

The Scots-Dutch Brigade and the Highland War, 1689-1691



Major-General Hugh Mackay of Scourie by Nicolaes van Ravesteyn II (c.1690).
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Abstract

This thesis is a re-examination of the Highland War (1689-1691) from the Williamite side, analysing it through the participation of the Scots-Dutch Brigade, a unit of three Scottish regiments serving in the army of the Dutch Republic. These regiments returned to Britain as part of William of Orange's invasion force in 1688 before they were redeployed to Scotland in the following year. They had been issued with orders to secure the country for William and his supporters, representing a return home for many of them. This thesis illustrates that the Scots-Dutch Brigade's return saw them centrally involved in the efforts to secure the nascent Williamite regime in Scotland. For three years the officers of the Brigade acted as the nucleus of William's Scottish army. Re-examining the Highland War through this prism greatly extends our understanding of the impact of the revolution in Scotland. In seizing power from King James' supporters politically, the Williamites had gained power *de jure* but, as we shall see, a significant military endeavour was required to secure *de facto* control of Scotland. The Scots-Dutch regiments were more than just a contingent of veterans of continental service, the officer corps became the vanguard of William and Mary's cause in the country. These officers, due to their long-standing service to the Dutch Republic held a high degree of trust of the Prince of Orange. Their sojourn in Scotland saw William vest the highest degree of confidence in the Scots-Dutch officers who had remained loyal to him throughout the Revolution. The military aspect of the revolution in Scotland has been significantly undervalued within various historiographies. This work will demonstrate that William & Mary's reign over Scotland was only secured through coercive military means and the Brigade was at the forefront of this. The Scots-Dutch soldiers returned to their homeland only to be plunged into the heart of a civil war and their efforts were instrumental in bringing the Jacobites to the negotiating table and, thus, securing the stability of the new government.

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Author's Note

All quotations from manuscript sources have retained original spelling with contractions and abbreviations expanded where needed. Place names, forenames and surnames have not been modernised in quotations. Where sources have been in a foreign language, particularly Dutch and French in this case, translation has been undertaken, where possible, with the advice of a translator. Major-General Hugh Mackay's *Memoirs* utilise a third-person perspective and quotes from that text have been appropriately framed. Sums of money are in £'s Sterling unless otherwise indicated, as the Scottish treasury of the period utilised Sterling currency in calculating most army accounts from 1689 onwards. £1 Sterling was equal to £12 Scots. This thesis was finished during the COVID-19 Pandemic (2020-21). As a result of this, some sources were not accessible due to restrictions on archival access. Similarly, as this thesis has been completed at some distance from the University of Kent's campus, access to libraries became untenable during the pandemic. Regrettably, this led universities to restrict the shared access scheme, SCONUL, for student's from other institutions and, at the time of writing, this has yet to be resolved. This meant, however, that some secondary sources could not be revisited or consulted during this period. All other errors are my own.

Abbreviations

BL	British Library
CSP	British History Online - Calendar of State Papers
EEBO	Early English Books Online
EUL	Edinburgh University Library - Special Collections
NA	National Archives [UK]
NAM	National Army Museum
NLNA	Nationaal Archief [NL]
NLS	National Library of Scotland
NRAS	National Register of Archives for Scotland
NRS	National Records of Scotland
ODNB	Oxford Dictionary of National Biography
PKC	Perth & Kinross Council Archives
SSNE	The Scotland, Scandinavia, and Northern Europe Database

Introduction

In the early hours of the morning of 1st May 1690, Sir Thomas Livingstone and his soldiers were surrounding Lethendry Castle.¹ The small tower lay at the foot of Cromdale Hill, Strathspey, overlooking the undulating plains where the Scottish Jacobite army had encamped only hours before.² Inside around sixty Jacobite officers had taken shelter after Livingstone's detachment, of the Scottish Williamite army, had surprised them, marching through the night from Inverness before launching a surprise assault at three o'clock in the morning.³ This swift attack, combining mounted dragoons and infantry, quickly stormed the crossings over the River Spey to fall on the Jacobite camp and scattering the Highland clans in confusion.⁴ Despite dominating the clans predominance in the Jacobite army, there was a small corps of Lowland Jacobite gentry and professional soldiers, many veterans of wars in Europe, within the force as well.⁵ The bulk of the surviving clansmen largely made good their escape, alongside the Jacobite leadership, hastily retreating across the bogs and moors that surrounded the battlefield, but the remaining contingent of Jacobite officers were now trapped in Lethendry Castle.⁶ Surrounded they now faced a decision, to lay down their arms and surrender themselves to the Williamites or to hold out to the last man. Livingstone was inclined to offer these holdouts good terms, sending a soldier to carry this message of mercy.⁷ The Jacobites flatly refused Livingstone,

¹ William Fraser (ed.), *The Melvilles Earls of Melville and the Leslies Earls of Leven*, Vol II, (Edinburgh, 1890), Sir Thomas Livingstone [probably to Major-General Mackay] – Account of the battle at Cromdale, 2nd May 1690, p. 152.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 152-153.

³ *Melvilles*, Livingstone to [Mackay] – Account, 2nd May 1690, p. 153.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 152-153. *National Records of Scotland [NRS]*, GD26/8/71, Number of highland men with Dundie giving numbers by clans, [pre-July] 1689.

⁵ See Chapter 2 & Appendix 3: Jacobite Army Officers with previous military experience present at Killiecrankie.

⁶ *Melvilles*, Livingstone to [Mackay] – Account, 2nd May 1690, p. 153.

⁷ *Ibid.*; Anon., (ed.), *The Memoirs of Captain George Carleton, and The Life and Adventures of Mrs. Christian Davies* (Oxford, 1840), p. 28.

responding with a ragged volley of musket fire and killing two of his grenadiers.⁸ This defiance, Livingstone ordered, was to be met with a swift and brutal bombardment of grenades from the Williamite soldiers.⁹ We know about this incident, in part, from the memoirs of the English Williamite soldier Captain George Carleton, who 'had served together' with Livingstone in the army of the Dutch Republic.¹⁰ Grenades were, at the time, a highly dangerous weapon to wield and thus required a high degree of skill, strength and, ideally, experience to utilise.¹¹ Amongst the Williamite detachment that day, Carleton was among those most qualified to throw a 'grenado', having learned whilst garrisoned at Grave, in modern-day North Brabant.¹² Throwing four in total, the volatility of the weapon becomes clear from the Englishman's account as he recalled missing the target on his first attempt, the second causing an explosion near enough in his hand but with the third and fourth proving highly effective against the castle as well as its occupants.¹³ The Jacobites inside were thrown into a panicked confusion and called out to Carleton for mercy.¹⁴ Promptly returning to Livingstone with word of their pleas for quarter, Carleton found his commander with a group of captured Jacobite Highland gentry.¹⁵ In a display clearly intended as a show of force to his captured foes, and those still inside Lethendry, 'sir Thomas, in a high voice, and broad Scotch, best to be heard and understood, ordered me back to tell them, He would cut them all to pieces, for their murder of two of his grenadiers'.¹⁶ Carleton was distraught at having to return such 'melancholy tidings' to the Jacobite officers within Lethendry. He had not gone far when

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 28-29.

¹⁰ Ibid; *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography [ODNB]*, John Ormsby, and R. L. Winstanley., 'Carleton, George (1651/2–1728/30), army officer and memoirist.'

¹¹ John Childs, *Warfare in the Seventeenth Century* (London, 2003), p. 156.

¹² Carleton, *Memoirs*, p. 29.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

Livingstone called after him discreetly, 'Hark ye, sir... I believe there may be among them some of our old acquaintance... therefore tell them they shall have good quarter'.¹⁷

Livingstone kept his word to Carleton and their former Jacobite comrades were shown mercy despite their initial intransigence.¹⁸

Old acquaintances from service abroad were not easily forgotten even during a divisive civil war. Livingstone had started his career serving in the Scots-Dutch Brigade alongside some of the officers he now took prisoner, such as Major James Middleton.¹⁹ In choosing this career, future Jacobites and Williamites beat a well-trodden path as the Scots-Dutch Brigade had been established in 1572, providing Scottish regiments to serve in the army of the States General of the Dutch Republic.²⁰ As an Englishman, Carleton had not been part of the Scots-Dutch Brigade but having served alongside these Scottish soldiers in Dutch service, as part of the Prince of Orange's Guards in the 1670s, he was well familiar with these men: hence his sadness at the prospect of returning Livingstone's message of no quarter to those whom he had formerly fought alongside.²¹ The engagement at Cromdale was to be the last pitched battle fought in Scotland as part of the Highland War (1689-91), and the prominent roles played by continental veterans there had been entirely typical of the conflict as a whole. This thesis will be a re-appraisal of said war from the Williamite perspective. Charting the conflict from the return of the Brigade, we will see that the Scots-Dutch officer corps acted as the vanguard of William's strategy to secure Scotland in the aftermath of the Revolution.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ ODNB, H.M., Chichester., & Timothy Harrison Place, 'Livingstone, Thomas, Viscount Teviot (c.1651-1711), army officer.' James Ferguson, *Papers Illustrating the History of the Scots Brigade in the Service of the United Netherlands 1572-1697*, Vol I (Edinburgh, 1899), p. 505.

²⁰ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. ix, 3-4.

²¹ ODNB, 'Carleton'.

The military aspects of the Revolution, in general, have been neglected within the historiography with a focus upon the event's political, social, and economic ramifications. The Scots-Dutch Brigade's return home saw them involved in a civil war which was a direct result of the Revolution of 1688. This regime change, in Scotland, was achieved by William's supporters, henceforth referred to as Williamites, seizing political power via a constitutional meeting, the Scottish Convention of Estates. Although they had power *de jure*, the Williamites soon found out that their power *de facto* was about to be challenged by a counter-revolution from the supporters of the exiled King James VII & II, henceforth referred to as Jacobites. The Revolution would have to be secured by force of arms in Scotland and the Scots-Dutch Brigade were at the heart of efforts to achieve this goal. They were not only deployed due to their years of continental military experience but because they were among the most loyal soldiers of William of Orange's armies post-1688. This made them the nucleus of William's forces in Scotland and placed the Brigade's commander, Major-General Hugh Mackay of Scourie, at the helm of Williamite military strategy in Scotland. The nascent Williamite state in Scotland had to move quickly to prepare for war and the impact of the conflict coincided with divisive arguments over constitutional reform and finances, making the pursuit of the Jacobites all the more difficult. Whilst this is not a traditional military history, following the campaigns closely and relating every single detail of the conflict, it is, nevertheless, a military history. It can, perhaps, be considered as part of the school of 'new' military history which examines conflict via the Williamites strategic considerations and central involvement of the Brigade in implementing said strategy on the ground. Equally, it examines the impact the Highland War had upon the Scots-Dutch Brigade by exploring their experiences via less explored avenues, such as the human cost of their participation in the Battle of Killiecrankie. This thesis is less concerned with re-writing the Highland War, which has been done elsewhere, and more concerned with examining the role of the Brigade

alongside wider geo-strategic implications and practicalities that regime change and civil war brought to Scotland in the aftermath of the Revolution of 1688.

Historiographies

This thesis has engaged with a variety of historiographical areas surrounding the Highland War and the Scots-Dutch Brigade. Firstly, in order to understand the context of the Brigade's return to Scotland we have engaged with the historiography of the Revolution in England, sometimes referred to as the 'Anglo-Dutch Moment'.²² By looking at that moment, we can surmise that historians have looked at the broader contexts, European and British, for the Revolution in England and in doing so have intersected with our second area of concern, studies of the Scottish diaspora in Europe. Although these studies have focused upon Scottish migrant communities in Europe, in our case the Netherlands, we can see that they have examined the participation of a group of Scottish political and religious exiles in the invasion of 1688 as well as identifying a cadre of Scottish soldiers, most notably the Brigade, who were involved.²³ Thirdly, we move to the Scottish revolution and the advances made in our understanding of it by political and social historians. The Scottish revolution, and its outcome, has received much more attention in recent years than ever before with some understanding of the violent result, the Highland War, of those political events.²⁴ However, no dedicated study of the Highland War has been undertaken since Paul Hopkins' monograph, *Glencoe and the End*

²² Jonathan I. Israel (ed.), *The Anglo-Dutch Moment?: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its World Impact* (Cambridge, 2003).

²³ Ginny Gardner, 'A Haven for Intrigue: the Scottish Exile Community in the Netherlands, 1660-1690' in Alexia Grosjean & Steve Murdoch (eds.), *Scottish Communities Abroad in Early Modern Europe* (Leiden, 2005), pp. 277-301. Esther Mijers, 'Scottish Students in the Netherlands, 1680-1730' in Murdoch & Grosjean (ed.), *Scottish Communities Abroad in Early Modern Europe* (Leiden, 2005), pp. 301-333.

²⁴ Alasdair Raffae, *Scotland in Revolution, 1689-90* (Edinburgh, 2018). Tim Harris, 'Scotland under Charles II and James VII and II: In Search of the British Causes of the Glorious Revolution' in Tim Harris & Stephen Taylor (eds.), *The Final Crisis of the Stuart Monarchy: The Revolutions of 1688-91 in their British, Atlantic and European Contexts* (Woodbridge, 2015), pp. 109-132.

of the Highland War, which was first published in the mid-1980s and revised in the late 1990s.²⁵ This brings us to the final corpus of work we engaged with, histories of the Jacobite movement. Jacobite historians have made some strides helpful to our understanding of the Highland War, or, as it is sometimes erroneously referred to, 'first Jacobite rising'. In spite of these advances, largely expanding upon Hopkins' work on the 'basics' of the campaigns of 1689-1691, Jacobite scholars have understandably focused upon the Jacobites themselves with only a rudimentary understanding of the Scottish Williamite government's strategy and the operations of their army.²⁶ Moreover, as we shall see, the focus upon the Jacobite movement as a whole, which lasted around a century (1688-1788), means that the Highland War remains misunderstood and has been largely confined to playing the role of an introduction to the more dramatic Jacobite risings of 1715 and 1745.²⁷ This thesis greatly expands our understanding of the 'first rising' by concentrating upon the activities of the Jacobites opponents via the Scots-Dutch Brigade's and their role in defeating them. Therefore, not only does this approach afford further insights into the events of the Highland War but explores the return migration of a unit of Scottish military veterans in a civil war. This, however, had its roots in the events that took place in England.

1688: The Anglo-Dutch Moment?

To understand the Highland War, and the Scots-Dutch Brigade's role in that conflict, we must first understand the Revolution of 1688. This thesis expands our knowledge of the Scottish revolution's consequences and impacts: the outbreak of a civil war in the wake of the Williamites' seizure of political power in March 1689 and the effect

²⁵ Paul Hopkins, *Glencoe and the End of the Highland War* (Edinburgh, 1998).

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

²⁷ Daniel Szechi, *The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688-1788* (Manchester, 2019), pp. 133-143, 176-180. Bruce Lenman, *The Jacobite Risings in Britain, 1689-1746* (Dalkeith, 2004), pp. 107-154, 231-282.

of that conflict upon the fledgling regime in the years following. The Highland War, at first glance, appears to be an insularly Scottish topic but its origins go far beyond Scotland's borders. Alasdair Raffe points out that historians, such as Ian Cowan and Bruce Lenman, have focused upon internal factors as the cause of the revolution in Scotland.²⁸ Raffe goes on to argue that the 'primary cause' of the Scottish revolution 'was not division among the country's elites... but rather William's successful invasion of England'.²⁹ The Highland War, as a result of that revolution, is inextricably linked to that same event. Similar historiographical introspection in England has been challenged by Tim Harris, who argues that the English revolution had 'far reaching consequences... for Scotland and Ireland'.³⁰ This is not to say, however, that the English revolution was merely imported to Scotland, a notion which Harris has helpfully challenged by pointing out the Scottish revolution had distinct and differing characteristics from its English counterpart.³¹ Rather, we must understand that without the events of 1688 in England there would have been no catalyst for revolution in Scotland and it is upon this fundamental point which this thesis' engagement with the historiography begins.

The Brigade first returned to Britain as part of William of Orange's invasion of England, with the Scots-Dutch soldiers and officers landing at the head of a Dutch army at Torbay on 5th November 1688.³² The participation of the Scots-Dutch Brigade in this Dutch military intervention necessitates an engagement with the historiography of 1688.³³

²⁸ Raffe, *Scotland*, p. 4. See also: Ian B. Cowan, 'The reluctant revolutionaries: Scotland in 1688' in Eveline Cruickshanks (ed.), *By Force or by Default? The Revolution of 1688-1689* (Edinburgh, 1989), pp. 65-81. Bruce Lenman, 'The Scottish nobility and the revolution of 1688-90' in Beddard (ed.), *Revolutions of 1688*, pp. 137-162.

²⁹ Raffe, *Scotland*, p. 4.

³⁰ Tim Harris, *Revolution: The Great Crisis of the British Monarchy, 1685-1720* (London, 2007), p. 4.

³¹ Harris, *Revolution*, p. 366. George Macaulay Trevelyan, *The English Revolution 1688-1689* (London, 1938), pp. 63-64, 69. F.C. Turner, *James II* (London, 1948). Stephen B. Baxter, *William III* (London, 1966), pp. 237-238.

³² Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 477-478.

³³ Israel (ed.), *Anglo-Dutch*.

Until the late 1980s, the historiography had maintained the political, and therefore popular, nature of the Revolution of 1688 and de-emphasised the Dutch role in effectuating regime change via military intervention. Some popular histories still characterise that revolution as 'bloodless' or 'Glorious'.³⁴ However, in doing so they part company from the current academic historiographical consensus. Although Harris has emphasised the popular support for William's intervention, he has also acknowledged that 'the Dutch conquest' cannot simply be ignored.³⁵ Jonathan I. Israel sought to extend the understandings of the Revolution by looking at the Dutch and European contexts; by underlining the fact that the 'far reaching consequences' of de-throning of James VII & II went beyond England.³⁶ Israel has argued that it was the Prince of Orange and the Dutch States General who removed James from power, not the English elite.³⁷ He shows that the 'invitation', extended to William by seven English lords, which appealed for the Prince to intervene in England's affairs, was sent months after the Dutch had begun planning their military incursion.³⁸

Considering such evidence, the notion that the Revolution was devoid of any hint of foreign military intervention becomes unpersuasive. This military element, or *coup d'etat*, was a defining aspect which led to political change in the Three Kingdoms. This is more compelling when we consider the scale of the Dutch invasion force, of which the Brigade were a critical part. The Dutch army had 14,532 regular troops, with a significant artillery train, carried across the North Sea by 400 transport ships and an armada of fifty-three war ships to escort them.³⁹ Within the work of Israel and others, the initial hints of

³⁴ Edward Vallance, *The Glorious Revolution 1688 – Britain's Fight for Liberty* (London, 2006), p. 194.

³⁵ Harris, *Revolution*, p. 3-4.

³⁶ Jonathan I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806* (Oxford, 1998), p. 841.

