



Kent Academic Repository

Heaton, Robert (2007) *Policing styles, police centralisation and volume crime rates*. Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) thesis, University of Kent.

Downloaded from

<https://kar.kent.ac.uk/95191/> The University of Kent's Academic Repository KAR

The version of record is available from

<https://doi.org/10.22024/UniKent/01.02.95191>

This document version

UNSPECIFIED

DOI for this version

Licence for this version

CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives)

Additional information

This thesis has been digitised by EThOS, the British Library digitisation service, for purposes of preservation and dissemination. All theses digitised by EThOS are protected by copyright and other relevant Intellectual Property Rights. They are made available to users under a non-exclusive, non-transferable licence under which they may use or reproduce, in whole or in part, material for valid purposes, providing the copyright owners are acknowledged using the normal conventions. If you think that your rights are compromised by open access to this thesis, or if you would like more information about its availability, please contact us at Rese...

Versions of research works

Versions of Record

If this version is the version of record, it is the same as the published version available on the publisher's web site. Cite as the published version.

Author Accepted Manuscripts

If this document is identified as the Author Accepted Manuscript it is the version after peer review but before type setting, copy editing or publisher branding. Cite as Surname, Initial. (Year) 'Title of article'. To be published in *Title of Journal*, Volume and issue numbers [peer-reviewed accepted version]. Available at: DOI or URL (Accessed: date).

Enquiries

If you have questions about this document contact ResearchSupport@kent.ac.uk. Please include the URL of the record in KAR. If you believe that your, or a third party's rights have been compromised through this document please see our [Take Down policy](https://www.kent.ac.uk/guides/kar-the-kent-academic-repository#policies) (available from <https://www.kent.ac.uk/guides/kar-the-kent-academic-repository#policies>).

Policing Styles, Police Centralisation and Volume Crime Rates

By

Robert Heaton

June 2007

PhD Thesis

**Kent Law School
University of Kent**



IMAGING SERVICES NORTH

Boston Spa, Wetherby
West Yorkshire, LS23 7BQ
www.bl.uk

**ORIGINAL COPY TIGHTLY
BOUND**

**'It is a capital mistake to theorise before one has data.
Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories,
instead of theories to suit facts.'**

***Sherlock Holmes
(A Scandal in Bohemia)***

Abstract

The 1990s saw increasing Government intervention in the police service, as part of its wider promotion of New Public Management. The principal aim was to reduce crime and disorder. The police service implemented a variety of focussed policing styles, against a background of academic scepticism that police action can significantly reduce crime rates. This thesis explores the extent to which policing styles can affect recorded crime. It places this examination in the context of increasing intervention by central government in the police service generally but especially in the development of various policing strategies. The thesis assesses the value and direction of those policing styles in the light of continuing moves towards centralisation.

An examination of influences upon police centralisation is undertaken, in particular the work of the Audit Commission and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. The Association of Chief Police Officers is also identified as playing a key role in the erosion of chief constables' independence, to be replaced by a corporate voice. Chief constables' choices of policing style are considered. It is found that these are more likely to be a product of personal preference than of local socioeconomic and geographic factors. The disadvantage to 'local needs' arising from centralisation, may be minimal.

The second strand of research identifies the crime trends associated with each policing style after several years of practice. The reductions in crime associated with the use of policing styles are found to be marginal when measured at police force level, but more significant at local level. Current performance indicators are inappropriate for their purpose, being insufficiently sensitive to assess accurately, the results of crime reduction activity. The increased use of qualitative indicators may be a useful approach.

The thesis then examines recent developments in centrally-preferred policing styles, which occurred during the course of research. The rise of 'neighbourhood' policing is traced and the prospects for its success are found to be fragile.

The thesis concludes that an increased emphasis upon the role of the police as service providers, may be more useful than the narrower crime-fighting perspective, driven by blunt, quantitative performance indicators, which held sway in the 1990s.

Preface

This thesis identifies focussed 'styles' of policing which were introduced in many police forces in England and Wales during the 1990s, heavily encouraged by successive governments and their executive agencies. The mechanisms of centralisation and the extent to which policing styles may have contributed towards reductions in volume crime, are also explored.

Chapter 1 sets out the historical context of the thesis. The social and political developments which created pressures for centralisation, are described. The key terms 'crime' and 'policing style' are discussed. A literature review which is the subject of Chapter 2, places the use of policing styles into the wider academic contexts of crime reduction and the effectiveness of policing. There follows a series of linked pieces of original research.

Chapter 3 describes preliminary research which identifies the nature and prevalence of the policing styles brought into common use by forces in the 1990s. This exercise provides baseline information which enables further research to take place.

The thesis then considers aspects of its first principal theme, police centralisation. Chapter 4 examines the centralisation processes which encouraged police forces to adopt 'approved' policing styles. The roles of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and the Audit Commission are described, and illustrated with the use of case studies. The rationale behind Chief Constables' choices of policing styles is scrutinised in Chapter 5. The conclusion is drawn, that such choices appear to be the products of personal and political considerations, rather than socio-economic or geographical factors.

The second part of the thesis considers the relationship between the practice of focussed policing styles, and the reduction of recorded crime. Chapter 6 identifies the extent of

success attained by each style in respect of 42 Home Office police forces in the 1990s. Unequivocal success, taking into account long-term crime trends and socio-economic factors, is found to be very difficult to demonstrate.

Chapter 7 carries out a further study of policing styles and crime reduction, examining a smaller number of forces in greater depth. Six 'intelligence-led' forces, used as case examples, are found to be relatively successful in respect of the reduction of thefts of motor vehicles. Similar success could not be demonstrated in respect of 'all crime' or burglary, when trends were measured at force level.

Chapter 8 examines the possibility that the practice of focussed policing styles may reduce crime at a very local level, but that such reductions become more difficult to measure at police force level. A study is carried out, of the relationship between crime rates and the imprisonment of prolific burglars. A significant association is found in respect of burglary measured at police beat level. However, the association is reduced when the units of measurement are widened that of burglary in an entire town, and becomes non-significant when the numbers of burglaries are replaced by those of 'all crime'. The results of Chapters 6, 7 and 8 call into question, the efficacy of current performance indicators.

Chapter 9 considers further developments towards the centralisation of policing styles, which emerged during the course of this study and the likelihood that these will contribute towards crime and disorder control. The Home-Office inspired rise of 'neighbourhood' policing is summarised. It is considered that local examples of success are unlikely to be replicated on a wider scale.

Chapter 10 draws conclusions from the thesis and suggests areas for further study.

The undertaking of this research has been in the main, an absorbing and stimulating process. It is hoped that the reader will find much of interest, although the sheer speed of organisational developments in the police service threatened to make some of the areas of

debate seem outdated. Neither were such developments always predictable. For example, the determination of the Home Secretary in late 2005 to drive through the amalgamation of police forces, was seen by commentators (eg Newburn 2005) as a precursor to a national police force. This thesis would have reflected that viewpoint. In the event, the sudden and unpredictable collapse of amalgamations is likely to have dampened political enthusiasm for such a move, for the foreseeable future.

I must place on record my warmest thanks for those who have offered encouragement and assistance throughout this experience. In particular, Professors Steve Uglow and Chris Hale performed a first-class and complementary double-act of supervision. Superintendent David Pryer of Kent Police gave practical support at a pivotal time. The staff of the National Police Library offered a professional and comprehensive service, whether on personal visits or in response to innumerable postal requests. Finally, I would like to thank my celestially talented wife Wendy and our children, who are still learning to love the relentless tip-tap of finger upon keyboard. Perhaps it will pause for a short interval.

Table of Statutes

Police Act 1964

Sexual Offences Act 1967

Local Government Act 1982

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984

Public Order Act 1986

Local Government Act 1992

Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994

Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994

Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996

Police Act 1996

Protection from Harassment Act 1997

Audit Commission Act 1998

Crime and Disorder Act 1998

Human Rights Act 1998

Local Government Act 1999

Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000

Police Reform Act 2002

Police and Justice Act 2006

Glossary: Table of Abbreviations

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
APA	Association of Police Authorities
BCS	British Crime Survey
BCU	Basic Command Unit
BOTD	Burglary Other Than Dwelling
CAD	Communities Against Drugs
CDRP	Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships
CIC	Criminal Information Centre
CIO	Crime Intelligence Officer
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
EDR	Earliest Date of Release
FIO	Field Intelligence Officer
GLC	Greater London Council
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
ILP	Intelligence-led policing
KPM	Kent Policing Model
LIO	Local Intelligence Officer
LOP	Location Oriented Patrol
LPU	Local Policing Unit
MSF	Most Similar Force
MSFA	Most Similar Force Analysis

NCRS	National Crime Recording Standard
NIM	National Intelligence Model
NPIA	National Police Improvement Agency
NPM	New Public Management
NYPD	New York City Police Department
POP	Perpetrator Oriented Patrol
POP	Problem Oriented Policing
PPAF	Police Performance assessment Framework
SRB	Single Regeneration Budget
TCG	Tasking and Coordinating Group
TOMV	Thefts of Motor Vehicles
UCF	Urban Crime Fund
UTMV	Unlawful Taking of Motor Vehicles

Contents

Abstract	i
Preface.....	iii
Table of Statutes.....	vi
Glossary: Table of Abbreviations	vii
Contents.....	ix
 Chapter One: Introduction	
Introduction to Thesis	1
The Rise of Performance Management in the Public Sector	2
Police Target Setting and Centralisation – A Formula to Reduce Crime?	4
Outline of Research	14
 Chapter Two: Core Concepts, Methodological Issues and Literature	
Introduction	21
Key Definitions and Data Collection	22
Literature Review	30
Conclusions	87
 Chapter Three: The Policing Styles of Home Office Police Forces in England and Wales	
Introduction	89
Methodology of Study	92
Results	95

Discussion	114
Conclusions	120
 Chapter Four: Centralisation of the Police Service: HMIC and the Audit Commission	
Introduction	121
Agents of Police Centralisation	124
Reactions to Centralisation: Case Examples	130
Discussion	147
Conclusions	154
 Chapter Five: Local Policing – Science or Alchemy?	
Introduction	159
Centralisation – A National Policing Model?	161
Policing and Crime Reduction	163
Policing Styles	166
The Allocation of Police Forces into Family Groups	170
The Study and its Results	174
Discussion	178
Conclusions	186
 Chapter Six: Policing Styles and Crime Reduction	
Introduction	189
Methodology	190
‘All Crime’	194

Burglary	202
Theft of Motor Vehicles	207
Criminal Damage	211
Conclusions.....	216

Chapter Seven: Policing Styles and Crime Reduction in Intelligence-Led Police Forces: A 6-Force Case Study

Introduction	226
The Study Forces	228
Methodology	239
Results	242
Discussion	246
Conclusions	254

Chapter Eight: Prolific Offenders and Crime Reduction

Introduction	257
'How efficiently can we target prolific offenders?'	260
Prolific Offenders: Measuring Crime Reduction	262
Discussion	272
Conclusions	274

Chapter Nine: Policing Styles and Centralisation – Recent Developments, Future Directions

Introduction	277
The Rise of Neighbourhood Policing.....	278
Neighbourhood Policing: A National Policing Model?.....	280

The Prospects for Neighbourhood Policing.....	282
Conclusions.....	286
Chapter Ten: Summary, Further Research and Conclusions	
Summary of Thesis	289
Further Research	298
Conclusions of Thesis.....	303
Bibliography.....	308
Appendix A	
Data: Imprisonment and Local Crime Rates	

Policing Styles, Police Centralisation and Volume Crime Rates

Chapter 1

Introduction

Introduction to Thesis

This work traces the introduction of centralisation processes including legislation, to the police service in the 1990s. These processes, which influenced the ways in which the police went about their business, were principally aimed at the reduction of volume crime. They took place against a backcloth of longstanding academic debates about the effectiveness of policing. The extent to which the police are able to influence levels of criminality, and to which the social benefits of policing can be measured, are prominent amongst these debates.

The major part of the thesis describes a series of linked pieces of original research, comprising two related themes. The mechanisms of centralisation and the police response to them, are described. Further research assesses the extent of crime reduction in Home Office forces over the course of a decade. These studies collectively establish the extent to which reductions in recorded crime levels can be ascribed to 'approved' policing methods, and thereby to centralisation. An assessment is made of the extent to which

centralisation of the police service has succeeded in fulfilling governmental aims. First, the centralisation of policing activity is placed into the wider context of the rise of New Public Management throughout public services in many countries.

The Rise of Performance Management in the Public Sector

New Public Management (NPM) has been a prominent part of the restructuring of public services, in most Western governments since the mid-1980s. New Right governments, led in Great Britain by Margaret Thatcher, and in the United States by Ronald Reagan, were committed to fostering 'enterprise cultures' across their economies. The core principles underpinning NPM were that differences between the public and private sectors should, as far as possible, be removed, and that the work of the public sector should be focussed towards the fulfilment of public demand, rather than the compliance with procedural rules. NPM aimed to separate 'steering from rowing' in the public sector, allowing the centre to define policies by 'steering', whilst a plethora of agencies 'rowed' in order to deliver the policies' results (Leishman et al 1996, pp.11-12).

In pursuit of NPM, successive governments in the United Kingdom sought to improve the services provided by public sector organisations, through the application of 'performance management'. 'Performance' was considered by successive governments to represent accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in public expenditure (Talbot 2005 pp.496-501). The necessity to demonstrate improvements was dependent upon the ability of

public sector organisations to measure variations in their performance. This had hitherto been widely considered to be impossible, for cogent reasons.

The choice of aspects of activity to be measured, was and remains a matter of controversy. Most public sector organisations are state-funded and have little potential for income generation. Financial measurements such as profit are therefore inadequate as a single, or principal means of accountability. Such organisations are typically answerable in numerous ways to a variety of stakeholders (Boland and Fowler 2000, p.417).

Performance measurement potentially gives a selective picture of activity biased towards readily available quantitative information, and is less able to reflect qualitative outcomes.

In the search for the elusive goal of completeness, measurement systems may become increasingly complex, difficult to manage and expensive to maintain. Furthermore, the priority given to the achievement of targets can cause distortions in professional judgement (Talbot 2005, pp.501-503). For example, the use of 'coaching' techniques in schools to boost examination pass rates, and the administering of vaccines by doctors in order to meet targets, may represent the amplification of measurable spheres of activity at the expense of others.

The measurement of police performance presents all of these challenges. The service has to pursue a multitude of objectives in varying arenas such as traffic control, crime investigation and public order maintenance. The results of much activity are not readily measurable. The objectives may be in mutual conflict, such as the use of aggressive

crime reduction methods which generate disorder. Moreover, the relationship between inputs, outputs and final outcomes is very tenuous (Carter et al 1994, pp.53-54).

Police Target Setting and Centralisation – A Formula to Reduce Crime?

The police in England and Wales, in common with those worldwide, provide services within two principal spheres of activity. These are the response to a wide range of calls for assistance by uniformed officers, and the provision of personnel to investigate crime incidents (Bayley 1994, pp.29-41).

The long-standing tradition of independence of police forces from political intervention has historically allowed many variations in the interpretation of this broad remit. For example, the relative importance of emergency response and crime investigation, the division of resources between crime prevention and detection, and the extent to which officers were community-based, were all determined by Chief Constables. These structural decisions did much to determine the corporate character of each force, now commonly referred to as its 'policing style.' External scrutiny of forces was less than intrusive for many years. For example, the periodic inspection reports produced by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) were not published. The extent of Chief Constables' autonomy was such that they were under no real pressure to promote any particular policing style and where these existed, they were rarely explicit. With the

exception of obvious contrasts such as urban and rural force areas, the service presented a homogeneous, if ill-defined face to the world.

During the 1990s, this equilibrium was profoundly disturbed. Most police forces overtly adopted named policing styles with defined objectives, the most significant of which was crime reduction. The same era saw increased centralization of policing styles at the behest of and enforced by, government and its agencies. This thesis identifies the policing styles which became prevalent, together with the theory underpinning each style which was used to justify its introduction. The extent to which these policing styles were likely to succeed in their aims is discussed, based upon the research evidence which was available at the time of their inception. The thesis then compares the crime reduction results of individual police forces after a decade of practice, in relation to 'all crime' and to selected categories of crime. The aggregated evidence is used to consider whether the imposition of legislation and centrally-preferred practice is more effective at achieving long-term crime reduction, than the judgement of individual chief constables. This and associated questions will be considered later in greater detail. An assessment is made of the extent to which, in the face of centralisation, the police service has retained its traditional independence. First, the context in which the police service found it necessary to accede to pressures for change will be explained.

The generally positive view of the police service which had been held hitherto by public and politicians, began to change fundamentally in the 1950s. A series of scandals saw

corruption allegations against the chief constables of Cardiganshire, Brighton and Worcester. Concern about rising crime fuelled moral panic about novel forms of youth culture such as 'mods' and 'teddy boys'. This and disquiet about police accountability and complaints procedures prompted the establishment of the Royal Commission on the Police, whose report was published in 1962 (Reiner 2000 pp.59-60). Its recommendation that the structure of the service in England and Wales be reorganised, came to fruition in the form of the Police Act 1964.

The Act enabled the number of forces to be reduced from 117 to 43 in the early 1980s, in alignment with local government reorganisation at that time (Newburn 2003 pp.91-92).

The Act brought standardised pay and conditions to the service. The majority of costs were borne centrally, comprising 51 per cent directly by the Treasury and another 25 per cent by means of support to local councils. Tripartite oversight was also established. The chief constable of each force was responsible for 'direction and control', whilst local police authorities composed of councillors and magistrates had the duty of 'maintenance of an adequate and efficient' force (s.4). The Home Office delegated Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, to subject forces to periodic scrutiny of their organisation and management, but its power as their main paymaster lay dormant. In practice, the chief constable was regarded by the other parties as the professional expert, usually allowed to operate unchallenged as the dominant partner (Reiner 1994 p.749, 2000 p.189). Some elements of centralisation existed, such as the Police National Computer and Home Office-controlled probationer training centres, but these did little to control operational policies within forces.

For one and a half decades, the tripartite structure maintained an imbalanced equilibrium of control over the police service. Where the weakest members, the police authorities, disagreed with the policies of chief constables, there were unsuccessful attempts to increase their executive authority. The early 1980s saw conflicts over accountability and control, between chief constables and radical Labour-controlled metropolitan counties, in particular the Merseyside Police Authority and the Greater London Council (GLC). (Reiner 1994 pp.710-711, 750, 752-757, 2000 p.189).

During the same period there was a deep economic recession, during which race riots and industrial unrest escalated in concert with mass unemployment. The police were continually involved in high-profile, controversial public disorder, where traditional headgear and foot patrol were exchanged for riot helmets, shields and squad vans. Disturbances at Toxteth and Brixton in 1981 attracted criticism in the 1982 Scarman Report. The Report concluded that the police bore substantial responsibility for the Brixton riots. Heavy-handed 'stop and search' tactics and failure to consult the community during earlier 'saturation' policing of the area, had led to widespread public alienation (Newburn 2003 pp 88-89). Although the service responded by introducing formal consultation arrangements, these made little impact on wider public perception, which for the next five years was dominated by prolonged industrial conflict. The police were heavily and publicly involved in high-profile disorder during the 1984-85 miners' strike, the 1986-87 printers' dispute at Wapping and the 1988 seamen's dispute (Newburn 2003 p.86).

The inevitable consequence of these developments was that the police suffered from continual public relations setbacks, which in aggregate severely damaged their hitherto benign image. However politically neutral and well-intentioned the police attempted to be in times of conflict, the feelings of those involved inevitably ran high and gave rise to accusations of heavy-handedness and partisanship. The service appeared to have become reactionary and unresponsive towards the public and its representatives in difficult times.

Matters went from bad to worse, as police ethics were shown to have fallen behind public expectations. In 1986, PC Ron Walker of Kent complained at Scotland Yard that his force was producing bogus crime statistics on an industrial scale. This included the detection of fictitious offences, and the use of a convicted prisoner who admitted to committing 87 offences, of which 34 occurred whilst he was in prison. Similar manipulations of figures had taken place across the service (Loveday 2000, pp.224-228, The Guardian, July 11th 2003).

Serious ethical questions were also raised against serious crime investigations. A long series of 'miscarriage of justice' court cases were revealed, which saw the release of the 'Guildford Four' in 1989, the 'Maguire Seven' in 1990, the 'Birmingham Six' in 1991 and the 'Tottenham Three' in 1992. The Chief Constable of the West Midlands disbanded the force's Serious Crime Squad in 1989 following corruption allegations (Newburn 2003

p.86). In short, the police became associated with internal malpractice in addition to discord in their dealings with the public, whose confidence in them declined.

Against this background of continual criticism, the police were scrutinised under the microscope of a government which had become increasingly concerned about the performance of the public sector in general. Recorded crime had grown relentlessly from about 0.5 million recorded offences in 1950 and reached over 5 million such offences by 1990, followed by further sharp rises of 17 and 16 per cent in 1990 and 1991 (Barclay and Tavares 1999, p.2). The erosion of public confidence in police effectiveness and ethics was now accompanied by growing government perception that the service needed clearer control and direction. Following the election of the Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government in 1979, the British political landscape changed irrevocably. 'Value for money' from the public services became a key theme. Home Office Circular 114/83 made it clear that additional expenditure would be conditional upon evidence that existing resources were being used efficiently, effectively and economically. Nonetheless, police numbers grew by 6.3 per cent from 120,000 to 127,100 between 1981 and 1991 (Reiner 1994 p.754), and the service was treated generously in terms of pay rises, following the 1978 Edmund Davies settlement. Total expenditure doubled to £3,358 million in the five years to 1984. By the end of the decade, Conservative Ministers saw the police as failing in their job, in responding to open-handedness by 'allowing' recorded crime to rise over the same period (Newburn 2003 p.97).

In consequence, monitoring of the police was tightened and centralisation processes took a firmer hold upon the service. The Audit Commission, which had been established by the Government to monitor local authority expenditure, issued a series of reports in the late 1980s, aimed at improving value for money within the police service. The role of H.M. Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) was also enhanced by the Home Office. Force inspection reports, which hitherto had been perfunctory and descriptive, evolved by means of collating and publishing comparative performance data. The requirement for such data and inter-force comparisons enabled policing activity and thereby, policing styles to be pushed into centrally determined channels (Reiner 2000 p.191). Additionally, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) was encouraged to develop into a central policy-making body, replacing the traditional idiosyncrasies of individual chief constables with a powerful corporate voice (Loader and Mulcahy 2001a, 2001b, Savage et al 2000a, 2000b).

At the Home Office, Kenneth Clarke was succeeded by Michael Howard in the early 1990s. Their tenures as Home Secretaries, saw the 'behind the scenes' centralisation of advisory written 'circulars' being complemented by more overt measures. A process of increasingly prescriptive legislation was initiated, in order to make the police more 'businesslike'. Clarification of the service's role and objectives was considered from the outset to be necessary, in order to enable the measurement of police performance. The 1993 White Paper on Police Reform stated that:

'The government believes that reductions in the levels of crime against the person and property and improved protection of the public must be the top priority of police work. Whilst the police service has a broad range of important duties, no other is as important.' (Home Office 1993, para.7.4)

The White Paper was followed by the Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994, a landmark piece of legislation which sought for the first time to enshrine the priorities of police forces and their chief constables in law. The Act provided for national performance indicators, including crime reduction targets, towards which forces were expected to work (Morgan and Newburn 1997 pp.11-57, Loveday 2000).

The Police Act 1996 tightened the Government's grip upon the service. Every police authority was required to 'have regard to any objectives determined by the Secretary of State' (s.6(2)(a)) and to 'comply with any direction given to it by the Secretary of State' (s.6(4)) in the course of its work. Additionally, the Home Secretary took on sweeping new powers over the fate of police forces, being able to 'make alterations in police areas in England and Wales (s.32(1)). The requirement that 'it appears to him to be expedient to make the alterations in the interests of efficiency or effectiveness' (s.32(3)(b)) was unlikely to inhibit such action.

As the decade progressed, the sphere of activity which had been known as 'crime prevention' was the subject of further intervention. Not only were the police given targets to achieve, they were now told, if in broad terms, how to set about achieving them. A

police-dominated 'locks and bolts' approach gave way to the broader concept of 'community safety', enshrined in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The Act recognised community safety as a multi-faceted and complex enterprise. The police were now required to work in partnership with local government, the criminal justice agencies and other statutory and voluntary organisations, towards the common goal of crime and disorder reduction.

During the same period, crime investigation methods became the subject of greater accountability. The most significant single piece of legislation in this respect was the 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act, whose primary function was to provide 'rules' for the treatment of suspects in police stations and elsewhere. Further control was exerted over a decade later, by the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, which regulated the provision of prosecution evidence to defence lawyers, and by the Human Rights Act 1998. Legislation also intervened in specialist police work, when the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 prescribed the circumstances in which surveillance could take place, and the levels of required authority. Although further discussion of these developments is beyond the scope of this work, they demonstrate the breadth and depth of post-war changes in the management and accountability mechanisms imposed upon the police service by legislation.

The combination of public disquiet, rising crime rates and pressure from government and its agencies, rendered the status quo in policing unsustainable. The police needed to 'do

something differently'. The 1990s saw a decade of unprecedented experimentation in policing methods. These were in the main, aimed at stemming the increase in volume crime and meeting the new targets. The term 'policing styles' came into vogue in the community of chief officers, each of whose annual reports extolled the perceived advantages of the style adopted by his or her force. The centralisation processes imposed by government and its agencies were thus complemented by further, voluntary centralisation, as some styles such as 'intelligence led' and 'geographic' policing were widely adopted, whilst others fell by the wayside. A few styles, such as 'zero tolerance' policing imported from New York and adopted by Cleveland Police in the late 1990s, rose to brief national prominence as 'the' answer to crime.

Meanwhile, recorded crime rates fell by fifteen per cent from a total of 5,276,173 in 1991, to 4,481,817 in 1998/99 (Home Office 2002). Police and government interpreted the fall as vindication of their crime-focussed policies, amounting to success which could be built upon by intensification of the same measures. The Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 had introduced performance indicators, but had little to say about how they might be achieved. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 was somewhat bolder, decreeing that the police must work in partnership with local authorities and other agencies in order to achieve the targets, but fell short of prescribing the nature of that work. The shroud of police independence was finally brushed aside by the Police Reform Act 2002. The Act required a National Policing Plan, which specified the methods by which forces would seek to achieve government targets. The Plan included the creation of a National Intelligence Model and encouraged 'problem solving policing', both of which were

considered by government to be successful derivatives of policing styles practised by some forces.

In attempting to reduce recorded crime levels, policy developed at a faster pace than theory. Despite research evidence of the 1970s and 1980s which indicated that they can do little to reduce crime rates, the police service set out to achieve precisely that objective, with heavy encouragement from government. This theory gap raises practical problems. Fundamental changes to the governance of policing were made with the aim of achieving crime reduction objectives, although their likelihood of achieving those objectives was poorly understood. Substantial resources were ploughed into new structures, although the crime reduction benefits were not estimated, even at an approximate level. This research aims to explore the relationships between centralisation, policing activity and crime reduction. The principal question to be addressed is:

'To what extent does the adoption of identifiable policing styles by police forces, reduce recorded crime?'

Outline of Research

'Policing styles' and 'recorded crime rates' are core concepts of, and used throughout this thesis. Neither term is uncontested. Chapter 2 explains the extent to which they can be accurately defined. The research methodology is then outlined and the accuracy with

which they are measured is discussed. The chapter then explores the current state of knowledge and debate surrounding the research question by turning to the relevant academic literature.

The introduction of discrete policing styles was in large part a consequence of concern about rising crime levels in the early 1990s, and the perceived ineffectiveness of existing crime reduction strategies. Chapter 2 reviews such strategies in their broadest context, then progressively focuses upon policing activity and finally upon policing styles. The chapter outlines a classification of all crime reduction measures and traces the development of inter-agency community safety initiatives from their 'situational crime prevention' roots. The effectiveness of such measures is assessed. Within the sphere of police-related activity, the literature review then examines the ability of the traditional policing functions of patrol and crime investigation to reduce crime. The inception of policing styles in the 1990s is thereby placed into the broader contexts of mainstream policing activity and the spectrum of crime reduction measures across the criminal justice system. This process paints a backcloth of the research evidence which was available at that time, appertaining to police effectiveness in reducing crime. An assessment is then be made, of what were the prospects for the success of further initiatives.

The chapter explains the reasons why researchers have taken a contrary view, namely that police can do little to affect crime levels, to that of politicians and the police service. The probable effects of socioeconomic factors upon crime rates are identified. The limitations of theoretical knowledge and therefore the room for doubt in the academic viewpoint, are

also acknowledged. The preventative and rehabilitative work of non-police agencies such as the prison and probation services is beyond the scope of this research and is not considered in detail. Beyond the core sources examined in Chapter 2, further literature is referred to in subsequent chapters as it relates to the unfolding research.

Summarising thus far, Chapter 2 assesses the likelihood that prior to their adoption in the 1990s, the use of particular policing styles would reduce volume crime. This assessment is based upon research evidence, much of which was available at that time. The thesis later aims to establish the practical results based upon several years of experience, and the extent to which these have been in accord with varied academic and political expectations.

Many policing styles passed in and out of police and public consciousness during the 1990s, to the accompaniment of descriptions in media, chief constables' and other police-produced reports, and non-academic periodicals aimed at police audiences. Such accounts were generally uncritical in response to the public relations imperative for 'good news', and lacked objective evaluation. Prior to this work, there had been no systematic study to establish the number and prevalence of policing styles used by forces in England and Wales. Chapter 3 gives an account of ground-clearing research, using inspection reports published by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), to determine this baseline information. The mechanisms by which HMIC and the Audit Commission have promoted the adoption of common policing styles, are described in detail. Case examples describe the progress made in some forces and reveal barriers which have been raised

elsewhere. The chapter also outlines the principles underlying each policing style and concludes that although presented as 'best practice', there is little evidence that they amount to more than centrally-preferred practice.

The thesis then examines its first key theme, the processes of centralisation, in further detail. Some of the competing tensions between the pressures of centralisation and the traditional independence of police forces, are explored. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) and the Audit Commission are identified in Chapter 4 as key executive drivers of centralisation. Their development and operating mechanisms are described in detail. In order to assess their effectiveness, a comparative study is then undertaken of the development of intelligence-led policing (ILP) in six police forces. The chapter concludes that a variety of pressures and agencies contributed to an uneven but essentially one-way process of centralisation. Although chief constables retained elements of independence, they were increasingly selective in its exercise.

Chapter 5 addresses the question of whether government intervention has taken place at the expense of forces' ability to police in response to local socio-economic conditions. The distribution of policing styles established in Chapter 3, is used as a platform for further research which considers the basis upon which choices of policing style are made. It is argued that if policing styles are the outcome of rational choices based upon the socioeconomic conditions within individual forces, then the case for 'one size fits all' centralisation is relatively weak. If on the other hand, policing styles are merely a product of chief officers' personal preferences, then the case for centralisation, if evidence-based,

is stronger. Using existing HMIC methodology, forces are assembled into 'family groups' in which socioeconomic and geographic conditions are considered to be similar. Intra-group and inter-group comparisons of policing styles are then made in order to establish whether there are any apparent links between these external pressures upon police forces, and their response in choice of policing styles. The chapter concludes that there are no such links. Policing styles appear to be chosen as products of chief officers' personal preference, influenced by pressures of centralisation. A model is proposed, which suggests that volume crime is composed of individual elements which have varying degrees of patterning which reflect their amenability to intervention.

The thesis then addresses its second key theme, the effect of policing styles upon volume crime rates. The crime reduction results of forces using a variety of policing styles are examined in Chapter 6. The reductions of several categories of crime are compared across a variety of time periods in the 1990s. The conclusion is reached, that the evidence of enhanced effectiveness of any policing style compared with any other, is difficult to demonstrate.

The breadth of scope of the survey undertaken in Chapter 6, is accompanied by methodological limitations associated with the definition and the implementation of policing styles. These are acknowledged in Chapter 7, in which complementary research examines crime reduction over time in fewer forces, but in greater depth. 'Intelligence-led' police forces, where methodological difficulties are minimised, are selected for study. The chapter demonstrates that despite vigorous implementation by a number of

forces over a decade, their success in reducing crime compared with that of other forces, appears to be extremely limited. Weak evidence is found to suggest that intelligence-led policing may be effective in the reduction of vehicle crime, but no similar relationship could be found in respect of other types of crime. Overall, the pessimistic research conclusions of the 1980s and 1980s, backed by the results of Chapter 6, appear to be justified.

The thesis goes on to consider the implications of these results for performance measurement. Intelligence-led policing sets out to reduce crime by taking repeat offenders out of public circulation by means such as imprisonment. The results of Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate that such efforts are not readily reflected by conventional measurement of volume crime at Force and Basic Command Unit (BCU) level.

Therefore, current performance indicators may be an inappropriate means of assessing police performance. Chapter 8 describes further research which sought to establish whether policing efforts are reflected in crime levels at local level. A weak relationship was found between the practice of intelligence-led policing, and the reduction of burglary at beat and at BCU level, particularly under favourable conditions of measurement. When measurements were made using a wider crime classification such as 'all crime', a significant relationship was no longer present. The conclusion is reached that the relationship between police activity and volume crime rates, is usually measureable only at local level and in respect of some forms of acquisitive property crime.

It was argued earlier that police centralisation was implemented with the primary aim of reducing recorded crime, in the virtual absence of any underpinning theory. The trend accelerated throughout the period of this research, during which further critical elements of centralisation were imposed upon the service. For example, the promotion by the Home Office of 'neighbourhood policing' and the National Intelligence Model, were major steps towards the implementation of a national policing model. Chapter 9 summarises the rise of 'neighbourhood policing', discussing whether or not it amounts to the arrival of a national policing model.

Chapter 10 concludes the thesis, arguing that the overwhelming weight of evidence shows crime levels to be predominantly a product of socioeconomic factors. The police can take action to reduce crime, but success is not readily measureable. The leverage exerted upon crime statistics by the police is minimal and in practice becomes submerged beneath more influential external factors. Therefore, the crime-related performance indicators by which the police are judged, are inappropriate. A broader, 'service provider' approach, backed by a greater qualitative element in the assessment of performance, may be more likely to improve public confidence.

Chapter 2

Core Concepts, Methodological Issues and Literature Review

Introduction

This study examines the relationships between levels of crime and centralisation processes, as a consequence of which police forces in England and Wales have sought to adopt common structures and practices. These processes include the use of legislation and the introduction by forces of defined policing styles, with the intention of reducing recorded crime levels. The relationship between the terms 'crime' and 'policing styles' is at the heart of this research. Neither concept is uncontentious. The nature of 'crime' and the means of its measurement are not straightforward, and the concept of 'policing styles' needs to be put into the broader context of crime reduction activity undertaken by the police.

This chapter explores key definitions, outlines the core research methodologies used and explains their limitations as a means of gathering the required data. It is argued that within these constraints, the methodologies used are appropriate and adequate for the purposes required. A review of core literature places the study in the wider contexts of developments in crime reduction processes and the conclusions of 'what works' research. Crime control by means of policing is then considered in more detail. Well-established British and American literature which has shaped academic

perceptions of the effectiveness of traditional patrol and crime investigation, is examined. Finally, an account of further research is presented, examining influences upon crime rates which are outside the ambit of policing.

Key Definitions and Data Collection

Crime

Criminologists have long pointed out that 'crime' is a social construct; a set of behaviours which at a particular time, are prohibited by law. Therefore, recorded crime levels are liable to change irrespective of patterns of personal behaviour. For example, harassment was criminalised by the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, whereas sexual intercourse between males aged over 21 was partially decriminalised by the Sexual Offences Act 1967. Categorisation of behaviour as criminal has been described as 'anything but mechanical and value-free; it is highly selective and value-laden, the product of complex social, political and organisational processes' (Maguire 1994, pp.238-239). Critical criminologists go further, arguing that these processes are systematic and stem from political motivation. According to this viewpoint, the criminal justice system is a means of social control exerted by the ruling class, who define working class behaviour as criminal. Rises in crime and imprisonment are predominantly a reflection of increased state power and control (Young 1994, p.84-85). 'White collar crimes' such as avoidable industrial accidents, the sale of unsafe pharmaceutical products and the avoidable collapse of pension schemes, may be as

morally reprehensible as conventional 'crime'. In practice, they rarely attract the attention of the criminal law (Nelken 2002, p.844-847).

The nature of the behaviour which amounts to, or should amount to crime, is therefore uncertain, and the aggregate of all recorded crime is in part, a consequence of a shifting social construction. Definitional uncertainties are compounded by inconsistencies in the recording of crime. A crime report is the product of a filtration system which comprises a series of organisational and personal decisions and policies. These may emanate from the victim, the police or increasingly, the Home Office. After a recordable crime has occurred, the victim must recognise it as such, and report it to the police. Many victims choose not to do so for a variety of reasons, such as perceptions of triviality or police ineffectiveness (Home Office 2003, p.47). The police may also choose not to record a crime for a variety of reasons. They may consider that there is insufficient evidence, and record for example, a perceived incident of pickpocketing as lost property.

This filtration system describes the 'attrition' process which affects recorded crime levels. Estimates of the attrition rate are published periodically by the Home Office. For example, in 2002/2003, it was estimated that 29 per cent of 'all crime' was eventually recorded by the police. This figure masks considerable variations amongst different offence types. In that year, the rate of recording was 81 per cent for thefts of motor vehicles, but only 16 per cent for common assaults (Home Office 2003 p.14). These estimates are useful for research purposes, drawing attention to the limitations of data, and offering the opportunity to choose between data sources of varying degrees of accuracy and consistency.

Uncertainty may exist in relation to the numbers and types of offences which were committed on a particular occasion. For instance, an incident of violent disorder, recordable as a single offence under the Public Order Act 1986, may contain a large number of assaults under other legislation. Similarly, a recorded instance of theft from a car might consist of a broken window, followed by the theft of a stereo unit and then further theft of items from the boot. In an attempt to introduce greater consistency in recording practices, the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS), consisting of complex 'counting rules' for individual offences, was introduced by the Home Office in April 2002. The NCRS was estimated to have increased 'all crime' levels by 10 per cent (Home Office 2003a p.35).

This is not the only means by which Home Office policies make crime levels the subject of arbitrary and changing limits. Many minor offences which are triable summarily, are not designated as 'recordable' by the Home Office, pointing to an arbitrary element in the choice of those offences regarded as 'real' crimes. Offences such as drunkenness became recordable for the first time in 1998. This development inflated crime figures in all forces but to different extents, depending on the prevalence of the 'new' recordable offences in each force.

The British Crime Survey (BCS), which first took place in 1982, questioned members of the public directly about their experiences of crime, and provided an alternative range of statistics to that recorded by the police. Estimates of the attrition rate of crime are derived from the comparison of recorded crime figures, with those produced by the BCS. Surveys were carried out in 1982, 1984, 1988, 1992 and then biennially

until 2001/2002, when annual surveys were introduced with sample sizes of approximately 36,000 interviewees (Home Office 2003 p.10-13, Maguire 2002 pp.349-354). The BCS bypasses the filtration process involved in the production of police 'recorded crime' statistics. Comparisons of BCS and police statistics enable a fuller estimate of some categories of crime, and thus the attrition rate of police-recorded crime, to be made. Additionally, the survey allows the measurement of perceptions, such as the prevalent belief in the extent of crime and the fear of crime. These advantages have allowed BCS information to play an increasingly prominent role in annual, Home Office bulletins of crime statistics which formerly consisted solely of police-generated figures.

These advantages of BCS figures are counter-balanced by some shortcomings, compared with police-generated statistics. The surveys were until recently produced less frequently, allowing less detailed trends over time to be produced. Moreover, they rely upon the accuracy of personal memories, which may be asked to recall information, long after events took place. The use of samples introduces error, particularly for individual crime types where the sample is relatively small. The survey is aimed at households and thus omits crimes against businesses and public property. Furthermore, interviewees are asked questions on behalf of themselves and of other household members. It is probable that many intra-household offences are not reported, sexual offences being 'reported to BCS interviewers so infrequently that no reliable estimations can be produced' (Maguire 2002 p.356). Persons aged under 16 are not included in the survey. The problem of under-reporting is also experienced with 'hard to reach' groups, in common with police-generated statistics. In such cases, the attrition rate and thus the 'true' level of crime cannot be reliably estimated.

To summarise, recorded crime and BCS statistics are complementary, and may be 'likened to a dark stage with two spotlights which illuminate part of the action extremely well while other areas remain in semi-gloom' (Lewis 1992 p.15).

Policing Styles

The data gathering processes of recorded crime are considerably simpler than those in relation to policing styles. Crime statistics are readily available, being published regularly by the Home Office. Their strengths and limitations are well established.

The acquisition of data describing the use of policing styles is more problematic. The term lacks a formal definition, but became a common item of terminology in the 1990s, in Chief Constables' annual reports and in HMIC force inspection reports.

'Policing style' is a less than entrenched term in academic literature, being interchangeable with 'policing model' (Tilley 2003). It may be used for example, to denote where a force lies on the continuum of 'policing with people' at one extreme, or 'policing against people' at the other (Bowling and Foster 2002 p.984). Hale et al (2004) noted that:

'Although undefined, the term is used to describe the corporate character of a police force and the approach which it has chosen to adopt towards its work'
(Hale et al 2004, p.293).

'Policing style' is used in literature and in this thesis, as a means of expressing in indirect terms, the priorities and objectives of a police force. For example, an 'intelligence led' force would attach a high priority to crime reduction, with emphasis upon the use of informants and surveillance to engage directly with prolific offenders. Alternatively, a force engaged in 'geographic' policing would seek to establish strong community ties and invest significant resources in the promotion of public reassurance. Some policing styles are associated with closely defined organisational structures which are described in later chapters.

In summary, the two core variables studied, crime and policing styles, are both problematic in terms of definitions and data collection. The choice of data sources and their treatment will now be outlined. Further details of these processes will be provided in the chapters which explain the individual elements of research.

Data Collection

For the purposes of this research, the decisive factors in the choice of crime statistics were the context of research, together with the availability and quality of data. The study examined crime rates throughout the 1990s in 42 police forces, and the extent to which the volume of crime may have been affected by the use of particular policing styles. In view of the large quantity of data required, the practical choice of data sources was between annual police-generated data, and the results of successive British Crime Surveys. BCS data was not readily available at police force level, being aggregated to regional and national level. It was produced less frequently than police

statistics during the study period. Sampling error would become more significant if BCS data was apportioned between the forty three police forces of England and Wales. Error would increase further if 'all crime' at force level was sub-divided into individual crime types, and for part of this research, into beatcodes. Therefore, police-generated recorded crime statistics are preferred in this study. The limitations of these statistics are acknowledged and are minimised by several methods.

In order to minimise attrition error, crime types were examined where possible, which were associated with relatively high recording rates. For example, reported burglary was studied. This had an estimated recording rate of 46 per cent, compared with 21 per cent for violent crime and 29 per cent for 'all crime' (Home Office 2003 p.19).

Burglary was also minimally affected by changes in Home Office-imposed counting rules. The implementation of the 2002/2003 National Crime Recording Standards was estimated to have increased recorded burglary levels by only 3 per cent, in comparison with assault where the estimated increase was 23 per cent (Home Office 2003a p.17). Therefore, the recording of 'burglary' refers to a reasonably consistent pattern of behaviour, throughout the survey period.

The policing styles of individual forces were determined by means of reference to HMIC force inspection reports. This process has been described in detail in the third chapter. The critical question which establishes the validity of the research is not the extent to which the term 'policing style' has been accurately defined, but whether the reference to a particular policing style is consistent in terms of corporate systems and structures. It was found that the consistency of interpretation varied from one policing style to another. For example the term 'intelligence led' policing referred to better-

defined practices than the term 'partnership working'. Therefore, 'intelligence led' policing was preferred for study in more depth. In order to smooth differences of interpretation, groups of forces which employed the same policing style were studied where possible. Therefore, a group of 'intelligence led' forces might be expected to show different and more consistent crime reduction results over time, than a group of 'partnership working' forces.

The study aimed to ascertain whether the use of focussed policing styles affects levels of volume crime. It did not seek to ascertain the precise nature of the relationship, such as the key variables within a policing style which might reduce crime, or the crime levels which might be anticipated in the event of a particular policing style being employed. Crime trends across forces were compared in terms of percentage increases or decreases over time in preference to the use of raw numbers. Time periods of several years were examined, to minimise the effects of changes in internal crime recording policies within forces. Furthermore, crime trends were calculated across several time periods, in order to obtain a balanced view of results. To prevent over-interpretation of results, they were presented in some cases by the use of a simple ordinal format.

Little is known about the relationship between policing and recorded crime rates, including the question of whether any such relationship is linear. For example, the Cheshire force recorded 6,441 crimes per 100,000 population in 2000, compared with 11,576 crimes per 100,000 population in Cleveland (Home Office 2001a). The marked difference in criminality in the two areas raises the question of whether, given the same intensity and methods of policing, a particular percentage crime reduction

would be 'easier' to achieve in one of the force areas. This problem is beyond the scope of the thesis, but is acknowledged and reduced where possible by comparing crime reduction within similar 'families' of forces.

In summary, the thesis aims to provide some illumination to an area of policy where links between cause (policing) and effect (crime rates) are notoriously difficult to establish. It is believed that the data used is appropriate and adequate for its purpose of providing information which is indicative rather than precise. Furthermore, central intervention to promote particular policing styles, has been accompanied by changes in police governance and considerable financial expenditure. Examples of these are provided elsewhere in the thesis. Information as to the efficacy of these policing styles, even at an indicative level, is more likely to be helpful in informing future policy than the current absence of such information.

In order to place this research into the context of the wider academic knowledge surrounding it, a review of relevant literature is presented.

Literature Review

Introduction

Recorded crime in England and Wales rose sharply at the end of the 1980s and reached a peak in the early 1990s. Police forces responded by adopting styles of policing which were explicitly aimed at stemming and reversing the trend. This

response did not occur in isolation, taking place against a backcloth of developments in situational and social crime reduction methods by police and other agencies. Their culmination in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, required sustained work to be undertaken by local authorities, the police and other bodies towards achieving 'community safety.' The requirements of the Act played a key role in the selection by some forces of 'partnership' policing styles which were in accord with its multi-agency ethos. Other forces which had preferred police-dominated styles, found it necessary to adapt or augment their existing practices in order to comply with the Act.

In order to understand the wider context within which focused policing styles were adopted, an account is presented of the development of 'crime reduction' activity. The perceived weaknesses of early strategies are explained. The preventive effects of law enforcement 'downstream' from the police by the courts and by the probation service, are beyond the scope of this research. The terms 'crime reduction' and 'crime prevention' are taken here as being interchangeable.

The chapter then focuses in greater depth upon attempts by the police to prevent and detect crime. British and American literature is presented which examines the effectiveness of patrolling officers, crime investigation and the use of specialised tactics. Its conclusions allow the likelihood of success of the policing styles initiated in the 1990s, to be assessed. This literature also points to uncertainties in knowledge at that time which gave some grounds for further experimentation in the form of focussed policing styles. Finally, the chapter provides an account of evaluations of socio-economic influences upon crime rates in Great Britain and the United States.

As the account of research is developed, further information including the distribution of policing styles in England and Wales will unfold. Literature describing existing knowledge of the impact of these policing styles, will be discussed in detail in the relevant chapters.

The Classification of Crime Reduction Methods

Crime definitions vary with time and place, reflecting variations across national jurisdictions and the development of criminal law over time in line with social values (Pease 2002 pp.947-948). Nonetheless, the predominant categories of crimes against property such as theft, and against the person such as assault, are near-universal and relatively durable. Within these categories, the criminal law is applied to a wide range of human activity in an even larger variety of contexts. For example, assaults include domestic violence, scuffles in school playgrounds, alcohol-fuelled aggression inside and outside licensed premises, neighbour disputes and numerous other sources of conflict. The number of ways in which potential crime might be identified, intercepted and prevented, are almost infinite in number. In order to discuss theories of crime reduction in a coherent manner, attempts have been made by various authors to subdivide the subject into mutually related areas of activity, which invariably include overlapping elements.

The simplest model is the 'problem analysis triangle' which posits that any crime requires an offender, a victim and a location. Removal of any of these three elements prevents the crime from taking place (Felson and Clarke 1998 p.4).

An early and influential attempt to categorise crime prevention in more detail was made by Brantingham and Faust, who described it as 'probably the most overworked and least understood concept in contemporary criminology' (Brantingham and Faust 1976, p.284). In order to bring order to what they saw as conceptual chaos, they suggested a model which would separate it into more or less discrete elements, with the potential to highlight suitable areas for future research. They classified primary prevention as the reduction of crime opportunities; secondary prevention as the diversion of potentially criminal behaviour, and tertiary prevention as the diversion of known offenders away from further crime. Traditionally, these have been the respective domains of the police, youth services and finally, the prison and probation services (Pease 2002 p.950).

Subsequent attempts to sub-divide the crime prevention arena produced broadly similar results. For example, Bright (1995, pp.62-66) identified three main perspectives. These were: 'situational' crime prevention, which seeks to promote physical and environmental 'target hardening' and thus limit opportunities to commit crime; 'social' crime prevention, which aims to improve social conditions and divert potential offenders away from criminal activity; and thirdly, the preventive effect of law enforcement and the criminal justice agencies.

Alternative methods of categorisation have been offered by various authors, some of which are more explicit in their explanation of the police role. For example, Bottoms and Wiles proposed a four-way classification. 'Defensive strategies' were chiefly concerned with 'target hardening', including opportunity reduction and environmental

management. 'Guardianship and monitoring' included policing, both by the police and by other means such as CCTV. 'The creation of new forms of social order' was focussed upon distinct measures such as the exclusion of potentially troublesome individuals from crime and disorder 'hotspots'. Finally, 'criminality prevention' included educational programmes and crime diversion schemes aimed at youth (Bottoms and Wiles 1996, pp.7-10).

A study of research lessons for crime prevention was commissioned by the Home Office. The study considered crime prevention to include enforcement and situational prevention (Hough and Tilley 1998, p.4). This was seen as distinct from criminality prevention, which was sub-divided into social prevention and rehabilitation. A further, interesting classification was used in research carried out for the National Institute of Justice in the United States, in an investigation into 'what works' in reducing crime. The research classified crime prevention activities into a seven-point division, according to the institutional setting within which they took place. This study will be considered later, in more detail. First, the development of the 'crime prevention' discipline will be described.

The Development of Crime Reduction Strategies in England and Wales

The first significant post-war development in crime prevention was the publication in 1965, of the report of the Cornish Committee on the Prevention and Detection of Crime. The Committee had been appointed by the Home Secretary in 1961, in order to identify ways of mitigating twin problems of rising crime and overflowing prisons.

