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# The University of Kent at Canterbury Faculty of Social Sciences

# COERCIVE DIPLOMACY:

# THE NKOMA TI ACCORD BETWEEN MOZAMBIQUE AND SOUTH AFRICA

## A Study of the Reactions of the Front Line States and the Effectiveness and Implications of the Accord

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Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations

February 1990

To my wife AMNEH

with *love* and *appreciation*

## ABSTRACT

The independence gained by Angola and by Mozambique in 1974 and by Zim­ babwe in 1980 caused a 'security vacuum' for the Republic of South Africa, since it had lost its buffer zone. Accompanying these events, there was an upsurge in guerrilla activi­ ties led by the ANC, PAC and SWAPO with the support of the FLS. In response to these developments, South Africa implemented a strategy of coercion designed to deal with any threat to its internal security and maintain its external influence as a regional power. In the 1980's, therefore, the region has witnessed an escalating pattern of coercion, aggres­ sion and destabilisation by Pretoria, aimed against the independent Southern African countries. These policies have bad a devastating effect on the stability of the region as a whole, as well as on the economic, political, military and the like developments of the FLS-SADCC countries.

The aim of this study is to investigate the nature of this coercive diplomacy exer­ cised by the South African government in Southern Africa.

The best example of South Africa's strategy of coercion is the signing of the Nkomati Accord in 1984 with Mozambique. The reasons behind Mozambique's signing of the Accord are examined in detail and the reactions of the FLS are presented and analysed. These reactions are drawn from interviews conducted by the researcher in Southern Africa in 1988. They deal with the implication of the signing of the Accord for the solidarity of the FLS and their support of the liberation movements.

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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## ABBREVIATIONS

ACR ATh1 ANC APLA AZAPO BBC BCM BCP BDF BDP BLS BMATI BNP BOSS CCM CIA CIO

COMECON CONSAS COREMO COSATU CPL

CYL DGS DTA DZ EEC ESCOM FAPLA FLS FNLA FPLM

FRELIMO

FUMO

GDP GDR GNP HCT's HQ IDAF IMF IISS ISSUP JMC JSC

LESOMA LMS LLA

Africa Contemporary Record Mozambique Information Agency

African National Congress of South Africa Azanian People's Liberation Army Azanian People's Organisation

British Broadcasting Corporation

Black Consciousness Movement (South Africa) Basutoland Congress Party (Lesotho) Botswana Defence Force

Bechuanaland Democratic Party (Botswana) Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland

British Military Advisory and Training Team (Zimbabwe-Mozambique) Basutoland National Party (Lesotho)

Bureau of State Security (South Africa)

Chama Cha Mapinduzi (The Revolutionary Party of Tanzania) Central Intelligence Agency (United States)

Central Intelligence Organization (Rhodesia) Economic Association of Communist Countries Constellation of Southern African States Mozambique Revolutionary Council

Council of South African Trade Unions Communist Party of Lesotho

Congress Youth League of the ANC (South Africa) General Security Directorate (Portugal) Democratic Tumhalle Alliance (Namibia) Dropping Zone (Mozambique)

European Economic Community

Electricity Supply Commission (South Africa) People's Armed Forces or the Liberation of Angola Front Line States

National Front for the Liberation of Angola

Mozambique People's Liberation Forces, also known as FAM Mozambique Liberation Front , Mozambique United Front

Gross Domestic Product Democratic Republic of Germany Gross National Product

High Commission Territories Head Quarters

International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (Britain) International Monetary Fund

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria Joint Monitoring Commission (Angola/South Africa) Joint Security Commission (Mozambique/South Africa) League of Socialists of Malawi

Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland Lesotho Liberation Army

MA.FR.EMO MCP

:MFA

:MFP MID 11NR

lv1PC

lv1PLA **NAM** NATO NDP

NEC NIS NP OAU OECD OPEC OPO PAC

PESCOM PF

PFP

PF-ZAPU PIDE PLAN PLO POQO PTA PWV RENAMO RSA

RT SABC SACC SACU SACTU SADCC SADF SAFIO SAIIA

SAJvfI SM1NC SAP SAPC SAR SATCC SATS SAVVM

Malawi Freedom Movement Malawi Congress Party

Movement of the Anned Forces (Portugal) Marema Tlou Freedom Party (Lesotho)

Military Intelligence Directorate (Rhodesia, South Africa) Mozambique National Resistance, also known as RENAMO Multi-Party Conference (Namibia)

People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola Non-Aligned Movement

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

National Democratic Party (formed by Nkomo in 1959 and banned in 1961 - Rhodesia)

National Executive Committee

National Intelligence Service (South Africa) National Party (South Africa)

Organization of African Unity

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Ovamboland People's Organisation (Namibia)

Pan-African Congress (South Africa)

Joint Mozambique and Soviet Fishing Company (Mozambique) Patriotic Front (Zimbabwe)

Progressive Federal Party (South Africa)

Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union International Police for the Defence of the State (Portugal)

Peoples Liberation Anny of Namibia (the military wing of SWAPO) Palestine Liberation Organization · 'Ourselves', the military wing of the PAC

Preferential Trade Area

Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (South Africa) Mozambique National Resistance

Republic of South Africa

Radio Transmitter (Mozambique)

South African Broadcasting Corporation

South African Council *of* Churches ' Southern African Customs Union

South African Congress of Trade Unions

Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference South African Defence Force

South African Foreign Trade Office

South African Institute of International Affairs South African Military Intelligence

South African Native National Congress South African Police

South Africa Communist Party South African Railway

Southern African Transport and Communications Commission South African Transport Services

The Portuguese initials for, The African Voluntary Cotton Society of Mozambique

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Soweto

ss

SSC SWANU SWAPO SWATF SWB TANZAM TANU TAZARA UANC UDENAMO UDF

UDI UDP UK

Umkbonto we Sizwe

UN UNIP UNITA UNTAG

UPP

us

USSR ZANLA ZANU ZANU-PF ZAPU ZILA ZIMOFA ZIPA ZPRA ZNA

South Western Townships (a major black 'group area' near Johannesburg) Secret Service (South Africa)

State Security Council (South Africa)

South West African National Union (Namibia) South West Africa People's Organization (Namibia) South West Africa Territory Force

Summary of World Broadcasts (London) Tanzania-Zambian Highway

Tanganyikan African National Union (Tanzania) Tanzania-Zambia Railway

United African National Council (Zimbabwe) Mozambique National Democratic Union United Democratic Front (South Africa)

Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Rhodesia) United Democratic Party (Lesotho)

United Kingdom

The Spear of the Nation (the military wing oftbe ANC) United Nations

United National Independent Party (Zambia) National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (Namibia) United Progressive Party (Zambia)

United States

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Zimbabwe African National Liberation Anny Zimbabwe African National Union

Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African People's Union

Zimbabwe Liberation Anny

Zimbabwe-Mozambique Friendship Association (Zimbabwe) Zimbabwe People's Anny

Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Anny Zimbabwe National Anny

## INTRODUCTION

In the mid-1980s, the attention of the world was focused on events occurring within the Republic of South Africa. Regardless of one's position or sympathies, the violent conflict within that country, and the repressive measures taken by its government to quell that conflict are of compelling interest. As significant as are the problems of the Republic of South Africa to continuing world order, and as potentially disastrous as they are for the country's population - black, white, coloured or Asian they remain, nevertheless, a part of much broader problems. In a regional c·ontext, the problems within the Republic of South Africa are a part of the political, social, and economic environments of all of southern Africa. Most of the countries of southern Africa believe that regional solutions are required; that as long as untenable conditions prevail in any part of southern Africa, the stability and development of the entire region is threatened. This position is strongly held - particularly in the so-called 'Front Line States'.

The Front Line States are a group of politically independent countries in southern Africa comprising also of the ANC and SWAPO are observer members. The six independent countries included in the Front Line States are Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.\* The two revolution­ ary organizations are the African National Congress (ANC), which is seeking political equality for all citizens within the Republic of South Africa, and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), which seeks political independence for Namibia.

Whether or not the Front Line States and organizations in southern Africa were communist or left­ leaning originally, they are ready to avail themselves of help from the east-bloc and the nonaligned states, as the United States and Britain cling to 'constructive engagement' with the white-led government of the Republic of South Africa. Thus southern Africa, in particular the Front Line States, find themselves entan­ gled in the world confrontation and manipulated by the greater powers. The east-west context, however, suits the pm:poses of the Republic of South Africa.

As events have transpired in southern Africa, the conflicts of that region have also become a manifes-

* Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland arc part of the Southern African region and share with the Front Line States membership of Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC).

tation of a process of international relations which bas been described as *coercive diplomacy.* Coercive diplomacy

" ... calls for using just enough force of an appropriate kind ...

to demonstrate resolution to protect well-defined interests and ... to demonstrate the credibility of one's determination to use more force if necessary."[l]

Coercive diplomacy is said to focus upon "affecting the enemy's will rather than upon negating his capabilities."[2] The force employed in the conduct of coercive diplomacy is, thus, said to be used "in an exemplary, demonstrative manner, in discrete and controlled increments, to induce the opponent to revise bis calculations and agree to a mutually acceptable termination of the conflict."[3] In actuality, after all of this high level rhetoric is distilled, coercive diplomacy is seen by many as a limited application of military power by a stronger state against another weaker state (and not usually the contrary) in an effort to attain its goals without the risks typically associated with full-scale military action. There have been several exam­ ples of coercive diplomacy since 1980. One example was the Israeli incursion into Lebanon in 1982. Through the use of limited military force, Israel hoped to compel the Lebanese government to deny the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and other Arab revolutionary organizations access to Israeli terri­ tory from bases in Lebanon. In 1986, the United States was practising coercive diplomacy, when it bombed Libyan cities. The intent of the American action was claimed to be to persuade the Libyan government to cease its support of terrorist activities. The implicit threat was that the Americans would direct stronger military actions against the Libyans, if the Libyan government did not conform to American desires.[4]

Similarly, the Republic of South Africa practised coercive diplomacy in 1983 and 1984, when, through the use of limited military force against a weaker neighbouring state, it persuaded Mozambique to sign the Nkomati Accord.[5] From the South African perspective, the intent of the accord was to cause Mozambique to deny bases of operation to revolutionary organizations conducting activities in territory

[l] Alexander L. George, David K. Hall and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,* Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971, p.18.

1. *Ibid..*
2. *Ibid.,*

[41 Sec, Tim Zimmermann, "The American Bombing of Libya: A Success for Coercive Diplomacy", *Survival,* London, The Inter­ national Institute for Strategic Studies, May 1 June 1987.

1. "Mozambique", in *African Contemporary Record: Annual Survey of Documents 1983-1984,* Volume 16, ed. by Colin Legum, London: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1985, p.B666.

controlled by the Republic of South Africa.[6] Coercive diplomacy, thus, plays a prominent role in the con­ duct of international relations in the 1980s, as part of the currency of power politics.

## STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

There are many advantages to states which practise coercive diplomacy - when it works. If the United States causes Libya to stop supporting terrorist activities (assuming for the moment that Libya indeed does support such activities) through the use of coercive diplomacy, it bas achieved a foreign policy goal. It has also avoided the greater risks to world order which would be associated with full-scale military activity, and it bas minimiz.ed its exposure as a bully nation (it is, indeed, no less a bully nation: it has sim­ ply minimized its exposure in this capacity). If coercive diplomacy does not work, however, the perpetuat­ ing state may weaken its position significantly.[7] Such has been the case with the Israeli incursion into Lebanon, where pressures from other Arab states have been effective in persuading the Lebanese govern­ ment not to implement fully its agreement with Israel. It remains too soon to assess the long-tenn effective­ ness of the American action against Libya.

In Southern Africa, however, the Front Line States are playing a role with respect to the Nkomati Accord similar to that of the Arab states with respect to the Israel-Lebanon Agreement. Whilst the Front Line States are trying to oppose the implementation of the Nkomati Accord, the Republic of South Africa is effectively negating the ramifications of the agreement by not in fact implementing the agreement that it

itself instigated and signed.[8] This effective negation of the Nkomati Accord bas weakened the position of

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the Republic of South Africa in the Southern Africa region.[9] Thus, failed coercive diplomacy both weak-

ened the position of the stronger state employing the strategy, and placed world order at greater risk.

Coercive diplomacy is a high risk strategy, as well as being a strategy of oppression employed usu­ ally by stronger states against weaker states. The risk for world order and stability are high in such a stra­ tegy.

1. *Ibid..*
2. Michael Handel, *Weak States in the International System,* London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1981, pp.265-276. (8] Alves Gomes, "Southern Africa 1984", *Review of African Political Economy,* 29 July 1984: 144-150.
3. "Raid Against Reason", *The Times,* London, 20 May 1986.

### PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

It is the purpose of this study to assess the impact of the Nkomati Accord within the context of the strategy of coercive diplomacy. Specifically, the study assesses

1. the reaction of the Front Line States to the Nkomati Accord,
2. the effectiveness of the Front Line States in negating the implementation of the Nkomati Accord, together with
3. the implications of the actions of the Front line States.

### RESEARCH QUESTIONS

More specifically the following research questions are being addressed in this study:

1. What was the logic which led the Republic of South Africa to adopt a coercive diplomacy strategy with respect to Mozambique?
2. What actions, military and non-military, were required to effect the Nkomati Accord, and what were the principal provisions of the Accord?
3. Was there opposition by the Front Line States of South Africa to the Nkomati Accord and if so was

this effectively manifested? Why did Mozambique accept the Nkomati Accord?

1. What are the implications (long-term and short-term) for Southern Africa of the Republic of South Africa's coercive diplomacy strategy related to the Nkomati Accord?
2. What are the implications (long-term and short-time) for the world of the Republic of South Africa's coercive diplomacy strategy related to the Nkomati Accord?
3. What are the implications (long-term and short-term) for the theory and practice of international rela­ tions of the Republic of South Africa's coercive diplomacy strategy related to the Nkomati Accord?

### DATA COLLECTION

**A** wide variety of published material, official documents, scholarly papers and other pertinent writ­ ings have been consulted in the conduct of this study. Additionally, the researcher undertook a field

research trip to Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe from Janu­ ary to the end of May 1988. Tbis field trip has contributed significantly to the study through access to documents, press clippings and personal interviews with numerous officials and scholars. These interviews made clearer the official and academic perspectives on FLS-South African relations, and the impact of the Nkomati Agreement on the future development of this increasingly important relationship.

### **PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH F1NDINGS**

The findings of the study are set out in eight chapters of which this is the introduction. The first chapter reviews the literature related to coercive diplomacy strategy. It begins with a discussion of diplomacy in general, before broaching its specific relationship to coercive diplomacy. The second chapter surveys the theoretical literature related to the foreign policy decision- making and contains a description and explanation of the foreign policy decision-making of the FLS-SADCC and South Africa.

Chapter three describes and seeks to explain the motives and process which led the Republic of South Africa to adopt a coercive diplomacy strategy through studying the Afrikaner's history, South Africa's regional policies from 1948 to 1974 and the application of South African total strategy policies and its regional relations from 1974 to 1984. Chapter four, on the other hand, serves as a background to under­ stand the various elements which were to effect the Mozambican situation. In other words, this chapter discusses the events which shaped the history of Mozambique and were to provide the background to

Nkomati Accord. This is followed by the fifth chapter which analyses in great detail the negotiations which

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led to the signing of the agreement and offers out an intensive analysis of the content of the Nkomati Accord. The final section of this chapter deals with the violation of the agreement through analysing the Gorongosa documents.

Chapter six discusses the reasons why and what the parties, the Republic of South Africa on the one hand and Mozambique on the other, hoped to realize from the Nkomati Accord. Then there is a review of the reactions of the Front Line States, SADCC and the rest of the world to the agreement The seventh chapter describes, in great detail, the survey of experts on the Southern African relations and analyses the results of the survey.

Chapter eight attempts to come to terms with the effects and implications of the Nkomati agreement for the FLS-SADCC and the rest of the world. Toe final part of this thesis presents the conclusions which represent the study findings. In the final analysis, it is the hope that this study will contribute to the debate on and understanding of the problems of peace and stability in Southern Africa.

# CHAPTER ONE COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

The strategy of coercive diplomacy "employs threats or limited force to persuade an opponent to call off or undo an encroacbment."[l] In other words, coercive diplomacy, involves the attempt by one state to cause another state either to act or refrain from acting in a way it would not do if no external coercive pres­ sure were applied, that is, measures unacceptable to the target state which are forced upon it by some coer­ cive means either military, economic and other. Coercive diplomacy may, in theory, be practiced by any state against any other state. To be applied, coercive diplomacy requires the existence of two basic condi­ tions. First, the state to which coercive diplomacy is to be applied must either be vulnerable in some aspect, or it must be thought to be vulnerable by the state which desires to apply coercive diplomacy. Second, the state which desires to apply coercive diplomacy must either be in a position, believe that it is in such a position, or believe that it can persuade a second state that it is in a position to exploit a real or per­ ceived vulnerability of the target state. With these conditions in place, a state may be willing to implement a strategy of coercive diplomacy. These two conditions, however, are far from all the requirements needed to ensure the success of such a strategy.[2]

In many, perhaps most, instances, coercive diplomacy involves the coercion, or the attempted coer­ cion, of weaker states by stronger states. It is useful, therefore, to discuss diplomacy in general and its rela­ tionship to coercive diplomacy. This raises the question of the use of coercion in international relations.

and the application of coercive diplomacy by stronger states against weaker states.

***T***

## DIPLOMACY

To understand the role and function of coercive diplomacy as a recognized aspect of international relations entails a discussion of diplomacy itself - its origin and development, its aims and purposes. What must be realized is the fact that coercive diplomacy represents an organized interaction between traditional

[l] Gordon **A.** Craig and Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of our Time,* Oxford, Oxford Universi­

ty Press, 1983, p.189.

* 1. These requirements are discussed later in this chapter.

diplomatic methods and coercive measures. Diplomacy reflects efforts toward human coexistence. It is discernible in the attitudes of one state in its relations to another, and in inter-state contacts it is reflected in peaceful or non-violent advances directed toward the settlement of claims and negotiations regarding national interest and security.

## Origin of the term

The term diplomacy is derived from the French word *diplome,* although etymologically it is of Greek origin adopted into Latin as *diploma* (a double document). A *diploma* in the Roman Empire denoted at the time of Cicero, "a letter of recommendation, which was given to persons, who travelled on behalf of the state, that they might speedily get anything required for the prosecution of their journey from the magis­ trates of the towns on their way".[3] Toward the end of the eighteenth century the word *diploma* had under­ gone a process of transformation resulting from its specific usage in the political terminology of interna­ tional relations. The meaning of the word shifted from the form of the document to its contents, from the paper itself to what it actually represented in international relations. The new word *diplomatie* (diplomacy) thus derived signified the art or business of the *diplomarius* of the French *diplomate,* and the English *diplomatist,* or *diplomat* by contraction.[4] Thus diplomacy had become the craft which entrusted a person with an official mission by a state in its intercourse ·with other countries. Europe of the eighteenth century witnessed the rise of strong national states struggling for hegemony over the continent. Increased political

activity created the need for a new approach to official communication, and the old *diplomes* authorizing

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representation were replaced by *diplomatie,* the new method of intercourse, and the *diplomate,* the represen- tative of a state.

### Definitions of Diplomacy

Niccolo Machiavelli in 1513 offered an interesting definition of diplomacy. Machiavelli's main intention was to warn his Prince against the dangers from other governments:

* 1. Alexander Ostrower, *Law and Diplomacy,* vol. 1, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965, p.108.
  2. *Ibid.,* p.109. E. Satow claims "the earliest use of this word in England appears to be in the Annual Register in 1787." See, Sir Ernest M. Satow, *A Guide to DiplomaJic Practice,* London, Longmans, 1957, p.6.

"You must know", be writes, "that there are two methods of fighting, the one by law [diplomacy], the other by force; the first method is that of man, the second of beasts; but

as the first method is often insufficient; one must have recourse to the second: Therefore, a prince must know how to use wisely the natures of the beast and the man."[5]

This is why most of the contemporary scholars relate diplomacy to power and defined it accordingly. The diplomatic historian Thomas A. Bailey defined diplomacy as "... the first line of defence",[6] also, in relat­ ing diplomacy to military force, it has been called "both the art and science by which each state attempts to achieve success in its foreign policy short of forcing conclusions by armed conflict",[7] and in this sense it "may be said to stop where war begins and it starts where war ends".[8]

Henry Kissinger characterizes modem diplomacy as three kinds of power. He argues that, any assessment of the impact of power on diplomacy must begin with a discussion of the characteristics of power in the nuclear age.[9] The three kinds of power are:

*"offensive power* is the ability of a political unit to impose its will on another state;

*defensive power* is the ability of a state to avoid coercion by another;

*deterrent power* is the ability to prevent certain threats or actions from being carried out by posing an equivalent or greatertbreat."[10]

In 1883 De Garden offered us the first scientific definition of diplomacy.

"diplomacy embraces the whole system of the interests resulting from the relations established between nations - it has for its object

their respective security, their dignity; and its direct, immediate aim, is, or at least ought to be, the maintenance of peace and of harmony between the powers."[11]

* 1. Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince,* Chapter xviii, edited and translated by Peter Bondanella and Mark Musa, London, Penguin Books, 1983, p.133. Machiavelli is generally considered the most articulate spokesman and Byzantium the historical guide. Machiavellis followers from the so-called Florentine school of diplomacy which dealt exclusively in terms of power, personali­ ty, and duplicity. See, Livingston Merchant, 'New Techniques in Diplomacy', in E.A.J. Johnson, *The Dimensions of Diploma­ cy,* Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967, p.116.
  2. Thomas A. Bailey, *The Art of Diplomacy,* New York; Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968, p.148.
  3. Elmer Plischke, *Modern Diplomocy,* Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute Studies in Foreign Policy, 1979, p.54.
  4. *Ibid..*

(9] Henry A. Kissinger, 'Reflections on Power and Diplomacy', in E.AJ. Johnson, *op. cit.,* p.17. (10] *Ibid.,* p.19.

(11] Alexander Ostrower, *op. cit.,* p.100.

This sounds more like a statement of principles, a manifesto, and a task for diplomacy than a clear formulation of the term diplomacy itself. An attempt by a diplomat at defining diplomacy was made by Sir Ernest Satow, saying that

"diplomacy is the application of intelligence and tact to

the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states ..."[12]

Diplomacy was thus broadened to include open-mindedness in the conduct of the foreign affairs and no longer was the self-interest of a state the only relevant consideration. Hans Morgenthau ascribes to diplomacy" ... the task of forming and executing the foreign policy on all levels".[13] Harold Nicolson dis­ tinguishes diplomacy from foreign policy by considering the former merely a method, "not an end but a means and not a purpose ..."[14] while foreign policy is based upon a general understanding of national requirements, diplomacy, therefore, "seeks by the use of reason, conciliation and exchange of interests to prevent major conflicts arising between sovereign states."[15]

The *Oxford English Dictionary* refers to diplomacy as:

"... the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist "[16]

The objectionable feature in the Oxford Dictionary's definition is the limitation of the circle of diplomatic agents to "ambassadors and envoys", which omits heads of states, foreign ministers, and lower diplomatic agents, particularly when one considers that foreign ministers are primarily charged with the conduct of diplomacy. The *Encyclopedia Britannica* favours this approach because"... it is the method, not the object of the negotiation which is the subject of diplomacy."[17]

1. Sir Ernest M. Satow, *op. cit.,* p.29.
2. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations,* 3rd ed., New York, 1961, p.139. Morgenthau, thus speaks of diplomacy as" ... the art of bringing the different elements of national power to bear with maximum effect upon those points in the international situation which concern the national interest most directly".
3. Harold Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna,* London, Constable, 1946, p.164.

[15] *Ibid.,* p.165.

[16] *The Oxford English Dictionary,* Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1933, vol. III, p.385. This definition was employed by Harold Nicolson in his study of Diplomacy in 1939. See Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy,* 3rd cdn., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1939, p.15.

[I 7] *Encyclopedia Britannica,* Chicago, Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 1962, vol. vii, p.404.

More modem definitions came from scholars like Martin Wight's "diplomacy is the system and the art of communication between powers."[18] A. Watson wrote "... by diplomacy I mean the dialogue between independent states ..." and "... the need for states to communicate with one another first gives rise to the diplomatic dialogues."[19] Deutsch defined diplomacy as "... a system of communication and com­ munication flows".[20] and Livingston defined it as "the advancement and defense of the vital interests of a country, utilizing every honourable means to resolve conflicts of interest by negotiation, by persuasion, and by mutual understanding."[21]

### The Functions of Diplomacy

In a British White Paper, the function of diplomacy is defined as "making the policy of His Majesty's Government, whatever it may be, understood and, if possible, accepted by other countries."[22] In 1943 a proposal was presented to the Foreign Service said "diplomacy is but one of the weapons of which His Majesty's Government dispose for the protection of British interests".(23] Moreover, a report of the Inter­ national Law Commission on 'Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities' accepts the functions of a diplomatic mission as follows:

1. representing the sending state in the receiving state;
2. protecting in the receiving state the interests of the sending state and of its nationals;
3. negotiating with the government of the receiving state;
4. ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving state, and reporting thereon to the government of the sending state; and
5. Martin Wight, *Power Politics,* Harmondsworth, Middx: Pelican, 1979, p.133.
6. A. Watson, *Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States,* London, Eyre Methuen, 1982, pp.11-13.
7. K. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government,* New York, Free Press, 1969, quoted in, James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy,* Oxford, Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1987, p.32.
8. Livingston Merchant, **'New** Techniques in Diplomacy', in, E.A.J. Johnson, *op. cit.,* Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967, p.129.
9. Georg Schwarzenberger, *Power Politics:* ***A*** *Study of World Society,* 3rd Edition, London, The London Institute of World Af­

fairs, 1964, p.152.

1. 'Proposals for the Reform of the Foreign Service', London, 1943, cited in, Schwarz.enberger, *op. cit.,* p.1S2.
2. promoting friendly relations between the sending state and the receiving state, and developing their economic and cultural and scientific relations.[24]

Thus, the task of diplomacy is fourfold: representation, negotiation, reporting, and the protection of state interests. Therefore, diplomacy, considered as a technique of state action, is essentially a process whereby communications from one government go directly into the decision-making apparatus of another. If the operational purpose of policy is to secure the agreement of other states to national designs, it is only by diplomatic means that such assent can be formally registered and communicated.[25] In this sense, diplomacy is the central technique of foreign policy and the object of all policies is agreement or compli­ ance. We can distinguish several distinct functions of diplomacy, such as, negotiation, mediation, coercion, persuasion, adjustment and reaching agreement For the purpose of this study we will discuss the last four techniques to draw a clear picture about the outcome of coercive diplomacy (the main theory of this study) and its process.

First, diplomacy may involve an element of coercion. Coercive moves made by other means are communicated diplomatically, and the narrower framework of pure diplomacy contains significant resources of pressure.[26]

Second, diplomacy is a technique of persuasion. The advancement of arguments and the proffering of a *quid pro quo,* both persuasive devices, are within the exclusive province of diplomatic technique. In terms of our discussion of the forms of capability, diplomacy is used to capitalise upon the capability of one state to influence another through persuasive means. However, the actual liPJ.e between coercion and per­ suasion is often vague.[27]

Third, diplomacy is uniquely a procedure of adjustment. It is admirably suited to the task of enabling two states to modify their positions on an issue in order to reach a stable relationship. States may prosecute their differences and intensify their conflicts by a great variety of methods, but they may reduce tensions

1. International Law Commission, 10th Session, 28th April - 4th July, 1958, Article 3.
2. Charles O. Lerche Jr., and Abdul A. Said, *Concepts of International Relations,* 2nd ed., Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Clifs, New Jersey, 1970, p.79.
3. *Ibid..*
4. Elmer Plischkc, *Modern Diplomacy: The Arland the Artisans,* Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Pol­ icy Research, 1979, p.20.

between themselves by diplomatic and other means. However, the adjustment function of diplomacy is effective only if both parties are able to negotiate.[28]

Finally, diplomacy is a technique for reaching agreement, indeed, it has been said that diplomacy is the art of negotiating written agreements. We must note that agreement may be arrived at through coercion, persuasion, or adjustment, and that no agreement is possible unless both parties wish it.[29]

As far as the coercive diplomacy process is concerned, operationally it has a simple process when one state coerces a weaker state to force-its decision-makers to adjust some of their objectives, goals and principles and to reach agreement with the state which is applying coercive diplomacy. Effective commun­ ications and some form of dialogue are therefore necessary.

In the context of coercive diplomacy, the relevant factor is the relative strength of states. The United States may be able to coerce Libya into some action or posture desired by the United States, while Ameri­ can coercion is likely to be ineffective against the Soviet Union. The Republic of South Africa (RSA), on the other hand, could not coerce the United States, but it might well be able to coerce a weaker neighbour- ing state into some desired action or posture.

South Africa was developed itself as the dominant power in the region. Historically, Pretoria main­ tained its regional hegemony by strengthening its alliance with Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies in Mozambique and Angola. The colonial period in Southern Africa ensured the subordination of the neigh­ bouring countries to the South, and their integration into the South African economy, because of the lack of resources and the need to use the South African railway system.[30] The Front Lines States (FLS) declared at Lusaka in April 1980 that, "Southern Africa [was] a focus of transport and communications, an exporter of goods and services and ... an importer of goods and cheap labour ..."[31] Moreover, in 1980 the FLS faced South Africa's immeasurably greater military power in the region. This led to an increased South African military capability to operate over a wider range and at any time of their choosing. This has been

(28] *Ibid.,* p.21.

(29] *Ibid.,* p.21. Also sec Charles 0. l.erchc Jr., and Abdul A. Said, *op. cit.,* pp.79-83.

1. N. Parsons, *A New History of Southem Africa,* London, Macmillan, 1982, p.305.
2. Quoted in, Timothy M. Shaw, "South Africa's Role in Southern Africa in the Year 2000", in Olajide Aluko and Timothy M. Shaw, *Southern Africa in the 1980' s,* London, George Allen and Unwin, 1985, p.309.

accompanied by economic action to ensure the continuation of the FLS dependence on the South African economy. South Africa's actions have clearly established its role as a regional power. In 1984, the South African Foreign Minister 'Pik' Botha stated that

" ... In the period during which we determined the strategy which was ultimately crowned with success at Nk:omati, I was in absolute agreement with the decisions taken ... I believe

we did that by way of the military action that we took, as well as by way of diplomatic action. It was also the result of the relative economic strength of this country ... and the fact that we made it clear to both.friend and foe that we consider ourselves a regional power ..."[32]

Indeed, Nk:omati agreement was the result of South Africa's coercive diplomacy, therefore, the agree- ment advanced Pretoria's claim for *de facto* recognition as the regional power in Southern Africa

Thus in the context of coercive diplomacy, the power of states may serve as a useful starting point in the determination of the relative strengths of the states involved. **As a** result of the imprecision of some of the classifications, however, they may not, in many instances, provide a definitive assessment of the relative strengths of states. In analyses of applications of the coercive diplomacy concept, thus, it is necessary to examine carefully the military strength, economic strength, and resource control of the states involved - panicularly when the states involved are classified as **a** regional power. It is also essential to assess the will of small states and the methods they may employ to resist the coercive actions of larger states. As pointed out by Mack, these factors may enable a small state successfully to resist the coercive actions of larger states.[33]

### THE USE OF COERCION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Quincy Wright wrote that effective government "necessarily combines the principles of consent and coercion, but the proportion of each is not unimportant. The virtues of modern civilization ... can be better preserved ... with a maximum of consent and a minimum of compulsion ...[34] Coercion used by states is a

1. *Republic of South Africa House of Assembly Debates,* Pretoria, 9 May 1984, col. 6099, 61101-61102.
2. Andrew Mack, ''Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict", *World Politics,* no.2, January 1975, pp.175-200.
3. Quincy Wright, ***A*** *Study of War,* Abridged Edition, Chicago, The University of Ch.icago Press, 1964, p.205. The use of coer­ cive diplomacy can be either defensive or offensive in nature. According to Paul Gordon Lauren, "defensive coercion may **be** attempted, for example, to persuade an opponent to stop or undo an encroachment viewed as highly dangerous to peace. Its purpose clearly is to maintain the status quo. Offensive coercion, on the other hand, may be attempted to blackmail an adver-

part of conflict behaviour among states. Conflict behaviour is contrasted with competition. Where com­ petition is "aimed at achieving particular goals," conflict implies "behaviour aimed at affecting an opponent."[35] The differentation between conflict behaviour and competition is significant, because conilict assumes the necessity or the desirability of confrontation.[36] C.R. Mitchell defined conilict behaviour as, "... overt actions undertaken by one party ... aimed at an opposing party with the intention of making that party abandon or modify its goals."[37] For Mandel "coercive diplomacy is a type of conflict behaviour."[38]

The use of coercion by states against other states is a negative action, as opposed to the pursuit of a positive policy.[39] The use of coercion is one means of attempting to upset some sort of existing bal­ ance.[40] It attempts to cause the state at which it is directed "to relinquish values that would not otherwise be relinquished".[41] Thomas Schelling said that the "distinction between the power to hurt and the power to seize or hold forceably is important ..."[42] The use of coercion requires that the using state possess the power to hurt the state to which the coercion is applied. The success of coercive action depends "more on the threat of what is yet to come than on damage already done."[43]

The use of coercion also requires that the interests of the two states concerned "not be absolutely opposed".[44] If the coercing state had no commonality of interest with the target state, it would simply impose the hurt on that target state, rather than attempting to gain its objectives through coercive

action.[45] The use of coercion by states, however, is always a high risk action, because it is quite likely to

sary in an effort to make him give up something that he already possesses simply because it is easier to talcc it peacefully rather than by using force." Sec, Paul Gordon Lauren, "Theories of Bargaining with Threats of,Forcc: Deterrence and Coercive Di­ plomacy", in his edited book, *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy,* New York, The Free Press, 1979, chapter cighL

(35] C.R. Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict,* New York, St. Martin's Press, 1981, p.30.

1. Louis Hcren, "War Oakes Endanger American Foreign Policy", *The Times,* London, 4th May 1966, *5.*
2. Mitchell, *op. cit.,* p.120.
3. Robert Mandel, 'The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy", *International Studies Quarterly,* XXX, 1 March 1986, 60.
4. Alexander L. George, and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice,* New York, Colum- bia University Pres, 1974, pp.607-608.
5. John Spanier, *Games Nations Play* New York, Praegcr Publishers, 1972, p.159.
6. Mandel, *op. cit.,* p.63
7. Thomas C. Schelling, "The Diplomacy of Violence", in *The Use of Force,* eds. Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1971, p.80.
8. Thomas C. Schelling,Arms *and Influence,* New Haven, Connecticut, Yale University Press, 1966, p.172.
9. *Ibid.,* p.4.

[45) *Ibid .•*

"inspire an unpleasant response from the" target state.[46]

### The Concept and Application of Coercive Diplomacy

Coercive diplomacy "focusses upon affecting the enemy's will rather than upon negating bis capabili­ ties"[47] The threats employed in coercive diplomacy

... may be purely verbal; at other times, they may take the form of

actions intended to convey the prospect of more forceful actions to follow if compliance is not forthcoming; while at still other times, coercive pressures may take the form of actions intended to impose serious costs on an opponent, thus tacitly threatening a high level of continuing costs until the opponent complies.[48]

Coercive diplomacy is, thus, "distinguished from pure coercion; it includes bargaining, negotiations, and compromise as well as coercive threats".[49] Coercive diplomacy is characterized by a high level of verbal communication between the states involved.[50] When force is used in coercive diplomacy,[51] it is used in an "exemplary, demonstrative manner, in discrete and controlled increments, to induce an opponent to revise ... calculations and agree to a mutually acceptable termination of the conflict "[52] Thus, both force, albeit controlled, and threats of the use of force may be integral components of a coercive diplomacy stra- tegy.

From the perspective of the state applying coercive diplomacy, there are six pre-conditions which must be fulfilled, before the strategy is applied. These six preconditions are as follows:

1. George, and Smoke, *op. cit.,* p.92. For general use of coercion see, Alan Wertheimer, *Coe rcion,* Princeton, Priceton University Press, 1987.
2. Alexander L. George, David K. Hall and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,* Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1971, p.18.
3. Wallace J. Thies, *When Governments Collide,* Berkely, California, University of California Press, 1980, p.9.
4. George, Hall and Simons *op. cit.,* p.132.
5. Mandel, *op. cit.,* p.61. Such communication or sending messages between the states involved in coercive diplomacy may be in forms of signals and indices. As Jervis wrote that "signals are statements or actions the meanings of which are established by tacit or explicit understandings among the actors. As all actors know, signals are issued mainly to influence the receiver's im­ age of the sender. Indices are statements or actions that carry some inherent evidence that the image projected is correct be­ cause they are believed to be inextricably linked to the actor's capabilities or intentions." See, Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Im­ ages in International Relations,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970, pp.18-40.
6. According to AJ.R. Groom, that "coercive measures are not restricted to the use of force but they usually rely for their effec­ tiveness upon the possibility of the ultimate appeal to the use of force". See, AJ.R. Groom, 'Crisis Management in Long Range Perspective', in, Daniel Frei, *International Crises and Crisis Management,* London, Saxon House, 1978, p.112.
7. George, Hall and Simons, *op. cit.,* p.18. In coercive diplomacy, one gives the opponent an opportunity to stop or back off be­ fore employing force or escalating its use, as the British did in the early stages of the Falklands dispute in 1982.
8. The coercing state must have a strong and unified motivation.[53]
9. There must be an apparent advantage for the coercing state.
10. There must be a sense of urgency m the conflict situation from the perspective of the coercing state.[54]
11. The coercing state must have realistic military options.
12. The state being coerced must fear an unacceptable escalation of the conflict.[55]
13. The acceptable terms for a settlement of the conflict situation must be precise and fully known.

There are two general variants of the coercive diplomacy strategy - the weak variant and the strong variant.[56] The weak variant is called the "try-and-see" approach.[57] It is a strategic move which may be implemented with some less than a full commitment on the part of the coercer, because, if the strategy does not work, the coercer is not committed, internally, to pursue the strategy. The second variant of the coer­ cive diplomacy strategy, the strong variant, is called a "tacit-ultimatum" approach.[58] With this strategy, the coercing state must be prepared from the beginning to pursue the action. A failure to do so will likely weaken the position of the coercing state to a greater degree than would the failure of a try-and-see strategy.

Together, the two variants of the coercive diplomacy strategy provide the two ends of a continuum.

[53] *Ibid.,* p.216.

1. *Ibid..*
2. Empirically, George, Hall and Simons attempted to delineate the conditions of failure and success of coercive diplomacy by re­ viewing its uses in Laocs 1960-1961, Cuba 1962, and Vietnam 1964-1965. They suggested that U.S. use of coercive diploma­ cy would succeed given eight conditions: "strength of U.S. motivation, asymmetry of motivation favouring the U.S., clarity of American objective, adequate domestic political support, usable military options, opponlnt's fear of unacceptable escalation, and clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement." *Ibid.,* p.216. Sec, John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: A Critique,* London, Frances Pinter, 1983, chapter four.
3. George, Hall and Simons, *op. cit.,* p.27.
4. *Ibid.* In this variant of the coercive diplomacy strategy, a specific and clear demand is conveyed and the coercing power docs not announce a time limit or attempt to create a strong sense of urgency for compliance. According to George and Craig, "the try-and-sec approach is not uncommon, a coercing power often shies away from employing the ultimarum form for one reason or another. Instead, it takes one limited action, as the U.S. did in attempting to pressure Japan for several years before Pearl Harbour, and waits to see whether it will suffice to persuade the opponent before threatening or taking the next step. See, Gor­ don A. Craig and Alexander L. George, *op. cit,* pp.189-193.
5. George, Hall and Simons, *op. cit.,* p.27. The tacit-ultimarum approach has three components: "a specific and clear demand on the opponent, a time limit for compliance, and a threat of punishment for noncompliance which is both credible and sufficiently potent to impress upon the opponent that compliance is preferable". Sec, Craig and George, *op. cit.,* p.190. However, these three components are not always fully present in efforts at coercive diplomacy, for example Craig and George state that, "these three components may lack clarity or specificity. It may not be accompanied by a specific time limit for compliance, and the coercing power may fail to convey a sense of urgency. The threat of punishment for noncompliance may be ambiguous, of insufficient magnirude, or lacking in credibility. Generally speaking, dilution of any of these three components in the ultima­ tum may weaken its impact on the other actor's calculations and behaviour". See, Craig and George, *op. cit.,* p.191.

Strategy variations are available to the coercing state all along the continuum. Either of the variants represents an attempt by one state to influence the behaviour of another state. Further, in almost all instances, the application of coercive diplomacy will attain only short-term objectives, if it attains any objectives at all.

### CONCLUSION

In the context of coercive diplomacy, a relevant factor is the relative strength of states. The classification of states according to relative strength may serve as a useful starting point for analyses. *As* a result of the imprecision of most definitions of power and its relational nature, they may not, in many instances, provide a definitive assessment of the relative strengths of states. In analyses of applications of the coercive diplomacy concept, it is necessary to examine carefully the military strength, economic strength, and resource control of the states involved. Further, the will of the target state and the methods which may be used by that state to resist coercive actions are of paramount importance. These factors may enable a target state, even small power, successfully to resist the coercive actions of another state.

The use of coercion by states against other states is a negative action, as opposed to the pursuit of a positive policy. The use of coercion is one means of attempting to upset some sort of existing balance. The use of coercion requires that the using state possess the power to hurt the state to which the coercion is applied. The use of coercion also requires the existence of some commonality of interests between the states involved in the conflict action. Lastly, the use of coercion by states is always a high-risk action for all parties involved.


Coercive diplomacy is characterized by a high level of verbal communication between the states involved. When force is used in coercive diplomacy, it is used in a controlled manner. Thus, both force, albeit controlled, and threats of the use of force may be integral components of a coercive diplomacy stra­ tegy. From the perspective of the state applying coercive diplomacy, there are six pre-conditions which must be fulfilled, before the strategy is applied. The pre-conditions are primarily related to

1. the coercing state's motivation,
2. the coercing state's military capabilities, and
3. the clarity and knowledge of the terms which must be fulfilled by the coerced stated to end the conflict

There are two general variants of the coercive diplomacy strategy - the weak variant and the strong variant. The weak variant is called a try-and-see approach. While the strong variant, is called a tacit­ ultimatum approach. Together, the two variants of the coercive diplomacy strategy provide the two ends of a continuum. Strategy variations are available to the coercing state all along the continuum. Regardless of the variant of the strategy employed, however, long-term objectives are not likely be attained by a state employing a coercive diplomacy strategy because the long-term costs of maintaining coercion are likely to prove to be exorbitant

Therefore, coercive diplomacy is distinguished from pure diplomacy in the use of force and it is dis­ tinguished from pure coercion by its use of bargaining, compromise, and rewards. The carrot and stick are employed alternatively and selectively to affect the target's behaviour. However, "the attractiveness of coercive diplomacy must not be allowed to prejudge the question of its feasibility in any particular situa­ tion. The beguiling character of the strategy may easily distort the judgement of policy-maker, who are confronted by a difficult crises that poses damage to national interests they would like to avoid."[59] There­ fore, such a strategy needs a strong and unified decision-maker team, as we shall see in the next chapter.

1. George, Hall and Simons, *op. cit.,* p.250.



**KENYA**

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### Map no. 1, Southern Africa

Source: Marjorie Wallace, Zimbabwe Publishing House Ltd., Harare, Zimbabwe

# CHAPTER TWO

# FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING AND PROCESS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

## INTRODUCTION

If we define foreign policy - at least in an initial analytical sense - as "those actions of a state that are designed to achieve particular objectives involving other actors beyond the states' own boundaries,"[1] a degree of rationality and pmpose would necessarily appear to form the basis of such actions. Thus, as we have seen in Chapter 1, coercive diplomacy can make up a part of this overall process, especially as a 'stronger' state tries to influence a 'weaker' one.

Yet we are still faced - especially in the cases of African and other less-developed countries - with explaining what Korany calls the 'what', 'why' and 'how' questions of foreign policy. The first refers to definitions and measurements of foreign policy, the second to determinants and sources of foreign policy, and the third to conversion of those input-output factors into a decision-making process.[2] In short, the issue of an explanatory model of decision-making has to be faced. However, all models are generalized views of how decisions are made to the extent that such models, especially the 'rational comprehensive' one (see below) have significant shortcomings as attempts to explain events. Indeed, no model is truly per­ fect as an explanation. For example, one cannot speak of the 'bargaining' model alone since it is made up of a number of theories or approaches that also have to be accounted for. The5e would include deterrence, negotiation, brinkmanship, perceptions and beliefs, and influence strategies, and so forth.

This question becomes more difficult to address when one realizes, with Lindblom, that much policy is actually conducted on an alternative options basis in which alternatives, for various reasons, are usually limited and the desired objective is not that different from current policy.[3] This incremental type of analysis, facetiously but truly labelled 'muddling through', has a number of elements, especially psycholog-

1. Olatunde J.C.B. Ojo, D.K. Orwa and C.M.B. Otete, *African International Relations,* New York, Longman, 1985, p.43.
2. Bahgat Korany, "The Take-Off of Third World Studies? The Case of Foreign Policy", *World Politics,* no.3, 1983, pp.465-66.
3. Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through"', *Public Administration Review,* no.19, 1959, pp.79-88; and "Still Muddling, Not Yet Through", *Public Administration Review,* November/December 1979, pp.517-26.

ical ones, that make the model more realistic.

Decision-making and policy-making are closely related. Decision-making can be defined as "the act of choosing among available alternatives about which uncertainty exists."[4] This is in agreement with Lindblom's **view** that policy-making is necessarily limited by the information that is available and/or expressed by policy objective to the interested parties.[5]

In this chapter then, we will review the major theories or models of foreign-policy decision-making in order to determine which best applies to various states of Southen Africa. The psychological approach is specific to each country's actors, conditions and goals, etc., because conditions, perceptions and informa­ tion are connected to policy decisions. In brief, the rational model, combined with the psychological approach is deemed explanatory for the *FLS;* while the bureaucratic/psychological model characterires South African foreign policy. One will also need to connect the coercive aspects of South African foreign policy to the bureaucratic/psychological model. This is because the 'rational' factor in South African decision-making, which sees coercion as a viable alternative, is affected by the social-psychological nature of the South African state. Meanwhile, the bureaucratic model has been found wanting in Africa to the extent that rationality and psychology (the acceptance of certain principles and beliefs) largely determine policy-making there.[6]

## DECISION-MAKING THEORIES: OVERVIEW

There is a great deal of theoretical literature on the processes of foreign policy and international rela­ tions. In order to connect this literature manageably to the subject at band, we will concentrate on the four general sets of theories as presented by Graham Allison, Glenn H. Snyder, the 'cybernetic' paradigm as described by John D. Steinbruner, and the 'psychological' factors of McOelland and others, in respect to decision-making in crises. The important point to note in this is that these are not so much single theories or models as approaches that utilise interconnected sets of theories. Further, although each is critical of the

1. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey,*

2nd Edition, New York, Harper & Row, 1981, p.469.

(5) Lindblom, *op. cit.,* p.85.

1. Olajicle Aluko, "Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Nigeria", in *Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alterna­ tive Perceptions and Systems,* edited by Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko, London, Macmillan, 1983, chapter *5.*

'rational' model, these models themselves understand that rationality (reason) in some way or ways forms the basis of decision-making. It is just that the early 'rational-comprehensive' model in which policy­ makers supposedly had some synoptic view of all available information and options, is no longer accepted as conforming to reality. For example, Lindblom has shown that policy-makers cannot be considered omniscient (which the rational-comprehensive model assumes). But even if that were the case, such a comprehensive analysis would be too costly and time-consuming. Thus, solutions are limited by several factors. Lindblom 's "successive limited comparison model" therefore is a kind of goal-setting one in which the various alternatives open to policy-makers are somehow analysed and a decision made. Means and goals are interconnected **in** this latter process.[7] Such limitations to reason can be shown by describing and analysing the theories noted above in a little more detail. This discussion is also a necessary prelude to the

foreign policies of the FLS and South Africa.

## Allison's Three Models

Allison posits that foreign policy - indeed many kinds of decision, crises and governmental policy­ making - are conducted within one or more of three main models: the Rational Actor Model, the Organiza­ tional Process Model and the Bureaul--ra.tic Process Model.[8] The first corresponds to Lindblom's "rational comprehensive" model and is often referred to as the 'Oassical' model. Allison differs from Lindblom, however, in holding that this model can be an explanatory one in some instances, especially in cases where

an action is related to a plausible calculation For Allison, often there is sufficient information available, at

*T*

least in the so-called 'big' decision situations.

Allison's other two models are attempts to supplement or supplant that model, due to the effects of the 'governmental machine'. The first of these models, the Organizational Process Model, corresponds to Lindblom's "limited successive comparison model", especially as Alison favourably comments on Herbert Simon's concept of bounded rationality, also noted by Lindblom.[9] For Allison, this model is determined by standard or routine operating procedures. Governmental structure is held to be a set of procedures and

1. Lindblom, *op. cit.,* pp.79-88.
2. Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crises,* Boston, Little, Brown, 1971.
3. Lindblom, *op. cit.,* pp.518-19.

behaviours that are regularised by the very procedures and the societies that particular governments are embedded in.[10] Finally, the third model, the Bureaucratic Politics one, allows for a degree of nonrational­ ity in that decisions result from bargaining and compromise within the decisional unit. But this bargaining process arises from conflicting conceptions of national, bureaucratic and personal goals. Thus, there is no 'master plan' as understood in the Oassical Model. The decision rests on the skill and influence of the respective bargaining interests.[11]

These models, in tum, have been criticized on conceptual grounds. In brief, Allison contends that decision-making can and should be explained in terms of causal determinants. However, the models do not really explain, certainly in the manner Allison claims that they do, but they do describe practices in decision-making.[12]

## Snyder and Diesing

Glenn H. Snyder and his co-worker, Paul Diesing, have further researched and refined the three models.[13] They designate these models as utility maximization (the Classical Model), bounded rationality and bureaucratic politics. Simply stated, their version of the Classical model is based on choosing one alternative out of all those available that best maximizes expected utility. Bounded rationality refers to their conclusion that there is no sure rational way of calculating which decision should be sacrificed in respect to another. In such an instance, decision-makers cannot maximize. They operate under constraints and try to arrive at an acceptable course of action. Snyder and Diesing, howeyer, also state that these two models are not mutually exclusive. They can be combined. Sometimes one is basic and the other supple­ mentary and vice-versa Indeed, even the bureaucratic process does not actually compete with the other two methods. It is just that when a body like a committee or a cabinet comes into play, that model is the most likely explanation of what will happen.

[IO] Allison, *op. cit.,* pp.68-77.

[ll] *Ibid.,* pp.144-45.

1. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, *op. cit.,* p.481.
2. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-Making and System Structure in Interna­ tional Crises,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977.

It follows that Snyder and Diesing have combined 'rational' and 'irrational' behaviour in all these models because of the differing kinds of personalities normally involved in decision-making. Rationality, in this frame of reference, means proceeding from inadequate information and imprecise knowledge of interests, while irrationality refers to acceptance of certain givens and beliefs that affect judgement and con­ clusions. As Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff note, this set of models has the benefit of recognizing that decision-making is, in the end, a very human activity proceeding from the specific external and social situa­ tion. Thus, a 'true' model of decision-making may be impossible to derive.[14]

## The Cybernetic Paradigm

The 'cybernetic paradigm' also tries to account for the fact of limited rationality. However, it also was derived under the assumption that normally, people do not try to analyze complex problems by dissect­ ing them into logical components anyway. Thus, it criticizes both the rational model and the way in which decision-makers are assumed to think. So, the concept of value tradeoffs, presumed even in cases of inade­ quate information, is questioned.[15]

Simply stated, the cybernetic paradigm is based on the scientific principle of servomechanistic responses to complex situations. That is, decision-makers start with the belief that the decision process is a simple one, despite the variables that may be involved. Decision-makers in this model concern themselves only with a key set of variables and uncertainty is reduced by keeping those variables within tolerable liin­

its. Logic is not so much involved in this model as past experience in which intuition plays the major

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role.(16]

But the above is only a basic description of the cybernetic process. Steinbruner also has recourse to orgc1llZational theory and certain cognitive theories since he also has to address the problem of complex situations in foreign policy. Organizational theory, then, accounts for the increased number of decision­ makers which increases the variables. But under cognitive theory, the situation is still not analytically

1. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, *op. cit.,* pp.482-83.
2. John D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis,* Princeton, Princeton Universi­

ty Press, 1974, chapter 1.

[16] *Ibid.,* pp.48-67.

arranged so much as each individual contributes a number of limited-dimension questions and variables. Information is processed collectively and independently prior to the conscious direction of policy. Uncer­ tainty is resolved by subjective or intuitive means in which the process of what Steinbruner calls *grooved thinki.ng* talces place.[17]

Steinbruner bases his model on an analysis of a defence question, rather than a foreign policy issue. But he claims the model applies in either instances. However, he does not hold that his model is superior to any other analytical framework. Instead, the two models tend to operate as substitutes for each other in the actual processing of complex situations. Each will produce different kinds of decisions. His point in presenting the cybernetic process is that it helps to explain decisions that on reflection by analytically­ oriented people might be termed irrational, even stupid. Both. however, are valid in that both are used depending on the people and situations involved.

## Psychology **and** Crisis

The final set of theories concerns the psychological aspects, aspects will also be described further in connection with the southern African situation. For the moment, we are more interested in its general theoretical implications. The literature on the psychological aspects is basically one of case studies so that the crisis aspect of the situation is usually the centrepiece.

In any event, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff[18] have presented three case studies - the U.S. decision to intervene in Korea, the outbreak of the First World War, and the Cuban Missile Crisis - to emphasize the crisis aspects of decision-making. Each of the above cases is, of course, different But they also point up what some of the previous models have noted; the effect of perceptions, their ad hoc quality, different kinds of input variables, concerns over the adequacy of information, attitudes, reactions to events, and bargaining manoeuvres, to name only some of the factors. Psychological factors, of course, are not the only elements in those decisions and this fact is important when we come to consider the foreign policy mechanisms in southern Africa and more especially, the Front Line States. In the latter instance we are interested in a

1. *Ibid.,* chapter **4.**
2. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, *op. cit.,* pp.487-96.

more cumulative process while also accounting for the bureaucratic effect in the case of South Africa.

The case studies described do not actually explain the 'why' of those decisions. Rather, the various models posited can help explain the 'how' of the decisions. We have seen, for example, how Allison's Three Models can be used to explain how certain of the actions during the Cuban Missile crisis, especially on the American side, were decided on and accomplished.

Crisis behaviour, in fact, has generated its own sub-literature, as it were, under decision-making. It is concerned with such questions as defining and classifying crisis, crisis goals and objectives, and crisis management and decision-making. One need merely note in this respect one study that stresses the impor­ tance of choice under the pressures of time and the relationship between time and the availability of infor­ mation.[19] Psychology, stress and perceived threats are all unique to the particular event or related series of events and probably cannot be generalized to any great extent. Yet despite this specificity, it seems clear that stress and perceived threats can give rise to situations which produce more tensions.[20]

If there is a basic pessimism about the general psychological aspects, it is not necessarily in an extreme form, as the rational, organizational, bureaucratic, and political process approaches help to show. If decision-making in this framework is the result of a set of personal, often emotional factors, it is alrn true that these factors can be affected by structural, political and situational variables that introduce or reinforce forms of rationality.

### Further Theories

***T***

We have seen that it is probably necessary to employ more than one decision-making perspective for understanding a foreign policy decision. Therefore, it is useful to introduce further refinements and con­ cepts to the above discussion. These are related to the psychological aspects which will be discussed in more detail below.

Robinson bas shown how a legislative body such as the U.S. Congress acts as a kind of questioning voice on foreign policy in the U.S.A. That is, the Congress is usually more involved with the formulation

[I 9] Ole R. Holsti, *Crisis, Escalation, War,* Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972.

[20] Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, *op. cit.,* pp.499-500.

of foreign policy than with actual negotiations with other governments. Much depends, of course, on the sources of infonnation that are available. The more a body like the Congress or a parliament relies on the executive for its infonnation, the less 'independent' it is likely to be. Thus, a legislative body's influence on foreign policy is often in the nature of legitimizing recommendations already initiated by the executive. This relationship, in turn, is based on the changing character of information and intelligence in modern policy-making. So, legislative and parliamentary bodies have increasingly been losing influence according to Robinson, in relation to the executive in setting and operating foreign policy.[21] This is particularly the case in the legislative bodies of South Africa and the FLS which play little substantive role in either foreign policy formulation or in negotiations. As is explained by Dr. Baregu:

" ... Africa does not have institutionalised rule but basically rulership is based on individuals ..."[22]

Lindblom 's notion of the impossibility of synopsis imposing choice on decision-makers means that 'stra- tegic analysis', no matter how crude, becomes a major form of decision-making.[23] Thus, 'rational' decision-making can account for conflict management, negotiation, bargaining, problem-solving, education, and transcultural communication and psychological factors still come into play. These involve power, infltience, decision-making, and strategic interaction. Further, such diplomatic processes are not always strictly adhered to as part of the long-term foreign policy process. The Nkomati Accord - its origins and development - help to show this. In further connection to our subject, violence, broadly speaking, bas the two 'rational' aspects of actual use and potential use. The rational aspect lies in the threat of violence as an accommodation of interests, not the onset of actual violence.[24] The questitin is one of whether South Africa, for example, falls within this framework. Violence gets out of band when political leaders overesti­ mate their ambitions in relation to their bargaining position or when the violence is distanced from normal policy controls.

This mention of the actual parties involved brings up the fact that states, power and 'realist' theory also have to be considered in decision-making. Robinson, for instance, prefers the use of the concept of

[21) James E. Robinson, *Congress and Foreign Policy-Making,* rev. edition, Homewood, Dorsey Press, 1967.

1. *Personal Interview,* Dr. Mwcsiga Barcgu, University of Dar es Salaam, Dar cs Salaam, Tanzania, 18 April 1988.
2. Lindblom, *op. cit.,* pp.518, 524.
3. Harold L. Nicburg, "Uses ofViolencc",Journal *of Conflict Resolution,* vol.7, no.I, March 1963, pp.43-54.

'power', especially because of its psychological overtones. Power in this instance means "affecting, con- trolling, modifying, causing, or altering some activity or behaviour. So, an analysis of decision-making is nothing more than a search for explaining how, and hopefully why, a decision turned out the way it did."[25] Power may not actually be strictly tied to 'realism', but both concepts centre on the state as the actor. State capabilities are crucial for certain international outcomes. Realist theory, on its part, is grounded in the belief in certain immutable factors, especially perceptions about 'human nature'.[26] More­ over, influence and power are strongly related to coercive diplomacy and state characteristics. In coercive diplomacy, power is related to state capabilities, regional location, interdependence, reactions and responses of other states, degree of bargaining skill, and, of course, the very perceptions of power on the part of the different actors. Power is a conscious action that is held to be 'realistic' at a particular time and cir­ cumstances.[27] Psychological factors need to be introduced not so much as an explanation, but as a modi­ fying element in the various theories that describe decision-making. Perhaps this is best illustrated by refer­ ence to linkage theory. *As* a basic unit of analysis it bolds that linkage is "any recurrent sequence of behaviours that originates in one system and is reacted to in another".[28] One can see that because of regionalism, conflict, perceptions, and interdependence, South Africa and the FLS easily fall within this definition. In addition, there exists a linkage between domestic and intemational politics and psychological-rational-bureaucratic approaches to decision-making. This is because linkage theory can be connected to social psychology and the rational and bureaucratic actions of the state involved. The prob­

lem, of course, is the degree to which external factors affect domestic politic,s and vice-versa.[29] But link- age theory itself may be only an explanation of certain variables, whether dependent or independent.

The interaction of psychological and strictly rational factors will first be discussed in more detail in respect to foreign policy in southern Africa before we take up the separate areas of the Front Line States and South Africa.

1. Robinson, *op. cit.,* pp.2-5.
2. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, *op. cit.,* pp.84-85.

[27] *Ibid.,* p.87.

(28] James N. Rosenau, ed., *linkage Politics: Essays on the National and International Systems,* New York, Free Press, 1969, p.45. (29] *Ibid.,* pp.4-6, 33-34.

## THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE AND FOREIGN POLICY

The description of this perspective, especially in respect to southern African states, probably best begins by noting the importance of national security, especially considering the recent fact of independence for the different FLS.[30) National security, in this respect, has both abstract and economic values and the maintenance of these values is linked to the international system and the characteristics of the state's actors.

Al-Mashat states that the distinction between national security and national interests is vague. But the important point is that the state perceives national interests to be the bases of its decisions. And these decisions, as noted, are connected to social structure, process, historical conditions, and available power.[31] All the models discussed here, in some way, address the question of national security and national interests and the factors of interdependence and perceptions have become increasingly important in analysis thereby. The fact of the Nk:omati Accord, the motivation for it and the reaction to it illustrates this.

But descriptions of third world states in their international or regional framework generally emphasize their dependency and external penetration aspects. Yet, it is necessary to explain a third world state's foreign policy precisely because of this linkage feature.[32) Such a state's primary interest (or secu­ rity) is its own maintenance in a situation of interdependence. The African case is complicated by ethnic, social and economic differences and the fact that most independence boundaries were inherited and in many cases were not appropriate in a political, economical or cultural sense. It has led to the development whereby third world states - especially those in proximity like the FLS - build up relationships among themselves, usually in the economic spheres.

So, if the psychological-rational perspective is fruitful because of the interconnected nature of the theories so far discussed, it is itself far from perfect One still has to account for domestic social structure, treaty and trade patterns, regime characteristics, and regional factors.[33) This is more evident when it is understood that the models discussed were mainly derived from research on industrialized nations.

[30] Abdul-Monem Al-Mashat, *National Secun·ry in the Third World,* Boulder, CO. Westview Press, 1985, p.17. [3 I] *Ibid.,* pp.27-31.

1. Christopher Clapham, *Third World Politics: An Introduction,* London, Croom, Helm, 1985, pp.13-14.
2. Korany, *op. cit.,* p.467.

So foreign policy in the third world or developing state is a different concem It involves, in no par­ ticular order, material and natural resources, ethnic and tribal traditions, the history of the independence movement, size, social, cultural and psychological factors, and a foreign policy which has to be decided within the framework of the state's capabilities. In this respect, the "capacity of the individual African state to exert influence on the course of events tends to decline as one moves from local or regional issues to con- tinental and global issues".[34] Such imposed perspectives and constraints, however, can lead to necessary rational analyses, rather than emotional actions. We see such instances, for example, in regional co­ operation, organizational association (as in the Organization of African Unity, OAU, with its own set of principles and goals), and economic treaties.

In one of the few studies of foreign policy decision-making of an African state, Aluko's analysis of Nigeria, even though it *is* not a Front Line State, is illustrative of this whole process, and of benefit before we get into the rational-psychological model more directly. First of all, Aluko shows that neither the Rational (Oassical) or the Bureaucratic models can adequately describe Nigerian foreign policy.[35] They

both have an obvious effect, especially considering the tradition of the civil service arm in Nigeria. How­ ever, the decision process - as in the case of the decision not to break diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom over Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965 and the decision to close the High Commission in Kampala - were also based on "image values" and the "psychological environ­ ment" of the Nigerian officials involved. These perceptions included the need to continue trade relations with and aid reception from Britain in the first instance, for example; and commitment to OAU principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other African states in the second. Nigerian leaders believed that the military government of Tanzania that overthrew Idi Amin in Uganda was bent on military expan- sion. One is less concerned with the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of these decisions that with the reasoning behind them. Certain 'shared' values in the Nigerian foreign service are evident in these decisions, but that service too was faced with the problems of cumulative process and the difficulties of breaking down issues into military, economic, and other aspects, compartments. Thus, a 'mix' of models is a better explanation,

(34] Ojo, C-rwa and Otetc, *op. cit.,* p.48.

[35] A!uko, *op. cit.,* pp.77-80.

with rational and psychological factors intervening in important ways.

Our view of the psychological-rational approach as it applies to Africa and other third world coun­ tries begins with the complex of the state and the decision-making process within that state. Such decision­ makers formulate their policy decisions in accordance with their perceptions of the environment in its vari- ous external and internal d.imensions.(36] Brecher has then suggested how the relationship between the state of the environment, the perceptions and images of the decision- makers, and the kinds of decisions made have a considerable impact on the study of foreign policy.(37] The personalities of the key decision- makers are such that they are little drawn to analysis because of the less-structured nature of the govern­ mental machinery in a less-developed state. Decision-making is more personal than analytical.

That there is no one psychological perspective has been shown by Kinder and Weiss who have for­ mulated a model that emphasizes cognitive consistency, systematic biases in causative analysis, and the cognitive construction of order and predictability.[38] Related to this is the manner in which the ramification of attempted cognitive consistency works out in practice. Jervis has shown that it *is* impossi­ ble for a decision-maker to operate without reference to images and beliefs. These beliefs are organized and shape the way in which policy makers respond to external events. History and experience work hand­ in-hand in a kind of stereotypical fashion.[39] Images and perceptions, in one degree or another, then affect actual foreign policy behaviour. Yet, such 'consistency' *is* not a matter of irrationality. Consistency helps make sense of new information. Such 'rationality' probably has a more conservative than a 'correct'

aspect, especially if new information challenges previously held beliefs. This ,is especially the case in the Bureaucratic Process model.(40]

But if consistency can distort, there are 'correctives' to the process in terms of rational trade-offs, motivations toward one decision or goal over another, and the give-and-take of interest interaction. One

[36) Richard Snyder, W.H. Bruch, and B. Sapin, *Foreign Policy Making,* New York, Free Press, 1962, pp.65,90.

[37] Michael Brechcr, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process,* New Haven, Yale University Press, 1972, pp.1-4.

[38) D.R. Kinder and J.A. Weiss, "In Lieu of Rationality: Psychological Perspectives and Foreign Policy Decision Making", *Jour­*

*nal of Conflict Resolution,* no.22, December 1978, pp.707-35.

[39) Robert Jervis, *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976, pp.239- 248.

[40) *Ibid.,* pp.187-91.

can further recognize that images and perceptions are themselves the results of actual events and relation­ ships, trade patterns, economic interactions, and the foreign policies of other states. Thus, we further note the linkage effect discussed above.

## THE FLS, SADCC AND SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

The idea of the formation of the FLS goes back to 1970s and is described by senior minister thus:

"The background is quite long. Basically it was to try and have an organisation that can offer resistance to the South African, Rhodesian and Portuguese colonial regimes ... and also to have an organisation that would assist in the liberation of unliberated people. President Kuanda and President Nyerere were the first people to think of an idea like this ... the two of them used to meet just before the independence of other countries ... [they] used to meet and discuss ... the focus was on the liberation struggle [in Southern Africa] ..."[41]

The Frontline States were originally an informal grouping of the Heads of State of Zambia, Botswana and Tanzania, and the leader of the Mozambique Independence Movement, Frelimo.[42]

They met in November 1974, as a group, because of their concern at the need to co-ordinate their pol­ icies and their actions in the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe conflict. That conflict had been in progress at least since 1965, but at that point, late 1974, the situation was about to change radically - the Portuguese coup had taken place in April, followed by the historic meetings in Lusaka in August between Portugal's Soares and Mozambique's Machel. Very soon Mozambique and Angola, the two Portugurse African colonies, would be independent, reflecting a profound change in Southern African politics, and a new state in the struggle

[41] *Personal Interview,* Mr. M. Punabantu, Minister of Information, Lusaka, Zambia, 10 March 1988.

(42) Nigeria assumed a place in the membership of FLS, the core of the initiative was a nationalist "Africa-for-the-Africans" im­ pulse rooted in the knowledge that Nigeria was potentially Africa's greatest power. In this conception, the FLS would assume its rightful place in global affairs and Nigeria's voice would be extremely important in representing Africa. Therefore, the Obasanjo (1975-1979) government put its weight behind pressure on Western governments, to assist in the decolonization of Rhodesia and Namibia. It exerted power most directly by nationalizing British Petroleum assets on the eve of the 1979 Com­ monwealth conference in Lusaka that was to formulate a policy on Rhodesia. Nevertheless Nigeria's relations with some FLS were difficult since both Tanzania and Zambia had supported Biafra in the Nigerian civil war. Moreover Kuanda's opposition

to military coups was well-known as he wrote: "Military coups can never provide solutions to problems ... Wherever there has b=n a military coup there has been great instability ... there must be morality in politics. The methods you use to organize against other people will be used against you."

Kenneth D. Kaunda, *Africa in Sixties: the decade of decision and definition,* Lusaka, ZIS, 1970, p.2. However, Nigeria insisted on its right to be consulted as a FLS despite its geographical distance from the Front Line. See, I. William Zartman (ed), *The Political Economy of Nigeria,* New York, Pracgcr, 1983, p.213. Also see, Naomi Chazan ct al., *Politics and Society in Con­ temporary Africa,* London, Macmillan, 1988, p.314 and p.337.

for the independence of Zimbabwe. So Presidents Kaunda, Nyerere and Seretse Kbama and Frelirno's Samora Machel met to consider their response. The group was enlarged when Agostino Neto, MPLA leader and first President of Angola joined them in 1976 after Angola bad become independent, and again when Robert Mugabe became a member after Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. [43] For the R.,S the pol­ itical necessity of the new situation (after the independence of Zimbabwe)"... demanded that they have to co- ordinate their activities in trying to offer organised protection for themselves, and also to enable them to co-ordinate their assistance to the liberation struggle in South Africa and Namibia. Therefore, [since 1980] the Front Line States was a natural reaction to conditions in South Africa, particularly the aggressive nature of the South African regime against any country in the region which is supporting the liberation struggle

..."[44]

The actual membership of the leadership group has changed, because Seretse Khama, Agostino Neto and Samora Machel are all dead. But the association remains, it is the association of independent African states to the north of the South African Republic whose concern remains to resolve the conflict that disrupts the region. They vary, as we shall see, in many ways and not least in their individual relationship with South Africa. But what holds them together is their common belief in and commitment to independent African development. This means a common opposition to the apartheid system in South Africa - and sup­ port for the liberation of South Africa from minority rule.

In 1980 the six FLS joined with Lesotho, Malawi, and Swaziland to establish the Southern African

Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). The actual reasons for t,he new grouping were because "... if you look at our [FLS] history during the colonial era, things were done in such a way that everything was centred on South Africa ... we were simply just appendices to South African economy ... so South Africa can be able to bully us because they know we are economically dependent on them ... hence we

[FLS] have come back with SADCC ... and the aim is to try to minimise our dependency on South Africa

..."[45]. The Lusaka Declaration of April 1980 identified four broad 'development objectives' for SADCC:

1. Olajide Aluko and Timothy M. Shaw (cd), *Southern Africa in the 1980s,* London, George Allen & Unwin, 1985, pp.23-24. See also, Colin Legum (ed}, *Africa Contemporary Record* 1974-75, London, Rex Collings, 1975, vol. 7 and M. Evans, *The Frontline States: South Africa and Southern African Security,* Harare, University of Zimbabwe, 1986.
2. *Personal Interview,* Mr. Shedrack B.S. Gutto, Faculty of Law, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 23 March 1988.
3. *Personal Interview,* Mr. Bogatsu Pilanc, Ministry of External Affairs, Botswana, Gaborone, 2 May 1988.
4. the reduction of economic dependence, particularly but not only, on the Republic of South Africa;
5. the forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration;
6. the mobilization of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional poll- cies;
7. concerted action to secure international co-operation within the framework of our strategy of economic liberation.[46]

In addition to the above, there was a fifth and final objective, which was SADCC's commitment to "com­ plete the struggle for genuine political independence in Namibia and South Africa". As the Lusaka Declara­ tion said, "... we, the majority-ruled states of Southern Africa, recognize our responsibilities ... to *assist* in achieving a successful culmination of our struggle ..."[47] Therefore, it is with the nine FLS that we are

now primarily concerned, they are all in one sense Front Line States.[48] The two fronts of the war for independence the SADCC and the FLS - cannot be viewed separately.

Within the region we have nine different regimes. There are considerable differences of ideology and of national policies, especially in relation to development. At least four states follow an essentially capital­ ist strategy which involves also state intervention and participation in the economy - Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. However, Zambia and Zimbabwe have mixed economy strategies with a long­ term commitment to socialism and Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania follow what we might call transi- ti.on to socialism strategies (or as Timothy Shaw has called it a transformationalist system).[49] In other

[46) A great deal of literature has been written about SADCC, see Reginald Herbold Green, *AfridJ Contemporary Record,* edited by Colin Legum, 1979-1980, pp.33-43. See also 1981-1988 Carol B. Thompson, *Regional Economic Policy Under Crisis Condi­ tions: The Case of the SADCC,* Uppsala, Sweden, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, no. 6, 1986. See also, *Jour­ nal of Souihern African Studies,* vol. 13, no. l, October 1986, pp.82-100. Amon J. Nsekela (ed) *Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation,* London, Rex Collings, 1981. *Southern African Development Co- ordination Conference: A Handbook,* Gaborone: SADCC, 1984.

1. Quoted in Amon J. Nsekela, ed., *Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation,* London, Rex Collings, 1984, pp.2-3.
2. According to Bernhard Weimer, the FLS remained largely responsible for the area of 'politics' such as liberation, foreign poli­ cy, security and defence, the area of economic questions was delegated to SADCC, a brainchild of the FLS Presidents. In both areas a high degree of unity and efficiency could be achieved through effective *co-* ordination, especially through 'summitry'. Gradually, 'non- economic' matters will be incorporated into SADCCs role within the co-operative structure and the overall objectives set forth by the FLS alliance, for example in the field of security and defence. Thus, the FLS Presidents attempt to co-opt the 'LMS'-states (Lesotho, Malawi, and Swaziland) which arc part of SADCC but not the FLS- group. In the medium

nm, it is likely that Lesotho will become a full-fledged FLS-member, whereas the chances for weaning Malawi and Swaziland away from South Africa are rather slim. See, Bernhard Weimer, 'The Alliance of the FLS of Southern Africa: From the Mulu­ gushi Club - 1974 to the Nkomati Accord- 1984", *Vierteljahresberichte* vol. 102, 1985, pp.233-239. (The article is in German but with an English summary).

1. Aluko and Shaw, *op. cit.,* p.23.

words:

"... the Front Line States have differences in the social, economical and political systems ... and a lot of them still tied to the imperialism economically, and that affect the foreign policies of these countries ..."[50]

Their political systems also vary: Botswana remains a multi-party parliamentary system as well as Zimbabwe until recently, while her neighbours Tanzania, Zambia and Angola are one-party states as are Mozambique Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland, although the character of their parties differs.[51] These differences reflect in part the differences of history and past development and also of leadership. The most important point to understand, however, is that all these regimes, in the 1980s, have a clear and well­ defined identity, and there is a real self-consciousness and pride in that identity.

The Front Line States are Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Also of importance here are the two organizations - the African National Congress (ANC) which works for majority rule in South Africa, and the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), the principal group then seeking independence for Namibia [52] It is the common experience of the FLS with respect to South Africa, rather than any strict alignment, which bas bound these nations somewhat together. Swaziland and Mozambique, for example, although neighbours, have undoubted ideological differences.

The similar experience of a new found independence, along with the regional recognition of the power of South Africa are factors which cement together the FLS. However, the outcome of any intra-bloc discussions depends in part on the nature of the bloc. *AI;* noted, the FLS should not be considered an alli- ance in the generally accepted sense of the term. Indeed, with opposition to South Africa as its principal rallying point (while still having to deal with it), a formal alliance seems unlikely, at least at this period in time. Nevertheless, that opposition should not be de-emphasized because it affects each state individually and they have responded to it. Therefore, FLS's foreign policy decision-making"... is usually based on, or

1. *Personal Interview,* Mr. Shedrack B.S. Gutto, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 23 March 1988.
2. See, country by country, *Marxist Regimes Series,* London and New York, Pinter Publishers, 1986-1989.
3. The SADCC fifth Conference in Lusaka in February 1984 withdrew the ANCs and SWAPOs observer st.atus in a gesture of conciliation to South Africa. See, *The Times,* London, 12 March 1984. And, Douglas G. Anglin, SADCC After Nkomati, *International Peace Academy Workship 'Toward Peace and Security in Southern Africa",* New York, Mohonk Mountain House, Deccmbcr7-9, 1984, p.6.

related to the internal considerations of the political, economical and the social aspects of a given country. That is in the FLS ... the foreign policies are made largely within the broader framework of the OAU, the FLS-SADCC, non- alignment movement and within the broader framework of the South parameters to a large extent ..."[53]

In the remainder of this chapter, our interest is in noting briefly how the individual Front Line States fall within the rational-psychological framework. Since the Nkomati Accord was agreed to between South Africa and Mozambique, Mozambique will be the final FLS discussed. This will be followed by a brief discussion showing how South Africa falls within the bureaucratic-psychological mode. For the pUipose of this study, we will define the rational mode as in the case ofFLS-SADCC countries, that most decisions are made by the Head of States - Governments, in other words, decision-making is highly personalised by the leadership even when they work closely with others. On the other hand, the bureaucratic mode decision­ making as in the case of South Africa is more collective and it considers many actors to be players, these

players are assumed to make governmental decisions not through a single rational choice as in the case of the FLS. The bureaucratic model, in other words, focuses solely on the executive branch of government and decisions can be explained as outcomes of organisational decision-making. Both modes to be con­ sidered in this study are affected by psychological features such as, history, economic, security, personal characteristics, values, beliefs, attitude and the like. However, further details of these models are better

presented in the chapters that follow in which the Nkomati Accord and the actions and reactions it inspired form the basis of the study.

## Angola

Angola became independent in November 1975, on the heels of a military coup in Portugal the previ­ ous year (April 1974) which overthrew the colonial administration that up to then had controlled Angola and Mozambique.

1. *Personal lntervieW,* Dr. John M.W. Mak7.!mbe, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 17 March 1988.

" ... before the independence of Angola, there was this idea of national unity. President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya was appointed by the OAU as a Chairman, who puts together government ofnational unity for all the parties in Angola ... President Kaunda and all

other leaders supported that ... they did not oppose the OAU position ... we should try and work out what was agreed by the OAU process ... I am sure that President Neto before he died was

coming [with] this theory ... he believed in kind of political solution for Angola ..."[54]

Since that time, civil war has been the norm in Angola and this war was directly tied to the fact that the People's Movement for the Liberation· of Angola (MPLA) became the ruling party and government. The MPLA was and is opposed by South Africa which was, in fact, taken by surprise by the events in Portugal. Also opposing the 1v1PLA is the UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), which is involved in an armed struggle and which controls a substantial proportion of the south of the country, and the FNLA [National Front for the Liberation of Angola] which was supported by Zaire to facilitate FNLA operations in northern part of Angola. Yet each of these military parties had their origins in the anti­ Portuguese struggle so that South Africa was forced to deal with the best of a bad situation (in its eyes). South Africa supports UNITA, but the decision to intervene in Angola was bureaucratically complex.[55]

As noted, the 1v1PLA as the ruling party and government forms a unity of sorts. But given the shock, to South Africa, of the concurrent independence of Angola and Mozambique, the South African govern­ ment was faced with a "political and psychological" situation "because both new states were committed to multi-racialism and socialism. If they were allowed to succeed, it would destroy the entire ideological

underpinnings of apartheid".[56]

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Thus, the Angolan response to South Africa is also psychological and blend of emotive in nature as being based on rational calculation. Related to this is the South African-Angolan conflict relationship over the future of Namibia. In Namibia, SWAPO was attempting to make South Africa conclude that its pres-

1. *Personal Interview,* Mr. M. Punabantu, Minister of Information, Lusaka, Zambia, 10 March 1988. Mr. Punabantu described the Zambian position of supporting Savimbia (UNITA) in 1974 by saying"... Zambia was being reactionary ..• but at pn:scnt we have to say no, no, no, ... look we have been honest ... we have got that Angola cannot afford to start its independence in that kind of situation, where the political groups are actually armed shooting at each other ..• it is not possible ..• [we] arc in a difficult situation."
2. Kenneth W. Grundy, *The Militarization of South African Politics,* London, I.B. Tauris, 1986, pp.88-89.

[56) Joseph Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front: South Africa's War Against Its Neighbours,* Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1986, p.36.

ence there was more a liability than an asset In the linkage sense, also, the MPLA supported SWAPO while South Africa, at the minimum, wanted Cuban troops out of Angola[57] On December 1983 South Africa launched an invasion of Southern Angola - an operation called Askari. However, South Africa was faced with tremendous resistance from the Angolan and SWAPO troops, and, operation Askari bas proved to be a failure. *As* a result of the fighting and of American pressure on both Angola and South Africa, *talks* started between Luanda and Pretoria, with American officials acting as intermediaries, to find a solution to the border fighting and continual South Africa raids.[58] After two months of negotiations in Lusaka, an accord was agreed on 16 February 1984 by Pik Botha, Angolan Interior Minister Alexandre Rodrigues, Chester Crocker, and a representative of the Zambian governrnent.[59] This agreement known as Lusaka Accord called for:

1. Withdrawal of South African troops from Southern Angola.
2. Stop SWAPO forces infiltration into Namibia from Angolan territory.
3. The disengagement of forces in Southern Angola.
4. Setting up a Joint Monitoring Commission [JMC] of Angolan and South African personnel to moni­ tor the Agreement.[60]

The significance of this agreement was to break down the psychological barrier between the two governments and to generate more understanding in dealing with each other especially in the Namibian

case. Moreover, the MPLA government gained a major objective of its foreign policy from signing the

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Lusaka Agreement with South Africa. "... Angola bad to be seen to be willing to come to the conference table not because it believed S.A would honour the agreement ... but more because of its own interests for support in recognition and understanding by the international community which it was lobbying for support and for acceptance."[61]

[57) Gcisa Maria Rocha, *In Search of Namibian Independence: The Limitations of the United Nations,* Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984, pp.3-4, 161-67.

1. Keith Somerville, *Angola: Politics, Economics, and Society,* Marxist Regimes, London, Frances Pinter, 1986, pp.66-67.
2. *Times of Zambia,* Lusaka, 17 February 1984.
3. *Ibid.,* sec also, *Africa Contemporary Record,* 1983-84, vol. 16, 1985, and Joseph Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours,* London, CUR, 1986, p.15l.
4. *Personal Interview,* Dr. John **M.W.** Malaunbe, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 17 March 1988.

The Lusaka Accord, whatever its ultimate fate, was a forerunner of the Nkomati Accord. Foreign policy formulation and the decision making in Angola was controlled and influenced by the President As on the 14 of December 1977:

"The Congress and the Central Committee meeting confirmed the President's position and power. His pre-eminent position introduced the 'presidential' factor into party and national politics.

Although decision-making was the prerogative of the Congress, the Central Committee and the Political Bureau, the President was clearly the dominant force and guided the work ofleading party and state politics. He had to have the support of his colleagues, but be was very much the first among equals on the Political Bureau. The other leading members were the veteran ideologist and the Minister of Defence."[62]

Angola's general foreign policy orientation can be traced to the 'left-wing' tendencies of the MPLA, its actual policy objectives have been motivated more by the search for national security, unity, and development than by any other factor. The weakness of Angola's foreign policy stems essentially from the problem of internal disunity. [63] This illustrates how internal politics affect external policy.

## Botswana

Botswana, the former Becbuanaland, became independent in 1966 after a British plan to incorporate it into South Africa was abandoned because of South Africa's domestic racial policy. So, although Botswana must be psychologically attuned to South African policy in that potential South African reactions

to a policy decision by Botswana are an integral part of the Botswana decision-making process. It bas also undertaken a more 'rational' response because of its close economic ties to the latter. It belongs to a cus­ toms union with South Africa, along with Lesotho and Swaziland, and it also belongs to SADCC (the

Southern African Development Co- ordinating Commission).

Botswana bas a unicameral legislature (the National Assembly of 38 members) with general elections every five years. The current President Dr. Quett Masire of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has held power since 1980. The House of Chiefs advises government in matters of traditional law.[64]

(62] Keith Somerville,Angola, *op. cit.,* p.92.

(63] Fola Soremekun. Angola, cited in. Timothy M. Shaw and Olajude Aluko, *The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy,*

Aldershot, Gower, 1984, p.25.

[64] Ronald T. Libby, *The Politics of Economic Power* in *Southern Africa,* New Jersey, Princeton Univ=ity Press, 1987, pp.110-

111.

As it is land-locked, Botswana is dependent on its neighbours for communication and trade routes. It is heavily (if not totally) reliant on external links with South Africa and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Such a dependency on the South African economy was explained by a Botswanan official as

"... we [Botswana] are depending on South Africa in just everything ... our routes to the sea for export ... we have to use South African ports ... our dependency on South Africa in terms of communication because we are landlocked ... we are just appendix to South Africa ... it takes time for someone to really rid

himself of somebody's dependency, and in particular Botswana ..."[65]

However, it has no diplomatic relations with South Africa, but maintains a working relationship (such as border meeting from time to time to solve any dispute) and close economic ties. It makes clear its opposition to apartheid and stood firm on its refusal to sign a Nkomati type of Accord.[66] Botswana has pledged to stop ANC infiltration into South Africa and, in fact, it has had problems with Zimbabwean forces in its territories. Nevertheless, South Africa did undertake a commando raid into the capital, Gaberone, in June 1985 which Botswana was unable to prevent[67]

Botswana's foreign policy has been designed to balance conflicting regional political interests pri­ marily in order to maintain an attractive foreign investment climate in the country. As Sir Seretse Kbama - the fust President of Botswana - stressed in the importance of foreign investment:

"The Prime Minister reaffirmed his intention to welcome investment from all countries, including South Africa and Rhodesia, and emphasized his belief that economics and politics remained

distinct. He indicated that under his government, Bechuanaland would be favourably disposed toward an economic grouping of Southern African states."[68]

Much of Botswana's foreign policy can be understood in terms of an overriding concern to maintain a stable business climate in the country, and balancing its political and economical interests with the regional conflict. For example, in response to South African pressure to sign a non-aggression pact, President

[65] *Personal Interview,* Mr. Bogatsu Pilanc, Ministry of External Affairs, Botswana, Gaborone, 2 May 1988. (66] See, *The Guardian,* Gabarone, 6 and 7 January 1986.

1. Grundy, *op. cit.,* p.10.
2. Christopher Colclough and Stephen McCarthy, *The Political Economy of Botswana,* London, Oxford University Press, 1980, p.153.

Masire argued that such a treaty would seriously damage its relations with other African states in SADCC (as the chairman of the organization), and would invite attacks against the Botswana government by anti­ South African guerillas (ANC) who have never been allowed to operate in Botswana. [69] Therefore, Botswana's foreign policy"... have to do things in open but of course, occasionally, some security elements are involved in which this case you cannot be so open ..."[70]

However, foreign policy decision making process in Botswana is controlled by the President to a great degree although:

"The Ministry of External Affairs for the most part initiates the issues related to foreign policy. And of course, we have to brief the head of state, ... if the President does think of

something or is confronted with a problem, he has to come out and formulate a policy related to that particular area. So, I would again say that the President has got a monopoly in initiating the foreign policy decisions."[71]

And about the National Assembly role in the foreign policy of Botswana Mr. Pilane said;

"... Ideally they could be playing quite a sireable role. So far, I don't really think they have done so much. They are always supportive of the Department of External Affairs, in as far as foreign policies are concerned. So, we don't really have any

problem with them beyond query about certain things. They are always supportive. [72]

With the independence of Namibia, Botswana's hopes will tum westward and an attempt will be made to make the trans-Kalahari railway to Walvis Bay a reality. However Walvis Bay still remains under South African control. If SADCC manages to implement even part of its proposed targets, then collective dependence upon South Africa could be lessened to a degree.

## Lesotho

Lesotho, the former Basutoland, also became independent in 1966. It is entirely surrounded by South

[69) Ronald T. Libby, *op. cit.,* p.133. See also, Jack Parson, "The Trajectory of Class and State in Dependent Development: The Consequences of New Wealth for Botswana", *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics,* vol. 21., November 1983.

[70] Libby, *op. cit.*

[71) *Personal interview,* Mr. Bogatsu Pilane, Ministry of External Affairs, Botswana, Gaborone, 2 May 1988.

1. *Ibid..*

Africa and is economically dependent on it. It is not smprising that it has generally sought to accommodate itself to South African foreign policy, but it is officially opposed to apartheid and even claims part of the Orange Free State. The main political issue between Lesotho and South Africa is the latter's perception that Lesotho is too lenient with the ANC. The major political party is the Basotho National Party, founded in 1959; but it has a major rival in the Basotho Congress Party.

King Moshoeshoe II became Head of State and Constitutional Monarch. Cabinet consists of a Prime Minister and seven other ministers. There are two Houses of Parliament. Therefore, the ability of Chief Leabua Jonathan's BNP to win the pre-independence election of 1965 was largely due to their success in mobilizing the lower echelons of the chieftaincy system. Jonathan himself is a "Son ofMoshoeshoe" a des­ cendent of a minor house of Moshoeshoe, Molapo, and is therefore a cousin of King Moshoeshoe II. How­ ever, the initial base of his party's political support did not lie with the Moshoeshoeism but rather with a large number of lesser chiefs and headmen whose economic and social status depended entirely upon state patronage. [73]

The BNP party constitution supports the hereditary chieftainship and is dedicated to restoring the his­ toric relationship between the chiefs and the people. Therefore, they support an expanded political role for the King in which he would acquire the 'reserved powers' held by the British colonial government But, after the elections, which they won, they shifted ground on this issue and argued for a narrow largely ceremonial role for the King.[74]

The Prime Minister, Chief Jonathan suspended the constitution in 1970 when it seemed as though the opposition Basotho Congress Party might win an election. A state of emergency was declared and govem­ ment was conducted by decree until 1973 when Chief Jonathan introduced an Interim National Assembly of 93 nominated members drawn from a number of different parties.[75] One scholar described the decision- making actors when:

1. James Cobbc and John Bardill, *Lesotho,* Boulder, Colo, Westview Press, 1985, pp.82-87.
2. Richard F. Weisfeldcr, "The Basotho Nation-State: What Legacy for the Future?" *The Journal of Modern African Studies,*

vol.19, no.2, 1981, pp.230-236.

1. Richard F. Weisfelder, "Lesotho", in *Southern Africa in Perspective,* edited by C.P. Potholm and R Dale, New York, The Free Press, 1972, p.126.

"... studying the development policies of the state institutions,

I soon found that all decision-making was connected with either of two strong parties: the Basutoland Congress Party [BCP] and the Basotho National Party [BNP]".(76]

Lesotho's economy has for the past hundred years been inextricably bound up with that of South Africa. Lesotho relies to major extent on South Africa's road and railway systems, while its subordinate status in the membership of the SACU and participation in the South African economic activity via the migratory labour system make it a complete hostage of Pretoria Lesotho's economy generates 40,000 paid jobs while approximately of 150,000 additional jobs are obtained in South Africa.(77) The earnings of the migrant workers in South Africa constitute 40% (if not more) of annual gross national product (GNP) while their remittances account for between 60% and 70% of total earnings from formal employment.[78] Over 90% of Lesotho's trade is conducted with South Africa and the trade deficit, currently estimated to be 25%. On the other band the revenue from the South African - SACU accounted for 66% of the total state revenue in 1983-84.(79] It is interesting to note that while the number of Basotho Miners in South Africa has reached a low record since independence - 114,071 miners - although the actual income earned from this source has increased dramatically. The amount of money brought to Lesotho through deferred the pay scheme in 1984 amounted to (Maloti) M 123.6 million while in 1981 the scheme generated only M 76.7 million. Remittances in 1984 amounted to M 82.9 million as against M 29.9 million in 1981. (80] With this situation it is clear that repatriation of migrant workers by South Africa can cause extreme hardship for Lesotho. In 1979, South Africa's success in forming the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), the anned wing of the exiled Mokbele's BCP, brought a new element of pressure in the decisiorr-makers in Lesotho.

Against this background its interesting to bring an official view from Lesotho about South African policy. T. Desmond Sexishe was reported as follows:

1. Gabriele Winai Strom, *Migration and Development, Dependence on South Africa: A Study of Lesotho,* Sweden, Uppsala, Scan­ dinavian Institute of African Studies, 1986, p.37.
2. **J.** Daniel, "A Comprehensive Analysis of Lesotho and Swaziland's Relations with South Africa", cited in, *South African* Re­ view One, Jonanncsburg, Raven Press, 1984, p.228.

[78] *Ibid.,* p.229.

1. S. Bardill, "Destabilization: the Case of Lesotho", London, *London University lnstituJe of Commonwealth Studies,*

no.SSA/84/3, 1984, pp.6-7.

1. *Ibid .•*

"... From sheer position of our weaknesses military and otherwise, economically and so on, we can't afford to put a finger in South Africa's eye ..."[81]

This view portrays the true situation that emerged as South Africa intensified pressure on Lesotho and other neighbouring countries after the signing of Nkomati Accord between S.A. and Mozambique in 16 March 1984. On December 9th 1982, South African commandos attacked Maseru, and on the 13 February 1983 there was a second raid in Lesotho. There were more LLA raids with the help of the SADF, and attempts on Prime Minister Jonathan's life were made in June and August 1983.(82] Economically, in 1983, South Africa imposed blockades to impede the normal flow of goods and traffic into and out of Lesotho and stopped Basotho migrants from entering South Africa. The blockade caused severe shortage of certain food stuffs. In August 1983, when, after consultation with the United Nations on the intensity of the military and economic pressure, Lesotho asked a number of refugees (South African/ANC) to leave the country.[83) Thus, economic blockade proved to be a most effective tool at the disposal of South Africa

Lesotho, in short, has to pursue a fine line between powerful South Africa and its more militant neighbours. For example, Lesotho is not a Front Line State. South Africa pressures Lesotho in respect of recognizing formally Transkei and Ciskei, two 'homelands' that are not recognized by the international community, it demands the cessation of anti-South African proclamations, the expulsion of all ANC ele­ ments in the country, and an end of overtures with the Soviet Union. South Africa's major pressure can be, and is, applied through the customs union of which Lesotho is a member.(84) The greatest pressure took place in January 1986 when Chief Jonathan was deposed in a military coug. and Major-General Justin LeKbanya took over at the head of a six-person Military Council. A 'non-political' cabinet was named and, although the military governs the country, the King Moshoeshoe !I's influence has increased since the coup.(85] Major-General LeKbanya, in his first speech announced that:

(8 I] *The Citizen,* Durban, 1 October 1984.

1. Joseph Hanlon, *Begg er Your Neighbours,* London, Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1986, pp.113-114.
2. *International Defence and Aid Fund,* no. 12, London, 1984, p.12.

[84] Grundy, *op. cit.,* p.93.

(85] for more details sec, *Africa Contemporary Record,* 1985-1986, Lesotho.

"... the military council of Lesotho decided to vest all executive and legislative powers in HM the King, with the military council to act as an advisory body".[86]

King Moshoeshoe II, in bis first speech to *bis* people, on 27 January 1986, declared that bis government will "pursue an independent foreign policy". 1bis means, that Lesotho will:

1. "defend her existence as **a** sovereign, independent, and non-aligned state,
2. remain the traditional and historical hospitable hosts of refugees,
3. strive to develop good relations with all neighbours based on the principle of non-interference in each others internal and external affairs, without across the border raids and economic blockades, and
4. remain committed to SADCC."[87]

## Swaziland

Swaziland became independent as a constitutional monarchy in 1968. Swaziland is constrained by its economic dependence on South Africa and its own internal conservatism in respect to land ownership and the institution of the monarchy. Lying between Marxist-leaning Mozambique and nationalist South Africa it seeks to regulate the flow of arms and agents that move in both directions. So, Swaziland's history and politics have always been strongly influenced by geographical and economic considerations and these are still probably the psychological and rational determining factors in its foreign relations.

For example Swaziland has pegged its currency to the South African Rand through a 1976 agreement that so far has induced no undue hardship. Part of this is due to the fact that along with Lesotho and Botswana, Swaziland has traditionally been the source of many migrant labourers to South Africa. But this source of income, and the trade patterns with South Africa, have been subject to much recent fluctuation, especially as South Africa has used more technology in its gold mines, thus reducing the need for foreign labour.[88]

[86) Joseph Hanlon, *op. cit.,* 1986, p.119. [87) *Ibid.,* p.120.

1. Sec, Alan R. Booth, *Swaziland: Tradition and Change in a Southern African Kingdom,* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1983, pp.109-11; and Robert H. Davies, Dan O'Meara and Sipho Dlarnini, *The Kingdom of Swaziland: A Profile,* London, Zed Books, Ltd., 1985, pp.45-47.

Swaziland inherited a Westminster-type of constitution with constitutional authority vested formally in an elected parliament with the King performing a ceremonial figurehead function. In reality, however, all elected seats are held by members of the King's lmbokdovo Party and all appointed members are behol­ den to him. King Sobbuza practically monopolised the political process.[89] Even so, in 1973 King Sobhuza II repealed the constitution, suspended the parliament, banned all political parties, established an army and introduced a detention without trial provision. For five years, the King exercised absolute power issuing decrees through a council-of-m sters.[90] In 1978, the King inaugurated a new constitution that was described as being more in keeping with Swazi traditions.

A significant aspect of the new constitution was the devolution of formal constitutional powers of local government to chieftaincies that were located primarily in the traditional sector. Despite this, the Par­ liament was resuscitated but with:

"... its membership now determined by an electorial system, which designed as to ensure domination by loyalists to traditional customs. Its functions were changed as well. Stripped of independent policy-making authority, it was reduced to enacting into law the decisions of Sobhuza and his advisors."[91]

Tbe death of Sobhura in 1982 created a power vacuum and plunged the royal family into a period of prolonged internecine strife which produced the deposition of Prime Minister Mabandla and his replace­ ment by a right-wing traditionalist, Prince Bhekimpi, who suppressed the opposition to the power of the monarchy and ended a period of power struggles.[92] The Supreme Ruling Council dominated the political

scene which included a small clique of princes and commoner allies with no clear set of political principles,

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therefore, they soon lacked popularity and any sense of legitimacy.[93] This clique was vulnerable to pres­ sure from abroad and soon began to bend to South African demands even though Pretoria had reneged on a promised 'land-deal'.[94] In mid 1984, the two governments announced an agreement to exchange Trade

1. John Daniel, "Swaziland in the Context of South African Destabilisation", *Unpublished Paper,* 1987, p.5.
2. *Ibid.,* 1973 known as the 'constitutional crisis' year.

(91] J. Daniel and J. Vilane, "Swaziland: Political Crisis and Regional Dilemma", *Review of African Political Economy,* no. 35, 1986, p.57.

[92] Gwyneth Williams and Brian Hackland, *The Dictionary of Conlemporary Politics of Southern Africa,* London, Routledge, 1988, p.268.

(93] John Daniel, *op. cit.,* p.9.

(94] The land deal between South Africa and Swaziland, would give the latter access to the sea, by receiving part of KwaZulu homeland south of Mozambique. The proposals would have increased Swaziland's area by a third and doubled its population. The deal dovetailed with the issue at the centre of Swazi politics, recovery of lost land. Swaziland has long claimed parts of

Missions and a spokesperson of the Swazi Foreign Ministry appealed to the world to:

"give South Africa a chance to sort out its problems. We have been really impressed by what South Africa bas been doing for the last years trying to improve conditions in this part of the

world, ... South Africa is on the right track as far as we are concerned."[95]

King Mswati. III (22 years old) was crowned in April 1986. He has come to the throne at a difficult ti.me. His administration must cope with the internal differences within the ruling elite which threaten pol­ itical stability. Under this pressure, it seemed inevitable that the government of Swaziland bas to balance its position in southern Africa with events in Mozambique and South Africa. South Africa probably operates with a relatively strong degree of independence in Swaziland, but the latter has stated its belief in

OAU principles, even while it attempts to neutralize ANC activities within its borders. In this respect we can note that Swaziland and South Africa signed a then secret non-aggression pact in 1982. Swaziland agreed to the pact in the psychological expectation that it would receive some South African territory that would enable it to have a coastal port on the Indian Ocean. This helped to strengthen those political forces in Swaziland that favoured closer ties with South Africa. (That struggle was also internally connected to the nature of the monarchy after the death of the long-reigning King Sobhuza.) South Africa then withdrew the territorial offer without endangering its political position in Swaziland.[96] Therefore, the new King (Mswati III) has dissolved the Supreme Ruling Council and is seeking to consolidate his power.