³⁷ Jonathan I. Israel, 'Introduction' in Israel (ed.), *The Anglo-Dutch Moment?: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its World Impact* (Cambridge, 2003), p. 2.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

³⁹ Israel, *Dutch*, pp. 849-850.

the Scottish participation within that invasion force can be seen. Harris has, additionally, pointed out the heavy involvement of Scottish exiles in the planning and execution of the operation.⁴⁰ Israel points to such Scottish exiles whom, alongside their Huguenot and English counterparts, made up a 5,000 strong 'volunteers' force, bringing the 1688 Dutch army's total strength to nearer 21,000.⁴¹ William, as stadtholder of the Dutch Republic and captain-general of the army, and the Dutch States General 'took an immense risk in sending across all the best regiments of the Dutch army'.⁴² Israel and Geoffrey Parker elaborate that the Scottish and English regiments within the Dutch army (those who were professional soldiers and not part of the volunteer forces) consisted of 3,710 men.⁴³ William himself, upon landing in England, told the English gentry of Devon, Somerset and Dorset, who offered to raise local militias for him, that he did not need their 'military assistance' as he already had an army.⁴⁴ In summary, the Dutch invasion was the root cause of the English revolution; this fact, in due course, served as the catalyst for revolution in Scotland and, thus, led to the outbreak of the Highland War. Whilst there certainly was discontent with King James' regime, it was not this discontent, in either Scotland or England, which brought about his downfall. The collapse of James' regimes in both countries is inextricably linked to the Dutch military intervention in November 1688. This thesis joins its contribution to the aforementioned historians endeavours by examining a parallel context of the revolution in Scotland, the Highland War.

Although this focus upon the revolution in England and the significance of Dutch military involvement is welcome, scholars have yet to fully work through the

⁴⁰ Harris, *Revolution*, pp. 367-368.

⁴¹ Jonathan I. Israel, 'The Dutch role in the Glorious Revolution' in Israel (ed.), *Anglo-Dutch The Anglo-Dutch Moment?: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its World Impact* (Cambridge, 2003), p. 103.

⁴² Israel, *Dutch*, p. 850.

⁴³ Jonathan I. Israel & Geoffrey Parker, 'Of Providence and Protestant Winds: the Spanish Armada of 1588 and the Dutch armada of 1688' in Israel (ed.) *The Anglo-Dutch Moment?: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its World Impact* (Cambridge, 2003), p. 354.

⁴⁴ Israel, *Dutch*, p. 852.

ramifications of this in a Scottish context.⁴⁵ Israel answered J.G.A Pocock's call for a new British history, adding that the isolation of the English Revolution from the rest of the Three Kingdoms history was simply 'parochial' and 'narrow minded'.⁴⁶ The achievement of his edited volume, *The Anglo-Dutch moment*, was to bring together a variety of European perspectives to broaden the understanding of the Revolution. Unfortunately, its centring upon said moment has had the unintended consequence of excluding Scotland – a point raised by one of the volume's contributors, John Morrill.⁴⁷ Harris has also appealed against Anglo-centric nature of the histories of the Revolution by arguing that a British approach, again influenced by Pocock, should be taken when discussing the event and its impacts.⁴⁸ He has contended that historians must view these revolutions as interconnected and that each country's experience influenced the other. British histories of 1688 have made efforts to include Scotland in their analysis but have struggled, due to their often broad scope, to investigate the Scottish context more meaningfully.⁴⁹ Even in striving for a broader British and European understanding of the Revolution, John M. Stapleton's work was overwhelmingly focused upon England and the Dutch.⁵⁰ This reflects efforts by scholars of English history, such as Lisa Jardine, to grapple with the European causes of 1688.⁵¹ Although the call from Harris, Israel and others to broaden the

⁴⁵ P. J.A.N Rietbergen, 'A fateful alliance? William III and England in Dutch historiography, 1688-9 to 1988-9' in *Anglo-Dutch*, pp. 463-480. William A. Speck, 'William III and the Three Kingdoms' in Esther Mijers & David Onnekink (eds.), *Redefining William III: The Impact of the King-Stadholder in an International Context* (Aldershot, 2007), pp. 39-54.

⁴⁶ Israel, 'Introduction' in *Anglo-Dutch*, pp. 10-11.

⁴⁷ John Morrill, 'The Sensible Revolution' in Israel (ed.), *The Anglo-Dutch Moment?: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its World Impact* (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 98-99.

⁴⁸ Harris, *Revolution*, p. 13. Harris, 'Scotland' in *Final*, p. 114.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ John M. Stapleton, 'The Dual Monarchy in Practice: Anglo-Dutch Alliance and War in the Spanish Netherlands 1689-1697' in Mijers & Onnekink (eds.), *Redefining William III: The Impact of the King-Stadholder in an International Context* (Aldershot, 2007), pp. 70-71, 85.

⁵¹ Lisa Jardine, *Going Dutch: How England Plundered Holland's Glory* (London, 2009), pp. 1-26, 27-52.

scope of the Revolution beyond England are useful, this broader approach leaves gaps in our understanding with regards to Scotland.

This thesis builds upon Israel *et al* in looking beyond the borders of Britain and interlinking European history, the Dutch invasion of England, and the Scottish context: exploring the Scots-Dutch Brigade's participation in that incursion as regiments of the Dutch army is the ideal way to achieve this. William A. Speck points out that the Scottish contribution, particularly in military terms, to the Revolution has been particularly underexplored.⁵² Such a study must, of course, also draw on the flourishing field of studies of Scottish communities abroad, including those historians above which have nodded to the involvement of the Scots in the Dutch descent upon England.⁵³ These initial hints at Scottish participation have been more fully explored by Ginny Gardner's examination of Scottish exiles present in the Netherlands from 1660 to 1690.⁵⁴ Gardner's work has illustrated that this community of exiles were not passive participants in the Revolution but integrally involved in its planning and execution.⁵⁵ Additionally, she identified the presence of Scottish regular troops within the Dutch forces.⁵⁶ Within the same edited collection, Esther Mijers looked specifically at Scottish students in the Netherlands, connecting them to the exile community as well as to other groups of Scottish migrants, such as soldiers, living in the Dutch Republic.⁵⁷ This work was, in part, expanding upon Douglas Catterall's monograph on the Scottish migrant community in the Dutch Republic, which again touched upon Scottish exiles and their role in the Revolution.⁵⁸ The contributions of Joachim Miggelbrink on the Scots-Dutch Brigade, as

⁵² Speck, 'William III' in *Redefining*, p. 41.

⁵³ Ibid; Morill, 'Sensible' in *Anglo-Dutch*, pp. 73-104.

⁵⁴ Gardner, 'Haven' in Grosjean & Murdoch (eds.), *Communities*, pp. 277-301.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 292.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Mijers, 'Scottish' in *Communities*, pp. 301-333.

⁵⁸ Douglas Catterall, *Community Without Borders: Scots Migrants and the Changing Face of Power in the Dutch Republic, c.1600-1700* (Leiden, 2002).

part of the Scottish martial diaspora in Europe, briefly discussed the Brigade's participation in the Revolution of 1688.⁵⁹ However, Miggelbrink focuses upon the Brigade's 'social history' via their presence in the Dutch Republic.⁶⁰ This thesis draws the examinations of the Scottish exiles and the Scottish community in the Netherlands, including the military migrants, to a logical conclusion by looking at what those Scottish participants did on the ground during the Revolution and the subsequent Highland War. Steve Murdoch, Alexia Grosjean and Andrew Mackillop have asserted that the Scottish expatriate communities in Europe could, and did, have an impact upon political events in Britain, and Scotland.⁶¹ The subject of this thesis, namely, a Scottish regiment serving a foreign power, the Dutch Republic, returning 'home' to play a critical role during a major constitutional upheaval and the resultant war is an excellent example of this phenomenon.

The neglect of this example within the historiography is especially surprising given the Brigade has been identified by historians as being a critical part, alongside the Scottish and English exiles, of the invasion force.⁶² Israel points out that the Prince of Orange 'Tactfully... placed the English and Scots regiments of the States' army, under the command of Major-General Hugh Mackay, at the head of his triumphal procession'.⁶³ One of the two instances of violent confrontation in England, the skirmish at Wincanton on 20th November 1688, was between a small party of King James' forces and an advance party of thirty Scots-Dutch Brigade soldiers, led by one Captain Campbell.⁶⁴ When the

⁵⁹ Joachim Miggelbrink, 'The End of the Scots-Dutch Brigade' in Steve Murdoch & Andrew Mackillop, (eds.), *Fighting for Identity: Scottish Military Experience c.1550-1900* (Leiden, 2002), pp. 83-105.

⁶⁰ Joachim Miggelbrink, 'Serving the Republic: Scottish Soldiers in the Republic of the United Provinces 1572-1782', (Unpublished thesis, Florence, 2005), p. 13.

⁶¹ Alexia Grosjean & Steve Murdoch, 'Introduction' in *Communities*, p. 22. Steve Murdoch & Andrew Mackillop, 'Introduction' in *Fighting for Identity: Scottish Military Experience c.1550-1900* (Leiden, 2002), p. xxxii.

⁶² Israel & Parker, 'Providence', p. 354. Israel, *Dutch*, p. 850.

⁶³ Israel, 'Introduction', p. 2.

⁶⁴ Piers Wauchope, *Patrick Sarsfield and the Williamite War* (Dublin, 1992), pp. 37-39.

Dutch army marched into London the Scots Brigade, alongside their English sister formation, were tasked with securing the Tower of London and nearby Southwark; the fact that all of James' former Scottish and English regiments in the city were ordered to leave highlights how trusted the Brigades were in comparison to their countrymen.⁶⁵ However, these initial observations can be refined through a fuller understanding of what the Scots-Dutch Brigade was and its status upon its return to Britain. Many political historians, such as Harris, although able to identify the presence of the Scottish regiments in Dutch service in 1688, do not make clear the distinction between these professional soldiers and the exiles serving as volunteers alongside them.⁶⁶

Focusing specifically upon the Scots-Dutch Brigade reveals that a number of generalisations applied to all the English and Scottish soldiers, professional and volunteer, in William's army, simply cannot be sustained in the case of the Scottish forces; although some volunteers, such as David Leslie, third Earl of Leven, and Sir Duncan Campbell of Auchinbreck, did have considerable military experience from serving elsewhere in Europe.⁶⁷ Israel and Parker, for instance, group English and Scottish regiments together and conclude that, in addition to playing a significant military role, 'in some cases the cosmetic value of the English and Scots volunteers was greater than their military value'.⁶⁸ This is part of a long-standing conflation of the Scots and Anglo Brigades in Dutch service, most notably espoused by John Childs in his military histories of James' and William's British armies.⁶⁹ The Scots-Dutch Brigade and Anglo-Dutch Brigade were separated along national lines with different command structures; the Scots Brigade only

⁶⁵ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, 'The Dutch Ambassador, A. Van Citters, to the States General, 28th December 1688', p. 567.

⁶⁶ Harris, *Revolution*, p. 368.

⁶⁷ Israel, 'Dutch role', p. 103.

⁶⁸ Israel & Parker, 'Providence', p. 354.

⁶⁹ John Childs, *The Army, James II and the Glorious Revolution* (Manchester, 1980), pp. 119-120. John Childs, *The British Army of William III, 1689-1702* (Manchester, 1987), pp. 40, 53, 55-56, 69, 74, 120.

served under an English commander once in its history, during the campaign at Juliers from 1610 to 1611.⁷⁰ The Dutch had allowed for the appointment of a single British general in 1678, but there is no evidence to suggest the Brigades were amalgamated during the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries. Childs has, at least, acknowledged that the Scots Brigade continued to exist in Dutch service after the Revolution, whilst the Anglo-Dutch Brigade's regiments were co-opted into William's new English army establishment in 1689.⁷¹ Even so, Israel and Parker conclude that the Scots and Anglo Brigades were 'not necessarily as zealous' for William's cause as their volunteer counterparts.⁷² Amongst the rank and file of the Scots-Dutch Brigade this does seem to have been the case for some, with common soldiers reportedly weeping at the prospect of fighting against James VII, whom they still considered to be their rightful sovereign monarch.⁷³ Israel and Parker were clearly influenced by the contemporary reports of James' envoy in the Dutch Republic, Ignatius White, the Marquess d'Albeville.⁷⁴ This reluctance cannot be attributed to the officers of the Scots nor the Anglo Brigades as they had been afforded the choice by the Dutch authorities to return to Britain in the wake of King James' recall of mid-1688, with around 180 of 240 choosing to stay in Dutch service.⁷⁵ This is a critical point as the evidence presented by this thesis shows that the trust and confidence which these Scots-Dutch officers enjoyed throughout the Highland War was largely due to this display of loyalty in the months prior to the invasion. This thesis focuses upon the Scots-Dutch Brigade during the Highland War, but it is clear from engagement around the Revolution that more work on the Scots Brigade's role in 1688 needs to be done.

⁷⁰ Steve Murdoch, 'James VI and the formation of a Scottish-British Military Identity' in *Fighting for Identity: Scottish Military Experience c. 1550-1900* (Leiden, 2002), pp. 11-15. Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. XX-XXI.

⁷¹ John Childs, 'The Scottish brigade in the service of the Dutch Republic, 1689 to 1782' in *Documentatieblad werkgroep Achttiende eeuw*, No. 61/62 (Jaargang, 1984), p. 61.

⁷² Israel & Parker, 'Providence', p. 355.

⁷³ *Ibid*; Childs, *James II*, pp. 133-135.

⁷⁴ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 477, 548-550.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 478.

Scotland's Revolution & the Highland War

If the historiography of the Anglo-Dutch Moment has only cursorily incorporated Scottish involvement in the English revolution, this has also served to obscure the full impact of regime change upon Scotland. Building upon calls by Israel, in a European sense, and by Harris, in a British sense, for broader perspectives on the Revolution this thesis examines the strategy behind William's intervention in Scotland.⁷⁶ The decision to intervene in the affairs of the Three Kingdoms was taken by William and the Dutch States with a full view of the ramifications beyond England.⁷⁷ The risk involved in such an undertaking cannot be understated, as Israel points out, 'William III's position in Britain – and with it the fate of the Dutch Republic and European balance of power – remained highly precarious, at least until the Battle of the Boyne' on 1st July 1690.⁷⁸ In Scotland, this precarity continued even after the political settlement had been agreed. Whilst both Harris and Pincus have acknowledged this violence, they remained content to note that it was smaller in scale than William's Irish war, albeit of a similar duration.⁷⁹ The fundamental difference which must be acknowledged is that Ireland, being a larger and more populous country, suffered a far bloodier conflict than Scotland, helped in no small part by the extensive French assistance the Jacobites received there.⁸⁰ Whilst the point they raise is undoubtedly true, this thesis presents evidence showing that the levels of violence which Scotland was significant in its impact upon the state and the population. The fact remains that the Williamite War in Ireland and the Highland War in Scotland took place in tandem with one another and were heavily interrelated.⁸¹ For instance, as we shall see

⁷⁶ Israel, 'Dutch role', p. 103. Harris, *Revolution*, p. 4.

⁷⁷ Harris, *Revolution*, p. 368.

⁷⁸ Israel, *Dutch*, pp. 852-853.

⁷⁹ Harris, *Revolution*, p. 35, 364. Steve Pincus, *1688: The First Modern Revolution* (Yale, 2009), p. 254.

⁸⁰ John Childs, *The Williamite Wars in Ireland, 1688-91* (London, 2007), pp. 29, 217-218, 227, 230, 241-242, 250-251, 259, 263.

⁸¹ Note: The Williamite War in Ireland is also referred to as the *Cogadh an Dá Rí* or 'War of the Two Kings'

in due course, there was widespread anxiety amongst the Scottish Williamite government surrounding an Irish invasion throughout the Highland War.

The neglect of the Highland War amongst historians of the Revolution is, thankfully, beginning to be reversed. In 2013, Keith M. Brown observed that our understanding of Scotland's history between 1688 and 1707 required further study.⁸² The notable efforts of Allan Macinnes, John Young and Christopher Whatley have since extended our understanding of Scotland's governance during and after the Revolution.⁸³ Nevertheless, the Highland War, which was a direct result of said revolution, has not received the same treatment. More recent advances have been made in our understanding of the Williamite government's structure in Scotland and the challenges it faced, by scholars like Laura Rayner and Alasdair Raffe.⁸⁴ Both have noted the impact of the Highland War upon the government in Edinburgh and in Scotland's localities.⁸⁵ Political historians, such as Harris, have viewed the Highland War as simply an extension of the power vacuum and resultant crowd violence that pervaded parts of the country from December 1688 to March 1689. Brief contributions from Raffe and Rayner have, however, somewhat expanded upon the importance and the scale of the subsequent conflict rather than downplaying it.⁸⁶

⁸² Keith M. Brown, 'Early Modern Scottish History – A Survey' in *The Scottish Historical Review [SHR]*, Vol 92 (April, 2013), pp. 5-24.

⁸³ Allan I. Macinnes, *Union and Empire: The Making of the United Kingdom in 1707* (Cambridge, 2007). John Young, 'The 1689 convention of estates and the parliament of 1689-90 in Scotland: securing the williamite regime in the context of the war in Ireland.' In A., Soddu & F., Soddu, (eds.) *Assemblee rappresentative, autonomie territoriali, culture politiche: Representative assemblies, territorial autonomies, political cultures*, Vol. 89 (2011), pp. 229-238. Allan I. Macinnes, 'William of Orange – 'Disaster for Scotland'' in *Redefining*. Christopher A. Whatley, *The Scots and the Union* (Edinburgh, 2011).

⁸⁴ Laura Rayner, 'The Tribulations of Everyday Government in Williamite Scotland' in Sharon Adams & Julian Goodare (eds.), *Scotland in the Age of Two Revolutions* (Woodbridge, 2014), pp. 193-210. Alasdair Raffe, 'Scottish State Oaths and the Revolution of 1688-1690' in Adams & Goodare (eds.), *Scotland in the Age of Two Revolutions* (Woodbridge, 2014), pp. 173-192.

⁸⁵ Harris, *Revolution*, p. 410.

⁸⁶ Raffe, *Scotland*, pp. 152-156. Rayner, 'Tribulations', pp. 196-197.

The misunderstanding that the Highland War was an extension of crowd violence has been reinforced by, and perhaps even in part arises from, the argument deployed by political historians, such as Wout Troost, and foreshadowed by Jacobite scholars, such as Lenman, that William of Orange was uninterested in Scotland.⁸⁷ Whilst there is some evidence for William's lack of willingness to engage in Scottish affairs in the latter years of his reign, this was simply not the case during the Highland War. Early in his reign William was indeed anxious about Scotland, particularly in respect to securing it militarily, as David Onnekink has pointed out.⁸⁸ Onnekink reinforces Israel's argument that in order to understand the Revolution comprehensively we must understand that the years following it, 1689 to 1691, were just as critical as the event itself.⁸⁹ William's revolution remained unsecured by the end of 1688 and his militarily engagement against counter-revolutionary forces in Ireland and in Scotland, Onnekink points out, were crucial to secure England.⁹⁰ William and his advisers knew that, prior to landing in England, all Three Kingdoms would likely have to be secured by military force, including Scotland. The misnomer that William did not care for Scotland, and thus ignored it, does not correspond with the fact that the Prince had a specific declaration written in 1688 to appeal to the Scottish political classes nor the reality that, in the following year, as a European war broke out, he ordered some of his best regiments, namely the Brigade, to be deployed to Scotland.⁹¹ P.W.J Riley has added that William did not simply seek to secure Scotland to consolidate his position in England but 'sought to tap his northern kingdom

⁸⁷ Wout Troost, *William III, the Stadholder-King: A Political Biography* (Aldershot, 2005), pp. 266-276. Lenman, *Risings*, p. 53.