The report recommended that all police forces should appoint specialist crime prevention officers and departments, to be trained and supported by the recently-established National Crime Prevention Centre at Stafford. The Committee also recommended the establishment of a national Standing Committee on Crime Prevention based at the Home Office. This would include representatives from the police, employer associations and trade unions, chambers of commerce and the insurance industry. The Standing Committee went on to initiate significant industry-wide agreements on acceptable security levels in, for example, new houses and cars. Locally, crime prevention panels were established, comprising the police and representatives from local businesses, statutory services and voluntary organisations. The panels aimed to provide a two-way flow of information which would include crime prevention advice from the police, and the identification of problems to the police which could generate prevention initiatives. (Gilling 1997 pp.76-79, Gilling 2000 pp.127-128, Byrne and Pease 2003 p.289). The Standing Committee also produced the influential 1991 Morgan Report, named after its chairman, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

The make-up and the aims of the Cornish framework of bodies responsible for national and local crime prevention, have remained recognisable throughout the development of crime prevention efforts in succeeding years. The Committee's scale of operations was however, very limited in practice and recorded crime levels rose further. Home Office Crime Prevention Unit researchers noted this trend and that furthermore, recently published research (eg Greenwood et al 1977) pointed to the limited efficacy of police operations in reducing crime (Clarke and Hough 1984). The relatively unfocussed efforts at crime prevention thus far, were developed into the

situational approach championed by Ronald Clarke, using methodology which was far more problem-centred. In essence, the situation of the offence was to be considered, potential preventive approaches were to be identified, and the most appropriate solution was to be selected and implemented.

The situational approach was based on the premise that crime is not only a result of deep-seated, long-term social problems such as relative deprivation and youth unemployment. It was also believed to be in substantial measure, a product of a 'rational choice' made by the offender. Such a choice is made when an opportunity to commit crime is perceived and the offender considers that the anticipated rewards outweigh the effort and risks. The approach aims to reduce opportunities for crime, by making an effective intervention in a given situation. This could take the form of increasing the effort or the perceived risk of committing an offence, such as installation of improved locks and alarms, the installation of 'defensible space' architecture or CCTV. Alternatively, the rewards might be reduced by for example, the installation of card-operated electricity meters or removable car stereo equipment (Clarke 1980 p.139, Felson and Clarke 1998 p.25).

The Home Office Crime Prevention Unit launched an 18-month project known as the Five Towns Initiative in early 1986, in order to establish models of good practice for other areas to follow. Research, technical support and publicity together with modest funding were provided for the towns: Bolton, Croydon, North Tyneside, Swansea and Wellingborough. Situational methods were used predominantly, but results were inconsistent, perhaps reflecting variable motivation of those involved. Researchers

noted that 'it would be wrong to assume that all organisations with the capability to prevent crime are actively committed to doing so' (Heal and Laycock 1988, p.237).

Following the Five Towns initiative, academic support for situational crime prevention remained less whole-hearted than that of the Home Office. The primary reason for the academics' stance, was that the focus of situationalism was considered to be the prevention of individual criminal acts, whilst ignoring the deeper-set and longer-term conditions which, they believed, shaped criminal behaviour. Crimes prevented by situational measures were considered to be particularly prone to displacement, benefiting some individuals at the expense of others and providing scant net reduction in the total number of crimes committed. For example, a would-be car thief trying to open door handles will always find an unlocked one, if enough are tested.

According to this viewpoint, the 'root causes' of crime needed to be tackled by means such as improvement in housing conditions, the reduction of relative deprivation and the provision of diversionary activities such as employment schemes and youth clubs. Social crime prevention strategies such as these may appear to chime with commonsense, but successful implementation is at least as problematic, as is experienced with situational measures. The supposed 'root causes' of crime are so remote from its commission, that there is ample opportunity for a host of other variables to intercede. For example, the rapid increase in thefts of mobile telephones at the end of the 1990s is more easily attributable to the parallel growth in their ownership and opportunities for crime; than to any underlying variation in social conditions during that period (Harrington and Mayhew 2001).

Situationalists criticise social crime prevention for assuming that ‘the earliest and remote causes are most significant’, asserting that ‘the more immediate causes are often more powerful in generating crime’ (Felson and Clarke 1998, p.2). This viewpoint may go some way towards explaining the Home Office’s historically cautious attitude towards social crime prevention. There was little prospect of short-term success, substantial public funds would be required, and it would be difficult to establish the relationship between inputs and outcomes. The spectre of spending large amounts of public money without the guarantee of being able to point to any benefit, would be a high-risk strategy. In contrast, situationalism might achieve more immediate results, taking into account an element of crime displacement.

Such considerations failed to deter most academics from preferring the vision, even if in the far distance, of greater long-term crime reduction achieved by social measures. In addition to the perceived Achilles heel of displacement, ‘the dominant judgement is that (situationalism) does nothing about underlying risk factors, and that while it may prevent opportunities, this comes at a heavy price of engendering a fortress mentality and generally enhanced insecurity’ (Gilling 2001, p.382).

In summary, the half-loaf offered to the Home Office by the situationalists seemed better than none, which was the alternative promised by social crime prevention in the foreseeable future. The difficulty of measuring the effects of social interventions meant that it was always less attractive to policy-makers than to theoreticians. Situational crime prevention remained the preferred option of the Home Office until the early 1990s (Bright 1995, p.62). The modesty of its success in the Five Towns Initiative meant that in future, additional means of exerting leverage upon crime levels had to

be found. The time had come for social measures to be introduced, if cautiously, as an instrument of national crime prevention policy.

In the light of the Five Towns experience and continuing rises in nationally reported crime levels, the Home Office elected to launch a similar, but much expanded scheme in March 1988, named the Safer Cities Programme. Based upon, but more ambitious than its predecessor, it allowed annual budgets of £250,000 for each of twenty urban areas, to be spent on crime prevention projects. A Co-ordinator was appointed for each area in order to 'bring local agencies together, encourage them to think about crime prevention and motivate them to make individual project bids (Gilling 1997 p.91). The aims of the programme, which lasted for five years, were 'to reduce crime', to 'lessen fear of crime', and to 'create safer cities where economic enterprise and community life can flourish' (Tilley 1993, p.40). The final aim, which had not been included in the Five Towns Initiative, was broader in scope than the situational crime prevention approach and 'softer' in its association with any success criteria. This may have encouraged the increased involvement of non-police agencies in the Safer Cities Programme.

The inclusion of many agencies in the Safer Cities Programme widened further, the Home Office's approach to crime prevention, allowing more prominence to social initiatives. The move may also have been encouraged by personnel changes within the Home Office which included the departure of some of situational crime prevention's strongest advocates. A hybrid form of crime prevention which became known as 'community safety' thus emerged in a manner which was as much spontaneous as it was planned. (Gilling 1997, pp 91-93). Despite the appointment of coordinators, the

agencies involved in 'Safer Cities' made little effort to work together for their mutual benefit. As Tilley noted,

'No coordinated rationale for focussing on particular crimes and particular areas emerges. That is not to say that there are no rationales. Nevertheless it is each agency and each interagency group orientating their work to crime prevention that determines where its efforts will be most appropriately directed. Not surprisingly, where there are priorities because of local difficulties, groups are apt to light on the same most obviously pressing problem or area, with the result that there tend then to be a profusion of (sometimes competing) initiatives. The plurality of rationales produces an abundance of activity in some places but none in, so to speak, second division problem areas'. (Tilley1993 p.52-53)

Despite such reservations, the new concept was given further impetus by the conspicuous success of the Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project in a Rochdale housing estate. The initiative included the improvement of physical security, development of the Neighbourhood Watch Scheme, the formation of a local crime prevention group and probation-led diversion initiatives, using a variety of agencies and community groups (Forrester et al 1988).

Further rises in crime during the Safer Cities Programme brought a new urgency to the task of encouraging the spread of community safety initiatives. The Home Office issued Circular 44/90, emphasising the need for partnership working towards crime prevention (Home Office 1990a). Progress was slow, in part because no agency had been nominated to take the lead. The Morgan Committee was established in 1991 by

the Home Office, in order to address such problems of local co-ordination. The Committee took a wide and critical view of its role. Its report endorsed the concept of community safety, taking the view that the term 'crime prevention' 'is often narrowly interpreted and this reinforces the view that it is solely the responsibility of the police' (Morgan 1991 p.3, quoted in Pease (1994), p.687). As the report opined, 'crime prevention is a peripheral concern for all the agencies and a truly core activity for none of them'. It went on to recommend that local authorities, together with the police service, should be given statutory responsibility for crime prevention. (Morgan 1991, p.13-15, quoted in Gilling 1997 p.99).

The Morgan Report brought a mixed response from the Conservative government of the day, as part of a piecemeal response to still-burgeoning crime levels. The political emphasis remained upon situational prevention underpinned by rational choice theory, accompanied by the need to punish those who made the 'wrong' choice. The Home Secretary, Michael Howard made the widely-publicised, although imprecise and unevidenced assertion that 'prison works' (Downes and Morgan 2002 p.296). In what amounted to dabbling with the Brantingham and Faust 'tertiary prevention' concept, the government took a harsher stance towards offenders by increasing the severity of youth punishment. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 doubled maximum custodial sentences on young offenders (s.17) and introduced secure training orders (s.1).

More positively, a new National Board for Crime Prevention was also established in 1994, comprising representatives from a wide range of agencies. The Board recommended that locally, agencies use the partnership approach endorsed by the

Morgan Report. In practice, the level of implementation brought about by the Board's glossy literature fell far short of that anticipated by Morgan's vision of statutory compulsion. However, the seeds of community safety had begun to take root, and by 1996, approximately half of all local authorities had appointed specialist community safety officers (Gilling 2001, p.388).

The arrival of New Labour in office in 1997, was rapidly followed by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which required local authorities and police authorities to 'formulate and implement a strategy for the reduction of crime and disorder in the area' (s.6). The Act did not introduce the notion of 'community safety' as a new concept. In simple terms, the Conservative government had cautiously set the ball rolling, and its Labour successor picked it up and ran with it.

The accelerating pace of reform demanded by the 1998 Act caused its own problems, highlighted by the Audit Commission's report 'Community Safety Partnerships' (Audit Commission 2002). The most fundamental of these was that the term 'community safety' remained a contested concept. The Morgan Report had envisaged a multi-agency, problem-centred response, aimed at crime, disorder and incivility in public places. The approach would include situational and social crime prevention methods and also tackle fear and insecurity, all by the most effective means (Gilling 2001, p.383-385).

In practice, a narrower definition led from the outset by Government was widely applied. The focus of the 1998 Act was upon crime and disorder reduction, as suggested by its title. Although it required local action, partnership performance was

to be measured against national crime problems, based upon established 'what works' methods. The emphasis of these requirements on the 'here and now' steered partnerships towards situational methods, marginalising longer-term social crime prevention and the 'fear of crime' agenda. As the Audit Commission report 'Community Safety Partnerships' pointed out, the application of the Act created tension between 'bottom up' local community safety priorities, and 'top down' national performance indicators and policing objectives (Audit Commission 2002, p.16).

Echoing the earlier Morgan Report, the Audit Commission's assessment implied that a decade later, its lessons had not been learned. Community safety continued to have a low priority in the work of the health, probation, education and social service departments. The 'what works' principle, whilst appearing to be pragmatic, had reinforced the status quo by discouraging innovation in terms of both partnership arrangements and the nature of initiatives taken. Furthermore, local partnerships had been required to contend with unsatisfactory funding arrangements. The Government had rejected the Morgan Report's proposal for ring-fenced core finance, opting instead to establish specific funds for which partnerships could make bids. Examples included CAD (Communities Against Drugs) and SRB (Single Regeneration Budget) finance.

The Audit Commission called for the simplification of funding, pointing out that the cost of community safety partnership activity had been £8.7 billion since 1999. By way of results, the contribution made by this investment towards cutting crime was 'not clear'. The Commission considered that:

'Local partnerships have not made an obvious impact on community safety between 1999 and 2002. The Government and regulators need to work with the partner agencies to help them maximise their impact and make neighbourhoods safer for local people' (Audit Commission 2002, p.1).

Given such a negative cost-benefit analysis, the ensuing recommendation was extremely mild and it is surprising that the fundamental potential for the community safety, partnership-based approach to crime reduction was not called into question. The Audit Commission saw the problem as one of inadequate management by central government and by the partnerships. The possibility of a theory failure was either not considered, or was set aside.

This is a longstanding area of wider debate. The question of whether any unsuccessful crime prevention initiative was fundamentally unsound in principle, or a good idea which was poorly implemented, is one which has dogged the evaluators of such initiatives. The arena of crime prevention evaluation will be considered in more detail.

The Evaluation of Crime Prevention Initiatives

British authors have been generally reluctant to be prescriptive about the detailed nature of crime prevention initiatives, which might reasonably anticipate success. For example, police forces and other agencies are likely to have examined the Home Office study 'Getting the Grease to the Squeak – Research Lessons for Crime

Prevention', in the hope of identifying those types of project which have a high chance of success. If so, they would have been disappointed. The authors disassociated themselves from such an ambition from the outset, stating that the study 'is less concerned with 'what to do' questions, and more concerned with ones about 'how to do it' (Hough and Tilley 1998, p.1). In summary, the study endorsed a systematic, problem-solving approach to crime prevention, involving partnership agencies where the police are able to exert limited influence over particular problems.

Evaluation of projects was also recommended, on a scale which was proportionate to that of the initiative. The study identified that objective evaluations have rarely happened in practice, being complex and expensive. The scarcity of evaluations has inhibited the establishment of transferable 'what works' knowledge in the crime prevention arena. Outputs such as numbers of police arrests and 'before and after' crime rates are relatively easy to measure. However, final outcomes are much more difficult to assess. The ensuing crime rate may be affected by reporting rates and displacement, and long-term effects may be altered by the introduction of other variables, some of which may be unknown. As Hough and Tilley concluded in relation to policing,

'It is well nigh impossible to research the general deterrent effects of enforcement in any conclusive way. In other words, policing usually involves a complex means-end chain. The further one moves down the chain, the less certain are the links between the different elements' (Hough and Tilley 1998, p.38-39).

In practice, difficulties of evaluation can be compounded by the variable quality of research and by the divided loyalties of researchers, particularly those who are working 'in house' for the organisation which carried out an initiative. This profound problem has persistently bedevilled the apparent pragmatism of 'what works' principles underpinning Home Office policies for the police and probation services. Reviewing innovations of police forces in England and Wales in the early 1980s, Mollie Weatheritt opined that:

'.....many police officers are apt to engage in what might be termed 'foregone conclusion' research, that is the seeking out of research information to support a preferred course of action rather than analysing the necessity for it and the results of it.....the reputations of several well-known policing initiatives rest less on any carefully considered evaluation of their effectiveness than on a fudging of ambiguous or inadequate data and on good publicity' (Weatheritt 1986, p.19).

A decade later, it seemed that nothing had changed. A review of evaluation techniques applied to crime prevention programmes concluded that:

'Crime prevention research has been dominated by two evaluative designs and a great deal of self-serving unpublished and semi-published work that does not meet even the most elementary criteria of evaluative probity' (Ekblom and Pease, 1995 pp 585-6).

More specifically, a study of reconviction rates following probation supervision programmes found that:

'Much of UK based 'what works' research falls far below the standards associated with objective and empirical inquiry. Major methodological problems have been ignored; research claims are frequently made on the basis of highly selective reporting of results, and inconsistencies between conclusions and data outcomes of 'what works' programmes undermines credibility'.

Claims of effectiveness:

'continue to be contradicted by official reconviction data and other independent research, they cannot be regarded as serious and objective scholarship, but simply as a vehicle for the ideology of their authors' (Fraser 2000, pp.356, 358).

Low standards of evaluation and literature do not necessarily equate to unsuccessful initiatives. It is interesting to note that despite his scepticism about standards of accountability, Pease went on to take a far more positive stance in a later review of the outcomes of crime reduction activity. He concluded that:

'It is no longer premature to claim that the vast bulk of well conceived and properly implemented primary prevention programmes achieve some success in crime reduction. The prospects for diversion of offenders by means of secondary and to a lesser extent, tertiary prevention are guardedly positive. The key factor appears to be investment in early intervention, such as parent

education and pre-school intellectual enrichment programmes. Tertiary prevention work with those who are already engaged in criminality generally produces poorer results' (Pease 2002 pp.954, 957; see also Byrne and Pease 2003, pp.297-301).

Researchers in the United States have gone further by producing more specific recommendations, although there is scant evidence that British policy has taken account of their findings. A comprehensive survey headed by Lawrence Sherman was carried out for Washington's National Institute of Justice, to produce a report which had been commissioned by the United States Congress. Given that the researchers were allowed only six months to produce the report, its scope as suggested by the title 'Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising' was extremely ambitious. The researchers examined over 500 research reports, grading the validity of the reports' conclusions. To this end the 'Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods' was devised and used. Ratings were based primarily on three factors: control of other variables, measurement error and the statistical power that any differences found by a study were not due to chance. The report found that:

'There is a clear tradeoff between the level of certainty in the answers that can be givenand the level of useful information that can be gleaned.....The report takes the middle road between reaching very few conclusions with great certainty, and reaching very many conclusions with very little certainty' (Sherman et al 1998, p4-5).

Crime prevention programmes were classified into one of four categories which described their likelihood of success. These were: 'what works', 'what doesn't', 'what's promising' and 'what's unknown'. 'What works' required two positive evaluations, using statistical significance tests backed by the demonstration of effectiveness through the preponderance of available evidence. 'What doesn't work' required the same level of negative evidence. 'What's promising' required one positive statistical evaluation and the bulk of the remaining evidence. 'What's unknown' was a programme which did not fit into any of these categories. The programmes which fell into each of the four categories of success were then allocated into one of seven social or institutional settings: communities, families, schools, labour markets, places, police and finally the criminal justice system.

The entire findings are too lengthy to reproduce here, but a selection of 'what works', 'what doesn't' and 'what's promising', which might be expected to apply in the context of the U.K. is shown at Fig. 1.

Figure 1.

	<i>What Works</i>	<i>What Doesn't</i>	<i>What's Promising</i>
<i>Communities</i>	Not known	Community mobilisation in high-crime areas	Community-based afterschool recreation
<i>Families</i>	Parent training	Domestic violence counselling by police	Women's refuges
<i>Schools</i>	Behaviour norms required	Drugs education by police Self-esteem exercises	Coaching/behaviour modification for high-risk youth
<i>Labour Markets</i>	Ex-offender training (older males)	Summer job schemes, short-term training for at-risk youth	Enterprise zones in areas of high unemployment
<i>Places</i>	Action by landlords in private housing	Not known	Target hardening Problem-solving analysis
<i>Police</i>	Targeting repeat offenders Hot spot patrols	Neighbourhood Watch Drug supply arrests Community newsletters	More police
<i>Criminal Justice</i>	Prison for repeat offenders Rehabilitation specific to offender	'Boot camps' Prison visits Electronic tagging General rehabilitation/ counselling	Fines Intensive supervision of juveniles

The distribution of results across the three categories of effectiveness is of interest and highlights the poor state of knowledge of this arena. In the full list of 68 programmes, 15 (22%) were assigned to 'what works', 23 (34%) to 'what doesn't' and 30 (44%) to 'what's promising'. Crime reduction programmes of proven utility were in a minority, but were of a significant proportion of all programmes. There is no evidence that policy-makers in the United Kingdom considered this research in any systematic

manner, as a prime opportunity to maximise the effectiveness of crime reduction efforts. A similar point could be made in relation to the 'What doesn't work' category. For example, the British Government emphasised the reduction of crime and drug abuse by the targeting of controlled drug suppliers, as one of the four principal elements of its 'Updated Drug Strategy', launched in December 2002. According to Sherman's analysis, this part of the strategy has little probability of success. Once again, the propensity of policy-makers to ignore research evidence (eg Hough 1987 p.2, Loveday 2000 p.222) was demonstrated.

The 'What's promising' group included almost half of the crime prevention programmes which were subject to consideration. Further experimentation and evaluation to reduce this high level of uncertainty is a necessary, if not straightforward, method of establishing the types of initiative which have the greatest probability of success. As the authors pointed out, if half of the 'What's promising' group were found to be effective, the number of useful options open to crime reduction agencies would be doubled. (Sherman et al 1998, p.13).

Crime Reduction and Policing

Mainstream policing and specialist crime reduction activity have traditionally had an arms-length relationship. Crime reduction has historically been a low-status activity which the service failed to treat as an integral responsibility of every officer, but instead entrusted as a specialism to about 1 per cent of its establishment of officers. The Government encouraged the development of crime prevention in the 1980s, but

the critical pressures during that decade which were discussed in Chapter 1, meant that this was never high on the police agenda. Additionally, the Government provided little guidance about the direction of development (Byrne and Pease 2003 pp.286-292, Gilling 2000 pp127-131). Moreover, academic typologies of crime reduction were less than explicit about how such activity might be integrated into the twin engines of mainstream police activity; patrol and crime investigation.

A comprehensive review of police effectiveness and its relationship with crime reduction was carried out by Bowling and Foster. The authors considered a wide range of strategies; ranging for example from increasing police numbers to the use of various policing styles, community contact and random patrol. The hypothesis underpinning each strategy was outlined. For example, random patrol was expected to deter crime through apparent police omnipresence. The research evidence of the effectiveness of each strategy was summarised. The conclusions were more pessimistic than those of Sherman's National Institute of Justice study. Two of the thirteen strategies examined, were found to be ineffective and in a further seven, the evidence was inconclusive. The remaining four strategies were believed to be effective in a limited range of contexts, but not in others (Bowling and Foster 2002, pp.998-999). No strategy was able to demonstrate clear and unambiguous effectiveness, although it was unclear whether the term 'effective' was judged in terms of crime reduction, detection rates or both. The authors concluded that:

'The most generous assessment is that some things work, in some places, under some conditions, particularly when social and economic conditions are favourable. However, substantial reductions in crime for long periods of time

are difficult to achieve.....The difficulty is in disentangling the effect of 'good police work' from changes in the economic and social context'

(Bowling and Foster 2002, p.997).

The twin core policing activities of patrol and crime investigation are more discrete processes than the wider spectrum of crime reduction activity. For example, the gathering of witness and forensic evidence are mainstream crime investigation processes in developed countries. The universality of these core activities has allowed the growth of a body of literature which has allowed academics to form considered views on police effectiveness in relation to crime control. This literature will now be reviewed.

Police Effectiveness

Any attempt to assess the extent to which the police are effective, involves the making of judgements about the fundamental purpose of policing. This area of debate is beset by contradictions. The 1993 White Paper on Police Reform claimed that 'the main job of the police is to catch criminals'. It also went on to point out that 'In a typical day, however, only 18 per cent of calls to the police are about crime, and only about 40 per cent of police officers' time is spent dealing directly with crime' (Morgan and Newburn 1997, p.5).

A brief consideration of the breadth of police activity is helpful, to understand why the police devote only a minority of their resources to addressing their 'main job'. In

contrast to the other emergency services whose remits are relatively narrow and well-defined, the police deal with a myriad of calls for assistance. Such calls might relate to traditional police tasks such as public order maintenance, missing persons, deaths where doctors' certificates cannot be issued, or to any other incident where the citizen feels that 'someone in authority ought to know'. The size of this final category should not be underestimated. The five years from 1997 to 2001 inclusive saw a rise of 76 per cent in 999 calls, despite the absence of a real overall rise in recorded crime¹ and coincident with mass public acquisition of mobile telephones², demonstrating the vulnerability of police workload to broader societal developments.

Tackling crime is amongst the most fundamental of policing activities. However, attempts to reduce the scope of police activity on the basis of this apparently simple proposition, immediately become problematic. Crime is a significant component of police work, but remains in a minority of all public demand. Moreover, crime is frequently inextricably interlinked with other police work. For example, the identification of a crime offender may be made by a witness who has the confidence to come forward, following a period of varied community activity by an officer. Surveys of police officers, Neighbourhood Watch coordinators and members of the wider public, carried out in the Devon and Cornwall Police area, found that:

Notes

¹ Recorded crime in England and Wales rose from 4,598,327 in 1997-98, to 5,170,843 in 2000-2001. However, the change in Home Office counting rules which came into effect from 1998-99 increased crime levels from 4,481,817 to 5,109,089 in that year, a rise of 14.0 per cent. (Home Office Statistical Bulletin 07/02, Table 3.04)

² The number of 999 calls in England and Wales rose from 22.6 million in 1997 to 39.7 million in 2001. In 2001, 52% of 999 calls were made from mobile telephones. Household penetration of mobile phones rose from 27% in January 1999 to 69% in November 2002. ('Charges for Emergency Service (999) Calls', OfTel (2003))

'There is recognition that in order to carry out 'crime control' policing tasks, the police need to engage in a wide range of other activities, and that separating 'core' from 'ancillary' tasks is a dangerous, if not impossible exercise' (Redshaw et al 1997, p.299).

These practical difficulties have meant that formal attempts to reduce the scope of policing activity, such as the 1994 Review of Core and Ancillary Tasks (the 'Posen' Inquiry) have met very limited success (Morgan and Newburn 1997 p.8). Indeed, the trend has recently been in the opposite direction. Legislative changes added to the breadth of policing activity, such as the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.

Although the Act was intended to address the problem of lone females being preyed upon by stalkers, the breadth of the term 'harassment' made the police liable to deal formally with a far wider spectrum of incidents including breakdowns in personal relationships, neighbour disputes and bullying incidents in school playgrounds.

The service also had to contend with fresh legislation aimed at securing due process for suspects. The incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law carried the insistence that policing decisions should be auditable; in practical terms, recorded and justified in writing. Additionally, the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 insisted that 'information which is obtained in the course of a criminal investigation and *may* be relevant to the investigation is recorded' and that 'any record of such information is retained' (s.23, emphasis added). The sheer breadth of these provisions is such that in adding to police workload, it is difficult to draw any conclusion, other than that the balance of activity must have been affected to the detriment of proactivity in crime reduction.

Such developments did not prevent successive governments from continuing to apply considerable pressure on forces, in an increasingly prescriptive manner, to improve performance in relation to the police's 'main job'. National performance indicators, introduced by the Police and Magistrates Court Act 1994, prescribed annual crime reduction targets. Forces were required by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 to work in cooperation with local authorities and other agencies, in order to secure longer-term crime reduction.

The view of the government was clear. Despite the imposition of additional responsibilities, the police were considered to have not only the duty to reduce the volume of crime but also the knowledge and resources to do so. Results would be mainly dependent on the application of corporate willingness to apply established 'best practice' to the problem. The source of this viewpoint is not apparent, but it raises the obvious question: 'If the route to crime reduction was unambiguous, would it not have been already taken, and with alacrity, by most or all police forces in many countries?' In order to resolve this question, the remainder of this part of the chapter is devoted to examining American and British literature, which is concerned with assessing the effectiveness of core police activities in relation to crime reduction.

American Literature

Police forces in the United States have a longer history than their British counterparts, of self-analysis and engaging in experimentation with the aim of increasing

effectiveness. The best-known study of the investigative function was carried out by the Rand Corporation, supported by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, over a two-year period between 1973 and 1975. The study was on a large scale. It included a literature review, a national questionnaire survey, police department records, interviews and direct observation (Greenwood et al 1977, 1985a, 1985b). The process enabled the researchers to assess nature of detective activity, the progress and disposal of crime cases, and their determinants. At a wider level, police departments were studied in terms of degrees of centralisation and allocation of responsibilities in relation to crime investigation.

The literature review cited six earlier studies, all of which took place in the 1970s. Their collective evidence indicated that crime cases were rarely solved, other than by the use of direct evidence such as witness identification or arrest at the scene. Later 'follow-up' investigations were almost entirely ineffective. (Greenwood et al 1977, p.43). The subsequent Rand analysis of detective activity in Kansas City showed that such personnel spent only a minority (7 per cent) of their time engaged in the investigation of crimes that were eventually solved. The breakdown of their remaining time was as follows: 45 per cent non-casework related, 22 per cent investigating unsolved crime and 26 per cent on cases after they had been solved. Comparison with other cities showed similar results (p.230).

The report's authors concluded that:

'.....some crimes are easy to clear, with either no work by an investigator or with small amounts of routine administrative activity. The remaining crimes, which constitute the majority, are difficult, if not impossible, to solve,

regardless of the efforts expended by the police. Some of these receive no attention by investigators, while others are pursued diligently. But the number of difficult crimes that are eventually cleared is so small, when they are compared to the number of cleared crimes that were easy to solve, that overall clearance statistics are little affected by the efforts devoted to them'
(Greenwood et al 1977, p.121).

Such conclusions, in destroying the mystique of detective activity, were not universally welcomed. The Rand methodology and conclusions were subject of sustained attack by the Assistant Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, Darryl Gates, in a paper written with Lyle Knowles of the University of Southern California. The criticism included alleged methodological problems, inadequate data sets and errors in drawing conclusions, which they claimed amounted in aggregate to fatal flaws. In particular, it was alleged that because the Rand study failed to discover differences in the effectiveness of different investigatory practices, this did not mean that such differences did not exist (p.22). In conclusion, Gates and Knowles opined that:

'Having failed in its endeavour, it appears that Rand proceeded to erect a series of straw men which it then knocked down to provide a basis for provocative and seemingly significant, findings and proposals' (Gates and Knowles 1976, p.77).

This criticism was later rebutted in detail by the study's authors (Greenwood et al 1976), although minor points were conceded. Insisting that their conclusions were

sound, they pointed out that no-one had produced contradictory evidence to infer otherwise. Despite the criticism, the Rand research marked a watershed in the perceptions of criminal investigations by criminologists, heralding a widely held 'nothing works' era in relation to crime reduction.

This was not entirely the intention of the Rand researchers, who noted with dismay the readiness of some municipal administrators to use the study results as a rationale to reduce police budgets, instead of as 'an objective basis.....to explore more productive uses of their manpower' (Greenwood et al. 1976 p.71). Such uses may have included initiatives which were to be seen as innovative, when brought into use in the United Kingdom, a quarter of a century later.

The Rand study included analysis of the 'investigative strike force' concept, which had been recently implemented by some police departments, to provide a proactive capacity against criminal activity. The 'strike teams were expected to 'proceed on their own initiative to develop cases against serious offenders' (Greenwood et al 1977 p.205), and to 'use intelligence gathered from informants or exploit the leads gathered by traditional investigators' (p.207). There is a clear element of comparability with the 'tactical teams' instigated by many forces in the United Kingdom in the early 1990s, following recommendations made by the Audit Commission (Audit Commission 1993). Tactical teams worked in a similar manner to their earlier American counterparts, but with a greater degree of central direction and with the benefit of crime analysis provided by modern, sophisticated computer systems.

The Rand researchers concluded that 'strike forces' had the potential to increase arrest rates for a few difficult target offences, but there were no consistent effects on overall crime rates. Practical difficulties were experienced when the units were diverted into other work and by short-term funding arrangements which gave little time for the units to develop their full effectiveness. (Greenwood et al 1977 p.221, 235).

The researchers commented upon other aspects of organisation which are comparable with later 'innovations' in the United Kingdom. In particular, 'geographic' policing, pioneered by Surrey in 1989 and subsequently adopted by many other forces, had marked similarities with 'team' policing identified by the Rand team. This involved the assignment of 'complete responsibility for police service in a small geographic area to a team of police officers, commanded by a team leader' (Greenwood et al 1977 p.20). The researchers were unable to reach any conclusions as to the effectiveness of such organisation.

Further primary research into crime investigation was undertaken over a two-year period by the Police Executive Research Forum, in order to build upon the information provided by earlier work, in particular the Rand survey. The new study focussed upon robbery and burglary in three police areas: De Kalb County, Georgia; St Petersburg, Florida; and Wichita, Kansas. It aimed to provide more detail about specific investigatory practices in terms of their nature, time taken and the likelihood that they would produce arrests (Eck 1983). This was a more microscopic approach than had been taken by the Rand study.

The research found that the investigative process amounted to an 'implicit triage system' irrespective of whether or not formal case screening existed. Cases were divided into three groups. The first, being those which were very unlikely to be solved with a reasonable amount of effort, were shelved at an early stage. The second group comprised cases that had effectively already been solved, the remaining investigation consisting of little more than an interview. The final category consisted of those cases that might be solved with reasonable effort, but certainly would not be solved without such effort. It was the final group which received the bulk of investigative attention. (Eck 1983, p.xviii).

Significant variations of practice were found between police departments. For example, following robberies, De Kalb detectives were eight times as likely to obtain suspect names from informants, as were detectives from St Petersburg (p.175). The study concluded that police departments were over-reliant on victims as information sources. There was scope for improvement in detection rates through increased use of intelligence sources such as informants and police records (Eck 1983 pp.xxvi-xxvii, 199), if all departments worked to the standards of the most effective. In this respect, the findings of the Rand research were contradicted. However, no assessment was offered of the extent to which commission rates and detection rates of burglary, robbery or aggregate crime might be affected, if such improvements were made.

Trends in crime in the United States broadly followed those in the U.K in the 1980s and 1990s. For example, the homicide rate in the United States rose by 24 per cent, from 7.9 to 9.8 per 100,000 population, between 1985 and 1991. The level of homicide then declined to 6.3 per 100,000 population in 1998, the lowest level since

1967 (Blumstein 2000 p.13). Policy-makers and criminal justice professionals, in common with those in the U.K, were quick to claim credit for the reduction. Their verdict was not shared by academics who emphasised the role of socio-economic factors such as demographics, economic opportunity and drugs sub-culture.

There have been several studies of the fall in crime in United States, such as Blumstein's authoritative collection of specialist essays which examined some of these factors individually (Blumstein 2000). The evidence relating to the extent to which they may have contributed towards the fall in crime is summarised here. Such studies were almost invariably focussed upon violent crime, particularly homicide. For the purposes of this research, caution should be applied, when parallels between American and British studies are drawn. The studies are taken from different social and judicial environments, where the motivations for crime and the effect of official interventions may vary. The extent to which the policing of British property crime and American violent crime are similar, should not be overstated. Nonetheless, both countries are advanced industrial nations with similar concepts of crime and of policing methods, allowing cautious but interesting conclusions to be drawn about the prime causes of crime and the effectiveness of policing.

The best-known example of an aggressively-applied policing style was 'zero tolerance' policing, introduced to New York City Police Department (NYPD) by Police Commissioner William Bratton in 1993. Supported by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, Bratton aimed to restore 'quality of life' to New York by the application of 'broken windows' theory. The theory postulated that disorder and minor offences were precursors of and therefore interlinked with, more widespread and serious crime

(Wilson and Kelling 1982, quoted in Eck and Maguire 2000, p.224). It has been the subject of serious academic criticism, chief of which was its lack of any empirical basis (Dixon and Maher 2005, p.123). Other critics have suggested that aggressive policing could lead to serious consequences in the form of community backlash (Eck and Maguire 2000, p.227).

In New York, the strategy of 'zero tolerance' policing was to make arrests for minor offences such as littering, drunkenness and urinating in public, in order to create a climate wherein crime was discouraged. Misdemeanour arrests in NYPD rose from 133,446 in 1993 to 205,277 in 1996. Aggressive policing was complemented by aggressive management, with the arrival of 'Compstat' in 1994. The Police Department introduced computerised crime analysis, including a real-time geographic mapping system. This was monitored from headquarters. Precinct commanders were expected to assume total responsibility for crime levels in their districts and to respond effectively to shifting patterns. They were called frequently to headquarters to account for their decisions, and if considered to be unsuccessful, were reassigned to other roles (Eck and Maguire 2000, pp.225-230).

There is little doubt that in introducing 'zero tolerance' and Compstat, Bratton made significant reforms to the force. The notion that the police could and should reduce crime, in the face of conventional academic wisdom, was attractive to existing police culture. There is also no doubt that crime fell significantly following the introduction of these innovations. However, crime had already fallen throughout the United States since 1991, before the introduction of 'zero tolerance' and Compstat. These were

unlikely to have been the primary causes of the reduction, but the question of whether it was more successful than other policing systems requires further consideration.

In the three years after the introduction of Compstat, the rate of decline in crime in New York City was similar to that in the surrounding states, and to that in large cities throughout the nation (Eck and Maguire 2000, p.231). Moreover, the fall in crime was an international phenomenon, occurring in 12 of the 17 advanced industrial countries (Barclay and Tavares 2000). As Dixon and Maher pointed out in relation to other United States cities:

'In most of these places, the police were not applying the NYPD strategy. They were either doing what they had always done or they were reforming in other directions. Unless you are prepared to make the unlikely claim that similar results were achieved by completely different inputs, then you have to accept that the New York miracle was not just the product of the NYPD, and that we have to look beyond policing for explanation.....This conclusion should not really be a surprise.....it is unlikely that cracking down on squeegee men would reduce a city's homicide rate by 75 per cent' (Dixon and Maher 2005, p.125).

In conclusion, the effectiveness of the New York 'zero tolerance' policing in relation to crime reduction, mirrored that of policing styles introduced about the same time in the United Kingdom. There is no evidence that zero tolerance policing caused greater crime reductions than would otherwise have been the case. This does not mean that there was no such reduction or other qualitative benefits, but that these were not

detectable against the background of greater changes in crime rates which occurred for other reasons.

For over twenty years, many police agencies in the United States have engaged in 'community policing'. Although there is no definition of the term, Eck and Maguire noted that it has usually included decentralised decision-making, and emphasised the promotion of good relationships between the police and the public. Community policing has no prescription for the nature of such relationships, which may range from minimal public involvement in policing, to partnerships for the formulation of policing policy. Common strategies have included the use of police officers on foot patrol and the promotion of Neighbourhood Watch schemes, neither of which has been demonstrated to reduce crime. Overall, there has been no consistent evidence of the effectiveness of community policing in general or of partnerships in particular. The rise of community policing cannot be shown to have played a role in violent crime reductions in the United States (Eck and Maguire 2000, pp.217-225).

Problem-oriented policing (POP) was also implemented by many police agencies. In contrast with the emphasis of community policing upon police-public relationships, POP was aimed at finding lasting solutions to the public's problems. In achieving such outcomes, police-public relationships were secondary; a means to the end. Although there were localised examples of successful crime reduction, evidence of widespread and thorough implementation of POP was difficult to prove. By 1997, about half of large agencies reported that they encouraged patrol officers to participate in problem-solving projects. The question of whether POP had been implemented thoroughly was difficult to resolve, but the limited available evidence suggested that

implementation was generally weak. In summary, there was little evidence to suggest that POP had contributed significantly to the violent crime reduction in the United States (Eck and Maguire 2000, pp243-245).

British Literature

In Great Britain, Morris and Heal were the first of a succession of Home Office researchers examining police efficiency and effectiveness in the early 1980s, reflecting increased public sector managerialism on behalf of the newly-elected Conservative government. In the absence of significant recorded experimentation in the domestic arena, they relied heavily upon American research, pointing to 'similarities in the organisation of police work (particularly that undertaken by the lower ranks) in tactics, workload distribution and the nature of public demand' (Morris and Heal 1981, pp3-4). In consideration of the Rand study, Morris and Heal accepted that:

'Differences in the training, staffing, workload and procedures of detective departments appear to have no appreciable effect on crime, arrest or clearance rates, and that the organisational structure of the force appears unrelated to such rates' (Morris and Heal 1981, p.29).

They also noted an exception to these general conclusions. In respect of serious crimes, investigating officers had some potential to increase arrest rates, providing that they only dealt with crimes of that nature. The authors made no estimate of the

effect of such improvements upon overall crime rates, although their conclusions amounted to acceptance that these might be minimal.

'At the risk of some over-simplification the message most obviously to be drawn from this review is that it is beyond the ability of the police to have a direct effect on a good deal of crime.....the cumulative evidence from completed studies, whatever their individual weaknesses, is, nevertheless, remarkably consistent in supporting the view that few police tactics seem to work very well' (Morris and Heal 1981, p.49).

The most that the police could reasonably hope for, was to identify a limited range of 'controllable crimes' which might be dealt with more effectively by 'carefully designed strategies specifically tailored to tackle selected problems' (Morris and Heal 1981 p.55).

The Home Office sought to develop this theme in a further study which:

'does not argue that nothing works.....rather, the report says that there is only limited scope for enhancing the impact which the police already have upon crime, and it aims to promote a sharper awareness of the options which offer best value for money' (Clarke and Hough 1984, p.2).

Considering conventional uniformed deterrent policing, the authors pointed out that a police officer on foot patrol in London could expect to go within one hundred yards of a burglary in progress, only once every eight years. Moreover, interviews with offenders confirmed that they knew that the chances of being caught committing a

crime were low. Random patrolling in cars was no more effective. An experiment in Kansas City in 1974 had manipulated levels of patrol cars so that some localities received extra patrolling at the expense of other areas. This had no discernible impact on crime patterns and indeed the experiment went virtually unnoticed by the public (Clarke and Hough 1984, p.7).

The effectiveness of crime investigation was also considered and referred to the pessimistic conclusion of the Rand survey, that 'only about 3 per cent of all index arrests appeared to result from special investigative efforts where organisation, training or skill could make any conceivable difference' (Clark and Hough 1984, p.10).

The poverty of conventional uniformed policing was thus complemented by equally ineffective detective work in terms of crime prevention. Despite these bleak conclusions, Clark and Hough were able to point to some strands of innovatory practice. For example, 'community' policing sought to improve police-public relations and bolster mechanisms of informal social control. At the same time, the development of 'situational' crime prevention aimed to alter the physical environment in ways which would make crime more difficult, from 'locks and bolts' to wider architectural improvements. The final category of innovation, that of improving the focus of police tactics, aimed to increase the ability of the police to catch criminals by a variety of methods.

Few of these initiatives had been the subject of evaluation, which in some cases would be extremely problematic due to their long-term nature, the difficulty of

finding suitable variables to measure, and the number of extraneous variables which might affect such evaluation.

Uniformed patrols could be concentrated in high-crime areas, although the effectiveness of doing so was unclear. The development of this approach by the extensive use of stop-and-search tactics yielded significant numbers of arrests, but for minor offences and in low proportion to the numbers of people stopped. This aggressive approach could have a markedly negative impact on police-public relations. Clarke and Hough were understandably cautious about this strategy in the wake of rioting which followed the Metropolitan Police's 'Swamp 81' operation in Brixton (p.14).

Finally, strategies based on the use of information to 'target' specific types of offender or even individual offenders, were considered. These involved the formation of specialist squads, which would take responsibility for dealing with specific categories of offence such as burglary or robbery. The working methods of the squads varied, such as in the use of information technology to ascertain crime patterns, or the use of surveillance techniques. However, they were relatively labour-intensive. Clark and Hough also pointed out that such a strategy 'is only effective against highly active offenders' (p.15). The extent to which this is a positive or negative attribute, is debatable. If such offenders are responsible for a large proportion of all offences, then the strategy would be effective and efficient. If however such offenders commit only a small proportion of all offences, targeting efforts might be effective in the limited sense of dealing with those offenders, but would not bring about substantial, wider reductions in crime levels. The benefits of such operations would then be primarily

qualitative and symbolic, in their ability to bring the most prolific offenders to justice. Moreover, the labour-intensive nature of achieving these results could render them a relatively expensive, and thus inefficient means of cutting crime.

The conclusions reached by Clarke and Hough were similar to those of their British and American predecessors. They accepted that the development and systematic application of strategies aimed at specific offenders, might make some reductions in crime. However, they considered that 'all of these approaches are of limited application and even if systematically applied, may not substantially alter overall levels of crime' (Clark and Hough 1984, p.19).

This was not a wholly pessimistic viewpoint. As Hough pointed out later, 'there is a world of difference between 'nothing works' and 'nothing works very well' (Hough 1987, p74). Five areas of potential improvement were highlighted. Technological advances included the use of improved DNA and fingerprint analysis, although this might be countered by offenders learning to avoid leaving forensic samples. The public could be encouraged to provide the police with more information, by the use of 'team' (geographic) policing. Informal social controls might be strengthened by greater use of schools liaison visits and Neighbourhood Watch programmes. Environmental improvements could potentially reverse the decline in appearance of localities and thus inhibit casually-committed offences such as criminal damage. Finally, the focus of police work could be shifted, to give a less central role to crime control. Although this concept had no contribution to make towards crime reduction, it reflected the view that the effectiveness of the police should be judged according to a wider range of criteria (Hough 1987, pp.74-78).

Hough had little faith that there would be such a change in perception, by either Government or by the public. He concluded that:

(Crimefighting) 'promises accountability, measurable output and popular consent. It offers clarity of purpose, which carries a greater premium than precision in both political and media discussion of policing. And finally, there is the inexorable demand from the public that the police get to grips with crime; people have for years been encouraged to regard this as a reasonable expectation, and they will not readily change their minds (Hough 1987, p.79).

This pessimistic outlook was challenged in a consecutive paper by Chatterton, who argued that whilst the conclusions might be valid, this was not proven. Echoing Gates and Knowles's rejection of the Rand conclusions a decade earlier, he contended that there was little data-based research evidence linking a type of policing activity (cause), to a particular outcome (effect). Far more experiments accompanied by evaluation were required in order to ascertain the nature of such linkages. This would require a cultural change where 'failed' experiments would be viewed as valuable, if the conditions leading to failure could be identified and designed out in future (Chatterton 1987, pp80-86).

The dominant academic view that policing activity does little to affect crime rates, has been lent weight by quantitative considerations. The number of variables, including confounding variables, is so great that the relationships between them are difficult to establish with confidence. This may account for the paucity of quantitative research

into such a significant area of public policy. Nonetheless, the conclusions inferred by such research are compelling and consistent. A study of forces' detection rates estimated that a 1 per cent increase in force staffing, equivalent to 7 per cent if directed entirely at CID, would raise the clear-up rate by less than 1 per cent (Burrows and Tarling 1982, p.11). Research into conviction rates concluded that for every patrolling police officer, there are at least 100 repeat offenders (Morgan and Newburn 1997, p. 115). A study of repeat offender statistics concluded that the potential for crime reduction by means of targeting repeat offenders was probably a low single-figure percentage of all crime (Heaton 2000).

A further study by the Home Office calculated the 'attrition rate' of offences within the criminal justice system. Crime statistics produced by the British Crime Survey, were compared with those figures generated by the police and the courts. It was estimated that for every 100 offences committed, 45 per cent are reported to police, who record 24 per cent as crimes. The police consider 5.5 per cent of offences to be detected. Only 3 per cent of crimes result in a formal caution or conviction, 2.2 per cent result in a conviction and 0.3 per cent see a custodial sentence (Home Office 1999 p.29).

These statistics, though drawn from a variety of contexts, reinforce Morris and Heal's 'remarkably consistent' picture of a police service and criminal justice system which cannot be very effective at reducing crime levels. The sheer volume of offenders and offences is so great that the experience of offenders is virtually always of non-detection. The impact of the agencies which deal with offenders is marginal, and the role of the justice system in reducing crime is primarily symbolic.

Despite the preponderance of evidence, these are provisional, not final conclusions. As Gates and Knowles, and later, Chatterton pointed out, the roots of crime are complex and little is known about their interactions with police interventions. It is therefore difficult to reach a final conclusion that such interventions are ineffective, or cannot be made more effective. The propensity of offenders to commit crime may be a product not of an objectively-based assessment of the police and the criminal justice system, but of their subjective perception of it. The persistent imprisonment of persistent offenders at the core of criminal networks, may exert deterrence upon less committed individuals at the fringes.

Moreover, public perceptions of levels and trends in criminality are frequently inaccurate. For example, the 2001 British Crime Survey estimated that there was a fall of 12 per cent in crime against people living in private households, during the period 1999-2000. Over the same timescale, 26 per cent of respondents believed that crime had risen 'a lot', whilst a further 32 per cent considered that it had risen 'a little' (Home Office 2001, pp. 13, 47). It is entirely possible that some offenders may have a similarly inaccurate perception of the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. For the most persistent criminals, detection of only a small proportion of offences may equate to being seen to be 'always being arrested' and 'always in and out of prison', which may have a deterrent effect upon the less committed offender. Paradoxically, high levels of criminality in some offenders, accompanied by greater police attention and targeting efforts, may reduce the offending of others.

The Prospects for Focussed Policing Styles

By the end of the 1980s, a body of American and British research evidence was available, from which the prospects for the police to reduce volume crime had been assessed. Such assessments were bleak. Little was known about the efficacy of primary, secondary or tertiary crime prevention. Researchers had concluded that police activity had little effect upon crime rates. There was some room for doubt, based on three possibilities. The first was that the development of specialist tactics could improve detection rates, although this was likely to apply only to a marginal number of offences, with little effect on the 'all crime' rate. An escalation in the use of specialist tactics far beyond anything seen hitherto, might significantly reduce crime levels. The second reason for doubt was that in the absence of precise knowledge of cause-effect mechanisms, effective policing techniques might exist but their effectiveness may not have been identified. Finally, the propensity of individuals to commit crime might be reduced, if their subjective perception of the likelihood of detection could be magnified far beyond the objective reality. The prospects for success of focussed policing styles in the 1990s hung upon these slender theoretical threads.

Policing styles were introduced in the 1990s with little reference to these considerations. The arguments for the widespread use of 'specialist' tactics were not counterbalanced by references to quantitative or historical evidence. For example, no estimate was made of the proportion of all offences, to which specialist tactics could in practice be applied. If that proportion was low, policing styles were unlikely to have much effect upon crime levels. Moreover, the prospects for any innovation were

poor unless the volume of reactive ‘business as usual’, in particular emergency calls, could be reduced in order to create proactive ‘tactical’ capacity. The experience of United States-based experiments had been that none had produced sufficiently positive results to justify their continuation. In short, when arguments in their favour were considered, the prospects for reducing crime by means of focussed policing styles remained bleak.

Policing Styles: Comparisons and Coexistence

The dominant policing styles of the 1990s will be described in Chapter 3, as the outcome of preliminary research. There is a significant and growing volume of qualitative academic literature surrounding these styles at an individual level. This is also discussed in detail in that chapter. In contrast, comparative evaluations of their relative strengths and weaknesses remain scarce. The use of research findings as a basis for either making informed choices between policing styles, or anticipating the effect of combining two or more styles, remains limited. The literature which deals with these considerations will now be outlined.

Comparative Studies

Bowling and Foster’s review of the role of policing in crime reduction, considered the effectiveness of a variety of policing styles. The evidence in relation to ‘zero tolerance’ policing, ‘problem oriented’ policing and ‘multi agency working’ was considered to be inconclusive. The judgement that ‘intelligence led’ policing ‘may be

effective in some contexts' was similar, reflecting the difficulties in separating the effects upon crime of policing styles, from those of wider socio-economic trends (Bowling and Foster 2002, p.998-999).

A comprehensive review of community policing, problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing styles examined the theoretical basis, aims and organisational structures of each model. It is unclear why these models were selected, other than that they 'all comprise reform movements for the police' (Tilley 2003 p.311) and were apparently viewed by the author as the most significant policing styles in use at the time.

'Community policing' was considered by Tilley to be poorly defined, in common with Eck and Maguire's assessment. The term implied policing in accordance with shared values of the public, which in practice, usually amounted to working in defined geographic localities. Tilley pointed out that in practice, such 'communities' are usually socially fractured with widely varied interests and values, and the achievement of accurate representation is almost impossible. He concluded that there was some consensus of the core elements of community policing, which is primarily aimed at achieving legitimacy. This included organisational decentralisation, patrol systems designed to encourage communication, consultation with representatives of the public, involvement in functions other than law enforcement and the use of problem-solving systems. As a consequence, the pattern of policing would vary from one place to another (Tilley 2003 pp.315-317).

'Problem oriented policing' aimed to identify, analyse and solve police-relevant community problems in a systematic manner. Examples included repeat victimisation, prolific offenders and seasonal crime. The emphasis was on finding the most appropriate solution, which might or might not involve the community consultation, geographic emphasis and 'bottom up' approach of community policing. The essence of the approach was technique-centred (Tilley 2003 pp.317-321).

'Intelligence-led' policing was focussed upon the reduction and detection of crime. Intelligence was used to identify repeat offenders, who became targets. The police then sought to systematically disrupt and curtail their activities by the use of measures such as arrest and curfews, with a presumption of prosecution wherever possible. The emphasis of intelligence-led policing was upon law enforcement (Tilley 2003 pp.323-324).