## Tanzania

Tanzania, the former Tanganyika and Zanzibar, became independent in 1961. It is a Front Line State mainly because of its ideological beliefs and transportation links to Zambia and Mozambique. It does not border on South Africa. However, the ideological nature of the CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi) Party is

toward non-racialism and socialism. Tanzania publicly supports attempts to overthrow the South African

South Africa, and many Swazi supported the deal as redressing the colonial appropriation of land and people. Negotiations over the land deal began in 1981. In February 1982, Swaziland signed a secret security agreement with South Africa. That achieved, South Africa's interest in the land deal waned. The negotiations dragged on, but with less and less prospect of com­ ing to fruition, until South Africa effectively withdrew from them in 1984. There was a good deal of internal opposition to the deal in South Africa particularly in KwaZulu, For more details sec, John Daniel, *op. cit.,* p.8. Hanlon, *op. cit.,* p.93, and John­ son and Martin, *op. cit.,* pp.161-162.

1. Daniel and Vilanc, *op. cit.,* p.65.
2. Hanlon, *op. cit,* pp.58-59; and Davies, ct al., *Kingdom, op. cit.,* pp.52-53.

govern.meat, thus its main conflict with that country is psychological and ideological, and less economic. The retirement of President Julius Nyerere in November 1985 has not changed this stance.[97]

Tanzania's prime objectives for action are to safeguard the independence and socialist development of the country, and to devote itself to two major foreign policy principles: the liberation of minority regimes in Southern Africa and non-alignment in East-West affairs. On the issue of liberation, Tanzania committed itself to supporting movements in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Rhodesia, and South Africa Because of lending support, both diplomatic and material, Tanzania was accorded the status of being the headquarters of the African Liberation Committee of the OAU and was also given the chairmanship of the Front Line States.[98] Moreover,

"... the government and the party in Tanzania sets the broad parameter for foreign policy ... and specific policies which then become the functional approach to the President and Ministers ... these specific policies are supposed to be conceived within these broad parameters ... support for human rights ... liberation struggle ... national economy and freedom ... and the solidarity with the third world countries ... Tanzania's foreign policy is very clear ... for example, if the Minister of Foreign Affairs is responding to issues related to South Africa ... it would be strange if the Minister failed to condemn S.A we would say,

'hey, what is going on with this guy!' on an issue like that,

there are certain issues which matter on fundamental principle which everybody more or less is agreed upon "[99]

Tanzania sees increased Soviet-US involvement in Africa as providing an even greater need for strict non-alignment. Nyerere criticized the Soviet Union for supporting Idi Amin, and he criticized Washington for "intimidating and threatening" Indian Ocean countries in its efforts to obtain military bases following events in Iran and Afghanistan.[100] Nyerere beliefs that "non-alignment is the only basis on which a small and weak state like ours can maintain its political independence".[101] He criticized both the Soviet Union

1. Sec, Alt.af Gauhar, interview with Julius K. Nyerere, *Third World Quarterly,* vol.6, no.4, October 1984, pp.815-839. In 1977 the Tanganyika African National Union and Zanzibar's ruling party, the Afro-Shirazi party merged to form one ruling party called the Chama Cha Mapinduzi. which in English means Revolutionary Party of Tanzania.
2. Ronald T. Libby, *op. cit.,* p.246. President Nyerere was one of the architects of the FLS's strategy of combining assisbnce to and support for the guerrilla struggles with diplomatic pressure on Western powers to play an active role in seeking a negotiat­ ed settlement leading to majority rule. See, David F. Gordon and Ali A. Mazrui, "Black African States and the Struggle for Southern Africa", in *Southern Africa since the Portuguese Coup,* ed. J. Seiler, Boulder, Co, Westview Press, 1980, pp.183-94.

[99) *Personal Interview,* Dr. Mwesiga Baregn, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 18 April 1988.

[JOO] David F. Gordon, "Anglophonic Variants: Kenya versus Tanzania", *ANNALS, AAPSS,* no. 489, January 1987, p.99.

1. Colin Legum, ed., *African Contemporary Record.* 1980, London, Rex Collings, 1981, p.334.

and the United States for viewing all events in the world through the lens of East-West conflict

Within this framework, Tanzania's development policies are based on the principles of socialism and self-reliance. *As* such, the state controls key sectors of the economy, for example the financial system, most external and internal trade and large-scale enterprises. This was the result of the new approach which was announced in 1967 by the CCMs ruling party and known as the Arusha Declaration of establishing a socialist state where workers and peasants controlled and owned the means of production. The Arusha Declaration encouraged self-reliance by. expanding agricultural production though the establishment of "Ujamaa villages" or familyhood villages, in which the rural population would collectively live and work together and share in the increased agricultural production.[102]

President Nyerere has been the main source of policy in general, and foreign policy formulation in particular, for constitutional, historical and personal reasons.[103] The constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania invests all executive powers in the Presidency and foreign policy decisions are considered a legitimate responsibility of the executive although this has to be shared with the Party. The President of the Republic is also the Chairman of the Party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi. - CCM) which inherited legal supremacy in policy formulation acquired by TANU in 1975. [104] Therefore, when Nyerere was stepping down after leading the country since its independence 24 years earlier, and was succeeded by Ali Hussan Nwinyi in October 1985, he kept his chairmanship of the Chama Cha Mapinduzi. party to keep his domi­ nance in decision-making. One of the Tanzanian scholars described the foreign policy decision-making process in Tanzania as saying:

1. Sec, Andrew Coulson, *Tanzania: A Political &onomy,* London, Oxford University Press, 1982. On the Arusha development strategy, see, Issa Shivji, *Class Struggle in Tanzania,* London, Monthly Review Press, 1976, pp.79-99.
2. S.S. Mushi and K. Mathews, *Foreign Policy of Tanzania 1961-1981: A Reader,* Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House, 1981, p.3.

[104] *Ibid.,* p.10.

"Africa does not have institutionalised rule but basically rulership is based on individuals ... but there are social forces that influence even the most dictatorial, or the most genius

leadership ... the party [CCM] has a number of commissions - the national defence commission, internal affairs in terms of foreign policy and on top of that the Central Committee of the Party.

These are the committees which work out the major policies, and

\_the role of the Minister of Foreign Affairs is basically implementational. However, the President Nyerere did play a very major role in the foreign policy, there is no question about that."[105]

## Zambia

Zambia, now a one party state under President Kenneth Kaunda, became independent in 1964. The ruling party is the United National Independence party (UNIP), other major parties are the United Progres­ sive party (UPP) lead by Simon Kapwepwe, and the Zambian African National Congress (ZANC), how­ ever, both parties were banned in 1972 when Zambia was declared a one party state.[106] Kaunda's humanistic political philosophy, which is a blend of socialism and Christianity characterized the political system of Zambia.

Zambia's foreign policy reflects the personal views of the President, given the constitutional powers of his office and the absence of any institutional structure to assist in the formulation of foreign policy. The Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee has little influence as is also the case of the Diplomatic Career Service.[107] Zambia's foreign policy has always been reactive.[108] For example, Zambia's decision to support Savimbi (UNlTA) in 1974-75, has been explained as:

"... Zambia [has been] reactionary ... and should go with the others [countries] ... but at present we have to say no ... we have been honest ..."[109]

Zambia's foreign policy has undergone failures and successes. The reason for this is that, "... at times, events have overtaken us and so that our policies tend to take the form of a reaction. For this reason it will

1. *Personal interview,* Dr. Mwesiga Barcgu, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 8 April 1988.
2. Patrick E. Ollawa, *Partidpatory Democracy in Zambia: The Political &onomy of National Development,* London, Arthur H.

Stockwell Ltd., 1979, p.229.

1. UNIP, "Zambia Foreign Policy Since Independence", Lusaka, *Confidential Briefing Document,* 1988, p.1.
2. Stephen Chan, *Issues in International Relations: A View from Africa,* London, Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1987, p.160.
3. *Personal Interview,* H.E.M. Punabantu, Minister of National Guidance, Information and Broadcasting Services, Zambia, Lusa­ ka, 10 March 1988.

be important that Zambia set up a career service structure that would evaluate each of our policies, in the present and the future, in order to avoid our policies undergoing regressions". [110] The direction of its foreign policy is set by the President in consultation with his State House advisers, various Ministries and members of the Central Committee. It can balance its economic relations with South Africa somewhat by its close ties to neighbouring countries, especially Tanzania. [111) Thus, there is a wider range of actors than is the case, for example, in Angola and Mozambique. In the words of Zambian senior official describ- ing the major actors:

"... we have the Secretary General of the Party, who actually runs the UNlP daily, then we have the Prime Minister, who runs the government, we have the Secretary of State for Defence and Security, and on the top of

these the PresidenL Now, those are the 'Big Four' in terms of day-to-day policies ... but otherwise day-to-day decisions regarding, say, policy matters, or specific policies, what should happen and so on, is really the President ... the final decisions, of course, the

President ... the President here, is an Executive President, in other words he is not like a Prince or King, he is a

real executive ... that is why he has to have a direct link to each and every Minister ... and this is true of every Minister and every member of the Central Committee, he supervises things". [112)

In other words

"the Head of State draws for us what specific policy is to follow ..." [113)

The freedom for any state to make foreign policy is constrained by the realitites of the economic needs and vulnerability of the society.[114) Therefore, Zambia's economic development J'lanning has had two aims:

1. to bring ownership of the main industries into the hands of the state, and
2. to broaden the base of the economy by moving away from a reliance on copper, and keeping the economy built on the high returns from copper revenues going when the world price is low.

(110] UNIP, *Confidential Briefing Document,* p.2.

(111] Douglas G. Anglin and Timothy M. Shaw, *Z.ambia' s Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), pp.77-78.

(112] *Personal Interview,* with H.E. M. Punabantu, Minister of National Guidance, Information and Broadcasting Services, Zambia, Lusaka, 10 March 1988.

(113] *Personal Interview with,* Mr. Humphrey Bwalya Kunda, Director of International Organization, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zambia, Lusaka, 2 March 1988.

(114] Shaw and Aluko, *op. cit.,* p.344.

However, the most important factor is that Zambia is a landlocked country entirely dependent on its neighbours for economic survival.[115] Therefore, its foreign policy is motivated by its economica needs, as the case of its support for (UNITA) and its stem response to Soviet involvement in Angola. It must also be judged in light of the economic difficulties caused by the closure of the Benguela railway in 1975, which was handling just above 40% of Zambia's cargo. Kaunda was of the view that Portugal was more amen­ able to negotiate with UNITA than with the MPLA. Thus following the victory of the MPLA in Angola, an early reapproachment with the new Angolan government had to be sought in order to secure the reopening of the Benguela line. In April 1976, Zambia recognized the MPLA government While in 1987, Zambia expressed willingness to send Zambian troops to help defend the line from sabotage by UNITA.[116] As an active member of the Non-Aligned Movement, "Zambia pursues a policy of non-alignment, not so much as to have an independent voice, but as to seek assistance whenever need arises from any source ..."[117] Zambia's foreign policy is constrained by the country's dependence on South Africa and its lack of industry has shaped Zambia's foreign and internal policies. Essentially, Zambia's foreign policy can be described as neutral in that attempts are being made for closer economic ties with other countries including non-African ones - in order to lessen its historical dependency on South Africa. President Kaunda became the Chairman of FLS in 1985, and Zambia is the headquarters of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa. Moreover, the second largest office of SWAPO is located in Lusaka.

## Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe, the former Rhodesia, is almost as important in South African eyes as Angola and Mozambique, because of the nature of that country's independence, which also came as a surprise to South Africa that Mugabe won the election. Such independence events, in fact, gave rise to South Africa's 'Con­ stellation of Southern African States' (CONSAS), which it hoped would link its SAC1J partners with Malawi and Zimbabwe (preferably under Muzorewa) and possibly Mozambique, with South Africa and its bantustans (thereby gaining them a measure of international recognition).[118]

[l 15] UNIP, *Confidential Briefing Document,* p.3.

[116] *Ibid.,* p.8.

[117] *Ibid.,* p.15.

1. M. Evans, *The Front Line States and Southern African Security,* Harare, University of Zimbabwe Press, 1986, p.3.

Zimbabwe became independent in 1980. And although South Africa had become resigned to an independent Zimbabwe after the failure of UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence) in Rhodesia, there is no doubt that the election of Robert Mugabe, a professed Marxist, as Prime Minister in 1980, was both unexpected and displeasing. Mugabe heads the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) which won an easy victory over ZAPU (Zimbabwean African People's Union), headed by Joshua Nkomo, and over Bishop Abel Muzorewa, who was supported financially and politically by South Africa since they believed, or at least hoped, that Mozorewa would \l{in the election.[119] The hope of CONSAS was destroyed when Robert Mugabe became the first Prime Minister of Zimbabwe (now the President). Therefore, Zimbabwe immediately enter the grouping of the FLS and SADCC. For South Africa, all that was seen as "the most shattering regional political defeat since the foundation of the modern Afrikaner Republic in 1961, but, cer­ tainly the Republic remained the economic and military colossus of the subcontinent but her diplomacy had again faltered".(120] However, there are no formal diplomatic links with South Africa, but relations are handled through the South African Trade Mission in Harare, and there is also an active South African Tour­ ism Board.(121]

Following the result of the 1980 election, ZANU was therefore the majority party and on that basis formed Zimbabwe's first black government with a coalition with ZAPU (in 1980 ZAPU - renamed itself as the Patriotic Front Party - PFP) - the ruling party known as ZANU-PF. The long-standing bitter rivalry between the two parties erupted in armed conflict in November 1980 resulting in ethnic clashes between the Ndebele in supporting ZAPU and the Shona in supporting ZAND, and the outcome of further clashes between ZANLA and ZIPRA, was that Nkomo and three of his colleagues were sacked from the govern­ ment and a temporary peace achieved. (122] Since the outbreak of violent clashes between the rival parties, ZANU has declared itself the *de facto* ruling party as Mugabe stated:

1. Ibbo Mandaza, *Zimbabwe: The Political Economy ofTransition 1980-1986,* Harare, Jongwe Press, 1987, p.83. Mugabe's par­ ty ZANU, with 63% of the vote, won 57 of the 80 seats contested by African candidates. Nkomo's ZAPU was second with 24% of the vote and won 20 seats. Muzorewa's UANC came in third with three seats. The remaining 20 reserved seats went *to* the all-white Republican party - now named the Conservative Alliance party.
2. **M.** Evans, *op. cit.,* pp.2-3. Also **see,** Robert G. Mugabe, "Struggle for Southern Africa", *Foreign Affairs,* vol. 66, no. 2, winter 1987-88, pp.313-314.
3. Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, *Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society,* London, Pinter Publishers, 1989, p.50.
4. Phyllis Johnson and David Martin (ed), *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War,* Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986, pp.47-55.

"We believe that it is better to operate under one political umbrella. It is a kind of national unity you create by

one-party provided that within the system you have machinery for democratic expression of views." [123]

In August 1984, following the party's first congress in twenty years, ZANU reverted to its original name and dropped the Patriotic Front from its title. The congress also adopted resolutions declaring its intention to establish a one-party state and to follow 'Marxist-Leninist principles'. [124) In the July 1985 elections the ruling ZANU party won 64 seats, and 15 seats went to ZAPU-PF party in Parliament. [125) Unity talks between Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe took place in latter part of 1986 and they broke down in May 1987 with the failure to work out a solution to their differences, which included the proposal for a one-party democratic state in which top ZAPU members would be included in the Cabinet and Nkomo himself would have a secondary status in the amalgamated party while remaining in effect leader of the ZAPU.[126] However, Nkomo was offered bis present position in the government as well as becoming a senior Minister in the President's office but without portfolio.

Zimbabwe's political independence was achieved through peaceful, democratically contested elec­ tions albeit after a bitter and long war. The new government inherited a relatively advanced and dynamic capitalist economy which bad well-developed manufacturing and commercial agricultural sectors. The industrial sector output was in advance of all other African countries except South Africa and Algeria. Gross domestic product in 1980 was an estimated 4.8 billion USA dollars,[127] and 7.13 billion USA dol­

lars in 1986.(128]

*T*

Zimbabwe sees itself as the equal of South Africa as a major power in the region, as it has "played important roles in the FLS, in SADCC, and in the PTA (Preferential Trade Area), providing the first two executive secretaries of SADCC, and fulfilling its responsibilities for regional food security competently. It

1. Quoted in Aluko and Shaw, *op. cit.,* p.200.
2. *African Research Bulletin,* London, August 1-31, 1984, p.345.
3. Masipula Sithole, "The General Elections: 1979-1985", in Ibbo Mandaza, *op. cit.,* pp.89-94, For more detailed analysis about 1984 elections, sec, *The Sunday Times,* London, 19 July 1987.
4. *The G1U1rdian,* Manchester, 23 December 1987, also see, *The Economist,* "Zimbabwe: One-party pluralism", London, 18 March 1989.
5. Colin Stoneman (eel), *Zimbabwe's Inheritance,* London, Macmillan, 1981, pp.151-152. Also see, Brian Raftopoulos, "Human Resources Development and the Problem of Labour Utilisation", in Ibbo Mandaza, *op. cit.,* pp.275-314.
6. Xavier M. Kadhani, "Zimbabwe: The Economy: Issues, Problems and Prospects", in Ibbo Mandaza, *op. cit.,* p.116.

also has a high degree of political and military sympathy with all FLS and especially with Mozambique for its support during the liberation war, including the provision of bases for ZANU and the ruinously expen­ sive border closure of 1975-1980".[129] A Zimbabwe-Mozambique Friendship Association (ZIMOFA) exists between the two countries. Moreover, under the terms of the 1981 Zimbabwe-Mozambique Defence Agreement it is stated:

"We have concurred that an attack against Mozambique shall be regarded as an attack against Zimbabwe ..."[130]

On August 1985 Mugabe gave an open-ended commitment to the survival of Mozambique, by stating that Zimbabwe would deploy up to 30,000 troops to defend the 'Beira Corridor' guarding the pipeline and reo­ pening the Beira Port for Zimbabwe trade. Also, it was agreed between Britain, Zimbabwe, and Mozam­ bique that a number of Mozambican officers would be trained by the British Military Advisory and Train­ ing Team (BMATT) in Zimbabwe.[131] Louis Nel, the South African Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, confirmed such agreement between Britain, Mozambique and Zimbabwe to the President of the MNR, as saying:

"... the news today reported that Britain is going to train Frelimo officers in Zimbabwe ... thirty officers will be assigned, the training will last five months and will begin in January next year [1986] ..."[132]

Following the death of Samora Machel in October 1986, Mugabe guaranteed the security of Mozam- bique in saying:

"Survival of Mozambique is our survival. The fall of Mozambique will certainly be our fall ... All and one stand together. All

and one fight together."[133]

After that statement the MNR declared war on Zimbabwe for supporting FRELIMO, Mugabe received the threat with this comment "OH, COME ON".[134] Mozambique has become militarily and economically

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| [129) | Colinc Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, *op. cit,* p.181. |
| [130) | Michael Evans, ''The Security Threat from South Africa", in Colin Stoneman (ed), *Z-imbabwe's Prospects: Issues of Race, Class, State and Capital* in *Southern Africa,* London, Macmillan, 1988, p.227. |
| [131) | Coline Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, *op. cit.,* p.187. |
| [132] | *Gorongosa Documents,* Notebook 3, Extracts, 2 July 1985. |
| [133] | *The Herald,* Harare, 12 November 1986, in Evans, *op. cit.,* p.228. |
| [134) | *The Times,* London, 30 October 1986, sec also, James Barber, "Zimbabwe: the Southern African Setting", *The World Today,*  vol.44, no.10, October 1988, pp.170-171. |

dependent on Zimbabwe for keeping the 'Beira Corridor' open. Zimbabwe then took "the initiative in per­ suading the FLS to stand firm with Maputo, and as a result 2,000 Tanzanian troops moved into northern Mozambique in March 1987. Pressure was applied on Malawi to secure its border to prevent MNR infiltration."[135] In international political affairs Zimbabwe has enunciated and followed fairly con­ sistently a foreign policy based on the principles of non-alignment, emphasis on African issues, free exchange of ideas, culture and trade, and the reordering of the international economic system.[136] Zimbabwe's foreign policy has been aim at decreasing political and economic dependence by means of a stated policy of non-alignment South Africa's response has been less in the military sphere and more in the nature of propaganda, economic pressure and selective assassination because:

"... destabilising Zimbabwe could be to prevent it from becoming economically strong enough to reduce its economic ties with South Africa to an insignificant level, and militarily strong enough

not to be deterred by the Republic ... a Zimbabwe economically vulnerable and closely tied to South Africa and domestically faced with political disaffection, unrest and violence, may be an appealing scenario to those South African decision-makers favouring destabilisation". [137]

Zimbabwe's policy towards South Africa was constrained on the one hand by a desire to aid the liberation struggle within South Africa and on the other by fear of the consequences of provoking open hostility and economic or military reprisals. This position was explained by a journalist: "... Zimbabwe cannot provide the bases for South African liberation forces, because it [Zimbabwe] has not got the military strength to stand on its own ... the possible reaction of the apartheid regime in such matter ..."[138]

ZANUs second Congress was held in 1984, and approved a new party'constitution which provided the necessary authorization for the establishment of a Central Committee (ninety members) with a fourteen-member of the Political Bureau. This Political Bureau is appointed by the party's President (and Secretary General) Robert Mugabe. So, the major actors in Zimbabwe policies are, as it was described by

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| [135] | Stoneman and Qiffe, *op. cit.,* p.188. |
| [136] | See, H. Patel, "No Master, No Mortgage, No Sale: The Foreign Policy of Zimbabwe" in T. Shaw and Y. Tandon (cd), *Regional* |
|  | *Development at the International Level,* vol.2, London, University Press of America, 1985, chapter 10. |
| (137] | D. Gcldenhuys, "The Destabilisation Controversy: An Analysis of a High Risk Foreign Policy Option for South Africa", *Poli­* |
|  | *ti/am,* no.9, December 1982, p.2. |
| (138] | *Personal Interview,* Mr. Charles Chikerema, The Political Editor, The Herald Newspaper (daily) Zimbabwe, Harare, 17 March 1988. |

one academic:

"... after the creation of the executive Presidency on 31 December 1987, the President has a lot of power, but he works very closely with the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the ruling party. And there is an extent to which the Cabinet also participates in decision making. So, largely, that is the

structure of the policy-making, but I also emphasise that the President can actually propose policies."[139)

Since the Central Committee met once every two years, therefore, the main decision-making body would be the Political Bureau which is appointed .by the President of Zimbabwe and who is the chairman of the Bureau. The 1984 constitution proclaimed the supremacy of the Party over government bodies in outlining the main directions of policies. The foreign policy decision-making process in Zimbabwe

"... The ruling party formulates what is foreign policy. If there is an issue, it starts with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and we

will make all the recommendations to the Minister - it depends on whether it is a major or minor issue, and then the Minister takes

it up to the President, and he has his own personal advisers, and then he proposes it to the Cabinet and the policy [decision]

formulated. It goes by stages and in many cases is very democratic."[140)

Io other words:

"... first, the civil servants [Ministers] made a recommendation to the President, then the President takes the last decision." [141]

Io the final analysis we can say that the decision-making of foreign policy is dominated by the Secre­ tary General of the ZANU ruling party, who is at the same time, the President of the Republic of Zim­ babwe. The major issues of its foreign policy reflect the principal questions *pf* Zimbabwe's life, that is to keep its economy productive and as advanced as when it was inherited, to control the internal opposition by ZAPU-PF and other parties and to stop ethnic clashes, and to prevent South Africa from destabilizing the country. All these objectives to help ZANU in the achievement of stability and national unity of Zim-

[139) *Personal Interview,* Dr. John **M.W.** Makwnbe, Head of the Political Science Department, Unviersity of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe, 17 March 1988. An interesting view comes from Dr. Ibbo Mandaza, when I asked him about foreign policy decision-making, in his words: "I don't believe in foreign policy when it comes to small countries, I know you International Relations people believe there is such a thing, what I am saying basically and particularly that people in International Relations make a big noise about foreign policy and its not really an issue"!! *Personal Interview,* Dr. Ibbo Mandaza, Harare, Zimbabwe, 24 March 1988.

[140). *Personal InJerview,* Mr. Misheck C. Hove, Under Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Harare, Zimbabwe, 23 March 1988. [141) *Personal InJerview,* H.E. Mr. Shududa, Zimbabwean Ambassador for Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana, 9 May 1988.

babwe.

## Malawi

Malawi was first declared a British protectorate in 1891, then known as Nyasaland. In 1964 it became the Independent state of Malawi within the British Commonwealth. Dr. Hastings K. Banda, leader of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) since 1959 was appointed Prime Minister. In 1966 a republic was instituted with Dr. Banda as President. There were the last presidential elections in 1970, and in 1971 parli­ ament declared Dr. Banda the country's Life President.[142]

Constitutionally, the Life President has the authority to appoint the Cabinet and up to 15 members of the National Assembly. The supreme authority is vested in parliament, which consists of the President and a National Assembly. The only legal party is the ruling MCP party and membership is compulsory for all adults. There are several opposition groups in exile, the Congress for the Second Republic, the Save Malawi Committee, the Socialist League of Malawi, and the Malawi Freedom Movement *(MAFREMO).* All opposition parties are banned within Malawi, so all are based outside in the neighbouring countries such as Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. The governments of these countries support MAFREMO which has its headquarters in Dar es Salaam.[143]

Banda's economic strategy of creating a personal base of power by "gaining economic control through two companies: Press Holdings, which was Banda's personal company, and Admarc, the parastatal Agricultural Development and Marlceting Corporation. Between them, they c9ntrol the banks, most agricul­ tural estates, and most apparently private companies. The economy is thus personally controlled by President Banda, and Malawi is often described as a capitalist country without capitalists". [144] To achieve such strategy, Banda gained parliamentary approval for the Malawi Land Bill in 1965, which gave the President absolute power over the use and ownership of all land in the country. All this enabled Banda to undertake major investments in agricultural estates as well as to secure a monopoly over the private sec-

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| [142] | Williams and Hackland, *op. cit.,* pp.143-144. |
| (143] | *Ibid.,* sec also, *Africa Contemporary Record,* vol. 19, 1987, p.674. |
| [144] | Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours, op. cit.,* p.236. |

tor.[145]

Historically, Malawi has played the role of a labour reservoir primarily for Zimbabwe and South Africa For example, Rhodesia and South Africa competed for Nyasaland (Malawi) labour to develop the mines and farms in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and the diamond and gold mines in South Africa. The number of Malawians living and working outside the country is about 10% if not more. The significance of the roughly half million migrant labour force to the Malawian government was the large inflows of migrant labour remittances in foreign exchange. (146]

This explains Malawi's decision to establish diplomatic relations with South Africa and to conclude the so-called 'trade with the devil' and labour agreement with the country in terms of Malawi's economic relationship with South Africa. Apart from the jarring psychological impact of being the only African country to have diplomatic relations with South Africa, the agreement was simply a fonnal recognition of the country's importance to Malawi's economy. This also explains Malawi's policy of 'dialogue' with South Africa in tenns of an exchange of Malawi's 'political neutrality' toward South Africa for important economic benefits.[147]

Such benefits made Banda refuse to change tack over his diplomatic relations with South Africa, and be continued to oppose sanctions against Pretoria. He accused "some African Leaders of hypocrisy in their attitude to South Africa", saying:

"The African countries who talk about boycotting South Africa - they just talk. We go to South Africa in the daytime, not

like Nicodemus going to Jesus Christ at night We deal with South Africa openly."(148]

.Malawi bas been described as South Africa's closest friend in the region, while relations with FLS -

* 1. Jonathan Kydd, "Malawi in the 1970s: Development Policies, and Economic Change", Paper presented at the conference,

*Malawi -An Alternative Pattem of Development,* Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, 24-25 May 19S4, p.37.

* 1. Robert B. Boeder, "Malawian Labour Migration and International Relations in Southern Africa", *Africa Insight,* vol.14, no.I, 1984, pp.2-24.
  2. *Ibid.,* p.20. The trade agreement was signed in 1967, which granted Malawi the duty-free importation of five hundred thousand pounds annually of its tobacco, tea, oil, and other manufactured goods into South Africa. In addition to that, there was other agreements with South Africa such as, Investment, Aid, and Labour agreements which gave Malawi's government control of supplying Malawi labour to South Africa. Malawi's top three foreign aid donors were the United Kingdom, the World Banlc, and in the third place was South Africa. See Neva Makgetla, and Ann Seidman, *Owpasts of Monopoly Capitalism: Southern Africa in the Changing Global Economy,* Westport Laurence Hill and Co., 1980, pp.126-127.
  3. *Africa Contemporary Record,* vol.19, 1987, p.49.

SADCC were troubled for many years. Opposition Malawian politicians have fled to neighbouring states for refuge and in 1965 Dr. Banda accused Tanzania of helping to organise subversive activities against him. In 1968 there was a boundary dispute over Lake Malawi in which Malawi laid claim to the northern half, including the Tanzanian shores. However, during the 1970s the FLS made an effort to improve their rela­ tions with Dr. Banda. The first overtures were made by Zambia's President Kaunda. In July 1971 he opened a High Commission in Malawi.[149]

By 1980 the situation bad improved considerably and Malawi joined SADCC, an organisation of Southern African states committed to developing alternative economic networks not dependent on South Africa. By joining SADCC, Malawi improved its relations with Zambia, Tanzania, and Mozambique and strengthened economic ties with them. Tanzania bas agreed to co-operate with Malawi in constructing a road that would give Malawi direct access to the port of Dar es Salaam. Zambia has agreed to the construc­ tion of another rail link to enable Malawi to use the TAZAR.A rail line to get access to the sea, and Mozam­ bique agreed to reconstruct the Nacala railway line giving Malawi access to use the ports of Nacala and Beira.[150]

In 1984 full diplomatic relations were established with Mozambique and in 1985 with Tanzania. Co-operation and security agreements was signed with Mozambique (October 1984) providing for defence and economic co-operation. The agreements set up a joint permanent commission and railway co-operation agreement. Banda even offered to contribute Malawian troops in a joint effort to combat 'MNR sabotage

against Mozambique's transport lines and facilities.[151] However, Malawi's involvement with the MNR

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was identified clearly in the Gorongosa Documents, for example, one of the extracts as a message from

:tvlNR to South Africa said:

* 1. Sec, Ali A. Mazrui and Michael Tidy, *Nationalism and New States in Africa,* London, Heinemann, 1984. Also sec, Naomi Chazan. eL al., *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa,* London, Macmillan, 1988.
  2. *African Contemporary Record,* vol.15, 1984, p.654.
  3. *Ibid..*

"The Malawian government is withdrawing or expelling our delegate [MNR representative in Malawi] Gimo from Malawi. at the request of Pik Botha ... alleging that if they [S.A.]

do not give more goods to Malawi ..because Malawi depends on S.A "[152]

Such involvement explained by Davies that "... the use of Malawi we know now that, basically it was

South African Military Intelligence that continued to control the bandit [MNRJ activity in Malawi "[153]

Confrontation between Banda and the leaders of Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique took place in September 1986, to demand that Malawi stop the MNR from operating from its territory or it would face a total transport cut-off of all its routes to the sea, including Malawi's southern route to South Africa. After the meeting, Banda publicly admitted for the first time that the MNR had bases in the south of Malawi. Suggestions have been made that South Africa was influencing Malawi policy and supporting the MNR from bases in Malawi.[154] After 1986 Malawi's relations with the neighbouring FLS which were troubled for many years, improved. Malawi followed a 'neutral' foreign policy toward the region to balance its rela­ tions with the FLS on one hand and South Africa on the other hand. Another objective of the 'neutral' foreign policy of Malawi is to ensure maximum economic benefit from any part of the world, such as, sign­ ing agreements with IMF, World Bank and South Africa. Internal and external security is one of the main objectives of Banda's neutral policy, and by joining SADCC, he seeks a rapproachment with the socialist and hostile neighbouring governments in the region while at the same time maintaining diplomatic ties and

economic relations with South Africa.

Unquestionably, Banda has dominated the country's foreign policy decv;ion-making, his government was nevertheless forced to formulate foreign policy within the context of regional economic relationships

* 1. *Gorongosa Documents,* Maputo, Extract Date 27 May 1984. Malawi was mentioned several times in the documents, for exam­ ple," Colonial Vanikav [SAMI] went to Malawi to talk to President Banda about the Russians [Soviet civilians kidnapped at

the Nurrua mines in Zambezia in January 1983] and to take them to South Africa ••. at the request of Prime Minister Botha ..• this decision was a matter of disagreement with Renamo "

*Gorongosa Documents,* Extract, 21 January 1984. It seems that the Soviet were kidnapped in Mozambique by the MNR and

kept in captivity somewhere in Malawi.

* 1. *Personal Interview,* Robert Davies, Centre for African Studies, Mozambique, Maputo, 19 April 1988.
  2. *Africa Contemporary Record,* vol. 19, 1988, p.34. There are two stories behind the idea of supporting the MNR.. First, the idea of creating the Great Nyasaland Kingdom which contained Malawi and northern part of Mozambique. This is why Banda said, in 1960: ''When Nyasaland [Malawi now] is free, I will not rest until the greater part of Mozambique is joined to iL We are all the same people". See, lain Christie, *Machel of Mozambique,* Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House Ltd., 1988, p.51. Second, to support the first dream, Banda agreed with the MNR leadership about the idea of dividing Mozambique in half (like Korea or Germany). The northern part was to be linked to Malawi, giving Banda permanent access to the sea and ensuring a non-socialist neighbour. See, Joseph Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours, op. cit.,* p.241.

inherited at independence. Dr. Banda's idea of 'neutral' policy explains Malawi's foreign policy.[155] Malawi's success in identifying its foreign policy objectives with the FLS (without, however, breaking its diplomatic relations with South Africa) was evident in the country's acceptance as a member of SADCC when it was established in March 1980. The success of Banda's 'neutral' strategy to secure his domestic base of political support facilitated the relaxing of economic ties with South Africa and other states in the region by greating productive economy and more jobs for the population.

Speaking at the opening session o( the Council of Ministers of the SADCC in Malawi on 24 May 1984, President Banda left his guests in no doubt as to the nature of politics and leadership in Malawi:

"I think it is better for me to tell delegates what is going on here in Malawi ... [and to do that] I have to state what the policy of this country is ... As long as I am here in charge of public affairs of this country, the people of this country must have three basic things of life ... food, clothing,

housing ... Government here means Kamuzu, [the Birth name of Dr. Banda] does it not? There was a Governor in Zamba but that was not an African Government. So, to be frank, when you are speaking about government you now are speaking about Kamuzu, that is all, whether you like it or not ..."[156]

Regionally, in Southern Africa, public opinion sees Dr. Banda as a traitor to their own struggle or an agent of South Africa in the region. For example, following the death of Samora Machel, the Malawian High Commission and the offices of Air Malawi were attacked in Zimbabwean capital - Harare - by student demonstrators. And in Mozambique students carried out a similar attack against the Malawian Embassy in Maputo.[157] Dr. Banda has shown himself to be largely impervious to public opinion whether at home or abroad.

**LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA**

What we mean by liberation movements in Southern Africa here is those movements which are recognized by the OAU or UN and fighting (politically and militarily) for majority rule either in South Africa or Namibia. These movements are the ANC, PAC and SWAPO which enjoy secondary membership

(155] Ronald T. Libby, *op. cit.,* p.198. Also see, Simon Thomas, "Economic Developments in Malawi since *Indcpendence",Journa/*

*of Sowhern African Studies,* vol.2, no.I, 1975.

[156] *Africa Contemporary Record,* vol.I*1,* p.665.

[l 57] *African Contemporary Record.* vol.19, p.677.

with observer status of the FLS.[158]

African National Congress of South Africa

The African National Congress (ANC) is one of the leading groups of the liberation struggle in South Africa. It was founded as the South African Native National Congress [SANNC] on January 1912 at a conference in Bloemfontein, and in 1923 changed its name to the African National Congress.[159] The ANC opposed tribalism, the colour bar and sought to extend African democratic rights and advance Afri­ cans within society generally. This it aimed to accomplish through peaceful lobbying and protest A new political programme was adopted in 1943 including a demand for full political rights, and during this period, the ANC also began to co-operate with the Communist party of South Africa (CPSA) on key issues. The Congress Youth League (CYL) was formed within the ANC in 1943 with a radical programme of action including strikes, boycotts and civil disobedience.[160]

The ANC became more militant in its political struggle against white oppression. In 1950 the Com­ munist Party (CP) was banned and dissolved itself, taking the decision to work within the Congress move­ ment[161] In 1953 a decision was taken to convene a national convention, and to draw up a Freedom Char­ ter for a future democratic South Africa. The idea came from Professor Z.K. Matthews, an ANC leader. The Congress, which took place in June 1955 in an open space near Johannesburg, was broken up by police at the end of its second day.[162] The Freedom Charter produced by the Congress of the People has become the basic document of the ANC and sets out its main aims and philosophy. The Freedom Charter opens with the words:

(158] For literature related to the Liberation Movement in Southern Africa, see, Richard Gibson, *African Liberation Movements,* Ox­ ford, Oxford University Press, 1971. John Marcwn, 'Southern African Movements', in Christian Potholm and Richard Dale (eds), *Southern Africa in Perspective,* New York, Free Press, 1979, and Tom Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945,* London, Longman, 1983.

[159] T.R. Davenport, *South Africa: A Modern History,* Third Edition, London, Macmillan Press, p.250.

(160] Rob Davies, Dan O'Meara, and Sipho Dlamini, *The Struggle for South Africa: A Reference Guide to Movem,mls, Organiza­ tions and Institutions,* vol.2, London, Zed Books Ltd., p.285. The Communist Party of South Africa was formed in 1921 by the revolutionary wing of the white working-class movement. Much of its early history was characterised by a struggle to resolve for itself the relationship between the national question on one hand, and socialist rcvolution on the other.

(161] T.R.H. Davenport, *op. cit.,* p.369.

(162] Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara (eds), *Southern Africa in Crisis,* Bloomington, Indiana University Press, pp.104- 106.

"We, the people of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know:

that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no Government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the people ..."[163]

The main demands of the Freedom Charter are as follows:

"The People Shall Govern

All National Groups have Equal Rights

The People Shall Share in the Country's Wealth

The Land Shall be Shared Among those who Work it All Shall be Equal before the

Law

All Shall Enjoy Equal Human Rights There Shall be Work and Security for All

The Doors of Learning and Culture Shall be Opened There Shall be Houses, Security and Comfort

There Shall be Peace and Friendship."[164]

The Freedom Charter brought to a head a central ideological difference within the ANC, between the Afri- canists, led by Robert Sobukwe and the Charterists, led by the ANC's then president Chief Albert Lutuli. The Africanists claimed that the ANC had betrayed the nationalist struggle to win South Africa for black South Africans and was pursuing instead a left-wing, communist-inspired class struggle. In November 1958 they split from the ANC and founded the Pan-Africanist Congress in April 1959.(165]

The ANC was declared an 'unlawful' organisation in April 1960 following the killings at Sharpeville, and was forced to continue its activities underground. In this context the ANC abandoned peaceful protest and turned to the armed struggle. Its armed wing, *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (the Spear of the Nation) was

formed in agreement with the South African Communist Party in 1961, with Nelson Mandela as its

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Commander-in-Chief.[166] After a series of sabotage attacks by *Umkhonto we Sizwe* within South Africa, the state soon exposed the underground networks of the organisation and captured most of the leaders at its secret Rivonia headquarters. The 'Rivonia Trial' resulted in the sentencing to life imprisonment of Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki and others. The ANC networks had been destroyed and the focus

[163] Extract from *Freedom Charter,* adopted by the Congress of the People, 26 June 1955.

[164) *Ibid.,* see, Davies, O'Meara, and Dlamini, *op. cit.,vol.* 2, pp.314-317. Also see, Francis Meli, *A History of the ANC: South Africa Belong to Us,* London, James Currey, 1988, appendix one, Full Text of the Freedom Charter.

[165) Davies, O'Meara, and Dlamini, *op. cit,* p.297.

1. Carter and O'Mcara, *op. cit.,* p.106. It was the PAC that organized the demonstrations against carrying passes on April 1960. When police fired on an unarmed crowd at Sharpeville in the Transvaal, killing seventy-two Africans and wounding some one hundred and eighty-six, including women and children, a new watershed was created in South African history.

turned towards regional alliances, as for instance with FRELIMO of Mozambique, MPLA of Angola, SWAPO of Namibia, and ZAPU of Zimbabwe.[167] The rest of the leadership went *into* exile to the sur­ rounding states.

The ANC has been a body *in* exile for over two decades, and to survive as a liberation movement *in* initiating political or military activity within South Africa, it has had to develop its political and bureau­ cratic organisation. The ANC has elected a National Executive Committee (NEC) of thirty-members. "The NEC meets infrequently and everyday df;cisions are in the hands of smaller Working Committee based *in* Lusaka and chaired by Olive Tambo [the President], or *in* his absence, the Secretary-General, Alfred Nzo

..."[168] The NEC has two Committees *in* policy formulation, first political committee, which deals with

political affairs *in* general, and the second military committee, which is responsible for the military activity within South Africa. All are subject to the authority of the NEC and were established *in* 1983 to replace the 'Revolutionary Council'.[169] The ANC secretariat is based *in* Lusaka and it is divided into three sections, a president's office, a treasury, and a division for external affairs. "The external affairs section administers

the ANCs diplomatic offices and representatives, a network which today embraces twenty-two coun­ tries."[170] One senior official from the President's Office described the ANC's foreign policy decision­ making:

"... our foreign policy is decided by the National Executive Committee [NEC] ..."[171]

The President's role in this process was stated thus:

1. T.R.H. Davenport, *op. cit,* pp.403-405.
2. Philip FrankeL Noam Pines and Mark Swilling (ed), *State Resistance and Change in South Africa,* London Croom Helm, 1988, p.232.
3. Tom Lodge, "State of Exile: The African National Congress of South Africa, 1976-86", *Third World Quarterly,* vol.9, no.1, January 1987, p.4.
4. *Ibid.,* p.5. The President's Office oversees the ANC's military establishment as well as its Information and Publicity Dcpart­ menL
5. *Personal Interview,* Tom Sebina, President's Office, Department of Information and Publicity, ANC Headquarter, Lusaka, Zambia, 4 March 1988.

"He is a man who likes to discuss everything with the NEC

and debate. That is his own personality. He doesn't want to be seen influencing that discussion in favour of his position. So it is very difficult for me to say who finally decides. But the major power is with Oliver Tarnbo and he is the leader of the organisation."[172)

The 1980s have seen·a dramatic change in the image of the ANC, both within South Africa and abroad. In South Africa it is widely perceived as the legitimate symbol of all the years of protest and tradi­ tional resistance against apartheid. Even in white liberal circles the ANC has gained credibility and some respectability, to the extent that liberal South Africans met and talked to ANC leaders in 1985 in Zambia. These meetings were started by Professor Hendrick Van Der Merwe of Cape Town University and Piet Muller, an assistant editor of *Die Beeld,* a government-supporting newspaper. The main objective of this meeting was to sit down at a round table and start a dialogue between the ANC officials and the South Afri­ can regime.[173] Another meeting was held in Senegal in July 1987 between fifty representatives ofliberal and progressive white opinion and ANC Officials.[174] Last, but not the least, a meeting was held between

P.W. Botha and Nelson Mandela in the presidential residence in Cape Town in 5 July 1989. On 12 July Mandela issued a statement saying:

" ... my release was not an issue at this stage, ...

my position is that talks with ANC were the only way of bringing peace ... at this early stage further statements to the press as a means of conducting possible future discussions would not be the appropriate course of action to promote peaceful development[l75]

Internationally, the ANC leaders have had official meetings with the' British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe and the US Secretary of State, George Schultz. The West has at last been chosen to turn to the ANC as a legitimate representative of black South Africa.

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| (172) | *Ibid..* |
| (173) | Interview with, Oliver Tambo, President of the ANC, *The Indian Ocean Newsletter: Special Report,* Paris 26 January 1985, pp.7-8. |
| [174) | William Cobbett and Robin Cohen, *Popular Struggle in South Africa,* London, James Currey, 1988, p.6. |
| (175) | *The Economist,* London, 15 July 1989, pp.67-68. |

## Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania

The PAC was formed in 1959, when Robert Sobukwe - an 'Africanist' - led a breakaway group from the ANC. It was the second organisation recognised by the OAU as a liberation movement in South Africa. The PAC was based on a philosophy of 'Africanism', the view that Africans should take their destiny into their own hands and not turn to other racial groups for a resolution of South Africa's political problems. After the ANC and PAC were banned in 1960, most of the PAC members escaped to Lesotho, then a Brit­ ish territory. In 1963 the PAC headquarters there were raided by South African and local police and the leaders were again forced to flee. The new headquarters were established in Tanzania. A futile attempt was made in Tanzania to form a united front with the ANC, and the two organizations remain separate and hos- tile. [176]

The PAC is based on a strong Pan-Africanist ideology. It identifies its "ultimate goal" as the achieve­ ment of "Africanist Socialist Democracy". This is defined politically as "government of the Africans, by the Africans and for the Africans", economically as "the rapid extension of industrial development in order to alleviate pressure on the land ... and a policy guaranteeing the most equitable distribution of wealth", and socially as "the full development of human personality".[177] *Pogo* "ourselves" or APLA - Azanian People's Liberation Anny - is the military wing of PAC. This began a series of attacks inside South Africa. In 1963 its underground organisation was destroyed and the PAC bas been riven with internal dispute since. In 1985, Johnson Mlambo was elected as leader and new chailperson of the PAC, Mlambo is working to try

to re-establish the PAC as a rival nationalist organisation to the ANC. [178]

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A senior official of the PAC described the political and bureaucratic hierarchy in the following manner:

1. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Southern Africa: The Escalation of a Conjiict,* London, Pracgcr Publishers, 1976, p.17.
2. Davies, ct. al., *op. cit.,* p.297. •Africanism' is a political philosophy developed by a pressure group within the Congr.:ss Youth League (CYL) during the 1940s. The philosophy behind Africanism was as assertive nationalism which emphasised local leadership and the liberation of Africans by Africans. It argued that Africans should assert themselves and their rights and that mass struggles were necessary to overthrow white domination. Africanism conflicted with the ANC's developing policy of a multi-racial, class-oriented approach to liberation, influenced by the Communist Party of South Africa. Africanism had its influence on the later development of black consciousness during the 1960s and 1970s, but it differed profoundly from the modem movement. Black consciousness, for instance, included 'Coloureds' and 'Indians' in its definition of black. See, Ali

A. Mazrui and Michael Tidy, *Nationalism and New States in Africa,* London, Heinemann, 1984.

1. *Ibid.,* pp.301-302. Also sec, G. Parker and P. Pfukani, *History of Southern Africa,* London, Bell and Hyman, 1983, pp.247- 257.

"Our Central Committee is a governing body, and we have got what we call a planner which bas been held in August every year. Now that planner confirms and corroborates all the decisions of the Central Committee. It becomes

the highest body of the Organisation, which deals with the external affairs. Internally, or the administrative body of the PAC is controlled by the National

Executive Committee and under that several departments, such as, foreign affairs, educational power, finance, economical affairs, welfare and health, and public information ... the foreign affairs department is being

led by Ahmed Abrahaim who represents the department in

the Central Committee. [179]

The Policy formulation and decision-making is in the hands of:

"... 20 members of the Central Committee plus the Chairman of the PAC. It is a collective decision, not a one-man decision."(180]

In 1979 unity of the ANC and PAC was formally recommended by the OAU Liberation Committee and supported by Nigeria, Libya, Tanzania and other states within the OAU to create a "united front" of all "African revolutionaries". However, the Front Line States have effectively ignored the PAC, despite his­ toric links between the PAC and the ruling parties in Zimbabwe and Tanzania. [181] The declared goal of the PAC remains that of creating a democratic state, based on African nationalism, after fust destroying white supremacy through armed struggle.

### The South West Africa People's Organisation

SWAPO is the primary political organisation in Namibia and led the truggle against the South Afri­ can administration of the country. During the First World War South African forces, acting at the request of the British Government, invaded South West Africa and, after defeating the German colonial forces, took control of the capital, Windhoek, in May 1915. After the Allied Peace Conference which was held in Paris in 1919, and the formation of the League of Nations, South Africa was made responsible for South West Africa under the terms of a League of Nations Mandate, to administer South West Africa as a "sacred trust

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| [179) | *Personal [nJerview,* Mr. Waters Toboti, PAC, Chief Representative for Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe, Harare, 22 March 1988. |
| [180) | *Ibid..* |
| [181) | Davies ct. al., *op. cit.,* p.302. Also sec, Tom Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945,* London, Longman, 1983, pp.305-317. |

of civilisation"[l82]

The historical roots of SWAPO lie in an organisation of Namibian contract workers, the Ovamboland People's Organisation (OPO) founded by Toivo ja Toivo in Cape Town, in 1957. Sam Nujoma and several others went to New York, where they began to seek support for the OPO among UN delegates. However, the South West Africa National Union (SWANU) was established in 1959. SWANU, known as a moderate political organization, was alleged to have been in contact with the South African Communist Party as well.[183] SWAPO was formed on 19 April 1960 as an alliance between the OPO and SWANU, with the former president of the OPO, Sam Nujoma, as its :first presidenl[l84] SWAPOs aims and objectives are:

"to 'Work in Solidarity for Justice and Freedom' ... to establish a free, democratic Government in South West Africa ... to work for the unification of all the people of South West Africa into a cohesive represen­ tative, national political organisation ... to work for the achievement of a complete independence for South West Africa and the removal all forms of oppression such as apartheid laws ... to work for a speedy recon­ struction of a better South West Africa ... reconstruction of the economy, education and social foundations

maintenance of contact, exchange of views and information and co-operation ..." [185]

The International Court of Justice ruled on the legality of South Africa's presence in Namibia on 26 August 1966, but its ruling was rejected by South Africa. This was followed by SWAPO guerilla attacks on South African troops. SWAPOs military wing was later re-organised and in 1973 was renamed the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). [186]

SWAPO was recognised in 1965 by the OAU as the liberation mov,ement of the Namibian people and accepted as the "authentic representative of the Namibian people". The General Assembly of the United Nations recognised it in December 1973 as the "sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people". In 1976 the UN Security Council passed a hard-hitting Resolution 385 calling for South African withdrawal from Namibia/South West Africa. The five western members of the UN Security Council came

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| [182) | Peter H. Katjaviva, *A History of Resistance in Namibia,* London, James Cuney, 1988, p.13. |
| [183] | Robert S. Jaster, *South Africa in Namibia: The Botha Strategy,* London, University Press of America, 1985, pp.17-19. |
| [184] | *Ibid.•* |
| [185] | *SWAPO* Constitution cited in, Katjavivi, *op. dt,* pp.45-46. |
| [186] | See, Mburumba *Kerina,Namibia:The Making of a Nation,* New York, Books in Focus Inc., 1981. |

together in a 'Contact Group' to defuse mounting pressure in South Africa and to facilitate negotiations for a settlement in Namibia. In February 1978 the group produced a set of proposals which was accepted in principle by SW APO and the South African government, and the UN Security Council endorsed a report by the UN Secretary General laying down the basis for transition to independence in Resolution 435. How­ ever, Resolution 435 was blocked for a ti.me by South Africa and US, which were insistent on linking a set­ tlement in Namibia to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. [187] As the dispute enters the 1990s following a UN monitored election indept;ndence for Namibia is at hand and hopes for its future are high.

SW APO survived the machinations of the USA and South Africans to eliminate the organisation as a political force. Tbis attempt to crush SWAPO has failed to create a political alternative in Namibia. SWAPO's survival can be seen in the context of its international relations with the international community and its clear policy in dealing with other states in gaining moral and material support for the liberation movement because of:

" ... **SW**APO's dependence on outside support forits very survival, its spokesmen are inclined to express a belligerent, Marxist line when they are in Moscow seeking arms ... and to take a pragmatic, non-aligned,

less doctrinaire stance when they are looking for diplomatic and financial support from the FLS or the UN ... the political wing [ofSWAPO] ... is thought to be moderate

and non-Marxist ... SWAPO president Sam Nujoma is a good team-worker who helps to maintain SWAPO unity ..." [188]

Meanwhile, SW APO has been markedly successful in winning growing political support within Namibia and in enhancing its claim to be the leading Namibian national movement This was confumed by its vie- tory in the recent elections, a victory which, nevertheless, does not obviate it from co-operating with other political groups in the seen-to-be-independent territory.

## Mozambique

As was the case in Angola, Mozambique became independent in 1975 after the Portuguese coup. However, Mozambique also had an anti-Portugese party, FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of

(187] Katjavivi, *op. cit.,* pp.114-120.

[188] RobertS. Jaster, *op. cit.,* p.19.

Mozambique), founded in 1962, which became the ruling party. It is opposed by :MNR-RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance), supported since independence by South Africa. But unlike Angola, Mozambique draws substantial income from the South African transit trade through the port of Maputo (the capital) and from the earnings of many of *its* citizens in South Africa. Thus, it is subject to more economic pressure by South Africa than is Angola. However, Mozambique did support guerilla activities in South Africa. The ANC and FRELIMO were particularly close to each other. As Samora Machel said, "the ANC represents the aspirations of all Southern Africans to a truly free and democratic fatherland." [189] Mozam­ bique was fully committed to help the liberation movements in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and now in South Africa. Inspite of its economic burdens Mozambique adopted a foreign policy which made it a target of outside aggression.

To understand Mozambique's foreign policy, it is necessary to look at the history of FRELIMO as the ruling party. FRELIMO's leadership has gone through three periods of transformation: the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. The formation of FRELIMO took place in the 1960s from the coalition of four political organizations that were fighting against the Portuguese colonial regime in Mozambique. These movements, consisting of black nationalists, have been identified as the Mozambican National Democratic Union (UDENAMO), the Mozambican National Union (MANU), the African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI), and "O Bando de Argel" (the Gang of Argel), which was a Marxist group that consisted predom­ inantly of non-blacks. That period was dominated by strong nationalist and pro-West foreign policy orien­ tations, which can be seen in Dr. Eduardo Mondlane's good relationship witk the Kennedy Administration.

[190] From the mid-sixties to the early-seventies there was a struggle for power between the black national­ ists and the Marxists. The era of the 1970s was known as the struggle for liberation of Mozambique and during this time, the Marxists took total control of FRELIMO's leadership. In foreign policy FRELIMO was going to follow the principles of non-alignment. However, they defined non-alignment to be "align­ ment against imperialism". Thus FRELIMO's foreign policy, particularly between 1975 to 1981, was anti-

[I 89) Quotation from *AIM,* "President Delivers New Years Addressff, Maputo, 29 December 1983.

(190) Luis Benjamin Serapaio, "Mozambique Foreign Policy and '

the West: 1975-1984", *Munger Africana Library Notes,* California, California Institute of Technology, no. 76, August 1985, pp.3-4. For more historical background, see chapter four of this thesis. See also, Tony Hodges, "Mozambique: The Politics of Liberation", in, Carter and O'Meara, *op. cit.,* pp.48-88.

West and solidarity with full support for the liberation struggle in Southern Africa [191]

After independence, Mozambique was involved in the liberation struggle in Rhodesia, which made it a target of outside aggression, and its support for the ANC incited the South African military's direct attacks and total support for the MNR. The pressure on Mozambique became so great, that FRELIMO decided to end the hostility of South Africa and cultivate new sources of aid by following an Open-Door policy with the West This campaign for international understanding came to be called the 'Diplomatic Offensive'. [192)

South Africa's interest in Mozambique stems from the geographical locations of both countries. Mozambique falls exactly within the zone of South Africa's plan for the Constellation of Southern African States, which would provide a buffer zone against ANC infiltration into South Africa. Mozambique also provides a great economic opportunity for South African businessmen. However, Mozambique also has an interest in South Africa, such as, controlling the MNR infiltration into Mozambique and technical­ economic help from South Africa would assist in re-building the Mozambican economy.

On a political level FRELIMO bas sought since its entry into the transitional government to consoli­ date its political supremacy by creating a one-party state. All opposition political groups are now illegal and all governmental bodies are subordinate to FRELIMO.[193) Article 37 of the constitution states that"... the People's Assembly is the supreme organ of the State". The People's Assembly meets in ordinary ses­ sion at least twice per year. Between meetings of the Assembly its functions are performed by a 15-

member Permanent Commission (comprising six Politburo members and ni,ne government officials) elected from among its members. The People's Assembly bas 210 members who include the Central Committee of

FRELIMO, ministers, vice-ministers, provincial governors, representatives of the armed forces and from each province and ten other Mozambican citizens, all these members of the Assembly are appointed by the

(191] *Ibid.,* p.5.

(192] Joseph Hanlon, *Mozambique: Revolution Under Fire,* London, Zed Books Press, 1984, p.235. Also see, Benjamin Pognmd, "Maputo Gingerly Opens Door to the West", *Rand Daily Mail,* 5 June 1984, p.11, From the Joint Publication Research Service, *Sub-Saharan Africa Report,* vol.84, no.75, 1984, p.43-44. FRELIMO altered its foreign policy in 1982 in order to mount a di­ plomatic counter-offensive against South Africa and MNR attacks. Without breaking its ties with Eastern-bloc countries. FRELIMO also sought Western economic aid and assistance. Sec, Allen Isaacman, "Mozambique and South Africa, 1900- 1983: Tugging at the Chains of Dependency", in, Gerald Bender, et. al. (ed), *African Crisis Areas and US Foreign Policy,* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985.

[193] Carter and O'Meara, *op. cit.,* p.59.

President. [194] In practice the People's Assembly's role in the Nkomati decision process was secondary and far from what the constitution states its function to be, that is 'supreme'. For example, the decision to sign the Nkomati Accord with South Africa was not taken by the Assembly. According to Vieira:

"... the decision was taken in discussions in the Politburo,

in the Central Committee, then, in the Council of Ministers ... it was later presented to the People's Assembly as

the Constitution demands, to be ratified ... It was discussed and approved unanimously ..." [195]

So, the role of the People's Assembly became largely a rubber-stamp for the decisions of the government. However, a clearer picture about the decision-making process in Mozambique came from Robert Davies:

"In Mozambique [the decision-making process in foreign policy is] basically the highest political body is the FRELIMOs Political Bureau ... I think many of the decisions are during the time when the President Samora Machel around taken under his leadership ... he was a very

strong personal input ... Chissano is more a collective

and associate with the Political Bureau ..." [196]

We can understand from Davies' statement that President Samora Machel was dominant in decision- making and policy formulation because

"... there was a feeling that Mozambique was characterised by sha1p divisions between the military and political leadership and that only President Samora Machel run the whole show ..."[197]

The major issues of FRELIMO's foreign policy reflect the principal questions of Mozambique's

problems, especially on the economic and security levels. Mozambique has attempted to lessen its

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economic dependence on South Africa by joining the SADCC. At its first conference in Maputo in November 1980, two billion American dollars in projects were proposed of which over 40% was to have been spent in Mozambique primarily on transportation and communication facilities, illustrating Mozambique's key regional position. [198]

[194) *Ibid..*

1. *Personal Interview,* Colonel, Sergio Vieira, Director of Centre for African Studies, Maputo, 28 April 1988.
2. *Personal Interview,* Robert Davies, Centre for African Studies, Maputo, Mozambique, 19 April 1988.
3. *Ibid..*

[198) Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution; 1900-1982,* Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983, p.173.

Unlike Angola, the pressures of civil war in Mozambique proved too much to bear. At the same time, South Africa was under US and European pressure to solve its problems with Mozambique in the interests of regional stability and to ease off on the ANC. This is the basic background of the Nkomati Accord the subject of the remainder of this study. The Accord, however, was the result of both psychologi­ cal and economic concerns on both sides. But since that time, the terms of the agreement have increasingly come to play a part in the politics of southern Africa.

In conclusion, the Front Line States present different political structures and economic bases, but all have to take account of South African foreign policies toward them. That policy is briefly the subject of the final section in this chapter.

## South Africa

The key factors in shaping the present system of government and bureaucracy in South Africa regard­ ing Southern Africa were the 1974 Portuguese coup and the events leading up to the independence of Zim­ babwe in 1980. It was deemed necessary to restructure and 'rationalize' the policy-decision process under a new bureaucratic National Security Management System which, although separate from the political government as represented by the ruling National Party, yet would be integrated in a military-intelligence­ political establishment. Briefly stated, this system would consist of four bodies - National Security, Consti­ tutional Affairs, Economic Affairs, and Social Affairs. The first is also known as the State Security Council

(SSC).[199] The basic perception of this new structure was that the threa,t and use of violence was neces- sary and useful in preserving South African nationalism as it had developed under apartheid.

This security system is an attempt to transcend the obvious splits in the National Party. As such, much political power was transferred from parliament to a number of interrelated state departments in which the military and the police would play major roles. It works in the following way:

1. The State Security Council, although only a cabinet committee, is responsible for deciding on and implementing policy decision related to state security.

[199] Gavin Cawthra, *Brutal Force: The Aparthied War Machine,* London; International Defence & Aid for Southern Africa, 1986, pp.31-32. :

1. Directly under the SSC are fifteen (15) interdepartmental committees which are involved with almost all state departments or 'national interests'.
2. These committees are responsible for national co-ordination, the implementation of which falls under a number of Joint Management Centres. A number of these bodies, for example, correspond exactly to SADF (South African Defence Forces) area commands.
3. All South African intelligence services were reorganized for better unity of operation.
4. Members of the SSC include the President of the Republic, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Police Commissioner, and the Head of the SADF.[200]

One can see from the above, that South Africa, in its bureaucratic mode, tends to illustrate the bureaucratic model within which different actors create a competition between and within South African administration. Evidence has indicated tensions and disagreements within Pretoria bureaucracy, for exam­ ple, *Gorongosa Docwnents,* showed not only continued support to :MNR in direct violation of the Nkomati Accord, but also evidence of severe tensions between SADF and the Foreign Ministry as well as within the Foreign Ministry (the case of Louis Nel's visit to Gorongosa as we shall see in chapter five). We can note, further, that there were other events such as the riots in South Africa beginning in the mid-1970s that helped lead to this greater concern over security and its attainment. These will be discussed as appropriate in the next chapter. But for the moment, it is important to see generally the psychological and perceptual bases of the actual operation of the security policy of this bureaucratic structure and some of the stresses and strains it has caused within South Africa.

The government of South Africa, during the late 1970s and especially from 1980 on, used its new policy structure to implement what it called a 'total strategy' toward its neighbours, meaning especially the Front Line States. We have seen some evidence of how this strategy is worked out in practice. However, the state's public explanation of this strategy was that it was necessary to prevent southern Africa from drifting toward and collapsing into communist regimes.[201]

[200] *Ibid.,* pp.35-40.

1. *Ibid.,* pp.27-28, also sec, Kenneth W. Grundy, *The Militarization of South African Politics,* Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988, pp.87-106.

Yet, it is important to remember in all this that the government's main psychological and rhetorical efforts in this policy are directed toward its own people. It was deemed necessary to build up the morale and unity of the troops and the civilian population. Thus, South Africa has had to reformulate the policy of apartheid in South Africa, while pointing to the communist menace for international and internal consump­ tion - a menace that many in all sectors of society took to be real.

A major part of this programme is thus based on a review of certain South African historical events and developments that magnify the Afrikaner role and denigrate the roles of other South African peoples. According to Leonard Thompson, the basis of this 'history' is racial superiority or, in other words, a myth. But for South Africa, the pexpetuation of the myth is itself a matter of history, tradition, political pro­ paganda, and social reinforcement Thompson continues: ''The political mythology that legitimizes the South African social order rests on a core assumption about humanity. The core assumption is that *races* are the fundamental divisions of humanity and that different races possess inherently different cultural as well as physical qualities".[202]

This doctrine, therefore, is considered necessary for many reasons and it has become even more cru­ cial because of undoubted tensions within South Africa. Briefly, these are:

1. Criticisms from both the 'right' and 'left' political elements. The first, for example, is not going far enough in its domestic and foreign policies; that Pretoria is engaging in a 'sellout'. The second ele­ ment, far weaker, runs the gamut from simple humanitarian concerns to the view that South Africa needs a social revolution. *T*
2. The economic drain of the policy on South Africa, is estimated at about one billion (US $) per annum

(in the mid 1980s).

1. Growing disagreements between the military and civilian leaders over the tactics of the policy. This split is exacerbated after military setbacks, such as that in Angola in 1975-76.
2. Even some National Party politicians have stated that South Africa should, instead, try to find credit­ able alternatives, rather than just reacting to ANC and SWAPO actions.[203]
3. Leonard Thompson, *The Political Myth of Apartheid,* New Haven, Yale University fuss, 1985, p.69.
4. Sec, generally, Joseph Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, *op. cit..*

Foreign policy-making under P.W. Botha was highly centralised and dominated by the head of state

and bis key advisors.[204] According to Jaster:

11 ••• Botha and a small group of intimates, most of whom were hand-picked by him, discuss and decide policy ... none of this is likely to change much under the new

three-chambered parliament, indeed, the new system places more power in bis hands ... it can be said with

confidence that [Botha] has been the dominant influence on policy in the past years ... He is an aggressive, articulate political animal who fought bis way up ... he is a career-type more common to·the Soviet leadership hierarchy ...11[205]

Botha's long and close association with the military as defence minister has led him to give the military establishment a greater formal role in the decision-making process.[206] After Botha came to power, he

11 ••• was in fact re-organising the decision-making process in the apartheid state, and the militarisation of the forces ... Botha came to power with the support of the top military commanders ... They had been given a key role in the decision-making process through the national security

management system, the state security council - which is the highest body of the national

security management system - generally reckoned to be the highest decision-making body in the apartheid state, the military are strongly represented in this ... but I think these processes have taken place not as it were against the politicians but with the direct support and encouragement of P.W. Botha ... P.W. Botha has been intimately involved in this as [well as] bis

political associates ...11[207]

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The new constitution which was adopted by South Africa in 1984, gave the state President potentially authoritarian powers and the SSC has become even more important than the cabinet and the new tricameral parliament In the new constitution, the power to make decisions is focused in the office of the President. Toe SSC is well placed to advise and guide the President Although the SSC is structurally placed to extend its already great and increase its influence on most of the decisions,[208] nevertheless, civil servants

1. Deon Gcldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy-Making,*Johannesburg, Macmillan South Africa, 1984, p.238.
2. Jaster, *op. cit.,* p.102.
3. Grundy, *op. cit.,* p.107.
4. *Personal Interview,* Robert Davies, Centre for African Studies, Mozambique, Maputo, 19 April 1988. See, Stephen Cb.an, *Ex­ porting Apartheid: Foreign Policies in Southern Africa, 1978-1988,* London, Macmillan, forthcoming 1990.
5. Robert I. Rotberg, Henry S. Bicnen, Robert Lcgvold, and Gavin G. Maasdorp, *South Africa and its Neighbours: Regional*

of the foreign affairs and other individuals groups such as, the Afrikaans-speaking business community, still influence decision-makers and they have access to the President and bis government, which makes the decision-making process in South Africa today a very complex bureaucratic one.

### CONCLUSION

Decision-making in the FLS-SADCC countries is dominated by the bead of the government This bas significant implications for problem0 sol ving and foreign policy on Southern Africa. Mozambique's decision to sign the Nkomati Accord is an example of this. The President acts in the name of the state, and makes **a** strong impact on the formulation and articulation of foreign policy in Southern Africa. On the other hand, South Africa, in its bureaucratic mode, tends to illustrate the bureaucratic politics model but not exclusively so since it, too, like the FLS, does give a wide degree of discretion to the bead of government. This bas been recognised now in the strengthened position of the President in the new constitution. In secu­ rity matters, given their great importance in regional affairs, decision-making is restricted to a small group, although the implementation of decisions is subject to the vagaries of bureaucratic politics. The competi­ tion between and within government administrations may also be the result of a calculated ambiguity in South African's regional policies, an ambiguity designed to keep the FLS-SADCC countries off balance. The SADF keeps South Africa's neighbours in fear while Pik Botha promies economic rewards and assis­ tance in exchange for 'good behaviour'. In other words, the decision-making structure is well adapted for

South Africa's foreign policy, based on strength and coercion, which bas always bad 'carrot' and 'stick'

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faces, reflecting both its ability to enforce its will militarily, and its need for regional economic co­ operation to secure profits from its neighbours.

The above of course, is only an outline of the policy that South Africa has undertaken recently. It bas varied in terms of which country South Africa is dealing with - the Nkomati Accord would be an example here. There is also no doubt that Swaziland, to take another example, poses far less of a threat, in South African eyes, than does the Mugabe regime. And South Africa bas bad to take account of international

views and pressures. But these fluctuations only point out that the bureaucratic policy machine is subject to

*Security and Self-lnteust,* Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1985, p.13.

perceptions about its neighbours. And these perceptions, in tum, are strongly tied to the domestic situation. South Africa perceives that the domestic conflict can be solved by solving the regional conflict - in its favour, by coercive policies, if necessary. Therefore, the next ·chapter will describe and explain the root of South Africa's coercive policies through studying the Afrikaner's history. Chapter three, also, will explain Pretoria's regional strategy which shape the present political events in Southern Africa today.

# CHAPTER THREE IDSTORICAL BACKGROUND

## The Afrikaners' History

South African history, like that of all sections of the planet, fades into the mists of the primordial. Before the European went to Southern Africa, Bushmen and Hottentots roved freely throughout the terri­ tory, hunting game and fighting with one another. Tribes from central and eastern Africa were migrating southward and settling in parts of what were later to become the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, Natal, the Cape Province, South West Africa (Namibia), Basutoland (Lesotho), Swaziland and Bechuanaland (Botswana). During the Age of Exploration, the Portuguese found the way around the Cape of Good Hope.[1] and became the undisputed masters of the trade with the East. Philip II of Spain, at the end of the sixteenth century, acquired Portugal as part of bis domains, and, in bis efforts to subdue bis rebellious Dutch subjects, closed the port of Lisbon to their ships. Their response was to found the Dutch East India Company and to establish a supply station halfway between Europe and the East, at the very tip of Africa, at Cape Town. Here their ships could stop, take on fresh water, vegetables and meat and finish their jour­ ney, either to the East, to buy the spices, silks and the like which were their goal, or to the North and West, homeward with their profitable cargo. The initial vision of the Company was a spartan station which was under strict instructions not to invite any trouble with the indigenous peoples, at that time mostly Bushmen and Hottentots, essentially nomadic peoples, who raised cattle but regarded the land which they occupied as belonging to all for common use. The earliest occupants of the station bartped with the natives, exchang­ ing copper wire and beads for cattle and living in peace.

The first head of the station, send out from the Netherlands, quickly discovered that the cheapest way to provide supplies for the ships was to import free colonists and to encourage them to raise sheep, cattle and food to sell to the Company at fixed prices. Thus began the first real immigration to the region, a small company of independent farmers and their families who began to regard the territory as home. Many

1. Bartholemew Diaz (1450-1500), was the Portuguese sailor who discovered for Europeans and named the Cape of Good Hope in 1488. He was followed ten years later by Vasco da Gama who opened up the route to India for the Portuguese. Since that time South Africa has been very important strategically as the guardian of the Cape sea routes. Sec, C.FJ. Muller, *Five H11n­ dred Years: A History of South Africa,* Pretoria, Acadcmica, Third Edition, 1981, pp.5-6.

Afrikaner historians declare absolutely that these early settlers found the territory uninhabited and that all Black natives were later arrivals on the scene. As we shall see, that official history chooses to ignore much that *is* inconvenient for its patriotic purposes, and there is clear evidence, from the letters and journals of Portuguese in the region at the time, that "Africans were living in what is now ... the Republic of South Africa from at least 1500".[2] Around Cape Town itself, the natives were mostly Bushmen and Hottentots,

although slaves were imported by the Dutch from Madagascar and both East and West Africa very early in their period of settlement. The miscegenation that occurred over the years between the Bushmen, the Afri­ cans and the Europeans created the Cape Coloured, who today represent about ten per cent of the total population of South Africa. The indigenous Blacks, who lived in and around the lands settled by the expanding farmers, are still in the country and form an integral part of the population. The Europeans are themselves a mixture of Dutch, Germans, French, Portuguese, Hugenots, and English and number some­

what more than three million today (more than eight times as great as the rest of the white population living south of the Sahara). So the origins of the demographic difficulties besetting the Republic of South Africa today go back to the earliest times of the European settlement The small Asian population came later, except the Malaysians, brought by the Dutch in the early days as workers.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, there were about "1,700 European men, women and chil­ dren, and about an equal number of slaves. There was a sturdy independence of mind and spirit that grew up among the white settlers, which had its roots in their ancestral origins but developed a flavour all its

own, so that the term Afrikaner became a description of someone who though European by origin, was nei-

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ther Dutch nor German nor French ... with ... a strong sense of individual freedom and a hearty dislike of

.control by government ... the European colonists bad every incentive to become undisciplined individual­ ists. Slave labour, plenty of land, and a reasonably fertile climate conspired to produce a leisurely people, accustomed to being obeyed by slaves and Hottentots but themselves not obeying the law, resenting interference, and regarding government at the distant castle in Cape Town as something that should protect but not tax".[3]

* 1. Leo Marquard, *The People and Policies of South Africa,* 3rd edition, London and Oxford, 1962, Oxford University Press, p.l.
  2. *Ibid.,* p.5.

The significance of that period was witnessed on emergence of the Afrikaner political consciousness, which is still characterising some of the political activity and thinking in modem South Africa. Describing the emergence of the:

" ... Afrikaner political consciousness, we must be careful not to ignore the social differences and economic cleavages among the white population at the Cape. From the outset Afrikaner political thinking was not the unified product of an undifferentiated group consciousness, but tended to reflect the social differences and economic cleavages which existed within the settler community at large. The most obvious differences were between the settled colonists of the southwestern Cape enjoying an established community life, and the isolated cattle farmers of the interior.

Politically the dominant group was the farmer, a small fairly prosperous bourgeoisie, consisting of top government officials ... and few wealthy farmers. For all these internal differences the vast majority had one thing on common ... by the end of the eighteenth century no longer considered themselves Dutchmen,

Germans or Frenchmen. Their conception of being rooted in Africa, their only true home, found expression in the term 'Afrikaner', which now began to come into general usage ... Afrikaner was to become the term that epitomized the concept of a settler society which had become indigenous ... it was a term worthy of esteem, of pride, it reflected the self-conception of a group beginning to articulate its sense of its own social existence and political status."[4]

Toe steadily increasing demand for meat and produce in Cape Town led to migrations east across the Hottentots-Holland Mountains to establish large cattle farms during the eighteenth century.. These were the *trekboere* (the sons of boers which means the frontier farmers), the trekking farmers who asked for nothing but to be left alone. They found vast stretches of what they regarded as uninhabited land and they grazed it at will, moving as the occasion demanded. They encountered the ushmen, who believed the land was 'theirs' and conflict broke out with the seeminly inevitable result of the eventual defeat and subjugation of the natives.

Efforts on the part of the government in Cape Town led to the establishment, in 1795, of two short­ lived republics. The British, in support of the Dutch after the Netherlands had been invaded by French revolutionaries in 1795, occupied Cape Town and returned it in 1806 not to the Dutch East India Company but to the new Dutch Republic. Napoleon's war with Britain led the latter to resume control of the Cape,

* 1. Andre Du Toit and Hermann Giliomee, *Afrikaner Political Thought,* vol. one: 1780-1850, Cape Town, David Philip Publisher Ltd., 1983, pp.4-5.

fearful of the colony remaining in the hands of a French ally. In 1815 the Congress of Vienna ratified the annexation to the British Empire. The British were not content with the relaxed style of government of the Dutch trading company and set out to put things in order. The slave trade was abolished and courts were established to deal with matters the frontiersmen had earlier regarded as purely personal matters. Although the new British immigrants, some 5,000 of them in 1822, and the new administration brought order, and economic vigour to the region, two acts of the new masters rankled greatly with the Afrikaners: English was declared the only official language, d the principle of equality before the law was established for 'all free persons of colour'. The former was repealed thirty years later, but it is still remembered with rancour. As for the latter, "In the twentieth century, white opinion in Africa can with difficulty bring itself even to contemplate the doctrine of racial equality, and it may be imagined with what loathing the frontiersmen of 1828 regarded it".[5]

Some of the Afrikaners trekked to the highveld of what is now the Orange Free State, but conflict broke out with the native Kaffirs,[6] and the British government refused to annex lands belonging to the indigenous people, so the farmers, despairing of any help from the English governors, began what is known as the Great Trek. The major reason of such conflict was that there was no "recognized authority capable of settling such disputes as might develop ... [it can] best be described an an authority crisis. There were, of course, various authorities exercising some control on the colonists as well as in the various tribal commun- ities, but none was capable of establishing itself as undisputed authority in the frontier zone, restraining unauthoriz.ed actions, or enforcing treaties and settlements on its nominal subjects. In the absence of any common and generally legitimired conventions for conflict regulation, frontiermen intent on pressing their claims usually had *to* make do with whatever coercive powers were at their own disposal. The intensity of such disputes as would arise was constrained by the limited powers of coercion available to individuals and groups, as well as by the risks of open conflict".[7]

[5) Leo Marquard, *op. cit.,* p.9.

1. The words Native Kaffir are used to describe the Bantu-speaking people of S.A. See Leo Marquard, *The Story of South Africa,* London, Faber and Faber Ltd., 1963, pp.20-27. In earlier times the tribes which long challenged the white colonists' advance on the eastern frontier were distinctively known as the Kaffir. However, in origin, Kaffir, or giaour, was the Islamic term for unbeliever and is still used by Islamic Africans of their non-Islamic fellows. Even more decisively an Afrikaans form, Kaffir, has become a term of contemptuous abuse. Sec W.M. Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer, and Briton,* Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1963, p.xv.
2. Du Toit and Giliomce, *op. cit.,* p.129.

The pioneers complained of the suppression of their language and customs, the lack of protection on the frontier, the unfair way in which the liberation of slaves had been accomplished, and they complained that they had no representative in the government that truced them. Between 1836 and 1846 some 10,000 men, women and children left their homes in the Cape Colony, seeking only to be left in peace. The Voor­ trekkers encountered dangers and difficulties even more severe than the pioneers moving West in America. They sought an independent republican state where there would be no equality between black and white. The intended to purchase the lands on "'.'hich they should settle and sought an agreement with the Zulu monarch, Dingaan. He feared this intrusion and in a trick slaughtered seventy of the leaders of the settlers. This resulted in a war, with the usual result, in 1838 the Zulus were decisively defeated and their territory annexed.[8] Their new land (Natal) included the port of Durban, and was regarded by Cape merchants as a competitive threat to their monopoly. This, together with continuing troubles with the Zulu, led to British intervention and annexation, which in tum gave birth to another trek back over the Drakensberg Mountains to the bighveld of the present Free State and Transvaal, but the British followed them there as well, and in 1848 a British Governor was installed.[9] The main political question during this period" ... was not the conflict with the indigenous peoples, but whether or not the British colonial authorities would attempt to gain control of these new settlements and thus, as it were, capture the Trek movement from behiod ... [therefore] .. the Trekker communities knew that they were not strong enough to offer any direct challenge to the imperial forces".[10]

The home government in London was wearying of the expense and trouble of colonies and in 1852,

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Britain withdrew all claims to sovereignty beyond the Vaal River and two years later withdrew south of the

.Orange River, leaving two Boer Republics, The Orange Free State and the South African Republic (the Transvaal), free of British control. The Boers established huge farms and ranches in their new territories. "The Boer ideal, that when he sat on bis step he should not see the smoke from bis nearest neighbour's chimney, could be realized in those spacious days".[11] They found vast stretches of 'unoccupied' land

1. Bill Freund, *The Making of Contemporary Africa,* London, The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1984, pp.76-78.
2. T.R.H. Davenport, *South Africa: A Modem History,* London, Macmillan Press, 1987, pp.80-82.
3. Du Toit and Giliomce, *op. cit.,* p.19.
4. Marquard, *op. cit.,* p.12.

which the native Africans regarded as theirs for hunting and grazing. When the settlers entered agreements to acquire the land by purchase or treaty from the tribal chiefs, they did not realize that the chiefs had no power to dispose of these lands which belonged to all. The chiefs believed they were agreeing to let the newcomers 'use' the land. No one could 'own' it

So the new republics were set apart from the British colonies to the south by three important matters. First, the language was Afrikans, not English. Second. there was no pretence about racial equality, which in the eyes of the Dutch Reformed Church was unBiblical and contrary to the laws of God. And third, the Boers regarded the land they acquired from the natives as rightfully theirs (given them, in fact, by God) whereas the British displayed greater respect for the territorial rights of the African natives. All three of these were to have fateful consequences as the years went on.

The Great Trek changed the course of the history of southem Africa. It withdrew from the Cape Colony, at a critical period, about a quarter of its Dutch speaking population, thus giving British ideas and institutions fuller play in the Cape Colony. In a period of ten years it opened up vast tracts of land and esta­ blished three new political entities, and it thus opened the way to eventual expansion northwards. It brought millions of Africans under the political control of Europeans, and in so doing it deprived them of any of their rights to tribal occupation of land and reduced the areas to which they had previous had free access.[12]

The Great Trek thus created a great wall between Afrikaners and British ways of living and govern­

ing. The Cape used English and provided some rights for blacks. "British policy from the Great Trek until

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the Boer War bred a deep suspicion in the minds of Afrikaners, and even now the Afrikaner cannot quite shake off the illusion that he is being followed".[13] But perhaps the greatest result of the Great Trek is found in its impact on Afrikaner thought patterns. Just before the Battle of Blood River, at which the Zulus were decisively defeated, the Trekkers held a solemn church service in which the minister declared that if God granted them the victory, they would thereafter hold a service of Thanksgiving every year on that day (December 16).(14) The Day of the Covenant is still celebrated as a national holiday. "Afrikaners regard the

[l'.!] *Ibid.,* p.14.

1. *Ibid.,* see also, Eric Anderson Walker, *The Great Trek,*London, Adam and Charles Black, 1965.
2. Muller, *op. cit.,* p.166.

Great Trek as the great cultural, spiritual and political event that gave birth to the Afrikaner nation ... South Africa is full of memories that its citizens cannot yet share with equal pride: and the Great Trek is still one of them".[15] The Europeans in the Cape Colony had a very good experience with the policy of some suf­ frage for all races, largely because there were restrictions of property and educational requirements applica­ ble to all, which meant that the enfranchisement of the coloured and Africans was very gradual, and those who could vote were well qualified. A number of factors combined in the last half of the nineteenth cen­ tury, including the discovery first of diam(?nds and then of gold, to encourage several efforts toward a union of the two cultures: the British in the south and the Afrikaners in the north.

The Transvaal was at one point forcibly annexed by British arms but had its independence restored by London Liberal outrage. Cecil Rhodes and his shady colleague, Jameson (an infamous name to this day in South Africa) cooked up a plot to take the Transvaal by use of a trumped up incident It failed miserably and both Rhodes and Jameson were disgraced, but a new jingoistic spirit in London refused to repudiate the action.[16]

The Afrikaners believed that Britain wanted to reduce them to the position of political, economic, and cultural vassalage. This they would not allow, no matter what happened. Their answer was to struggle to assert Boer initiatives as the dominant influences in the white community. Thus were the foundation laid for the long and bitter conflict between the Boers and the British.[17] A conference in 1899 sought to bring about reconciliation but failed because of President Kruger's inability to ensure the rights of the so-called


Uitlanders (non-Afrikaners) living in the Afrikaner republics. The British sent troops; the Transvaal

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demanded they be withdrawn and the Boer War began. (See map no. 2).


After some initial military successes, the Boers were driven back, and British troops moved into the Free State and the Transvaal. Lord Kitchener discovered that every farm was a Boer base and decided he must bum them. Women and children could not be left on the bare veld to starve and so were brought into concentration camps. The impulse was humane, but the administration of the camps left much to be

1. Marquard, *op. cit., p.15.*
2. Davenport, *op. cit.,* pp.206-210.
3. Jordan K. Ngubanc, *An African Explains Apartheid,* Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1963, p.23.



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### Map no. 2, The Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902.



Source: T.R.H. Davenport, *South Africa:* ***A*** *Modern History,*

Third edition, London, Macmillan Press 1987, p.213.

desired. Crowded conditions, poor sanitation, bad supply arrangements combined to create epidemics of typhoid fever and measles, costing the lives of some 26,000 women and children. The fact that thousands of British soldiers also perished from the fever was (and is) regarded as irrelevant Those camps fmm a last­ ing scar on the Afrikaner mentality, a kind of Holocaust of their own. The war finally ended on May 3, 1902. On the same date, eight years later, the Union of South Africa came into being. Initially the Anglo­ Boer War of 1899-1902 ... "united the Afrikaners in South Africa. Transvaalers and Free Staters fought side by side and many Afrikaners went from the Cape Colony and Natal to join the republican forces. This war, which involved the whole of South Africa, was greatly to influence the future course of South Africa "[18]

Most of the terms of the proposed constitution were acceptable to both English and Afrikaner delegates to the National Convention, including the decision to create a genuine Union as opposed to a mere federation. But several issues divided the delegates. Provincial councils in Natal and the Free State were given powers that could not be over-ridden by Parliament until ten years after union. The franchise matter was the most difficult of all. The Cape franchise, with no colour bar, was precious to its believers, while the Transvaal and Free Staters staunchly refused to give the vote to non-Europeans. "Eventually it was decided to leave the franchise laws of the four states as they were and to satisfy the Cape delegates by entrenching the Cape franchise in a clause which provided that it could be altered only by a two-thirds majority of both Houses of Parliament sitting together ... by May of 1910 the Union was an accomplished fact"[l9]

The Union was actively involved in both of the World Wars of the twentieth century, but neither of them produced a united European population. Both from 1914 to 1918 and from 1939 to 1945, there were strong pro-German and anti-British feelings common among the Afrikaner population. There was a wave of isolationism and a feeling that the Union should not be involved in 'English Wars'. The pro­ Commonwealth forces prevailed and large numbers of citizens fought bravely and gallantly against the Tri-

1. Muller, *op. cit.,* p.327. For detailed events about the Anglo-Boer war 1899-1902, see also, Muller, *op. cit,* pp.328- 361 and Davenport, *op. cit.,* pp.211-221.
2. Marquard, *op. cit.,* p.17. See also, Edwin S. Munger, *Afrikaner and African Nationalism: South Africa Parallels and Parame­ ters,* Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1967.

ple Alliance and the Axis Powers.[20] The Anglo-Boer War was still fresh in their minds. They had not yet forgiven the British for what they had made them suffer.

The Nationalist Party, which had been founded by Hertzog in 1914 in protest against the decision to declare war on Germany and had taken as its slogan 'South Africa First', grew steadily in power and was able in 1924 to form a coalition government in co-operation with the Labour Party. At the Imperial Confer­ ences of 1926 and 1930, Herwg secured beyond any doubt the independence of South Africa as a member of the British Commonwealth, and he regarded his mission as accomplished. His view was not shared by the more extreme wing of the Nationalists, and the movement was troubled by schism and factionalism which resulted in political victory for the Union Party led by Herzog and Smuts. This was the party that carried the country into the Second World War, despite the protests of the Nationalist Party. Herzog pro­ posed first a 'benevolent neutrality' and when that failed, called for a General Election to test the will of the

electorate. The British Governor General refused, and feelings ran high, although the Nationalists rejoiced that Herzog had at last shown himself as a 'true Afrikaner'. Three years after the war, the Union Party, led by Smuts, suffered a narrow defeat by a coalition of the Nationalist and Afrikaner parties in the General Election of 1948. His defeat and death two years later "mark the end of one phase of South African history and the beginning of another and even more turbulent period".[21]

This is a bird's eye view of South African history from its beginnings in the sixteenth century until 1948, when the Afrikaners came to the political power they still hold. It is noteworthy that the speeches and

writings of the defenders of apartheid contain many references to historical reminders and historical

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justifications. One Afrikaner summed up the unique view of history as follows: "The Afrikaner's view of his past is based on national-political values and on biblical foundations. That is perhaps the reason for the ethical and moralizing note. There *is* a strong conviction that the destiny of this people and this country is divinely ordained."[22]

1. Ivor Wilkins and Hans Strydom, *The Super-Afrikaners: Inside the Afrikaner Broederbond,* Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball Pub­ lishers, 1978, pp.76-78.
2. F.A. van Jaarsvelcl, *The Afrikaners lnJupretation of South African History,* Cape Town, Simondium, 1964, p.58.
3. *Ibid.•*

To cite van Jaarsveld again, "It was Paul Kruger [President of the Transvaal during the Boer War] who revealed God's leadership in the history of the Afrikaner people: whatever happened to them was His will; He was the sovereign of history and its central theme. Being an Afrikaner is seen as a divine right, the highest and greatest worlc of God".[23] This is the official version of the national history taught in the schools in which the Bantu's place is only as the foe defeated by the heroism of the ancestors and the Brit­ ish are regarded "much more as the persecutors of the Afrikaner than builders of the country".[24] The three Dutch Reformed Churches have had their doctrinal differences over the years, but on this point they are solidly united: the divine hand in the shaping of the national history. God Himself, in their belief, placed the Afrikaners in Africa, gave them the Afrikaner language and charged them with the mission of building a Christian civilization in the Darlc Continent. But the main theme in the story of the Afrikaners' struggle, before and during the Great Trek, was the determination of the Boers to defend their freedom against the British, their oppressors and persecutors. There is a paranoia built into the national consciousness and fos­ tered deliberately both by the schools and the Church. Lord Milner, the representative of the British Crown at the tum of the century, in 1902 forbade the teaching of history in the schools "on the completely justifiable grounds that such teaching fostered the Afrikaners' nationalism (and hence their Anglopho­ bia)."[25] This of course produced a call to Afrikaner mothers to take up the cause, teaching their children the language and the true traditions of their people, heavily interspersed with Biblical parallels. The Milner ban on the teaching of history was quickly lifted, but the effort of suppression lives on in resentful memories.

When the Union first came into being, it will be recalled that the two Dutch Republics were allowed

·Provincial Councils with certain capacities that not even Parliament could override. One of those areas of autonomy was control over primary and secondary education, so that Afrikaner children have for genera­ tions been taught the rights and understandings of their history, underlined by both home and Church. It is important, in seeking to understand this somewhat myopic history, that the Afrikaners trace their true spiri-

(23] Marianne Comevin, *Apartheid Power and Historical Falsification,* Paris, Imprimierie des Press Univcrsitaircs de France, 1980, p.53.

[24] *Ibid..*

(25] Marquard, *op. cil.,* p.59.

tual origins to the trekboers, those adventuresome and daring farmers who left the comfort (and the confinements) of urban Cape Town for the wilderness, filled with danger, hardship and above all isolation in order to make their living and to be free from interference. The vast size of the farms in the lands beyond has already been noted, and this made close relationships even with their kindred spirits and neigh­ bours difficult at best "Isolation is undoubtedly the most single significant factor in the development of the Afrikaners nation· character".[26] Even the urban dwellers at the Cape were cut off from the rest of the world, seeing only an occasional ship from Europe or America. This separation was even truer of the trek­ hoers living in their distant, isolated farms, struggling against a harsh nature and hostile natives, too scat­ tered to organise churches and hold regular services. Such devotions *as* there were (except for the rare Holy Communion celebrations for which the farmers and their families would travel for days) were household affairs with the father leading the family and the servants and slaves in prayer and praise. It is said that the Boer travelled with his Bible in one hand and his rifle in the other.

It is not wonder that modem Afrikaners feel insecure and threatened as their history suggests, circling the wagons against the numerous and threatening foe. They deny that the indigenous peoples have any right to the territory, claiming that the land was vacant when they arrived and that the clamoring multitudes are in reality 'Johnny-come latelies'. They do not dare to give the vote to the subject peoples by whom they are surrounded, fearing that their unique way of life would surely perish in a republic where they would certainly be outvoted. The Afrikaners believe that God has chosen them for a special mission, to be

a 'light to lighten the Gentiles' and has given them their homeland as a specia,l sign of His favour. Paranoia is a coin with two sides: there is always the fear of persecution, the certainty that threats abound every­

where. But there is also the delusions of grandeur, the exalted view of one's superiority and special mission in life. The Afrikaner peoples see themselves as chosen by God to live in and rule over their lands. Although they are officially secular States, there is a sort of theocracy about them, with the official religious leaders playing a central role in supporting if not shaping official policy. They feel a strong sense of identification with their forefathers who found the land and made it theirs against great odds.[27] As the

[26] *lbi'd.,* p.27.

1. *Personal Conversation,* with a South African Academic from the University of Western Cape, May 1987.

Afrikaners had to fight the British and as the *voortrekkers[28]* had to :fight the Hottentots and the Bantu and the Zulu. All of this is essential to an understanding of the Afrikaner mentality as background for current South African policies, both foreign and domestic. Those policies are deeply rooted in the Kultur of the Volk.[29] The British have been vanquished politically at home, but now they are gathering the other coun­ tries of the world in a new attempt to interfere with the freedom of the Afrikaners to do things their own way and to follow the commands of God in their homeland. The Afrikaners are being persecuted and see themselves increasingly in the mould of. the figure found in the late chapters of the prophet Isaiah, the "suffering servant" of the Lord.[30]

As the Afrikaners struggled towards a notion of self-identity in this period, the concept of Afrikaner had an exclusive connotation, it denoted someone of Dutch or Huguenot descent who spoke neither English nor Dutch but Afrikaans. They believed there were three kinds of Afrikaners, those with English hearts, those with Dutch hearts and those with Afrikaans hearts. The last-mentioned were the True Afrikaners.[31] There were also conflicting views on the Afrikaner's political affiliation. Those who accepted the Afrikaner's position in the existing order were opposed by the Broederbond [Bond of Brothers], who con­ sidered it the Afrikaner's duty to regain bis liberty by force of arms. "With the Nationalist Party in power the impression was, however, firmly established that the National Afrikaner ruled the country, that he finally regained bis country. For its part the Nationalist Party strove to convince all Afrikaners that the party was the nation and the nation the party ... The Nationalist Party was no ordinary political party but a nation

in motion ... and Mr. Vorster claimed that the Nationalist Party has establi,shed Afrikaans and Afrikaner- dom".[32]

After the Second World War, colonialism came to an end in most of Asia and Africa and gave the right to the indigenous people to rule themselves. In South Africa the non-white races, through such

1. Voor here means "in front of', and Voortrckker means pioneer. Voortrekkers is a political party established in 1837 in S.A. to establish an independent republican state in which there would be no equality between black and white. See, Leo Marquard, *The Peoples and Policies of South Africa,* 3rd ed., London, Oxford University Press, 1962, chapter one.
2. The people culture/civilization. "The word VOLK when thus used in Afrikaans excludes all other population groups in South Africa". Sec Leonard Thompson and Andrew Prior, *South African Politics,* New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1982, pp.112-113.
3. Personal Conversation, *op. cit..*

(31] Hendrik W. van der Merwe, *Looking aJ the Afrikaner Today,* Cape Town, Tafelberg-Vitgewers Beperk, 1975, pp.16-17.

[32] *Ibid.,* p.25.

organisations as the Native Representative Council, the African National Congress, and the South African Indian Congress, began increasingly to press for a greater share in the government and for the abolition of discriminatory laws. These demands upset the whites, making them feel that their privileged position was being threatened. The whites felt insecure and such demands became a very serious political issue, and the Nationalists exploited this feeling of insecurity to the full.[33] The question which the voters would have to answer in the coming election, as Malan said in April 1948 during his campaign, was not only whether "the white race would be able, in the future, to maintain its supremacy and its civilization, but whether it would want to do so, or would it drift irresolutely and aimlessly, or even, in the case of some people, intentionally, until it disappeared for ever, without honour in the black sea of South Africa's non-white population."[34]

## South Africa's Relations with the External World: 1948-1974

The coming to power of a coalition of the Nationalist and Afrikaner Parties in 1948, strengthened by their merging under the title of National Party in 1951, meant that "for the first time since Union, a purely Afrikaans-speaking party was in power. Afrikaners had had independent republics for fifty years before the end of the Boer War and it took another fifty years before they regained at the polling booth what they had lost on the battlefield. They had lost two economically and politically weak republics and they had gained the Union of South Africa. This was a notable achievement of power by the Nationalists, marred only by the knowledge that their party did not yet have the support of the voters and that it was the vagaries of the South African electoral system that had given them victory; moreover, they knew that about one quarter of

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Afrikaans-speaking South Africans had voted against their party. Nevertheless, Afrikaner nationalism was in effective control of government, and two subsequent elections, in 1953 and 1958, were to increase their parliamentary majority".[35]

These early days of the Afrikaners rise to power in their homeland were, on the world scene, the years of the 'Cold War', the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the invasion of South Korea by its

1. Muller, *op. cit.,* p.263.
2. *Ibid.•*
3. Robert S. Jaster, *South Africa's Narrowing Security Option.s,* Adelphi Papers no. 159, International Institute for Strategic Stu­ dies, London, 1980, p.10.

communist neighbour to the North. The alliance with the Soviet Union during the Second World War was at an end, and the 'free world' was in a state of alann over perceived Soviet expansionist intentions and a state of determination to block such imperialist ambitions. Although the Truman Administration held McCarthyism in undisguised contempt, neither the President nor his spokesmen at State and Defense were above waving the bloody shirt of the communist threat in order to gain both popular and Congressional support for their measures. The new leadership of South Africa was not slow to follow this lead. "South African leaders, like those in some other countries, have found it useful to exaggerate and distort the com­ munist danger for domestic political pwposes. And over the years South Africa's Afrikaner leaders have perceived a direct causal link between alleged international communist designs and the internal and external security threat to South Africa. Indeed, there is a plausible basis in South African history for harbouring the notion, exaggerated though it may be, of such a linkage. In the 1920s, the Afrikaans-speaking community was shocked at communist inroads into the white labour movement and the threat this posed to the struggle for Afrikaner unity. Later, when the black resistance to apartheid emerged in the early 1950s, South Afri­ can communists were prominent among the white supporters. In the words of one historian: 'Communist disregard for racial differences was a thrust at the very heart of the Afrikaner experience'."[36]

In the early years of Afrikaner control over the government, there was a deliberate effort to join forces with the Western countries in resisting communist aggression. South Africa sent an air squadron to join the United Nations forces in Korea and participated in the Berlin airlift. Indeed, there is considerable

evidence that the nationalist leaders hoped to establish a firm alliance with the United States as a guarantee

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of their national security. Meanwhile, however, on the domestic front, the new leadership was moving as rapidly as possible to implement its long held convictions about the proper relations between peoples. The Asians, a relatively small but highly vocal minority, and the Cape Coloured, those of mixed blood were given some consideration. But the indigenous Black Africans were to be separated and settled in their own villages in the outlying territories. Those needed for labour, either industrial or domestic, were granted spe­ cial permission to live in settlements nearer the urban centres, but they required special passes to work, to

1. Roger J. Southall, "South Africa", in *The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy,* T.M. Shaw and Olajidc Aluko eds., London, 1984, Gower Publishing Co, 1984, p.209.

travel, to reside in the approved areas. Apartheid, the separation of the races, was adopted as a national pol­ icy. This aroused great opposition throughout the world, and condemnations in the councils of the United Nations were frequent, eloquent and virtually universal. This had the effect of heightening the sense of iso­ lation felt by the Afrikaners and simply increased their detennination to 'go it alone'. As the voortrekkers sought freedom from British interference at the time of the Great Trek, now twentieth century South Africa would seek freedom from interference from the rest of the world.[37]

"The establishment of the United.Nations, the early grant of independence to India (which took a particular interest in the fate of South Africa's Asian population) and the subsequent commitment by Britain to the decolonization of African states (though not without considerable prevarication concerning those

with a sizeable white population) implied a formal commitment to racial equality which the South African government could not but be opposed to, while simultaneously making apartheid the butt of increasingly extensive international criticism".(381

The National Party government found itself involved in a dispute with the United Nations over the matter of the territory known as South West Africa, a pre-First World War German colony which South Africa bad been administering under a League of Nations mandate since 1921. The U.N. claimed that the League mandate was invalid because South Africa's racial policies violated the U.N's Charter of Human Rights. The International Court of Justice ruled in 1950 that the League's mandate was still in force. Although South Africa was under no obligation to conclude a trusteeship agreement with the U.N. and refused to do so, it postponed implementation of the 1949 South West Africa Amendment Act, which granted whites living there their first direct representation to the Union's legislature because the govern- ment was fearful of the international complications that might arise from a full incorporation of the territory into the Union.[39]

The efforts of the government to secure lasting alliances with Western powers were frustrated for three reasons. First, the NATO powers did not see the same threat from communism as did the National­ ists; second, France and Britain were beginning seriously to question the wisdom of their remaining in

1. John Cope, *South Africa,* London, Ernest Benn Limited, 1965, p.190.
2. Shaw and Aluko, *op. cit.,* p.224.
3. Muller, *op. cit.,* pp.501-504. Also sec, Davenport, *op. cit.,* pp.481-486. For general historical background sec Peter H. Katjaviv *A History of Resistance in Namibia,* London, James Currey, 1988, pp.55-59.

