a requirement on justification as cosmopolitanism, nor need a proposal convince or give a reason to everybody. This kind of realism is an attractive feature of the approach: it can accept kinds of partisanship and makes space for the legitimate enactment of political power, and can do so even if a particular project offered by some group would fail to move everybody without this needing to undo the project, as I have argued occurs with cosmopolitanism. A project need only convince enough people and endeavour to be general with regard to the law by respecting the personal independence of each person in the same way. This maintains the political in that it accepts the possibility and likelihood of disagreement, but need not be undo a political project because of that. The argument thus begins to lend some shape to what a positive case within the ethics of immigration might look like, by outlining the overarching political theoretical framework. In what follows, I build on this to fill in some further details that lend a better sense to the overall picture of how a more attractive internalist case for free movement could be made.

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[724] Rousseau quoted in Philip J. Kain, 'Rousseau, the General Will, and Individual Liberty', *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 7, no. 3 (1990): 316, see also 316 ff. for discussion of majoritarianism and the general will.

8.3.1 From Cosmopolitanism to Internalist Internationalism

If reasons internalism is to be taken seriously in political and ethical argument then, as I have argued, a cosmopolitan approach to ethical and political theory will likely have to be abandoned. However, this does not mean a theory inspired by internalism must rule out ambitious and bold political and ethical argument, nor that it has nothing to say with regard to the international. Rather, what it does is present a more accurate picture of the political nature of any such argument and a clearer picture of the constraints and steps such an argument requires. I argue that in the international sphere the approach and framework for projects with an international scope should be internationalist rather than cosmopolitan.

Internationalism, very broadly, refers to 'any outlook, or practice, that tends to transcend the nation towards a wider community, of which nations continue to form the principal units.'[725] More specifically, I take it here to refer to a view in which national sovereignty is retained as the principal means of representation and securing the well-being of the people partly constitutive of the state and thus as the principal and ultimate source of political authority and which, in contrast to nationalism, 'seeks to establish global relations of respect and cooperation, based on acceptance of differences in polity as well as culture.'[726] To modify slightly the distinction between cosmopolitanism and internationalism Charles Beitz draws, it contrasts with cosmopolitanism – which attempts to appeal directly to people considered as individual units (usually in the name of supranationalism) rather than collectivises – internationalism emphasises the importance of a mediating collectivity, namely the state.[727] To make the case for an internationalist approach, it will be useful to revisit the discussion of Joseph Carens's case for open borders discussed in the previous chapter.

I suggested that some aspects of Carens's approach could be interpreted in a way more amenable to internalism. What makes Carens's approach fruitful in this regard is his contextualist approach to political theory. Carens deliberately appeals to and draws from the values of a specific moral and political culture, namely North American/European liberal-democratic political culture. However, as argued in chapter seven, there is a tension between this and the cosmopolitan scope of justification. Instead, Carens's contextualism should be retained and the cosmopolitan approach to justification set aside, accepting that whatever one is arguing for may not be

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[725] Perry Anderson, 'Internationalism: A Breviary', *New Left Review*, no. 14 (1 April 2002): 6.

[726] Timothy Brennan, 'Cosmopolitanism and Internationalism', *New Left Review*, no. 7 (1 February 2001): 77.

[727] Beitz, 'Rawls's Law of Peoples'; Charles R. Beitz, 'Social and Cosmopolitan Liberalism', *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 75, no. 3 (1999).

able to give practical reasons to all. Instead, the aim is to appeal to enough people through prospective internal reasons statements to persuade them that one's proposal is attractive (and, of course, that it will meet the goal it sets). To be successful, this will involve considerations of feasibility and requires that one's proposal be based on a sound understanding of the context in which the proposal is made such as the ethical standards of the group one appeals to. The aim, with the proposal, is to show to a sufficient amount of people that the proposal will for them, and according to their standards, goals, and what these require will result in something attractive to them.

With regard to others part of the aim may even be to create the motivational conditions for others to see the success and attractiveness of the project or that are required to get the project off the ground. Again, not anything goes and one cannot try to shape a group's S by any means: ethical standards actually held will be important for convincing others and important to the arguer, and the standards actually held by the members of various communities may well have a pragmatic point and purpose that one may need to pay heed to and can be argued about themselves.[728]

Without the cosmopolitan framework, Carens's approach can be adapted to stay within the structure of reasons internalism. This approach then draws from a particular context and culture and bases its claims around the goals, interests, ethical standards, and problems faced by the people one appeals to within that context. To understand these elements accurately, social scientific research will be necessary. Conflicts between groups and between interests will also be an important consideration. All this means that an internalist political theory will appeal to the context in which the theorist is writing. Typically, this means making an appeal to one's fellow-citizens. Combined with the Rousseauian considerations above, an internalist political theory aims to appeal to groups of citizens within a state and aims to persuade them of their proposals to democratically push for an ideal. Returning to the ethics of immigration, this underpins an important that underpins the shift from cosmopolitanism to internationalism.

Given this principle, my position sides partly with Christopher Heath Wellman and Michael Walzer in it has the result that is the citizens of some particular state who should ultimately decide who can be a member of the state.[729] Thus, the question debated in much of the literature on the ethics of immigration of whether

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[728] Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism and The Politics of Recognition: An Essay by Charles Taylor*, 1st Edition (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1992).
[729] Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*; Wellman, 'Immigration and Freedom of Association'.

there is a 'right to exclude' is given a fairly clear answer on the approach I have outlined. The principle is that a 'right to exclude' is synonymous with a right to decide and always there. It is a right in the Spinozist sense of being a power or potentiality that necessarily is the case, rather than being directly a moral warrant. I take it as attractive that the question, which it seems to me can only occur to one as a serious issue if one makes assumptions in tension with reasons internalism – since it implies an external moral and legal standard of right independent of popular will – is dissolved within the approach I am outlining. Popular sovereignty is necessarily a fundamental political principle of the approach. Legitimacy – of the law, of a right – stems from the will of the demos.[730] While the citizens of a state might agree to 'give up' their right to exclude as part of an agreement to join an institution like the EU, those same citizens may later decide to leave that institution and thus 'retain' the right. And indeed, the citizens of a state might be persuaded to not exercise the right, opting instead for an open or more open borders policy in their state. That said, at the bottom the right can never fully be given up since right-making, law, and legitimacy ultimately resides with the will of the demos on this account and within the jurisdiction presided over by the demos and in which the demos resides. There is, then, always a right to decide which resides with the demos. Given, then, the ineliminability of the right to decide – absent a greater power able to enforce its non-exercise by constraining and effectively eliminating a state's sovereignty – establishing free movement should be conceived as agreements between and among the citizens of states, beginning with the domestic democratic case and moving through dialogue outward.

Concerns over feasibility further point towards the necessity of an internationalist framework for any case for more free movement. David Miller discusses this feasibility concern, an issue he claims the case for open borders under-appreciates: if other states keep their borders somewhat closed, then there is a potential problem of 'flooding' if only one or a few wealthy states had open borders. Such flooding would likely lead to a high burden on the infrastructure of even a particularly wealthy state and conflict and competition with the locals, leading to an unattractive result. A strong argument for why this would not occur would need to be made by objectors. The question for free movement advocates is then how, realistically, to get people to agree to such an arrangement and how to avoid harming the interests of the citizens of such states (particularly vulnerable

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[730] It is tempting to say 'for the most part' for reasons outlined above: domination that itself rules out popular sovereignty is self-defeating because it undermines the principle of personal independence and thus the purpose of the state. For similar thoughts, see Bruno Leipold, Karma Nabulsi, and Stuart White, *Radical Republicanism: Recovering the Tradition's Popular Heritage* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 3–4. However, since an aspect of the problem with political domination is that it contradicts the personal independence necessary for popular sovereignty in the first place – i.e., that there *is* something that can be called the will of the demos – I opt for the more definitive phrasing above.

people who, not without reason, fear competition over jobs and living space, amongst other things). Part of the way to avoid this problem is to frame the case in internationalist terms. By framing the case for free movement as based upon agreements between states, the problem of flooding can be absorbed. This also makes a case for free movement compatible with the right to decide.