All three styles of policing expected to achieve reductions in crime, through the application of different priorities, emphases and key personnel. Tilley went on to consider whether the styles could be combined. In principle, the fundamental differences would make coexistence very difficult. In practice, the breadth and volume of non-negotiable 'business as usual' meant that each style could be used according to the context of activity and the role of officers. For example, community beat officers would practice community policing, crime prevention officers would engage in problem-oriented policing, and intelligence-led policing would be undertaken by intelligence officers. Coexistence would also occur at points of natural convergence. For example, problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing

would act to prevent repeat victimisation, using enhanced analytical capacity to identify and consider the events in detail (Tilley 2003 pp.327-329).

Concluding the review, the prospects for the three models were considered. Tilley pointed out that there are considerable difficulties in altering dominant patterns of thought and action in large organisations. Despite these difficulties, many individual officers were committed to one or other model and examples of excellent work could be found. Intelligence-led policing was considered to be the style which was best placed to receive wide implementation. It had received wide endorsement, and its methods were a development of traditional policing practices which do not threaten cultural beliefs. Moreover, the analytical capability allowed some problem-oriented policing, and some community engagement was encouraged in order to provide the intelligence which is the lifeblood of the model.

Problem-oriented policing was considered to be potentially the most beneficial of the three styles. Although lacking the strength of central commitment enjoyed by intelligence-led policing, it could be applied to all policing problems. It was evidence-based, stressing effectiveness over process. However, widespread application would require a revolution in police culture. The required long-term view was vulnerable to the immediate imperatives of emergency service work, and the outcomes of problem-oriented policing were too varied to be readily expressed through conventional performance indicators (Tilley 2003 pp.330-336).

Tilley's vision of co-existence of the three models represented a practical outcome, allowing each to operate within its arena of natural 'best fit' within existing structures and practices. This would be a relatively comfortable option for forces. What was not made clear by his review, was whether selective implementation of each model would produce limited effectiveness in the form of marginal crime reduction. Moreover, skewed existing force structures could severely limit the practice of one or other model. For example, a force may have reduced its establishment of community officers in order to invest in a heavily centralised, intelligence-led model. It is difficult to see how community policing practised by the few remaining officers could be particularly effective, other than at a very local level. Chapter 5 considers this question in greater depth.

The Integration of Policing Styles

In 1999, officers of the West Mercia Constabulary described the conceptual 'Four Tracks of Policing', upon which the force's activities were based. 'Track 1' was 'local policing', to be carried out by community-based officers. This emphasised community consultation to identify problems, in particular 'quality of life' concerns, which were to be tackled in a systematic 'problem oriented' manner. The second 'track' was 'responsive policing', in which the urgency and nature of calls for assistance were graded, prior to allocation to a suitable officer. 'Track 3' was 'partnership working' with other agencies, in accordance with the requirements of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Finally, 'Track 4' was 'targeted policing', in which resources could be

aimed at any frequently-recurring problems, from burglaries to road accidents in particular locations.

The West Mercia approach represented an early attempt to integrate the perceived advantages of several policing styles. The authors saw the 'four tracks' as complementary and stated that the approach had a 'proven success record', but failed to provide any supporting data (West Mercia 1999 pp.19-29). It was unclear whether their paper amounted to more than an example of Weatheritt's (1986) 'forgone conclusion research'.

Similar policing styles were identified in a Sussex Police-based discussion of the integration of 'partnership, problem-solving and the National Intelligence Model'. Problem-solving approaches to policing were considered to be interdependent with the 'partnership' policing required by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, The forthcoming Police Reform Act 2002 was to introduce the National Intelligence Model (NIM). The authors accepted these as the three predominant policing styles, equating the introduction of the NIM with intelligence-led policing. Differences between the styles were considered to be largely illusory. Integration depended upon development of police-focused 'problem profiling' under the NIM, to a more inclusive view of 'intelligence' which reflected the work of non-police partners (Oakensen et al 2002). No assessment was made of the resource demands of their model. Whilst broadening the definitions of each style allowed conceptual integration, there was no attempt to explain how their competing resource demands would allow for anything more than Tilley's 'selective implementation' of each style. There was

also no attempt to quantify the potential impact of the integrated model upon crime levels.

Socioeconomic Influences upon Crime Rates

The dominant academic view that policing has little effect upon crime, is complemented by the supposition that socioeconomic factors are the key influences upon the rise and fall of crime levels. An account of British and American literature summarises these factors.

Consumer Expenditure

A study by Field drew upon earlier work (Field 1990, Pyle & Deadman 1994, Hale 1998) to develop a socioeconomic model of property crime in England and Wales. The research hypothesised that the volume of long-term crime was primarily related to consumer expenditure.

It was argued that opportunities for theft and burglary were related to the positive opportunity effect of the quantity of consumer goods in circulation. This in turn was posited to be a function of consumer expenditure. Furthermore, it was postulated that since a large proportion of property crime is committed by young males, demographic trends should influence crime levels over time (Field 2000 p.7).

The research compared recorded crime levels, with those which would be predicted from Field's model. It was demonstrated that for every 1 per cent increase in

consumer expenditure, burglary and theft increased by about 2 per cent. Moreover, every 1 per cent increase in the number of males between aged 15 and 20 was associated with an increase in theft and burglary of about 1 per cent. These economic and demographic factors were the main factors which determined long-term 'equilibrium' levels of such crime, consumer expenditure being dominant. The application of these factors alone, produced an equilibrium level of theft and burglary which rose steadily between 1977 and 1997. 'What goes up, comes down', was an essentially correct, but over-simplistic maxim when applied to crime trends. A significant rise or fall in crime was likely to be followed by a 'correction', not to the previous level, but to a somewhat higher point at which the earlier trend was resumed.

The only disturbance in this pattern was in 1992-1994, when economic recession diminished consumer expenditure and the equilibrium crime level fell. The difference between actual and equilibrium levels of crime, was accounted for, at least in part, by short-term influences. The first of these was believed to be the 'pull' towards the equilibrium, of actual crime levels. Secondly, Field suggested that in periods of rapid economic growth or decline, there is an inverse relationship between personal consumption and property crime. During such times, people's perceptions of affluence or poverty are at their most acute. If they feel richer, they are less likely to feel the need to steal. This secondary effect of personal consumption opposes the positive effect described earlier, and accounts for most of the sharp peaks and troughs around the equilibrium of crime. In the recession of the early 1990s, the secondary effect vastly outweighed the dip in the equilibrium crime level, producing a sharp peak in property crime.

The effect of unemployment upon crime was also considered. A simple correlation was found between unemployment and property crime, but this was a far weaker link than that between crime and personal consumption. The nature of the link between unemployment and crime was unclear (Field 2000 p.15).

For the purposes of this research, consumer expenditure data was sought, but was not available at sub-regional level. Therefore, crime levels experienced by individual police forces could not be compared with those which would be predicted by Field's model.

Prison Expansion

In the twenty years from 1980 to 2000, the prison population of England and Wales increased from 43,900 to 65,910, amounting to a relative increase of 26% from 88.4 to 111.5 per 100,000 population (Source: Home Office website). Although this represented substantial growth, it was distinctly modest compared with the enthusiasm shown for incarceration across the Atlantic. The United States imprisoned 329,821 of its citizens in 1980, amounting to 139 per 100,000 population. By 2000, the figure had risen to 1,381,892 inmates, equivalent to 477 per 100,000 population, a relative increase of 243% from the 1980 figure (Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics website).

Spelman (2000) studied the phenomenon of crime elasticity, defined as the percentage change in the crime rate associated with a 1 per cent change in the prison population.

A combination of simulation studies and multiple regression-based econometric studies was used to analyse the relationship between violent crime and imprisonment in the United States, between 1974 and 1997. It was estimated that at the end of the period, violent crime was between 4 per cent and 21 per cent lower than it would have been otherwise, in the absence of prison expansion. As the author pointed out, the astronomical cost of incarceration on that scale could be used to pay the average working wage, to every unemployed adult in the country. (Spelman 2000, pp97-129). Reductions in crime are very low, in relation to increases in levels imprisonment and associated financial cost. In the context of England and Wales, the scale of increases in imprisonment since 1980, are little more than one-tenth those of the United States. The consequent reductions in crime are likely to have amounted to a minimal, low single-figure percentage of all crime.

Drugs Culture

No review of influences upon crime rates would be complete without some consideration of the demand for the consumption of controlled drugs. In the absence of suitable British literature, the experience of a large city in the United States is described. Considerable caution must be exercised when considering transferability of that experience to the British environment. There are likely to be substantial cultural differences, particularly in relation to the carrying of firearms, which would reduce drug-related variations in serious violent crime in Great Britain. Nonetheless, the American experience may provide some guidance as to the effect of drugs culture upon drugs-related property crime and lower-level violent crime.

In the 1980s and 1990s, New York City experienced a series of distinct drugs 'eras', or periods during which the use of a particular drug was predominant. The 'cocaine/crack era' peaked in the late 1980s, to be replaced in the early 1990s by the 'marijuana/blunts era' (Johnson et al 2000). 'Blunt' referred to the placing of marijuana into a cigar wrapper. The widespread use of each drug was accompanied by a distinctive sub-culture.

The early 1980s saw the increased use of cocaine in the United States in preference to its predecessor, heroin. The cost of the cocaine and the difficulty of its administration limited its initial popularity. About 1984, vials of 'crack' cocaine, with impurities removed, were distributed. These only needed to be heated prior to inhalation of fumes, and were massively addictive. A typical crack user would cyclically commit a property crime, spend the proceeds on crack and smoke it, several times per day. No drug-substitute treatment was available. Crack distribution became so lucrative that virtually the entire illicit drugs market in New York turned to it. Buyers could choose between offers and inevitably, competition grew among sellers. A sub-culture developed of handgun use and assault, in order to protect sellers' 'turf', to discipline drugs debtors and to rob other sellers (Blumstein and Rosenfeld 1998 pp.1208-1210, Johnson et al 2000).

The 1990s saw the rise of marijuana use and a corresponding drop in the consumption of cocaine. This was primarily a consequence of the attainment of adulthood by inner-city youths, who did not wish to participate in the poverty and destructive lifestyle induced by crack. Their sub-culture emphasised the controlled use of

marijuana and alcohol in group settings, the sociable ambience being enhanced by the provision of music and non-aggressive language. They developed strong avoidance norms against the use of heroin and cocaine.

'Don't use crack. Crackheads are shit! Heroin injection causes AIDS! Addicts are the scum of the earth. Stay safe, stay alive. Don't mix cocaine or heroin with my marijuana. Shun and exclude heroin and crack users from peer groups' (Johnson et al 2000, p.185)

The marijuana generation required less money, and therefore less property crime, to fund its habit. Profit margins were lower than was the case with crack, encouraging fewer users to become dealers. Many users were also aware that few of their crack-dealing predecessors had ultimately made much money, far more having been killed, disabled or imprisoned. The social setting of marijuana use together with reduced inter-dealer rivalry, contributed towards additional reductions in violent crime (Johnson et al 2000, p.189).

There is no direct evidence of the extent to which changes in drugs markets affected United States crime rates, but there are significant indications that it may have been substantial, particularly in the cocaine/crack era. Rates of violent crime rose and fell in coincidence with the use of crack nationally. A survey of U.S. cities showed that the introduction of crack in each, correlated closely with peak homicide rates (Grogger 2000 p.284-285).

Demographic Composition

A study of homicide in the United States showed that during the rise in offences between 1985 to 1992, arrests per 100,000 population for those aged 18 and younger doubled, whilst those for ages 30 and above declined by 20-25 per cent. During 1993-1997, there was a universal fall in arrests which was steepest for the younger age group.

In 1993, the year of peak offending, the smallest age cohort for persons aged under 40, was at age 17. Younger and older aged persons saw progressively larger cohorts, but at the rate of only about 1 per cent for each year older or younger. As the 1990s progressed, the substantial fall in arrests of persons aged 18 and under for homicide, coincided with a slowly rising population of that age group. Therefore, there was no simple relationship between age and the prevalence of this type of offence (Blumstein and Rosenfeld 1998 pp 1183-1189).

Conclusions

Research evidence indicates that socio-economic factors, and in particular consumer expenditure, have a significant effect upon crime rates. In contrast, further evidence suggests that the effect of policing is marginal. In particular, no assessment of focussed policing styles has concluded that their use, either singly or in combination, significantly reduces crime levels. The strong consensus is that there is some prospect that limited co-existence of styles may be achieved, but with no prospect of

substantial quantitative gains. It remains the case that 'innovative strategies may have some impact in particular situations but probably not much effect on overall levels of crime' (Reiner 2000 p.215). This consensus represents an inferential judgement, based upon a variety of research studies. The studies include evaluations of 'innovative strategies' carried out on a small scale, usually in the United States, and over relatively short periods of time. The effect of an innovative strategy' embedded in an entire police force for several years, remained untested.

In order to resolve whether Reiner's conclusion is correct, it is necessary to establish the nature and distribution of the predominant policing styles which came into use in English and Welsh forces in the 1990s. Chapter 3 is an account of original research which aims to achieve that goal. The period saw unprecedented experimentation with focussed policing styles, prior to the homogenising effect of the Police Reform Act 2002. Comparisons of the rise or fall in volume crime associated with each policing style would enable their relative effectiveness to be assessed. These assessments are made in Chapter 6 of the thesis.

Chapter 3

The Policing Styles of Home Office Police forces in England and Wales¹

Introduction

The last twenty or so years saw increasingly significant attempts by government to meet rising public expectations in the provision of public services. (For a wider discussion of policing reform in the context of New Public Management, see Leishman et al 1996, pp.20-24). Chapter 1 outlined how in the policing context, this process started in 1983 with the issue of Home Office Circular 114/83 'Manpower, Efficiency and Effectiveness', the first in a series of such 'advisory' papers (Home Office 1983). Recorded crime levels however rose steadily throughout the 1980s. In response to this perceived failure on the part of the police, the Conservative government imposed 'efficiency' measures upon the service by means of the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994, including new 'businesslike' police authorities and the setting of national performance indicators to ensure managerial accountability. (Loveday 1996 p. 73-75).

¹ This chapter is based upon the paper 'Uniform Styles? Aspects of Police Centralisation in England and Wales', Hale C, Heaton R. and Uglow S. (2004)

The White Paper on Police Reform which preceded the Act envisaged that statutory bodies would act in support of these aims. In particular, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) was 'expected to collaborate with the Home Office and other interested agencies, such as the Audit Commission, to develop good practice and to provide co-ordinated advice and support to forces on implementation of key policies' (Home Office 1993, para.13).

The publication of the White Paper coincided with the first foray undertaken by the Audit Commission into the organisation of mainstream policing. Its November 1993 report 'Helping With Enquiries – Tackling Crime Effectively' advocated the adoption by forces of an 'intelligence led' policing style in order to reduce burgeoning crime rates (Audit Commission 1993). The implementation of the report's recommendations was encouraged by HMIC in its annual inspection reports of individual forces and in specialised thematic inspection reports.

The years following 'Helping With Enquiries' saw sustained reductions in recorded crime levels for the first time in many years. Despite the lack of research evidence pointing to any causal relationship between police action and crime rates, the appetite of successive governments to legislate for diminished crime had been whetted. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 required 'partnership' working between police, local authorities and other agencies. The Police Reform Act 2002 went further, specifying in greater detail the 'how' in addition to the 'what' of expectations upon forces. Prior to this legislation, forces were already able to consider the use of a succession of well-publicised and labelled policing

styles, all promising to make a significant if unquantified impact upon crime rates (Maguire 2000, p.316). In addition to the Audit Commission's 'intelligence led' policing, 'community', 'problem oriented' and 'zero tolerance' policing, together with 'partnership working' all enjoyed periods of media and political prominence as 'the' answer to crime.

The 1990s saw the voluntary practice by most forces of one or more of these policing styles, prior to the greater homogeneity imposed by the Police Reform Act 2002. The decade amounted to a unique period of experimentation, which presented a research opportunity to assess the degree of crime reduction which was associated with each style. What was not clear, was whether forces practised a sufficiently small aggregate number of styles, to allow a reasonable sample size of each for assessment purposes. Moreover, the extent to which a named policing style represented a consistent set of structures and practices, was not apparent. The study described in this chapter aimed to establish the nature and range of policing styles brought into use in the 1990s. This preliminary research would allow further examination of the relationship between the use of focussed policing styles and the reduction of volume crime.

The chapter summarises the research literature in relation to each policing style, explaining its underpinning theory and the academic assessments of its effectiveness at securing crime reduction.

The 1990s was a period of competing influences upon police forces. The pressures of centralisation imposed by government and its agencies being in varying degrees of

tension with the traditional independence of Chief Constables. The range of bodies which influence the policies of police forces has been explored elsewhere (Jones et al. 1994 pp.289-295, Savage et al. 2000a, pp 129-137, 2000b). Her Majesty's Inspectorate and the Audit Commission became the key external agencies in examining, monitoring and reforming working practices in police forces in the 1990s. Their respective contributions towards centralisation of the police service are considered further in Chapter 8. The literature published by these bodies is an obvious source of information with which to assess the nature and distribution of policing styles. HMIC reports relating to individual police forces and also to multi-force thematic inspections were considered to be of adequate quality for the survey and were used as a primary information source. This process will be described in more detail.

Methodology of Study

In order to assess the nature of policing styles adopted by police forces, HMIC Inspection reports were studied in respect of all forces in England and Wales. This source was used as a means of gathering sufficiently reliable data for the purpose to which it was to be put, with other practical considerations. First, full HMIC Inspection reports address a consistent range of issues, and thus offer comparable information, across all forces. They also appear to retain a high degree of objectivity, unlike Chief Constables' and police authority annual reports which are in large part public relations documents, invariably

presenting forces' activities in a positive light. HMIC comments in relation to Force performance are in contrast not infrequently pointed, such as:

'There is no comprehensive crime strategy to guide development and help set priorities. Indeed.....it has apparently been delayed by the re-organisation rather than providing the essential guide to it.' (HMIC 1999d),

or pithy, such as:

'Senior managers.....describe patrols as being intelligence led....The paucity of IT provision has an especially negative effect on the ability of the force to maximise the use of intelligence to direct activity.' (HMIC 2000k).

It was apparent upon initial examination of Inspection reports, that the City of London force's primary agenda of public order, terrorism and financial fraud was far removed from other forces' concerns about volume crime such as burglary and theft of and from motor vehicles. In the light of its different priorities and uniquely small geographical size, the organisational structure and working practices adopted by the City might reasonably be expected to differ from those of other forces. The City of London was therefore excluded from further consideration.

In respect of each of the other 42 forces, the most recent full Inspection report was studied. Dependent upon the force, this referred to the year 1998-99, 1999-2000 or 2000-2001. Key policing styles were identified and an assessment made of the state of their development within individual forces. Assessments were placed into one of three categories.

‘Acknowledged/emphasised’ was used where a force laid significance upon a particular style, but there was little or no evidence of its practice in a systematic and sustained manner. ‘Developing/limited’ was used where a force had declared an intention of pursuing a particular style and was either in the course of putting supporting structures into place, or had done so but only to a markedly limited extent. Finally, the category ‘implemented’ acknowledged that a particular style had reached a state of maturity within a force, being practised comprehensively and consistently. In order to ensure that the development of a style within a force was not under-represented, all previous HMIC reports relating to that force were checked, working back until 1990. The results were then summarised.

The study method used was not sufficiently precise to allow a detailed quantitative evaluation of the results. There was an assumption that HMIC reports had reported upon and reflected to a reasonable degree of accuracy, the issues which were subject of examination. Furthermore, and in spite of the back-checking of over 300 earlier HMIC reports, there remained an element of subjectivity in their interpretation. Additionally, the triennial nature of full Inspections meant that the results represented a picture of activity across a significant timescale, rather than a true temporal ‘snapshot’.

Despite these limitations, the survey method was adequate for the use to which it was put, namely a broad assessment of the range of policing styles in use to combat volume crime, and an indication of the extent of adoption of each style by each force. Policing strategies and styles evolve constantly under a variety of labels and sometimes under none. It is

difficult to envisage a survey method which would fulfil better the requirements of timeliness and more importantly objectivity, or to dispute Loveday's contention that the evidence provided by HMIC reports is 'limited yet still persuasive' (Loveday 2000, p.235).

Results

Four widespread, clearly identifiable varieties of policing style were found. The number of forces subscribing to each and their relative extent of their development is summarised at Table 1. The persistently identified themes were intelligence-led', 'problem oriented' and 'geographic' policing, together with 'partnership working', a term which recognises the crime reduction role of non-police agencies. The nature of each policing style and its underlying principles will be described, together with an account of relevant literature.

Table 1.**No. of Police Forces Operating Identified Policing Styles**

Extent of Development	Policing Style							
	Geographic		Problem Oriented		Intelligence Led		Partnerships	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
None	15	36	20	48	0	0	0	0
Acknowledged/ Emphasised	2	5	6	14	4	10	9	19
Developing/ Limited Implementation	4	10	11	26	27	64	21	50
Fully Implemented	21	50	5	12	11	26	12	29

Notes:

1. Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
2. Total no. of HMIC reports studied = 366
3. Data refers to HMIC Inspection Reports published to end August 2001.

Intelligence Led Policing

Intelligence-led policing (ILP) was initiated and adopted by an increasing number of forces following the publication of the 1993 Audit Commission report 'Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively' (Audit Commission 1993). As implied by its title, the report aimed to reduce then-burgeoning crime levels by 'doing the practical business of policing more smartly, incorporating modern information technology and modern methods' (Tilley 2003 p.321). In summary, it proposed the adoption of 'crime desks' to screen out the majority of crime from further investigation. The resources saved would be used to strengthen the intelligence function and gain better information about the activities of prolific offenders. Forces' proactive 'tactical' capacity would also be increased, to act upon intelligence and disrupt these offenders by means such as the execution of search warrants and the making of arrests. The new emphasis of ILP was upon 'targeting the criminals rather than responding to crime incidents' (Audit Commission 1993, p.2). ILP sought to identify, target and incapacitate those prolific offenders who commit a relatively large proportion of crime, thus producing maximum leverage on the crime problem with finite resources.

Although the systematic application of ILP was novel in the United Kingdom, its principles were not new, having been exploited in American forces for many years. The Special Operations Division of the City Police Department in Kansas City, Missouri was an early exponent of intelligence-led policing. In 1972-73, a 'Criminal Information Centre' (CIC) which gathered information about prolific offenders, was established. The

CIC acted as a clearing-house for intelligence, emphasising the use of informants and surveillance. The CIC directed officers by means of 'location oriented patrol' (LOPs), and 'perpetrator oriented patrol' (POPs). The terms 'CIC', 'LOPs' and 'POPs' are equivalent to their modern-day counterparts 'intelligence unit', 'hotspots' and 'offender targeting'. The results of the experiment were disappointing, achieving no discernible effect upon crime rates or detection rates. It was also considered to be relatively expensive. (Pate et al 1976).

In 1982, a 'Repeat Offender Program' was introduced in Washington D.C. A team of 88 selected officers was used to arrest offenders believed to be committing five or more serious offences per week. The study found that the likelihood of target offenders being arrested and convicted, increased. However, this may have been partly due to the selective and highly motivated nature of the team, which may have reduced productivity elsewhere in the organisation. In summary, the study found that the strategy could be effective in respect of individual offenders, but it was difficult to establish 'cause and effect' relationships between police activity and crime levels (Martin 1986, Martin and Sherman 1986).

It is clear that these experiments had methodological limitations. It is unlikely that the Washington force's analytical capabilities in the 1980s, could match those provided by computer systems, over twenty years later. They may also have been affected by limitations upon funding, which was usually discontinued after a year in the absence of a rapid effect upon crime rates. The question of whether the results were due to failure of

theory or failure of practice remains open. What is clear, is that the arrest of prolific offenders did not reduce volume crime in fulfilment of the ILP theory.

The identification of an intelligence-led policing structure in modern-day English and Welsh police forces is fairly straightforward. Amey et al. (1996, pp.4-5) identified essential and optional elements of an integrated ILP model. Essential components consisted of a Tasking and Coordinating Group to decide upon non-emergency resource deployment; a Crime Desk to deal with appropriate crimes by means of telephone investigation; and an Intelligence Unit to develop intelligence and devise suitable tactics to incapacitate offenders. The examination of HMIC reports found that 11 forces (26%) had an integrated ILP model, whilst 27 others (64%) were developing such a model, or had implemented ILP to only a limited extent. The remaining 4 (10%) of forces acknowledged the significance of intelligence but appeared to taken few steps towards its practical development and use.

There is a small but growing body of literature examining ILP (eg Gill 1998, Gill 2000, Heaton 2000, Maguire 2000, Townsley and Pease 2002, James 2003, Tilley 2003, Hale et al 2004, 2005, Maguire and John 2006). Much of this literature points out that both the extent to which policing 'on the ground' has changed and the crime reduction benefits, remain unclear. For example,

'the term ILP is now used in many different contexts and the strategies can be very different in application....There is a priori a suspicion that little has actually changed' (James 2003 pp.54-55).

Limited effectiveness may have been the inevitable outcome of the application of weak theory. The key to the Commission's approach was its extraction of information contained within Home Office Statistical Bulletin 32/89 (Home Office 1989, p.2).

'Helping with Enquiries' stated that,

'Analysis of the histories of a large sample of males born in a particular year showed that 7% of them accounted for 65% of all convictions in this age group'
(Audit Commission 1993 p.54).

The striking contrast between 7 and 65 per cent was an apparently attractive basis upon which to make significant inroads upon volume crime. The difficulty with this interpretation was that the 7% of males quoted, referred to the population at large, not to the offending population. The Statistical Bulletin went on to equate 7 per cent of males with 21 per cent of offenders (Home Office 1989 p.8), a fact not mentioned by the 'Helping With Enquiries' report. The involvement of 21 per cent of offenders in 65 per cent of crime allows objective, if mundane conclusions to be drawn. The police in a medium-sized town of 100,000 people would be required to target several thousand offenders, in order to make a substantial impact upon the level of crime. Therefore, the efficiency of ILP is unlikely to be matched by effectiveness. The ability of the police to reduce volume crime by targeting repeat offenders is more limited than has been widely assumed (Heaton 2000).

Despite variations in its application, the core structure of intelligence-led policing is well-defined, and it has been practised for over a decade by a substantial number of forces. The emphasis of ILP upon law enforcement is likely to be in accord with the culture of police officers (Tilley 2003 p.334), but it carries a risk of ethical problems from the disproportionate use of intelligence gathering such as covert surveillance (Maguire 2000). The endorsement by ACPO, HMIC, the Audit Commission and the Home Office (HMIC 1997a) culminated in the development of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) by the National Criminal Intelligence Service (John and Maguire 2003). The incorporation of the NIM in the 2003-2006 National Policing Plan (Home Office 2002a p.14) confirmed predictions that ILP was likely to take hold more quickly than other policing styles (Tilley 2003 p.35).

Geographic Policing

‘Geographic’ policing, sometimes referred to as ‘sector’ or ‘neighbourhood’ policing, involves the subdivision of Basic Command Units (BCUs) into localities which are policed by small units, typically under Inspector command. Emergency response may be provided locally or at divisional level. The strategy relies upon officers becoming sensitive to community needs and taking long-term responsibility for problem-solving, frequently in consultation with other agencies. It could be readily identified by examination of HMIC reports, the devolvement of responsibilities on a geographical as opposed to a functional basis being relatively clear and unequivocal. Of the forty two



forces studied, this method of policing appeared to be have been fully implemented by twenty one (50%) of forces and partially developed by four others (10%). The impetus for its growth was unclear, but appeared to have been generated from within the service rather than as a result of central government pressure or research evidence.

Although literature in relation to geographic policing is scarce, the concept is not new. In 1989 the Chief Constable of the Surrey Constabulary, Brian Hayes, introduced Total Geographic Policing to the force. The aims were to give policing areas continuity of service, from officers who were well-briefed on local problems and priorities, together with the motivation of 'ownership' to set about solving problems. Sub-Divisions were divided into sub-areas under the management of an inspector and two sergeants. Officers were expected to police demand rather than a fixed bloc of time, using flexible duty rosters. Enhanced 'station information units' were introduced, to provide intelligence information and demand analysis (Hayes 1987 pp28-34).

The innovation sparked a heated debate in the columns of the service's biggest-selling weekly paper, *Police Review*. An anonymous Surrey officer claimed that the high rate of officer transfer from the force was in large part, the result of antipathy towards Total Geographical Policing, 'or as our operations room calls it, 'Try Getting a Policeman!'' Others claimed that there were insufficient numbers of them to work the system properly, reducing their motivation to tackle problems and leaving them dangerously exposed at times of disorder (*Police Review* 1990a, pp.598-599). A follow-up investigation by *Police Review* found that such views were widely but not universally held. Officers in

parts of the force which had operated the scheme for several years as part of an experiment, cited successful examples of problem-solving motivated by continued geographical responsibility (Police Review 1990b, pp.745-746).

The longer-term results were that between 1988 and 1998, trends in 'all crime' in Surrey broadly followed the national pattern, rising to a peak in 1992 prior to a long-term decline. Burglary also followed a similar pattern to that experienced nationally, peaking in 1993. The 1989-1993 rise in burglary of 100% was very steep, compared with 42-force average of about 75%. The 1993-1999 fall in burglary was also greater than that in most forces.

Surrey's record of crime reduction is summarised in Chapter 6. The force saw strong reductions in respect of 'all crime' and thefts of motor vehicles, but substantially weaker reductions in burglary, relative to other forces. There is good reason to doubt that the best results were achieved as a consequence of Surrey's policing style. Geographic policing started in the force in 1989 and was followed for the next four years by very steep rises in crime. The subsequent decline in crime, whilst not fully explained, was timed exactly the same as those in most other forces. Therefore, the fall seems to have been substantially a consequence of regaining an equilibrium position.

Elsewhere, an evaluation was made of the outcomes of geographic policing, following several one-year projects which took place in West Yorkshire in 1992-93, sponsored by the Urban Crime Fund (UCF) initiative. (Brownlee and Walker 1998, pp. 125-152). In summary, the effect upon recorded crime was 'at best only mildly positive or at worst,

neutral' (p.139), and detection rates fell in line with the general trend for the force (p.140). Moreover, opinion surveys showed that there was no overall reduction in public fear of crime (p.141-143). These results may have been a consequence of the short-term nature of the project. The researchers concluded that

'a community-based or problem-oriented style of policing requires considerable change at an organisational and structural level, together with extensive preparation of those personnel who are to be involved, none of which was evidenced at the time of the UCF in West Yorkshire' (Brownlee and Walker 1998, pp.147-148).

Despite these pessimistic findings, the principles underpinning geographic policing found favour with chief officers, who had implemented it half of all forces by the time of this survey. Later, the approach received the seal of governmental approval as part of a broader 'neighbourhood policing' approach to crime. The White Paper 'Building Communities, Beating Crime', echoing Surrey's intentions fifteen years previously, promised that officers:

'.....will involve their local community in establishing and negotiating priorities for action and in identifying and implementing solutions. They will ensure a two-way flow of information with the community to build trust and cooperation to help them deal more effectively with crime and antisocial behaviour.....People will see a more visible, accessible police presence on the streets and in their communities' (Home Office 2004 pp.7-8).

Given this requirement, geographic systems of policing seem certain to become adopted by all Home Office police forces, although the extent of implementation within individual forces may vary widely. Experience suggests that the achievement of the promised outcomes is at best, far from certain. Furthermore, geographic policing requires a decentralised structure, which forces are expected to implement in addition to the National Intelligence Model. This may cause further tensions which are discussed in Chapter 9 of this thesis.

Problem Oriented Policing

‘Problem oriented policing’ (POP) is based on the principle of identifying and tackling the underlying causes of problems, rather than merely responding to the symptoms. The notion was formally espoused by Herman Goldstein and widely adopted in the United States (Goldstein 1979). The aim of POP is to systematically address ‘patterned issues of community concern’, which include, but are not limited to crime. These may be as diverse as traffic problems, neighbour disputes and widespread perceptions of insecurity. The patterns may consist for example of repeat victimisation, incident hotspots or seasonal incident patterns (Tilley 2003 p.318). Problem-oriented policing is not synonymous with problem-solving policing (Bullock and Tilley 2003, p.8). Police officers have always used an element of problem-solving on an informal basis. In contrast, the full POP model requires a systematic process of problem identification, analysis, solving, monitoring and evaluation. Whilst the distinction is acknowledged here,

it is not evident that police forces are aware of it, using both terms in publications such as annual reports. The full POP process can be lengthy and resource-intensive (Leigh et al 1998, Enders 1999). In practice, overlaps and feedback between theoretically discrete stages of the process make the model's practice messier than its theory (Tilley 2003 p.321).

The effectiveness of problem-oriented policing is inconclusive. Examples may be readily found of successful examples of its application in well-defined circumstances and on a small scale. For example, thefts of plug-in kitchen appliances from newly-built houses were reduced from 3.9 to 0.9 per cent, after builders were persuaded to install them after the houses had become occupied (Tilley 2003 p.319). Implementation on a significant scale has proved to be more elusive. In summary,

'In the United States it has been found very difficult to convert POP from a promising set of ideas into an altered way of policing, and this experience has been matched in this country also' (Leigh et al 1998, p.9).

For example 'sector policing' was introduced in London in 1992, in an attempt to increase police accountability and public consent. In common with Surrey, the force aimed to encourage officers to 'own and 'get ahead' of local problems by identifying and helping to tackle their underlying causes' (Dixon and Stanko 1995 p.172). Similar inspector-led 'sectors' were required to align shift patterns with demand, and guidance was provided for the formation of public consultation groups. Public acceptance was to be gained by repeated and prolonged community contact.

Experience did not match these aspirations. Put simply, the population and its attendant 'problems' were too numerous and too dispersed, to be tackled and solved in the manner envisaged by proponents of POP. The researchers noted that:

'The most fundamental difficulty was the sheer number of people policed by a single sector and its officers. The three sectors on our inner city division were relatively compact but covered areas with resident populations in excess of 30,000. Officers can hardly be expected to 'own' the problems of such a large number of people in any meaningful waythe system was under constant threat from the demands made on the time of sector-based officers to provide aid to other parts of the MPS or to provide 'core duties' off the sector for which they were primarily responsible' (Dixon and Stanko 1995 p.178).

Moreover, officers' commitment to problem-solving was not evident, and they continued to perceive themselves as accountable to their police colleagues rather than the public. Existing specialist community officers were of the view that the arrival of sector-based officers had done nothing to strengthen links between the police and the community. In this respect, there was little evidence that additional formal accountability mechanisms had been created. Neighbourhood forums covering a range of community issues already existed, and there was little appetite on the part of the police or the public to alter their make-up or agendas (Dixon and Stanko 1995 pp.177-179).

Although the longest-established policing style of those examined here, POP was found to have the lowest level of full implementation. Those forces which implemented formal POP processes in the UK followed considerable Home Office interest in the technique in the mid 1990s (Leigh, Read and Tilley 1996, 1998). HMIC reports show awareness of this distinction, noting for instance that:

'In the same way as sub-divisional commanders describe their policing style as intelligence-led, they also describe their approach as problem-solving through partnership.....However, there is a difference between a force that has strong partnership links and one that fully embraces the problem-solving ethos.' (HMIC 2000k, p.35).

The traditional obsession of the police with catching criminals has been cited as fostering cultural resistance to implementation of POP (Tilley 2003 p.329, Leigh et al 1996 p.39). Pragmatic considerations are equally significant, the most obvious being the problem of how officers who have to respond to urgent, effectively non-negotiable demands for service, can find the time to invest in a lengthy process, however worthy (Tilley 2003 p.330, Bullock and Tilley 2003 p.6). This difficulty may explain why Cleveland Police, a force committed to POP which claimed to have a 'national reputation' in the field, used the approach only 82 times during the year 1999-2000 (Cleveland Police 2000 p.3). During the same year, the force recorded 65,185 crimes (Home Office 2001a) and answered 99,665 '999' calls (HMIC 2001, p.12). This equates to one use of POP per 795 crimes, or one use of POP per 1215 emergency calls. If each solved problem prevented ten crimes or ten '999' calls per year, its impact would be a reduction in the region of one

per cent of either crimes or '999' calls. Unless the scale of POP implementation were to be multiplied many times, it is difficult to see how its impact could be other than marginal.

In common with intelligence-led policing (ILP), POP depends for effectiveness upon the existence of highly patterned incidents, which are amenable to prevention by means of identification and interception by the police and partner agencies. The limited available evidence suggests that POP shares the same Achilles heel as ILP. The volume of incidents with a low degree of repetition, whether crime or otherwise, is very high. Police intervention in highly patterned incidents is resource-intensive and has little effect upon the total volume of incidents.

It seems inevitable that forces must operate triage systems, whether explicit or otherwise, in order to determine which 'problems' receive further attention. This raises the interesting question of what factors are used to make such a determination. These might potentially include 'solvability' of the problem, the scale of perceived benefit to the public, the local prominence of the problem and the need to avert complaints.

The expanded, problem-solving role for the police has also raised some strong objections. It has been argued that the police are an emergency service whose job is to provide the initial response to incidents, whilst other agencies should solve underlying problems. Moreover, those problems may be so deep-seated that they are beyond the capacity of any agency and certainly the police, to make any significant impact (Leigh et al 1996, p.39).

This view was expressed trenchantly by Waddington (2005), reviewing a failed POP project in Thames Valley and Northumbria. He noted that:

'Like other researchers who have documented failures in relation to the problem oriented policing approach, these authors do not attribute blame to the weakness of the policies or the theory on which those theories are based, but to the people responsible for applying the policy.....It makes no more sense to ask police officers to resolve the multitude of problems whose manifestations they tackle, than it would be to blame or praise the fire service for fluctuating levels of damage and injury caused by house fires (Waddington 2005a, pp.14-15).

Examination of recent HMIC reports suggested that of the forty two forces studied, POP had been comprehensively implemented by five (12%). The technique was being actively developed by eleven (26%) of others. These results broadly reflect the findings of the thematic inspection report 'Calling Time on Crime' which examined the extent of forces' POP development in 1998 and in 2000 (HMIC 2000a, p.71).

More recently, problem oriented policing received government backing in the National Policing Plan 2003-2006. The Plan required that in formulating local policing plans, '....forces should work closely with CDRP's. Plans should cover all aspects of the problem from responding to reports of antisocial behaviour incidents to fundamental problem solving' (Home Office 2002a p.9).

This endorsement was less than prescriptive. The Policing Plan required that some auditable problem solving activity took place, but was silent about the precise nature or the extent of such activity. Given this flexibility and the probable difficulties of going further, the likelihood was that most forces would opt for limited implementation. 'Success' was likely to consist of the citation of individual examples of POP rather than the measurement of reduced aggregate numbers of crime or incidents of antisocial behaviour. The same Home Office endorsement made it clear that POP would be associated with the work of Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs), which consisted of multi-agency groups with representatives from local authorities, the police and other bodies. The link between POP and 'partnership working' had been made explicit.

Partnership Working

The background to the rise of 'partnership working' was described in Chapter 2. In summary, the 1991 Morgan Report recommended the redefinition and broadening of established 'crime prevention' techniques to 'community safety,' and proposed that local authorities should co-ordinate strategies in their areas (Hughes 1996 p.225). The Conservative Government shelved the report. Its recommendations were later resurrected by the incoming Labour administration and formed the basis of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act. The Act required local authorities to devise community safety plans,

working towards published crime reduction targets, in partnership with police and other agencies such as local health and education services.

‘Partnership working’ was the first of the four policing styles identified, to receive statutory backing. It is therefore not surprising that of the 42 forces studied, all emphasised their commitment to it in some way. Interpretation of HMIC reports suggested that 12 forces (29%) had highly developed force-wide partnership mechanisms, 21 forces (50%) were actively developing such systems, whilst the remaining 9 forces (19%) acknowledged their responsibilities in more general terms. It should be noted that objective assessment of such development was relatively difficult and therefore these figures should be treated with appropriate caution. All forces have carried out varying degrees of partnership working for many years and are able to cite examples of successful partnerships. In view of the mandatory legislative requirement, they have every incentive to do so. In the absence of an ideal model or template, assessments of the degree of implementation in this research, reflected as much the degree of HMIC approval expressed for arrangements in each force, as the existence of specific organisational structures and processes.

In common with the experience of other policing styles, successful examples of ‘partnership working’ have not readily translated into broader crime reduction results. It is unclear whether this is the outcome of weak theory, or sound theory which has suffered from deficiencies in implementation. Whilst strength of theory is untested, examples of difficulties in implementation abound. Several years before the Crime and Disorder Act

1998 made partnerships mandatory, Gilling identified fundamental barriers to collaboration which included the imprecise and broad definition of 'crime prevention', Different perceptions which reinforced the status quo, allowed agencies to pursue their own agendas. For example, 'a community constable told me 'it's what bobbying is', whilst a senior probation officer said 'its what we've always done'' (Gilling 1994 p.249).

Crawford and Jones examined the manifestations of inter-agency conflicts of interests, revealing subtle mechanisms by which such barriers may be hidden or rationalised. As they pointed out,

'In inter-agency forums conflict is often defined away, avoided or circumvented. What is most striking, given the deep structural oppositions that exist, is the absence of overt conflict.....In other instances from our fieldwork, items were omitted from agendas or not recorded in the minutes. Further, certain problematic issues were managed 'off stage' in exclusive and discrete settings which controlled the impact upon the rest of the group'.

As a result, the status quo was reinforced and opportunities were missed to recognise and constructively manage competing perspectives (Crawford and Jones 1995 p.24-25).

A review of the work of community safety partnerships was undertaken by the Audit Commission, a few years after local authorities and the police had implemented the provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The only variable which could be measured with certainty was financial expenditure. The Government had spent an additional £8.7 billion on community safety and related issues over a two-year period.

The Commission found that in common with Gilling's earlier research, 'many organisations are involved in assessment, each with their own remit and methods, so no rounded performance figure exists to reassure the public'. The Commission concluded that 'local partnerships have not made an obvious impact on community safety between 1999 and 2000' (Audit Commission 2002). A later assessment described the success of partnerships as 'mixed' (Loveday 2005b).

Gilling analysed the Audit Commission's report and found that the problems identified by the Commission fell into two broad areas. The first area, determined by central government policy, included rigid financial rules and lack of performance criteria, which could be interpreted as 'the community safety equivalent of receiving EU subsidies and leaving the land fallow' (Gilling 2003 p.5). Furthermore, there were tensions between locally perceived requirements and ministerial crime reduction priorities. The second problematic area was local capacity and practice, where he considered that 'the Audit Commission wheels out the usual suspects' of failed initiatives. Non-engagement of relevant potential partners, lack of leadership, failure to exchange information and organisational culture clashes were all cited as reducing the effectiveness of partnerships. Police forces and partner agencies had not used consistent operational and administrative processes, making the identification of transferable success extremely difficult. Gilling also considered that a fundamental mistake was made when partnerships were created in too much haste after the passage of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, leaving little time for building the trust which is essential to successful partnerships (Gilling 2003 p 10).

Discussion

The existence of only four identifiable policing styles illustrates the extent to which police forces adopted common working methods during the 1990s. The study found instances of forces attaching other labels to their activities, but these almost invariably involved emphasis on one or more of the same approaches. It is interesting that only one force, Cleveland, claimed to be an exponent of 'zero tolerance' policing which rose to prominence in the USA and was subject of considerable media interest in the U.K. during the early 1990s. HMIC noted the 'distinction between the colloquial interpretation of 'zero tolerance' and the policy of focused positive action implemented by the force.' (HMIC 1998c, p.1). The Chief Constable added clarification, stating that 'officers are encouraged to use their discretion when dealing with offenders, but we are determined that any form of unacceptable behaviour will not be ignored' (Cleveland Police 2000, p.3). This explanation demonstrated that the British interpretation of 'zero tolerance' was far less radical than the rigid, maximal enforcement of law envisaged by the American model. The results of 'zero tolerance' policing in the USA were discussed in Chapter 2 and found to be at best, equivocal.

This study found that the level of support for a particular policing style was a product of a number of factors. The most significant of these appeared to be the expectations of the government and its agencies, the ease of implementation and the likelihood of an obvious and early 'positive result'. It is not surprising that 'geographic policing,' which showed the highest levels of full implementation, also had the largest percentage of non- involved

police forces. The arrangement did not have statutory backing and was likely to be viewed by forces only as an option. A few forces such as Surrey operated a geographic policing system for many years, but a greater number adopted it more recently (eg HMIC Inspection Reports 2000b p.1, 2000c p.1, 2000h p.2, 2001j p.23). The likelihood is that this was seen as a natural structure within which to carry out community-based policing and partnership working. Some forces may also have foreseen and pre-empted, government sponsorship of 'neighbourhood policing' by the Home Office.

Her Majesty's Inspectorate identified operational tensions which arose in some forces, following the implementation of geographic policing systems. They noted that 'whilst sectors provide an ideal vehicle for problem-solving in communities, they are not always the best structure to provide reactive policing, such as response to emergencies' (HMIC 1998b, p.9). Similarly, an inspection of South Wales Police revealed that 'some divisions have drawn exclusively on experienced constables to staff community policing teams and specialist squads to the detriment of response teams already suffering from shortages of skills and experience as a result of other abstractions' (HMIC 2000m, p.3). These observations make a point which could be applied to any of the identified policing styles. Any police force has a finite number of best-qualified personnel, whose use for the demands of any specialist policing model is likely to have a deleterious effect upon 'core' police work.

Relatively straightforward implementation is likely to have contributed to the high level of take-up of geographic policing. In isolation, it represents conventional working

methods under a different organisational structure, rather than wholly new approaches to, or methods of work. This may explain why HMIC's 'ideal vehicle' was not accompanied in most forces by problem-oriented policing (POP) and partnership working. Although decentralisation may be a natural framework for these policing styles, they are resource-intensive and therefore difficult to implement on a substantial scale. Leigh et. al. (1996) noted that of those forces which had adopted POP by 1995, 'most initiatives have been relatively small-scale and have affected only a small number of dedicated officers. All have recorded mixed success, although none has established a formal means by which to assess outcomes.' The same authors concluded in 1998 that if problem oriented policing was to be adopted successfully, 'whole force commitment is needed,' 'training in problem-solving techniques....needs to be provided' and that 'the change processes required to implement POP fully will not be achieved in weeks or months, but will require years' (Leigh et al 1998, p.55). The envisaged timescale raises the question of how success might be measured, in view of the number of other variable factors which might affect crime rates over that period.

In addition to the ultimate incentive of being a statutory requirement, implementation of partnership working is likely to be made easier by its relative ease of accommodation, at least on a superficial level, within current Force structures. In many cases, the effect of the Act would be to formalise and strengthen existing practices, which vary considerably in terms of scope, formality, working mechanisms and accountability. This raises the question of how forces' compliance with the Act can be effectively monitored and assessed. The absence of any template to monitor progress may have been the spur to the

Inspectorate's creation of an 18-point provisional list of 'model partnership critical success factors' which was 'not intended to be exhaustive' (HMIC 2000a, p.123). The list anticipated significant levels of investment in IT and training, although there was no indication of the likely scale of consequent crime reduction. Particular emphasis was placed on the presence of supporting structures including a financial plan, information sharing protocols, targets and timescales, performance review and accountability mechanisms. No cost-benefit projections were provided by HMIC or indeed required of partnerships.

During the survey period, 'partnership working' and 'intelligence-led' policing were found to be adopted by forces to a broadly similar extent; a not unexpected result. Although not enjoying statutory force, the latter had been consistently sponsored by HMIC and the Audit Commission since 1993, and was practised to varying extents by 90 per cent of forces. This finding may be compared with that presented by the Audit Commission's 'Annual Report on Police Audits 1993-94' (p.17), which identified that 11% of forces (ie four) nationally used had a fully integrated ILP model, whilst 33% were 'planning' to do so. Significantly, the remaining 56% of forces at that time had no such plans. The results were echoed in the Commission's 1996 'Detecting a Change' report (Audit Commission 1996c, p.13). It appears that although the development of ILP nationally has been relatively slow, it gathered strength towards the end of the 1990s. The level of implementation by the end of the decade exceeded the intentions of many Chief Constables holding office in 1993. The resistance of the few remaining forces was pushed

aside, by the incorporation of the National Intelligence Model in the National Policing Plan 2003-2006.

The 'crime desk' element of the Audit Commission's proposals, which had already been adopted by some forces, was always likely to be an attractive option as an efficiency device, if only to manage the volume of crime which had increased sharply and consistently in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It is not surprising that of the 42 forces examined, only Gwent and Dyfed-Powys were found to still send a police officer to every report of crime. All other forces created crime desks to screen out those crimes which were unlikely to be detected.

The removal of some officers from response policing to intelligence and tactical functions was likely to require far greater organisational restructuring with attendant cost and risk, given that this would require considerable investment in training and technology, and probably reduce numbers of officers in daily contact with members of the public. There is therefore a conflict between geographic policing which emphasises decentralisation of resources, and a fully intelligence-led policing model which requires centralisation in order to create specialist teams to engage in intelligence production, tactical operations and prisoner handling.

Conclusions

This ground-clearing research identified four predominant policing styles operated by police forces in England and Wales during the 1990s. These were ‘intelligence led’, ‘geographic’ and ‘problem oriented’ policing, together with ‘partnership working’. The choice of policing styles by individual forces appeared to be the product of centralising influences exerted by Government and its agencies, refracted through the lens of still-independent chief constables’ choices. Each of the four policing styles is supported by a basic theory underpinning its anticipated effectiveness. Each style had recorded individual, small-scale examples of success, but none had demonstrated effectiveness in relation to volume crime reduction, prior to widespread acceptance by government, its agencies and police forces.

The thesis now turns to the first of two chapters which explore the relationship between police centralisation and policing styles. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) and the Audit Commission were identified in Chapter 1 as key influences upon forces towards the attainment of government-inspired centralisation. Chapter 4 explains the working methods of these agencies and assesses their effectiveness by charting the ‘progress’ of selected police forces towards the implementation of ‘intelligence-led’ policing.

Chapter 4

Centralisation of the Police Service: HMIC and the Audit Commission

Introduction

Chapters 1 and 3 outlined the means by which over two decades, successive governments exercised increasingly stringent central control over the police service in England and Wales. Although the process started in the 1980s, it gained momentum when the Conservative government enacted the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994, in response to sharp rises in recorded crime levels. The Act provided for national objectives (s.28A) and performance targets (s.28B) which in practice focused upon crime reduction targets. The White Paper on Police Reform which preceded the Act made it clear that statutory bodies would act as executive arms of the Home Office, to ensure that forces would work towards the achievement of central expectations. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) was identified as the key co-ordinating agency of police reform (Home Office 1993).

Cooperation between HMIC and the Audit Commission started promptly, following the publications of the White Paper, and the Commission's report 'Helping With Enquiries – Tackling Crime Effectively'. The report recommended the adoption by forces of

'intelligence led' policing, which was intended to take a proactive approach towards prolific offenders in order to reduce crime rates (Audit Commission 1993). The implementation of the report's recommendations was thereafter encouraged by HMIC in its annual inspection reports of individual forces and in specialised thematic inspection reports.