Africa as colonial powers; and third, the whole racial issue muddied the waters on a number of fronts. South Africa, for example, refused to enter any agreement which involved the bearing of arms by blacks, even colonial troops. But South Africa was still clinging to a hope that it could somehow involve itself with other developed nations in diplomatic and military alliances. It continued its membership in the Brit­ ish Commonwealth despite India's criticism of South African practices in the U.N. as well as in the Com­ monwealth. For South Africa to take such a step, even by referendum was seen at that point as divisive of the white vote, and "outright departure .from the Commonwealth would have likely reduced Pretoria's influence over Britain's Africa policy and implied loss of imperial preference for South Africa's trade goods in a world increasingly hostile to apartheid".[40]

During the early 1950s Pretoria was increasingly concerned over the signals that Britain was prepar­ ing to hand over its colonies in East Africa to indigenous rule and even more alarmed by the situation sur­ rounding the British protectorates of Basutoland [Lesotho], Bechuanaland [Botswana], and Swaziland. These had not been incoiporated into South Africa at the time of Union, but the way was left open for a possible transfer at a later time. Basutoland was entirely surrounded by South Africa, and Bechuanaland and Swaziland are both bounded on three sides by the Union and were in many respects economic exten­ sions of the larger and more powerful nation. "Regarded by the Nationalists as outposts of empire whose natural destiny lay with South Africa, there was also a wish to extend the Union's 'native' policy to the Protectorates lest any advantages which their inhabitants might enjoy unsettle the Union's own Africans.

Accordingly, successive Union governments sought to negotiate the Protectorates' transfer to South Africa,

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their failure to persuade the British to hand them over being traced to imperial perfidy and continuing antipathy toward the Afrikaner".[41]

The British had promised that no transfer to South African control would be carried out without con­ sultation of the inhabitants who were continuously and vigorously opposed to such a step, so as the 1950s wore on, it became increasingly clear that they would be given independent status, a prospect feared by the Union for a number of reasons, not least of which was the example to which their own blacks could look.

1. Shaw and Aluko, *op. cit.,* p.225.
2. John Cope, *op. cit.,* pp.187-189. Also see, Muller, op. ciL, pp.555-557 and Davenport, generally under, HCTs.

But accepting the inevitable, the administration in Pretoria began to talk of a "South African Com­ monwealth", seeking increasingly to entangle the HCTs [High Commission Tenitories of Basutoland, Becbuanaland, and Swaziland] within a web of interdependence on the white South African economy.[42]

In 1960, seventeen former French colonies in Africa were granted independence, working a sharp transference of relations between governments throughout Africa. Having failed in their efforts to halt decolonization, both Premiers Strydom and Verwoerd sought to adjust by suggesting co-existence between black and white states, based upon mutual recognition of one another's rights, meaning that South Africa's racial policies were its own affair. When Ghana achieved independence in 1957, the Nkrumah government showed initially a willingness to continue its profitable trade with South Africa despite official disapproval of apartheid. But events brought two irreconcilable forces together: the increasing independence of former black colonies and the growing restrictions on black existence within South Africa itself, a development to which the new governments could not, politically, remain indifferent. The result was a gradual exclusion of the Union from virtually all pan-African organizations, despite Pretoria's eagerness to play a role of finan­ cial and economic leadership for the entire southern half of the continent. The intervention in the Congo crisis, with the Union's lending support to the secessionist Katanga regime increased the isolation, and the Sbarpville massacre on March 21, 1960, in which police fired on unarmed demonstrators against extension of the pass laws, brought further repressive measures, including the banning of the major nationalist organi- zations.[43]

All of this culminated in the National Party's declaration on May ll, 1961 in favour of republic status which was seen as a defiance of world opinion, and when Verwoerd's request to rejoin the Com­

·monwealth seemed likely to be denied, largely because of Afro-Asian opposition within the Com­ monwealth, the Party leadership made virtue of necessity and praised the advantages of national isolation. But the efforts at some sort of accommodation with the Union's neighbours were not yet over. Verwoerd in 1964 publicly renounced any ambitions to annex the HCTs and announced a policy to be known as the "Great Road North". This had three prongs: the provision of cheap labour, the export of manufactured

1. *Ibid.•*
2. Donald Denoon and Balem Nycko, *Southern Africa* ***since*** *1800,* London, Longman, 1984, pp.193-194 and pp.221-226.

goods and the establishment of co-operative relations with those black African states that showed them­ selves willing partners. The Organization of African Unity, founded in 1963, which, among many other things tried to bring sanctions against South Africa's racial policies, was unsuccessful in those efforts. Zambia, Lesotho,. Botswana, and Swaziland, all newly independent, were all more or less economically dependent on South Africa and unable to enjoy the luxury of an ideologically inspired boycott of the Union. Conservative leaders, like ChiefLeabua Jonathan and President Hastings Banda were against a boycott.

So the OAU was not successful in -its efforts to counter the northern thrust from Pretoria which was more than merely economic. Aid in the form of low interest loans, channelled directly rather than through international agencies like the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, was concentrated in a few select countries. Malawi, Madagascar, Swaziland, Lesotho and the Portuguese received in 1972 a total of some R 171 million designed to integrate the infrastructures into a South African networlc. "South Africa's greatest successes were with Malawi and Madagascar. The former was the only black state to open formal diplomatic relations with the Union and became its staunchest ally among the African republics. Prime Minister Vorster visited Malawi in 1970 and Prime Minister Banda returned the honour in 1971. Blantyre accepted a South African military attache. Banda explained this policy by saying that his country's acts were dictated by the reality of its poverty, dependence and geographical position. However, a more likely rationale lies in the benefits of South African collaboration in securing him against his radical opponents [who fled the country in the early 1960s] and entrenching him domestically by allowing him to extend his support via the dispensation of patronage".[44]

In Madagascar, the conservative Tsirana government was concerned to liberate itself from the cul­ tural and economic domination of France and was preoccupied with strengthening its defences against what it perceived as both Soviet and Chinese threats to its domestic security. France meanwhile was pursuing a policy of increased relations with Pretoria despite the 1963 UN embargo on the sales of arms. So many of the francophile nations, seeking to curry favour with Paris, warmed up at the same time their relations with Pretoria, more especially those states with conservative governments. President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast in November of 1970 declared the strategies against apartheid a failure and called for an all-

1. Southall. *op. cit.,* p.237.

Africa conference to discuss the possibilities of dialogue. This ran against the thrust of the 'Lusaka Mani­ festo', a statement issued by the beads of state in East and Central Africa in April of 1969, which softened the previous stem stand of the OAU against South Africa, calling for conciliation and non-violent change in the Union, but still supported boycott and isolation of the Republic so long as it maintained its policy of apartheid. French-speaking Africa showed considerable support for the alternative of dialogue, including the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, the Central African Republic, Gabon, Dahomey; Togo and Niger, but their

proposals were vigorously rejected by Guinea, Senegal and the Cameroons.[45]

The Mogadishu Declaration, issued by a summit of leaders of central African states, endorsed armed struggle as the only way to achieve liberation in Southern Africa and condemned any African states who sought closer ties to the Republic pursuing apartheid. The early efforts at closer relations with African states, thus, although experiencing some initial success, were failing. During this same period, South Africa was seeking cordial relations with its neighbouring white regimes. The Portuguese had up to this point strongly resisted decolonization, a posture welcomed in Pretoria because both Angola and Mozam­ bique were buffer states on their borders. Trade between South Africa and the two Portuguese colonies was not very brisk in the early 1960s, due largely to Lisbon's determination to retain its monopolistic control of its colonies. But as time went on, the tides of trade shifted sharply in South Africa's favour. International pressures on Portugal to decolonize combined with guerilla freedom movements in both Angola and Mozambique, were such that Portugal sought relief by encouraging large-scale emigration of whites to the

colonies and by opening up the territories to foreign -investment. This brou9ht large amounts of South Afri­

can capital into both colonies, developing mineral and resource extraction facilities, measures which fitted nicely with South Africa's own economic plans for the future. There was European and American capital involved in the search for oil and the construction of the natural gas line in Angola, but neither project would have succeeded without South African financing, technological know-how and assurance of future markets.[47]

[45] *!bid.,* p.238.

1. *Ibid.,* 237. See also, Sam C. Nolutshungu, *South Africa in Africa: A Study in Ideology and Foreign Policy,* Manchester, Man­

chester University Press, 1975, pp.195-220. And, Legum, *ACR,* vol.4, 1972, P.B366.


The guerilla threat brought increased South African involvement in the defence of the Portuguese empire, although there was little direct military involvement Most of the aid was in the provision of sup­ plies and exchange of intelligence. South Africa sought not only to support the continued existence of white rule in Angola and Mozambique but looked to closer relations with Portugal to accomplish several other goals: proximity to NATO through Portugal's membership in that body, access to Brazil and the pos­ sible establishment of a South Atlantic treaty organization against the spread of communism.[46]

To the North lay another country still governed by a white minority, Rhodesia. Prime Minister Ian Smith's doomed efforts to maintain white supremacy through his UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Indepen­ dence) issued in November of 1965 for a time brought closer relations between Salisbury, Pretoria and Lis­ bon. "Without South African and Portuguese assistance, Rhodesia would have been denied oil, transport linkages and vital supplies. Yet South African commitment was not unambiguous in that it eschewed recognition of the illegal regime and espoused a formal neutrality which urged a negotiated settlement between the British and Rhodesian governments. South African efforts were devoted to ensuring that Brit­ ish imposed and UN mandated sanctions against Rhodesia were rendered ineffective, in large part to discourage the adoption of such a weapon against the Republic itself, and when British determination to end the rebellion proved irresolute, the Republic did not hesitate to send its police in 1967 to assist the Rhodesian military control insurgents on the grounds that South African ANC guerillas were fighting alongside the ZAPU [the Zimbabwe African People's Union]".[48]

Zambia formed a special case during this period. President Kennet4 Kaunda was publicly in strong support of the struggle for independence in Rhodesia and of the similar movements in Angola and Mozam­ bique. Yet his country was heavily dependent on South Africa for transport routes, for skilled manpower, and for imports of many kinds. For this reason, the government in Pretoria entered into secret negotiations with the Kaunda government from 1%8 and pursued a policy of restraint. Kaunda himself encouraged the relations, hopeful that he could exert a modifying influence on South African activities in support of the Smith regime in Rhodesia. When Kaunda became President of the OAU in 1970 and played a leading role

(46] Christopher *Cokcr,NATO, The Warsaw Pact and Africa,* London, Macmillan, 1985, pp.60-62.

1. Shaw and Aluko, *op. cit.,* p.240.



in that body's opposition to dialogue and negotiation with South Africa, Vorster, aware of Kaunda's pre­ carious political position with his own people, exposed the secret talks. The effort failed, and the hopes of somehow bringing Zambia into closer relations with the Republic were dashed, still another disappointment in the efforts at an outward movement[49]

Following the ruling of the International Court in 1950, South Africa began strenuous efforts to ex.tend its apartheid policies to Namibia Liberia and Ethiopia sought to gain a ruling from the Court that such activities were illegal, but the Court found itself unable to comply. The General Assembly oftbe UN declared not only the policies of apartheid in Namibia illegal but the entire occupation itself. A national liberation movement, SWAPO, was formed and began to prepare itself for an armed struggle. The external headquarters of the movement, located in Tanzania, declared that Namibians had "no alternative but to rise in arms and bring about our liberation".[50] The SWAPO fighters were confronted with severe logistical difficulties. Angola was of little use as a base, and the nearest transit facilities were in Zambia Reluctant to use the South African army in Namibia, the local police were trained in anti-guerilla tactics and proved able to put down the first wave of armed resistance. In 1967 universal conscription for all white males in both South Africa and Namibia was instituted, showing how seriously Pretoria took the threat from SWAPO. In 1971, the International Court finally declared the occupation of Namibia illegal, and this set off a wave of demonstrations throughout the territory.[51] In January of 1972, "the South African Defense Force for the first time was sent into Namibia with operational instructions to assist the police in 'restoring

order'. On 4 February legislation amounting to martial law was impos,ed on the Ovambo bantustan - this

was later extended to other areas of the country. Hundreds of people were rounded up by police and sol­ diers, held for months without trial and tortured."[52]

The 25th of April 1974, marked a turning point in affairs in eouthern Africa, with the coup d'etat in which the Portuguese Armed Forces sick of the colonial wars, overthrew the dictatorship. The new ruling junta was divided as to the policy to follow with respect to Angola and Mozambique, but "it was clear that

1. Richard E. Bissel and Chester A. Crocker (eds), *South Africa into the 1980s,* Colorado, Westview Press, 1979, pp.21-29. [50) Katjavivi, *op. cit.,* p.59.

[51) *Ibid.,* p.65. See also Richard Gibson, *African Liberation Movements,* London, Oxford University Press, 1972, pp.132-141.

1. Gavin Cawthra, *Brutal Force: The Apartheid War Machine,* London, The International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern

Africa, 1986, p.19.

the alliance between South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia had been irrevocably breached. Rhodesia and Namibia could now expect to become exposed to guerilla pressure from once Portuguese borders that had formerly provided for their protection, whilst South Africa also had to reckon with a re-evaluation in Western capitals of those South African policies which bad been based on the mistaken assumption of the invulnerability of white power."[53]

Making virtue of necessity, Pretoria extended recognition to the new government in Mozambique, despite its self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist ideology and gave no support to a right-wing effort to overthrow the regime undertaken in 1974 by some white settlers in Laurenco Marques (Maputo). The new FRELilvfO government thus began with a relatively positive attitude toward South Africa, which did not deter them from declaring that the withdrawal of all South African forces from Rhodesia was the precondi­ tion for all future negotiations. This was instrumental in leading to an 'agonizing re-appraisal' of the policy toward Rhodesia. Continued support of a regime which was seen as inevitably doomed was costly and obviously unwise, inviting even further isolation of Pretoria from the other African states and the rest of the world. The new policy was to persuade Smith to give way to a 'moderate' black regime. A negotiated set­ tlement was therefore openly sought and received support from many of the other governments of the area, largely because they, too, wanted peace and order and a resumption of profitable economic activity among the various states. Zambia saw detente as highly desirable because it could lead to a new inflow of much needed capital. "The ruling elements of all of the other Front Line States - Botswana, Tanzania, Mozam­ bique, and (later) Angola (whose economies were also ailing to some consi erable extent) - were also eager to achieve some measure of political accommodation with the Republic; and, in consequence, the basis of the deal that while Vorster would deliver Smith to the conference table to negotiate a transition to majority rule, the Front Line States [and notably Kaunda and Nyerere] would ensure the co-operation of the Zim­ babwean liberation movements".[54]

The Lusaka Agreement of December 1974, as it was called, resulted in a cease-fire as the condition required for constitutional discussions. Disagreements as to details resulted in a resumption of armed hostil-

1. Shaw and Aluko, op. ciL, p.242. [54] *Ibid.,* pp.243-244.

ities which endangered the whole movement toward detente. Vorster and Kaunda succeeded in setting up a symbolic conference on the bridge over the Victoria Falls between Rhodesia and Zambia, but those talks too proved fruitless and the struggle stretched out over the next several years. What is interesting to note about this particular period is that although Vorster and his ministers in Pretoria continued steadfastly to use coercion at borne and in Namibia to impose apartheid, for a time, they showed a rare realism and a genuine effort to adopt a different style of diplomacy abroad. They accepted the realities in Mozambique, extending official recognition to an avowedly Marxist regime. They abandoned their futile efforts to shore up the doomed Smith regime in Rhodesia and sought accommodation with all of the Front Line States to bring about peace and stability within the region. The effort was not long-lived, as we shall see, but it is notable as an exception to the more common posture of isolation.[55]

While the problems of Rhodesia were troubling all of its neighbours, the situation in Angola was not much better. The nationalist forces there were split into three camps: the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola) representing principally the working classes in greater Luanda and supported by the USSR; the FNLA (Fronte Nacional de Libertacao de Angola) comprised mainly of ethnic Bakongo and supported by the Mobuto regime in Zaire and also the US; and UNITA (Uniao Nacional para a Independen­ cia Total de Angola), led by Jonas Savimbi with bases in Zambia and Eastern Zaire. The Alvor Agreement of January 1975 provided that all three parties were to remain within their own liberated areas, to co-- operate in creating a national army, and to join in the formation of a national government which would

draw up a constitution and arrange for national elections, with full independence scheduled on 11

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November 1975.[56]

Angola was by all odds the most valuable of the Portuguese possessions in Africa The third largest oil-producing country on the continent, it was also a source of coffee, diamonds, iron ore, copper and uranium. Its future destiny was therefore a matter of great concern not only to its immediate neighbours in southern Africa and to the OAU in general, but also to the super-powers. Both the USA and the USSR

(55] Bissel and Crocker, *op. cit.,* p.107.



(56] John A Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 1962-1976,* vol.2, London, MIT Press, 1978, pp.255-258. Also sec, Fola Soremekun, *Angola: The Road lo Independence,* Ile-ife, Nigeria, University of Ife Press Ltd., 1983, pp.I 12-150.

displayed a lively interest in who should be governing this newly independent state. In such an atmosphere, it is not srnprising that Pretoria should share that lively interest and play an important role in seeking actively to shape its neighbours' future. But that belongs to the third part of this Chapter.

South Africa bad little impact on the regional policies of countries in the region at that time, "South Africa's bid in the 1970s to achieve sounder co-operative relations within Africa yielded a meagre harvest. A change of government in Malagasy in 1972 brought a regime to power which broke off political and commercial ties with the Republic. Africa was united in its condemnation of aggression in Angola and the serious internal riots at Soweto and elsewhere aroused bitter protests at the policy of apartheid. Malawi, an exceptional case, had benefited from a normal diplomatic relationship which resulted in her obtaining a large South African loan in 1968. The Lusaka government accused Pretoria of supporting an illegal regime in Rhodesia and it allowed terrorists to use Zambian territory for attacks on the Caprivi strip. At the same time, however, Zambia was dependent on the Republic for many of her imports, exports, and trade contin­ ued ... with two of the former protectorates, Lesotho and Botswana, the Republic's relationship fell short of cordiality. Their leaders were critics of South Africa's racial policies, and fugitives from the Republic crossed their borders to seek asylum ... Mozambique's political and economic :flexibility was circumscribed to an extent, but her initiatives concerning Rhodesia, which in their result added to the complexity of South Africa's problems, were not the action of a client state. Despite common economic and other interests, the road ahead to any southern association or commonwealth of independent African countries was a long and difficult one."[57]

Such diplomatic isolation gave the rise to an old idea of 'Black Homelands' (see map no. 3), which became later on known as 'Bantustans'. This an idea which was first announced by Prime Minister Verwoerd in 1962 when be stated "... It will be no multi-racial Transkei as far as it government is con­ cerned. The whites there will be represented in the Republican parliament, just as the Bantu voters [Xbo­ sas] in the white areas will be represented in the Transkeian parliament ..."[58] And in 1970 Vorster announced again in the House of Assembly that "... If there is a Bantu people that believes the time has

1. Muller, *op. cit.,* pp.572-573.
2. Muller, *op. cit.,* p.522.



**HOMELANDS**

D KwaNdebele

CAPE PROVINCt

**SO-CALLED 'INDEPENDENT STATES'**

Bophulhalswana

§ Gazankulu

Transke,

* c,ske,

[ill Venda

KwaZulu

**ffl** Lebowa

II Owaqwa

IIIlil] Kangwane

### Map no. 3, South Africa, The Bantustans 'Black Homeland'.

**Source: Martin Murray, *South Africa: Time of Agony, Time of Destiny,***

**London, Verso, 1987, p.x.**

arrived for it to become independent, they can come and discuss the matter with me ... if a homeland does not wish to become independent because I am not prepared to give it more land, that is its affair ... it can­ not then blame me for the fact that it did not become independent".[59] In 1970 the Bantu Homelands Citiz.enship Act was issued under the provisions of which Africans with genetic, cultural, linguistic, or residential links to a particular Bantustan were automatically deprived of South African citiz.enship on the day that specific entity was declared independent.[60]

The objective of *this* Act and the creation of the ten 'Bantustans' or 'Homelands' is that the African population is not South African but belongs to ten different ethnic nationalities with different languages, customs and cultures. These separate 'Homelands' will be given the right to self-determination in their traditional areas. The aim is that each 'Homeland' should become independent leaving white citizens only in South Africa. None are recognised (internationally) as independent states outside South Africa. These 'Homelands' signified "... the highest stage of separate development [apartheid]".[61]

As we noted, the final objectives of the Bantustan policy were to defuse international criticism of apartheid policies and to divert African political activity from the centre and fragment it along ethnic lines.[62] However, the Homelands policy (a Divide and Rule strategy) created "... deep divisions among Africans over the separate development institutions, not only between opponents and supporters of their use, but also between those who accepted them as part of a long-term solution and those [like Buthelezi] who would only use them as a step towards securing full political rights."[63]

As the Homelands were designed to contain the black population and outh Africa was for the white peoples, this brings us to the question of the Afrikaner identity. During the 1960s and 1970s the enthusiasm formerly expanded on formulations of Afrikan identity, to distinguish it from that of the English, was channelled into attempts to define the position of the white in relation to the non-whites and to

[59] *Ibid.,* p.524.

1. Martin Murray, *South Africa: Time uf Agony, Time of Destiny,* London, Verso, 1987, p.77.
2. Deon Gcldenhuys, *South Africa's Black Homelands: Past Objectives, Present Realities and Future Development,* Johannes­ burg, **SAIIA,** 1981, p.2.
3. Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler, *Change in Contemporary South Africa,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of Cali­ fornia Press, 1975, p.411.
4. Merle Lipton, *Capitalism and Apartheid: South Africa, 1910-1986,* London Wildwood House, 1986, p.336.

incorporate such distinctions into government policy. Parallel with the view of Afrikaner leaders that white dominance and privilege were their fulfilment of any nation's claim to self-protection and survival, there was a clear tendency to justify this view by the instrumental value it was claimed to have in South African society.[64] For example, in 1961 Prime Minister Verwoerd said, "everything points to the necessity for us [Afrikaners and the other whites] to get together, because what is our problem for the future ... it is to ensure that this white republic of South Africa remains white. From now onwards it *is* our common white

heritage that counts above everything else ... we ought to regard everything that divided us in the past as an

epoch in our history that came to an end with the establishment of a Republic outside of the Com­ monwealth. From now onwards we have something else to achieve ... that we must make it possible for a white nation to continue to maintain itself bere".[65] So the classification of the South African population based on colour as a basic premise reflects the view that, ".. difference in colour indicates a simple but highly significant fact, i.e. that whites and non-whites are not of the same kind. They are different".[66] And then apartheid shifted to separate development, as Vorster on 1968 stated that " ... the policy of separate development was conceived not because we considered ourselves better than others ... we created the policy of separate development because we maintained that we were different from others and valued that difference, and we are not prepared to sacrifice that difference".[67] In this sense Afrikaner identity and white identity become inter- changeable. Thus Vorster could assert that, the people (Volk) of South Africa meaning the white South African nation will not tolerate domination by anyone. As the Afrikaners pro­

gressed during the 1960s and 1970s "... towards seeing the people of differen,t colours no longer as different

races but as different nations, there bas been at the same time an increasing tendency to see themselves, in their relationship with other whites, as members of a common race or of the [white] South African nation, rather than as **a** separate nation".[68] Therefore, the Afrikaners self-concepts and identity became more crystallised, which leads us to see its effect in South African external relations with its neighbours. In this period undoubtedly the most important factor that affected South Africa's external relations was "the

1. Hendrik W. van der Meiwe, *op. cit.,* p.26.
2. Verwoerd quoted in Muller, *op. cit.,* p.508.
3. Verwoerd quoted in Van der Merwe, *op. cit.,* p.27.
4. Vorster quoted in, van der Merwe, *op. cit.,* p.27.
5. Van der Merwe, *op. cit.,* pp.28-29.

astonishing speed with which political events in the rest of Africa marched after 1950. Within a decade, territory after territory in Africa achieved independence ... Few [at the war's end] would have believed that, within ten years' time, more than half the population of Africa would be politically independent, and that the white governments of the territories occupied by the rest would be faced with urgent and immediate problems of extending political power to their African subjects ... by 1961 it was no longer a question of *whether* political rights and power would be extended to Africans; it was only a question of *when* and *how* this would happen".[69]

South African whites, especially the Afrikaners, have yet to realize the full impact of this given piece of history. After the initial shock and rather strong negative reactions, "The Nationalist Press and ministers then began to take the realistic line of recognizing and of welcoming any new States and of offering, in advance, to co-operate with them in solving common African problems; at the same time, great stress was laid on the need to respect South Africa's right to deal with her interracial problems in her own way - that of apartbeid".[70]

## South African Regional Strategy

In 1963 Prime Minister Verwoerd proposed the formation of a common mru:ket - commonwealth in Southern Africa The main objective of this plan was to establish **a** free trade zone as the first step toward a regional co-operation. In fact, it was hoped the careful nurturing of these economic linkages would herald the formation of a political union of sorts, it was described as an "association of black and white states with South Africa as the centralizing mother country".[71] The common market - commonwealth initiative failed. During Vorster's years South Africa diplomacy had become more flexible with far more basic tact, with a policy successively described as 'outward looking', involving 'dialogue', and moving towards 'detente'. This new political initiative was launched in October 1974, and its main objective was defined as

[69) Marquard, *op. cit.,* p.191.

[70] *Ibid.,* sec also, Robert M. Price and Carl G. Rosberg, *The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domination,* Califor­ nia, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, no. 43, 1980.

[71) Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara, ''Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy Since 1978", *Journal of Southern African Studies,* London, vol. 11, no. 2, April 1985, p.186. Prime Minister Verwoerd put forward the idea of an economic community of Southern African states which would be dominated by South Africa. The idea came as a result when South Africa left the British Commonwealth following the declaration of the Republic in 1961.

drawing the states of Southern Africa into a "constellation of completely independent states", which would fonn a "strong bloc" and "present a united front against common enemies".[72] The dialogue and detente policies met with some initial diplomatic triumphs such as, the Victoria Falls meeting in August 1975 between Vorster, Kaunda, and Smith, and the attempt by Zambian President Kaunda to establish diplomatic relations with South Africa as Malawi had earlier done in 1968. Vorster also offered to sign a 'Non­ aggression Agreement' with Mozambique, however, the FRELIMO government rejected the offer but signed **a** five-year agreement on economic co-operation governing trade, transportation, and electricity sup­ plies from Cahora Bassa, and South Africa made commodity credits available to Mozambique.[73] By the end of 1976, it became clear that the detente initiative had collapsed for several reasons. Firstly, this initia­ tive was blocked by an OAU resolution in 1971. condemning South Africa's dialogue plans as a "manoeuvre designed to divide African states and confuse public opinion in order to end the isolation of South Africa, and thus to maintain the status quo in South Africa".[74] Looking at the result of the voting in the OAU resolution, we can note to what extent the initiative had succeeded. Six OAU members (Malawi, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mauritania and Lesotho) voted against the motion while five other states (Dahomey, Niger, Togo, Upper Volta and Swaziland) abstained. Secondly the initiative failed because of the South African invasion of Angola in 1975, and finally, it was a victim of the brutal suppression of the 1976 Soweto uprising.[75] *The Economist* observed that period of time by saying:

"detente failed because the black states were not well enough motivated to talk to 'racist' South Africa openly ... destabilization helped to provide that motivation".[76]

The notion that there is a 'communist total onslaught' against the security of the state became espe- cially strong in the SADF officer corps. By the time P.W. Botha took up the post of Defence Minister in 1966, he found himself face to face with the concept of total onslaught, and it was reflected in most of his

(72] *Ibid.,* p.187. See also, Stephen Chan, "Zambia, Morality, and Mediation: A Problematic Approach to Conflict Resolution in

Southern *Airica",paper presented to BISA-ISA Conference,* London, April 1989.

1. MJ. Azevedo, "Sober Commitment to Liberation? Mozambique and South Africa: 1974-1979", *African Affairs,* London, vol. 79, October 1980, p.31.
2. Sam Nolutshangu, *South Africa in Africa: A Study in Ideology and Foreign Policy,* Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1975, p.276.

(75] Robert Davies, *South African StraJegy Towards Mozambique in the Post-Nkomati Period,* Uppsala, Sweden, Scandanavian In­

stitute for African Affairs, 1985, p.4.

(76] Quoted in, David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, "Destabilization and Dependence", in Mark A. Uhlig (ed), *Apartheid in Crisis,*

London, Penguin Books, 1986, p.285.

speeches in his first few years as Minister.[77) P.W. Botha presented to parliament the Defence Wbite Paper in March 1975, which asserted:

"... It involves economy, ideology, technology, and even social matters and can therefore only be meaningful and valid if proper account is taken of these other spheres ... all countries must, more than ever, muster all their activities - political, economic, diplomatic and military - for their defence. This, in fact, is

the meaning of Total Strategy, its defence strategy embraces much more than military strategy ..."[78]

The Wbite Paper explained that Pretoria's strategic situation had to be seen in the context of a per- ceived global East-West conflict in which South Africa was a major battlefield. The Wbite Paper contin­ ued:

"The resolution of a conflict in the times in which we now live demands interdependent and co-ordinated action in all fields - military, psychological, economic, political, sociological, technological, diplomatic, ideological, cultural, etc ... It is therefore essential that a Total National Strategy be formulated at the highest level. The defence of the Republic of South Africa

is not solely the responsibility of the Department of Defence. On the contrary, the maintenance of the sovereignty of the RSA is the combined responsibility of all r;ovemment departments. This can be taken further - it is the responsibility of the entire

population, the nation and every population group."[79]

After the Information Scandal which revealed widespread government corruption and misuse of funds, P.W. Botha was able to muster sufficient support in the National Party to be elected Prime Minister on 28 September 1978, and the 'Total National Strategy' was adopted as official state policy. This led to a

reformulation of regional policy to deal with the international threat to white rule and to ensure the survival

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of the apartheid regime. Such a threat to the Republic's survival was perceived by Pretoria on three fronts:

1. "Liberation Movements based in neighbouring states, represent little immediate threat to the survival of white political power.
2. A conventional military threat - as the South African spokesmen speak often of a military threat - from the Soviet Union and Cuba, and sometimes mention Nigeria as a state that could become a
3. Gavin Cawthra, *Brutal Force: The Apartheid War Machine,* London, Canon Collins House, 1986, p.26.
4. Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *White Paper on Defence,* South Africa, May 1975, pp.3-4.
5. *White Paper on Defence,* South Africa, May 1977, p.4.

major concern in the future. And,

1. International economic pressure. Pretoria must concern itself with the possibility of trade embargoes and boycotts, as well as with blocked access to technology, capital marlcets, and direct foreign invest- ment"[80]

To meet such a threat from world communism, P.W. Botha expounded the idea of a constellation of states, which was first put forward by Vorster in 1974 but was now substantially developed and defined as the long-term objective of regional policy. "In this new regional policy, the moderate states of Southern Africa were seen as facing a common Marxist onslaught but could not depend on support from the Western powers. This led to a need to create a regional alliance in which South Africa would play the central role. Therefore, it was seen to be necessary to generate a counter-ideology to Marxism in the region, and this was to demonstrate the superiority of South African capitalism over socialist alternatives, and would thus depend on a high level of involvement by the private sector".[81] The 1979 initiative of a Constellation of Southern African States defined at least four regional gains:

1. "CONSAS would lock Pretoria's neighbours more firmly into the South African economic system ...
2. CONSAS would entail, at a minimum, the indirect recognition, by at least some black African states, of the independence and sovereignty of the South African Homelands ...
3. CONSAS would split the countries of Africa on the issue of relations with South Africa, making it more difficult to co- ordinate support for liberation movements ...
4. The above three gains would be the basis for a fourth achievement - the creation of an international environment conducive to rapprochement between South Africa and the West, and on Pretoria's terms ..."[82]
5. Robert M. Price, "Pretoria's Southern African Strategy", *African Affairs,* London, vol. 83, no. 330, January 1984, pp.12-13.
6. Robert Davies, *op. cit.,* 1985, p.5. Price identified three levels of South African regional objectives, as the following:
   1. Long-term objective: a Constellation of Southern African States.
   2. Medium-term objective: the 'neutralization' of neighbouring states.
   3. Short-term objective: confronting the Soviet and Cuban presence in Southern Africa. See, Price, *op. cit.,* pp.14-27. The general aim of these three levels objectives has "centred on the survival of white rule, more specific objectives call for the ex­ pulsion of ANC and SWAPO from the region and for recognition • through agreement of security and co-operation and other means - of South Africa's hegemony in the region." Sec, Kenneth W. Grundy, *The Militarization of South African Politics,* 2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988, chapter 6, for a general discussion of the ideology and policy behind the Total Strategy.
7. Robert M. Price, *op. cit.,* p.*15.*

Pretoria's hopes for the implementation of its CONSAS were dashed when Robert Mugabe's ZANU came to power in Zimbabwe and SADCC was formed in April 1980. SADCC thus represented a setback for South African regional policies. Pretoria scaled down its CONSAS scheme to include only the inner con­ stellation, that is South Africa and the independent homelands.[83]

In addition to the CONSAS as a long-term objective of the total strategy, there are also four immedi­ ate regional objectives of the total strategy:

1. That regional states both refuse to permit liberation movements to operate from their territories and take steps to prevent these movements from operating clandestinely.
2. That regional states do not develop strong economic or more particularly military ties with socialist countries.
3. That regional states maintain and even deepen their economic links with South Africa, and refrain from supporting calls for sanctions against South Africa.
4. That regional states moderate their criticisms of apartheid.[84]

To achieve the above objectives, Pretoria has to apply

"Political action, military/para-military action, economic action, psychological action, scientific and technological action, religious-cultural action, manpower services, intelligence services, security services, national supplies, resources and production services, transport and distribution services,

:financial services, community services, telecommunication services ..."[85]

At the same time considerable attention was given to ways in which economic links could be used to further South African regional objectives. The Pretoria regime's strategic planners began to consider ways in which economic action (mobilised through the network of structures controlled by the State Security Council - SSC) could be applied either in the form of incentive levers or techniques of persuasion to those states showing willingness to collaborate, or as disincentive levers or techniques of coercion against those

[83) *Ibid.,* p.16, sec also, Uhlig, *op. cit.,* p.287. And, Robert H. Davies and Dan O'Mcara, "The State of Analysis of the Southern African Region: Issues Raised by South African Strategy", *Review of African Political Economy,* Baltimore, no. 29, July 1984, p.72.

[84) Davies and O'Mcara, *op. cit.,* pp.190-191. Also sec, Deon Gcldcnhuys, "Some Strategic Implications of Regional Economic Relationships for the Republic of South Africa, *ISSUP Strategic Review,* University of Pretoria, January 1981, p.20.

[85) *Defence White Paper,* 1977, p.5.

viewed as hostile.[86]

Pretoria applied its total strategy to the Southern African region, which involved the application of destabilization tactics (support for insurgent movements, military attack, economic pressure ... etc) in order to ensure its regional hegemonic status. See table 1.\*

| Table 1  IMPOSIDON OF REGIONAL HEGEMONY POLlCY | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Country | Destabilization (Support for Insurgent Movements) | Military Attack | Economic Pressure |
| Angola | Support for UNITA, 1976 to present | Invasion, Intermittent, 1977 to present  Air attack, intermittent,  1980 to present Occupation of Cunene province, 1979-85 |  |
| Botswana | Commando raid, June 1985 | Delayed Customs Commando raid, May 1986 | Customs  Union payments |
| Lesotho | Support for LLA  Support for coup, January 1986 | Commando raid on ANC houses, December 1982 Commando raid on ANC  houses, December 1985 | Border closure, 1983, 1986  Delayed Customs  Union payments |
| Mozambique | Support for RENAMO, | Commando raid on ANC | Cut employment |
|  | 1979 to present; | houses, January 1981 | of mine workers |
|  | reduced support after | Air strike against ANC | Reduced use of |
|  | Nkomati Accord of | houses, May 1983 | railroad and port |
|  | 1984 |  | facilities |
| Zimbabwe | Support for ZAPU and Ndebele dissidents, 1979-81 | Commando raid on airfield, July 1982  Commando raid, August 1982  Commando raid, May 1986 | Petrol cutoff, 1981 |

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Such destabilization brought some success for Pretoria's total strategy, th se successes can be seen in a non-aggression pact with Swaziland in 1982, the Lusaka agreement with Angola in February 1984, and an agreement on non-aggression and good-neighbourliness with Mozambique in March 1984. The Nkomati Accord was the crowning achievement of South Africa's destabilization tactic in particular and of the total strategy in general. P.W. Botha is quoted as follows:

1. Davies and O'Meara, *op. cit.,* October 1984, p.195.
   * Source: Robert M. Price, "Security versus Gt-owth: The International Factor in South African Policy", *The Annals,* AAPSS, *no.*

489, January 1987, p.115.

"Just as with the result of the referendum on 2nd November 1983, the Nk:omati Accord was the result of a process which began years ago in accordance with our philosophy of Total Strategy.

It was a process in which the image of South Africa and all it had to offer economically and technologically, was finnly made known. The belief was built up in our capacity to maintain internal peace and safeguard our borders ... in our military strength. We could then undertake our diplomacy with self­ confidence born of strength, economic and military strength, and make standing room for ourselves in Southern Africa."[87]

Foreign Minister R.F. Botha expressed similar sentiments in a parliamentary speech during his Department's Budget vote. He said:

"... The hon-members can talce it from me that in the period during which we determined the Total Strategy which was ultimately crowned with success at Nk:omati., I was in absolute agreement with the decisions taken ... I believe we did that by way of the military

action that we took, as well as by way of diplomatic action. It was also the result of the relative economic strength of this country ... and the fact that we made it clear to both friend and foe that we consider ourselves a regional power ... A combination of all these factors ultimately made it possible for realism to crystallize in our relations with some of our neighbours."[88]

## South Africa's Regional Relations from 1974-1984 and the Application of the Total Strategy

As 1974 opened, the foreign policy horizon of the Republic of South Africa was dominated by events in Angola and Mozambique. Two countries formerly with white domination of black majorities, and as such staunch allies of Pretoria, were on the brink of fundamental change. The question dominating the government agenda was how to respond. There appears to have been somo- difference of opinion between the hawkish Department of Defence and the more dovish Foreign Ministry, a difference that would persist. The collapse of the Alvor Agreement in March, 1975 (which was signed in January 1975 and conceived a transitional government in Angola of MPLA, UNITA, FNLA and Portuguese representatives, with indepen­ dence on 11 November 1975) [89] as the FNLA sought to drive the MPLA out of its power base in and

1. Quoted in, Robert Davies, *op. cit.,* 1985, p.10. The original work of 'tot.al strategy' has been written by the French strategist General Andre Beaufre in one of his books. He refers to psychological warfare which included the tot.al strategy aspects. Sec Andre Beaufre's two distinguished works dealing with total strategy: *An Introduction to Strategy,* translated by Major-General

R.H. Barry, London, Faber and Faber, 1963, and *Strategy of Action,* translated by R.H. Barry, London, Faber and Faber, 1967.

1. Quoted in, *Ibid.,* p.55. Also sec, *House of Assembly Debates,* Pretoria, 9 May 1984, Columns 6099 and 61101-2.
2. For the Alvor Agreement between Portugal and the MPLA/FNLA and UNITA, sec *Africa Contemporary Record,* 1974-75, pp.22lff. Sec also, Sorcmekun, *op. cit.,* p.114.

around Luanda, created a situation which deteriorated into a three-way struggle for military victory long before the official date established for independence. Congo-Brazzaville favoured the :MPLA, while Zaire supported the FNLA. South Africa and the Western powers gave clandestine backing to FNLA and UNITA. The :MPLA mobilized its support through a network of people's power committees *(poder power)* and took the offensive, threatening to establish a rapid hegemony over the entire country. Western support for their clients took the form of finance, weapons and mercenaries. South Africa, with assurance of sup­ port from Washington, sent two to three thousand troops across the Angolan border, adding to their number with two to three thousand mechanized Cavalry in December.[90]

After some early military successes, the South African Defence Forces encountered two obstacles which were more than they bad bargained for. First, the :MPLA received a huge supply of weapons from the Soviet Union, and some 9,000 troops from Cuba. Second, the U.S. Congress, with a wary eye on Viet­ nam, made it clear that it would not support Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's proposals for an escalated involvement in the Angola affair. Kenneth Kaunda and several Western powers strove mightily to achieve a negotiated settlement, but without avail. The :MPLA with the help of the Cuban troops pressed on to a speedy victory over its rivals and secured recognition as the official government of the new Angola from most African States. These latter were enraged by the South African military intervention, and the SADF was forced to retreat back to its home base because of an international pressure.[91]

The concern of almost all parties, including the U.S., South Africa and many of the other African States had been for detente in Angola, in the context of which the MPLA wctory was seen as disastrous because it was supported by the Soviet Union. Zambia and Zaire bad supported UNITA and FNLA respec­ tively to stop the :MPLA. The widespread consensus among the other African States against South African intervention silenced this possible support, and the leadership now passed from the more moderate forces seeking negotiation and detente to the radical voices who favoured a resumption of the armed struggle in Rbodesia.[92]

1. Colin Legum and Tony Hodges, *After Angola: The War Over Southern Africa,* London, Rex Collings Ltd., 1976, pp.10-16.

[91] *Ibid.,* p.25.

1. Southall, *op. cit.,* p.244.

"The collapse of Portuguese authority, the consequent handover of power to FRELIMO in Mozam­ bique, outbreak of war in Angola and the intensifying scope of the conflict in Rhodesia, caused a major reassessment by the Western powers of their short- and long-term interest in Southern Africa. No longer able to rely on the 'triple alliance' of white regimes to protect their interests within the region, they were particularly alarrned by the perceived strategic and economic threat which was posed by growing Soviet influence (more usually termed 'intervention' after Cuban troops had arrived in Angola at the behest of the MPLA)."[93]

Between June and September, 1976, there was a series of uprisings within South Africa itself at Soweto, where severe strikes by black workers undermined the confidence of Western capital in the future of the Republic and there was a major withdrawal of investments.[94]

Pretoria's pursuit of detente had its political goals, an end to warfare and a gradual transition to majority rule, as in Zimbabwe, but it bad its economic pwpose as well. Between 1966 and 1976, South African exports to other parts of Africa increased by 130 per cent, while imports from elsewhere in the con­ tinent grew by 141 per cent, creating a healthy balance of payments in Pretoria's favour. Despite this fact, the outward thrust was encountering serious difficulties. Between 1964 and 1971, some 19 per cent of South Africa's exports went to other African countries, but by 1980, this had fallen to 10 per cent. It was not traceable to the OAU boycott; in 1981 47 of Africa's 51 independent states were doing business with the Union.[95] Further, the bulk of South African trade with the rest of the continent, in the late 1970s, was going to the Southern African periphery. Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, Zaire, and Mauritius. Of equal importance, however, was the slow but steady shift of Western trade away from South Africa and toward other African nations. U.S. firms in 1976 invested some S9 million and reinvested some $73 million in earnings, but the comparable figures for Africa as a whole were $256 million and $584 million. South Africa had been Britain's third largest trading partner in 1967, buying five per cent of all British exports. By 1977 it had fallen to sixteenth place taking only 1.8 per cent

1. *Ibid.,* p.246, also see, John Macum, *The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare,* vol. 2, London, MIT Press, 1978.

(94] About Soweto Uprisings see, Hermann Gilimce, *The Parting of the Ways: South African Politics 1976-82,* Cape Town, David Philip, 1982, pp.6-9.

1. Southall, *op. cit.,* p.247.

of British products sold abroad.[96]

The Cuban presence in Angola alanned the new Republican President of the United States, Gerald Ford, who let Pretoria know that the U.S. was prepared to cut a deal. If Pretoria would twist the arm of Ian Smith and get him to the negotiating table, and if, at the same time. they would introduce some convincing domestic reforms, the U.S. was prepared to exert whatever influence it bad in international circles to relieve pressure on the South African regime. Talks were arranged between Vorster, Smith and Kissinger, and Smith announced on September 24, 1976 bis willingness to negotiate a treaty that would lead to majority rule in Rhodesia. This led to an international conference in Geneva which collapsed when it become clear that the ruling Rhodesian Front Party bad no intention of surrendering its power.[97]

The inauguration of Jimmy Carter as the new U.S. President in January 1977 brought about a sweep­ ing reassessment of American foreign policy. There was a decided increase in U.S. interest in black Africa, especially Nigeria, and the 'human rights' concerns of the new President inevitably led to increased criti­ cisms of apartheid and the government responsible for it The U.S. announced its support for the arms embargo imposed by the U.N. following the South African crackdown on black militants in October, 1977, which included outlawing some 34 political organizations.[98]

Vorster countered these moves by calling and winning a new general election, in which U.S. interfer­ ence in South African affairs was a major issue. This was followed by a major shift in the Rhodesian pol­ icy of Pretoria. Ian Smith was seeking an 'internal settlement', and South Africa supported that with enthusiasm. With that support, Smith sought accommodation with Nkomo, who was perceived as another Jomo Kenyatta, pro-western, pro-capitalist, leader. When this failed, Smith turned to Abel Muzorewa, the leader of the United African Nationalist Council, an internal party with wide support in other parts of Africa. Chief Jeremiah Cbirau and Ndabaningi Sithole, deposed leader of ZANU, joined with Muzorewa and entered into an agreement with Smith in March of 1978. Toe settlement provided for a majority rule

1. Shaw and Aluko, *op. cit.,* pp.247-248.
2. Andre Ascrow, *Zimbabwe:* ***A*** *Revolution that Lost its Way?,* London, Zed Books Ltd., 1983, p.101. Sec also, Wilfred Bur­ chett, *Southern Africa Stands Up,* New Yorlc, Urizen Book, 1978, pp.224-230. And, Colin Legum, *Southern Africa: The Year of the Whirlwind,* London, Rex Collings, 1977.
3. Shaw and Aluko, *op. cit.,* p.248. Also sec, Wilmot G. James, *The State of Apartheid,* Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Ricnncr Pub­ lishers, 1987, p.153.

constitution, but the real power, both political and economic, and over military forces and internal security would remain in white bands, as indeed it did after the elections which provided Muzorewa with the prem- iership.(99]

This settlement was condemned by almost all outside powers, the U.N., the O.A.U., and both wings of the excluded Patriotic Front and it resulted in a stepping up of guerilla activity. South African support for Muzorewa, both material and military, enabled the new regime to survive. Zambia and Mozambique, each for reasons of its own, played a key i:ole in forcing ZANU and ZAPU to accept Carrington's terms for negotiations, the Carter Administration increasingly alarmed over Soviet adventurism on the continent, decided upon a thaw in relations between Washington and Pretoria, and Margaret Thatcher, the new Con­ servative Prime Minister in London appeared favourably disposed to cooperation with the Republic. Decidedly things were looking up for the supporters of detente between the FLS and South Africa.[100]

Nigeria decided to throw its weight into the balance by warning both the U.S. and the U.K. that play­ ing 'footsies' with Pretoria and Salisbury would carry a heavy price. This brought about a revival of earlier proposals for an inclusion in the process of negotiation of forces representing the Patriotic Front, and a conference was convened at Lancaster House in London in December of 1979. The West and South Africa pushed Muzorewa on one side, and the Front Line States pressured ZANU and ZAPU on the other, result­ ing in an agreement to bold new elections. To the astonishment of everyone, Robert Mugabe's ZANU won 57 seats and 20 went to Nkomo's P.F. out of 80 seats in a 100 seat parliament, 20 of which were reserved for whites. South Africa, the white Rhodesian settlers and the Western powocs awaited developments with grave concern to see if ZANU would implement the socialist programme it bad stood for.[101]

The news of the election was received in Pretoria with shock, where there bad been great confidence that if Muzorewa could not win, neither could Mugabe and a 'moderate' coalition would result. Even so,

P.W. Botha, now Prime Minister, resisted the temptation to support a post-election coup by Rhodesian security forces and announced a policy of careful neutrality. There was some consolation in developments

[99] *Ibid.,* p.249.

1. Ascrow, *op. cit,* p.154.
2. Ali Mazrui and Michael Tidy, *Naionalism and New Stales in Africa,* London, Heinemann, 1984, p.150.

in Zimbabwe, where the government was taking vigorous measures to stem a drain of white citizens from the country, adopting a pro-capitalist posture and signalling that its socialism would be tempered with economic realism, which included active courting of foreign investment[102]

In the event Mugabe responded to this with recognition of the need for coexistence with South Africa Mozambique continued to supply migrant workers for the mines, and Pretoria availed itself liberally of Mozambiquan railroads and harbours, and continued to receive electrical power from the Cabora Bassa Dam. Zambia increased both its imports and exports with the Republic. But these substan- tial advances in positive relations with its near neighbours, including Rhodesia, were offset 011 the interna­ tional scene by the growing tensions surrounding the future of Namibia

Under pressure from the U.N. Security Council, the South African government convened a confer­ ence of diverse ethnic groups, excluding SWAPO, to achieve formal independence for Namibia, combined with the elimination of certain apartheid laws in order to legitimate the government to be established. The 'Tumhalle' Conference met from September of 1975 through August of 1976, gaining from South Africa a definite date for Namibian independence on December 31, 1978. The white delegation refused to budge on the basic structures of apartheid, creating frictions with the West and leading Vorster to suspend the Conference and appoint a transitional administration which would work closely with the U.N. towards holding a general election for a constituent assembly whose assigDment would be to prepare for indepen­ dence. The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 435 in June of 1978, providing the framework for a Geneva Conference, involving South Africa, SWAPO, the 'Contact Group' of five Western powers and the Front Line African States. No agreement was reached by this group. Pretoria refused to consider reducing its military forces in Namibia to 1,500 or to accept a proposed U.N. supervisory force of 7,500, or to trust

U.N. monitoring of SW APO guerilla bases in Angola during the transition period.[103]

Emerging from all of this was the formation of a Democratic Tumhalle Alliance, which won the elec­ tions held in December of 1978. This created a bicameral legislature with separate houses for blacks and whites, one of whose principal effects was the exclusion of SWAPO from political representation. The

[102) *Ibid.,* p.151, see also, Anthony Verrier, *The Road to Zimbabwe: 1890-1980,* London, Jonathan Cape, 1986, and Stephen Chan,

*'The Commonwealth Observer Group in Zimbabwe',* Gweru: Mambo Press, 1985.

1. Davenport, *op. cit.,* pp.483-486.

government did succeed in eliminating some discriminatory practices, but it lost support both from whites, for going too far and from blacks, for not going far enough.[104]

Increased guerilla activity by SWAPO operating from bases in Angola probably influenced South Africa to maintain ties with the so-called 'Contact Group' during 1980, 1981 and 1982.(105] Later, the Reagan Administration reduced pressure on the issue of Namibian independence in favour of demanding the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The South African government did not perceive SWAPO as a legitimate nationalist group, but as a revolutionary communist movement; SWAPO participation in Nam­ ibian government was seen as a threat to the security of the Republic and would seriously threaten the white settlers living in the territory. Against this, Pretoria bad to deal with the fact that the OAU, Nigeria and the Front Line States were all growing impatient with what they reganled as footdragging, and the failure to make progress towards a settlement along lines laid down by the U.N. Additional concerns were raised by continued military activity by South Africa in Angola, designed both to destroy SWAPO as a threat to Namibia and to weaken the MPLA regime.[106]

The problems associated with Rhodesia, Angola and Namibia have been the principal foreign preoc­ cupation of Pretoria since 1974. South Africa has not been alone as seei..'lg the outcome in Angola as a vic­ tory for the Soviet Union and its satellites. That view was shared strongly by Henry Kissinger and most Western commentators. What this analysis failed to take into account, according to Colin Legum, an Afri­ can expert for the *The Observer* was the extremely important rivalry between the Soviet Union and China

* + for influence in Africa. "Only if this rivalry is given the emphasis it deserve§ can one understand the true

1. Robert S. Jaster, *South Africa in Namibia: The Botha Strategy,* London, University Press of America, 1985, pp.7-9. In 1977, following encouragement from South Africa, a group of ethnically-based political parties met in the so-called 'Tumhalle Con­ stitutional Conference' to discuss a possible internal political settlement excluding SWAPO. The parties held their meetings in the Tumhallc, a building from the German colonial period in Namibia, and used its name for the alliance which resulted. On 7 November, they agreed to form a joint organization to campaign for internal sclf-govcmrncnt, the Democratic Tumhalle Alli­ ance. The DTA is dominated by the white Republican Party. In addition it includes small ethnically-based parties from each of the ten other ethenic groups. See, Jaster, *op.* cit., p.8, *Namibia: The Constitutional Fraud,* London, International Defence and Aid Fund, Briefing Paper, no. 2, July 1981. Also sec, Katjavivi, *op. cit.,* pp.94-103.
2. *Ibid.,* pp.10-14. Also see, Katjavivi, *op. cit.,* chapter 17. In 1977, the United States joined the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, and Canada to organise a 'Contact Group'. They sought to engage the African countries, the O.A.U., and SWAPO in discussions about the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 435. From 1977 to 1983, the Contact Group negotiated with South Africa to arrange for U.N.-superviscd elections leading to independence. At the end of 1983, the French representative withdrew from the Contact Group. See, Ann Seidman, *The Roots of Crisis in Southem Africa,* New Jersey, Ox­ fam America, 1985, p.81. For more discussion of the Contact Group see, Andre du Pisan "SWA-Namibia Update: 1981- 1984", *Africa Insight,* vol. 14, no. 3, 1984.

[106) Davenport, *op. cit.,* pp.501-505, also see, Carter and O'Meara, *op. cit.,* p.195.

nature of the struggle that is taking place in Rhodesia, and, prospectively, future conflicts in Namibia and South Africa".[107)

Legum was not suggesting that the situation in Southern Africa was simply a result of struggles between Moscow and Peking. The conflict "arises from the detennination of black Africans to bring an end to the white supremacist regimes there. Most Africans would much prefer, in their own interests, to see this come about through nonviolent means, as was demonstrated by their response in 1974 to the offer to start talks by South African's Prime Minister Johannes Vorster. They will, nonetheless, support violence if no other way seems open. Similarly, most African leaders are hardly ardent supporters of communism and are strongly opposed to the intrusion of big power politics in Africa; but because they see white racism in Southern Africa as a bigger menace to them than communism, they will welcome anti-Western forces in the struggle against the white supremacist regimes".[108) Both the Soviet Union and the Chinese can support wholeheartedly and ideologically the aspirations of the African peoples towards self-determination, while the Western powers, including the U.S. are not without ambiguities in their attitudes towards an end to white rule south of the Sahara.

All three are of course motivated more by their own 'neo-colonial' designs than by genuine altruistic concerns for Africa and Africans, but it is important to understand what is happening between and among them as they reacted to events in Southern Africa. From the early 1960s to the mid 1970s the rivalry between China and the Soviet Union intensified palpably in the Third World. The USSR made determined efforts in black Africa in the 1960s, most notably in Zaire, Ghana, Guinea and Mali, in none of which were they especially successful. By 1973, the Soviets were relatively isolated except for a few unreliable con­ tacts in Somalia and an unstable Congo-Brazzaville. The Chinese got off to a bad start, encouraging revolts against popular leaders like Jomo Kenyatta, but they learned quickly and have managed to project an image of generosity and empathy, avoiding the appearance of seeking domination and maintaining a sensitive ear to the needs of the Africans themselves. They experienced two special successes; friendship with Tanzania

[107] Colin Legum, 'The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa', *Foreign Affairs,* July 1976, p.745. Rivalry has now died down. For Chinese foreign policy blunders, see Herbert S. Ycc, 'The Three Worlds Theory and Post-Mao China's Global Strategy', *International Affairs,* vol. 59, no. 2, 1983. And for ideological reasons for Chinese withdrawal see, Stephen Chan, 'The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Three Worlds Theory: Chinese Foreign Policy and Africa', *The Round Table,* no. 296, 1985.

[108] *Ibid.,* p.746.

and Zaire through building the Freedom railway to Zambia, and they have won the confidence of all the major liberation movements in Southern Africa. This was especially true of the FRELIMO in Mozambique and ZANU in Rhodesia, as well as SWAPO in Namibia.[109]

The Soviet Union had severe difficulties in Angola, finding it difficult to work with the leader of

:MPLA, Agostino Neto, and at one point cut off all aid and encouraged a rival of Neto's, Daniel Chipenda, later resuming their support of Neto. Soviet concern over Chinese successes in Africa led them in 1972-73 to a much more vigorous policy, supplying anns to Idi Amin in Uganda, and entering into an arms agree­ ment with Qaddafi in Libya. This positioned Moscow to take advantage of two developments in 1974: the army mutiny in Ethiopia against Haile Selassie and the Portuguese coup. The latter event worked at fust in favour of the Chinese, who were able to consolidate their position in Mozambique and strengthen their rela­ tions with Tanzania and Zambia. They were already closely associated with two of the Angolan liberation movements, FNLA and UNITA and had influence with the government of Zaire.

Against this background, the Soviet Union decided to go 'all out' in Angola. They put all their eggs in the one basket, the MPLA, and openly defied the wishes of the OAU. By March of 1975, they were sending substantial military supplies to the MPLA - a full six months before U.S. supplies began to reach FNLA through Zaire. "By June the MPLA was strong enough to take on UNITA as well and to spread its forces, albeit lightly, across 12 of the 14 provinces."[110] The Cubans, armed and supplied by the Soviet Union, were in Angola in considerable force in early October, three weeks before the South African Defence Force crossed the border. They had established lines of communic¥ion and supply through Braz­ zaville, with the concurrence of President Ngouabi. The Soviet/Cuban contention is that their entry into the military field was in response to South African's invasion.

The Soviet Union openly opposed the call of the OAU for a government of unity in Angola which should include representative of all parties, demanding recognition unilaterally of the :MPLA as the legiti­ mate government. The Chinese followed the OAU lead, withdrawing their military advisers to FNLA in Zaire in July of 1975. They were in no position to compete with Moscow in massive military support of

[109] *Ibid.,* p.749. [l 10] *Ibid.,* p.750.

their clients, and they probably believed that in the long run, their African position would be strengthened by full cooperation with the wishes of the OAU. "What happened in Angola suggests that in the Third World the Sino-Soviet rivalry with each other has become more important to them than either's rivalry with the West The Chinese felt themselves to be in de facto alliance with the United States and reportedly urged U.N. intervention against the Soviet and the Cubans. The Russians, for their part, were willing to place detente with Washington in jeopardy at a time when opposition to detente was already growing in the United States and Western Europe".[111] ·

The propaganda which spread through the Third World countries during the Angolan crisis showed that both Peking and Moscow were primarily interested in seeking to discredit each other, only secondarily attacking the Western powers. Peking accused "the modem tsarists" of "single-handedly provoking the civil war in Angola" and the Soviets counter charged that "all the action taken by the Peking leadership shows that the Marxists, who are seeking their own hegemonic control [over the world] have not stopped subversive activity against the Angolan people for a single minute; that they gave active support to pro­ imperialist groupings and organizations, pushing them to talce action against the genuine representatives and vanguard of the Angolan people - the MPLA".[112]

Curiously, the Chinese line is very close to that of Western hawks, accusing the Soviet Union of seeking to become the new colonial power in Africa. At the end of the Angolan affair, the balance of power or influence in Africa shifted from its decidedly Chinese 'tilt' in favour of the USSR. The willing­ ness of Moscow to undertalce substantial military support of MPLA encouragiro other liberation movements to think seriously about seeking and accepting Soviet help in their own struggles.

Legum cautions against drawing too close a parallel between Angola and Rhodesia. The USSR was able to intervene decisively in the former for a number of reasons unique to that situation. There was a multi-sided struggle for power in a country without a legitimate government; South Africa had decided to intervene militarily; and the Chinese decided to support neutrality.[113]

[111] *Ibid.,* p.751. For aspects of Sino-Soviet rivalry over Angola see, Colin Legum and Tony Hodges, *After Angola,* London, Rex Collings, 1976, pp.22-25.

[112] *Ibid.,* p.752.

[113] For further discussion of this issue sec, Julius Nyerere, "Foreign Troops in Africa", *Africa Report,* vol. 23, no. 4, July-August 1978, pp.11-15.

In both Rhodesia and Namibia, the role that can be played by any of the outside powers was likely to be limited by the actions of the neighbouring Front Line States. Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Samora Machel, Neto of Angola and Sir Seretse Khama (known as the group of five Presidents from June 1976, then later changed to the Front Line Presidents, then in 1980 to the Front Line States), were not likely to sit back and allow Moscow, Peking or Washington to play a determining role in events in their backyard. They needed to carry with them a majority of the OAU membership, but they were experienced and skilled in that role. The division between Kaunda and Khama on one side, and Nyerere and Machel on the other with respect to Angola did not exist in the Rhodesian situation. They were united to some extent in support of a full-scale guerilla war in Rhodesia until a white leadership would emerge which was willing to enter immediate negotiations which would begin with the concession of majority rule.[114]

The five Presidents also agreed that any foreign aid to Rhodesian guerillas must be channeled through the OAU Liberation Committee in Dar es Salaam. This, they hoped, would prevent any major power from backing rival nationalist factions as happened in Angola. They further insisted that all the fighting be done by Zimbabweans, excluding any foreign mercenaries, Cuban or South African, and that no new military instructors be admitted to the training camps of the ZILA (Zimbabwe Liberation Anny) fighters in Mozam­ bique and Tanzania, which was a point for the Chinese, who already have their instructors there. A few Cuban instructors were admitted as a trade-off for the delivery of some sophisticated weapons not available from China.[115]

Writing in 1976, Legum expressed uncertainty as to the future South African role in Rhodesia. Vor­ ster bad accepted majority rule as both inevitable and necessary at that point The withdrawal from active support of Smith following the Angolan debacle appeared sensible and moderate, but South Africa would not align itself with those who sought a 'quick kill' in Rhodesia. To support a South African boycott of Rhodesia would be hypocritical in the extreme and would risk the displeasure of the extreme right in South Africa itself.

[114) Robert S. Jaster, "A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front Line States: Experience and Prospects", *Adelphi Papers,* no.

180, London, IISS, 1983, p.34.

[115) Mazrui and Tidy, *op. cit.,* pp.148-149. For further discussion on the issue of the Liberation Committee of the OAU, see, K. Mathews, 'The Organization of African Unity", *India Quarterly,* vol. 33, 1977, pp.308-323.

Whatever the successes or failures of the Western powers, the Soviet Union and the Chinese in Southern Africa, it is clear that South Africa has been fighting a losing battle ever since the end of the Second World War in so far as its efforts to influence the actions of other African States to act favourably in its own cause are concerned. It struggled to preserve British, French and Portuguese colonialism and failed. It sought to support a continuation of white power in Rhodesia and failed. It supported moderate regimes in Angola and Rhodesia and failed. It sought accommodation with the new black rulers, seeking their agree­ ment that South Africa's internal affairs; i.e. apartheid was purely a domestic matter and nobody else's business. That, too, failed. It tried to gain international approval of its administration of Namibia and the HCTs, without success. Everywhere the Afrikaner looks he finds a repetition of his situation before the Great Trek: someone telling him what he can and cannot do, when all he wants is to be left alone. He can­ not pack up and move, as he did before. What is he to do? Some are circling their wagons, adopting a defensive posture and protecting their own against all comers. But some are doing more than that. They are seeking actively to destabilize their hostile neighbours, to keep them off balance so that they cannot attack. Others still are beginning to consider seriously the possibility of accommodation. However, look­ ing at the events of the past few years, country after country abutting the Republic has been the 'beneficiary' of coercive diplomacy or, as it is more commonly termed, destabilization.

The assumption is that South Africa's neighbours are, without exception, seeking to destabilize her and worlcing toward the goal of ending apartheid and white rule within the Republic, so that there is a sense in which South Africa's covert 'attacks' on her neighbours can be seen as piy:ely defensive. In one paper, published by the South Africa Forum in September, 1982, the importance of the destabilizer attacking "the target state's political, economic and military vulnerabilities" is considered. It indicates the opportunities to "lend support to receptive disaffected groups", lending "military support" that is more or less covert ... pro­ viding arms and equipment, recruiting and arming mercenaries, sending own military personnel as advisers or as combatants, and setting up radio stations for rebels.[116] Indeed, all of these tactics have been used against South Africa by the enemies of apartheid, and South Africa has responded in kind against Mozam-

[116] Deon Geldenhuys, "Destabilisation Controversy in Southern Africa", *S.A. Forum Position Paper,* Johannesburg, September 1982, p.6.

bique, Angola, Lesotho and Zimbabwe.

Another suggestion is to cut the food supply to the neighbouring states. "The objective would be to cause serious hardship to the population, who would in turn direct their frustration and fury at the target's regime". In a study commissioned by the University of Pretoria's Institute of Strategic Studies, published in 1981,Geldenhuys focussed especially on economic actions rather than military ones that could be taken against·neighbours. Among these were the following:

"Limiting the use of South African railways by manipulating the availability of railway wagons.

Restrictions on migrant labour. Border closures or restrictions.

Cuming imports from neighbouring states. Regulating the export of goods to black states. Cutting electricity supplies.

Restricting South African tourists.

Violating the customs union agreement "[117]

All of these were used before and after the paper was published. "The overall goal of destabilization is to assert and maintain regional dominance".[118] Foremost among the results of dominance is the ability to force the neighbours not to support calls for mandatory trade sanctions against South Africa. "The stronger their economic ties with South Africa, perhaps the lesser the **chances** of their supporting sanctions. Black states could, in other words, shield South Africa from mandatory sanctions."[119]

One important technique of destabilization is to intervene politically in the affairs of neighbouring states, seeking to encourage regimes that will be friendly, which is ironic since South Africa complains

[117) Deon Gcldenhuys, "Some Strategic Implementations of Regional Economic Relations for the Republic of South Africa", */SS­ UP Strategic Review,* Pretoria, January 1981, pp.17-19. Gcldenhuys has attempted to defend his position against criticism that he was an apologist for government policy and a correspondence has appeared in the *Journal of Southern African Studies,* vol. 12, no. 2, April 1986, pp.313-315, [dialogue between Robert Davies and Deon Gcldenhuys]. Stephen Chan writes, "I do not believe Gcldenhuys was a principal or even minor advisor to the military ... Whether he sought that role and hoped to advenise his availability through his writings is a question which nobody can answer properly". Stephen Chan, "The Strategist in Isola­ tion: The Case of Deon Gcldenhuys and the South African Military", *Defense Analysis,* vol. *5,* no. 4, 1989.

[118] *Ibid..*

(119) *Ibid.,* p.20.

bitterly about efforts of neighbours to intervene in its internal political affairs, efforts designed to end apartheid. But Pretoria has used this tactic repeatedly. As white rule in Rhodesia came to an end and Zim­ babwe was about to be born, South Africa threw its support behind Muzorewa and his UANC, providing substantial amounts of financial support and cooperation with the Rhodesian security services. Muzorewa won only three seats in the parliament, losing overwhelmingly to the parties most hostile to South Africa. Mugabe, the winner in the election, announced a policy of reconciliation - between black and white and between the rival liberation parties ZANU and ZAPU.[120] South Africa sought to widen the differences and to prevent reconciliation. While the struggle was still going on, South Africa had agents at work in the Rhodesian security forces and so was in a position to know of anns caches of both ZANU and ZAPU. After the elections that brought Mugabe to power in Zimbabwe, South Africa revealed that ZAPU members had hidden arms rather than turn them in, as the agreement called for, to the central annory. This caused the dismissal of Nkomo and other ZAPU ministers from the government Hundreds of former ZAPU members returned to the bush and became what Zimbabwe calls 'dissidents', attacking trains, road traffic and farms. This created grave internal difficulties for Mugabe in Zimbabwe, and the movement was ini- tiated, supported and encouraged by South Africa.[121]

A further tactic of destabilization is raids across the neighbour's border, of the kind common in the Middle East, where the PLO strikes into Israel with commando raids, bombings, kidnappings, assassina­ tions, and the like, and Israel strikes back at PLO camps with aerial bombings, raids by commandos, and other measures South Africa has become expert at such tactics. In July of 1982, the air base at Thornhill in Zimbabwe was attacked; explosives were put in thirteen aircraft with millions of pounds worth of damage resulting. There was evidently collusion on the part of some former white settlers in Rhodesia, and the government moved sharply against whites, causing disruption in the policy of attempted reconciliation, a double destabilization.[122]

Well-trained and supplied commandos carry out regular raids from South Africa into neighbouring

[120) Mazrui and Tidy, *op. cit.,* p.151.

[121) Joseph Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours,* London, CIIR, 1986, p.179. Also sec, Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, *op. cit.,*

pp.45-47. For more discussion of the policy of reconciliation and the disagreement between ZANU and ZAPU. [122) *Ibid.,* p.28.

territory, where the most common target is personnel of the African National Congress, the chief foe of South Africa in the region. Some of its leaders have been assassinated, its headquarters in various parts of the area subject to ground attack, aerial bombardment and general destruction. As the Israelis justify such attacks in Lebanon, Jordan, and elsewhere, as a purely defensive or retaliatory in response to previous attacks by the PLO, so South Africa always claims that because of the hostile actions of the ANC against its security and the safety of its citizens,"it is forced to reply in kind. This policy is known as the big stick. It sets up a vicious circle where violence begets violence. But neither Israel nor South Africa is prepared to sit down at the negotiating table with its enemies, the PLO or the ANC. Both governments enjoy enormous advantages, economically, militarily, technologically over its foes and cannot be forced, even with the strongest international pressures, to negotiate. Toe disparity in numbers, in both cases, would appear to mitigate in the long run against the settler state and in favour of the majority of the population, though there

is no prospect in the foreseeable future of any possible way the Palestinians (with the help of their Arab

neighbours) or the black South Africans (with the help of their African neighbours) can possibly overthrow their oppressors and establish majority rule.

Geldenhuys, with the collaboration of a British colleague, William Gutteridge, has produced a publi­ cation in a series of Conflict Studies, in which they provide a plausible rationale for the destabilization pol­ icy. "It requires no lengthy examination", they wrote, "to make the point that relations between South Africa and the black southern African states generally are characterized by deep political/ideological differ­ ences. At the heart of the resulting antagonism are South Africa's domesp.c racial policies, which are anathema to the black states, as well as to the international community ... just as the black states are com­ mitted to end South Africa's control of Namibia and support the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). Tuey have dedicated themselves to the 'struggle against apartheid' and they support the so­ called liberation movements, particularly the African National Congress (ANC) as the vehicles of change."[123] They went on to point out that the neighbouring states all engaged in strident criticism of South Africa and that some of them provided sanctuary and limited military assistance to SWAPO and

[123] Deon Geldenhuys and William Gutteridge, "Instability and Conflict in Southern Africa: South Africa's Role in Regional Secu­ rity, *Conflict Studies,* no. 148, London, The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1983, p.15.

ANC. Nearly all supported mandatory UN sanctions against South African, "including those economically heavily dependent on the Republic" and continue to do so. The black states, then, have "engaged in a sys­ tematic effort to destabilize South Africa. The object is perlectly clear: not merely the behaviour of the government - specifically its advocacy of separate development - should be changed, but also its structure: a 'minority' regime bas to be replaced by a 'majority' government".[124] The means being employed are essentially coercive in nature.

In contrast to this, Geldenhuys continues, South Africa bas been advocating a policy of 'peaceful coexistence' with black African states. "Prime Minister Vorster in the late 1960s embarlced on bis 'outward movement', subsequently renamed (and revised) as the dialogue and later the detente initiatives."[125] There is an element of truth in bis contention, in that South Africa bas expressed repeated willingness to negotiate with its neighbours. However, in the South African view the problem was that the neighbours were unwilling and unable to accept the basic premise on which South Africa insists that all negotiations be based: the refusal to support the ANC, unless the ANC denies the use of violence.

"Relations between South Africa and the black states are, on both sides, characterized by suspicion, fear and even a strong dose of paranoia. Each sees its security and stability threatened by the other; each side, in other words, perceives itself the target of destabilization by the other".[126] So Geldenbuys sum­ marized the situation with accuracy and surprising candor. He proceeded to examine in some detail the accusations that South Africa deliberately used political, economic and military measures to destabilize its. neighbours, specifically Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe. He did not deny categorically such activities. In fact, he admitted that to do so would be foolish. He pointed out that there are *'hawks'* and *'doves'[127]* in the South African government, listed the risks and dangers to South Africa in a hawk-

[124] *Ibid.,* p.16.

[I 25] *Ibid.,* p.16.

[126] *Ibid.,* p.18.

[127] South Africa's foreign policy makers were divided on the question of regional strategy into two schools of thought, which can conveniently be classified as 'hawkish' and 'doveish'. The hawks maintain that South Africa possesses only two credible and effective instruments to insure its security in the Southern African context, viz. economic and military muscle. The doves place heavy reliance on economic links as a determinant of political behaviour. They sec the neighbouring states' close economic tics with South Africa as an incentive for them to maintain a reasonable or tolerable attitude towards the public, which essentially means not endangering its security. Sec Hawkish and Doveish in, Deon Gcldcnhuys, *The Diplomacy of Iso­ lation: South Africa Foreign Policy Making,* Johannesburg, Macmillan South Africa, 1984. Also sec chapter two of this thesis:

South Africa Foreign Policy.

ish policy of destabilization against its neighbours and suggested, in conclusion, that "inter-state and intra­ state stability in Southern Africa might be the only alternative to disastrous regional conflict."[128]

This view is shared by Kenneth Grundy of Case Western Reserve University in *Current History.* "From 1973 until 1983, but especially in the last three years of that period, South African policy in southern Africa was pugnacious and militaristic. In a word, South Africa sought to destabilize neighbouring govern­ ments to force them to foresake forces antagonistic to the white minority government in Pretoria."[129] Grundy points out that there is substantial e\_vidence, some of it circumstantial, to be sure, that South Africa . has engaged in persistent efforts to subvert neighbouring governments and to engage them militarily in order to prevent them from supporting liberation or revolutionary movements seeking refuge in their terri­ tories or using them as bases from which to fight against apartheid in South Africa itself. "South Africa was determined to pursue a forward defence of the status quo".[130]

'Forward defence' in this context means 'coercive diplomacy' or 'destabilization'. South Africa sought to overthrow or replace the government of Zimbabwe, it undertook raids into Mozambique, Botswana, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho as well, all aimed at alleged ANC installations in those coun­ tries. The operations were justified as 'surgical', exactly the word Israel uses to describe attacks on PLO camps in Lebanon.[131]

The incursions into Angola during the struggle among the rival factions have already been discussed. There have been a number since the establishment of the FRELIMO government. Raids have been made

outside Maputo in Mozambique in January, 1981 and in October, 1983 and air ,strikes on many occasions.

Much more damaging has been the activity of the MNR-RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance Movement), an internal guerilla force opposed to the FRELIMO government and supplied by South Africa with arms, supplies, training and logistical support. Food supplies have been disrupted in Mozambique,

(1281 *Ibid.,* p.26.

(1291 Kenneth W. Grundy, "South Africa's Regional Policy", in *Current History,* April 1985, p.150. (1301 *Ibid.,* p.152.

[131] According to Geldenhuys, "Pretoria's primary objective would be to force the MPLA into a fundamental policy shift on Nami­ bia. Ideally, the Luanda regime should deny SWAPO bases and protection on Angolan soil. Alternatively, South Africa would want Angola to exert pressure on SWAPO to support an intemational settlement in Namibia on terms which South Africa would regard as favourable to its own interests. The way to achieve either objective is to punish Angola militarily in much the same way as Israel reacts against Arab hosts of the PLO". Deon Gcldenhuys, 'The Destabilisation Controversy: An Analysis of a High Risk Foreign Policy Option for S.A.", *Politikon,* vol. 9, no. 2, December 1982, pp.28-29.

sabotage and armed conflict have been commonplace. Mozambique's government has more than once been on the verge of collapse. The beauty of this technique is that it provides Pretoria with a sort of dial which can be turned up or down at will. If the neighbouring government has been 'bad', harbouring anti-apartheid forces, or vocally supporting moves in the OAU or other international bodies for boycott or sanctions directed against South Africa, then the dial is turned up, and the offending government suffers the conse­ quences. If the neighbours have been 'good', expelling ANC forces, acting as they 'should' in international councils, and elsewhere, then the dial is turned down and there is peace and stability. This is why the term 'coercive diplomacy' is apt.

In Lesotho, which is even more vulnerable than Mozambique, both geographically and economically, the impounding of shipments of vital goods at South African ports and harassment of Basuto labourers in South Africa are useful tools. An SADF raid in December 1982, which resulted in the death of 42 people, helped to persuade Lesotho to expel refugees who were *persona non grata* in Pretoria.[132] South Africa covertly supported certain dissident groups opposed to the regime of Chief Jonathan Leabua. As Gel­ denhuys points out, there are, in fact, dissident groups in all of these countries, and it is not difficult, if one is of the mind, to identify, locate, recruit and support them with information, supplies, weapons, training, logistical support, or in other ways. Zimbabwe is convinced that South Africa has supported dissident groups within its borders. There has been a steady stream of radio propaganda, assassinations, espionage and a series of 'dirty tricks'[133] for some time. Economic pressures are often brought to bear, especially

in the area of transportation facilities. Afrikaners occupying key positions in the military or security forces

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are persuaded to defect, and there are occasional raids of SADF commandos into Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe, all of which combined to make those governments feel exceedingly vulnerable and need to respond to South African pressures. There are similar activities in Botswana, in Swaziland, and even as far afield as the Seychelles.[134]

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| (132] | Hanlon, *op. cit.,* p.113. |
| (133] | Geldenhuys, *op. cit.,* September 1982, p.14. |
| (134] | Joseph Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front: South Africa War Against its Neighbours,* London, Penguin Books, 1986, p.99. On  25th November 1980, a South African-organized attempt to overthrow the Seychelles government failed. And on 14th March |
|  | 1982, South Africa bombed the ANC office in London. See: Joseph Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front,* p.67. Also see: Peter  Calvocoressi, *World Politics Since 1945,* 5th edition, London, Longman, 1987, p.266. |

This continued activity in the late 1970s and early 1980s subjected the South African government (which was divided internally between the hawks at Defence and the doves in the Foreign Ministry) both from its own citizens and in international circles as well. Geldeobuys openly expressed his feeling that the tactic had gone too far and that the time bad come to seek other means of accommodation through inter­ state and intra-state negotiations, as we have seen. As a result of the inner and outer pressures, South Africa signed an agreement at Lusaka in February 1984, agreeing to withdraw all SADF forces in Angola, and in March of that same year, Prime Minister Botha and President Machel of Mozambique concluded an historic agreement at the border town of Nkomati. The Treaty contained three concessions from Mozarn- bique to South Africa. Mozambique was the first neighbour publicly to sign a non-aggression pact with South Africa. It was announced later that Swaziland had earlier concluded a secret pact to that effect Second, the Mozambicans agreed to expel all ANC, military as well as ordinary refugees, with the excep­ tion of ten members who would remain as a diplomatic mission. Third, Mozambique agreed to parallel talks on economic issues, one of which was reopening the border to South African tourists. The agreement

was humiliating, bringing strong criticism from many other African States, but Mozambique was satisfied

in receiving in return assurances from Pretoria that all support to Jv1NR would cease.[135]

Those assurances were not honoured. The continued attacks by the Jv1NR at first made it appear that they were continuing to receive supplies across the border, but later investigation revealed that Pretoria, in anticipation of the Nkomati pacts and under steady pressure from the U.S.A. to come to some agreement before the national elections in November of 1984, bad pre-supplied the forces with enough material to carry on for at least six months.(136] A Joint force of Mozambiquan and Zimbabwean troops captured the main Jv1NR base in Mozambique in August of 1985, uncovering clear evidence that contacts continued between Pretoria and the Jv1NR leadership long after the Nkomati accord was to have taken effect[137]

During the early months of 1979, P.W. Botha and Pik Botha, Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister respectively, batched **a** scheme to find a solution to the problems of southern Africa independent of any 'outside' interference. They proposed a 'constellation' of seven to ten regional states, totalling some 40

[135] *Ibid.,* pp.104-105.

[136] *Ibid.,* p.107. Also sec, *Review of African Political Economy,* no. 29, July 1984, 'Southern Africa 1984', pp.144-150. [137] Sec chapter five of this study.

million people, with South Africa at its centre.[138] This suggestion, came at a time when P.W. Botha was condemning the Western powers and urging South Africa to 'go it alone'. The idea was put forward in a speech announcing that Pretoria intended to tum its back on the international scene and solve its problems in concert with its near neighbours. The vision was of a core of 'moderate' states, South Africa, Malawi, Botswana., Lesotho, Swazi.land., Zimbabwe and Namibia, together with the Bantustans nominally indepen­ dent (at that time Transkei and Bophuthatswana) which would enter into a "sub-continental solidarity", including close economic, political and military ties. Other moderate states were invited to join. South Africa already enjoyed close economic ties with these states, but now it was proposed to develop a "com­ mon approach in the security field" since all of them faced a common Marxist threat and could not rely on the West for support.[139]

To no one's smprise, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (they are members of the Customs Union with South Africa) declined the invitation. *As* members of the OAU they were steadfastly opposed to apartheid and refused to recognize the Transkei and Bophuthatswana as independent states. Within three months (in July 1979) of the South African proposal, Botswana and the other Front Line States came for­ ward with a plan of their own, involving economic cooperation between and among Mozambique, Angola, Zambia, and Tanzania. Calling themselves the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), they sought to promote regional economic development and reduce their dependence on South Africa In addition to the Front Line States, SADCC members include Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi - the only African state to recognize South Africa. Zimbabwe became the ninth state after independence in 1980. The door was not closed to South African membership, but only on condition that apartheid be aban­

doned. The South African government proceeded anyway with the idea of a constellation with the other candidates: the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Namibia, with the latter enjoying only observer status. Most of the activity of the new council has been economic, with South Africa pushing hard to pro­ vide for economic growth and development, creating a Southern Africa Development Bank and a Small Business Development Corporation. The four nominally independent homelands (Ciskei was added in late

1. Cawthra, *op. cit.,* p.139.
2. The speech is referred to in Price, *op. cit.,* January 1984, p.14. Also sec, Davies and O'Mcara, *op. cit.,* April 1985, p.189. And, Martin Murray, *South Africa: Time of Agony, Time af Destiny,* London, Verso, 1987, pp.43-46.

1981) have representatives on the Bank.[140]

Security concerns and measures have not been neglected. The SADF bas trained the local defence forces of the four states and also trained what are called 'regional black units', whose task will be to train and prepare soldiers for operations in their command areas, as well as in the Operational Area, by which is meant the Namibia-Angola border.[141] "South African foreign affairs officials maintain that the risk of really punitive sanctions by the West would ·be minimized if South Africa could create a region of economi­ cally interdependent states in which South Africa could play a leading and supportive role. So far, how­ ever, the poverty and economic neglect in these entities offer little to attract others. Furthermore, the out­ side world continues to view the Bantustans not only as puppets created and maintained by South Africa's white minority government, but also as the most egregious -and extreme aspect of the apartheid edifice itself'.[142]

One of the significant factors in South African foreign policy planning and policies is, of course, the ANC. For a long time, this organization played a relatively minor role in the region, taking a back seat to the various national liberation movements. In the 1980s it emerged as a dominant political force among South African blacks and the major perceived threat to the continuation of apartheid. A number of factors contributed to bringing this about The rise of a series of independent black states along South Africa's borders, Angola and Mozambique in particular, created a sanctuary for the ANC leadership and its activi­ ties. Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho and Zimbabwe deny sanctuary to the guerillas, but they allow ANC members to remain within their borders as refugees. The Soweto uprising In 1976 was another factor in lending new power to the ANC. As the security forces moved in with brute force to quell the disturbances, thousands of teenage students fled to neighbouring states where they had been recruited by the ANC, about 4,000 of them, according to the ANC itself. Young, hostile and dedicated, they have made excellent raw material for guerilla training provided by Soviet advisers and a number of African states.[143] Neither of these developments was brought about by direct ANC action, but the organization was in a position to take

1. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa and its Neighbours: The Dynamics of Regional Conflict", *Adelphi Papers,* no. 209, London, IISS, 1986, p.46.

[141] *Ibid.,* p.48.

[142] *Ibid.,* p.63.

[143] *Ibid.,* p.50.

full advantage of them and to position itself as the leading force in the struggle against apartheid, able to launch several campaigns of sabotage against South Africa.

The deaths of the two leaders of alternative organisations, Steve Biko in 1977 and Robert Sobul.-we in 1978, helped the ANC to position themselves as a spokesman for the aspirations of all South African blacks in ending apartheid and creating a truly democratic state. The very successes of ANC in recent years has provided South Africa with a convenient excuse to pursue its policy of destabilization with its neighbouring States[144] But this is only a supemcial explanation for the conflict between South Africa and its neigh­ bours. South Africa has "extended military and diplomatic support to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement

for more than a decade - long before SW APO bad become even a serious nuisance. Nor does it explain

why official South African support to RENAMO in Mozambique at least a year after Botha and Machel bad signed a mutual non-aggression pact, and Machel had expelled the ANC from Mozambique".(145]

It would seem that the destabilization policy has a far broader aim than simply bringing an end to guerilla activities carried out against it across neighbouring borders. "Its underlying objective bas been to establish and maintain critical South African leverage over the behaviour of these states".(146] The South African government continues to believe that it stands in mortal danger of what it calls a 'Total Onslaught', orchestrated and directed by world-wide communism and that in 'the final conflict' South Africa will have to stand alone, unguarded and unprotected by the West. This has been for some time the threat assessment of the South African military. And like any good defence establishment, they want to fight as far from their home territory as possible. The real motivation behind support for UNITA in Angola, then, is to promote the establishment of a friendly, non-Marxist regime in Luanda which could serve as a buffer state against possible invasion from outside.

It is a curious irony that the Soviet Union, whose imperialist ambitions are so seriously feared in Pre­ toria, manifested exactly the same mentality with respect to its allies in Eastern Europe. There was a deadly

1. *Ibid.,* p.52. Also sec, John D. Brewer, *Can South Africa Survive?,* London, Macmillan Press, 1989, pp.189-196.
2. Jaster, *op. cit.,* p.62.

[146] *Ibid.,* p.63.

fear in Moscow of invasion from the West It did happen twice in modem history, and though both Napoleon and Hitler ultimately failed, a terrible price was paid in Russian blood and treasure. So if you have to fight a war to the death with an implacable foe, it is best to fight as much of it as you can on some­ one else's territory. In the case of the U.S.S.R., this meant Eastern Europe. In the case of South Africa it means the Front Line States. How aptly they are named!

The military in Pretoria was strongly opposed to the Nkomati accord· and made no secret of the fact. It is now clear that they continued to supply the insurgent forces in Mozambique in clear violation of the agreement, though to what extent that violation was carried out behind the backs of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister and to what extent they had .knowledge of it but looked the other way, is not clear.[147]


With the independence of Namibia, "South Africa now stands isolated in Africa as the only remain­ ing state ruled by a white minority. With its buffer hinterland of Portuguese colonialism and settler Rho­ desia gone, South Africa now faces the prospect of mounting external pressure in the form of guerilla chal­ lenge, diplomatic squeez.e by friend and foe, and, possibly, even economic sanctions at some future date. Despite continuing divisions within OAU and despite whatever linkages which South Africa manages to form with African states, rejection of apartheid continues to provide an emotional bond behind which the rest of the continent can unite ... Even if greater Soviet support were to be lent to the forces of liberation, the apartheid will render South African attempts to identify continuance of white power with an anti- communist crusade ultimately futile".[148] *T*

In sum, the focus of this section has been on the external relations of South Africa, more especially with her neighbours in Africa, most especially with her immediate neighbours. It was clearly from the out­ side that South Africa perceived its threat as arising in the 1970s and early 1980s. It has been in an attempt to manipulate, to control, to influence, to threaten, sometimes to bribe one or more of these outside forces that has driven and motivated South African foreign policy since the coming to power of the Nationalist government in 1948. Yet that foreign policy has always been at bottom concerned to protect and preserve

* 1. Davies and O'Meara, *op. dt.,* April 1985, pp.210-211.
  2. Southall, *op. dt.,* p.256.

the internal policy of apartheid. And the irony is that in the long run, the greater threat to the Nationalist regime and apartheid has come from inside the country, encouraged, perhaps, even at some time armed and supplied by outside forces, but whose greatest strength lies in their overwhelming numbers and their deter­ mination to be free. It is a truism of politics that no law can be enforced indefinitely if a majority of the population does not support it. But beyond that, it stirs the conscience of the oppressors themselves, who are, after all, human beings also, and to be asked to gun down those who are no real immediate threat becomes a serious problem for those in the military and security forces. South Africa might learn from that If it were to recover from its paranoia and abandon its coercive diplomacy, its destabilization or for­ ward defence and to embarlc instead upon a peaceful coexistence with its neighbours, seeking a genuine regional accord and stability, the opposition to apartheid would not disappear, but the whole atmosphere would be far less tense and less dangerous, not alone for southern Africa, but for the world. As in 1984, the case of Nkomati Accord, which was signed between Mozambique and South Africa, brought the conditions of peaceful coexistence and regional co-operation between the two countries. FRELIMO signed the agree­

ment to stop Pretoria's destabilization, however, there are several factors which helped in bringing Mozam­ bique to the table of negotiations to settle down the dispute with South Africa. This is the subject of the next chapter.



**ZAMBIA**

*l,\'Dl:IN OCEAN*

### Map no. 4, Mozambique.

Source: Marjorie Wallace, Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, Zimbabwe.

# CHAPTER FOUR TOWARDS THE NKOMATI ACCORD

Mozambique is not only adjacent to South Africa, but bound closely to the Republic by ties of history and economics. Like the other Portuguese colonies, its origins and development were sharply different from those areas colonised in the nineteenth century by Britain, France, and Germany. The latter represented the classical stage of developing capitalism, which demands additional sources of raw materials and new markets for its manufactures, a dual function which the underdeveloped areas of the world, includ­ ing Africa, supplied abundantly. The Portuguese colonies dated back to the early days of the Age of Discovery, when Portugal dominated the trade routes to India and made Lisbon one of the richest capital in Europe. But Portugal was not then a processor and conveyer of raw materials, nor did it become so during the Industrial Revolution, which bypassed it altogether, leaving it an undeveloped country, serving almost as a British colony. "From 1865 to 1879, between a half and two-thirds of Portugal's exports went to Bri­ tain. Nine-tenths of all exports were agricultural products (wine was 40 per cent of the total) and the existence of a single stable market for exports (in England) reinforced Portugal's position as a dependent, predominantly agricultural economy. Over this same period England provided between 37 and 59 per cent of Portugal's imports."[!]

Portugal's interest in its African colonies, then, was not predominantly economic. With the collapse

of the spice market and later the ending of the slave trade, both of which had enriched the mother country,

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the profit from the African colonies was minimal at best, giving them a very different character from the

areas colonized by the industrial European powers. Portugal maintained political control until very late in the game, but the economic power lay elsewhere. "As a result of the weakness of the Portuguese economy. Mozambique's dependency was to take a very peculiar form. It was not to be dominated by the colonising power's capital; quite simply, that capital was not available. Instead, Mozambique became an integral part of a regional sub-system dominated by the peripheral center, South Africa".[2] Political and economic

1. Barry Munslow, *Mozambique: The Re-.-olution and its Origins,* London, Longman, 1983, p.5.
2. B.J. Hammond, *Portugal and Africa 1815-1910: A Study in Uneconomic Imperialism,* Stanford, Ca, Stanford University Press, 1966, p.2. For more discussion of this period of time, see, Allen F. Jsaacman, *The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique: Anti-Colonial Activity in the Zambesi Valley 1850-1921,* London, Heinemann, 1976.

control were divided, with the former in far-off Europe and the latter next door.

Despite measures taken by Salazar (1928-1962) Portugal remained an underdeveloped country economically, highly dependent on foreign capital. The colonies were more effectively exploited, using intense labour-repressive measures; slavery bad been replaced by forced labour during the nineteenth cen­ tury. But this policy was stepped up markedly and the cotton crop grew dramatically in the African colonies. But the domestic economic situation in Portugal itself, taken together with the political situation in the colonies, where no indigenous leadership had been developed, made it virtually impossible for Portu­ gal to follow the example of other European powers and decolonise. The Foreign Minister for many years under Salazar explained it, saying, "Portugal was neither France nor England. It was very clear that once the political links were severed or weakened all the other links would d.isappear."[3] It was a case of all or nothing, thus setting the stage for an armed struggle for independence.

## The Independence War

The groundwork was laid in the Province of Mueda, a plateau in the north of Mozambique, adjacent to Tanganyika, where thousands of Mozambican workers went to cut sisal, at a slightly better pay rate and under very much better working conditions than before. There they encountered, and some of them joined, TANU (Tanganyikan African National Union) beaded by Julius Nyerere. This led to the formation of SAVVM (the Portuguese initials for the African Voluntary Cotton Society of Mozambique) which nego­

tiated a contract for the cotton crop with the colonial administrator, who looked upon it as a way to stem the

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flight of workers to Tanganyika. The co-operative secured exemption for its members from forced labour. Between 1957 and 1960, the crop produced by the co-operative exceeded by three times that cultivated by forced labour, and the income of its three thousand plus members was increased. Also increased were

1. *Expresso,* Lisbon, 23 March 1978, cited in Legum, *ACR,* vol. 16, 1983-1984, p.27. This is bring us to the question of the so­ called assimilados/assimilation policy, which means, the only Africans who were exempted from the labour laws were called assimilated peoples or citizens. They were few in number (only about five thousand in 1950) and achieved their status by prov­ ing their ability to speak and write Portuguese and to cam a relatively high income, the tokens of assimilation into Portuguese 'civilization'. The assimilado notion was based on the derogatory idea that 'civilization' involved the rejection of all things African and the absorption of Portuguese culture and language. For more discussion of the assimilation policy in Mozambique, see, Thomas H. Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History,* London, Rex Collings, 1978, pp.126-128. Also see, Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution,* 1900-1982, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1983, pp.39-53.

national consciousness and demands for simple justice. "On 16 June, 1960 a large crowd gathered outside the administrator's office to protest to the visiting provisional governor. The governor ordered the soldiers to fire on the crowd, and as many as 600 people were killed".[4] As might be expected, this led to the reali­ sation that the peaceful, negotiated road to independence was barred for Mozambique, and several indepen­ dence movements were formed. These all came together in June of 1962 in Dar es Salaam to create the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELlMO), with Eduardo Mondlane as President. Nyerere allowed the new organization to use the newly independent Tanganyika as its base. Throughout its activi­ ties in the armed struggle for independence, FRELIMO suffered from internecine struggles - over tactics, over ideology, and over who should wield power. In addition, it was infiltrated and weakened by the Por­ tuguese secret police, PIDE.

As Mondlane wrote, "The armed struggle was launched on 25 September, 1965".[5] As in all such encounters, the indigenous people enjoy an enormous advantage. They know the territory; they enjoy the support of the local populace; and they can hit and run quickly. The Western armies are bogged down, forced to concentrate on holding territory, :finding their weapons, designed for a very different sort of

conflict, relatively ineffective. Both sides escalated the numbers involved very quickly. In 1964, FREL­ IMO had only 250 men trained and equipped, facing some 35,000 Portuguese soldiers. By 1967, FREL­ IMO claimed 8,000 trained fighters active in the rebellion, not counting the people's militia, or guerillas. By that time, Portugal had a force of between sixty-five and seventy thousand troops engaged.[6]

FRELIMO forces were early on able to establish themselves in the nor;:h; while the Portuguese forces held their ground in the urban areas in the central and southern regions. A sort of stalemate ensued, with the Mozambicans staging quick raids, mining roads and attacking supply routes, but with not much pro­ gress on either side. Time was on the side of the Mozambican rebels. They knew that independence would require a protracted struggle and were willing to pay the price. In Lisbon the cost in funds and bodies grew steadily, a bill Portugal was ill prepared to pay. But as the FRELIMO forces steadily advanced their con­ trol over more of their native land, a split within the forces of resistance became more and more intense and

1. Joseph Hanlon, *Mozambique: The Revolution under Fire,* London, Zed Books Ltd., 1984, p.24.
2. Eduardo Mondlane, *The Struggle/or Mozambique,* London, Zed Books Ltd, 1983, p.138. [6] *Ibid.,* p.139.

apparent

Basically, the struggle was between two main groups, who saw a very different future for their liberated land. "On the one side were the proponents of a traditional African nationalist 'independence', and on the other those who believed that this would be meaningless unless accompanied by a social revolu­ tion."[7] For the former group, the struggle was to throw out the Portuguese and replace the ruling/ownership class with indigenous capitalists. Indeed, in the liberated zones of Cabo Delgado Pro­ vince, this was already happening. Workers were being exploited by Mozambican owner/managers of plantations, and questions began to be raised as to the goals of the armed struggle. "We are fighting against whom? To establish what? The soldiers were giving their lives, the people were making sacrifices, they. were carrying heavy loads, for what? Precisely what was the object of the struggle?"[8]

Many of those involved in the fighting and suffering began to believe that their struggle was not sim­ ply against colonialism but against exploitation and inequality and injustice. Another issue connected with this dealt with the definition of the enemy. The more conservative traditionalists sought to make the strug­ gle essentially a racially-based conflict The revolutionaries, on the other hand, saw the struggle as against any, whatever their colour, who seek to exploit and misuse their fellow men. There were tribal tensions as well. Lazaro Nk:avandame, the head of the Department of Interior Organization in Cabo Delgado, com­ plained that all the FRELIMO leaders came from the south, and that the local tribe, the Makondo, was not represented in the top circles. He appointed all the chairmen in the province from his own tribe.

This group, who sought to replace white rulers with black but to leave,.the basic structure unchanged, formed a Council of Elders, the chiefs and the tribal leaders, who were accustomed to exercising great power. This group opposed the emancipation of women and the full participation of other parties within the revolution. The revolutionary leadership of FRELIMO insisted that women and youth had earned the right to a full voice in decision-making and that this was a *people's* war of liberation. Mondlane and Samora Machel were among the leading voices heard on behalf of this view. The divergences continued to mount, and all attempts at reconciliation failed. A Congress was called for July of 1968 in Niassa, but

1. Munslow, *op. cit.,* p.104.
2. Sergio Vieira, *Mozambique,* Paper given to the Faculty of Law, Eduardo Mondlane University, Maputo, 4 July 1977.

Nkavandame and the delegation from Cabo Delgado refused to attend.[9]

Aided measurably by the presence of young men who had fought their way to positions of military leadership, the revolutionary understanding of the war made progress over the more conservative tradition- alists. A protracted people's war, with the widest possible popular participation was deemed inescapable. "The aim of the liberated zones", declared the Congress, "aims at establishing people's power".[10] The race issue was also resolved in favour of the radicals. Efforts were to be made to persuade soldiers of the

Portuguese colonial army to desert, and this was supported by anti-Salazar forces in Portugal who distri­

buted anti-war literature to the army. This decision "implicitly reaffirmed that the movement was not fighting whites, but a system that employed Portuguese peasants and workers in a conscripted army to defend the interests of its wealthy rulers."[11] Nkavandame and his chairmen from the north refused to accept the decisions of the Congress and sought to establish their independence from FRELIMO, closing the border with Tanganyika and hoping for support from Nyerere. This was not forthcoming, Nkavandame quickly lost the confidence of the peasants of Cabo Delgado and defected to the enemy.