8.3.2 Audience and Group

Political realism and by extension internalism make vivid the importance of the relation between a writer, their audience and, when perhaps these differ, the groups the writer is concerned with. Geuss, for example, makes as a central pillar of his political realism the aim of analysing political reality to provide a map that can aid groups in their political struggles. Williams also articulates a similar idea.[731] For Williams, political philosophy should aim to have as its audience the general public, but often it is written 'to address itself to the attention of someone who has *power*, who could enact what the writer urges on him'.[732] For Williams, the problem with this approach is that it fails to make much sense to a generally unempowered audience and ends up displacing the reality of political life.[733] These concerns match those internalism brings to the fore in its emphasis on a mode of argument and reasoning based on prospective appeal to the likely S or S'.

However, while Williams, Geuss, and other realists agree that it is important to consider the recipient of a political theory, it raises tricky and important questions about the relation of the theorist to their audience, the groups they write for, and their object of study – particularly when the theorist aims at producing action-guiding theory. Turning to Williams, for instance, one might question whether a political philosophy really should have as its aim the general public when that public itself is stratified and organised into groupings in tension with each other. It is possible that writing in a general way may depend upon accepting ideas and ideals which themselves contribute to the disempowerment of a group. If one pictures society with tensions and competing interests between and within groups – perhaps pictured as divided into classes with competing interests – then at first glance it appears there is a risk of presuming and reproducing the kind of idealised moral and political consensus political realists have worked to unravel which may favour the interests of one group over another. Thus, there are questions like: which audience to write for? presuming it is unavoidable as internalism suggests,

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[731] The distinction lies in to whom the text is addressed (the listener) and who is expected to read it (the audience). See Williams, *In the Beginning Was the Deed*, 56.
[732] Williams, 57.
[733] Williams, 58–59.

which interests to favour? how should one go about deciding all this? and just what is the theorist's position in all this, particularly when the theorist is a part of or apart from the group(s) they write for and about?

One part of what underpins these questions is a concern about arbitrariness: that the choice is rooted in little more than the writer's preference and so theory becomes merely an exercise in partisanship. There is a similar issue reflected in a long running debate in the sciences (natural and social) over the issue of values and theory. The idea is that each person engaged in a scientific endeavour brings their own set of values and beliefs that may bias the overall endeavour in various ways. Feminist philosophers of science and feminist theorists in the social sciences and those who emphasise interpretivist methods have long been aware of the significance of prior values and beliefs and dominant values and beliefs in scholarly endeavour and some claim it is unavoidable and not necessarily a bad thing so long as we are aware of it and respond appropriately. At a minimum, this affects the choice of what to study. The issue is the way bias functions create distorting structures and serves some interests over others. For example, within the ethics of immigration several theorists have pointed out that this is an issue when it comes to the focus on citizens and migrants. Philip Cole points out that normative political philosophy approaches questions in the ethics of immigration from the perspective of a citizen viewing immigration as a problem to be solved. This has meant that the perspective of the migrant viewing citizenship as a problem has been overlooked. For Cole, this means theorists must radically rethink the assumptions from which political theory begins such as citizenship, the nation-state, and so on.[734]

The writings of Marx and Hegel provide some ideas that can contribute to illuminating the problem and both Marx and Hegel's thought supply ideas amenable to the version of political realism worked out here. Hegel's emphasis on context, for instance, is one and others have suggested Hegel's implicit understanding of how reasons work and what they are is a kind of internalism.[735] Similarly, Hegel's scepticism towards theory that 'aims to tell the world how it should be' and historicist conception of philosophy lends some credence to this view. Marx, as a successor of Hegel, his carrying through of (his understand of) Hegel's philosophical 'method' may also credibly be placed in this tradition.[736] Both thinkers emphasise context, and Marx in particular pays deep attention to the forces of interests and the competing aims amongst groups in society. Although Marx and

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[734] Cole, 'Beyond Reason'.

[735] See for example Kate Padgett Walsh, 'Reasons Internalism, Hegelian Resources', *The Journal of Value Inquiry* 44, no. 2 (1 June 2010) and; Allen W. Wood, *Hegel's Ethical Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 171. Not everyone agrees, for example Robert B. Pippin, 'Hegel, Ethical Reasons, Kantian Rejoinders', *Philosophical Topics* 19, no. 2 (1991): n. 8.

[736] Some political realists agree. See R. N. Berki, *On Political Realism* (London: Dent, 1981); Thom Brooks, 'Between Statism and Cosmopolitanism: Hegel and the Possibility of Global Justice', in *Hegel and Global Justice*, ed. Andrew Buchwalter, Studies in Global Justice (London: Springer, 2012); Enzo Rossi, 'Being Realistic and Demanding the Impossible', *Constellations* 26, no. 4 (2019); R. B. J. Walker, 'Realism, Change, and International Political Theory', *International Studies Quarterly* 31, no. 1 (1 March 1987).

Hegel thought very differently about the subject, the contribution to the problem outlined above stems from the notion of a 'universal class'. The universal class is the class whose interests or whose business is the interests of the whole society. For Hegel, this is the civil service. For Marx, taking Hegel's idea in a new direction, this was the industrial proletariat. Both dedicated a significant part of their work on the universal class.[737] Hegel placed an emphasis on his works as the basis for a general philosophical education that would serve as the organisational foundation for other branches of knowledge. The idea was that working through and grasping this foundation in combination with a general education in other fields, would produce well-rounded individuals in possession of *Bildung* – roughly, a self-cultivated virtue, culture, and knowledge – who would move on to a career in the civil service to effectively put their skills to use in the interests of all.[738]

It would be tempting to go all in on Marx or Hegel's solution, either by arguing for one position over the other or by taking the idea of a universal class and redeveloping it and then to answer the problem above by writing for and about the class representative of the interests of all (the theorist's own included). However, the notion of a universal class could be taken to imply that there is such a thing as 'real interests' some class embodies. It would not be a leap to infer that this implies externalism: that each person, whoever they are, has an interest that can be parsed through the universal class. They thus have a reason to support or follow along with the direction the interests that class points towards. Moreover, it remains to be established that there is a particular class that embodies or would have, in virtue of their structural position of a state (as with Hegel) with their occupation the interests of all. In Hegel's case, one may worry that it implies a technocratic conception of governance in tension with the internalist interpretation of the state above which has at its core a democratic ideal of popular sovereignty. However, it is also not necessarily the case that the idea is externalist.

In response to these worries, there is an internalist conception of virtue ethics (due to Jessica Moss and discussed in more detail below) which supplies a way of answering these worries without relying on externalism. Part of the response involves emphasising the political by understanding politics with Marx as partly a kind of struggle for control. The idea of political struggle implies that sides in a struggle have competing reasons and motivations.

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[737] M. W. Jackson, 'Bureaucracy in Hegel's Political Theory', *Administration & Society* 18, no. 2 (1 August 1986); Renzo Llorente, 'Marx's Concept of "Universal Class": A Rehabilitation', *Science & Society* 77, no. 4 (2013).
[738] Terry Pinkard, *Hegel: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 16, 537, 605.

This idea of political struggle can be read into the structure of Moss's Humean Aristotelianism. Moss argues that some individuals, in virtue of their upbringing and experiences, have an inclination towards an implicit conception of the good that is more likely to lead them to flourishing, which itself is the embodiment and behaviour of virtue. However, others, in virtue of their circumstances may not have this conception. They are not necessarily fated to flounder in their effort to flourish, but the internal structure of reasons for the virtuous individual and for the individual who lacks this implicit conception of good will be different. The virtuous person may be able to give advice to those who lack it, but there is no guarantee this will succeed since much of the socialisation process that instils direction and shape to one's life is non-rational and so they may not be capable of being moved in the direction virtue requires. Building on Moss's idea, we can infer that to really give this direction to others the conditions of socialisation enabling flourishing would need to be created. Thus, virtue and flourishing become political topics because we can now envisage a struggle for control over the conditions required for flourishing which, for Moss's Aristotle, includes material circumstances as well as the process of socialisation, which are inter-linked.[739]

To bring this back to the question of universal class and the choice of audience and group, the characteristics that a group possesses – those which, up until now we have understood as those that further the interests of all – can be construed as characteristics that would create the conditions for greater flourishing. Rather than relying on the notion of giving external reasons to all, the selection of group would amount to reasoning about and choosing sides in the political push and pull of a struggle over the conditions of motivational production: the production of the capacity to flourish. This is not a new idea in political theory. Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Adam Smith, Hegel, Marx and many others all expressed an interest and concern with the relation between social and environmental conditions, the production of members of society, and the way the latter in turn reproduce society for better or worse. Thus, one option in the question of selection and group is to view the problem as one of backing a side that the theorist has concluded will improve society. Another, more specific question, is which group to support and why.