Further centralising legislation culminated in the Police Reform Act 2002, which provided for a National Policing Plan specifying the strategic priorities for police forces for the next three years.(s.36(A)(6)(a)). According to the Act, The Plan would describe *inter alia*:

' the setting of objectives under section 37 and the giving of general directions in relation to any objective so set' (s.36(A)(6)(b)(i)),

' the specification, under section 4 of the Local Government Act 1999 (c. 27) (performance indicators), of performance indicators (within the meaning of that section) for police authorities' (s.36(A)(6)(b)(ii)),

' the issuing of guidance under any provision of this Act or of Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002' (c. 30)[a] (s.36(A)(6)(b)(iv))

Inspection arrangements were also prescribed, in order to ensure that forces worked in the desired manner, to achieve the desired goals. Regular inspection reports would be presented to the Secretary of State, who had new powers to require remedial action plans to be formulated by forces which were not considered to be efficient or effective (s.41A).

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and the Audit Commission examined and monitored police working practices throughout the 1990s and into the twenty first century. Chapters 6-8 of this thesis suggest that measureable crime reduction arising from the actions of the police is in general, difficult to demonstrate. It is unclear whether the loss of chief constables' autonomy has been counterbalanced by qualitative benefits, as a result of the imposition of 'improved' methods from the centre. The extent to which forces have carried on 'business as usual,' or have actively resisted centralisation is equally questionable. This chapter uses case examples to assess the effectiveness of the Inspectorate and the Audit Commission as agents of central preference.

Intelligence led policing (ILP) was established in Chapter 3 as a widely-established and relatively well-defined policing style. Its development is traced here, and an assessment is made of the respective contributions of the Audit Commission and HMIC to the development and implementation processes. The experiences of several individual forces are described. First, the legal status of both organisations, the development of their responsibilities over time and their broad operating mechanisms, will be described.

Agents of Police Centralisation

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

The Police Acts of 1964 (s.38) and 1996 (s.54) provided for the appointment of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, and imposed upon it broad duties of monitoring and reporting upon the efficiency and effectiveness of all Home Office forces in England and Wales. Inspection reports have been published since 1990.

The 1993 White Paper on Police Reform was a watershed for the Inspectorate, providing it with far greater focus and accountability for its activities than was previously required. HMIC was promised a clear statement of its responsibilities, which emerged in Home Office Circular 67/94, 'Role of HM Inspectorate of Constabulary' (Home Office 1994). This defined the effectiveness which forces and HMIC were to pursue as 'those results (which) are the right ones and are consistent both with the Government's key objectives for policing and the objectives set locally by police authorities' (para 5). In assessing such effectiveness, the Inspectorate was expected 'to provide an assessment of performance against national indicators, effectiveness of the Force strategy for achieving both key and local objectives, and the adequacy of police-community partnership arrangements' (para. 6). Additionally, the White Paper proposed that the Inspectorate would, as part of its programme of thematic inspections, 'be undertaking in-depth reviews jointly with the Audit Commission, building on the successful and close relationship between the Inspectorate and the Commission which has been established in recent years' (para. 8.8).

More generally, HMIC was 'expected to collaborate with the Home Office and other interested agencies, such as the Audit Commission, to develop good practice guidance and to provide co-ordinated advice and support to forces on implementation of key policies' (para.13). The expectation that the police service and the inspectorate would work towards the achievement of Home Office-determined targets had thus been made very clear.

The scope of inspection regimes developed as HMIC attempted to meet ambitious Government expectations. In the early 1990s, forces could expect in alternate years to undergo either a 'primary' (full) inspection, or an intermediate inspection which would focus in greater depth, upon particular issues identified by HMIC and the Home Office. Additionally, the Inspectorate undertook occasional 'thematic' inspections, examining a single issue across a sample of forces in order to identify and disseminate best practice. In the wake of the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994, primary inspections were reduced to triennial frequency, whilst 'intermediate' inspections were redesignated as 'performance reviews'. The purpose of these was to examine 'the development, implementation and delivery of force strategy, on the formulation of local policing plans and on force performance, particularly in relation to the Home Secretary's key objectives'. (HMCIC 1995, p.10). In short, the work of HMIC had been refocussed to fulfil the new requirements.

Towards the end of the 1997-98, the inspection frequency was reduced from 12 to 18 months, to allow HMIC resources to be used for a greater number of thematic

inspections. The distinction between primary and performance review inspections was abolished, to allow HMIC to determine the scope of inspections in accordance with perceived force needs and Best Value principles. April 2000 saw a further development of the inspection process to a risk-assessment based 'diagnostic' model. Using a variety of indicators, the model generated tables of performance in which police forces were ranked against each other, in order to identify 'best-performing' forces and encourage the remainder to match their achievements. On the basis of the model and dependent upon the severity of apparent problems, HMIC could decide to undertake one of three levels of inspection. The first was essentially paper-based, the second was a formal inspection covering a limited range of activities, and the third was a comprehensive inspection. The latter would take place in every force every three years, regardless of performance indicators. (HMIC 2000b, p.1). The consequence of the new regime was that forces which appeared to under-perform in particular areas of activity, could expect to receive greater Inspectorate attention than was previously paid to those activities.

The Audit Commission

The Audit Commission, established by the Local Government Act of 1982, has a remit which applies *inter alia* to all local authorities and police authorities. The general duties of auditors appointed by the Commission include an assessment of whether 'the body whose accounts are being audited has made proper arrangements for securing economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the use of its resources' (s.15(1)(c)). The Act went on to

require that the Commission 'shall undertake or promote comparative and other studies designed to enable it to make recommendations for improving economy, efficiency and effectiveness' (3'E's') in services provided (s.26). The responsibilities imposed upon individual auditors by s.15 were thus complemented by the requirement to consider the '3 E's' in the broadest possible context, identifying and promulgating best practice.

The 1992 Local Government Act also aimed to facilitate the comparison of performance standards, by requiring that the Audit Commission direct the bodies audited, to publish information that would facilitate the making of such comparisons. The aim here was to improve standards in support of the Citizens' Charter movement. Legislation relating to the Commission was consolidated by the Audit Commission Act of 1998.

The 1999 Local Government Act designated 'best value' authorities, including local authorities and police authorities (s.1), and imposed a general duty on such authorities to secure 'continuous improvement in the way in which its functions are exercised, having regard to a combination of economy, efficiency and effectiveness' (s.3). The Secretary of State was to specify performance indicators and performance standards (s.4), but in doing so, 'shall have regard to any recommendations made to him by the Audit Commission' (s.4(5)).

The early years of the Audit Commission saw studies into peripheral aspects of police activity such as transport and catering (Heaton 2000 p.345, Savage et al 2000a, p.134). 'Helping with Enquiries', which advocated the use of intelligence-led policing, was the

first of several reports which examined 'core' aspects of policing. The study process typically consisted of visits to police forces, gaining information by means of personal interviews and analysis of records. The Commission's recommendations tended to emphasise the development and promulgation of existing ideas and best practice, rather than the introduction of wholly 'new' ideas. This was perhaps predictable in view of the methodology. In the words of a Commission official:

'It is that synthesis of our expertise and knowing how to unpick things and analyse and quantify, linked to practical experience of how to do the job that we get from spending a lot of time talking to police officers, that is then blended together in a report which is both authoritative but practically based' (Heaton 1996).

It is perhaps surprising that when compiling 'Helping With Enquiries', the Audit Commission, as an accountancy-based organisation, did not include any cost-benefit projection based on empirical research. For example, there was no estimate of the additional expenditure per anticipated unit reduction in crime, even at an approximate level. Furthermore, no survey of academic literature was undertaken in order to provide an assessment of the report's probable strengths and weaknesses. The Commission's working methods have been subject of fairly isolated academic criticism. A critique of youth justice reports (Audit Commission 1996b) argued that 'It is as if the critical faculties of youth justice academics and practitioners are suspended.....' (Jones 2001, p.362). Elsewhere, in a review of influences upon police policy-making, it was considered that the Audit Commission 'punches above its weight' (Savage et al 2000a,

p.133). Despite these concerns, the Commission's policy of close consultation with the police did much to pave the way to acceptance of 'Helping with Enquiries' within the service.

There followed increased and more overt collaboration between Her Majesty's Inspectors and the Audit Commission. Following publication of the 'Helping with Enquiries' report, the two bodies together with ACPO produced a management guide to its implementation (Audit Commission 1996a), H.M. Inspector noting that this '.....is a new departure for the Inspectorate. I intend that we should do more of it' (HMCIC 1995).

In accordance with its aim of carrying out more thematic inspections and in the light of national developments in recent years, HMIC reviewed the intelligence function and endorsed the intelligence-led policing style, in a report 'Policing With Intelligence' (HMIC 1997a), followed by the broader-based 'Beating Crime' report (HMIC 1998a). Further collaboration together with the Audit Commission and other interested bodies saw another large-scale thematic inspection examining the wider crime reduction effort. The report 'Calling Time on Crime' (HMIC 2000a) advocated an integrated crime reduction model (p.88) including intelligence-led, problem-solving and partnership approaches. 'Models of success' checklists were provided, against which the success of forces in setting up appropriate crime reduction structures were to be judged (HMIC 2000a, p.122-123, 154-155).

Reactions to Centralisation: Case Examples

In order to assess the influence of HMIC and the Audit Commission upon the development of ILP, inspection reports relating to six forces were examined, in the decade from 1991 to 2001. To allow clear comparisons to be made of influences upon strategies, the forces were chosen on the basis that whilst three appeared to have well-developed ILP systems (according to most recent inspection reports), the other three did not. The history of ILP development in each force will be summarised in turn.

Forces With Well-Developed ILP Systems

Hertfordshire

Crime levels in Hertfordshire rose broadly in accordance with the sharp national increase at the start of the 1990s. For example, between 1988 and 1992, the 'all crime' total in '42 forces' rose from 3,709,258 to 5,584,949 offences, amounting to 50.6 per cent. In Hertfordshire, the equivalent rise was from 40,645 to 59,129 offences, a rise of 45.5 per cent. The pressures for change were typical of those upon all forces.

The 1995 HMIC inspection report noted the start of the process, stating that:

'The Force has undergone significant change in the past two years, including the integration of a new executive team who have actively begun to address a wide

range of major corporate issues.....A number of major IT projects covering.....intelligence and crime pattern analysis.....are under way' (HMIC 1995e, p.1).

As might have been expected, given the scale of innovation, progress was initially slow. HMIC acknowledged that the Force had been working towards implementing the recommendations of the Audit Commission ILP report 'Helping With Enquiries', but identified geographical inconsistencies in the key areas of criminal intelligence, crime desks, tasking of officers and specialist units. Crime pattern analysis was undertaken on a manual basis (HMIC 1995e).

The 1996-97 Performance Review Inspection recorded further progress, stating that in relation to thefts of cars:

'Much of this success clearly reflects the Force's commitment to tackling crime as its top priority. This has been achieved by the emphasis laid on ILP, but is indicative of strong partnerships being successfully forged with the community' (HMIC 1997d, p.9).

A further Inspection in 1997-98 found 'a vibrant performance culture taking hold' (p.1) and 'a growing emphasis on the importance of intelligence-led targeting of criminals and serious crime, and congratulates the Force on the progress it is making in this area' (HMIC 1998g, p.14).

The 1999 HMIC inspection of Hertfordshire identified a new style of policing for the Force, with three models of problem-solving linked by an established ILP approach backed by information technology. The Chief Constable was unambivalent in his statement that 'Tackling crime is and will remain the top priority for Hertfordshire Constabulary' (HMIC 1999f, p.16).

In summary, Hertfordshire was not a pioneer of ILP, but development followed soon after that in the initial tranche of ILP forces. The catalyst was the arrival of a new ACPO team, who were aware of central pressures, and judged that the implementation of ILP was a preferable option to the maintenance of organisational status quo.

Northumbria

Crime reduction efforts in Northumbria received plaudits from HMIC throughout the mid- and late 1990s. This was not always the case. In common with Kent, which similarly came to be credited with sustained crime-fighting success, Northumbria suffered from very large increases in crime during the late 1980s. Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the likelihood that rises in crime in these forces, may have produced high temporary base levels. From these and in order to revert to equilibrium levels, large reductions might more readily be made than in other forces. The 1991 HMIC Primary Inspection noted with concern that in relation to recorded crime:

'Northumbria has the highest figure in the country, 132.9 per 1000 population, compared with the 'family of forces' average of 106.7 and the national average of 81.4. This is the most disturbing and relevant comparator' (HMIC 1991b, p.61).

It is also notable that at the time, the force already employed crime pattern analysts with access to computer systems, working in intelligence units with Crime Intelligence Officers (CIO's) and Field Intelligence Officers (FIO's) (HMIC 1991b). Although it might be supposed that the computer systems would have been relatively rudimentary, the early introduction of some ILP principles had not prevented substantial increases in crime from an already-high base level.

The 1993 HMIC Primary Inspection noted the introduction of a 'Crime Desk and Management Information Unit' on one sub-division on a 'pilot' basis. This was a precursor of the crime management units (p.32) which became part of the standard ILP structure. Further moves had been made towards the greater use of intelligence sources and 21 Field Intelligence Officers were employed. It was evident that the Force had become committed to an integrated ILP system at a very early stage. The system was to be developed further in succeeding years (HMIC 1993b).

The 1996 HMIC Primary Inspection was again glowing in its praise of the Force, citing 'a strong emphasis upon collation and effective use of intelligence.....The Force's excellent crime results speak for themselves' (p.2). Northumbria had developed its integrated ILP system further, including:

'the creation of a target list of prolific and persistent offenders. The aim, in each case over the year, was to build up a comprehensive intelligence package, mount a well planned operation to arrest the offender on good grounds, secure a remand in custody when fully justified and then obtain a custodial sentence on the basis of strong primary evidence.....A key factor in all approaches undertaken was the integrated role and creative involvement of all available resources.....' (HMIC 1996c, p.38).

In addition the Force was developing its Community Safety Strategy which had been launched in 1994, and went on to become an early market leader in partnership working practices prior to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (HMIC 1996c).

Northumbria became one of several forces which claimed pre-eminence in its crime-fighting abilities, being the only force able to demonstrate eight successive years of crime reduction (HMIC 1999j). Earlier, the 1997 HMIC inspection team was clearly impressed by the force's organisation, stating in its Performance Review Report that 'excellent use is made of intelligence to identify and target criminals' (p.1). Furthermore,

'the introduction of enhanced crime desks, combining crime recording, allocation and analysis with active management of disorder, offers enormous potential to tackle problems Analytical assessment of 'problems' with rapid response to reports is working well and reducing demand. Extensive profiles of offenders are proving useful as a deterrent and for intelligence purposes' (HMIC 1997e, p.11).

In summary, Northumbria suffered from a severe and growing crime problem at the start of the 1990s, and the force was under great pressure to find a solution. Intelligence-led policing offered the prospect of significant gains. The force implemented ILP with alacrity, and in the absence of any attractive alternative, any scepticism was unlikely to be sought or heeded. Later years saw successive reductions in crime. Like every other force, Northumbria, encouraged by HMIC, interpreted the trend as vindication of its policies and centrally-preferred 'best practice'.

Staffordshire

Staffordshire was subject of even more severe increases in crime in the late 1980s than the rises experienced by most police forces. From 1988 to 1992, recorded 'all crime' rose by 72.2 per cent from 56,654 to 97,536, compared with the '42 force' increase of 50.6 per cent, from 3,709,258 to 5,584,949 offences. The pressure for innovation was considerable.

The Force was prompt in its acceptance of central guidance, eventually reaching a point where its systems and structures received repeated warm praise from HMIC. The Primary Inspection in 1992 stated that:

'All reported crime is investigated and the aim is to visit every victim, and crime scene where possible. The Force will find difficulty in managing the increasing level of crime, which elsewhere has been successfully tackled through 'crime desk' and other crime management systems' (HMIC 1992b, p.16-17).

The following year, the Force 'piloted' crime management units and in liaison with the Audit Commission, to review its approach towards tackling crime. Further progress was recorded in successive reports and following the 1995 inspection, HMIC stated that:

'By March 1996 the Force will have introduced an integrated crime intelligence system.....impressive crime pattern analysis...further enhanced by a mapping facility by 1996/97' (HMIC 1995f, p.23).

The 1997-98 inspection showed that Staffordshire considered its development in ILP terms to be relatively mature, and the force turned its attention to the Crime and Disorder Act (HMIC 1998j). A review of its crime strategy was carried out,

'to shape a Force response to the shift in emphasis towards crime reduction and youth disorder as seen in Government policy and the new performance indicators which have been identified for 1998-99, whilst also re-emphasising the Force's long-standing commitment to ILP' (HMIC 1998j, p.15).

This initiative culminated in the integration of the twin approaches to crime reduction practised by the Force. Policing in Staffordshire went on to embrace the national trend towards conducting operations on a devolved geographic basis. A reorganisation in 1999 created 4 divisions and 26 local policing units (LPU's). The 1999-2000 HMIC inspection report found that 'a problem solving approach has been introduced and a focus continues on ILP' (HMIC 2000n, p.2). Weekly tasking and coordination meetings took place at Force and divisional levels, and the intelligence management system was fully used by all

staff. The 2000-2001 HMIC Inspection applauded the development of the force's crime reduction culture, noting with approval the 'significant reductions being delivered' (HMIC 2001g, p.1).

The 2000-2005 Policing Plan published by the Police Authority highlighted problem-solving in Staffordshire's repertoire of policing styles, stating the force's intention of, amongst other actions, 'addressing causes rather than symptoms', 'targeting problem locations' and 'targeting prolific offenders' (Staffordshire 2000, p.6). This is not surprising. Staffordshire had responded to the problems of a decade earlier by the introduction of centrally-approved measures, and reductions in reported crime had ensued. The force's corporate antennae remained sensitive to HMIC expectations.

Forces With Less-Developed ILP Systems

Derbyshire

Throughout the 1990s, the Derbyshire force remained remarkably resistant to pressures to implement intelligence-led policing. The 1998-99 HMIC inspection report described the aim of the Force's crime strategy as 'to develop and implement an effective and co-ordinated partnership approach to the prevention and detection of crime' (HMIC 1999b, p.33). Intelligence analysis consisted of Local Intelligence Officers (LIOs) who received crime pattern analysis data weekly and circulated it to colleagues by a multiplicity of

means. There was no mapping system. The Force employed no intelligence analysts and was planning to recruit only two. In some areas, officers were unaware of their priorities. Levels of technical surveillance equipment were modest (p.35). HMIC made a specific recommendation 'that the Force give priority to the further developments of intelligence led policing' (HMIC 1999b, p.38).

Earlier reports shed some light on the background to the lack of progress. The principal reason was the widely differing approaches taken to policing, by central and local government, which jointly held the force's pursestrings. Derbyshire County Council was unwilling to invest the necessary funds to bring the Force up to modern standards in virtually any respect. Financial constraints were accompanied by managerial inertia in respect of developments which became more or less standard practice elsewhere in England and Wales. These factors led uniquely to the Force being withheld a succession of Certificates of Efficiency in the early 1990s. The 1993 HMIC report highlighted with considerable concern:

'the marked rise in crime in Derbyshire – above the national average – and the continuing decline of the detection rates.....Crime is quite clearly growing at a pace in Derbyshire that undermines the ability of the Force to respond effectively within its current policies' (HMIC 1993a, p.41).

Recorded 'all crime', for example, rose by 104.7 per cent from 43,204 to 88,449 offences between 1988 and 1992, compared with the '42-force' rise of 50.6 per cent from

3,709,258 to 5,584,949 offences. The policies referred to by HMIC included ‘the absence of a formalised crime management structure.....which would assist crime managers to target crime and criminals much more professionally’ (p.43). The introduction of divisional proactive units did little to improve the confidence of HMIC in the Force, stating that:

‘there is little evidence of a rationale for the identification of the level and mix of resources...nor evidence of training and equipment commensurate with their task.....The absence...of terms of reference or performance indicators, only serves to underline the ad-hoc way in which this initiative is being developed’ (HMIC 1993a, p.43).

The 1994 Inspection was neither of the Primary nor the Performance Review type which HMIC customarily undertook at the time, but instead an assessment of the Force’s financial position and the effects on service delivery to the public. This exceptional measure highlighted deep central concerns for the state and management of the force. The Inspectorate welcomed the introduction of crime desks, but betrayed some frustration at the County Council’s refusal to fund the Force at the minimum levels required by the police authority. Their report stated that:

‘HM Inspector has reported on this situation in four previous reports.....it must be clear to any objective observer that the situation should have been addressed already and should not be allowed to continue’ (HMIC 1994b, p.2-3).

It also noted that in relation to the proactive units referred to in its previous report:

'units lack the necessary vehicles, radios and other equipment essential to their role. Many examples were given of officers purchasing their own mobile telephones and pagers, with the Force being unable to pay even for telephone calls used in the course of operations' (p.28).

In relation to criminal intelligence, HMIC found that 'crime pattern analysis is not a feature of either the intelligence or crime recording facility' (p.28). Criminal intelligence bulletins were:

'not of a standard, or properly targeted, to maximise their effectiveness. As such, many hours are spent in their production with little measureable benefit' (HMIC 1994b, p.28).

Subsequent reports continued to echo the twin themes of financial and managerial inadequacies. The 1995 Performance Review report recorded HMIC's opinion that 'the Force continues to find it difficult to move forward in any area, without there being some adverse effect on some other policing function' (HMIC 1995b, p.1). The new five-year strategic plan was considered to be:

'no more than a statement of an ultimate goal.....a subset of achievable targets should be identified in the next planning round, to bring a greater sense of reality to the planning process' (p.1).

In relation to crime management, HMIC found that 'the Force has yet to determine its corporate approach' (p.22). The Inspectorate's recommendations were terse and specific:

'HMI has visited many forces where the essential and integral role of an effective crime desk is the close relationship it enjoys with the other principles of the crime management units – LIO, FIO, CPO, analyst, crime manager. This could be replicated in Derbyshire' (HMIC 1995b, p.22-23).

HMIC went on to note in the 1997 Performance Review inspection:

'the Force continues to carry the millstone of serious under-funding seen in the early 1980s. HMI is aware of some slight improvements, but the scale of the underfunding is so big that improvements have had only a tiny effect.' (HMIC 1997c, p.1).

Succeeding years saw the introduction of limited ILP elements such as crime management units, but funding remained a continuing problem. The importance of intelligence in tackling crime effectively was however considered to be 'well understood', and the subsequent recruitment of two intelligence analysts to the force was seen as a significant, if small and belated step forward (HMIC 1999b, p.35).

In summary, managerial inertia and antipathy of local government towards expenditure, combined to block any large-scale innovation in the Derbyshire force in the 1990s. The consequences of the force's failure to adopt 'modern' structures are difficult to quantify but are unlikely to have been positive. Following heavy rises in the early 1990s, levels of crime in the force failed to reduce in line with those in most other forces. The analyses of

Chapter 6 demonstrates that with the exception of criminal damage, Derbyshire saw relatively low reductions in the latter part of the decade.

Gloucestershire

An notable and unusual feature of this Force in the 1990s was that its Chief Constable, Dr. A.J. P. Butler, was the author of a standard police textbook, 'Police Management' (Butler1992). The force might therefore have been expected to play a leading role in the implementation of accepted 'best practice', including the introduction of intelligence-led policing. Instead, the force focussed its efforts upon promoting a geographic policing system, referred to as 'Inspector Neighbourhood Areas.'

Successive reports published by HMIC, the Chief Constable and the Police Authority, were curiously circumspect in their promotion of intelligence-led policing, given that criminality within the force area had increased markedly. Between 1988 and 1992, recorded 'all crime' in Gloucestershire rose by 78.2 per cent, from 34,012 to 60,601 offences. This was substantially above the corresponding '42 force' increase of 50.6 per cent, from 3,709,258 to 5,584,949 offences.

The 1992 Primary Inspection identified that Gloucestershire was at that time relatively advanced in terms of crime analysis, producing monthly statistics in numerical and graphic form. Local intelligence officers were employed on BCU's but were also required

to maintain crime management systems. Of greater concern to HMIC were prison clear-up procedures which when revised, led to a substantial decline in crime detection performance (HMIC 1992a). This was a central theme of the 1993 Intermediate Inspection which identified further anomalies which the Force was instructed to correct. An intelligence-based new crime strategy had been devised and crime management units were in place. It appeared however that proactive capability following crime pattern analysis consisted primarily of the use of local beat officers.

The 1994 Primary Inspection continued to identify Gloucestershire's crime management units as the principal area of ILP implementation. There remained however, little indication of the processes whereby intelligence could be translated into proactive work to incapacitate prolific offenders (HMIC 1994c).

Subsequent (1995 and 1996) HMIC reports reviewed force planning systems and therefore the issue escaped further scrutiny for a considerable time (HMIC 1995c, HMIC 1996a). At the time of the 1997-98 Inspection, the Force was in the process of establishing its geographic model, an exercise which consumed the bulk of its energies. HMIC noted that 'there is now clearly a requirement to concentrate greater effort on developing intelligence-focused briefing methods' (HMIC 1998d, p.2) and that whilst 'the crime current strategy outlines a broad philosophy of approach.....it does not identify any priorities or targets in the medium or longer term'(p.28). Expressing concern about multiple handling of crime reports, HMIC considered that 'The principles of crime

desks.....could be better met by a reorganisation of the current resources and with appropriate training (HMIC 1998d, p.32).

The 1999-2000 HMIC report opined that:

'there should be a bidding process for resources, which requires a forum for discussion of the level of crime in the last week/fortnight and what measures have been implemented to deal with it. Such measures are not consistently in place'
(HMIC 2000h, p.29).

In summary, the Force implemented crime desks at an early stage, but as a result of other priorities and assisted by lack of HMIC scrutiny, the further development of ILP stagnated for several years in the mid and late 1990s. Chapter 6 demonstrates that during this time, the force saw greater than median reductions in 'all crime' and burglary, but smaller than median reductions in thefts of motor vehicles and criminal damage. Against a background of substantial increases followed by moderate reductions in crime, the independence of the Chief Constable held sway in the face of central pressures for directed reform.

Gwent

Gwent Police enjoyed an enviable reputation for success in dealing with crime for many years, having the second highest crime detection rate (53%) of any force in England and Wales at the time of the 1999-2000 HMIC Inspection. The joint police/police authority

report of that year lauded the Force's success and emphasised the importance of crime reduction partnerships, but made no mention of the role of intelligence. The Inspectorate however found 'little evidence that the crime strategy, produced in 1997, was impacting on the day-to-day direction of criminal investigation' (HMIC 2000i, p.30). Gwent was the only force in England and Wales which maintained a policy of personal visits to all crime victims, taking not only formal crime reports but in addition, witness statements. At the time of inspection, HMIC opined that:

'the intention to investigate fully all crime is laudable and the intelligence potential of visiting victims is acknowledged but the public are increasingly becoming accustomed to using the telephone and more recently electronic means, for conducting their business. Her Majesty's Inspector urges a review....' (HMIC 2000i, p.31).

The report was unimpressed by the intelligence capability of the Force, citing:

'divisions turning to 'self help' IT schemes in the absence of intelligence support from headquarters departments.....Crime analysts, recruited to provide timely and relevant crime pattern analysis, do not have the necessary IT support to function properly.....HMI...is concerned, however, at the limited intelligence analysis carried out and therefore the ability to engage in an intelligence led strategy' (HMIC 2000i, p.32).

Similar comments had been made in HMIC reports throughout the previous decade. In 1991, the Inspectorate noted that:

'Crime management and crime pattern analysis continue to be conducted manually, to the disadvantage of the Force. It was recommended in the 1990 Inspection Report that a review be undertaken of the policy requiring statements to be taken for every crime reported. This recommendation has not been acted upon by the Force since the Chief Constable considers his policy assists crime detection' (HMIC 1991a, p.40).

The 1994 Primary Inspection made similar points, acknowledging that:

'It is strongly argued within the Force that personal visits (often multiple visits) to all victims and the taking of written statements in every case, are the foundations of its excellent performance against crime and that they help to foster good community relations. HMIC are reluctant to criticise these practices in a Force with such a good record of preventing and detecting crime' (HMIC 1994d, p.39).

The 1997-98 Performance Review Inspection echoed these points. The following year's Primary Inspection revealed continuing unsatisfactory practices in relation to the production and dissemination of intelligence, including briefing systems of which 'the nature and quality...vary greatly, both within and across divisions' (HMIC 1998e, p.31). Intelligence inputting to the computer system was a month out of date and the regularity of meetings to discuss intelligence 'varies from weekly to monthly and attendance can be poor' (p.32). Furthermore, the meetings 'were not minuted as directed and were not always valued as a key focus for directed patrolling, targeting or tasking' (p.34). Once again, the policy of visiting all crime victims was noted with HMIC commenting that 'it

is difficult however, to challenge the system when taking into account the good results in preventing and detecting crime' (HMIC 1998e, p.35).

The Inspectorate was not wholly correct in advancing this viewpoint. Although Gwent had a long-established reputation for crime detection, its track record in respect of prevention was distinctly unimpressive. Chapter 6 shows that in respect of volume crime in the mid and late 1990s, the force saw smaller reductions than almost any other force. This significant measure of performance was not commented upon in successive HMIC reports. Despite long-term pressure from HMIC, the Chief Constable was able to set his own principal success criteria, and to prescribe the methods by which these would be achieved.

Discussion

The development of intelligence-led policing in the 1990s provides an interesting commentary on some of the influences which affected the strategic development of police forces. A small minority of forces, including Northumbria and Kent, implemented integrated ILP models at an early stage, about the same time as 'Helping With Enquiries' was published. Both forces had suffered heavy crime increases in the late 1980s, even by the standards of the time.

Northumbria and Kent made substantial structural force alterations with the strong backing of their respective Chief Officer teams. They had appointed new Chief Constables who were personally committed to ILP and who considered that contrary to mainstream academic opinion, well-organised policing could markedly affect crime rates. Moreover, they were prepared to make sweeping organisational changes in order to introduce integrated systems. By the late 1990s, such forces were operating ILP at a sophisticated level, during a time of falling crime nationwide. In the absence of analysis of cause and effect, their investment in ILP appeared to reap substantial and lasting benefits in terms of crime reduction. Chapter 6 identifies that Northumbria achieved sweeping crime reductions in all categories of crime. The Northumbria Police Authority was able in 2000 to claim:

'the premier position in the country for cutting crimethe only area to record a reduction for eight successive yearsruthless criminals went to jail for lengthy periods as a consequence of targeted, intelligence-led policing' (Northumbria 2000, p.10-11).

Kent was also associated with some impressive crime reductions, although these were more dependent upon the type of crime and the method of measurement. The Kent Police Authority confirmed that the force 'secured the third-best crime reduction results from 1993-94, to 1998-99, out of all 43 forces in England and Wales' (Kent Police Authority 2000). Taken together with that of Northumbria, Kent's apparent success was a powerful incentive to other forces to implement intelligence-led policing.

Northumbria went on to embrace the partnership work demanded by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, although the Kent force was a more reluctant convert to the multi-agency cause. Both forces credited intelligence-led policing with their success. In Kent's case, this was not a result of adherence to centrally preferred 'best practice', but of the Chief Constable's personal ideology, which shaped and thus coincided with the development of that 'best practice'. David Phillips was the prime driving force behind the 'Kent Policing Model' which was the forerunner of the National Intelligence Model (Tilley 2003, p.313).

The Staffordshire force acted rapidly to develop ILP after the publication of 'Helping With Enquiries' and in liaison with the Audit Commission. Hertfordshire was somewhat slower, but on the appointment of a new chief officer team, joined what was to become an increasingly popular policing strategy, again in accordance with Audit Commission guidelines. These were not ILP 'pioneer' forces, but their experience was typical of many. The incentive to reverse recent increases in recorded crime, combined with central pressures and examples of apparent success, was sufficient to trigger the introduction of ILP.

The publication of 'Helping With Enquiries' might imply that the Commission was more influential than HMIC in initiating the spread of ILP, but this would be a premature conclusion. There is clear evidence that although the Commission produced a strategy for forces to follow in a single document, some of its elements such as crime desks were being recommended to forces by HMIC before the Commission had considered the

matter. The Inspectorate continued to champion ILP throughout the 1990s. With firm Home Office support and despite the reluctance of some forces, HMIC made further progress in persuading forces towards implementation. The roles of the Audit Commission and HMIC were therefore interlinked and complementary. This is not surprising. Audit Commission consultation procedures included liaison with the Inspectorate and with ACPO police officers who were likely to become Her Majesty's Inspectors.

The experience of Derbyshire was that of a force which had grown used to a state of organisational paralysis with financial impoverishment at its roots. These problems were a consequence of inaction on the part of the force's management and of local government. Derbyshire had reached a state of being beyond the repeated reform attempts of HMIC or virtually any other central influence. The force's crime-fighting performance was poor. If there was a case for policing methods to be prescribed from the centre, it was best made by Derbyshire.

The extent of ILP development in Gwent was affected profoundly, by the continuing if diminishing independence of chief constables. In common with Derbyshire, Gwent failed to respond to the urges of HMIC to join the intelligence-led policing revolution. The symptoms of non-compliance were different to those of Derbyshire, although they shared the common factor that localism prevailed over central direction. In Derbyshire, the rejection of central pressures was a consequence of inertia. In Gwent, it was a conscious

and repeated expression of operational independence. Gwent achieved repeatedly excellent crime detection results and wished to retain the systems which the Chief Constable believed were essential to the achievement of success.

Gwent had throughout the 1990s, consistently declined to introduce crime desks to deal with the less evidently solvable crimes by telephone, against the consistent advice of the Her Majesty's Inspectorate and the Audit Commission. A succession of HMIC reports addressed this 'problem', whereby the Force appeared to have gained the 'right' results but by the 'wrong' means. Subsequent reports placed an interesting variety of persuasion and pressure upon Gwent to change its policy, to no avail. The force appeared if anything to become more entrenched in its position, the Inspectorate noting that:

'A gold standard for the Force is its requirement for a written statement to be obtained from every complainant of a crime.....There is no crime screening. Virtually unanimous support for these policies was discerned across the Force.....While recognising that future policies or pressures may necessitate amendment to this practice, Her Majesty's Inspector congratulates the Force on its present ability to marry this procedure with the achievement of the second-best detection rate nationally' (HMIC 2001c, p.12).

The failure of Gloucestershire to achieve a fully integrated ILP system was a result of a change in priorities of the force, following early implementation of some ILP elements. This underdevelopment may have been assisted by lack of HMIC scrutiny at the crucial time, the 1995 and 1996 Performance Review reports focussing upon planning processes.

In common with Gwent, the force was led by one of the diminishing group of Chief Constables, who was determined to do what he alone considered to be in the best interests of the force area.

The experiences of the six forces studied, are illustrative of the range of factors which affected the development of intelligence-led policing within individual police forces. The adoption of ILP by most forces in the early 1990s, was rooted in the personal commitment on the part of a few chief constables. They appeared to be following the policies of the Audit Commission and HMIC, but may also have been the 'behind the scenes' architects of those policies. The process was an example of key members of the police service policing the work of the Audit Commission, rather than the Audit Commission auditing the police service (Savage et al 2000a, p.133).

In the latter part of the 1990s, national developments and central pressures became the dominant engines of change in most forces. The succession of Audit Commission and HMIC thematic reports, continual pressure by HMIC on forces to adopt ILP practices, the formation of the National Criminal Intelligence Service and its development of a National Intelligence Model (Gill 2000 pp.251-252, HMIC 2000a p.75, Litman 2000) were all significant factors. Chief officers knew that the scope for individualism was vanishing rapidly. Most acceded to central expectations, but a few chose to exercise operational independence and exercise their personal judgement. The process of acceptance was hastened when forces experienced changes in leadership, which tended to result in reorganisation in line with nationally accepted practices. Some examples of this occurred

in Staffordshire in 1996 (HMIC 1997e), Warwickshire in 1998 (HMIC 1999k) and South Wales in 2000 (HMIC 2001f). Although the implementation of ILP was uneven over time, it was essentially a one-way process. No instance of a force publicly reducing its commitment to centrally-preferred practice was found in this study.

A similar observation might be made in relation to all four policing styles, supporting the comments of an Audit Commission member: 'I remember people saying when I first came here that if you got four chief constables into this room, they wouldn't agree on the colour of the carpet.....I think that even within the very short space of four years that attitude has just gone completely' (Savage et al. 2000a, p. 91). Whilst the convergence of policing styles did not amount to abrogation of constabulary independence, it was clear that chief constables had become increasingly selective in its exercise. The more corporate approach which they have adopted since the late 1990s (Loader and Mulcahy 2001a, 2001b) has complemented greater willingness to adopt the recommendations of government agencies such as the Audit Commission. (Savage et al 2000a, p.89, p.133). Moreover, this research has revealed numerous instances of approval expressed by HMIC for cultural and organisational changes undertaken by forces. The concept that 'the police are almost unique in the extent to which they have remained resistant to reform as witnessed in other policy sectors' (Leishman et al 1996, p.19) may be due for re-examination. Although such a comparative exercise is beyond the scope of this research, the indications are that the service has moved on to take a very positive approach to reform in the twenty-first century. The unspoken stipulation is that the service expects to

influence the direction of reform through the involvement of ACPO in policymaking bodies.

Conclusions

Prior to the 1990s, chief constables enjoyed virtually total freedom in the means by which they operated their forces under the banner of constabulary independence. Although forces' activities were scrutinised by HMIC, the Inspectorate lacked templates against which to judge their primary agendas, or the efficiency and effectiveness of policing activity. As the decade progressed, the influence of government and its agencies upon the service grew. Performance indicators were developed and targets were determined; computer technology to monitor progress became available, and statutory frameworks became an increasingly common feature of policing strategy. Forces' primary agendas were prescribed by central government, and the structures within which they worked were in the main, those 'approved' by government agencies such as HMIC and the Audit Commission. This trend has continued. As the Home Secretary David Blunkett stated in 2001:

'The new Police Standards Unit will gather evidence of what works and spread that best practice.....This is not a threat to operational independence. It is about ensuring that the police improve their own performance' (The Times 12/7/01).

Significant elements of the ‘operational independence’ referred to still exist, such as the extent of geographically-based policing in forces, and the insistence of Gwent in sending a police officer to every report of crime. These examples represent a shrinking kernel of independence within the sphere of police activity. As discussed in Chapter 1 and 3, the Police Reform Act 2002 added weight to earlier centralisation measures. The Act specified in greater detail than previously, how forces would go about their business, through the National Policing Plan. The Home Secretary took powers which enabled him, following any inspection which identified deficiencies in efficiency or effectiveness, to require the force to submit and implement a remedial action plan (s.41A).

The precise role of the new agencies such as the Police Standards Unit and the National Police Improvement Agency remain of interest. There is evidence of significant overlap between the roles of existing government agencies. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate has had a clear and long-standing remit to carry out thematic inspections, yet it is difficult to view the Audit Commission’s ‘Helping With Enquiries’ report as anything other than such an inspection. The success of the report may have contributed to a bolder approach taken during the mid- and late-1990s by HMIC, which carried out similar large-scale research and made increasingly prescriptive recommendations in relation to police structures and processes. Similarly, the Home Office has for many years employed a police research unit which has produced a large number of reports into many areas of police activity. It is notable that few research reports, irrespective of the source of their production, are able to identify obvious and well-defined ‘wins’ which can be readily transferred from one

police force to another, and that their recommendations tend to be somewhat broad in nature. Thus, the Home Office Policing and Reducing Crime Unit concluded in relation to problem-oriented policing that 'Training....relevant to local conditions and preferably local examples, needs to be provided' (Leigh et al. 1998, p.55).

Her Majesty's Inspectorate has encountered similar problems in relating the cause of a particular policing technique, to an effect in terms of crime levels. The Chief Inspector stated in his 1994-95 report that 'the focus of both primary and performance review inspections moved from an examination of the planning, policy and performance assessment framework towards a greater concentration on outcomes' (HMCIC 1995, p.11). This move towards a results-based culture appeared however to be reversed in the Inspectorate's 'Beating Crime' (HMIC 1998a) and 'Calling Time on Crime' (HMIC 2000a) thematic inspection reports, through the provision of a series of 'good practice' checklists. These factors listed were again broad and process-oriented. The recommendation to 'implement and evaluate what works...' (HMIC 2000a, p.89) in relation to partnerships, was somewhat ironic, in the context of a report in which 'The Inspection set out to identify what works in reducing the incidence of crime and disorder' (HMIC 2000a, p.xiii).

The circularity of these remarks and the Inspectorate's view that 'the most important success factor is 'a belief that it can happen' (p.xiv) neatly encapsulate the difficulty for police forces and inspection agencies when they consider the efficacy of policing techniques. Isolated examples of success may be cited in support of any policing style,

but there remains little evidence, even at an approximate level, of effectiveness in terms of reductions in volume crime rates. Put simply, forces are navigating in a quantitative fog, in which Chapters 6, 7 and 8 aim to provide some illumination.

Reports in support of a particular policing style tend to contain generalised exhortations together with recommendations to implement a particular policing style 'properly'.

Invariably this requires the investment of considerable resources including active ACPO-level support, 'whole force' commitment, training programmes, computer systems, formal meeting and liaison structures, together with written planning, monitoring and accountability mechanisms. Not only is the effectiveness of the four predominant policing styles limited; even less is known about them in terms of the efficiency which has been demanded by successive governments since 1983. It is however evident that HMIC and the police service are fully aware of the 'menu' of current policing styles (eg West Mercia 1999). Attempts have been made to integrate the styles conceptually (HMIC 2000a, p. 86-88, Oakensen et al 2002) although it is unclear whether this can be achieved in practice, without sacrificing the 'whole commitment' required for each style, and thus achieving something which is little altered from 'business as usual'. Chapter 5 considers this question in further depth.

It remains also to be seen whether under the Best Value regime, the four currently preferred policing styles will become subject of more critical scrutiny, and subject to further rationalisation or amendment. The absence of information about cause and effect, raises doubts about the ability of police forces to demonstrate their effectiveness, to meet

the 'performance measurement' demands of New Public Management. Such concerns have not prevented HMIC from making comparisons of forces based upon a plethora of 'performance indicator' data, and publishing the results in force inspection reports. The limited accuracy of such data as a representation of police effectiveness, raises the question of whether NPM-inspired central 'steering' of the police, confers benefits which outweigh those of chief constables' autonomy.

Chapter 5 examines another aspect of the relationship between centralisation and the practice of focused policing styles. An examination is made of the extent to which chief constables' choices of policing style are objectively based upon local socioeconomic conditions, and may be more appropriate than a centrally-approved national policing model.

Chapter 5

Local Policing – Science or Alchemy?¹

Introduction

In Chapters 3 and 4, it was argued that in order to reduce recorded crime rates, the police have adopted structures and methods which are ‘approved’ by Government and its agencies. The Home Office Circular 114/83 ‘Manpower, Efficiency and Effectiveness’ was the start of an increasingly intrusive stance by the Government towards the police service. The stance developed from concerns about the achievement of ‘value for money’, to the use of performance indicators and then to an expectation that police would employ particular policing methods. Crime control became and remains a key government expectation of the police, crystallised by the assertion in the 1993 White Paper on Police Reform, that ‘The main job of the police is to catch criminals’ (Home Office 1993 para.2.3).

This centralisation process occurred in the context of a marked lack of information about the likelihood that such structures and methods would achieve the desired results. In the absence of

¹ This chapter is based upon the paper ‘Uniform Styles II: Police Families and Policing Styles’, Hale C, Uglow S. and Heaton R. (2005), *Policing and Society*, Vol.15 No.1, pp.1-18

demonstrable quantitative benefits of centralisation, questions and concerns about loss of local influence upon policing, are thrown into sharper relief. Whilst the government has been increasingly concerned with managerialism and centralisation, have local concerns thereby been neglected? Those concerns were made more apparent as a result of the crime and disorder audits carried out by partnerships established by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. It has been argued by the think-tank 'Policy Exchange', that local authorities and police forces are best positioned to determine local policing strategies. To ensure the provision of appropriate levels of service, the accountability of the police to elected representatives should be strengthened, and the focus of accountability should shift from the level of central government, to that of local authorities (Loveday and Reid 2003, Loveday 2006).

Policy Exchange's arguments raise further questions. If centralisation breeds insensitivity towards 'local needs', is the track record of Chief Constables, in the absence of enhanced accountability to local representatives, any better? Have policing styles been based upon objective consideration of socio-economic conditions, or are they merely a product of Chief Constables' personal preferences? This chapter examines the extent to which, in the 1990s, Chief Constables took local conditions into account, in determining their forces' policing styles.

First, the extent of police centralisation is summarised. The likelihood that centralisation will produce measureable reductions in crime is reviewed. The chapter then focuses in further detail, upon one of the mechanisms by which the Home Office has sought to encourage further

homogenisation of policing. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has supported government efforts to develop a 'performance culture' within the service. HMIC linked forces together into 'families' with the intention that forces' performance could be compared with others which operate in similar environments. At and around the same time, many forces adopted defined 'policing styles.' The chapter reviews the aims of, and organisational structures associated with these policing styles. It explores the question of whether families of forces adopted similar and identifiable patterns of policing. The methodology behind the grouping of police forces into families is explained. The policing styles of forces and the extent of adoption of those styles, within three selected families are identified. The key assessment is whether there is an association between the degree of similarity of forces within a police family, and the extent of commonality of their policing styles. Finally, the convergence of policing styles into a national policing model is revisited, and the likelihood that such a model will actually contribute towards crime control is discussed.

Centralisation – A National Policing Model?

The weight of the available evidence is that forces' policing styles are converging towards the formulation of an approved national policing model. A host of national support and monitoring functions are in place. Substantial elements of police training are carried out on a national basis. A Serious Organised Crime Agency has been introduced and a National Intelligence Model has been implemented by all forces. The National Fingerprint Identification Service is a shared

facility, and a national communications system, Airwaves, has been brought into commission. The Audit Commission and HMIC have become increasingly prescriptive in their recommendations to forces, as has the Association of Chief Police Officers.

The Police Standards Unit has added to the plethora of organisations devoted to the identification and promulgation of police 'best practice', described by the Chief Constable of Hampshire as 'a host of competing bodies, the inter-relationship of which is not clear even to insiders' (Kernaghan 2002). In 2007, the National Police Improvement Agency will be created by the Police and Justice Act 2006. The Agency will amalgamate some existing central police functions such as training, technology and parts of the Home Office. In addition it will take on new responsibilities, including 'looking ahead and identifying the challenges for policing' (Neyroud 2006). The work of the agency is discussed further in Chapter 9.

The internal structures and processes within police forces are also substantially driven from the centre. The service works to achieve performance indicators set by Government. The Police Reform Act 2002 introduced further decisive centralisation measures to the police service. The Act required that Home Secretary should prepare an annual National Policing Plan, setting out strategic priorities in respect of the forthcoming three-year period (s.1(6)(a)). The Plan would *inter alia*, also set objectives and give directions in relation to them, specify performance indicators (s.1 (6)(b)) and 'may contain such other information, plans and advice as the Secretary of State considers relevant to the priorities set out in the plan' (s.1(6)(c)). Sweeping powers were

also conferred upon the Home Secretary to enforce the implementation of 'best' or centrally-preferred practice. The Act went on to provide that the Home Secretary may issue Codes of Practice for Chief Officers to which they 'shall have regard' (s.2(7)), and make regulations requiring all forces to 'adopt procedures or practices of a particular description' (s.7(1)).

Moreover, although forces were also expected to compile local plans, 51 national priorities were required to be reflected in those plans, 19 of which had specific targets attached (Home Office 2002a p.5, Loveday and Reid 2003, p.14).

Policing and Crime Reduction

While the political process moved along the lines of centralism and intervention, the last twenty five years saw the emergence of a broad academic consensus, that police activity can only affect overall crime levels to a very limited extent. The provenance of this viewpoint was explored in depth in Chapter 2, and will only be summarised here. It arises primarily from policing experiments carried out in the United States, the best known of which was the Rand study of the criminal investigation (Greenwood et al 1977). In the United Kingdom, Home Office researchers carried out literature reviews of these experiments (Morris and Heal 1981, Burrows and Tarling 1982, Clarke and Hough 1984). Further research emerged which was also sceptical about the ability of the police to control crime, subject to a limited caveat. There was evidence that the arrest rates of serious and prolific offenders could be increased, by the use of specialist tactics such as greater use of informants and the formation of proactive policing squads to 'target' such

offenders (Eck 1983 p.265-266, Clarke and Hough 1984, pp13-15, Cordner 1996). These tactics were potentially valuable additions to the police armoury, but there was an important distinction to be drawn between tackling individual problems and the consequent effect upon overall crime rates. Cordner, in a review of the successful implementation of problem-oriented policing (POP) in Newport News, Virginia in the mid 1980s, pointed out that

'Had this tactical effort been judged by the total amount of crime rather than just thefts from autos, however, or if it had been judged on the basis of citywide data rather than target-area data, its impact might have been missed' (Cordner 1996 p.198).

Analysis of repeat offender data demonstrates that the leverage exerted by police targeting probably amounts to only a few percentage points potential for crime reduction. (Morgan and Newburn 1997 pp110-116, Heaton 2000 pp347-351). This finding might be viewed as a considerable social benefit when it is considered in the context of the five million crimes recorded annually, offering a potential reduction of tens of thousands in the number of crime victims. However, national performance indicators currently deal in percentages and by this measure, the potential for crime reduction by policing efforts is modest. Any national evaluation of the impact of new policing methods and initiatives is difficult, given that crime levels fluctuate annually as a result of many factors. The nature and relative influences of these factors are only partially understood. For this reason, it is problematic to determine the extent to which year-on-year variations in crime within individual forces are the result of organisational changes or of external factors.

These research findings have not prevented a persistently deterministic view in the political arena, of the relationship between policing activity and crime rates. Mike Hough, when reviewing studies of police effectiveness in the late 1980s, noted wryly that

'The crime-fighting role meets with least opposition across the spectrum of policing politics. It promises accountability, measurable output and popular consent. It offers clarity of purpose, which carries a greater premium than precision in both political and media discussion of policing' (Hough 1987, p.79).

The 1990s saw little attention paid to inconvenient research evidence by either police or politicians, who may well have been encouraged in their stance by recorded crime rates which were falling for the first time in many years. As Loveday opined,

'Current research on the impact of the economy and demographics, along with future crime projections, might have been expected to temper Government commitment to police performance objectives and crime reduction targets. In fact, a completely contrary position has been adopted by it, with a renewed emphasis being given to police activity to reduce crime' (Loveday 2000, p.222).

Policing Styles

In Chapter 3, it was established by examining HMIC inspection reports, that police forces in England and Wales have in the vast majority of cases, adopted one or more of four predominant policing styles. These are 'intelligence-led,' 'geographic', and 'problem oriented' policing, together with 'partnership working'. These determined the corporate ethos, approach and to a lesser extent, working methods of each force. The relationship of these policing styles with the 'force families' identified by the HMIC is of considerable interest, raising questions about the reasons why a particular policing style is adopted. If the demands upon forces within each family are indeed comparable, then a measure of consistency might be expected in their policing styles, providing that these are adopted according to the assessed needs of each force area. Furthermore, the extent of consistency of policing style might be expected to vary according to the degree of similarity of forces within each family. Thus, forces within a 'close-knit' family should exhibit greater similarities in policing styles, than in a family where the degree of association between forces is judged to be looser. The absence of any such relationship would suggest that considerable uncertainty exists as to the relative effectiveness of the various policing styles in crime reduction. Forces' working structures and methods would in that case be primarily a product of other factors, such as chief officers' personal preferences and perceived political necessity.

The aims of, and organisational structures associated with the four policing styles were described

in Chapter 3, and will be briefly reviewed here.