⁸⁸ Ibid; Rayner, 'Tribulations', pp. 196-197. David Onnekink, *The Anglo-Dutch Favourite: The Career of Hans Willem Bentinck, 1st Earl of Portland (1649-1709)* (Aldershot, 2007), p. 69. See also: Israel, 'Dutch role' in *Anglo-Dutch*, p. 154.

⁸⁹ Onnekink, *Portland*, pp. 63, 68-69.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Harris, 'Scotland' in *Final*, pp. 114, 129. Early English Books Online [EEBO], William of Orange et al, *The DECLARATION OF HIS HIGHNES WILLIAM HENRY, By the Grace of God, PRINCE OF ORANGE, &c. Of the Reasons inducing him, To Appear in Armes for Preserving of the Protestant Religion, and for Restoring the Lawes and Liberties of the ancient Kingdome of Scotland* (Hague, 1688).

as a source of manpower for his armies and of money to defray a fraction of their cost'.⁹² This present study of the Highland War and the Scots-Dutch Brigade's central role in that conflict shifts focus away from an approach centred upon political manoeuvring towards an understanding of how control was achieved in military terms.

The lacuna surrounding the Highland War in relation to the Revolution of 1688 has only been partly recognised by historians of this 'Anglo-Dutch' moment. It has, however, been more fully engaged with by Jacobite historians. The histories of the Jacobite movement in Scotland, Britain and Europe have been critical to this thesis, as many of these broad works begin with an examination of the Highland War; usually they framed this as part of a series of conflicts which acted as a catalyst for the later risings, such as those in 1715, 1719 and 1745. The importance of the Highland War for Jacobite scholars arises from the conflict's status as the 'first rising' in Scotland. Lenman's monograph on the subject, first published in 1980, brought a broader British and European approach to the study of the Jacobites, although this had been in part initiated by Sir Charles Petrie's pioneering work on the movement, first published in the 1930s.⁹³ Lenman views the Highland War, in essence, as a brief 'rebellion' characterised by the 'heroic simplicity' of its leader, John Graham of Claverhouse, first Viscount Dundee.⁹⁴ Lenman's dismissive attitude toward the Jacobite threat leads him to conclude that the Highland War effectively ended in 'fiasco' after Dundee's death at Killiecrankie and the Jacobite army's subsequent defeat at Dunkeld.⁹⁵ He did, however, view the Highland War as inextricably connected to the conflicts in Ireland and Europe.⁹⁶ The major issue with Lenman's work, and, indeed, that of many other Jacobite historians, is that their focus is

⁹² P.W.J. Riley, *King William and the Scottish Politicians* (Edinburgh, 1979) p. 1.

⁹³ Lenman, *Risings*. Charles Petrie, *The Jacobite Movement* (London, 1932), pp. 81-86.

⁹⁴ Lenman, *Risings*, pp. 28-29.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 31, 49.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

upon the Jacobites. The lack of understanding of the Scottish Williamite state's structure, and response to the Jacobites during the conflict, has occurred as a result of understandable limitations of time and scope of any study. This thesis focuses upon the Williamite state's strategy as well as their military organisation against the Jacobites to rectify this. This deficiency has been, partly, due to misapprehensions emanating from such broad studies of the Jacobites, most of which are largely concerned with the insurrections of the eighteenth-century. Although Johnathan D. Oates provided an in-depth relation of the campaigns, and forces involved, in the Highland War, this self-described 'pure military history', published in 2018, does not fully engage with the conflict in its broader context.⁹⁷ This is not dissimilar to military histories produced by Childs and Roger B. Manning, both of whom have discussed the Highland War briefly in relation to William's British armies and the wars in which those forces were involved.⁹⁸ Oates models his work on the former's studies of parallel conflicts in Ireland and Flanders.⁹⁹ Again, these works provide a vital framework for understanding the military structures involved and the conflicts interrelated to the Highland War, but do not provide significant insight into the Scottish conflict. For an account of the war, historians remained obliged to consult Hopkins' monograph on the subject.¹⁰⁰

Hopkins' ground-breaking study of the Highland War approached the conflict with a relatively simple objective, to develop our understanding of the factual events of the conflict. In his introduction, Hopkins identifies that there had been a lack of balance in studies of the conflict, mostly emanating from previous Jacobite scholars' characterisation

⁹⁷ Johnathan D. Oates, *The Battle of Killiecrankie: The First Jacobite Campaign, 1689-1691* (Warwick, 2018), p. vii.

⁹⁸ Childs, *British*, p. 74. Childs, *The Nine Years' War and the British Army 1688-97: The operations in the Low Countries* (Manchester, 1991), pp. 26-27. Roger B. Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army 1585-1702* (Oxford, 2006).

⁹⁹ Oates, *Killiecrankie*, p. ix. Childs, *Ireland*.

¹⁰⁰ Hopkins, *Glencoe*.

of the Highland War as the first Jacobite uprising.¹⁰¹ He argues that the misconceptions of the conflict arose from the lack of focus on the Highland War and that they compressed those events into a convenient shortened narrative giving the impression that the conflict effectively ended with Viscount Dundee's death at Killiecrankie.¹⁰² This emphasis upon Dundee is most evident in Andrew Murray-Scott's eponymous biography of the Viscount. However, the campaigns extend almost two years beyond the death of the Scottish Jacobite army's first quixotic commander, as Hopkins points out.¹⁰³ This preoccupation with the 'great-man', Hopkins asserts, obscures the fact that for two years following the last pitched-battle, at Cromdale, a 'shooting war' carried on between the Scottish Williamites and the Jacobite army, almost entirely confined to the Highlands.¹⁰⁴ At the time of his writings, Hopkins surmised that Jacobite scholars felt confident to presume 'the final outcome was certain...' and 'the Jacobite cause stone-dead from the start'.¹⁰⁵ Whilst the Jacobites proved unable to succeed in their first martial outing, framing the campaigns from a teleological perspective does not advance our understanding. Hopkins argues that in predicting the Jacobites' defeat in the Highland War, historians, like Lenman, have by-passed the need for research into the Jacobites during this period.¹⁰⁶ The gaps in research of the 'first rising' left the historiography, to Hopkins' mind, bereft of a rudimentary understanding of the Highland War which, in turn, made placing the conflict in its wider British and European contexts all the more difficult.¹⁰⁷

Hopkins' study of the Highland War has developed our factual understanding of the conflict by re-examining the campaigns, and in doing so he necessarily tackled both

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*; Andrew Murray-Scott, *Bonnie Dundee: John Grahame of Claverhouse* (Edinburgh, 1989).

¹⁰⁴ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 7.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 7; Lenman, *Risings*, pp. 31, 49.

¹⁰⁷ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 7.

sides of the conflict, Jacobite and Williamite. However, the Jacobites remained at the core of this re-evaluation.¹⁰⁸ His focus upon the Williamites was, largely, done to contextualise the Jacobites' organisational structure and its efforts to overthrow the Williamite regime in Scotland. This study does not seek to challenge Hopkins but instead expand upon his work. He did, for example, identify the Scots-Dutch Brigade's involvement in the Highland War not unlike historians of the Revolution have identified their participation in the invasion of England.¹⁰⁹ He did not, however, recognize the unit's central role in much of the campaigning against the Scottish Jacobites.¹¹⁰ Examining not only the Williamite strategy in Scotland, but those involved in its execution, offers a new perspective on the Highland War by showing how the country was secured. Hopkins offers a comprehensive narrative of the campaigns which provides a solid foundation for this work to depart from. By examining the context of the Brigade's involvement, as Scottish regiments of the Dutch army, we can further develop an understanding of the Highland War beyond a relation of the campaigns. Moreover, examining the role of senior officers in Scotland, particularly Mackay, reveals further insights into the Scottish Williamites military strategy. The importance of Hopkins' seminal study to this thesis cannot be understated as he provides detailed accounts of the campaigns, down to the minutiae. This is, however, both the main strength and weakness of his contribution, as attested to by both positive and negative academic reviews of his work.¹¹¹ In spite of examining the Williamite aspect of the campaigns, Hopkins conceived his book as one part Jacobite study and the other a new perspective on the massacre of Glencoe, 13th February 1692, which we shall not be engaging with as it came after the end of

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 488.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 125; Israel & Parker, 'Providence' in *Anglo-Dutch*, p. 354.

¹¹⁰ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 125.

¹¹¹ Daniel Szechi, 'Review: Glencoe and the End of the Highland War by Paul Hopkins' in *The Scottish Historical Review* [SHR], Vol. 79, No. 207, Part 1 (April, 2000), pp. 120-122. James Hunter, 'Review: Glencoe and the End of the Highland War' in *Scottish Affairs*, no. 27 (Spring, 1999), pp. 105-107.

hostilities.¹¹² Nevertheless, Hopkins' effort to expand our understanding of the Highland War has been recently reflected in the field of Jacobite studies.

Daniel Szechi has provided the most recent and comprehensive contribution to the field of Jacobite studies with his monograph, *The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688-1788*.¹¹³ His contention that the Jacobites continued to be a threat until late 1691 has been critically to countering previously shortened narratives of the conflict in that field. Equally, Szechi has expanded upon Hopkins' argument for a broader view of the Highland War by interlinking it to events in Ireland. The hint of a possible Williamite reversal, until 1691, there as well as the continuation of the French threat in Europe left the possibility that the Jacobite cause in Scotland could be revived.¹¹⁴ Moreover, Szechi has underlined the need to revisit the Highland War stating that it should not be characterised as an 'unimportant little episode' but rather as a 'crippling civil war'.¹¹⁵ Szechi has recognised the need for Jacobite histories to engage more fully with the Highland War, especially the period following the Battle of Cromdale, 1st May 1690.¹¹⁶ However, Szechi has utilised the problematic term 'War for the English Succession' to categorise the Highland War as part of a series of conflicts which arose in the aftermath of the Revolution.¹¹⁷ He has argued that it was 'English soldiers and money' that secured the Williamite victory in Scotland.¹¹⁸ Whilst England certainly contributed to the defeat of the Jacobites in Scotland, it was not, as Szechi seems to imply, a victory devoid of the Scottish Williamites' own military and financial contributions, as we shall see in Chapters four and five.¹¹⁹ For example, the fact that the Scots-Dutch Brigade was paid via the English Treasury, has been utilised by

¹¹² Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 308-350

¹¹³ Szechi, *Jacobites*.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 70-71; Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 5-6.

¹¹⁵ Szechi, *Jacobites*, p. 3.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 65-67.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

¹¹⁹ Szechi, *Jacobites*, pp. 66, 76.

historians, such as Parker, Israel and others, an indication that they were co-opted into the English army.¹²⁰ However, this thesis demonstrates, in Chapters one and five, that the Brigade's status as part of the Dutch army continued during its time in Scotland. All of the Dutch regiments stationed in Britain and in Ireland after William's invasion were paid for via the English treasury; yet, there is no assertion of Dutch regiments being part of the English army, temporarily or otherwise.¹²¹ In spite of such misapprehensions, Szechi provides an updated and comprehensive understanding of the Jacobite side of the Highland War but this is not matched for the Williamite government's forces. For all Jacobite historians, such misapprehensions are, to a degree, understandable as their focus, as mentioned earlier, remains the Jacobite movement. These misunderstandings, however, only underline the need for a study like this one. By re-examining the Williamite forces, their organisation, and strategy will build an increased understanding of the Highland War. Therefore, even with more recent contributions from the field of Jacobite studies, such as Szechi's, many of the gaps in our knowledge, which Hopkins has outlined previously, remain unfilled.¹²²

Many historiographies intersect to discuss the Highland War in different contexts, but none of them, with the notable exception of Hopkins, focus upon the conflict itself. Instead, the focal point remains the Revolution or the politics of Scotland in the lead up to the union of 1707. Otherwise, historians have focused on the Highland War as the birth of the Jacobite movement, the Williamite armies or upon the parallel conflicts outwith Scotland. Before now, only Hopkins has directly approached the Highland War as an object of academic study. Building on Hopkins' work, as well as the plethora of diverse studies from other historiographical fields, which partially cover the conflict, this thesis

¹²⁰ Israel & Parker, 'Providence', pp. 354-355.

¹²¹ Israel, *Dutch*, pp. 851-852.

¹²² *Ibid*; Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 5-7.

considers the Highland War and its part in William of Orange's broader strategy. This study illustrates that the war in Scotland was not simply an irksome distraction but a serious civil war which sparked considerable concern for William and his government in Scotland. Teleologically forecasting the doom of the 1689 Jacobites does not expand our understanding of the Highland War nor does it explain why the Williamite government continued to invest military forces in Scotland, as they were desperately needed elsewhere, until 1691.

Another aspect of the historiographical neglect of the Highland War is the lack of understanding about the Scots-Dutch Brigade's involvement, alongside its continued status as a unit of the Dutch Republic's army. This occurs due to the dearth of historical study of the Brigade in general. Beyond brief mentions of the Brigade's participation in the Revolution, and the Highland War, Miggelbrink's unpublished thesis does, briefly, discuss the unit's involvement in the conflict.¹²³ The neglect of the Highland War seen in the historiographies of the Anglo-Dutch Moment and the Scottish Revolution have been, unintentionally, mirrored by Miggelbrink's study, with only brief references to the Brigade's return 'home' to provide historical background. His neglect of the Highland War was, however, admittedly reasonable as he states his work is a social study of Scottish regiments, their structure and their interactions with the citizenry as well as the authorities in the Dutch Republic.¹²⁴ This thesis expands upon this by examining the Brigade in a Scottish context, investigating their return to Scotland during the Revolution, a major moment in Scottish, British and European history, as well as their role in the subsequent conflict.¹²⁵

¹²³ Miggelbrink, 'Serving', pp. 15-18.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

To date, the only published scholarly work devoted to the entire history of the Scots-Dutch Brigade remains James Ferguson's three volume study of the regiments, published between 1899 and 1901.¹²⁶ Ferguson offers a basic narrative of the Highland War as part of his introduction for his compilation of documents from the era of William of Orange (1649-1697).¹²⁷ These volumes provide the pillars for any modern day study of the Scots-Dutch Brigade but Ferguson's use of the sources, to which we shall return shortly, and analysis was limited by prevalent historical biases at the time of writing.¹²⁸ Miggelbrink explains, Ferguson's 'discussion of the history of the Scots Brigade is coloured by the political context of his time... when Great Britain was an empire in which the Scottish prowess played an important role'.¹²⁹ A recognition of this 'Whig' bias is important as Ferguson's presentation of the historical context is often tinged with a glorification of the Brigade's martial abilities as well as similar biases about major events, such as the Revolution of 1688.¹³⁰ These biases also colour, to a lesser extent, Ferguson's assessment of the Brigade's role during the Highland War.¹³¹ Although he recognises the central role of the Brigade during the conflict, his narrative of their involvement proves brief. Nevertheless, Ferguson's efforts as an editor of primary source material continues to underpin current scholarship, despite the outmoded nature of his analysis. Ferguson provided this study with an overview of the Scots-Dutch officers present in Scotland during the Highland War as well as the structure of the regiments during that time, but this was limited due to only consulting primary sources in the Netherlands and not within Scotland.

¹²⁶ James Ferguson, *Papers Illustrating the History of the Scots Brigade in the Service of the United Netherlands 1572-1782*, Vols. I-III (Edinburgh, 1899-1901).

¹²⁷ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 465-488.

¹²⁸ Miggelbrink, 'Serving'.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹³⁰ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 477-480.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 482-485.

Sources

Ferguson published sources from the *Dutch Resolutions of the States General* and the Council of State as well as the *States of War*.¹³² At the start of the Highland War there were three regiments: the first, sometimes referred to as the 'old', regiment commanded by Major-General Hugh Mackay, the second regiment commanded by Brigadier Barthold Balfour, and the third regiment commanded by Colonel George Ramsay.¹³³ Later, after Killiecrankie, this would change with Ramsay assuming command of the second and Lieutenant-Colonel George Lauder taking over the third. Names of officers were first published by Ferguson's utilisation of the Dutch States of War, with additional biographical detail added based on his research of oath books and commission books.¹³⁴ Despite the advanced nature of the army of the Dutch States General for much of the early modern period, the Dutch authorities did not keep extensive muster rolls nor did they list common soldiers names, ranks and pay; a practice common in other contemporary European nations, such as Sweden.¹³⁵ Instead, the *States of War* listed the notional strength of each company (e.g. x amount of men under command of xx). The Dutch Republic had a de-centralised system whereby these companies were paid for by the province they were quartered in (e.g. Major-General Mackay's company was paid by Guelderland).¹³⁶ These lists provide a directory of company level commanders, ranging from captains to colonels, as well as clergymen and provosts kept for each regiment, with lists from the earlier half of the seventeenth century providing more detail than the latter.¹³⁷ Thus, during the Highland War there are no muster rolls or lists which provide us with the exact strength

¹³² *Ibid.*, p. ix-x; *Nationaal Archief [NLNA]*, 3.01.04.01, Inventaris van het archief van de Staten van Holland en West-Friesland, 1572-1795.

¹³³ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 479-481.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. xi.

¹³⁵ Olaf van Nimwegen, *The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions, 1588-1688* (Woodbridge, 2010).

¹³⁶ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, 'States of War – 1688-1689', pp. 511-518.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 'States of War (1610-1618)', pp. 226-227

of each company or the names of those soldiers from amongst the rank-and-file. However, Ferguson's transcription of the *States* for the period prior to the invasion of 1688 provides the names, ranks, men per company and monthly pay of said companies.¹³⁸ Commission and oath lists for this period prior to the conflict, 1674 to 1688, offer insight into the length of service for each officer serving in the Brigade, earlier lists have also been consulted.¹³⁹ During their return to Scotland, the relevant material to the Brigade's structure and personnel during the Highland War has been published in Ferguson.¹⁴⁰ Therefore, Dutch archives were not the focus of this study as the lacuna surrounding the Brigade in Scotland emanated from the lack of scrutiny of Scottish archival sources.

With our knowledge of the Brigade's structure as they returned to Britain, and Scotland, well covered, this thesis undertook a survey of archival material related to their operations during the Highland War. This, in turn, revealed some insight into changes in the Brigade's organisation during that conflict. Moreover, the lack of extant muster rolls for the Scots-Dutch regiments time in England and in Scotland (1688-1691) reveals that the regiments maintained Dutch military practices, and did not adopt Scottish or English practices; whereby muster rolls, such as those kept in the *National Records of Scotland* [NRS] contained the names of common soldiers.¹⁴¹ A comprehensive list of Scots-Dutch officers serving in Scotland (see Appendix 1 & 2) had to be pieced together from Ferguson's research as well as a variety of primary sources, including widows' petitions for financial relief and contemporary correspondence. This confirmed the presence of

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 511-518.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 503-505.