The Marxist answer to this question is usually the working class. However, assuming this is right, this itself has some more difficulties. For example, there have been tensions between workers and migrants. Marx briefly considers this issue in relation to Ireland, noting that Irish migrant workers had been used to create

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[739] Moss, *Aristotle on the Apparent Good*.

tensions with local workers to both group's detriment, matching the way labour reserves put pressure on employed labour to the detriment of both parties and to the benefit of employers. Currently, there is also a general and widespread belief that migrants undercut the wages and interests of local workers, particularly in low-wage and low-skilled jobs.[740] Meanwhile, some portions of migrants and those who have not yet arrived are left in fairly awful conditions. Thus, in many cases and as a quick glance at the media over the last few years should tell anyone, there are tensions between these two groups. Favouring any one group seems to leave the writer lop-sided: elevating their support for one group leaves them yanked down by the plight of the other. The Hegelian answer faces difficulties in non-ideal circumstances as well. As Bob Jessop argues, even civil servants and groups within the civil service pursue their own agendas, agendas which do not necessarily work for the good of all.[741] One way of trying to sort through this problem is to follow the path of Marxist writers: to look for joint interests that might resolve the tension by looking to the conditions that produce the opposition in the first place.[742] Another problem stems from the notion of there being any such thing as a universal class. Non-domination, however, could provide a way of meeting it.

As argued above, the internalist theory I have outlined can support a kind of Rousseauian theory of the state. Each person has an interest in enacting their own projects which supplies the shape and structure to the reasons they could have. Each therefore has an interest in some degree of personal independence. Each person's interest in personal independence amounts to the claim that each person has an interest in freedom as non-domination. It would then seem that the choice of selection would be a group with an interest in or who could be brought to having an interest in establishing a general state of non-domination. The step to be taken would be to focus on identifying dominated groups who, in the process of working toward the goal of non-domination, would establish the conditions of their own emancipation and thus for the view taken here non-domination.[743] Non-domination is in the interest of the dominated. However, it is not immediately obvious, nor does it necessarily follow, that those who are dominated have as part of their interests a goal of non-domination for others. The only interest that does follow is establishing the conditions of their own non-domination and there is no guarantee that a previously dominated group, perhaps winning after gaining power, does not become part

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[740] Stephen Castles, 'International Migration at a Crossroads', *Citizenship Studies* 18, no. 2 (17 February 2014).
[741] Bob Jessop, *The State: Past, Present, Future* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 84–86.
[742] See, for example, Pietro Basso, 'Marx on Migration and the Industrial Reserve Army: Not to Be Misused!', in *Rethinking Alternatives with Marx: Economy, Ecology and Migration*, ed. Marcello Musto, Marx, Engels, and Marxisms (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021).
[743] Asad Haider, 'Emancipation, Political, and Real', in *Domination and Emancipation: Remaking Critique*, ed. Luc Boltanski and Nancy Fraser (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2021).

of the source of domination for another group. As implied by Cole's observation, this concern frequently underpins some stances within the ethics of immigration.

Given the state-focused theory defended above and the emphasis on popular sovereignty, citizenship is important for an internalist political theory. This, along with the goal of establishing non-domination, means that for reasons outlined above it can only be citizens – those within a state – who could be the appropriate bearers of this goal. This is not to say that pressure, publication, and dialogue with and by migrants and migrant advocacy groups is not worthwhile or should be abandoned: it is quite clearly an important element in policy debate and formation. It is to say, however, that the main focus and vehicle for effective theory should be within the category of an appeal to them. The classic bias mentioned by Cole in political theory towards focusing on writing from the standpoint of and for citizens has some theoretical justification in the framework laid out here although, to reiterate, it need not exclude – and requires for a fuller picture – the standpoint of migrants.

This still leaves the problem of (at least perceived) conflicts of interests. As mentioned before, focus on and writing for and with the perspective of groups of citizens undergoing domination does not necessarily amount to their having an interest in the freedom of others. As suggested above, this problem can partly be resolved by bringing in insights from virtue ethics. In establishing the conditions of flourishing and thus virtue, citizens can and will become interested in establishing the conditions that reproduce virtue which itself involves, as I shall argue, a concern with the situation of others. In what follows, I outline a conception of virtue ethics compatible with internalism.

8.3.3 Internalism and Virtue

In this vein, I outline a specific version of Aristotelian theory of virtues called 'practical induction'.[744] Jessica Moss distinguishes between a Humean interpretation of Aristotle and a Kantian mirroring internalist and externalist interpretations of virtue theory.

Aristotelian externalists have presented their position as an alternative to Williams's reasons internalism They usually rely on a functionalist account of human nature or characteristic human activities that supply an independent account of what it is for humans to flourish. From this account, they derive reasons which are in principle be independent of some particular individuals' motivation. Some versions also refer to the roles

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[744] Millgram, *Ethics Done Right*; Moss, *Aristotle on the Apparent Good*.

one occupies or identities one has as supplying reasons independent of motivations such that the goal of being a good X supplies further and more specific reasons for action independent of motivation.[745] Another, often in combination with the above, refers to the ethical role of habituation and education in the formation of moral agency. Reasons derived from the functional account of human nature or, for some others, independent norms of cooperation then play a corrective role for others: to teach or habituate them into virtue.[746] The function of such reasons is not to connect with pre-existing motivations, but to condition and form the correct ones in others. These strategies aim at supplying what Jessica Moss terms an intellectualist account of the good at which agents should aim,[747] which implies that they understand the good as something that can be rationally discerned through reasoning about the good and which implies an externalist account of the good.

Aristotelian internalism differs by defending a Humean interpretation of Aristotle. Moss, for instance, argues a (quasi-)Humeanised version of Aristotle is in fact both the correct interpretation of Aristotle and an independently attractive view. Pertinent to this discussion is that Moss cites Williams's account of reasons internalism as a version of what she would call the Aristotelian theory of practical reasoning.[748] She argues that what underpins Aristotle's theory is a theory she calls practical induction.[749] The theory of practical induction which Moss attributes to Aristotle is the view that every agent aims at the apparent good – what appears good to them – while virtuous agents aim at what is really good.[750] Agents form a sense for the good through pleasurable experiences. What is good is what is really pleasurable. This is not to be confused with the view that the good aims at pleasure. Agents can aim at things other than pleasure (and will if they are virtuous) and aiming at pleasure can be a vice. Pleasure instead inductively forms the agent's view of what is good by acting as a kind of indicator of the good. So, the experience of drinking water when thirsty is pleasurable for the agent and disagreeable when they've already had plenty to drink and so drinking water when thirsty comes to be seen as a good thing to do.

Through this inductive process, agents gain a general sense of what is valuable to them and thus begins to form their character, goals, and thus their implicit conception of and orientation towards the good. Agents habituated well will develop good character and virtue and because of this pursue goals conducive to flourishing,

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[745] Following some Kantians like Korsgaard – Humean Aristotelians tend to describe the intellectualised versions as Kantian Aristotelians. Moss, *Aristotle on the Apparent Good*.

[746] Which are equivalent, for Wong, to an independent account of morality. See David B. Wong, 'Moral Reasons: Internal and External', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 72, no. 3 (2006); Wong, 'Emotion and the Cognition of Reasons in Moral Motivation'.

[747] Moss, *Aristotle on the Apparent Good*.

[748] Moss.

[749] Also elaborated and defended in Millgram, *Ethics Done Right*.

[750] This view is another way of expressing motivational judgement internalism, defended in chapter three.

which amounts to the aim of 'doing the right thing'. Agents habituated badly will have bad goals, aiming only at an apparent good. These goals are the starting points – in other words, the premises – from which practical reasoning begins. While they can be grasped by the intellect – and thus can be brought before the mind, conceptualised as ends, and so be reasoned with – the intellect does not modify or supply the goal. The role of the intellect is instead to grasp what the goal requires and what success in the goal looks like in a particular instant. Which, for the fully virtuous person – as opposed to the naturally or partially virtuous person, who aims at doing the right thing, but may not always hit it due to a lack of *phronesis* – is hitting the mean precisely: not too much, not too little, but exactly right.[751] Thus, something non-rational supplies the goal: namely, an individual's character produced as a result of habituation and natural inclination. In Williams's terminology, this is expressed in and expressive of the agent's S.