‘Intelligence-led’ policing (ILP) is based on the premise that the acquisition, development and use of information about serious and prolific offenders is likely to be an effective route to the disruption or cessation of their activities. The commission of disproportionately high numbers of offences by such offenders holds the prospect that ILP is also an efficient means of crime reduction. It should be noted that in recent years, the term ‘intelligence led policing’ is increasingly used in the broader sense of any police activity which is informed by the analysis of information, for instance the identification of locations of frequent traffic accidents (eg Home Office 2002 p.7, Phillips 2003). In the remainder of this chapter, the term will be used in the narrower context of targeting repeat offenders, unless stated otherwise.

The use of ILP in England and Wales grew considerably in the last decade, following its initial endorsement by the Audit Commission. (Audit Commission 1993). HMIC was subsequently a strong advocate of ILP, making clear its expectation of the adoption by forces of this policing style, in its force inspection reports. The Inspectorate also produced a thematic inspection report ‘Policing with Intelligence’ in 1997, which set out to identify and promulgate best practice. (HMIC 1997a). The elements of an ILP model can be defined, the essential components being an Intelligence Unit to gather, process and develop information, and a Tasking and Coordinating Group (TCG) to prioritise and drive forward policing activity (Audit Commission 1993, Amey et al 1996, Flood 2004, pp 48-50). HMIC was able to use this structure in its inspection reports, as a

template against which to measure forces' progress towards the achievement of intelligence-led policing. Foot-dragging by individual forces was to be finally eliminated by the arrival of the National Intelligence Model. (NIM) which received the seal of governmental approval in the National Policing Plan 2003-2006. The Plan, enforceable under the Police Reform Act 2002, stated that the NIM 'should be implemented by all forces to commonly accepted minimum standards by April 2004 at the latest' (Home Office 2002, p.14).

'Geographic' policing has been adopted by a number of forces, sometimes under different labels such as 'sector' or 'neighbourhood' policing. Under this approach, Basic Command Units (BCU's) are sub-divided into local policing areas, typically under the command of an Inspector. Officers working in each locality have collective 24-hour responsibility for its policing, usually working from a base within that locality. This contrasts with the traditional policing approach, in which officers are responsible for policing a larger geographical area, but only for the duration of their shifts. Geographic policing is intended to increase officers' sense of ownership of their area and their level of contact with local communities, encouraging them to tackle problems in a constructive and long-term manner. This may reduce fear of crime and encourage the supply of information to detect crime. However, any effect upon levels of crime committed is likely to be dependent upon the exploitation of such intelligence and the use of full problem-solving approaches to crime by individual officers. Geographic policing systems were frequently developed in isolation, in particular from problem-oriented policing which shares a decentralized, 'bottom up' approach to crime reduction. By virtue of chief constables' declarations of its adoption, its devolvement of 24-hour responsibility to a relatively low level

and the physical dispersion of officers places of work, geographic policing systems could be readily identified from HMIC inspection reports of individual forces.

Problem-oriented policing (POP) was originally championed in the United States (Goldstein 1979), and has in latter years been adopted by some forces in the United Kingdom. POP encourages the adoption of a long-term, problem-solving approach to policing, in contrast with traditional visits by officers, who might apply 'sticking-plaster' solutions to symptoms, before moving on to the next incident. The full POP approach requires a systematic process of problem identification and analysis, followed by appropriate intervention and subsequent evaluation. It is the formal nature of POP which distinguishes it from informal problem-solving, which has been carried out by individual officers for many years. HMIC inspection reports reveal an awareness of this distinction, demonstrating that between 1998 and 2000, the proportion of all forces which had adopted the full POP approach, had risen from 7 per cent to 24 per cent (Home Office 2000, p.71). Such forces may have anticipated the compulsion of legislation which mirrored that which enshrined ILP in law. The National Policing Plan 2003-2006 made it clear that 'Forces should wherever possible adopt a problem-solving approach, in collaboration with other agencies, to the main manifestations of anti-social behaviour in their areas, which will typically include drug dealing, begging, drunkenness and graffiti' (Home Office 2002a p.9).

The term 'partnership working' reflects the multi-agency approach which all forces have been required to adopt towards crime reduction, by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The Act

required designated responsible authorities to ‘formulate and implement.....a strategy for the reduction of crime and disorder in the area (s.6(1)). Although such authorities were also expected to review crime and disorder patterns (s.6(2)), the only requirement of the strategy was that it must include objectives and performance targets (s.6(4)). The increasingly formal context of partnership working has some similarity with ILP and POP development, but there are also differences. ILP and POP have relatively prescriptive approaches with audit trails, and are therefore amenable to being tracked by inspection processes. Implementation of the Crime and Disorder Act is longer-established in law, but its requirements are exceedingly broad in nature. In the absence of any ideal model of partnership working and the necessity for all forces to claim its practice, it is difficult to ascertain its extent and effectiveness in any particular police force. It is even more problematic to make a meaningful comparison of such activity in one force with that in another.

The Allocation of Police Forces into Family Groups

In order to monitor the work of police forces, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has carried out inspection visits to individual police forces for many years. The detailed purpose, nature and frequency of such visits by to police forces has been summarised in Chapter 4 and will not be repeated here. To encourage improvement in police performance, HMIC introduced the concept of ‘families of forces,’ which were those believed to be working in similar geographic and social conditions. During inspection visits of any individual force,

performance indicator data such as crime detection rates, are gathered. These are compared with equivalent data in respect of other forces, the highest performances achieved within each family being benchmarks towards which other forces are expected to aim.

The methodology used in the grouping process was explained to Chief Constables in an unpublished letter from Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary (HMCIC 1997). In formulating a model to represent the characteristics and workload of forces, the Inspectorate opted not to use police-generated measurements such as recorded crime rates. These were considered to be vulnerable to inaccuracies and fluctuations as a result of variable recording practices. Instead, external factors were chosen. These fell into two broad dimensions, social and geographical. Five factors were chosen from a shortlist, in order to capture significant aspects of the 'differences' or 'similarities' between police force areas, whilst maintaining a reasonable balance between these social and geographical dimensions. The chosen factors underwent correlational analysis, to ensure that they were not highly correlated to each other and thus liable to give undue weight to a particular type of factor.

The five selected factors were as follows, in relation to every police area. The percentage of one-parent families; the percentage of the unemployed who are males aged under 25; the percentage of households living in rented accommodation; the percentage of the population living in the most densely populated Enumeration Districts in England and Wales; and the percentage of land area falling within the most sparsely populated Enumeration Districts in England and Wales. The

data was then subjected to statistical analyses, to determine the degree of closeness of forces based upon these factors. In order to check the robustness of the analysis, additional factors were introduced and the analysis was repeated. No significant changes arose in the groupings of forces, this being considered to confirm the original selection of factors.

A method of compiling family groups of forces then had to be chosen. The most obvious means, namely the allocation of each force into a number of mutually exclusive groups, was rejected. This decision reflected the non-symmetrical relationship between forces. For example, the Metropolitan force was deemed to be most similar to Greater Manchester, Merseyside, and West Midlands, making a group of four forces. However, Merseyside was considered to be more similar to Cleveland and to West Yorkshire than to the Metropolitan force, which does not appear in Merseyside's group. This example demonstrates how anomalies in the membership of particular groups would inevitably occur if the groups were to be mutually exclusive. HMIC opted instead for Most Similar Force Analysis (MSFA), in which each of the forty three police forces in England and Wales was listed with a group of 'most similar' forces taken from the other forty-two, in decreasing order of similarity to the force in question. The selection of other forces and the extent of their similarity to the force heading the group may be assessed by HMIC's assignment of numerical 'distance measures' which are calculated as follows.

The five social and geographical factors used to compile the groups were standardised to allow for different units of measure. For each factor, the mean and standard deviation across all forces

was calculated. The deviation of each police force from the mean was then calculated, and divided by the standard deviation to give the coefficient of standard deviation for each force. Distance measures were then calculated by calculating the mean of the differences between a force's coefficients of standard deviation, and those of the other forces. The forces within any particular family group, were assessed as 'very similar (stronger comparison)', 'similar' or 'moderately similar (weaker comparison)', dependent upon the range of distance measures. Of the 43 police forces, these three types of group included 16, 13 and 11 forces respectively. The City of London, Metropolitan and Northumbria forces all had unusual characteristics. When the statistical model was applied, anomalous results were obtained. These forces were considered to be 'special cases' which were considered by HMIC, to be not readily comparable with other forces. They were therefore excluded from this study.

As an example of the outcome of MSFA calculations, the six forces considered to be most similar to Hampshire are Avon and Somerset, Leicestershire, Kent, Northamptonshire, Essex and Thames Valley. The distance measures connecting Hampshire to these forces are 0.6, 0.6, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0 and 1.0 respectively with a mean of 0.9. HMIC considered this to be a close-knit group within which the forces are 'very similar'. These figures may be compared, for example, with those in respect of Lancashire, whose MSF group consists of Leicestershire, Cheshire, South Wales, Northamptonshire and Hampshire. Distance measures range from 1.8 to 2.2 with a mean of 2.0, implying that there is a weaker mutual association of forces within this group, which is considered by HMIC to be 'moderately similar'. It is unclear what a mean distance measure for the Lancashire group of approximately double that for the Hampshire group,

amounts to in practical terms, or at what point a distance measure would indicate that there is no significant relationship between two forces.

Statistical information relating to a variety of performance indicators for a particular force is tabulated in HMIC Inspection Reports alongside the MSF averages for the same indicators. These include for example, levels of recorded crime, crime detection rates, emergency response times, stop-searches, complaints, staff sickness, public satisfaction levels, call management, staffing levels and diversity. The indicators are combined under broad headings of 'Service Delivery', 'Quality of Service', 'Fair Access' and 'Corporate Health.' Under each of these headings, the force's position is stated in relation to other forces. Thus for example, Sussex Police was stated to be in the lower quartile of service delivery performance in 1999-2000, and in a MSF position of 6 of 7 (HMIC 2001h, p22).

The Study and its Results

Methodology

The policing styles of individual forces were established from HMIC force inspection reports

using the methodology described in Chapter 3. Examination of these reports, which follow a standard format, allowed the state of development of intelligence-led, problem-oriented and geographic policing to be established with a reasonable degree of accuracy. (Hale et al 2004).

In this study, three HMIC families of forces were examined. One was the family headed by Wiltshire, where the mean distance measure of 0.78 was the least of any force. This is according to HMIC the 'closest-knit' of any family. The family included six other forces: Norfolk, West Mercia, Suffolk, Cambridge, Derbyshire and Gloucestershire. The second family chosen was the group of seven forces headed by Cheshire, which included Leicestershire, Staffordshire, Northamptonshire, Hampshire, Kent and Nottinghamshire. The mean distance measure within the group was 1.25, this being the median of mean distance measures in respect of the forty forces analysed. The forces within the group could be considered to have an 'average' degree of similarity. Finally, the third family considered was that headed by Durham, where the mean distance measure of 3.00 was the greatest for any force, excluding special cases. The mutual association of forces in this group was therefore considered by HMIC to be at its weakest. This family included seven other forces; North Wales, Cumbria, Humberside, Dyfed-Powys, North Yorkshire, Cleveland and Lincolnshire.

The selection of three family groups allowed two sets of comparisons to be made. First, each group was examined separately, to determine the extent of consistency of policing styles within the group. Secondly, the extent of consistency within one group could be compared with that of

the other. It would be anticipated that the group of forces headed by Wiltshire, which are considered by HMIC to share 'very similar' characteristics, would have a high degree of policing styles in common. Conversely, the group headed by Durham would be expected to have a looser association of policing styles.

The policing methods of the forces in the three study groups were identified by means of reference of HMIC inspection reports, and were classified in terms of the ILP, POP and geographic policing styles. The primary sources of information were reports published in 1999, 2000 or 2001. In this sense the study did not represent a true temporal 'snapshot', and it is difficult to assess the extent to which this may have affected the results. However, it may be argued that during this timeframe, it is unlikely that social or geographic factors within police forces have changed significantly. If choices of policing style were based predominantly upon these factors, such choices would not be markedly affected.

Where ambiguity was found in identifying the style of a particular force, reference was made to earlier HMIC reports, Chief Constables' annual reports and to published policing plans.

'Partnership working', although commonly claimed as a policing style, was excluded from consideration because its more nebulous nature made positive identification more difficult. The results of the classification were tabulated against the forces in the chosen HMIC Most Similar Force groups. Only those forces with fully developed ILP, POP and geographic policing systems were included in the tabulation, to prevent over-representation of a policing style. For example,

where an inspection report cited isolated examples of problem-solving as opposed to the routine practice of POP with supporting systems, the force would not be classified as having implemented POP as a policing style.

The results of this exercise were tabulated at Table 1.

Results

Table 1

<u>Family</u>	<u>No. Forces</u>	<u>Similarity</u>	<u>Forces practising style</u>		
			<u>ILP</u>	<u>POP</u>	<u>Geographic</u>
Wiltshire	7	Very similar	4	1	4
Cheshire	7	Similar	6	1	2
Durham	8	Moderately similar	6	1	2

N.B. Some forces practiced more than one policing style. Therefore, the total number of forces practising the three styles, exceeds the number of forces in each family group.

Discussion

Interpretation of Results

The aim of this study was to ascertain whether there is any identifiable link between the social and geographical characteristics and workload of police forces, and the policing styles adopted by those forces. These variables are neither measurable with precision nor static over time, and as such are not amenable to sophisticated quantitative treatment. In recognition of these limitations, little emphasis was laid upon the comparison of individual forces, expressed by HMIC in the form of distance measures. However, if the distance measure concept is valid, it is reasonable to put them into a broader context by using mean distance measures to compare the characteristics of families of forces. In the case of the two families headed by Wiltshire and Durham, the difference in the mean distance measures is greatest. If policing styles are products of social and geographic factors, then the difference in the pattern of policing styles would be most apparent when comparing these two families. Moreover, a fundamental part of the remit of HMIC in an inspection of any police force, is to assess whether that force's structures and methods are appropriate to the demands placed upon it. It is therefore a valid exercise to ascertain whether the HMIC is in a position to make such judgements, based upon information which would be available to it, and informed by the existence or absence of a straightforward relationship between policing style and force characteristics.

In this case, the 'very similar' family headed by Wiltshire, was split centrally. Four forces had

adopted geographic policing, whilst three had not. Similarly, four forces operated well-developed ILP models, whilst three did not do so. Only one force had implemented a full problem-solving model. In the 'similar' family headed by Cheshire, the ILP model was dominant, being practised by six out of seven forces. Two forces used a geographic policing model, and one force used problem oriented policing in a systematic manner. The 'moderately similar' family headed by Durham contained a distribution of policing styles which was identical to that of the Cheshire family, the only difference being the size of Durham's family, which contained eight forces instead of Cheshire's seven. This had the effect of slightly reducing the incidence of all three policing styles. For example, the incidence of ILP was 75 per cent in the Durham family compared with 86 per cent in the Cheshire family.

In summary, the police force family headed by Wiltshire, which according to HMIC is the 'most similar' group, showed less consistency of policing styles than either the most loosely associated group headed by Durham, or the family headed by Cheshire which contained forces of 'average' mutual similarity. There was little difference in the distribution of styles, between the Cheshire and Durham groups.

The reason for this result is unclear, although there are two possibilities. The first is that the HMIC classification of force families is substantially invalid. This interpretation is unlikely to be correct. Force families are determined by a combination of carefully chosen social and geographical factors. Examination of the families, although subjective, does not reveal obvious

anomalies. Moreover, the families headed by Wiltshire and Durham were, according to HMIC, at the extremes of internal similarity. Any direct relationship between policing styles and force family characteristics, should have been apparent. The lack of any such relationship would require the HMIC classifications of families to be inaccurate to the point where they are merely random groups of forces.

The second explanation of the results is more credible. This is that the policing styles chosen by forces' chief officers, are not primarily a result of pressures arising from the social and geographic factors used by HMIC in its composition of families. The rationale underpinning actual choices of policing styles is unclear. This interpretation raises the question of whether the ethos of a force may lead it to opt for a particular policing style in the expectation of gaining benefits on some aspects of measured performance, if necessary at the expense of others. For example, one force which operates a geographical policing system where many resources are devolved to neighbourhood level, might hope to perform impressively in respect of quality of service. It may however, expect to fare less well than an intelligence-led force, in the area of crime reduction. The latter type of force is likely to have invested considerable resources in centralisation, developing intelligence units and the proactive tactical capacity which is necessary to exploit the intelligence gained. Structural differences such as these may substantially hinder a force's ability to improve a particular aspect of performance. MSF data is a useful starting point for the raising of questions about force performance, but may merely reflect choice of policing style rather than provide practical blueprints for improvement. These are more likely to be presented where forces are compared which have similar policing styles in addition

to membership of the same family.

The Integration of Policing Styles

Tensions between policing styles will arise as police forces attempt to integrate such styles into everyday operations in order to meet Home Office and HMIC aspirations, especially amongst families of forces. While different policing styles can exist side-by-side and complement each other, they can also create divergent demands, both operationally and for resources. Here, a model of criminality is presented which illustrates the problem is considered in relation to intelligence-led policing and POP.

Policing styles may impact differentially on crime rates. The reduction of volume crime depends substantially upon the ability of the police to identify patterns of criminality. The degree of patterning is a product of a many factors. Although the spectrum of patterning is continuous, it is divided here into degrees of 'low', 'medium' and 'high' patterning in order to facilitate interpretation. (Fig. 1).

Figure 1 postulates that a bedrock of crime, where the motivation for commission is unclear or inconsistent, is of 'low' patterning. These might include assaults arising from spontaneous disputes, some vandalism and some theft from shops. They are for practical purposes, beyond the

prevention ability of the police, who attempt instead to detect offenders after the event. Such offences are likely to be relatively stable in number.

Overlaid upon this bedrock is a further group of crimes which may be described as of 'medium' patterning, with more consistency in the motivation leading to their commission. The peaks and troughs of such crimes are likely to be more pronounced and of higher frequency over time. They could include domestic assaults, and vandalism in particular locations such as bus stops and alleyways. The decentralized approach of problem oriented policing (POP) aims to identify such patterns of crime, at neighbourhood level and by individual officers. Such officers are expected to propose actions to eliminate such patterns, using the resources of the police and other agencies as necessary. Put simply, they aim to take a chunk from the middle of the crime problem.

The final element of the aggregated crime picture is the highly patterned offences which are characterized by a substantial degree of motivation. These would include acquisitive, particularly drug-fuelled property crime such as burglary and thefts of and from vehicles. Such crime is likely to fluctuate frequently and considerably over time. It is likely to be responsible for most severe rises in overall crime, but by the same token, is relatively amenable to police intervention by the incapacitation of offenders. Intelligence-led policing (ILP) aims to do so explicitly, 'top-slicing' crime by focusing primarily upon the activity of repeat offenders, through crime pattern analysis and the use of tactical intervention to disrupt criminal activity. The control and direction

of such intervention is undertaken by Tasking and Coordinating Groups (TCGs), which are at the hub of a BCU's operations and thus exert a 'top down' approach to crime reduction.

It is the centralised approach of ILP contrasted with the decentralised nature of POP which is likely to make their simultaneous use problematic in practice. In principle these policing styles are complementary, but both are labour-intensive against a background of relatively static resources. In ILP-dominated forces, TCGs wield considerable resources, which are likely to include the use of one or more specialised proactive units. These and intelligence units may have been staffed at least in part, by a reduction in numbers of community-based officers, whose work was hitherto viewed by senior officers as desirable rather than essential. The overarching view of a BCU's crime problems which is taken by its TCG, focuses its efforts upon those criminals who are considered to be the most prolific and serious offenders, and are therefore high-profile targets.

In contrast, POP relies upon officers 'on the ground' to exploit local knowledge, in order to deal with problems which may not be significant or even apparent from the centre. Furthermore, the full POP process requires significant resource input to individual problems. In a trial in Leicestershire supported by the Home Office-based Police Research Group, officers were required to complete 10 pages of 'SARA' forms in order to scan, analyse and respond to the problem, followed by an assessment of the effectiveness and costs of the action taken. The multi-agency approach envisaged by the process is also likely to be lengthy and resource-intensive

(Leigh et al 1996, pp 52-61). This prospect raises interesting questions about its efficiency.

For example, a five or six reported cases of graffiti per annum to a sports pavilion, are unlikely to trigger intelligence-led action through the TCG process. The incidents may however, be drawn to the attention of a locally-based officer and trigger a problem-oriented, partnership response. The provision of a youth shelter may appear to be a reasonable proposal. Its realisation would require multi-agency meetings, compliance with environmental planning procedures, availability of finance and siting objections to be overcome. This process would be labour-intensive, take months to reach fruition, and produce a local qualitative benefit, but make would no discernible impact upon reported crime figures. It remains to be seen whether the POP process can avoid the pitfall of becoming bogged down in an ever-accumulating list of problems. Resources are therefore likely to be a problem for the individual officer practising POP within an intelligence-led force. Such officers are likely to be few in number and the problems which they identify may not be sufficiently great to attract central support.

The quantification of costs in the full POP procedure may also herald the start of a wider process of ascertaining the relationships between policing styles, consequent crime levels and costs. This would extend the measurement of 'value for money' from situational crime prevention, where the cost of 'locks and bolts' is an obvious consideration, to the broader arena of community safety. Such cost-benefit analysis has been advocated by researchers (Hough and Tilley 1998, pp 42-43) and by Her Majesty's Inspectorate (HMIC 1998a, p.5), which also identified that

evaluation 'is often the least considered component in developing a problem solving approach' (HMIC 2000a, p.85). Evaluations can carry considerable costs, and it may be more productive to carry out strong evaluations of few initiatives, than weak evaluations of many initiatives (Sherman et al 1998).

Cordner's observation earlier in this chapter, highlights the necessity for such evaluation in problem-oriented policing. For example, there might be a very significant level of car crime in a particular locality. However, the problem may comprise perhaps 10 per cent of car crime in the BCU in which the locality is situated, and car crime might again, constitute only 10 per cent of all crime. The potential for overall crime reduction is thus only 1 per cent, against a background of annual changes of several per cent. This demonstrates the difficulties involved in attempting to affect volume crime rates, and in being seen to do so. A similar point might be made in relation to intelligence-led policing, where there is an important distinction to be drawn between incapacitating a small number of offenders and making a substantial impact upon crime levels. It has been estimated that the leverage which police action is able to exert using existing resources, probably amounts to only a few per cent of all crime committed (Morgan and Newburn 1997, pp110-116, Heaton 2000 p. 347-351), although it is unclear whether there is a cumulative effect over time.

Conclusions

Police forces in England and Wales operate one or more of a limited range of policing styles. These are currently known as 'intelligence led', 'problem oriented' and 'geographic' policing, together with 'partnership working.' This study has shown that the choice of styles is not a product of purely utilitarian considerations such as the social or geographic characteristics of force areas. The decision appears to be a product of chief officer preference, in which political pressures and a more corporate approach by ACPO have become a highly significant factor in recent years. Chief officers are increasingly ready to accede these influences (Savage et al 2000a, pp.69-80). In the face of government readiness to legislate for crime reduction, together with the absence of demonstrable links between force characteristics, policing styles and crime rates, there is little reason for them to do otherwise. There is no evidence that local factors, other than perhaps tradition, favour the practice of a particular policing style instead of any other.

The likely outcome of this process of centralisation, is the development of a national policing model. Not only is this taking place in the virtual absence of public debate outside the academic press; the pace of such developments has left any such debate (eg Savage 2001, Kernaghan 2002, Loveday 2002, Oakensen et al 2002, Loveday and Read 2003) trailing in its wake. The attempt by Home Secretary Charles Clarke in 2005-2006 to force through amalgamations of police forces, is discussed in Chapter 9.

The shape of such a policing model is open to conjecture, but is likely to include elements of all four policing styles, the balance of which will be determined as a function of the continuing operational independence of chief constables. Intelligence-led policing directed from the centre will claim a central role as it continues to enjoy central Government support in the form of the National Intelligence Model. To this end, it will be broadened to become something more akin to 'intelligent' policing, of far wider scope than the incapacitation of repeat offenders envisaged by the Audit Commission, at the time of its inception a decade ago. As the Home Office claimed in a briefing note to the Police Reform Act: 'The NIM goes beyond the management of intelligence. It is at the centre of all policing activity and can be applied to most if not all policing problems.....The NIM provides a model for policing' (Home Office 2001). At the BCU level, ILP will be used to flatten those peaks of crime which are caused by prolific offenders. Some officers will continue to work at a neighbourhood level, as forces operating geographical policing systems develop full problem-solving systems. They will be expected to discern further crime patterns which are not necessarily visible from the BCU centre, and work to eliminate them in a systematic manner. These approaches will require an element of partnership working, to tackle the social and environmental factors which allow crime to flourish.

The management of BCUs will include the management of paradox, balancing the 'top down' nature of ILP with the 'bottom up' demands of POP. There will undoubtedly be many examples of success at the local level, but their aggregation into a substantial impact upon overall crime levels, is a challenge of a different order. The quantitative information which is currently available about the effects of ILP and POP upon crime rates, is limited but unequivocal. Each

policing style may be effective at a very local level, but the benefits are difficult to measure using quantitative performance indicators. Each style is also labour-intensive, and addresses only part of the overall crime problem.

Further quantitative research, complementary to that described by Chapters 6-8, would be necessary in order to gain a clearer picture of how ILP and POP may affect crime types and levels, thus allowing these styles to be applied efficiently. For example, intelligence-led targeting of repeat offenders may be an effective means of tackling acquisitive property crime such as burglary, whilst the 'bottom-up', community-based approach of problem-solving may achieve better results in the reduction of youth damage. Moreover, the question of whether the continued application of these policing styles produces an agglomeration of small annual percentage reductions in crime, remains outstanding. These are matters of conjecture which need to be resolved if police forces are to accept that a national policing model will promulgate 'best practice' as opposed to 'best guess' central preference.

The next three chapters of the thesis give accounts of quantitative research which addresses its second theme, namely the extent to which the use of identifiable policing styles has reduced volume crime. Chapter 6 commences that task by examining crime statistics across a wide range of police forces, in relation to several categories of crime.

Chapter 6

Policing Styles and Crime Reduction

Introduction

The late 1990s saw a reduction in crime in England and Wales, from a peak of 5,591,717 recorded offences in 1992 (Home Office 1993a) to a trough of 4,481,817 such offences in 1998-1999 (Home Office 2001a). There were wide variations in individual police forces, above and below the 20 per cent mean reduction in crime. The research described by this chapter aimed to identify and compare the crime reduction results associated with the four main policing styles used by forces during the period.

The comparison was not straightforward. The number of possible variables required choices to be made, some of which were alternatives whilst others allowed multiple possibilities. The variables to be chosen initially, included the type of offence and the time period to be surveyed. 'Success' in dealing with crime could be measured in terms of the reduction in the number of offences committed or alternatively, increased detection rates. Any reduction in offences could be assessed in terms of either the aggregate number committed, or the number per 100,000 population. A full exploration of the relationships between all of these variables is outside the scope of this thesis. In

the more limited exercise which was carried out here, the variables subject of comparison were chosen with the aim of maximising the validity of the results.

Methodology

The policing styles of individual forces excluding the City of London, were obtained by examining HMIC reports, using the process described in Chapter 3. Crime statistics were obtained from the annual Home Office report 'Crime Statistics in England and Wales' which provided force-level data. Figures relating to the City of London were subtracted from 'all forces' data, to produce '42 Force' data. 'Crime Statistics' in England and Wales' monitored calendar years until 1997 and then moved to April-March financial years. Faced with a choice between a 4-month omission of data or an 8-month duplication, the omission was chosen. Therefore, data from the 1997 report was followed by that from April 1998-March 1999. The time periods over which crime reductions were measured, comprised several years, so the effect of data loss upon the results would be minimised.

Offence definitions remained constant throughout the majority of the survey period. All forces were affected by changes in Home Office 'counting rules' in 1998-99, as a result of which additional offences such as drunkenness were recorded. This measure produced a national 14 per cent increase recorded crime from 4,481,817 to 5,109,089 for that year (Home Office 2001a, p.41). Survey periods of several years were again used in order to

minimise the differential impact per year, upon forces' crime levels. The comparison of crime reductions for some individual types of offence, such as criminal damage, provided information which avoided the problem.

Further, limited changes occurred in 2000-2001, as a result of boundary changes. Parts of the Metropolitan force were transferred to Essex, Hertfordshire and Surrey. The effect on crime in these forces was respectively -3, +7, +23 and +38 per cent respectively (Home Office 2001a, p.41). Across the survey periods, the impact upon the smaller Hertfordshire and Surrey forces is potentially significant, and is acknowledged where necessary in this analysis.

A suitable measure of outcome needed to be selected. All four of the policing styles had a primary aim, though not necessarily the sole aim of crime reduction. Moreover, the processing by police forces of 'committed' crime into 'detected' crime statistics, is an administrative exercise. It was probable that the results would reflect individual forces' administrative rules, perhaps temporarily applied, as much as any impact upon volume crime. A small-scale survey of 'all crime' detection rates confirmed the likelihood that this was the case, showing many single-year alterations of 25 to 30 per cent of the previous year. Therefore, gross numbers of crimes committed were examined in preference to detection rates. The exercise was partially repeated using measures of crime per 100,000 population. It was found that this did not significantly affect the results.

Finally, categories of crime were selected. 'All crime', comprising all recordable offences, was chosen as the single widely cited, politically sensitive measure of the extent of crime and police forces' performance in dealing with it. This choice presented some methodological limitations. It was estimated from a comparison with British Crime Survey-derived figures, that the police record only 29 per cent of all offences. (Home Office 2003 p.19). In addition, 'all crime' included low-volume offences which were unlikely to be affected by the use of targeted policing styles, such as fraud and sexual offences.

The study of two other offences, burglary and theft of motor vehicles, aimed to address these problems. All policing styles attempt to reduce crime by identifying patterns in features of its commission, and making interventions to prevent further offences.

Burglary and theft of motor vehicles are examples of property crime which provide the offender with a consistent motivation, that of monetary gain. They should therefore be susceptible to police intervention. Burglary was likely to be the stronger offence type for research purposes in this respect. Vehicle thefts include temporary 'taking without consent' with no financial advantage, and may be affected by cultural propensity towards 'joyriding'. Additionally, burglary offences were likely to be less susceptible to economic forces than vehicle thefts, which may be affected by market values of reliable vehicles and manufacturers' security improvements. In respect of recording rates, vehicle theft had the research advantage, which at 81 per cent bettered the 46 per cent for burglary (Home Office 2003 p.19).

Finally, criminal damage was studied. It is an offence which, unlike the others studied, generated an increasing number of crime reports throughout most of the 1990s. As burglary and vehicle crime decreased towards the end of that decade, the attention of government turned towards other offences such as damage, together with antisocial behaviour and violent crime. The prospects for reduction by the application of a particular policing style are therefore of interest. Criminal damage does not involve personal gain, and is likely to be the subject of less consistent motivation than burglary or vehicle theft. Very little time is required to commit damage and the carriage of equipment and other goods to and from the scene is not essential, making detection difficult. Less patterning of offences would be anticipated and therefore, the effectiveness of policing would be expected to be lower than that in respect of acquisitive crime. Criminal damage has a low recording rate of 22 per cent (Home Office 2003, pp12,15). Time periods across which to measure crime reduction, were then chosen. Two lengthy time spans were chosen, each of which was identical for all forces, as measures of comparability of individual forces with national trends. This would minimise the effect of short-term differences in recording practices between forces.

For each offence type, an approximate means of gauging the extent to which national trends had been replicated in individual forces was required. The 42-force mean crime reduction was noted, for every time period studied for each type of offence. This measurement was weighted towards larger forces with greater numbers of offences. For example, the Metropolitan Police saw the fifth greatest criminal damage reduction of all forces during 1993-1999. The large number of offences in that force skewed the '42

force mean' crime reduction, which was situated between the 11th and 12th most successful forces. Therefore, the number of forces which had clustered within 5 per cent of the median midpoint of the 21st and 22nd forces, was preferred as a guide to conformity to national trends.


'All Crime'

Trends

A graph of recorded 'all crime' in the 42 study forces between 1981 and 2001 was compiled and examined. (Figure 1). Nationally, 'all crime' rose steadily throughout the 1980s, reaching an approximate plateau between 1986 and 1988. It then climbed steeply between 1989 and 1992. Following its 1992 peak, the crime level declined until it reached a shallow trough in 1998-99. Within the time periods chosen for study, 38 of the 42 forces studied followed this broad description of crime trends, although crime peaks and troughs varied by a year or so compared with national trends. The four exceptions were Cambridgeshire, Merseyside, Sussex and Gwent.

Cambridgeshire, Sussex and Gwent followed the national rise in crime until the peak of 1992. Thereafter, Cambridgeshire and Sussex fluctuated at approximately the 1992 level until 1998, whilst crime in most forces fell. The level in Gwent rose further during that period. The pattern of crime levels in Merseyside was unlike that of any other force. 'All

Figure 1: All Recorded Crime, 42 Forces



crime' levels reached a trough in 1989, and fluctuated widely around that level for the next decade, with no sustained peaks or troughs. No theories have been advanced, to explain the reasons why these forces exhibited atypical crime rate patterns.

Two time periods were chosen for inter-force comparisons. The first was between the national peak of 1992 and the trough of 1998, to ascertain how forces had fared compared with the largest sustained national fall in crime. The second period was between 1988, the last year before the steep rise which led to the peak of 1992, and the post-peak trough of 1998-99. The aim was to present an alternative and complementary view of long-term crime trends. A force which had experienced a large pre-1992 rise, would not present an unchallenged picture of successful reduction, merely by reverting to pre-rise levels.

It was also necessary to take account of crime fluctuations within individual forces, which contained short-term peaks and troughs within long-term trends. Some forces which broadly followed national trends, showed long-term peaks and troughs of crime which varied by a year or so from the national picture. Therefore, a comparison of two forces between identical years might produce a peak-trough measurement for one, and a trough-peak figure for the other, and thus a skewed comparison. In order to allow comparison of the 'best results' of each force, the third time period was flexible. It consisted of the crime reduction from the highest crime level from 1991 to 1996 inclusive, to the lowest crime level from 1997 to 2000 inclusive. This method was not suitable to compare the 4 atypical forces with the 38 which followed national trends.

The results were calculated and presented by dividing the crime figure of the final year, by that of the first year of the survey period. For example, a force which halved its crime rate between 1992 and 1998 would produce a result of 0.5. Therefore, lower numerical results denoted larger crime reductions. Results were presented numerically and in order of forces' results, for the longest time period. The force which saw the largest crime reduction was denoted as number 1, whilst the lowest was number 42. This order of presentation was maintained for the shorter time periods, for which numerical and ordinal results were again given. A consistently successful force would feature highly in the 'league table' across all time periods. A force which achieved a high position in only one list of ordinal results had experienced less robust success.

Results

The results of the research were displayed at Table 1 (p.218).

Discussion

Period 1 was 1992-1998, a time of nationally falling recorded crime in most police forces. The four exceptions, Cambridgeshire, Merseyside, Sussex and Gwent are discussed above. The fall in crime in individual forces compared with the national trend was highlighted and presented as a 'league table' of crime reduction. The median crime

level in 1998 was at 0.787, or 78.7% of its 1992 level. There was considerable clustering of forces around the median. Twenty forces, amounting to almost half the total, saw recorded crime in 1998 within 5 per cent of the median, at 73.7% to 83.7% of the 1992 level.

Period 2 was 1988-1998. The period saw a sharp rise in nationally recorded crime until 1992, followed by the slower fall studied in Period 1. Therefore, a force which featured highly in Period 1 but not in Period 2, had preceded its 'success' with a sharp increase in crime. For example, Kent, Avon and Somerset, and Nottinghamshire fell into this category. Conversely, some forces such as Lancashire and the Metropolitan, achieved a relatively better long-term result in Period 2, than during the shorter time of nationally falling crime of Period 1. In 1998, the median crime level was 22.7% above that reported in 1988. There was less clustering around the median than during the shorter Period 1, seven forces' final crime levels being within 5 per cent of the median, at between 17.7 and 27.7 per cent above the 1988 level.

Crime reduction during Period 3 was calculated in a similar manner to that in Period 1, but using the peaks and troughs of individual forces which in some cases varied from those experienced nationally. In practice, there was little difference in the results for most forces, compared with the fixed timespan of Period 1. The median 42-force crime trough level in the period 1997-2000, was 77.7 per cent of the 1991-1996 peak level. Over the same period, twenty-three forces saw reductions to within 5 per cent of the median, between 72.7 and 82.7 per cent of the peak level. Only six of the forty two

forces studied, altered their 'league table' positions by more than five places, compared with those in which they were placed in Period 1.

The reductions in 'all crime' following the 1992 peak, saw a high level of compliance by individual forces with national trends. The longer period from 1988 to 1998 showed a wider range of results. The difference in the extent of crime reduction achieved by individual forces was in large part, attributable to the varied extent to which they experienced rises in crime, between 1988 and the 1992 peak. There is no evidence that the national rise in crime at that time was a result of some national deterioration in policing, or of any other cause than adverse socioeconomic factors. The question is thus raised of whether the subsequent fall was a consequence of improved socioeconomic conditions, or the result of more effective policing applied with remarkable uniformity, despite police forces' use of a variety of policing styles.

The longest-established policing style, intelligence-led policing (ILP), was brought into use by several forces in 1994 and 1995, following publication of the Audit Commission's report 'Helping with Enquiries – Tackling Crime Effectively' November 1993 (Audit Commission 1993). During the mid- and late 1990s, many other forces followed suit or adopted alternative policing styles. In general, the introduction of policing styles followed crime reductions and not vice versa. On the basis of this evidence, the dominant determinants of 'all crime' levels appear to be factors external to policing, such as socioeconomic conditions. This does not mean that the role of policing is insignificant.

The study went on to examine the extent to which the application of different policing styles may affect volume crime rates.

The results table was examined, using the 'league table' generated by Period 1. The table showed a wide distribution of policing styles. For example, ILP had been adopted by forces in position 1-5, but also by those in positions 32-37. Problem-oriented policing was predominantly practised by forces in the lower half of the table, but had the lowest sample size of any style examined. Geographic policing and partnership working were distributed throughout the table. The six forces with no discernable policing style occupied position numbers 6, 8, 18, 28, 31 and 38. Their median crime reduction was similar to the median reduction in forces which had adopted named styles. As stated earlier, the results produced by Period 3 were similar to those of Period 1.

When the table was rearranged to reflect the longer timescale of Period 2, there was little difference in results. For example, ILP was a feature of all forces in positions 1-5 inclusive, but also of those in positions 34-37 inclusive. The six forces with no apparent policing style experienced a similar spread of success to those with defined styles, occupying positions 5, 16, 17, 20, 29 and 40.

The only forces which featured in the 'top five' of crime reduction, irrespective of the period of measurement, were Northumbria, Dyfed-Powys and Durham. Each of these forces practised a different combination of policing styles. Dyfed Powys was in notable

opposition to Northumbria and Durham, by declining to practise crime ‘screening’, followed by investigation of the potentially most solvable crimes.

Dyfed-Powys may have used different recording practices to those in other forces. In 1998/99, new Home Office crime counting rules, including an expanded list of offences, were applied to all forces. This innovation had the effect of raising nationally-recorded crime from 4,481,817 to 5,109,089, equating to 14 per cent. In Dyfed-Powys, offences rose by 37 per cent from 17,858 to 24,588 (Home Office 2001a p.41). In 2002/2003, further Home Office crime counting rules were applied to all forces. Nationally-recorded crime rose further by 10 per cent (Home Office 2003a p.xi). Recorded crime in Dyfed-Powys rose by 21 per cent (Home Office 2003b p.28). The increases in Dyfed-Powys are unlikely to have significantly affected the measurement of crime reduction within the force, in this study. Time periods 1 and 2 ended in 1998, before the increases took place. Period 3 allowed the selection of the trough measurement of the years 1997-2000, enabling post-increase measurements to be avoided.

It was unclear whether there was any regional link in the results of Northumbria and Durham. It was also notable that Her Majesty’s Inspectorate, when formulating ‘families’ of similar forces, considered Northumbria to possess unique social and geographic characteristics. These rendered it non-comparable with any other force (HMCIC 1997). Moreover, Durham’s ‘family’ was considered to have the weakest mutual association of any group of forces.

Gwent and Sussex featured in the five forces which saw the smallest reductions in crime, irrespective of the period of measurement. Gwent was primarily committed to geographic policing and shared with Dyfed-Powys, the practice of attending and investigating all crimes. Gwent also combined low crime reduction with the second-highest national crime detection rate (HMIC 2001c p.12). Gwent and Sussex saw a short period of crime reduction following the peak of the early 1990s, but unlike most forces, failed to sustain the trend. The reasons for this are unclear.

On this limited evidence, it appears that no policing style has played a clear role in volume crime reduction. This conclusion is open to the criticism that 'all crime' includes many offences of widely differing provenance, some of which are not amenable to police intervention. For example, the crime category 'Theft – Other' includes offences of myriad descriptions. The effectiveness of policing styles may be discernable for some individual crime types, but invisible within 'all crime' statistics which are susceptible to be affected by random offences. In order to test this hypothesis, the crime reduction results of police forces were examined in relation to burglary, thefts of motor vehicles and criminal damage.


Burglary

Trends

A graph of recorded burglary between 1981 and 2001 in the 42 study forces was compiled and examined. (Figure 2). Within the time periods studied, this presented a similar pattern to that of 'all crime', although the significant years were different by a year or so. Forty of the forces broadly followed national trends, the exceptions being Merseyside and Gwent. Merseyside showed an almost continuous decline in burglary between 1986 and 2000. Burglary in Gwent initially followed the national pattern, peaking sharply in 1992 and then declining until 1995. It then rose again to a higher peak in 1996 and 1997, before a further decline.

The two fixed time periods chosen for study, in a similar manner to those for 'all crime', were 1993-2000 and 1989-2000. Although 2000 was a point of lowest burglary for most forces, its choice disadvantaged Essex, Hertfordshire and Surrey, all of which acquired enlarged boundaries from parts of the Metropolitan Police and thereby, additional offences. The flexible time period was designated as that between the highest crime between 1991 and 1996, and the lowest crime level between 1998 and 2000.

Figure 2: Burglary, 42 Forces



Results

The results were calculated and presented in the same manner as for 'all crime' in Table 2 (p.220).

Discussion

Period 1 was 1993-2000, a time of nationally falling recorded burglary in most police forces. The fall in burglary in individual forces compared with the national trend was highlighted and presented as a 'league table' of crime reduction. The 42-force burglary level in 2000, representing the mean of the forces studied, was at 0.610, or 61.0% of its 1993 level. The median reduction was 60.4%. There was significant clustering of forces around the median but less than was found for 'all crime'. Fifteen forces saw recorded crime in 2000 within 5% of the median, at 55.4% to 65.4% of the 1993 level.

Period 2 was 1989-2000. The period saw a sharp rise in nationally recorded burglary until 1993, followed by the slower fall studied in Period 1. Therefore, a force which featured highly in Period 1 but not in Period 2, had preceded its 'success' with a sharp increase in offences. For example, Devon and Cornwall, Leicestershire and Cheshire were amongst many forces which fell into this category. Some forces such as Cleveland and the Metropolitan, achieved a relatively better long-term result in Period 2, than during the time of nationally falling crime of Period 1. The success of the Metropolitan

force in achieving the sixth-greatest fall, skewed the mean reduction in burglary to a point well below the median of all forces. In 2000, the 42-force crime level was 1.3 % above that reported in 1989. The median 2000 level was 15.1% above that reported in 1989.

There was considerably less clustering around the median in Period 2, than during the shorter Period 1. Four forces' final crime levels were within 5 per cent of the median, at between 10.1% and 20.1% above the 1989 level.

Crime reduction during Period 3 was calculated in a similar manner to that in Period 1, but using the peaks and troughs of individual forces which in some cases varied from those experienced nationally. In practice, there was little difference in the results for most forces, although a few forces showed different results. For example, Hertfordshire showed the 28th greatest burglary reduction during the flexible peak-trough offered by Period 3, but only the 38th greatest reduction during Period 1, 1993-2000. The cause of this apparent anomaly was that Hertfordshire reached a burglary trough in 1998, and climbed again to its 2000 level. Therefore, the fixed period showed a considerably smaller crime reduction than the flexible period. Hertfordshire's acquisition of the Metropolitan Police District accounts for some of the 1998-2000 rise in burglary. However, the reason for increases in two successive years is unclear.

The mean 42-force burglary reduction for Period 3 was to 61 % of its peak level, in common with Period 1. The median reduction was to 57.7% of its peak level. Eighteen

forces, compared with 23 for the all 'crime' Period 3, saw reductions of within five per cent of the median. Ten of the forces studied, compared with six for 'all crime', altered their 'league table' positions by more than five places, relative to Period 1.

In summary, the burglary reduction results of individual forces showed greater variation from national trends, than was the case for 'all crime'. The policing styles of forces were then examined in order to ascertain whether there was a demonstrable connection between variations in burglary reduction and the use of particular policing styles.

Four forces appeared in the 'top five' positions of burglary reduction, irrespective of the method of measurement. These were Northumbria, Dyfed-Powys, South Wales and Cumbria. As outlined in the results for 'all crime', Northumbria was predominantly intelligence-led and the comparability of its results with those of other forces, has been called into question. Dyfed-Powys maintained a geographic, community-based policing style. During the period of this survey, no policing style was discernable in South Wales, although the force moved later to a 'community based, problem orientated, intelligence led' style (HMIC 2000m p.3). Similarly, the Cumbria force adopted its intelligence-led style relatively late during the period of this survey, having 'launched a commitment to a policing philosophy based upon intelligence led policing' in 1998 (HMIC 1999a, p.1). Its success cannot be explained in terms of that policing style.

The only force which appeared consistently in the 'bottom five' forces of crime reduction was Gwent. The characteristics of this force have been discussed under 'all crime'.

The results of other forces were examined. No policing style appeared to have achieved particularly strong results. In Period 1, intelligence-led policing (ILP) was a feature of three of the four most highly placed forces, but also of forces placed from the 32nd to the 39th positions. Geographic policing was practised by five of the nine top-placed forces, but also in five of the seven forces placed 30th to 36th inclusive. The majority of the small sample of forces practising problem-oriented policing (POP) appeared in the lower half of the table. Similarly, forces practising partnership working had not enjoyed conspicuous success, appearing mainly in the middle and lower parts of the table. The six forces which had not declared the use of any policing style achieved the 3rd, 7th, 12th, 16th, 19th and 40th greatest reductions in reported burglary. This apparent success suggests that the effect of policing styles upon burglary reduction, is so minimal that their distribution is random.

When the table was rearranged in order of crime reduction during Period 2, similar results were obtained. ILP was a feature of the forces which occupied positions 1, 2, 4 and 5, but also those which occupied positions 36-41 inclusive. Geographic policing had been declared by the forces occupying positions 2, 4, 8 and 9, but also positions 35, 38, 39 and 42. On this evidence, the use of policing styles had no discernible effect upon the incidence of recorded burglary.


Theft of Motor Vehicles

Trends

A graph of recorded thefts of motor vehicles (TOMV) between 1981 and 2001 in the 42 study forces was compiled and examined. (Figure 3). For the purposes of this study, 'thefts' included unlawful taking of motor vehicles, commonly referred to as 'UTMV' or 'joyriding', which excludes any intention to permanently deprive vehicle owners of their property. 'Criminal Statistics' did not provide separate figures for these two types of offence. Had these been available, they would have been products of judgements as to the intentions of offenders and therefore liable to significant error. The addition of UTMV to theft made the level of such offences susceptible to socio-economic or regional cultural influences. For example, the predominant youth culture in a particular city may have held a positive view of, and thus encouraged, 'joyriding'. Variations in the level of such offences may have been in part, a result of unmeasured cultural shifts. Hereafter, TOMV will be taken to include UTMV offences.

The level of offences presented a similar pattern to that of 'all crime', but in common with burglary, rises and falls in offence levels were steeper. The highest national level of offences was recorded in 1993 and some forces experienced a second peak, two or three years later. Numbers of offences then fell every year until the end of the decade.

Figure 3: Theft of Motor Vehicles, 42 Forces



Forty of the 42 forces broadly followed national trends, although the troughs and peaks of the late 1980s and the early 1990s varied by a year or so from one force to another. The steep increases and decreases in numbers of offences meant that the use of fixed time periods would produce results which were not representative of crime reductions in individual forces. Therefore, flexible time periods were used. The first period was from the deepest trough of the years 1988 or 1989, until 1999. This period would reveal the long-term rate of crime reduction underlying the sharp fluctuations of the 1990s. The second period chosen, was from the highest peak between 1990 and 1993, and 1999. This period was designed to capture the greatest crime reduction in each force, irrespective of the extent of its pre-peak rise.

The exceptional forces, as for burglary, were Merseyside and Gwent. Merseyside showed a slow decline in theft of motor vehicles during the early 1990s, before rising to a steep peak in 1995 and 1996. This was followed by an even steeper fall in 1997, before the resumption of an erratic rise until the end of the decade. Vehicle thefts in Gwent initially followed the national pattern, peaking sharply in 1993 and then declining moderately until 1995. It then rose again to a secondary peak in 1998, and did not share the heavy falls experienced by most other forces.

Results

The results were presented at Table 3 (p.222).

Discussion

Period 1 was from the highest peak in the years 1990-1993, until 1999. Individual forces' reductions in TOMV offences during this period were compared. The median 1999 offence level was at 53.2% of the 1990-93 peak. The 42-force level of offences in 1999, representing the mean of all the forces studied, was at 0.627, or 62.7% of its 1990-93 peak. This reflected a relatively low reduction in the Metropolitan Police area, whose high volume of offences skewed the mean. There was similar degree of clustering of forces around the median to that which was found for the flexible Period 3 in the case of 'all crime' and burglary. Twenty-one forces saw recorded crime in 1999 within 5% of the mean, at 48.2% to 58.2% of the 1990-93 level.

Period 2 was from the deepest trough of the years 1988 or 1989, until 1999. This was intended to reveal the long-term rate of reduction of TOMV offences underlying the sharp national rise and fall of the 1990s. The fall in TOMV in individual forces compared with the national trend was highlighted and presented as a 'league table' of crime reduction. The 42-force TOMV level in 1999, representing the mean of the forces studied, was at 1.022, or 2.2% above its 1988/89 trough level. The median 1999 TOMV level was identical to the median of 1988/89. Seven forces saw recorded crime in 1999 within 5% of the mean, at 95.0% to 105.0% of the 1988/89 level.

The policing styles of forces were then examined in order to ascertain whether they reflected variations in TOMV reduction.

‘Success’ in crime reduction was vulnerable to the time period of measurement. Only two forces, Northumbria and Cleveland, appeared in the ‘top five’ forces irrespective of the time period used. The forces used different policing styles. Northumbria was primarily intelligence-led whilst Cleveland preferred a problem-oriented, partnership working approach, together with an element of ‘zero tolerance’ policing. It was notable that Cumbria and Durham achieved high positions achieved during Period 1, from the 1990-1993 peak until 1999. This result raises the question of whether the reductions in TOMV in the four forces, may have reflected a variation in regional youth culture over that period.

The only forces in the ‘lowest five’ group of performers, irrespective of the timescale of measurement, were Sussex and Gwent. These were low-performing forces in respect of ‘all crime’ and have been discussed under that heading.