¹⁴⁰ Note: Any other changes to the structure or personnel of the Brigade during the Highland War have been gleaned from Scottish archival research, for examples see Chapter two. The Mackay van Ophemert family papers from the Nationaal Archief at the Hague were consulted thanks to the assistance of fellow PhD student Jack Abernethy, they were not used extensively here but may prove fruitful for future research. For more see: *NLNA*, 2.21.115, *Inventaris van het archief van het geslacht Mackay van Ophemert en aanverwante geslachten, 1370-1968* (1994).

¹⁴¹ *NRS*, E100/14, Duke of Argyll's Regiment of Foot, 1689-91.

Scots-Dutch officers in Scotland as well as their respective fates during the Highland War. Crucially, this approach has revealed previously unknown common soldiers from the Brigade, some of whom are confirmed to have been veterans of the Brigade for well over a decade. This provides an exciting view into the otherwise obscured lives of the Scots-Dutch, and more generally European, common soldiery; men who have very little in the way of extant sources related to them or their experiences. Additionally, it can safely be concluded from this lack of muster rolls that the Scots-Dutch regiments were not co-opted into the Scottish Williamite army establishment upon their return to Scotland. More importantly, the Brigade's apparent insistence in keeping their practices in line with the Dutch army establishment demonstrates the extent to which they sought to remain distinct from their Scottish counterparts. In the realms of strategy, which Mackay was heavily involved in as the Williamite Scottish commander-in-chief, correspondence between London and Edinburgh has been examined, particularly letters relating to the Brigade, or events they were involved in, addressed to William Blathwayt, William's English secretary of war; these are held in the National Library of Scotland [NLS].¹⁴² More importantly, the *Calendar of State Papers* [CSP] provides us with a viewpoint of the Highland War from the court in London as well as vital orders and correspondence relating to the conflict, and the Brigade, north of the border.¹⁴³ The Brigade were, as mentioned earlier, paid via the English Treasury. Despite this fact, the *National Archives of Great Britain* [NA] holds a remarkably small corpus of material referring to or dealing with the Brigade. This is, perhaps, unsurprisingly due to a general lack of extensive personnel

¹⁴² *National Library of Scotland* [NLS], MS.3740, Misc Letters & documents, relating to Scottish and foreign affairs, Lanier to Blathwayt, 1689-1690.

¹⁴³ *Calendar of State Papers Online* [CSP], E.K. Timings (ed.), Domestic Series, of the reign of James II, 1685-1689, preserved in the State Paper Department of Her Majesty's Public Record Officer 1893, Vol I, Feb-Dec 1685 (London, 1960). E.K. Timings (ed.), *CSP, Domestic Series, James II, 1685-1689, Vol II, Jan 1686-May 1687* (London, 1964). E.K. Timings (ed.), *CSP, Domestic Series, of the reign of William and Mary, 1689-1702, Vol I, Feb 1689-April 1690* (London, 1966).

records regarding the armies of Britain prior to the Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707 and the official amalgamation of the English and Scottish forces.¹⁴⁴ Beyond some few references amongst English secretaries of the treasury, which have been consulted online via the *British Calendar of Treasury Books*, regarding payments relating to transportation, weapons, equipment and, later, wages there is only a limited amount of information to be gleaned from the *NA*, albeit the Brigade's transitional time garrisoned in England in late 1688 and early 1689 could provide a fruitful avenue for further study.¹⁴⁵

Although the material relating to the Scots-Dutch Brigade's structure and pay is limited in Scotland, there is a plethora of material available in the Scottish archives related to their participation in the Highland War. Scottish Williamite government sources from the time were critical to understanding the Williamites strategy and their operations during the Highland War. Most importantly was the third series of the *Register of the Privy Council of Scotland [RPCS]*. The privy council was the main government executive in Scotland at the time and so was responsible for co-ordinating the war effort between various arms of the government, such as the army, the parliament, and the treasury, as well as communicating events in Scotland to the crown and the crown's orders to officers and officials on the ground. These papers were transcribed and edited for publication by Henry Paton, E.W.M Balfour-Melville and M.R. Miller. Volumes thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen cover the period of study, 1689-1691, for this thesis but only the first of these has been digitised: accordingly, during the Covid-19 pandemic, only volume thirteen has been available for consultation throughout the last year with notes on the others taken

¹⁴⁴ Note: The lack of common soldiers' records before the early decades of the eighteenth century proves relatively common across Europe. Prior to the amalgamation of the English and Scottish Armies in 1707 each kept separate army establishments which were paid for by their respective parliaments, although united by the British monarchy these military forces remained officially separate until the Union of the Parliaments in 1707.

¹⁴⁵ William A. Shaw (ed.), *Calendar of Treasury Books [CTB]*, Vol IX, Part I, 1689-92 (London, 1931).

prior to the lockdown of libraries and archives.¹⁴⁶ Moreover, the editors were somewhat selective in their choice of documents which made it necessary to consult the third series of the privy council manuscripts, utilised in the aforementioned publications, in the *NRS*. These are largely unsorted materials and so prove difficult to navigate unless consulting the printed sources for guidance.¹⁴⁷ The *Records of the Parliament of Scotland* [*RPS*], fully digitized and freely available online, have been consulted with various acts related to the war, army and Brigade consulted from the period of 1688-91. In addition, the contemporary newsletter *Proceedings of the Convention of Estates*, reveals how news spread during the war as well as how events were more widely perceived at the time.¹⁴⁸ An effort was also made to understand the impact of the war and the Brigade's presence in Scotland upon the localities with a small corpus of sources in Perth & Kinross Council archives [*PKC*] have been consulted.¹⁴⁹

The privy council papers can be supplemented the family archives of the Leslie family, the earls of Melville and Leven, in the *NRS*. Far from being a personal archive of the family, the senior positions held by members of the family in William's reign mean that the collections hold army and naval papers, GD26/9, a series of papers relating to the Jacobites, GD26/8, and various collections of correspondence and state papers, GD26/1, GD26/7, GD26/13. Specifically, Lord George Melville, acted as William's Scottish secretary of state throughout the Highland War; meaning much of the state correspondence regarding the Highland War, from army officers, Mackay as commander-in-chief, the Scottish privy council, William as monarch, and his advisers, was often

¹⁴⁶ Henry Paton (ed.), *Register of the Privy Council of Scotland* [*RPCS*], 3rd Series, Vol XIII, 1686-1689 (Edinburgh, 1932). Henry Paton (ed.), *RPCS*, 3rd series, Vol XIV, 1689 [Part two] (Edinburgh, 1933). Evan Whyte Melville Balfour-Melville (ed.), *RPCS*, 3rd Series, Vol XV, 1690 (Edinburgh, 1967). E.W.M Balfour-Melville & M.R. Miller (eds.), *RPCS*, 3rd Series, Vol XVI, 1691 (Edinburgh, 1970).

¹⁴⁷ *NRS*, PC12/13A-16, Privy Council Papers, 3rd Series, 1686-1691.

¹⁴⁸ E.W.M Balfour-Melville (ed.), Anon., *Proceedings of the Convention of Estates*, Volume I-II, 1689-1690, (Edinburgh, 1954-55).

¹⁴⁹ Perth and Kinross Council Archives [*PKC*], B59/32, Documents relating to military affairs, 1689-91.

addressed to Melville and, as such, has ended up in the family's collection, which was in turn gifted to the *NRS*. Moreover, Melville's son, the Earl of Leven, acted as both a colonel of a regiment of foot and, later, as an adjutant to Mackay after the winter of 1689-90. This was augmented by examining the published correspondence of the family by Sir William Fraser, which provides transcribed letters between Melville, the crown, Scottish privy councillors and officers of the army and the Scots-Dutch Brigade, particularly Mackay.¹⁵⁰ Additionally, the correspondence of the Douglas' of Hamilton in the *NRS* offers insight into William Hamilton's, third Duke of Hamilton, role as president of the privy council in Scotland and his activities as a conduit for critical correspondence related to the conflict.¹⁵¹ Some of these are published in Major-General Mackay's memoirs as an appendix to the main text, which we shall return to momentarily. To examine the conduct of the war and the structure of the Williamite state during the Highland War, particularly in Chapter five, the accounts of the army establishment held by the Scottish exchequer and treasury, E91, E93, E96 and E99, were vital. Foundational to any understanding of the Scottish and English armies during this period are the works of Charles Dalton, which provide printed material of the army establishments down to their regiments and the commission lists for officers and commissaries.¹⁵² Although Dalton only provides a starting point for many of the sources, his lists of regiments and commissions proved nonetheless crucial to understanding the 1688 army establishment in Scotland.¹⁵³

A key source for our reappraisal of the Highland War from the Scots-Dutch Brigade's, and thus Williamite military's, perspective of said conflict was Major-General

¹⁵⁰ Fraser (ed.), *Melvilles*.

¹⁵¹ *NRS*, GD406, Papers of the Douglas Hamilton Family, Dukes of Hamilton and Brandon.

¹⁵² Charles Dalton, *The Scots Army 1661-1688* (London, 1989).

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

Hugh Mackay's *MEMOIRS touching the Scotsh [sic] War*.¹⁵⁴ First printed, as part of the 1833 *Memoirs of the War Carried on in Scotland and Ireland*, by the Maitland Club this volume incorporated Mackay's written recollections of the Highland War in Scotland and the Williamite War in Ireland as well as providing an attached collection of correspondence related to the former.¹⁵⁵ The print version of Mackay's Scottish memoir was checked against an original manuscript in the British Library [BL], as well as various scribal copies of the text kept in the NLS, to check for any alterations to the text.¹⁵⁶ However, as all versions of the text proved to be identical to the nineteenth-century print version, this was used for the sake of convenience and a digital version is freely available online.¹⁵⁷ Mackay's relation of the events of the Highland War is the only first-hand account of the campaign from the most senior Scottish Williamite commander during the conflict and the only memoir produced by a Scots-Dutch officer during this period. Obviously, there are implicit biases in this source that are present in any autobiographical text as well as the fact that the Memoir was written with hindsight in the years following the conclusion of the conflict. Yet, Mackay's narrative proves to be, when tested against other contemporary sources, a balanced and reliable account of the Highland War. In addition to the narrative, the letters printed alongside the text have been utilised to compare Mackay's version of events in his published autobiography and more contemporary correspondence regarding these events, such as his account of the defeat at Killiecrankie.

¹⁵⁴ British Library [BL], Kings MS.277, *Memoirs touching the Scotsh War caryed on for their Majesties by Lieutenant General Mackay against the Viscount Dundee and after him Cannan and at last Major General Buchan* (c.1690-92).

¹⁵⁵ Fraser Tytler, Adam Urquhart & James Hogg (eds.), Hugh Mackay, *Memoirs of the War Carried on in Scotland and Ireland*, (Edinburgh, 1833).

¹⁵⁶ BL, Kings MS.277. NLS, Adv. MS.31.7.1, Copy, made in 1702, of letters and memoirs of Major-General Hugh Mackay of Scoury [sic]... concerning the campaigns in Scotland in 1689-90, and in Ireland in 1691, (1702). Ibid., MS.3739, Memoirs of Major-General Hugh Mackay and other material, in an eighteenth-century hand, corresponding to parts of Adv.MS.31.7.1, concerning the campaigns in Scotland in 1689-90, and in Ireland in 1691. *National Register of Archives for Scotland [NRAS]*, NRAS2655/5, Mackay's Memoirs [held in Earl of Dalhousie's private collection – not consulted due to lack of access] (1690-1702).

¹⁵⁷ Mackay, *Memoirs* (1833).

Other texts Mackay wrote, such as his manual on infantry warfare and discipline as well as his account of his involvement in the siege of Candia (in 1668-69), have also been consulted.¹⁵⁸ Mackay's memoirs have been cross referenced with contemporaneous writers of the period, such as Gilbert Burnet, Carleton, Donald McBane and John Bernardi, to provide balance.¹⁵⁹

Chapter Summaries

This thesis is divided into two unequal halves. The first, chapters one to four, is a chronological overview of the Highland War which situates the Scots-Dutch Brigade in their proper role, tackling misconceptions and clarifying the significance of their involvement in relevant engagement. The second, chapter five, takes a thematic approach tackling head on two areas which emerged as particularly important throughout the chronological overview and for which the sources are especially rich as well as remaining, hitherto, little explored with regards to the Highland War.

Our re-assessment of the War begins in chapter one not with the arrival of the Scots-Dutch Brigade in Scotland, at the end of March 1689, but instead an examination of William's decision to send them to Scotland almost a month prior. The decision to deploy to the Scots-Dutch Brigade to their homeland was motivated by William's distrust of and

¹⁵⁸ BL, BN5/2, *Exercise of the Foot... Rules of War for the Infantry, to be Observed when they are to Encounter with the Enemy in the day of Battel In Twenty three Articles by Hugh Mackay* (Edinburgh, 1693). Ibid., Kings MS 245-246, Hugh Mackay of Scourie, *PREMIER (-second) Tome de la Politique Militaire, traictant des guerres de Jules Cezar en France, Angleterre, Hollande Allemaigne et les pays voisins, avec les dernieres guerres de Kandie et d' Irlande, recueilly et composé par Monsieur Hugh de Mackay, Lieut..General des armées de sa Majesté Bretonique* (Gelderland, 1702).

¹⁵⁹ James Drummond, *Memoirs of Sir Ewen Cameron of Lochiel, Chief of the Clan Cameron; with an Introductory Account of the History and Antiquities of that Family and Neighbouring Clans*, (Edinburgh, 1842). Colin Lindsay [of Balcarres], *Memoirs Touching the Revolution in Scotland 1688-1690*, (Edinburgh, 1841). James Dalrymple, *Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland*, Volume II (London, 1790). Gilbert Burnet, *Bishop Burnet's history of his own time : from the restoration of King Charles II, to the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace at Utrecht, in the reign of Queen Anne*, Volume IV (Oxford, 1823). Carleton, *Memoirs*. Jared Kirby (ed.), Donald McBane, *The Expert Sword-Man's Companion: Or the True Art of Self-Defence. With An Account of the Authors Life* (New York, 2017). Johnathan Swift (ed.), John Creighton, *The Memoirs of Captain John Creighton*, (London, 1827). John Bernardi, *A Short History of the Life of Major John Bernardi* (London, 1729).

suspicion towards British officers who had not served in the Dutch Republic. William had developed these qualms having seen, first-hand, the desertions from amongst James VII & II's senior officer corps at Salisbury Plain in November 1688. By contrast, William's view that the Brigade officers were a loyal and trustworthy vanguard for his cause secured them a central role in the conflicts which ensued after 1688. Epitomizing this role was Major-General Mackay, one of only three British officers William entrusted with a senior independent command throughout the entirety of the Nine Years' War (1688-1697). Comparing and contrasting Mackay's career with these other two it becomes apparent that his appointment to command the Williamite forces in Scotland has been significantly neglected in the historiography. Although trust was clearly important in William's decision to send the Brigade and Mackay to Scotland, it becomes apparent that he also placed a great deal of emphasis upon continental military experience. As well as foregrounding the importance of trust and military expertise in William's decision to send the Brigade to Scotland, this chapter introduces new evidence in the form of warrants issued to the Brigade to demonstrate that political historians have underplayed the military aspect of the Revolution in Scotland.

The Brigade was dispersed throughout Scotland on a variety of detachments and deployments which would appear to far exceed their desiccated formation. They would form the 'backbone' of the Scottish Williamite army from 1689 to 1691, as James Ferguson pointed out.¹⁶⁰ The lack of military forces in Scotland, disbanded after William's seizure of the throne in England, would see the Brigade overstretched, with their military expertise being deployed immediately during the siege of Edinburgh Castle, 22nd March-13th June 1689, and the rapid deployment of Scots-Dutch detachments to secure key garrisons across Scotland. William's distrust of Scottish forces raised on his behalf, to some extent,

¹⁶⁰ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 482.

transferred to the Convention of Estates and this meant that the Scots-Dutch officers would form the nucleus of their new army. The Scots-Dutch officers were placed at the heart of the Williamite War effort in Scotland, with officers like Brigadier Balfour taking on co-ordinating roles for forces in different parts of the kingdom. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the tensions and disagreements that began to emerge between the Scots-Dutch officers, as professional soldiers, and the Scottish officer corps, who almost were exclusively noblemen and gentry.

Chapter two will re-examine the Battle of Killiecrankie, 27th July 1689. As the first major engagement of the Highland War, Killiecrankie has often been viewed as the beginning of the Jacobite risings in Scotland. Due to its well-known status the battle has been covered in a myriad of historical fields ranging from broad political and military histories of Britain to studies of the Jacobite movement in Scotland and in popular Scottish history. Although it features in many of these works, the events at Killiecrankie have often been either misunderstood or neglected as part of a wider narrative. Moreover, the Scots-Dutch Brigade's prominent involvement in the battle has been vastly neglected. This chapter re-evaluates the battle by examining the Brigade's involvement in events and seeking to clarify the Scots-Dutch regiments' involvement as well as clear up the significant misapprehensions that have built up over time within the historiography of the battle. These misapprehensions are due, in large part, to the confusion which surrounded the battle itself and various conflicting reports in its aftermath, a phenomenon which has been similarly seen in relation to other battles of this period. After a brief overview of the historical perception of the events at Killiecrankie, the chapter opens with an examination of the geography of the battlefield, the positioning of the armies and the composition of the armies themselves.

The efficacy of the Highland charge has been cited by most historians as one of the major reasons for the defeat of the Scottish Williamite army at Killiecrankie. However, this has not examined the fact that the charge's effectiveness was variable at different parts of the line. This will be counterbalanced with a discussion regarding the effectiveness of the Scots-Dutch musketry volleys in the initial stages of the engagement. This chapter concludes by examining one of the major myths of the battle: the notion that the entirety of the Williamite army present, including the Scots-Dutch Brigade, routed and fled the field in confusion. Various sources, from both sides, indicate that although the majority of Williamite troops did, indeed, rout this was not universally true of all of them. A remnant Williamite force stayed behind after the Highland charge had concluded. This contingent of survivors included the bloodied remainder of Mackay's Scots-Dutch regiment as well as survivors from the other two regiments of the Brigade.