One apparent issue with coupling this version of virtue ethics with internalism stems from Moss's claim that practical induction differs from some the Humean picture of practical reasoning in a couple of ways. The first is a non-issue for reasons internalism. The difference Moss highlights is that, while both views are in agreement that reason does not set the end, practical induction allows for a kind of constitutive reasoning which is not simply means-end reasoning. This is not an issue for internalism because, as we have seen, Williams himself corrects the sub-Humean view by defending constitutive reasoning. Moss even cites Williams's theory as an instance. The second issue is on the surface more problematic, although Moss's reasoning behind the distinction is unclear.

Moss's somewhat ambiguous claim is that when it comes to the virtuous agent there is a sense in which the passions are a slave to reason rather than vice-versa as (arguably) Hume and (some) Humeans seem to have it. Moss locates the difference in an apparent consequence of Humean theory that the Humean agent simply chooses whatever action will best achieve their immediate desires while the Aristotelian virtuous agent must figure out which action has virtuous properties prior to action and so they must engage in a form of reasoning and selection amongst their passions, in other words, amongst their immediate desires. There are a couple of ways to interpret Moss's claim.

One way to make sense of Moss's claim is to understand it as expressing a contrast with the sub-Humean model of reasoning, in which the agent chooses whichever action has the properties that satisfy their

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[751] Moss, *Aristotle on the Apparent Good*.

immediate desires and a model of reasoning in which the virtuous agent chooses actions based on its virtuous properties. In the latter case, the virtuous agent might have to suppress some immediate desires in service of their overall goal of doing the right thing by reasoning about which actions would best serve it. In this case, since 'doing the right thing' is expressed in terms of the desires of the virtuous agent, as Moss highlights, this model does not show itself to be incompatible with reasons internalism. Understood this way, reason makes passion its slave in the sense that it suppresses passions that might direct the agent away from virtuous action, even if reason still plays a role subservient to the overarching goal of doing the right thing. This allows for a reading of practical induction that is compatible with reasons internalism, and contrasting the Aristotelian account with the sub-Humean model reveals that although in the latter the agent might reason in the sense of selecting among the actions for properties that would best satisfy their immediate desires, reason's mediating role in this case does not necessarily subdue any particular desire but figures out how best to satisfy desire.

There is another issue, however, in that the virtuous agent is supposed not even to feel or to desire the pull of something other than what is right: feeling and desiring the right things as well as desiring to do what is right and being successful in these endeavours is what constitutes the fully virtuous agent.[752] The issue this raises is that the above interpretation of Moss's distancing of Aristotelianism from the Humeanism involves the virtuous agent's having more immediate desires that seem to detract away from their goal of doing what is right but which are controlled for through reason in the service of the overall goal. Internalism allows this and it may be the case for imperfectly virtuous agents, but the conception of a fully virtuous agent given by Moss seems to exclude it: the fully virtuous agent doesn't even feel the pull of a desire toward non-virtuous actions and need not control for this through reason because they don't have these desires in the first place. This suggests that Moss has something else in mind when she claims that there is a sense in which the virtuous agent does make passion a slave to reason in a way not present in (some kinds of) Humeanism.

Fortunately, Moss clarifies what she means in a later essay. The virtuous person aims at the intermediate between extremes: this intermediate is exactly the right amount between two opposite excesses. Moss explains that the mean, the intermediate, is exactly the right amount and requires a great deal of precision on the part of the agent. The fully virtuous agent like the naturally virtuous agent both constitutively aim at doing the right thing. The difference between the fully virtuous agent and the naturally virtuous agent is that

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[752] As Moss puts it: 'To be virtuous is to be disposed to feel the right passions and do the right actions.' Moss, 216.

the former is also *phronimos*: an expert in practical reasoning and judgement who possesses the corresponding virtue, *phronesis*. Because of this, the naturally virtuous agent while aiming to do the right thing may go awry and choose an action that ends up undermining their goal because of their lack of *phronesis*. *Phronesis* is a quality of reason and intellectual in that regard. It allows the fully virtuous agent to figure out or to know which actions hit the mean and which do not, unlike the naturally virtuous agent.[753] Moss claims it is this function of *phronesis* in the fully virtuous agent that shows, for them at least, that reason can be a master of passion. Moss describes this idea as follows:

> A Humean nonrational part obeys reason only in the minimal way that someone obeys another when she says "I want x but I don't know how to get it; therefore I will heed the advice of my clever servant." But an Aristotelian virtuous person's nonrational part is different. It is well habituated and so wants the fine and the intermediate, but it also knows that this means waiting to hear what reason prescribes. Thus it obeys reason in the much more substantive way that someone obeys another when she says "I want F things, but I don't know what kinds of things are really F, and so I don't know if I want x or y or z; therefore I will defer to the counsel of my wise parent, friend, or teacher."[754]

The difference appears to be in the idea that immediate passion, on the Humean picture, tells the agent directly what to aim at. They know that they want F, which passion immediately labels as x, and so they only need to figure out which action will lead to x. In contrast, while the Aristotelian agent knows what they want in a general sense that they want to perform actions of a certain kind, the Aristotelian reasoner does not, without the aid of reason, yet know which among a set of available actions are actions of this kind. In this way, there is a sense in which reason aids the Aristotelian reasoner in figuring out what, specifically, they should want in light of their overall want.

On this picture, reason does not control passion in the sense that it directs the agent away from passions that deflect from the overall desire to do what is right. Rather, given this general desire, it aids the reasoner in establishing what, given this goal, they should do towards this goal and so tells the reasoner what it

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[753] Moss, *Aristotle on the Apparent Good*.
[754] Moss, 238–39.

is that they want to do. It is not that, for a fairly virtuous agent, reason plays a mediating role between overall desire by controlling immediate desires. Rather, it tells the agent what, specifically – and given the overarching desire for fine things or doing what is right – the reasoner should do so by establishing which amongst a range of actions has virtuous properties. The picture Moss gives of Aristotelian reasoning in contrast with the Humean picture is compatible with reasons internalism because it does not deny that the agent's character determines what can be a reason for them: their reasons are still ultimately a product of their character. What it establishes is, given an agent's character and overall aims, there is still space for reasoning not just in figuring out which actions satisfy a want or what exactly the want is in the first place, but also for aiding an agent in figuring out what to want in a specific sense given a more general want.

Given that practical induction posits the existence of fully virtuous agents (at least ideally), can the theory still be internalist in terms of reasons? The issue that I have in mind is that one might claim on the side of externalism that although the goal of even the virtuous agent is a product of their character – that their overarching desire to do the right thing is non-rationally given, that one cannot grasp exactly what *eudaimonia* is through a rational process but only through a non-rational process of habituation[755] – virtuous agents can dictate external reasons to others that they may justifiably impose on other agents in their own interests.[756]

In response, while it may be the case that virtuous agents might give reasons and advice to others, this does not establish externalism about reasons. The option of legitimate coercion, on the other hand, for instance by those who 'really' know what is best. However, that an agent might legitimately be coerced requires a different kind of argument than saying they have a reason to do it. They do not have a reason since they cannot act for the specific reason that is offered. Instead, they act for the reason that they do not want to be whipped, arrested, shouted at, and so on. Acting for these reasons *is* compatible with internalism. What is needed is not an argument for why they had a reason to do it anyway, but an argument for why coercion is legitimate. That is, a reason for the coercing agents to do the coercing. This, then, is a separate issue from reasons internalism. Furthermore, a response can be gleaned through the Rousseauian conception of legitimacy and the general will,

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[755] Moss writes: 'We all by nature aim at one highest good, and all agree on calling it happiness (eudaimonia), but different people have different views about what happiness is. Most people think it is "something obvious and manifest, like pleasure or wealth or honor"; only the few and refined know that it is the life of virtuous activity or of contemplation.' Moss, 155, quoting Aristotle. Those who know what eudaimonia is, the life of virtuous activity, can only know this as a result of non-rational processes. This is a central thesis of Moss's book. See, in particular, Moss, 178–79. Moss explains how one's view of happiness is a result of one's character, itself a product of habituation and upbringing.
[756] See John McDowell, 'Virtue and Reason', *The Monist* 62, no. 3 (1979); John McDowell, 'Might There Be External Reasons?', in *World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams*, ed. J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Alan Thomas, 'Internal Reasons and Contractualist Impartiality', *Utilitas* 14, no. 2 (July 2002).

discussed above: a project respecting, to a sufficient degree – and something I believe a virtuous agent must do – personal independence and that perhaps aims at improving upon it may provide ground for doing so.