The results of other forces were examined. In Period 1, there appeared to be an advantage in favour of intelligence-led policing. ILP was a feature of the eleven forces which occupied positions 1-13 inclusive, but also those which occupied positions 35, 37 and 42. Geographic policing saw weak results, having been declared by the forces occupying positions 6 and 7, but also positions 35, 38, 39 and 42. Problem-oriented policing (POP) and partnership working appeared throughout the table. The six forces which had no declared policing style, occupied positions 19, 21, 29, 31, 33 and 36. On

this evidence, the use of ILP may have an advantage over other policing styles and also over the practice of no policing style, upon the incidence of TOMV.

When the table was rearranged in order of crime reduction during the longer timespan of Period 2, no policing style appeared to have achieved outstanding results. Intelligence-led policing (ILP) was a feature of all eight forces in positions 6-13, but also of all four forces placed from the 34th to the 37th positions. Geographic policing achieved stronger results than during the shorter Period 1. It was practised by five of the eight top-placed forces, but also in four of the forces placed from 33rd to 41st inclusive. The six forces which had not declared the use of any policing style achieved the 5th, 14th, 17th, 24th, 39th and 42nd greatest reductions in reported theft of motor vehicles. The mean of their positions was close to the mean of forces which had implemented discrete styles.


The study then examined another category of crime, criminal damage.

Criminal Damage

Trends

A graph of recorded criminal damage between 1981 and 2001 in the 42 study forces was compiled and examined. (Figure 4). Within the time period studied, the pattern was unlike that shown by 'all crime', burglary or TOMV. Recorded offences rose steeply

Figure 4: Criminal Damage, 42 Forces



between 1989 and 1992, and then at a more moderate rate with some temporary small falls, until the end of the decade. Thirty-seven of the 42 forces followed the national trends, although with considerable short-term variations. The exceptions were the Cleveland, Durham, Northumbria, South Wales and Metropolitan forces. Cleveland experienced a sharp rise in damage reports between the late 1980s and 1994, before these declined steeply and continuously through the remainder of the 1990s. Durham and Northumbria showed similar pattern, in an interesting although unexplained regional trend. The trend was also shared with the Metropolitan and South Wales forces, where damage reports peaked in the early 1990s and declined thereafter, with some small short-term rises.

In respect of the sustained rise in criminal damage during the 1990s in most police areas, no policing style was successful in absolute terms. Relative 'success' of a policing style could equate to a smaller rise in reported offences, than that associated with other styles. Two time periods were chosen for study. The first was 1993-1999, during which most forces adopted named policing styles, in order to establish the impact of policing styles upon criminal damage, during a period of nationally falling crime. The second period chosen was 1989-1999, to allow comparison of reported criminal damage with the longer-term rise and fall of 'all crime'.

Results

The research results were presented at Table 4 (p.224).

Discussion

Period 1 was from 1993 until 1999, a time of nationally falling rates of ‘all crime’, burglary and TOMV, but of rising numbers of damage offences. The rise in TOMV in individual forces compared with the national trend was highlighted and presented as a ‘league table’ of ‘reduction’ in crime levels. In practice, a greater ‘reduction’ usually amounted to a lesser increase over the time period studied. The 42-force criminal damage level in 1999, representing the mean of the forces studied, was at 1.501, or 50.1% above its 1993 level. The median level in 1999 was 68.5% above the 1993 level. There was less clustering of forces around the mean than was found for ‘all crime’, burglary or TOMV. Seven forces saw recorded crime in 1999 within 5% of the median, at 63.5% to 73.5% above the 1988/89 level.

Period 2 was from 1989 until 1999. The 42-force criminal damage level in 1999, representing the mean of the forces studied, was at 1.043, or 4.3% above its 1989 level. The median level in 1999 was 17.4% above the 1989 level. The mean results were skewed by the Metropolitan Police’s attainment of high positions, irrespective of the time period of measurement. There was less clustering of forces around the median than

was found for 'all crime', burglary or TOMV. Six forces saw recorded crime in 1999 within 5% of the median, at 12.4% to 22.4% above the 1988/89 level.

In summary, the criminal damage reduction results of individual forces showed greater variation from national trends, than was the case for 'all crime'. The policing styles of forces were then examined in order to ascertain whether they reflected variations in damage reduction.

Four forces appeared in the 'top five' positions of damage reduction in both time periods. The characteristics of two of the forces, Northumbria and Cleveland, have already been discussed. The Metropolitan force operated a variety of policing styles and did not feature as highly in the reduction of any other variety of crime. It is unlikely that the operation of a particular policing style was a determining factor in relation to criminal damage. The fourth force, Lancashire, operated a variety of policing styles. Already a practitioner of intelligence-led policing (ILP), the force adopted problem-oriented, community-based policing in 1997 (Lancashire 1998 p.2). It is unlikely that the longer-established ILP system was the cause of success, given the lesser success enjoyed by the force in relation to other crime types, and the lack of general success of ILP forces in reducing criminal damage.

Three forces appeared in the lowest five crime-reducing forces, Cambridgeshire, Sussex and Gwent. The Sussex and Gwent forces performed poorly in relation to other crime types and have been discussed under 'all crime'. Cambridgeshire was also a generally

lower performer, although to a lesser extent. The force was an early exponent of ILP, adopting the provisions of the Audit Commission's 'Helping With Enquiries' report (Audit Commission 1993), 'developing into an integrated model that reflects the latest national strategies' (HMIC 1994a p.2). The force went on to adopt a 14-sector, inspector-led geographic policing model (HMIC 1998 b, p.9). It is difficult to account for the difference between Cambridgeshire and the high-performing forces, in terms of policing styles.

The results of other forces were examined. No policing style appeared to have achieved particularly strong results. In Period 1, intelligence-led policing (ILP) and geographic policing were placed in the ten highest-performing forces. They also featured heavily in the ten lowest-placed forces, particularly geographic policing in positions 37-42 inclusive. Forces which practised problem-oriented policing (POP) and partnership working had results spread throughout the table. The six forces which had not declared the use of any policing style achieved the 2nd, 12th, 16th, 20th, 31st and 36th greatest reductions in reported criminal damage. On this evidence, the absence of any applied policing style had not disadvantaged these forces.

Over the longer timespan of Period 2, similar results were obtained. The six forces which had not declared the use of any policing style achieved the 7th, 20th, 22nd, 24th, 25th and 27th greatest reductions in reported criminal damage, close to the median of other forces.

Conclusions

No policing style consistently achieved significantly better or worse crime reduction results than any other style. The minority of forces which had adopted no defined policing style, achieved results which were comparable with those of other forces. Where individual forces were particularly successful in reducing crime, there were good reasons to believe that their policing styles were not dominant factors.

The exception to these conclusions was in respect of thefts of motor vehicles.

Intelligence-led policing (ILP) appeared to achieve greater crime reductions than other policing styles. This left open the possibility that the application of ILP may reduce crime to a modest extent, which is only apparent in types of crime where there is a very high level of repeat offending. Disruption of relatively few offenders may achieve a greater reduction, than for other types of crime.

Geographic policing was not associated with high levels of crime reduction for any category of crime. The dispersion of officers to locally-based posts may appear to be a better opportunity than a centralised model, for them to gain community information and reduce criminal damage by means of identifying offenders and wider problem-solving methods. In practice, there was no evidence that this theory achieved measureable results.

These conclusions are constrained by the limitations of the methodology used in the study. In particular, many forces adopted policing styles in the late 1990s, after most of the national reduction in crime had already occurred. These relative times reinforce the view that most of the widespread crime reduction in the late 1990s was no more related to police organisation, than was the earlier national increase. There may have been a modest effect of policing styles upon crime rates. Obscured by different times and degrees of implementation, patterns of effectiveness would be difficult to trace. In order to address this problem, closer study was required of a policing style which was well-established and where forces' structures and systems were well-defined and mutually comparable. Chapter 7 undertakes this task through the examination of intelligence-led policing (ILP) in greater depth.

Table 1**Results – ‘All Crime’**

Force	Period 1 1998/1992		Period 2 1998/1988		Period 3 Flexi Trough 97-2000/Peak 91-96		Style
	Ratio	Pos	Ratio	Pos	Ratio	Pos	
Northumbria	0.591	<i>1</i>	0.825	<i>1</i>	0.586	<i>1</i>	ILP /Part
Dyfed-Powys	0.626	<i>2</i>	0.905	<i>2</i>	0.626	<i>2</i>	Geog /ILP/Part
Durham	0.656	<i>3</i>	0.995	<i>4</i>	0.656	<i>3</i>	ILP/POP/Part
Surrey	0.680	<i>4</i>	1.128	<i>11</i>	0.680	<i>4</i>	Geog /ILP
Kent	0.690	<i>5</i>	1.397	<i>31</i>	0.681	<i>5</i>	ILP
South Wales	0.717	<i>6</i>	1.033	<i>5</i>	0.717	<i>6</i>	None
Gloucestershire	0.726	<i>7</i>	1.294	<i>26</i>	0.721	<i>7</i>	Geog
Essex	0.731	<i>8</i>	1.206	<i>16</i>	0.757	<i>17</i>	None
Bedfordshire	0.739	<i>9</i>	1.113	<i>10</i>	0.739	<i>9</i>	Geog /ILP
North Wales	0.743	<i>10</i>	1.036	<i>6</i>	0.743	<i>11</i>	ILP
Cheshire	0.747	<i>11</i>	1.211	<i>17</i>	0.741	<i>10</i>	ILP
Hampshire	0.750	<i>12</i>	1.230	<i>22</i>	0.750	<i>13</i>	ILP
Avon & Som	0.752	<i>13</i>	1.344	<i>27</i>	0.750	<i>12</i>	Geog /ILP
Nottinghamshire	0.752	<i>14</i>	1.280	<i>24</i>	0.752	<i>14</i>	ILP
Cleveland	0.756	<i>15</i>	1.090	<i>8</i>	0.756	<i>16</i>	POP /Part
Norfolk	0.764	<i>16</i>	1.220	<i>19</i>	0.764	<i>19</i>	Geog.
Suffolk	0.767	<i>17</i>	1.138	<i>12</i>	0.767	<i>20</i>	Geog /ILP 1995
Devon/ Cornwall	0.772	<i>18</i>	1.211	<i>17</i>	0.731	<i>8</i>	None
Cumbria	0.776	<i>19</i>	1.291	<i>25</i>	0.776	<i>21</i>	ILP
Wiltshire	0.781	<i>20</i>	1.234	<i>23</i>	0.781	<i>24</i>	Geog /ILP/Part
Hertfordshire	0.782	<i>21</i>	1.138	<i>13</i>	0.782	<i>25</i>	ILP /POP
Median	0.787		1.227		0.777		

Force	1998/1992		1998/1988		Flexi Trough 97-2000/ Peak 91-96		Style
	Ratio	Pos	Ratio	Pos	Ratio	Pos	
Warwickshire	0.792	22	1.543	37	0.783	26	ILP /Geog /Part
Lancashire	0.796	23	1.090	8	0.781	23	Geog/POP /ILP
42 Forces	0.801		1.207		0.801		
Lincolnshire	0.806	24	1.225	21	0.754	15	ILP
West Yorkshire	0.807	25	1.402	32	0.800	30	ILP /Part
Metropolitan	0.814	26	1.067	7	0.814	32	Various
Thames Valley	0.817	27	1.480	35	0.786	27	POP /Part /ILP
Derbyshire	0.837	28	1.714	40	0.834	34	None
Leicestershire	0.838	29	1.627	38	0.814	31	Geog
West Midlands	0.840	30	1.169	15	0.838	35	Geog
Dorset	0.840	31	1.223	20	0.792	29	None
Greater Man	0.851	32	1.144	14	0.778	22	ILP/POP/Part
Staffordshire	0.866	33	1.491	36	0.866	39	ILP /POP /Part
Merseyside	0.873	34	0.907	3	0.842	36	ILP /POP /Geog
West Mercia	0.877	35	1.388	28	0.827	33	ILP/Part
North Yorkshire	0.882	36	1.395	30	0.761	18	ILP
Cambridgeshire	0.900	37	1.760	41	0.858	38	Geog /ILP
South Yorkshire	0.906	38	1.393	29	0.791	28	None
Humberside	0.927	39	1.402	32	0.846	37	Geog
Sussex	0.934	40	1.657	39	0.934	41	Geog /POP
Northants	0.938	41	1.473	34	0.903	40	Geog /ILP /Part
Gwent	1.157	42	1.938	42	1.060	42	Geog

Table 2Results – Burglary

Force	Period 1 2000/1993		Period 2 2000/1989		Period 3 Flexi Trough 98-2000/Peak 91-96		Style
	Ratio	Pos	Ratio	Pos	Ratio	Pos	
Northumbria	0.393	<i>1</i>	0.499	<i>1</i>	0.374	<i>1</i>	ILP /Part
Dyfed-Powys	0.427	<i>2</i>	0.727	<i>4</i>	0.388	<i>2</i>	Geog /ILP/Part
South Wales	0.439	<i>3</i>	0.668	<i>3</i>	0.420	<i>4</i>	None
Bedfordshire	0.441	<i>4</i>	0.905	<i>9</i>	0.436	<i>5</i>	Geog /ILP
Cumbria	0.446	<i>5</i>	0.740	<i>5</i>	0.410	<i>3</i>	ILP
Gloucestershire	0.452	<i>6</i>	0.951	<i>12</i>	0.452	<i>6</i>	Geog
Devon/Comwall	0.479	<i>7</i>	0.986	<i>17</i>	0.479	<i>7</i>	None
Norfolk	0.520	<i>8</i>	0.904	<i>8</i>	0.520	<i>12</i>	Geog.
Leicestershire	0.531	<i>9</i>	1.158	<i>22</i>	0.512	<i>9</i>	Geog
Hampshire	0.543	<i>10</i>	0.918	<i>10</i>	0.520	<i>11</i>	ILP
Cheshire	0.545	<i>11</i>	1.144	<i>21</i>	0.545	<i>13</i>	ILP
Essex	0.548	<i>12</i>	0.978	<i>15</i>	0.548	<i>17</i>	None
Humberside	0.548	<i>13</i>	1.191	<i>23</i>	0.548	<i>11</i>	Geog
Wiltshire	0.553	<i>14</i>	0.951	<i>13</i>	0.547	<i>14</i>	Geog /ILP/Part
Durham	0.558	<i>15</i>	0.784	<i>7</i>	0.493	<i>8</i>	ILP/POP/Part
South Yorkshire	0.562	<i>16</i>	1.307	<i>28</i>	0.562	<i>19</i>	None
Staffordshire	0.568	<i>17</i>	1.276	<i>27</i>	0.568	<i>21</i>	ILP /POP /Part
Warwickshire	0.573	<i>18</i>	1.315	<i>30</i>	0.565	<i>16</i>	ILP /Geog /Part
Derbyshire	0.586	<i>19</i>	1.597	<i>41</i>	0.586	<i>22</i>	None
Northants	0.599	<i>20</i>	1.493	<i>38</i>	0.599	<i>27</i>	Geog /ILP /Part
North Yorkshire	0.604	<i>21</i>	1.218	<i>24</i>	0.589	<i>24</i>	ILP

Force	2000/1993		2000/1989		Flexi Trough 98-2000/Peak 91-96		Style
	Ratio	Pos	Ratio	Pos	Ratio	Pos	
Median	0.604		1.151		0.577		
North Wales	0.604	22	0.981	16	0.553	15	ILP
42 Forces	0.610		1.013		0.610		
Kent	0.624	23	1.330	31	0.566	20	ILP
West Midlands	0.626	24	1.078	19	0.619	27	Geog
Suffolk	0.627	25	0.953	14	0.627	30	Geog /ILP 1995
Avon & Som	0.634	26	1.469	37	0.598	26	Geog /ILP
West Yorkshire	0.638	27	1.348	32	0.625	29	ILP /Part
Metropolitan	0.643	28	0.755	6	0.586	23	Various
Nottinghamshire	0.647	29	1.419	36	0.647	33	ILP
Cambridgeshire	0.682	30	1.529	39	0.82	36	Geog /ILP
Sussex	0.686	31	1.141	20	0.631	31	Geog /Part
Thames Valley	0.688	32	1.369	33	0.688	37	POP /Part /ILP
Surrey	0.695	33	1.238	25	0.518	10	Geog /ILP
Greater Man	0.709	34	0.944	11	0.671	35	ILP/POPPart
Merseyside	0.711	35	0.649	2	0.691	38	ILP /POP /Geog
Lancashire	0.733	36	1.274	26	0.700	39	Geog/POP /ILP
Lincolnshire	0.737	37	1.408	35	0.737	40	ILP
Hertfordshire	0.741	38	1.564	40	0.622	28	ILP /POP
West Mercia	0.744	39	1.398	34	0.744	41	ILP/Part
Dorset	0.811	40	1.307	29	0.632	32	None
Cleveland	0.814	41	1.059	18	0.648	34	POP /Part
Gwent	0.974	42	1.799	42	0.792	42	Geog

Table 3**Results - Theft of Motor Vehicles**

Force	Period 1 1999/Flexi Peak 90-93 Ratio <i>Pos</i>		Period 2 1999/Flexi Trough 88-89 Ratio <i>Pos</i>		Style
Cleveland	0.333	<i>1</i>	0.753	<i>2</i>	POP /Part
Northumbria	0.342	<i>2</i>	0.527	<i>1</i>	ILP /Part
Cumbria	0.378	<i>3</i>	1.001	<i>22</i>	ILP
Durham	0.387	<i>4</i>	0.881	<i>11</i>	ILP/POP/Part
Nottinghamshire	0.400	<i>5</i>	1.044	<i>25</i>	ILP
Surrey	0.425	<i>6</i>	0.839	<i>6</i>	Geog /ILP
Avon & Som	0.431	<i>7</i>	1.074	<i>29</i>	Geog /ILP
Kent	0.436	<i>8</i>	0.925	<i>15</i>	ILP
Warwickshire	0.489	<i>9</i>	0.998	<i>21</i>	ILP /Geog /Part
Lancashire	0.495	<i>10</i>	0.803	<i>4</i>	Geog/POP /ILP
Humberside	0.506	<i>11</i>	1.224	<i>33</i>	Geog
Cheshire	0.509	<i>12</i>	0.860	<i>10</i>	ILP
Northants	0.513	<i>13</i>	0.852	<i>8</i>	Geog /ILP /Part
Leicestershire	0.515	<i>14</i>	1.370	<i>38</i>	Geog
Bedfordshire	0.515	<i>15</i>	0.898	<i>12</i>	Geog /ILP
Cambridgeshire	0.518	<i>16</i>	1.279	<i>36</i>	Geog /ILP
North Yorkshire	0.521	<i>17</i>	1.003	<i>23</i>	ILP
Staffordshire	0.522	<i>18</i>	1.235	<i>34</i>	ILP /POP /Part
Devon/Comwall	0.523	<i>19</i>	0.832	<i>5</i>	None
West Yorkshire	0.527	<i>20</i>	1.320	<i>37</i>	ILP /Part
South Yorkshire	0.530	<i>21</i>	1.402	<i>39</i>	None
Median	0.532		1.000		

Force	Period 1 1999/Flexi Peak 90-93 Ratio <i>Pos</i>		Period 2 1999/Flexi Trough 88-89 Ratio <i>Pos</i>		Style
Hertfordshire	0.533	<i>22</i>	0.858	<i>9</i>	ILP /POP
Gloucestershire	0.534	<i>23</i>	1.060	<i>27</i>	Geog
Norfolk	0.541	<i>24</i>	0.753	<i>3</i>	Geog.
West Mercia	0.542	<i>25</i>	1.192	<i>32</i>	ILP/Part
Wiltshire	0.544	<i>26</i>	0.842	<i>7</i>	Geog /ILP/Part
Lincolnshire	0.548	<i>27</i>	0.982	<i>20</i>	ILP
Dyfed-Powys	0.581	<i>28</i>	0.899	<i>13</i>	Geog /ILP/Part
Derbyshire	0.581	<i>29</i>	1.919	<i>42</i>	None
Hampshire	0.601	<i>30</i>	0.949	<i>18</i>	ILP
Essex	0.623	<i>31</i>	0.943	<i>17</i>	None
42 Forces	0.627		1.022		
Thames Valley	0.627	<i>32</i>	1.243	<i>35</i>	POP /Part /ILP
Dorset	0.634	<i>33</i>	0.919	<i>14</i>	None
Suffolk	0.640	<i>34</i>	0.979	<i>19</i>	Geog /ILP 1995
North Wales	0.640	<i>35</i>	1.069	<i>28</i>	ILP
South Wales	0.687	<i>36</i>	1.011	<i>24</i>	None
Greater Man	0.739	<i>37</i>	1.112	<i>30</i>	ILP/POP/Part
Metropolitan	0.774	<i>38</i>	0.939	<i>16</i>	Various
West Midlands	0.802	<i>39</i>	1.154	<i>31</i>	Geog
Sussex	0.835	<i>40</i>	1.405	<i>40</i>	Geog /POP
Gwent	0.908	<i>41</i>	1.820	<i>41</i>	Geog
Merseyside	0.988	<i>42</i>	1.054	<i>26</i>	ILP /POP /Geog

Table 4**Results – Criminal Damage**

Force	Period 1 1999/1993		Period 2 1999/1989		Style
	Ratio	Pos	Ratio	Pos	
Northumbria	0.604	<i>1</i>	0.942	<i>1</i>	ILP /Part
South Wales	0.750	<i>2</i>	1.245	<i>7</i>	None
Cleveland	0.790	<i>3</i>	1.134	<i>4</i>	POP /Part
Metropolitan	0.865	<i>4</i>	1.190	<i>5</i>	Various
Lancashire	0.880	<i>5</i>	1.127	<i>3</i>	Geog/POP /ILP
Dyfed-Powys	0.886	<i>6</i>	1.275	<i>8</i>	Geog /ILP/Part
Kent	0.904	<i>7</i>	1.769	<i>30</i>	ILP
Thames Valley	0.907	<i>8</i>	1.723	<i>23</i>	POP /Part /ILP
Durham	0.920	<i>9</i>	1.101	<i>2</i>	ILP/POP/Part
Nottinghamshire	0.926	<i>10</i>	1.382	<i>9</i>	ILP
Avon & Som	0.948	<i>11</i>	1.464	<i>11</i>	Geog /ILP
Derbyshire	0.960	<i>12</i>	1.731	<i>25</i>	None
Lincolnshire	0.980	<i>13</i>	1.595	<i>16</i>	ILP
42 Forces	1.043		1.501		
Humberside	1.048	<i>14</i>	1.390	<i>10</i>	Geog
Cheshire	1.060	<i>15</i>	1.656	<i>21</i>	ILP
South Yorkshire	1.093	<i>16</i>	1.726	<i>24</i>	None
West Yorkshire	1.101	<i>17</i>	1.531	<i>13</i>	ILP /Part
Bedfordshire	1.108	<i>18</i>	1.233	<i>6</i>	Geog /ILP
Warwickshire	1.139	<i>19</i>	2.037	<i>38</i>	ILP /Geog /Part
Devon/Cornwall	1.167	<i>20</i>	1.652	<i>20</i>	None
Cumbria	1.170	<i>21</i>	1.991	<i>37</i>	ILP

Force	1999/1993		1999/1989		Style
	Ratio	Pos	Ratio	Pos	
Median	1.174		1.685		
Wiltshire	1.178	22	1.551	14	Geog /ILP/Part
North Yorkshire	1.191	23	1.742	26	ILP
Leicestershire	1.201	24	2.121	39	Geog
West Midlands	1.214	25	1.780	31	Geog
Greater Man	1.225	26	1.514	12	ILP/POP/Part
Northants	1.230	27	1.601	18	Geog /ILP /Part
Hertfordshire	1.238	28	1.555	15	ILP /POP
Surrey	1.258	29	1.787	32	Geog /ILP
Staffordshire	1.259	30	1.923	36	ILP /POP /Part
Essex	1.259	31	1.713	22	None
Hampshire	1.268	32	1.823	34	ILP
North Wales	1.302	33	1.640	19	ILP
Merseyside	1.313	34	1.574	17	ILP /POP /Geog
West Mercia	1.391	35	1.758	28	ILP/Part
Dorset	1.412	36	1.756	27	None
Norfolk	1.425	37	1.795	33	Geog.
Sussex	1.438	38	2.648	41	Geog /POP
Gloucestershire	1.490	39	1.888	35	Geog
Suffolk	1.512	40	1.763	29	Geog /ILP 1995
Cambridgeshire	1.653	41	2.644	40	Geog /ILP
Gwent	1.798	42	2.755	42	Geog

Chapter 7

Policing Styles and Crime Reduction in Intelligence-Led Police Forces:

A 6-Force Case Study

Introduction

Chapter 6 compared the crime trends associated with the practice of different policing styles during the 1990s. At the national level, the decade saw a steep rise in England and Wales, followed by a prolonged although uneven fall in recorded volume crime. The study found no connection between a police force's choice of policing styles and the extent of crime reduction in that force, across significant time periods of up to ten years.

The methodology had several strong points. Its broad approach to data capture enabled the dominant policing styles being practised during the course of the 1990s to be established. Crime trends were compared in respect of several crime types and across a variety of time periods. Had there been a significant crime reduction advantage associated with a group of forces employing a particular policing style, the advantage should have been apparent.

The comparison of crime trends between individual forces is more problematic. Police forces introduced focussed policing styles at different times. For example, crime reductions in two forces over the period 1993-1998 might be studied. One force which had practised intelligence-led policing (ILP) since 1994 would be of poor comparability with another which had implemented problem-oriented policing (POP) in 1997. In the latter force, staff training, understanding of new expectations, and application of the new working arrangements would be less than complete. POP would have had relatively little opportunity to 'bed in' and attain full effectiveness.

Furthermore, other variables including socio-economic factors, would reduce the comparability of policing styles which were introduced at different times. In this case, the two-year period during which POP was practised in the second force may have coincided with a recession which was atypical of economic conditions in the five years during which ILP was practised in the first force. Such an exercise would be likely to produce a poor result for the POP force. These difficulties may have been mitigated, but not removed by the use of multi-force comparisons in which each policing style had been in use by some forces over a variety of time periods. An alternative approach to the problem was to study a selection of forces, in which the number of variables which might affect crime rates was reduced.

The research described in this chapter aimed to complement the approach taken by Chapter 6. The relationship between the implementation of a policing style and the subsequent effect upon volume crime rates, was examined at a more microscopic level.

This element of research used methodology which aimed to reduce problems of inter-police force comparability, in a case study-based examination of the effect of crime reduction associated with intelligence-led policing. Although the variables which may affect crime rates could not be wholly controlled, the study aimed to minimise them, and to produce conclusions which would support or challenge those obtained in Chapter 6.

The Study Forces

Choice of Forces

Chapter 3 identified that intelligence-led policing (ILP) was associated with particular organisational structures, such as intelligence units with analytical capacity, and the use of Tasking and Coordinating Groups (TCGs) to direct proactive activity. The study examined six police forces which were identified by examination of HMIC reports, as the longest-established exponents of ILP, having practised it since 1993 or 1994. The forces were Northumbria, Hampshire, Warwickshire, Northamptonshire, Kent and Cambridgeshire. ILP was promoted by the Audit Commission's 'Helping with Enquiries' report, published in November 1993 (Audit Commission 1993). The Commission produced a follow-up report 'Detecting a Change' three years later, which aimed to monitor progress. 'Detecting a Change' found that 'only 11 per cent (of forces) had an integrated system of crime recording, crime pattern analysis and criminal intelligence' (Audit Commission 1996, p13). This amounted to five forces, which was reasonably consistent with the six identified from HMIC reports in this study.

These forces operated well-established ILP systems which were explicitly aimed at crime reduction throughout the mid and late-1990s, by means of repeat offender targeting. For each force, a brief case history of crime trends and organisational arrangements was established. Crime rates in each study force were compared with those of other forces, using a variety of methods which will be discussed later in the chapter.

Case Histories

1. Northumbria

In the late 1990s, Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary (HMCIC) devised 'families' of police forces, to enable each force to compare its performance with others which operated in similar socio-economic circumstances (HMCIC 1997). The methodology is discussed in Chapter 5. HMCIC concluded that Northumbria was unique and therefore no such comparison could usefully be made.

HMIC inspection reports of Northumbria in the late 1980s and early 1990s were highly pessimistic. The Inspectorate noted in 1991 that in relation to recorded crime, Northumbria had the highest figure in the country, at 132.9 per 1000 population, compared with the national average of 81.4 crimes. Some crime analysis took place using microcomputers, and decisions for action were taken at ad hoc meetings (HMIC 1991b).

The Force was an early convert to ILP (Amey et al 1996). It 'piloted' telephone crime 'screening', in which investigative efforts were focussed upon those crimes which were most likely to be solved, in South Shields in 1993 (HMIC 1993b). Intelligence units and 'tasking and co-ordinating groups'(TCGs) were created, to identify and take action against prolific offenders. By 1996, crime had fallen for five consecutive years. HMIC considered that the force held the 'blue riband' in respect of its crime reduction performance (HMIC 1996c). Following reductions for several more years, HMIC continued to ascribe success to the force's policies, which included the development of community safety partnerships (HMIC 1997e, 1999j). The force's rhetoric at the end of the decade, reflected the national prominence of community safety required by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The Chief Constable sidelined the role of ILP, stating that 'the partnership approach to community safety that we have pioneered has achieved record breaking reductions in the level of recorded crime' (Northumbria Police Authority 2000).

The crime pattern for burglary in Northumbria was similar to that for 'all crime'. The steep rise prior to 1991 was outweighed by a continuous fall thereafter, amounting to the greatest crime reduction experienced by any force.

2. Hampshire

HMIC Family of forces: Essex, Avon & Somerset, Kent, Leicestershire, Northamptonshire, Thames Valley.

In common with most other forces, Hampshire experienced sharp increases in crime levels in the late 1980s. The Chief Constable sided with the prevailing academic view, opining that:

'There are limited areas in which the police are able to affect the incidence of crime. Factors which exercise far more influence include social trends and the ready availability of temptation in this age of materialism, and in particular the ready market for disposal of ill-gotten property' (Hampshire Constabulary 1990 p.7).

Nonetheless, perhaps with a view to affecting the 'limited areas', the force became a pioneer of intelligence-led policing. Her Majesty's Inspectorate was impressed by this initiative, stating that:

'The Force has played a leading role in the national thrust for change within crime investigation. The Force review of the investigation of crime and the CID was completed before the Audit Commission report 'Helping With Enquiries – Tackling Crime Effectively' was commenced. Hampshire made a considerable contribution to the Audit Commission study, having been amongst the first to follow this route' (HMIC 1994e p.6).

HMIC may have been encouraged in its viewpoint by seeing reductions in 'all crime' and burglary in the county, although these reflected national trends. Further reductions, again broadly in line with national trends, occurred until 1998 for 'all crime' and until 2000 for burglary.

During this time, successive inspection reports made further positive comments, endorsing the force's use of crime pattern analysis, a computerised, integrated information system, and the targeting of key offenders (HMIC 1995d, 1996a). Towards the end of the 1990s, partnership working developed increased status within the force. HMIC noted that 'an appropriate balance is to be sought between crime prevention, partnership, enforcement and detection' (HMIC 1998f p.15).

3. Warwickshire

Family of forces: Essex, Gloucestershire, Kent, West Mercia, Dorset, Thames Valley, Hampshire.

The pattern of recorded 'all crime' and burglary in Warwickshire followed national trends in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. At the end of the 1980s, reports rose sharply in respects of both types of crime, which reached peaks in 1992 for burglary, and 1993 in respect of 'all crime'. Rates of both offence types then fell continuously, to 2000 for burglary and 1998 for 'all crime'.

The HMIC inspection report of 1992 struck a distinctly gloomy note, opining that:

'the overall performance indicates a picture of crime growing faster than the ability of the Force to cope. HMI believes the shortage of financial resources for staff, overtime and equipment, is a compounding factor to this problem' (HMIC 1992c p.15).

The Force reacted in the same way as many others, adopting 'crime desks' to determine which crimes would receive personal attendance, and to highlight patterns which would be the targets of positive action. HMIC reported that the force had pre-empted some of the Audit Commission's proposals. These included:

'the setting-up of crime desks on each BCU to help integrate the work of locally based officers engaged in crime intelligence, crime management and crime pattern analysis, enabling the identification of local crime trends, active local criminals and the development of intelligence to assist directing operational officers in their response to them' (HMIC 1994g p.15).

In the late 1990s there were indications that the Force had adopted a broader approach towards crime reduction. As the status of partnership working increased in line with the requirements of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, the emphasis upon ILP appeared to have lost some impetus. HMIC noted that intelligence units appeared to be working in isolation, and appeared to be acting as collators of information rather than drivers of activity (HMIC 1997g, 1999k). At the end of the decade, the force developed a

geographic 'sector policing' model, with the aim of improving partnerships and implementing a 'problem solving' approach as standard practice (HMIC 2001k p.18).

4. Northamptonshire

Family of forces: West Mercia, Avon & Somerset, Devon & Cornwall, Leicestershire, Derbyshire, Hampshire.

In the late 1980s, Northamptonshire experienced sharp rises in 'all crime' and burglary, which both reached peaks in 1993. Burglary then declined every year, with the exception of a small rise in 1998, until 2000. Recorded 'all crime' also subsided, but more moderately. It reached a trough in 1997 and then rose again, so that by the end of the decade, it had almost regained its peak level.

The force was an early exponent of intelligence-led policing, having been actively involved with the Audit Commission, in the latter's production of its report 'Helping With Enquiries – Tackling Crime Effectively'. HMIC heaped fulsome praise upon the force's commitment, noting that the targeting of persistent criminals was becoming part of the daily routine of local officers. Crime desks were established on all areas, and Tasking and Coordinating Groups drove activity, supported by a new computerised crime recording system. (HMIC 1994f).

The force also adopted geographic, inspector-led sectors in 1994, and was a keen advocate of partnership working throughout the rest of the decade. HMIC noted with approval that 'Northamptonshire Police has well-developed multi-agency and partnership links...local initiatives, too numerous to mention'. In the same report, the Inspectorate praised the force for its 'performance culture' and its continued pursuit of ILP, directing efforts towards targeting the criminal rather than the crime. (HMIC 1998h).

The force continued to receive warm approval until the end of the decade as a reward for implementing centrally-approved policing methods. Geographic, intelligence-led and partnership policing styles had all been implemented. The Inspectorate considered that 'partnership and community safety is clearly integrated with enforcement and detection, with detection seen very much as a means to an end rather than an end in itself' (HMIC 1999i p15). In summary, this was a police force which could hardly have done more to satisfy the wishes of government and its agencies.

5. Kent

Family of forces: Essex, Avon & Somerset, Warwickshire, Hampshire, Thames Valley, Bedfordshire.

Between 1989 and 1993, Kent saw a steep rise in recorded crime, which almost doubled from 78,889 to 159,81 recorded offences. This increase compared unfavourably with the

42-force rise of 51 per cent from 3,709,258 to 5,584,949 offences over the same time period. During this time, burglaries in Kent rose by 121 per cent from 14,420 to 30,743 offences, compared with the national increase of 66 per cent from 825,019 to 1,368,806 offences (Home Office 1990, 1994a). Following these peaks, 'all crime' levels fell steeply and almost continuously until 1998. Burglary produced a second, higher peak in 1995 before falling steeply for the rest of the decade. In summary and with the exception of the secondary burglary peak, the crime pattern in Kent broadly reflected the national picture with more exaggerated rises and subsequent falls in numbers of offences.

The Chief Constable perceived a need to take effective action and was an early and enthusiastic exponent of the Audit Commission's intelligence-led policing style (Amey et al 1996). A major reorganisation of the force took place. Crime management units were established in order to filter out those crimes which were unlikely to be solved by further investigation. Intelligence units were heavily resourced and 'tactical teams' were formed, whose remit was to act upon generated intelligence, at the behest of Tasking and Co-ordinating Groups (TCGs). Specialist teams were created to interview and process detainees. Further TCGs and proactive squads were set up at Force level, to deal with cross-border criminals (Maguire 2003 p.385). These arrangements, known as the Kent Policing Model (KPM), heavily influenced the design of the National Intelligence Model almost a decade later (Tilley 2003 p313).

Her Majesty's Inspectorate supported Kent's initiative, stating that 'the KPM continues to repay the significant energy and resource invested in it.....The fact is that the force

is a superior performer in the field of crime detection' (HMIC 1999g). When the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 required 'partnership working' of all forces, Kent broadened its hitherto single-track focus. HMIC acknowledged the force's efforts but considered them to be less than whole-hearted, pointing out that:

'The inception of local, strategic partnerships was the final key matter which highlighted that the Constabulary was poorly placed to control or influence any of these bodies. Strategic control of relevant bodies and integration of their initiatives into police core business, or police initiatives into their core business was both ad hoc and uncoordinated' (HMIC 2002 p29).

In summary, Kent was a pioneer of ILP, but was slow to adapt to the broader expectations placed upon forces by the end of the 1990s.

6. Cambridgeshire

Family of forces: Wiltshire, Norfolk, West Mercia, Suffolk, Northamptonshire, Derbyshire.

In broad line with national trends, recorded burglary and 'all crime' in Cambridgeshire rose steeply between 1989 and 1992. Burglary then fell in most successive years until 2000, again in accord with the national picture. 'All crime' levels diverged from most

forces, failing to reduce in line with national trends during the mid- and late-1990s. Instead, they fluctuated around an approximate plateau until the end of the decade.

Following the Audit Commission's 1993 report, the force adopted

'.....a highly impressive strategy incorporating many aspects of effective crime management identified in.....'Helping With Enquiries'. When fully implemented, the strategy will enable the effective, computer-supported, linking of intelligence with crime pattern analysis to target criminals through the coordination of proactive and reactive teams. This work will be fully integrated with crime reduction initiatives' (HMIC 1994a p23).

The Inspectorate continued to be impressed by the Force's efforts, praising its focus upon crime management and its development of intelligence-led proactive initiatives (HMIC 1995a, 1997b). The force went on to implement a geographic policing system in 1997, but was considered to maintain an effective intelligence-led approach to targeting criminals through central and local TCG's (HMIC 1998b).

By the end of the decade, HMIC exhortations reflected the imperatives of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, in believing that partnerships 'form the bedrock upon which the vast majority of policing is delivered'. The Inspectorate acknowledged the force's efforts, but considered that its entire crime strategy needed to be revised (HMIC 2000d).

Methodology

The study aimed to test three hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: the emphasis of ILP upon crime reduction should have enabled the six forces studied, to exhibit greater mean crime reductions, than the median of those in other forces. Median figures of combined forces were preferred to mean figures, in order to avoid the weighting effect of large numbers of crimes in a few metropolitan forces.

Hypothesis 2: acquisitive property crime offers a continuing motivation to offend. Each of the six forces should achieve greater success for burglary and theft of motor vehicles (TOMV), which should be susceptible to ILP strategies, than for 'all crime'.

Hypothesis 3: each of the six forces should exhibit greater crime reductions, than the median of those designated by HMIC as its comparable 'family of forces'.

Crime reduction was assessed across the same time periods as in Chapter 6, as follows.

'All Crime':-

- 1) Fall from peak compared with national trend – fixed years – 1992 vs 1998
- 2) Fall compared with underlying pre-peak national trend – fixed years – 1988 vs. 1998.

3) Fall from highest 1991-96 peak, to lowest 1997-2000 trough.

Burglary:-

- 1) Fall from peak compared with national trend – fixed years – 1993 vs 2000
- 2) Fall compared with underlying pre-peak national trend – fixed years – 1989 vs. 2000.
- 3) Fall from highest 1991-96 peak, to lowest 1998-2000 trough.

Theft of Motor Vehicles (TOMV):-

- 1) Fall from highest 1990-1993 peak, to 1999 national trough.
- 2) Fall from 1988-1989 pre-peak trough, to 1999 national trough.

Therefore, the time periods referred to in the tables of results were not mutually consistent.

Success in crime reduction was assessed by the same method as that which was used in Chapter 6. For example, a force which halved its crime rate over a particular period, received a value of 0.5. Forces were then placed in an ordinal 'league table' format of crime reduction. The force achieving the greatest reduction was assigned No.1 and the force achieving the lowest rate of reduction was assigned No.42. This exercise was

undertaken in respect of 'all crime', burglary and TOMV. Tables of results were then compiled to allow the hypotheses to be tested.

Table 1 (p.242) displayed the positions of each of the six study forces in the 'league table' of crime reduction of all 42 forces. These positions were shown in respect of 'all crime', burglary and theft of motor vehicles, for each allotted time period.

Table 2 (p.243) sought to compare in greater detail, crime reduction in study forces against those in their respective 'families of forces'. The table identified 'all crime' results across each designated time period. Table 3 (p.244) and Table 4 (p.245) carried out the same exercise in relation to burglary and theft of motor vehicles respectively.

Results

Table 1

Position in 42 Forces (No.1 = greatest reduction, No.42 = least reduction).

**All Crime Position
Burglary Position
TOMV Position**

	Time Period		
	1	2	3
Northumbria	1 <i>1</i> 2	1 <i>1</i> 1	1 <i>1</i>
Hampshire	12 <i>10</i> 30	22 <i>10</i> 18	13 <i>11</i>
Warwickshire	22 <i>18</i> 9	37 <i>30</i> 21	26 <i>16</i>
Northamptonshire	41 <i>20</i> 13	34 <i>38</i> 8	40 <i>27</i>
Kent	5 <i>23</i> 8	31 <i>31</i> 15	5 <i>20</i>
Cambridgeshire	37 <i>30</i> 16	41 <i>39</i> 36	38 <i>36</i>

Table 2

Position in 42 Forces (No.1 = greatest reduction, No.42 = least reduction)

Vs Force Family Positions

All Crime Position

Force Family Positions – Ascending Order (Bold = 1 of the other study forces)

	Time Period		
	1	2	3
Northum. <i>No Family</i>	1 <i>N/A</i>	1 <i>N/A</i>	1 <i>N/A</i>
Hants <i>Family</i>	12 <i>5,8,13,27,29,41</i>	22 <i>16,27,31,34,35,38</i>	13 <i>5,12,17,27,31,40</i>
Warks <i>Family</i>	22 <i>5,7,8,12,27,30,35</i>	37 <i>16,20,22,26,28,31,35</i>	26 <i>5,7,13,17,27,29,34</i>
Northants <i>Family</i>	41 <i>12,13,18,28,29,35</i>	34 <i>17,22,27,28,38,40</i>	40 <i>8,12,13,31,33,34</i>
Kent <i>Family</i>	5 <i>8,9,12,13,22,27</i>	31 <i>10,16,22,27,35,37</i>	5 <i>9,12,13,17,26,27</i>
Cambs <i>Family</i>	37 <i>16,18,20,28,35,41</i>	41 <i>12,19,23,28,34,40</i>	38 <i>19,20,24,33,34,40</i>

Table 3

Position in 42 Forces (No.1 = greatest reduction, No.42 = least reduction)

Vs Force Family Positions

Burglary Position

Force Family Positions – Ascending Order (Bold = 1 of the other study forces)

	Time Period		
	1	2	3
Northumbria <i>No family</i>	1 <i>N/A</i>	1 <i>N/A</i>	1 <i>N/A</i>
Hampshire <i>Family</i>	10 <i>9,12,20,23,26,32,</i>	10 <i>15,22,31,33,37,38</i>	11 <i>9,17,20,26,27,37</i>
Warwickshire <i>Family</i> <i>6,11,17,20,29,37,41</i>	18 <i>6,10,12,23,32,39,40</i>	30 <i>10,12,15,29,31,33,34</i>	16
Northamptonshire <i>Family</i>	20 <i>7,9,10,19,26,39</i>	38 <i>10,17,22,34,37,41</i>	27 <i>7,9,11,22,26,41</i>
Kent <i>Family</i>	23 <i>4,10,12,18,26,32</i>	31 <i>9,10,15,30,33,37</i>	20 <i>5,11,16,17,26,37</i>
Cambridgeshire <i>Family</i>	30 <i>8,14,19,20,25,39</i>	39 <i>8,13,14,34,38,41</i>	36 <i>12,14,22,27,30,41</i>

Table 4

Position in 42 Forces (No.1 = greatest reduction, No.42 = least reduction)

Vs Force Family Positions

TOMV Position

Force Family Positions – Ascending Order (Bold = 1 of the other study forces)

	Time Period	
	1	2
Northumbria <i>No family</i>	2 <i>N/A</i>	1 <i>N/A</i>
Hampshire <i>Family</i>	30 <i>7,8,13,14,31,32</i>	18 <i>8,15,17,29,35,38</i>
Warwickshire <i>Family</i>	9 <i>8,23,25,30,31,32,33,</i>	21 <i>14,15,17,18,27,32, 35</i>
Northamptonshire <i>Family</i>	13 <i>7,14,19,25,29,30</i>	8 <i>5,18,29,32,38,42</i>
Kent <i>Family</i>	8 <i>7,9,15,30,31,32,</i>	15 <i>12,17,18,21,29,35</i>
Cambridgeshire <i>Family</i>	16 <i>13,20,24,25,29,34</i>	36 <i>3,7,8,19,32,42</i>

Discussion

The three hypotheses of the study were considered in turn.

Hypothesis 1: the six forces studied should achieve a higher average 'league table' position than 21.5, which was the median position of all forces. Table 1 (p.242) was used to consider this question.

In relation to 'all crime', the positions of the six study forces were:

Period 1 - 1,5,12,22,37,41.	Mean = 19.7 – higher than average 21.5
Period 2 - 1,22,31,34,37,41	Mean = 27.7 – lower than average 21.5
Period 3 - 1,5,13,26,38,40	Mean = 20.5 – higher than average 21.5

In relation to burglary, the positions of the six study forces were:

Period 1 – 1,10,18,20,23,30	Mean = 17.0 – higher than average 21.5
Period 2 – 1,10,30,31,38,39	Mean = 24.8 – lower than average 21.5
Period 3 – 1,11,16,20,27,36	Mean = 18.5 – higher than average 21.5

In relation to TOMV, the positions of the six study forces were:

Period 1 – 2,8,9,13,16,30	Mean = 13.0 – higher than average 21.5
Period 2 – 1,8,15,18,21,36	Mean = 16.5 – higher than average 21.5

For each category of crime, Periods 1 and 3 examined forces' success in crime reduction, during the period of nationally falling crime between the peak of the early 1990s and the trough of the late 1990s. In practice, there was little difference in the mean results of Periods 1 and 3. A longer-term measure was provided by Period 2, from the point immediately before the sharp rise of the early 1980s, until the late 1990s trough.

For each crime type, the study forces fared better during Periods 1 and 3, than during the longer Period 2. In respect of 'all crime' and burglary, the study forces performed better during Periods 1 and 3, than the mean of all forces. However, they performed less well than the mean of other forces during Period 2. The study forces had suffered from large increases in crime from the end of the 1980s until the sharp peak of the early 1990s. This is likely to have been a powerful incentive for their adoption of intelligence-led policing (ILP), which was intended to reduce the problem. Crime levels subsequently fell to a greater extent than in other forces, but not enough to compensate for the pre-peak rises.

In respect of TOMV, the six study forces achieved significantly greater mean crime reductions, than those of other forces. These were also sufficient to outweigh the increases of the early 1990s.

There are alternative explanations of the extent to which ILP was successful. The negative interpretation is that the rise and fall in crime during the 1990s occurred primarily for socio-economic reasons. The reductions of the mid-1990s were only made possible by the previous sharp rises, which were followed by a return to equilibrium

positions. There is good reason to suppose that this view of events is substantially correct. There is no research evidence to suggest that the rise in crime of the late 1980s was a result of sudden, near-universal and substantial deterioration in the effectiveness of policing. If it is accepted that socio-economic factors such as the recession at that time were predominant, it is reasonable to posit that similar factors, including economic recovery, underlay the subsequent fall. The near-universality of the fall in recorded crime before the adoption of most policing styles and irrespective of their nature, reinforces this account of events, which might be characterised as the 'what goes up, comes down' explanation.

The positive interpretation is that the adoption of ILP was crucial to the fortunes of the study forces, enabling steep increases in crime to be brought back under control. The probable predominance of socioeconomic factors suggests that this is a heavily overdeterministic explanation. It is however feasible that crime reductions may have been greater in ILP forces than they would have otherwise experienced. On the evidence of this part of the study, there is little force in the broad argument that ILP significantly reduces crime levels. In relation to 'all crime' and burglary, the study forces achieved no more in aggregate than the 'what goes up, comes down' effect. Their crime reduction results for TOMV were more impressive. The ILP forces achieved substantially greater reductions than those of the other forces, irrespective of the method of measurement.

Returning to the mean positions of the study forces, it was evident that better results were obtained in relation to burglary and TOMV, than to 'all crime'. For example, Period 1

saw respective mean positions of 19.7, 17.0 and 13.0 in relation to 'all crime', burglary and TOMV. Although 'Period 1' comprised a slightly different time period for each crime type, it was consistent in terms of crime trends, being the time between the early 1990s national peak, and the end of the steep fall in crime at the end of the 1990s. This outcome might be anticipated in view of the nature of the offence types. Burglary and TOMV are acquisitive property crime which should provide motivation for repeat offending, and thus be susceptible to police intervention. 'All crime' includes offences with a lesser degree of repeat offending and would produce smaller crime reductions by means of such intervention. The next hypothesis tested the consistency of the mean outcome within individual police forces.

Hypothesis 2: each of the six forces should exhibit greater crime reductions for burglary and theft of motor vehicles (TOMV), which should be susceptible to ILP strategies, than for 'all crime'. The hypothesis was interpreted according to the question of whether or not each study force had achieved higher 'league table' positions for the reductions of burglary and TOMV, than for 'all crime'. Table 1 (p.242) was used to consider this question.

A force was considered to have passed the test, if it had achieved this outcome across all time periods. If the force did not achieve the outcome in any time period, it failed the test. For example, if it achieved the outcome in Periods 1 and 3, but not in Period 2, the

force was considered to have attained no more than might be expected from a socio-economic 'what goes up, comes down' effect. Therefore, it failed the test.

Northumbria was the most successful force nationally, in respect of crime reduction. This outcome applied to all crime types across all time periods, except for Period 1 TOMV reduction where it was placed second. Therefore, it passed the test for burglary, but failed in respect of TOMV.

Hampshire was placed higher for burglary than for 'all crime', across all time periods. It was placed lower for TOMV than for 'all crime' in Period 1, but higher for TOMV than for 'all crime' in Period 2. Therefore, it passed the test for burglary, but failed in respect of TOMV.

Warwickshire achieved better results for burglary, and substantially better results for TOMV, than for 'all crime', in all time periods. Therefore, it passed the test.

Northamptonshire achieved better results for burglary, and substantially better results for TOMV, than for 'all crime', during Periods 1 and 3. In the longer Period 2, burglary results were slightly worse, but TOMV reductions were considerably greater, than for 'all crime'. Therefore, it failed the test in respect of burglary, but passed in respect of TOMV.

Kent achieved better results for 'all crime' than for burglary, across all time periods. The 'all crime' results were also better than for TOMV during Period 1, but were less successful than TOMV for Period 2. Therefore, it failed the test.

Cambridgeshire achieved better results for burglary than for 'all crime' across all time periods, and better results for TOMV than for burglary and 'all crime'. Therefore, it passed the test.