Chapter three investigates the aftermath of Killiecrankie and the impact the defeat had upon the Scots-Dutch Brigade, the Scottish Williamite government and Major-General Mackay's authority as commander-in-chief. The importance of this seminal battle has long been evident to historians, but its outcome, much like the battle itself, has been subject to a variety of misinterpretations. In previous years, historians have viewed Killiecrankie as the effective end of the Highland War. However, this chapter argues against this notion by building upon the work of Hopkins as well as more recent revisions of the battle from scholars such as Oates and Szechi.¹⁶¹ The chapter begins by examining the confusion which prevailed in Edinburgh immediately after the battle, emanating from Mackay's brief absence and the panicked reports of those soldiers and officers who fled the field before him. Cumulatively, this threw the government in Edinburgh and the court in London into a panic, which was in turn exacerbated by the limitations of the

¹⁶¹ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 157-60. Oates, *Killiecrankie*, pp. 86-131. Szechi, *Jacobites*, p. 66.

correspondence network utilised by the Scottish Williamite government and William and his advisers in London. Although the panic proved brief, the consequences of the defeat were anything but short-lived. The news of Mackay's survival then precipitated a wave of palpable relief in Edinburgh. However, when this was combined with news, that emerged only a few days later, of Viscount Dundee's death, it obscured the impact of Killiecrankie upon the Scots-Dutch Brigade and upon the Williamite cause in Scotland. The loss of veteran officers, which had previously been of great concern in Edinburgh, was now forgotten and the reports which had somewhat exaggerated the loss of a small group of senior officers, such as Mackay, were now disregarded entirely despite proving, in large part, true. This moment represented a nadir for the Scots-Dutch Brigade's time in Scotland, as the losses they suffered at the battle impacted their operational capability in the field as well as their reputation. The chapter concludes by returning to the tensions and disagreements between Major-General Hugh Mackay, the Scottish noble officer corps, and the Scottish privy council and the secretary of state. This led to Mackay's temporary political eclipse in late 1689 and considerable anxiety on his part that he had lost the King's trust. These strategic disagreements were only exacerbated by the political stalemate between the crown and the Scottish parliament over constitutional reform, because of which, parliament refused financial supply for the Scottish Williamite army.

The final chronological chapter of the thesis will examine the latter campaigns, 1690 and 1691 respectively, of the Highland War. New research conducted for this thesis illustrates that the Scots-Dutch Brigade's involvement was critical to bringing the Jacobites to the negotiating table. However, this period saw the Brigade gradually curtail its role in Scotland. In the 1690 campaign, trust in Mackay was renewed by William's intervention into the disagreements surrounding strategy. The monarch's reassertion of confidence in Mackay was to be accompanied by the resolution of the constitutional

stalemate in the Scottish parliament which, in turn, led to the release of a significant act of supply to fund a renewed offensive against the Jacobites. With renewed confidence and funds, Mackay set about enacting a strategy of encirclement in the Highlands. This would bring about a new stage in the war, with Mackay launching a massive effort to plant garrisons in the Jacobite supporting areas, such as Lochaber, Badenoch, and the Western Isles, and undertaking punitive expeditions to these areas. This new phase, whereby significant numbers of Williamite troops descended on Jacobite clans' territory, was characterised by brutal reprisal tactics, such as the burning of lands and property. This was, in turn, met with guerrilla style assaults on Williamite forces and garrisons, carried out by the scattered Jacobite forces. The Battle of Cromdale, 1st May 1690, saw the Jacobite army shattered after a surprise attack by a Williamite detachment but this was, again, not the end of the conflict. A major focus of Mackay's strategy was the re-establishment of a Cromwellian era Fort at Inverlochy, soon after to be called Fort William. This significant fortification and sizeable garrison were the lynchpin of Mackay's plan to end the Highland War. The second part of the chapter will discuss the efforts made to encircle the Jacobites with a ring of garrisons combined with the last real parts of campaigning. The chapter concludes by examining the penultimate stages of the Highland War and the Brigade's gradual withdrawal. Just as the Brigade had been dispersed around Scotland upon their arrival, illustrating how important Scotland was to William's strategic considerations, they were now gradually redeployed to more pressing theatres of the ongoing pan-European conflict as the Jacobite cause in Scotland floundered throughout the latter half of 1690 and the whole of 1691.

The final chapter analyses behaviour of the Scottish Williamite state during the Highland War. Previous chapters have re-appraised the chronology of the Highland War through the experience of the Scots-Dutch Brigade but this thematic chapter will focus

upon the Scottish Williamite state's reaction to the conflict as well as the impact it had upon the state's structures and finances. Michael J. Braddick and John Brewer have shown how important the Nine Years' War was for the development of the English state.¹⁶² Although the Scottish Williamite state's fiscal-military capacity was nowhere near comparable to their larger southern neighbour, the Highland War did necessitate a significant, albeit brief, expansion of the Scottish Williamites army and, therefore, the Scottish Williamite state's finances. We will demonstrate that the Scottish Williamite state in 1689-91 had a degree of continuity with previous Scottish governments in the way it waged war. The Williamites in Scotland elected to build upon the precedents of previous decades, which we shall briefly examine, to finance their army. These changes may not have been radical or revolutionary, as those seen in England, but they did occur, even if they were only incremental and evolutionary. This chapter represents the first concerted scholarly effort to examine the fledgling Scottish Williamite state's fiscal-military expansion and capability based on a close analysis of Scottish treasury commission's records and exchequer accounts during the Highland War. The first section will first explain the precedents and context of the structure of the Scottish Williamite state during this period. Secondly, the chapter will provide an analysis of the Scottish Williamite army's personnel related costs. This analysis illustrates the total cost of the expansion of the Williamite army's manpower, allowing us to offer a year-by-year analysis of the personnel costs of the Williamites war against the Jacobites in Scotland. This was, by no means, a resounding success and the massive expansion saw a subsequent contraction of personnel, with many regiments amalgamated or disbanded, and expenditure as the war went on. This will be accompanied by a brief, yet critical, aside which examines how the

¹⁶² Michael J. Braddick, 'The Rise of the Fiscal State' in Barry Coward (ed.), *A Companion to Stuart Britain* (London, 2009), pp. 69-87. John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783* (London, 1989).

Scots-Dutch Brigade was paid during its campaigns in Scotland. This will offer new insights into the status of the unit as a part of the Dutch army rather than the English or Scottish establishments. This chapter illustrates, by contrasting the Scottish Williamite army's personnel related costs with the pre-Revolution formation, that the Scottish Williamites army rapidly expanded, both in terms of manpower and cost. This expansion proved unsustainable for both financial and political reasons as the Scottish parliament and the British crown both proved unwilling, or in the latter's case unable, to foot the cost of this expanded force indefinitely. As the war in Scotland waned, it became clear that such an investment in a large force, at least for Scotland, was not only unsustainable, it was also undesirable as both domestic and wider geo-strategic factors changed the security situation in Scotland considerably in 1691.

Chapter One - 'Confident Persons'¹⁶³: The outbreak of war and the Scots-Dutch homecoming, March 1689-July 1689

*This war is a bitter one and is waged violently; though it has a serpent's head, it will have a
peacock's tail.*¹⁶⁴

On 27th March 1689, Viscount Dundee received a summons from a herald sent to his estate at Dudhope, Angus.¹⁶⁵ The herald carried an ominous message which required the Viscount to return immediately to Edinburgh to face trial before the then sitting Convention of Estates.¹⁶⁶ Dundee replied on the same day, writing that he would not comply because:

I cannot come with freedom and safety, because I am informed there are men of war, and foreign troops in the passage; and, till I know what they are, and what are their orders, the Meeting cannot blame me for not coming.¹⁶⁷

These warships proved to be Dutch and aboard them were the three regiments of the Scots-Dutch Brigade.¹⁶⁸ On 14th March 1689, the meeting of the Scottish Convention of Estates, a constitutional body which aimed to determine the succession to the Scottish throne in the wake of the Revolution of November 1688, saw the emergence of factional divisions between Scots who continued to support James VII and those who did not.¹⁶⁹ In

¹⁶³ Mackay, *Memoirs*, 'Instructions to Mackay', 7th March 1689, p. 221.

¹⁶⁴ Please note: This line is derived from the Gaelic bard and poet John MacDonald of Keppoch's poem on the Battle of Killiecrankie, at which he was present within the ranks of the Jacobite Army. See: Annie M. Mackenzie (ed.), *Orain Iain Luim: Songs of John MacDonald Bard of Keppoch* (Edinburgh, 1973), The Battle of Killiecrankie, p. 195.

¹⁶⁵ E.W.M. Balfour-Melville (ed.), Anonymous, *An Account of the Proceedings of the Estates in Scotland 1689-1690*, Vol I (Edinburgh, 1954), 25th March 1689, p. 15.

¹⁶⁶ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 30th March 1689, p. 21. Murray-Scott, *Dundee*, pp. 86-89.

¹⁶⁷ George Smyth (ed.), *Letters of the Viscount of Dundee* (Edinburgh, 1826), 'For his Grace the Duke of Hamilton', 27th March 1689, pp. 32-34.

¹⁶⁸ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 26th March 1689, p. 18. Mackay, *Memoirs*, 'Instructions to Mackay', 7th March 1689, pp. 221-222.

¹⁶⁹ Harris, *Revolution*, pp. 308-363. Raffe, *Scotland*, pp. 106-107.

the following days, it had become clear to Viscount Dundee that the Convention would side against King James, to whom he remained absolutely loyal, and intended to declare the exiled monarch's son-in-law, William of Orange, and his Protestant daughter, Mary Stuart, the new joint monarchs of Scotland.¹⁷⁰ The departure of Viscount Dundee from the capital came on 18th March. He decided to spurn the Convention, as *de facto* leader of the Jacobites, climbing the walls of Edinburgh Castle to communicate his intentions to the defiantly loyal governor of the garrison there, George Gordon, first Duke of Gordon.¹⁷¹ Gordon had refused to hand over the castle to the Convention, declaring he held it for the rightful king, and, as a result, all communication with the governor had been expressly forbidden. The meeting announced that anyone who violated this order would be considered guilty of treason against the 'free and lawful' meeting of the Estates.¹⁷² Dundee encouraged Gordon to hold out, whilst he would seek to rally supporters to defend James' rule by force of arms.¹⁷³ Shortly afterward, on 22nd March, armed volunteers in support of the Convention of Estates encircled Edinburgh Castle and, thus, the first shots of a new Scottish civil war were fired.¹⁷⁴ This signalled the beginning of the Highland War in which the Scots-Dutch Brigade would play a central role.¹⁷⁵

The anxiety with which Dundee clearly regarded the appearance of these 'foreign troops' proved to be well-founded. The Brigade's arrival in Scotland, on 26th March, heralded the beginning of an effort by the Prince of Orange, and his soon-to-be new Scottish government, to seize control of the country militarily; the Brigade were the coercive arm of the constitutional opposition which would depose James and declare

¹⁷⁰ Harris, *Revolution*, pp. 388-389.

¹⁷¹ *ODNB*, B.L.H Horn, 'Gordon, George, first duke of Gordon (1649-1716)'.

¹⁷² Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 128-129.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ C.S. Terry, 'The Siege of Edinburgh Castle, March-June 1689' in *The Scottish Historical Review*, Vol II (Edinburgh, 1905), pp. 166-167.

¹⁷⁵ Hopkins, *Glencoe*.

William and Mary the rightful heirs to the Scottish throne.¹⁷⁶ Dundee's self-imposed exile from Edinburgh came in the aftermath of an effective political victory for William's supporters in the Scottish Convention. Harris has rightly pointed out that Viscount Dundee and the Jacobites withdrawal from the meeting had effectively ceded political control of Scotland's government to William's supporters.¹⁷⁷ Raffe has concurred, stating that after the Jacobites major error was to agreed to allow the Convention of Estates to continue sitting following the reading of both James and William's addresses; an error only compounded by the uncompromising threats from James.¹⁷⁸ They had, effectively, relinquished control of the constitutional process. This proved to be a critical misstep, as Dundee's withdrawal allowed the Williamites to assume the mantle of government in Edinburgh, with all its attendant legislative and financial powers as well as an air of legitimacy. The Williamite regime had *de facto* control of key areas of Scotland, particularly the Lowlands south of the River Tay, before the Highland War had even begun.¹⁷⁹ Whilst the Williamites had political control, they lacked security as Gordon's continued defiance and Dundee's escape threatened to muster James' supporters against the new regime. More importantly, it created the distinct possibility that they would attempt to establish a rival Jacobite government. All of these factors signalled the need for military intervention from William of Orange, as Raffe has pointed out.¹⁸⁰

After sending his reply to the Convention, Dundee departed his estate with a retinue of fifty former army officers and Jacobite gentlemen, who had accompanied him from Edinburgh.¹⁸¹ Riding to Dundee Law, a hill overlooking the town, the errant Viscount raised King James' banner and called for all of his loyal subjects to oppose the

¹⁷⁶ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 26th March 1689, p. 18.

¹⁷⁷ Harris, 'Scotland' in *Final*, pp. 130-131.

¹⁷⁸ Raffe, *Scotland*, pp. 133, 155.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 145, 154.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

¹⁸¹ Murray-Scott, *Dundee*, pp. 86-89.

Convention and the 'usurpers'. The small Jacobite party then departed for the Highlands where they could raise an army from Gaelic clans sympathetic to James. Meanwhile, Major-General Hugh Mackay came ashore at Leith, leading the men of the Scots-Dutch Brigade. Mackay later recalled, in his memoirs, that 'the disposition of that Kingdom [was] tending to a civil war by the retreat of the Lord Dundee'.¹⁸² This chronological re-assessment of the Highland War will, therefore, begin with the arrival of the Brigade which, of course, signalled the beginning of their involvement in, and the escalation of, the conflict as opposed to an analysis of the *long durée* of unrest and violence which had plagued parts of Scotland since late 1688.

This chapter will examine the first stage of the Highland War, tracing it from the Brigade's arrival in March to the build-up to the Battle of Killiecrankie on 27th July 1689. The initial stage of the war was characterised by a complex series of manoeuvres and counter-manoevres. Colin Lindsay, third Earl of Balcarres and Jacobite courtier, reflected this when he wrote of the months, March to July, that the Jacobite and Williamite armies 'having pursued or fled [the other], according to their present condition or enemy's strength, by turns retired'.¹⁸³ Captain John Creighton, a crypto-Jacobite serving in the Royal Scots Dragoons at the time, noted that on one occasion he was present with the Williamite forces: 'we spent about three weeks, sometimes pursuing and sometimes pursued'.¹⁸⁴ It is clear, that the early months of the conflict were a protracted and convoluted affair and, as such, neither this chapter, nor this thesis, will seek to recount every aspect of the conflict. Hopkins' formidable monograph about the Highland War provides readers with a comprehensive narrative.¹⁸⁵ Instead, we will focus upon the Scots-

¹⁸² Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 6.

¹⁸³ Balcarres, *Memoirs*, p. 42.

¹⁸⁴ Creighton, *Memoirs*, p. 67.

¹⁸⁵ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 120-177.

Dutch Brigade itself from the circumstances which saw it dispatched to Scotland to its role in critical episodes of the early parts of the first campaign.

This chapter will be split into six sections. Firstly, we will examine William's decision to send the Scots-Dutch Brigade to Scotland. This was driven by William's suspicion towards and distrust of the English and Scottish officer corps who had formerly served in King James' armies. William's opinion greatly formed by the desertions of prominent officers of James' armies at Salisbury Plain in November 1688. His appointment of Major-General Mackay, colonel of the first Scots-Dutch regiment, as commander of all of his forces in Scotland ensured the war's direction was entrusted to a professional soldier. William considered Mackay as a politically loyal officer with extensive European military experience. The Prince considered both of these qualities crucial for his commander-in-chief in Scotland. Moreover, William had had ample opportunity to witness Mackay in action due to the Scottish officer's decades of service to the Dutch Republic. We will take some time to explore Mackay's career, comparing it to those of the only two other senior British officers in William's armies, as the Major-General provides us with a great deal of evidence of the reasons behind the decision to send the Scots-Dutch Brigade. These qualities, as well as the Brigade's Scottish character, saw the Brigade dispatched to Scotland ahead of any other forces, albeit they were significantly delayed. The deployment of the Brigade to the country, in turn, demonstrated that Scotland was strategically important to William. The deployment of the Scots-Dutch Brigade was not a matter of convenience nor a coincidental decision for William, but a deliberate strategic choice to deploy a politically loyal, largely experienced cadre of soldiers around which a new Scottish army, in support of the Williamite cause, could be built. To understand the importance of the Brigade's role, we must first

understand the importance of the trust placed in the Scots-Dutch officer corps by William, by the Scottish Convention of Estates and, of course, by Major-General Mackay himself.

Secondly, the chapter will explore the Brigade's role upon their arrival in Scotland. The Brigade acted as a loyal vanguard for the fledgling Williamite government in Scotland. Their trustworthiness, and the distrust and suspicion held for non-Brigade Scottish troops, proves key to understanding the role they played in securing control of Scotland by military means.¹⁸⁶ This section will first examine the circumstances under which the Scots-Dutch Brigade arrived and the Convention's attitude towards them and Mackay. We will then move on to the third section, which will look at the siege of Edinburgh Castle, which lasted from 22nd March until 13th June 1689. This proved to be the first military action the Brigade were involved in and the first time their military expertise from the continent was put to use. In the fourth section, we will examine the role of the Brigade beyond Edinburgh, examining the seizure of Stirling Castle; a critical step in securing central Scotland for the Convention and one which demonstrated both the trust placed in the Scots-Dutch officers as well as the distrust with which they viewed their Scottish counterparts. During this episode it became clear that Mackay, like William, preferred to entrust important military charges to officers with whom he was familiar and whose loyalty to the cause was well-known. This led to the appointment of Scots-Dutch officers, such as Brigadier Barthold Balfour and Colonel George Ramsay, to important charges. The Brigade's officers were chosen, almost exclusively, by Mackay to secure key areas and were dispersed widely throughout the country. However, Ferguson has noted that the bulk of the Brigade were kept available for service in the field and that at least

¹⁸⁶ Note: To better distinguish between the members of the Scots-Dutch Brigade and the members of the Scottish army [who had not served in the Dutch Republic], we will henceforth refer to the former as Scots-Dutch and the latter as non-Brigade Scots. The Brigade was, after all, a grouping of Scottish regiments whose officers and soldiers would have identified as Scottish as well as British.

one detachment of Scots-Dutch troops accompanied Mackay on his marches into the Highlands.¹⁸⁷ Balfour's involvement in co-ordinating forces in Mackay's absence would most notably lead to his organisation of the detachment that fought at the Battle of Loup Hill, 16th May 1689. Whilst Ferguson has noted the dispersal of the unit, throughout Scotland, this new analysis explains it.¹⁸⁸ This, of course, would mean that Mackay distrusted non-Brigade Scottish officers and the central role of Scots-Dutch officers would lead to tensions within the Williamite forces as well as disagreements between Mackay and the ministers of William's new Scottish government.

Finally, the last two sections of this chapter will focus upon the Battle of Loup Hill and subsequent tensions amongst the ranks of the Scottish Williamites. Mackay's complaints about the non-Brigade Scottish officer corps will be examined against the few instances of disobedience from said officers. The commander-in-chief's distrust of non-Brigade officers will be analysed in the wider context of officer purges called for by William of Orange. This will illustrate that Mackay's distrust of these Scottish officers and his reliance on the Scots-Dutch Brigade was, at least in his eyes, merited. Furthermore, with most Scots-Dutch officers widely dispersed and engaged in fighting the Jacobites in various parts of the country the Scottish Williamite regiments were largely staffed by inexperienced commanders, mainly from the nobility and gentry. Tensions within the army, emanating from the Brigade's continental attitude to military discipline, will also be examined alongside the strategic disagreements Mackay had with George Melville, Lord of Melville, and the Williamite secretary of state for Scotland, as well as the nuanced relationship between Mackay and the Scottish privy council. This section will argue, that rather than a diametrically opposed professional officer pitted against noble politicians,

¹⁸⁷ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 482-483.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

Mackay was largely trusted for his expertise. Whilst disagreements did arise over strategy, particularly due to the slow pace of progress against the Scottish Jacobites army, confidence in Mackay's command was reiterated time and again by the privy council, which trusted him as William's appointed commander. Ultimately, this chapter will conclude, that this led to a large degree of confidence in Mackay and his abilities up until his defeat at the hands of the Jacobites at Killiecrankie. It was only after the infamous battle that the first cracks in the relationship, between Mackay and the Scottish government, began to emerge. Critically, we will conclude that the concept of trust is crucial to understanding why, and how, the Scots-Dutch Brigade were deployed during the early stages of the Highland War. We shall now begin with our examination of the reasons behind the dispatch of the Brigade to Scotland with a brief recap of the political and military situation in Scotland prior to the outbreak of the conflict.