8.3.4 Virtue and Concern for Others

How, then, does this internalist conception of virtue help explain the development of concern for others? The virtues are human qualities acquired through upbringing and immersion in practices that, once acquired, function as habits do.[757] Their possession and proper exercise often depends on the possession of the other virtues, encapsulated by *phronesis*.[758] That virtues function like habits is significant because it points towards a kind of spill-over effect from the possession of the virtues, in that their exercise necessarily occurs across contexts, so must be modified to suit the contexts through *phronesis*. This means the exercise and possession of the virtues entails no calculation on the part of the actor in terms of asking whether this or that action will benefit the actor.

Of particular importance here is the virtue of *misericordia*. *Misericordia*, sometimes misleadingly translated as 'pity' and sometimes as 'mercy', features prominently in the work of St Thomas Aquinas, but perhaps the figure who has done most to repopularise the notion is Alasdair MacIntyre who, with the qualifications mentioned in chapter 7, outlines an attractive answer to the above question.[759] Aquinas follows Augustine who defines *misericordia* as 'heartfelt compassion towards another's misery, a compassion which drives us to do what we can to help him'.[760] It contains two elements: a feeling, compassion towards another's suffering; and an accompanying action to relieve the other's suffering, distinguishing *misericordia* from mere sentiment.[761] When we possess *misericordia*, we feel compassion towards those in need, and we act as we can to alleviate that need. *Misericordia* could include giving aid to the hungry, rescuing someone in danger, or providing shelter to someone in need when each of these acts can be reasonably thought to achieve the goal of remedying another's plight without needlessly placing oneself at risk.[762] With *misericordia*, 'those who possess

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[757] Alasdair MacIntyre, *The Tasks of Philosophy, Volume 1: Selected Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 3.

[758] MacIntyre, 3–4; Robert C. Miner, 'The Difficulties of Mercy: Reading Thomas Aquinas on Misericordia', *Studies in Christian Ethics* 28, no. 1 (1 February 2015): 78–79.

[759] Alasdair MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues* (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 1999), 123–24; Thomas Ryan, 'Aquinas on Compassion: Has He Something to Offer Today?', *Irish Theological Quarterly* 75, no. 2 (1 May 2010): 159.

[760] Augustine quoted by St Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae, IIa-IIae*, trans. R. J. Batten, vol. 34 (1265–1274; repr., Oxford: Blackfriars, 1975), 30.1.

[761] Miner, 'The Difficulties of Mercy', 74–75, 78–79.

[762] Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae, IIa-IIae*, 34: 32.3, 32.6, 32.9; Miner, 'The Difficulties of Mercy', 78–82.

it are not only disposed to find someone's need in such circumstances a sufficient reason for going to her or his aid, but will be unable to conceive of such a reason as requiring or being open to further justification'.[763]

MacIntyre provides a useful example of *misericordia* by way of New England fishing crews. These people

> discover that their lives and livelihood now depend on other people … and that those other people depend on them not only to do their work well … but also expect them to be prepared to risk their lives on occasion to save other crew members. Moreover, although fishing boats are always competing with each other, everyone knows that if another boat is in danger, you have to go to its aid, if at all possible. So in the life of a fishing crew common goods … are achieved only through the exercise of the virtues, such as the courage and endurance of risk-taking, and the virtues of acknowledged dependence.[764]

Misericordia plays a central role here. The members of the crews respond to one another's needs and to those of rival fishing crews possibly in danger. They recognise that they depend on each other to have their needs met and to acquire the common and individual goods of fishing. In recognising that their good and well-being is dependent on the good and well-being of the other crew members, they begin to acquire the virtue of *misericordia*. In responding to the needs of rival crews, they demonstrate that they have acquired the virtue by the spill-over effect mentioned earlier. But in responding to their rivals' needs, they also benefit the practice of fishing overall by upholding norms the crew might benefit from in the future, even though they might not require it. Here we can see how *misericordia* meets the conditions for it to be a virtue: it is itself a common good internal to the practice; it enables the practitioners to acquire common and individual goods; each individual may benefit from the virtue; and it maintains the attitudes required to be a successful fishing crew, as well as the practice of fishing in New England.

Although a fishing community in New England is a rather idiosyncratic example, it shows how *misericordia* supports much of what is important to people such as raising a family, life in a community, and schooling – practically any project (and so practically all projects) that involve and depend on others for their

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[763] MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, 158.
[764] Alasdair MacIntyre, 'How Aristotelianism Can Become Revolutionary: Ethics, Resistance, and Utopia', in *Virtue and Politics: Alasdair MacIntyre's Revolutionary Aristotelianism*, ed. Paul Blackledge and Kelvin Knight (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011), 18.

success. Its absence in these contexts will likely undermine the success off the project or practice. In any community, there will be people who require support because they are injured or ill, young or old, and this will at some point be the state of any member of that community. The absence of people willing to respond emotionally and practically to others' needs will seriously undermine the quality of the overall practice or community. But because any particular individual may not – in the context of some practice – actually become needy, the quality of the virtue should be exercised in a general and generic way, and more or less without calculation (outside of judging whether a particular course of action is the best way to alleviate another's need). Thus, so long as vulnerability and dependence are pervasive features of human life, *misericordia* is a necessary component of human flourishing.

Misericordia would thus function through its spill-over effect after being acquired in the relevant practices as a recognition and response to the neediness and vulnerability of others and as a recognition of the potential for oneself to be likewise needy and vulnerable. This is entailed by one of the central components of *misericordia*, a recognition that, *that could be me,* which 'extends beyond communal obligations.'[765] The general habitual nature of virtues like *misericordia* in combination with justice and the other virtues, skill in practical judgement – which for reasons which should be clear would likely lead to maintaining and establishing the conditions for the production of virtue – show how concerns for others can be made sense of from within an internalist framework.

8.4 Conclusion

Reasons internalism reframes the central discussions in political theory and political ethics by placing boundaries around the limits of what political theory can and should aim to do. However, in doing so it points towards a more realistic political theory and thus opens up clearer lines of what is politically possible and thus how a progressive political programme could develop. My aim in this chapter is to build on the ground-clearing exercise of the previous chapters to make the case for a specifically internalist political theory and to think through the framework normative framework in places around progressive arguments in the ethics of immigration. I have thus attempted to work out and partly demonstrate a fairly general-level argument for how at least the normative side of the argument could be made from within this framework.

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[765] MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, 124.

I have argued that a case for free movement must be done so with the background acceptance of a democratic right to decide due to the importance self-determination and popular sovereignty will have within a political theory that takes internalism seriously, which means people could decide in favour of closure – but not necessarily so and which would be open to criticism. On the other hand, a progressive case for free movement need not be hamstrung by the cosmopolitan justification requirement: should sufficient people be convinced democratically that free or freer movement is attractive then that some people oppose it, so long as they have room to express their opposition and retain a sufficient degree of personal independence then the opening of state borders is legitimate. For the similar reasons, free movement would likely have to be built in an internationalist manner, as series of agreements between states and unilateral decisions to open borders. However, the argument from virtues suggests that perhaps the most important focus for advocates of a freer world should not just be the situation beyond the borders of a state, but instead begins domestically with the cultivation of virtue and the conditions for flourishing which in turn both are and create the conditions for a freer world.

Conclusion: Outline of a Realist Case for Free Movement

I began the thesis with three questions: (1) how should one approach the ethics of immigration? (2) how should practical normativity be understood? and (3) how could reasons internalism inform political ethics and the problem of first-admissions?