The unity achieved by the Second Congress was largely traceable to the statesmanlike leadership of Eduardo Mondlane. Unfortunately, he was assassinated by a parcel bomb in Dar es Salaam in February of 1969, and the Presidency passed to Machel. Lisbon stepped up its offensive, employing mass terror methods against villagers, hoping that this would intimidate the indigenous people into withdrawing sup­ port from the freedom fighters. The policy produced the opposite effect, as did the evacuation of hundreds

of thousands of Africans from their villages to relocate them in *aldeamentos* (strategic hamlets). "Despite

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Portugal's use of sophisticated military equipment and methods of mass terror, the nationalists tenacity and determination slowly began to give them the edge over their Portuguese adversaries. At the end of 1973 the guerilla war spread dramatically southward into the strategic central province of Manica e Sofala, heralding a new stage of the war in which the country's rail links with Rhodesia and Malawi came under incessant attack and the fighting reached within fifty miles ofBeira, the country's second largest city."[12]

1. From 1968 to 1970 is known in the Mozambican history as "the years of crisis", see, Iain Christie, *Machel of Mozambique,*

Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1988, pp.48-60.

1. "Frclimo: Documentos do Segundo Congresso", 1968, cited in Muslow, *op. cit.,* p.109.
2. *Ibid.,* p.109.

[12] Tony Hodges, "Mozambique: the Politics of Liberation", in *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis,* edited by Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1982, p.60.

The situation became so serious for the Portuguese that an additional ten thousand troops were air­ lifted to Mozambique in March of 1974, bringing the total to some seventy thousand. Seeing the futility of military operations and seeking a political solution in Portugal's African territories, the officers of the *Movimento das Forcas Armada* overthrew the Salazar regime headed by Marcello Caetano in April of 1974. But the new rulers did not immediately withdraw from the African colonies. They sought a compromise solution short of full independence. Their offers were promptly and vigorously rejected by FRELIMO, which proceeded to a vigoro s offensive, moving south of Beira and carrying the fighting into the province of Zambezia. Troop morale among the Portuguese army collapsed and their black troops deserted in large nwnbers. Strikes were called in the cities and people rose up in the rural areas and seized property belonging to white settlers. The combination of all these factors led to an agonizing reappraisal in Lisbon and on July 27, President Spinola gave up a referendum proposal and announced full "recognition of the rights of the inhabitants of Portugal's overseas territories to self-determination, including the immediate recognition of their right to independence".[13] This led to a meeting between Machel and Por­ tuguese Foreign Minister Mario Soares in Lusaka, who worked out a transitional arrangement, with a pro­ gressive transfer of powers to FRELIMO, culminating in formal independence as of June 15, 1975. Nine ministers, six appointed by FRELIMO and three by Lisbon would govern in the interim. There were episodes of resistance by white settlers and uprisings by the indigenous people, but the Portuguese finally withdrew, the last military units departing on June 24, 1975. "The next day the Portuguese flag was hauled

down for the last time. Direct colonial rule had finally ended and Machel became Mozambique's first

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president".[14] The four hundred years through which Mozambique had passed under Portuguese colonial- ism " ... were really four hundred years of underdevelopment ... the Portuguese were not able to develop Mozambique to any reasonable extent, they were very selfish colonialists and lazy ... just outright exploiters of Mozambique's resources ... they [Portuguese] at the time laid down an inadequate infrastructure. After independence, Mozambique had a most daunting task once reconstruction was adopted as a way to bring growth and further development to the country."[15]

[13] *Ibid.,* p.63.

1. *Ibid.,* p.55, also see, Henriksen, *op. cit.,* pp.222-224.
2. *Personal Interview,* Dr. John M. Makumbc, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe, 17 March 1988.

## The Rhodesian War

The British government, during the 1960s, made several efforts to persuade the white settler govern­ ment of Southern Rhodesia to move toward majority rule, without success. The right wing settler party, under the leadership of Winston Field, won the election of December, 1962. Ian Smith, even more strident than Field, succeeded the latter as Prime Minister in 1964 and broke off negotiations with London, where Harold Wilson beaded a Labour Government. A new constitution was being constructed in Salisbury, and Wtlson was insisting that the document include a guarantee that steady progress would be made toward eventual majority rule. Without that, London could not grant full independence to its former colony. Smith proclaimed a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on November 11. 1965, announcing a policy of perpetual maintenance of white supremacy. This was in fact an act of rebellion, but no troops were sent to suppress it. Wilson gave two reasons for this restraint: "the Smith regime had control of the armed forces, police and administration of 'Rhodesia' and might successfully resist a British invasion; and Britain had never bad troops in the country which had always been ruled by the settlers".[16] He made with a declara­ tion of the illegality of UDI and an appeal to the United Nations to apply economic sanctions to Rhodesia.

These were not effective in breaking the UDI regime, and Rhodesia received strong support from the Portuguese administration in Mozambique which provided forged certificates of origin for Rhodesian exports. South Africa also assisted with imports of oil which managed to elude the British naval blockade, in Vieira's words, " ... it was Verwoerd, the then Prime Minister who said that a neighbour need not be requested to help his neighbour, when that neighbour's house is on fire."[l The Smith regime vigorously encouraged expansion of agriculture, resulting in large increases in coffee, tea, cotton, wheat and livestock. The government budget for 1968-69 was one hundred and three million pounds, with a surplus from the previous year's budget.

This internal prosperity, together with the failure of external pressures from Britain and the United Nations, led the nationalists within the country to realise that a negotiated road to majority rule was blocked and that the Zimbabweans would have to gain self rule by armed struggle. "Joshua Nkomo, a former social

(16] Ali Mazrui and Michael Tidy, *Nationalism and New States in Africa: From about 1935 to the Present,* Nairobi, Heinemann, 1984, p.145.

[11] *Personal Interview,* Colonel Sergio Vieira, Director of Centre for African Studies, Maputo, Mozambique, 28 April 1988.

worker, trade unionist and Protestant lay preacher was the undisputed leader of Zimbabwean nationalism until 1963. When his African National Congress [ANC] was banned in 1959 he formed a successor party along similar lines, the NDP [National Democratic Party]".[18] This was banned in 1961, accused of plot­ ting urban violence. This led to the immediate formation of ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) which was outlawed in 1962, causing Nkomo to go to Dar es Salaam to seek establishment of a government in exile. Nyerere disappointed Nkomo's hopes for support; he shared a growing feeling that the leadership being provided was too weak, too coocili!ltory and too ineffective. Some opponents in ZAPU broke away and formed ZANU, (Zimbabwe African National Union) under the leadership of President Ndabaniogi Sithole and Secretary General Robert Mugabe. Both organizations were outlawed and their leaders detained, remaining so for ten years, while their followers took up arms against the foe.[19]

Harold Wilson continued his efforts at a political settlement, meeting with Smith on two occasions on *H M.S. Tiger,* in December of 1966 and again in October of 1968, proposing a Legislative Assembly in which the Africans would have representation. Both proposals were rejected, but Smith accepted one advanced by Edward Heath's Conservative government in November of 1971. Heath, however, attached a condition, that the arrangement should be acceptable to a majority of the Africans and sent a Commission to test the indigenous opinion. Vigorous opposition was led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the Reverend Canaan Banana, and this rejected the British proposal. The only road to independence and majority rule lay down the road to war.[20]

"The War of Independence really began on 29 April 1966 when thirty guerilla soldiers of ZANLA

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[Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army], the military wing of ZANU, operating from bases in Zam- bia, clashed with troops of the Smith regime at Sinoia. Seven freedom fighters and several policemen were killed. Sinoia marked the beginning of full-scale guerilla war".[21] The war would continue and expand for the next thirteen years. The indigenous fighting forces were supervised by the political leaders from their exile in Lusaka. ZANU was led by Herbert Chitepo, the first black in Zimbabwe to be admitted to the bar;

(18] Mazrui and Tidy, *op. cit.,* p.144.

[19] David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War,* London, Faber and Faber, 1981, pp.70-

71.

[20] *Ibid.,* pp.98-99.

1. Mazrui and Tidy, *op. cit.,* p.146.

ZAPU's leader was James Chik:etema. The former set up training bases in Zambia and Tanzania as well as in China, while the latter organized joint training exercises with the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC - SA), led by Oliver Tambo, in Zambia and the Soviet Union. Using a white settler force of 3400 men, reinforced by 4000 European reservists and what was still called the British South African pol­ ice, which consisted of 2000 Europeans and 5000 Africans, the Smith government, with assistance from South Africa, was able to contain the guerilla activities directed against it in the first years of the struggle.

A succession of military defeats undermined morale among the fighting Zimbabweans and led to feuds and internecine squabbles, sparked by a combination of tribal and ideological rivalries. President Kaunda in Zambia brought some order in 1978 with a threat to expel the ZAPU forces. ZANU was divided by differences between the more Mand.st-oriented and the moderate socialist parties within its ranks. The antagonism between ZAPU and ZANU was both ethnic and ideological. The Ndebele recruits in ZAPU far outnumbered the Shona, whereas ZANU was composed largely of Shona speaking individuals and was more closely related to China, while ZAPU tended to look to Moscow. Neither party was 'communist', though Marxist-Leninist ideas were popular. The leaning toward Peking or Moscow was related more to the source of weapons than to philosophical points of view. The war was not a social revolution but a nationalist uprising.[22]

Although the leadership of the freedom fighters in Zimbabwe operated out of exile in Zambia, there were thousands of refugees who fled into Mozambique, and numerous guerilla camps were established

there, using these bases for attacks across the border. This led to a series, of reprisals, starting in 1976, establishing a virtual state of war between Mozambique and the Smith regime in Rhodesia. Rhodesian

troops repeatedly crossed the border, and planes conducted regular bombing raids on Zimbabwean guerilla bases and refugee camps. President Machel reported on June 18, 1977, "Between March 1976 and March this year, 143 acts of aggression against the People's Republic of Mozambique took place: 54 in Gaza, 33 in Manica and 56 in Tete province. Between May 1976 and mid-June of this year, 1,432 civilians were murdered, including 874 Zimbabwean refugees at Nyazonia, and 527 were wounded. Today, at

1. William J. Foltz and Henry S. Bienen, *Arms and the African Military Influences on Africa's International Relations,* New Haven, Yale University Press, 1985, p.48. Also sec, Andre Ascrow, *op. cit.,* pp.79-82 for more discussion about the Shona and Ndebele people and ZANU-ZAPU dispute.

Massangeoa, Mapai, Navonde and Chioco, only ashes remain of what were once houses, schools, hospitals, people's shops, public services and factories. This destruction has cost more than 400 million escudos. Ian Smith's regime is in a state of open war against Mozambique".[23]

During 1976-77 three Rhodesian cross-border invasions occurred, inflicting serious damage. The first on August 8, 1976 was directed against the Nyazonia refugee camp, resulting in a death toll of over six hundred, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The United Nations estimated that in 1977 there were over thirty-two thousand refugees from Zimbabwe in Mozambique.[24] On May 29, 1977, Rhodesian troops crossed the border, moved fifty miles into Mozambique and captured the city of Mapai which they held until June 2. November of 1977 saw a raid into what Salisbury claimed were guerilla bases, resulting in the death of some twelve hundred blacks. Mozambique had closed the Rhode­ sian border in March of 1976, partly in support of the rebels and partly in protest against the invasions. This action was not without its cost, as revenues connected with international trade fell sharply. There was widespread destruction wrought by planes and troops - on roads, telephone and telegraph wires, bridges, railway lines and the like. The thousands of refugees required food and shelter, extra expenses which FRELIMO could ill afford. President Machel and his government had earlier supported all efforts toward conciliation and a compromise agreement, even refusing to allow their territory to be used by Zimbabwean guerillas. The OAU had exerted strenuous efforts to secure a peaceful settlement, all to no avail. The intransigence of the Smith regime, refusing even minimal concessions, brought Mozambique and the other Front Line governments into support of the guerilla attacks.[25] The FRELIMO leadership remembered its own experience with Lisbon and concluded that only armed pressure would force the Smith government to concede self-rule to the Zimbabweans.

But Mozambique did not proceed unilaterally: its policy and actions were closely coordinated with the other Front Line States. Machel met in northern Mozambique in February, 1976, with Presidents Nyerere, Kaunda and Seretse Khama, where all agreed on support for the guerilla activities. There were at this time about ten thousand Zimbabwean refugees in camps in Mozambique, most of them either receiving

1. Hodges, *op. cit.,* p.84.
2. lsaacman and lsaacman, *op. cit.,* p.146.

[25] *Ibid.,* pp.176-178.

or waiting to receive training as guerillas. The outbreak in 1976 of fighting in eastern Zimbabwe, far removed from the north eastern area where guerillas had long been moving across the border, pointed to an infiltration into Zimbabwe all along the border between the two countries.[26]

At the meeting of the four presidents, all agreed that their countries should apply economic sanctions, as called for by the United Nations, against Rhodesia and that the border between Mozambique and Rho­ desia should be closed. This latter act was, as already noted, costly to Mozambique. "For a start, the rail­ way network [which lacks a north-south axis] was cut in two and Beira port was virtually put out of action. Frelimo's initial figure of $57 million annual losses [reported to the UN in May 1976] increased to $200 million by the end of 1976".[27] But the closure also was costly to Rhodesia. The two ports of Beira and

Maputo, which had in the past carried over eighty per cent of Rhodesia's imports and exports, were no longer available. This made the Smith government dependent on the two railway lines, one through Botswana to Mafek:ing, the other from Ritenga to the South African border to Beitbridge. Rhodesia lost one sixth of its rolling stock to Mozambican expropriation, worth some forty six million dollars.[28] Rho­ desia thus became heavily dependent on South Africa to handle its foreign trade, so that later, when Vorster became disillusioned with the whole affair, as we shall see, the Smith government was virtually helpless.

FRELIMO continued to hope for a negotiated settlement, participating in the British sponsored Geneva talks in 1976 and supporting, at least partially, proposals advanced in 1977 by Britain's Foreign Secretary, David Owen and Andrew Young, United States Ambassador to the United Nations. Further, the Front Line States from which the Zimbabwean guerillas were operating, including Mozambique, held a tight control over those guerilla activities by keeping a hand on the supplies that were available.[29] During all the infighting that took place between ZANU and ZAPU and the various factions that fought for control of the Zimbabwe revolution, Machel, together with Kaunda and Nyerere unabashedly supported the leaders of whom they approved. When the ANC split in September of 1975 into two organizations, UANC, led by

(26] Hodges, *op. cit.,* p.85, also see, Ascrow, *op. cit.,* pp.150-155.

(27] Keith Middlemas, "Independent Mozambique and its Regional Policy", in *Southern Africa since the Portuguese Coup,* edited by John Seiler, Boulder, Colo., Westvicw Press, 1980, p.229.

[28] Martin and Johnson, *op. cit.,* 1981, p.225,

(29] Christie, *op. cit.,* pp.100-101. For more detailed discussion, see, Ken Flower, *Serving Secretly: Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964-1981,* London, John Murray, 1987.

Bishop Muzorawa and Sithole, and ZAPU, headed by Joshua Nkomo, Maputo turned a cold shoulder to the former, refusing permission for new guerilla activities from Mozambique and for visits by the leadership to their camps in Mozambique. In late 1976, "Maputo gave exclusive support to the Patriotic Front, a bloc formed by Nkomo and Mugabe in September 1976 as ZIPA's [Zimbabwe People's Army] political leader­ ship. The disfavoured nationalists, notably Muzorewa and Sithole, were now completely ostracized by the Mozambican and other Front Line governments, and, at the July 1977 OAU summit in Libreville, Gabon, the Mozambican and Zambian delegatio led a successful diplomatic battle for exclusive OAU backing for the Patriotic Front".[30]

FRELIMO, on accession to full power in Mozambique, faced severe economic problems from the start. The flood of departing white brainpower and capital was bad enough, but the involvement in the Rhodesian struggle made matters worse. Much needed income was lost by the closing of the frontier, as noted above. The Portuguese had sponsored almost no industrial development, leaving the country heavily dependent on its exports of its five major crops - sugar, tea, sisal, cotton, and cashew nuts - which accounted for almost two thirds of its foreign trade. The country did have rich mineral assets but these had been left undeveloped, except for the coal mines at Moatize in Tete. It was estimated that there were some four hundred million tons in the ground there, but only about six hundred thousand tons were extracted annually. There was a perennial deficit in the balance of trade, with imports running about twice the rate of exports. A balance was achieved by a combination of factors: tourist trade, revenues from the commerce flowing through the ports at Lourenco Marques (now Maputo) and Beira, and exported labour to mines in South Africa and Rhodesia.[31] So Mozambique's economic viability had been deliberately structured to keep it dependent on Portugal as the buyer of its agricultural products and on South Africa and Rhodesia as the buyers of its labour and customers for its ports. Independence was not without its economic advan­ tages. Now Mozambique could sell its products at market prices instead of the low rate imposed by Portu­ gal. Sugar had gone to the mother country in 1973 for fifty two pounds per ton; in 1977, the price ran between one hundred and twenty eight and four hundred and eighty pounds per ton. Maputo also received

1. Hodges, *op. cit.,* p.87.
2. Berti! Egero, *Mozambique A Dream Undone: The Political Economy of Democracy, 1975-1984,* Uppsala, Scandinavian Insti­ tute of African Studies, 1987, pp.88-92.

substantial annual payments in gold from South Africa as payment for its exported labour, under the Mozambique Convention. 1bis could now be sold on the open market, with the substantial profit due to the sharp rise in the price of gold during the 1970s, and the proceeds staying in Mozambique instead of going to Portugal.[32] Nonetheless, Mozambican independence coincided with world-wide inflation, with the major leap in oil prices imposed by OPEC, and a sharp decline in commodity prices.

Worst of all was the shortage of trained manpower. The country was bit by "the exodus of almost all of the ... technicians, civil servants, skilled workers, experts, administrators and farmers, a flight accom­ panied in many cases by deliberate acts of economic sabotage."[33] In other words, when the Portuguese

were in power " ... nothing was done to develop the indigenous population ... the FRELIMO struggle which

took many years ... destroyed a number of things ... all [economic] facilities were destroyed ... Mozambique became independent ... a sudden change of government from Portuguese to FRELIMO in 1974 ... the new government did not make any arrangements prior to the independence of Mozambique ... there were no preparations ... when FRELIMO came to power it is one thing to be a liberation movement and another thing to run a government ... the Portuguese destroyed everything, the documentation ... what they could not destroy they took away, what they could not take away they destroyed ... and all of them left Mozam­ bique most of them in one day ... then there was the Rhodesian war ... they [Mozambicans] bad to continue fighting for the independence of Zimbabwe ... they got further entangled in the war and bad no time to reconstruct ... So, Mozambique [was] not [to] be given a day of peace ..."[34] Both industrial and agricul­

tural production fell sharply with a corresponding decrease in revenues for the new government Nonethe-

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less, Maputo continued to support the Zimbabwean fight for liberation, including the continued closure of the border.

The military situation began to deteriorate steadily for the Smith regime. White immigration came to a standstill, and white emigration grew; the white population bad declined by seven thousand in 1976. The Portuguese coup and the achievement of independence in Mozambique led many of the whites to the con­ clusion that they were fighting a lost cause, and it encouraged and invigorated the indigenous efforts to

[32) Hodges, *op. dt.,* pp.62-63.

1. Carter and O'Mcara, *op. cit.,* p.89.
2. *Personal Interview,* Mr. Ben Motlhalamme, Deputy Director of Foreign Affairs, Gaborone, Botswana, 6 May 1988.

achieve their independence as well. "Rhodesia could no longer count on the security of its eastern border with Mozambique. Most of all Rhodesia was no longer strategically important to South Africa as a buffer zone, because it no longer presented a border that could be easily defended. The South African Prime Min­ ister, Johannes Vorster, now regarded white Rhodesia as expendable".[35] Together with President Kaunda, Vorster brought the Salisbury cabinet to the Victoria Falls Conference in August 1975, which did not succeed becuase Smith was demanding a fifteen year transition period. The Victoria Falls meeting was described by a Zambian senior Minister iQ the following terms:

" ... that meeting was held, you know, on the bridge, right on the bridge, the passenger train truck was left on the two tracks one for the South African, one for the Zambian and the middle one for the meeting ... and stood there, not exactly no man's

land, it was in Zimbabwe-Zambia border line and there was almost one hundred and fifty feets below them ... the Prime Minister

of South Africa, the Nationalists of Zimbabwe and Smith said, what can we do about the independence of Zimbabwe? ... [they reached an agreement] yes they did, in the sense that it came quite clear

that Smith was not going to give up ... so the Nationalists were free, they were then able to disappear into neighbouring countries and step up the liberation struggle. In other words, that meeting served great purpose in giving the signal to the Nationalists

that despite South Africa being there, Smith was not going to give up ... and so they had to fight it out ... and they did that ..."[36]

The United States, in the person of Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State, now entered the picture. He and the Nixon Administration were genuinely alarmed, fearing that continued warfare would mean the ultimate radicalization of the resistance movement, and determined to seek peace under a moderate indigenous Afri- can leader.[37] In September of 1976, Kis inger met Smith in Pretoria and issued an ultimatum to him, which produced his agreement to independence in two years. In October a Geneva conference between Smith and the nationalists broke down over disagreements about the terms of independence and its timet­ able. As a result of this activity, ZANU and ZAPU joined forces to form the Patriotic Front. At the end of 1977, Smith, in a frenzy of desperate activity, directed massive Rhodesian forces across the Mozambican border, leaving over a thousand dead. He sought an "internal agreement" to which Muzorewa, Sithole and

(35] Mazrui and Tidy, *op. cit.,* p.149.

1. *Persona/ Interview,* Mr. M. Punabantu, Minister of National Guidance, Information and Broadcasting Services, Lusaka, Zam­ bia, 10 March 1988.
2. Flower, *op. cit.,* pp.169-170.

Chief Cbirau, leader of a new party of government-appointed chiefs, assented. Elections were held in April of 1979. The PF refused to have anything to do with what they regarded as a sell-out and refused an offer of amnesty from the new government headed by Muwrewa following the elections. "At the beginning of the period of the internal settlement there were about 6000 PF guerrillas operating inside the country. By the end of the period there were 11,000".[38] Muzorewa failed miserably, both in domestic reform and in military efforts at victory. He lost the confidence of the people, winning only three seats in the final government established in February of 19 0.

"To sum up, the Zimbabwean war was a war of independence because the guerilla armies, although they did not manage

to establish effective liberated zones, as in Guinea and Mozambique, did succeed in denying victory to a white colonial army and in forcing the colonial enemy to the conference table where meaningful majority rule was conceded. Moreover, Britain, as the nominal colonial power was only prepared to exercise its authority when the guerillas had so weakened

the white regime that British intervention could no longer be interpreted as an attack on white 'kith and kin' but rather a belated effort to protect what remained of their privileges. Further, Britain was only able to exercise this

authority after the United States and South Africa abandoned Ian Smith."[39]

## THE WAR AGAINST THE MNR 1980 to 1984

The Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) was organized in Rhodesia under the leadership of Ken Flower, former head of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization. Seeking a means to weaken the Maputo regime, he brought together anti-FRELIMO forces who had sought refuge inside Rhodesia in 1974. Some wanted to continue the fight against FRELIMO, and some were members of PIDE,[40] para­ troopers, commandos and those who had fought vigorously on the side of Portugal. Ron Reid Daly, founder of the Selous Scouts[41] was also present at the birth of MNR. Flower had travelled to Lisbon in

1. Mazrui and Tidy, *op. cit.,* p.150.

[39] *Ibid.,* p.151.

1. PIDE: The International Police for the Defence of the State. For more details about The Portuguese Security Police PIDE, see, Flower, *op. cit.,* p.36.
2. The Sealous Scouts was an irregular force of the Rhodesian anny which was used for 'dirty tricks' operations against the li­ beration movements. Its forces were largely black and those who were white often blacked their faces before a military opera­ tion. One of its primary aims was to discredit the guerrilla forces of ZANLA and ZIPRA. During the Zimbabwean war of in­ dependence the Selous Scouts became notorious for their brutality. Gwyneth Williams and Brian Hackland, *The Dictionary of Contemporary Politics of SouJhern Africa,* London, Routledge, 1988, p.238. Also see, Flower, *op. cit..*

1971 to meet with Caetano, carrying **a** message from Ian Smith to "represent our apprehension over our deteriorating security situation in Mozambique and to try to persuade them to allow us to further develop cross-border operations in Tete".[42] A second trip earned an invitation to "get agreement from the PIDE to form 'Flechas' for trans-border operations in Mozambique where the security situation continues to deteriorate ..."[43] Nothing came of this for sixteen months. Following the coup in Lisbon, some of the forces who had been fighting FRELIMO came across into Rhodesia and placed themselves at Rower's disposal. **A** permanent training camp w established just outside the small farming settlement of Odzi in eastern Rhodesia near the city of Umtali [now Mutare]. The strategy during this early period was "sabo­ tage, *to* disrupt the population and disrupt the economy which really comes under sabotage, to come back with decent recruits at that stage and *to* hit any Frelirno bases they came across."[44]

The 1\1NR functioned in Mozambique as a guerilla force throughout the period of the Zimbabwe war for independence, striking across the border, infiltrating and establishing a base on Gorongosa mountain, one hundred kilometers north-west of Beira. They hoped to isolate Beira, Maputo and Tete, cutting them off from communications. There were about 400 MNR guerillas involved in this operation. But, peace broke out "We [the MNR] were given 72 hours to get out of the country", a senior MNR instructor, recalled, speaking of April, 1980 when independence for Zimbabwe officially was declared. He "shoved everybody across [into Mozambique] except for about 250. I must have put across 300 to 400, bringing the total inside to about 2,000".[45] Flower had been trying since 1976 to persuade the South African govern­

ment to support the l\.1NR, but Vorster bad refused, saying that to do so would violate the policy of *detente*

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with the independent black states of Africa.

Late in 1978, however, Vorster was forced out of office and replaced by Botha as Prime Minister, who surrounded himself with military advisers. Some commentators argued that, "In effect, there had been

(42] Flower, *op. cit.,* p.116.

1. *[bid.,* p.140. The Flechas were an elite group set up by PIDE in Mozambique to combat FRELIMO at a time when the libera­ tion movement had made significant advances against the Portuguese colonial army. The finit Flechas (Arrows) were recruited in Angola during the 1960's by the Head of PIDE. For more discussion, sec, Appendix: Flechas and the Formation of the Mo­ zambique National Resistance, in Flower, *op. cit.,* pp.300-302.
2. Phyllis Johnson and David Martin (eds), *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War,* Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986, p.6.

[45] *Ibid.,* p.12.

a constitutional military *coup d' etat".[46]* Flower approached the new leadership and was given a positive, though limited response. The liaison was established a full year before Zimbabwean independence. A con­ tingency plan was developed, calling for transfer of MNR personnel and equipment, in the event of defeat in Rhodesia, to South Africa, " ... the MNR, of course, *if* something that has a history especially in Zim­ babwe when they were established by the CIO of Rhodesia, established basically to destabilise Mozam­ bique ... to make it difficult for Mozambique to act as an independent state, then later on they were handed over to South Africa and transferred the whole MNR lock, stock and barrel to the South Africans ..."[47] This plan was carried out in three phases. The first group to be moved was the staff of Free Africa voice, the radio station that had been broadcasting propaganda into Mozambique from Zimbabwe. They were flown to Waterkloof military base outside Pretoria. The second phase consisted of driving seven MNR vehicles from the base at Odzi to the Voortrekkerhoogte barracks at Pretoria. The third phase was the larg­ est and most important, involving an air shuttle which airlifted about 250 MNR personnel and their arma­ ments, landing at Phalaborwa in the eastern Transvaal, where they were then moved by boat to their new base on the edge of the Lutabo River, about one kilometer from Kruger National Park.[48] In other words, "

... when Zimbabwe became [independent] South Africa inherited this group of mercenaries [MNR] and trained them further because in 1980 at that time South Africa wanted to control the whole region and [was] talking about what it called the Constellation of Southern African States ... it [Pretoria] wants to remain the core ..."[49]

The situation in April of 1980 was not favourable to Mozambique for responding to hostilities by

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Pretoria. The leaders in Maputo were elated over the Zimbabwean independence, the successful struggle

against white colonial rule, and there was a feeling that they could win any conflict. Nothing was done about the African National Congress of South Africa and its steady incursions across the border from Mozambique into South Africa, though Machel and his ministers knew that such activity was bound to bring reprisals, especially from the new Prime Minister and his associates. As though this military threat to

[46) *Ibid.,* p.13.

[47) *Personal InJerview,* Dr. Mwesiga Baregu, University of Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 8 April 1988. [48) *Ibid.,* p.15.

[49] Personal Interview, Mr. Ben Motlhalamme, *op. cit..*

South African security were not enough, there were economic factors as well. Mozambique bad paid a ter­ rible price for its involvement in the Zimbabwean conflict. The closed border and loss of revenue from that source, plus the attacks from the Rhodesian army and the MNR, many of which were directed at economic targets, and added to that the refusal of the South African government to pay in gold the agreed-upon per­ centage of the mine-workers' salaries - the cumulative effect was to cost Mozambique a conservatively estimated US $556 million over the four year period.[50]

The African states of the region, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tan­ zania, Zambia and Zimbabwe banded together in April of 1980 to create the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). The purpose was to engage cooperatively to promote economic development of its member states and to reduce, for all of them, their dependence upon South Africa. The leaders specifically denied any hostility towards South Africa in the formation of the new organization, but economic independence was something that Botha and South Africa did not want. And Machel was actively engaged at this point in seeking to reduce Mozambican dependence on South Africa by reopening the border with Zimbabwe; by 1982 Zimbabwe was sending almost fifty-four per cent of its imports and exports through Mozambique.[51] "Thus, while the activities of the ANC infiltrating across the border from Mozambique gave South Africa's militarists the excuse to pull the trigger, this was not the sole reason for what followed. As important, if not more important, was Pretoria's determination to enforce continued dependence, and this factor is borne out by the strategic economic havoc they now began to wreak in Mozambique."[52]

Strong support for the MNR's activities in Mozambique began in June of 1980. By December of that year, the Renamo had between six and seven thousand fully armed men in the field with another two thousand recruits in training. By February of 1981, there were ten thousand men engaged. The South Afri. cans obviously planned to use the MNR very differently from the way they had been deployed in Rhodesia. In the latter, they were a clandestine force with a low profile. Pretoria sent Dhlakama, one of the MNR

(50] *Economic Report,* The Mozambique National Planning Commission, Maputo, January 1984.

1. European and parliamentarians working seminar on support for SADCC, *Southern Africa's Future: Europe's Role,* London, CIIR, Russel Press Ltd., 1987, p.9.
2. Johnson and *Martin,-op. cit.,* 1986, p.18.

leaders on an extensive tour of Europe, seeking support from right-wing governments, posing as the true leader of the Mozambican people. The MNR was also used to expand and intensify the military efforts against the Machel government in Maputo. Many of the targets were deliberately chosen to strike against the economic viability of that government - sabotage against the oil pipelines from Beira to Feruka, disrup­ tion of the railway line to Zimbabwe by planned explosions, and regular attacks on National Highway No. 1, the road between Beira and Maputo.[53]

Machel spoke to a rally in Maputo on 23 June, 1982, saying, "After independence, when we took off our guns, and exchanged our uniforms for suits and ties, we made a mistake. We looked elegant, but the bourgeoisie had the guns. Now we're putting on our guns once more, and we won't make the same mistake this time".[54] At the SADCC summit meeting some thirteen months later, he said, "We are aware that the fundamental aim of the actions of destabilization against our countries is to render SADCC non-viable. Our land, sea and air frontiers are regularly violated by the Pretoria regime. Destabilization through gangs of bandits is complemented by the operations of special units designed to destroy selected targets that are vital for regional cooperation. Our ports and railways, fuel depots and pipelines, bridges and roads, com­

munication systems and other economic development projects are the targets for this kind of aggres- sion".[55]

The South African Defence Force itself was directly involved on more than one occasion. Troops invaded Mozambique in January, 1981, and there were rocket attacks and bombings, reportedly directed

against members of the African National Congress in refuge in Mozambique,, but destructive of Mozambi- can life and property as well. "At first, the MNR tried to cover South African involvement"[56] but this

soon became impossible as the supply activities were readily observable and captured documents proved beyond doubt that the shots for the entire operation were being called from Pretoria. In early 1983, the U.S. State Department issued a public statement that the MNR "receives the bulk of its support from South

[53] *bid.,* pp.19-21.

1. *AIM,* Mozambique News Agency, Maputo, 24 Jwte 1982. For more selected Speeches and Writings, see Barry Munslow,

*Samora Machel: An African Revolutionary,*London. Zed Books Ltd., 1985.

1. *AIM,* Maputo, 11 July 1983.
2. Joseph Hanlon. *Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa,* London. Catholic Institute for International Re­ lations, 1986, p.136.

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The early experiences of the South African-directed MNR were dramatically successful. It began operating in the southern provinces of Manica and Sofala, closing the main north-south road. Early in 1982 Inhambe and Gaza Provinces were invaded and base camps established. The areas occupied were sparsely inhabited for the most part. In August of 1982, bases were set up in Malawi and hundreds of men pushed across the border into the provinces of Zambesia and Tete. They were able to move almost at will, destroy­ ing much of the economic base of Mozambique's export trade. But two events in October-November of 1982 proved serious setbacks to the MNR. In the earlier month, Malawi vigorously demanded a halt to the use of its territory as bases for MNR activities, and in November, the Mozambican army captured the main MNR base in Zambesia Province (Gorongosa). Still, the MNR was able to continue operations in Zam­ besia and even spread into Nampula, meaning that by mid 1983 it was active in nine of the eleven pro­ vinces of Mozambique. The main aim of South Africa's employment of the MNR was disruption and economic damage; a much more traditional policy of 'destabilization'.[58) Shops, villages, locomotives, sawmills, cotton gins and tea factories - anything that provides economic strength was fair game. Commu- nal villages with their health facilities were often burned. Crops were burned both in the field and in storage bins. People were killed and their bodies stuffed down wells to poison the already scant water sup­ ply. Traffic and communication facilities received special attention. Travellers by car on main roads were often forced to remain inside while a fire was built beneath them, roasting them alive.[59)

Despite these atrocities, some indigenous Mozambicans did join the,MNR forces. These seem to have come from four main groups: members of the old Portuguese establishment who had opposed FREL­

IMO from the beginning; former FRELIMO members who were disgruntled and dissatisfied; disappointed individuals defeated in local elections, unable to attain power and influence under FRELIMO: and the deposed witch doctors and chiefs from the Portuguese regime. Tribalism played an important role as well. Shona-speaking areas of Manica and Sofala proved a fruitful ground for the MNR, where it was argued that

*[S7] The New Yorker,* New York, 22 May 1989. Also see, Paul Fauvet "Roots of Countc-Revolution: The Mozambique National Resistance", *Review of African Political Economy,* no. 29, July 1984, p.116.

[58] Hanlon, *op. cit.,* p.141.

*[591* Based on my personal conversations with local Mozambicans, Maputo, April 1988.

FRELIMO was the party run by southern Mozarnbicans.[60]

Two important points are to be noted. First, If South Africa had not taken up the reins, the MNR would have disappeared. Second, the primacy goal of Pretoria in supporting the MNR was not any expecta­ tion that a civil war would succeed in unseating the Machel government but rather a desire to undennine Mozambican efforts at economic independence. That is the purpose of the destabilization policy, to keep all of the SADCC states on South Africa's borders in a position of economic dependency, and as discussed below it was the success of that policy in economic manipulation as much as the military action of the MNR that finally persuaded President Machel that the better part of wisdom was the Nkomati Agreements.

## The Economic Situation and the Relations with South Africa:

The SADCC was founded initially in order to escape economic bondage to Pretoria. "South Africa had always been the focus of regional development This role actually increased as the wave of decoloniza­ tion swept south and the remaining White-rule states - Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa - pulled together. With UDI [Unilateral Declaration of Independence] in Rhodesia and the imposition of sanctions, British capital in Rhodesia was replaced with South African capital".[61) With the inevitability of national rule in Zimbabwe, Pretoria backed Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the wrong horse, as it turned out With the rise of Mugabe, the newly independent state united with its neighbours to fight for their own economic autonomy, and the issue was joined.

The first priority for the SADCC leaders was the reorientation of transport and communication. The founding Conference in Maputo in November of 1980 solicited foreign capital in excess of one billion pounds to rehabilitate and upgrade the systems of transport and communication. About a third of the desired funds were raised and an international commission was established in Maputo, the logical choice because Mozambique's ports could serve all but two of the member states. There was and is also a strong desire for greater independence from South Africa in the fields of energy and industry, a need to develop indigenous oil products and manufactured goods.[62)

1. *Ibid..*
2. Hanlon, *op. cit.,* 1984, p.213. Also sec, David and O'Mcara, "1bc State of Analysis of the Southern African Region: Issues Raised by South African Strategy", *Review of African Political Economy,* no. 29, 1984, p.64.

But these desires encounter serious difficulties, especially in Mozambique, where independence from Portugal was accompanied by a flight of capital and trained manpower and a widespread destruction of abandoned facilities of all kinds of shops, factories, mills, farms. The new national government found itself with an economy in desperate straits and very short on both funds and expertise with which to repair it.

There were practical as well as ideological reasons for the 'clean break' with colonialism espoused by Machel in

July, 1975, just after independence: thus the abrupt takeover ofland, communications and transport: the nationalization of medicine, private schools, legal practice, and church property - far more disturbing to whites; and the stringent surveillance mounted against urban whites in the latter

part of 1975. But the price was very high. Of the 80,000

to 100,000 whites who bad remained after independence, either as Mozambican citizens or as Portuguese citizens on contract, only 25,000 were still in the country by the end of 1975.

Most emigrated after the nationalization of rented property in March 1976 and the consequent embargo of any property bought with foreign currency.[63]

This flight of managers and artisans led to a collapse of the industrial sectors and those engaged in export activities: sugar crops, as well as cashew nuts, sisal, tea, rice and maize dropped below the figures for 1973 from fifty to eighty per cent. Despite vigorous efforts on the part of the new government to regu­ late and direct the economy, there was an almost total lack of any second echelon managers. The leaders themselves "were as able and dedicated as any in Africa, but the next layer down of officials was practically non-existent".[64] Moreover, during the colonial rule, Mozambique's economy was oriented towards ser­ vicing the South African economy. In other words " ... there was a lot of integration between the South African and Mozambican economies ... You might look at Mozambique's la our immigration, this has con­ tinued to the present ... there is no training to prepare them to take over their economy ... then you get tour­ ism ... the capital of Mozambique when it was under the Portuguese one could not distinguish whether it was a town in South Africa because it was a tourist resort of South Africa ... for many years all the transport went through Mozambique ... the Mozambicans were really just sort of slaves serving the interests of the

Portuguese ... so nothing was done to develop the indigenous population ..."[65]

1. Isaacman and Isaacman, *op. cit.,* p.176. Also see, Douglas G. Anglin, "SADCC in the Aftermath of the Nkomati Accord", in Ibrahim S.R. Msabaha and Timothy M. Shaw, *Confrontation in Southern Africa: Regional Directions After the Nkomati Ac­ cord,* Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1987.
2. John Seiler, *op. cit.,* p.218. (64] *Ibid.,* p.219.

Mozambique was heavily dependent for capital on the revenues received from the exportation of labour to South Africa An agreement with Lisbon signed in 1928 gave Pretoria the right to recruit labour in Mozambique with the understanding that sixty per cent of the wages of such recruited miners would be deferred and paid to them on the occasion of their return to Mozambique. Prior to independence, those pay­ ments bad been made to Portugal in gold bars valued at the official gold price of $12.22 an ounce. The ingots were transferred to vaults in Lisbon, while the returning miners were paid in Mozambican escu­ dos.[66] Both the rising price of gold (so g in 1974 to $194.50 an ounce and the increase in the number of worlcers recruited, rising from 79,700 to 102,725 in 1975, and the decrease in those returning, from 88,488 in 1971 to 83,456 in 1975 provided a handsome income. Following independence, the government in Maputo stood to earn some $175 million in foreign exchange in 1975, almost one third of the entire foreign currency earnings. This provided an overwhelming motivation for the preservation of "nonnal" relations with South Africa But two things occurred - a drop in the price of gold and a decrease in the number of Mozambicans worlcing in South African mines (the rate of recruitment fell from 2,000 per week in 1975 to 400 per week in the second quarter of 1976) reduced the national earnings to about $100 million a year.[67]

**A** second source of dependence on South Africa is found in the shipments of South African exports and imports through the port of Maputo, one of the largest in Africa. In 1975, eighteen per cent of South Africa's exports and imports went through that facility, providing about thirty per cent of Mozambique's

total foreign exchange earnings. In 1976 the exodus of competent managers from the port created a slump

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in traffic and a loss of revenue. These have recovered, due partly to efforts from Pretoria, but the income stands as a constant reminder to Maputo of its dependent status. This is further heightened by the fact that South Africa now stands as Mozambique's major and most convenient source of imports. That position, earlier filled by Portugal, relies on convenience as much as anything else. Spare parts and supplies are quickly and readily available from Johannesburg, while communication and transport with Europe are dis-

1. Personal Interview, Mr. Ben Motlhalamme, *op. cit..*
2. Isaacman and Isaacman, *op. cit.,* p.35. Also sec, P. Fauvet, **"S.A.** Boycott Forces Mozambique to Reschedule Debts", *Africa Now,* April 1984.

(67] Carter and O'Meara, *op. cit.,* pp.79-80.

tant and can be cumbersome. "South African exports to Mozambique include machinery, spare parts, iron and steel, fertilizer and wheat ... Mozambique finds South Africa to be its closest and cheapest marketplace for the purchase of a wide range of manufactured goods".[68]

The need for good relations with Pretoria in Maputo, in addition to the revenues derived from exported manpower, imported products and from export-import duties, is strengthened by the giant Cabora Bassa hydroelectric system, built in Tete by a Portuguese consortium, to provide electricity to South Africa. Vorster pointed out in a speech to the South African Parliament that Cabora Bassa (which is the fourth larg­ est hydroelectric project in the world) would be a 'white elephant' to Mozambique if the electricity were not sold to South Africa. Under the terms of agreement, ESCOM (the Electricity Supply Commission of

South Africa) is bound to buy electricity at 0.3 South African cents per kilowatt for a period of twenty years. Mozambique's own power needs are relatively small, and there are no other viable alternative mark­ ets for the electricity. The price per kilowatt hour has been raised to 0.5 South African cents because of financing necessities within the project.[69]

South Africa is not without its own interests in maintaining good relations with FRELIMO. As Vor­ ster said in Parliament in 1974:

We have asked that certain agreements between Mozambique and our country be honoured because it was in South Africa's interest that the ports of Lourenco Marques and Beira remain open and the railways carry traffic. It is also in South Africa's interest that the Mozambique labour agreement be

honoured and the Cabora Bassa power scheme be fully completed.

I am glad to be able to tell you that in spite of certain difficulties these agreements will be reasonably honoured.[70]

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It would be seriously inconvenient for Pretoria to have to find alternative port facilities, manpower supplies and marlcets for its goods, not to mention a source of electrical power. But it would not be a disaster. South African dependence on Mozambique is miniscule compared to the obverse side of that coin.

One of the problems for the Mozambican economy since independence has been the tendency on the

[68] *Ibid.,* p.80.

1. *Ibid.,* p.8 I.
2. Part of speech delivered by the South African Prime Minister John Vorster in Parliament on the 5th November 1974. Cited in: Carter and O'Meara, *Southern Africa in Crisis,* Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1977, p.82.

part of the FRELIMO leadership to politicise everything. "Frelimo's approach to development has con­ sistently been political rather than economic, directed toward changes in the structure of power and in atti­ tude rather than toward rapid growth".[71] In its first two years of rule, the government confiscated all the major installations agricultural and industrial that had been owned by the white citizenry, all but one of the banks, and placed *all* mines, railways, ports, and the like, under government control. In addition, there has been sometimes brutal collectivization of the agricultural sector, creating *aldeias communais,* collective farms patterned after Eastern European fil:ld Soviet models,[72] in other words, "a number of policies were mis-calculated by FRELIMO to cope with, particularly in the area of economic and policy formulation and indeed in the agricultural area ... at the transition period from capitalism to socialism in Mozambique ... the economic policies which were adopted were not realistic ... particularly in relation to the small farms ... The FRELIMO government, in the view of the *small* farms was undemocratic in its approach to formulating development policies. In short, it was lacking of popular participation in the whole process."[73]

All of this has made the Mozambican economy progressively more dependent on South Africa, which has done its best to encourage such developments. Adopting the policy of 'destabilization', Pretoria spared lit­ tle energy or expense to compel Mozambique to come to the accords reached at Nkomati. Geldenhuys specifically wrote about the instigation of change in the behaviour of South Africa's neighbours, and referred to the use of "its economic relations in southern Africa for non-economic purposes".[74]

Among South African's tactics, which were in fact used in dealings with Mozambique, were "limit­ ing or banning the importation·of black labour from black states Regulating the export of goods to black

states", especially, "food and oil, but machinery, spares, and various other goods could also be added ...

Restrictions on the availability of loans and credits could also be added Regulating investment by both

South African public and private sectors in the black states ... Regulating the supply of South African­ generated electricity to neighbouring states ... South Africa should endeavour to keep black states as

[71) Michael S. Radu, "Mozambique: Nonalignment or New Dependence?", *Current History,* March 1984, p.103.

1. For more discussion about the collective farms in Mozambique, sec Kenneth Hcrmclc, *Land Struggles and Social Differenta­ tion in Southern Mozambique,* Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, no. 82, 1988.
2. *Personal Interview,* Dr. E. Maganya, Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar cs Salaam, Tanzania, 7 April 1988. [74) Deon Geldcnhuys, "Some Strategic Implications of Regional Economic Relations for the Republic of South Africa", */SSUP*

*Strategic Review,* Pretoria, January 1981, p.20.

economically dependent as possible, thereby circumscribing their freedom of economic, political and also military action vis-a-vis South Africa". This makes it essential that "black southern African states would retain substantial economic ties with South Africa despite their efforts to reduce their economic dependence on the Republic (through the so-called counter-constellation - SADCC)"[75]

As one commentator has summarised the goals and interests of Pretoria in the region, what is sought is "sympathetic, non-socialist neighbours who would accept apartheid, support South Africa in world forums, and remain economically dependent on it. Since this is impossible, the main goal of the South African government is to have regional economic, military and political hegemony. If it cannot gain its dominance by any other means, South Africa adopts the alternative objective of causing instability and chaos in unsympathetic, Marxist states."[76] The specific aims pursued in the early 1980s in harmony with this overall goal included the continuation and expansion of exports, selling to neighbouring states in order to advance at once domestic growth in the Republic and to continue the dependency of its neighbouring black states. Manipulation and pressure were mingled with export incentives. There was also a deliberate effort to maintain transport dependence, making sure that more regional traffic flows through South African ports and railway centres. Combined with a deliberate sabotage of SADCC, this would provide significant economic leverage. South Africa must, according to this strategy, remain the economic focal point of the region. All investment in the area must be channelled through, if not controlled by Johannesburg. This involved the encouragement of transnational corporations, especially those based in South Africa, seeking

to strengthen the private initiative in the region and to discourage socialism. South Africa suffers from a

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dearth of both oil and water. The lack of the former can be partially compensated by the use of coal, but its use to produce energy requires vast amounts of water. This means that South Africa needs to continue the

[75] *Ibid.,* pp.22-24. Also sec, Davies and O'Meara, *op. cit.,* 1985, p.195-196. The South African decision-makers described their foreign policy objectives in destabilising Mozambique as follows: "Asswning that South Africa is either engaged in destabilis­ ing Mozambique or contemplating it, several objectives are readily disccmable. First and foremost, South Africa would want FRELIMO to abandon its active support for the ANC, which means denying it sanctuary. A more ambitious objective would be to influence Mozambique to loosen, if not cut, its close tics - particularly in the military field - with communist powers. South Africa would also welcome Mozambique toning down its revolutionary fevour and moderating its condemnation of the republic. What Pretoria essentially desires is a friendly co-operative neighbour instead of a Marxist state threatening its securi­ ty. To achieve these objectives, support for the MNR and severe manipulation of economic tics are the two obvious means to apply. To talk of the MNR overthrowing FRELIMO, or even forcing it into a compromise, seems highly premature and indeed highly unrealistic. South Africa would therefore, have to confine its objectives to changing political behaviour, not political structures." Deon Geldcnhuys, "The Destabilisation Controversy: An Analysis of a High Risk Foreign Policy Option for South Africa", *Politikon,* vol. 9, no. 2, December 1982, p.29.

[76) Hanlon, *op. cit.,* p.58.

supply of electricity from Cabora Bassa in Mozambique. An additional tactic is to support large projects in neighbouring states, such as the proposal to produce ammonia in Mozambique. "In all cases the neighbour­ ing states supply goods or services which they could, in principle, cut off. Thus such projects seem to involve 'mutual dependence' and give the host states more power than traditional one-way links in which the neighbouring states simply buy goods and services from South Africa. In practice, this is not the case. South Africa is demanding cast iron, sanction-proof guarantees against any cutting off of supply. And such projects are so much more important to the.smaller economy of the host state than to South Africa, that Pre­ toria retains its leverage."[77] Still another tactic is the control of the lucrative tourist trade, encouraging or making it impossible for tourists to visit other countries in the region.

"Economic rewards and inducements are used by South Africa to make her neighbours realise that there are economic benefits to the gained by them in a dependent and pliant relationship to South Africa, where the latter is the only real 'saviour' they have (e.g., through the Customs Union membership, through investment funds, land deals, and the like.)[78] This is the positive side of the coin, the carrot held out in front while the stick is applied to the behind. Mozambique has had an exceedingly difficult time with independence, partly because of the heritage left behind by Portugal, who, as we saw earlier, made little or no effort to create an independent viable economy in its African colonies, seeing them rather as essentially providing services to the other European colonies. Part of the problem also, as already noted, has come from the doctrinaire Marxism of the FRELIMO party. But certainly the destabilization policy directed

from South Africa - military, economic and political - has not helped the newly independent state to

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achieve the economic freedom it seeks.

South Africa has sought to portray both Mozambique and Angola as part of the world-wide 'com­ munist bloc' whose success must be opposed by the democracies as part of their own wider interests. That posture has succeeded, at least partially, with the United States, where support has been provided to the right-wing UNITA in Angola. So there is a multiple motivation for destabilization. "By diverting funds from development to defence and survival is meant to show up the bankruptcy of socialism, if it can be

[77] *Ibid.,* p.62.

[78] Hasu H. Patel, "South Africa's Destabilization Policy", *Review of International Affairs,* Belgrade, vol. Vil, no. 877, October

1986, p.305.

shown, however inaccurately, that shortages of essential commodities such as food and fuel are not the han­ diwork of destabilisation but are the consequences of socialist rather than capitalist policies, which can then create a legitimate gap between the people and their governments".(79] The destabilization policy has con­ sistently been portrayed by Pretoria as a response to what they call 'total onslaught', the threat to their national security from a Marxist or Soviet inspired conspiracy. The Front Line States do indeed pose a threat to the future of white rule and apartheid in South Africa, but not because there is the slightest danger militarily or even economically. The threat comes from the living proof that indigenous Africans are entirely capable of managing their own affairs, that they are not inferior primitives who, without benevolent, even Christian guidance, would soon return to the bush. The progress being made all around them by the newly independent states is well known to the majority black South Africans and fuels their determination that one day they, too, shall be masters of their own destiny.

The cost of destabilization bas been nothing short of devastating to the Front Llne/SADCC states. Estimates vary from ten to thirteen billion U.S. dollars for the period between 1980 and 1984.[80] These estimates include direct war damage, extra budgets for defence, higher costs for transport and energy, refugees, loss of both tourism and exports, boycotts and embargoes, and the loss of economic growth and trade agreements. "The human costs are equally unimaginable. As many as 250,000 people have lost their lives as a result of South African aggression. The vast majority died because economic and military aggres­ sion bas created famine in southern Angola and Mozambique by disrupting agricultural production, preventing famine relief, food distribution, and destroying the rural water, health and education networks. About 100,000 refugees have crossed borders, mostly Angolans into Zambia and Mozambicans into Zim­ babwe; but this figure is dwarfed by up to five million people displaced from their homes in Angola and Mozambique by the tidal waves of war and famine."[81]

[79] *Ibid.,* p.306.

[80] Davies and O'Meara, in Msabaha and Shaw, *op. cit.,* p.262. Another source estimated the cost of SADCC countries destabili­ sation since 1980 25 billion US dollars (this estimated the cost from 1980 to 1986) see, European parliamentarians' working seminar on support for SADCC, *op. cit.,* p.25. Mozambique estimated the cost of destabilisation by the MNR and South Africa at 3.8 billion US dollars, this until the signing Nkomati Accord in March 1984. See, People's Republic of Mozambique, *Economic Report,* Maputo, National Planning Commission, January 1984, p.41.

(81] Patel, *op. cit.,* p.307.

It must be recognised that not all Mozambican economic dependence on South Africa is the result of aggression, military or economic. Much of it has come about as a natural aftermath of the Portuguese poli­ cies. As the colonial period drew to its close, Johannesburg replaced Lisbon as the metropole and the cul­ tural focus. Whites became accustomed to going to South Africa for all the things they used to seek in Por­ tugal: graduate education, shopping, recreation and health. The whites, then, found the atmosphere conge­ nial: "the third white tribe" of South Africa were the Portuguese, with more than half a million of them there before 1975. The blacks saw primarily Soweto, high wages for miners, abundant supermarkets, and were ignorant of the bantustans. South Africa replaced Portugal as Mozambique's principal supplier. Even basic foodstuffs like onions were imported, and services for machinery spare parts and expert technicians were much more readily available. In the early days following independence, Pretoria did not move against FRELIMO. Although the flow of traffic through Maputo was immediately reduced by one-third, it contin­ ued to flow at that level for some years thereafter. "South African Railways (SAR) retained various rules requiring shippern to use Maputo, and traffic remained steady at 4m tons per year up to 1979. The main exception was with regard to migrant miners. The number was cut shruply in 1976, and in April 1978 South Africa ended the highly profitable system under which Mozambique was paid a part of minern' wages in gold at the official price rather than the free market price".[82]

The twofold occurrences of Zimbabwean independence and the founding of SADCC in 1980 marked a waternhed in relations between South Africa and Mozambique. As we saw earlier, Vornter had turned a

largely deaf ear to :MNR requests for support during the war in Rhodesia, but Botha saw things differently.

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*De facto* sanctions were imposed on Mozambique, with substantial quantities of rail traffic being routed away from Maputo. Volume fell from 4m tons in 1979 to I.Sm tons in 1983. And it was the cargoes that produced high customs income that were rerouted. Both steel and car kits were suspended in 1981. SAR had positively forbade shippern to avoid Maputo in the past; now they forbade them to use that port, provid­ ing only freight cars that went to Durban. Ferrocbrome was diverted from Maputo to Richards Bay, and in 1983 the shipment of South African fuel through Maputo was suspended. Only coal increased in volume, producing a very low tariff income. More than half the South African exports and imports passed through [821 Hanlon. *op. cit.,* 1986, p.134.

Maputo in 1983.[83]

The sanctions were not confined to government agencies. In 1981 Anglo American, a multinational corporation based in South Africa, suddenly announced it was abandoning its two cashew nut factories in Mozambique, at Antenes and Mocita, a serious blow because cashew nuts are the country's largest export item. Some 12,000 migrant labourers working in the Transvaal were expelled in 1982.[84]

We have seen the damage done by the Jv.lNR., but the South African Defence Force from 1980 onwards, made at least a dozen attacks on· its own. Three raids took place in November of 1981, all near Beira, a port serving Malawi and Zimbabwe, where the SADCC leaders were in conference at the time, and all attacks were directed at the port and railway facilities, the first was a failure. The second raid was more successful, knocking out two bridges over the Pungue River near Beira. The road and the pipeline were destroyed, and the bridge carrying the railway line was severely damaged, interrupting traffic between Beira and Zimbabwe. In the same week, the marker buoys in Beira harbour were destroyed, endangering naviga­ tion in the port. The Reconnaissance Commandos of the SADF struck at Beira again in December of 1982, blowing up the oil depot which held fuel for the pipeline to Zimbabwe and to Malawi. On May 23, 1983 twelve South African jets bombed Matola and another Maputo suburb. "The South African Defense Force said it had destroyed ANC bases and killed what it called 41 'ANC terrorists'. The Mozambican version is that in fact, it killed three workers at the Somopal jam factory as they arrived for work, a soldier guarding a bridge, a child playing, and an ANC man washing a car. At least 40 other people, mostly women and chil­ dren were hurt by shrapnel."[85]

The aggression, both military and economic, stemming from Pretoria was brutal and effective. But there were internal factors at work in the Mozambican economy which contributed to the need to reach some accord with South Africa. "The evidence in the past eight years has been that the response of FREL­ IMO to this deformed and retarded form of underdevelopment was to declare that 'The Mozambican work­ ing classes, led by their vanguard party, will create, develop and consolidate the ideological and technical

[83) *Economic report,* Mozambique National Planning Commission, Maputo, Januay 1984. [84) Hanlon, *op. cit.,* 1986, p.135.

[85] *Ibid.,* p.139. For more details, sec Jan Marsh and Paul Fauvct, *South Africa's undeclared war against Mo=ambique,* London, Mozambique Angola Committee, 1984.

bases for passing to the stage of socialist revolution'. However, in practice, what was done was to intensify what had gone on before".[86] FRELIMO early on committed itself to rapid industrialisation and the crea­ tion of heavy industry and the collectivization of agriculture. "The campaigns of the leadership towards the development and consolidation of the role of the state in the economy were based on concepts related to discipline and increased productivity. The dynamising groups and production councils did not reorient the industrial sector into forms of relations which could break the dependence on foreign markets, on raw materials and on foreign expertise."[87]

The workers in the nationalised operations, both industrial and agricultural, were in fact not liberated at all They simply exchanged their white, Portuguese masters for black FRELIMO ideologies and bureau­ crats, who lacked the know-how of their predecessors. The three forms of agricultural production that the Portuguese left behind were the plantation sector, financed by foreign capital, growing copra, sugar and tea; the white settlers producing cotton and food for their fellow citizens who lived in the cities; and the peasants who cultivated maize, casaya, cashew nuts and millet. Failing to learn from the experience of other socialist countries with forced collectivization of the farms, FRELIM:O pushed a programme of com­ pulsory state farms, which, like their predecessors in the Soviet Union. and elsewhere, have been disasters. "The ideological posture of FRELIMO pushed the party into pumping huge resources into the state farms without an examination of how the settler agriculture was linked to the marketing, the milling and ginning of peasant produce".[88]

This approach led to the collapse of the state fanns and acute shortages q.f food throughout the coun­ try, a plight aggravated by the sabotage of the "MNR forces. FRELIMO was forced to turn to the world's beneficence to feed its hungry, claiming that it was the victim of South African aggression, which was only

partially true. It was also the victim of its own mismanagement, born of its Marxist myopia. In 1983 the Party Congress admitted that the state farms had been "an error" and proceeded to compound the mistake by forcibly relocating between fifty and one hundred thousand urban citizens, "unproductive" so-called, to

[86) Horace Campbell, "War, Reconstruction and Dependence in Mozambique", *Third World Quarterly,* vol. 6, no. 4, October 1984, p.858.

[87] *Ibid.,* p.857.

[88] *Ibid.,* p.860.

rural areas where they proved even more unproductive. According to Maganya " ... there was a war of disenchantment by the fanners ... there are many misjudged policies which were clearly recognised and accepted by the FRELIMO Fourth Congress in late 1983, particularly for the small fanners and farms

..."[89] All of this simply added to the already heavy burden of dependence of the Mozambican economy on South Africa. FRELIMO efforts at encouraging capital and investment from European and American sources ran into a problem described by one commentator as one in which "Western capitalism views the region as a single political economy with the centre of accumulation in South Africa" rendering it inevitable that "the Mozambican state had to come to an agreement with South Africa as a prerequisite for further Western penetration and exploitation of Mozambican labour".[90]

The desperation of Machel and his ministers for such capital is illustrated by the deal that was made with Esso and Shell for the development of oil exploration and production in the Rouvama basin. The oil companies have been offered profit margins far exceeding those they gained in Nigeria or Cameroon, where they were not dealing with socialist governments. Faced with desperate needs for progress in economic development, including agriculture, which in tum requires capital, and assessing the damage done to the economy and the people from the hostilities with South Africa and its lv1NR allies, Maputo began increas­ ingly to think about accommodation. Therefore, after the Fourth Congress " ... they [Mozambicans] decided that it was part of their strategy of combating the bandits [the MNR] to try and isolate their external backers

- South Africa - from the Western powers and prevent a situation such as in Angola where UNITA has the

material military support from the United States. So basically there was this, period of diplomacy winch ended in these results [signing Nkomati] ... the MNR is regarded in a different light to UNITA ..."[91] The

costs of Pretoria's policy of direct and indirect sanctions were calculated by the Mozambique Council of Ministers in February of 1984 at over two billion U.S. dollars. "Among the items listed were the drop of one sixth of the pre-independence revenue from SA traffic chartered through Mozambique ports - a loss of

$248 million; a two third drop in the number of Mozambican workers on SA gold mines - a loss of $568m in remittances; a concomitant increase of 70,000 unemployed in Mozambique; the loss from scrapping the

1. Personal Interview, Dr. E. Maganya, *op. cit..*
2. Campbell, *op. cit.,* p.863.
3. *Personal Interview,* Mr. Robert Davies, Centre for African Studies, Maputo, Mozambique, 19 April 1988.

system under colonialism whereby SA paid one half of miners' wages in gold at the official price - no esti­ mates given of the losses from this source. In addition, there was the cost of actual physical damage done by MNR - $333m ... In total, the Council of Ministers estimated that SA's policy of destabilization had cost the country well over $4bn - more than three times the Mozambique debt to the West".[92] Those figures, by themselves, provide strong incentive for taking the road to Nkomati.

At the same time, there was a growing realisation that the Mozambican army was no match for the continued raids of the MNR and the SADF; who could operate almost at will. "The rebel force was increas­ ingly successful in destabilising the country's transport and rural economy. The drought brought misery and the threat of starvation to five million Mozambicans. Machel was in urgent need of vastly more economic and military aid than he was getting from the Soviet bloc and other friendly countries."[93] All of these factors combined to nurture an openness to negotiations between Maputo and Pretoria, which was increasingly under pressure from world opinion and from the Reagan administration in Washington. 1984 was an election year in the United States, and the President wanted some progress in Africa.[94] So when Portugal made overtures to serve as mediator, both countries were not unresponsive. Pik Botha, the Foreign Minister from Pretoria visited Lisbon on 8 December, 1983, and eleven days later Machel dis­ closed that be bad received many messages from Western and American leaders, expressing their hopes for peace in the region. "He added that those countries well understood that Mozambique would not give up its fight against apartheid or abandon its support for the ANC".[95]

In sum, Mozambique has witnessed a long period of war and instability since the beginnings of the

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liberation struggle against the Portuguese colonial forces, that was from 1964 to 1974, a period of war for independence. A second war from 1976 to 1979 was characterised by economic and military aggression from the final stages of the Rhodesian war. A third war was against the MNR which has increasingly aggravated the economic and political situation of the country. Mozambique's dependence on the South African economy, was created by the Portuguese Colonial administration which built the Mozambican

[9'.?.J Colin Legum, ''The Continuing Crisis in Southern Africa", *Africa Contemporary Record,* 1983-84, vol. 16, p.18.

1. *Ibid.*
2. *Africa Research Bulletin,* Exter, 1-29 February 1984, p.7153.
3. Legum, *op. cit.,* p.19.

economic infrastructure which was not meant to lay a basis for autonomous growth and development but to service the South African mining and industrial capital. For example, the railway line from Maputo to the Transvaal was motivated by the need to forge links with the South African mining magnates and other pro­ jects in that country rather than Mozambique's own developmental needs. South Africa's destabilisation policy - directly - or through the MNR, was becoming increasingly difficult to be met by the FRELWO government Added to the huge losses caused by South Africa's coercive policy on Mozambique, there was also the damage occasioned by natural disasters - floods in 1977 and 1978, and drought in 1982 and 1983.[96] In the words of a Zambian senior Minister, describing the situaton in Mozambique before the signing Nkomati Accord, " ... Mozambique was faced by a situation where the government could collapse under the pressure of the South Africans, MNR and so on ... so correctly President Machel had also to try and do something about this situation on bis bat ..."[97] Thus, the Nkomati Agreement has to be seen in the background of the effect of South African destabilisation " ... particularly since 1982, there bas been a significant escalation of destabilisation directly against Mozambique and the country found itself in a situa­ tion where its economy was ravaged, production was beginning to fall drastically by - well it bas now been calculated at an average of -16% per annum. So I think that was the objective background to the whole thing ... there was a thing on the part of the Mozambicans, that it was possible to try to either force Pretoria to abandon its destabilisation through diplomatic action, or to expose Pretoria to the Western World in par­ ticular as the region's aggressor ..."[98]

It was against this picture of the situation in Mozambique that the talks between South Africa and Mozambique for peace began. The talks for peace came at a point when the whole economic basis had "ground to a halt".[99] By the end of 1983 the economy of Mozambique was in tatters ravaged by drought and then floods in addition to destabilisation.[100] As such Mozambique knew no peace since its indepen­ dence.

1. For more discussion, sec the three D's of drought, debt and destabilisation in, Douglas G. Anglin, "Southern Africa under Siege: Options for the Frontline States", *The Journal uf Modem African Studies,* vol. 26, no. 4, Cambridge, Cambridge Univer­ sity Press, 1988.

[97) Personal Interview, H.E. Mr. M. Punabantu, *op. cit.*

[98] Personal Interview, Mr. Robert Davies, *op. cit..*

(99] Campble, *op. cit.,* p.859.

[100] Davies, *op. cit.,* 1985, p.5,

# CHAPTER FIVE THE NKOMATI ACCORD

After its independence in 1975, Mozambique's relations with South Africa deteriorated to a level where at times the possibility of war between both countries became all to imminent In the event, South Africa sought to isolate Mozambique by 'destabilizing' the latter's economy and security. Yet by 1984 the relations were such whereby both countries seemed to be committed to a policy of compromise and peacemaking in their region. As a Mozambican senior official and member of the FRELIMO's Central Committee explained,

" ... Mozambique is a country that wants to have a peaceful relationship with its neighbours ... it is the main principle

of the FRELIMO Party's policy ... we don't look only to have

a peaceful relationship with those who think the same way we do [FLS-SADCC] ... we have also to look for a peaceful relation

or peaceful coexistence, particularly with those who disagree

at our principles and our way of being in existence [South Africa] ... the course of events arbitrated that was taking place and leading

to a direct war between the two states ...[1]

This new diplomatic wave was to try to reduce the problems of the region, and to come to some under- standing, the Nkomati agreement comes onto the international scene as a dramatic event from Southern Africa, an attempt by both sides to seek some degree of rapprochment.

## NEGOTIATIONS

The signing of the Nkomati Accord was fust broached, when delegations from the two respective sig­ natories, namely, South Africa and Mozambique met at the border town of Komatipoort - to discuss a pol­ ice matter - on the 17 December 1982. At that meeting the Mozambicans proposed to sign **a** Security agreement with the aim of controlling the border area, albeit with specific conditions from the South Afri­ can delegations which were:[2]

[l] *Personal Interview,* Colonel Sergio **Vieira,** Director of Centre for African Studies, Maputo, Mozambique, 28 April 1988.

1. *Personal interview,* Dr. Mota Lopes, Deputy Director of The Center for African Studies, and former Political Adviser to President Samora Machel 1982-1986. Maputo, 19 April 1988. There were always diplomatic contacts between South Africa and Mozambique dating from the time of Mozambican independence. In them were involved, on the Mozambican side, Sergio Vieira, who was then the Director of the President's Office, and on the South African side, Brandt Fourie, then General Direc­ tor of Foreign Affairs. *Daily News,* Dar cs Salaam, 19 March 1984. For a full text of Nlcomati Agreement sec Appendix one.
2. South African economic investments will continue to have access to the Mozambican economy.
3. South Africa will accord the FRELIMO government a formal recognition.
4. Political and security stability in Mozambique will be encouraged and that South Africa will do its part to help bring this about (without mentioning the MNR in name).
5. South Africa will encourage tourist investment and the like.

However, for these conditions to obtain the Mozambican government must:

1. Sever its relations with the ANC, including the closure of the latter's headquarters in Maputo.
2. Sever its diplomatic relations with the Eastern bloc and renege on the Treaty of Friendship and

Cooperation with the USSR signed in 1977.

1. Recognize the reforms in South Africa.
2. Accord recognition to the MNR.[3]

After six months of silence from both sides, in June 1983, at the behest of the American mediation effort, the two countries were successfully brought to the negotiation table once again.[4] In this description the Americans' role in the exercise of talks between South Africa and her neighbours is significant,

" ... the role of the United States in all this, Chester Crocker bas been shuttling in Southern Africa ... if you remember the Kissinger shuttles of the Middle East ... the United States is interested not only on its own warming up

towards South Africa, but also in creating amicable relations between South Africa and its neighbours ..."[5]

Lawrence Eagleburger, U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs, proudly"announced that "we have pressed for dialogue between South Africa and Mozambique for an end to cross border violence ... Simi­ larly, between South Africa and Zimbabwe, and South Africa and Lesotho we have quietly urged patience, restraints, dialogue" [6]. Moreover, Eagleburger characterized the United States role as resting on several premises, namely, the sovereignty of state, that states have a duty to refrain from tolerating or acquiescing

1. *Ibid .•*
2. *Ibid.•*
3. *Personal Interview,* Dr. Mwesiga Barcgu, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 8 April 1988.
4. L.S. Eagleburger, "South Africa: America's Responsibility for Peace and Change". *Current Policy,* no. 497, United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., June 1983, p.11.

in organised activities within their territories by guerillas or dissident movements planning acts of violence in the territory of another state, and that in *this* effort America's role is to foster a climate conducive to building regional security. Davies described the new American policy,

" ... Since 1982 there bas been a partial shift about the Reagan Administration from the doctrine of constructive engagement to the doctrine which was announced by Lawrence Eagleburger of 'Regional Security' there was a ressure in *this* direction ... some pressure on the Pretoria regime ... and South Africa may actually be forced to buy up ..."[7]

To this end the United States bad made a beginning by stressing its readiness to work for reduced violence, to facilitate contact and communication, to build bridges and to serve as peace broker. Eagleburger con- eluded by saying it was up to South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia, and oth­ ers to make the choice between what be called the temptations of violence and the challenge of coexistence. The United States made no secret of "using its influence to shape events in the region."[8]

On 20 December, 1983, the second round of talks was held in Swaziland, with a Mozambican delega­ tion which included the Ministers for Justice and Economic Affairs in Maputo, a South African delegation which was composed of its Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Law and Order. Machel character­ ized these talks as "essential to find a *modus vivendi* with South Africa. One does not choose one's neigh­ bours. They are uncomfortable for us; we are uncomfortable for them ... the principal objective is that no country attacks another".[9]

Not all was sweetness and light. Machel bad, during his summer visit to Lisbon, compared the South African regime to the Nazis, accusing Pretoria of using the same methods of aggression, intimidation, blackmail and propaganda, blaming "the racist regime of South Africa for the insecurity, the climate of ins­ tability, and the threat of a generalized war in our region".[10] Pretoria responded by accusing Maputo of becoming "a main base of the Soviet-supported terrorist offensive against South Africa. ANC terrorism provoked retaliatory and pre-emptive strikes against the organization's bases, and the ideological preoccu-

[7) *Personal ln1erview,* Robert Davies, Centre for African Studies, Maputo, Mozambique, 19 April 1988. [8) Eagleburger, *op. cil.,* p.12.

[9) *AIM,* Maputo, 20 December 1984.

[IO) *lnlernalionalHerald Tribune,* Paris, 10 October 1983.

pation that led Frelirno to support the ANC was responsible, internally, for a degree of authoritarianism, social dislocation and economic disintegration, that resulted in the popular disillusionment from which Renamo [MNR] was born."[11] Nonetheless, the Pretoria government was pleased to welcome the peace initiatives which it characterized as having been sought by President Machel "under increasing internal pressure", promising that if be "wishes to return to the principles of peaceful cooperation and negotiation over differences, ... he will find the South African policy unchanged". [12]

The talks in Swaziland led to the formation of four committees on Security, on Tourism, on Cabora­ Bassa and Economic agreement. These talks reached a 'gentleman's agreement' which was established and constantly reaffirmed in talks between Mozambique and South Africa in Mbabane; it was agreed that nei­ ther party would use the period between the Mbabane meeting in December 1983 and the signing of the Agreement to infiltrate men and equipment or carry out reprisals.[13] On the 3rd of January 1984, President Machel bad further declared that Mozambique bad been holding talks with South Africa "within the frame­ work of the application of the socialist policy of peace".[14] The committees met in January, 16 1984, the Security Committee in Pretoria, the other three in Maputo. At the latter meeting, Jacinto Veloso, of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, told the delegates from Pretoria, "We interpret your presence here as proof of the intention of the South African Government to carry out actions to end the violence and escalating war."[15] The agenda for the meetings included discussion of the future of some 60,000 workers still in South Africa, the continuation of power supplies to South Africa from Mozambique, which was expected to

earn the latter some $45 million a year, and the resumption of normal tourism, calculated to net Maputo an

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additional $100 million a year. In Pretoria, there was rapid agreement that neither state should be involved in any violence against the other.[16] Meanwhile, Major General Veloso, stated that the delegations bad

1. S.A. Broadcasting Corporation, Johannesburg, 10 January 1984. Cited in Legum,ACR, 1984.
2. *Ibid ..*
3. Press Conference given by Minister of Security Colonel Sergio Vieira, Maputo, 30 September 1985. *AIM* September 1985. This 'gentleman's agreement' was violated by circles that are clearly identified in the GORONGOSA documents. Precisely during this period the South Africans reorganized the MNR for the post-Nkomati phase, reanned and supplied them for six months, and trained them including parachutists, instructors, radio specialists, etc., and infiltrated the MNR in massive numbers, and organised clandestine liaison between the MNR and South Africa. See section three of this chapter.
4. *AIM,* Maputo, 4 January 1984. (15] *Legum,ACR,* 1984, p.20.
5. *Ibid ..*

considered measures to be taken in order that the territories of neither state should serve as "a springboard for aggression and violent actions against the other".[17] However, the Mozambican delegations to this meeting added another point of fundamental importance, "there could not be any state to state relationship without first reaching a security agreement In another words, without South Africa first abandoning its sup- port for the MNR".[18]

Both sides faced problems with justifying their actions to their own constituents. FRELIMO was at pains to argue that they were not abandoning socialist principles, and Pretoria went to great lengths to say that it was not abandoning its struggle against communism. "In Southern Africa today", was the party line, "the wherewithal to escape the Soviet embrace in the form of economic aid and effective countervailing power are as necessary to end the confrontation as is the will of the region's governments. The *talks* going on in Maputo and Pretoria are the product of that doctrine applied in support of the efforts of South Africa and its eastern neighbours. It is a comprehensive approach that is designed to take account of the total mul­ tifaceted Southern African situation. It cannot guarantee success in resolving every dispute, but it is the only approach through which success can be achieved."[19] The unspoken truth was that to rescue Mozam­ bique from the embrace of the Soviets carried with it the price of accepting the embrace of Pretoria!

A further meeting at Maputo on February 20 brought agreement that the two sides should conclude a formal security arrangement, ignoring the Treaty of Friendship and Co- operation with the USSR of 1977, which promised Soviet assistance to Mozambique in the event of external aggression. The official corn- munique observed that the entire region had been "plagued by conflict for too Jong", which had "retarded progress in the resolution of the common problems of our region". Machel was cited as reaffirming "the principles of peace, stability, progress and good neighbourliness which underline the current discussions", while Pik Botha explained that what the agreement was doing was to ensure that "the two governments will not allow any form of subversion against each other". The few unfinished details, dealing mainly with the matter of monitoring the agreement, were dealt with at a meeting in Cape Town on 2 March - "the last lap on the road to Nkomati".[20] The two countries reached agreement on "the principle features of a military

1. *AIM,* Maputo, 17 January 1984.
2. *Daily News,* Dar cs Salaam, 18 March 1984. Also scc,AJM, Maputo, 17 March 1984.

[19] Lcgum,ACR, 1984, p.21.

security pact" to prevent cross-border aggression, and declared that "neither country will serve as a base for acts of violence or aggression against the other, nor use the territory of third states for such actions" they, also, agreed to establish a joint security commission to monitor the pact.[21] In reference to Mozambican allegations of South African support for the MNR and to South African accusations that Mozambique backed the ANC, Pik Botha stated on 2 March that "neither country bad made any admissions about sup­ port for each other's enemies in the past"[22] However, Maputo radio commented on the 7th of March that "as long as apartheid exists, Mozambique. cannot have friendly relations with South Africa, but we can have, and we intend to have good-neighbourly relations with South Africa" and added that "one can choose one's friends, but not one's neighbours".(23] The significance of that period of time was that the two coun­ tries had, in principle, agreed to each other's minimum demands, that South Africa cut off aid to MNR and Mozambique stop ANC infiltration.

Machel was deeply concerned to allow his party and his people to realize that this was not a surrender

- of the party's principles or of its continued opposition to apartheid. As a symbol of that, the final agree­ ment permitted the retention of an ANC office and skeleton staff in Maputo. He insisted that both sides needed the agreement, Pretoria as well as Maputo. A Mozambican journalist pointed out that he had ques­ tioned Pik Botha, the South African Foreign Minister, whether the agreement that had been concluded was not reminiscent of the previous attempt by John Vorster some nine years earlier. "Pik Botha did not give an immediate answer. For about five seconds he had a vacant look, perhaps recalling old memories, and he

ended up diplomatically answering what had been implied in the question. W, hat we are doing, he said, is the continuation of the policy of peace of the successive South African Prime Ministers".[24]

Whatever the situation in Pretoria, and it is clear that the government there was under significant international, if not domestic pressure to bring a halt to the bloodshed and human suffering, certainly "Mozambique needed a respite from the ravages of war, the total breakdown of the distribution of seeds and

hoes, the shortages of food in the urban centres and the famine complex in the rural communities. "[25]

1. *Ibid ..*
2. Robert Fraser, *Keesing' s Contemporary Archives,* vol. x.xx, no. 5, London, Longman, May 1984, p.32835.
3. *Ibid••*
4. Quoted in, *Ibid,* p.32835.
5. Legum, *op. cit.,* p,22.

More precisely,

11 ••• there was a coercive diplomatic move [by South Africa] ... in other words, Mozambique was coerced ... it [was] pushed into

a corner where it had few options and in fact had only one option, that was to sign ... no other options, it was coerced into the signing ...11[26]

## AGREEMENT

The conclusion on March 16, 1984 of the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique was a dramatic event. Although it may have come as a surprise to many capitals, to observers of Southern African it had become apparently inevitable. As the signing of Nkomati was described by a Tanzanian academic,

" ... [when] Mozambique signed, it was a quite euphoric [event], in fact [Mozambique] even prepared to have a public holiday and the whole thing [the signing] in my own judgement was bizarre. It was a very big error on the part of Machel ..."[27]

A Zimbabwean senior official explained how most of the FLS capitals perceived the signing of Nkomati,

11 ••• its embarrassed Mozambique more than anybody else, and not only that, what annoyed most people was the way it was done ...

it was fanfare ... I saw it on TV ... Lonrbo made it available on TV to all countries by satellite. And I was amazed at ... the fanfare, flags, military uniforms, guards of honour ... you know I think it was very stupid, I mean *if* I might use my own terms ... talking as a government official, very stupid, becuase one *could* have done it differently ... without all the fanfare ... I think

we were all shocked, everyone was shocked ... I think it was poor judgement ..."[28) ,

The precarious security and economic situation that existed in both countries and especially Mozambique, compelled the ideological adversaries to succumb to the inevitable reality and sign a non-aggression and good-neighbourliness pact The agreement was signed by President Machel and Prime Minister P.W. Botha on the borders, near the towns of Komatipoort and Ressano Garcia, and was named after the nearby

river Nkomati.[29) Leaders of the other Front Line States and SADCC countries were invited to attend the

1. Horace Campbell, "War Reconstruction and Dependence in Mozambique", *Third World Quarterly,* vol. 6, October 1984, p.864.
2. *Personal Interview,* Dr. Mwcsiga Barcgu, University of Dar cs Salaam, Tanzania, 8 April 1988.
3. *Ibid..*
4. *Personal !nten•iew,* Dr. Ibbo Mandaza, Public Service Commissioner, Harare, Zimbabwe, 24 March 1988.

ceremony of the signing (see Appendix One, section B for the program of the signing). One senior Minis­ ter described the Mozambican invitation:

"... it was when they [the Mozambicans] reached the point where they said 'next week we are going to sign' that was when they said 'can you come and witness this' and then I think they said 'witness what?'. The President was asked to go, be did not go ... he could not go. I know I was working with him at that time [1984]. I think one of the reasons really is that he was not part or parcel of the process, but I think someone from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs went there ... if you look in your records you will probably find that ... President Nyerere of Tanzania was

there ... he was present I think at the signing of Nkomati."[30]

However, Swaziland was the only state to be represented at more than ambassadorial level, by Prime Minis- ter Prince Bhekimpi Dlamini.[31] The non-aggression and good-neighbourliness agreement[32] contained eleven articles with a preamble as the framework of the agreement The Nkomati Accord can be analysed as the following:

## The Preamble

The Preamble of the Accord is a policy statement indicating what is intended to be contained in the agreement. According to the Nkomati Accord preamble, the agreement upheld the recognition of the prin­ ciples of strict respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, sovereign equality, political independence, inviolability of the borders of all states and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.[33]

The agreement also took cognisance of the internationally recognized principle of the right of the

1. *AIM,* Maputo, 17 March 1984.

(30] *Personal Interview,* H.E. Mr. M. Punabantu, Minister of National Guidance, Information and Broadcasting Services, Lusaka, Zambia, 10 March 1988. Strangely I could not find any other sources to support his argument about President Nyerere's pres­ ence at the ceremony of l:'-,'komati.

[31] Keesing's Archives, *op. cit.,* p.32835. A non-aggression agreement between Swaziland and South Africa has been signed secretly in February 1982. For full text of the agreement see, Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, *Destructive Engagemenl: Southern Africa at War,* Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986, Appendix 4, pp.332-338.

(32] The General Assembly in 1974 adopted the Resolution on the Definition of Aggression as "the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty or political independence of another state ...", and acts of aggression, include activities such as" ... an in­ vasion or attacks by armed forces, bombardment, blockade of ports, the sending of armed mercenaries into another state's terri­ tory ..." For the full text see, *American Journal of International l..Aw,* vol. 2, 1975, p.480. For more discussion, see,'Ahmed

M. Rifaat, *International Aggression,* Atlanta, Humanities Press, 1979.

1. *Nkomati Accord,* The Preamble, see Appendix one.

people to self-determination and independence and the principle of equal rights of all peoples. The two respective signatories recognized the obligations of all states to refrain in their international relations, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state and the obli­ gation of states to settle conflicts by peaceful means and thus safeguard international peace, security and justice.[34] Both parties recognized the responsibility of states not to allow their territory to be used for acts of war, aggression or violence against other states and the need to promote relations of good neighbourli­ ness based on principles of equality of righ and mutual advantage.[35]

As we noticed from the preamble of Nkomati Accord, it is a general policy statement, which indi­ cates how normal relations between states should be. However, it seems that the preamble was collected from various United Nations resolutions. Toe most interesting is that South Africa agreed on some things which, to most people, were against its principles. For example, Pretoria recognised the principle of the right of people to self-determination and independence, but in the mean time, South Africa continued to administer Namibia. Also the preamble of Nkomati agreement recognised the principle of equal rights of all peoples by both countries. However, South Africa is still applying the apartheid policies against the majority of its citizens and the principle of equal rights of all peoples does not exist in South Africa.

## Mutual Relations

In the agreement, the two countries are required to respect each other's sovereignty and indepen­ dence. In fulfillment of this obligation they must not interfere in each other internal affairs.[36]

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This article obliged both states to give political recognition to the other. In other words, Mozambique has implied it will not criticize South Africa's policy of apartheid as that is a social system that the Pretoria regime has chosen for itself. On the other hand, South Africa has to accept the existence of Mozambique as a Marxist-Leninist state and its political system.

1. *Ibid..*
2. *Ibid ..*
3. *Nkomati Accord,* Article one.

## Conflict Resolution

The two respective signatories were agreed that disputes and differences which are likely to endanger mutual peace and security or the peace and security of the region should be solved peacefully. The agree­ ment contains a list of dispute settlement procedures which include the usual reference to negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or other peaceful means.[37] There is a technical point missing in this article as it is common in most of the international agreements. The United Nations Charter asserts that in cases of disputes the parties are required to reach peaceful settlements, or, if unsuccessful, judicial settlements. Judicial settlement in the context of international disputes is to mean settlement by the Interna­ tional Court of Justice or settlement by an Arbitral Tribunal.[38] It mentions also "resort to regional agen­ cies or arrangements" as possible means to peaceful settlement[39] Should these states fail to come to a peaceful resolution, they are bound to refer the matter to the Security Council.[40] However, as South Africa and Mozambique are members of the United Nations, the Nkomati Accord will not change this, nei­ ther will it relieve them of their obligations under the Charter. For example, they have to report any dispute to the Security Council, and they have the right to resort to the United Nations agencies to solve any future dispute.

Both states further undertook "not to resort, individually or collectively to the threat or use of force against each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence".[41] This entails a general prohibition on the use of force, which is stated in Article Two, Section Four of the UN Charter. According

to the Charter, the use of force will be legitimate, if it is used for self-defence and secondly if the use of

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force is authorised by the Security Council. The list of prohibited acts of aggression has been defined to include attack by land, air and sea forces, sabotage, unwarranted concentration of military forces at or near international boundaries of both states, and violation ofland, air or sea boundaries.[42] The two states have written into their agreement that no assistance is to be given to the forces of any third state or group of

[37) Article Two, Section One.

[38) *United Nations Charter,* Article Six.

1. *Ibid.,* Article Thirty Three.
2. *Ibid.,* Article Thirty Seven.
3. *Nkomati Accord,* Article Two.
4. *Ibid.,* Article Two, Section Two.

states deployed against one of the parties.[43] The fact that the list of forbidden acts of aggression is specifically mentioned is presumably to be explained in the light of Mozambique's past complaints about South Africa's destabilisation, and this list is apparently aimed at preventing the recurrence of South Afri­ can raids into Mozambique.

## Elimination of the ANC and MNR

The heart of the agreement is the obligations laid down in Article Three, and leaves no doubt as to whom it was aimed.

"The High Contracting Parties shall not allow their respective territories, territorial waters or air space to be used as a base, thoroughfare, or in any other way by another state, government, foreign military forces, organisations or individuals which plan or prepare to commit acts of violence, terrorism or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other or may threaten the security of its inhabitants. "[44]

Although the question of the ANC was not specifically mentioned in the documents, Article Three of the Accord prohibits the contracting parties from helping organisations like the ANC. The MNR also falls under this category. In other words, Mozambique was thinking of the MNR, while Pretoria regime bad in mind the ANC. This situation was predicated in *Africa Now,* before signing the Pact

"any security arrangement will inevitably contain restrictions on the ANC activity in Mozambique. Otherwise South Africa will not sign it Equally, it will include a South African pledge to drop their support for the rebels of the MNR. Otherwise the Mozambicans will not sign it"[45]

Article Three describes the ANC and MNR as, irregular forces, armed bands and mercenaries.(46] This entails the duty to "eliminate from their respective territories: bases, training centres, places of shelter, accommodation and transit for elements who intend to carry out the forbidden acts".[47] Thus in the day of signing the agreement, South Africa put off the air radio broadcasts by the MNR from the Transvaal

1. *Ibid.,* Anicle Two, Section Three.
2. *Ibid.,* Anicle Three, Section One.
3. *Africa Now,* no. 35, London, 1 March 1984.
4. *Nkomati Accord,* Article Three, Section Two-A.
5. *Ibid.,* Section Two-B.

area.[48] Moreover, Mozambique has, since the conclusion of this accord., expelled some 800 ANC members, reducing the organisation to a 10- man office in Maputo.[49] Such Mozambican action against the ANC cadres" ... caused a lot of stress in the FLS between Mozambique's FRELIMO and ANC a highly strained period ... [because] in fact Mozambique police even clashed with the ANC ... they sent people [ANC] out of Mozambique and expelled them ..."[50]

It is observable that five out of the eleven sections of Article Three start with a duty to "eliminate" specific conditions and activities, which is· to give precise content to this obligation. The list of prohibited activities or conditions includes the maintenance of arms depots, command posts, communication facilities and radio broadcasting stations, as well as the prevention of any elements from operating from bases else­ where. Transit from the territory of either "or to a place in the territory of any third state which has a com­ mon boundary with the contracting state against which the action is planned", is to be prevented.[51] It is, therefore, laid down that "recruitment of elements of whatever nationality"[52] "or abduction or other acts aimed at taking citizens of any nationality hostage"[53] should be prevented.

## Securing the Borders

Both countries are agreed in Article Four to take effective steps either individually or collectively to ensure that the international boundary between their respective territories is effectively patrolled and that the border posts are efficiently administered to prevent illegal crossings from the territory of one party into

the territory of the other.[54] This article is related directly to Article Three of the agreement, that is to stop

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the ANC and 11NR infiltration into South Africa and Mozambique respectively. The question is whether the two countries were able effectively take up the obligation set by this article. The doubt here is that Mozambique with a poorly equipped and trained army could not afford the capability to exercise this Arti-

1. *Times of Zambia,* Lusaka, 21 March 1984.
2. *The Economist,* London, 2 June 1984, p.35.
3. Personal Interview, Dr. Baregu, *op. cit..*
4. *Nkomati Accord,* Article Three, Section Two-C.
5. *Ibid.,* Section Two-I.
6. *[bid.,* Section Two-J.
7. *!bid,.* Article Four.

cle, even if it had the desire to do so. However, South Africa had the military capability to enable it to patrol its border, but with the division among its politicians, civilians and militaries in the top administra­ tion showed that Pretoria did not exercise this Article from the Accord. [See Section 1bree of this chapter].

## Propaganda

The Nkomati Agreement also compels the signatories to prohibit within their territory acts of pro­ paganda that incite a war of aggression against the other ... and act of terrorism and civil war in the territory of the other party.[55] However, not all propaganda has as its main intention wars or aggression, terrorism or civil war, although it might have such consequences. It is certain that this Article aimed to stop the radio broadcasts by the ANC and :MNR as South Africa did in closing down the MNR broadcasting station in the Transvaal in the 16 of March 1984.[56]

## The Joint Security Commission

One of the most important provisions of the agreement is Article Nine. It sets out the Joint Security Commission. Both parties to the agreement were obligated to appoint high-ranking representatives to serve on the Commission whose aim is to supervise and moniter the application of the Accord.[57] Toe Commis­ sion is obligated to determine its own working procedure[58] and its meetings were to be on a regular basis or could be specifically convened whenever circumstances require.[59] Therefore, the Commission's basic function is to moniter the implementation of the Nkomati Accord and more cifically to consider any infringements and to recommend measures for improving the whole arrangement

A further function of the Commission is to investigate all allegations of infringements of the provi- sions of this agreement.[60] The Commission was to show the way out of any impasse. Another of its tasks concerned the taking of interim measures in cases of duly recognized emergency.[61] Both states promised

1. *Ibid.,* Article Five.
2. *Times of Zambia,* Lusaka, 21 March 1984.
3. *Nkomati Accord,* Article Nine, Section One.
4. *Ibid..* Section Two.
5. *Ibid.,* Section Three.
6. *Ibid.,* Section Four.
7. *Ibid.,* Section Five.

to make available all the facilities necessary for the effective functioning of the organ and jointly to con­ sider its conclusions and recommendations.[62] A great deal of hope seems to have been put in the Com­ mission, indeed, it is one of the most important communication channels between the two countries. Thus, the Joint Security Commission is considered to be one of the major achievements of the agreement, and it is still in operation.

## Other Provisions

Under Article Eight, there is no obligation on both parties to - renounce self defence in the event of anned attacks.[63] This gives Pretoria the right to retaliate against the ANC or any other group operating from Mozambique in the future. However, this Article acts as a safety valve to give the right for both par- ties to violate the agreement by invoking self defence as a justification whenever the need arises.

South Ahica and Mozambique committed themselves to interpret the Accord in good faith and to make periodic contact in order to ensure effective application of what has been agreed.[64] Both states declared that there was no conflict between their commitments in treaties and international obligations and the commitment undertaken in the agreement.[65] As far as Mozambique was concerned regarding this Article, FRELIMO was thereby in conflict with various commitments it had undertaken with FLS, SADCC, and OAU which are opposed to South Africa in principle, and Mozambique has supported numerous UN resolutions condemning South Ahica. Pretoria has to change its attitude toward its commitment against 'total onslaught' from the Mozambique political system with the existence of Marxist-Leninist regime in Maputo.

The last two Articles were purely procedural. The .first one, gave the name of the agreement It states that this agreement shall also be known as "The Accord ofNkomati."[66] The second, gives the agreement of entry into force of the accord, that is on the date of the signing.[67] Which was 16 March 1984. Any

[6'.?) *Ibid.,* Section Six.

* 1. *Ibid.,* Article Eight.
  2. *Nkomati Accord,* Article Seven.
  3. *Ibid.,* Article Six.
  4. *Ibid.,* Article Ten.
  5. *Ibid.,* Article Eleven, Section One.

amendment to the agreement has to be agreed to by both countries and would be effected by the exchange of notes between them.[68]

On the first anniversary of the signing of the Nkomati Accord of "Non-Aggression and Good Neigh­ bourliness" between South Africa and Mozambique, the official Mozambican News Agency (AIM) com­ mented as follows:

'' **A** year after the agreement Mozambican workers and peasants are still being killed and maimed ...1'4uch of the continued banditry in Mozambique is due to the growing number of violations of the accord from South African soil ... Inside Mozambique, the belief is growing, both in official and unofficial circles, that South Africa has not respected the Nkomati Accord because it saw the agreement as a mere tactic, a first step in any vaster plan, the

goal of which was to force Mozambique into power sharing with the bandits ... Toe Pretoria regime has shown that it is not a

serious partner in an agreement of this nature ... So one year after the signing of the agreement there is very little to celebrate."[69]

Such remarks came in the circumstance of a series of increasingly bitter complaints by Mozambican officials at the continuing acts of aggression by the N1NR operating within Mozambique and from South African territory. On 1985 President Machel told a press conference, "... South Africa is not complying with the Nkomati Accord ... I do not know if it does not have the capacity or whether it is because of bad faith ..."[70] The President's comments manifested the first public statement by a senior member of the Mozambican government hinting at duplicity on the part of South Africa.

## VIOLATION

The Nkomati Accord, theoretically, banned South Africa from supporting the MNR. What happened in practice was just the reverse. According to Davies,

* 1. *Ibid.,* Section Two.
  2. *AIM,* Bulletin no. 104, Maputo, March 1985.
  3. *AIM,* Maputo, 7 February 1985.

" ... before the Accord was signed they were given supplies which was supposed to last them two years. Some attempts were made to try to restrict bandit activity directly out of South Africa. You have from this period onwards the major shift towards the use of

Malawi, but we know now that basically it was South African military intelligence that continued to control the bandit activity as in

Malawi. But in general the whole period afterwards just showed that South Africa was not going to abandon destabilisation. I think

for some time afterwards Mozambique adopted a role of 'wait and see' attitude and an attitude of being willing to give some time for

those forces perhaps in South Africa who were willing to cease support of the RENAMO and to assert themselves, and so we have a period of nine months or so when all these violations continued,

when nonetheless, the government of Mozambique did not directly accuse the South African government of failing the Accord. But actually as

time went by I think the influence of these forces within the militarised South African regime I think began to reveal itself more and more, such protestation of non-involvement was seen to be thinner and thinner. At the same time the economic benefits which South Africa held out were shown as not being realised. There was scarcely any investment of any significance and basically I think this was straining this whole process and of course finally what led

to the rupture was the discovery of the documents in Gorongosa which demonstrated the violation of Nkomati by South Africa and there continued military support to the :MNR bandits. And that has been constant up to now. It bad continued support and you have every now and again assertions from various quarters that perhaps now South Africa is at last giving up its destabilisation only to be followed

by revelations, and this has continued up to now with the revelations of Bailo-Vaira and Ian Grey, and various other formal bandits have been banding themselves over to amnesty orders last year [1987]. So basically I think the reality is that South Africa and the Botha

regime have not abandoned the destabilisation within the country which has intensified."[71]

The purpose of this section is to analyse some of the documents that were found in the :MNR.s Casa Banana headquarters in Gorongosa district, which was captured on 28 August by joint Mozambican and Zimbabwean forces. In the ruins were found notebooks and diaries which provided damning evidence that the Pretoria government, or some elements of the South African administration had not only violated the Nkomati Accord, but that they had never intended to honour it. The researcher managed to secure a copy of these documents during a field trip to Mozambique in April 1988.

The documents are extracts from three notebooks and these documents were written up by secretaries of the MNR as are entitled:

[7 lJ Personal Interview, Davies, *op. cit..*

DESK DIARY -1984

CADERNO No. 2 (Notebook No. 2)

CADERNO No. 3 (Notebook No. 3)

The above documents covered the period from the end of December 1983 to the beginning of July 1985.

The DESK DIARY is a diary starting on 26 December 1983 with regular entries up to 14 October, and scattered entries up to December 1984. It has notes of meetings, and entries about movements in which their writer was involved. It also has some personal notes, arid information on the behaviour of the MNR ringleaders within and outside the country. There is a record of various messages from a Commandant Charles, who is identified in the same documents as being Colonel Charles Van Niekerk of South African Military Intelligence. The Diary mainly records relations with South Africa.

This is also the case for Notebooks 2 and 3. The Diary is used as such and also as a notebook. Sometimes, therefore, the date of the event does not coincide with the date of the respective column of the Diary, but in these cases, the writer writes the date of the event.

Notebook 2 contains essential points from the meetings of the commission for implementation of the declaration of 3 October 1984, and from meetings between the MNR and the South African side charged with implementing the declaration. It contains messages of 1985 from the 1vfNR chief to Colonel Van Niekerk, always addressing him as "Friend Commandant Charles". It also contains notes about the various meetings held in Gorongosa between the 1vfNR chief and South African representatives, including the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Louis Nel. The final entry in this nott!book refers to a meeting on 3 July 1985 with Deputy Minister Louis Nel.

Notebook 3 contains transcriptions of some parts of Notebook 2. The two books repeat each other in many respects. There are many messages abroad, particularly to South Africa. A 'gentleman's agreement' was established and constantly reaffirmed in talks between the Government of Mozambique and South Africa in Mbabane, Pretoria, Maputo and Cape Town, with variously the Defence Minister, General Magnus Malan, the Commandant General of Police, General Goetzee, and the then Prime Minister P.W. Botha. It was agreed that neither party would use the period between the Mbabane meeting in December 1983 and the signing of the Agreement to infiltrate men and equipment or carry out reprisals.[72]

[7'.!] *AIM,* Maputo, 30 September 1985.

*As* is chronicled, this 'gentleman's agreement' was violated by circles that are clearly identified in the document Precisely during this period they reorganised the MNR for the post-Nkomati phase, reanned and supplied them "for six months", trained them (they included parachutists, instructors, radio specialists) and infiltrated them in massive numbers, and organised clandestine liaison between the MNR and South Africa,

and abroad via South Africa.