In summary, the hypothesis was successful for burglary and TOMV in two of the six study forces, Warwickshire and Cambridgeshire. In two more forces, it passed the test in respect of burglary, but failed in respect of TOMV. In one force, it passed the test in respect of TOMV, but failed in respect of burglary. In one force, the hypothesis failed in respect of burglary and TOMV. Overall, four out of the six forces consistently achieved better results for burglary than for 'all crime'. Three out of the six forces consistently achieved better results for TOMV than for 'all crime'. On the basis of the testing of this hypothesis, the evidence is weak, that ILP has an enhanced crime reduction capability compared with alternative policing styles.

Hypothesis 3: each of the six forces should exhibit greater crime reductions, than the median of those designated by HMIC as its comparable 'family of forces'. This was studied with reference to Tables 2, 3 and 4 (pp.243-245).

Northumbria was considered by HMIC to be too different from other forces, to place into a 'family'. Therefore, the hypothesis could not be tested.

Hampshire was in a family with six other forces of which two, Kent and Northamptonshire, were study forces. Compared with the remaining four forces, Hampshire achieved better than median 'all crime', burglary and TOMV reductions across all of the designated time periods. Therefore, it passed the test.

Warwickshire was in a family with seven other forces of which two, Hampshire and Kent, were also study forces. Compared with the remaining five forces and in relation to 'all crime' and burglary, Warwickshire achieved better than median results over Periods 1 and 3, but worse than median results for Period 2. In relation to TOMV, the force achieved better than median results across both time periods. Therefore, the hypothesis was unsuccessful for 'all crime' and burglary, but was successful for TOMV.

Northamptonshire was in a family with six other forces, of which one, Hampshire, was a study force. Compared with remaining five forces and in relation to 'all crime' and burglary, Northamptonshire achieved worse than median results over all time periods. In relation to TOMV, the force achieved better than median results. Therefore, the hypothesis was unsuccessful for 'all crime' and burglary, but was successful for TOMV.

Kent was in a family with six other forces, of which two, Hampshire and Warwickshire, were study forces. Compared with the remaining four forces and in relation to 'all

crime', Kent achieved better than median results over Periods 1 and 3, but worse than median results for the longer Period 2. In relation to burglary, the force achieved worse than median results over all time periods. In relation to TOMV, Kent achieved better than median results over both time periods. Therefore, the hypothesis was unsuccessful for 'all crime' and burglary, but was successful in relation to TOMV.

Cambridgeshire was in a family with six other forces, of which one, Northamptonshire, was a study force. Compared with the remaining five forces and in relation to 'all crime' and burglary, Cambridgeshire achieved worse than median results over all time periods. In relation to TOMV, the force achieved above median results for Period 1, but worse than median results for the longer Period 2. Therefore, the hypothesis was unsuccessful in relation to all crime types tested.

In summary, one force of the five tested, Hampshire, achieved better than median 'all crime', burglary and TOMV reductions than the remainder of its HMIC 'family', across all of the designated time periods. Three other forces achieved better than median results, only in respect of TOMV. One force achieved worse than median results across all crime types. According to this method of assessment, intelligence-led policing appears to have contributed towards reductions in TOMV.

Conclusions

In relation of thefts of motor vehicles (TOMV), the study forces achieved significantly greater median crime reductions, than the average of all other forces. This outcome supports the corresponding conclusion in Chapter 6. On the basis of this evidence, intelligence-led policing (ILP) appears to have made a significant contribution to crime reduction.

Crime reduction in each force was also compared with those considered by HMIC to share sufficiently similar characteristics, to be designated as its 'family'. Confirming the previous findings, four out of five ILP study forces showed greater crime reductions than their family members, in respect of theft of motor vehicles. In relation to 'all crime' and burglary, the study forces showed smaller reductions than the median of the others in their families in at least one of the chosen time periods. Using this methodology, the application of ILP to these offences was unable to demonstrate success in its aim of reducing 'all crime' and burglary.

In respect of 'all crime' and burglary, further comparisons also produced ambiguous results. The study forces saw greater median crime reductions than the average of other forces, during the time of predominant national crime reduction in the mid and late-1990s. Reductions were also measured during a longer time period, which included sharp rises in crime at the start of the 1990s. According to this measure, the study forces achieved less than average reductions. Similar results were obtained, when individual

study forces were compared with their respective 'force families'. Therefore, the 'greater than average' crime reductions of the study forces followed 'greater than average' rises in crime. It is unclear whether this was a causal progression wherein sharp rises in crime were necessary in order allow large reductions towards equilibrium levels. If ILP was effective in the reduction of TOMV, it is unlikely that it would have no effect upon 'all crime' and burglary. However, the likelihood that socio-economic factors were predominant in determining volume crime levels, makes it difficult to conclude without further evidence, that ILP was a significant factor.

The reductions of individual categories of crime within the study forces were also considered, using the hypothesis that their 'league table' positions would be higher for burglary and TOMV, than for 'all crime'. There was weak evidence that this might be the case. Four out of the six forces consistently achieved better results for burglary than for 'all crime'. Three out of the six forces consistently achieved better results for TOMV than for 'all crime'. The results tended to contradict and weaken the conclusion that ILP was effective in TOMV reduction, demonstrating that general effectiveness was far from reliable when translated into the results of individual forces.

The combined findings of Chapters 6 and 7 raised the possibility that the application of focussed policing styles, in particular intelligence-led policing, may have a weak effect upon crime levels. The measurement of crime at police force level may be insufficiently sensitive to detect this effect reliably. Chapter 8 investigates the possibility that the

effectiveness of intelligence-led policing could be measured across a range of geographical areas, in respect of 'all crime' and burglary.

Chapter 8

Prolific Offenders and Crime Reduction

Introduction

The research described in Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrated the possibility of a weak relationship between the use of a particular policing style, and crime reductions measured at police force level. A tentative link was established between the practice of intelligence-led policing (ILP) and reductions in thefts of motor vehicles. This effect was not apparent for other type of crime such as burglary or 'all crime'.

The absence of obvious effects of policing upon the volume of most reported crime, does not mean that such a relationship does not exist. It is reasonable to deduce that if a prolific offender is imprisoned, then crime levels must reduce by the amount of crime that they would have committed, had the opportunity continued for them to do so.

Intelligence-led policing depends on the targeting of such offenders in order to achieve reductions in crime. Chapters 6 and 7 revealed that after a decade of practice, intelligence-led forces have had difficulty in demonstrating better-than-average crime reduction results than other forces, when numbers of crimes were aggregated at police force level. If in the main, the police are correctly identifying and targeting the most

prolific offenders, some probable reasons for the lack of conspicuous success may be inferred. The most fundamental of these, is that the extent of repeat offending is not as great as police, Government and its agencies appear to have assumed in their promotion of ILP.

Morris and Heal's (1981) conclusions, drawn from a review of research evidence was quoted in Chapter 2 (p.67) as 'remarkably consistent'. In summary, the police are able to affect only a minority of all crime. Quantitative analysis (p.72) suggests that the potential crime reduction to be attained by the targeting of repeat offenders, is probably a low single-figure percentage of all crime.

The premise that 'relatively few offenders commit disproportionately large numbers of crimes' is the cornerstone of ILP theory. This proposition may be correct, but the 'disproportionately large numbers of crimes' amount to only a small fraction of all crimes. Most crimes are committed not by prolific offenders, but by individuals who commit small numbers of offences, which may be spread over a period of several years. The potential of ILP for volume crime reduction has been exaggerated or ignored in the formulation of policing policies. In order to make a significant impact upon crime levels, offenders would need to be targeted in numbers far beyond the investigation capacity of the police.

ILP may be effective in a very diluted form, compared with the high expectations with which it was originally promoted (Audit Commission 1993). The 'background noise' of

other influences upon crime rates, as diverse as socioeconomic reasons and the weather, may be dominant. The effects of these factors, which are beyond the control of the police, statistically swamp those of policing when conventional units of measurement are used. The annual aggregation of crime rates at Force level may be insufficiently sensitive, to be an appropriate means of assessing the effectiveness of police activity.

This chapter describes further research which examined the relationship between ILP and crime levels at a more microscopic level, narrowing the initial focus of measurement to individual police beat codes. The primary aim of the research was to ascertain whether the imprisonment of prolific burglars produced significant reductions in recorded burglary at beat level. Furthermore, if such a relationship could be established, the research aimed to ascertain at what point it would be lost in 'background noise' of other crime, by widening the unit of geographical measurement from beat, via basic command unit (BCU), to Force level. A similar exercise was carried out in relation to types of crime, using burglary and the wider-defined category 'all crime'. The exercise aimed to establish the largest appropriate unit of measurement for use as performance indicators.

The research drew upon, and was complementary to a study carried out by Townsley and Pease, which examined the effects of imprisonment upon levels of several categories of crime (Townsley and Pease 2002, pp.323-331). 'How efficiently can we target prolific offenders?' had important methodological similarities and contrasts to the study carried out in this chapter. These will be described in further detail.

'How Efficiently Can We Target Prolific Offenders?'

Townsley and Pease examined the magnitude of crime perpetrated by the most active offenders in a police basic command unit (BCU). They aimed to test 'whether the general observation that a minority of offenders commits a majority of offences is translated into local crime reduction associated with the incapacitation of nominated prolific offenders' (p.324-325). There was no discussion of the meaning of the terms 'minority' and 'majority'. It was therefore unclear whether the 'general observation' amounted to, for instance, 5 per cent or 49 per cent of offenders committing 51 per cent of all crime. The distinction is of prime importance in determining the probable effectiveness of the targeting of offenders.

The BCU was referred to as a 'sector', which was divided into 'neighbourhood' sub-areas A-D. The BCU had a population of about 160,000 people. Two sub-areas each contained about one-third of the population, whilst each of the other two contained about one-sixth of the population¹. The policing style of the BCU was not disclosed. The organisational terminology made it clear that geographic policing was in use. The systematic regime of offender targeting suggests that the force probably also practised intelligence-led policing.

¹ Personal communication, November 2005

The study period was 21 months from 1 January 2000 until 1st October 2001. Thirteen burglars and 33 vehicle crime offenders in the three sub-areas A, B and C were nominated for study by police intelligence officers. 'Vehicle crime' consisted of thefts of motor vehicles added to offences of unlawful taking motor vehicles, and thefts from motor vehicles. The aggregate number of days of offender freedom per month was compared with recorded crime levels. For instance, ten offenders would have a maximum of 280-310 days of freedom per month, dependent upon the month of the year. Scatter plots with 'lines of best fit' were constructed to show for example, the number of burglaries per burglar at liberty. A horizontal line of zero gradient, would indicate that the liberty of the nominees did not influence the volume of crime.

The results of this exercise showed that at BCU level, the liberty of the nominated groups of offenders did not appear to contribute substantially to 'all crime' or burglary levels. In contrast, the number of vehicle crimes did vary according to the number of nominated offenders available. The scatterplot 'line of best fit' indicated that the 33 nominated offenders were apparently responsible for 90 per cent of vehicle crime in the BCU. The authors considered that if this result was probably exaggerated due to data problems, but that it was reasonable to conclude that the impact of incapacitation upon crime levels was substantial.

At neighbourhood level, only one of the three sub-areas showed a relationship between levels of crime and the availability of nominated offenders. Positive correlations for almost all crime types were obtained, the strongest of which was in respect of thefts

including unlawful taking, of motor vehicles. The offenders had been nominated in respect of vehicle crime, but also appeared to be committing significant numbers of other offences. The other two sub-areas failed to produce any meaningful relationship between nominated offenders and crime levels.

Townsley and Pease concluded that in the sector studied, there was little evidence that the group of nominated offenders contributed disproportionately to the level of crime. The exception was nominated vehicle crime offenders in sub-Area A. The targeting of offenders was a less than perfect process. There were difficulties in justifying the practice in terms of human rights and alternative methods of targeting should be sought.

Prolific Offenders: Measuring Crime Reduction

Introduction

Chapters 6 and 7 of this research found little evidence that the application of discrete policing styles had a measureable impact upon recorded crime rates. The exception was in respect of thefts of motor vehicles, where the preponderance of evidence was that intelligence-led policing appeared to have a limited effect.

The Townsley and Pease research appears to support these findings but took place in a different context of a local police area. The policing style of the force was not clear, but

was geographically-based and appeared to include an element of intelligence-led policing. The smallest unit of measurement was the sub-areas A to D, with populations of between about 20,000 and 60,000 people. This was equivalent to a small to medium-sized town. At this level of measurement, there may have been sufficient 'background noise' of non-targeted crime, to reduce the visible effect of prolific offender targeting on crime rates.

If a smaller geographical area of measurement were to be considered, the effect of police targeting might be relatively greater and therefore more visible. A further study was carried out in order to study this hypothesis, in a force which operated a well-established, intelligence-led policing system.

The Study Locality and Selection of Subjects

A study area was chosen within a medium-sized county police force with a strong reputation for the pursuit of intelligence-led policing. Successive HMIC reports acknowledged that a key objective of the force was the reduction of volume crime by means of criminal targeting and incapacitation. The BCU which was the subject of study, comprised a market town surrounded by a large, predominantly rural area. The BCU had a population of about 150,000 people. In common with the rest of the force, it employed a relatively centralised policing model. There had been no introduction of the inspector-led sectors which are usually associated with geographic policing. Instead, the BCU was sub-

divided into about 20 traditional police 'beats'. These were areas, each of which had historically been policed by a community-based officer before the advent of ILP. Beat areas typically contained populations of between 4,000 and 8,000 residents, and were thus considerably smaller than the sub-areas studied by Townsley and Pease.

Two of the most prolific known burglars resident in the BCU were chosen for study, taking into account the advice of the BCU Intelligence Unit. The choices were intended to reveal the effect of imprisonment upon crime levels in contrasting environments.

'Offender 1' lived and committed crime in a locality, where the effect of his presence or absence upon burglary rates should have been maximal. In contrast, 'Offender 2' operated in a more typical urban environment which could be expected to reflect the effect of targeting in most circumstances.

Offender 1 was believed to be an alcohol abuser and a drug user, although the extent of such use was unclear. He lived in a discrete suburb of the BCU's main town, separated from the rest of town by a motorway and other geographical features.

Offender 1 had been arrested 41 times between April 1999 and November 2004. He had been predominantly linked by the BCU Intelligence Unit with burglaries, by means of crime pattern analysis and by monitoring of the offences with which he had been charged. The offences comprised 53% burglary of dwellings, wherein cash was usually stolen. Another 25% of offences comprised 'burglary other than dwelling' (BOTD). The

premises consisted mainly of sheds where tools and alcohol were stolen, together with local schools from which computer equipment was taken.

The burglaries with which he was charged, predominantly featured this suburb which was allotted its own beatcode. There was no indication that he had offended significantly elsewhere. No other prolific burglars were known to live in the same beatcode area.

Offender 2 was believed to burgle mainly near to his place of residence. There were several other persistent burglars resident in the area. In that locality, two beatcodes abutted each other, in a suburb which was readily accessible to other parts of the town. In order to capture the majority of offences, the study examined the aggregate reported crime in respect of the two beatcodes. Offender 2 also resided from time to time with a network of friends and acquaintances across the town. His track record of burglary and theft from those friends meant that he rarely stayed in one place for very long. In view of all these factors and in contrast to Offender 1, some geographical diffusion of offences was anticipated.

Offender 2 had been arrested 64 times between January 1998 and December 2004.

He had been linked with 69 offences by means of monitoring charges and crime pattern analysis. Of these, 41 offences, equating to 58% of the total, were burglaries of dwellings. In the main, cash was stolen. On a previous computer system which covered the period 1994 to 1998, Offender 2 had been similarly linked with 288 offences, of which 167, amounting to 59%, were burglaries of dwellings (59%).

Methodology

The study aimed to compare reported crime levels across selected beat codes, with the times at which prolific offenders were imprisoned, or alternatively were out of prison and thus available to commit crime. The force's local computer was used to generate monthly crime statistics over the six years 1999 to 2004 inclusive. The period was chosen with regard to the availability of data, and the ability to study the effects of several periods of imprisonment for each offender. The primary type of crime examined was burglary. As discussed in Chapter 6, burglary was considered to have a reasonably high reporting rate, to be relatively amenable to intervention by ILP, and to be resistant to change in market forces which might affect other offences such as vehicle-related thefts. Levels of 'all crime' were also monitored, to ascertain whether the availability of prolific offenders would make a significant impact.

The following information was recorded in respect of each offender.

- a) Dates of imprisonment, over the six years 1999-2004 inclusive.
- b) Monthly recorded burglary and 'all crime' levels for the beatcode (two adjacent beatcodes for Offender 2) of his residence, over the same timescale.
- c) Monthly recorded burglary and 'all crime' levels for the BCU over the same timescale.

The monthly data for both offenders were coded '0' if the offender was out of prison, '1' if they were in custody and '2' if they moved from one state to the other during that

month. The study aimed to test whether there was a significant reduction in crime, when the offenders were imprisoned.

A two-sample t-test was used to test the null hypothesis H_0 , that there was no difference in the recorded crime rate when the offenders were free, compared with when they were in custody. The alternative hypothesis H_1 , was that the recorded crime rate was higher, when the offenders were at liberty. 'Code 2' months, when the offenders moved from one state to the other, were treated first as though they were available to commit offences. The data were then reanalysed, treating 'code 2' data as though the offenders were in custody. In respect of offender 2, limited further analysis took place, excluding the months of part-imprisonment.

The results were tabulated at Table 1 and Table 2. The data from which the tables were formulated, are displayed at Appendix A.

The data collected had some limitations. Information submitted by police officers to the computer system was used to determine the times at which offenders were in and out of prison. This process was reasonably straightforward, but was subject to deficiencies. The dates on which offenders were imprisoned could be readily ascertained. Precise dates of release were more difficult to obtain. These were a product of the prison service and not the police service. Accuracy within the police computer system depended upon liaison between the two organisations. It was evident that this process was less than perfect. If a prisoner was seen by a police officer soon after his 'Earliest Date of Release' (EDR), it

was assumed for research purposes, that he had been released on the EDR. In a few cases, an offender was seen at liberty before his EDR. In such cases it was assumed that he had been released within the last few days, unless an officer had interviewed him and ascertained the correct date. The offenders who were studied, were very well known to local police officers. Intelligence reports were submitted for input to the computer system on an almost daily basis. Therefore, errors were unlikely to be significant.

The study was also unable to take account of periods during which an offender was at liberty, but his actions were the subject of restrictive conditions. These included bail conditions such as curfews imposed by the police and the courts, and post-sentence Home Detention Curfews. The offenders' frequent arrests for breaches of restrictive conditions, suggests that their effectiveness in relation to curtailing offending behaviour, was likely to have been minimal. Further examination of this issue was beyond the scope of this study.

Finally, in order to compare crime rates with offender availability, a decision had to be reached as to whether an offender should be counted as in prison, when he spent part of the month there. In order to resolve the problem, these months were treated both ways. The data was analysed as though the offender was in prison, and then re-analysed under the alternative assumption that they were out of prison. The treatment of part-months was most sensitive in the case of offender 2, who moved in and out of prison in 16 of the 72 months of the survey period. The incorrect assignment of large numbers of offences from the 'out of prison' to the 'in prison' cohort, would potentially narrow the difference in the

means of the cohorts to a significant degree. In order to take account of this problem, some limited further analysis was carried out in respect of Offender 2, excluding the data relating to the months of partial imprisonment.

Comparison with 'How efficiently can we target prolific offenders?'

Both methodologies provided the opportunity to compare levels of measurement. Crime trends at beatcode or sector level could be compared with those for the BCU. Similarly, statistics for individual crime types could be compared with those for 'all crime.' This study used smaller unit areas at beat level and therefore had greater potential for the demonstration of the effects of imprisonment upon crime rates at a local level.

This study was more likely to demonstrate the effect of offender targeting upon crime rate, by the selection of the only known prolific burglar on a beat area. In contrast, the Townsley and Pease research examined aggregate numbers of offenders, which equated better to a 'real-life' targeting regime. Compared with this study, it provided a more realistic method of estimating the total potential crime reduction of such a regime. In summary, 'How efficiently can we target prolific offenders' examined the effectiveness of a targeting regime upon crime rates, with a shifting equilibrium of available offenders. This study sought to isolate the effect of targeting in order to provide a direct comparison of offender availability and crime rates.

Results

Table 1

Offender 1 – Imprisonment and Local Crime

Null hypothesis H_0 : there is no difference in the recorded crime rate when the offenders were free compared with when they were in custody.

Alternative hypothesis H_1 : the recorded rate was higher when the offenders were not in custody.

State 0 = month out of custody

State 1 – month in custody

State 2 – month and out of custody

- treated as state 0
- *treated as state 1*
- **data excluded from analysis**

OTD = Other than dwelling

	Mean Offences/month		t	p	H_0 vs H_1
	Out custody	In custody			
Burglary/beat (dwelling + OTD)	12.0	8.52	2.99	0.0039	H_1
	<i>11.8</i>	<i>9.10</i>	<i>2.19</i>	<i>0.032</i>	<i>H₁</i>
All Crime/beat	82.3	84.7	-0.511	0.61	H_0
	<i>82.7</i>	<i>84.1</i>	<i>-0.302</i>	<i>0.76</i>	<i>H₀</i>
Burglary/BCU (dwelling + OTD)	152	131	2.93	0.0046	H_1
	<i>152</i>	<i>135</i>	<i>2.40</i>	<i>0.019</i>	<i>H₁</i>

Table 2

Offender 2 – Imprisonment and Local Crime

Null hypothesis H_0 : there is no difference in the recorded crime rate when the offenders were free compared to when they were in custody.

Alternative hypothesis H_1 : the recorded rate was higher when the offenders were not in custody.

	Mean Offences/month		t	p	H_0 vs H_1
	Out custody	In custody			
Burglary/2 beats (dwelling)	17.0	11.5	2.91	0.0049	H_1
	<i>16.4</i>	<i>14.2</i>	<i>1.18</i>	<i>0.24</i>	H_0
	16.4	11.5	2.45	0.018	H_1
Burglary/2 beats (dwelling + OTD)	30.4	24.5	2.34	0.022	H_1
	<i>31.0</i>	<i>26.4</i>	<i>1.91</i>	<i>0.060</i>	H_0
	31.0	24.5	2.29	0.026	H_1
All Crime/2 beats	227	221	0.595	0.55	H_0
	<i>228</i>	<i>221</i>	<i>0.613</i>	<i>0.54</i>	H_0
	228	223	0.530	0.60	H_0
Burglary/BCU (dwelling)	54.7	47.8	1.88	0.064	H_0
	<i>54.3</i>	<i>50.8</i>	<i>0.986</i>	<i>0.33</i>	H_0
Burglary/BCU (dwelling + OTD)	145	141	0.526	0.60	H_0
	<i>148</i>	<i>140</i>	<i>1.03</i>	<i>0.31</i>	H_0

Discussion

The targeting of Offender 1 took place under conditions of crime measurement which were as near-ideal as could reasonably be expected. His area of offending was discrete and there were no other known prolific burglars in the locality. The study showed a significant relationship between the liberty or custody of Offender 1, and the number of burglaries measured at beat level. More surprisingly, the effect of police targeting remained clear, when numbers of burglaries were measured at BCU level. The effect was lost when 'all crime' was measured, even at beat level.

When part-months were treated as 'in prison', the relationship between custody and burglary levels remained significant, but was diminished. This was probably an effect of Offender 1's burglaries during part-months, boosting the figures of the 'in prison' data cohort.

The capture and measurement of offences associated with Offender 2 was a more difficult exercise. His semi-itinerant lifestyle and the close mutual proximity of the affected beat areas, made the identification of offences committed by him, problematic. There were several other active burglars who were resident in the same beat areas. The aggregation of statistics from two adjoining beat areas was unlikely to have captured all of the offences committed by Offender 2, although it reduced that problem. The advantage of aggregation, namely the capture of a greater proportion of his offences, conflicted with

the objective of using a small geographical area to isolate those offences from those committed by other offenders.

These problems would be anticipated, if the exercise was to be carried out in respect of most offenders. In summary, Offender 2 was effectively a 'real life model', in contrast to the 'ideal model' presented by Offender 1.

A positive relationship was found, between the number of burglaries at beatcode level, and the liberty or custody of Offender 2, when 'part custody' months were treated as though he was out of custody. Whilst the relationship was not as strong as the equivalent measurement in respect of Offender 1, this was not surprising in view of the extraction of data from two beatcodes instead of one.

When 'part-months' were treated as though Offender 2 was in custody, the relationship was reduced to a non-significant level. However, exclusion of 'part months' from the study saw the re-establishment of the relationship. The most likely explanation for these findings, was that there was a significant relationship between the imprisonment of Offender 2, and the number of burglaries measured at beat level. The treatment of 'part-custody' months as 'in custody', may well have erroneously transferred a statistically significant number of offences from the 'out of custody' to the 'in custody' cohort.

In order to assess whether the level of a narrower category of crime would exhibit a stronger relationship with the liberty or custody, this part of the study was repeated with

the use of statistics relating to burglaries only of dwellings. Offender 2 was believed to commit in the main, such offences. The results showed the predicted stronger relationship, provided that the 'part custody' months were treated as 'out of custody'.

When the availability of Offender 2 was compared with burglary levels across the BCU, the relationship dropped to a non-significant level. In respect of burglaries of dwellings across the BCU, the relationship was stronger but remained non-significant. The treatment of 'part-custody' months made no difference to these results.

The level of 'all crime' across the two beatcodes was compared with the liberty or custody of Offender 2. Again, no significant relationship was found, irrespective of the method of measurement.

Conclusions

The effect of intelligence led policing can be clearly demonstrated by the measurement of burglary levels at beatcode level. This was shown under 'ideal' experimental conditions, where one prolific offender was active locally, in an area where the equilibrium level of burglary was relatively low and stable. Under these conditions, the effect of policing was also evident when burglary was measured at BCU level.

More often, other variables interfere with the measurement of cause (police activity) and effect (burglary level). The nature of these variables is not known, but may include the

activity of other criminals, inconsistency in the level of offending of any individual, and the effect of restrictive conditions such as curfews. The study found that using the 'real life model' of Offender 2, the effect of policing upon burglary remained significant when offences were measured at beat level. However, the significance was lost when burglaries were measured at BCU level.

It was noted that irrespective of statistical significance, aggregate numbers of burglary offences at beat and at BCU level, invariably dropped when either of the offenders was in custody. For example, the imprisonment of Offender 2 was associated with an average fall of four offences in burglaries at BCU level, from 145 to 141 offences per month.

Although this was not statistically significant, the police in the BCU subject of study, also targeted several other known offenders. The likelihood is that the aggregate impact of the total targeting effort upon burglaries would have been significant at BCU level. Further exploration of this possibility was beyond the scope of the study.

In respect of both offenders, no significant relationship was found between their liberty or custody, and 'all crime' measured at beat level. Indeed, police targeting of Offender 1 was associated with a non-significant increase in 'all crime'. The measurement of 'all crime' at any geographical level, had no apparent relationship with this aspect of police activity.

The results call into question, the measurement of recorded 'all crime' as an indicator of police performance. The level of some categories of crime such as burglary, may be

correlated with police performance when measured at local level. The correlation depends upon the activities of prolific offenders making a significant contribution towards total offence levels. It is unclear whether at low levels and in the absence of prolific offenders, numbers of burglaries reflect policing activity. Further research would also be required, to establish the nature of linkages between policing and other categories of offences.

The completion of this chapter concludes the second theme of the thesis, namely the nature of the relationship between the use of focussed policing styles and recorded crime rates. Chapter 9 returns to the subject of centralisation and policing styles. The chapter summarises and considers the implications of 'neighbourhood' policing, which rose to prominence during the course of the study.

Chapter 9

Recent Developments: Neighbourhood Policing

Introduction

At the conclusion of Chapter 5, it was argued that the pace of police centralisation had left academic and public debate trailing in its wake. In the period during which this research took place, the Government continued to take a deterministic view of the connection between policing on one hand, and crime and disorder on the other. Through a succession of Home Secretaries, it took further control of police organisation and priorities.

Disparate expectations of the police exerted opposing pressures upon the organisation of forces. A review of 'protective services', including 'Levels 2 and 3' inter-force organised crime and terrorism, found that arrangements in most forces fell far short of the ideal (HMIC 2005). An attempt to amalgamate forces into larger units which might be more effective in this regard, was unsuccessful. Forces were instead expected to bolster their capacity by internal reorganisation which would pull resources towards their centres, and by inter-force collaboration.

The decentralising 'geographic' style which had been adopted by some forces in the 1990s, was repackaged as 'neighbourhood policing' and was required to be implemented

by all forces, by April 2008. This chapter summarises the development of neighbourhood policing and considers the likelihood that, in the light of this study, it will fulfil government expectations.

The Rise of Neighbourhood Policing

During the latter part of the 1990s, most police forces in England and Wales operated one or more of four principal policing styles. 'Intelligence led' policing was sponsored by the Audit Commission and 'partnership working' received the statutory backing of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. 'Geographic policing' and 'problem oriented' policing, were also practised by several forces, which received HMIC support during the course of force inspections. During this period, recorded crime rates fell significantly.

The White Paper 'Building Communities, Beating Crime' identified that the public were reluctant to accept that matters had improved, perceiving low police visibility and equating this perception to a poor state of the community safety environment. (Home Office 2004). The White Paper claimed that 'the police commitment and Government investment have led to a drop in overall crime by 30% since 1997 (p.6). More negatively, it also identified that 'despite this substantial growth in police numbers, people have the perception that there are fewer police on the streets' (p.15). The report endorsed intelligence-led policing and partnership working, but added that:

'...the Government's view is that the policing pendulum has swung too far in the reactive direction. We believe there needs to be a shift towards more proactive, problem-solving policing - with forces getting better at preventing crime happening in the first place, but also being better at solving it when it does happen. It was no accident of drafting that the first function ascribed to the then new Metropolitan Police in 1829 was to prevent crime. We believe that policing has shifted too far away from this ideal. So we place particular emphasis – as has the police service itself in recent years – on the need to embed a truly problem-solving, intelligence-led approach to policing'(Home Office 2004, p.19).

The White Paper prescribed ambitious aims for 'neighbourhood policing' as the way forward for the service, stating that:

'By 2008 we want every community to benefit from the level and style of neighbourhood policing that they need. This will involve dedicated teams of police officers, community support officers and wardens providing a visible, reassuring presence, preventing and detecting crime and developing a constructive and lasting engagement with members of their community.....They will take an intelligence-led, proactive, problem-solving approach to enable them to focus on and tackle specific local issues. They will involve their local community in establishing and negotiating priorities for action and in identifying and implementing solutions.....Police and their partners providing useful and meaningful information on how a community is being policed will encourage and empower individuals to work with the police, feeding

community intelligence into crime prevention, detection and reductionpeople will see a more visible, accessible police presence on the streets and in their communities' (Home Office 2004, p.7-8).

Although 'neighbourhood policing' was not precisely defined, it appeared to consist of geographically decentralised policing, in which partnership working and problem oriented policing would play substantial roles. Its predecessor 'community' policing, born in the UK from the aftermath of the riots of the early 1980s, emphasised positive police-community relations as a goal. Neighbourhood policing saw such engagement as a means to the end of crime and disorder reduction (Bowes 2005, Rogers 2005). Such activity, together with problem-solving techniques, would be informed by the provision of intelligence in its widest sense. The White Paper appeared to envisage 'neighbourhood policing' as an amalgam of best practice, which would deliver to the public, the best of all worlds.

Neighbourhood Policing: A National Policing Model?

'Neighbourhood policing' amounted to the simultaneous practice by all forces, of the four dominant policing styles of the 1990s. Enforced by the National Policing Plan, it was the closest point reached to date by the government, to the imposition of a national policing model upon forces.

The reason why 'neighbourhood policing' did not amount to such a model, was that it fell short of prescribing in detail, the mix of structures and processes within each force.

Compliance with the National Intelligence Model was required, but the balance of the four constituent policing styles remained a function of the shrinking core of independence of chief constables. The extent of geographic decentralisation was not specified, and 'partnership working' remained an equally nebulous concept. It was clear that some form of formal problem-solving process was a part of 'neighbourhood policing', but again the nature and extent of required implementation was unclear. Resource limitations were likely to remain a key factor in force structures and processes.

'Neighbourhood policing' currently amounts to an aspirational conjunction of linked styles of policing, all of which are individually resource-hungry. Its implementation will inevitably produce tensions which will in the short term, probably be resolved by rebranding forces' existing styles. As the light of scrutiny continues to shine upon forces, this arrangement is likely to be adjudged unsatisfactory by agencies concerned with the promulgation of 'best practice.' It may be reasonably anticipated that further standardisation of organisational arrangements will follow. In addition to compliance with the National Intelligence Model, forces will be required to implement a prescribed degree of geographic decentralisation.

The structure and remit of partnerships will similarly become more tightly drawn. Forces' approaches to problem-solving policing will be standardised and the nature of the

'problems' which trigger the approach will be better defined. At the point that all of these measures have been implemented, a national policing model will have been reached.

The Prospects for Neighbourhood Policing

The introduction of 'neighbourhood policing' appeared to take little heed of either the lessons of history, or of competing demands upon the service. The White Paper's concern with excessive police reactivity was curious, given its wish to achieve 'locally responsive policing' (Home Office 2004, p.102). Chapter 2 of this study identified that numbers of '999' calls had risen from 22.6 million in 1997, to 39.7 million in 2001. In dealing with the increase in demands, the service could reasonably argue that it was extremely responsive. Given the intrinsic nature of emergency calls, it had no option but to treat these as an overriding priority which could not be 'wished away'. It would appear that however that this was the 'wrong' type of responsiveness for the White Paper, which implicitly saw 'local problems' as separate from, and far fewer than, the causes of emergency calls.

In this respect, 'Building Communities, Beating Crime' offered a curious echo of the Audit Commission's earlier paper, 'Helping With Enquiries - Tackling Crime Effectively' (Audit Commission 1993). In that paper, the Commission was critical of excessive police reactivity towards escalating volume crime, and proposed intelligence-led policing as a 'magic bullet' solution, from which a 'virtuous circle' of proactive crime

reduction would emerge. Chapter 3 of this thesis pointed out that the statistics upon the theory was based, were fundamentally flawed. The White Paper 'Building Communities, Beating Crime' offered a similar vision of a shift towards proactivity, in relation to a wider spectrum of crime and disorder incidents. Unhelpfully, it offered no theory, flawed or otherwise, as to how this fundamental change in policing, from reactive to proactive activity, might be achieved. The literature review and original research described in Chapters 3 and 6 of this study showed that consequent reductions in crime were unlikely to be sufficiently great, to be measureable.

The notion that neighbourhood policing would increase public reassurance, owed more to aspiration than to research evidence. The West Yorkshire study referred to in Chapter 3, discovered that geographic devolvement did not necessarily produce greater public reassurance (Brownlee and Walker 1998). More generally, the police visibility problem identified by the White Paper was set against a backcloth of widespread, existing geographic policing. The White Paper envisaged that police visibility would not only be improved, but to the point where the public would notice the improvement. This vision was a remarkable hostage to fortune. There was no convincing plan as to how it might be achieved, in the face of other policing pressures, and the scant likelihood that the public would change their daily habits in such a way as to see more officers. It is difficult to envisage how the 'more visible, accessible police presence' could be achieved, other than by the employment of additional officers on an immensely expensive scale.

Significant investment has undoubtedly been made. In 2004, there was a record number of almost 140,000 police officers. This amounted to an increase of 12,570 officers, or about ten per cent, since 1997. Over that period, government funding for the police rose by 21 per cent in real terms (Home Office 2004, p.30). Translation of this investment into proactivity was and will remain difficult to achieve in view of competing demands upon the service. Public perceptions of police visibility are also unlikely to be sensitive to a ten per cent change in officer numbers. The achievement of the government's ambition in this regard, is likely to hinge upon the realisation of its ambition to recruit 14,000 community support officers and community wardens by 2008.

If implemented, the recruitment campaign would add on average, about 325 uniformed personnel to each force area. These personnel would have limited remits linked to visibility, continuity of presence and reassurance, and would not be readily transferable to meet other pressures. Although not police officers, they represent by far, the most realistic opportunity to meet public demand for the presence of uniformed authority figures in public places.

The assignment of significant numbers of officers to geographically devolved locations had varied implications for police forces, dependent upon their existing structures. Chapter 3 of this thesis identified that the organisational shift had already been carried out by 50 per cent of forces, by the turn of the millenium. In isolation, the requirement amounted to 'no change' in those forces. The drawback was that realisation of the benefits were likely to be difficult to achieve. It was also identified in Chapter 3, that

geographic policing was 'not always the best structure to provide reactive policing, such as response to emergencies.....' (HMIC 1998b, p.9). More recently, the vice-chairman of the Police Federation, Alan Gordon, highlighted some of the competing tensions at the Federation's annual conference in May 2006, stating that: 'It's resource intensive. It is not possible to provide adequate response policing and deliver neighbourhood policing'. He told delegates that during one neighbourhood policing pilot, the scheme only worked because the response teams were able to 'poach' officers from other areas who were not involved in the pilot (Police, June 2006, p.17).

Tensions may be settled by the absorption of a limited 'neighbourhood' element into existing force structures. The 'neighbourhood' element of a formerly ILP-dominated force, may be a good deal weaker, than that in a force which was already committed to geographic policing. It is likely that the implementation of neighbourhood policing will consist of variable adaptation of force structures, together with some 'easy hit' measures. These might include the provision to communities of officers' mobile telephone numbers, and the setting of service standards for frequency and timeliness of officers' contact with customers. Vigorous publicity for such measures may also be anticipated, but the strength of the core 'local' element is likely to be dependent upon existing force structures.

Some forces with the centralised structures associated with intelligence-led policing, may implement a sparser version of neighbourhood policing, dominated by the rebranding of existing structures and by publicity. Such forces are likely to be heavily dependent upon the use of Community Support Officers and wardens, to provide the visible presence envisaged by the White Paper.

Despite such concerns, there are signs that neighbourhood policing may achieve some of its aims. In May 2006, a Home Office progress report claimed that in pilot areas, crime fell by almost twice as much in wards where neighbourhood activity took place, compared with control wards. Moreover, public confidence in the police rose substantially in the 'neighbourhood' wards (Home Office 2006). The report was compiled by the ACPO and Home Office team who were responsible for the implementation of neighbourhood policing throughout England and Wales. The results must be considered in the light of the team's vested interest in success, and the Police Federation's concerns about resource 'poaching' in order to bolster the pilot areas. It is unclear whether the report amounted to another example of Weatheritt's 'foregone conclusion' research, or whether the results could be sustained over a longer time period and a wider geographical area. The measurement of success at ward level, equating approximately to a few police beat areas, is interesting, being a far smaller geographical unit than conventional crime measurement at BCU or force level.

Conclusions

It may be realistic to conclude that neighbourhood policing can be successful at ward level, if enough resources are provided. Chapter 8 demonstrated that the application of intelligence-led policing, depressed burglary at a similar local level. The challenge for neighbourhood policing is the same as that for all crime reduction initiatives, namely, successful implementation on a significant scale.

The aspirational term 'neighbourhood policing' reflects the nature of the White Paper in which it was promoted. The weight of evidence suggests that neighbourhood policing will do little to affect volume crime rates, although there will be examples of local success. The vision of a significant shift to proactivity is also chimerical. Demands upon the police have grown significantly in the last decade. In part, this was the result of direct public demand, such as the growth in the number of emergency calls generated in the main by mobile telephones. Centralised requirements for procedural changes also added to workload. These included the investigation of new offences such as criminal harassment, the investigation of a wider range of existing offences such as common assault, and additional 'brought to justice' requirements. In relation to serious offences, the police face irresistible pressure to provide improved 'protective services'. It is difficult to conceive of any area of operations, which the police can treat as less than high priority, releasing staff to achieve the proactivity expected of neighbourhood policing. Neither are there substantial gains to be made by analysis of problems, which are far too dispersed to be amenable to the use of any simplistic solution.

In practice, implementation will consist of a mixture of the imposition of central preferences and genuine but limited innovation, together with vigorous marketing of the 'new' policing style. Some successes will be achieved, on a limited scale. The Achilles heel of neighbourhood policing will be in the provision of resources to match its ambition of nationwide application.

Some of the aims of neighbourhood policing cannot be measured readily by means of quantitative performance indicators. The current array of PPAF indicators, although complex, take more account than their predecessors of public concerns about crime and disorder. Qualitative techniques may offer useful and complementary approaches to performance assessment, but their acceptance would require a cultural change on the part of both police and the police monitoring agencies.

Chapter 10 draws conclusions from the thesis and suggests areas for further research.

Chapter 10

Summary, Further Research and Conclusions

Summary of Thesis

This thesis aimed to explore several related themes and questions. The initial aim was to ascertain the nature and impact of centralisation processes which produced a range of focussed policing styles in the 1990s. These studies allowed further, quantitative questions to be addressed. The first question was whether any connection could be established between the policing style employed by a police force, and the extent of subsequent crime reduction in that police force area. The answer would also establish the likelihood that governments can legislate for crime reduction by the imposition of centrally-preferred methods of policing. The research also aimed to determine at what units of geography and category of crime, any such connection could be most effectively measured. For example, the effect of police activity might be measureable in terms of burglaries within a beat code, but be dissipated to the point of invisibility, when 'all crime' across a police force was measured.

Chapter 1 described the process by which successive governments imposed increasingly centralised control upon the police service over the last thirty years. A landmark piece of legislation in this respect was the Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994, which followed sharp increases in crime nationwide. The Act provided for national performance

indicators towards which police forces were expected to work. For the first time, police priorities had been defined from the centre. Falling crime levels encouraged further intervention. New legislation, in particular the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the Police Reform Act 2002, prescribed not only the nature of the police's 'core business', but the means by which they would go about it.

Following the crime increases of the early 1990s, most police forces adopted named 'policing styles'. Their objectives were to focus upon, and improve performance in relation to particular areas of policing, in which crime reduction featured heavily.

Government policy and police practice developed within a theoretical framework which, if not a vacuum, contained little to support the policy. Research-based information suggested that alterations in policing tactics had little or no effect upon crime rates. There were however, two areas of doubt. First, there was evidence that the use of specialised tactics could produce more positive results, although the extent to which these would affect crime rates across an entire police force was unclear. Secondly, some research studies demonstrated the successful application of crime reduction techniques within small localities. It was also unclear, to what extent such success could be replicated across an entire police force.

Chapter 2 carried out some definitional ground-clearance, to clarify the meaning of the core concepts of 'crime' and 'policing styles' which were used throughout the research.

The subjectivity of these terms was discussed and the consequent limitations upon the accuracy of the research results were explained.

The chapter went on to examine core literature, in order to place the research into the context of existing knowledge and debate. The arena of research was the contribution of policing to the reduction of recorded crime. The literature review examined the development of crime reduction strategies in England and Wales, from its situational roots in the 1960s, to the broader concept of 'community safety' which took hold thirty years later. The literature surrounding the effectiveness of policing was then considered in further detail. Key studies such as the Rand survey of the late 1970s, found crime investigation to be a predominantly routine activity. Those crimes without ready witnesses were rarely solved. Other studies, also chiefly based in the United States, found that the patrolling of uniformed officers had little or no effect upon crime levels. The use of specialist squads produced increased rates of arrest, but no discernable effect upon crime levels. The generally pessimistic conclusions were qualified by the possibility that the widespread application of what had historically been regarded as specialised tactics, might significantly reduce crime levels. There was therefore, a limited prospect that the use by police forces of focussed policing styles might achieve the success which hitherto, had been elusive.

Further research was examined, which considered socio-economic determinants of crime rates. The most significant of these studies was a Home Office study. Field (2000) demonstrated that the main long-term determinants of theft and burglary were consumer expenditure and the number of males in the population aged between 15 and 20. Short-

term crime levels were also primarily determined by socio-economic factors. During periods of recession, when perceptions of deprivation are most acute, there was an inverse relationship between personal consumption and levels of property crime. None of these factors are amenable to police intervention.

In order to establish baseline information which would allow further research, Chapter 3 set out to identify the nature of the policing styles which were in widespread use in United Kingdom police forces in the 1990s. Inspection reports published by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) were used to establish four distinct styles. These were: 'intelligence-led' policing, 'geographic' policing, 'problem oriented' policing and 'partnership working'. Some forces practised more than one style, and a small minority relied upon conducting 'business as usual'. Each policing style was underpinned by a specific, although untested theory. For example, 'intelligence-led' policing aimed to identify and disrupt the activities of prolific offenders, and thereby to obtain maximal crime reductions in proportion to expenditure of resources. The chapter also identified that the simultaneous practice of more than one policing style might produce organisational tensions and shortfalls in resources.

The thesis then explored its first principal theme, police centralisation. The mechanisms by which pressures for conformity were exerted upon the police service by key Government agencies, were examined in a case study of six forces. Chapter 4 described the processes by which Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and the Audit

Commission monitored the work of police forces, and promulgated widely-perceived 'best practice' throughout the 1990s. The experience of the forces studied showed a substantial degree of chief constables' independence at the start of the decade.

Compliance with central preference was most evident, when it coincided with the chief constable's own views. By the end of the decade, compliance was almost complete. Some significant, continued expressions of independence became the exception rather than the rule.

Chapter 5 considered the question of whether the loss of chief constables' autonomy had reduced the likelihood of policing in response to local conditions. A study was undertaken of HMIC-designated 'families' of police forces, which are considered to operate under similar socio-economic and geographic conditions, and thus are mutually comparable. Three force families were studied. In two families, the forces were considered by HMIC to be at the extremes of internal similarity. In the third family, the forces were designated to have an 'average' level of mutual similarity. It was postulated that if policing was undertaken according to 'local needs', then the 'most similar' family should also exhibit similar policing styles. The 'least similar' family should contain the widest variety of policing styles.

The study found that the 'most similar' group, showed less consistency of policing styles than either the most loosely associated group, or the family which contained forces of 'average' mutual similarity. On this evidence, it was unlikely that chief constables chose their forces' policing styles upon the basis of an objective assessment of local conditions.

The research then turned to its second key theme, the scale of crime reductions which were associated with the practice of each policing style. Chapter 6 identified that this was a contentious exercise, the results of which would be dependent upon the type of crime under consideration, and the time period over which variations in crime levels were to be measured. In order to minimise this problem, several variables were used. Crime reductions were measured in terms of 'all crime', burglary, thefts of motor vehicles and criminal damage. At least two time periods were used in respect of each type of crime. The analysis showed that no policing style was associated with significantly different crime reduction results, than was any other policing style. The exception to the conclusion was that intelligence-led policing appeared to be more successful at achieving reductions than other styles, in respect of thefts from motor vehicles.

The reason for this result was considered. It was unlikely that a particular policing style was effective in relation to only one category of crime. An alternative explanation was that thefts of motor vehicles included a greater element of repeat offending than other types of crime. For every disrupted offender, the associated crime reduction would be greater and could be measured more readily. In that case, conventional units of measurement might not be appropriate in order to measure the effects of police action.

The study then examined the effects of intelligence-led policing in greater depth. Compared with the other policing styles, the study of ILP had methodological advantages in terms of consistency of policing structures and the length of time for which they had

been practised. Chapter 7 aimed to explore the extent and consistency of crime reductions associated with this policing style. Six police forces with long-established ILP styles were chosen and their crime reduction results were examined by means of three methods. First, their median crime reductions were compared with those of other forces, across a variety of crime types and time periods. In relation to thefts of motor vehicles, the ILP forces showed greater median crime reductions, than those of other forces. Greater reductions could not be demonstrated in respect of other types of crime. This conclusion supported the results of Chapter 6.

The second hypothesis was that each of the six forces should exhibit greater crime reductions in respect of burglary and theft of motor vehicles, than in respect of 'all crime'. Inconsistent results were achieved.

Finally, crime reductions for each of the study forces were compared with those designated by HMIC as its 'family of forces', in order to control as far as possible for variations in forces' operating environments. Again, the ILP forces showed greater reductions than those of other forces, only in respect of thefts of motor vehicles.

The study then pursued further, the idea that the discrete policing styles may be effective in reducing crime, at a smaller geographical level than at those currently used. For example, crime reductions at local level may be dissipated at police force level. Chapter 8 examined the activities of two prolific burglars within an intelligence-led police force. Crime levels during periods of imprisonment were compared with those during periods of

liberty. This process examined rates of reported burglary and 'all crime' at beat, BCU and force levels, in order to establish any point at which measureable crime reduction results might be dissipated.

The study found that at beat level there was a relationship between imprisonment of each offender, and numbers of burglaries. The relationship was weaker, but remained significant when the units of measurement were broadened from beat area to BCU level. No significant relationship was apparent between police activity and 'all crime', even at beat level. This result raises the question of whether current performance indicators are sufficiently sensitive to be useful measures of police performance.

Summarising the second theme of the thesis, the extent to which policing can affect volume crime rates, can be assessed from a variety of disparate literature. Each source provides useful indicative information, but none is decisive. This study has added further information of indicative value, to the existing body of knowledge.

No example was found of a policing style producing 'all crime' reductions which were geographically widespread and maintained over a sustained time period. There was evidence that intelligence-led policing (ILP) produced reductions in some categories of acquisitive property crime. Compared with other policing styles, the practice of ILP had some advantage in respect of thefts of motor vehicles, when these offences were measured at police force level. At police beat and BCU levels, the imprisonment of

individual prolific offenders by the practice of ILP was shown to reduce recorded burglaries.

The consistent difficulty facing the police, irrespective of the policing style applied, is organisational capacity compared with the volume of crime. Techniques such as intelligence-led policing seek to be efficient by means of eliminating multiple crimes. In practice, their effectiveness is limited by the very small proportion of crime to which they are applied.

These conclusions complement Pease's contention, referred to in Chapter 2, that 'the vast bulk of well conceived and properly implemented primary prevention programmes achieve some success in crime reduction' (Pease 2002, p.954). In common with the application of policing styles, effectiveness in crime reduction may be achieved on a limited scale. Set against the totality of all recorded crime, the gains become difficult to demonstrate.

Chapter 10 summarised recent national developments in the centralisation of policing styles. The promotion of 'neighbourhood policing' was considered to amount to a loose combination of the four policing styles which were examined in Chapter 3. Tensions were evident in the competition for resources between the different elements. In the absence of further definition, 'neighbourhood policing' fell short of a national policing model. It was unlikely to produce widespread, measureable reductions in crime and

disorder, although there was limited emerging evidence of success at a local level.

Improvements in police 'visibility' were likely to depend upon the employment of large numbers of uniformed community support officers.

Further Research

This thesis has described a series of pieces of interlinked research. At the conclusion of each element, further research possibilities became evident, presenting options to increase the breadth or the depth of the study. Some of the avenues which were not pursued, will be summarised.

Policing and Crime Reduction

1. The Effectiveness of Problem Oriented Policing (POP)

The use of intelligence-led policing (ILP) as an enhanced research area meant that the other identified policing styles were relatively neglected. During the research period of several years, it is probable that some police forces have built up experience and capacity in the operation of other policing styles. This thesis takes the view that POP will remain a marginal activity, unable to significantly reduce numbers of crimes or other incidents. It would be interesting to establish whether or not this prediction has been borne out in

practice, using data from forces which purport to use POP as a mainstream activity. The results in relation to criminal damage would be of further interest, in view of the continued national increases in this category of offence.