My answer to (1) is partly that a deep source of divergence between different positions in the ethics of immigration lies in their background understanding of normativity. Specifically, I have argued that this difference is over the status of agent-neutrality. Cosmopolitan views have the generation of agent-neutral reasons as a constitutive feature of their approach to political ethics and thus the denial of the relevance of special-relationships giving agent-relative reasons. Non-cosmopolitan views tend, in various ways, to give special-relationships and agent-relative reasons prominence in their approach. Thus, I turned to the question of how exactly to understand practical normativity to develop a position on this key issue leading to the second question.

My answer to (2) partly involved defending a Humean theory of normativity and then more specifically Bernard Williams's reasons internalism. I argued that Williams's theory is more robust than its critics have allowed, being able to withstand the Too Few and Too Many Reasons objections, as well as four other kinds of objections: two versions of the view that Williams's distinction between internal and external reasons does not hold up to scrutiny; the view that Williams accepts a problematic 'identity thesis'; and the view that Williams's theory relies on an objectionable theory called psychologism, unable to make sense of the reference of reasons to facts about the world.

The defence of Williams's reasons internalism then lead to the third and final question which, in answering, rounds out my answer to (1) and (2). In chapter six, I argued that a Humean theory of practical reasoning (and thus practical normativity) is best understood in the form of reasons internalism and, moreover, that Mark Schroeder's rival theory should be ruled out. This has the result that if internalism is right – and unlike what would be the case if Schroeder's theory held – agent-neutral reasons are hard to come by. I then turned in chapter seven to argue that reasons internalism requires a different approach to political ethics than cosmopolitanism since internalism reveals something wrong with the cosmopolitan approach to ethics. I argue

that a very similar problem underpins Rawlsian statism so neither can this approach be the basis of political ethics from the internalist point of view. In making the arguments in chapter six and seven, I further flesh out what reasons internalism entails in terms of normativity. Thus, the understanding of practical normativity entailed by reasons internalism provides one way of ruling out approaches to the ethics of immigration and thus supplies part of the answer to (3): internalism leads to a view sceptical of cosmopolitan approaches.

In chapter eight, I further answered (3) by fleshing out an approach to political ethics that takes internalism seriously and draw out some conclusions relevant to the problem of first-admissions: a progressive case for free movement should be made in internationalist terms; centres on the notion freedom and non-domination; and begins with creating the conditions for flourishing and virtuous behaviour domestically. An internalist political theory need not undermine the case for free movement. This dissertation has thus developed a novel approach to political ethics that takes internalism seriously. The approach is politically realistic, rejecting and revealing what is wrong with cosmopolitan approaches to political ethics and contains freedom and popular sovereignty at its core. This approach allows a reframing of the debate within the ethics of immigration, opening up a different and more fruitful set of problems and questions than those that have occupied the debate so far.

I conclude by outlining a why it is worthwhile to pursue an argument for free movement within the internalist-realist framework I have been describing and supply five guiding principles for the construction of such an argument. I begin by presenting a prima-facie case for why free movement is attractive (supplementing the assumption underpinning chapter eight and with the acknowledgement that much more needs to be said about it) and suggest how it could be aligned with the internalist framework I have defended. I then sketch an outline of the shape an internalist case for more free movement would look like. As such, it blocks in the broad details and areas of focus and so and each area is no doubt in need of further development – but the aim is to indicate what I believe is an attractive direction for future work given what I have argued in this dissertation. The outline supplies a kind of map for an internalist's case for free movement and is presented as a set of five guiding principles an internalist case for free movement should ideally follow. Granted, the framework supplied by the internalist political theory defended here need not be employed for the purposes of an argument for free movement. Free movement is, as I suggest below, an attractive goal for reasons independent of the framework supplied here. My aim is to show, from within that framework, how the case for such an ambitious project could be made possible.

Why Free Movement?

There is something attractive about the ideal of free movement suggesting the case for free movement should not be abandoned too quickly. Its attraction can be seen by exploring Kieran Oberman and Joseph Carens 'direct strategy' for a human right to immigrate. The direct strategy for a right to immigrate makes a case for a vital or essential interest that people possess that ought to be protected by a human right. Oberman argues that the essential interest that would be sufficient to ground the right lies in the significance that having access to the range of life options on offer globally and the ability to participate in political discussions and events the world over (although not necessarily voting abroad).[766] Carens also bases his account of essential interests in a similar appeal to the range of life options that would be open to individuals with a right to immigrate and, like Oberman, the interests we already have that may be stifled by the lack of the human right to immigrate. As we have seen, Carens includes reasons of love, work, religion, and cultural opportunities that may require the crossing of borders while educational opportunities could be added.[767] Shelving the issue of whether this is sufficient to ground a human right – moral or otherwise and both of which David Miller rejects[768] – what the direct strategy reveals is that there is something clearly attractive to the idea of being able to move freely across borders: it increases one's freedom.

This interest in increasing freedom can be made sense of and built upon from within internalism. Not only may many people have the kinds of direct interests for moving across borders, there is also a certain kind of productive indeterminacy in the world which means people have an interest in an open and thus freer future. This interest can be indicated from a view I outlined in chapter eight (section 8.3.3): the Aristotelian internalist view called practical induction. This was the view that as people experience the world and so long as other conditions (like a decent upbringing) they develop a sense of the good. Elijah Millgram has developed this into a view he calls experientialism.[769] Briefly, experientialism is the view that experience itself is valuable. We, as limited individuals, must try things out to discover if they work: I do not know if I like some cuisine, if it brings me pleasure and may form an important part of my interests and thus my S, if I do not first try the cuisine. Of course, this applies to more than just matters of taste: I cannot know if my worldview will change, if my ideas hold weight, if my understanding of the world will change unless I accumulate experience. Wants, needs, beliefs

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[766] Oberman, 'Immigration as a Human Right'.
[767] Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*.
[768] Miller, 'Is There a Human Right to Immigrate?'
[769] Millgram, *Ethics Done Right*.

and thus our unconscious and conscious ideas of what is good can grow and change as we experience more. The S is dynamic and capable of growth and change and the terrain of the S can only be discovered, illuminated, and mapped with the help of experience's torch – since merely thinking about what one's S is seems likely not to reveal anything more than what one already thinks about themselves. But the S can only be brightened and self-discovery achieved if the as yet unknown is available. It turns out that an interest in freedom may be one thing that both transcends and remains imminent to internalism by pointing to things that could be reasons for people but which could not be directly reasoned to except by reasons of self-discovery, which itself is a form of freedom.

Less abstractly, free movement could also function as a means of furthering the goal of non-domination by reducing the possibility of domination. Several scholars have argued that closed borders can be used to dominate both domestic workers and migrants – who, it should be added – are themselves potential or actual workers. Work by Reece Jones explores growing militarization of borders in the US and elsewhere, arguing that the view of migrants as enemies or criminals to be combated in the US stems from the employment of ex-military personnel on the US-Mexico border with an accompanying military-strategic logic prevailing amongst border control agents, reinforcing the view of migrants not as people in need of support, but as potential invaders, criminals, and enemies.[770] Thus, there is a transformation of the migrant from an object of compassion to an object of fear and contempt.

In the EU, Didier Bigo shows how border controls are constituted through different tasks at multiple locations, and each task is performed by different professions with particular skill sets and strategies.[771] For example, borders can be maintained in terms of 'internal security' and through 'global cyber-surveillance'.[772] The former refers to professionals whose task is to internally manage border controls by filtering out illegal immigrants.[773] The latter refers to the profiling of potential migrants and the management of population flows to the interests of European states through 'smart borders': forms of border control that prevent or allow individuals to move before they reach the physical border.[774] Whilst each entails its own logic and problems inherent to it (the former, arbitrary detention and expulsion, the latter, the problems inherent to abstract images of humans), Bigo points out that the overall trend in each of these 'universes' of border controls is toward

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[770] Jones, *Violent Borders*.
[771] Didier Bigo, 'The (in)Securitization Practices of the Three Universes of EU Border Control: Military/Navy – Border Guards/Police – Database Analysts', *Security Dialogue* 45, no. 3 (1 June 2014).
[772] Bigo, 211.
[773] Bigo, 213.
[774] Bigo, 216–20.

a 'politics of indifference', contributing toward the dehumanisation of migrants.[775] Each form of border control tends towards it in different ways, but global-cyber surveillance particularly emphasises the abstraction of the migrant and so prevents responding to real need. They are assimilated to a general group with certain features and barred from travel on the basis of what others in the group have done, rather than what they have done themselves.[776]

This transformation of migrants to objects of fear and contempt through the militarisation of border controls and its subsequent impact on the imaginary surrounding the figure of the migrant, speaks both to the domination of migrants – as, generally, dangerous, risky, and adversaries – and the domination of the border on the minds of domestic workers too: trapped by fear and vulnerable to predators. Border controls also differentiate between different categories of desirable and undesirable migrants, tending to be 'open for bona fide travellers among third-country nationals, "trusted" individuals who come frequently in order to do business or who are rich enough to be good consumers.'[777] This commodifies migrants and so 'attempts to treat them as no more than a disposable labour force.'[778] Moreover, as Leah Ypi and Ayelet Shachar have pointed out, migration and the opportunity to move is divided by class and wealth.[779] Wealthy individuals, those who least *need* to migrate, are those most able to move. Not only, then, does this form of domination negatively affect the interests of migrants, it also undermines an interest in personal independence via freedom from fear and insecurity. Undoing both these forms of domination seems to point to a mutual interest in confronting the ideological aspect of border controls through their militarisation.