### Reorganising the MNR for the Post-Nkomati Phase

"Owing to the undertaking that the South Africans will make to Machel in the light of the talks underway, resupply for

the first six months of 1984 will come in the first months ... apart from the resupplies in January 1984".[73]

At a meeting in Pretoria between the MNR and some of the South African military personnel, the latter gave their objectives to the MNR President by saying:

"Our objective is to plan a war in the face of the situation taken up by the South African Republic".[74]

Instructions, orders and defining the targets as the following:

"Railways, Cabora Bassa, co-operantes, and other targets of an economic nature, SADCC ... Destroy the Mozambican economy in the rural zones ... Destroy the communications routes to prevent

exports and imports, and the movement of domestic produce ... Prevent the activities of foreigners [co-operantes] because they are the most dangerous in the recovery of the economy."[75]

However, the major objective in defining such targets was to " force FRELIMO to talk with RENAMO".[76] *As* far as the violation of the 'gentleman's agreement' was concerned, it was Pretoria's decision to reorganise the MNR for the post-Nkomati phase, giving them instructions and defining their tar- gets.

1. *Gorongosa Documents,* Extracts, 16 January 1984.
2. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 22 February 1984.
3. *Ibid.,* Extracts, General Plan No. l, 24 February 1984.
4. *Ibid.,* Extracts, *25* February 1984.

### Rearming and Supplying the MNR Forces

There are several entries recording the movements of supply planes, supply ships, and mention is even made of the establishment of 15 dropping zones (DZ) as the following "South-5DZ, Centre-7DZ, and North-3DZ"[78] "H.E. [the MNR President, Alfonso Dhlakama] asks ... for 12.7mm and SAM7 weapons for the Northern Zone ... it was agreed that at the end of January 1984, an aircraft will go to Botoro DZ in Gurne, material for Niassa - Tiogre ... and other aircraft for Viola - Maganja da Costa".[79] To ensure future supplies, "H.E. left for Pretoria at 15h00 with the Secretary General [Evo Fernandes] for talks with the South African Generals, at their invitation ..." After the meeting the answer went back to the MNR headquarters saying "... the meeting with the general settled the arms supplies: huge for 8 weeks because

S.A. is going to stop giving logistics ..."[80] Next day the MNR started receiving these resupplies by sea

and air, "... resupply by ship is expected soon at Bata de Mcoluine ... with 60 specialists and 40 tons of material ..."[81] Another entry was recording a fixed resupply programme for"... 23,25,27 and 28 February 1984 ... [then] 4,4,7,11 and 14 March 1984 ... each date with its DZ ... resupply by boat at Culemine Bay will be on 10.3.84 east of Cheringoma ... apart from these there will be other extras by Dakota for the Sul do Save which will carry 100 boxes of ammunition each time ... the war material that will be carried in these resupplies: [listed] ... each resupply will carry 4M.60, 4M.81, 4M.82 and 30 RPG? and machine guns

... 100 pistols with 1000 bullets each will also go to Gorongosa ..."[82]

### Training the MNR Forces

In the meeting of 16 January (mentioned above) a South African team going to Zambezi.a, and the composition of the training team was described, "... the South African team going to Zambezi.a: Colonel Eurico, Jakson, volunteer Joanh, boat specialist, 2 doctors with Daniel Pos, and 10 of our instructors, the total of 18 people ..."[83] The defination of the training programme they were to carry out, came under the

1. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 16 January 1984.
2. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 19 January 1984.
3. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 7 February 1984.
4. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 8 February 1984.
5. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 11 February 1984, other entries recording the arming and supplies given to the MNR by South Africa: 30 De­ cember 1983, 4,13,14,23,24,25 and 27 February 1984, and 1 March 1984.
6. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 28 January 1984.

title of "... Programme for our friends in Zambezia".[84] Instructions for camouflaging the presence of South African instructors were given.

"Our fighters must not talk to the people about our friends, so that the enemy should not find out, in the event of our friends being seen by the people, it will be the fighter's duty to inform the people that they are the captured Russians ... our

friends must always speak English and not Afrikaans, to avoid the soldiers finding out, as we have many fighters who were formerly workers in RSA".[85]

However some of the MNR training· was earned out in places other than in Mozambique, for exam­ ple, "Radio transmission course, in Namibia".[86] As another example, there are references to personnel

who will train in parachute jumping and other courses. "On the 27th the Dakota will go to Namibia to take our 8 instructors, who are taking the heavy weapons course ... 23 parachutes ... 23 RT sets ..."[87] Then a message for the South Africans from the MNR asked "what our 19 specialists learned in Namibia, and 10 of our fighters remained there ..."[89] Also, there is reference to 100 men who were training with the South African Special Forces saying "... of the 100 men, 2 died struck down by the Angolans, 3 are prisoners, 30 in Namibia, and 65 in Parabolwa [Transvaal] ... out of these 75 are parachutists. They have been trained on various courses: security, WT, drivers, etc ... The general asks to keep 10 of our soldiers ..."[90]

### Infiltration of MNR

In face of the Nkomati Agreement, South Africa reorganised the MNR by regions and created regional leaderships, 11 the group of250 for Maputo set off on 26/2/84 frollj Jonnen ..."[91] 11 South HQ, with 25 people ... 2 planes will go to Maputo ... There will be 2 more flights for Maputo ..."[92] 11 possi­ bility of putting them [100 specialist] into Maputo overland ... Method of infiltrating the 95 into Maputo overland."[93] again, "... 100 men should enter Maputo in small groups via the Libombos, with pre-

••• ...

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(84] *Gorongosa Documents,* Extracts, 31 January 1984.

(85] *Ibid.,* Extracts, 2 February 1984.

1. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 10 February 1984.
2. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 20 February 1984.
3. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 2 March 1984.
4. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 27 February 1984.

(91] *Gorongosa Documents,* Extracts, 19 January 1984.

(92] *Ibid.,* Extracts, 20 February 1984.

(93] *Ibid.,* Extracts, 27 February 1984.

determined aims and targets for each group ... Joan and Eurico [Colonel from SADF] will go only with the authorization of the Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan ..."[94]" ... the contact will always be on the Monday and Thursday of each week ... from 26.3.84 onwards Pretoria will be listening in to receive any messages ... an agreed time will be communicated through Noa Muchanga before 26.3.84 ..."[95]

All the above, provides us with some evidence that the 'gentleman's agreement', was violated inten- tionally by some military elements within the South African government.

### Communications

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As the South African government found itself proceeding with Nkomati Accord, the decision was taken to prepare the MNR for the post-Nkomati phase including the method of communications "... two MNR men will be trained in ultra-secret communications between MNR and Pretoria ..."[96] Also, "... communication by radio or physically between Renamo and the South African soldiers ..."[97] The previ- ous two messages in title from: Brigadier Van Tonder - SAMI, therefore, the dates and timetable for con­ tacts were established (see ft. 85 in this section, extract date 11 March 1984). In addition there are some drawings and instructions for working with an ultra-fast computer and transmitter in the Portuguese version of these documents.

### Assurances given to the MNR by the South African Military of Non-observance of the Agreement

### “ ... Colonel Charles guarantees Renamo that for all that they 7

sign an agreement with Machel they will continue to send planes now and again "[98]

These assurances resulted from a meeting in Pretoria on February 23, 1984 between the President of the MNR and the head of South African Military Intelligence, General Van der Westhuisen. The General ensured the MNR of his support in saying " we are solders [SAMI] will continue to support without the

[94) *Ibid.,* Extracts, 24 February 1984.

[95] *Ibid.,* Extracts, 11 March 1984. [96) *Ibid.,* Extracts, 24 February 1984.

[97] *Ibid.,* Extracts, 25 February 1984. [98) *Ibid.,* Extracts, 13 February 1984.

consent of our politicians in massive numbers so as to win the war ... Machel can only fall immediately through a cut in the economy and communications routes ..."[99]

Violation of the 'gentleman's agreement' clarifies the decision of certain South African circles at the moment of signing the agreement, not only not to observe it, but also to maintain a climate of instability in the region.

### The Period Following the Signing of the Nkomati Accord

After March 1984, at a meeting of the Joint Security Commission established by the Agreement, the Mozambican side constantly asked the South African side where they had put the many 11NR to be found on their territory, and where they had dropped and disembarked the material. The South African side always refused to give any explanation, but merely said that it had parted from the 11NR on not very friendly terms, had cut all and any links with them and was observing the Agreement

In May, June, July and August 1984 the Mozambican side, both in the Joint Commission and through special envoys, denounced the violations that had taken place, and that are now in part chronicled by the

:MNR.[100] It will be recalled that the South African armed forces, in order to conceal the violations they were committing installed radar on the frontier with the People's Republic of Mozambique so as to prevent violations of Mozambican air space from South Africa. The same institution that installed the radar also violated the Agreement, despatching aircraft and building landing strips in the People's Republic of Mozambique. When Mozambique was denouncing maritime violations, the South African side, while denying them, offered to patrol even Mozambican territorial waters so as to prevent sea borne landings. They declared this publicly.[101]

Since the Nkomati Agreement was signed, what violations can be noted from the documents regard­ ing the Accord? Pretoria continued to direct and support the 11:NR, as the following reply to the RENAMO President from C/Charles-Vanicar suggests,"... I received your message on 16.6.84 ... The political climate

1. *Ibid.,* Ex.tracts, 23 February 1984.
2. *AIM,* Press Conference given by H.E. 1be Minister of Security Colonel Sergio **Vieira,** Maputo, 30 September 1985. (IOI] *Ibid..*

here [S.A.] and internationally, is still bad for continuing to supply RENAMO. Any violation of the Incomati [Nkomati] Accord on our part will prejudice South African peace attempts in Southern Africa. The situation could change at any moment, because the Machel government has serious problems as can already be seen from Honwana's [Fernando Honwana, President Machel's personal adviser and member of the Mozambican delegation] talks with Evo [Evo Fernandes, the MNR Secretary General] ... Renamo must continue to squeeze Machel but in such a way as to use as little war material as possible ... avoid combat with the FAM [Mozambican Armed Forces], giving more attention to destroy the economy, infrastructure and controlling the population ... Renamo has to survive longer until Machel reaches an agreement with Renamo, but never let Frelimo see that we have no more material ..."[102]

As we noticed, the South African government was serious in cutting aid and support for the MNR, and in a two months period, the lack of ammunition was noticeable on the MNR side. Various meetings were then arranged with "... Chief of Staff Visloen [General Constand Viljoen, Head of the SADF], with the Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pile Botha. With the first two it is for us to request humanitarian aid, and with the last-named to sound out his point of view about the expected talks with Frelimo ..."[103] Another meeting about 'aid' and to adopt a new strategy to face the Nkomati situation was held: "... at 17h00 we had a meeting with the Chief of Staff of the South African Armed Forces, General Visloen [Viljoen], General Van Der West Huisen [SAMl], Br. Van Tonder [SAMl] and Colonel Vanikerke [SAMl Director] were present at the meeting ... was discussed humanitarian aid for

Renamo ... General Viljoen agreed to send us humanitarian aid in Air Forc,e C130 planes ... he said he would do everything possible to have at least one hour on SABC, information about Renamo activities ...

he recommended us not to lose military strength and control in the face of these negotiations [with Frelimo]

... he said that the ceasefire must not be effective, he agreed with the plan of two to three months maximum

... he recommended us not to accept the amnesty [from Frelimo] ... he suggested that the ceasefire should not enable economic agreements between S.A. and Machel, these should be suspended until the conclusion of the final peace agreement in Mozambique [with Renamo] ..."[104]

1. *Gorongosa Documents,* Extracts, 21 June 1984.
2. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 4 September 1984.
3. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 7 September 1984.

The South Africans reached the point of deciding strategy and new methods of support, which aimed at transforming the granting of amnesty to penitent 11:NR into political negotiations leading to the Mozam­ bican government's destruction. Thus, South Africa decided the strategy for trying to present the MNR as a political organisation and as an opposition party to FRELIMO. Pretoria guided and supported the MNR's political and diplomatic activity.

The decision was made to supply the ?v1NR with passports "... Swazi passports for Vaz and Mateus ... Tour of Europe ..."(105] The SA1vll wouid obtain passports from another country, and organise trips to Europe and try to organise trips with Africa "It was agreed that our friends would arrange two passports ... with the aim of facilitating the journeys abroad ..."(106] "... it was agreed that our friends would establish conditions for our delegation to be received in some countries in Europe as in Africa, on which it was left to us to say which countries would accept our presence ..."(107]

The strong alliance between the MNR and SA1vll reached the point where the latter would " ... install microphones in the negotiating room to listen in on the talks between Pile Botha and the Mozambican dele­ gation, it will be very advantageous for us [11NR and SAMI]. In this way we will know Pile Botha's plan and Frelimo's, this was guaranteed us with Van Niekerk:, SS colonel in SA ..."(108]

Brigadier Van Tonder warns Dhlakama [11NR President], who had meanwhile arrived in Pretoria of the questions that Pile Botha will ask him on the following day,"... if Renamo continues to receive aid from SA ... the thinking of Renamo on the Incomati [Nkomati] Accord ... if the South African military are carry­ ing out the Incomati [Nkomati] Accord ..."[109] Also, there is a message frt>m Colonel Van Niekerk to Dhlakama, transmitting a request from Pile Botha for the President of the MNR to meet Bulhosa (Manuel Bulhosa, a rich business man whose interests in Mozambique had been nationalized). The message said, "... it appears that Secretary General Evo Fernandes is not aware of this ... it is part of Pile Botha plan to eliminate the Secretary General from the talks ..."(11O] As part of this preparation for visits, the major part

(105] *Ibid.,* Ex.tracts, 1 September 1984.

(106] *Ibid.,* Ex.tracts, 3 September 1984. ( I07] *Ibid.,* Ex.tracts, 4 September 1984.

1. *Ibid.,* Ex.tracts, 17 September 1984.
2. *Ibid.,* Ex.tracts, 20 September 1984.

(1IO] *Gorongosa Documents* - *Notebook 2,* Ex.tracts, 12 January 1985.

of Notebook 2 is recording the various visits by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Louis Nel. Start­ ing with the recommendation for bis visit by the Military Intelligence and some instructions"... Louis Nel, is still interested in the search for peace in Mozambique ... if possible he will visit the President here in Goroogosa ... he said in addition that bis coming here would be without the knowledge of bis Chief Pik Botha ... the most important point that brings him here is to ask for a resumption of Reoamo-Frelimo talks

..."[111] The MNR replied immediately to this plan"... The Deputy Minister, Louis Nel, can come here to Goroogosa on 7 June 1985 in accordance with bis request, since it is beneficial to us and only in this way can Reoamo's situation here in Mozambique be clarified personally, as well as it being a victory for Reoamo and at a time when your government is side by side with Marxist government ofFrelimo ..."[112]

Io a further meeting in Gorongosa the South African military leaders continued to prepare Nel's visit and talks with the MNR and gave some instructions to them "... the need for Reoamo to give Deputy­ Minister Louis Nel a hope of solving the problem that he is coming here to discuss with the President [MNR]. It will be useful to make him see that Reoamo will win this war ... we will send the head of the army with Louis Nel, or the deputy-minister of defence and police who is 100% in favour of Reoamo ... the basic idea is for the military to get influence over Louis Nel ... For South African military, Louis Nel is the most honest of the South African politicians ... [finally] Mr. President can talk about everything, but never about Renamo strategy. And you must also tell him that Renamo controls all this country ..."[113] Thus, the first meeting between the MNR President and the South African Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs

Louis Nel, took place on 8 June 1984 at the General Staff Base in·Gorongos,a. Louis Nel saying"... We

came here as friends ... the medicines that are in short supply here, I will bring some when I return on my next trip ... Renamo needs a lot of war material and uniforms ..."[114] Back in South Africa, a message from Colonel Charles to President ofReoamo on the former's arrival with Louis Nel in Pretoria, saying"... He [Nel] was very satisfied and hopeful with the progress ... the big problem for Louis Nel is how to handle bis initiative within the South African government itself keeping out certain elements like Pik ... Louis Nel

1. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 26 May 1985.
2. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 27 May 1985.
3. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 5 June 1985. [I 14] *Ibid.,* Extracts, 8 June 1985.

advised ... that we must be very careful with the kind of material we are supplying to Renamo, so as not to violate the Incomati [Nkomati] Accord as this could prejudice his initiative and the current progress

..."[115] On Nel's second visit to Gorongosa, he informed Dhlakama, within this plan of instructing and preparing the MNR forces, that "... Britain is going to train Frelimo officers in Zimbabwe ... thirty officers will be assigned, the training will last *5* months and will begin in January next year. I believe that by Janu­ ary next year the war will already be over ..."[116] Dhlakama then said"... I agree with the Minister when be says that by January next year the war will be over, either Frelimo loses or Renamo ..."[117] Louis Nel goes on to say"...I shall be meeting Veloso [the Mozambican Chairman of the Joint Security Commission] on Friday ... I shall tell him if they do not accept talks the war will go on for many years ... I shall speak so as to leave the idea that Renamo has assistance abroad ... I shall not say that I was in Mozambique ... and that the President of Renamo is moving from one side to the other ... so we are going *to* negotiate peace ...

and the President of Renamo will have to make a statement and go on telling the world that he wants peace negotiations ... and S.A. wants to play a very important role ... we want to make Frelimo enter into negotia- tions. 1bis will make Frelimo lose its diplomatic weight ... we need the international press I believe

[Nel] that good will come ofit "[118] The decision to continue support and aid *to* the MNR was made by

the military, and it was investigated by Pik: Botha, as the documents recorded" Pik: Botha stressed that the

Maputo government is still accusing S.A. of going on supporting Renamo and that on this very day the Frelimo government put the following charges against S.A. before Prime Minister P.W. Botha after the

Incomati [Nkomati] Accord the South African government went on supporting Renamo, with the indication that in May, June, July they sent a total of 14 aircraft full of war material to Renamo there are officers in

S.A. military circles directly linked to this support, with a mention of Colonel Van Niekerk as one of them

..."[119] Because the military men - who continue to support the MNR - believe that" Pik Botha wants to

remove the military as intermediaries between Frelimo and Renamo for him to be the one to serve in the

1. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 8 June 1985.
2. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 2 July 1985.
3. *Ibid..*
4. *Ibid..*
5. *Gorongosa Documents* - *Desk Diary,* Extracts, 9 August 1984, also 13 August mentioned the names of the Mozambican dele­ gation, who will meet the Prime Minister.

negotiation with Frelimo ... he even asked to be chairman of the negotiations ..."[120]

The point is that South African military circles support to the MNR was crucial in saving them from the desperate plight in which they found themselves in the second half of 1984 (after the signing of the Nkomati Accord). The messages from the MNR forces asking for ammunition give a clear picture of their despair at the prospect of imminent collapse. Dblakama sends a long message "... we [MNR] no longer have war material ... we already lacked material to respond to the massive offensive that Frelimo bas just announced would be launched after the signing of the [Nkomati] Accord ... so, we [MNR] want to remind our friends of the pledge they gave us of keeping up support to us clandestinely ... we need ammunition to sustain the war ... we guarantee every safeguard ... we shall also recommend to our forces the maximum security and avoidance of leaks ... friend Commandant Charles should not forget that our enemy will do everything possible to disorganize us in the centre of the country ... we no longer have the war material to go on squeezing Machel as we were squeezing just after the signing of the [Nkomati] Accord ... this could cause a bad situation to occur for us identical with that of 1980 when we were so badly hit by Rhodesia abandoning us ... this will happen to us because we no longer have the war material ... however, after this message, I feel that friend Commandant Charles will be very sympathetic, as be bas always been the South African government's official representative to Renamo ... the war you have always represented and still represent bas not yet been won ..."[121] The reply to the above message came back as saying"... the politi­ cal climate here [S.A.] is still bad for continuing to supply Renamo ... Renamo must continue to squeeze

Machel but in such a way as to use as little war material as pos.sible ... avoid combat with the FAM ...

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Renamo has to survive longer ... never let Frelirno see that we have no more material ..."[122] From 17 July 1984 onward, we noticed several entries recording supplies and instructions for the MNR forces. There are many messages and references to supplies by aircraft and cargo planes involving such as C-130, C-160 and C-47 planes.[123]

[120) *Ibid.,* Extracts, 15 August 1984.

1. *Gorongosa Documents* - *Notebook 3,* Extracts, 16 June 1984.
2. *Ibid., Desk Diary,* Extracts, 21 June 1984.

[123) *Ibid.,* 17 July, 18 August, 16 and 19 August 1984.

In the joint strategy for war and the destruction of Mozambique, the South African military support­ ing MNR did not spare even South African interests as targets. They demanded that economic agreements between Mozambique and Pretoria, which are beneficial to South Africa be suspended as long as they fail to place MNR in the Mozambican government. For such reasons, the MNR went to Cape Town, where they had a meeting with Pile Botha in Cape Castle from 9pm to midnight, the meeting was on the 10th of September 1984.[124] The MNR asked Pik Botha about"... the suspension of economic agreements from

S.A. to Maputo, Pik Botha refused, saying I will only pressurise Maputo to come to the negotiations seri­ ously and not with the story of the amnesty ..."[125] Also, "... Pik Botha had requested that the Renamo delegation should be under his wing and that the military should look after the Renamo delegation ..."[126] In another meeting between Louis Nel and the President of the MNR Mr. Nel was to ask the President the following "... the Cabora Bassa power lines, the S.A. - Maputo high tension lines, the S.A. - Maputo rail­ way and the S.A. - Maputo road ... he will later ask Renamo not to attack these targets ..."[127]

This is a partial enumeration of violations to the agreement which is decisive for peace in Southern Africa, and for peaceful co-existence between Mozambique and South Africa. More than a violation of the Nkomati Accord, these documents reveal a decision, at least by some, not to observe it. Above all it shows the divisions - in respect of honouring Nkomati Agreement - among the politicians and the military in South Africa. It suggests a state within a state, as was mentioned in the documents "... the meeting with the General settled the arms supplies ... but only the South African military have this strength ... while Pik

Botha the Foreign Minister is pressurising the South African politicians to abandon Renamo ... he is func-

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tioning as if he was a narlc for the Soviet Union ... And it seems to be generalised because they are also going to abandon UNITA and give independence to SWAPO ..."[128] Also we are (S.A.) "... soldiers will continue to give support without the consent of our politicians in massive numbers so as to win the war

..."[129] Moreover, the General warned the MNR "... not to be fooled by the schemes of Pik Botha because

1. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 11 Sept.ember 1984.
2. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 12 Sept.ember 1984.
3. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 13 Sept.ember 1984.
4. *lbid.,Notebook-2,*Extracts, 26 May 1985.
5. *Ibid., Desk Diary,* Extracts, 7 February 1984.
6. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 23 February 1984. Also see, Extracts for 14 August 1984 (above).

he is a traitor ..."[130] It is for this reason that we are reviewing the various documents which demonstrate violation of the formal agreement, and continuous support for the 11NR by the South African military because,

" ... they [South Africa] never saw it [Nkomati] in the same sort

of light as Mozambique did. I think Mozambique saw it as a treaty which was governed by the principles of international law to establish peaceful co-existence. And I think the Pretoria regime always saw it as a mere tactical device, that it would be useful to sign it as a non-aggression factor of this nature because of the possibilities it offered in terms of gaining through economic levers; the possibilities perhaps of brokery in some kind of negotiated political settlement for the bandits; the possible influence it had

in terms of the other regional states and in terms of the possibility to break out of the international isolation. So I think they saw it as a tactical advantage in all these sorts [of ways], but they were not basically then to abandon - they keep a trump card which was destabilisation just for the potentiality. I think that basically the price of abandoning the destabilisation was ... underlined in some

parts of the Gorongosa documents was basically the achievement of some kind of coalition government in Mozambique which had basically been led by FRELIMO - because the international recognition and so on would have been necessary but which would have included a major component of

the 11NR bandits and would have acted as a guarantor that the Mozambique government would never challenge any of South African regional objectives.

So I think basically they were never going to abandon destabilisation

even when they signed the Accord, they had no intention of doing so."[131]

To this end the love story between the two, indeed, it has to be explained by one of them. In the words of General Viljoen:

"... I agree with a joint strategy for putting Machel out Because we want to remove the Russians from our region of

Southern Africa, we have to employ a joint strategy to be able to 7

defeat communism we want Renamo to win the war to remove the

communists from the area. The USA has its way to fighting the Russian, like South African politicians too, who have

their way of fighting the Russians. During the negotiations we must begin with strong propaganda. For this we

have to keep the negotiations going for some time, we must never accept first time ... our guarantee until the final victory "[132)

General Van Der Westhuisen expressed the same feelings in saying:

1. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 9 September 1984.
2. Personal Interview, Davies, *op. cit..*
3. *Gorongosa Documents- Desk Diary,* Extracts, IO September 1984.

"... [We] are always side by side with Renamo and that we shall study and work together, since our common purpose is to rid

Southern Africa of communism both militarily and politically ..."[133]

At a news conference in Pretoria on 18 September, as a reaction to the documents, the South African Foreign Minister admitted that there bad been continued contacts between the South Africans and the 11NR after signing Nk:omati Agreement, but claimed that they represented only "technical" violations of the Accord. The Minister also characterized the arms supply to the MNR as being "mostly humanitarian aid".[134] President P.W. Botha publicly gave General Viljoen bis total support, "... whatever you say of him [Viljoen], you can surely say that he is an honourable and brave officer ... I believe General Viljoen and no communist attempt to discredit him or the deputy Foreign Minister Louis Nel will succeed ..."[135] As a result of the Gorongosa scandal, therefore, General Viljoen retired as army chief. Louis Nel was removed as Foreign Affairs Deputy to new post of Deputy Minister in charge of the state president's infor­ mation bureau. General Van Der Westhuisen was moved from SAMI as the Chief of Military Intelligence to the powerful post of Secretary of the State Security Council (SSC). Lieutenant General Andre Lieben­ berg, bead of SADF Special Forces, was promoted to army commander.[136]

In sum, that there were contradictions between some politicians and some soldiers over Nkomati, is beyond dispute. However, the South African government must be held responsible for the actions of its army, because it is a very serious matter when armies do not follow the orders of their governments. Gorongosa gave the diplomatic initiative back to Mozambique, leaving South Africa in the dock.

In the final analysis, the significance of the Nkomati Accord lies in its ragional political implications. This chapter bas endeavoured to show that the Nkomati Agreement was an important document among states in Southern Africa. Maputo and Pretoria had realised that confrontation was not in the best interest of the two countries. As Machel asked the South African:

1. *Ibid.,* Extracts, 4 September 1984.
2. *Africa Research Bulletin,* London, vol. 22, no. 9, 15 October 1985.
3. *Financial Mail,* Johannesburg, 4 October 1985.
4. Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, *Des/mctive Engagement: Southern Africa al War,* Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986, p.39.

"... we do not want Southern Africa, and our two countries to be turned into a theatre for a generalised conflict ..."[137]

P.W. Botha answer was:

"... we have signalled to the world our belief that states with difference socio-economic and political systems can live together in peace and harmony, and work together in pursuit of common interests ..."[138]

It must be concluded that both counties have intended to enter into a long term arrangement that could only be altered by mutual consent.

*The Times* had this to say about the agreement It was, in their view "a striking proof of the efficacy of South Africa's strong-arm diplomacy, which assumes that every black government, however much it may abhor apartheid, has a price for swallowing its pride. And that is a strikingly accurate point. Destabili­ zation did bring Maputo to Nkomati.".[139] But that is to get ahead of the story. The aftermath of Nkomati, the 'road from it', so to speak, forms the subject of the next chapter. Chapter six will deal with the reac­ tions to the Accords by Front Line/SADCC states, and the rest of the world.

1. *Speech by His Excellency.Marshal Samora Moises Machel,* President of the People's Republic of Mozambique, on the occa­ sion of the signing of the Accord of Nkomati, 16 March 1984. See Appendix 2.
2. *Speech by Ille Hon. P.W. Bolha,* Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, on the occasion of the signing of the Accord ofNkomati, 16 March 1984. See Appendix 3.
3. *The Times,* London, 16 March 1984.

# CHAPTER SIX

# NKOMATI; REASONS AND REACTIONS

In Chapters Four and Five, we traced the road to Nkomati, the events leading up to its occurrence. In this chapter, the focus will be first on the reasons behind what each of the parties, the RSA on the one hand and President Machel and his FRELIMO party on the other, hoped to realize from the agreement. As we shall see, both sides were confronted with a domestic political problem, almost at once after the Accord, and with the necessity of justifying their action to their own constituents. Neither in Maputo nor in Pretoria were the Accords greeted with universal enthusiasm. Both Botha and Machel bad their reasons. Moreover, the reactions beyond the two countries and their peoples were interesting. As a stone cast into the midst of a pond sets off a series of ripples, moving outward from the point of contact, so Nkomati was received with varying degrees of shock, dismay, apathy, or enthusiasm, beginning with the Front Line States, SADCC

and moving outward to other parts of Africa, to Western Europe and the United States and to Moscow and

the Communist world.

## The Pretoria Strategy

The policy of destabilization was not without its costs. The price of the military support provided to the MNR was substantial, both in terms of funds and manpower, not to mention the disapproval widely expressed in European and American circles. But the pinch was larger than that, The longstanding arrangement for migrant Mozambican labour in South Africa, dating back *t6* 1897, was in jeopardy and threatening the loss of "the largest single group of migrant labourers in South Africa with a total of about 60,000" an arrangement the continuation of which was in the interest of both parties. Some 50,000 Mozambicans were employed in mines, mostly in the Transvaal, earning an income in 1983 of some R

150.7 million. And some 4,600 Mozambicans were employed in the agricultural sector. Under this arrangement, "South Africa is assured of a well-trained, stable Mozambican labour force which makes a valuable contribution to the economy" ... and "Mozambican workers, employed by farmers in the Lowveld, make a very substantial contribution to agriculture in this region". *[1]*

[!] The Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, *Strategic Review,* March 1984.

The ISS (Institute for Strategic Studies) at Pretoria also pointed out that there are further economic advantages to South Africa in peaceful coexistence with Mozambique despite "differing political ideolo­ gies". The figures for 1977 show South African exports to Mozambique in the amount of fifty-one million Rands, or almost twenty per cent of total Mozambican imports; by 1983, for the eleven months from Janu­ ary 1 to November 30, the exports from RSA to Mozambique totalled one hundred and eight million Rand, while South Africa imported from Mozambican products to the tune of sixteen million. The port of Maputo, it was also pointed out, "is the cl sest outlet to the sea for the PWV-area and is used extensively by the RSA for the exports of the bulk of the citrus fruit in the Lowveld and certain minerals". [2]

The hydro-electric power provided by the Cabora Bassa project has generally been cheaper than that available from South African coal-fired power stations, benefitting the South African consumer. Such argu­ ments were persuasive to the South African business and financial interests, but the super patriots of the extreme right wing required other reasons for abandoning the destabilization policies which had been work­ ing so well. To them the response was that Nkomati and the earlier secret accord with Swaziland was sim­ ply a matter of "coming to terms with Southern African realities". The Botha government pointed out that the confrontation policy had resulted only "in grim harvests of self-destruction ... Southern Africa has become an arena of Super power struggle ... The clear implication was that the West would have to become more actively involved in Southern Africa in a role supportive of the moderates. That implication gave birth to the policy of constructive engagement". [3] The United States, through Mr. Crocker, the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, was applying pressure on Pretoria to abandon its destabilization policy for one of "constructive engagement" as one seen as more effective in countering the activities of the Soviet Union, operating through Cuba, and China in the region. The primary motive for Pretoria to come to the peace table was international, though it also bad strong domestic economic reasons for doing so.

Among their strong domestic pressures at work, as Finance Minister Owen Harwood stated, South Africa was caught "in one of the most difficult phases since the Great Depression" and was hoping for greater access to markets for its surplus industrial products in Mozambique and other neighbouring coun-

1. *Ibid..*
2. Cited in Colin Legum, "The Continuing Crisis in Southern Africa", *Africa Contemporary Record,* 1983-84, Vol.#16, p-A.20.

tries, entry into which required the use of Mozambican rail and sea facilities. "Pretoria probably also hoped to curb Mozambique's vocal support for the liberation of South Africa itself." [4] South Africa's leading transnational corporations enthusiastically endorsed the Accord. Some of the top officials attended the signing ceremonies to give visible evidence of their endorsement Among these were Harry Oppenheimer and Gaven Reilly of the Anglo American Group, Donald Gordon of Standard Bank, and John Maree of the Barlow Rand Group. The Accord produced a record upward leap on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Lonrho, the largest finance house not engaged in mining in South Africa, sponsored a television show showing the advantages of the Accord. \_Prime Minister Botha waxed lyrical: "I have a vision of the nations of southern Africa working together in every field of human endeavor ... a veritable constellation of states". [5]

## The Strategy of Machel

The President of Mozambique encountered far greater criticism both at home and abroad for his par­ ticipation in Nkomati than did Prime Minister Botha.

"Everybody in the region was anxious ... I do not know of anybody [FLS] in the region who was happy by the Nkomati Accord ..."[6]

Machel was accused of "selling out" the Mozambican Revolution, of caving in to the white man's pressure and abandoning the larger cause of African independence from colonialism. Many of his fellow country­ men attacked their President for his surrender. What his fellow citizens and neighbours, both in the Front Line States and in the wider SADCC, failed to take into account was the reality of the situation, which for Machel was inescapable. To continue the open hostilities with Pretoria was to deprive his country's econ­ omy of indispensable revenues: from the migrant workers in the South African mines and farms, from com­ merce and trade, both exports and imports and from the transport of South African goods over the rails and through the seaports of Mozambique. The potential income from the Cabora Bassa project was imperiled. Add to these economic realities the ravages on economic targets being wreaked by the :MNR. forces across

1. Ann Seidman, *The Roots of Crisis in Southern Africa,* Trenton, African World Press, N.J., 1985, p.131.

(5] *Speech by the Hon. P.W. Botha,* Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, on the occasion of the signing of the Accord of Nkomati, 16 March I984. See Appendix. 3.

1. *Personal lnterl'iew,* Dr. Mwesiga Barcgu, University of Dar es Salaam, Dar cs Salaam, Tanzania, 8 April 1988.

broad areas of the land, guerilla raids impossible for the national security forces to halt, and the damage wrought by natural forces of drought and crop failures, spreading serious malnutrition and slow starvation among the citizenry. One alternative, of course, was to tum to the Soviet Union for assistance, but Machel knew that there was always a price tag attached to such beneficence, a tag that seriously curtailed national independence.

In his address following the Nkomati Accord on 16 March, 1984, Machel skillfully defended his actions. Although members of the ANC were in fact sheltered in Mozambique, the damage they were able to inflict on South Africa across the national borders was in fact minimal, whereas the MNR was doing seri­ ous injury to the Mozambican people and economy. "We have undertaken", said Machel, "not to launch any aggressive actions of any sort against one another, and we have created conditions for the establish­ ment, with honour and dignity, of a new phase of stability and security on our common borders". [7] What sorts of "aggressive actions" were being launched from Mozambique into South Africa? Who stood to gain more from a discontinuance of such actions? Article Two, section 3 of the Agreement says that neither party shall "in any way assist the armed forces of any state or group of states deployed against the territorial sovereignty or political independence of the other".[8] So Mozambique was seen in some quarters as aban­ doning the ANC and its efforts to weaken the Pretoria regime. But how effective were ANC efforts ori­ ginating in Maputo, especially in comparison to those of the MNR, which were clearly aided and abetted by South Africa? And Machel did succeed in gaining agreement to allow a token ANC force to continue in existence in Maputo.

Further, Machel specifically stated in the address already cited, "We recognize that the conditions of economic dependence are not conducive to stability and harmonious progress. For this reason our state rejects any type of relationship that might in any way limit its independence or make it economically dependent on any other country". [9] This spoke directly to South African opposition to SADCC and its efforts to increase the economic independence of its member states thus, lowering the level of South Afri-

1. *Speech by His Excellency, Marshal Samora Moises Machel,* President of the People's Republic of Mozambique, on the occa­ sion of the signing of the Accord of Nkomati, 16 March 1984. See Appendix 2.
2. *Nkomati Accord,* Article 2, section 3. See Appendix No.I. (9] Speech by President Samora Machel, *op. cit.,* 16 March 1984.

can economic domination of the region. "We shall bring an end to fighting and sabotage", said Machel, "but we shall not become subservient". He called for "ways of developing resources, infrastructures and circwnstances which, being part of the experience of our relations, are likely to bring reciprocal advantages and benefits on the basis of equality." [10] He went on to deny that SADCC had been created *as* a threat to South Africa. "Its central objective is to eliminate hunger, wretchedness, and illiteracy and to improve the standard of living of the peoples of the region. Its member states refuse economic dependence on South Africa as on any other country". [11]

Returning to Maputo following the signing ceremonies, President Machel gave a major address to his countrymen at a ceremony on April 5, marking the Nkomati Accord He pointed out to them that the government would keep its powder dry, building its armed forces for self defense, but, he said, "In peace we can buy more machines and tools for our workshops and fewer cannons, more ploughs, hoes and axes, in order to increase production, and fewer rifles." [12] The majority of the country's slender resources, he said, could be used to fight against hunger, lack of clothes, ignorance and disease, instead of weapons and ammunition. He acknowledged that the country had emerged from the fight "with deep wounds" but insisted that the Accord represented a victory for "our socialist policy of peace". [13] Machel was engaging in some wishful thinking when he observed that South Africa, in signing the Accord, "recognized the absence of any political opposition in our country". [14] He sought to advance the idea that the work of the 1VINR was exclusively South African, without support from any Mozambiqueans, which was not the case,

as subsequent events were to demonstrate. How effective these indigenous centres of discontent would

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have been without support from Pretoria is another matter, but the anti-FRELIMO forces were not without their indigenous participants, as Machel must have known but chose to gloss over in his official address. He called the South African policy of destabilization a failure, boasting that "it did not have the looked-for results. The political objectives for which South Africa bad launched this was were not reached". [15] That

[!OJ *Ibid ..*

[II] *lbid..*

1. Speech by President Samora Machel at a special ceremony in Maputo to commemorate Nkomati Accord, *Mo:ambique Infor- mation Agency (AIM),* Bulletin, No. 94, April 1984.
2. *Ibid ..*
3. *Ibid..*
4. *Ibid..*

of course raises the question as to what those objectives in fact were. It does not appear that Pretoria was under any illusion that it could overthrow the FRELIMO regime. It was content to keep it chronically des­ tabilized, and in that respect it enjoyed a large measure of success.

Further wishful thinking emerged in the President's remarks when he declared that "the Mozambican anned forces [FPLM] are more experienced and stronger than ever. They are a secure bulwark in the defense of the country and the revolution". [16] The future was to show that those forces were still unable to cope effectively with the continued MNR activities. Machel evidently was under no illusion that the guerilla activities would cease at once, despite the Accord. He knew that Maputo would have to deal for some time with what was called the 'pipe-line effect'. Even if South Africa ended all its support at once, which of course it did not, there would still be a residue of arms and ammunition, food and supplies remain­ ing in the 'pipe-line' which the MNR would use up. But Machel gave every indication of believing that once that source was dried up, then the :MNR would be forced to give up its activities. Therein he was naive, as would soon become apparent.

He was not naive, however, when faced with mounting pressure from the United States to enter into negotiations with South Africa. His country was plagued with drought, severe food shortages and the actual starvation of multitudes. The United States, through Assistant Secretary Crocker, announced that it was "responding to Mozambique's desperate economic situation with food aid" [17] while at the same time encouraging "bilateral talks between Mozambique and South Africa ... [and] sent an Ambassador to Maputo

to help foster this fragile dialogue between our two states". [18] The U.S,. did in fact sharply increase its supply of food, but not until the FRELIMO government had agreed to negotiate a non-aggression pact with

South Africa. In 1983, the U.S. provided almost ten million dollars worth of food to Mozambique, includ- ing transportation costs, and in 1984 after the Nkomati signing, the Congress lifted its earlier ban on development assistance to Maputo and initially allocated half a million dollars to that purpose. [19] In 1985, project food aid increased to over twenty-five million dollars. That factor alone provides a powerful

1. *Ibid..*
2. Chester Crocker, "Reagan Administration's Africa, Policy: A Progress Report", *Fourth Annual Conference on International Affairs, U.S. -Africa Relations Since 1960,* University of Kansas, 10 November 1983.
3. *Ibid..*

[ I 9] *International Herald Tribune,* Paris, 13 June, 1984.

incentive for a government to accede to pressure (see table 2).

Table 2

U.S. Aid to Mozambique 1976-1987 (Millions of U.S. Dollars)

| Year | Loans | Grants Aid | Development Aid | Military | Total |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1976 | - | 0.8 | 11.9 | - | 12.7 |
| 1977 | - | 5.2 | - | - | 5.2 |
| 1978 | - | 8.4 | - | - | 8.4 |
| 1979 | 4.8 | 12.0 | - | - | 16.8 |
| 1980 | 9.0 | 9.9 | - | - | 18.9 |
| 1981 | 4.8 | 3.9 | - | - | 8.7 |
| 1982 | - | .6 | - | - | .6 |
| 1983 | - | 9.7 | - | - | 9.7 |
| 1984 | - | 33.5 | - | - | 33.5\* |
| 1985 | - | 12 | 31.5 | 1.1 | 44.6 |
| 1986 | - | - | - | - | - |
| 1987 | - | 10.0 | 75.0 | - | 85.0 |

Source: United States, AID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, 1976-1984 Volumes. For 1985 Figures cited in, Lee Cokorinos and James H. Mittelman, "Reagan and the Pax-Afrikaana", *The Journal of Modern Afri­ can Studies,* Cambridge, vol. 23, no. 4, 1985, p.569. Also see, "U.S. Aid for Marxist Mozambique", in, *Christian Science Monitor,* Boston, 14 January 1985. The Administration's request for military aid was subsequently denied because of stiff pressure from conservative Republicans in the Senate. 1987 Figures cited in, Robert G. Mugabe, "Struggle for Southern Africa", *Foreign Affairs,* vol. 66, no. 2, 1987, p.321.

\* In 1984 Mozambique was the largest recipient of United States food aid.

Other Western governments and transnational banks supported the American pressure by "refusing to

grant credit to Mozambique until its government agreed to a comprehensive p,ackage including joining the IMF and negotiating a settlement with South Africa". [20] The National Planning Commission issued a

report in 1984 to show what price Mozambique had paid since its independence: the costs associated with the U.N. sponsored boycott of the Smith regime in Rhodesia - S556 million; the effects of South African destabilization - $3,796,000,000; damage from floods and droughts - $383 million; and the effect of increased oil prices following 1975 - $819 million; totalling over five and a half billion dollars. [21] This constituted another powerful incentive to reach for stability and peace.

1. Seidman, op. cit, p.131. See also, Joseph Hanlon, *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire,* London: Zed Press, 1984.
2. People's Republic of Mozambique, *Economic Report,* National Planning Commission, Maputo, 1984.

"Operating from its Transvaal bases and with close SADF support in planning and logistics, RENAMO had penetrated almost all of Mozambique's ten provinces by late 1983. Its estimated 5000 - 8000 guerillas operated in groups of 100 or so to carry out traditional guerilla tactics: sabotaging railways and pipelines; attacking isolated villages, and remote police posts; and killing and kidnapping villagers. By the end of 1983 they had succeeded in removing large areas of Mozambique's far-flung territory - more than 1,000 miles separates the northern and southern borders - from any vestige of government control. Further, as Machel himself later acknowledged, poverty, unemployment and ignorance were leading many young Mozambicans to join the *ranks* of the well-paid and well-fed RENAMO". [22]

It was not only the military destruction wrought by the MNR but also by the South African Defence Force itself, against which the Mozambican defence forces found themselves ineffective. The SADF had carried out ground and air attacks against suspected ANC-occupied areas three times since 1981, the latest in October of 1983. This was despite the fact that the ANC specifically denied any military actions based in Mozambique. In a communique issued from ANC headquarters, it was declared that "Sensitive to matters of security for the People's Republic of Mozambique, we did not ask for and have never had train­ ing camps on Mozambican territory. The apartheid regime cannot name a single ANC cadres who has ever crossed into South Africa at any point on the long Mozambique-South African border. The ANC has honoured the agreement reached with the FRELJMO leadership that this border should not be used for crossing either cadres or materials". (23) But peace with Pretoria would presumably bring an end to SADF attacks on Mozambique, and it was this also which Machel earnestly sought.

Machel and FRELIMO had looked for help in resisting these attacks but with little effect A visit by Soviet cruisers following the 1983 SADF raid on Maputo was seen in Pretoria as an empty gesture, offering no real threat. [24) The food crisis was gaining some response from the United States and the United Nations, but it was clear to all concerned that no progress could be made in rebuilding the Mozambican economy until and unless the destructive military attacks were halted. Only South Africa was in a position

1. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa and its Neighbours: The Dynamics of Regional Conflict", *Adelphi Papers,* No. 209, London, The Institute for International Strategic Studies, 1986, p.27.
2. *Solidan"ty News Service* (Botswana), *5* September 1984. See also, *AIM,* 15 September 1984; and, Seidman, *op.cit.,* p.l::?9.
3. *SABC,* 29 November 1983, cited in Legum, *op. cit.,* 1983-84.

to halt its own attacks (at the minimum price of Mozambican promises to suspend support of the ANC) and to put a restraining band on the 11:NR.

Machel was thus faced with a dilemma with only one possible solution. He could continue to join with the other Front Line States and SADCC in empty rhetoric, proclaiming economic and political independence, opposition to apartheid and the regime in Pretoria, which pleased the Soviets and their inter­ national friends and allies as well as most of the other African states. But all of these were either unable or unwilling to provide any realistic assistance to Mozambique in solving its overwhelming problems: economic, political, social and military. Moreover, most Eastern Bloc foreign aid is in the form of barter agreements. This limits its visibility, but such agreements can provide important services at a low cost One example is the PESCOM, the joint Mozambican and Soviet fishing company. Mozambique adminis­ ters the company and provides existing facilities. In exchange the Soviet Union provides ships and crews. The Soviet Union takes expensive fish, while leaving Mozambique with cheaper varieties, which are nonetheless an abundant and popular source of protein. This constitutes a large, effective subsidy of the Mozambican economy.[25]

The Eastern Bloc cannot provide Mozambique with one thing it desperately requires: capital. In an effort to avoid the deflationary policies of western financial institutions, Mozambique attempted - several times and the last one in 1983 - to join COMECON, the socialist multinational economic body. However, its application was rejected because Mozambique's growth was too slow. [26] However, the United States

1. People's Republic of Mozambique, Centro de Informacao e Tourismo, "Fishing Industry C&ated to Local Consumption", *Noti­ cias de Mozambique,* Maputo, *5* May 19S4, p.3, from the Joint Publication Research Service, Sub-Saharan Africa Report, 84, No.113 (1984), pp.63-64.

[26) *Personal and confidential conversation with senior diplomat,* Maputo, April 1988. Despite this, I could not find any source to support this argument. However, from the historical background of Mozambique, it could be believable. Moreover, since that date the Soviet lost or weakened their influence and control over its allies in the region for different reasons. First, "suspicion of Soviet motives on the part of almost all African politicians is at least as deep as suspicion of Western motives. Secondly, the Soviet bloc has been manifestly incapable of providing the economic assistance so badly needed by Angola and Mozambique and both have been turning for this increasingly to the West. Thirdly, the Soviet bloc has no monopoly on the supply of mili­ tary equipment or advice and recently Mozambique has accepted military advisers from Britain and Portugal. Fourthly, it does not have a monopoly on the supply of troops for internal security, Mozambique, for example, whose need in this respect is par­ ticularly urgent in view of the extensive activities of the South African backed MNR, has since July 1985 come to rely increas­ ingly on the large and well-trained Zimbabwe army plus small complement of Tanzanian troops, especially for defence of the vital Beira Corridor, following an agreement of December 1986, defence of the Nacala route by the Chissano government is to be assisted by troops from Malawi. Fifthly, the Soviet Union cannot marshal military and economic power in the region com­ parable lo that of South Africa. And finally, it has no influence over the South African government nor even (since 1956) for­ mal diplomatic relations with it, consequently, it cannot plausibly offer to put pressure on Pretoria in the interests of any of its clients". For more details see: John D. Brewer (ed.), *Can South Africa Survive?,* MacMillan Press, London, 1989, pp.9-34. Also sec, Jaster, 'South Africa and its Neighbours', op.cit., p.72. And sec, President Chissano of Mozambique, speaking at Chatham House, 7 May 1987.

was offering some assistance but insisting on negotiations with Pretoria, and that same price tag was attached to financial assistance available from the IMF and the World Bank. Only from Pretoria itself could any realistic relief be expected, and Machel responded to pressures from Washington by asking if the U.S. would take the initiative in probing Pretoria on the possibility of negotiations.[27]

There were no illusions that all would be peace and harmony between the two countries, certainly not in Maputo. An editorial in *AIM,* the official FRELIMO publication explained the rationale behind the Accord and justified it as inescapable. But it added to its reminder that "many financial institutions and multinational companies suspended their investments in Mozambique" because of the war situation and that one could now expect those investments to return with the caveat that imperialism, although it failed to des­ troy socialism in Mozambique by military means, "will now try to do so through economic means"[28] A long argument about the necessity and the possibility of the Mozambican people's learning how to resist imperialist exploitation and to manipulate economic factors for their own benefit was followed by the observation, "This is the wider context of the Nkomati Accord, its strategic dimension. Not to understand this, to see in the accord only its tactical aspects, is like refusing to see in the years at the end of one century

the beginnings of the century that is to follow". The editorial concludes by reminding its readers that the

elimination of the bandits will mean rhat the guns will fall silent but that those guns must be always kept at the ready, "since this phase of human development is still marked by war in many regions, and by the defence of peace in many others. To relax the defence of peace would be to abandon everything".[29) Those words can be taken as the strategy of President Machel and his FRELIMO party as they moved into Nkomati and beyond.

Reference has already been made to the disappointed expectations of assistance from Moscow, either in terms of emergency food supplies, which the Soviets could not spare, or economic development funds, or any significant military deterrent to Pretoria's policy of destabilization. Despite the official Marxist­ Leninist ideology of FRELIMO, the benefits of that from the Eastern bloc countries were notably absent. The internal economic problems being faced by Gorbachev - at that time - were such as to require a

1. *The Guardian,* Manchester, 20 July 1984.
2. *AIM,* editorial, Maputo, 9 April 1984
3. *Ibid ..*

substantial reduction in Soviet commitments throughout the Third World. The journal *Foreign Affairs* con­ tains an article on "Gorbachev and the Third World", which points out that "In the economic sphere the message of the recent reassessment is straightforward: concentrate on building the Soviet economy at home and discontinue pouring resources into dubious new Third World adventures ... This means that budget cuts will have to be made in the tier of clients below Cuba and Vietnam - states like Angola, Ethiopia, Syria and India ... The Soviet Union already has a poor reputation among its clients as a source of support for economic development, a factor that played an important role in the tum of countries like Mozambique away from the Soviet Union."[30]

One analysis of the situation in southern Africa sees the entire scenario as a rivahy between the two Super powers and praises Machel for avoiding entanglement in the struggle. "The MNR must ... be seen not just as an instrument used by South Africa to destabilize Mozambique. We should contend that it is first and foremost an instrument in the hands of American imperialism to weaken the revolutionary move­ ment in Southern Africa (just as UNITA in Angola) and to reduce the prospects of Soviet entry into the region".[31] That assessment dovetails with the comment made by Fukuyama, "Should Moscow decide ... to cut current aid levels, the United States and other Western countries would obviously be presented with opportunities to encourage the defection of further clients from the Soviet camp''. [32] Tandon continues his global analysis saying "We would view Nkomati in the framework of superpower conflict in Southern Africa It is to the credit of FRELIMO that instead of soliciting further military intervention from the Soviet Union to counter the threat of i:he MNR, it bas chosen to talk to the South African government. The

alternative of Soviet intrusion would have intensified superpower involvement in Southern Africa and

further compounded the problem. If Nkomati in the long run enables FRELIMO to neutralize the MNR and to resolve the secondary contradictions with its people through political means, then it will have justified itself'. [33]

1. Francis Fukuyama, "Gorbachev and the Third World", *Foreign Affairs,* Spring 1986, p,725,
2. Yash Tandon, "Africa within the Context of Global Superpower Struggle", in *Africa: Perspectives on Peace and Development,*

edited by Emanuel Hansen, London, United Nations University, 1987, p.40.

1. Fukuyama, *op.cit.•*
2. Tandon, *op.cit.,* p.41.

Whether such an analysis played a role in Machel's strategy leading to Nk:omati is a matter of specu­ lation. He may have indeed seen the situation in such a light, or he may simply have detennined that to expect any substantive assistance from Moscow was a vain hope. He knew that some assistance was avail­ able from the United States and from Western financial institutions, and he also knew that the price for such aid was to negotiate with Pretoria. Certainly there is no evidence that Machel lost faith in socialism as the ultimate answer to bis country's problems. On the contrary, be demonstrated repeatedly bis determination to prove bow erroneous were the capitalist ·critics, whether in South Africa or elsewhere, who kept pointing to Mozambique as an example of the incapacity of socialism to cope with economic problems. If Soviet assistance had been available, the likelihood is that be would have sought and accepted it! His strategy, among other things, sought to insure a diversity of sources of economic growth so that Mozambique could escape its long dependence on South Africa. That was the rationale behind the formation of SADCC, to which Machel pledged continued allegiance even in bis speech at Nk:omati itself. [See Appendix 2].

## Reactions to Nkomti within Mozambique

On April 24, the People's Assembly ratified by acclamation the Nkomati Accord. Foreign Affairs Minister Joaquim Chissano presented the resolution, calling the agreement a victory for Mozambique. He insisted that the eyes of the leadership were wide open and that all consequences bad been thought through with the greatest of care.[34] His speech directed attention to the internal opposition, which obviously came

most vocally from the radical left within FRELIMO. He referred to the "ultra-left myopic revolutionaries",

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saying "they don't hesitate in asking us to die so that they can applaud us as heroes". [35] Deputy Defence Minister Sergio Vieira, in bis remarks to the Assembly, shed further light on the opposition, likening them to the Bolsheviks who "in the name of the revolution always opposed the concrete struggle for peace". [36] Karl Kautsky had expressed approval of the imperialist war of 1914-18, and Trotsky had opposed the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. "To be a revolutionary, a democrat, a communist in the Africa of 1984", be asserted,

1. *AIM,* Maputo, 24 April 1984.
2. Joaquim Alberto Chissano, speech to the 12th Session of the People's Assembly, *AIM,* Maputo, 24 April 1984.

[36) Speech by Defence Deputy Minister, Col. Sergio Vieira, to the 12th Session of the People's Assembly, *AIM,* Maputo, 24 April 1984.

"demands the defense and consolidation of Africa's socialist revolutions. The touchstone of international- ism in Africa today is the concrete attitude taken toward the first liberated zones on the continent". The strategy must be to compel the anti-communists to coexist with socialist states. The Accord is therefore a "basic part of our struggle for peace and socialism, and an integral part of the global strategy to remove from Africa and from the world the horrors of war and of nuclear catastrophe". [37] The FRELIMO leader­ ship saw in their own differences a reflection of the controversy between Trotsky, who opposed concessions to the capitalist world and Stalin, who saw the task as building a strong socialist state as the first priority. The 'Trotskyites' within FRELIMO did not prevail. The Accord was approved by acclamation, in the pres­ ence of Moses Mabbida, a member of the Executive Committee of the ANC and General Secretary of the South African Communist Party. [38]

That the opposition from the radical left in FRELIMO was not altogether silenced was clear within a matter of months. Three ministers of Machel's cabinet, characterized by the correspondent of *The Econom­ ist* as "too pro-Soviet", were removed; Lieutenant General Guebuza, the interior minister in charge of the police, Major General Matsinhe, the security minister in charge of the armed forces, and Mr. Lobo, minister for mineral resources were reassigned to positions of lowered power and prestige. "No official reason for the three demotions has been given", [39] commented *The Economist,* but suggested the possibility that these men were being "eased aside" as "those likely to disagree with the decision to deal with South Africa and to seek aid from western Europe". (40] With the local media firmly under government control, the

dissent was effectively smothered and controlled.

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*Africa Now* reports from Maputo the view that FRELIMO leaders regarded the Accord as an unqualified "victory for our policy of peace".(41] The article points out that South Africa was forced to back down on its initial demand·that all elements of the ANC must be expelled from Mozambique. That country "insisted on its right to let whoever it pleased live on its territory", and South Africa's Western

1. *Ibid ..*
2. *Ibid..*
3. *The Economist,* London, 23 June 1984.
4. *Ibid ..*
5. *Africa Now,* London, April 1984.

allies refused to support its hard-line position. There had been some anxiety that Pretoria would present Mozambique with a list of named ANC members to be prevented from entering the country, but this "also turned out to be unfounded and forms no part of the agreement". [42] South Africa also retains the right to allow MNR members to continue to live within its borders, but that did not worry Mozambique "so long as the other conditions of the accord are adhered to - particularly the paragraph which forbids the 'organiza­ tion of irregular forces or armed bands' designed to attack the other signatory. The reference to the MNR is crystal clear: 'armed bands' is a direct translation of the Portuguese *'bandos armadas',* the term which the Mozambique authorities always use to describe the 11:NR". [43] The article describes Mozambique's cries of victory as "exaggerated" but admits "there is no doubt that Mozambique did extract important conces­ sions from South Africa in the course of the negotiations". [44]

If the agreement is implemented, the article continues, "then that will be the end of the MNR", but no one in Maputo expected such an outcome, at least immediately. "The immediate perspective for Mozam­ bique in fact, is not peace, despite the agreement, but intensified warfare, as the army responds to President Machel's instructions to 'clean up the house' ... Machel went to some lengths to explain that the accord was a limited state-to-state affair and did not mean that the social system of apartheid had suddenly become acceptable ... Politically Mozambique and South Africa remained 'antagonistic"'. [45] Interestingly, the article contrasted the effects of the Accord on the ANC and the MNR, referring to the former as "a setback but certainly not a crippling one as the South African press likes to believe. For while an end to South Afri­

can support will cut the ground from under the feet of the MNR, the ANC's e,xistence is not threatened by

the agreement. As the South African regime will find out to its cost in months to come, the ANC draws its main strength from support inside South Africa, rather than from the availability of friendly borders". [46] This obviously reflects the optimism of official Mozambique at two points: the lack of internal support for the MNR and its ultimate disappearance without assistance from Pretoria. Neither of these proved accurate as time went on. But the article is revealing of the state of euphoria that gripped most of the FRELIMO

1. *Ibid ..*
2. *Africa Now,* April 1984.
3. *Ibid..*
4. *Ibid ..*
5. *Ibid..*

leadership immediately after Nkomati.

The *Africa Research Bulletin* carries a claim that "in the weeks before the signing of the security accord ... a large number of MNR guerillas were allowed to infiltrate Mozambique through the Kruger National Park. These 'bandits' are thought to be responsible for the latest rebel activity near Moamba about 70km from Maputo. However, the Mozambican spokesman also said that the accord was having a 'demoralizing effect' on the MNR and that 'defections' from the rebels were increasing, particularly in the centre of the country". [47]

By November of 1984, however, that same journal was carrying accounts of violations of the Nkomati agreement, with extensive quotes from the *Financial Mail* of Johannesburg, critical of the failure of the Pretoria government Some diaries captured in a Mozambican army raid on an MNR base showed clearly that the SADF was continuing to support the guerilla actions, and General Viljoen, Chief of South Africa's armed forces, admitted that "the military willfully and without authority from the Pretoria govern­ ment had flouted the non-aggression pact signed with the government of Mozambique." [48] In March of 1985, an official statement from the government in Maputo referred to this lack of coordination by President Botha, saying, "We have always believed that [he] was a De Gaulle in full control of his own country. But we have now come to realize that he is merely a manager who cannot force through his will".[49]

This reflects a long-standing split in the Pretoria cabinet. President Botha had been Defence Minister under Vorster and had early on been highly militant in supporting the policy f destabilization, but under increasing pressure from the West, he gradually listened to Pik Botha, his Foreign Minister, who had been told in a December, 1983 visit to London and Lisbon that a peaceful resolution in southern Africa was of high priority to the West. [50] "Events such as the 23 May 1983 raid on Maputo reinforced the opinion that a military strategy under the almost exclusive control of the military itself had become unacceptably clumsy

1. *African Research Bulletin,* Exeter, England, 1-30, April 1984.
2. *Africa Research Bulletin,* Exeter, England, Vol.21, No.IO, 14 November 1984, pp.7396-7401. For more details about the vio­ lations of the Nkomati Accord sec: *Financial Mail,* Johannesburg, 26 October 1984; *Guardian,* Manchester, 20 May 1984; *AIM,* 14 December 1984; and *Rand Daily Mail,* Johannesburg, 29 September 1984.
3. *Star International Weekly,* Johannesburg, 18 March 1984.
4. *Africa Confidential,* ISSN, Vol.25, No.2, 18 January 1984.

... So Prime Minister Pieter Botha evidently decided that his civilian foreign policy advisers should be given an opportunity to engage Mozambique diplomatically." [51] What obviously happened, however, was that the left band in Pretoria did not know what the right band was doing, and the military continued to support the MNR unbeknown to the President and his Foreign Minister. And "while the Mozambican government is prepared to give Pretoria officially the benefit of the doubt, accepting the personal sincerity of Mr. Botha in signing Nkomati, there is no hiding of their deep disappointment that it bas failed on funda­ mental aspects". [52] President Machel was quoted as saying, "South Africa is not upholding the Nkomati Accord. I do not know whether they have the capacity to implement it or whether they are unwilling". [53] One adviser to the President told the *Star* reporter that "We are in a most embarrassing situation. Because

critics of Nkomati, who include some of our closest allies [and be might have added some of our own peo­ ple] are now in a position to say, 'We told you that you cannot trust the Afrikaner'. Stressing that Frelimo categorically rejects this analysis and fully accepts Mr. Botha's personal integrity, be added, 'How is it pos­ sible that the extremely efficient and sophisticated South African security machine cannot curb Renamo activities from South Africa? We do not believe that individuals and organizations can support Renamo without the knowledge of the South African government"[54]

The anger of the FRELIMO leadership was especially aroused because "for the first time in 10 years they are forced to seriously consider asking assistance from the Soviet Union - which would seriously reduce its sovereignty ... such a step would destroy one of the major achievements of the Nkomati Accord, the avoidance of an East-West confrontation. For more than a decade it has peen a holy cow of Frelimo foreign policy to refuse Soviet or Cuban assistance."[55] This flare-up led to a meeting in Pretoria in October of 1984 which produced a formal statement from Pile Botha, saying that "an agreement had been reached between representatives of FRELIMO and of Renamo which consisted of four points. Machel was acknowledged as the legitimate President; armed activity and conflict within Mozambique must stop; South Africa's government is 'requested to consider' playing a role in the implementation of the agreement; and a

1. *Ibid ..*
2. *Star International Weekly,* Johannesburg, 18, March 1985,
3. *Ibid ..*
4. *Ibid ..*

(55] *Ibid ..*

commission is established to work toward implementation".[56] Thus Nkomati appeared to be rescued and revived as of October, 1984, and Machel and his colleagues seemed justified in their optimism about the gains made by signing the Accord. The extreme leftists in the government were silenced or replaced so that the official reaction was cautiously hopeful.[57]

Subsequent events were to prove that hope vain. In March of 1985 President Machel "told other African leaders that he now considers the Nkomati non-aggression pact he signed with neighbouring South Africa a failure".[58] This statement was issued at a meeting of the Frontline States leaders in Lusaka. At a previous summit meeting held in December, the Mozambican delegation was still urging "that more time be given for the Nkomati Accord to prove itself, but sources close to the Lusaka meeting said there was now a unanimous view that the agreement was a failure".[59] This was not a new position for other Front Line leaders, as we shall see presently, but it was a new attitude on the part of Machel and the FRELIMO leader­ ship. There was still no direct accusation of involvement by the Pretoria government in continuing to sup­ ply the MNR, but it was stated that Pretoria "is not doing enough to prevent extreme right wing groups from supplying them. Such groups are said to be connected with the large Portuguese population in South Africa, many of whom fled there after the Frelimo government took over at independence in June 1975 ... As far as President Machel is concerned, Nkomati has not fulfilled its promise".[60]

## Reaction in South Africa

The official response of South Africa to Nkomati has been to say to its O}Vn citizens, both its support­ ers and its critics, "what is happening now is proof that destabilization *worked:* that it had a constructive

1. *Africa Research Bulletin,* 'Mozambique: Ceasefire Agreement', Vol.21, No.10, 30 October 1984. After the announcement of the Declaration, the first reaction came from the head of the Mozarnbiquean delegation Maj-Gen Jacinto Veloso who said, the Declaration 'as a basis for peace in Mozambique ... had given 'the kiss of life to the Nkomati Accord'. *AIM,* 3 October 1984. The October Declaration marked the high point of Pretoria's influence. *Rand Daily Mail,* 4 October 1984. "It is in no one's in­ terest that the MNR takes over the government. They have very weak leadership, no clear ideological direction and absolutely no administration. With them in power and Frelirno in opposition, Mozambique will be in greater chaos than ever before. And we will be the first to feel *it". Finandal Mail,* Johannesburg, 30 November 1984. The Agreement known as Pretoria Declara­ tion and October Declaration. For more details see: Colin Legum, *Africa Contemporary Record,* Vol.17, 1984-1985. *West Africa,* London, 15 October 1984, pp.2073-2074.
2. *Africa Research Bulletin,* 30 *October* 1984.
3. *Daily News,* Dar es Salaam, 12 March 1985.
4. *AIM,* Maputo,12 March 1985.
5. *Times of Zambia,* Lusaka, 12 March 1985.

component".[61) The policy of *detente,* supported by liberal circles in the Republic could not succeed, said the government, because "the black states were not well enough motivated to talk to 'racist' South Africa openly. Destabilization helped provide the motivation".[62). Two disclaimers have been strengthened by the Accord: one that Pretoria never had any serious expectation of overthrowing any of its neighbouring regimes; and the other, that its ambitions for economic dominance have been scaled down to more realistic proportions.[63) The *Financial Mail* pointed out that "the initial idea of an extended customs union, with a common development fund administered by the Development Bank of Southern Africa, together with an extension of all the industrialization programmes, was quietly shelved. But that did not prevent the expan­ sion of covert economic links".[64) As Development Bank Chief Executive, Mr. Simon Brand, says, "Southern Africa is not completely unfamiliar with finding ways to overcome political inhibitions to make sound economic arrangements work".[65) Rand Afrikaans University political scientist, Deon Geldeohuys, commented, "South Africa was compelled to scale down its plans for regional cooperation; it was a case of reconciling the desirable with the possible. This has resulted in a much more modest and indeed more real­ istic conception of a favourable regional environment The grandiose scheme for a regional constellation of states has given way to an overriding concern for security."[66)

The main strategic aims illustrated in the Nkomati agreement appeared to be a dual one: to discourage neighbouring states from acting as hosts to guerillas associated with ANC or SWAPO and at the same time to establish regional links that were tight enough to eliminate the spectre of sanctions and disin­

vestment on the part of the financial powers of the West Toward the end of winning friends and funds

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abroad, Prime Minister Botha embarked on his first European visit in June of 1984, where he pointed to the Nkomati Accord as tangible evidence that South Africa was committed to a peaceful resolution of the regional problems. "The tour" said a semi-official SABC broadcast on 15 June, "marked a significant shift in government attitudes on isolating this country, so much so, that European leaders were speaking of their

1. *Africa Research Bulletin,* Vol.21, No.10, Exeter, England, 1-30, October 1984, pp.7396-7401.
2. *Ibid ..*
3. *Ibid..*
4. *Ibid ..*
5. *Ibid ..*
6. *Financial Mail,* Johannesburg, 19 October 1984.

need to maintain a dialogue with it on issues of common concern. That is, of course, partly accounted for by its emergence as a regional power capable of fundamentally influencing the course of events in Southern Africa. But it is also a consequence of the changed priorities in SA' s own foreign policy, and of the events to which the change has given rise".[67] Botha was at pains to impress on his peers in the Western Euro­ pean capitals that Nkomati was a symbol of a new foreign policy based upon regional cooperation and friendship, with Pretoria as the leader of the new coalition. What he sought on his European trip was "to reestablish the pre-1948 Smuts policy of gaining acceptance of SA as an indispensable and reliable ally of the West By ending its isolation in Southern Africa and showing that it is possible, and desirable, for Afri­ can leaders, (even Marxists) to sit down at the same table with SA, it should be possible for Western leaders to do the same, and to acknowledge SA's valuable contribution to heading off anti-Western forces on the continent".[68]

Pretoria consistently took the position that FRELIMO was not a free agent capable of acting without approval, if not direction, from Moscow. Logic and consistency would dictate, therefore, that Machel's decision to come to Nkomati was on orders from the Kremlin, but no such suggestion was forthcoming. All of the substantial volume of favourable publicity on the Accord emanating from Pretoria praised Machel and FRELIMO for their far-sighted statesmanship. Both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Botha outdid themselves in their glowing predictions that the agreement marlced a turning point in regional relations, and all official statements emphasized the government's firm commitment to observation of the agreement. There were admissions of "technical"violations, and there is evideQce of the military operating independently of the President and the Foreign Minister.[69] This is strikingly similar to what happened in Washington when some of the staff of the National Security Council were engaged in the Iran-Contra affair without the knowledge or approval of either the President or the Department of State.

"As Mozambique intensified its charges that RENAMO was still receiving support from South Africa, P.W. Botha and his Foreign Minister feared that Machel was on the verge of renouncing the

1. *Soulh African Broadcast* - *SABC* - Commentary- 15 June 1984, cited in Legum, *op. cil.,* 1983-84, pp.A34-35.
2. Legum, "The Continuing Crisis in Southern Africa", *op.cit.,* 1983-84, p.A34.
3. Sec Chapter Five, Section Three of this thesis, *Violation: Gorongosa Documenls.* See also, Jaster, *op.cil.,* p.30, and *African Research B11lletin,* Vol.22, No.9, 15 October 1985.

Nkomati Accord. Accordingly, South African denials of collusion with RENAMO began to be followed up with action. First, the Foreign Minister approached several countries through which RENAMO was known to be or suspected of receiving clandestine support; Malawi, Saudi Arabia and the Comoro Islands. RENAMO's principal sources of external support, however, appeared to be in Portugal, West Germany and Oman".[70) Meanwhile, P.W. Botha sought internally to find the sources of support for 11:NR. In early February, 1985, there came from Pretoria for the first time an acknowledgement that there were indeed forces inside South Africa that were aiding and abetting 11NR in violation of the Accord. There was no evidence, it was insisted, that any of this emanated from any department of the government.[71) But two weeks later the Foreign Minister stated that the broad investigation conducted by the security forces had uncovered a Mafia type criminal and political syndicate which had been secretly smuggling arms and ammunition to RENAMO with the collaboration of some elements within the SADF and former Mozambi­ cans who were hostile to FRELIMO. Pretoria denied that any high level officers within the SADF were involved, dismissed all the guilty parties and promised to monitor future activities carefully to assure con­ formity to the agreement.[72]

On the positive side, the Pretoria government, together with private South African business interests involved themselves in developing a number of joint economic enterprises with Mozambique. South Africa announced a five and a half million U.S. dollar loan to develop Mozambican rail facilities at the port of Maputo.[73] Further, South Africa agreed to assist Mozambique in securing the power lines emanating

from i:he Cabora Bassa project against MNR attacks.[74] REPMOSA, a consortium of South African busi-

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ness groups, was established in 1984 to promote joint projects in Mozambique, promoting tourism, civil aviation, agriculture, and industry. South African farmers were to develop production of citrus, grapes and maize in a half and half partnership with the Mozambican government.[75] All of this activity can be seen, of course, as further efforts on Pretoria's part to deepen Mozambican economic dependence, but the official

1. Jaster, *op.cit.,* p.31.
2. *Ibid..*

[72] *Ibid.,* p.32.

1. *The Star,* Johannesburg, 20 August 1984.
2. *The Star,* Johannesburg, 13 May 1985.
3. Jaster, *op.cit.•*

posture in South Africa bas been to make considerable efforts to observe Nkomati and to seek to end hostil­ ities and to encourage cooperation between the two countries. Mozambique of course continues to feel that South Africa could do more to restrain RENAMO, but Pretoria consistently insists that it is doing all it can. However, the reaction to Nkomati Accord, have been seen in two different sides in South Africa. Prime Minister P.W. Botha saw the agreement as "... signalling a new course in the history of Southern Africa".[76] As for the importance of the Accord, he said:

"I would like us, together, to build a memorial in this spot where the accord of Nkomati was signed, so that long after we have done, future generations will know that we met here today to charter a new and promising course in the history of our

two countries. Our task now is to return to work, to put our agreement into operation we believe that this agreement

between our two countries can serve as a model for relationships throughout our region."[77]

This declared South Africa's willingness to live in peace and harmony and in pursuit of common interests with its neighbours. A different view came from another circle, which was published in the *Star* newspa­ per, showed the Nkomati agreement as

" a reward for President Machel for nine years of

Marxist incompetence and an illusory alliance with the Soviet Union from now on Machel toes South Africa's

line on everything from trade to suppression of the African National Congress or face the downfall of bis government at the hand of the Mozambique National Resistance guerrillas." [78]

Archbishop Denis Hurley of Durban noted that:

"Nkomati Accord could not bring peace in South Africa because

it left apartheid untouched".[79]

Even, within South Africa the black political reactions were divided over the Nkomati Accord. While Homeland leaders like Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of KwaZulu and the Inkatha movement, and Prime Minister George Matanzima of Transkei pleaded for understanding of the pressures that had led President Machel to

1. *Speech by the Hon. P.W. Botha,* Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, on the occasion of the signing of the Accord ofNkomati, 16 March 1984. Sec Appendix. 3.
2. *Ibid..*
3. *The Star,* Johannesburg, 26 March 1984.
4. *Africa Now,* No.35, March 1984, p.37.

enter into the agreement with Pretoria, the urban political leaders were generally angry and felt badly let down,[80] both because of the effects it would have on the ANC and because of the appearance of success it gave to Pretoria's coercive diplomacy. Dr Nthato Motlana, Chairman of the Committee of Ten and the Soweto Civic Association, described the signing of the Nkomati Accord as "a day of mourning and of utter humiliation for President Machel". He said "the fundamental issue in South Africa was that of white rulers oppressing the black majority, therefore, the Accord was a meaningless gesture".[81] Saths Cooper, one of the leaders of the National Forum, who had been imprisoned for organizing a demonstration welcoming Mozambique's independence, said, "I didn't serve six years for the sake of the Nkomati Accord".[82]

Reverend Allan Boesak, (the President of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches and the leader of UDF) said, "the Nkomati Accord is a peace which has come out of the barrel of a gun. People must not blame us if we cannot understand how South Africa can set itself up as a peacemaker in the region when it remains the creator of destruction at home. While South Africa makes peace with Mozambique, our leaders still languish in prison, black people are still being forcibly removed from home and thrown into those con­ centration camps which are euphemistically called 'resettlement areas', and people here are still being banned and detained without trial. No matter how many agreements the government makes, or how well it subjects the Frontline States to its will, the people of South Africa will not give up the struggle for demo­ cracy, freedom and human dignity. No matter how many pacts are signed, the final deal must be made with us".[83]

Reaction of the African National Congress

One of the forces to be considered within South Africa itself is the ANC, which of course has exiled members operating throughout the region. After Nkomati, the reaction was swift. "The racists" (i.e. the Pretoria government) "believe that the proximity of the independent African states is the root cause of the escalation of the revolution. Therefore they seek as a reciprocal condition that the independent states

1. *Rand Daily Mail,* Johannesburg, 19 April 1984.

[8!] *Ibid ..*

(82] *International Herald Tribune,* Paris, 14 June 1984.

(83] *The Star,* Johannesburg, 24 April 1984

should deny the ANC bases from which to organize incursions into South Africa. But the South African revolution is growing internally, which by any stretch of the imagination cannot be attributed to the existence of the ANC in neighbouring African independent states."[84] In an official statement issued from Lusaka on 16 March, 1984, the National Executive Committee of the ANC summarized the major objec­ tives of the South African diplomatic offensive leading to Lusaka and Nkomati as follows:

"To isolate the ANC throughout southern Africa and to compel the independent countries to act as Pretoria's agents in emasculating the ANC as the vanguard movement of the South African struggle for national liberation.

To liquidate the armed struggle for liberation in South Africa.

To gain new bridgeheads for the Pretoria regime in its efforts

to undermine the unity of the Frontier States, destroy the SADCC and replace it with a so-called constellation of states and thus

to transform the independent countries of southern African into its client states and

To use the prestige of the Frontline States in the campaign of the white minority regime to reduce the international isolation of apartheid South Africa and to lend legitimacy to its colonial and fascist state".[85] [see Appendix 4]

The statement continued by characterizing the intent of the Botha regime as seeking to reduce the indepen- dent states to the level of bantustans. The accords, including Nkomati, were "concluded with a regime which has no moral or legal right to govern our country" and can only contribute to a perpetuation of its illegitimate rule. In a conciliatory spirit, the statement expresses the ANC's understanding of the "enor­ mous political, economic and security problems that confront many of the peoples of our region". The

blame for this lies at the door of Pretoria, a regime "dripping from head to foot with the blood of the

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thousands of people it has murdered which "cannot be an architect of justice and peace in our region". The

Reagan Administration and its policy of 'constructive engagement' is also condemned.[86]

The principal task of the ANC, therefore, was to "intensity our political and military offensive inside South Africa", calling upon all to join in the goal which was to overthrow the white regime, "the seizure of power by the people and the uprooting by these victorious masses of the entire apartheid system of colonial and racist domination, fascist tyranny, the superexploitation of the black majority and imperialist aggres-

1. *Times of Zambia,* Lusaka, 7 April 1984.
2. *Re.•iew of African Political Economy,* No. 27, July 1984, p.147.

[86] *Ibid.,* p.148.

sion and expansionism". The statement concluded that ''This question will be and is being settled, in strug­ gle, within the boundaries of our country and nowhere else".[87]

So the major reaction of the ANC to Nkomati was to accuse Pretoria of trying to divert attention away from the internal struggle of the black majority for justice and freedom and to act as though all of the problems came from a dissident exiled minority who could be rendered ineffective if kept out of the Repub­ lic through accords with its neighbouring states. Against this, the ANC insisted that, "The struggle in South Africa is clearly not an import from the outside. It is the product of prevailing circumstances that result from segregation, exploitation, and violent repression".[88] This article goes to great lengths to chronicle the strikes, the unrest, the discontent manifested within the Republic in recent months to show that they bad nothing to do with externally stimulated or assisted forces. "More than a hundred strikes by workers have taken place this year alone. The strikes have been held against the new taxation law which enforces equal taxation of blacks and whites despite the monumental disparity in earnings ... numerous bus boycotts have shaken the country ... the period under consideration shows a remarkable identification of the church and the church personalities with the aspirations of the people against tyranny".[89]

Thabo Mbeki, Director of Information of the ANC, laid further stress on this point in a statement issued from Oslo in March of 1984. "The South African regime will, as before, when we carry out an operation in Cape Town, thousands of kilometres from the nearest border, point its finger for instance at Botswana and say that these people came from Botswana. But this regime will not answer the question as to how these people travelled 800 kilometres from the border of Botswana to,Cape Town and they didn't catch them. They will say it is the duty of Botswana to catch them as an excuse to invade Botswana, to try to compel Botswana (or any other country in our region) to bend to the purposes of South Africa, which in our view remain unchanged."[90] [See Appendix 4].

The ANC seized enthusiastically on P.W. Botha's statement at Nkomati that steps were being taken

(87] *Ibid ..*

[88] *Times of Zambia,* Lusaka, 7 April 1984. (89] *Ibid ..*

(90] Statement by Thabo Mbeki, Director of Information, on behalf of ANC of South Africa, *International Hearings on South Afri­ can Aggression,* Oslo, March 1984.

toward the creation of a constellation of states as proof that "Pretoria is continuing to pursue an old policy. The racists want to dominate the countries of our region." The true motive of Pretoria is to destroy the ANC and the accords with the independent states were merely a means to that end. So long as they feel the democratic movement in southern Africa is active in any way, politically, militarily, or otherwise, South Africa "will point a finger at the independent states of the region as people who are harboring this move­ ment".[91] *As* problems with Nkomati began to emerge, the ANC of course took the obvious posture of saying, 'We told you so', claiming justification for their suspicion and opposition from the outset. The ANC's bitterness was understandable. Mozambique bad been the only country bordering on South Africa to give them virtually unfettered access for infiltration to conduct military operations. The ANC were openly hostile and President Oliver Tambo accused Mozambique of responsibility for "the emasculation of the liberation struggle", and said that Machel bad been "hugging the bated hyena".[92]

Moreover, a bitter reaction came from the ANC about the Nkomati Accord because:

"we were taken by surprise that the Mozambican government bad agreed with this Accord ... of course it was not totally acceptable to us ... once you are faced with a situation that has been completed, what do you do?"[93]

The Nkomati agreement "represents a setback. The whole question of having hundreds of our members removed from Mozambique or from any other African country for that matter is a setback. But this is a temporary setback. It is a setback that we have by now almost recovered from".[94] South Africa's main

objective was to sign a non-aggression pact and "to see its domination over the Black people. Pretoria will

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never rest until it bas been able to put a government in Mozambique that will be along the same lines as these puppet administrations in other Bantustans."[95] Several unsuccessful attempts were made by the SADF to catch one of the South African Communist Party prominent leaders, Joe Slovo. The SACP reacted to Nkomati Accord in a long statement saying that "Nkomati Accord is not a peace signal for

[91) *Ibid ..*

[92) In many African languages the hyena is a symbol of evil or treachery. *The Journal of African Marxists,* London, No. 6, 1984, p.47.

[93) *Personal lnten•iew,* Tom Sebina, Information Officer, ANC-HQ, Lusaka, Zambia, 4 March 1988. During my interview, Mr

Tom Sebina, most of the time refers to Nkomati Accord as "this thing". This term can show the degree of reaction.

[94) Interview with Mr David Ndaba, Administrative Secretary of the ANC Observer Mission to the United Nations in Kew York, cited in, *The Black Scholar,* Vol.15, No.6, 15 November 1984, p.10.

[95) *Ibid.,* p.11.

Africa, it is, in our view, the forerunner of worse pressures, worse aggressions to come, for all the frontline states. And it should be a warning to them all to prepare".[96] Their position in regard to the Nkomati agreement "is unique, not directly shared by others in the Front Line States. Premier Botha undoubtedly hopes that the Accord will destroy our movement and our challenge to apartheid, undermining the Front Line States is only one aspect of it as far as he is concerned. It is we South African revolutionaries who are at the centre of the Accord and its main target Yet it is we, uniquely, who are not a party to the discus­ sions, not asked whether any accord is possible, not asked even to talk about a treaty whose subject is, after all, ourselves; us, our country, our people, our future ... no one could possibly pretend that the Accord has not adversely affected our freedom to operate ... the facilities accorded to us by Mozambique in the past have been amongst the most important Now these facilities have been severely restricted, in some spheres totally withdrawn."[97] One of the tragedies of the agreement to the SACP was that "Mozambique signed the Nkomati Accord without adequate consultation with all the parties concerned. It appeared to be an indi­ vidual decision reached unilaterally".[98]

Toe Pan Africanist Congress analysed the Nkomati Accord in a different way:

"We are not allowed to criticize any member states of the O.A.U we decided to reserve our comments apart from Nkomati

Accord We are not affected and to a certain extent as far

as the ANC is concerned they might be affected because they [were] told to leave Mozambique the PAC was never approached

about Nkomati agreement, we just saw it in the newspapers, it

started as a rumour and then it came to practicality and we saw it with our naked eyes ... it is dead, yes, it is irrelevant ...

if South Africa would sign accords with all the Front Line States, , we are going to change tactics When I sign pact with South

Africa [that] will be selling out, will be surrender "[99]

Although, the PAC was at pains in this statement to avoid any direct criticism of Mozambique, it did take serious offence to President Machel's surrender and selling of liberation movements in Southern Africa.

1. Statement by the South African Communist Party, which is published twice in *The African Communist,* Third Quarter 1984, and *The Black Scholar,* What the Nkomati Accord means for Africa, Vol.15, No.6, November-December 1984. Joe Slovo was reputed to be the chief-of-staff of the ANC's guerilla army, *Umkhonto we Sizwe,* until the end of 1988. His wife, Ruth First, was killed in a parcel bomb explosion in Maputo 1982. After the Nkomati Accord was signed, Pretoria made it clear that they expected Slovo to be expelled from Mozambique. After three weeks of waiting and a lot of promises were made to interview him in Lusaka, I failed to do so because of security reasons.
2. *Ibid.•*
3. *Ibid .•*
4. *Personal Interview,* Waters Toboti, Chief Representative of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). Harare, Zimbabwe, 22 March 1988.

### The Reaction of the Front Line States

In the words of Robert Davis' description of the Nkomati Accord and the reaction of the FLS: "It came as a bolt out of the blue to the FLS. It was not a

move which was taken in consultation with the FLS or for that

matter the liberation movements. It was something which was taken unilaterally and I think there was considerable concern on the

part of the FLS."[100]

The Front Line States reacted much as Mozambique itself did, at fust with hope and then with gradual disil- lusionment and some bitterness. Despite some scepticism among the leaders of these states based upon a certain cynicism towards Pretoria, they all understood the pressures on Machel and FRELIMO.

"There were different reactions, each country is sovereign ... you have different assessments of asituation ... everybody recognised in one way or other that it was a correct sovereign decision ofMozambique".[101]

The immediate reaction to Nkomati among the independent states in southern Africa was one of qual.iiied understanding. "All the Frontline leaders gave their support to Machel. Angola's President dos Santos assured him of Angola's 'total solidarity'. Zimbabwe's Prime Minister expressed 'total support for efforts to find peace in the region', adding, 'If South Africa honours the spirit and letter of the agreement, then Zimbabwe will [also] benefit immensely'. Zambia's President Kaunda sent a special envoy with a message conveying his 'entire confidence' in the Mozambique leadership and people. 'Total solidarity'

was promised by Botswana's President Quett Masire. President Nyerere, while on a visit to Maputo,

expressed Tanzania's support for Mozambique's peace initiative. The Prime M,inister of Lesotho, Jonathan, expressed 'solidarity and understanding for Mozambique's position' ... The Prime Minister of Swaziland described the agreement as 'a triumph for peace ... a dream come true".[102] Mugabe joined the leaders of

Botswana and Lesotho, in saying that be felt no need for a similar agreement with Pretoria. But he admit­ ted that all the Frontline States were "too weak and vulnerable to withstand incursions by South Africa".

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| [100] | *Personal Interview,* Robert Davis, Centre for African Studies, Maputo, Mozambique, 19 April 1988. |
| [101] | *Personal Interview,* Colonel Sergio Vieira, Minister of Security and Deputy Minister of Defence, Maputo, Mozambique, 28  April 1988. |
| [102] | *Rand Daily Mail,* Johannesburg, 22 March 1984. |
| [103] | *The Herald,* Harare, 18 March 1984. |

Less than a week after the signing of Nkomati a meeting was held in Maputo with representatives of South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Mozambique to discuss the joint building of a dam on the Lim­ popo River. The Zimbabwe Minister for water resources said that all three Frontline states would benefit from such a project, though Botswana's interest was greatest.[104] Reflective of the ambivalence felt throughout the region, the same news story carried a report of a speech by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz sharply critical of apartheid as well as an account of a South African plot to overthrow the govern­ ment of Chief Jonathan. "Mr Botha [P.W.]-admitted in Cape Town that Pretoria bad been aiding opposition politicians in Lesotho and warned Chief Leabua Jonathan not to jeopardiz.e relations between the two coun- tries". [105]

This ambivalence is found also in a newsletter from Botswana which said, "With the euphoria on the part of white South Africa, and the orgy of interpretation on the part of journalists, which surrounded the signing of the Nkomati Accord now more or less over, a number of realistic assessments of the Accord are beginning to get themselves heard".[106] Among the more realistic judgements was cited a comment of President Kenneth Kaunda made as early as April 16, 1984. "In a wide ranging interview, the President described the pact as 'a setback for all of us' ... Dr. Kaunda stressed that he fully understood the military and economic factors which brought Mozambique to the conference table. He supported President Machel

in his decision but went on, 'We would be less than honest if we tried to glorify the situation. It is not glorifiable ... We accept we are weak. If we glorify this pact we will be making a tactical error".[107]

The Botswana newsletter also cites as an additional pinch of the salt of>-realism to moderate undue enthusiasm about Nkomati, a South African White Paper on Defence, which speaks of a "successful stra­ tegy of deterrence" and observes that Nkomati will make it possible "to conduct future negotiations in a calm and relaxed atmosphere, thereby gaining more time in which the negotiating process can develop".[108] However, some consideration and careful consultation among the Front Line leadership pro-

1. *TimesofZambia,* Lusaka, 31 March 1984.
2. *Ibid ..*
3. *Solidarity News Service,* Gaborone, 25 April 1984, p.2.
4. *Financial Times,* London, 7 April 1984.
5. *SolidarityNewsSen•ice,* Gaborone, *25* April 1984.

duced a softening of that attitude and a greater understanding of the problems involved. At a meeting at Arusha in Tanzania, the Heads of State and Government and the leaders of Liberation Movements issued a formal communique, responding in part to the Nkomati Accord but addressing an even wider spectrum of concerns and issues. They expressed their continuing unqualified support for the people of Namibia against colonialism and the people of South Africa against apartheid. They reasserted their belief, shared by the Organization of African Unity that the entire continent must be liberated from all traces of colonialism and racism. The root cause of the problems in the region is to be found in apartheid. The hostility toward South Africa on the part of all the Front Line States, and the existence of refugees in all their countries was caused by nothing other than apartheid, an institution in whose condemnation African states have been joined by the leaders of Europe, America, Australia and Asia.[109]

Support for both the agreements reached between Pretoria and the People's Republic of Angola and the Nkomati Accord was expressed in the official statement, expressing the hope that in both instances South Africa would live up to its commitments (a) to withdraw its troops from Angola and (b) to cease its acts aimed at the destabilization of Mozambique "through the use of armed bandits".[110] The statement also supported Mozambican efforts to brin about the total elimination of the MNR. "They expressed appreciation of Mozambique's commitment to continued moral, political and diplomatic support for the ANC in the struggle against apartheid and for majority rule in South Africa".[111] [See Appendix 5].

This wording represents a compromise produced by the persuasive diplomacy of Machel. He suc­ ceeded in showing his fellow heads of state in the region the impossible positiOJl he was in and the absolute necessity of his being able to play for time. Although in the initial stages, as we have seen, he was naive about the extent of the support for MNR by local citizens, he did know that the worse matters became in his country, the greater the discontent would grow and the easier it would be for the MNR to recruit volunteers. The realism of this was inescapable, and the Front Line Heads of States could understand it and support it It was necessary for them, however, to surround such sweet reasonableness with a generous coating of

1. *Arusha Statement,* Communique issued after a one-day summit meeting of six African Front Line States at Arusha, Northern Tanzania, 29 April 1084. See *AIM,* Maputo, 30 April 1984 and *Daily News,* Dar es Salaam, 30 April 1984.
2. *Ibid ..*

[Ill] *Ibid ..*

vitriolic indictment of South Africa and apartheid. They did reiterate their "strong preference for apartheid to be brought to an end by peaceful means" but in the context of their commitment to "the abolition of apartheid by whatever means are necessary". (112]

They called for free negotiations but with little expectation that their demand would be met and therefore declared that "The alternative to free negotiations with South Africa aimed at the ending of apartheid will inevitably be continued struggle against that system by other means, including armed strug­ gle. This struggle is being waged and will be conducted and led by the people of South Africa themselves, on their own initiative and within their own country. However, their struggle is seen by Africa to be, a struggle for the freedom and security of all the peoples of the continent and for the human dignity of all men and women regardless of colour. It therefore receives, and will continue to receive, the full support of the peoples and nations represented by the Heads of States and Governments of the Front Line States".(!13] And that company, of course, included Machel.

A further statement of understanding and conciliation was the following: "Involved in the struggle for the total liberation of Africa from colonialism and racism is the consolidation of the freedom and security of the states that have already achieved independence. To that end, and in the light of the difficult cir­ cumstances which do from time to time confront such states, the leaders of the Front Line States and the Liberation Movements reaffirm their understanding of steps which are taken for this purpose by states which are fully committed to the liberation struggles."[114] The repeated assertions by Machel, even at Nkomati itself toward this end, obviously paid off at Arusha.

The external representatives of SWAPO and ANC are defended by the statement, which pointed out that "the denial of human rights, and the ruthlessness of the oppressor has made it impossible for many active leaders of the Liberation Movements to live and work within their own countries ... The Front Line States reaffirm their recognition of these external operations of the Movements and reassert their intention to give shelter to them."(115] The communique finally addressed the wider world, appealing for "concrete

[112) *Ibid ..*

[113) *Ibid ..*

[114) *Ibid ..*

1. *Ibid ..*

support to be given to the efforts of the Front Line States aimed at the consolidation of their independence and their fragile economies, as these are of direct relevance to their ability to play a constructive role in the search for peace and freedom in southern Africa".[116]. However, the discussion behind the scenes in Aru­ sba was different from the official statement, as one of the senior ministers and a close adviser to President Kaunda of Zambia described President Kaunda's private opinion:

"We went to Arusba soon after Nkomati sometime ... and the discussion was on Nkomati ... at that time, nobody in the Front Line States - no President bad corrie out to say be did not agree

with what President Machel bad done ... it was at that meeting when President Kaunda said, look let me state Zambia's position.

I President Kaunda of Zambia will defend Nkomati in Zambia in all

international affairs. I would defend it because it is better

to have an agreement like that with South Africa than to have Bantustan in Mozambique ... we defend it because we know, we understand the pressure under which you know, Mozambique is ... because of Machel bad spoken earlier, let me be frank Samora, there is no way I can see Nkomati as a victory for socialism or progressive forces ... you going too far ... you confuse our friends and our supporters ... We can't say that ... we can use this as a strategy for protecting ourselves on that front, while we are fighting ... but we cannot say now we have won a victory and relax,

no, it is confusing the people ... So this is bow we see Nkomati ..."[117)

The Front Line Heads of State issued a number of official statements at a series of meetings in the months following Nkomati. The meeting in Arusba, their first summit since Mozambique and Angola signed agreements with Pretoria, they manifested their ambivalence. They "expressed their 'understanding' for the agreements but reaffirmed their hostility towards South Africa ... On the Nkomati Accord, the com­ munique was cautious. 'In the light of the difficulties which do from time *}O* time confront states, the leaders of the frontline states and movements reaffirm their understanding of steps taken by states which are fully committed to the liberation struggle', it said. There was no reference to the idea of a summit meeting between Frontline States and South Africa, suggested by President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. His col­ leagues clearly feel his idea was going too far".[118)

None of the heads of state of the front line group accepted President Machel's invitation to attend the

1. *Ibid ..*
2. *Personal lnten•iew,* H.E. M. Punabantu, The Minister of National Guidance, Information and Broadcasting Services, Lusaka, Zambia, 10 March 1988.
3. *The Guardian,* Manchester, 28 May 1984.

Nkomati signing. The group bad since 1983 been following a "two-track policy - searching for ways of improving their collective security arrangements while at the same time encouraging a process of negotia- lions for stand-off agreements between Angola and Mozambique with Pretoria ... J.C. Mponzi, Tanzanian Director of the OAU Bureau for African refugees ... was reported to have said at Mbabane in 1983 that 'S.A. is a military power to be reckoned with, and neighbouring states should not delude themselves that they could stand up to it'".[119]

Following the Arusba meeting, Mozambique issued through its official news agency, *AIM,* a state­ ment, saying that "Once again the Frontline is witnessing the start of a new process. As in the past, the Frontline's first action will be to a common platfonn for effective action. It will define the strategy for the new process. This will certainly include demands that S.A. respect international law and rigorously respect the Accord it bas signed. It will also include independence for Namibia. The Frontline will also act as a group in relation to apartheid in S.A. in this new phase in which Pretoria bas said it will not resort to the use of aggression and threats of aggression".[120]

A message of comfort to the ANC from the Front Llne State leaders issued in Lusaka said: "The older statesmen and tried crusaders of African liberation in the Frontline alliance would not have supported Machel if they believed that what be was doing as a deviation from the war of decolonialization. They have weighed the situation. President Kaunda's message was delivered by the Secretary of State for Defence and Security which shows the 'complete confidence' that Zambia bas in the Machel-Botha breakthrough. The goodwill messages from Angola and Zimbabwe are similarly expressed, and T zania's Julius Nyerere per­ sonally flew to Maputo to express bis wishes. The only dissenting voice appears to come from Botswana where President Quett Masire is quoted by a South African news agency as saying Machel was 'bullied'. We don't agree with bim."[121] By May of 1984 the reaction was growing more pronounced. In a dispatch from Dar es Salaam, President Nyerere is quoted as warning South Africa not to try to use the Nkomati Accord to topple the FRELIMO government in Maputo. "I am now convinced", said Nyerere, at that moment Chairman of OAU, "that South Africa wants to topple the governments of Frelimo and the MPLA

[l 19] *Rand Daily Mail,* Johannesburg, 8 November 1983.

[120] *AIM,* Maputo, 10 April 1984.

(121] *Times of Zambia,* Lusaka, 17 March 1984.

in Angola. But if Frelimo is overthrown through Pretoria's assistance, then we shall start the liberation war afresh with more vigour and the war will sweep through Capetown".(122]

Later that same month *The Swazi Observer* carried a 'news in depth' piece and made the observation about Nkomati that the leaders of the Frontline States bad little choice but to accept the agreement President Nyerere said in a conversation, "You reach a situation when you get a little shock, and you rethink and you begin to move forward again ... Mozambique must survive, but it will not survive by aban­ doning its obligations to the people of Nam'ibia and South Africa. South Africa can offer all kinds of bland­ ishments to pull Mozambique into its economic trap, but that trap will turn into a stranglehold for the whole of Africa".[123] A paper presented to an International Conference on Peace and Security in Southern Africa in Arusha in late May by two professors at the University of Dar es Salaam warned that Nkomati had altered the balance of power between "the forces of liberation and the apartheid regime. It is an exaggera­ tion to give so much importance to Nkomati as to start thinking of changing course. Nkomati is a failure, a fact already acknowledged by Mozambique, and Tanzania's position on this is very clear".[124] One of the professors, however, found a silver lining in the cloud, pointing to the fact that Mozambique had leamed from Nkomati of the need to collaborate with her neighbours, notably Tanzania and Zimbabwe. The Pro­ fessor said "political will and courage as demonstrated by Lesotho in withstanding South African pressure and demands were needed to thwart the racist manoeuvre".[125]

The mixed feelings were well expressed editorially by the *Botswana Guardian,* under the heading "Qualified support for Nkomati".[126] In response to speculations in the South,African press whether there might be follow-up agreements with Botswana and Lesotho, President Quett Masire and Foreign Minister Archie Mogwe "have in no uncertain terms expressed their misgivings about South Africa's sincerity. This position bas been shared by Lesotho which was the first to talk to white South African leaders in the 1960's

... President Masire said that South Africa bad bullied Mozambique into signing the Nkomati peace in the

1. *Times of Zambia,* Lusaka, 8 May 1984.
2. *The Swazi Obsen•er,* Mbabane, 24 May 1984.
3. *Daily News,* Dar cs Salaam, 30 May 1984.