A Matter of Trust: The Scots-Dutch Brigade & the Prince of Orange

In the early months of 1689, the political and military situation in Scotland remained uncertain. The Scottish Convention of Estates met, on 14th March 1689, against a backdrop of public disorder, violence as well as political and religious division.¹⁸⁹ The departure of James VII for exile in France and the disbandment of his Scottish army, and militia, in December 1688 had left the exiled monarch's Scottish government without an effective means of maintaining control of the country.¹⁹⁰ In its first few days of sitting, the Convention had yet to declare either James or William and Mary as the rightful claimants to the Scottish throne.¹⁹¹ It is important to note that whilst Williamites viewed this period as an 'interregnum', with the throne vacant, the Jacobites would have viewed it as an unlawful 'usurpation' instigated by William and Mary's supporters. Regardless, during

¹⁸⁹ Harris, *Revolution*, pp. 370-378.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 370; Raffe, *Scotland*, p. 108.

¹⁹¹ Harris, *Revolution*, p. 370.

this period of constitutional instability a select group of Scottish lords and gentlemen, unsurprisingly composed, predominately, of William's supporters, requested the Prince of Orange oversee Scotland's civil and military administration until the matter of the succession was settled.¹⁹² This gave William the modicum of legitimacy he required to intervene in the country militarily, citing the need to defend the right of the Convention of Estates to meet and to protect Scotland from foreign interventions.¹⁹³ The insecurity of the situation in Scotland was only compounded by its ability to de-stabilise William's position in England. The potential impact of the landing of King James in Ireland on 12th March 1689, with a substantial French force, was only worsened by the beginning of the siege of Edinburgh Castle and the increasing tensions in Scotland.¹⁹⁴

With an open armed challenge in Ireland, the situation in Scotland, and thus, England, looked increasingly unstable. The threat from north of the border would have been a well-known fact in England with the last successful Scottish incursion having taken place just around forty years prior.¹⁹⁵ The ability for Scotland to threaten England's northern frontier was an evident concern for William's government in England and for William himself.¹⁹⁶ In the early months of 1689, William had clearly concluded that Scotland must be secured, by force if necessary.¹⁹⁷ Pressure from the Dutch Republic was also mounting as the campaign season in Europe began in earnest and William, with a

¹⁹² E.W.M. Balfour-Melville (ed.), Anonymous, *Proceedings of the Convention of Estates*, Vol II (Edinburgh, 1955), 'Appendix: His Highness the Prince of Orange His Speech to the Scots Lords and Gentlemen; with Their Address, and His Highness his Answer. With a true Account of what past at their Meeting in the Council-Chamber, at Whitehall, [7th] Jan. 1688/89', pp. 293-296.

¹⁹³ Mackay, *Memoirs*, 'Instructions to Mackay', 7th March 1689, pp. 221-222.

¹⁹⁴ Childs, *Ireland*, pp. 53-54. Bannatyne Club (eds.), Anonymous, *Siege of Edinburgh Castle* (Edinburgh, 1828), p. 38.

¹⁹⁵ Note: The Scottish Covenanters launched numerous military incursions into England with extreme success and, thus, were able to intervene in English politics and the English Civil War. See: David Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution 1637-44* (Edinburgh, 2011), pp. 127-151, 183-205, 261-276.

¹⁹⁶ Steve Murdoch & Alexia Grosjean, *Alexander Leslie and the Scottish Generals of the Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648* (London, 2016), pp. 113-118.

¹⁹⁷ Mackay, *Memoirs*, 'Instructions to Mackay', 7th March 1689, pp. 221-222.

considerable Dutch army, remained preoccupied with affairs in the Three Kingdoms. Protracted wars in Scotland and Ireland would see the Dutch States General forced to maintain a defensive posture on the continent until at least 1691; William would have to divide his armies to fight both the Jacobites and their French allies on two broad fronts.¹⁹⁸ Despite the seeming stability of the situation in England, William and Mary had yet to be officially crowned as monarchs of the country; this occurred on 11th April 1689.¹⁹⁹ If James' supporters should seize control of Scotland, or the Convention of Estates rule against them in the succession, the precarity of their position in England, and ultimately the Dutch position in Europe, would only have increased.²⁰⁰ Just as he would have to send military forces to Ireland to secure his position in England William would also have to do the same in Scotland.²⁰¹ Both military and political historians, namely Childs, Harris and Mark Kishlansky, have long acknowledged the importance of the conflict in Ireland as part of the wider Nine Years' War and to William of Orange's position in Britain, but have not accorded Scotland a similar status, despite its clear strategic importance.²⁰² Whilst the Highland War proved to be smaller in scale when compared to the Williamite War in Ireland, the outcome of the Scottish conflict was no less important to William's overall strategy. The issue William faced was who to send to Scotland, as he had developed a deep mistrust of the vast majority of his new British officer corps. Additionally, his preference for experienced European officers to staff his armies was worsened by the fact that such veterans were already thinly spread between Flanders, England, and Ireland.²⁰³

¹⁹⁸ Israel, *Dutch*, p. 853. Childs, *Nine*, p. 69.

¹⁹⁹ Harris, *Revolution*, p. 355.

²⁰⁰ Troost, *William*, pp. 266-268.

²⁰¹ Childs, *Nine*, p. 67.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, pp. 135-6, 156; Harris, *Revolution*, pp. 445-446. Mark Kishlansky, *A Monarchy Transformed Britain 1603-1714* (London, 1996), p. 296.

²⁰³ Childs, *British*, pp. 54-56.

The Prince of Orange's decision to send the Scots-Dutch Brigade to Scotland must be viewed in the context of the deep distrust he harboured towards English and Scottish officers who had formerly served in James' armies in the previous year. William's confidence in the officers of the Three Kingdoms had been deeply shaken by events at Salisbury in November 1688. King James VII & II had assembled his Scottish, Irish and English armies there to repel the Dutch expeditionary force led by William.²⁰⁴ However, James' officers deserted him in droves to join the Dutch; most prominent amongst these deserters were men like John Churchill, later first Duke of Marlborough, Henry Fitzroy, first Duke of Grafton, and James Douglas, Lord of Drumlanrig.²⁰⁵ These desertions, however, have been greatly overestimated and, as Harris points out, 'The total number of desertions was not particularly large'.²⁰⁶ Whilst the bulk of James' armies remained loyal to him, the desertion of groups of senior officers 'gravely affected the operational capacity' of his forces which greatly contributed to the collapse of his armies and cause in England.²⁰⁷ The fact that such desertions afforded William and his Dutch forces an easy victory, as James' morale collapsed overnight, did not endear the deserters to the Prince of Orange. The actions of these men, to William's mind, tarnished not only their own reputations, but, rather unfairly, the reputations of all officers and soldiers serving in James' armies.²⁰⁸ Most of those soldiers had stayed with King James until he gave the order for them to disband.²⁰⁹ However, it must be noted that switching sides during this period was not a reason to distrust someone in and of itself. Mackay had done just that in 1674, leaving the service of Louis XIV to serve the Prince of Orange.²¹⁰ While Mackay

²⁰⁴ Childs, *James II*, pp. 185-188.

²⁰⁵ Harris, *Revolution*, p. 284.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁷ Childs, *James II*, pp. 184-185.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 190-192, 198.

²¹⁰ *ODNB*, Piers Wauchope, 'Mackay, Hugh (d. 1692), army officer'.

could be accused of the same failing as James' officers in 1688, the circumstances were different as he had spent enough time in Dutch service, just under fifteen years, to build up his credit there. Whether or not William's perception of officers in England was correct is irrelevant, the fact remains that he held little trust or regard for officers or soldiers who, in his eyes, had so easily deserted their former master.

J.M. Stapleton has pointed out that William valued not only those officers who had proven themselves 'politically reliable' but those who had significant military experience.²¹¹ Childs states that William 'thought very little of the expertise of any member of the British officer corps, whether gentlemen or professional'.²¹² There is, therefore, a scholarly consensus that the events of 1688 were compounded by William's perception that Dutch or European officers were more experienced, and better trained, than their British counterparts. This perception was shared by members of William's inner circle of advisers, who had accompanied him in his journey from the Dutch Republic to England. William's, Dutch secretary, Constantijn Huygens Jr., echoed his master's sentiment when he wrote in his diary that James' armies were largely composed of 'newly recruited men without discipline'.²¹³ Even advisers from the Three Kingdoms' felt that their soldierly countrymen were no match for their counterparts serving in the Dutch Republic. Bishop Gilbert Burnet, a Scottish clergyman and adviser to William, later wrote of the English army that 'both officers and souldiers... were raw, without experience and without skill'.²¹⁴ Whatever the veracity of William and his advisers' claims regarding the military personnel of the Three Kingdoms, their lack of faith in the experience and training of these soldiers, particularly the officers, was evidently the prevailing attitude

²¹¹ Stapleton, 'Dual', p. 79.

²¹² Childs, *British*, p. 43.

²¹³ Rudolf Dekker (ed.), *The Diary of Constantijn Huygens Jr, Secretary to the Stadholder-King William of Orange* (Amsterdam, 2015), 2nd December 1688, p. 62.

²¹⁴ Burnet, *History*, IV, p. 34.

amongst them. In addition to distrust of the senior officers, William did not believe those men were adequately experienced or trained to command his forces in Scotland.

William's distrust of large swathes of the officer corps of the Three Kingdoms was well known in England contemporaneously. Sir George Savile, the English Lord Privy Seal, observed in a diary entry, dated 28th March 1689, that William expressed his wish in a meeting to 'raise [English] Reg[imen]ts... but not to give command of them to [the English] L[or]ds'.²¹⁵ The reason given by the Prince, at least according to Savile, was that 'The humour and character of a peer of England do not agree very well with the discipline to which a Colonell must bee subject'.²¹⁶ It is clear that William did not only distrust the English officers corps for political reasons, or their lack of experience, but also because he felt their national aristocratic character made them poorer officers compared to their Dutch counter-parts. Whether he held similar feelings towards Scottish officers has remained unexplained due to a lack of surviving material upon the subject and the fact that William never travelled to Scotland in person throughout his reign. There was, however, a great deal of precedent regarding professional soldiers' beliefs that service trumped birth when it came to military command and competence. This was most notably articulated by Robert Monro, a Scottish writer and veteran of the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648). Monro argued 'It should then be the duty of brave Generalls to make choice of brave and virtuous commanders, not asking of whom they come, but where, and how long, have they practiced'.²¹⁷ Within the Scots-Dutch Brigade itself, Colonel William Brog had refused to stand down in favour of Walter Scott, first Earl of Buccleuch, in the early 1620s.²¹⁸ Buccleuch had been promised command of the first regiment, formerly

²¹⁵ H.C. Foxcroft (ed.), *The Life and Letters of Sir George Savile, Bart., first Marquis of Halifax &c* (London, 1898), Vol II, 'The Spencer House Journals', 28th March 1689, p. 205.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

²¹⁷ Robert Monro, *His Expedition with the worthy Scots regiment*, (2 Vols., London, 1637) I, p. 20.

²¹⁸ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 385-388. *The Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern Europe Database [SSNE]*, 'Brog, William [SSNE 7842]'.

commanded by his father.²¹⁹ Instead, the Dutch States General were forced to break the then two regiments of the Brigade into three and this, in turn, allowed Buccleuch to command a regiment whilst Brog did not have to serve under an inexperienced nobleman.²²⁰ There are many more examples of professional soldiers objecting to nobles without military experience receiving senior positions of command.²²¹ Crucially, the existence of these precedents would mean that William of Orange, being deeply interested in warfare, would have known that his most experienced officers would not have deigned it fit to serve under inexperienced men, noble or otherwise.

William's decision to deploy the Scots-Dutch Brigade, however, betrays a similar lack of faith in the military abilities of the Scottish nobility. Politically, a handful of Scottish noble exile supporters were trusted, as they had been part of the Dutch invasion of England. Gardner has pointed out that historians have often viewed the Scottish exiles as passive participants in the Revolution, but her own research demonstrates that these Scots in William's Dutch court were actively involved.²²² This illustrates that William's probable distrust of the Scottish nobility, at least in military terms, was less related to political reliability, in some instances, and more to do with his lack of faith in their training and experience. Indeed, there were likely candidates for senior command from amongst the Scottish noble exiles, such as Archibald Campbell, tenth Earl of Argyll, and Henry Erskine, third Lord of Cardross. Unlike their exiled countrymen, the Scots-Dutch Brigade's senior ranks were officered by veterans with decades of military training and experience of war on the continent under Dutch, and, thus, William's, command. The reason influential noblemen, like Argyll, Cardross, or Leven, were not appointed to

²¹⁹ *SSNE*, 'Scott, Walter [SSNE 5009]'.

²²⁰ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 385-388.

²²¹ Murdoch and Grosjean, *Leslie*, pp. 124-125.

²²² Ginny Gardner, *The Scottish Exile Community in the Netherlands, 1660-1690* (Edinburgh, 2004) p. 292.

command the Williamite army in Scotland was their lack of experience and William's lack of familiarity with them as officers. These Scots may have been of higher social standing than the Brigade's professional officer corps, as well as trustworthy, but they were far too inexperienced to be appointed as William's Scottish commander-in-chief.

For William, both the former officers of James' armies and the politically loyal, yet inexperienced, exiles could not be relied upon to lead his forces in Scotland. William distrusted the former almost as much as he appears to have had a lack of faith in the latter.²²³ The only English and Scottish officers whom William trusted enough in both of those regards were the men who had served the Dutch Republic prior to 1688 and had remained loyal to him.²²⁴ For the entirety of the Nine Years' War, William only extended senior independent commands, defined here as command of a large detachment or army, to three such officers: Major-General Percy Kirke, Lieutenant-General Thomas Tollemache and Major-General Hugh Mackay.²²⁵ Kirke, Tollemache and Mackay were all career soldiers who had worked their way up from the rank of captain to attain staff-level command. William favoured such professional soldiers over noble officers with little to no experience. Childs has underlined this by pointing out that William was, of course, trained within the Dutch military system which emphasised dedication and merit as a course to promotion; although like all European armies of this period Dutch officers generally had to be at least gentlemen to be commissioned.²²⁶ Entrusting important commands, where day-to-day oversight was impossible, to officers like Mackay over those of a higher social standing was based primarily upon this Dutch model.²²⁷ William trusted men like Kirke, Tollemache and Mackay not only because they had experience but

²²³ Stapleton, 'Dual' in *Redefining*, p. 79.

²²⁴ Childs, *British*, pp. 24-25.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*

²²⁷ *Ibid.*

because they had faithfully served both him and the Dutch Republic. Before we come to Mackay's career, and the Brigade's sojourn to Scotland, it is worth briefly comparing it to that of Kirke and Tollemache.

Sir Percy Kirke was the son of an army officer and had joined the English army after the Restoration of Charles II before joining the Franco-British expedition against the Dutch during the third Anglo-Dutch War (1672-1674).²²⁸ Kirke returned to England after a separate peace was signed with the Dutch in 1674 and the Three Kingdoms became neutral.²²⁹ After his return, he was promoted to colonel and appointed to command Lord Plymouth's regiment of foot before they were dispatched to Tangier in 1680, where England had a short-lived colonial outpost on the North African coast. There the regiment was involved in numerous skirmishes with local powers.²³⁰ By 1685, he had returned from Tangier only to be deployed again, this time within England in defence of the newly crowned King James VII & II during the Monmouth Rising.²³¹ Kirke retained his position in the English army until November 1688 when he defected to the Dutch and sided with the Prince of Orange against his former master.²³² Unlike other defectors, however, Kirke had been a high-level conspirator against James prior to the invasion and had communicated with the Dutch to organise a mutiny within the English army, bringing across his entire regiment and a number of officers before the events at Salisbury.²³³ For his co-operation prior to the landing, William quickly promoted Kirke to the rank of major-general in the English army as it was well-known he had ample military experience and little sympathy for the Catholic King James or his adherents.²³⁴ As part of the re-

²²⁸ ODNB, Piers Wauchope, 'Kirke, Percy (d. 1691), army officer lieutenant.'

²²⁹ Ronald Hutton, *Charles II: King of England, Scotland, and Ireland* (New York, 1989), pp. 317-318.

²³⁰ ODNB, 'Kirke'.

²³¹ *Ibid.*

²³² *Ibid.*

²³³ Childs, *James II*, p. 185.

²³⁴ ODNB, 'Kirke'.

constituted Williamite English army, Kirke was placed in command of the force sent to relieve the city of Derry in June 1689.²³⁵ This was Kirke's first independent command, but in the year that followed he was relieved of it, being placed under the command of William himself after he arrived in Ireland.²³⁶ In his final year, 1691, Kirke was sent to Flanders where he was again subordinated to another, Georg Fredrich the Prince of Waldeck, and it was there that he died of an illness during the campaign.²³⁷ Of these three trusted senior British officers, Kirke was the only one who did not have decades of service in the Dutch army but rather was promoted due to his years of valuable experience elsewhere and his collusion prior to the events of Salisbury Plain.²³⁸ For William, these two facts placed him above the rest of James' former English officers who defected in 1688.

Lieutenant-General Thomas Tollemache had, similarly to Kirke, served in the Franco-British expedition during the third Anglo-Dutch War as well as in the Tangier garrison.²³⁹ Unlike Kirke, however, Tollemache had left the English army in 1685 after resigning his commission in protest at James' appointment of Catholic officers to the English, Scottish, and Irish armies.²⁴⁰ Travelling to the Dutch Republic, Tollemache sought employment with the Anglo-Dutch Brigade and was commissioned as a colonel, where he remained up until 1688.²⁴¹ After leading the English regiments in Dutch service during the invasion, Tollemache was given a position in William's English army.²⁴² This appointment was due, in large part, to the fact that the four regiments of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade were

²³⁵ Childs, *Ireland*, pp. 85-102.