Border controls are also premised on a particular conception of the way the world is: split and bound up into different territories, containing different populations, each with their own set of goods created or inherited from within these boundaries and which may need to be protected against outsiders. This emphasizes the resource scarcity and inequality of wealth that border controls are premised on. But resource scarcity is not always a reasonable assumption. For many key resources there does indeed seem to be enough to go around,

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[775] Bigo, 221.
[776] Bigo, 'The (in)Securitization Practices of the Three Universes of EU Border Control'.
[777] Bigo, 218.
[778] MacIntyre, 'How Aristotelianism Can Become Revolutionary: Ethics, Resistance, and Utopia', 17.
[779] Ayelet Shachar, 'Selecting by Merit: The Brave New World of Stratified Mobility', in *Migration in Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Ayelet Shachar, 'The Marketization of Citizenship in an Age of Restrictionism', *Ethics & International Affairs* 32, no. 1 (ed 2018); Lea Ypi, 'Borders of Class: Migration and Citizenship in the Capitalist State', *Ethics & International Affairs* 32, no. 2 (ed 2018).

and immigrants can contribute to their own costs and to the overall wealth of society.[780] This misplaced belief contributes to an over-emphasis on protecting what one has or the opportunities one perceives to be at risk from outsiders. Thus, in this sense, border controls conceptually stem from and reinforce the belief that there is not enough to go around and so also to *misericordia.*

Five Guidelines for an Internalist Case for Free Movement

1. The case for more free movement should be made on a democratic, internationalist basis.

As argued above, instead of the legalistic approach of political moralists, an internalist political theory has, as its core, a democratic sensibility. Respect for, and the primacy of, popular sovereignty is necessarily the base of the approach. As I have argued, not only does placing an emphasis on the importance of popular sovereignty and allowing this to be the background assumption of one's approach create the conditions of a more politically realistic argument – since it acknowledges the ultimate root of power and legitimacy lies with the demos – and thus must appeal to, rather than dictate to, people (a paternalistic attitude that often backfires when aimed at adults) – popular sovereignty and law rooted in the popular sovereignty is the chief means to resolve the coercion dilemma.

This emphasis has the result that the legs of an ambitious political project like the case for more free movement need not tied up from the beginning by a needlessly and perhaps impossibly demanding justification requirement at the centre of cosmopolitan political theory. Far from giving their arguments additional moral weight, the justification requirement stumbles over the tangled, turbulent, and sometimes tragic nature of the realities of ethical justification. Rather than move people, the cosmopolitan justification requirement can only function to made the theory appear removed from the concerns of the people meant to accept cosmopolitan proposals. Rather, an internalist case for free movement need only aim to convince enough people to support the proposal. And this proposal must then win in the democratic court of appeal, which, if successful, lends it the legitimacy required to go ahead with it, despite the likely outcome that such a proposal fails to sway everyone.

[780] David Laibman, *Deep History: A Study in Social Evolution and Human Potential* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, n.d.), 193–95; Legrain, *Immigrants*; Moses, *International Migration*; Sean Sayers, *Marx and Alienation: Essays on Hegelian Themes* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 60–64.

To be realistic and maintain the emphasis on popular sovereignty, the case for more free movement should be internationalist as well as democratically made. This, of course, may require cross borders communication between groups in favour or who could be convinced to support the movement. More importantly, however, it means the way the case for free movement is to be conceived as a series of agreements between states to an open or more open borders arrangement. Thus, on this conception, the case for more free movement should be understood strategically, as a series of iterative developments that steadily increases the capacity of people to move. This may involve difficult decisions in terms of which states to target such agreements initially.

It may involve the difficult act of balancing needs – of migrants, of locals – with feasibility in making the case and with possible conflict. While the issue of cultural and religious conflict between and amongst migrants and locals is less clear than the common-sense take on the matter (that some groups are incompatible, and it is simply ideology to blame for conflict), there is no doubt a risk that an increased rate of change to the circumstances of one's life, the sudden presence of significant numbers of individuals whose way of life does not necessarily cohere with local norms and customs runs the risk of stoking tensions between groups and cannot but be harmful to the case for more freedom of movement, as David Miller has argued. Indeed, a view of migrants as a threat to security or culture is one that appears regularly in liberal-democratic societies and others.[781] This very real risk of conflict and tension can partly be handled through the iterative internationalist process. The risk of tension between groups may be one of the criteria the theorist must consider in making their case for more free movement. It may mean that initially the theorist accepts the necessity of controlling the flow of migrants into a country, with the eventual aim that the need to control a flow is erased. Another element in considering the possibility of conflict is properly understanding the origins of such tensions.

2. The case for free movement should begin at home by focusing on the conditions productive of life, particularly as they pertain to the virtue of misericordia

It's clear to see how focus on and cultivation of *misericordia* could play a role in case for more free movement, as part of the overall case to be made for responding to the need of migrants. Theoretically, too, *misericordia* functions in a partly internalist way: people *misericordia* is a useful character trait for a society that supports the

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[781] Castles, 'International Migration at a Crossroads'.

needs of its members. However, there is a tendency in discussions of *misericordia* to emphasise the ideational sources of its absence or presence, making it look as though *misericordia* is purely a product of the will. For example, that which undermines *misericordia* have been broken down into three categories: factors that undermine compassion, factors that undermine the capacity to act, and factors that undermine the capacity to respond effectively to need. On the undermining of compassion, Aquinas highlighted two ways in which compassion may be undermined: through a belief in one's own strength (real or imagined) – like, 'that could never be me'; 'I would never have landed myself in that situation'; 'it is their own fault that they are in such a predicament' – or through an excess of weakness (real or imagined).[782]

Against this tendency towards pointing mainly to ideational factors as the source of undermining the development of *misericordia* – so that it looks as if the cultivation of *misericordia* depends on correcting beliefs – the compassion that underpins *misericordia* is natural and widespread human characteristic. The main source of its absence or lack is not primarily faulty ideational factors, but rather the product of material conditions that produce the ideational factors. Competition over jobs, scarcity of resources, inequality, the cost of living, insecure living conditions, a feeling of a lack of control over one's life – in short, insecurity – will be important. Material restrictions such as a lack of resources, and physical and logistical barriers are also mentioned and legal barriers and epistemological barriers like a false belief could also be added.

What this means is that one useful guiding thread in an internalist case for free movement, will be an exploration and focus on the conditions that produce *misericordia*. More particularly, the focus should be on the workers who are, or perceive themselves to be, most vulnerable to migration. It's these people who stand to lose most and these people who, not without sense. What this means, however, is that contra the recent trend in political theory – a turn towards the, no doubt important, circumstances and experiences of migrants – the internalist case for free movement must begin with considerably more focus directed to the home, or host nation. A more productive and effective focus for making a case for free movement needs to begin by focusing on the conditions that undermine *misericordia* and those that improve it, and contributing towards the latter. Thus, the case for free movement cannot begin and leave its focus primarily on migration, but instead should primarily focus on the conditions of domestic life, on increasing workers' control over their lives, and on understanding and resolving those conditions that produce insecurity. It seems a reasonable wager to expect

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[782] Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae, IIa-IIae*, 34: 30.2.

that as feelings of insecurity and lack of control are reduced, the conditions for the cultivation of *misericordia* are improved.[783]

3. The case for free movement should regard the effective description and framing of the complex whole of migration as being as important as the ethical argument

The third principle relates to the claim made in chapter 8 that an internalist political theory, as a branch political realism, should and will bring with it a focus on social scientific resources. It also reflects a tendency in the ethics of migration to focus primarily on moral argumentation rather than on a detailed and accurate description of the context of migration, the absence of a widespread understanding of which is an obstacle to reasoned debate on the matter. This absence, and a tendency to focus on anecdote and thought experiment, rather than on sociological literature ends up making the case for free movement appear divorced from reality.