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1. *The Botswana Guardian,* Gaborone, 27 April 1984.

sub region. The President said he would not be happy being forced into a situation like that, and doubted that Front Line States leaders had a right to talk to white South Africa when the oppressed in that country hardly had that privilege".[127]

As the months went by in the spring of 1984 and South Africa made no apparent efforts to stem the activities of RENAMO inside the borders of Mozambique, there was even some evidence, as noted earlier, that there was active collusion between SADF and the :MNR. This led in June to serious talks by Machel with Nyerere of Tanzania and Mugabe of Zimbabwe over the possibility of active military assistance by Mozambique's two neighbours in the fight against the South African-backed guerillas. *The Guardian* car­ ried reports that the "hidden agenda" of a meeting among the three heads of state was military aid for Mozambique to deal with the rebel Mozambique National Resistance. "At present", says the article, "about 1,500 Zimbabwean troops are guarding the Beira-Mutare corridor through which run the road and rail links to Zimbabwe, as well as the Beira-Mutare pipeline. There are also some Tanzanian troops acting as trainers".[128) The Mozambican military chiefs had been sensitive to charges of their inability to "defend the national territory" were brought to the meeting by Machel to "persuade them of the necessity of accept­ ing help".[129)

Additionally, Kaunda was reported as supporting Nkomati on the grounds that if Mozambique had not signed the agreement, "she would have turned into a bantustan". "Dr. Kaunda stressed African coun­ tries should look at the Nkomati accord in the spirit in which it was signed and analyse 'faithfully the forces that are behind South Africa and the forces which are behind us' ... Making reference to critics of Mozam­ bique, Dr. Kaunda asked, 'Who are we to fight against South Africa?"'[l30] A lecturer in the University of Zambia School of Law, testifying before an ad hoc committee of the United Nations on human rights, said on 17 August that "I'm not speaking for the Zambian government, but I wish to say that while we under­ stand the circumstances under which the agreement [Nkomati] was reached, we are concerned by its impli­ cations for the region". Mr. Melvin Mbao said that "the signing of peace agreements with South Africa had

1. *Ibid ..*
2. *The Botswana Guardian,* Gaborone, 25 June 1984.
3. *Ibid ..*
4. *Times of Zambia,* Lusaka, 3 August 1984.

undennined the essence of the formation of regional economic groupings, such as SADCC and the Pre­ ferential Trade Area in efforts to reduce economic dependence on South Africa. He also expressed concern over the denial of bases to South Africa freedom fighters who had previously found shelter and support in frontline countries." [131]

The other side of the coin turns up again, where an article points out that "What the Nkomati Accord does is to recognize a reality: South Africa is a powerful neighbour. No country in the region can fight her singlehanded, not even the collective military effort of the countries in the region can defeat her in open war".[132] Furthermore, the economies of all the Frontline States are tied to South Africa, a fact they sim­ ply cannot ignore. "All of them depend upon her for some services, such as transportation of their imports and exports or some vital goods. Three of them, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in fact have custom union with her. They hardly have a choice".[133] South Africa, the article pointed out, had brutally bullied her neighbours - Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotha, Zambia and Zimbabwe had all suffered the effects of destabilization. "One lesson that should be drawn from Nkomati is that while South Africa's neighbours are as opposed as ever to its apartheid regime, they also want to have peace, security and stabil­ ity in order to develop".[134]

Salim Ahmed Salim, Foreign Minister for Tanzania, made similar statements at the time of the Accord's signing. "We are neither optimistic nor pessimistic about the bilaterial arrangements", he said. "We are waiting for the results of those negotiations." He rejected suggestions that the decision of Mozam­ bique to negotiate directly with Pretoria without involving the frontline State was a contradiction of the role of the six countries alliance. "We are fully aware of what is happening. We believe Angola and Mozambique know what is best for them and that is what the Frontline States support".[135]

By November of 1984, however, Julius Nyerere was saying that it was "humiliating for African states to sign agreements in the form of Nkomati with apartheid South Africa." [136] He said that although the

1. *Times ofZ,ambia,* Lusaka, 18 August 1984.
2. *Times ofZAmbia,* Lusaka, 22 August 1984.
3. *Ibid..*
4. *Ibid..*
5. *Daily News,* Dar es Salaam, 16 March 1984.
6. *Times ofZ,ambia,* Lusaka, 24 November 1984.

Accord was regarded as a "success for the United States policy of constructive engagements, it was proper that Africa viewed it as a defeat."[137] He was careful to express understanding of the circumstances that pressured Mozambique to Nkomati but insisted that the agreement was a victory for the South African pol­ icy of destabilization, in which support had been provided by the United States. The repeated violations of the Accord by RENAMO forces gradually undermined the confidence of the Frontline States and in succes­ sive meetings, the organization condemned South Africa for bad faith.[138)

President Nyerere, in his capacity as President of the OAU, gave an interview in Dar es Salaam

which was printed in the *Sunday News,* in which he expressed much the same views we have already cited. Asked how he viewed Nkomati, he commented that "South Africa thinks it is wonderful. The Americans think it is a tremendous example of the success of 'constructive engagement'. They say how wonderful it is. We think it is a humiliation. We don't want any more Nkomatis because it really is the success of the South African policy of destabilizing the Frontline States, and they are assisted in this by the United States. It is proper that Africa should view this frankly as a defeat on ourpart".[139] This response was repeated in the year following the signing of the Accord. On the one hand, there was an expression of understanding and support for Mozambique and on the other a recurrence of fear of the consequences for the region and its efforts to win security and economic development independently of the giant to the south. There was never any suggestion, least of all in Maputo, that the fierce opposition to apartheid and the support for the African blacks in their liberation drive was in any way diminished. On that point there was total and continuing

agreement among all the Frontline States. The ambivalence was created by, the recognition of the cir­ cumstances that forced FRELIMO to negotiate tied with the suspicion of South African sincerity and the fear that such negotiation would serve the interests of South Africa and not those of the other independent states in southern Africa and the oppressed people of South Africa.

The total failure of Pretoria to lay any effective restraining hand on the MNR and the strong feeling that there was at least covert support for the guerilla operations inside Mozambique led, one year later, to a repudiation of the Accord by the Front Line States, whose leaders met in Lusaka on March 8, 1985. A

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| (137] | *Ibid ..* |
| (138] | *Ibid ..* |
| (139] | *Sunday News,* Dar es Salaam, 2 December 1984. |

private meeting was held between Nyerere, Chairman of the OAU and of the Front Line States and President of Tanzania, and Machel in Dar es Salaam. 'The talks centered on the current situation in South­ ern Africa, particularly in view of the racist South African regime's disregard of the Nkomati Accord ... It has been proved that South Africa never stopped supporting, training and infiltrating armed bandit gangs and sending planes loaded with weapons inside Mozambique to disrupt peace and order in the coun­ try".[140] This was followed by a one-day summit meeting of the Front Line State leaders, chaired by Nyerere and attended by Kaunda of Zambia, Machel of Mozambique, Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Masire of Botswana, dos Santos of Angola, and also attended by SWAPO President Sam Nujoma and Oliver Tambo of the African National Congress.[141] The communique stated that the pretence on Pretoria's part that the unrest in the region had been caused by the ANC and dissidents in the Front Line States was now seen to be false. 'Those who pretended in the past that the tension and troubles in the area were caused by Mozam­ bique will now see that the source of these troubles is apartheid South Africa ... It is South Africa which uses Namibia to attack Frontline states. South Africa is supporting dissidents in Angola, not Angolans or Narnibians."[142] No questions were permitted after the formal communique, but Kaunda's special assis­ tant for press, Mr. Milimo Punabantu, said "Dr. Nyerere's denunciation of the Nkomati agreement meant that the accord was 'dead'. It also means that Frontline countries, including Mozambique, are back to square one. They will not be operating with the Nkomati accord in mind. We in Zambia have always been clear that the accord would not work. The leaders of Frontline countries have now stated this publicly and collectively is a terrific thing because destabilization of neighbouring countrit;5 by South Africa has been worse than before Nkomati was signed".[143] It seems odd for a Zambian to say "we have always been clear that the accord would not work"[144] because Kaunda has consistently been the leading figure in the region seeking understanding with South Africa. President Nyerere, at a briefing for African ambassadors in Belgrade explained the communique issued by the Frontline States in Lusaka in March of 1985. The Nkomati Accord was formally rejected because South Africa had consistently failed to live up to its

(140] *Daily News,* Dar es Salaam, 6 March 1985.

(141] *Times of Zambia,* Lusaka, 9 March 1985.

[14'.!] *Ibid ..*

(143] *Ibid ..*

(144] *Ibid..*

promises by continuing to support the guerilla bandits called RENAMO. He said "Mozambique remained faithful to the accord while the Frontline States appealed to the Western powers to put pressure on South Africa so that she also respects the accord. They were also asked to help Mozambique rebuild its econ- omy".[145]

Tanzania publicly urged the international community to "exert more pressure on South Africa to abandon its apartheid policies and grant independence for Namibia". Prime Minister Salim Ahmed Salim appealed for voluntary sanctions. He accused Pretoria of "destabilizing its neighbours, particularly the Frontline States and hoodwinking the world by adopting cosmetic changes while also blackmailing some African states to coexist with it ... The Prime Minister said the mere fact that the Pretoria regime started flouting the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique before the ink on the paper bad dried, by supplying more arms to the MNR bandits, showed clearly the nature of the Boers". [146]

## SADCC Reaction:

The SADCC fifth summit met in Botswana in July 1984. From the SADCC point of view, the Nkomati Agreement between South Africa and Mozambique, which looks beyond security matters to closer economic cooperation, has been widely described as undermining the rationale on which SADCC has been based. Some members have expressed an uneasy understanding, rather than approval of Mozambique's position. A spokesman for the organization insisted that:

"the Nkomati Agreement would not be on the summit agenda, arguing that it had not changed SADCC's basic aim of coordination development and lessening dependence on the outside world generally".[147]

Mr Peter Mmusi, the Vice President of Botswana continued to say:

"Nkomati or no Nkomati, SADCC must go on".[148] President Nyerere's speech at the 1984 summit is relevant:

* 1. *Times of Zambia,* Lusaka, 26 March 1985.
  2. *Daily News,* Dar cs Salaam, 25 May 1985.
  3. *The Times,* London, 6 July 1984 (148] *Ibid .•*

"Through a combination of threats and promises, South Africa is now trying to divert the attention of SADCC members from their long-term future ofless reliance upon South Africa. It wants

them to aim at the mirage of quick economic prosperity in cooperation with apartheid ... There is no basis for cooperation between

apartheid in South Africa and SADCC countries ... Apartheid remains immoral, and any support given to South Africa is immoral".[149]

Nyerere did not mention any names, but his remarks seemed to be directed at President Samora Machel.

The restoration of secure rail access to Mozambican ports promised to constitute a major step for­ ward in realizing SADCC's aim of reducing dependence on South African routes and ports. As Carlos Car­ doso of *AIM* explained: "The Nkomati Accord will help to end this dependence. Thus we can conclude that the accord is not a threat to SADCC. Quite the contrary, the principles of SADCC have become operative for the first time".(150]

The SADCC Secretariat in Botswana issued a statement which accused South Africa of deliberately seeking to retard if not destroy the region's development programmes. South Africa has continually bullied its neighbours "with various strategies that range from military sabotage acts in respective countries, spon­ sorship of insurgence, coercion of member states to listen to its dictates and withholding certain essential goods destined for those countries to create social unrest".[151] Mozambique according to the com­ munique, had been hardest hit by sabotage activities carried out by the MNR. "Mozambique was charged with the responsibility of coordinating transport needs, largely by expanding the Maputo and Beira har­

bours to meet all transport requirements for the region. Countries like Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and

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even Tanzania which have previously relied on South African ports and railway for their imports, would

have used the Mozambique facilities. But the MNR bandits have persistently destroyed roads and blown bridges and railway lines, thus denying the countries the service and forcing them to turn to South Africa".[152] The paper lamented the fact that the Nkomati and Lusaka agreements have still not brought peace to the region.

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| [149) | *The Times,* London, 7 July 1984. |
| (150) | C. Cardoso, "The Nkomati Accord and SADCC", AIM feature cited in *Review of AfricOJl Political Economy,* No.29, 1984, p.150. |
| (151) | *West Africa,* London, 24 June 1985, p.1297. |
| (152] | *lbid..* |

At a later summit meeting, held in Maputo in October of 1986, the ambivalence had disappeared and the language was direct and blunt Peace in South Africa, said the heads of state, was "threatened by South Africa's frequent attacks on the Frontline States. They said Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe had repeat­ edly been attacked while part of Angola was being occupied by South Africa. They accused the Pretoria regime of grossly and systematically violating the Lusaka understanding and the Nkomati Accord".[153] They spoke out vigorously against South Africa's use of Malawi to attack Mozambique "counter to the interests of the people of Malawi and South Africa itself'. Malawi itself was "blasted" "for setting up con­ ditions for bandit gangs to occupy the frontier zone in Sofaia, Tete and Zambesia of Mozambique".[154] Keooeth Kaunda, at this time serving as Chairman of the Frontline States issued a statement following the summit meeting in which he expressed disappointment in the failure of the heads of state to persuade Malawi to abandon allowing South Africa to use its territory to launch MNR attacks into Mozambique. He went on to add, "Mozambique has been extremely patient. We have tried the language of peace [but] it has led nowhere. We have left everything in the hands of our host [Mozambique]".[155]

Unable to confront South Africa with a viable military threat, the language of peace was all the Front­ line States had available to them, that and an appeal to the "international community" to bring pressure on Pretoria to abandon its policy of destabilization, an appeal that was not producing any spectacular results. Zimbabwe bad, as of July 1986, some 12,000 soldiers in Mozambique. [156] They were engaged in guard­ ing the Beira Corridor, a rail, road and pipeline link between eastern Zimbabwe and the Indian Ocean port of Beira in Mozambique. British officers were engaged in training Mozambi ao officers at a base inside Zimbabwe, but these measures were purely defensive, designed to react to and if possible interdict MNR offensives.[157] It was literally impossible for the weak and poorly trained and equipped Mozambican forces to cope in any way with the SADF.

There bad been some military successes against the MNR. A combined force of Mozambican and

1. *AIM,* Maputo, 14 October 1986.
2. *Ibid ..*
3. *Daily News,* Dar cs Salaam, 14 October 1986.
4. *Africa Now,* London, No. 179, July 19S6, p.27.
5. *Ibid ..*

Zimbabwean troops bad captured a guerilla headquarters known as the Casa Banana in the Gorongoza game reserve in central Mozambique.[158] "But", the dispatch went on to say, "few observers in Maputo appear to believe that Renamo is beaded for a military defeat".[159] The Nkomati Accord bas become a "dead letter" with the :tv1NR assaults in Mozambique continuing. And "The economic benefits hoped for under the

accord have also failed to materialize. Trade with South Africa is actually on the decline ... and few private investors from the Republic have been willing to brace the security risks."[160] The reporter for the *Finan­ cial Times* concluded bis story with a telling paragraph, which speaks volumes for the entire region: "the South African military ... is likely to regard a stable Mozambique as undesirable, for Maputo might well have the confidence to provide a rear base for guerillas seeking Pretoria's overtbrow".[161]

In swn, the Frontline States from the outset understood the pressures bearing on Machel and FREL­ IMO and were eager not to embarrass their neighbour, although they were sceptical and suspicious. The dual feelings were apparent throughout the months following the signing, and there was almost a sense of relief when the evidence became overwhelming that their initial misgivings were justified. They no longer were required to present a double face to their own peoples and to the world. They could openly attack Pre­

toria for its duplicity, while praising Mozambique for its sincere efforts to bring peace to the region.

We see, then, that the Frontline States began with a policy of understanding and support for Nkomati, recognizing the intense pressures on Mozambique produced by South Africa's coercive diplomacy. But as time went on and the violations were unchecked, indeed even multiplied, the States involved, both collec-

tively and individually, shifted to a posture of denunciation - not of Mozambw\_ue, but of South Africa for its duplicity and bad faith.

## Reaction from the United States

Since the U.S. policy of 'constructive engagement' played so large a role in pushing both South Africa and Mozambique to the table at Nkomati, it is interesting to look at reactions to the Accord from that

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| [158] | *Financial Times,* London, 9 May 1986. |
| [159] | *Ibid ..* |
| [160) | *Ibid ..* |
| [161] | *Ibid ..* |

quarter. The immediate reaction from Washington was of course very positive. Mozambique was described by a State Department spokesman as having "undertaken a serious opening to the West in general and the United States in particular" and the signing of the accord represented, in this view, a "dramatic break with the cycle of violence in the region".[162] One American report compared Nkomati with Camp David, hailing it as containing as much fruit for progress in South Africa as Camp David did for the Middle East. A report from Maputo, saying that the Nkomati talks "appear to have put the Reagan Administration on the verge of a major diplomatic triumph in Mozambique after three years of dead ends, frustration, and mounting criticism of its efforts in Southern Africa".[163]

In an interview, Dr. Chester Crocker, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, stated very clearly the official U.S. reaction. He observed that "the illusion that armed struggle will solve South Africa's problems has been dealt a body blow" by the Nkomati Accord. "It could even be", he said, "an irreversible body blow. So has the illusion that South Africa faces a total onslaught by its neigh­ bours".[164] Crocker characterized the view that Nkomati was a one-sided humiliation as "rubbish. This is to show not the slightest familiarity with the agenda of the parties and denigrate both sides' statesmanship in recognizing what had to be given in exchange for what was gotten".[165]

Crocker pointed out that the situation between Mozambique and South Africa is not all that different from the relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland or Zambia. Nkomati, be said, "brings to southern Africa for the first time the observance of OAU principles. If one is going to take the position that it is unimportant for the independent states of southern A a, then one is really saying that sovereignty is unimportant, that statehood is unimportant, that survival is unimportant."[166] Asked about the lack of response to Mozambican requests for Western capital, Crocker responded "What was there to invest in?" He pointed out the benefits to be reaped from economic cooperation between Mozam­ bique and South Africa giving them a "reciprocal influence on each other, in the way that most neighbours

[161] *Times of Zambia,* Lusaka, 7 March 1984.

1. *The Star,* Johannesburg, 13 February 1984.
2. *The G1,ardian,* Manchester, 20 July 1984.
3. *Ibid ..*
4. *Ibid ..*

develop".[167] He characterized American foreign policy in the region, of which he is seen as the principal architect as "a kind of total realism, some would say objectivity ... The position facing South Africa ... is quite unlike that of the Portuguese or the Smith regime in the terminal period of that era If there is going to be a negotiated settlement, there has to be something in it for everybody, including the party which con­ trols Namibia today. There is no doubt in our minds that the South Africans would like to see a settlement in Namibia sooner than later."[168]

The Soviet journal *New Times* published a lengthy analysis of the situation in the region, discussing the American role in recent events. It has been reported, the article alleged, that "the Americans have esta- blished direct contacts with the MNR leaders. Washington and Pretoria obviously intend to continue using UNITA and the MNR to put more pressure on Angola and Mozambique. This is fully in line with their joint policy of strangling the national liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia, destabilizing the progressive regimes in Angola and Mozambique, disuniting the frontline states and strengthening the racist positions."[169] The so-called American initiatives in the region were seen in the article as totally without positive results during the Reagan years. "It may be said that in this period American diplomacy has created no few additional obstacles to the solution of these problems."[170] Washington has been insistent, in disagreement with its allies in Western Europe and Canada, in linking the Namibian question with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. "This approach has put South Africa and the United States at loggerheads not only with the peoples of southern Africa, the front-line states and the Organization of Afri­

can Unity, but also with the U.S. partners in the 'contact group' which a,lso included Britain, West Ger- many, France and Canada. That group bas practically disintegrated, and Washington is compelled to search

for a way out of the protracted deadlock."[171]

The announced aim of Washington for *New Times* was for "regional settlement", which called for "normalization" of relations between South Africa and Mozambique and Angola, following which the other

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| [167] | *Ibid ..* |
| (168] | *Ibid ..* |
| [169] | *New Times,* Moscow, August 1984. |
| [170] | *Ibid ..* |
| [171] | *Ibid ..* |

members of the "contact group" were to be drawn into "constructive cooperation" with Pretoria, thereby helping to relieve the isolation of South Africa.[172] If the neighbouring states could be persuaded to sit down with Pretoria and negotiate over political, economic and military matters, then the Europeans and Canadians could do likewise, justifying such action to their constituencies by pointing to the frontline states also at the table. "The question of sanctions - the most important for Pretoria - would in that case be buried, and the international boycott of the South African regime ended."[173]

Toe second part of the regional settlement involved forcing Angola to effect a withdrawal of Cuban troops from its territory "or at least announce a timetable for their evacuation in the near future."[174] Thirdly, Resolution 435 is to be revised so that U.N. recognition of SWAJ>O was withdrawn and a coalition formed with allied parties responsive to the concerns of the U.S. and South Africa. "Toe political stunts being performed by Washington in southern Africa will certainly not help to solve the vital problems of that region ... U.S. diplomacy is not guided by a desire to find mutually acceptable solutions and does not take the present realities into account but proceeds from the assumption that South Africa and the United States can dictate their own terms of ... 'normalization' of the situation and prescribe their own standards of rela­ tions between the advocates and opponents of apartheid".[175]

To be sure, the foregoing was a highly partisan analysis of Washington's activity at that time in southern Africa, but there is no question that great pressure was brought on Machel and FRELIMO to go to Nkomati, threatening the withholding of economic aid until the conditions were met and promising such assistance as a 'carrot'. Washington, to be fair, also pressured Pretoria to negotiate with Mozambique and expressed great pleasure with the results of Nkomati.[176] But it is also true that during the Reagan years,

U.S. foreign policy was obsessed with the threat of left-wing revolutions everywhere and found itself sup- porting some highly undemocratic and tyrannical regimes simply because they were "anti-communist", and there was a strong tendency for Secretary Crocker and his colleagues on the African desk at the State

1. *Ibid ..*
2. *Ibid..*
3. *Prm·da,* Moscow, 5 March 1984.
4. *Prm•da,* Moscow, 22 March 1984.
5. *New Times,* Moscow, August 1984.

Department to "bought" Pretoria's cries of the dangers of communist infiltration in the region. Machel bent over backwards to avoid involvement with the U.S.S.R. precisely in order to deny Pretoria the claim of a communist threat FRELIMO's Marxist-Leninist orientation played virtually no role in the East-West conflict between the Super-powers. But Washington's preoccupation with the communist threat, made it extremely difficult for the U.S. Administration to see matters in the region very clearly. One analyst bas written "In short, 'constructive engagement' is the modem version of the Monroe Doctrine in which the

U.S. is blatantly telling those who are not yet free that they dare not choose self-determination lest they be labelled communists and therefore be candidates for massacring ... meanwhile South Africa, the local pol­ iceman for U.S. interests, will see to it that Washington's mandates are carried out".[177) Granted that this

suffers from a heavy Marxist bias, there is an element of truth in the contention all the same.

In response to such critics of U.S. policy in the region, another author sees its major objective as "the pursuit of stability so that its economic and strategic interests will, as far as possible, be maintained intact. In pursuit of these it will use military means but it prefers a political solution ... This explains recent events in Angola and Mozambique, in particular the fact that the Lusaka and Nkomati Accords are both designed to soften up the ANC and SWAPO as well as to counter Soviet influence in Angola and Mozambique. This is all with a view to bring about neo-colonialism in Namibia and South Africa within the context ofimperi- alist stability".[178)

## Moscow and the Eastern bloc Response to Nkomati

Romania's President Ceausescu, described the Accord as "a positive factor that would help Mozam­ bique to consolidate its revolutionary gains ... what is imperative now is that South Africa should be com­ pelled to respect this agreement, and that all anti-imperialist and progressive forces should give increasingly strong support to Mozambique.[179] Yugoslavia reacted to Nkomati Accord as "part of a process of change

1. **M.M.** Ncube, "The U.S., South Africa and Destabilization in Southern Africa", *Journal of African Marxists,* London, No.6, 1984, p.38.
2. Ibbo Mandaza, "Conflict in Southern Africa", in *Africa: Perspectives on Peace and Development,* Emmannuel Hansen, editor, London, The United Nations University, 1987, p.111.
3. *AIM,* Maputo, 16 March 1984. Also see, *Yugoslav Telegraph Sen•ice,* 17 March 1984, cited in Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 2, Eastern Europe, London, 20 March 1984.

in Southern Africa connected with meeting the vital interests of the countries and people of the region".[180] East Germany for its part issued a communique about Nkomati and said," ... of course a step towards normalization of bilateral relations and the people in Pretoria are obviously interested in this too, because otherwise the treaty would hardly have been concluded ... it seems that the important element in this development is the fact that Mozambique will be able to improve matters internally as a result of posi­ tive external circumstances ... peace will not grow automatically from the signing of the agreement ... That in itself is a lot".[181]

The Soviet media virtually ignored the signing of the Nkomati agreement, which represented a clear expression of Moscow's dissatisfaction. However, the Soviet Union reacted to Nkomati in arguing that South Africa"... is now trying to represent itself as a peace loving state".[182] Mozambique was viewed as a state which "acted on the principle of survival in concluding agreements with South Africa ... and S.A. is trying to use the situation by exerting economic and diplomatic pressure to transform the Front Line States into Bantustans of a higher type".[183] The only official response to Nkomati from Moscow was a com­ ment made in a communique issued in March of 1984 following talks between President Chernenko and the Ethiopian leader, Mengitsu Haile Mariam, in which there was "indirect criticism of Mozambique's agree­ ment with South Africa, and one Soviet Africanist in Moscow criticized the Accord for breaking South Africa out of diplomatic isolation on the continent".[184] Diplomatically, it was humiliating for the Soviet to stand passively by while two of its allies - Angola and Mozambique - bound by Friendship Treaties, were

being ravaged by **S.A.** coercive diplomacy, forced to turn for economic and, diplomatic assistance to the United States and other Western countries and, finally, compelled to enter into an agreement with South

Africa. The Nkomati agreement represented a setback for Soviet foreign policy and interests, therefore, Nkomati evoked a clear expression of Moscow's dissatisfaction. Moscow also viewed the Accord as **a**

1. *Ibid ..*
2. GDR Position on Mozambique-South Africa Treaty, Berlin, *GDR Home Service,* 19 March 1984, cited in SWB, London, 22 March 1984.
3. *Pral'da,* Moscow, 22 March 1984.
4. *Izvestia,* Moscow, 23 March 1984.
5. *Tass,* Moscow, 29 March 1984. More interesting statements came from the Soviet Union press such as "the midwife of the

:Nlcomati agreement was the United States ... thereby serving as a kind of guarantor of the Treaty". *Pravda,* Moscow, 18 March 1985. 'Signing the Lusaka and Nkomati Treaties, the Front Line States, replaced the sword with an olive branch'. *Prwda,* Moscow, I March 1985.

direct criticism of its economic assistance programmes.[185]

## Chinese Reaction

China gave its open support to Mozambique over the Nkomati Accord. President Li Xiannian assured President Machel of China's "backing for the action Mozambique had taken to safeguard the country's independence and security in the light of the country's situation".[186] The Nkomati Accord was the result of "the thirst for peace of many African States after years of tunnoil" and "therefore, the peaceful action of the Mozambiquean Government has China's understanding and support ..."[187]

## North Korean Reaction

President Kim II-Sung gave President Machel "full support when he visitied Pyongyang"[l88] after China. The North Korean Central News Agency reported Kim II-Sung as saying:

"The struggle against enemies can take different fonns ... We consider the series of measure to consolidate national independence and stability, and to create the peaceful environment needed for the building of an independent new society, suit the

present internal and external conditions, and we support them".[189]

## Reaction in Europe

It has already been pointed out that the 'Contact Group' tended after 1983 to take a back seat in southern Africa, allowing the U.S. to play the principal role in initiatives **ie** the region. There has been strong disagreement over the whole situation there concerning the presence of Cuban troops and the U.S. demand for their withdrawal as the price for any settlement, a view not shared in London, Paris, Bonn, or Ottawa, for that matter. The other members of the Group welcomed the Nkomati Accord with high hopes that it marked a genuine shift in South African policy away from destabilization and toward genuine

1. Peter Clement, "Moscow and Southern Africa", in *Problems of Communism,* Washington D.C., March-April 1985, p.42.
2. New China News Agency, quoted in *Rand Daily Mail,* Johannesburg, 19 July 1984.
3. *Ibid ..*
4. *Rand Daily Mail,* Johannesburg, 24 July 1985.
5. *Ibid ..*

regional cooperation. The gradual disillusionment that has occurred after March of 1984 was well expressed as reflecting the reaction of many Western European countries. In April, it was officially con.firmed that Prime Minister P.W. Botha, would visit Portugal, Britain, Belgium, West Germany, Switzerland, France and Italy, where he was also received by the Pope.[190] All these visits would not have been possible without the signing of Nkomati Accord.

Britain's Prime Minister said the agreement ofNkomati was:

"a step of great importance for the security, not only of Mozambique and South Africa, but for the whole region".[191]

This reaction shows the improvement of British relations with Mozambique after the Nkomati Accord, which the U.K. had welcomed and encouraged. Britain waived the £22.Sm loans owed by Mozambique, and promised 10.8m pounds for rail and port development[192] The British role in Southern Africa can best be described as ambiguous. While the Thatcher Administration played a spoiling role over the sanctions campaign against South Africa, it gave strong support to the SADCC's efforts to lessen the FLS depen­ dency on **S.A.** and put itself firmly on the side of Mozambique through its military training team in Zim­ babwe, which was enlarged to include training for Mozambican officers.[193] In 1987 British aid for development projects in Mozambique totalled £34m, and military assistance was provided in the form of

£250,000 worth of arms and a training programme.[194] President Chissano encouraged the training of his officers by the British military training team in Zimbabwe, and he declared his willingness to accept mili-

. tary aid from any country.[195] The South African media criticized the British government for not sending a letter of support to the South African government about the Nkomati agreement as it did to Mozambique. It said that the British government had shown no great enthusiasm for Nkomati. In the past it stated that

Britain had given preference to good relations with the black states (and other members) of the Com­

monwealth over good relations with Pretoria. It would seem that Mrs Thatcher's officialsmen were uncer-

1. Colin Legum, *Africa Contemporary Record,* Vol.17, London, 1984-1985, p.B797.
2. *AIM,* Maputo, 16 March 1984.
3. *The Gllardian,* Manchester, 20 August 1984.
4. *The Independent,* London, 18 February 1987.
5. *The Times,* London, 23 February 1987.
6. *The Guardian,* Manchester, 17 June 1987.

tain about how to read the Southern African situation: was this conflict of interests to continue, or was it resolved? London's attitude would not be clear until there has a crystallisation of the reaction of the black members of the Commonwealth to Nkomati.[196]

In France, Nkomati elicited the first statement on Africa that former President Giscard d'Estaing had made after he lost power. He told *Figaro* in late April 1984:

"I have noticed certain developments in Southern Africa where there is an idea of neighbourliness.that is beginning to spread..

It has by no means gone far enough but there is a definite change in the state of mind that existed there previously." Re wen.t on to describe the agreements between South Africa, Angola and

Mozambique as "a total defeat for the Soviet Union"; and. added.:

"In a world in crisis, Africa is the continent of the future fm:

Europe. It is **a** gigantic market for our trade, with fabulous

mineral riches."[197]

Portugal's President, General Eanes, and Prime Minister Soares both sent messages of support to President Machel and both praised him for his courageous attitude, worthy of a great statesman.[198]

The Europeans and the Canadians saw Nkomati as a hope for peaceful resolution and genuine pro­ gress in the region, but that hope was dealt a severe blow by the continued actions of the MNR within Mozambique, actions which Pretoria may indeed not actively promote but which it has certainly done little to interdict or to hinder. **A** West African review reflected later that:

***c,*** In the history of Africa's struggle for genuine independence, there appear to be two routes to neocolonialism. The first has generally been encountered by those countries 'granted' formal independence after increasingly militant struggles by unarmed nationalists. After such independence, the more radical the political and economic options chosen by the governments in the attempt to transform the colonial structures and relations, the sooner and more intense the covert and overt measures applied by

old and new colonial powers to reverse their progress. Mozambique is a good example of the second route. This is where protracted armed struggle won liberation in 1975 ... The specific context of southern Africa saw Rhodesia in the throes of liberation war.

Unsurprisingly Rhodesian intelligence set up a 'Mozambican National Resistance' in that same 1975 ... Immediately Zimbabwe

became independent, South Africa took over the running of the MNR".[199]

[ I 96] *Review of Southern African Affairs,* Pretoria, May 1984. (197] Quoted in, *Ibid ..*

(19S] *AIM,* Maputo, 16 March 1984.

With Machel now dead, killed in a plane crash, the editors saw South Africa and the 11NR. seeking to push Mozambique as far toward total ruin as they possibly could. Zimbabwe has sent thousands of troops into Mozambique to guard rail lines against the :MNR. "It is such cooperation from Frontline and other African states, material, military and diplomatic which will help Mozambique resist subversion. The political leadership ... said it trusted the Mozambican people to 'maintain a heroic tradition of knowing how to transform their grief into sorrow into new and greater energies and capacities in order to overcome adver- sity and open new paths permitting them• to achieve a future of peace and prosperity to which they so eagerly aspire".[200]

The *Guardian* went a step further in suggesting that "U.S. influence in both Saudi Arabia and Malawi is such that J\.1NR support could not continue without at least tacit U.S. approval and may actually have active C.I.A involvement"[201] "Ironically", the *Guardian* continued, "The only chance to salvage Nkomati is that South Africa will have to make some concessions to head off the growing dissident cam­ paign in the United States and oil boycott campaign in Holland. Even then perhaps the best Mozambique can hope for is that South Africa will ease off the pressure on Maputo and southern Mozambique. It is there that the J\.1NR is still directly supplied from South Africa and still under Pretoria's direct control, and it is only there that South Africa has economic interests. Ending the war will require agreement of Ger­ many, Portugal and the United States, and the swallowing of more 'pills' than simply joining the IMF."(202]

Thus the Nkomati Accord was a masterly demonstration of how t(l- combine military, economic, diplomatic and other aspects of Coercive Diplomacy to achieve national ends, a combination which is not as easy as it looks.

In summary, then, the reactions to Nkomati were varied depending upon the time and the place. Mozambique and the Frontline States were at :first cautiously optimistic and then progressively disil­ lusioned as events unfolded. The ANC was sceptical and hostile from the beginning, and time has proved

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| [199] | *West Africa,* "No Crocodile Tears for Machel", 27 October 1986, p.2243. |
| [200] | *Ibid..* |
| [201] | *The Guardian,* Manchester, 15 March 1985. |
| (202) | *Ibid..* |

them correct The United States, now having achieved a Cuban promise to withdraw from Angola, feels a sense of triumph on all fronts and sheds few tears over the problems of a Marxist-Leoioist regime in Maputo. Europe took a broader and more comprehensive view but was reluctant to oppose too strongly and openly its powerful ally across the Atlantic. South Africa continued to pay lip service to the agreement and to deny active support for the MNR, insisting that its arms were originating elsewhere, as indeed was in part the case. But Pretoria was able to move forcefully beyond its borders against the ANC; its pleas of helplessness against the MNR were somehow dubious. Therefore, the next chapter will describe, in great detail, the survey of experts on the Southern African relations and analyse the results of the field research trip to Southern Africa.

# CHAPTER SEVEN SURVEY OF THE F1ELD-WORK

## INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to recount the research conducted on Southern Africa, bearing in mind that little is recorded or documented in this region and that the study relies heavily on interviews. The interviews lend support to the literature and the framework underlying the study (by either confirming or rejecting it) which would otherwise lack good evidence, and contribute to our knowledge of how Africans perceive events in Southern Africa.

The researcher's goals for data collection in southern Africa were, first, to gain access to written material (such as, documents, press clippings, and conference papers) and second, to interview informed people, in and out of government, about the Nkomati Accord and its ramifications. The Nkomati Accord functioned in these interviews as a touchstone in discussions of the general state of affairs existing between the Republic of South Africa and the surrounding countries. The organization of these states in the FLS (Front Line States) and the degree of solidarity and progress they have achieved in the struggle with South Africa was a corollary point for investigation.

However, this field work proved to be fraught with difficulties - some of them unexpected. In mid­ January 1988 the researcher left the United Kingdom with a visa for Zambia. None of the other countries contacted had been forthcoming with either research or tourist visas. It w hoped that entry into the other FLS would be facilitated by the mere fact of being in. the area and that visas would be more readily obtain­ able on site. Though a good number of interviews and a great deal of information was obtained, important omissions exist in the range of individuals interviewed and the number of states represented.

In Zambia contact was made with the United Nations Institute of Namibia (this contact was facili­ tated by the efforts of SWAPO, South West African Peoples' Organisation, headquarters in London) and through them access was gained to the University of Zambia, Zambia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the

.Ministry of National Guidance, Information and Broadcasting Services. In all, three weeks were spent in

Lusaka

Entry into Zimbabwe was arranged and in Harare contact was made with the Department of Political Science and the Faculty of Law at the University of Zimbabwe. In a pattern which often repeated itself, numerous promises were made but few interviews materialized. A number of other sessions were recorded during visits to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The Herald* and the offices of the PAC (Pan African Congress).

After three weeks the researcher left for Tanzania where, after serious problems involving a diplomatic visa issued for an ordinary passport, which resulted in a brief period of incarceration, contact was established with the Centre for Foreign Relations. There access to the Institute for Development Stu­ dies and University of Dar es Salaam was arranged. Some interviews were conducted and a significant body of material (primarily press clippings) was obtained from both the Institute's Library and the National Library. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused all assistance because the researcher was not equipped

with a research permit - an item priced at US $500 which they were then, admittedly, willing to supply.

In Mozambique several interviews and a certain number of government documents were obtained. This was facilitated by the Centre for African Studies in Maputo. A third source of valuable information on Nkomati was the offices of *AIM* (Mozambique Information Agency). After three weeks in Maputo the researcher entered Swaziland. For the first time, however, there was a point blank refusal by all contacts to be interviewed or to provide access to newspaper files, libraries, and the like. These refusals were predi­ cated entirely on the subject being researched and, apparently, its ramifications in and for Swaziland.

In the University of Botswana personnel were unavailable due to a vacation break. Interviews were conducted at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and data was collected at the broadcasting station and the offices of *The Guardian* newspaper in Gabarone. Interviews were requested at SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference) headquarters but after four days of deliberation they were finally refused on the grounds that the Nkomati Accord was a subject irrelevant to SADCC (they did agree to answer the interview questions in questionnaire form but no written response bas been forthcoming).

The researcher left Botswana near the end of May to return to the United Kingdom. After a little over five months in southern Africa a considerable body of data (especially news accounts, editorials and conference papers) had been collected. The interviews which had been conducted were remarkable for their

consistency rather than their variety and have also proved an invaluable resource in studying the Accord and in building a general picture of FLS reactions to Nkomati, their attitudes towards South Africa, and their general view of the situation in southern Africa.

The following analysis of the interviews conducted on the tour is performed in terms of the collective response to each question. The interview format was fairly consistent throughout and the general printed guideline to which the researcher referred is appended (Appendix Six). The general topics addressed in the questions (as they are ordered in the interview format) can be broken down as follows:

* 1. the nature and purpose of establishing the FLS;
  2. reactions to the signing of the Nkomati Accord;
  3. possible FLS or other party involvement in the Accord;
  4. both Mozambique's and South Africa's reasoning in making the agreement;
  5. the respondents' perceptions of South Africa's internal and external programmes; and
  6. their views on the general international situations in southern Africa.

While it is unfortunate that substantially more members of the press, academia and the governments of each of the countries visited by the researcher could not be included among the interviews there does appear to be such nearly unanimous response in each area that more interviews might have resulted in more of the same responses. While this cannot be said with any certainty, it does seem probable.

The following list gives the names, positions, and locations of the, principal persons who were inter- viewed and the date on which the questioning took place. References in the text will give only surnames

and countries.

Humphrey Bwalya Kunda

Director of International Organizations Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Lusaka, Zambia (2/3/88)

J.M.Ngo

Director of African Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs Lusaka, Zambia

(4/3/88)

Tom Sebina

Information Officer

Department of Information and Publicity African National Congress Headquarters Lusaka, Zambia

(4/3/88)

Arthur Simucboba

News Editor *Times ofZ,ambia* Lusaka, Zambia (10/3/88)

Charles Chikerema

Political Editor *The Herald* Harare, Zimbabwe (17/3/88)

Dr John M.W. Makumbe

Head, Political Science Department University of Zimbabwe

Harare, Zimbabwe (17/3/88)

Waters Toboti

Chief Representative Pan African Congress Zimbabwe

Harare (22/3/88)

Mishek C Hove

Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Harare, Zimbabwe

(23/3/89)

Sghed.rack B.S. Gutto

Lecturer, Faculty of Law University of Zimbabwe Harare, Zimbabwe (23/3/88)

Dr Ibbo Mandaza

Public Service Commissioner Harare, Zimbabwe

(24/3/88)

DrEMa.::;anya

Institute of Development Studies University of Dar es Salaam

Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (7/4/88)

Dr Mwesiga Baregu

University of Dar es Salaam Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (8/4/88)

M. Punabantu

Minister of National Guidance, Information and Broadcasting Lusaka, Zambia

(10/4/88)

Dr. Robert Davies

Centre for African Studies Maputo, Mozambique (19/4/88)

Colonel Sergio Vieira [1]

Director, Centre for African Studies Maputo,Mozambique

(28/4/88)

Bogatsu Pilane

Director of African Affairs Ministry of External Affairs Gabarone, Botswana (2/5/88)

[!] Colonel Sergio Vieria was characterised one of the originators of the Nkomati Accord idea. He was the chief negotiator of the Mozambican side with South Africa during Nkomati negotiations, while he was then the Director of the President's office. After signing the Agreement he became the Chairman of the Joint Security Commission with South Africa. He was the Minis­ ter of Defence, Security, Interior and a Governor one of the Provinces in Mozambique. Now he is a member of the Central Committee and the Director of the Centre for African Studies.

Ben Motlbalamme

Deputy Director of Foreign Affairs Gabarone, Botswana

(6/5/88)

His Excellency E. Shududa

Ambassador to Botswana for Zimbabwe Gabarone, Botswana

(9/5/88)

## ANALYSIS

The questions pertaining directly to the FLS (not all of which were asked or, sometimes, answered) were: what was the purpose in establishing the Front Line States; what are the political, economic and cultural relations among the members; and, what benefit does your country expect from its membership in the FLS?

The essential answer to the question about the establishment of the FLS was put best by Mr. Pilane who summed it up as self-preservation. He cites the need for collective action (or at least its possibility) in the face of South African aggression. For all the respondents this aggression is the source of the need to band together. "None of the frontline states could face South Africa alone." [2] The front which these states face is the last bastion of colonialism on the continent: Namibia, where a war ef liberation was conducted until August 1989 and South Africa, where apartheid is pursued internally and the destabilisation of the neighbouring states is pursued in order to prevent the FLS countries supporting any efforts to overthrow the white government in Pretoria. The very name 'Front Line' implies that these states are engaged in a war. It is a low key, undeclared war but it *is* war nonetheless. "In Zimbabwe when this concept was developed we

were part of [the] colonized area [and] proximity to the area where the liberation war was engaged

prompted this concept of 'Frontline States'. They were attacked so therefore they had to formulate a com­ mon strategy. They were not just attacked directly, but also indirectly through the bandits or sponsored

[2] Pilane, Botswana.

groups." [3] In mentioning only the overt use of violence (whether by the South African army or groups covertly sponsored by Pretoria) only a part of South Africa's aggression is touched on but it is a factor that looms large in the eyes of those who have only recently gained their own freedom. "The effects of [the] two liberation wars [Namibia and South Africa] going on are now spilling over beyond their immediate borders. We see South Africa not only carrying out its brutal suppression and oppression of the people of both Namibia and South Africa, but in carrying out their aggressive acts against its immediate neighbours, for instance what is happening in Mozambique today, it's really a war that is going on between terrorist groups and bandits created and supported by the South African regime [and] the Mozambican government and ... the Mozambican people. In Angola it is the same: the South African regime backs UNITA against the MPLA government ... and especially during the '70s, most of the '70s, South Africa ... carried out its own raids against Mozambique, against Lesotho, against Botswana, against Zambia, against Zimbabwe, so actually these countries are in a battle, in a war which was created by South Africa, so they have to ... defend themselves ..." [4] The white regime in South Africa is equated more than once in the interviews with the Portuguese in Mozambique and Angola and all the respondents regarded the South African whites as colonials, regardless of their claims to 'rights' over South Africa because of their lengthy (by European standards) residence or their 'development' of the country.

Mention is also made of the need "to provide also facilities for political asylum to the victims" of South Africa.[5] The coordination of political action was mentioned by several respondents. And, as Mr. Chik:erema pointed out, the entire FLS effort can be seen as flowing naturally as a part of the "continuing African struggle against colonialism."[6]

As was mentioned, actual violence is only a part of the destabilisation effort which South Africa bas undertaken. it is principally in their answers regarding the possible benefits expected from FLS member­ ship that the respondents addressed these problems. Mr. Chik:erema, for instance, cites the FLS' "ability to frustrate the attempt in Rhodesia to create an internal option with puppet leaders ... so the Frontline States

1. Hove, Zimbabwe.
2. Sebina, Zambia.
3. Makumbe, Zimbabwe.
4. Chikerema, Zimbabwe.

all came together and supported ZANU and ZAPU in the arm[ed] struggle and that is the policy that finally won ..." This represented political and diplomatic action as a group, along with military, involvement It was proof that the members of the FLS were capable of managing concerted action against the much greater resources of South Africa and whatever Western powers might have been pouring money and material into the fight in Zimbabwe. Yet destabilisation is being sought by South Africa in more subtle ways as well. Opinions vary as to whether there is any possibility of the FLS combating the South African efforts at undermining the economies of the FLS. In one man's opinion "we do not derive any benefit as such from this membership of Frontline States. We only offer free service to those of our comrades in South Africa and Namibia who are struggling to liberate themselves. I think it would be very naive of us to ever imagine or think in terms of deriving any economic advantage from this because we are essentially providing a sacrifice for a service."[7]

Another speaks in terms of sacrifice as well. "The crosses [to be borne] are heavy in the sense that the South African regime fights back and tries to destabilise the FLS ... There have been incidents where there have been bombings of residential places, of offices and other facilities which are suspected of being used or occupied by ANC or PAC liberation fighters ... That is outright physical or material cost to the country ..."[8] Sacrifice is seen as the nature ofFLS membership as an obligation "to provide logistical sup­ port to the liberation movement; to wake up support for the liberation movements in the ... area and in the international organisations; but also the FLS has the role of being the ... area to which victims of apartheid

can escape ... and ... receive shelter, receive such services as education, health,, accommodation, and even

the facilities for self-development. The other role would be for the FLS to really magnify the evils of apartheid thereby sending a message to South Africa and the rest of the world.[9]

As others see it, the FLS "was not formed so that people can get gains. It was not like the PTA [Pre­ ferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa] or the SADCC or an economic association where you look to further your economic interests ..."[10] But in its nature as a political/military response to South

1. Kunda, Zambia.
2. Makumbe, Zimbabwe.
3. Makumbe, Zimbabwe.
4. Gutto, Zimbabwe.

Africa they see that "also it has its economic aspects because if you are strong politically, militarily, to resist enemy aggression, and so on, so it is for purposes of enabling you to continue with your nonnal economic activities ... And to that extent, therefore, I think it has certain economic benefits that emerge from pooling resources together to fight the enemy rather than each individual trying to look for resources

to defend itself, to assist the liberation movement ... It has created some gains. But the ... gains are more political/military than economic."[11]

Such is the general view of the purposes of membership in FLS. The call for sacrifice on the part of the countries involved invokes the same spirit of a people at war as does the name 'Frontline' States. 'Gains' was a word that met with immediate reaction from a number of those interviewed who wished to make it clear right away that no gains other than those which contributed to the liberation effort in Namibia and South Africa were part of the FLS agenda

The next question was: **Did Mozambique consulted the FLS before the signing of the Nkomati Accord?** In answering this question, interviewees referred to individual countries responses to the agree­ ment and to whether the FLS (or individual states) had been consulted by Mozambique prior to finalising the Accord arrangements.

"It was not a move which was taken in consultation with the FLS or for that matter the liberation movement. It was something which was taken unilaterally and I think there was considerable concern on the part of the FLS that this was in fact a breakthrough for South Africa's consolidation of state strategy ... in that one of the essential elements was the signing of non-aggression pacts. And I think for some consid­ erable time there were some differences, and particularly also the fact is ... that this signing was followed by pressure on other regional states ... to follow suit, and I think there was some concern that what had hap­ pened was a major diplomatic breakthrough scored by Pretoria, and so there was ... considerable concern (at least until the period following the breakdown of the October Declaration negotiations) and I think (I am not privy to the inside discussion that went on) but there was a meeting of the FLS after the October Declaration and I believe there was at least [an] exchange of views about this ... I think that is probably pretty well established now ... they [the Mozambican] did not consult the FLS"[12] There was general [I!] Gutto, Zimbabwe.

agreement that the decision was not made in full consultation with the FLS. "They did not tell the frontline states in advance ... but ... Mozambique briefed other heads of states ... that they had signed this Nkomati Accord. And they explained why they were forced to sign it. And, while, in as much as most of us are very sceptical about signing it ... this kind of security agreement with South Africa ... we understood and appre­ ciated Mozambique's problem, and I don't think there was any violent or serious opposition to the approval of Mozambique's signing of this Accord."[13]

Some interviewees believed that, aithough there may have been little or no consultation, it was Mozambique's right as a sovereign country not to consult the FLS. "No. It was their right. The FLS tend to respect that a lot. There are certain situations ... which they can discuss at common meetings, but there are I think things which are left to the individual country."[14] This view was shared by a senior Zambian Minister who expanded on why be felt the FLS were not consulted "We are not a part of it, no, it is when they reached the point where they said 'next week we are going to sign' that is when they said 'can you come and witness this?' and then I think we said 'witness what?' ... I think someone went there. The President was asked but be could not go. I know, I was working with him at that time. I think one of the reasons really is be is not part and parcel of the process, you know, leading to this and he saw it as an effort by Mozambique as a sovereign state ... to do this, just in the same way as be [Kaunda] meets President Botha. I mean be did not consult to say 'well, can I meet President Botha or not?' He decided and said 'O.K., I think I will meet him before the others' and indeed there was some resistance, there were different

views. There were those who thought 'no, no, President Kaunda should not talk to President Botha', but he

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said 'I am going to speak to him.' And of course, after speaking to him he reported to them ... what he had talked about. So there was no consultation, not in the case ofZambia."[15]

A second Zambian interviewee also believed that there was no formal consultation but that it was Mozambique's right as an independent country to make unilateral decisions. "I don't think they did. No. Well, Mozambique is a sovereign country. And they thought ... they signed an agreement that was not

[12) Davies, Mozambique.

1. Pilane, Botswana.
2. Hove, Zimbabwe.
3. Punabantu, Zambia.

going to compromise the common cause ... there was not formal consultation. "[16]

Other intenriewees disagreed that there bad been no consultation over the signing of the Nkomati Accord. "I think the consultation happened because Samora Machel came to Tanzania and met the chair­ man of the FLS at that time, before signing the agreement."[17] Although it had not been discussed in detail, "Yes, they discussed it in the Front Line summits, not the details of course ... The FLS knew all about the proposed agreement of Accord, before Mozambique went to talk to South Africa, but it was on a take note basis really, rather than on a consultation basis. It is not like Mozambique to ask the FLS 'could you allow us to do this' or 'what do you think we should do' or 'can we have permission to do this.' No. I mean no sovereign state would do that even within a given corporation or group of countries. But it was a take note basis and very informal so that the FLS were not entirely surprised to hear the Accord had been signed, but they agreed ... it was really Mozambique's decision as a sovereign state, and if it worked the FLS would wish Mozambique all the best If it did not work, they would continue to support Mozambique in its problems of destabilisation, which they themselves were experiencing."[18]

Many interviewees could not claim to know of formal consultation having taken place, but believed it must have taken place. "I think she must have addressed it to the FLS. I think Mozambique told the FLS about [the] Nkomati Accord ... before the signing [but] I do not know at what stage before the signing."[19] A second opinion believed that" ... I really do not know. But it is normal that if we are going to take acer­ tain act we do inform the neighbouring parties. They would have informed them first."[20] The majority of the people interviewed were unsure as to the degree of consultation which bad t,iken place. "Not as far as I know. [The members are] individual countries which are sovereignly different, social, political systems and therefore they may have told those whom they are closer to but not everybody, so I don't think it was discussed as a Frontline State issue before it was done."[21)

1. Ngo, Zambia.
2. Barcgu, Tanzania.

[I SJ Makumbe, Zimbabwe.

1. Simuchoba, Zambia.
2. Shududa, Zimbabwe.
3. Gutto, Zimbabwe.

"I cannot say much ... I don't know very much about that I think they informed the frontline states. That is why I say there was an all round mode of understanding although there was scepticism at the possi­ bility of the exercise being beneficial."[22]

Among those interviewees who were uncertain about the extent of any consultation, some were of the opinion that any discussion which might have taken place would have been negligible. "I am not quite sure. All that I know is that governments of the H..S were invited to the signing of the agreement by Mozambique, no one attended the signing. ·so I think really most of the FLS were not aware."[23]

"I don't know if they consulted the other countries but to us [ANC] they just came to explain what they were doing ... That was before the thing was signed. A short time before the thing was signed but the conclusions in it had already been ..."[24]

It would appear from the responses of the interviewees that most were of the opinion that little or no consultation had taken place (only two out of eighteen believed that there had definitely been consultation) in the case of the Nkomati Accord, which will support our argument put forward in chapter six. The lack of consultation would account for the reaction of the H..S to the Accord, which was one of surprise " ... It came as a bolt out of the blue to the FLS ..."[25] and disagreement with Mozambique's decision. We might suppose that if full consultation had taken place, the reaction of the FLS to the Accord would have been less vehement.

**Q.** Is **there was any pressures being put on both sides (South Africa and Mozambique) to sign Nkomati Accord?**

In asking the above question, we allowed the respondent to put his own interpretation on the meaning of the word 'pressure' that is, either external or internal pressure (or both). Some interviewees believed that if any pressure exerted on Mozambique was internal with the FRELIMO government. "I don't think there was a pressure from anywhere else. It was a decision taken by the Mozambican government"[26]

1. Chikerema, Zimbabwe.
2. Maganya, Tanzania.
3. Sebina, Zambia.
4. Davies, Mozambique.
5. Sebina, Zambia.

"No. The pressure was from within Mozambique itself, and it was their decision ..."[27]

However, the major source of internal pressure within Mozambique was undoubtedly the 11NR (iron­ ically, supported by certain South African military elements). "From outside I am not aware of pressures being put on Mozambique. However, one cannot - given the reality of history - say that there was no attempt made particularly by imperialist countries trying to pretend that they would be able to make South Africa stop the bandits and so on and so there may have been that kind of pressure being put on. What the imperialists knew that South Africa continued to help the MNR bandits and so on, there may have been some pressure - and I don't think imperialism is beyond this kind of manoeuvre but I do not have concrete information."[28]

The need to deal with this internal pressure was uppermost in the mind of the FRELIMO govern-

ment

"What happened was that after the Fourth Congress they decided that it was part of [their] strategy of combating the bandits to try and isolate their external backers - South Africa - from the western powers and prevent a situation such as in Angola where UNITA has been [getting] material military support from the United States. So basically there was this period of diplomacy which ended in these results ... The MNR is

regarded in a different light [from] UNITA. The western nations' suggestion this way to seek security for

South Africa, and I think it is a matter of some dispute. And if you speak to Mozambicans they will insist that basically it was Mozambique acting out of its own pursuit of its interests and not western pressure. But I think the general attitude at least of the western powers had changed towarck having previously created the climate for regional aggression can now see that this had negative consequences and possibly states may turn increasingly to the Soviet Union. I think this has played some role in creating this climate."[29]

Although, no respondents bad concrete evidence of any external pressure, some believed that such pressure must have been applied. "...I would like to argue that that pressure would be minimal. There could be pressure particularly from Mozambique's major supporters such as the Soviet Union and possibly

1. Ngo, Zambia.
2. Gutta, Zimbabwe.
3. Davies, Mozambique.

China, both countries which really in the past five - ten years have softened their stance against imperialism and have basically said that there is nothing wrong with doing business with imperialism, with the West. And I can assume, I don't have any empirical evidence at all ... that they have had pressure. There could have been pressure as well, but probably much more subtly applied, by Zimbabwe, in the sense that Zim­ babwe has a trade mission and [its] trade relations are very strong with South Africa. There could be a situation where Zimbabwe possibly advised rather than pressured Mozambique to get into a situation where

... relations ofunderstanding could be established with apartheid rule in South Africa to enable the develop- ment of the country to proceed. There could have been pressure but I would like to argue that if there was any external ... pressure it was mainly from the supporters of Mozambique ... Pressure from the imperialist camp can be discounted [because] it took a very long time for the western countries to recognize Mozam­ bique anyway, so that it would not be obvious pressure. It would just be outright opposition to disturb the ideological stance that Mozambique had adopted since its independence ..."[30]

In addition to the above pressure, some respondents believed that western governments also had a role to play. "The imperialist countries I think must also have come out because several times the Frontline States have appealed to them ... to western countries ... to cease supporting South Africa, to bring pressure to bear on South Africa, not to aggravate the regional situation and to achieve independence for Namibia. So I am just really ma.king the point that the western countries must have said 'Yes, we are prepared to do this, but maybe you can also help us, if you sign this sort of thing.' So it was turned around, as it turned

out, because I remember President Kaunda saying, attacking the West, that ,they had promised to do their

best after the signing of the Nkomati Accord. But nothing of that sort took place. On the contrary, just as South Africa, the West had wanted to weaken the Frontline States so to protect South Africa, and the Ban­ tustans inside South Africa ..."[31]

The question of pressure led us to ask Colonel Vieira if there was any third party acted as a mediator between Mozambique and South Africa (especially the United States as most of the reports mentioned). "As far as I know, no mediator exists. The Accord was entirely discussed, conceived, in the discussions

(30] Makumbe, Zimbabwe. (3I] Chikerema, Zimbabwe.

between Mozambique and South Africa. Of course, during that process we have discussed with other coun­ tries. I presume South Africa discussed with other countries. I just can't present their views on Mozam-\_ bique. And I presume that other countries present also their views to South Africa, because a lot of coun­ tries were concerned by the evolution of the situation in southern Africa. But again I say, no mediator exists, contrary to what I have read in several places." "It's an untruth. It's not fair. Of course, we have expressed our views to the United States government The United States government has presented its views to us. I presume that ... and they have told us so ... that they have discussed with South Africa, but no mediator." "They [US] support Nkomati Accord, as other countries have supported. Full stop." "Well, if there was pressure in South Africa to sign the Accord, I don't know. As far as Mozambique is con­ cerned, no pressure was put in Mozambique to sign the Accord. It was entirely and solely our decision. And I want to say that as far as I know, that I was placed in a very good situation to know about it "[32]

The above view is however disputed. " ... the role of the United States in all *this* ... Chester Crocker has been shuttling in Southern Africa ... if you remember the Kissinger shuttles of the Middle East ... there had been the Chester Crocker shuttle into Southern Africa ... the United States was interested not only in its own warming up towards South Africa but also in creating amicable relations between South Africa and its neighbours ..."[33]

As we review the responses to the above question, we can see that more than one interpretation bas been put on the possible role of pressure which helped in bringing Mozambique to Nkomati Some inter­ viewees were of the opinion that there might have been external pressure on l-4ozambique (Soviet Union, China, South Africa, Zimbabwe, United States and so forth) and others that, indeed, there was a different kind of pressure internally (within the FRELIMO government) also internally by the :MNR. It could be argued that there was a combination of both external and internal pressure on Mozambique (for example, the support of the Jv1NR by some military elements within South Africa) to coerce the FRELIMO govern- ment into signing the Nkomati Accord.

1. Vieira, Mozambique.
2. Barcgu, Tanzania.

### Q. Did the signing of the Nkomati Accord affect the solidarity of the FLS?

The Nkomati Accord acted as a test-bed for the solidarity of the FLS. There were different views expressed by the respondents, the solidarity of the FLS bad been affected by Nkomati. "I would imagine initially, yes. Initially it must have come *as* a shock. Particularly those countries that were real principals in the question of the South African Liberation struggle such as Tanzania, definitely Zimbabwe was dis­ turbed; and to some extent Zambia. So I think initially there was shock as to what bad happened, and I

think after one month from the signing I tbmk most of the FLS began to assess the situation. Increasingly it

became clear that the Nkomati Agreement would not work and that, of course, signing an agreement with a state that has no morals and no principles ... definitely it was already clear that the Nkomati Accord might have been really not respected by South Africa. So in that position they eventually realised that, indeed, the Liberation struggle would continue."[34] "It was a controversial matter between the FLS. I think the way that things have worked out now, and particularly the whole period of 1985 onwards, is really basically a strengthening of the community within the FLS. The commitment of Zimbabwe, Tanzania, to militarily support the Frelimo government that emerged in the context of the failure of the Accord to achieve its prin­ ciple objective ... that of bringing peace to South Africa. The secondary objective of exposing South Africa as the regional aggressor has achieved marvelous results."[35]

The degree to which the solidarity of the FLS bad been undermined was not, however, clear cut. Some interviewees were hesitant in their response to this question. "I think it did, and I do not know if this documented how Tanzania responded, but I remember that the ANC for example was fairly guarded in its response and they said something to the effect that we understand the problems that made this necessary but they were still quite critical of it ... not in the open. In other words, it did not isolate Mozambique or did not seek that Mozambique should be ostracized from the coalition of the FLS but it was felt that the move was detrimental and that potentially it would bring about a breakdown of the coalition among the FLS. But there was guarded criticism and it was kept within the limits of the context of sovereign rights. This is already a sovereign state. This is a clause in the nature of coalitions that the whole coalition is premised on

1. Maganya, Tanzania.
2. Davies, Mozambique.

mutual respect for each other's sovereignty until one member acts in a manner which threatens the whole coalition then you have to find ways of dealing with that. But I think it became gradually obvious to Mozambique that there bad been a mi.stake. Now it is not clear to me whether Mozambique bad placed all its faith in the agreement, or whether they left themselves options ... in other words, if you sign on but you are aware that there is the good possibility that the other country is not going to conform to the agreement then you might begin to adopt certain strategies which would limit the damage [which could] be done."[36]

Some interviewees felt that Mozambique, being one of the major FLS, had embarrassed the other FLS by signing the Nkomati Accord. 1bis could have constituted a real threat to the solidarity of the FLS, if it bad not been for the eventual understanding of the difficult position Mozambique found itself in with regard to South Africa. "It raised eyebrows in not only FLS but also internationally, because it did look like an embarrassment to the FLS. Indeed, with all the anti-apartheid movements in the FLS, in South Africa and in the international community. But the FLS were understanding, more understanding than would otherwise have been the case because for the severe economic and political problems which Mozam­ bique has experienced since 1975 ... that is since its independence. The decimation of its society, its com­ munity, its economy, in the sponsoring of the so-called monolithic national resistance army, necessitated, the FLS understood, the Nkomati Accord. A half-baked solution but a necessary attempt by Mozambique to solve that problem. Not just for putting apartheid out of business, but really for its own sake. But it really did raise some eyebrows and some worries because of the various clauses in the agreement which

seemed really to reflect a sort of truce or partnership with an obnoxious system. But fortunately, for both

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the FLS and for Mozambique, the Apartheid regime could not honour the Nkomati Agreement. It contin­ ued to support the MNR and it failed to prevent or to stop the bandits from operating in Mozambique. It actually continued to supply them arms, clothing and food. And that annulled technically the Nkomati Agreement And that again came about with very little of the FLS making any noise about it or shouting at either Mozambique or South Africa. And therefore, the extent to which Nkomati Agreement largely can be said to be a non-event is to the FLS is probably a benefit."[37]

1. Baregu, Tanzania.
2. Makumbe, Zimbabwe.

"What we observed in a way was that ... there was a mood, an all around mood of understanding as to why Mozambique was obliged to do that. It is a country that got independence around 1975 I think, immediately after that it gave military base to the Zimbabwe Liberation forces - ZANU in particular - and the war was won primarily because of those military bases and those that were in Zambia ... And this agreement to support the Liberation Movement that openly, provoked retaliation from the military govern­ ment, gave rise to the creation of the Renamo [MNR] bandits and eventually played havoc with the politi­ cal, military and security situation in Mozambique. In one way Mozambique was never given breathing space after its independence. The South African military structure intensified its acts of aggression and adopted the Renamo bandit political structure to intensify acts of aggression, and it is within that situation that ... within that framework ... political situation ... I mean within economic-social-political situation that Nkomati was signed. So what I say is that the Frontline States understood that the Mozambique govern­ ment was obliged to attempt to minimise the impact of South African aggression by not giving military bases to the liberation forces in South Africa, but agreeing not to give ... hoping that South Africa would do the same and not support the Renamo bandits. There was a mood of understanding, but, I daresay many of them did not think that was the correct thing, but they understood the circumstances ... the political cir­ cumstances under which Mozambique was obliged to do so."[38]

Other interviewees took the view that the signing of the Nkomati Agreement had no effect on the solidarity of the FLS. "No I don't think so. I don't remember anything of any one opposing it. Mozam­ bique had to do that to protect their own security."[39]

It would appear that we have three groups of respondents to this question. Those who believe that the solidarity of the FLS was affected, those who believe it was not and those who believe it was only affected initially. However, it is clear that for each of the respondents who was asked this question con­ sideration of the overall commitment of the FLS to liberation overrode (for themselves and for the FLS members) shorter term goals. As Davies in particular points out, the Accord has worked in the FLS's favour since South Africa has so blatantly failed to keep its end of the bargain. It could be argued, however,

(38] Chikerema, Zimbabwe.

(39] Hove, Zimbabwe.

that Mozambique has it both ways in having reached an understanding with both South Africa and the FLS. There was, nonetheless, a great deal of discomfort, shock and scepticism initially but the respondents seem to realize that without the necessary recognition of Mozambique's sovereignty and its right to make such decisions for itc;elf the solidarity of the FLS would be seriously threatened. Those nations have banded together as a group of sovereign states and once any inroads are made on that sovereignty the very nature of their coalition is changed. For this reason the individual reactions are as interesting as those of the group.

### Q: What was your government's reaction to the Nkomati Accord?

Many of the interviewees were hesitant or reluctant to speak on behalf of their or other governments with regard to any reaction to the Nkomati Accord. Therefore, " ... there were different reactions ... each country is sovereign and you can have different assessments of a situation ... [some] fully understood and

supported our [MozambiqueJ decisions ... other countries considered that it was for this or that special rea­

son erroneous ... "[40] Consequently, some responses to the above question were often curt. "Well, our reaction was, number one, we appreciate Mozambique's problem, and it had no other way of ensuring that South Africa will not intervene in their internal affairs ... So as much as we do not like getting into any kind of agreements with South Africa, at least those of a security nature ... we did appreciate [that] Mozambique's problems motivated them to sign ..." (41] Some interviewees had even less to offer on this issue. "Our reaction was to say it was not going to work." [42]

According to Mr. Ngo a decision "compromising [the] liberation struggle ... compromising our com­ mon cause" would have met with resistance with Zambia. But "Nkomati does'not compromise that com- mon cause."[43] Mr Kunda called the Zambian government's reaction "one of support" - citing sovereignty as the important issue so long as the liberation struggle is not endangered.[44]

The reaction of Zimbabwe was described as one of "let's wait and see." According to Dr Makumbe this meant that "knowing [the] apartheid regime in South Africa ... you can[not] trust the regime with any-

1. Vieira, Mozambique,
2. Pilane, Botswana.
3. Hove, Zimbabwe. [43) Ngo, Zambia.
4. Kunda, Zambia.

thing honourable, and so by waiting and seeing they were able to see the apartheid regime act in accordance with what they know all along, that it cannot honour any such agreement ..."[45] A Tanzanian academic summarised the FLS reaction to Nkomati Accord by saying " ... I do not know of anybody in the region who was happy by the Accord ... it would seem to me through the grapevine is that Nyerere was very angry

... [because] Machel probably at that time had run too far ..."[46]

Most of the respondents were sceptical with regard to South Africa's sincerity in signing the Nkomati Accord and were sympathetic to the position in which Mozambique found itself. In believing, therefore, that the Accord would eventually fail, they seemed to be happy just to "wait and see". This would explain why it took one year for the FLS publicly to condemn (in the 1985 Lusaka summit) the Nkomati Accord (see chapter 6).

### Q: What is the extent ofFLS support for the Liberation Movements?

All the respondents agreed that the FLS gave considerable support to the liberation movements in Southern Africa and some were of the opinion that the motive behind the formation of the FLS was the sup­ port of such movements. "I think to a very large extent ... both [the FLS and the OAU] give both material and moral and financial support."[47] "They support those groupings fully. In fact ... the whole ptupose of forming the frontline states as a political force was to facilitate ... the support for the ANC, SWAPO and PAC."[48]

Some of the respondents emphasized the problems of the liberation movements and the capacity of the FLS to help. "Well, we will all go and support it We know theirs is a very difficult task ... So there is no question [that the FLS] supports the liberation struggle led by SWAPO and ANC."[49] "There is quite visible cooperation [between] the liberation movements and the FLS ... [But] recently South Africa claimed the ANC attacked a farm in South Africa from the Zimbabwe borders with our assistance, we could provide rear bases, we have the capacity, but we don't encourage that kind of thing. We prefer the people [refugees,

1. Makumbe, Zimbabwe.
2. Baregu, Tanzania.
3. Simuchoba, Zambia.
4. Kunda, Zambia.
5. Ngo, Zambia.

etc.] to find something inside the country."[50]

The response of Mr. Sebina of the ANC to the earlier question about membership of the ANC in the FLS (in which the ANC are observer members) and its 'benefits' shoud be coupled with his response to this question about FLS support and gives a viewpoint from the ANC side. Its enthusiasm may be, in part, pub­ lic relations but it seems to be a credible assessment.

"They have been in the forefront of supporting our liberation struggle all the time and they have been very very strong about it; I think that *is* the most important thing we get. And of course there *is* also the question that when our people are forced to leave South Africa they find a refuge and protection in these countries. And as members of the OAU they receive financial and material support and it had been very very great and we appreciate it very much ... Well I think again the support we get from the Front Line States has been enormous, enormous in the sense that they have taken very strong political positions like the example I gave you on the question of sanctions. I told you they have given us moral and material sup­ port, the material support coming through the Liberation Committee of the OAU, and of course there is the fact that all these countries have accepted our presence in these countries. To us that is very encouraging. It means that they understand our struggle and accept the fact that they are part and parcel of this process of liberating our people in South Africa."[51]

It would seem, from the responses given, that there is little disagreement over the degree of support given to the liberation movements by the FLS, even if some FLS (Zimbabwe and Botswana) do not wish to be seen as collaborating with groups such as the ANC. Any attacks carried out in South Africa by the mili­ tary wing of the ANC which are launched from their soil, are immediately condemned by Zimbabwe and Botswana. Attacks carried out wholly within South Africa by the ANC do not attract such condemnation by Zimbabwe, Botswana and other FLS. This rather ambiguous position underlines the weakness of the FLS capacity to challenge the Pretoria military forces.

### Q: Why do you think Mozambique signed the Nkomati Accord?

1. Hove, Zimbabwe.
2. Sebina, Zambia.

The most resounding and understanding, answer offered by those interviewed was 'peace'. "It was a country that bad never known the peace for a long time ..."[52] "Mozambique signed the agreement trying to bring peace into their country ..."[53] "Mozambique wanted to show that they are really a peace loving country, they wanted to pursue peace with South Africa, [though] at the same time condemn[ing] apartbeid."[54] "Mozambique, I assume, signed it because they wanted to have some peace and tranquil­ ity."[55] "Well, they signed the Accord because they wanted some peace ... This is what everybody was told, you know ..."[56] "The desire to have peace itself."[57] As Colonel Vieira put it, in a somewhat self­ justifying fashion: "Now, in looking for this peaceful relationship with neighbours, we don't look only to have a peaceful relationship with those who think the same way as we do. We have also to look for a peaceful relation or peaceful coexistence, particularly with those who disagree at our principles and our way of being in existence. Now, the course of events that was taking place was leading to a direct war between the two states. After several attacks South Africa may have made an air raid against the outskirts of Maputo. So an escalation was taking place. We don't refuse to defend ourselves if we are attacked. The Mozambican people have proved in different wars that it was committed to the defence of bis national rights and civil rights. But of course if we can prevent a war we would be completely fools to refuse it. Now, we took the initiative, took the proposal to South Africa. A non-aggression accord. The first reason it was because we want to prevent a war between the two states."[58]

But immediately following all these references to peace were the reasons why peace was not only

desirable but necessary. "They were trying to save their country from destabilisation - to create stability in

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their country as a basis for economic development."[59] South Africa's "support [of the :tvfNR] was weak­ ening the economy of the country. So they wanted just to destroy the MNR in any way."[60] "Mozambique

1. Motlhamme, Botswana.
2. Simuchoba, Zambia.
3. Shududa, Zimbabwe.
4. Pilane, Botswana.
5. Kunda, Zambia.
6. Gutto, Zimbabwe.
7. Vieira, Mozambique.
8. Simuchoba, Zambia.
9. Shududa, Botswana.

that the Accord was, specifically, a non-aggression pact was a clear indication from Pretoria that failure to sign would be taken by the regime there as a paper justification for a first strike. If a country such as Mozambique was unwilling to sign an agreement not to attack another country, that country must then be perfectly justified in assuming that Mozambique's intentions were not peaceful and, were, in fact, a threat to South Africa. This did not mean, however, that the South Africans completely neglected the finer shades of diplomacy. Mr. Punabantu describes the sort of persuasion used by the South Africans. Of President Botha on apartheid there is a claim that '"If you watch my speeches ... I rarely use the word 'Apartheid'. I use the words 'separate development'." Botha claims that "Our people, meaning the people of South Africa, made mistakes, and really some of them were terrible mistakes ... South Africa today is more or less at the point where the British left us ... The Afrikaners there, the Blacks there, the British there, and so on ... Now when you start developing them you should put the same amount of development into each commun­ ity ... you know, in my party they think I am just too ... liberal, and as a result my party is peeling off on the right ..."[65] It would seem, therefore, that if right wing groups are to be prevented from taking power in South Africa, then support for Botha (or the present regime) and the unity of his party were a means to achieve this goal and to prevent a deterioration the lot of black South Africans. Clearly the South Africans were devoted to these ideas of reforms which are intended to place them in a good light in world opinion.

But there was also a faint hope for Mozambique that South Africa *might* feel obliged actually to earn

the world's good opinion if the Accord was made between the two countries. "I think there was hope from

ex-pectation on the part of some of the Mozambican decision makers, that South, Africa [might] actually be forced to [live] up to it, but failing this, then would be exposed as the aggressor, [which] would undermine

its position [with] the Western powers."[66]

Q: Do you think the Accord is still alive? Why?

Collectively the answer to this question is a resounding No. Mr. Sebina laughed ironically at the question. His answer amounted to the same blunt No as most of the others but he managed to put a much finer point on it. "Well it has still got a certain life because of the Mozambicans saying that they are to

(65] Punabantu, Zambia.

(66] Davies, Mozambique.

signed ... to develop its resources, because you cannot carry on a [socialist] revolution and at the same time engage in war ..."[61] "Its economy [was] integrated with that of South Africa. You might look at Mozambique's labour immigration. There was no training to prepare them [Mozambicans] to take over their own economy ... Under the Portuguese you could not distinguish whether [Maputo] was a town in South Africa because it was a tourist resort for South Africans."[62] Mr. Motlhalamme goes on to say that under the Portuguese the indigenous population of Mozambique had never had even the slightest part of its potential developed. The Frelimo government was therefore faced with an overwhelming task of moderniz­ ing what bad essentially been a slave colony up until a few years ago. To place itself on any reasonably competitive footing with a country like South Africa was more than they were able to accomplish while the state's security was under constant attack from the South African-supported guerilla of the 11:NR. "The 11NR for its part did not just shoot the people and kill them, but it also destroyed the infrastructure and suc­ cessful irrigation schemes, and power lines were all blown off and destroyed, billions of dollars were lost to Mozambique as a result of the activity of the apartheid regime and 11:NR."[63]

The intertwining of the economies of the two countries proves, as it has elsewhere in southern Africa to be an insuperable obstacle. The operations of the MNR in farming regions of Mozambique, the disrup­ tion of ordinary commerce, the expenditure on the military necessitated by everyday threats from South Africa and aggravated by the 11:NR, the problem of supply and outlets from South Africa were an economic destabilisation programme that could not be met by Mozambique. "It is pushed into a comer where it bas few options and in fact had only one option, that was to sign. No other options. So it was coerced into signing. The question is, once it signs does Mozambique then, in the next period, comply or does it not comply?"[64] This is the point at which the threat is, by implication, escalated as high as it can go. *As*

several of the respondents pointed out, South Africa made it clear, from the specific type of comer into

which it pushed Mozambique that failure to sign the Accord would result in outright war. A country so lit­ tle equipped to meet the demands of regular tactical warfare could never risk such a possibility. The fact

1. Gutto, Zimbabwe.
2. Mot\halamme, Botswana.
3. Makumbe, Zimbabwe.
4. Baregu, Tanzania.

stand by it ... on [their] side the Accord, of course, is still alive. I think it's dead as far as the South Afri­ cans are concerned. As far as the South African government it doesn't exist ... they are continuing support­ ing the rebels there and all the evidence [is] that the South African regime is directly involved ..."[67] Strong terms were repeatedly invoked to second this opinion. "The South Africans have done everything in their power to destroy the Nkomati Agreement. It might be there on paper but in terms of what it is sup- posed to [do] it is just not there."[68]

Honour aside, for some Nkomati represents a response to the particular threat of South African mili­ tary action. Rather than getting rid of the 1v1NR by signing the Accord, Mozambique may have been keep­ ing South Africa from escalating its attack on the country. "As far as Mozambique is concerned it is not dead. The day Mozambique says the Nkomati Accord is not there, South Africa will attack them."[69]

The opinion of most of the interviewees is, then, that the Nkomati Accord is being kept alive by Mozambique alone. We should bear in mind, however, that South Africa also has a strong interest in keep­ ing the Accord alive. South Africa wants to keep the liberation movements away from its borders and to appear as a peace-keeping force (at least to international eyes) in Southern Africa. As most of the inter­ viewees claim that South Africa is still supporting the MNR, their desire to appear as peace-keepers in Southern Africa is perhaps a little hopeful. Our study has shown (chapter 5, 'Gorongosa documents') that certain elements within the South African military establishment had supported the 1v1NR. However, there

is no evidence to suggest that this support continues to exist.

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In 1989, F.W. de Klerk (who later became President of South Africa) visited Mozambique and with President Chissano insisted on revitalising the Nkomti Accord.

### Q: Has any other country from the region signed any kind of agreement with South Africa?

Several agreements were mentioned by various respondents. There was a certain amount of disagree­ ment as to whether certain secret arrangements existed in fact or were merely rumours. "Well, different accords were signed. In '84 South Africa signed an accord with the People's Republic of Angola. What is

1. Sebina, Zambia.
2. Kunda, Zambia.
3. Shududa, Botswana.

known as the Lusaka Understanding. But South Africa never respected it. You remember that South Africa by that understanding was forced to withdraw all its troops from Angola, and a few days after they have signed that understanding, they tried to make an aggression against the province of Cangamba in Angola in which Major Dutoit from the South Africa defence forces was captured and a number of South African soldiers were killed. So the understanding of Lusaka was one of these agreements. South Africa signed an accord with Swaziland but also I think that they never respect ... they are all the time making kil­ lings within the territory of Swaziland. They have signed an accord with Lesotho that also they have not respected. They have principles of understanding with Botswana that they never respect, but they don't have a signed accord. But they have principles of understanding. Also I understand that they have an agreed modus vivendi with Zimbabwe that they are not respecting. But the question is not South Africa not respecting. The fact is, the potent fact is, that today in terms of the governments and international public opinion there is a very clear understanding [as to] the nature of the conflict in southern Africa, and who is the aggressor. And this is something that which we achieved, not only for Mozambique, but all for the Front-Line States."[7O]

In the case of other countries the pervasiveness of rumour takes over. "I don't think Botswana signed an accord ... Zimbabwe have refused."[71] "Yes I think it is common knowledge that Swaziland, to an extent, Botswana, and people rumoured that Zimbabwe might but I am not quite, ... well-informed on that, so I cannot say whether they have or not ... Very few of them have been publicised except [that with] Swaziland..."[72]

As most of the interviewees stated, South Africa has signed various agreements with most of the FLS. Only three of these agreements have been publicly accounced (with Angola, Mozambique and Swazi­ land) while the remainder have constituted kind of 'principles of understanding' such as with Botswana. Most of the respondents felt that whatever agreement South Africa inters into (whether formal or informal), Pretoria never respects it.

1. Vieira, Mozambique.
2. Chikerema, Zimbabwe.
3. Gutto, Zimbabwe.

### Q: How would you define the conflict in Southern Africa?

The answers to this particular question, which is certainly open to rather wide interpretation, covered a range of subjects depending on how the respondents perceived what it was they were being asked. Dr Baregu of Dar es Salaam University, for instance, gave an academic answer which focussed on the stratification of the groups in the area and external influences in economic tenns. "On the one hand, you have imperialist interest. Namely from western countries including Japan. They divide themselves between investments, business interests, commercial trade-type interests, minerals, etc. ... you have the internal class contradictions between the settler colonial elements. You have the capitalist internal element, which is more in collaboration with international capital and probably tends to have to take more progres­ sive views than the Africans who form the majority, and of course the coloureds. And you have that kind of dialectic between the African labour force [and] the white labour force, all playing within the context of the apartheid system ...\)What these conflicts produce are apparent liberalism in a capitalist bourgeoisie which, by its nature, sees limitations on the free movement of labour as utterly antithetical to the full func­ tioning of the capitalist system. Hence the urging of much more radical reform by this group while the white labour force is deeply conservative. Their conservatism is motivated by fear of competition for the better jobs which currently fall to the whites' share and fear of a loss of status since their sole claim to any­ thing other than the near-bottom of the heap, in a very class-conscious society, is based on their colour.[73]

Yet, despite analyzing the Marxist/socialist/democratic alternatives, for Dr Baregu, as for most of the respondents, the entire current situation boils down to what South Africa is doing to ensure the continued reign of apartheid there. *All* economic, political, and security decisions in the countries surrounding South Africa are directly influenced by that country's concerted effort to destabilise the region. Military threats, support of guerilla groups, economic threats, inaccessibility of ports and markets, propaganda of a political nature ... all these are cited by various respondents as the tools South Africa uses in this effort.

There is also enonnous significance in relative wealth, resources and international influence enjoyed by the aggressor in comparison with the weaker status of the FLS coalition. "Combined the FLS are still militarily weak.er than South Africa, mainly because South Africa is funded, armed and equipped by the

(73] Baregu, Tanzania.

imperialist countries and also because there is far much more resources available for purchasing the latest equipment, the most sophisticated, and it has the guts to use this equipment against the FLS and against its own citizens within South Africa. So the conflict is a military one, it is a political one, it is an economic one, it is a social one, it is a racial one."[74] This is the source of most of South Africa's power in the bal­ ance with the FLS. But South Africa, as several respondents mentioned, also bas to be careful because the FLS countries are a major market for them. Io part because of the low wages and consequent low standard of living of the vast majority of the residents of South Africa, there is a need to export a large part of the total national product in order to operate at a profit The total collapse of the economies and the govern­ ments of the FLS is, therefore, not in South Africa's best interest. Instead they are forced to maintain a careful balance in which the FLS remain economically stable enough to serve as a market for South African products, but economically unstable enough to keep them from developing in terms of productivity so that they will not be economically independent of South Africa or productive enough to field armies comparable to its own. They are, unfortunately, considerably aided in this effort by problems within the FLS them­ selves. "A lot of the FLS are land locked, and they would like a situation where they would be able to tran­ sport their goods to the coast, and transport their imports from the coast at the lowest prices. They would like a situation where the cooperation between themselves would benefit all of them. At the moment they are not able to do that because of the hostilities which exist between them, and the country which has or owns the most efficient, or the most effective, powerful and widespread infrastructure in essential transpor­

tation of goods, facilitation of development activities within the FLS themselves. So that the conflict does

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affect the foreign policies of these countries so that they spend quite a lot of their time and resources fighting apartheid rather than talk:ing."[75]

Those who addressed the question of regional conflict in more immediate tenns gave answers that bode ill for peace of any sort in the near future. "It seems to me to be intensifying. It is getting very seri­ ous, especially within South Africa itself. I think there is eventual civil war going on there ... For instance, the example [of] Angola where there is actual physical war - tactical war between South Africa and Angola,

1. Makumbe, Zimbabwe.
2. MaJ...'1lmbe, Zimbabwe.

UNITA, SWAPO, and so on."[76]

### Q: To what extent do you think the FLS, OAU, and the UN can play an effective role in the southern African conflicts in general and of South Africa in particular?

The answers to this question were generally filled with vague hopes that these groups would be able to do something but these hopes were tempered by the strong realization that "everything depends on the South Africans does it not?"[77] A few ascribe particular success to one group or another. "[The OAU] in its own way has been able to support the liberation movement ..."[78] They praise the U.N., for example, for at least making an effort. But the major positive force for most of the respondents is the FLS. The FLS is both a statement of unity and determination in the face of apartheid and a genuine source of support to those who fight throughout the region and even inside South Africa itself.

Q: Do you think that Mozambique gains any kinds of goals or interests from signing the Accord?

### What about the South African government?

In terms of benefits to Mozambique respondents say the benefits of the Accord have been only of a secondary nature. "It has banded Mozambique **a** diplomatic victory ... moral victory over South Africa [in] that it bas been able to adhere to the agreements it bas made and South Africa has proved that South Africa is somebody not to be trusted, and I think this bas formed the basis reiuly for countries like Angola in deal­ ing with South Africa ... how can they know precisely what South Africa [will] and [will] not honour

..."[79]

Others refused to see even this as a benefit "Mozambique did not benefit anything for the Accord."[80] The general response followed the lines of Mr. Sebina's answer. "I feel that Mozambique is not going to decide what they have benefited and what it cost them, but I think it has cost them a lot: it has cost them a lot in lives; it has cost them a lot in damage to their economic infrastructure ... terrible, terrible

..."[81]

1. Simuchoba, Zambia.
2. Simuchoba, Zambia.
3. Maganya, Tanzania.
4. Gutto, Zimbabwe.
5. Ngo, Zambia.
6. Sebina, Zambia.

Points which were not mentioned were that even if there was a certain portion of moral victory scored by Mozambique because of South Africa's cavalier attitude toward the agreement, world opinion of South Africa is low enough that it hardly warrants such a sacrifice as Mozambique's surrendering some of its share in supporting the liberation struggle, by being forced to expel all but a few ANC cadres, while con­ tinuing to suffer the onslaught of the l\lfNR.

Mozambique's own perspective on the results of signing the Accord are, after the passage of four years, similar but they contain a more elaborate effort at justifying the agreement. "Today, all governments in the world do say that South Africa is aggressing Mozambique. Nobody says Mozambique is ag,,crressing South Africa, who is viewed in the world today as militarist, as expansionist, as having an aggressive policy as South Africa. The struggle of the Mozambican people to defend Mozambican sovereignty ... to defend the Mozambican right to choose its own path of political, economical and social development, is today fully understood in the world. And nobody views the struggle of the Mozambican people as an issue of the conflict between big powers, between East and West and anything like that. Up to the point that even NATO countries like Britain, like France, like Italy, like Spain, like Portugal (for instance) have accepted the principle of giving military support to Mozambique. Training, for instance in the case of Britain, the case of Spain; of sending weapons even to Mozambique. Even in the government of the United States ... I think in '84 or '85, I don't remember exactly ... has approved, it was symbolic, but it has approved $1 mil­ lion to the reinforcement of the defence capacity of Mozambique. So the defence of Mozambique, the defence of our right of existence, is truly understood by everybody, is no more l}Il issue of east and west, rivalry, conflict, whatever, and this is an achievement. The third aspect. South Africa up to now because of the Nkomati Accord has not been in conditions internationally to launch open attacks against Mozambique like, for instance, they are doing in Angola They attack, they are making a war with us, against us, but they are not in a moral or diplomatic condition to say so. When they attack Zambia or Zimbabwe or Botswana or Angola they say so: here they can't. Their people when they are killed here, they become anonymous, non-existent. They can't say 'he was killed in action in Mozambique.' They are ashamed. It's important Nkomati Accord has not achieved the goal of peace. Why is this? South Africa has never respected the Nkomati Accord in reality, but they are paying a price for it."(82]

1. Vieira, Mozambique.

As to the benefits accrued by South Africa from the signing of the agreement, they obtained their wishes with regard to the ANC and continued to pursue their own goals in Mozambique through the agency of the MNR. South Africa strengthened its own security and felt free to continue to undermine that of Mozambique.

A number of questions on the list are directed at assessing the respondents' views of South Africa and its internal and external policies and their general effect on the region. The order they are given in the questionnaire outline used by the interviewer is as follows: 13. How do you characterize the South African situation? 15. What kind of policy is South Africa applying to the region? *Is* it military, political interven­ tion, economic pressure? And how do you define these tools? 16. Let us talk about the military action which South Africa used at more than one time to achieve specific goals. What is your definition of that technique? Do you think it is/was effective to create buffer states in the region? Or peaceful states? 20. How do you describe the political system in South Africa? 21. Do you think that the government of South Africa is an aggressive government? Why?

Western involvement in South Africa was seen by several respondents as the best starting place since it is a given, along with the natural resources found in the Republic of South Africa, as the basis upon which the power of the Republic rests. Mr. Davies put it best. "There is an historical involvement of western capital in ... South Africa. Perhaps it is true that western imperialism bas not found its direct politi­ cal expression in governing nationalist parties in South Africa [but] since it took over in 1948 there bas been a coexistence between western imperialism and apartheid. Apartheid basic y guaranteed conditions of exploitation which led to super profits within South Africa ... But [when] South Africa began to enter into crisis certain contradictions began to appear ... something of a perception that perhaps in the long run racist minority rule was not going to guarantee stability ..."[83] Davies feels that the western countries are attempting to modify their strategy " ... there is now an attempt to "hedge your bets, develop some relation­ ships and investments in the rest of Southern Africa in case South Africa falls, so that you are not seen wholly and only to be backing the apartheid regime ... So I think we are going into a slightly more compli­ cated phase ... basically ... western imperialism is trying to ... achieve a long-standing objective, which

1. Davies, Mozambique.

previously it saw as being achievable to a large extent through racist minority rule, and that is to try and guarantee that South and southern Africa remain safe for capitalism."[84]

Economic ties with Europe and the USA are the source of South Africa's power and the actors it must constantly placate, reassure, and satisfy. Internal policies in South Africa were variously character­ ized in the interview as fascist, right-wing racist, and so forth. Such issues are generally irrelevant to the businessmen who wish to exploit the country's resources except insofar as the cheap labour nearby creates such enormous profits. Without this cheap· labour western investments would not withdraw but they might be diversified throughout southern Africa.

Those in charge in South Africa are therefore reinforced in their quest to maintain the status quo. By adopting a policy of destabilisation in the neighbouring countries they not only seek to lessen the threat from the FLS in military terms but seek to reduce their attractiveness to potential competitors for North American, European and Japanese investment Any country with an unstable government and a shaky, overextended economy is going to look like a very poor bet in contrast, with the iron rule of the Pretoria regime. In logical, definitely not in moral, terms this foreign policy of destabilisation, coercion and threats which forces its neighbours to expend vast amounts (which they can ill afford) on arms, is the best policy for South Africa. But, as one respondent put it, "You may study the reactions of small countries to super­ power politics and call that foreign policy, but this is *not* foreign policy. Foreign policy, in emphatic terms, requires initiative ... No matter how limited an initiative might be, it's true foreign policy ... in [countries such as] Zimbabwe [it has] less to do with initiative than with reaction, with die art of survival in this difficult world."[85]

But is there another option open to the FLS and the black majority in South Africa? Can the FLS "not only fortify their defences, but conceive of a strategy of moving from a defensive policy to an offen- sive policy"?[86] The limits of defensive policies seem to Dr. Baregu to be "that the whole situation remains unpredictable, and in a sense that they tend to accept ... the myth of South Africa being more

1. Davies, Mozambique. [85) Mandaza, Zimbabwe.

[86] Baregu, Tanzania.

powerful, more impregnable. I do not believe that personally ... I think it a myth which has the political purpose of keeping the FLS scared ... It is not an easy thing ... but I think you can turn the threat of South Africa to the FLS ... turn it around with collective threats of the FLS to South Africa ... If you put South Africa in conflict with every country around there is a way they have the capacity to fight a war. Most peo­ ple who do not agree with that position probably would tend to embrace political solution through negotia- tion."[87]

What Dr Baregu does in his response is to bring the argument around to the point where there are basically two alternatives available to the FLS: counter preparedness and eventual coercion of South Africa or a political solution based on negotiation. But in the context of the Nkomati Accord and the South Afri­ can government's behaviour he (and several others who were interviewed) makes it clear that South Africa cannot "be relied upon to negotiate a solution that would fundamentally change the structure of the coun­ try."[88] According to Baregu if one believes that negotiation is impossible, that this is a lesson to be learned from Nkomati, then one must think in terms of a military solution. Military solutions can take several forms, independently or in cooperation with each other. Sebina, Davies, Vieira and others suggest that at the very least the FLS must continue to offer whatever support they can to the ANC in pursuing the armed struggle within South Africa. Baregu and nearly all the other respondents said that continued defen­ sive arms build up is a basic, essential step for the FLS regardless of any country's views of other options. The last military option is that offered by Dr Baregu above.

The problem is that South Africa's military policy consists so basically of cpercive threats that many of the Frontline States are convinced that they could never stand even a collective chance in a war. "Mili­ tarily South Africa is fighting against the FLS by equipping itself better than the FLS and getting even much more sophisticated, computerised sometimes, technology. There is even a possibility that South Africa has a miniaturised bomb or some of those sophisticated missiles and so it is military by virtue of being equipped, it is actually telling the FLS in terms of this conflict, 'Don't you dare! Don't do anything, don't even think of it because we will destroy you.'"[89]

(87] Barcgu, Tanzania.

(88) Barcgu, Tanzania. [89) Makumbe, Zimbabwe.

The other facets of South Africa's regional policy consist of "Political intervention in the sense [that] South Africa has often sponsored the opposition in these various countries."[90] This happens for two rea­ sons. First, it happens not because the opposition sponsored by the South Africans would necessarily be more favourable toward the apartheid regime (though in some cases this may be true) but merely out of a wish to cause internal dissension of a sort which will cripple a country's efforts at development and force it to expend all its military resources on civil wars rather than allowing for a military build up which could threaten South Africa The second reas9n is that South Africa supports right wing or at least anti­ communist, anti-socialist oppositions which placates the American paranoia about such things ... it is an ideological game which convinces some investors in South Africa that South Africa's government is their natural ally.

Economic pressure is the third factor in Pretoria's regional policy. It is a two-pronged attack in which FLS dependence on South Africa is facilitated and any change of FLS independence is crippled by other destructive actions. "South Africa has, up to this point, tried to ensure that its ports, harbours, railways infrastructure is used to the full by the FLS and that they would not be successful in disconnecting, disen­ gaging themselves from it [South Africa] has continued to disrupt the Beira corridor, for example, and it has continued to support those who have made the Benguela railway line impossible to operate. It has con­ tinued to destabilize the FLS economically in the sense of destroying the infrastructure for development, production, etc."[91] This sums up the regional policy of South Africa Aggression, dishonesty, destabili­

sation and coercion are the means by which they conduct their relations with the surrounding countries of

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the FLS.

As to the question of South Africa's success in creating buffer states most respondents felt that the idea had not been a great success for Pretoria. "The only buffer states which South Africa has are countries like Swaziland and Lesotho, [if] you ... create a buffer state like that and make it a puppet state like Lesotho or Swaziland the liberation movements will not patronise it ..."[92] This opinion is echoed among the respondents. The general idea of creating a number of states which would be, by definition, at peace with

1. Makumbc, Zimbabwe.
2. Makumbc, Zimbabwe.
3. Makumbc, Zimbabwe.

South Africa and would serve, possibly, as economic conduits to the FLS might have seemed logical if one did not take into account the commitment of the FLS to the liberation struggle and the depth of their abhorrence of apartheid.

When the interviewer characterized as 'peaceful states' those who bad signed accords with Pretoria this was regarded as less than complete assessment **Q: After Angola signed the Lusaka Agreement and Mozambique signed the Nkomati Accord they became peaceful states. They are not supporting the liberation struggle,** I **mean militarily, which means,** I **think coercive diplomacy has been successful. What** do you **think?** Dr Baregu, to whom the question was addressed, did not see this as the result of the Accord in Mozambique. While be felt that the initial expulsion of the ANC made it seem to be the case he also felt that Mozambique and the FLS were "undergoing a very serious exercise of reassessing [their] stra­ tegic positions and it is very important I think that at the time of Samora Macbel's death Mozambique was embarking on a policy of moving from this acquiescence ... towards a more aggressive posture."[93] In part he, and others, saw such movement as a logical response to the failure of South Africa to live up to any of the terms of the Accord. For Baregu, when the military posture of South Africa was weighed with their obvious dishonesty and complete unwillingness to honour any contracts with the FLS it seemed, that mili­ tary readiness was the only reasonable alternative. To assume that South Africa's intentions were anything other than they appear to be would bring into question the whole rational of the liberation movements. "[I]f you look at it from the African historical or evolutionary standpoint, I don't think it takes a genius to know

that this process ... can't just stop; we are talking about twenty, thirty years in w ch all this continued ...

we know that it is just a matter of time. You cannot, as they say, stop the rain."[94] In referring to the 'peace' with South Africa established by the Accord, Mr Kunda was equally scornful: "I don't think that kind of peace is worthy ... South Africa is essentially postponing the day of reckoning. They might block the entry of the ANC cadres from Mozambique, they might do that temporarily, but the struggle continues on other fronts."[95]

1. Baregu, Tanzania.
2. Baregu, Tanzania.
3. Kunda, Zambia.

There were, however, surprisingly few respondents who cited the purpose of the buffer states as economically dependent satellites of Pretoria who, in maintaining 'good' relations with the South Africa government, also functioned as a public relations tool Others felt that arrangements such as the Lusaka Agreement and the Nkomati Accord were attempts by South Africa to reduce Angola and Mozambique to the same level as the original buffer states such as Swaziland and Botswana. For most the presented desire for peace on South Africa's part was a hoax intended to accomplish the seduction of these countries to will-less, powerless states. *AB* one respondent point out, however, it is not important whether South Africa succeeds entirely in operationalising the concept of buffer states because they really "prefer to maintain the regional state in a state of permanent crisis."[96] But whether one policy or the other is pursued, success­ fully or unsuccessfully South Africa has, generally, gone as far as it can go ... short of full scale military involvement *AB* Davies says, *"This* is where they are at the moment and, short of the possibility of colla­ boration which is pretty remote at the moment except for minor countries of the region (not particularly the FLS)" this is as far as they will be able to go.[97]

Even so, this begs the question of how the process of foreign policy formulation in Southern Africa is to be gauged. In this context, the views of Mandaza are worthy of note. As he states: "I don't believe in foreign policy when it comes to small countries ... it doesn't matter who takes [decisions] because the parameters are set. I mean Zimbabwe couldn't decide tomorrow to cut relations with the U.S. or Britain, I mean it's unheard of. It doesn't matter who is acting ... southern Africa, broadly speaking [is guided by] the parameters of U.S./British foreign policy. With the exception of Angola [Th(¼1.lgh] even Angola pays a bit of attention ... and Mozambique is increasingly watching out for [these] parameters ... it [all] falls within the Western sphere of influence ... people in international relations make a big noise about foreign policy in countries and it's not really an issue ... in a world which is dominated by super powers ... yes, by power- blocs ... I think it's naive to expect foreign policy to be central at the level of the small country ..."[98]

By implication Dr. Mandaza holds that what is termed foreign policy in the FLS and even South Africa is merely a working out of the directions dictated (even if not directly) by the foreign policies of the

1. Davies, Mozambique. (97] Davies, Mozambique. (98] Mandaza, Zimbabwe.

United States and the United Kingdom. The allegiance of countries such as Angola and Mozambique to various sectors of the communist bloc does not prevent even them from having to work within the limits and directions set by the West.