²³⁶ *ODNB*, 'Kirke'.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*

²³⁸ *Ibid.*

²³⁹ *ODNB*, Piers Wauchope, 'Tollemache [Tolmach, Talmach, Talmash], Thomas (c. 1651-1694), army officer'.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*

²⁴² *Ibid.*

co-opted into the English establishment.²⁴³ Tollemache, however, was transferred to command the Coldstream Guards regiment and was deployed to Flanders in 1689, either his ability did not merit a senior command position at that time or there was no position available.²⁴⁴ In the following year, Tollemache's ability was recognised and he was promoted to Major-General to be attached to the command staff of William's army in Ireland.²⁴⁵ In 1692, he was promoted again, this time to the rank of lieutenant-general, after he complained directly to William about the preference for foreigners above British officers; a complaint which both Kirke and Mackay lodged in 1690 and 1691, respectively.²⁴⁶ Tollemache was given his first independent command as governor of Dixmunde, an important garrison city in Flanders with an army of 12,000 stationed there semi-permanently.²⁴⁷ In 1693, the final year of his life, Tollemache was killed commanding another independent detachment, this time an expeditionary force sent to capture the city of Brest.²⁴⁸ Tollemache was appointed to these two commands due to his previous military experience and his decades of loyal service to the Dutch Republic and William of Orange. Although both Kirke and Tollemache held important senior commands within the Williamite forces, Mackay would be the only one to be given command of an entire theatre of the Nine Years' War, Scotland, and command of the entirety of one of the Three Kingdoms' armies, the Scottish Williamite army.

Major-General Hugh Mackay was the third son of a landed Gaelic gentleman, also named Hugh, who had been a member of the Scottish parliament and a colonel of foot in the 1650s army of the Covenant.²⁴⁹ John Mackay of Rockwell, a nineteenth century

²⁴³ Childs, 'Scottish' in *Documentatieblad*, pp. 61-62.

²⁴⁴ *ODNB*, 'Tollemache'.

²⁴⁵ Childs, *Ireland*, pp. 308, 325, 336.

²⁴⁶ *ODNB*, 'Tollemache'; 'Kirke'; Wauchope, 'Mackay'.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁹ *ODNB*, 'Mackay'. See also: John Mackay, *The Life of Lieut.-General Hugh Mackay, Commander in Chief of the Forces in Scotland, 1689 and 1690* (Edinburgh, 1836), p. 3.

descendant and family historian of the Scourie Mackays, estimates that Major-General Mackay was born around 1640 in the parish of Eddrachillis, Sutherland, on the north-west coast of Scotland.²⁵⁰ Hugh Mackay embarked on his own military career in the early 1660s joining the *Regiment de Douglas*, a Scottish regiment in French service.²⁵¹ During his time in France, Mackay volunteered to be part of a levy of French officers who were to travel to the Venetian Republic to assist in the Cretan War (1645-1666). Arriving in the latter stages of the conflict, Mackay and his fellow officers were deployed to Crete as part of a French force sent to relieve the besieged Venetian forces at Candia.²⁵² He later wrote an account of his part in the siege of Candia, one the longest in history, as part of a comparative treatise with Julius Caesar's campaigns in Gaul.²⁵³ He returned to France and was in service there when the third Anglo-Dutch War (1672-1674) and Franco-Dutch War (1672-1678) broke out.²⁵⁴

The beginning of the war with the Dutch would signal a shift in Mackay's career as a soldier. As a subject of Charles II, and a captain in Douglas' regiment, he was heavily involved in fighting alongside the British expeditionary force led by James Scott, first Duke of Monmouth.²⁵⁵ However, the co-operation between the Stuart dynasty and Louis XIV's France ended when Charles II withdrew from the war with the Treaty of Westminster (1674).²⁵⁶ This would see the Scottish, English and Irish officers abroad withdrawn from France as part of the terms.²⁵⁷ With the *Regiment de Douglas* returning to Britain, Mackay took the decision to transfer his captaincy, a common practice amongst

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*

²⁵² *Ibid.*

²⁵³ *BL*, Kings MS 245-246, f. 164.

²⁵⁴ *ODNB*, 'Mackay'.

²⁵⁵ *ODNB*, Tim Harris, 'Scott [formerly Crofts], James, duke of Monmouth and first duke of Buccleuch (1649–1685), politician'.

²⁵⁶ Hutton, *Charles II*, pp. 317-318.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

Scottish regiments abroad, to the Scots-Dutch Brigade.²⁵⁸ This was, undoubtedly, due in large part to the fact Mackay had fallen in love with his future wife Clara de Bie, the daughter of the Dutch family he had been quartered upon during the French invasion.²⁵⁹ After switching sides, Mackay rose through the ranks of the Scots Brigade quickly and, by 1677, had succeeded Colonel Henry Graham as commander of the first regiment; a rank which effectively made him commander of the Scottish forces serving in the Dutch Republic.²⁶⁰ It was during this time that Mackay, and the Brigade, came to the attention of the Prince of Orange, who had found himself thrust into the role of captain-general of the Dutch army.²⁶¹

The early stages of the Franco-Dutch War had seen the Republic severely straitened by French forces, so much so that 1672 is still referred to as the *Rampjaar*, or 'Disaster Year'.²⁶² The Brigade had not fared much better, as the war with Scotland had closed off access to the unit's traditional recruiting grounds until 1676. The Brigade's fame as 'the bulwark of the Republic' suffered greatly during these years as it was staffed by European officers, largely disinterested in the preservation of the Brigade's martial reputation.²⁶³ By 1676, William was reportedly so 'picqued [sic] and displeased' with his 'Scotch' regiments that he asked Mackay 'if he was not surprised and ashamed at the behaviour of his countrymen'.²⁶⁴ Mackay responded 'that altho they had' the name, the Scots Brigade, 'they did not deserve it, for that near one half of the officers and more of the men were not Scots... having no relations, nor interest in Scotland'.²⁶⁵ Although still a

²⁵⁸ Murdoch & Grosjean, *Leslie*, p. 173. Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 470.

²⁵⁹ *ODNB*, 'Mackay'.

²⁶⁰ Murdoch & Grosjean, *Leslie*, p. 33. Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 472-473.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*

²⁶² Israel, *Dutch*, pp. 796-806.

²⁶³ James Cunningham, *Strictures on military discipline, in a series of letters, with a military discourse: in which is interspersed some account of the Scotch Brigade in the Dutch service. By an officer* (London, 1774), pp. 74-75.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

lieutenant-colonel at the time, Mackay went on to argue that the only way to 'recover' the Brigade's past rigor was to transfer all Dutch and European officers to other regiments and to allow 'officers, under-officers, and men... be only Scots'.²⁶⁶ Staffing the regiment purely with Scottish men, in Mackay's opinion, was the only way to improve their performance.²⁶⁷ Mackay went so far as to state that if they did not improve after these measures he would 'answer' for it.²⁶⁸ Clearly, Mackay's frank opinion impressed the Prince, as did the marked improvement in the Brigade's performance in 1677-78, and played no small part in his promotion in the following year.²⁶⁹

In 1685, the Brigade and Mackay were recalled by James to assist his forces in England in putting down the Monmouth Rising, whereby the Duke of Monmouth and Archibald Campbell, ninth Earl of Argyll, sought to remove the new King from his throne by force.²⁷⁰ Although Mackay and his men arrived too late to fight at the Battle of Sedgemoor, 5th July 1685, they were garrisoned in London for security until 1686.²⁷¹ During this time, the Brigade's wages were paid as part of the English army establishment.²⁷² Mackay became a key point of contact between William and his father-in-law, James. Mackay relayed expressions of loyalty to James via letters from William and reported back to the latter on affairs in London.²⁷³ James was greatly pleased with the condition of the Scots-Dutch Brigade and his 'secretary at war', William Blathwayt, wrote after seeing them on parade: 'They are the best men, and best prepared for service, that

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

²⁶⁹ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 476-478.

²⁷⁰ Childs, *James II*, pp. 1-18.

²⁷¹ *CSP*, James II, Vol II, H[ugh] Mackay to the Prince of Orange, 21st May 1686, p. 135.

²⁷² *CSP*, James II, II, The Earl of Rochester to the Prince of Orange, 26th January 1686, p. 17., *Ibid.*, 'The King to the Prince of Orange', 25th July 1686, p. 221. See also: Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 477.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, 'Mackay to Prince', 21st May 1686, p. 135.

ever were seen'.²⁷⁴ In a letter to William, James wrote of Mackay 'I hope you will be favourable to him for I find him a very good kind of man and you knew him to be a very good officer'.²⁷⁵ For his 'loyaltie' and his ability, James rewarded 'the trustie and wellbeloved' Colonel Hugh Mackay by appointing him to the Scottish privy council on 23rd July 1685.²⁷⁶ In addition to this, the council was informed that Mackay was to be promoted to 'Major Generall of our forces in that our ancient kingdom'.²⁷⁷ The rank remained only tacitly recognised in Dutch service and Mackay continued to be referred to in muster rolls as a colonel.²⁷⁸

Mackay had gained the esteem of both James and William prior to 1688, but it would be the Revolution that ultimately severed his connection, and the Brigade's, to the former. As explored in the introduction, James had ordered a recall of all of his subjects serving in the Dutch army in mid-1688, in light of increasing tensions between the Stuart kingdoms and the Dutch Republic.²⁷⁹ Mackay was one of 180 British officers who chose to stay in Dutch service in the lead-up to William's invasion of England.²⁸⁰ The recall, according to Childs, only increased the importance of the Scots and Anglo Brigades to William's invasion plans as James' proclamation had the effect of purging the Brigade of all officers whose loyalty to the House of Orange was 'dubious'.²⁸¹ Harris states that Mackay's role in leading the Scots and Anglo Brigades ashore at Torbay highlighted his

²⁷⁴ Blathwayt Papers, W. Blathwayt to the Duke of Albemarle, 4th July 1685, pp. 536-541., Quoted in Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 476.

²⁷⁵ *CSP*, James II, Vol I, The King to the Prince of Orange, 29th July 1685, p. 284.

²⁷⁶ Henry Paton (ed.), *RPCS*, Vol XI, 1685-1686, Letter from the King for admitting Hugh McKay of Scourie to the Council, 23rd July 1685, p. 107.

²⁷⁷ *RPCS*, XI, Letter from the King appointing Colonel Hugh McKay to command the three Scottish regiments from Holland', 30th July 1685, p. 125.

²⁷⁸ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 478

²⁷⁹ George Hilton Jones, 'The Recall of the British from the Dutch Service' in *The Historical Journal*, Vol 25, No. 2 (June, 1982), pp. 423-435.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁸¹ Childs, 'Scottish', p. 61.

importance to William.²⁸² Israel has also noted Mackay's close ties to the Prince of Orange adding that his importance in the military aspect of the Revolution and the Nine Years' War has remained largely ignored by historians.²⁸³ Israel has concluded that historians should take more heed of Mackay's central involvement both in the Revolution and in subsequent events.²⁸⁴ The Highland War was one such event and William's trust in his abilities, and his loyalty, was a key aspect of his central role. Mackay's years of experience as well as his twenty-year service record in the Dutch Republic made him a natural choice for senior command in the Highland War. However, his demonstrable loyalty to the Dutch Republic, proven by his decision to stay in William's service in 1688, was a major factor in the Prince of Orange's decision to trust him with an independent command in Scotland. Now that we have a comparative idea of Tollemache, Kirke and Mackay's careers we can return to William's decision to deploy the Brigade to Scotland and their orders. These men were all veteran soldiers with over sixty years of military experience between them and a proven loyalty to William, but Tollemache and Mackay were given greater positions of authority and responsibility due to their outstanding service to the Dutch Republic prior to 1688. Regardless, all three were held in higher esteem than the vast majority of their countrymen, especially those who had abandoned James at the last moment.

William had especial need of men he could trust since money to pay his armies was in short supply. The costs of Dutch intervention in England were substantial and had yet to be reimbursed, and Stephen Baxter points out that the Dutch army had only £10,000 remaining for its use in early 1689; eventually the English parliament would offer £600,000

²⁸² Harris, *Revolution*, p. 368.

²⁸³ Israel, *Dutch*, p. 145.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

in the summer of that year.²⁸⁵ Difficulties continued to mount for William in Scotland and Ireland as well, becoming increasingly unstable. The opening of a northern front in Scotland would have been, arguably, far too much for the Williamites in England, especially if the Scottish Convention sided with James. From a Dutch point of view, William had promised the States General the significant military support of the Three Kingdoms against France on the continent. Childs has stated the fact that William wanted to 'conquer England and then return to the war in Europe was well known'.²⁸⁶ Huygens, recorded, in February 1689, that the Prince's mood appeared troubled.²⁸⁷ Clearly, the tumultuous state of the Three Kingdoms, which now threatened to embroil him, and the Dutch army accompanying him, was a concern, especially as a war raged on the Dutch Republic's borders. Scotland was one such consideration that William would have resolve if he wished to redirect the Three Kingdoms military power to the continent and to secure his position in England.

On 7th March 1689, William acted as he issued Mackay with instructions that the Scots-Dutch Brigade were to be dispatched to their ancestral homeland.²⁸⁸ William empowered Mackay to command all his forces in Scotland and gave the Brigade orders to protect 'the kingdome and our interest'.²⁸⁹ Mackay and the Brigade had been given clear orders to secure Scotland for William and Mary, whatever the outcome of the proceedings of the Convention of Estates. On the same day, William likewise issued instructions to Lord George Melville, a chief supporter and William's new Scottish secretary of state.²⁹⁰ Melville was instructed to 'concurr in advice and direction in matters of war with the

²⁸⁵ Baxter, *William*, p. 250.

²⁸⁶ Childs, *James II*, p. 189.

²⁸⁷ Huygens, *Diary*, 20th February 1689, p. 83.

²⁸⁸ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Instructions to Mackay, 7th March 1689, pp. 221-222.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 222.

²⁹⁰ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Instructions from the King for the Lord Melville, 7th March 1689, p. 222.

Commander in Cheife of our forces'.²⁹¹ He was to ensure that Scottish forces would be levied to counter 'any formed party' or 'invasion' that threatened the Kingdom and, perhaps more importantly, protect William's interests there.²⁹² Melville represented the political arm of William's strategy to secure Scotland as well as to ensure the co-operation of Scottish civil authorities with Mackay and the Scots-Dutch Brigade. Clearly, the Brigade were to play a central role in securing Scotland militarily with Mackay placed firmly as William's selected commander-in-chief for any Scottish force that would be raised there by his supporters. Harris argued that it is 'incorrect to paint a picture of William invading England blithely unconcerned about what was going on in Scotland'.²⁹³ All of this demonstrates that William was very much concerned about Scotland and his deployment of the Brigade, along with his selection of Mackay as his Scottish commander, reinforces this. The Scots-Dutch Brigade's order to travel to their homeland, prior to the Convention's first meeting on 14th March, tells us that William was well aware of the need to secure Scotland for his interest. In such uncertain circumstances, only a trusted commander with a loyal cadre of soldiers could be sent to oversee forces in Scotland. Mackay and the Scots-Dutch Brigade would have been considered the best group to undertake this mission. This leads us to the circumstances of their departure.

The Brigade was set to depart by sea on the day following 7th March 1689, but were delayed as a result of Mackay falling ill and the slow pace of preparations, particularly in gathering the required weapons, ammunition, and money.²⁹⁴ The Scots-Dutch Brigade were to be supported by the Royal Scots Dragoons; a regiment of Scots serving in the English army and commanded by a, newly appointed, former lieutenant-

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*

²⁹² *Ibid.*

²⁹³ Harris, 'Scotland', p. 130.

²⁹⁴ *CTB*, IX, Part I, 15th March 1689, p. 9.

colonel of the Brigade.²⁹⁵ Sir Thomas Livingstone had been with the unit when they landed in England in 1688. Livingstone had served in the unit for much of his adult life having been born in the Dutch Republic, the son of second-generation Scottish migrants.²⁹⁶ Mackay relayed an order from William Blathwayt, who retained his position as secretary of war after the Revolution, for the dragoons to be sent overland to Scotland on 4th February 1689.²⁹⁷ However, Livingstone and his dragoons were also delayed in their departure because the regiment had remained unpaid as its former commander, Charles Murray, Lord Dunmore, refused to settle this outstanding debt from his own pocket.²⁹⁸ As the Brigade set sail from London on 13th March, Charles Erskine, fifth Earl of Mar's Scottish regiment of foot had mutinied at Ipswich upon learning they were to be sent to Flanders.²⁹⁹

A significant portion of Mar's regiment of foot, also known as the Royal Scots Fusiliers, had decided to march for Scotland with the apparent purpose of serving King James' cause in the homeland.³⁰⁰ The regiment's Jacobite tendencies were well-known as they had been commanded, during the Revolution, by Brigadier Thomas Buchan; a former Scots-Dutch Colonel who had heeded James' 1688 recall, left Dutch service and had remained loyal to the point of going into exile with James in December of that year.³⁰¹ The regiment Buchan left behind in England had remained largely loyal to James and the mutiny comprised of 550 soldiers and officers, of 1,400 men in total).³⁰² Seizing weapons from the arsenal, as well as a small field cannon, they departed for Scotland with their likely objective being Stirling Castle, the regiment's traditional billet and where a small

²⁹⁵ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 319, 322.

²⁹⁶ ODNB, 'Livingstone'.

²⁹⁷ NLS, MS 3740, Major-General Mackay to Blathwayt, Secretary of War, 4th February 1689, f. 80.

²⁹⁸ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 125.

²⁹⁹ Raffe, *Scotland*, p. 152.

³⁰⁰ John Childs, *General Percy Kirk and the Later Stuart Army* (London, 2015), p. 134.

³⁰¹ Alastair J. Mann, *James VII: Duke and King of Scots, 1633-1701* (Edinburgh, 2014), p. 182.

³⁰² Childs, *Kirk*, p. 134. Childs, *British*, pp. 21-22.

company of their comrades remained in garrison.³⁰³ The mutiny confirmed William's fears about the loyalty of British regiments he had inherited from James. It set off fears amongst Williamites in the English parliament and they demanded the Prince of Orange send Dutch troops to arrest the Scottish mutineers, with the Whig M.P. Jack Howe declaring that only Dutchmen could be sent as 'I know not which else to trust'.³⁰⁴ This illustrates that feelings of distrust for and unease with soldiers who had formerly served James was pervasive even beyond William's inner circle. The Scottish fusiliers' mutiny would have undoubtedly further retrenched that distrust and would have, undoubtedly, reaffirmed William's confidence in deciding to send the Scots-Dutch Brigade to deal with the uncertain situation in Scotland. Two Dutch regiments were, shortly after Howe's appeals in parliament, sent to pursue the mutineers and managed to corner them on the road between East Anglia and Lincolnshire, whereupon the fusiliers promptly elected to surrender.³⁰⁵ Within a week the Mar's mutineers had been shipped to Flanders, but had they reached Scotland they may have delivered the Jacobites a professional, well-armed and, if they had reached Stirling, well positioned garrison.³⁰⁶ As Raffe states 'Though suppressed without violence, the mutiny was a harbinger of subsequent events in Scotland'.³⁰⁷

The Royal Scots Fusiliers' mutiny perfectly demonstrated the precarity of William's, and his supporters', control of England as well as the uncertainty surrounding the situation in Scotland. With the Brigade *en route* by sea and the Royal Scots Dragoons heading northward by road, William had now dispatched two detachments to Scotland. In addition, William ordered the Dutch general Godert de Ginkel to secure the Anglo-

³⁰³ Childs, *British*, pp. 21-22. *NRS*, E7/5, Treasury Register 1688-1689, 'Garrison (Old Company) Stirling Castle', 13th April 1689, ff. 3, 15.