The case for free movement must, for example, be based on an analysis and consideration of the capacity of states to host potentially more people – such as, for instance, an analysis of the capacity and attractiveness of building and supplying cheaper homes and reducing the cost of living. Indeed, if the focus of the case for free movement requires not just focusing on and promoting awareness of the conditions and experience of migration – although it clearly needs that too – it must also employ sociological, historical, and economic tools to apprehend the experience and interests of the life of workers and other relevant stakeholders, and work to resolve these seemingly more peripheral issues which, in fact, tend to be at the heart of the problem. Thus, the case for free movement must be made out of a fairly comprehensive understanding of migration theory and the domestic conditions of life and sources of tension and insecurity therein.

All this is information relevant to the case for free movement – such as to the cultivation of *misericordia*. The case for free movement must, obviously, focus getting the description and causation right and so supply a more accurate lens through which to view the issue. Information such as the above is largely absent from the public debate on migration. Exploration of existing research and theory, should be developed into a wider framework that allows individuals and groups to see more clearly the complex whole of migration, both on the

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[783] The aftermath of the Brexit vote lends some tentative support to this claim. After the vote, and with it the belief that the people had regained control over migration policy, fears over migration were significantly allayed. Attitudes towards migration in the UK then became significantly more positive and compare favourably with EU states. See Cassilde Schwartz et al., 'A Populist Paradox? How Brexit Softened Anti-Immigrant Attitudes', *British Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 3 (July 2021); Jamie Grierson and Pamela Duncan, 'Britons Most Positive in Europe on Benefits of Immigration', *The Guardian*, 2 May 2019, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/02/britons-more-sold-on-immigration-benefits-than-other-europeans.

side of migrants and those most likely to be affected by migration. It must be based in a plausible understanding of capacity and the problems that generate unfavourable sentiments towards more free movement and the operation and effects of migration more generally.

4. The case for free movement should involve critique of the dominant economic imaginary

In line with the third guiding principle, the fourth principle focuses on a getting the understanding of the political economy of migration right. A key source of tension between migrants and host-nation citizens, and contributing factor for anti-migrant sentiment, are tensions and contradictions between the groups within the labour market and the means of life. The internalist case for free movement, must then explore the origin and potential sources of resolution of these tensions. Getting the economic framing of migration right, too, cannot be ignored. The aim for the internalist case for free movement should be to undermine the inevitability of opposition between these groups.

As it so happens, it may be that the economic ideas that inform many of our world-views might be an important contributing factor to misunderstanding the nature and resolution of tensions between migrants and workers. Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), a theory of the economy growing in popularity that aims at modernising macroeconomic theory and the orientation towards austerity underpinning the dominant economic imaginary, suggests that there is no monetary limit on achieving full employment and inflation is rooted more in resources scarcity and inappropriate deployment of taxation than in increased social spending (to build, to create jobs).[784] While MMT has as the basis of the theory and as a normative ideal a monetarily sovereign state able to create money – and in the main presentations of the theory a consideration of the effects of migration on the economy tends not to be a primary focus – MMT opens up the prospect of rethinking the labour market and thus shifting how to understand the relation between migrants and domestic workers. MMT holds out the prospect that competition over jobs and underestimation of the capacity of sovereign states to produce and supply decent lives to its members is a product of outdated economic theory and poor government – rooted in austerity-based economics – rather than an inevitable economic law. It holds out the prospect that greater free movement is more a matter of political will and responsibility, than managing a process treated as

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[784] William Mitchell, L. Randall Wray, and Martin Watts, *Macroeconomics* (London: Springer Nature, 2019); Stephanie Kelton, *The Deficit Myth: Modern Monetary Theory and the Birth of the People's Economy* (London: Hachette UK, 2020).

an obscure natural law. MMT, or at least exploring the contours and options present in macroeconomic theory, is one area that holds out the prospect of an internalist case for free movement.

Furthermore, this involves rethinking and reorientating the way migrants are modelled in the popular economic imaginary. Much research has gone into questioning dominant, but poorly conceived, economic models of the migrant.[785] They show that rather than being a fixed drain on society, sucking up resources and taking what belongs to the citizens of the host nation – as many popular presentations of migration (particularly of the less well off) would have it – migrants should be understood in a dynamic sense: in movement. Migrants generally, when able to work, to start businesses, become net contributors to society creating wealth to cover their needs and can create further jobs to employ more people. The picture of migrants – here, it is refugees who are the target of such claims I have in mind – as a drain society is made true by bad politics rather than economic inevitability and is thus not outside of any control. In providing the opportunity for education, for furthering their own lives, for being productive members on society, migrants can improve their lot in life while also making a positive contribution to the societies of which they are now a part. This emphasis on creating the conditions of a productive contribution to society may also go some way to helping create the conditions alleviate tensions, manifest as tensions over values and religion, between and amongst migrants and locals that occur when groups and individuals are left immiserated and hopeless.

5. *The case for free movement should be made in terms of mutually increasing freedom*

The focus within this internalist theory on personal independence and the conditions needed to establish that and its accompanying ethic of non-domination means that the case for free movement should ultimately be made in terms of freedom. This will involve establishing how freedom can work to the joint interests of workers and migrants as a good common between them. Joseph Carens's approach is partly correct when he appeals to the values and interests of those in the host society and those of migrants and he is partly correct in his effort to argue for a goal meant to be in the joint interests of all. However, Carens's position ends up presenting a fairly abstracted and unrealistic harmonising ideal due to its rootedness in an overarching and abstract liberal morality. Instead, as indicated in the other principles, an internalist-realist political theory should work from a more detailed and accurate picture of what the interests and values of the host citizens are and work from there

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[785] See, for example, the overview provided in Jonathan Portes, 'The Economics of Migration', *Contexts* 18, no. 2 (1 May 2019).

to establish common interests. As argued in the final few chapters, the directional flow of current theory often operates in the wrong direction: from an abstracted morality to action; from a focus on the plight of migrants to the standards of right behaviour and institutional support meant to apply to citizens; and from each of these to the case for free movement. Instead, the flow should run from a real analysis of the situation of workers and migrants, their interests and values, and should then point to the interlinkages between them, if the case for free movement is ultimately to be successful.

To that end, a good place to start for the internalist-realist position would be on non-domination by drawing on observations about the way vulnerable workers and vulnerable migrants are subject to domination.[786] From there, the move would be to look to see if there are opportunities or formations what would reduce or eliminate the conditions of domination mutually for workers and migrants. The goal, therefore, is to work towards and search for conditions that would mutually benefit both workers and migrants. My claim is that in the goal of free movement, these conditions are there. This claim begins in the observation that, despite a tendency to obscure this fact by omitting it or glossing quickly over it, workers are subject to various forms of domination as are, in different and similar ways, vulnerable migrants. Both experience insecurity, both have little control over their lives, both are subject to fear, and both have interests that make it easy to manipulate their concerns against one another to the advantage of other parties.

The case for free movement suggested by the framework developed here stresses the need for a step-by-step approach to achieving the goal of free movement. It suggests that the case for free movement must first begin improving freedom and non-domination at home. Paradoxically, one of the best strategies in making the case for free movement is not to focus on making the case for free movement, but focusing on the background conditions needed for people's concerns and beliefs to match the aim and understanding those beliefs in the first place. It acknowledges that there is a great deal of distance between the goal of free movement from where we are now. It suggests that if this goal is to be achieved, an indirect strategy focusing on problems not obviously related to free movement may in fact be the best strategy for increasing the feasibility and attractiveness of a world made freer through free movement.

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[786] See for example Fine, 'Non-Domination and the Ethics of Migration'.

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