Mandaza 's response was unique but it serves to provide a context for the problems some of the other respondents seemed to have with the question. While all were able to offer opinions on the roles of Minis­ ters, Presidents, Central Committees, and the like in the process of foreign policy formulation many were obviously troubled by doubts about the process which could be ascribed to a nagging doubt about the rela­ tion of such a decision to the parameters, the rules of the 'game', inherent in Western interest in interna­ tional relations in southern Africa. In other contexts most respondents were perfectly comfortable in ack­ nowledging that the policies of the United States and the United Kingdom in the region represented the interests of capitalism (abstractly) and specifically the economic interests of the U.S., U.K., Japanese, Ger­ man, Canadian, Italian, etc. firms involved in the region's economy. It might be that these respondents are indulging in a little escapism by blaming the West for any problems (political, economic, security and so forth) which emerge in Southern Africa. When it comes to the question of the relation between the foreign policy of their own and other southern African countries and U.S./U.K. interests, their reluctance to con­ front the idea was probably seen as a threat to their much-cherished national autonomy.

Dr. Makumbe, for instance, points out that all foreign policy decisions are, initially, based on "the internal considerations of the politics, economics, and and social aspects of a given country but are then related to all the broader contexts to which the nation is related ... the OAU, the FLS, the SADCC, the non­ aligned movement and, finally, the relationship of the developing to the so-called developed countries."[99] The major considerations for Zimbabwe, according to Makumbe, (and most of them were cited by the other respondents) are "the dynamics within the country of the multi-party system of the country emerging from the liberation struggle, of the country richly endowed in natural resources, if the country which has adopted, or has claimed to adopt, socialist ideology, and of the country which inherited a colonial legacy of serious social and incomes disparities ... So foreign policies are made with those considerations in mind ... how do you address them, how do you safeguard the intended ideological developments, political developments,

1. MaJ...-umbc, Zimbabwe.

social developments, and how do you get rid of what we inherited from before independence?"[l00]

In the case of Mozambique some believe that because, organisationally, President Samora Machel was the primary decision-maker, as a strong leader, and because he had already spoken firmly about South Africa's failure to honour their part in the Nkomati Accord the Pretoria government had him mur­ dered.[101] As this idea is put foi;ward by Mr Davies it is interesting to note that he relates this action on the part of the South Africans to the structure of their own foreign policy decision making. "Botha came to power with the support of the top military· commanders. They have been given a key role in the decision making processes through the national security management system ... generally reckoned to be the highest decision-making body in the apartheid states [consequently] the overall leading forces in the state are increasingly the military ... it is not just some rogue elements of the military that have been involved in con­ tinuing support for destabilisation. It has been at the highest levels."[102] Sebina additionally mentions

that "the heads of the army, the navy, and the police ... sit in that committee."[103] As Sebina conjectures in the foreign policy decision making procedure in South Africa the President is a major actor, but "in the end it's state policy [and] the state is a military one ... inside the committee room there is this fight for influence and in South Africa today even in the economic area the military hold very strong influence."[104]

The only other response to this question which was anything other than vague generalisation about the organisational levels involved in the process, was Dr. Baregu's referring the question to the notion of personal leadership as the primary mode of African rule. He ultimately rejects the idea "because there are social forces that influence even the most dictatorial or the most genius leadership'..."[105] But there is also a distinct feeling from his entire response that he is having trouble in pinning down the precise source of the general guidelines for formulation of the country's (Tanzania's) foreign policy. In common with most of the respondents he did not specify a relationship to the direction in foreign policy of Britain and the USA. But, like some others, there is a mention of "solidarity with third world countries" as an important basis for

1. Makumbe, Zimbabwe. [IOI] Davies, Mozambique. [!02] Davies, Mozambique.
2. Sebina, Zambia.
3. Sebina, Zambia. [1051 Barcgu, Tanzania.

these decisions which, by its implied opposition, to Western policy interest, seems to acknowledge them.[106]

Initially most respondents did not address the full question of foreign policy decision making, but rather restricted their answers to foreign policy in general. After some coaxing, however, they did discuss the decision-making process with a certain amount of caution. We can see from the meat of the answers to this question that foreign policy decision-making in Southern Africa is highly personalised by the President or Prime Minister of the respective country•(with the exception of South Africa).

### Q: How do you describe the political system in South Africa?

In asking this question the researcher was interested in guaging the attitude of respondents towards South Africa and how they perceived the Pretoria regime. The majority of the responses to this question were quite negative, as was expected. "It is an outrage ... it is a political system which ... has divided mank­ ind into four classes." [107]

"It is abhorrent ... The black majority of South Africa ... cannot vote, cannot make decisions affecting their lives, cannot leave whenever they like, can be uprooted from their place of birth ... and then just driven to some other place."[108]

"A system for racist segregation."[109]

But two analytical responses, proved the most informative, not just because they gave more thought to the question but because they tried to pin down those elements of the situation which are unique to South

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Africa.

"There is not any political system at all! Right now it is actually the military who is running the country. Everything is militarized ... you can see this in the Townships [which] are not in the control of the central government but the armed forces and they are trying to constitute what they call a joint management concept. They have failed. In the process of trying all sorts of forms of government ... a government in

1. Baregu, Tanzania.
2. Kunda, Zambia.
3. Pilane, Botswana.
4. Chikcrema, Zimbabwe.

which the majority of the people are not participating is not a state ... and to enforce what they are doing

[the government] is excessively dependent on the anny."[110]

"It's fascist because it believes that the black people are an inferior race and that they have to be separated from the European race. And in order to do that they have built up a bureaucracy whose sole intention [sic] was to keep the whites in power over everybody else. And not to allow any democratic group to [operate] inside the country ... no democratic expression of any kind ... even cultural." The same informant was asked if he considered South African government to be a military regime. "Well it's a very new phenomenon ... The man who is now State President, be was the Minister of Defence for fourteen years, and he was very influential in bringing up the army to the strength it now has, and when he came into power he brought some of these military leaders into the political structure. He created committees where all the security forces were represented. How ... the whole security system, that is the police, the special forces, the army, and military intelligence, have a very, very strong influence on the political ... process in South Africa In fact they changed all the internal and foreign policies because even the committee which deals with foreign policy [has] got army people there ..."[111]

While Sebina may overstate the uniqueness of the situation he nonetheless offers the most detailed and considered response to the question, (this is probably due to the fact that he works for the ANC rather than a specific government). His answer points out the background behind the current single-minded policy of the Pretoria government. The relentless, ruthless pursuit of destabilisation in the region and its heavy emphasis on the support of military insurrectionists and on the use of implied military threats as the corner­ stone of the country's coercive diplomacy could have no other source than a government which was almost under the domination of its military. Most respondents did not bother to try to make this specific connec­ tion but it is essential, the researcher believes, to understanding the evolution of the current policies of South Africa

It could be argued, however, that events in Southern Africa are not due solely to the coercive policies of the South African government, but rather to a system of 'action and response' between Pretoria and FLS.

[I JO] Hove, Zimbabwe. [I I I] Sebina, Zambia.

South Africa responds to any perceived act of aggression by the FLS (for example, the ANC launching of an attack from FLS territory), and the FLS respond (if only verbally) to any perceived act of aggression by South Africa. Of course, the process of 'action and response' need not only refer to acts of aggression. When the Pretoria regime stopped supporting the 11:NR (assuming that South Africa, indeed, did stopped such support), Mozambique stopped supporting the ANC and other groups. This positive action and response led to the signing of the Nkomati Accord.

The so-called state of emergency and the imposition of something very like martial law in South Africa are part of this situation. "[T]he eighteen organisations which are part of the democratic movement are banned all over the country now ... when the state of emergency was originally declared ... there was a revolutionary climate inside the country. [It was declared] to stop that revolutionary climate. But our peo­ ple went on even under the state of emergency ... So by imposing restrictions on these organisations the government was indirectly admitting that it has failed in stopping [the] ongoing democratic struggle ... Whatever the government does has not really killed the spirit of the people to resist ... whatever they do creates temporary obstacles ..."[112] What Sebina describes is a people struggling to create a more demo­ cratic political system in the vacuum of apartheid. In terms of political systems the Pretoria government has been, at heart, reluctant to move too quickly in this direction.

In the face of the commitment shown by the ANC (as reported by Sebina) to radical reform, and the general disdain for the South African apartheid system described by other interviewees, there are strong demands on the Pretoria regime to increase the pace of its reform programme.

As mentioned elsewhere (chapter two) the government of South Afrca, during the late 1970s and especially from 1980 onwards, has resorted to various means of coercive policy actions towards its neigh­ bours, in particular the FLS. For instance, evidence of how this strategy is worked out in practice is reflected, in some of the answers offered to the question of how and to what extent the FLS depend on the South African economy.

Responses were given to this question which dealt specifically with Zambia (three), Zimbabwe (one)

(I 12] Sebina, Zambia.

and the FLS (four). Zambia's dependence was considered to be "to quite a large extent ... a considerable extent" especially since "it is an extremely cheap source of goods."[113] Ngo cited the need to transport *goods* to the sea via South Africa though be cites an attempt to lessen this dependence in the example of new routes for the export of Zambian copper.[114] Mr. Kunda offers the broadest picture of the relation­ ship: "I am not sure of the exact statistics but we are trying to diversify our sources and modify ourselves and when I was talking about the rehabilitation of the railway systems that go through Angola and Mozam­ bique the whole exercise is designed to lessen the Frontline States' dependence on South Africa. So the Frootline States are doing what they can. The SADCC, for example, is also helping in the rebabilitatioo of these railway systems."[115] Cbikerema cites the same problem of access to the sea for Zimbabwe. " ...

countries like Zimbabwe which are landlocked ... are attempting to make the sea route through Mozam­ bique viable, because it makes it very uncomfortable being dependent on South Africa, because of the geo- graphical situation".[116]

The responses relating to the R..S in general give a picture of very extensive dependence. "Very heavily, to the tune of 70 to 80 per cent for all the FLS ... minimally for Angola [but for] Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland, even up to 95%."[117] For example, "the mining industry here in Zambia has got to import a lot of machinery from South Africa, and the copper industry here is one of the main economic pillars of this country ... there are a lot of things that are imported from South Africa. At least this country is better off ... because they can import certain things through Tanzania [and] they are trying to open up through Angola and through Mozambique. But 9ountries like Botswana ... have got no way of importing and exporting things except through South Africa. [Any other] country would [offer] more cooperation on an equal level. There would be more distribution of responsibilities on how to keep the economic development on a level that is property shared by all of them. But now the bal­ ance is one-sided in favour of South Africa."[118]

1. Simuchoba, Zambia.
2. Ngo, Zambia.

[I 15] Kunda, Zambia.

1. Chikerema, Zimbabwe.
2. Makumbe, Zimbabwe.
3. Scbina, Zambia.

Mr. Pilane offered an explication of the background of this dependence. "[I]f you see our history during the colonial area tllings were done in such a way that everything was centred on South Africa. We

were simply just appendages to the South African economy. As you might appreciate it takes time for someone to really rid himself of ... dependency."[119] Speaking of his own country, Botswana, Pilane points out that the problem of ports, again, predominates. "One of the tllings the SADCC is doing is trying to develop other ports like Maputo where we can re-route our exports ... Because South Africa may decide today or tomorrow 'I am not going to allow your exports to pass through my country. '"[120]

While numerous efforts are underway in almost all the FLS countries seriously to reduce their depen­ dence on South Africa, it also has to be seen that increasing such dependence is an essential part of Pretoria's programme. It may sound overly sanguine for Mr. Hove to say that such dependence, in Zim­ babwe and Mozambique for instance, does not exist "to the extent that [they] cannot survive", but he points out that, "there is also the question of interdependence. We are dependent on South Africa and South Africa is also dependent on the region as well. Do you know that [since] the workers are not highly paid in South Africa the internal market is very poor. And this is why South Africa fights very hard to make sure it has this region as a market ..."(121]

The respondents offer no doubt of the extensiveness of FLS economic dependence on South Africa. Few of them bothered at this point to comment on the equally extensive efforts of South Africa to keep the status quo. Yet the balancing act which their own need of FLS markets necessitates indicates a vulnerable point for the country. If the FLS make a concerted effort to develop alternativ routes for goods and, by importing goods directly, are able to match or even undercut some of the prices on goods normally obtained from South Africa then they will be able to take a first major step toward the liberation of the country.

Thus, in this context of economic interdependences the question arises as to what options, if any, do the FLS have in signing a non-agression agreement - such as Nk:omati - with South Africa and at the same time obviate against further dependence on South Africa.

[l 19] Pilane, Botswana. (120] Pilane, Botswana.

1. Hove, Zimbabwe.

The answer to this question was universally negative. Citing the utter failure of the Nkomati Accord most respondents found the proposition ridiculous, because of the patent dishonesty of South Africa in the fact that it ignored repeated protestations of devotion to the cause of liberation. They found the question insulting because it appeared to ignore the whole point of coercive diplomacy which was at the root of the Accord. They bad bad no option but to submit, and their signuature was more a sign of their weakness than of their gullibility. When the question was phrased more generally to cover the possibility of all sorts of agreements between the FLS being of some help in resolving the situation the researcher was told that no agreements which did not include the abolition of apartheid would even be considered.

"No accord can bring peace. Whatever accord, they can sign a Nkomati Accord next week and then the week after sign another. It is not really in the Accords, it is in the system which is causing the failure to attain peace in the region. So the failure to attain peace in the region is the existence of the apartheid regime, the apartheid system. The only way peace and development can be realised in the region is when, and if, there is no if about it really, when apartheid has been abolished completely. That is the only solution to the conflict in the region. All the various accords and negotiations and so forth can only be temporary if they don't lead to abolishing the apartheid. They can only be stop-gap measures, temporary measures, but not the solution. The only solution can be the end of apartheid."[122] All the respondents (except two from Mozambique) felt that no accord could be signed with South Africa while the system of apartheid still in existence. Ironically, this bad been the view of Mozambique before the signing of the Nkomati Accord, but by the use of coercive means Pretoria succeeded in forcing Mozambique to siga a non-aggression agree­ ment.

The respondents felt equally strongly that an agreement signed with South Africa would be worthless since Pretoria would fail to honour it. In any case, in the opinion of the respondents, no accord can bring peace to Southern Africa unless South Africa abolishes apartheid. Even though most of the respondents were totally opposed to signing an Accord with South Africa, our study has shown (with particular refer­ ence to the Nkomati Agreement) that persuasion and coercion can bring any two states to the negotiating table.

1. Mak:umbe, Zimbabwe.

### **Q: Did** the FLS as one group try to contact the South African government in in an attempt to solve the problems of the region?

The general response to this question was, predictably, that the South Africa government is the prob­ lem of the region. Such contact would be utterly pointless since the very idea of solidarity among the nations of southern Africa is one of the objects of South Africa's greatest fears and the destruction of any such group figures quite prominently among Pretoria's military, political and economic goals.

The only significant contact reportea was the issuing of communiques, after meetings of the FLS, insisting on an immediate end to Pretoria's efforts at FLS destabilisation. "FLS tried to talk to leaders of the black majority, because what South Africa has now is just puppets that they put up and say 'this is our leader.'" [123] However, the most interesting response came from a senior minister, who said, "No not really, not as one group ... you see, South Africa has been trying to get that kind of approach ... especially the foreign minister of South Africa ... except only on the individual basis, Zambia's President Kaunda has tried very hard to get South Africa ... to influence them directly by speaking to them ... so, President Kaunda met Smith of Rhodesia, Vorster and Botha of South Africa ... It was very exciting [for example] I think it was 1982 in Botswana border with South Africa ... again President Kaunda and Prime Minister Botha of South Africa [before he became President in 1984] and eight people from each side, I was one of them, we put a track across the border and a table across the border... So, President Botha sat this side half in South African borders side and President Kaunda also half in Botswana and half in South Africa, and

then the delegations sat about eight people each side ... that was to discuss reall:>7, two issues, Namibia and apartheid... It was a very good meeting ... and then the situation ... really soften in a way ... we had the

Angolans and the South Africans worked out some kind of programme for the withdrawal of S.A. troops from Angola, and for implementation of Resolution 435 for Namibia ... that [Lusaka Agreement] went on beautifully ... we had even the S.A. Foreign :Minister and the Defence :Minister came to Lusaka ..."[124]

There would appear to be no formal meetings between the FLS as one group and the South African government to attempt to solve the problems of the region. However, we should bear in mind that there

1. Pilane, Botswana.
2. Punabantu, Zambia.

was some contact between South Africa and individual countries in Southern Africa, such as Mozambique, Zambia and Swaziland. However, such countries represent the FLS-SADCC views when they meet the South Africans as the case in President Kaunda previous meetings with Vorster, Botha and lately with President de Klerk.

### Q: How do you describe or evaluate the relations between Mozambique and South Africa since the signing of the Nkomati Accord?

Those who answered this question were agreed that relations were, if not worse, as bad as they had been prior to the Accord. "Quite definitely not a good relation. I'd say the situation ... is that of being forced in a situation that Mozambique does not want [but] because of its weakness being forced to go along. Mozambique is fighting to get out of the situation. But it cannot be described as harmonious coex­ istence."[125] Others described the tension which pervades the situation: "It is a very fragile relationship because it could easily lead to an open confrontation between South Africa and Mozambique. But for­ tunately the Mozambicans have ... shown restraint on this thing and stood firmly on the question of the Accord."[126] By which Mr. Chikerema meant, presumably, that for Mozambique to have openly :flaunted a disregard for the treaty and allowed the ANC to function without restraint in their country would have given South Africa an excuse, by its standards, to invade or to step up MNR activities in a more open, more harmful fashion. As an ANC representative the substance of this, and much else in Sebina's responses, seems to be that neither Mozambique nor the FLS as a group is in any sense ready for open confrontation with the Republic of South Africa.

### Q: How does the conflict between the FLS and South Africa affect the regional politics in Southern Africa?

The question was taken in several different ways, with Dr. Makumbe's answer being the most to the point. "The conflict ... affects internal politics within the FLS ... in the sense in which they have to spend a lot of resources arming themselves, defending themselves, protecting their citizens, protecting ... develop­ ment ... **[I)t** has also brought about a much higher level of social, economic and political cooperation of

1. Chikerema, Zimbabwe.
2. Scbina, Zambia,

SADCC which ... has aheady started to make some headway in providing some mutual benefits to the southern African countries ... and in trying to sever the umbilical cord between the [FLS] and the main power, South Africa."[127] Or, as Mr. Kunda puts it, the conflict "defines the politics of the area ... in [the] sense that it is this particular conflict which brought into being the Frontline States as a political entity, [it] was essentially a function of the existence of apartheid ..."[128] Others look at the problem from a slightly different angle: "Well, there is really no conflict between the Frontline States and South Africa. What there

is are South African destabilisation policies directed at the Frontline States and how these states respond to these policies ..."[129] Mr Gutto goes on to offer the example of Angola which has been so seriously dis­ rupted on every level by South Africa. "A lot of resources, human and material, are being spent and that affects the overall ability of Angola to reconstruct its society on progressive lines *so* it has a lot of political

consequences ..." [130] But the principal political effect that is cited by most of the respondents (including

Kunda and Gutto) is that "politically ... there is a unity of purpose and that purpose is to see that the strug­ gle ... for liberation ... continues all the time until the final solution is found in South Africa."[131]

What is not stated by the respondents but clearly looms at the back of their answers is the fact that if the extraordinary state of affairs were to cease in South Africa then these countries of southern Africa could get on to the business of running their countries in a normal fashion. It goes without saying that much of the unity of purpose and solidarity of the southern African countries would continue when such a thing

came to pass, but what is not stated is that their solidarity would be much less durable if they were allowed to go about their business unimpeded and in competition with each other as 'noniial' countries do.

### Q: How does the conflict between South Africa and the Frontline States affect the international order?

Those who responded to this particular question tended to offer examples of Western involvement in the problems of the region, such as Sebina's remarks: "[O]ne thinks of the United States involvement in

1. Mukumbe, Zimbabwe.

(12S] Kunda, Zambia.

[129] Gutto, Zimbabwe.

[LWl Gutto, Zimbabwe.

1. Sebina, Zambia.

Angola because the United States, especially the Reagan administration, supplies anns to the rebels in Angola. Very sophisticated weapons. So it means the issue bas now become internationalised. It is not only a question of Angola but it also affects our own liberation struggle inside South Africa. Because once you remove the support by South Africa and the ... United States from the UNITA rebels then the UNITA rebels have nowhere else to go. Then they can be defeated. But you find the Americans campaigning inter­ nationally to get support for Savimbi [UNITA] and his rebels. The whole question of South Africa bas become an international problem. It may need an international solution. And of course it worsens the pros­ pects for world peace because now there may be other forces who say, 'Well, if the Americans continue in this way the other forces may start thinking of us', and then it becomes a global problem."[132] As Mr. Gutto put it, the fact that "Talks are going on at the moment [1988] between Angola and Cuba on one side and on the other side South Africa and the United States ... is a clear reflection that we are dealing with an international problem ..."[133] "Whether it is in southern Africa, whether it is in Central America, whether it is in the Middle East, the Gulf, or Kampuchea or Korea, there is a cumulative effort towards international

... peace. *So* if there is no peace in southern Africa it subtracts that much from the larger framework

..."[134] The cumulative effect of such struggles as that in southern Africa was seen by several respondents as providing a part of the several ripple effects which keep the international order constantly threatened with instability. It is for this reason that so many other nations feel the need to become involved in the pro­ cess of asserting order in the region.

Others, such as Mr. Chikerema, pointed out that on an international scale, such as among the non- aligned movement, the struggle in southern Africa is providing an impetus toward the same end as it does in the region - it is becoming an ever more important rallying point for the solidarity of those countries. There are parallels between the regional and the international situation as described by the respondents but there is also a confusion among the international groups (non-aligned countries, EEC, Organisation of American States, UN) as to who they must trade with, continue diplomatic relations with, impose sanctions against, or whatever. There is an effect on the economy of the entire world which derives from conflicts

1. Sebina, Zambia.
2. Gutto, Zimbabwe.
3. Kunda, Zambia.

such as that in southern Africa.

### . Q: What are your expectations of the regional conflict in southern Africa?

Optimism would seem to be the chief note in responses to this question, but it is an optimism tem­ pered by the acute awareness of the difficulties of the struggle that still lies ahead. None of the respondents fooled himself into thinking that it would be an easy thing to bring about the abolition of apartheid in South Africa but all saw it as the cornerstone to the liberation and autonomy of the southern African region (including the struggles in Namibia and Angola) and all saw it as inevitable.

Most answered by describing particulars of their own prescriptions for achieving this end. "Well, I am hoping that the progressive forces in the region will deploy more efforts to get together in strengthening politically, militarily, the opposition ... What is required really is a lot of international support for the efforts ... to resist South Africa ... a united front."[133] As Mr. Kunda describes it, there are "three basic issues that characterise the region for which apartheid is solely responsible. Namely, the existence of apartheid itself; the continual illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa; and the destabilisation of the Frontline States ... [But] if anything the situation in South Africa is becoming worse. The adoption of the state of emergency is one example of where South Africa is ... is going."[134] South Africa, it was argued, was entrenched in its position and never made any moves which could be interpreted in any way as steps toward resolving the problem. There was no will at all among the South Africans to put an end to apartheid, instead it was ingrained into their way of thinking and they could conceive of problems only in terms of threats to their own system.

Dr. Mukumbe summed up the general, most optimistic position by saying, "I look at it as a situation which will continue for at least the immediate term, in other words, five to ten years. But I see it as a prob­ lem which will have no option but to be solved one way or another. I think the liberation forces in Africa as a whole have demonstrated that they can do it ... they can win. Eventually they have to get their act together and keep working and eventually they will win. When? In the long term, certainly not in the short term."[135]

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| (133] | Chikercma, Zimbabwe. |
| (134] | Kunda, Zimbabwe. |
| (135] | Makumbe, Zimbabwe. |

Additionally the possibility of a single agreement or a series of agreements such as the Nkomati Accord were rejected as possible resolutions to the conflict. Just as in Nkomati and in the Lusaka Agree­ ment with Angola, South Africa has shown itself unwilling and untrustworthy, so, the respondents feel, would it display the same attitudes in any other accord. A general agreement was also rejected as a possible solution because the cumulative effect of South Africa's policies of destabilisation has been to create "a specific problem in each area"[136] By following this course of dividing and conquering with the states of the region, South Africa is clearly willing to continue an infinite number of smaller actions of various times for an extended time. These efforts at creating dissension and undermining the solidarity of the Frontline Starers show that general agreements of any sort are not part of South Africa's plan and they also show that this solidarity and the ability of the Frontline States to act in concert is the very thing of which they are most afraid.

Whether the respondents gave a time frame of five years or twenty, all saw the eventual downfall of apartheid as an inevitability. None, however, saw that outcome as occurring without a bitter, extended struggle. It was clear support for the FLS from the Western industrial countries would further these aims but none saw this as an immediate possibility.

### CONCLUSION

Throughout the interviews there was a unanimity of response which, rather hopefully, belied the pos­ sible, eventual success of South Africa's policy of divide and conquer. Just a,s South Africa exploits the

serious tribal rivalries within its own borders, so it hopes to generate sufficient dissension among the Front- line States to cripple their desire to work together in undermining the Pretoria regime, disposing of apartheid, and establishing a community of economically sound states.

The tone of the interviews revealed a great determination never to let this happen. Clearly most of the respondents were well aware of the fact that agreements such as the Nk:omati Accord are one of the tools the South African government uses to sow the seeds of dissension among the FLS. Bearing in mind the total opposition of the FLS as a group to the signing of the Nkomati Accord, it is perhaps a little strange

[136] Hove, Zimbabwe.

that one of the respondents, Sebina, an ANC member, showed positive understanding of the predicament Mozambique had found itself in. Sebina's feelings on this issue sum up those of many of the respondents, "Once you are faced with a situation that has been completed, what do you do?" This defeatist tone prob­ ably results from the FLS having been taken by surprise over Mozambique's signing of the agreement The FLS recognize that they are vulnerable to South Africa's coercive diplomacy and view Mozambique's sign­ ing of the Accord as a starlc reminder of such vulnerability.

This agreement on general principles bodes ill for South Africa. The determination and willingness to sacrifice needed by such underdeveloped countries in the face of such an unequal contest may, at times, appear to descend to the level of empty rhetoric. Nonetheless the true spirit of resistance which is essential to the continuing health of the liberation struggle is kept alive by the severe harassment to which the FLS are subjected by South Africa. Their ploy to force Mozambique to expel the ANC probably seems to them the only course to pursue if they are to ensure the security of apartheid in their country. To allow the ANC to operate relatively unhampered from the neighbouring countries must seem like a prescription for self­ flagellation to Pretoria. Yet, the methods they must use to disable the ANC only guarantee continuous resentment from the FLS and constant adverse publicity for South Africa's government in a world com­

munity which even among Japan and the Western supporters of the regime, is growing less and less tolerant of apartheid.

The Nkomati Accord proves itself an important subject for study in that its public nature, the clear evidence that South Africa has never honoured its part of the arrangement,,.and the widespread public awareness of the Accord's significant subtext provides an object lesson in the temporary success and pro­ jected long-term failure of South Africa's policy of 'coercive diplomacy'. The subtext - the aggressor who sues for peace, forces its terms on the subject of its aggression, and then demonstrates that it never had the slightest intention of fulfilling its obligation - is clearly understood by every one of the subjects of these interviews. Publicly, however, Mozambique's government celebrated the arrival of 'peace', hoping that the Accord would put an end to South African support of the MNR and contribute to the rebuilding of their economy.

In summary, the general tone of the responses was a positive belief in the inevitable toppling of the

apartheid regime in Pretoria. None of the respondents felt that there was going to be any other outcome. But there was one option which would clearly aid the speed with which this would come about and that was the full, wholehearted participation of the other countries of the world in the struggle in southern Africa. It is unlikely that, faced with the removal of the intensive undermining destabilisation carried out by South Africa that the countries of the region will continue to have so many economic problems. The move toward productivity which will follow the end of the liberation struggle should be exactly what the West is looking for and if the profits are somewhat re4uced because racially economically-segregated labour is not employed as it is in South Africa this should, logically, be made up for by the expanded resources and expanded marlcets which the region will provide.

South Africa has done nothing to allay Western fears of communist expansion in Southern Africa. These fears on the part of the Americans, and some Western governments are exploited to the full by the South Africans who clearly know only too well how easily certain Western leaders can be manipulated on that score. Though this point was never dwelt on for very long by any of the respondents it clearly stood in the background of many of their answers. The only recently gained autonomy of so many of these coun­ tries undoubtedly made the speakers wary of commenting on such matters because it would imply that cer­ tain Western administrations had some right to dictate the forms that their governments should take. And

in view of the almost total lack of support, (even the active resistance of these countries, in the liberation

struggles of most of the Frontline States) this seems doubly insulting. But it clearly does not do to cut them off all together since many of the respondents still retained some hope that the western countries would see

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how self-defeating their support of South Africa was eventually going to be and would come around to the supporting the FLS. The fact that the industrial nations are beginning to hedge their bets, as was cited by several respondents, with investments in Mozambique and other places, is at least a hopeful sign.

# CHAPTER EIGHT

# EFFECTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF NKOMATI FOR THE FRONTLINE STATES AND FOR THE REST OF THE WORLD

The contemporary world is witnessing several centres of regional power, where one country is dom­ inating the scene, using its military might and its economic/technological superiority to enforce its will on its neighbours. Sometimes the pressure is subtle and covert; sometimes sheer brute force is employed: but the message is consistent: to threaten these powers is to court serious trouble. In Southern Africa, the Republic of South Africa flexes its muscle whenever it deems such action is needed to protect its interests.

Such powers are encountering increasing difficulty in imposing their will upon their neighbours, and this for a variety of reasons. First of all, there is growing domestic resistance to such an 'hegemonist' pol- icy, partly out of ideological conviction and partly out of concern for the considerable expense involved.

None of them is so wealthy as to be able to ignore the fact that buying guns means not buying butter.

Secondly, the 'victims' of the aggressive policies are proving more and more intransigent, unwilling simply to submit passively to the bullying of the dominant power, and this resistance draws international attention to the situation with accompanying disapproval, censure, and the possibility of sanctions, boycotts, and the like. And thirdly, there is a limit to what military superiority can accomplish, as the Soviets have learned in Afghanistan, the U.S. in Vietnam, Israel on the West Bank and Gaza, and South Africa in Angola[l] and Mozambique.

In southern Africa there are two forces engaged in continuing conflict wifu one another, each seeking to determine the course of the future of the region. "The one force seeks to establish a *Pax Pretoriana* and

[l] In December 1983, the SADF conducted a full-scale invasion of the Southern Angolan territory under the name of "Operation Askari" which was faced by a high level of joint Angolan/SWAPO resistance and the large number of reported South African casualties shocked the South African public. Operation Askari was designed to expand the occupied area in Southern Angola. It failed, and even the South Africans had not expected such resistance from the Angolan forces. (Sec PhyJJis Johnson and Da­ vid Martin, *Destructive Engagement: SouJhern Africa at War,* Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986, p.102.) The set­ backs of Operation Askari underlined the limitation of the South African military superiority. (Sec Gavin Cawthra, *Brutal Force: Apartheid War Machine,* London, Canon Collins House, 1986, p.155.) Even during Operation Protea in August 1981, some observers speculated that the SADF had been surprised by the degree of resistance it had faced from the Angolan forces, which showed the limitation of the SADF power. (Sec *Africa Contemporary Record,* vol.16, I983-1984, p.B 604.) For the first time, the pro-Afrikaans press hesitatingly called for South African withdrawal from Namibia, arguing that the costs were becoming prohibitive. In February 1984, South Africa signed the Lusaka agreement with Angola through which both sides agreed to supervise the SADF departure from Southern Angola. For a more detailed discussion of the war in Angola, sec: Gerald J. Bender, "Peacemaking in Southern Africa: the Luanda-Pretoria tug-of-war, *Third World Quarterly,* vol.I l, no.2, April 1989, pp.15-30.

the other a *Pax Africana.* The former envisages a security system imposed, maintained, and supervised by South Africa as the dominant regional power, with the main purpose of defending and promoting its interests, and with the border states playing the role of dependent partners though maintaining their appear­ ance of independent states. The latter envisages a regional security system through a voluntary alliance of equals committed to promoting the interests of all its members from outside intervention".[2]

Thus far in this study we have examined this struggle up to and immediately beyond the signing of the Nk:omati Accord. The focus of this chapter will be on the longer range impact and implications of that agreement and what lies behind it We shall seek to weigh in the balance the gains and losses for both sides experienced as a result, directly or indirectly, of Nkomati. The record is opaque at this point, neither *'Pax'*

*-Africana* or *Pretoriana* - has emerged as a clear victor from that historic moment in March of 1984. Now, more than five years later, South Africa has experienced some short run, immediate advantages, while the

Frontline States have suffered some setbacks. But it has not been all beer and skittles for Pretoria, nor has it been all vinegar and hemlock for the neighbouring states. This chapter will attempt to assess the out­ comes and to suggest some long term implications for the region as a whole, which cannot ignore the wider world of which it is a part Nor can this chapter, which will include implications for the international scene as well.

## PAX PRETORIANA

It is worth recalling that South African policy toward its neighbours has.undergone several changes in the past decades. Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara, however, argue persuasively that the surface changes have been tactical rather than strategic, that 'destabilisation' has never enjoyed the status of an overall pol­ icy, as many observers have thought it to be, collapsing "the entire South African regional policy ... into an attempt by Pretoria to inflict maximum material damage on the economies and social structures of regional states - as a prelude to undermining their political systems and/or otherthrowing their govemments".[3] It

1. Ibrahim S. Msabaha and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), *Confrontation and liberation in Southern Africa: Regional Directions after the Nkomati Accord,* Boulder Colorado, Westview Press, 1987, p.90.
2. Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara, Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy since 1978.

In Masabaha and Shaw (eds.), *op.cit.,* p.240.

must be pointed out that South Africa was never under any illusion that it could overthrow FRELIMO or

the governments of Zambia or Zimbabwe.

But, as Davies and O'Meara continue, "the view which reduces Pretoria's entire regional strategy to destabilisation fails to recognise that since at least 1978 this strategy has also involved what might be called 'formative action"' [4] The grand strategy clearly was to restructure the relations between and among the states of southern Africa in such a way as to create a 'constellation of states', dependent upon and subser­ vient to the interests of the South African Republic and without in any way challenging or altering the inter­ nal political structure of that Republic. Destabilisation was one tactic in that overall policy, and Nkomati was another. "The adoption of any particular tactical mix by Pretoria has depended on various factors. The most important of these include the rhythm of struggles at the regional level and the pattern of internal rela­ tions within the target state[s]."[5] This study suggested in Chapter Six that one of the chief factors impel­ ling Pretoria to Nkomati was the pressure brought from the United States and Western Europe, whose good opinion or at least abstinence from hampering actions, is earnestly desired in the Republic. As Robert Davies put it,

" ... the Western pressure which was being exerted at that time, this was the period when you have the partial shift about the Reagan Administration from the doctrine of 'constructive engagement' to the doctrine which is announced by Lawrence Eagleburger of 'regional security', ... there was pressure in this direction ... pressure on the Pretoria regime ..."[6]

So long as the economic powers of the West threaten sanctions and discourage trade, the goal of regional hegemony becomes that much more complicated to achieve.

South Africa's problems were minimal until the mid-1970s. So long as its neighbours consisted of the two Portuguese colonies, Mozambique and Angola, where the mother country made little effort to build any competing economic base, the British colony of Rhodesia, which did a brisk trade with Pretoria, and Namibia, ruled and controlled by South Africa, no threat, economic, political or military posed itself. The three so-called High Commission territories, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, administered by a British

1. *Ibid ..*

[5] *Ibid.,* p.241.

1. *Personal Interview,* Robert Davies, Centre for African Studies, Maputo, Mozambique, 19 April 1988.

Commissioner, were coveted by South Africa as future bantustans. When the British made clear it would not agree to such a plan, the Verwoerd regime in 1963 proposed the establishment of a common market or commonwealth, and to create a free trade zone in the region. This did not materialize at that time, but close links were established in the 1960s with the colonial states, and Pretoria increased its intervention in the High Commission territories as the time of their independence approached. All three lands were incor­ porated into the South African dominated Southern African Customs Union.[7]

*Al;,* colonialism drew to an end in "Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia, the Vorster government embarked upon a quest for alliance with the Organization for African Unity, a policy called 'outward look­ ing' or 'dialogue initiative'. This met with some early success, symbolized by a formal treaty and diplomatic relations with Malawi in 1967. But the OAU in 1971 denounced Pretoria's proposed dialogues "as a manoeuvre to divide African states and confuse public opinion and thus to maintain the status quo in South Africa".[8] But six member states (Malawi, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Madagascar and Lesotho) voted against the resolution and five others (Dahomey, Niger, Togo, Swaziland and Upper Volta) abstained, showing that some progress had been made by the policy.[9]

A Zambian Senior Minister described the 'dialogue initiative' and explained the *FI.S* position towards it;

" ... South Africa has been trying to get that kind of approach, especially the Foreign Ministers of South Africa ... I know one of the journalists put the idea of perhaps they could have a meeting with the FLS, altogether all the Presidents meet with the President of South Africa and discussing the problem of South Africa and so on ... but that idea [was] rejected by the FLS because, it would just help to consolidate South Africa ... unless South Africa were to say that they are prepared to dismantle apartheid, they are prepared to give independence to the black people and perhaps they want to find their way out if they were genuine in this, and maybe there would be a reason for meeting them ... but now they are existing in their maintenance of apartheid. So they risk that kind of approach [and] it has not been successful ..."[10]

1. Masabaha and Shaw, *op. cit.,* p.243.
2. Sam C. Nolutshungu, *South Africa in Africa,* Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1975, p.276.
3. *Ibid ..*

[IO] *Personal lnten•iew,* M. Punabantu, Minister of National Guidance, Information and Broadcasting Services, Lusaka, Zambia, 10 March 1988.

The arrest of this policy was disappointing but not serious until the overthrow of the Caetano regime in Lis­ bon and the independence of Angola and Mozambique, both under leftist governments hostile to South Africa "This dramatically changed the regional balance of forces and undennined the basis on which South African policy bad hitherto been built. With the independence of Mozambique and Angola two of South Africa's key buffers collapsed".[11] The Smith regime was also teetering, thanks partly to assistance provided to the freedom fighters by FRELIMO. All of this made an agonizing reappraisal urgently neces­ sary, and the first step was a sharp escalation in spending on the SADF. The defence budget for 1975 was 150% of the previous year, and by 1977-78 it bad risen to 350% of 1973-74. In 1974, a new programme called 'detente' was announced by Vorster which sought to draw all the states of southern Africa into a con­ stellation of completely "independent states", forming a "strong bloc", presenting "a united front against common enemies",[12] which of course remained unspecified.

Vorster visited a number of West African countries as well as meeting with President Kaunda of Zambia in pursuit of detente, and some minor internal changes were made, including the abolition of some petty forms of apartheid. But all of this unravelled in the South African invasion of Angola in 1975 and the expulsion of those troops by the MPLA and Cuban soldiers in 1976. The final *coup de grace* came with the brutal suppression of the Soweto uprising. "Not even the most conservative African regime could now afford to be collaborating with a regime which slaughtered unanned black school children in the streets".[13] The end of detente marked the beginning of what came to be known as 'Total Strategy', set

forth in a Defence White Paper in 1977 and serving as the guiding policy for P,retoria during the subsequent

years. The protection and advance of the interests of South Africa and its bantustans, it was argued, requires the mobilization of economic, political, military and psycho-social resources, in short a total com­ mitment both internally and externally to assure the security of the apartheid regime.(14] The White Paper spoke openly of the necessity to "maintain a solid military balance relative to neighbouring states and other states in South Africa", and called for "economic action" and "action in relation to transport services,

[11) Davies and O'Meara, p.245, in Masabaha and Shaw, *op. cit.*

1. D. Geldenhuys and D. Venter, "Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa: a constellation of states?", *South Ajr:can Institute of International Affairs Bulletin,* December, 1979, p.149.
2. Davies and O'Meara, *op.cit.,* p.246.
3. Department of Defence, *White Paper on Defence,* Cape Town, 1977.

distribution and telecommunications" in order to advance "political and economic collaboration among the states of Southern Africa".[15) It was P.W. Botha, after becoming Prime Minister officially who adopted the Total Strategy, and a vigorous, multi-faceted operation was set in motion designed to bring about the desired constellation of states. The keystone of this structure was to create a series of joint economic pro­ jects between South Africa and its neighbours in the region, designed to show that capitalism was far more productive of economic growth and development than socialism. So the superiority of the 'private sector' was to be the ideology advanced to combat the Marxist-Leninist programmes which, among other things, were vigorously opposed to apartheid in all its forms. The second part of this strategy called for a series of 'non-aggression pacts' with neighbouring regimes, the first of which was the secret Swaziland agreement and Nkomati was the second. Deon Geldenbuys expressed it as making sure that "neighbouring states are not used as springboards for guerrilla or terrorist attacks on South Africa South Africa clearly not only wants neighbouring governments to give an undertaking to the effect but also wants them to implement it effectively, thus ensuring that unauthorised incursions do not take place. Furthermore, South Africa would wish that black states in the region [not merely neighbouring countries] would not provide facilities for anti-South African liberation movements, and, ideally, would not allow the movements to establish offices in their countries".[16] *As* we noted in Chapter Six, what was sought was not merely an agreement not to harbour ANC or other anti-apartheid representatives but also a willingness to act as police agents for Pre­

toria to bar any anti-South African political activity while guaranteeing that no cross-border raids would be

permitted.

These are three more objectives to the Total Strategy. One was to ensure that the "Soviet bloc powers do not gain a foothold in Southern African states".[17] The other two were interrelated: a strengthening of economic ties between the independent black states and South Africa would help to discourage the former from seeking trade sanctions or boycotts against South Africa. "The stronger the economic ties with South Africa, perhaps the lesser the chances of their supporting sanctions. Black states

1. *Ibid.,* p.6.
2. Deon Gcldenhuys, "Some Strategic Implications of Regional Economic Relations for the Republic of South Africa". ISSUP,

*Strategic Review,* January 1981, p.20.

1. *Ibid..*

could, in other words, shield South Africa from mandatory economic sanctions".[18] And of course, the study pointed out the desire on Pretoria's part for some moderation in the anti-apartheid rhetoric emanating from neighbouring capitals, though realistically, he confessed, "it simply cannot be expected of OAU member states to refrain from denouncing apartheid: at issue is the manner in which this is done".[19]

The Total Strategy has sought to coordinate all national resources, military, political, economic and psychosocial towards the common goal. In this connection, 'incentive levers' or 'techniques of persuasion' were developed on the one hand and 'disincentive levers' and 'techniques of coercion' on the other. The positive 'carrots' were to consist of the prospect of joint ventures and projects designed to build and strengthen the infrastructure of countries willing to cooperate with Pretoria.[20] The initial idea was to fun­ nel private capital, South African and otherwise, through a Southern African Development Bank, as we have seen. The study was not unimaginative in S\lggesting "l:>ticl;i;'' fol' mDti%tiDn. So :m>»1s :>l :m5.s !S "limiting or prohibiting the use of South Africa's railway and harbour facilities for the export of goods from black states .... Limiting or banning the importation of labours from states ... Regulating the access to and movement through South Africa of nationals from black states... Placing curbs on the imports of goods from black states. The two most crucial items are undoubtedly food and oil, but machinery, spares and various other goods could also be added... Curtailing or terminating the provision of technical expertise to these states, e.g. in the operation of Maputo harbour". [21]

All of these tactics were either threatened or used during the 1980s. They were part of the 'formative action' to bring about the desired constellation. Zimbabwe was originally s.een as the key to the entire operation. If Muzorewa's government could be supported, that country could be leading the other regional independent states into the desired relationships with South Africa. The failure of Muzorewa and the suc­ cess of the leftists, not unassisted from Maputo, a fact that was well noted in Pretoria, doomed the hopes, at least for the immediate future, for creating the constellation envisaged. That hope was also seriously threatened, at least, if not actually hampered by the formation of SADCC in April of 1980, the announced

[18] *Ibid.,* p.21.

1. *Ibid ..*
2. Davies and O'Meara, *op.cit.,* p.253.
3. Geldenhuys, "Some Strategic Implications", *op.cit.,* p.17.

purpose of which was to reduce economic dependence on South Africa. The organization saw three levels of transformation required to achieve its objectives. First, the economies of each of the member states would require transformation, to be followed by transforming the internal economic relations between and among the members, and finally a transformation in relations of the entire group with the external world.

1. The above events were described by one of the interviewees. In bis words

" ... when Ian Smith fell and Zimbabwe became independent ... at that time, South Africa wanted to control the whole region, talking about what it called the constellation of States ... it

[South Africa] wants to remain the core, the centre and everything become the periphery, that was the strategy ... when Mugabe came

to power in Zimbabwe and South Africa hoped it should be Muzorewa as a moderate to South Africa ... Mugabe had been treated [by Pretoria] as a Marxist and a Communist ... and at the same time [1980] SADCC was established ... South Africa still had that idea

of constellation of states which included the same countries that were now consolidated in SADCC ... [South Africa] was unhappy about that because [it] was losing control ..."[23]

This meant that the 'constellation apparatus' established by Pretoria - the Common Market, the Development Fund, and the Customs Union - were all con.fined in their operations to white South Africa and the 'independent' bantustans. Expansion to the other independent states had to wait for a more propi­ tious moment. And the hurrying along of that future was the objective first of destabilisation and then of Nkomati, both of which must be scored as at least provisional victories for the 'Total Strategy'. They achieved their stated objectives, forcing first Swaziland secretly and then Mozambique openly to negotia­

tions. The former step was initiated in a letter from P.W. Botha to King Sobhuza II of Swaziland ofFebru-

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ary 17, 1982. Some four months later, South Africa announced that it planned to cede two border regions

to Swaziland, lands historically claimed by that kingdom. The areas in question, KaNgwane on the north­ ern border of Swaziland and Ingwavuma on southeast, had been designated by South Africa as ethnic 'homelands'. [24] The indigenous leaders of the area entered a court battle to block the deal and South Africa finally gave it up in June, 1984, three months after Nkomati. "The land deal would have given Swaziland an outlet to the sea but would have favoured South Africa's homeland policy and provided a

1. SADCC, *Southern Africa: Towards &anomic Liberation.A Strategy Paper,* Maputo, 1980, p.1.
2. *Personal Interview,* Ben Motlhalamme, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gaborone, Botswana, 6 May 1988.
3. Mark A. Uhlig, *Apartheid in Crisis,* London Penguin Books, 1986, p.303. See also, Legum, *Africa Contemporary Record,*

Vol.16 and 17, Part two, Southern Africa: Kingdom of Swaziland, Vol.16 and 17, 1983-1985.

buffer zone along the southern border of Mozambique. However, the cost of administering the territories would have been transferred to Swaziland, outweighing any economic benefit, perhaps one reason why the then prime minister, Prince Mabandia, opposed the deal". [25] But despite the failure of that particular agreement, entered into secretly, the long run result was positive for Pretoria. Due to severe economic problems in. Swaziland, the country moved more finnly into the South African economic orbit in 1984-5, joining Malawi and the bantustans as a beginning of the desired 'constellation'. [26]

South Africa did not succeed, at Nkomati, in rendering Mozambique into the sought-for status of economic dependency, but it did, certainly, accomplish a part of its goal. It delimited the activity of the ANC in Mozambique, which promptly and honourably lived up to its part of the bargain, reducing the ANC presence to a bare minimum. The evidence on how great a threat or how much actual damage the ANC's operations in Mozambique represented to South Africa is not clear, but certainly Pretoria lost nothing at Nkomati and clearly did not exert itself very successfully to reciprocate in seeking to curb 11::NR activities in Mozambique. Because, " ... the South Africans [some military elements] have been supporting Rename [11::NR] forces despite the signing of the Agreement which means that they are not honouring the provisions of the Nkomati at all."[27] But far more important than the immediate advantages Nkomati might have car­ ried for South Africa, the Accord sent out a signal to the rest of southern Africa, to the OAU, and to the wider world that Pretoria was reasonable, that negotiations with its regime were possible, and that not all independent African states regarded South Africa as the Devil incarnate. Thus "the champ ions of *Pax Pre­*

*toriana* achieved one major victory [the Nkomati Accord] and two smaller,but nevertheless important vie- tories - the agreement with Swaziland, which goes far beyond Nkomati, and the Lusaka agreement with

Angola in February 1984. However, they failed to extend these advances along their borders with Botswana, Lesotho and Zimbabwe".[28] In Davies' words" ... the fact is that this signing [ofNkomati] was

1. David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, "Destabilization and Dependence", in *Apartheid in Crisis,* edited by Mark A. Uhlig, *op. cit.,*

p.303.

1. *Ibid .•*
2. *Personal Inten•iew,* Humphrey B. Kunda, Director of International Organization, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zambia, Lusaka, 2 March 1988.
3. Legum, *op. cit.,* p.90. The main feature of the immediate Post-Nkomati period was the resistance put up by these states to South Africa. All refused strongly to sign formal agreements, although they each repeated that they would not permit liberation movements to operate from their territories. Sec, for example, *Rand Daily Mail,* Johannesburg, 31 July 1984, and 7 September 1984.

followed by pressure on other regional states, particularly Lesotho, Botswana and to an extent Zimbabwe to follow a suit ..."[29] "The second setback was on the international front where Pretoria failed in its bid to gain a more supportive role from the Western community and admission to the NATO club which was the aim of President Botha's mission to the capitals of Western Europe immediately after signing the Nkomati Accord. Although he was more or less courteously received, none of the European leaders, as be sourly remarked on his return home, were ready to respond positively to his demonstration of South Africa as a regional power."[30]

Nonetheless, the gains for the *Pax Pretoriana* from Nkomati have to be regarded as outweighing the losses, at least in the short run. It succeeded in forcing three of its closest neighbours - Mozambique, Swaziland and Angola to the negotiating table. Two of them bad come to power through armed struggle, and Angola and Mozambique bad governments that were avowedly committed to socialist solutions for their countries, and bad entered upon treaties of friendship and co-operation with *the* Soviet Union. There was also unity in their vigorous opposition to apartheid.

However, in the medium range, the balance of advantage tended to shift in favour of the *Pax Afri­ cana* for several reasons. First and foremost, the struggle within South Africa itself has, if anything, intensified in the years since Nkomati. The ANC leadership, as we have seen, was not pleased with Machel and FRELIMO for caving in to Pretoria, but they did understand, and they simply resolved to redouble their efforts toward freedom and democracy. "Clearly", as Legum comments, "any number of agreements with border states cannot produce racial peace and security inside South Africa itself, which remains the bard core of the struggle over the future regional systems in the sub-continent".[31] Machel took special pains, as noted above, to indicate in his Nkomati speech the continuing opposition to apartheid and commitment to the principle of majority rule. FREI.IMO, therefore, perceive apartheid as

1. *Personal Interview,* Robert Davies, Centre for African Studies, Maputo, Mozambique, 19 April 1988.
2. Colin Legum, The Nkomati and its Implications, *op.cit.,* p.90.
3. Legum, *op. cit.,* p.91.

11 ••• a conflict within South Africa, between the minority regime that espouses the principles of racialism, apartheid and the population of South Africa. There is a conflict between South

Africa and mankind, because mankind unanimously rejects apartheid ... not a single government in the world accepts the principles of

apartheid ... so, in going towards a non-aggression accord, that was the Nkomati Accord, we would also create the conditions internationally and in South Africa for public opinion and governments to better understanding and perceive the very nature of the conflict ... that it was not a Mozambican expansionist policy, but it was a very defined and precise conflict within South Africa.11(32]

There is a growing recognition in South Africa that the kind of long-term relationship the powerful state wants ultimately to establish with its neighbours cannot be imposed by force. In that sense Nkomati could be seen as a sort of stand-off between the two forces, producing a parity of gains and losses. Mozam- bique did not realize immediately the advantages it sought and desperately needed in going to negotiations, but insofar as efforts are made at solving problems by discussion rather than by force, a positive precedent is established with some hope for the future. The Mozambicans believed by signing the Accord that, as Vieira put it 11 of course if we can prevent a war we would be completely fools to refuse it ... [we signed] because we want to prevent a war between the two states ...11(33] Mozambique observed its obligations scrupulously, an integrity which was not matched by the other side, which might make any future negotia­ tions difficult, both in Maputo and throughout the region, but increasingly influential voices in the Afri- kaner community are pressing for negotiations in good faith to replace the more aggressive and destructive elements of the Total Strategy.[34]

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A third minus for South Africa following Nkomati has been its inability to have its way with respect

to Namibia. The Contact Group members refused resolutely to budge on their insistence on genuine independence for Namibia, including the recognition of SWAPO as the legitimate governing force within the country. Even the Reagan Administration, despite its efforts to 'link' Namibian independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops, did toughen its stand with Pretoria, refusing to accept the kind of manipulation which brought the former High Commission Territories into the South African orbit [35] U.N. Security

1. *Personal Interview,* Colonel Sergio Vieira, Director of Centre for African Studies, Maputo, Mozambique, 28 April 1988.
2. *[bid ..*
3. Legum, *op. cit.,* p.91.
4. Legum, *op.cit.,* p.90, about the role of the Contact Group, for example see, Geisa Maria Rocha, *In Search of Namibain In­ dependence: The Limitation of the United Nations,* Boulder, Co., Westview Press, 1984.

Council Resolution Number 385 bas stood fast *as* the only basis on which Namibia's independence can be recognised, and that resolution is crystal clear as to SWAPO's legitimate role. This was the context of the UN General Assembly resolution of December 1976 that recognised SW APO as the "sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people ... any independence talks should be with SWAPO, under UN auspices for the sole purpose of discussing the modalities of the transfer of power to the people of Nami- bia".[36]

Frnally, the aftermath ofNkomati showed that the policy of destabilisation had "only a limited utility. It wm:ked most effectively only in those border countries which were faced with serious internal political problems that could be exploited by Pretoria; attempts to create dissent, by, for example, supporting the Lesotho Liberation Army failed to destabilize the regime of Chief Leabua Jonathan, its support for Super­ ZAPU in Zimbabwe (admittedly limited, but potentially menacing) created difficulties for Prime Minister Robert Mugabe,[37] but eventually failed; while the internal stability of Botswana was not even ruffled. Moreover, although the Luanda regime was anxious to negotiate over the departure of the SA Defence Forces (SADF) from its territory it did not yield on the major issue of support for Namibian independence or the withdrawal of Cuban troops as a prerequisite for the withdrawal of SADF. In fact, SADF has now quit Angola before a single Cuban combat soldier has left".[38] However, the first contingent of Cuban sol­ diers departed on January 9-10, 1989.[39]

Following the Nkomati Accord, a number of steps which could be classified as 'formative action' have been implemented, in apparent efforts to contribute to the constellation qf states. The object of this sort of activity was to demonstrate to Mozambique that 'economic cooperation' with Pretoria presents greater advantages than socialistic efforts at growth and development The government itself has become involved: the rates for power from the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric power station are now based on the amount of power leaving the turbines instead of on how much reaches its terminals in South Africa, a

[36) UN General Assembly Resolution 31/146, adopted at its 105th session on December 1976, United Nation, New York, 1976. (37] Zimbabwe Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, spoke of pressure being put on his government to enter into a security agreement

with South Africa. This pressure was mainly in the form of continued South African support for the 'Super-ZAPU' operating in the Matabeleland province. *Rand Daily Mail,* Johannesburg, 19 July 1984.

(38] *Ibid ..*

(39] See, *The Times,* London, 10 January 1989. And *The Guardian,* Manchester, 11 January 1989.

decided concession to Mozambique. The security of the power lines has become the joint responsibility of both Pretoria and Maputo. "Other formal agreements on the use of Maputo port and possibly the recruit­ ment of additional Mozambican labour for the South African mines are also expected and a South African government 'economic committee' has been set up to deal with Mozambique".[40]

Significant pressures have also been applied by Pretoria on the private sector to make their contribu­ tion to the constellation of states. Many South African businessmen were present at the Nkomati ceremony itself, and numerous appeals have gone outto the business community to invest its capital in joint ventures. The head of the South African Associate Chambers of Commerce said in April of 1984, "Most businessmen today - in the aftermath of the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique, new arrangements with Swaziland, con­ ciliatory remarks by President Kaunda of Zambia, and peace moves in South West Africa [Namibia] - stand closer to the Prime Minister's goal [of a constellation of states] than ever before. Businessmen have an enormous stake in the success or otherwise of recent developments in Southern Africa, especially in Mozambique". [41]

Such initiatives had their place, of course, in the Total Strategy, one aspect of which was to under­ mine the SADCC and bind the independent states ever more closely to South Africa in economic depen­ dence. The *Financial Mail* commented editorially that "the dissipation of the South African Coordination Conference's fragile economic initiative is inevitable ... For instance, Mozambique was to have played a key role in the coordination of transport in the SADCC region. It is a role that South Africa is much better placed to fulfil more efficiently. Close trade between SA and Mozambique mu t lead to recognition of that fact".[42]

All of this indicates that the *'Pax Pretoriana'* was not without its successes in the short run. Nkomati had its possibilities for South Africa. The "long nurtured hopes for a constellation of states linked to Pre­ toria through economic, security, and eventually political ties, is seen to hang in the balance. If Nkomati works, this could pave the way for mutual security pacts with Botswana, Lesotho and Zimbabwe. This

1. Davies and O'Meara, *op.cit.,* p.269.
2. *The Star,* Johannesburg, 23 April 1984.
3. *Financial Mail,* Johannesburg, 27 April 1984.

would of course be a significant achievement in terms of South Africa's security interests. But it has broader implications: if South Africa, apartheid and all, were to be formally accepted by the regional states, this would go a long way toward gaining her acceptance by the world at large. Whether President Botha accepts this view, or that of his military, who appear unwilling to drop Renamo, remains to be seen".[43] However, the new South African President F.W. de Kerk promised the Mozambican government that be will reshuffle the commanding level of SADF who have been involved in supporting the MNR.[44] Such promises came after the United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, had publicly stated that the US bas evidence of continued South African support for the MNR.[45]

Given the possibilities for having taken Nk:omati seriously and seeking to make it work, it is difficult to understand why Pretoria did not pursue that course. But there are inherent contradictions in the Total Strategy which make it virtually impossible to achieve the goals. South Africa, on the one hand, wants to play the leading role, economically in the region, which means that it should be contributing significantly to the economic development and strength of the Front Line States, through joint ventures and the encourage­ ment of international investments in the region. Instead it persists in trying to undermine SADCC and to keep the economies of all its neighbours in a state of weakness and underdevelopment South Africa

"has been frustrating the SADCC by force and by instituting the policy of destabilisation including sabotage of certain infrastructures in the FLS ... the South Africans would like the FLS to continue to depend on South Africa's infrastructure such as the railway system ..."[46]

However, the answer to such destabilisation by Pretoria was given by other interviewee, he said

(43] Robert S. Jast.er, 'The Security Outlook in Mozambique", *Survival,* The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

Nov.-Dec. 1985, p.264.

(44] *AIM,* Maputo, 14 November 1989.

(45] *AIM,* Maputo, 11 November 1989.

1. *Personal Interview,* Humphrey B. Kunda, Ministry of Foreign Affiars, Lusaka, Zambia, 2 March 1988.

" ... the FLS play a defensive and active role in supporting actively in material, moral, political, diplomatic sense and also to an extent providing the basis ... you really cannot prosecute a war of you don't have a rear base in which you can be able to train, consolidate and so 011 ••• Angola for instance is giving the

ground for the SWAPO and its military wing also the ANC is using some facilities in Angola, besides elsewhere, and also Mozambique is playing a major role in the armed struggle before the Nkomati Accord in providing at least a place for fighting apartheid ... at

the same time providing a rear base for ANC and PAC members ... and to find a way of going to South Africa because that is where the war is ... each of these [FLSJ countries have played

positively to assist the prosecution of the struggle on the ground in South Africa and Namibia."[47)

South Africa "certainly does not wish to see economically strong independent states arising in the region, and much of its activities over the past six years have been explicitly designed to undermine the economic viability of other Southern African states."[48] South Africa had the challenge to demonstrate that "cooperation with South Africa works" but its internal contradictions could not permit such a course. The *Pax Pretoriana* demands a cordon of weak dependent states. Strong, economically prosperous neigh­ bours lead inevitably to a *Pax Africana,* which Pretoria does not want in the present circumstances.

A further internal contradiction is found in the institution of apartheid itself. That is the principal rea­ son why South Africa finds itself unable to gain acceptance and respect 011 the international scene. It wants desperately to be a significant player in the game of world trade and world politics, to be recognised as the leading power *in sub-Saharan* Africa. *But it cannot achieve that recognition while keeping the majonty of*

its citizens in a subservient state. It has made some limited changes here and there, but even those changes

*T*

do not alter the basic international disapproval under which South Africa constantly lives. It cannot have its cake and eat it simultaneously, so it is denied that international acceptance of the *Pax Pretoriana.*

Moreover, it has been unable to impose its *Pax* militarily. It learned the bard way in Angola that direct intervention does not always work, as the U.S. learned in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan. "In most cases, nations would prefer to answer security threats directly; after all, the use of surrogates is a tenuous strategy at best. In the case of South Africa, the failed intervention in Angola illustrated the serious

1. *Personal Interview,* Shcdrack B. Gutta, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe, 23 March 1988.
2. Robert Davies, *South African Strategy Toward Mozambique in the Post-Nkomati Period,* Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Sweden, 1985, p.60.

constraints on direct intervention from both within the country and from world pressure." [49] 1bis recogni­ tion strengthened the use of surrogates in programmes of destabilisation, and South Africa has consistently made use of two types of military surrogates: what are called 'secondary surrogates' and 'direct or puppet surrogates'. The former type is exemplified by UNITA and some of the dissident groups in Zimbabwe; they were not created by Pretoria; they have a greater degree of independence based on their own goals which may or may not coincide with South Africa's, which makes them more difficult to control. "UNITA especially rules large parts of Angola *as* if it were a legitimate government and would undoubtedly sever its

ties with South Africa if that were possible ... While UNITA strikes at targets directly related to the

strength and survival of the MPLA government, it does not pursue the sort of wholesale economic devasta­ tion that has become the MNR's stock and trade. Since the long-run objective of Savimbi and UNITA is control of Angola, this would clearly be counter-productive". [50] The MNR, on the other hand, although it had its origins in Rhodesia, is clearly the creature of South Africa, which "will continue to make moderate use ofUNITA-type surrogates, but will place greater reliance on MNR movements for some time".[51]

The surrogates have seriously destabilised Mozambique and its economy which in turn has had secondary destabilising effects on other Front Line States which had hoped to be able to use Mozambican ports and railways to transport goods both in and out of their countries. This has kept the region unsettled and in no position to offer any threat to South Africa either militarily or economically. But that does not represent a 'peace', especially when Pretoria knows that it sits on a perpetual powder keg both at home and in the region. It is an uneasy and costly region of terror whose tenure in the lon.,g run is uncertain at best. The oppressed indigenous population within South Africa itself may be held down for a very long time, but military and economic destabilisation aimed at the states of southern Africa cannot continue forever, as colonialism could not Pretoria has been forced to witness the end of colonial rule and the coming to power of indigenous governments all around it. The effort to impose its will on the region has enjoyed some tem­ porary success, but the ultimate outcome seems certain. Which brings us to the alternative, *Pax Africana,* in which South Africa must play an important, though no longer the dominant role.

[49) Steven Metz, 'The Mozambique National Resistance and South African Foreign Policy", *African Affairs,* October 1986, p.504. [50) *Ibid.•* p.506.

1. *Ibid .•*

**PAX AFRICANA**

The leadership of Mozambique was dealt a severe blow with the death, in an aeroplane crash, of President Samora Machel on October 19, 1986. The plane in which be was flying crashed into a bill. Many questions arose from this crash. President Oii.ssano mentions that an international commission of inquiry found that the flight path was diverted by the use of a VOR (very high frequency) omni-directional radio. '1t was stated that following the crash, the aircraft's instruments bad been tampered with. By whom and why? For the moment, there is no answer fo those questions".[52] There were of course suspicions of sabo­ tage, strengthened by annonymous phone calls at the time and also by a later report, published in the Harare *Herald,* which said that, Paul Oliveria, former spokesman for the l'v1NR in Lisbon, told the press that be bad received a phone call from South Africa confirming the news of Machel's death and telling him "to standby for it might be necessary for us to claim the action". By noon, however, be was informed "it was no longer necessary to be worried about the action". [53] The Pretoria government denied any responsibility about the accident, and, Colonel Vieira refused to relate the accident to Nkomati Accord. He claimed that" ... it's nothing to see with Nkomati ... the death of President Machel related with the decision of South Africa of

attacking Mozambique ... it was related with the decision of South Africa of attacking all the countries in the region ... of preventing the existence of organised states in her border ... that was the reason why they [SA] have lcilled Samora Machel ..."[54]

Machel was succeeded by the Foreign Minister, Joaquim Chissano. Asked in April of 1987 about relations between Mozambique and South Africa, be responded, "Nothing bas clµnged, unless it is that the situation has worsened. Pretoria is applying *de facto* sanctions". [55] The tonnage of South African goods flowing through the port at Maputo had dropped, said Chissano, from seven million to about 960,000. The number of Mozambicans working in South Africa also was steadily declining - 30,000 in 1987, less than half of what they were in 1986. Chissano claimed to have "proof that relations between South Africa and the armed bandits haven't changed, in spite of Pretoria's undertaking at Nkomati ... Pretoria provides them

1. Pietro Petrucci, "Interview with President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique", *AFRICASIA,* The English edition, Paris, No.40, April 1987.
2. *The Herald,* Harare, 24 March 1988.
3. *Personal Interview,* Colonel Sergio Vieira, Director of Centre for African Studies, Maputo, Mozambique, 28 April 1988.
4. Interview with President Chissano, *op.cit.,* p.9.

with munitions, foodstuffs and other essential goods". [56]

Chissano estimated that about four million Mozambicans have been adversely affected by a combina­ tion of the drought and the 'anned bandits'. There were acute shortages of shelter, food, medicines and agricultural equipment such as seed and implements. There was some respite from the drought with the coming of some rain, but the tools to take advantage of the situation were lacking. The new President said that "All the Frontline States are cooperating with us, but to varying degrees, of course ... For some time, Zimbabwe has been cooperating with us militarily by sending troops. Tanzania will soon be doing the same. In spite of difficulties caused by the war there, Angola is also giving us help in this field. As a whole, the Frontline States regard aid to Mozambique as a priority in defense of the region and they act accordingly". [57]

When President Chissano was asked how he felt about the notion entertained by some European governments that direct aid to the Frontline States was more effective than sanctions against South Africa, be recognized that aid to the beleaguered countries and investments through SADCC were important and helpful but expressed his hope that such actions might be supplemented by sanctions. "In essence we are asking the international community to step up at any price its efforts to force Pretoria to give up its role of international gendanne and anned movements to destabilize independent Africa." [58] Chissano went on to say that it was in the long-range interests of the EEC to provide aid for Mozambique and the SADCC. "The proper operation of the Mozambican ports and the railway networks in the independent countries of the region can only serve the interests of European countries in southern Africa, i.JJcluding - paradoxical as it might seem right now - South Africa". [59]

The priorities for Mozambique, according to Chissano, were foreign investment to "create jobs, set industry back on its feet and launch agricultural development programs". A number of emergency pro­ grammes had been initiated, aimed at helping the displaced South African miners, the victims of the drought and the ravages of the 11:NR. The railway link to Beira he saw as essential to the economic

1. *Ibid..*
2. *Ibid..*
3. *Ibid ..*
4. *Ibid ..*

development of the whole region, but it was not simply international transport but trade and communication domestically which were also vital [60] The economic and military evolution of Mozambique after the signing of Nkomati was provided by a scholar when he said,

* + ... until 1986 in fact, the spiral ofnegative growth continued ... I think it is 11% negative growth from 1982 to 1986, and this is principally the consequences of war ... so in fact 1984 they [the Mozambican's] did not find any improvement in the situation, what changed in the economy was perhaps the relationship with e western countries which is another whole area of struggle. In 1984 when

Mozambique joined the IMF and World Bank and that led to a series of negotiations and discussions which finally

culminated in an agreement in 1987 which was based on economic rehabilitation programme ... at the same time, we have an

emergency programme which was launched in 1987 [which] also received the support from the IMF and the World Bank, which leads

to a renegotiation of debt to some considerable inflow of funding and to a considerable influx of emergency funding ... and I think all these changes together lead to a small upswing of 4% in the real domestic product in 1987 ... In the context [of] continuing destabilisation the security situation

has bad its ups and downs to the extent that any breakthroughs there have been largely depends upon the transport corridor, the

Beira Corridor, with some support from the Zimbabwean troops, you have an improvement in the security situation ... at the

end of 1986, also Mozambique got some support from Tanzanian troops ... so these developments took place despite continuing destabilisation ... I don't think the Nkomati Accord itself

actually brought about any reduction in aggression ..."[61]

The situation in Mozambique, then, bas changed little since Nkomati, except for the worse. Maputo has consistently stressed, joined in this regard by all the Frontline States, that it observed the terms of the

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Accord faithfully, expelling all but a skeleton remnant of ANC members and ensuring that no attacks on South Africa were launched across its borders. It also stood ready to enter into projects of economic development and joint ventures of all kinds. South Africa, for its part, although claiming to observe the terms of the Accord, has consistently supported the MNR and has failed to make good on its promises for economic assistance, though these were not a formal part of the Nkomati document. So all the hopes aroused in Mozambique by Nkomati have been dashed. Yet as recently as late March, 1988, a senior Mozambican official, Marcelion dos Santos, the President of the Mozambican Assembly, was quoted as

1. *Ibid..*
2. Personal Interview, Robert Davies, *op. cit..*

saying that his government would adhere to the accord despite four years of continued South African aggression. The Nkomati Accord, he said, "is just like all unwritten agreements between Mozambique and its six neighbours. We do not see any reason why we should abrogate it because we are not a hostile coun­ try. We are using it to tell the world that we are not a hostile nation. We are a peace-loving country. It is only South Africa which continues to provoke and destabilize us in spite of this pact". [62]

In the long run, the entire experience may prove, ironically, to shift the balance in favour of Mozam­ bique, to the extent that FRELIMO gained some benefits from Nkomati. As Vieira stated,

* + ... we have isolated South Africa, we have depolarised the conflict ... instead of being an east-west conflict or perceived as such, it has become part and parcel of the conflict between mankind and the militarist and aggressive

policy of apartheid ... we have prevented South Africa [from] launching open aggression and declaring an aggression against us ... we have prevented the total war between the two states."[63]

Maputo has retained an international posture of good faith in spite of victimization and has won the respect of the world in the process. When and if a *Pax Africana* does become a reality, Mozambique will be assured of a leading role in its creation and administration. Mozambique experienced a degree of alienation at the time of Nkomati, though the Frontline neighbours outdid themselves in proclaiming their 'under­ standing', as we noted in Chapter Six. Maputo was regarded as credulous and naive by the more cynical and suspicious among the Frontline leadership, and there has been a strong temptation in more than one southern African capital to say to FRELIMO, 'We told you so!'. But Mozambique never was subjected to expulsion, as was Egypt following Camp David, nor labelled as a traitor to th! cause. The country has achieved the status of a martyr, a role it shares with Angola, which now has also entered into a treaty with South Africa, whose viability will be tested in the months to come.

Viewed in the context of a *Pax Africana* which envisages a regional security system that is to be achieved through a voluntary alliance of equals committed to promoting the interests of all its members free from outside intervention, Angola's relations with South Africa, in many ways, signal the degrees of suc­ cess and viability to such a future system. For until the signing of the treaty, Angola - like Mozambique -

1. *The Herald,* Harare, 30 March 1988.

(63] Personal Interview, Colonel Sergio Vieira, *op. cit..*

has been regard as a *bete noire* of Pretoria. The regimes of Angola and Mozambique, so regarded because they had come to power through armed struggle, they had opted for Marxist system and were bound by Treaties of Friendship and Co-opertion with the Soviet Union. What is more as noted earlier, Pretoria does not enjoy the same control over UNITA that she does over MNR, and despite the withdrawal of SADF and ultimately the Cuban troops, it is unlikely that Savimbi and his troops, supported as they are by American and South African right wing groups will obligingly fold their tents and quietly steal away. The devastation in Angola, following its prolonged warfare, is very severe. Two dispatches to the *New York Times* from Luanda, paint a grim picture. "Western aid workers estimate that there are 50,000 amputees in Angola, largely from UNITA's land mines. There have been massacres, but even worse the economy is in a sham­ bles and people go hungry in what is potentially one of Africa's richest countries". [64] There has been a drift away from the earlier Marxist line. Government leaders speak of Angola as a ;,state with a socialist orientation", and Angola well illustrates the biting truth of a comment by Soviet Foreign Ministry official Andrey V. Kozyrev that developing countries "suffer not so much from capitalism as from a lack of it "[65]

The struggle with Unita is likely to go on. Savimbi is "too formidable for any idea of power-sharing to be taken seriously. 'In Africa there can't be two chiefs' said an African diplomat" [66] Moreover, a Zambian senior minister, who witnessed the events of 1974-75 in Angola, described Savimbi's position on power-sharing.

" ... Savimbia was in Lusaka ... he went to Zaire for a meeting with Roberto and Neto ... to decide who is going to be President [of Angola] under the government of national unity ... and Savimbi has already made up his mind that he does not want to become President ... that it is up to Roberto

[FNLA] and Neto [MPLA] to decide which one of them will want to be President ... this is what he was saying, this is what

he was telling me ... he [Savimbi] does not mind because if they go together maybe after three, four, five years ... and will have a general election Savimbi says, he is going to win."[67]

1. *New York Times,* New York, 22 January 1989.
2. *Ibid ..*
3. *Ibid ..*
4. Personal Interview, M. Punabantu, *op. cit..*

President dos Santos commented that "in Africa we have one-party states. We think this system suits us in this phase. There can be only one party", and, "by implication, one chief!". [68] And, in the same edi­ tion, it was noted that "There are development projects with great exports potential. First on the list is reha­ bilitation of the Benguela Railway, which used to carry exports from Zaire and Zambia through Angola to the coast. But like so much else, that depends on the security situation. 'The Government was right to say that it couldn't wait for the end of the war to reform the economy' a diplomat says. 'But you can't really make the country work, or get development going, without settling the war"'. [69]

The *New York Times* pointed out that almost all of the shops in Luanda were shut and have been so since the Portuguese left in 1975. "The Angolan Government that took over in 1975, professing Marxist principles, set up state stores. They were a disastrous failure, with little available for ordinary people to buy

... The heyday of Marxist-Leninism is over, someone comments wryly. One still sees an occasional bust of Lenin, but the spirit of capitalism is in the air. People leave the civil service, buy an old car and set up in trade or transportation. There are traffic jams in Luanda now". [70]

Angola is seen by one knowledgeable source as "the main external target for South Africa's 'total strategy', and the transition from destabilization to diplomacy and back again has been so sudden that one South African magazine, the *Financial Mail,* likened it to a Transvaal thunderstorm". [71] Few in the gen­ eral public anywhere realize that the Cuban troops were summoned to Angola in November of 1975 to assist in protecting the new regime from a powerful South African force which was moving rapidly toward Luanda with the apparent intent of blocking the installation of the :MPLA. Angola was well supplied with sophisticated Soviet defence equipment and thus able to resist serious damage from the SADF, which has not been (until 1987/8) in direct engagement with Cuban troops since 1976. [72)

As a part of the diplomatic approach, in January of 1984, less than two months before Nkomati, the SADF began a withdrawal from Angola and P.W. Botha told Parliament that a cease-fire was the official

1. *New York Times,* New York, 22 January 1989.
2. *New York Times,* New York, 22 January 1989.
3. *Ibid.•*
4. Mark A. Uhlig, *op.cit.,* p.316.
5. *Ibid..*

goal. "South Africa", he said, "stands at the crossroads between confrontation and peace".[73] Or, as *The Guardian* put it, "The iron fist of destabilization is now decorously clothed in the velvet glove of diplomacy." An agreement on 16 February, 1984, monitored by Assistant Secretary Crocker of the U.S. State Department was signed at Lusaka which arranged for a withdrawal of SADF troops and material from Cuvelai, 120 miles north of the Namibian border, to Ngiva, 25 miles from the border, but not farther. In April of 1985, all forces were withdrawn across the border but reentered almost at once for a preemptive strike against the Angolan army. [74]

The United States, as part of its policy of 'constructive engagement' in the region, has consistently supported Savimbi, a skilled lobbyist with powerful friends in America. The Reagan Administration managed to get the Congress to repeal the Clark amendment which had banned any aid to UNITA in 1976 and was able to channel substantial assistance to the surrogate forces in Angola, largely by waving the red shirt of the Cuban presence and substantial Soviet assistance to :MPLA. [75]

Now that an agreement has been reached which calls for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Angola and the granting of independence to Namibia, there is at least the possibility of peaceful economic development in the region and the unfolding of a *Pax Africana.* However, Savimbi and his UNITA, despite his pro-Western, anti-Marxist posturing, is better described, according to Western business interests with experience in Angola, as 'Pro-Savimbi'. [76] It is highly dubious that he will accept a minority share of the governing power, even if it were offered. After all, UNITA fought together with the Portuguese army against :MPLA, even though it labelled itself as a 'liberation movement'. It appe¥8 likely, therefore, that a civil war of sorts will continue in Angola and that Pretoria will do what it can to continue the destabiliza­

tion of the country *as* a device to protect itself against the presence of secure and prosperous neighbours because of the facilities which is provided by the Angolan government to SWAPO in the past and the ANC in the present In other words " ... Angola is giving the ground for the SWAPO and its military wing ...

the ANC, also, and its military is using some facilities in Angola ..."[77]

[73] *Ibid.,* p.319.

1. Martin and Johnson, *op. cit.,* p.3J9.
2. Marga Holness, "Angola: The Struggle Continues", in Phyllis Johnson and David Martin (eds.), *Destn,ctive Engagement: Southern Africa at War,* Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986, p.89.
3. Martand Johnson, in *op. cit.,* p.323.

In Namibia, finally now scheduled for independence, South Africa has been engaged for twenty years against the South-West Africa People's Organization, which has been fighting to expel the South African administration. In 1984, as a part of the wider peace offensive which included Nkomati, overtures were made to SWAPO through the good offices of Kenneth Kaunda An effort was then made to divide the SWAPO forces and to impose a puppet regime masquerading as a step toward independence for the terri­ tory. A transitional government was installed in June of 1985, but this too strongly smelled of the same ploy that had been tried in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, and the governments of the world both in and out of Africa refused to recognize its legitimacy. Time has forced the hand of Pretoria and those who urged a staunch refusal to deal with SWAPO at all, together with those counselling a 'correct' settlement have been ren- dered obsolete by events and irrelevant.[78] The military efforts against SWAPO in Angola by the SADF became open aggression and won growing international protest. It has been suggested that a scenario, whose origin was uncertain as to Washington or Pretoria, was developed, which reasoned as follows: "Angola is not Mozambique and is too distant, too wealthy and too heavily armed by the Soviet Union to be drawn into South Africa's economic or security orbit or to be forced to abandon the ANC. Namibia is a liability and must be jettisoned in the foreseeable future with an internationally acceptable government [i.e. SWAPO]. It is therefore necessary to weaken the present administration in Angola as much as possible before that happens, either by forcing it into negotiations with anticommunist groups or through economic influence, or both". [79] The reasoning was sound but the strategy (of weakening the regime in Luanda) did not work. Dos Santos, Angola's President, proposed the terms for settlement - the phased withdrawal of Cuban troops over a three year period - in 1984, and stayed with them. Secretary Crocker, in a trip to Luanda in January of 1986, proposed U.S. support for financing oil exploration, at the same time threaten­ ing increased aid for UNITA. Dos Santos told him that the Angolan government did not understand whether to regard these proposals as a "form of pressure on Angola or a declaration of war by the United States". (80] Nevertheless, the Angolan and Namibian settlements were seen as a success for US diplomacy

1. Personal Interview, Shedrack B. Gutto, *op. cit..*
2. Martin and Johnson, *op. cit,* p.324.

[79] *Ibid.,* p.328.

1. *Ibid ..*

despite the support of the United States for UNITA who appear to be the losers in the emerging situation. Again, it will take time for Angola and Namibia to take hold of their massive internal problems and posture themselves for an active role in a *Pax Africana,* but time is on their side, and the ultimate outcome seems assured. (i.e. the independence of Namibia).

The three countries already drawn into the Southern African Customs Union, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, are all heavily dependent on revenues from South Africa - forty per cent for Botswana, sixty per cent for Swaziland and over seventy per cent for Lesotho.[81] Moreover, their (BI.S) economic depen­ dency in South Africa is not much different from the FLS-SADCC countries reliance in Pretoria economy, such dependency is ti ••• very heavily to the tune of 70% to 80% for all the FLS ... but Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland and even up to 95% ...tl[82] Swaziland had, as noted above, signed an earlier non-aggression pact with Pretoria, made public only after Nkomati. Following the death of King Sobhuza II, the economic dependence on South Africa grew to even greater proportions, and that kingdom appears for the foreseeable future to be destined to play the role of a client state, captive to the *Pax Pretoriana,* at least for the present.

Lesotho, a tiny country of only one and a half million people, finds itself entirely surrounded by South Africa, where more than half its adult male population works, sending the bulk of its pay back home. Chief Jonathan, who came to power initially in 1965, with Pretoria's blessing, enjoyed that favour even

more forcefully when in 1970 he refused to accept the result of an election which he lost and continued to rule illegally. An ambitious and vain man, he sought legitimacy in wider circles and a measure of freedom from South African control. [84]

In 1984 Chief Jonathan publicly announced opposition to an Nkomati-type accord between his coun­ try and South Africa, ti ••• the Jonathan government refused to sign a non-aggression pact and although they came under strong pressure to do so, basically that issue led to a struggle within the Basotho National Party

..."[85] Chief Jonathan insisted on good relations with both the ANC and some communist countries, which marked him for destruction, and a military coup led by Major General Justin Lekhanya overthrew the Chief

(8 I] See Chapter JO, 'Swaziland', in, Joseph Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours,* London, CIIR, 1986, pp.91-100. (82] *Personal lnten•iew,* Dr. John M.W. Makumbe, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe, 17 March 1988. (84] See Chapter 11, 'Lesotho', in Joseph Hanlon, *op.cit.,* pp.107-130.

(85] Personal Interview, Robert Davies, *op. cit ..*

in January 1986.[86] *The Herald,* published in Harare, Zimbabwe, commented that "Pretoria was unsettled in Chief Jonathan's later years by his increasingly anti-apartheid rhetoric and friendships with communist powers. Chief Jonathan got on well with Pretoria after seizing power in 1970, but in later years South Africa chaffed at the presence of African National Congress representatives in Maseru and Chief Jonathan's radical talk". [87] Since the coup, Lesotho has become entirely obliging. "Pretoria has found itself a friend in the military government of ... Maj-Gen. Metsing Lekhanya ... South Africa's influence is increasingly apparent as a cooperation with the righ g leadership in Maseru groups." [88] There is increasing economic activity on the part of South African investors and no tensions with Pretoria. Lekhanya answers his critics by saying "Lesotho is not moving any closer to South Africa than has always been necessary for its economic survival". [89] That is realism, whatever else may be said of it Lesotho is finnly in Pretoria's grasp and seems likely to remain there for some time to come. The Minister of Information, T. Desmond Sexishe, was reported as having said as follows " ... from sheer position of our weakness militarily and oth­ erwise, economically and so on, we [Lesotho] can't afford to put a finger in South Africa's eye ..."[90]

Later in 1986, South Africa - Lesotho relations were improved in a positive way by the " ... establish­ ment of the trade mission [in Maseru], as sort of diplomatic relations and there were specific reports of co­ operation and collaboration between the police and the military of the two countries at various levels ... as far as I know, there has been no formal security pact ..."[91]

Botswana, at the time ofNkomati, assured Pretoria that it would not allow any 'subversive elements'

to use its territory but refused to sign a formal security pact. [92] As a Botswa,na official put it, again, " ... we are in Botswana under pressure for quite a long time from the South Africans to sign a similar type of Accord, but we have so far resisted signing that kind of agreement ..."[93] Pointing to the continuing MNR

* 1. *Ibid ..*
  2. *The Herald,* Harare, 16 March 1988. [8S] *Ibid ..*

1. *Ibid ..*
2. *The Citi=en,* Durban, 1 October 1984.
3. Personal Interview, Robert Davies, *op. cit..*
4. *Daily News,* Gaborone, 14 May 1984. President Masire indicated that South Africa and Botswana had held four meetings on the topic of a non-aggression pacL While his Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Mogwc, suggested that Botswana would not sign such an agreement unless it was one which featured in the campaign for the 1984 general election, which was held in Sep­ tember 1984. See *Africa Report,* New York, July - August 1984, p.34; *Daily N=s,* Gaborone, 14 May 1984; *The Guardian,* 18 May 1984.

activities in Mozambique, President Masi.re observed that it would be "difficult to have confidence in what South Africa says it will do". Masire asked Reagan, at a meeting with the U.S. President in May of 1984, to help in preventing South Africa from forcing him to sign an accord. The combination of British and American pressure was effective in this. Pik Botha said in a statement that "his government no longer required Botswana to sign an agreement because it accepted assurances that it does not allow use of its ter­ ritory as a launching pad against South Africa. He said that South Africa also undertook not to allow its territory to be used as a launching pad against Botswana". [94] The statement was unclear as to who would be threatening Botswana from South African territory. There have been periodic raids on Gaborone launched by SADF, officially justified as attacks on ANC 'terrorists'. [95] Both the U.S. and Britain, how­ ever, have laid restraining hands on Pretoria with respect to Botswana, and that country may be able to develop without suffering too much from South African destabilization or economic pressures.

The latest developments with respect to Namibia are both encouraging and opaque. The agreement signed in Geneva on 15 November, 1988, calls for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435, which involves the pull-out of South African troops, the release of Namibian political prisoners and the election of a constituent assembly, all to be supervised by 7,500 UN troops and a multitude of UN officials.

[96] The deal reflects, and may accelerate, "a change of mood in southern Africa ... As South Africa finds its enemies weakened by the withdrawal of communist influence, it will be readier to count the cost of fighting them ... South Africa has been sending to Namibia's puppet government about $400 million a

year, spending almost as much on fighting the SWAPO guerillas ... If they do pull out of Namibia," the

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South Africans will be shifting from aggressively forward defence against their black-ruled neighbours to less assertive protection of their own borders." [97] A Report for January 23, 1989, referred to the departure of the first 3,000 Cuban troops and the closing down of ANC training camps in Angola, forcing some 2,500 plus cadres to other friendly countries. [98] UNITA has claimed that Pretoria has halted its aid, though

1. Personal Interview, Bogatsu Pilane, *op. cit..*
2. *Financial Mail,* Johannesburg, 12 July 1985.
3. *Daily News,* Gaborone, 1 July 1985. See also, *Africa Research Br,//etin,* Exeter, England, Vol.22, No.6, 15 July 1985, p.7668.
4. *The Times,* London, 16 November 1988.
5. *The Economist,* London, 19 November 1988, p.49.
6. *BBC World Service News,* London, 23 January 1989.

Luanda disputes the claim. "President Bush pledges to continue American aid to rebel leader, Jonas Savimbi until he and Angolan rulers reach a political settlement". And the report comments wryly, "That won't be soon". [99] Angola fears that South Africa may renege on its pledge of independence for Namibia, while South Africa fears that the small force of U.N. monitors cannot assure a complete Cuban pullout, and any successes by the UNITA forces, scheduled to continue to receive open U.S. aid and perhaps covert South African assistance as well could del y the Cuban withdrawal.

As for the Front Line States which are more mature in their post-colonial independence - Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe - they have long been committed to a *Pax Africana* and will continue to pursue that goal. Tuey are less subject to military destabilization from South Africa and increasingly aware of their need for economic development President Kaunda, on a trip to Peking in March of 1988, told his hosts that their economic aid and technical assistance had "contributed greatly to the development of Zambia's economic infrastructures". [100] Zambia has been enabled to become a net exporter of textiles as a result of the completion of the Mulungushi Textiles factory in 1981. In the transport sector, China contributed to the construction of the Tazara railway through a free loan amounting to 124 million pounds. [101] There were also significant steps made possible in road construction and in the field of medicine. Chinese President Li Xiannan called for Western governments to remove "the external restrictive factors seriously hampering the economic development of Africa. The fundamental upturn of African economies requires not only the efforts of the African countries but also the creation of favourable external conditions for which developed countries must bear unshakable responsibilities." [102] The mounting debt of the Frontline Staies has caused worldwide concern among the World Bank, the IMF and its contributing members.

An article in the *Herald* of Zimbabwe pointed out that the SADCC states are plagued by a chronic shortage of foreign exchange, due to a lack of sufficient foreign trade. Dependence on foreign trade ranges from more than 40% for Zimbabwe to close to 100% for Botswana. [103] "Because of this the question of

1. *Ibid ..* On the 7th of February, South African Foreign Minister P.K. Botha asked the U.S. administration to act as a mediator between the :MNR and FR.ELIMO government in Mozambique, and to play the same role which the U.S. played in Angola and Namibia in December 1988 in Geneva and New York. *BBC World Sen•ice News,* London, 7 February 1989.
2. *Times of Zambia,* Lusaka, 2 March 1988. [JOO] *Ibid..*
3. *Ibid.•*
4. *The Herald,* Harare, 24 March 1988.

trade routes is of almost paramount importance to the region. In an increasingly competitive world, to secure customers for their products, SADCC states must be able to guarantee security for access to trade routes. No one is going to buy Zimbabwean cotton and tobacco, Zambian copper or Malawian tea if they feel that the product will be held up in the transport system or damaged in transit". [104]

The Zimbabwean Minister of Transport, Simbarasbe Mbengegwi, issued a message in the same issue of the *Herald* quoted above: "For a landlocked country like Zimbabwe, and indeed for most SADCC coun­ tries, as they strive towards the reduction of links with South Africa, it is important to examine all aspects that contribute to the continuation of that dependence. This is particularly true of the shipping, freight and transport sections". [105] A preference for routes via South African ports is still being manifested at com­ mercial levels "mainly because the southern routes are the ones they know best". [106] There are presently five main ports open to SADCC shippers without having to go through South Africa. Maputo, Beira and Nacala in Mozambique, Dar es Salam in Tanzania, and Lobito in Angola are all available. But only three links are operational. Strong efforts are under way to open the railways between Malawi and the port of Nacala as well as the direct link between Zimbabwe and Maputo. The security problem, due to the activi­ ties of the MNR, bas been acute since 1984 and has affected Maputo more than Beira.

The Minister issued an appeal to shipping agents to "take up the offer of the Mozambican shipping authorities to negotiate for contract rates. I have no doubt that such contracts would be of great benefit to the economy of Zimbabwe. I am aware that some shipping agents arrange for goods destined for SADCC

countries, in particular Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi to be air freighted to South Africa and transhipped

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to road haulage. This is a waste of our limited foreign currency resources as it means that all the transport costs would be payable to shippers in foreign currency". [107] He pointed out that the national cargo airline is quite capable of moving a majority of the commodities from Europe. "The share of the region's overseas trade going through South Africa is still higher than it was in 1981. It can be expected, however, that the efforts of the past few years in reshaping the surface transport patterns in the region will begin to pay off in

1. *Ibid..*
2. *Ibid ..*
3. *Ibid..*

(107} *Ibid ..*

the short to medium term." [108]

Thus, there is full awareness among all the SADCC that they must, if their dream of a *Pax Afri.cana* is to be realized, make steady progress toward economic independence from South Africa. They are realis­ tic enough to know that they must continue to do significant amounts of business and trade through the Republic, but it should be on the basis of what is most profitable for both sides, not coerced by military sabotage of SADCC transport facilities or by economic pressures designed to weaken the economies of the black-ruled countries to the north of South Africa. The latter will for a long time to come, even in a real- ized *Pax Africana,* be *primus inter pares,* but at least there will be a degree of parity and not domination and control from Pretoria.

## BEYOND NKOMATI: THE FUTURE

1988-89 has witnessed several dramatic changes in the world scene, all with implications for the future of southern Africa. The first of these is the new directions in Soviet foreign policy, symbolized most dramatically by the to withdrawal from Afghanistan. One super power has reduced its appetite for total domination of its sphere. Gorbachev appears to have played a major role at Geneva in November of 1988 in pressuring Castro to accede to the proposed withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. What this new posture will mean ultimately for the governments of southern Africa is as yet unclear. The substantive assistance provided Angola may or may not continue; the support for Mozambique, Zimbabwe, *et al.,* bas

been token at best and does not appear likely to be significant in years to come., China is taking a growing interest in the region and its opportunities, but the future is speculative in that regard. But *glasnost* and

*perestroika* both have implications for future events in southern Africa, determining whether a *Pax Pretori­ ana* or a *Pax Africana* is likely to prevail in the sense of moderating the views of each other in the region and stopping the blaming of other countries for any economic or political failure or problem.

The second shift bas occurred in Washington with the inauguration of George Bush as Ronald Reagan's successor and James Baker taking over from George Shultz. The new administration is on record

[108] *The Herald,* Harare, 24 March 1988. Also see, Ibbo Mandaza (ed.), *Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition 1980- 1986,* Harare, Jongwe press, 1987.

as supportive of Savimbi and UNITA, at least for their inclusion in some sort of coalition government in Luanda. Savimbi has powerful friends in Washington, and they are likely to exert pressure on both the Congress and the Administration. However, early indications are that the new team in the White House and the State Department will prove less paranoid about threats of communist expansion and more amenable to reasonable resolutions of international tensions. The mood of the Congress is not supportive of continued belligerency anywhere, and Bush is eager for a bipartisan foreign policy, so he is unlikely to clash with the Democratic 'doves' either on Latin Americ.a or on Africa.

The third event is the stroke suffered by President Botha, who was recently displaying a realistic awareness that a hardline posture on apartheid is in the long run counter-productive. He has been slowly and gradually relaxing some minor barriers between the races and has warned the right wing local authori­ ties victorious in the recent by-elections against their determination to reinstate them. His willingness to concede withdrawal from Angola and independence to Namibia is also evidence of some growth in *Real­*

*politik* if not in altruism. *The Economist* commented on Botha's apparent shift in October 1988 as follows:

"To wishful thinkers, South Africa suddenly seems to be changing. In its relations with its black neigh­ bours, it once did nothing but bully; now President Botha talks of regional peace and independence for Namibia. South Africa's politicians were once untouchables; since September, Mr. Botha has been received by the Presidents of Mozambique, Malawi, Zaire and the Ivory Coast."(109) South African President P.W. Botha met with Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano at Songo, near the Cabora Bassa

dam on the Zambezi river, in the north western Mozambican province of Te,te, on 12 September 1988. At the end of the day a final communique was issued. The communique referred to "practical steps" that the

two sides had agreed on. These steps are a "reactivation and reinforcement" of the Nkomati Accord, the upgrading of Maputo harbour "and promotion of its use" by South African importers and exporters, as well as the provision of Cabora Bassa hydro-electric power to South Africa. [110]

Mozambican President Chissano said that South Africa "has given us guarantees that it is not going

(109] *The Economist,* London, 29 October 1988.

(110] *AIM,* Maputo, 12 September 1988. There was significance in the fact that the meeting took place in Songo, and not in Maputo, as the South Africans had wanted. In this decision to lower the profile of the encounter, one could sense that the Mozambicans were testing the ground, adding a touch of caution to the whole affair.

to help RENAMO" (this is the Portuguese acronym for the MNR - Mozambique National Resistance). The statement was in response to a journalist's question as to whether Chissano believed that South Africa would now stop all support for the MNR, given the fact that after the signing of the Nk:omati Non­ Aggression Agreement in 1984, Mozambique continually accused Pretoria of not fulfilling the Accord.

**[111]** President Chissano spoke of "building more and more confidence" between the countries and

, announced that he and Mr. Botha would meet again.[112] The dates had not been set for the next meeting, he added. The Mozambican President said he did not expect any criticism from other African leaders for having met Mr. Botha: "My colleagues are aware of this meeting, and they will not criticise me", he said. "The only thing they expect of me is that I tell them whether the meeting went well or badly. If I wish, I will tell them more, but they will not even ask me what we have discussed." [113]

Asked whether be still thought apartheid was the root cause of the problems in southern Africa, Mr. Chissano replied: "Yes, to a certain extent apartheid bas been an obstacle for the free contacts between the countries of the region and South Africa, and it has been the cause for mistrust Therefore, we have to work

together to see what is behind that policy. I think we understand that, but at the same time we also under­ stand that all the causes can be overcome, and I think this is also the opinion of the South African govern­ ment We may need to do something in order to speed up the necessary change to bring in complete har- mony". [114]

In the question of mutual trust, Mr. Chissano said that there was now "more confidence, more trust on

both sides due to several developments in the area and in South Africa too". ,T. he Mozambican President said that countries of the region have always tried to "work for detente with South Africa", adding that "his­

torical conditions" bad not allowed for the creation of "such an atmosphere as the one which we have created but we never ceased to work to that goal". He went on to recall the Lusaka and Nk:omati Accord "and other contacts" as examples of that process of detente. [115]

1. *AIM,* Chissano Press Conference, Maputo, 12 September 1988.
2. This was the third Presidential Summit meeting between the two countries. The first meeting was with President Samora Machel at Nkomati in 1984, and the second was in Swaziland in April 1986 during the ceremonies marking the coronation of the new Swazi monarch at the request of P.W. Botha, See, *Africa Contemporary Record,* vol.18, 1985-1986.
3. *FOCUS,* Cape Town, September 1988.
4. *AIM,* Maputo, Bulletin No. 136, 15 September 1988.
5. *Ibid,.*

The situation inside South Africa "used to have no mercy on its black opponents; by Christmas Mr. Botha may have released Mr. Nelson Mandela, ailing leader of the African National Congress who has been in prison since 1962. And on October 16th, the ANC, which for two decades has led the world's boycott of South African sportsmen, announced that it might help South African teams back into international rugby".

1. But *The Economist* hastens to add a note of caution, pointing out that there is a deadlock in South Africa between blacks who want a share of power and the whites do not want to give it to them. "Mr. Botha has tried to get talks started; black leaders, including the conservative Zulu chief Mr. Mangosouthu Buthelezi., refuse to join until Mr. Botha proves to be serious about transferring power." [117] And the

blacks who have proved themselves willing to cooperate with government efforts, which are vigorously resisted by an increasingly popular and militant Conservative Party, find themselves rejected as a variety of Quisling. Botha in February banned seventeen opposition groups and imposed censorship on the press who are critical of his administration, including the Catholic-financed *New Nation.* Pretoria has hung on to the extraordinary emergency powers conferred upon it by the Parliament during the black unrest in 1984-86, and there is a sharp increase in government by decree rather than through laws passed by Parliament. [118]

"Most white liberals", says the *Economist,* "including many of his liberal flank, sympathize with Mr. Botha. The country, they say, needs time to grow towards racial equality".[119] Such hopes were raised with the coming of a new President, F.W. de Klerlc, and his programme of change and reform. The new President started his office with a visit to Zambia on August 1989 and his objective was, he said " ... we are going through negotiations and dialogue ... I had the opportunity to give a positive vision of the future in which South Africa is going to break out of the cycle of con:flict."[120] Moreover, Mr. de Klerk, paid a visit to Mozambique (before he became a President) and promised that, he would " ... reshuffle the commanding levels of SADF who involved in supporting the MNR".[121) *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* have led to a lessen- ing of tensions between East and West Confrontation and threats are giving way to accommodation and

1. *The Economist,* London, 29 October 1988.
2. *Ibid..*
3. *The Economist,* London, 29 October 1988.
4. *Ibid ..*
5. *RSA Update,* London, no.6, September 1989, p.2.
6. *AIM,* Maputo, 14 November 1989.

co-operation, therefore, Mozambique had become a test of South Africa's credibility in the eyes of the world.