2. Crime Reduction and ILP: The Basis of Effectiveness.

The study found that ILP had some effect on the level of thefts of motor vehicles at police force level, and upon burglaries at local, police beat level. The effect upon thefts of motor vehicles at local level was not assessed. It seems a reasonable hypothesis that ILP is effective upon both types of crime. The effect is more widely evident in relation to vehicle crime, which attracts more repeat offenders than burglary. Consequently, the incapacitation of offenders has a greater depressive effect upon crime levels. A study of repeat offenders' conviction data would tend to confirm whether the hypothesis was correct or otherwise. The effectiveness of ILP in relation to other types of crime may then become more predictable.

3. The Optimisation of Police Effectiveness

The study identified that some forms of policing and other forms of crime reduction, such as those identified by Sherman, may be effective at a local level. For example, parent training and the policing of 'hot spot' crime areas were considered to be effective in the

‘What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising’ study (Sherman et al 1998). The identification of that crime reduction invariably becomes more difficult as the unit of measurement is made wider. What is not clear, is the relative scale of impact of crime reduction measures, and their costs.

A large-scale study would be required to establish these facts. It was identified in Chapter 2, that British researchers have been traditionally reluctant to prescribe transferable crime reduction techniques in the Sherman manner. Instead, they have preferred to discuss the principles of implementation, of initiatives deriving from ‘local conditions’. It is unlikely that transferable ‘best practice’ does not exist in the British context, and a bolder approach may be useful. A ‘What works.....’ survey could draw lessons from the implementation of focussed policing styles, and from the initiatives of community safety partnerships. Such a survey would amount to a major piece of research, whose results would also amount to a springboard for the measurement of efficiency in crime reduction.

There has been surprisingly little effort, given the Best Value regime under which the public sector operates, to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of crime reduction initiatives. The cost of implementation and maintenance of policing styles is not known. The public benefit, in comparison with competing demands upon public expenditure, is also unclear. This area is ripe for further research.

4. The Optimisation of Police Organisation: a National Policing Model?

This research has documented changes in the organisation of police forces over the course of a decade. It is salutary to note the modesty of the contribution of research evidence to those changes. Simplistic central expectations generated by political pressures, shallow theories and inappropriate performance measures have held sway. The collapse of force amalgamations epitomised this problem, and provided an opportunity to move forward in a more constructive fashion. The PPAF framework indicates the breadth of expectations upon the service. A study could usefully examine the extent to which its measures are achievable by policing efforts, and to which a greater qualitative element could be introduced. The aim would be to borrow from management theory, a technique such as Kaplan and Norton's 'balanced scorecard', to produce a realistic organizational structure with realistic goals (Kaplan and Norton 1992).

5. The Amalgamation of Police Forces

The collapse of plans to merge forces in England and Wales in 2006, following the publication of HMIC's 'Closing the Gap' report, amounted to the failure of one strand of centralisation. The majority of elements remained in place, as the methods by which the police went about their business are increasingly, centrally prescribed and monitored. The pressures for the amalgamation of forces and the eventual creation of a national police

force, although temporarily abated, remain. The intervening period presents an opportunity to research some interesting aspects of such a proposal.

A key reason for the failure of 'Closing the Gap', was that the speed of implementation was too rapid in relation to the calculation of its consequences. The perceived failure of 'protective services' was reasonably well defined. In contrast, major questions in relation to the prescribed remedy were unanswered, giving the impression that they had not been fully considered. The extent to which force amalgamations would address the central problem was unclear. The source of necessary, substantial funding had not been addressed. Moreover, the report claimed that the operation of forces at BCU level would be little affected. This was an unlikely outcome, following the mergers of force with dissimilar policing styles, and from which resources had been skimmed off at BCU level in order to bolster protective services. Major in-force reorganisations would have been necessary.

A large-scale study could examine options for change in detail, including probable outcomes, costs and sources of funding. An evaluated pilot study would further increase the probability that changes to forces' structures or collaborative arrangements would realise the anticipated benefits, and that adequate financial arrangements were in place.

Conclusions of Thesis

The role of policing in crime reduction has historically seen a deep divide between theory and practice. The prevalent and longstanding academic consensus is that the policing has little or no effect upon crime levels. The opposing viewpoint is that a primary function of the police is to reduce recorded crime, the magnitude of which is an essential measure of police performance. Moreover, the incapacitation of repeat offenders must necessarily reduce crime. This stance has been taken by the police service, the government and its agencies such as HMIC and the Audit Commission.

There has been little active debate between these polarised views. The proponents of each view have ploughed their respective 'theoretical' and 'practical' furrows, regardless of the other. Nowhere has the dichotomy been more apparent than in the Home Office. There, the pursuit of improved police performance has coexisted alongside the publication of research papers, which suggested that socio-economic factors are the primary determinants of crime. The dearth of active debate, may have contributed to the lack of consensus. This research aimed to identify common ground, by describing the effectiveness of focussed policing styles in a manner which would take into account the theory underpinning both viewpoints.

Four policing styles were brought into common use by police forces in England and Wales, in the 1990s. This study showed that no policing style enjoyed a substantial advantage over any other, in terms of subsequent crime reduction. There was evidence

that the use of intelligence-led policing (ILP) was more effective than other styles, in relation to some acquisitive property crime, such as burglary and theft of motor vehicles. These gains were most apparent at a local level, and dissipated as the units of measurement were made wider.

On this evidence, ILP, which adopted by many police forces in the 1990s, was the single most effective policing style to tackle the high level of property crime at that time.

Although these forces made the 'right choice', the adoption of ILP for most, was more of a reaction to central pressure, than a scientifically-based selection. The government and the police then took the deterministic view that the use of policing styles such as ILP had substantially reduced crime levels. In reality, the gains were far more modest than was widely claimed.

It is probable that the exercise of ILP incapacitated many prolific offenders and thereby prevented large numbers of crimes. However, these were marginal in terms of percentages of the great mass of all reported crime. Most forces saw reductions in crime, irrespective of their policing style. The bulk of crime reduction amounted to a return to the equilibrium trend, which had been disturbed by the rise in crime associated with the economic recession of the late 1980s.

By the start of the new millenium, acquisitive property crime had fallen considerably, but reports of criminal damage and assaults had risen. At the behest of government, the police service turned towards geographically decentralised 'neighbourhood' policing, in

response to public dissatisfaction with antisocial behaviour and police visibility. The likelihood is that the 'bottom up' business of neighbourhood policing is more suited to reduction of these offences, than centralised ILP. Once again, central promotion of the most appropriate policing style was fortuitous, being based upon political and public pressures rather than consideration of research evidence. Measureable gains are however, unlikely.

The picture of the police service groping with moderate success towards the limits of effectiveness, may also be applied to performance measurement. In the mid-1990s, performance indicators were heavily dominated by recorded crime, levels of which were only marginally affected by police activity. These indicators reflected the over-simplistic approach of the government at the time, which considered crime reduction to be the dominant task of the police. Their replacement by the PPAF formula saw the arrival of a complex system of measures. Some of these shared the limitations of crime measurements. More positively, there were also attempts to gauge public satisfaction, introducing a 'service delivery' element to police performance. The introduction of further qualitative performance indicators could enhance this approach, in recognition of the police's wider role.

Further centralisation will continue. Although the introduction of a national police force has been delayed for an indeterminate period, a national policing model may arrive within a few years, under the banner of 'neighbourhood' policing.

The introduction to this study cited David Bayley's finding, that there are two principal strands of worldwide policing. The first strand, response to calls for assistance, will continue to see increased demand arising from the spread of modern communication systems. The second strand, crime investigation, will also see increased demand, arising from the rises in property crime which are associated with expanding economies. These are commonplace, yet fundamental observations of the nature of most policing.

The introduction of named, focused policing styles obscured the nature of policing, and overstated what it could achieve. For example, 'intelligence led' policing was a misnomer. Policing is at best, 'intelligence led' in limited circumstances. More often, it is 'intelligence informed'. The bulk of police work comprises the style which does not state its name, 'demand led' policing. Heedless of Sherlock Holmes's warning preceding this thesis, these facts have been twisted or at least ignored, to suit superficial theories.

Focused policing styles are useful tools in the task of providing an efficient and effective police service. If that task is to be accomplished, it needs to be addressed against an objective view of policing, which identifies what can realistically be achieved and at what cost. In short, the firing of 'magic bullets' should be replaced by a more considered if mundane, evidence-based approach.

The disintegration of plans to amalgamate police forces, brought a halt to one far-reaching aspect of centralisation. It also provided an opportunity to take stock of the manner in which the police service in England and Wales operate, and the way in which they are governed. In this respect, a call by Tom Williamson for a Royal Commission on

the Police, was timely (Police Review, 7th July 2006). A Commission could consider the governance and accountability of the service, which has been the subject of surprisingly little active debate. It could revisit the possibility of amalgamations of police forces, and of a national force. Finally, the priorities of the police, realistic expectations of what forces can achieve and the way about which they go about their business, could be reassessed. The arrival of the National Police Improvement Agency would present an executive arm of the Commission, to implement its findings. The findings of this study support the establishment of such a Commission.

Bibliography

ACPO (2005), *'Practical Advice on Professionalising the Business of Neighbourhood Policing'*, Association of Chief Police Officers.

Amey P, Hale C. and Uglow S. (1996), 'Development and Evaluation of a Crime Management Model', *Police Research Series Paper 18*, Home Office: London.

Audit Commission (1993), 'Helping With Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively', *Police Paper No.12*, Stationery Office: London.

Audit Commission (1994), *'Annual Report on Police Audits 1993-94'*,
Audit Commission: London.

Audit Commission (1996a), *'Tackling Patrol Effectively - Management Handbook'*,
Stationery Office: London.

Audit Commission (1996b), *'Misspent Youth: Young People and Crime'*,
Stationery Office: London.

Audit Commission (1996c), *'Detecting a Change: Progress in Tackling Crime'*,
Audit Commission: London.

Audit Commission (2002), '*Community Safety Partnerships*', Audit Commission: London.

Barclay G and Tavares C. (eds) (1999), '*Digest 4: Information on the Criminal Justice System in England and Wales*', Home Office: London.

Barclay G and Tavares C. (2000), 'International Comparisons of Criminal Justice Statistics 1998', *Statistical Bulletin 04/00*, Home Office: London.

Bayley D.H. (1994), '*Police for the Future*', Oxford University Press: New York.

Blumstein A. and Rosenfeld R. (1998), 'Explaining Recent Trends in U.S. Homicide Rates', *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol.88 No.4, pp.1175-1216.

Blumstein A. (2000), 'Disaggregating the Violence Trends', in '*The Crime Drop in America*', Blumstein A. and Wallman J. (eds), pp. 13-44, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Boland T. and Fowler A. (2000), 'A Systems Perspective of Performance Management in Public Sector Organisations', *International Journal of Public Sector Management*, Vol.13 No.5, pp.417-446.

- Bottoms A. and Wiles P. (1996), 'Understanding Crime Prevention in Late Modern Societies', in Bennett T. (ed), *Preventing Crime and Disorder*, pp. 1-41, Institute of Criminology: Cambridge.
- Bowling B. and Foster J. (2002), 'Policing and the Police', in Maguire M, Morgan R. and Reiner R. (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*, pp. 980-1033, Clarendon Press: Oxford.
- Bowes D. (2005), 'Neighbourhood Policing: Beyond Community Policing', *Justice of The Peace*, Vol.169 No.17, pp.308-311.
- Brantingham P. J. and Faust F.L. (1976), 'A Conceptual Model of Crime Prevention', *Crime and Delinquency*, 22: 130-146.
- Bright J. (1995), 'The British Experience', in Stenson K. and Cowell D. (eds) *The Politics of Crime Control*, pp. 62-86, Sage: London
- Brownlee I. And Walker C (1998), 'The Urban Crime Fund and Total Geographic Policing Initiatives in West Yorkshire', *Policing and Society*, 1998, Vol. 8, pp.125-152.
- Bullock K. and Tilley N. (2003), 'Problem Oriented Policing: The Concept,

Implementation and Impact in the UK and USA', in Bullock K. and Tilley N. (eds), *'Crime Reduction and Problem Oriented Policing'*, pp.1-19, Willan: Cullompton.

Burrows J. and Tarling R. (1982), 'Clearing Up Crime', *Home Office Research Study No. 73*, Stationery Office: London.

Byrne S. and Pease K.(2003), 'Crime Reduction and Community Safety', in Newburn T. (ed), *'Handbook of Policing'*, pp.286-310, Willan: Cullompton.

Carter N, Klein R. and Day P. (1994), *'How Organisations Measure Success: The Use of Performance Indicators in Government'*, Routledge: London.

Chatterton M. (1987), 'Assessing Police Effectiveness – Future Prospects', *Brit. J. Criminol*, Vol.27, No.1, Winter 1987, pp 80-86.

Clarke R. (1980), 'Situational Crime Prevention: Theory and Practice', *Brit. J. Criminol*. Vol. 20 No. 2, April 1980, pp. 136-147.

Clarke R. and Hough M. (1984), 'Crime and Police Effectiveness', *Home Office Research Study No. 79*, Stationery Office, London.

Cleveland Police (2000), *'Chief Constable's Annual Report 1999-2000'*.

Cleveland Police.

Cordner G.W. (1996), 'Evaluating Tactical Patrol', in Hoover L.T. '*Quantifying Quality in Policing*', Police Executive Research Forum, Washington D.C.

Crawford A. and Jones M. (1995), 'Inter-Agency Co-operation and Community-Based Crime Prevention', *British Journal of Criminology*, Vol.35 No.1, Winter 1995, pp.17-33.

Dixon B. and Stanko B. (1995), 'Sector Policing and Public Accountability', *Policing And Society*, Vol.5 pp.171-183.

Dixon D. and Maher L. (2005), 'Policing, Crime and Public Health: Lessons for Australia From the 'New York Miracle'', *Criminal Justice*, Vol.5 (2), pp.115-143.

Dixon D. (2005), 'Beyond Zero Tolerance', in Newburn T. '*Policing: Key Readings*' pp.483-507, Willan: Cullompton.

Downes D. and Morgan R. (2002), 'The Skeletons in the Cupboard: The Politics of Law and Order at the Turn of the Millenium', in Maguire M, Morgan R. and Reiner R. (eds) '*The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*', pp. 286-321, Clarendon Press: Oxford.

Eck J.E. (1983), *'Solving Crimes: The Investigation of Burglary and Robbery'*, Police Executive Research Forum, Washington D.C.

Eck J.E. and Maguire E.R. (2000), 'Have Changes in Policing Reduced Violent Crime? An Assessment of the Evidence', in *'The Crime Drop in America'*, Blumstein A. and Wallman J. (eds), pp. 207-265, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Eck J.E. and Spelman W. (1987), 'Who Ya Gonna Call? The Police as Problem Busters', *Crime and Delinquency*, Vol. 33 No.1, January 1987, pp.31-52.

Ekblom, P. and Pease K. (1995), 'Evaluating Crime Prevention'. In Tonry M. and Farrington D.P., (eds) 'Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention', pp.585-662. *Crime and Justice*, Vol. 19. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.

Emsley C. (2002), 'The History of Crime and Crime Control Institutions', in Maguire M, Morgan R. and Reiner R, *'The Oxford Handbook of Criminology'*, pp.149-182, Clarendon Press: Oxford.

Enders M. (1999), 'Cops and Coconuts: The Problematic Nature of Problem-Oriented Policing', *Australian Police Journal*, December, Vol.53, No.4.

Felson M. and Clarke R. (1998), 'Opportunity Makes the Thief', *Police Research*

Paper 98, Home Office: London.

Field S. (1990), 'Trends in Crime and their Interpretation: A Study of Recorded Crime In Post-War England and Wales', *Home Office Research Study No.119*, Home Office: London.

Field S. (2000), 'Trends in Crime Revisited', *Home Office Research Study No. 195*, Home Office: London.

Flood B. (2004), 'Strategic Aspects of the UK National Intelligence Model', in Ratcliff J. (ed), '*Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence*', pp.37-52, Federation Press, Sydney.

Forrester D, Chatterton M. and Pease K. (1988), 'The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project, Rochdale', *Crime Prevention Paper 13*, Home Office: London.

Fraser D. (2000), 'A Critique of Research Related to "What Works" in reducing Offending', *Justice of the Peace*, pp 356-359, Vol. 164, 6th May 2000.

Gates D.F. and Knowles L. (1976), 'An Evaluation of the Rand Corporation's Analysis Of the Criminal Investigation Process', *The Police Chief*, pp20-24, 74-77, July 1976.

- Gill P. (1998), 'Making Sense of Police Intelligence? The Use of a Cybernetic Model in Analysing Information and Power in Police Intelligence Processes', *Policing and Society*, 1998, Vol.8, pp. 289-314
- Gill P. (2000), '*Rounding up the Usual Suspects?: Developments in Contemporary Law Enforcement Intelligence*', Ashgate Publishing: Aldershot.
- Gilling D. (1994), 'Multi-Agency Crime Prevention: Some Barriers to Collaboration', *Howard Journal*, Vol 33 No.3, pp.246-257, August 1994.
- Gilling D. (1997), '*Crime Prevention: Theory, Politics and Practice*', UCL Press: London.
- Gilling D. (2000), 'Policing, Crime Prevention and Partnerships', in Leishman F.G, Loveday B. and Savage S. (eds), '*Core Issues In Policing*', 2nd edn, pp.124-139, Longman: Harlow.
- Gilling D. (2001), 'Community Safety and Social Policy', *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research*, Vol. 9, pp. 381-400.
- Gilling D. (2003), 'The Audit Commission and the Ills of Local Community Safety: An Accurate Diagnosis?' *Community Safety Journal*, January 2003, pp.4-11.

- Goldstein H. (1979), 'Improving Policing – a Problem-Oriented Approach',
Crime and Delinquency, Vol. 25, p.236-258.
- Greenwood P.W, Chaiken J.M. and Petersilia J. (1976), 'Response to - An Evaluation of
The Rand Corporation's Analysis of the Criminal Investigation Process', *The
Police Chief*, pp. 62-71, December 1976.
- Greenwood P.W, Chaiken J.M. and Petersilia J. (1977) '*The Criminal Investigation
Process*', D.C. Heath, Lexington.
- Greenwood P.W, Chaiken J.M. and Petersilia J. (1985a), 'The Investigative Function', in
'Policing Society: An Occupational View', pp 340-351, W. Clinton Terry (ed),
Wiley: New York.
- Greenwood P.W, Chaiken J.M. and Petersilia J. (1985b), 'Police Criminal Investigations'
in '*Policing Society: An Occupational View*', pp352-364, W. Clinton Terry (ed),
Wiley: New York.
- Grogger J. (2000), 'An Economic Model of Recent Trends in Violence', in '*The Crime
Drop in America*', Blumstein A. and Wallman J. (eds), pp. 266-287, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
- Hale C. (1998), 'Crime and the Business Cycle in Post-War Britain Revisited', *British
Journal of Criminology*, Vol. 38 No.4, pp.681-698.

- Hale C, Heaton R and Uglow S. and. (2004), 'Uniform Styles? Aspects of Police Centralisation in England and Wales', *Policing and Society*, Vol.14 No.4, pp.291-312.
- Hale C, Uglow S. and Heaton R. (2005), 'Uniform Styles II: Police Families and Policing Styles', *Policing and Society*, Vol.15 No.1, pp.1-18.
- Hampshire Constabulary (1990), '*Hampshire Constabulary Annual Report 1990*'.
- Harrington V. and Mayhew P. (2001), 'Mobile Phone Theft', *Home Office Research Study No. 235*, Home Office: London.
- Hayes B. (1987), 'Neighbourhood Policing', *Police*, Vol.19 No.11, July 1987.
- Heal K. and Laycock G. (1988), 'The Development of Crime Prevention: Issues and Limitations', in Hope T. and Shaw M (eds) '*Communities and Crime Reduction*', Home Office: London.
- Heaton R. (1996), '*The Origins and Future Prospects of Intelligence-Led Policing*', unpublished MSc dissertation, University of Portsmouth.

Heaton R. (2000), 'The Prospects for Intelligence-Led Policing: Some Historical and Quantitative Considerations', *Policing and Society*, Vol. 9, pp. 337-355.

HMCIC (1994), '*Annual Report 1993*', Home Office: London.

HMCIC (1997), '*Revised Method for the Comparison of Force Performance*', letter from Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary to Chief Constables, 4th July 1997, unpublished.

HMIC (1991a), '*Gwent Police 1991 Inspection Report*', Home Office: London.

HMIC (1991b), '*Northumbria Police 1991 Inspection Report*', Home Office: London.

HMIC (1992a), '*Gloucestershire Constabulary 1992 Inspection Report*', Home Office: London.

HMIC (1992b), '*Staffordshire Constabulary 1992 Inspection Report*', Home Office: London.

HMIC (1992c), '*Warwickshire Constabulary 1992 Inspection Report*', Home Office: London.

HMIC (1993a), '*Derbyshire Constabulary 1993 Inspection Report*', Home Office:
London.

HMIC (1993b), '*Northumbria Police 1993 Inspection Report*', Home Office: London.

HMIC (1994a), '*Cambridgeshire Constabulary Inspection Report 1994*', Home Office:
London.

HMIC (1994b), '*Derbyshire Constabulary Inspection Report 1994*', Home Office:
London.

HMIC (1994c), '*Gloucestershire Constabulary Inspection Report 1994*', Home
Office: London.

HMIC (1994d), '*Gwent Constabulary Inspection Report 1994*', Home Office: London.

HMIC (1994e), '*Hampshire Constabulary Inspection Report 1994*', Home Office:
London.

HMIC (1994f), '*Northamptonshire Police Inspection Report 1994*', Home Office:
London.

HMIC (1994g), '*Warwickshire Constabulary 1994 Inspection Report*', Home
Office: London.

HMIC (1995a), *'Cambridgeshire Constabulary Inspection Report 1995'*, Home Office:
London.

HMIC (1995b), *'Derbyshire Constabulary Inspection Report 1995'*, Home Office:
London.

HMIC (1995c), *'Gloucestershire Constabulary Inspection Report 1995'*, Home
Office: London.

HMIC (1995d), *'Hampshire Constabulary Inspection Report 1995'*, Home Office:
London.

HMIC (1995e), *'Hertfordshire Constabulary Inspection Report 1995'*, Home Office:
London.

HMIC (1995f), *'Staffordshire Constabulary Inspection Report 1995'*, Home Office:
London.

HMIC (1996a), *'Hampshire Constabulary Inspection Report 1996'*, Home Office:
London.

HMIC (1996b), *'Northamptonshire Police Inspection Report 1996'*, Home Office:

London.

HMIC (1996c), '*Northumbria Police 1996 Inspection Report*', Home Office: London.

HMIC (1997a), '*Policing With Intelligence - Criminal Intelligence – A Thematic Inspection on Good Practice*', Home Office: London.

HMIC (1997b), '*Cambridgeshire Constabulary Inspection Report 1997*', Home Office: London.

HMIC (1997c), '*Derbyshire Constabulary Inspection Report 1996-97*', Home Office: London.

HMIC (1997d), '*Hertfordshire Constabulary Inspection Report 1996-97*', Home Office: London.

HMIC (1997e), '*Northumbria Police Inspection Report 1996-97*', Home Office: London.

HMIC (1997f), '*Staffordshire Police Inspection Report 1996-97*', Home Office: London.

HMIC (1997g), '*Warwickshire Constabulary 1997 Inspection Report*', Home Office: London.

HMIC (1998a), *'Beating Crime'*, Thematic Inspection Report, Stationery Office: London.

HMIC (1998b), *'Cambridgeshire Constabulary Inspection Report 1997-98'*, Home Office: London.

HMIC (1998c), *'Cleveland Constabulary Inspection Report 1997-98'*, Home Office: London.

HMIC (1998d), *'Gloucestershire Constabulary Inspection Report 1997-98'*, Home Office: London.

HMIC (1998e), *'Gwent Constabulary Inspection Report 1997-98'*, Home Office: London.

HMIC (1998f), *'Hampshire Constabulary Inspection Report 1997-98'*, Home Office: London.

HMIC (1998g), *'Hertfordshire Constabulary Inspection Report 1997-98'*, Home Office: London.

HMIC (1998h), *'Inspection Report: Northamptonshire Police 1997-1998'*, Stationery Office: London.

HMIC (1998i), *'Inspection Report: North Yorkshire Police 1997-1998'*, Stationery

Office: London.

HMIC (1998j), *'Inspection Report: Staffordshire Police 1997-1998'*, Stationery

Office: London.

HMIC (1999a), *'Inspection Report: Cumbria Constabulary 1998-1999'*, Stationery

Office: London.

HMIC (1999b), *'Derbyshire Constabulary Inspection Report 1998-99'*, Stationery

Office: London.

HMIC (1999c), *'Inspection Report: Dyfed-Powys Police 1998-1999'*, Stationery Office:

London.

HMIC (1999d), *'Essex Police 1998-1999 Inspection Report'*, Stationery Office: London.

HMIC (1999e), *'Inspection Report: Hampshire Constabulary 1999'*, Stationery Office:

London.

HMIC (1999f), *'Inspection Report: Hertfordshire Constabulary 1999'*, Stationery Office:

London.

HMIC (1999g), *'Kent Police 1998-1999 Inspection Report'*, Stationery Office: London.

HMIC (1999h), *'Inspection Report: Leicestershire Constabulary 1998-1999'*, Stationery Office: London.

HMIC (1999i), *'Inspection Report: Northamptonshire Police 1998-1999'*, Stationery Office: London.

HMIC (1999j), *'Inspection Report: Northumbria Police 1998-1999'*, Stationery Office: London.

HMIC (1999k), *'Warwickshire Constabulary 1998-1999 Inspection Report'*, Stationery Office: London.

HMIC (1999l), *'Inspection Report: Wiltshire Constabulary 1998-1999'*, Stationery Office: London.

HMIC (2000a), *'Calling Time on Crime'*, London: Home Office.

HMIC (2000b), *'Avon and Somerset Constabulary 1999-2000 Inspection Report'*, Stationery Office: London.

HMIC (2000c), '*Bedfordshire Police 1999-2000 Inspection Report*', Stationery Office: London.

HMIC (2000d), '*Inspection Report: Cambridgeshire Constabulary 1999-2000*', Stationery Office: London.

HMIC (2000e), '*Inspection Report: Cheshire Constabulary 1999-2000*', Stationery Office: London.

HMIC (2000f), '*Inspection Report: Cleveland Police 1999-2000*', Stationery Office: London.

HMIC (2000g), '*Inspection Report: Durham Constabulary 1999-2000*', Stationery Office: London.

HMIC (2000h), '*Gloucestershire Constabulary 1999-2000 Inspection Report*', Stationery Office: London.

HMIC (2000i), '*Gwent Police 1999-2000 Inspection Report*', Stationery Office: London.

HMIC (2000j), '*Inspection Report: Lincolnshire Police 1999-2000*', Stationery Office:

London.

HMIC (2000k), *'Norfolk Constabulary 1999-2000 Inspection Report'*, Stationery Office:
London.

HMIC (2000l), *'Inspection Report: Northamptonshire Police 1999-2000'*, Stationery
Office: London.

HMIC (2000m), *'Inspection Report: South Wales Police 1999-2000'*, Stationery Office:
London.

HMIC (2000n), *'Inspection Report: Staffordshire Police 1999-2000'*, Stationery
Office: London.

HMIC (2000o), *'Inspection Report: Suffolk Constabulary 1999-2000'*, Stationery Office:
London.

HMIC (2001), *'Inspection Report: Cleveland Police 2000-2001'*, Stationery Office:
London.

HMIC (2001a), *'Inspection Report: Derbyshire Constabulary 2000-2001'*, Stationery
Office: London.

HMIC (2001b), *'Essex Police 2000-2001 Inspection Report'*, Stationery Office: London.

HMIC (2001c), *'Gwent Police 2000-2001 Inspection Report'*, Stationery Office: London.

HMIC (2001d), *'Inspection Report: North Wales Police 2000-2001'*, Stationery Office:
London.

HMIC (2001e) *'Inspection Report: Nottinghamshire Police 2000-2001'*, Stationery
Office: London.

HMIC (2001f), *'South Wales Police 2000-2001 Inspection Report'*, Stationery
Office: London.

HMIC (2001g), *'Staffordshire Police 2000-2001 Inspection Report'*, Stationery
Office: London.

HMIC (2001h), *'Inspection Report: Sussex Police 2001'*, Stationery Office: London.

HMIC (2001i), *'Inspection Report: Thames Valley Police 2001'*, Stationery Office:
London.

HMIC (2001k), *'Warwickshire Constabulary 2000-2001 Inspection Report'*,
Stationery Office: London.

HMIC (2001), *'West Mercia 2000-2001 Inspection Report'*, Stationery Office:

London.

HMIC (2002), *'Inspection Report: Kent County Constabulary 2001-2002'*, Stationery

Office: London.

HMIC (2005), *'Closing the Gap – A Review of the 'Fitness for Purpose' of the Current*

Structure of Policing in England and Wales', Stationery Office: London.

Home Office (1983), *'H.O. Circular No. 114/1983: 'Manpower, Efficiency and*

Effectiveness', Home Office: London.

Home Office (1989), *'Criminal and Custodial Careers of Those Born in 1953, 1958 and*

1963', *Statistical Bulletin 32/89*, September 1989, Home Office: London.

Home Office (1990), *'Criminal Statistics in England and Wales 1989'*, Home Office:

London.

Home Office (1990a), *'H.O. Circular No. 44/1990: 'Crime Prevention: The Success of*

The Partnership Approach', Home Office: London.

Home Office (1992), *'Criminal Statistics in England and Wales 1991'*, Home Office:

London.

Home Office (1993), *'Police Reform: A Police Service for the Twenty First Century'*,
Home Office: London.

Home Office (1993a), *'Criminal Statistics in England and Wales 1992'*, Home Office:
London.

Home Office (1994), *'H.O. Circular N. 67/1994: Role of HM Inspectorate of
Constabulary'*, Home Office: London.

Home Office (1994a), *'Criminal Statistics in England and Wales 1993'*, Home Office:
London.

Home Office (1996), *'Criminal Statistics in England and Wales 1995'*, Home Office:
London.

Home Office (1999), *'Digest 4 – Information on the Criminal Justice System in England
And Wales'*, Home Office: London.

Home Office (2000), *'Calling Time on Crime'*, Thematic Inspection Report, Stationery
Office: London.

Home Office (2001), *'Policing a New Century: A Blueprint for Reform'*, Home Office:
London.

Home Office (2001a), *'Criminal Statistics in England and Wales 2000'*, Home Office:
London.

Home Office (2001b), *'National Intelligence Model – Providing a Model for Policing'* –
Home Office: London.

Home Office (2002), *'Crime in England and Wales 2001/2002'*, *Statistical Bulletin 7/02*,
Home Office: London.

Home Office (2002a), *'The National Policing Plan 2003-2006'*, Home Office: London.

Home Office (2003), *'Crime in England and Wales 2002/2003'*, *Statistical Bulletin*
07/03, Home Office: London.

Home Office (2003a), *'National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS): An Analysis of*
The Impact on Recorded Crime. Part One: The National Picture', *Online Bulletin*
31/03, Home Office: London.

Home Office (2003b), *'National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS): An Analysis of*

The Impact on Recorded Crime. Part Two: Impact on Individual Forces', *Online Bulletin 32/03*, Home Office: London.

Home Office (2003c), *'Policing: Building Safer Communities Together'*, Home Office: London.

Home Office (2004), *'Building Communities, Beating Crime'*, Home Office: London.

Home Office (2006), *'Neighbourhood Policing: Progress Report May 2006'*, Home Office: London.

Hough M. (1987), 'Thinking about Effectiveness', *Brit. J. Criminol*, Vol 27 No.1, Winter 1987, pp.70-79.

Hough M. and Tilley N. (1998), 'Getting the Grease to the Squeak: Research Lessons for Crime Prevention', *Crime Detection and Prevention Series Paper 85*, Home Office: London.

Hughes G. (1996), 'Strategies of Multi-Agency Crime Prevention and Community Safety in Contemporary Britain', *Studies on Crime and Crime Prevention*, Vol.5 No.2, pp.221-244.

- James A. (2003), 'The Advance of Intelligence-Led Policing Strategies: The Emperor's New Clothes?', *Police Journal*, Vol. 76 (2003), pp.45-59.
- John T. and Maguire M. (2003), 'Rolling out the National Intelligence Model: key Challenges', in Bullock K. and Tilley N, '*Crime Reduction and Problem-Oriented Policing*', pp.38-68, Willan: Cullompton.
- Johnson B.D, Golub A. and Dunlap E. (2000), 'The Rise and Decline of Hard Drugs, Drug Markets and Violence in Inner-City New York', in '*The Crime Drop in America*', Blumstein A. and Wallman J. (eds), pp. 164-206, Cambridge ` University Press, Cambridge.
- Jones D. (2001), 'Misjudged Youth: A Critique of the Audit Commission's reports on Youth Justice', *British Journal of Criminology*', Vol.41, No.2, pp.362-380.
- Jones T, Newburn T. and Smith D.J (1994), '*Democracy and Policing*', London: Policy Studies Institute.
- Kaplan R.S. and Norton D.P. (1992), 'Balanced Scorecard: Measures that Drive Performance', *Harvard Business Review*, Jan-Feb 1992, pp.71-79.
- Kent Police Authority (2000), '*Report 1999-2000*', Kent County Constabulary: Maidstone.

Kernaghan P. (2002), 'The English Quotient: One National Force', *Policing Today*, Vol.8 No.2, pp.22-23.

Kershaw C, Chivite-Matthews N, Thomas C. and Aust R. (2001), 'The 2001 British Crime Survey', *Statistical Bulletin 18/01*, Home Office: London.

Lancashire (1998), '*Lancashire Constabulary Chief Constable's Report 1997-98*', Lancashire Constabulary: Preston.

Leigh A, Read T. and Tilley N. (1996), 'Problem Oriented policing – Brit Pop', *Crime Detection and Prevention Series Paper 75*, Home Office: London.

Leigh A, Read T. and Tilley N. (1998), 'Brit Pop II – Problem Oriented Policing in Practice', *Crime Detection and Prevention Series Paper 83*, Home Office: London.

Leishman F, Cope S. and Starie P. (1996), 'Reinventing and restructuring: Towards a New Policing Order', in Leishman F, Loveday B. and Savage S. (eds), '*Core Issues in Policing*', 1st edn, pp.9-25, Longman: Harlow.

Lewis C. (1992), 'Crime Statistics: their use and misuse', in *Social Trends*, No.22, Home Office: London.

- Litman L. (2000), 'The NCIS National Intelligence Model', *Criminal Justice Management*, October, pp. 32-33
- Loader I. and Mulcahy A. (2001a), 'The Power of Legitimate Naming – Chief Constables as Social Commentators in Post War England', *British Journal of Criminology*, 41, pp.41-55
- Loader I. and Mulcahy A. (2001b), 'The Power of Legitimate Naming – Making Sense of the Elite Police Voice', *British Journal of Criminology*, 41, pp.252-265.
- Loveday B. (1996), 'Crime at the Core?' in Leishman F, Loveday B. and Savage S. (eds), *Core Issues in Policing*, 1st edn, pp73-100, Harlow: Longman.
- Loveday B. (2000), 'Managing Crime: Police Use of Crime Data as an Indicator of Effectiveness', *International Journal of the Sociology of the Law*, Vol. 28, pp.215-237.
- Loveday B. (2002), 'The Police Reform Agenda', *Criminal Justice Matters*, No. 46, Winter 2001/02, pp.28-29.
- Loveday B. and Reid A. (2003), *Going Local: Who Should Run Britain's Police?*, Policy Exchange: London.

- Loveday B. (2005a), 'Some Thoughts on the Accountability of Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships and the Police Response to the White Paper on Police Reform, Building Communities, Beating Crime', *Community Safety Journal*, Vol. 4 No. 3, pp.25-28.
- Loveday B. (2005b), 'The Challenge of Police Reform in England and Wales', *Public Money and Management*, October, pp.275-281.
- Maguire M. (1994), 'Crime Statistics, Patterns and Trends' in Maguire M, Morgan R. and Reiner R. *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*, pp. 233-291, Clarendon Press: Oxford.
- Maguire M (2000), 'Policing by Risks and targets: Some Dimensions and Implications Of Intelligence-Led Crime Control', *Policing and Society*, Vol.9 No.4, pp315-336.
- Maguire M. (2002), 'Crime Statistics: the 'Data Explosion' and its Implications', in Maguire M, Morgan R. and Reiner R. *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*, pp. 322-375, Clarendon Press: Oxford.
- Maguire M. (2003), 'Criminal Investigation and Crime Control,' in Newburn T.(ed), *Handbook of Policing*, pp.363-393, Willan: Cullompton.
- Maguire M. and John T. (2006), 'Intelligence Led Policing, Managerialism and

Community Engagement: Competing Priorities and the Role of the National Intelligence Model in the UK', *Policing and Society*, Vol.16 No.1, March 2006, pp.67-85.

Martin S.E. (1986), 'Policing Career Criminals: An Examination of an Innovative Crime Control Program', *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*', Vol. 77 No. 4, pp.1159-1182.

Martin S.E. and Sherman L.W. (1986), 'Selective Apprehension: A Police Strategy For Repeat Offenders', *Criminology*, Vol.24 No.1, pp.155-172.

Morgan J. (1991), *'Safer Communities: The Local delivery of Crime Prevention Through the Partnership Approach'*, Home Office: London.

Morgan R. and Newburn T. (1997), *'The Future of Policing'*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Morris P. and Heal K. (1981), 'Crime Control and the Police', *Home Office Research Study No. 67*, Home Office: London.

Nelken D. (2002), 'White Collar Crime', in Maguire M, Morgan R. and Reiner R. (eds), *'The Oxford Handbook of Criminology'*, pp.844-877, Clarendon Press: Oxford.

- Newburn T. (2003), 'Policing since 1945', in Newburn T. (ed), *Handbook of Policing*, pp.84-310, Willan: Cullompton.
- Neyroud P. (2005a), 'Catalyst for Change', *Police Review*, November 4th 2005, p.24.
- Neyroud P. (2005b), 'Improvement in Partnership', *Police Professional*, November 17th 2006, pp.24-25.
- Northumbria Police Authority (2000), *Police/Police Authority Joint Annual Review*, Newcastle upon Tyne: Northumbria Police.
- Oakensen D, Mockford R. and Pascoe C. (2002), 'Does there have to be blood on the carpet? Integrating Partnership, Problem-Solving and the National Intelligence Model in Strategic and Tactical Police Decision-Making Processes', *Police Research and Management*, 2001-2002, 5(4), pp.51-62.
- Pate T, Bowers R.A. and Parks R. (1976), *Three Approaches to Criminal Apprehension in Kansas City: An Evaluation Report*, Police Foundation, Washington D.C.
- Pease K. (1994), 'Crime Prevention' in Maguire M, Morgan R. and Reiner R, *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*, pp. 947-979, Clarendon Press: Oxford.
- Pease K. (2002), 'Crime Reduction' in Maguire M, Morgan R. and Reiner R,

'The Oxford Handbook of Criminology', pp. 947-979, Clarendon Press: Oxford.

Phillips D. (2003), 'Police Politics', *Police Review*, 17th January 2003, p.26.

Police Review (1990a), 'Cure Worse than the Disease?' *Police Review*, 23th March 1990, pp.598-599.

Police Review (1990b), 'TGP: At the Crossroads', *Police Review*, 13th April 1990, pp.745-747.

Pyle D.J. and Deadman D.F. (1994), 'Crime and the Business Cycle in Post-War Britain', *British Journal of Criminology*, Vol 34 No.3, pp 339-357.

Redshaw J, Mawby R.I. and Bunt P (1997), 'Evaluating Core Policing in Britain: The Views of Police and Consumers', *International Journal of the Sociology of the Law*, 1997, 25, pp 283-301.

Reiner R. (1994), 'Policing and the Police', in Maguire M, Morgan R. and Reiner R. *'The Oxford Handbook of Criminology'*, pp. 705-772, Clarendon Press: Oxford.

Reiner R. (2000), *'The Politics of the Police'*, Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Rogers C. (2003), 'Crime Reduction Programmes and Styles of Policing', *Community*

Safety Journal, Vol.2 Issue 3, June 2003.

Rogers C. (2005), 'Team Talk – An Integrated Model of Policing Crime and Disorder',
Community Safety Journal, Vol.4 Issue 3, July 2005.

Savage S. (2001), 'Forces of Independence', *Police Review*, 11th May 2001, pp.20-21.

Savage S, Charman S. and Cope S. (2000a), *Policing and the Power of Persuasion*,
Blackstone: London.

Savage S, Charman S. and Cope S. (2000b), 'The Policy Making Context: Who Shapes
Policing Policy?' in Leishman FG, Loveday B. and Savage S. (eds), *Core Issues
In Policing*, 2nd edn, pp.30-52, Longman: Harlow.

Scotland (2003), 'Narrowing the Justice Gap', *Justice of the Peace*, Vol.167, p.865.

Sherman L, Gottfredson D, Mackenzie D. Eck J. Reuter P. and Bushway S.
(1998), *Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising*,
National Institute of Justice: Washington D.C.

Spelman W. (2000), 'The Limited Importance of Prison Expansion', in *The Crime Drop
In America*, Blumstein A. and Wallman J. (eds), pp. 97-129, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.

Staffordshire (2000), *Policing Plan 2000-2005*, Staffordshire Police Authority.

Talbot C. (2005), 'Performance Management', in *The Oxford Handbook of Public Management*, Ferlie E, Lynn L.E. and Pollitt C (eds), pp 491-517, Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Tilley N. (1993), 'Crime Prevention and the Safer Cities Story', *Howard Journal*, Vol 32 No.1, February, pp.40-57.

Tilley N.(2003), 'Community Policing, Problem-Oriented Policing and Intelligence-Led Policing', in Newburn T.(ed), *Handbook of Policing*, pp.311-339, Willan: Cullompton.

Townsley M. and Pease K. (2002), 'How Efficiently can we Target Prolific Offenders?' *International Journal of Police Science and Management*, Vol.4 No. 4, 2002, pp.323-331.

Waddington P. (2005a), 'The Service Fights for Acceptance: Why Problem-Oriented Policing is not the Answer to the Malaise of Society', *Police Review*, 25th February 2005.

Weatheritt M. (1986), *Innovations in Policing*, Croom Helm: London.

West Mercia Constabulary (1999), 'The Four Tracks of Policing', *Police Research and Management*: Spring 1999, pp. 19-30.

Wilson J.Q. and Kelling G.L. (1982), 'Broken Windows: Police and Neighbourhood Safety', *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 249, pp.29-38.

Young J. (1994), 'Recent Paradigms in Criminology', in Maguire M, Morgan R. and Reiner R. *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*, pp 69-124, Clarendon Press: Oxford.

Appendix A

Data: Imprisonment and Local Crime Rates

Table 1

Period of survey – 1st January 1999-31st December 2004 (60 months)

OTD = Other than dwelling

Offender state:

0 = month spent in custody

1 = month spent out of custody

2 = month spent part in, part out of custody

Offender 1

<u>Month</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Burglary Dwelling</u>		<u>Burglary OTD</u>		<u>Burglary Total</u>		<u>All Crime</u>	
		<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>
1	0	7	47	6	108	13	155	45	869
2	0	0	50	4	96	4	146	46	817
3	0	3	65	2	91	5	156	59	906
4	0	2	51	3	118	5	169	52	884
5	0	3	52	9	102	12	154	88	979
6	0	5	56	8	97	13	153	60	890
7	0	6	60	1	122	7	182	48	957
8	0	5	78	5	103	10	181	72	922
9	0	12	58	6	83	18	141	64	909
10	0	7	59	6	102	13	161	60	979
11	0	3	77	11	113	14	190	115	1077
12	0	2	49	6	97	8	146	61	908

<u>Month</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Burglary Dwelling</u>		<u>Burglary OTD</u>		<u>Burglary Total</u>		<u>All Crime</u>	
		<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>
13	0	1	134	6	93	7	134	61	925
14	0	4	64	8	137	12	201	86	964
15	0	4	64	14	175	18	239	112	1167
16	0	9	62	7	141	16	203	76	1019
17	0	4	51	12	136	16	187	109	1016
18	0	14	63	7	92	21	155	83	933
19	2	7	44	6	83	13	127	52	920
20	1	2	56	10	124	12	180	83	1058
21	1	8	50	5	91	13	141	85	926
22	1	2	50	1	75	3	125	77	875
23	1	2	67	8	83	10	150	71	977
24	2	15	85	6	109	21	194	108	952
25	0	6	99	10	121	16	220	74	1016
26	0	4	68	7	85	11	153	85	966
27	2	8	75	7	101	15	175	77	950
28	1	1	26	1	100	2	126	73	798
29	1	3	31	8	120	11	151	80	971
30	1	5	39	5	113	10	152	82	998
31	1	8	38	2	108	10	146	82	959
32	1	7	61	6	89	13	150	94	967
33	1	3	67	4	106	7	173	81	866
34	1	3	70	8	76	11	146	103	964
35	1	1	59	8	78	9	137	83	895
36	1	3	55	6	77	9	132	127	876
37	2	8	69	3	107	11	176	94	914
38	0	3	53	6	82	9	135	77	870

<u>Month</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Burglary Dwelling</u>		<u>Burglary OTD</u>		<u>Burglary Total</u>		<u>All Crime</u>	
		<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>
39	0	5	55	7	105	12	160	91	885
40	0	6	38	4	116	10	157	97	938
41	0	15	67	6	95	21	172	103	1041
42	0	17	82	9	95	26	177	103	995
43	1	4	51	7	110	11	161	77	954
44	1	5	45	6	85	11	130	80	993
45	1	5	43	10	77	15	120	98	901
46	1	2	35	3	82	5	117	102	911
47	1	0	25	2	66	2	91	126	953
48	1	3	50	4	56	7	106	62	864
49	1	4	72	2	66	6	135	103	961
50	1	2	45	4	81	6	126	47	917
51	1	0	20	1	90	1	110	72	1053
52	1	1	46	12	131	13	167	95	1136
53	1	2	33	6	102	8	135	78	1070
54	1	3	32	2	64	5	96	77	954
55	1	8	42	15	86	23	128	103	1072
56	1	3	45	5	80	8	125	60	978
57	1	3	45	2	44	5	89	78	917
58	1	0	29	2	67	2	96	88	1049
59	1	4	41	5	84	9	125	99	1005
60	1	1	35	6	74	7	109	103	961
61	0	3	43	4	56	7	99	78	984
62	0	10	55	0	50	10	105	80	945
63	0	9	43	5	70	14	113	92	1015
64	0	6	43	3	65	9	108	80	1069

<u>Month</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Burglary Dwelling</u>		<u>Burglary OTD</u>		<u>Burglary Total</u>		<u>All Crime</u>	
		<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>
65	0	1	56	4	62	5	118	104	1128
66	0	2	59	3	64	5	123	96	1092
67	0	6	43	4	59	10	102	90	1015
68	0	11	67	5	78	16	145	107	1118
69	0	7	38	3	66	10	104	106	1077
70	0	10	41	3	82	13	123	118	1323
71	0	6	51	2	67	8	118	98	1182
72	2	3	47	4	57	7	104	69	1058

Table 2

Period of survey – 1st January 1999-31st December 2004 (60 months)

OTD = Other than dwelling

Offender state:

0 = month spent in custody

1 = month spent out of custody

2 = month spent part in, part out of custody

Offender 2

<u>Month</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Burglary Dwelling</u>		<u>Burglary OTD</u>		<u>Burglary Total</u>		<u>All Crime</u>	
		<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>
1	0	10	47	15	108	25	155	254	869
2	1	17	50	17	96	34	146	166	817
3	1	19	65	17	91	36	156	181	906
4	1	16	51	21	118	37	169	186	884
5	1	11	52	2	102	13	154	173	979
6	1	9	56	7	97	16	153	170	890
7	2	15	60	12	122	27	182	192	957
8	2	19	78	15	103	34	181	165	922
9	0	15	58	9	83	24	141	177	909
10	0	16	59	14	102	30	161	212	979
11	0	21	77	16	113	37	190	192	1077
12	0	17	49	20	97	37	146	163	908
13	0	11	41	15	93	26	134	183	925
14	0	19	64	32	137	51	201	208	964
15	0	14	64	25	175	39	239	248	1167

<u>Month</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Burglary Dwelling</u>		<u>Burglary OTD</u>		<u>Burglary Total</u>		<u>All Crime</u>	
		<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>
16	0	18	62	30	141	48	203	272	1019
17	0	11	51	28	136	39	187	244	1016
18	0	9	63	15	92	24	155	199	933
19	0	9	44	10	83	19	127	204	920
20	0	13	56	11	124	24	180	254	1058
21	0	14	50	15	91	29	141	228	926
22	0	4	50	13	75	17	125	166	875
23	0	28	67	10	83	38	150	246	977
24	0	26	85	18	109	44	194	212	952
25	0	40	99	15	121	55	220	256	1016
26	2	24	68	11	85	35	153	206	966
27	1	11	75	9	101	20	175	197	950
28	1	7	26	21	100	28	126	189	798
29	1	5	31	11	120	16	151	219	971
30	1	6	39	6	113	12	152	228	998
31	1	10	38	9	108	19	146	209	959
32	1	20	61	18	89	38	150	243	967
33	1	26	67	24	106	50	173	213	866
34	1	21	70	15	76	36	146	223	964
35	2	26	59	9	78	35	137	165	895
36	0	16	55	20	77	36	132	177	876
37	0	23	69	15	107	38	176	218	914
38	2	15	53	17	82	32	135	195	870
39	1	10	55	8	105	18	160	178	885
40	2	5	38	12	116	17	157	194	938

<u>Month</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Burglary Dwelling</u>		<u>Burglary OTD</u>		<u>Burglary Total</u>		<u>All Crime</u>	
		<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>
41	0	15	67	19	95	34	172	279	1041
42	2	23	82	6	95	29	177	228	995
43	1	20	51	4	110	24	161	226	954
44	2	13	45	5	85	18	130	265	993
45	0	9	43	9	77	18	120	228	901
46	0	9	35	5	82	14	117	194	911
47	0	11	25	9	66	20	91	241	953
48	0	18	50	4	56	22	106	221	864
49	2	38	72	11	66	49	135	265	934
50	2	26	45	11	81	37	126	250	917
51	1	6	20	10	90	16	110	178	1053
52	1	10	46	19	131	29	167	277	1136
53	1	6	33	22	102	28	135	268	1070
54	1	1	32	11	64	12	96	217	954
55	2	8	42	15	86	23	18	257	1072
56	0	9	45	17	80	26	125	265	978
57	0	18	45	14	44	32	89	255	917
58	0	15	29	13	67	28	96	296	1049
59	0	8	41	16	84	24	125	224	1005
60	2	8	35	11	74	19	109	189	961
61	1	5	43	12	56	17	99	240	984
62	1	7	55	7	50	14	105	232	945
63	0	13	43	7	70	20	113	219	1015
64	0	18	43	11	65	29	108	271	1069
65	0	24	56	21	62	45	118	290	1128
66	2	15	59	12	64	27	123	258	1092

<u>Month</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Burglary Dwelling</u>		<u>Burglary OTD</u>		<u>Burglary Total</u>		<u>All Crime</u>	
		<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>	<u>Beat</u>	<u>BCU</u>
67	2	16	43	4	59	20	102	266	1015
68	2	19	67	11	78	30	145	262	1118
69	1	8	38	6	66	14	104	244	1077
70	1	11	41	17	82	28	123	358	1313
71	1	14	51	20	67	34	118	297	1182
72	2	22	47	13	57	35	104	253	1058