Internally, de Kelk announced in bis presidential speech that, " ... the South African government is irrevocably committed to fundamental change ... a new democratic future without apartheid and racial discrimination ... is already well in the making. As recent events in the Soviet Union have demonstrated, change and reform is a difficult process. In South Africa, too, the government has to walk a tightrope of ever rising expectation. Despite the complexity of our situation, our goal remains clear, to create an authen­ tic and lasting democracy ... and most important ... to achieve it peacefully through negotiation ..."[122] The first positive sign from the new President, was the release of eight black political prisoners, all dedi­ cated opponents of the government, including Walter Sisulu, a former Secretary-general of the ANC.[123]

Another positive step from the South African government was the meeting which was held in London on 1st of November 1989, between the ANC and Afrikaner representatives led by Willem de Kleik (the brother ofF.W. de Klerk).[124] Indeed, this was the result of de Klerk's declaration that "the door to a new South Africa has already opened and it is not necessary to batter it down".[125] It may be that the new co­ operation betwen the two genuine super powers will encourage the South African government to come to terms with reality and to stop destabilising the region which they seek to dominate. Every time either super power perceives a threat of whatever dimensions, there is no hesitation on its part to take destructive action wherever it chooses to strike. But the United States and the Soviet Union appear to be approaching a per­

ception that such regional hegemony represents a threat to world peace and therefore it can no longer be

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tolerated. Fortunately one hopes a new policy toward southern Africa will be forged, a policy based not on

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hysterical anti-communism but on the realities of what is best for mankind. In that effort, all of the indica-

tions are that the Western European governments will cooperate fully because it is in their economic interests to promote stability and economic growth in southern Africa.

1. *Internationa/Hearld Tribune,* Paris, 29 September 1989.
2. *The &onomist,* London, 21 October 1989.
3. *The Economist,* London, 7 October 1989.
4. *International Herald Tribune,* Paris, 29 September 1989.

The Total Strategy is wearing thin and proving of questionable viability. Given the new faces and the new breezes blowing both in Washington and Moscow, a *Pax Pretoriana* does not appear to be very likely in the future. So it seems that Pretoria, though it cannot construct a *Pax Pretoriana,* is exerting efforts to prevent the construction of a *Pax Africana.* In the past, it has managed to exercise a degree of independence, despite international disapproval and the application of sanctions. Now that may be more difficult, if not impossible. De Klerk, despite pressure from the Conservative party at home, may find it less possible to play an irenic Gorbachev and a pragmatic Bush off against each other. The latter, although giving signals of support for Savimbi, appears less likely to continue the Reagan 'constructive engagement' in southern Africa and more likely to accommodate U.S. policies to regional realities.[126]

So Nkomati may prove to be a sort of watershed after all. Both Pretoria and Maputo came to the table with their own expectations and aspirations. South Africa hoped it would open the door to further such pacts with other Front Line States and provide greater international acceptability. Mozambique, exhausted after its own war of independence and its assistance to Zimbabwe, hoped for a respite in which it could "buy tractors instead of guns".[127] as Machel put it. Neither side got what it wanted. But now, as the fifth anniversary of the signing approaches, the birth of a *Pax Africana* appears feasible. If Cuban troops do indeed withdraw and South Africa does indeed desert UNITA, a 'secondary surrogate' as seen earlier, and grant Namibia independence, and if the United States and the Soviet Union work together to support peace and justice in the region, then the fruits of Nkomati may indeed blossom!

1. *The Economist,* London, 21 October 1989.
2. *AIM,* Maputo, 4 April 1984.

# CHAPTER NINE CONCLUSION

Any analysis of South Africa's policies has to take place in the context of its relations with the region surrounding it and an analysis of a specific facet of its regional policy, such as the circumstances surround­ ing the Nkomati Accord, will inevitably lead back to the question of coercion. Neither is it possible to con­ sider any particular aspect of it separately - questions of military action, economic exploitation, political uses of the system or the implications of coercive diplomacy are inextricably intertwined.

A strategy of coercive diplomacy bas eight elements which Alexander George associated with suc­ cess of the strategy in the cases of Laos, Cuba and Vietnam. These elements provide a useful framework within which to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the South Africa's coercive strategy towards Mozambique. They are:

1. the clarity of South African objectives,
2. the strength of South African motivation,
3. an asymmetry of motivation favouring the Pretoria regime,
4. a sense of urgency to achieve the South African objectives,
5. adequate domestic political support,
6. usable military options (directly by the SADF or indirectly by supporting the MNR),
7. the opponent's fear of unacceptable escalation,
8. clarity concerning the precise terms of settlements.[!]

## CLARITY OF SOUTH AFRICAN OBJECTIVES

Clarity of objective is **a** critical element of a strategy of coercive diplomacy, because the objective defines the target in an unambiguous manner from which significant light is thrown upon the coercer's motivation to succeed. As well as the opponent's motivation to resist. Pretoria's objectives can be

[l] Alexander L. George, David K. Hall and William R. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam,* Bos­ ton, Little, Brown and Company, 1971, p.216.

presented in the following time frame:

In the short term (1980-1984), it was South Africa's intention that the FLS should ban the ANC, PAC and SWAPO from operating from their territories. It also wanted to sign political, economic, security and other agreements with the FLS, which should negotiate directly or through South Africa with insurgent groups (such as :MNR, UNITA, LLA) to settle the dispute with these groups, as for example in the October 1984 Declaration between FRELIMO of Mozambique and 11:NR. Pretoria believed it should be recognised as regional power in Southern Africa by the international community, which would lead to an end of inter­ national isolation. In the medium term, South Africa wanted the FLS not only to ban the ANC and other liberation movements, but also for the FLS to put some pressure on them to renounce violence (which

might then lead to a peaceful resolution of the conflict within South Africa), the elimination of the Soviet and Cuban presence in Southern Africa, which felt to be essential, as well as the recognition of the Bantus­ tan Homeland in South Africa. In the long term, Pretoria wishes to convince the FLS of the need for greater co-operation between them and of the need to form the 'Constellation of Southern African States' which would even include the Bantustan Homelands. On the international scene, the FLS should oppose publicly any sanctions against the Republic and stop their criticism of South Africa's domestic policies of apartheid, bearing in mind the reforms already implemented. Pretoria would also like to see the existence of full diplomatic relations with the FLS.

As this study showed, in the case of Mozambique, South Africa might have more ambitious motives

than the simple ban on Maputo's support for Liberation movements." ... the objectives of South Africa bad

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been to complete a separate agreement with Mozambique, knowing full well that it would probably cause problems within the coalition of the FLS, in other words, for divisive tactics ... [and] setting Mozambique in conflict with other members of the FLS, then that did succeed in the short term ... [also] if it [South Africa] bad the objective of creating tension between the FLS and creating tension between Mozambique and the ANC ... in practical terms actually reducing the amount of aid or whatever ... reducing Mozambique's role as a real base for the liberation struggle ... then of course these objectives were achieved ..."[2] The clarity of Pretoria's objectives were described again by Davies " ... the essential

1. *Personal Interview,* Dr. Mwesiga Baregu, University of Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 18 April 1988.

elements was the signing of a non-aggression pact ... the possibilities it offered in terms of gaining through economic levers, the possibilities perhaps of brokery in the possible influence it had in tenns of the other regional states and in terms of ... to break out the international isolation ... there are different degrees to

which regional states are affected ... Pretoria has differentiated between them [FLS-SADCC] ... they actu­

ally thought that ... the ANC was going to be deprived of its eligible bases in Mozambique and that the struggle in South Africa was going to diminish ... they were going to bring about a partial re-arrangement in Mozambique [with the MNR], and all the other regional states were going to fall into line ..."[3] South Africa also could have reminded FRELIMO that if Mozambique continued to support the ANC in practical terms then South Africa would revert to a coercive strategy.

## Strength of The South African Motivation

Since the objectives are characterized, the strength of the coercers motivation to accomplish these objectives determines the lengths to which the coercive strategy will be pursued. In addition, the opponent's perception of the coercer's motivation defines the credibility of the strategy. The South African government's motivation to reinforce its coercive strategy against the FLS stemmed from both internal and external considerations. Internally, the Botha regime perceived the ANC, PAC and other liberation move­ ments to be a threat to national security and was also under pressure by its supporters and right-wing pres­ sure groups to deal with any threats (whether internal or external) even by applying a coercive strategy if

necessary. Therefore, " ... South Africa wants to intimidate the FLS by mounting military actions against

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[them] ... So South Africa can induce fear into these countries and ... possibly making them abandon their support for the struggle which is being mounted by the people of the ANC, PAC ... and SWAP0."[4]

Externally, Pretoria needed to be able to deal with the FLS militarily, economically and so forth, to demonstrate its credibility as the regional power in Southern Africa and thereby begin to break out of its international isolation. " ... the international situation was affected by the fact that South Africa continues aggressing Angola, Mozambique and threatening also the other countries here ... and in that case attracting

1. *Personal Interview,* Robert Davies, Centre for African Studies, Maputo, Mozambique, 19 April 1988.
2. *Personal Interview,* Humphrey B. Kunda, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lusaka, Zambia, 2 March 1988.

others [countries] from outside the region ... The whole question of Southern Africa has become an interna­ tional problem ... [and] its need an international solution ... South Africa's major aim to be a regional power, and especially as a military power ..."[5] Therefore, the FLS perception of Pretoria's motivation is more influential than the South Africa's actual motivation and should be exploited expediently, however, the perception and the a factulty cannot be entirely separated. Furthennore, the South African administra­ tion was motivated by its military and economic strength, but there was the fear that Pretoria in action against the ANC, PAC, SWAPO and their-supporters (FLS) would fundamentally undermine its credibility as a regional power. Pile Botha is quoted as follows " ... no problems in Southern Africa can be resolved unless the legitimate interests of this regional power, South Africa, are taken into account ... we are [S.A.] a regional power ... it is our region ..."[6] P.W. Botha put it more precisely by saying, " ... capacity to main­ tain internal peace and safeguard our borders ie. in our military strength. We could then undertake our diplomacy with self-confidence born of strength ... economic and military strength and make standing room for ourselves in Southern Africa."[7]

## An Asymmetry of Motivation Favouring the South African Regime

The stronger the motivation of the coercer, the more likely a coercive strategy is to succeed, all other things being equal (i.e. the greater the disparity of motivation in favour of the coercer - all other factors remaining constant - the more likely a coercive strategy is to succeed). Witness the circumstances which

lead to the road to Nkomati. The situation in Mozambique by 1983-84 was,bleak. The South Africa sup-

ported 11NR was spreading havoc and steadily expanding its field of operations. Then, the FRELIMO government had lost some credibility and a good deal of its popularity because of the security situation and desperate economic hardship suffered by most of the population. It was against *this* background FRELIMO decided to explore and ultimately signed the Nkomati agreement as a way of achieving a stand-off security agreement on respectable terms. Whereby the leadership could defend to themselves and to their people, as

1. *Personal lnten•iew,* Tom Sebina, ANC-HQ., Lusaka, Zambia, 4 March 1988.
2. Quoted in, Joseph Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa,* London, CIIR, 1986, p.41.
3. Quoted in, Robert Davies, *South African Strategy Towards Mozambique in the Post-Nkomati Period,* Uppsala, Sweden, The Scandanavian Institute for African Affairs, 1985, p. JO.

well as to the rest of Africa. The FRELIMO leaders understood that their greatest difficulties would be in persuading the ANC and the opponents of appartheid inside South Africa to accept that they were not being betrayed.. What would have happened if the FRELilv10 government bad not signed Nkomati and could it have survived as a government?

In coercive diplomacy, the coercer's motivation to endure must be stronger than the opponent's motivation to resist It is doubtful that a state will adopt a strategy of coercive diplomacy unless it detects its motivation to be stronger than that of its opponent Therefore, the coercer, usually is motivated by its capability to dominate the situation by demonstrating its military, economic and the like strength to affect the opponent perception.

There are two principal sources of motivation for Pretoria. Firstly, South Africa believes in the need to fight the 'total onslaught' orchestrated by communist and socialist regimes in Southern Africa and sup­ ported by the Soviets. In South African's view, therefore, overthrowing such regimes would be a welcome event to its supporters. Secondly, the loss of Portuguese territory and Rhodesia as a buffer belt created a security threat to South Africa, which sustained its motivation to rebuild its buffer zone in the 1980's. The idea of CONSAS is a good example here. Such motivation described by as" ... [the] struggle inside South Africa which has intensified in the period since the mid-1970's is also having repercussions at the regional level. The Pretoria regime has sought to respond to the struggle [inside South Africa] by defining it as an externally generated 'total onslaught' and it bas sought to export the total effects of it as far as possible to

the neighbouring states. At the same time ... bas been the change in regional ba,lance of forces. Before the mid-1970's South Africa relied on the string of buffer states which surrounded it, and of course with the

c·onapse of the Portuguese-African empire in the 1970's, these buffer states fell, and that created a whole new dimension at the regional level, and basically Pretoria sought to find ways of coping with this situation. And in the end, having failed to launch its CONSAS proposals which was intended to try and win positive support from regional states it has fallen back on trying to keep these states in a state of weakness, and ensure that they [FLS] do not constitute any challenge or threat to it [South Africa] ... this is basically what it is about Its [South Africa motivation] which derives from the crisis of the apartheid system at the inter­ nal and regional level ..."[8]

[SJ Personal Interview, Robert Davies, *op. cit..*

## Sense of Urgency to Achieve the South African Objective

A sense of urgency to accomplish the objective is an important factor to adopt the strong ultimatum approach rather than the weaker tty-and-see variant of the strategy. Furthermore, a sense of urgency can add credibility to the strategy of coercive diplomacy threats.

Pretoria's sense of urgency was motivated by its intention to cease the increasing activities by the ANC from neighbouring countries. For example, ANC guerilla activity from neighbouring countries was as follows: in 1977, 23 incidents; 1978, 30 incidents; 1981, 55 incidents; 1983, 56 incidents; and in 1984, 44 incidents (almost half of 1984 incidents took place before the signing of Nkomati Agreement).[9] Pretoria knew that such activities by the ANC and other groups were largely under the FLS's control. Thus, from 1980 onwards, Botba's regime, feeling a great sense of urgency, began supporting insurgent groups such as MNR and l.LA and increased military attacks on the ANC bases and economic pressure on the FLS. As one interviewee described one South African action in Zimbabwe 11 when they [SADF] came here [Harare] their target was the ANC ... when they see them, they [South Africa] feel threatened and should follow them [ANC] and destroy them before they do anything ... [our] support for the ANC ... make us a target in a way, therefore, that is why we get sabotaged economically ... it affects us economically and militarily

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••• 11 [10] On the other band, the FLS have nurtured the hope and belief that 11 their role will be confined to supporting the liberation struggle, supporting the ANC etc ... and we have to deal with military raids and invasions of FLS by South Africa and protecting of raiding guerrilla posts or guerrilla staging points in

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these countries, which is part and parcel of the destabilisation package ... a,pplication of enough force to

demonstrate or persuade the FLS from not only supporting the liberation forces but also refraining from condemnation of South Africa or the attempts that have been made to isolate South Africa ..."[11]

## Adequate Domestic Political Support

[9] Figures quoted in, Tom Lodge, 'State of Exile: The African National Congress of South Africa, 1976-1986', *Third World Quarterly,* vol.9, no.l, January 1987, p.4.

(!OJ *Personal [nten•iew,* Misheck C. Hove, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Zimbabwe, Harare, 23 March 1988. (11] Personal Interview, Dr. Baregu, *op. cit.*

The need of domestic political support is an important factor for a coercive strategy to succeed. In the case of South Africa domestic political support for the government can be seen in a survey which was confined to whites only. 80% of responding white voters were of the opinion that "a serious Communist threat against South Africa exists", 70.9% thought that "the government of Zimbabwe (FLS) constitutes a threat to South Africa's safety", 81.6% felt "that South Africa should militarily attack terrorist bases in its neighbouring states" and 70% supported an embargo on food exports to black states.[12] The conclusion to be drawn is that "the vast majority of white South Africans seem to share the government's perception of a serious Communist threat from the neighbouring countries ... [and] ... the overall impression is that of a decidedly militant or 'hawkish' white voting public."[13] Against this background, there is no question about the white internal political support to the government of South Africa. Despite a minimum opposition\_ from other groups and parties of the white community, the government gets full support when it comes to the issue of South Africa national security.

## Useable Military Options

The threat or use of military options are very essential to the credibility of a strategy of coercive diplomacy. The capability and availability of forces are clearly essential, as is the ability to perform in a controlled, discriminating manner congruent within the specific requirements of the decision- maker's objectives. A comparison of the combined military forces of the FLS and South Africa, will give us a clear picture of the capability and availability of South African forces. Armed forces: FLS = 155,750 troops and 207 combat jets, against S.A. = 404,500 men and 304 combat jets.[14] The SADFs operations fall under the overall guidance of the SSC, however, all operations were controlled by the President and Minister of Defence in co-operation with eleven separate territorial force commands.[15] The South African Armed Forces are considered one of the most advanced armies in the region. From 1974 to 1984-85, the SADF

[12] Deon Geldenhuys, *What do we Think? A Survey of White Opinion on Foreign Policy Issues,* no.3, Johannesburg, South African Institute of International Affairs, May 1986, pp.8-9 and p.14.

[13] *Ibid.,* no.2, 1984, pp.7-10.

1. M. Evans, *The Front Line States, South Africa and Southern African Security: Military Prospects and Perspectives,* Harare, University of Zimbabwe, 1986, p.12.
2. Gavin Cawthra, *Bmtal Force: The Apartheid War Machine,* London, IDAF, 1986p.112.

budget was R. 13 billion which accounted for 15% of the state budget. In the 1985-86 budget account 20% of the state budget went to military funding and development programmes - an estimated of R. 4.5 bil- lion.[16]

## Opponent's Fear of Unacceptable Escalation

The use of force in coercive diplomacy must be associated with a threat of escalation, so as to effect coercion rather than simple punishment. The objective is to affect the opponent's behaviour as well as damaging his assets. In the case of Mozambique, the Pretoria regime credibly conveyed a threat of escala­ tion throughout the period from 1980 to May 1983 when the last air strike against Maputo took place. After that period of time South Africa was still holding the card of more escalation by using the MNR and economic boycott if they did not get the desired behaviour from FRELIMO. At the same time its opponents were not in a position to escalate the situation, because the ability and capability of Mozambique

- militarily and economically - did not exist. Such evaluation can be applied to most of the FLS because "they are not able to defend themselves against South Africa ... there is also the economic aspect, a lot of them [FLS] depend on South Africa economically ... I think it creates a lot of insecurity and uncertainty and a lot of fear in some areas ..."[17] In the case of Mozambique it was coercively " ... pushed into the Nkomati and it was put into a position which the signing of the agreen:ient, tbe situation was so bad, it was almost like one choice ... they could not have been worse ... they [FRELIMO] did not really care ... Mozam­ bique was coerced with few options ... in fact had one option, that was to sign ..."[18] Another scholar, compared the FLS and South Africa military capability in saying " ... militarily South Africa is fighting against the FLS by equipping itself better than the FLS ... it [South Africa] is actually telling the FLS in term of this conflict don't you dare, don't do anything, don't even think of doing anything, because we [South Africa] will destroy you [FLS] ... as a result to patrol [Mozambique] and to keep it safe from dis­ sidents, bandits and invaders was very costly ... at the same time, the country had very few resources avail­ able for self-defence ..."[19] A former senior Minister and Chairman of the Joint Security Commission

1. Source, 'White Paper on Defence, Annual Estimates', press reports, cited in, *Ibid.,* p.259.
2. *Personal lnten•iew,* Arthur Simuchoba, News Editor, Times of Zambia newspaper, Lusaka, Zambia, 10 March 1988.
3. Personal Interview, Dr. Baregu, *op. cit.•*
4. Personal Interview, Dr. Makumbe, *op. cit..*

between Mozambique and South Africa commented on the idea of escalating the situation with Pretoria when be said 11 ••• an escalation was taking place [by South Africa only] ... we don't refuse to defend our­ selves ... but of course if we can prevent a war we would be completely fools to refuse it ..."[20] However, the question was how many options did Mozambique have rather than to comply to Pretoria coercion " ... the alternative was war".[21] As noted above, an asymmetry of motivation favouring the Pretoria regime existed and combined with its ability to do more damage (militarily and economically) to Mozambique, more than that of FRELIMO to do such damage to the South Africans.

## Oarity Concerning Precise Terms of Settlement

With clear demands by the coercer, it is necessary to communicate to the opponent exactly how be must comply with the demand. This was definitely true of South Africa's policy towards the FLS in gen­ eral and in our case study of Mozambique in particular. During the Vorster period the FLS and especially Mozambique were asked in 1976 to sign a security agreement. From 1980 this became an urgent and clear demand by Pretoria to sign an agreement with all *FI.S.* In the event, it succeeded in signing such an agree- rnent with Swaziland in 1982. From December 1982 up to March 1984, frequent meetings between the South African and the Mozambican governments took place in which they communicated and gave their

clear demands to each other. 11 First meeting took place in December 1982 and Nkomati Accord was signed in March 1984 ..."[22] In the upshot the Nkomati Accord was concluded. In such a strategy - as in

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the case of South Africa - the coercer needs to employ all its national resources, which in tum requires a

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very strong and unified group of decision-makers to get the fruits of a strategy of coercive diplomacy. In South Africa the decision was taken by the State Security Council (SSC), the highest decision- making body in the country. In contrast to the collective decision-making in South Africa, the response to Pretoria's 'carrot and stick' approach was highly personalised in the case of Mozambique, with decision­ making monopolised by the President in the case of signing the Nkomati Accord. As it explained by Davies, " ... the highest political body in Mozambique is the Politbureau ... many of the decisions are during

1. *Personal Interview,* Colonel Sergio Vieira, Director of Centre for African Studies, Maputo, Mozambique, 28 April 1988.
2. *Ibid ..*
3. *Ibid ..*

the time when the President Samora Machel was around and were taken under his leadership ... he was a very strong personal input ... President Chissano is more a collective and associate with the Politbureau

..."[23] The same method applied with respect to the other FLS. Even when the President or Prime Minis­ ter was working collectively with a group of Ministers or personal advisers, the final decision invariably was one controlled or made by the head of state as was clearly demonstrated in the interviews.

As this study has shown, the policies of the South African government involved the simultaneous exploitation of the economic advantages and military strength as the means to ensure its continuation. Such strength increased the South African government's capability to wage its multifronted aggression against the surrounding states who seek to dismantle the system or to support its political-public relations campaign to keep the industrialized countries in its camp.

Against the monolith of South African economic-military power the individual countries of southern Africa are nearly helpless. It has long been a primary objective of the Pretoria government not just to keep them that way but to thwart any attempts by them to join forces and form an alliance sufficiently committed and equipped to force majority rule on South Africa. As this study has demonstrated South Africa has sue- cessfully combined its 'coercive diplomacy' on individual countries in southern Africa with its overall effort to undermine their solidarity. The Nkomati Accord has been shown to be an example for the study of the regional policies of Pretoria. Monetary and military support of Mozambican insurgents, a variety of pressures which contribute to the economic destabilisation of Mozambique, the public relations ploy of

backing the government into a comer with the demand that they agree to a 'non-aggression' pact, and

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Pretoria's duplicity and cynicism in failing to honour its share of the agreement, all amount to a paradig- matic illustration of South Africa's 'coercive strategy'.

In many ways the situation in southern Africa is unique. But on the other hand the twentieth century is rife with examples of economic exploitation between countries. But it has generally been the case that the stronger states have benefitted from the economic underdevelopment of the weaker as a source of their wealth. In South Africa the situation is more one of internal colonialism, this has usually consisted of the exploitation of black, Asian or coloured peoples by Afrikaners and white Europeans. Thus, the colonial

1. Personal Interview, Davies, *op. cit..*

power centres were not located outside the exploited areas in Southern Africa. Elsewhere it has often been the relatively low numerical presence of the exploiters among the exploited that has made the overthrow of colonialism possible (albeit with extremely difficult struggles in some cases). South Africa is unique in that a sizeable minority has been so long in place and, in the case of the Afrikaners, so little in sympathy with the colonial authority of the European exploiter (Britain). Such a large number of white South Africans have never in their lives thought of Europe as 'home' and have so completely devoted themselves to the creation of a state which serves their interests and has made their economy flourish that they have become nearly immoveable. lo turn, as this study has shown, they have made good use of their enormous economic advantage over the rest of the region to ensure that their state will continue.

The role of the industrialized countries of North America, Europe and Asia in the continuation of the Pretoria government caooot be overlooked either. As was frequently mentioned by various scholars and the interested parties who were interviewed, the battle to convince these countries that stable, long-term invest- meot possibilities exist in the rest of the region is only just begiooiog. Claims of justice have had little noticeable effect on the Western governments, and strategists in the region are slowly begiooiog to realize that the best way to get a response from the industrialized countries is to speak to them in the only language they appear to heed - that of economic advantage. As has been discussed, the subtext of an arrangement such as the Nkomati Accord, the true nature of coercive diplomacy, is not hidden from the United States, Japan and others. On the contrary, they understand it perfectly well but they are williog to use the apparent

content of such agreements as a publicity screen behind which their economic concerns can be hidden. It

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has become increasingly clear to the countries of southern Africa and other interested parties that the strug-

gle for the hearts of the West cannot get anywhere until the minds of the West are satisfied that apartheid is doomed, whether it happens in five years or twenty-five, and that the high profits to be made from the sys­ tem will disappear and they would be wise to get in on the ground floor of investments elsewhere in the region and would be doing themselves a favour, in the long run, if they were to withdraw their support of apartheid now. Although these are the opinions of the parties interviewed, it could be argued that western governments play a major role in encouraging the Pretoria regime to continue introducing refoIIDs leading to a complete abolition of apartheid. The question here is perhaps not one of the volition to abolish the

minority-rule system in South Africa, but rather of the method of bringing a more democratic system into being which would include all races in South Africa

Such a programme is made exceedingly difficult by the fact that even as a group the Front Line States have little economic leverage and are unlikely, except in a few cases, to reject Western investment on ideo- logical bases if those countries do not cease to deal with Pretoria The general thinking is, (from the parties interviewed), that the industrialized countries will not be operating in their own best interest if they con­ tinue to take as much high profit from South Africa for as long as possible and merely lay the faintest groundwork for economic development in the remainder of the region. But, with the amorality which characterizes so many economic decisions, some Western governments feel that it would be against their own interests to fail to take advantage of the situation for as long as possible. Whether or not the with­ drawal of western support would considerably hasten the collapse of the South African system, the United States, Britain and others expend a lot of energy in arguing that the precipitous collapse of the system would only bann those who are already victimised by apartheid. This study bas shown the widespread rejection by regional spokespersons of such a claim. The study bas demonstrated that limited sanctions to pressurise the South African regime, and the maintenance of dialogue with it, is one of the best methods of bringing about more changes in South Africa. The history of other forms of colonialism in Africa, as well as the sheer numbers of black versus white South Africans (together with the mobilisation of blacks and the changing values of whites) spell out the inevitability of apartheid's eventual abolition.

How that end will come about depends on a variety of factors. Indeed, there is remarkably little feel-

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ing in favour of any particular scenario for the end of apartheid among the sources consulted in this study or the individuals interviewed by the researcher. On just the international level there are so many players involved in the number of possible scenarios that any calculation is rendered highly problematic. The war in Mozambique and Angola, the economic interests of Japan and the West, the efforts of the ANC and the FLS, abolitionists among the white population of South Africa, the international press, and divisions among

the black population of South Africa are all elements which can operate on each other in numerous ways. And, just as South Africa's policy in the region is complex, so is it open to a number of dangers - perhaps it is the location of its points of vulnerability and the pursuit of such points by the FLS and like-minded par-

ties which will contribute to the collapse of apartheid. To this end it is of great importance that the compli­ cated economic, military, political, diplomatic and public relations operations of the government be under­ stood. It is important that they be understood as part and parcel of the effort to shore up the current regime

- that it be understood that South Africa is using the profits and the political and educational backwardness of the black majority which are the results of apartheid to ensure its continuation. It should be remembered, however, that a black middle-class exists now in South Africa, that more blacks attend university and that, in general, blacks are allowed into the whi work place. Moreover, South Africa needs trained black people and relies upon them for the smooth running of its economy.

In analysing the course of events and circumstances surrounding the Nkomati Accord one certainly does not touch on all the aspects of South Africa's regional policy. The situation in Namibia or in Angola is manifestly different from that in a country technically at peace such as Mozambique. And the policies of South Africa regarding Botswana and Lesotho are quite different from a country such as Mozambique. The socialist policies of Machel and the FRELIMO government were important additional elements in the 'total onslaught' of South Africa which engages in it to keep the support of the United States administration. But, the Nkomati Accord provides a sufficient reason to determine South African policy and is an excellent illustration of the optimum conditions for and, subsequently, the full play of South Africa's coercive diplomacy. The questions which have been addressed by this study have, upon being answered, provided a sketch of the parameters of Pretoria's regional policies. What are the public and the real policies of South

Africa in regard to 'insurgent' agitators in Southern Africa and what is the extent of their own support of

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insurgent military forces and opposition political groups in the Front Line States? Why was Mozambique made the target of this particular strategy and how was it vulnerable to such coercion? What was the reac­ tion of the FLS and what has been the effect of Nkomati on regional solidarity? What has been the effect of the Agreement on the industrialized nations and on the Soviet bloc? What have been the results of the Agreement in terms of fulfillment or non-fulfillment on both sides? And, briefly considered, has this policy of forcing diplomatic agreements out of weaker countries been pursued, or is it likely to be pursued, by South Africa in other cases as well? The final consideration was how do the circumstances and results of Nkomati serve to define the general policy of South Africa in the region - is it a typical or an atypical

incident? Can it really be said to define that policy?

## South Africa and Insurgency

On this point South Africa's policy has been to commit itself to the support of insurgent military actions within the surrounding countries whenever the situation made this a useful tool and to protest simul­ taneously against the assault on its own autonomy being made by forces of the ANC who were harboured and supported by FLS. The Pretoria government has long made a point of ascribing any liberation-related activities within its own borders as stemming from the influence of outside agitators. The implicit statement in such cases is that the black population of South Africa is not interested in overthrowing the system without encouragement from outsiders - if they were only left alone they would continue to perform as pro­ ductive cogs in that system. A further extension of this fiction is that those countries which harbour the ANC, SWAPO and other anti-apartheid groups are able to provide sufficient monetary and military support to make armed aggression against South Africa a reality. As was pointed out, each time a group action

occurs the Pretoria regime declares that it is the work of outsiders - in a Cape Town incident the 'outsiders'

supposedly travelled some 800 kilometres from Botswana, they did so completely undetected in a country largely under martial law. That South Africa feels entirely free to engage in such wildly unlikely pro­ paganda seems to signify that they are first, desperately frightened and serious about convincing someone that the black majority within the country is relatively docile, and second, that they are receiving a sym­ pathetic hearing in some quarter or would like it This is not the only example of a willingness of the popu- lation of such groups to believe a great deal of the propaganda they receive because it is designed to shore up their own convictions of right and, in the case of other countries, it is what they want to hear - it is rhe- toric designed specifically to further the particular causes espoused by the public opinion. This study has shown that the conviction that apartheid cannot last is certainly very widespread and, undoubtedly, white South Africans are desperately in need of reassurance. The Western powers are trying to arrange for a peaceful and gradual accession to power by the black majority. However, communist or socialist insur­ gents supported by neighbouring regimes have long been the bugbears of American foreign policy and Pre- toria is clearly aware that this is the means by which the sympathy of the West can be held.

South African support of insurgency and of opposition politics in the region is usually tied to the bat­ tle against communism and socialism in which the United States believes itself to be engaged. 1bis is cer­ tainly very much the case in Mozambique where FRELIMO has bad a rocky history and only limited suc­ cess due to a variety of setbacks suffered throughout its brief history. The semi-public support South Africa provided to the lvfNR is only a part of the story. In fact, the MNR would probably have collapsed altogether without South African aid. Pretoria played a balancing game in trying to put forward its own claims that its autonomy was being assaulted by ANC forces in Mozambique while, at the same time, assur­ ing the MNR that it was doing *its* part to overthrow the socialist regime there. Mozambique and the other

countries of the region provide a major market for South African exports and Mozambique in particular is a

source of much badly needed migrant labour. To many pro-apartheid critics of the Nkomati Accord, the diplomatic measures involved, and the previous policy of strict economic destabilisation seemed to work well enough in keeping the countries of southern Africa in a subordinate position. It is the feeling of these critics that resorting to such paramilitary measures and relying on coercive strategy will undermine or, at the least, endanger the delicate economic balance of the region. How did Pretoria come to decide that des­ tabilisation was not enough?

## Economic Destabilisation

Most of the interviewees were in agreement that subsequent events have clearly shown that the

Republic, or part of the bureaucracy (the military establishment) of South Afric,a, bad no intention whatso-

ever of relinquishing its support of the lvfNR. The question arises of why they would choose to endanger the previously successful pursuit of economic destabilisation of Mozambique. Though Mozambique has always been clearly in the subordinate position in its relations with its powerful neighbour this should not distract from the fact that there has also always been a degree of mutual dependence in the situation. The enormous number of migrant workers from Mozambique in the mines of the Transvaal and on the farms of the nortbeast,[24] the fact that a major percentage of Mozambique's imports came from South Africa,

1. According to official sources, there was a total of 60,490 in 1980, 59,391 in 1981, 59,323 in 1982, 61,218 in 1983, 60,407 in 1984, 68,665 in 1985 and 73,186 in 1986 Mozambican workers legally in South Africa. Erich Leistner, 'Overview of Interac­ tion in Africa', *International Bulletin,* vol.l, no.3, Pretoria, The African Institute of South Africa, 1987, p.59. In 1987, there was a total of 300,000 Mozambicans in South Africa, 80,000 legal workers, 70,000 refugees and 150,000 illegal work-seekers distributed throughout South Africa, particularly the Pretoria- Witwatcrsrand-Vereeniging area. *The Star,* Johannesburg, 10 February 1987.

South Africa's obtaining cheaper electricity power from Mozambique, the use of Maputo as a port by South Africa - all these factors made it essential that the Mozambican economy should retain at least a vestige of stability. While the South African government was engaged in its destabilisation work. ranging from mili­ tary sabotage and destruction of public works to the withholding of essential goods, there was a point beyond which they did not wish to go. Since they would continue to support the 11:NR, Pretoria was wil­ ling to capitalize on an apparently peaceful measure such as the Nkomati Accord in order to placate voices in the international community which wex:e becoming ever stronger in their opposition to apartheid. Thus there was to be an apparent end to hostilities and, at the same time, South Africa was able to deal a blow,

albeit a limited one, to the ANC and possibly sow seeds of dissension among the FLS. The aggression of

the 11NR would not be a target for possible Soviet intervention in Mozambique's affairs and insurgency could continue at the levels which suited Pretoria By coercing it to sign the Accord, Mozambique would be left without as much room to complain about South Africa's aggression. In a way the Accord functioned as a blind for economic destabilisation and, far from being abandoned it, the earlier policy flourished. Our study has shown (Gorongosa Documents) that, although it was clearly in the interest of the South African government to maintain the Nkomati Accord, it was undermined by a small group for their own beliefs (the military) which they continued support of the :MNR. Such support was given without the knowledge or approval of the rest of the government (i.e. the President and Foreign Minister).

## Public Relations

The FLS considered that the aura of self-congratulation and the proclamations declaring that South Africa and Mozambique had made a great step toward peace and stability in the region were all helpful in gaining a more favourable Western public opinion. Certainly some Western governments made the most of the event in an effort to quell the objections of anti-apartheid groups who claimed that South Africa was

unwilling to undertake change of any sort. By dealing with an independent black state the South Africans

'showed' that they were capable of dealing with blacks and held out the promise that constructive engage­ ment within their own country was indeed the goal toward which they were working.

To say that the groundswell of public opinion against the reign of apartheid is ineffective would be inaccurate. But public opinion in the United States and Europe is having only a limited effect on the poli­ cies of the governments and the businesses which invest so much in the South African economy. Each attempt by South Africa to 'promote change' met with encouragement from the Reagan and Thatcher regimes. Nk:omati was seen by them as a hopeful step and there was little attempt to address the fact that such hopes were based on events taking place outside the Republic of South Africa. The fact that there has been little action taken on the rights of the black majority is ignored when the South Africans engage in stunts such as Nk:omati.

The Pretoria regime is certainly cognizant of all these undercurrents in their relations with the US, Britain and the other industrialised countries. They play very carefully on these underlying issues and perhaps unconscious, assumptions of white supremacy. They are careful never to suggest that these freedom-loving nations harbour any such ideas but their strategy gives the lie to this. As long as Pretoria gives the West sufficient evidence of 'constructive engagement' the governments will be able to answer anti-apartheid forces. They will also be able to protect their investment in South Africa and would be wil- ling to see the entire region come under the sort of *Pax Africana* implicit in arrangements such as the Nkomati Accord. As some of the interviewees claim that South Africa and the West co-ordinated public relations work and it is further supported by the relative lack of publicity the ANC, SWAPO, and the FLS receive in the Western press. Because the two associations are not as well-defined in the public's mind their protests, over the cynical failure of South· Africa to fulfill its part in the Nkomati Accord for instance, seldom receive anywhere near the amount of attention that the deeds of Pretoria, good (constructively engaged) or bad, receive. This contributes to the false sense of security that the Western governments try to create in their citizens when it assures them that such measures as the Accord are proof of South Africa's willingness to begin change.

In response to the above, could be argued that the FLS, ANC and SWAPO receive equal, if not more, press coverage and public support in the West, underlined by Western governments such as Britain allow­ ing their offices to be located in London. Margaret Thatcher, one of the strongest opponents of sanctions, bas in fact met both the President of the Republic and the President of the ANC. Furthermore, public sup-

port is undoubtedly boosted by the existence of the anti-apartheid movement having offices in most Western capitals, and being allowed by Western governments to operate freely.

As several of the respondents interviewed by the researcher pointed out the switch to the 'diplomacy of coercion' on South Africa's part also coincided with the increasing reluctance of the Soviet Union to involve its resources directly in the affairs of other socialist countries. Just as Mozambique was unlikely to relinquish any of its autonomy in turning to the Soviet Union for help so was it unlikely that such help would have been forthcoming. The disengagement in Afghanistan and the Soviet pressure for the with­ drawal of the Cuban presence in Angola are signs of the new direction the Soviet Union is taking in interna- tional affairs. In a similar fashion to the relief afforded to capitalist forces in the West by the Nkomati Accord, the Soviet Union is also able to take the Accord at face value and rest assured that peace is being negotiated between South Africa and the rest of the region. As Gorbachev noted that,

" ... We are in favour of stepping up a collective search for ways of unblocking conflict situations in the Near and Middle East, in Central America and Southern Africa and in all the hot-beds of the planet. 1bis is what the interests of universal security demand insistent!y."(25]

Again, the Soviet leader declared in unequivocal terms that the Soviet Union was seeking world stability so that it could concentrate on pressing domestic concerns. "I state with full responsibility that our interna­ tional policy is more than ever determined by domestic policy, by our interest in concentrating on construc­ tive endeavours to improve our country. 1bis is why we need lasting peace, predictability and constructive­ ness in international relations".(26]

This marked lessening of support by the Soviet Union in order to devote its resources to the buildup of its own economy and those of its major client states such as Vietnam and Cuba bad already caused Mozambique to turn away from the Soviet Union and to look about for options in terms of politically responsible Western investment and, after some important failures, gradual self-development with only minimal external support. This lessening of Soviet involvement has also made the situation in southern Africa less a centre of conflict between the two super-powers than it previously seemed it would be.

1. The full text of Gorbachev's statement was translated in, BBC, *Summary of World Broadcasts,* London, 27 February 1986.

['.26] Quoted in, Philip Taubman, 'Gorbachev Avows a Need for Peace to Pursue Domestic Reform', *New York Times,* 17 February 1987. ·

Therefore, the super-powers should start to develop more serious and frequent high-level meetings to dis­ cuss areas of regional conflict such as Southern Africa.

As has been mentioned, public relations involve making an impression not only on the United States and the Soviet Union but on the white population of South Africa as well. The Nk:omati Accord had to be perceived by them as a positive step in shoring up the pro-apartheid regime at the same time that others would be assured that it was no.such thing. Government publicity at the time of Nk:omati stressed the fact that the Accord would only serve to strengthen good relations with the West which were endangered by anti-apartheid protests there. AJl white South Africans are fully aware of the importance of this link and the government sought simultaneously to reforge the connection and use this improvement to reassure its citizens. The other important aspect of the public relations appeal to its own citizens was Pretoria's insistence on the fact that the Western powers had come to see South Africa, because of the Nk:omati Accord, as a regional power capable of uniting the region. The peace that was ostensibly sought by South Africa in the Accord (which was later violated by the upper echelons of the military) was a harbinger of the country's future role. Prime Minister Botha even used the Accord as the basis of his 1984 tour of Europe - it was the centrepiece of South Africa's commitment to the peaceful resolution of the problems of the region. The official government line was that the tour produced a new willingness of European leaders to deal with South Africa on account of its' "emergence as a regional power capable of fundamentally influencing the course of events in Southern Africa".[27]

The fourth and final aspect of the public relations effort inherent in the Nk:omati Accord was the

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demoralisation of the FLS and the hope on South Africa's part that the Accord would serve to undermine FLS solidarity. FLS responses to this attempt constitute an important aspect of this study.

## FLS Reactions to Nkomati

It bas been shown in this study that the response to the Nkomti Accord was initially one of surprise, but developed into one of disillusionment and, finally contempt Had the countries of the region given any credence to South Africa's claims for peace or even believed that Pretoria would make any attempt to

1. *SABC* broadcast, 15 June 1984, cited *inACR,* 1985.

might have taken place. Certainly South Africa had had a fair amount of success in the use it made of Malawi as a staging post for :MNR operations. Malawi had, effectively, exiled itself from the brotherhood of states opposed to apartheid and the resulting fracas was injurious to the liberation struggle. Indeed the situation in Malawi had contributed to forcing Mozambique to sign the agreement But the FLS did not for one instant perceive the situation surrounding as anything other than a case of the application of superior economic and military force against a weak country.

Part of South Africa's strategy involved a constant attempt to dissociate its foreign policy from apartheid.. It has been successful in several instances and Nkomati was one of them. FLS reactions to the Accord were invariably sympathetic to Mozambique (in public) if somewhat guarded (there was, after all, the example of Malawi to be remembered). The FLS does not indulge in the artificial separation of apartheid and foreign policy which the South African government and others would have had them believe possible. They are firmly aware that their commitment to the abolition of apartheid is total and that no rela­ tions with South Africa remain untouched by it

While official reactions from the FLS and the reactions of the people interviewed by the researcher constantly stressed the fact that Mozambique had been forced into signing the agreement and that the FLS remained united behind all efforts to end apartheid there was also a remarkable lack of comment on the role of the Western nations in bringing about the Accord. Most of the interviewees believe that the best thing that could happen for the anti-apartheid forces in southern Africa would be to have the United States, Japan and Europe withdraw from the fray. Moreover, the anti-apartheid forces want the7U.S., Japan and Europe to withdraw economically and politically from South Africa, so as to put pressure on the Pretoria regime to abolish apartheid. In the opinion of the anti-apartheid movements, such a direct economic-political with­

drawal would make Western governments more involved in the struggle against apartheid. However, as this study has shown, South Africa has been isolated since the early 1960's from the Commonwealth, the OAU and most of the UN agencies. Moreover, some of the European countries have reduced their diplomatic relations with Pretoria to below ambassador level. In the 1980's South Africa is more isolated, but nothing more has happened than limited reforms. Now, however, there appears to be a new readiness of Pretoria to increase its programme of reforms (with the new President F.W. de Klerk and his programme

of Pretoria to increase its programme of reforms (with the new President F.W. de Klerk and his programme of *Change* and *Reform).[28]* Such readiness has to be encouraged by the international community, in our belief that isolation makes states more aggressive and coercive. From the history of South Africa, the need for security and trust by its neighbours in particular and the international community in general dominated the Afrikaner's thinking. If such assurances are given to the Pretoria regime, and it is treated internation­ ally as a responsible and respectable sovereign state, probably, the influence on South Africa to abolish apartheid will be greater. When apartheid-is finally ended (and during the next twenty or thirty years) the FLS realize that they will need, do need now, an influx of Western capital and aid for development and they are not willing to jeopardize that possibility. If Mozambique and the other FLS are perfectly aware of the true subtext of the Accord and committed to apartheid's abolition, bow then did it come about that the Accord was signed? It was precisely the ability of FRELIMO to accept the false separation of South Afri­ can foreign policy from apartheid that formed one of the principal resons for Mozambique's capitulation.

## Reasons for Mozambique to Sign

In 1983 the FRELIMO government found itself faced with disaster on all fronts. The economic pres­ sures exerted by South Africa, the constant guerilla warfare carried out by the 11:NR., occasional attacks by the South African Defence Force (aimed at suspected ANC posts), drought, severe food shortages and star­ vation all left the country with nowhere to tum. Pressures were applied at this time by the Pretoria regime which insisted that badly needed aid would not be forthcoming until the Mozambicans agreed to negotiate a

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non-aggression pact with the Republic of South Africa. The absurdity of one of a relatively wealthy coun­ try insisting that a weak country like Mozambique negotiate a *Non-aggression* Pact with a country from whom it had been under attack for years, before starving people could be fed, is almost unbelievable. Pre­ toria and Mozambique were encouraged in this initiative by most of the industrialised countries, the private international banks, the IMF and the World Bank who would not give Mozambique credit until it nego­ tiated a settlement with Pretoria. Obviously the peace of the region is and was important to the interna­ tional investors. With peace restored, they reasoned, their enormous profits in South Africa would not be

1. See, *International Herald Tribune,* Paris, *29* September 1989.

endangered; their smaller profits in the rest of the region would be insured; and South Africa could get on with the business of solving its domestic problems, that is gradually allowing the black majority a 'share' of power. Their belief is that South Africa will eventually work out the transition of power in some way that will not upset the economy.

The question of "what is there to invest in Mozambique?" made by officials of the Western countries in response to criticism that they were not giving due consideration to Mozambique's request for capital investment rather than mere handouts indicates the degree to which the West felt that all the future of the region lay in the Republic of South Africa. As this study demonstrated there were some opportunities in Mozambique to invest in farming, mining and fisheries, but the guerilla activities of the MNR made any such investment extremely risky. For Western business, investment in South Africa was a safer and more profitable enterprise.

## Expectations of the Accord

Once President Machel and FRELIMO came to the conclusion that they had no choice but to sign the Accord the question arose of whether or not they could really expect any benefit to accrue from the agree­ ment other than receiving the food aid they badly needed from the West. (Even though the signing of the Accord was not a condition for Western assistance, aid for Mozambique did increase after its signing as the study showed). Certainly, from a post-Accord point of view it looks as though they would have been quite optimistic to expect anything of South Africa But in such situations it is necessary to make the best of things and this is what Machel sought to do in presenting the agreement to bis people. Retrospectively we can call him optimistic in expecting much relief from the MNR attacks but at the time he and bis govern­ ment could do little more than hope that relief would be possible.

In view of the bullying work of economic destabilisation which had been undertaken by South Africa for so long one of the most cherished hopes of all the countries in the region had been that they would be left in peace long enough to take some of the vital steps toward development of all sorts - economic, educa­ tional, and so forth. Without relative peace any co-operation efforts such as the rail, road and pipeline link in the Beira Corridor between Mozambique and Zimbabwe were doomed since they were the primary tar-

gets of the MNR. Co-operation on such a practical level is even more threatening to South Africa than the FLS since it reduces their influence in Southern Africa.

Machel expressed bis hope that the peace would allow for the development of resources and infras­ tructures so essential to any sort of progress and be stated bis belief that once South African support for the MNR dried up, the movement would be out of business. His overlooking of the fairly substantial internal support for the MNR and the fact that far from consisting of foreign mercenaries the MNR included large numbers of Mozambicans was a rather futile piece of propaganda and self-deception. But everything else

that be said was perfectly true. In the absence of South African coercion large steps toward economic independence could be made - he bad no political choice other than to outline the projected positive results of the Accord even if be was unable to believe in them rumself. But he managed to do this while pointing out that the major source of most of the FLS-SADCC troubles was the interference of South Africa in its affairs. He pointed out that Mozambique was willing to meet its share of the bargain and put the blame for the failure of the Accord on the South Africans. If Pretoria met its part of the bargain all that Machel claimed for the Accord would indeed have a good chance of coming to pass. It was clearly up to South Africa.

The understanding, if somewhat embarrassed, public posture taken by the other Front Line States in reaction to the Accord more or less followed Macbel's lead in the matter. They agreed that if the tenns were met by both sides the Accord could be of substantial importance to the welfare of the region as a

whole. It was clear within a year, however, that South Africa bad no intention whatsoever of fulfilling these

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terms. To enter into any such agreement with the Republic of South Africa indicated a subscribing to the legitimacy of its role in the region which was repugnant to all the Front Line States. If South Africa bad met the terms and the FLS been unable to condemn its duplicity and cynicism in making an agreement it bad no intention of honouring then the Accord would have contributed enormously to the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the World. Since Pretoria did not honour the Accord its legitimacy was not reinforced by it.

The Accord's subtext of placing South Africa at the head of the states in the region as the peace­ maker and the benevolent wielder of economic clout was doubly repulsive to the FLS because they bad

never separated the actions of the regime in any arena from the source of that power - apartheid. It was con­ stantly stressed in the literature and in the interviews conducted by the researcher that there is no separation of apartheid from any other aspect of the South African state. Without apartheid there would be *so* many differences, even with proportionate white represent.ation in the country, that it is inconceivable that the

state and the economy it serves represent anything other than the mechanism which keeps apartheid in place.

This is the substance of Mozambique's and the other Front Line St.ates' attitude toward South Africa and in their reactions to and expectations of the Nkomati Accord they were always aware that if they were to abandon completely the liberation struggle in South Africa they would be allowed to function peacefully in South Africa's shadow - but only to the extent that their power did not grow to a point where it threatened Pretoria. In short, until apartheid is banished they will always be held on as short a leash as pos­ sible by South Africa through whatever means are at its disposal.

## The Realities of Apartheid

Does **it** then merely come down to a matter of time? Everyone is convinced that apartheid's days are numbered and even aside from one's political persuasion or economic interest there is no single analyst, scholars of international relations, amateurs, politicians included, who is willing to say that he or she is fully convinced that this result will come about in one particular way or another. Whether South Africa will, in the worst case, be overtaken by a bloodbath or, in the best case, the w, hite population will uncondi- tionally accede to the rights of the majority, no one feels sure. It is the one point that all are agreed upon: the situation is unpredictable. It seems likely, from the information gathered in this study, that South

Africa's policies in the region, carefully balanced and planned as they may be, cannot stand the test of too much time. Mounting pressure from the international community is bound to continue and the temporizing approaches taken by the South Africans to apartheid are sure to be exposed even in the Western press which is so devoted to the interests of big business. Increasing civil actions such as strikes, civil disobedience, protest marches and rallies throughout South Africa will continue to grow and even the South African administrations can hardly ignore them. None of the Western leaders is callous enough, or perhaps just not

foolish enough, to suggest publicly that the majority of South Africans are being impatient and that their assumption of control of the government would endanger the economy. At the heart of Western involve­ ment in the question of apartheid is the deep-seated belief that the majority will be unable or unwilling to run the country in any efficient (i.e. profitable) manner. The failures in countries such as Mozambique are put down to the general fecklessness and innate inability of the Africans to run even a state with very little industry. Never mind that several of these countries were forced by the West to undergo a long and costly struggle to gain independence. Never m d that the colonial powers saw to it that most of their black citizens were constantly encouraged in a belief that they lacked any ability to organise politically in any effective manner.

The hidden agenda in Nkomati for the South Africans included making an example of Mozambique's lack of solidarity with the rest of the FLS. South Africa has long played on tribal and regional divisions among its own population as a means of keeping the liberation movement immobilised and it has been an important card for them to play in warning the international community that even if justice prevailed and the black majority was given its full share in the government, as so many Americans and Europeans wish, South Africa would rapidly descend into chaos - tom apart by tribal dissension. The example of Malawi's support of the MNR, of the civil war in Angola, and so forth are used by pro-apartheid spokespersons as demonstrations of this inability of the Africans to achieve an internal equilibrium, let alone to operate co­ operatively on an international level The majority in South Africa has been willing to co-operate with the white minority in the process of immediately assuming their full rights as citizens of their country. To ask more of them than this may be to tempt fate. The respondents to the researcher's questionnaire were all eager to call for the avoidance of desperate measures, but they were just as urgent in pointing out that such a solution cannot be ruled out if the white minority do not convince themselves soon that they have run out of options.

## The Outcome of the Nkomati Accord

As this study has demonstrated, bow one views such matters as the success or failure of the Nkomati Accord depends entirely on one's ability to understand that apartheid and all the policies of the Republic of

South Africa are inextricably tied together. If one chooses, as the South Africans do, to claim that harbour­ ing the ANC is a threat to South Africa's autonomy which represents aggression then one has to also accept the legitimacy of the South African government. In order to do this one would have to agree that it is possi­ ble for a country to exist in the late twentieth century which excludes seventy percent of its population from full representation within the system of government on grounds of race. It might also be argued that the acceptance of dealings with Pretoria by the other countries of southern Africa also legitimates the regime. Yet this is proof of precisely the point made in the literature and by the concerned parties interviewed by the researcher. Nkomati proves that the FLS are forced to deal with South Africa. Common sense would make it clear that if there is any truth to the claims of the FLS to be wholeheartedly devoted to the libera­ tion struggle in South Africa, and no one has cast any doubt on this, then there must be some other reason why they would deal with a government they condemn as a complete travesty. In other words, why would the FLS deal with a regime they are ideologically opposed to? The answer, of course, is economic. The FLS rely heavily, as most of the interviewees agreed, on the South African economy to the extent between 70% to *95%* the cessation of which would seriously undermine the FLS economy.

The Nkomati Accord was the achievement of South Africa's coercive diplomacy strategy. The Botha regime's policy towards Mozambique appears to be a success for coercive strategy in the short-tenn only. For two reasons Pretoria did not achieve the medium and long-term objectives. First, South Africa did not honour its part of the bargain which leads to the second reason, Pretoria kept the momentum of coercive

strategy by applying it to other countries in the region which put Mozambique i,n an embarrassing position in dealing with South Africa. However, of the various objectives of Pretoria's coercive strategy, how many

have been successful? While they did succeed in forcing Mozambique to expel the majority of the ANC personnel in the country they hardly crippled the movement. The ANC draws the majority of its support from within South Africa (a fact the government is loathe to admit) and it will not disappear simply because it loses a minor base of operations. The ANC has repeatedly stressed the fact that they have refrained from mounting any operations from Maputo across the border into South Africa for fear of placing the Mozambi­ cans in danger of serious reprisals. They have repeatedly pointed out that the South African government has failed to produce a single instance of an ANC attack of any sort taking place across the extensive border

with Mozambique - and it can be safely assumed that if such instances had occurred Pretoria would have made the most of them.

The South Africans also wished to strike a blow against the solidarity of the FLS. This was accom­ plished only because Mozambique bad been a v,,illing party to the agreement. The other countries, as was repeatedly stressed by those interviewed, understood fully the position the country was in and the fact that South Africa's failure to fulfill its end of the bargain came so soon and so publicly actually gave the FLS (especially Mozambique) new ammunition in their campaign to make South Africa's unwitting double­ dealing (in the sense that its military continued to support the MNR) common knowledge among the inter­ national community. The FLS was also able to point to Mozambique's honourable fulfillment of its share of the agreement. In terms of public relations the Accord was, in the long run, not a total loss for the Mozambique.

Another aspect of Pretoria's strategy was to buy itself time with the West. Tuey wished to prove that they were willing to work for peace in the region and to impress upon the West that once they were 'safe' from attack they would be able to address the problem of apartheid. In this they were successful. Toe effect of the public relations uproar surrounding the Accord was to make South Africa look like a country engaging in considered diplomacy with its black neighbours. It was only a temporising move, but in fact, once the West were committed to supporting South Africa in this way why should they not be committed to waiting until all the problems of the region had been worked out.

The South Africans also wished to safeguard their economic ties with MO'Z81Ilbique while, unknown to the government, their military blinded by the notion of 'total onslaught', continued to support the attacks on the country by the :MN'R which were undermining its economy. The military did succeed in this, though trade following the Nkomati agreement and has risen to its forn1er levels. They also managed to continue to support the destabilisation efforts of the MNR while protesting long and loud that they were not responsible for its activities - the government even going so far as to claimed that they had conducted an extensive investigation but had been unable to find any ties between the MNR and any part of the Pretoria administra­ tion, tracing the support from within South Africa to an illegal mafia-type organisation.[29]

1. Statement by Pik Botha the South African Foreign Minister, as the result of his investigation regarding the violation of Nkoma­

ti Accord. See, *Financial Mail,* Johannesburg, (date missing) late, 1985.

Fmally, the most important South African goal in setting up the Nk:omati Accord was to establish themselves as the natural leaders of the region, to make themselves as the architects of a *Pax Pretoriana.* They wished to establish this image in the minds of their supporters for the obvious reason that if they could guarantee peace they could guarantee the continuation of profits. But they also wished to establish this image in the consciousness of the region - they wished to repress opposition effectively in a display of superior economic and military power. In the first they were at least temporarily successful. For the second they were not telling southern Africa an g itdid not already know and the response of the FLS verifies this. They were publicly hopeful over the Accord, clearly in sympathy with Mozambique, but they were quick to come forward in condemnation of South Africa when it conspicuously failed to honour the agree­ ment The FLS was neither cowed nor tom apart by Nk:omati. Thus South Africa's principal gain from the Nk:omati Accord was to buy itself time with the West whose support cannot hold out forever in the face of intensifying domestic pressure. It is then, a matter of time.

As this study has shown nearly everyone is agreed that apartheid is doomed and the facts of the Nk:omati Accord make it perfectly clear to the interviewees that South Africa's policies are centered first and foremost around the perpetuation of the policy which makes it such a solid investment for Western and Japanese money: apartheid. However, it could be argued that apartheid puts the international investment in South Africa at risk. For example, after considerable pressure from the anti-apartheid movement in Britain, Barclays Bank withdrew from South Africa in 1987 with more than ten different companies.[30] These two

conclusions, taken together, spell out a reasonable course for all concerned.

,The South Africans have

demonstrated reluctance to do anything other than gradual reforms of apartheid and therefore real pressure, of the sort the Pretoria demonstrated itself capable of providing when it coerced FRELIMO to sign Nk:omati, must be exerted on South Africa to make it abolish apartheid. The people interviewed in the course of the study were unanimous in insisting that sanctions and boycotts of South Africa were infinitely preferable to the continuation of apartheid or the alternative of violence. Other options could include power-sharing and negotiation for a peaceful settlement in South Africa. Those who claim that such actions would only hurt the people they are supposed to help have a very incomplete understanding of what [30] *ACR,* 1986-1987, p.Al2.

it means to live in a country where one has little say in any of the decisions which affect one's life because of race. However, for example, the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) and other anti­ apartheid movements have gained some freedom to protest against the Pretoria regime, whilst effecting, albeit in a limited way, the South African government's decision-making processers.

If apartheid is going to end and if the white minority (with some few exceptions) refuses to relinquish its stranglehold on the majority then it is completely illogical for any country or group to spend its time try­ ing to shore up that regime. South Africa has also demonstrated, as in the case of Nkomati, that it is willing to use coercive diplomacy to destabilise the surrounding countries claiming that it has responded to external aggression in the form of the ANC or PAC operating from FLS territory.

But iflogic were all that was required to understand the implications of Nkomati, South Africa would not have lasted, and thrived, as long as it has. Time will force events. It seems unlikely that the South Africa which compelled Mozambique to undertake the signing of the Nkomati Accord will be able to lay quickly to rest the fears of the majority ruining the economy of the area when they are allowed full representation in the South African government

## The Future

Coercive diplomacy strategy may be chosen in part because it is less costly and also less risky - in terms of the probability of escalation to large-scale war - than other feasible alternatives. For any particular case, it is necessary to determine what range of options exists and where coerciye strategy fits within this range, it may be more risky than some options. It is not clear that the use of coercive diplomacy strategy will be effective in the settlement of conflicts at the world society level. However, coercive strategy is still one of the alternatives to large-scale war, therefore, it may be interesting to see some future studies in order to clarify issues involved in coercive diplomacy, to deal with states internal coercion to change the opponent's behaviour. For example, the Soviet Union in dealing with the internal minorities, who are seek­ ing independence from Moscow or Israel in dealing with the Palestinians uprising.

One of the major findings from this study is that the main cause of South Africa's coercive strategy is fundamentally related to internal development and the struggle for the survival of white rule, and that no

lasting peace in the area can be visible before the final elimination of apartheid.. It is possible to predict some changes in the near future, but we need to clarify issues involved in the post-apartheid era. The Nkomati Accord has proved the readiness of the FLS and South Africa to compromise their differences and to live in peaceful coexistence. It is indeed true, as the 1984 Front Line States meeting of Arusha con­ cluded that real peace in Southern Africa is impossible with the existence of apartheid. 1989, put us in an optimistic position, with the new President F.W. de Klerlc and his programme of change and reform for a better South Africa (a non-racial society) and, indeed its implications for peaceful co-existence in Southern Africa. Therefore, we have to commit ourselves to waiting and seeing.

# APPENDIXl

# MOZAMBIQUE-SOUTH AFRICA: AGREEMENT ON NON-AGGRESSION AND GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS

# [Done at the Nkomati River, March 16, 1984]

AGREE:MENT

ON NON-AGGRESSION AND GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS

BETWEEN

THE GOVERNMENT OF

THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTII AFRICA

AND

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

MOZAMBIQUE

The Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the People's Republic of Mozam­ bique, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties;

RECOGNISING the principles of strict respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, sovereign equality, political independence and the inviolability of the borders of all states;

REAFFIRMING the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states;

CONSIDERING the internationally recognised principle of the rights of peoples to self-determination and

independence and the principle of equal rights of all peoples;

CONSIDERING the obligation of all states to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state;

CONSIDERING the obligation of states to settle conflicts by peaceful means, and thus safeguard interna­ tional peace and security and justice;

RECOGNISING the responsibility of states not to allow their territory to be used for acts of war, aggres­ sion or violence against other states;

CONSCIOUS of the need to promote relations of good neighbourliness based on the principles of equality of rights and mutual advantage;

CONVINCED that relations of good neighbourliness between the High Contracting Parties will contribute to peace, security, stability and progress in South Africa, the Continent and the World;

Have solemnly agreed to the following:

## ARTICLE ONE

The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect each other's sovereignty and independence and, in fulfilment of this fundamental obligation, to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other.

## ARTICLE TWO

1. The High Contracting Parties shall resolve differences and disputes that may arise between them and that may or are likely to endanger mutual peace and security or peace and security in the region, by means of negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or other peaceful means, and undertake not to resort, individually or collectively, to the threat or use of force against each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence.
2. For the purposes of this article, the use of force shall include *inter alia* -
   1. attacks by land, air or sea forces:
   2. sabotage;
   3. unwarranted concentration of such forces at or near the international boundaries of the High Contracting Parties;
   4. violation of the international land, air or sea boundaries of either of the High Contracting Par­ ties.
3. The High Contracting Parties shall not in any way assist the anned forces of any state or group of states deployed against the territorial sovereignty or political independence of the other.

## ARTICLE THREE

1. The High Contracting Parties shall not allow their respective territories, territorial waters or air space to be used as a base, thoroughfare, or in any other way. by another state, government, foreign military forces, organisations or individuals which plan or prepare to commit acts of violence, terrorism or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other or may threaten the . security of its inhabitants.
2. The High Contracting Parties, in order to prevent or eliminate the acts or the preparation of acts men­ tioned in paragraph (1) of this article, undertake in particular to -
   1. forbid and prevent in their respective territories the organisation of irregular forces or anned bands, including mercenaries, whose objective is to carry out the acts contemplated in para­ graph (1) of this article;
   2. eliminate from their respective territories bases, training centres, places of shelter, accommoda­ tion and transit for elements who intend to carry out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;
   3. eliminate from their respective territories centres or depots containing annaments of whatever nature, destined to be used by the elements contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;
   4. eliminate from their respective territories command posts or other places for the command, direction and co-ordination of the elements contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;
   5. eliminate from their respective territories communication and telecommunication facilities between the command and the elements contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;
   6. eliminate and prohibit the installation in their respective territories of radio broadcasting sta­ tions, including unofficial or clandestine broadcasts, for the elements that carry out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;
   7. exercise strict control, in their respective territories, over elements which intend to carry out or plan the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;
   8. prevent the transit of elements who intend or plan to commit the a-cts contemplated in para­ graph (1) of this article, from a place in the territory of either to a place in the territory of the other or to a place in the tenitory of any third state which has a common boundary with the High Contracting Party against which such elements intend or plan to commit the said acts;
   9. take appropriate steps in their respective territories to prevent the recruitment of elements of whatever nationality for the purpose of carrying out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;
   10. prevent the elements contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article from carrying out from their respective territories by any means acts of abduction or other acts, aimed at taking citizens of any nationality hostage in the tenitory of the other High Contracting Party; and
   11. prohibit the provision on their respective tenitories of any logistic facilities for carrying out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article.
3. The High Contracting Parties will not use the territory of third states to carry out or support the acts contemplated in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this article.

## ARTICLE FOUR

The High Contracting Parties shall take steps, individually and collectively, to ensure that the international boundary between their respective territories is effectively patrolled and that the border posts are efficiently administered to prevent illegal crossings from the territory of a High Contracting Party to the territory of the other, and in particular, by elements contemplated in Article Three of this Agreement.

## ARTICLE FIVE

The High Contracting Parties shall prohibit within their territory acts of propaganda that incite a war of aggression against the other High Contracting Party and shall also prohibit acts of propaganda aimed at inciting acts of terrorism and civil war in the territory of the other High Contracting Party.

## . ARTICLE SIX

The High Contracting Parties declare that there is no conflict between their commitments in treaties and international obligations and the commitments undertaken in this Agreement.

## ARTICLE SEVEN

The High Contracting Parties are committed to interpreting this Agreement in good faith and will maintain periodic contact to ensure the effective application of what has been agreed.

## ARTICLE EIGHT

Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as detracting from the High Contracting Parties' rights of self-defence in the event of armed attacked, as provided for in the Charter of the United.Nations.

## ARTICLE NINE

1. Each of the High Contracting Parties shall appoint high-ranking representatives to serve on a Joint Security Commission with the aim of supervising and monitoring the application of this Agreement
2. Toe Commission shall determine its own working procedure.
3. The Commission shall meet on a regular basis and may be specially convened whenever cir­ cumstances so require.
4. The Commission shall -
   1. consider all allegations of infringements of the provisions of this Agreement;
   2. advise the High Contracting Parties of its conclusions; and
   3. make recommendations to the High Contracting Parties concerning measures for the effective application of this Agreement and the settlement of disputes over infringements or alleged infrj.ngements.
5. The High Contracting Parties shall determine the mandate of their respective representatives in order to enable interim measures to be taken in cases of duly recognised emergency.
6. The High Contracting Parties shall make available all the facilities necessary for the effective func­ tioning of the Commission and will jointly consider its conclusions and recommendations.

## ARTICLE TEN

This Agreement will also be known as "The Accord ofNkomati".

## ARTICLE ELEVEN

(I) This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the signature thereof.

1. Any amendment to this Agreement agreed to by the High Contracting Parties shall be effected by the Exchange of Notes between them.

IN 'WITNESS WHEREOF, the signatories, in the name of their respective governments, have signed and sealed this Agreement, in quadruplicate in the English and Portuguese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

TIWS DONE AND SIGNED AT the common border on the banks of the Nkomati River, on this the six­ teenth day of March 1984.

PIETER WILLEM BOTHA PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTii AFRICA

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTii AFRICA

,

SAMORA MOISES MACHEL MARSHALL OF THE REPUBLIC

PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE

PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE

# APPENDIX 1-B PROGRAMME

# **SIGNING OF THE ACCORD OF NKOMATI**

# **16 MARCH 1984**

10h00

10h-10h30

10h10-10h20

10h45

11h15

11h20

11h30

llh40-12h05

Arrival of His Excellency The President of the People's Republic of Mozambique, Marshall Samora Moises Machel. The President is met by, and enters *into* discussions with, The Honourable Pieter Willem Botha, Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa. The meeting takes place *in* a railway coach straddling the joint border between the People's Republic of Mozambique and the Republic of South Africa.

Texts of the Accord of Nkomati are initialled by The Honourable R.F. Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa, and His Excellency, Jacinto Soares Veloso, Minister for Economic Affairs in the Presidency of the People's Republic of Mozambique, in the leaders' coach.

Arrival of guests at ceremonial site Refreshments are served.

Guests take up their places in the pavilions, to be seated by not later than 11h10. They await the entry of the Mozambican and South African Guards of Honour and military bands.

Representatives of invited foreign governments arrive and take up their places. The wives of the two leaders take up their places.

The two Guards of Honour take up their positions.

The Mozambican and South African leaders leave the railway coach and walk to the ceremonial site together with their respective delegations. They introduce each other to the other members of their delegations.

The two leaders and their respective delegations take up their positions for the National Salutes.

The National Anthem of the Republic of South Africa is played-, followed by that of the People's Republic of Mozambique.

The two leaders ascend the dais.

Signing of the Accord of Nkomati by His Excellency The President of the People's Republic of Mozambique, Marshal Samora Moises Machel and The Honourable P.W. Botha, Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa. The two leaders exchange the signed texts of the Accord.

The two leaders exchange the pens with which they signed the Accord, and shake hands.

His Excellency The President of the People's Republic of Mozambique addresses the guests, followed by an address by the Honourable P.W. Botha.

12h05 His Excellency The President of the People's Republic of Mozambique and the Honour­ able the Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa inspect the Guards of Honour, followed by the playing of the National Anthem of Mozambique by the South African

Air Force Band and the South African National Anthem by the Mozambican Army Band.

12h20 Children from both countries present flowers.

His Excellency Samora Moises Machel introduces The Honourable P.W. Botha together with the South African delegation, to foreign dignitaries. The two leaders and foreign dignitaries are escorted to their luncheon venue.

Guests proceed to their tables.

During the luncheon toasts will be proposed by the two leaders, to The President of the People's Republic of Mozambique and to the Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa.

14h00

14h05

Departure of His Excellency Samora Moises Machel, foreign dignitaries and Mozambi­ can delegation.

Departure of The Honourable P.W. Botha and South African delegation.

14h20 Departure of guests.

## MOZAMBICAN DELEGATION

His Excellency Marshal Samora Moises - President of the People's Republic of Mozambique. His Excellency General J.S. Veloso - Minister for Economic Affairs in the Presidency.

His Excellency J.O. Monteiro - Minister of Justice.

His Excellency Major-General S. Nalyambipano - Vice-Minister of Security. His Excellency Colonel S. Vieira - Vice-Minister of Defence.

His Excellency T. Hunguana - Vice-Minister of the Interior. Major-General H. Thai - Commander of Defence.

Lieut-Col F. Honwaoa - Special Assistant to the President.

His Excellency Ambassador F. Madeira - Representative of Foreign Affairs. Mr A. Chissaoo - Director in the Presidency.

## SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION

The Honourable P.W. Botha - Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa. The Honourable R.F. Botha - Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Honourable H. Schoeman - Minister of Transport. The Honourable L. le Grange - Minister of Law and Order.

The Honourable Gen. M.A. de M. Malan - Minister of Defence. Mr J. van Dalsen - Director-General of Foreign Affairs.

Gen. C.L. Viljoen - Chief of the Defence Force.

Dr L.D. Barnard - Director-General, National Intelligence. Gen. P.J. Coetzee - Commissioner of Police.

Dr J.P. Roux - Secretary-General, Office of the Prime Minister.

Lieut-Gen. A.J. van Deventer - Secretary of the State Security Council. Lieut-Gen. P.W. van der Westhuizen - Chief of Staff Information.

Mr P.R. Killen - Deputy Director-General of Foreign Affairs. Mr J.C. Heunis - Department of Foreign Affairs.

Mr A.L. Manley - Department of Foreign Affans. Mr P.R. Dietricbsen - Department of Foreign Affairs.

# APPENDIX2

*Speech by His Excellency the President of the People's Republic of Mozambique, Marshal Samora Moises Machel, on the occasion of the signing of the Accord of Nkomati, 16 March 1984*

Mister Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, Mrs Botha, Ministers, Dear Guests, Ladies and

Gentlemen.

The signing of the agreement of non-aggression and good neighbourliness is a high point in the his­ tory of relations between our two States and a high point in the history of our region. The principles we have enshrined in the Accord of Nkomati are universally valid ones that govern relations between sovereign states regardless of their political, economic and social systems. They are principles that open new perspec­ tives for the relationship between our States, in so far as they guarantee a solid and lasting peace between the two neighbouring countries. They are principles that establish a new situation in our region, a situation of peace and good neighbourliness. ·

The Accord of Nk:omati is a unique document among the states of our region. The need for it arose not so much from the differences between us, but above all from the process of confrontation that developed and created the awareness that this was not the road that would be in the best interests of our two countries. By undertaking here a solemn commitment not to launch aggressive actions of any sort against one another, we have created conditions for the establishment, with honour and dignity, of a new phase of stability and security on our common borders.

We do not want southern Africa, and our two countries in particular, to be the theatre for a general­ ised conflict That is why we have enshrined in the Accord of Nkomati the principle that our states will not be used by any other state or group of states to jeopardize the sovereignty, territorial integrity or indepen­ dence of our countries.

We are thus laying the foundation for a definitive break of the cycle of violence that had been esta­ blished in this region of the continent. A violence that was above all the result of the burdensome legacies we carry with us. A violence that began some centuries ago, when the dignity and personality of African peoples were trampled on by the aggressive, domination and exploitation of European colonialism. Africa was ravaged by the brutality of slave wars and colonial conquest, which brought division, humiliation, povert'J and destruction to the peoples of the continent.

We are a continent of survivors. We survived slavery, we survived wars of conquest and we survived the brutality of repression when we decided to become masters of our own destinies. For that reason we are fully cognisant of the value of peace and of the need to reject the legacies that divide us. We thus assume, before the world and before history, responsibility for guaranteeing the perpetuity of this agreement and eliminating the root causes of violence, war and confrontation.

Mr Prime Minister, the differences between our political, economic and social concepts are great and even opposed to one another. We recognised these differences honourably on the g.ifficult road of frank and open talks that led to this agreement We shall continue to be aware of the remaining contradictions but we are able to recognise that we are indissolubly linked by geography and by proximity.

Peaceful coexistence, mutual respect, and relations of good neighbourliness are the only rational alternative for our future to be free of the spectre of violence and destruction. The People's Republic of Mozambique cherishes peace as the most precious possession of mankind, the deepest aspiration of all peo­ ples. Peace and coexistence are written into our constitution. Based on our socialist policy of peace we have propose, since the first meeting between our Governments on 17 December 1982, that we should agree, formally or informally, to let peace and coexistence prevail between our States.

* + There is peace when there is respect between states for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Peace is when there is harmony, and physical, material, spiritual and social tranquility. There is peace when the life, liberty, equality and dignity of man is respected without any discrimination. Peace generates conditions for progress, economic development and social well-being.

After a long period of armed conflicts, hopes of peace are emerging. They must be converted into reality. They must grow and become progressively more fertile and enriched. The prospect of peace opens possibilities for developing the vast resources in which our region abounds. These resources must as a

matter of priority be exploited for the benefit of the people, while always safeguarding the national interests of each state.

Economic relations between our States must develop in a healthy and correct manner. We neither can nor should ignore the fact that our relations have a historic tradition, which enhanced the geographical contiguity of the two countries. But we must also recognise that relations of economic dependence are not conducive to stability and harmonious progress. For this reason our State rejects any type of relationship that might in any way limit its independence or make it economically dependent on another country.

In the economic sphere, let us find ways of developing resources, infrastructures and circumstances which, being part of the experience of our relations, are likely to bring reciprocal advantages and benefits on the basis of equality. It is within this context that the agreement of non-aggression and good neighbour­ liness has an important role to play, as there can be no development without peace and tranquility.

We have established relations of cooperation with the States of Southern Africa in the framework of SADCC. *As* we have already bad occasion to state, the SADCC was not created against South Africa Its central objective is to eliminate hunger, wretchedness and illiteracy and to improve the standard of living of the peoples of the region. Its member-states refuse economic dependence on South Africa as on any other country. These objectives are solemnly proclaimed in the Lusaka Declaration which created the SADCC, and we would like to reaffirm here our total adherence to these principles.

Mr Prime Minister, our States have been able to map out the path of coexistence. They have been able to discuss these matters between themselves. Between themselves they have been able to define their interests and objectives. Many have been surprised at the speed with which we found the answers, and by our ability to do so without external interference.

None of us, Mozambicans or South Africans, have another country. We are not foreigners to our continent or our countries. We have to live together on a basis of mutual respect, freedom, equality and jus­ tice. These are fundamental principles of our State, principles that are the very essence of our concept of a free and democratic society. They are principles with which we remain consistent and to which we are intransigently loyal.

Our objective is that our region should assert itself as a model or peace. We do not want Southern Africa or our continent to be the base for any anned conflicts. In particular, we do not want to be the ones to trigger off a confrontation on a worldwide scale. The liberation struggle of the African peoples was a struggle to achieve peace. The whole of Africa is continuing the struggle to become a Zone of Peace, and for her oceans to be thoroughfares of peace, unity, friendship and cooperation between peoples. The whole of Africa is fighting to avert the horrors of a nuclear holocaust from the continent. The peoples of Africa have always struggled to eliminate the motive causes of conflicts, tension and wars. They have always struggled to eradicate foreign domination and exploitation, and to build progress, prosperity and happiness in peace.

In this struggle to affirm the dignity and personality of African man, the Organisation of African Unity *was* and continues to be an important instrument for materializing the legiumate aspirations of the

peoples of our continent. We cannot lose this opportunity to pay our tribute to those who founded and inspired the OAU. More than twenty years ago a galaxy of illustrious African leaders had the lucidity, the historical vision and the courage to give form to the aspiration of unity so that the struggle of the African people for the liberation of our continent could continue. In this great epic, the liberation of Africa, many were the heroes who sacrificed their lives for the noble cause. It is with deep emotion that at this moment we evoke their memories which will remain immortalised with affection and respect and in the history of Africa

We would like to emphasize the decisive role of the leaders of the Frontline States with which we have been united for a long time in the cause of the liberation of our continent and in the search for peace and progress, for justice and equality in this region of Africa. We salute Mwalirnu Julius Kambarage Nyerere and Doctor Kenneth David Kaunda, those distinguished figures who transfonned their peoples into firm and unwavering allies in the liberation of the Mozambican people. This respectful tribute to the peo­ ples of Tanzania and Zambia is extensive to all peoples who made our struggle for peace and freedom their own.

The agreement we have concluded is a significant contribution towards these noble objectives. Furthermore, it enables the region to concentrate its efforts on the prime struggle of the continent and humanity - the struggle against hunger, disease, ignorance, poverty and underdevelopment. Let Africa emerge as a region of progress where reason prevails over bat and prejudice and where the efforts of man are concentrated on the struggle for development and well-being.

Peace, security, stability and progress have always been objectives of the Mozambican people's struggle. In 1964 our people launched the armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism to win national independence and eliminate one of the factors that disturbed peace in our region. In 1974, ten years later, that objective was attained. Another ten years have elapsed, and we are here to establish the basis for a cli­ mate of good neighbourliness and peace to prevail between two states of the Southern region of our con­ tinent.

Mr Prime Minister, the effort to achieve peace required determination, a correct historical perspective and steadfastness. The moment has arrived when for us, what counts for more than legal texts and formula­ tions is the given word, the sense of commitment and good faith. The Government of the People's Repub­ lic of Mozambique will keep its word, both in letter and in spirit.

Mr Prime Minister, dear guests, we have always fought for peace, equality and progress, proclaiming Frelimo's watchword, 'The Struggle Continues'. Today the struggle continues for equality, for democracy, for justice so that on our continent we should all be equal. Today, for peace, stability, good neighbourliness and progress, *'a luta continua'.*

# APPENDIX3

*Speech by the Hon P.W. Botha, Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, on the occasion of the sign­ ing of the Accord of Nkomati, 16 March 1984.*

Our action today in signing this treaty, the Accord of Nkomati, sets a new course in the history of Southern Africa. We have signalled to the world our belief that states with different socio-economic and political systems can live together in peace and harmony, and work together in the pursuit of common interests. Our meeting today on the border between our two countries indicates our willingness, and our ability, to reach peaceful accords which enshrine our commitment to the principles of good neighbourliness.

Another principle that underlines the agreement we have signed today is that each country has the right to order its affairs as it sees fit, and at inter-state relations, particularly between neighbours, should not be disturbed by differences in internal policies. This is sensible and practical, as it recognises that each country has its own set of conditions for which it must seek its own solution in the interest of its citizens.

South Africa was one of the first countries of Africa to confront colonial occupation and foreign exploitation. The people I belong to know the feeling of powerlessness in the face of an external force far greater than ours. Our independence did not come easily. Countless numbers of our women and children died in concentration camps while their husbands, fathers and brothers fought the might of a great empire. Their sacrifice has kept the flame of freedom burning in the hearts of South Africans ever since.

Neither South Africa nor Mozambique had a hand in drawing the political map as we know it today. Our borders were arbitrarily drawn by others, by people who served the interests of colonial powers and who spared little thought, if any, for the inhabitants of the region. Having gained our political indepen­ dence, we have the duty to use it to free our peoples from the chains of poverty, ignorance and disease. The means we have chosen may point in opposite directions: they often conflict, but we cannot allow our diver­ gent outlooks on life to distract us from the urgent need to create better opportunities for our peoples to enable them to break out of the debilitating cycle of poverty, and to work for a future which offers realistic prospects for peace and a better standard of living.

This is the logic and purpose of the accord of Nkomati. It is an act of faith on the part of our two governments - faith in the promise that given a climate of stability and mutual coexistence we will be able to focus our energies on the problems which really matter in our region, and get to work on the fundamental requirements of our peoples. We face extremely complex social, political and economic problems in South Africa: so complex that they can result in conflict and it is often difficult to avoid being drawn into the resultant spiral of confrontation and conflict. In these circumstances the real issues are avoided - uncomfort­ able facts and harsh realities are dusted under the carpet while nations wage an ideological war of words and act with hostility toward each other. But fact and realities are remarkably resilient companions of mankind. They will not simply disappear because we banish them from our sight Indeed, unless we attend to them honestly and frankly the problems which they present will merely be compcfunded.

The republic of South Africa, in voicing its concern several years ago at the increasing signs of con­ frontation and conflict in our region, came to the conclusion that the leaders of our sub-continent would have to face these realities and rearrange their priorities accordingly. As governments we have a duty to view the welfare and prosperity of our peoples as our first priority. South Africa recognized that it had the stability, the economic strength and the productive capacity to assist its neighbours in achieving the regional goal of progress and development, provided the countries concerned were prepared to seek healthier mutual relations. My country offered to sign non-aggression pacts with all its neighbours in pur­ suit of that objective, and today with the People's Republic of Mozambique we are taking an important step in that direction.

In signing this agreement today we have opted for the road of peace. I know that it is a difficult road, not without risks for either of us: nor can we escape the fact that peace, too, has its price. We start off with a burden of mutual suspicion and bitter memories which, as we progress, must be shed by the wayside. There can be no question of this agreement being a temporary expedient from which one side or the other might desire to derive unilateral advantage. This is so because the factors which have brought us together are themselves immutable. it is the economic and geographic realities of our region which have brought us

together and which will be the best guarantee of the success and permanence of this agreement.

We can explore nwnerous possibilities for expanding our relations for mutual benefit in the atmo­ sphere of peace and trust that we are now creating. Such an atmosphere will lead to confidence and will encourage the private sectors of the South African economy and of other countries to play a constructive role if they can be assured that their investments will be secure and of mutual benefit to producers and con­ sumers alike.

We are both African countries, inhabited by African peoples whose past and whose future are firmly entrenched in the southern part of the African Continent. We are of Africa. We share a common future in this part of the world, and a common responsibility to ensure that the generations which follow us will inherit a better world than we did. 11ris agreement can contribute significantly towanis such a better world. We have signed it before an assembled group of dignitaries and guests, civilians from many walks of life, as well as before representatives of our armed forces on whom we rely to defend our countries with their lives. By ensuring the successful implementation of this agreement we will creat a situation in which, if our armed forces are called upon to do battle, it will not be between our respective countries.

By agreeing to the spirit and letter of this accord, my government looks forward to a new era of cooperation and peaceful coexistence between South Africa and Mozambique in the search for a better life for our peoples. I see a sub-continent in which countries work together to rationalize and increase food pro­ duction, develop regional trade, establish housing programmes, education and training schemes, health ser­ vices, employment opportunities, and many other mutually beneficial activities. We can exchange informa­ tion on programmes to overcome the consequences of droughts, floods and other natural disasters. Together we can form an economic alliance to negotiate better prices on world marlcets for our minerals and raw materials.

Given the necessary stability and good neighbourliness, we have a vision of nations of Southern Africa cooperating with each other in every field of human endeavour: a veritable constellation of states working together for the benefit of all on the basis of mutual respect. It is most appropriate that leaders and representatives of states in Southern Africa, as well as representatives of other states, are in attendance on this historic occasion. I wish to thank them for their presence. Some I have met before: others I am meet­ ing for the first time. All have, in one way or another, contributed to the process of communication and negotiation which bas culminated in our proceedings today.

When, later this afternoon, we have to part, the structures which have been erected here will be taken down and removed, and this beautiful valley will again be the domain of the hippopotamus and many other creatures of the animal kingdom. I would like us, together to build a memorial on this spot where the accord of Nkomati was signed, so that long after we have gone, future generations will know that we met here today to charter a new and promising course in the history of our two countries.

Our task now is to return to work, to put our agreement into operation, and do all we can to ensure that historians of the future will marlc today as a major turning point in the destiny of our sub-continent. Once again something new bas emerged from Africa. We believe that this agreef!lent between our two countries can serve as a model for relationships throughout our region, and, indeed, throughout the world. We cannot allow Southern Africa to wither away and die. Our responsibility as Africans is to give our sub-continent a chance to live. To grow, to develop, and to show that we can succeed without the interfer­ ence of outsiders. As Africans we take pride in our identity and in our traditions in this part of the world Instead of dividing our energies and resources let us pool them, for it is in our combined economic strength that the promise of a more prosperous region will best be realised.

By our meeting here today we are sending a message to the world that Southern Africa will survive and her children will prosper. May God grant us the courage and strength to fulfil our mission.

# APPENDIX4

*Statement of the African National Congress National Executive Committee, meeting in Lusaka, 16 March 1984.*

... Over the last few weeks, the racist and colonial regime of South Africa bas been involved in a frantic diplomatic, political and propaganda counter-offensive in Southern Africa.

Some of the principal objectives of this offensive are:

To isolate the ANC throughout Southern Africa and to compel the independent countries of our region to act as Pretoria's agents in emasculating the ANC, the vanguard movement of the South African struggle for national emancipation.

To liquidate the armed struggle for the liberation of South Africa.

To gain new bridgeheads for the Pretoria regime in its efforts to undermine the unity of the Frontline States, destroy the SADCC and replace it with a so-called constellation of states and thus to transform the independent countries of Southern Africa into its client states and

to use the prestige of the Frontline States in the campaign of the white minority regime to reduce the international isolation of apartheid South Africa and to lend legitimacy to itself and its colonial and fascist state.

In pursuit of these aims, the Botha regime has sought to reduce the independent countries of our region to the level of its bantustan creations by forcing them to join the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei bantustans in entering into so-called non-aggression pacts with Pretoria.

Such accords, concluded as they are with a regime which has no moral or legal right to govern our country, cannot but help to perpetuate the illegitimate rule of the South African white settler minority. It is exactly for this reason that this minority has over the years sought to bind independent Africa to such agreements.

The African National Congress is profoundly conscious of the enormous political, economic and security problems that confront many of the peoples of our region. The blame for many of these problems must be laid squarely on the Pretoria regime which has sought to define the limit of independence oftbe countries of our region through a policy of aggression and destabilisation.

We are convinced that this regime, which is dripping from head to foot with blood of thousands of people it bas murdered throughout Southern Africa, cannot be an architect of justice and peace in our region.

Neither can the ally of this regime, the Reagan administration of the United States, with its pro-apartheid policy of 'constructive engagement', by an architect of justice and peace in this region, while it is an angel of war, reaction and repression other regions of the world, including the United States itself ...

The Pretoria regime is acting in the manner that it is, to try to extricate itself out of the crisis that confronts its racist and colonial system of apartheid. It hopes that after it has 'pacified' our neighbours and driven the ANC out of our region, it will then have a free hand to suppress the mass democratic movement of our country and thus create the conditions for it to spin out its intricate web of measures for the refinement and entrenchment of the apartheid system.

Our principal task at this moment therefore is, and must be, to intensify our political and military offensive inside South Africa. This is the urgent call that we make to the masses of our people, to all democratic for­ mations and to all members and units of the ANC and *Umklwnto we Sizwe.* Relying on our own strength, through action, we will frustrate the schemes of the enemy of the peoples of Africa and continue our for­ ward march to the destruction of the system of white minority colonial domination in our country.

The central and immediate question of South African politics is the overthrow of the white minority regime, the seizure of power by the people and the uprooting of these victorious masses of the entire apartheid sys­ tem of colonial and racist domination, fascist tyranny, the superexploitation of the black majority and imperialist aggression and expansionism.

This question will be and is being settled, in struggle, within the borders of our country and nowhere else. We are entitled to expect that all those anywhere in the world, who count themselves among the anti­ colonial and anti-racist forces, will join hands with us to bring about this noble outcome ...

*Extracts from Statement by Thabo Mbeki, Director of Information, on behalf of ANC of South Africa, Inter­ national Hearings on South African Aggression, Oslo, March 1984.*

We have an obligation to ourselves to liberate ourselves. We have thought it was a very important thing that in the course of that effort to liberate ourselves, that we should do as little as possible that would serve as a provocation to the South African regime to attack the neighbouring states. To the best of our ability I am sure we shall continue to do that. But we nonetheless have an obligation to liberate ourselves.

We know this regime and its activities and have lived with colonialism for centuries. We know the nature of this regime and know that it does not seek peace. It forced us to take up anns. And for us to abandon armed struggle would be to surrender.

We certainly shall not surrender. And the South African regime will, as before, when we carry out an operation in Cape Town, thousands of kilometres from the nearest border, point its finger for instance at Botswana and say that these people came from Botswana But this regime will not answer the question as to bow these people travelled 800 kilometres from the border of Botswana to Cape Town, and they didn't catch them. They will say it is the duty of Botswana to catch them as an excuse to invade Botswana, to try to compel Botswana (or any other country in our region) to bend to the purposes of South Africa, which, in our view remain unchanged.

Botha, racist Prime Minister Botha when speaking last week at the signing of the 'Nk:omati Accord' said very boldly and very plainly that here was being taken one of the steps towards the formation of a constella­ tion of states. This was a confession that Pretoria is continuing to pursue an old policy. The racists want to dominate the countries of our region. So long as they feel that these countries are insufficiently dominated then so long will be continue with their policy of aggression against them. They want to destroy ANC and the democratic movement in South Africa So long as they feel the movement is active in a political way, in a military way, in all sorts of ways, so long will they point a finger at the independent states of the region as people who are harbouring this movement ...

# APPENDIXS

# **Arusha Statement 29 April 1984**

*The full text of the final communique issued after a one-day summit meeting of six African Frontline leaders at Arusha, northern Tanzania:*

The beads of state and government present were: President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of the People's Republic of Angola, President Quett Masire of the Republic of Botswana, President Samora Machel of the People's Republic of Mozambique, President Julius K Nyerere of the United Republic of Tanzania, President Kenneth Kaunda of the Republic of Zambia and Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of the Republic of Zimbabwe.

Also in attendance were: Comrade ·oliver Tambo, President of ANC, and Comrade Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO of Namibia.

The leaders stood for one minute of silence in tribute to the late Edward Moringe Sokoine, whose very valuable and practical contributions to the liberation struggle of southern Africa will be greatly missed by the Frontline States and the liberation movements.

The heads of state and government and the leaders of liberation movements reaffirmed their total and qualified commitment to the liberation struggles of the people of Namibia against colonialism and of the people of South Africa against apartheid.

They reasserted their conviction and that of the Organisation of African Unity, that the total libera­ tion of Africa from colonialism and racism is essential for the security of all the independent states of the continent and in particular of the Frontline States.

Further, they reiterated that the root cause of the problems in South Africa is apartheid itself. Apartheid is the cause of Africa's hostility to the South African racist regime and of the existence of South African and Namibian refugees. None of these things is caused by the Frontline or other states neighbour­ ing South Africa.

Apartheid has been condemned in categorical terms by the United Nations and by the leaders of Europe, America, Australia and Asia as well as by Africa. It cannot be made acceptable by the use of South Africa's military power and economic strength, nor by the use of mercenaries and traitors.

The heads of state and government and the leaders of the liberation movements discussed the under­ standing reached by the People's Republic of Angola and the Pretoria regime, and they hoped that South Africa will honour its commitment to withdraw its troops from Angola.

This withdrawal will constitute an opportunity for the immediate and unconditional implementation

of Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978. They welcomed Angola's reaffirmation, of its continued com- mitment to the struggle of the Namibian people under the leadership of SWAPO.

The heads of state and government expressed their support for the Angolan actions against the exter­ nally supported armed bandits who are causing death and misery to the Angolan people and destruction of the economic infrastructure of the state.

They expressed the hope that the South African Government will live up to the commitment to cease its acts aimed at the destabilisation of Mozambique through the use of armed bandits and gave their support to the Mozan1bican actions aimed at the total elimination of these vicious bandits.

They expressed appreciation of Mozambique's commitment to continued moral, political and diplomatic support for the ANC in the struggle against apartheid and for majority rule in South Africa.

The heads of state and government and the leaders of the liberation movements declared that the immediate objective for Namibia is and must be the rapid implementation of the UN Security Council reso­ lution 435 of 1978, in order that Namibia may attain full and internationally recognised independence on the basis of self-determination by all people of that country.

For South Africa, the objective of the Frontline States and liberation movements is the abolition of apartheid by whatever means are necessary. The leaders present again reiterated their strong preference for

apartheid to be brought to an end by peaceful means.

*This* can be achieved only through a process agreed upon in free discussions between the present South African regime and genuine representatives of the people of South Africa who are unrepresented in the present Government structure of that country.

Difficult as this step may be in the eyes of the present South African Government, there is no way to peace in Southern Africa except through discussions between the South African Government and the Afri­ can people of South Africa.

The alternative to free negotiations within South Africa aimed at the ending of apartheid will inevit­ ably be continued struggle against that system by other means, including armed struggle.

This struggle is being (led) and will be conducted and led by the people of South Africa themselves, on their own initiative and within their own country. However, their struggle is, and is seen by Africa to be, a struggle for the freedom and security \_of all the peoples of this continent and for the human dignity of all men and women regardless of colour.

It therefore receives and will continue to receive, the full support of the peoples and the nations represented by the heads of state and government of the Frontline States.

Involved in this struggle for the total liberation of Africa from colonialism and racism is the consoli­ dation of the freedom and the security of the states which have already achieved independence. To that end and in the light of the difficult circumstances which do from time to time confront such states, the leaders of the Frontline states and the liberation movements reaffinned their understanding of steps which are taken for this purpose by states which are fully committed to the liberation struggles.

The heads of state and government of the Frontline States and the leaders of the liberation move­ ments condemned without reservation the open and the covert aggressive actions of South Africa directed at the de-stabilisation of African states and those aimed against refugees from Namibia and apartheid South Africa.

They also repeated their rejection of the attempt to link the freedom of Namibia with any Angolan Government decisions relating to its security requirements and its internal political structures. The political and the armed struggles being waged by the peoples of Namibia and South Africa led by SWAPO and ANC respectively are taking place inside those two countries.

The struggle is between the people of Namibia and the occupying power, and between the people of South Africa and the apartheid regime. Therefore, the strategy of the liberation movements is that of inter­ nal struggle, finnly based on the people's will and determination.

As the denial of human rights, and the ruthlessness of the oppressor, has made it impossible for many active leaders of the liberation movements to live and work inside their own countries, it has been necessary for both SWAPO and ANC to have an external wing.

The international implications of the problems with which the liberation movements are contending

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also require international diplomatic and political activity, together with offices and representatives in other

countries.

The Frontline States reaffinn their recognition of these external operations of the movements and reassert their intention to give shelter to them. They appeal to the international community for diplomatic and economic support and protection as they carry out these international responsibilities.

The heads of state and government of the Frontline States and the leaders of the liberation move­ ments represented at the Arusha meeting, in reasserting their commitment to the struggle for freedom in Namibia and South Africa, also draw attention to the burden they are canying on behalf of the world con­ science and the international condemnation of colonialism and apartheid.

They therefore appeal for active participation in the struggle by all other nations, other organisations and institutions and all people who accept the principles of human dignity and equality.

In particular, they appeal for political, moral, material and diplomatic support to be given to the liberation movements. They appeal also for concrete support to be given to the efforts of the Frontline States aimed at the consolidation of their independence and their fragile economies, as they are of direct relevance to their ability to play a constructive role in the search for peace and freedom in Southern Africa.

For the heads of state and government of the Frontline States and the leaders of the liberation move­ ments repeat a truism. Peace is incompatible with racism and with colonialism. Neither military might nor devious political machinations, whether directed against the peoples inside Namibia and South Africa or against the free states of Africa, can defeat the idea of freedom and racial equality.

The struggle will be long and hard. it will be carried on until final victory - 'A luta continua'.

# APPENDIX6

Name: Country: Profession: Date:

1. What was the pw:pose [Political, Militaiy, Economic] of establishing the Front Llne States?

2.. What type of relationship have the members between each other? Political, economical, cultural, etc. relations?

1. What kind of benefit and cost [P, M, E, etc.] do you gain from your membership in the FLS?
2. What do you think of the role of the F.L.S. in Southern African conflict?
3. Is there any achievement by the F.L.S. as a regional collective?
4. Is there any obstacles that have stood in the way of F.L.S.?
5. Did the F.L.S. as one group try to contact the South African Government in solving the problems of the region?
6. To what extent do you think the F.L.S. support the ANC and SWAPO?
7. Did the signing of Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa affect the solidarity of theF.L.S.?
8. Why do you think Mozambique signed the Accord, under what kind of condition? Is there any kind of pressure from inside or outside the region?
9. What was the reaction of your Government and the F.L.S. to the Nkomati Accord?
10. Do you think the Accord is still alive? Why?
11. Do you think the Accord vital for both sides? Why?
12. Before signing the Nkomati Accord, did the Mozambiquean Government counsel the F.L.S.? Why?
13. Has any other country from the region signed any kind of agreement with South Africa?
14. How do you describe or evaluate the relations between Mozambique and South Africa since the sign­ ing of the Nkomati Accord?
15. What kind of benefit and cost do you think that Mozambique gains from signing the Accord?
16. How would you define the conflict in the region?
17. How does the conflict between F.L.S. and S.A. affect the regional politics in Southern Africa?
18. How does the conflict between *FL.S.* and S.A. affect the international order?
19. To what extent do you think the F.L.S., O.A.U. and U.N. play an effective role in the resolution of the Southern African conflicts in general, and in South Africa in particular?
20. What kind of role do you think fulfilling in the overall process of reconciliation in the conflict in Southern Africa in general, and in South Africa in particular?
21. What are your expectations of the regional conflict in Southern Africa?
22. What kind of policy - do you think- is South Africa applying to the region?

Is it military, political intervention, economic pressure? and How? How do you define these tools?

1. Let us talk about the military action which South Africa used at more than one time to achieve specific goals or interests in using a limited military force. What is your definition for that tech­ nique?

Do you think it is/was effective to create buffer states or peaceful states in the region?

1. Do you think that the military actions or pressures are a successful strategy to bring peace to the region?
2. How do you characterize the South African situation?
3. How do you describe the political system of S.A.?
4. Do you think that the South African Government is an aggressive one. Why and How?
5. To what extent does your country depend on the South African economy? and How?
6. How do you assess the stability of the situation in Southern Africa?
7. How do you describe the foreign policy Decision-Making process in Southern Africa in general and specifically in your country?

Who are the actors?

What did they do?

1. Do you think that your country is ready to sign a non-aggression agreement with South Africa? What are your conditions?
2. If Nkomati Accord proves unsuccessful, what is the best Accord or way to bring the peace to the region?

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