³⁰⁴ Childs, *British*, p. 22.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁷ Raffe, *Scotland*, p. 152.

Scottish border with a significant Anglo-Dutch garrison stationed at Berwick.³⁰⁸ Why then did William not simply order Ginkel to cross into Scotland to secure it? William knew that such an intervention would have been met with overwhelming negativity from much of the Scottish population if it was undertaken by foreign troops. The invasion, or intervention, of an exclusively English and Dutch force would have likely alienated even those Scottish noblemen and lords who had offered William their support. The Duke of Hamilton vehemently opposed even the slightest suggestion of deploying such a force in Scotland, as Savile later noted in April 1689.³⁰⁹ Hamilton had earlier, on 23rd March, expressed his opinion that the Prince of Orange would be better advised to release Scottish officers from his Dutch and English armies to raise new regiments in Scotland.³¹⁰ William had already ordered Scottish officers be sent to Scotland earlier, on 7th March 1689.³¹¹ However, these men were, of course, the Scots-Dutch Brigade and they were to, officially, remain a part of that unit rather than be dispersed to raise new units. Although Dundee's departure had accelerated the need for military forces to protect the Convention of Estates, Scottish Williamites still dismissed the notion that readily available English forces should intervene in Scotland. On 27th March, Sir James Dalrymple of Stair wrote to London advised against it, stating it would be counterproductive to send 'grein English [soldiers] from ther plentiful lyf [sic] to merch 400 myls, and get hard quarter'.³¹² Major English military intervention was considered deleterious by the Scottish Williamites for a variety of reasons; ranging from the political sensitivity of such a deployment, likely based on the collective memory of the Cromwellian Conquest (1650-1654), to concerns

³⁰⁸ Childs, *British*, p. 28.

³⁰⁹ Foxcroft (ed.), *Savile*, II, 4th April 1689, p. 212.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.* See also source quoted therein: Royal Historical Manuscripts Commission Report, Vol XI, Part 6, p. 175.

³¹¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Instructions to Mackay, 7th March 1689, pp. 221-222.

³¹² Note: 'grein', or green, would refer to inexperience in this context. *Melvilles*, Dalrymple to Melville, 27th March 1689, pp. 4-5.

about the ability of English soldiers to endure warfare in the harsher northern climes.³¹³ Dalrymple helpfully offered, to his mind, a more suitable solution by positing that the English parliament forward the Scottish Convention a sizeable loan to raise, and to pay for, a new Scottish army of 10,000 men.³¹⁴ However, William declined to entertain such a proposal as it would have been vastly unpopular amongst his English supporters.³¹⁵ This is not to say that the Scottish Williamites were completely opposed to military assistance being sent from England. During the Highland War three regiments were sent to serve in Scotland: Colonel Fernando Hastings' dragoons, Sir John Lanier's regiment of horse and Colonel Hayford's dragoons.³¹⁶ However, the Scottish Williamites stipulated that these regiments remain under the command of a Scottish commander-in-chief.

The level of opposition from Scottish Williamites surrounding the prospect of an English, or indeed Dutch, army entering Scotland reveals a degree of political calculation behind the Scots-Dutch Brigade's deployment there. William's decision to send the Brigade was a similar political 'masterstroke' to his use of the English and Scottish regiments of the Dutch army when invading England.³¹⁷ Sending the Scots-Dutch Brigade allowed William to secure Scotland, militarily, under the guise of releasing concerned Scottish soldiers from his service to protect the 'liberty' of their countrymen at home. The Scots-Dutch Brigade were not simply chosen because they were trustworthy men with whom the Dutch prince was familiar, they were also selected because of their identity as Scottish regiments. This made them far more politically palatable to the Scottish Convention of Estates and the population of Scotland in general. Of course, it must be borne in mind, the Scots-Dutch Brigade were never formally released from Dutch service

³¹³ Ibid. See also: Frances Dow, *Cromwellian Scotland 1651-1660* (Edinburgh, 1999), pp. 13-23.

³¹⁴ *Melvilles*, Dalrymple to Melville, 23rd March 1689, p. 4.

³¹⁵ Ibid.

³¹⁶ Charles Dalton, *English Army Lists and Commission Registers, 1661-1714*, Vol III, 1689-1694 (London, 1896), pp. 10- 11.

³¹⁷ Childs, *James II*, p. 176.

nor co-opted into the new Scottish Williamite army. Instead, the Brigade entered Scotland without offending the sensibilities of much of the Convention's membership, whilst William gained a loyal military force on the ground, thus ensuring the security of his interests there.

Securing Scotland, March-May 1689

When the Brigade arrived in Scotland they had three regiments, commanded by Mackay, Balfour, and Ramsay.³¹⁸ On 25th March, a small advance party, mainly composed of senior officers, came ashore at Leith docks and, by the following day, they had landed 1,100 soldiers with arms, ammunition, and £10,000 Sterling to facilitate raising new levies.³¹⁹ This represented only one-third of the total strength of the Scots Brigade from the previous year, when it had 3,000 men within its ranks.³²⁰ In his memoirs, Mackay explained that this drastic reduction in numbers was due to 'the king having taken away their old Dutch souldiers out of these three regiments'.³²¹ It is useful to note that Mackay's use of the term 'Dutch' in his account of the Highland War distinguishes the personnel of the Brigade from their non-Brigade counterparts.³²² These 'Dutch' veterans, according to Mackay, were among the Brigade's 'best and oldest men' but William had ordered these men stay behind 'to recruit the Dutch regiments in England'.³²³ The latter group were engaged in recruiting men to serve in English and Scottish regiments in Flanders. William acknowledged that the Brigade was understrength, instructing Mackay to 'strengthen the

³¹⁸ *SSNE*, 'Balfour, Batholomew [SSNE 8260]', 'Ramsay, George [SSNE 5052]'. Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 5.

³¹⁹ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 26th March 1689, p. 18. Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 6. *CTB*, 1689-92, 15th March 1689, p. 9.

³²⁰ Childs, *James II*, p. 132.

³²¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 6.

³²² The exact quote reads as follows: 'the three Scots regiments, which we shall henceforth, for distinction, call Dutch...' and they are initially referred to as 'the three Scots regiments come out of Holland'. See: Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 4.

³²³ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

regiments sent from hence for Scotland to number of marching foot in each company'.³²⁴ This reduction in the unit's strength, making it relatively small prior to their pre-Revolution formation, must be taken into account to contextualise the Brigade's role in the early stages of the Highland War.

Mackillop and Murdoch have posited that the Scots-Dutch Brigade's return to Scotland in 1689 is comparable to the return migration of Scottish veterans from the continent in 1638-39 in the Bishops' Wars.³²⁵ They point out that the Brigade's return was the second such instance in which 'overseas soldiers were so decisively involved in altering the country's entire direction' and that whilst the Revolution in Scotland was, in part, driven by events in England the 'Scots cannot be blamed for perceiving the Scots-Dutch regiments as finishing in 1688-91 what Swedish veterans had started in 1638-40'.³²⁶ Emphasising the importance of the Brigade's timely intervention in Scottish politics is certainly pertinent but the notion of the 'umbilical link' between these two events can prove unhelpful to our understanding of the Brigade's part in the Highland War.³²⁷ The mass return of Scottish veterans from European service to fight in the civil wars of the mid-century does not closely compare to the circumstances under which the Scots-Dutch regiments arrived in Scotland. The Brigade did not represent a large body of veterans, either officers or soldiers, and, as a result, could not have the same practical impact upon the Scottish Williamite military as the veterans of the mid-century had had upon the Covenanters armies.³²⁸ The Covenanters had thousands of veterans that they were able to disperse throughout the regiments of their armies and, thus, ensure that military doctrine and discipline learned in Europe was spread throughout those formations. Essentially,

³²⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Instructions to Mackay, 7th March 1689, p. 221.

³²⁵ Murdoch & Mackillop, 'Introduction' in *Fighting*, p. xxxii.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*

³²⁷ *Ibid.*

³²⁸ Stevenson, *Revolution*, p. 130.

these Scottish veterans with European service acted as a nucleus around which an army could be constructed, down to regimental level.³²⁹ The reduction in the Scots-Dutch Brigade's strength would mean their intervention in Scotland would occur under vastly different circumstances. Ferguson has observed that the Brigade were 'drawn upon for services of special importance and hazard' during the Highland War.³³⁰ Furthermore, he argues that as the Brigade were dispersed throughout Scotland their performance overall during the conflict was hampered and attributes their defeat at Killiecrankie to the latter factor.³³¹

In the days following their landing, the Brigade found themselves drawn between securing key garrisons and being sent as special detachments in pursuit of the Jacobites around Scotland. In addition to this, Mackay had assumed command of the Scottish Williamite army overall and other senior Brigade officers joined him, acting as military advisers or logistical overseers. Building on both Mackillop and Murdoch, as well as Ferguson's work, this section will argue that the Brigade, although understrength, performed well during the initial stages of the Highland War.³³² We will illustrate that the Scots-Dutch regiments played a critical role in securing Scotland for the fledgling Scottish Williamite regime, which had little to no military forces of its own in March 1689.³³³ The Scots-Dutch officers could not be dispersed widely, but instead acted as a loyal military cadre around which the Scottish Williamite army could be built. However, they proved far more useful as a vanguard for both William and the Convention as they were able to be quickly deployed in the initial months of the war; as they were at the siege of

³²⁹ Edward M. Furgol, 'Beating the Odds: Alexander Leslie's 1640 Campaign in England' in *Fighting*, pp. 38-39. Laura Stewart, *Rethinking the Scottish Revolution: Covenanted Scotland, 1637-1651* (Oxford, 2016), p. 180.

³³⁰ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 482.

³³¹ *Ibid.*

³³² *Ibid.*; Murdoch & Mackillop, 'Introduction', p. xxxii.

³³³ Raffe, *Scotland*, p. 109.

Edinburgh Castle, in the seizure of Stirling Castle, in the pursuit of Viscount Dundee, and in organising the war effort against the Jacobites.³³⁴ Effectively, the dispersal of the Brigade proved to be both an advantage and disadvantage. Whilst this put strain on their already diminished numbers, it would mean they were able to secure key areas of the Scottish Lowlands and to contribute to the defeat of the Jacobites in the first pitched battle at Loup Hill, 16th May 1689.³³⁵ This central role was accorded to them due to their loyalty to William, as established previously, and their status as veterans of European warfare. Moreover, these same factors made the Convention reliant upon the unit for much of the Highland War. These dynamics are first apparent in the Brigade's reception in the immediate aftermath of their arrival in Edinburgh and the uncertain political situation they briefly found themselves in.

When William wrote his instructions for Mackay, it provided the Scots-Dutch Brigade with a warrant to operate in Scotland up until 14th March, when the Convention commenced. This was based on William's status as an administrative caretaker of Scottish civil and military affairs, a mantle which he had been bestowed by a delegation of Scottish peers and gentry, which included men like William Hamilton, third Duke of Hamilton, Archibald Campbell, tenth Earl of Argyll, and Sir James Dalrymple, first Viscount Stair.³³⁶ This cadre of William's supporters lacked official status at the time, but by March 1689 they had become sitting members of the Convention of Estates.³³⁷ When the Brigade arrived in Scotland, the legitimacy of this warrant had expired as had William's status as

³³⁴ Anon., *Edinburgh*, p. 47. Henry Paton (ed.), *RPCS*, Vol XIV, 1689, Act in favour of John Barclay, gardener, 26th September 1689, p. 341.

³³⁵ Paul Hopkins, 'Loup Hill. 16th May 1689: The First 'Battle' of Dundee's Jacobite War – Part One & Part Two' in *The Kintyre Antiquarian & Natural History Society Magazine* [KANH] (June, 1998). *CSP*, William & Mary, I, Lord Melville to Major-General Mackay, 4th June 1689, p. 135.

³³⁶ *ODNB*, Rosalind K. Marshall, 'Hamilton, [formerly Douglas], William, third duke of Hamilton (1634-1694), nobleman.'; John S. Shaw, 'Campbell, Archibald, first duke of Argyll (d. 1703), nobleman and politician.'; J.D. Ford, 'Dalrymple, James, first Viscount Stair (1619-1695), lawyer and politician'.

³³⁷ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 10.

caretaker of Scottish affairs.³³⁸ Therefore, when the Brigade came ashore, on 25th March, they no longer had an official mandate to operate in Scotland.³³⁹ The uncertain political situation may have been a cause for concern for Mackay, especially when considering that the Convention's co-operation was not guaranteed. The uncertainty of the Brigade's status would see Mackay adopt a diplomatic approach toward the Convention. He later wrote, that at the time he had 'desired to act in concert with the said Convention'.³⁴⁰ William's instructions to Mackay encouraged he take such an approach, urging the Scots-Dutch commander to call all upon sympathisers to work with the Brigade to defend the country's 'Protestant Liberty' and the right of the Estates to convene.³⁴¹

William had sought to express such goals, with the aim of gaining further support in Scotland, by printing a declaration addressed to the country in 1688, the writing of which was assisted by the advice his chief Scottish supporters.³⁴² In this pamphlet, William connected his cause to 'the defence of the Laws and Liberties there of [sic], the maintaining of the Protestant Religion... and the securing of the People in the enjoyment of all their just Rights' in Scotland.³⁴³ William's greatest supporters in the country sought to emulate this approach to win 'the broadest possible cross-section' of support from the population, as Harris has pointed out.³⁴⁴ In light of the declaration and the aims of his most loyal Scottish adherents, it is clear that Mackay's instructions to do the same, drawing upon the broadest possible constituency, those disaffected from James, was a clear and thought-out strategy. With the spectre of civil war now looming, and a palpable

³³⁸ Anon., *Proceedings*, II, 'Appendix: His Highness the Prince of Orange His Speech to the Scots Lords and Gentlemen; with Their Address, and His Highness his Answer. With a true Account of what past at their Meeting in the Council-Chamber, at Whitehall, [7th] Jan. 1688/89', pp. 293-296.

³³⁹ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 26th March 1689, p. 18.

³⁴⁰ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 5.

³⁴¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Instructions to Mackay, 7th March 1689, p. 222.

³⁴² EEBO, William of Orange, *DECLARATION*.

³⁴³ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁴ Harris, *Revolution*, p. 381.

fear of invasion from Ireland by James' and his French allies' forces, the Convention quickly reciprocated Mackay's co-operative demeanour.

In the following days, the Brigade were granted warrant to quarter their regiments in Leith and 'the Suburbs of Edinburgh' as well as a warrant to 'beat the drums through the Kingdom, for recruits'.³⁴⁵ This allowed the Brigade to begin strengthening their regiments, as William had ordered, and to increase 'each [regiment] to 1200' men.³⁴⁶ Operating on the basis of warrants issued, by the Convention, for each individual aspect of their activities was not sustainable, nor did it constitute a broad based statement of their legitimacy to operate in Scotland. Accordingly, the Convention offered Mackay a commission, on 28th March 1689, as commander-in-chief of the Scottish Williamite army with the power 'to command any forces, either standing or to be raised with the militia, within this kingdom'.³⁴⁷ The Convention recognised that William had previously agreed to administer Scotland's affairs and 'had sent down Major General MacKay with some Scots regiments under his command for the security of the estates and general peace of the kingdom'.³⁴⁸ The fact that the Brigade were regiments of Scottish soldiers undoubtedly helped to allay the Convention's anxieties about their continued service in a foreign army. The Convention even acknowledged William's 'great kindness and care' to send the Brigade to protect them.³⁴⁹ The selection of Mackay would only have been aided by his rank as a major-general, granted to him in 1686, in the Scottish army. This earlier promotion served as evidence of his eminent qualification for the role of commander-in-

³⁴⁵ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 26th-27th March 1689, pp. 18-19.

³⁴⁶ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Instructions to Mackay, 7th March 1689, p. 221.

³⁴⁷ *Records of the Parliament of Scotland [RPS]*, 1689/7/70, Commission to Major General MacKay to command the forces, 28th March 1689.

³⁴⁸ *RPS*, 1689/7/70.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

chief.³⁵⁰ Mackay's perception of the situation, and the action he took, would be critical to positioning the Brigade at the heart of the Scottish Williamite war effort.

Mackay pointed out that when he first arrived in Scotland he 'could not regulate himself by the Kings instructions' and instead had to follow the 'order of the Convention'.³⁵¹ When they 'conferred upon the General command of all the forces of the kingdom... he made no difficulty to accept'.³⁵² Although Mackay had been instructed to command William's forces in Scotland, the instructions did not overtly state that he should assume command of the Convention's forces.³⁵³ His appointment was fraught with political uncertainty but, due to the geographical distance, Mackay had to interpret his instructions as best he could. He reasoned that 'his Majestie intrusted the service of that kingdom for him' and as such he accepted the role of Scottish commander-in-chief 'being sure his Majestie would be well satisfied'.³⁵⁴ Despite the circumstances having drastically changed since Mackay was issued with his instructions, on 7th March, Mackay evidently felt he had William's confidence and that this position would only serve to further his master's cause in Scotland. With Mackay now empowered by the Convention 'to reduce any castles or forts... to dissipate any bodies of men... in arms against the authority of the estates'.³⁵⁵ In other words, this commission provided the Scots-Dutch Brigade with a mandate to operate in Scotland legitimately. The Convention mimicked William by placing their trust in Mackay, and by association the Brigade, and they stated Mackay had the authority 'to do everything thereupon proper to the office and trust of a commander in chief of the forces of this kingdom'.³⁵⁶ Finally, they re-admitted Mackay to the Scottish

³⁵⁰ *RPCS*, XI, Letter from the King appointing Colonel Hugh McKay to command the three Scottish regiments from Holland, 30th July 1685, p. 125.

³⁵¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 10.

³⁵² *Ibid.*

³⁵³ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Instructions to Mackay, 7th March 1689, p. 221.

³⁵⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 10.

³⁵⁵ *RPS*, 1689/7/70.

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

privy council to better co-ordinate the war effort with the central government.³⁵⁷ These actions saw the Convention of Estates reinforce William's warrant to Mackay and the Brigade to operate in Scotland and provided them with the legal basis for action against the Jacobites and, crucially, the necessary access to state support to do so. The Brigade utilised this by immediately moving to seize control of key garrisons and taking over command of the developing siege of Edinburgh Castle.

Siege of Edinburgh Castle, 18th March-15th June 1689

Upon the Brigade's arrival in Edinburgh, they found themselves quickly co-opted into the ad-hoc forces besieging Edinburgh Castle.³⁵⁸ The Convention had no prepared military force when Dundee departed Edinburgh and the siege, which lasted until 15th June, was at first conducted by groups of volunteers.³⁵⁹ The Brigade's involvement in the siege proved to be their first military operation in Scotland and, as such, it offers a perfect example of how central their role would be in the Highland War. Gordon, the governor of the castle, had refused to surrender to the Convention and as a result the meeting's armed volunteers had encircled the Jacobite garrison.³⁶⁰ This volunteer force reportedly numbered 6,000 men in total.³⁶¹ The 'Cameronian Guard', followers of the late Covenanting minister Richard Cameron, made up the bulk of the forces blockading Edinburgh Castle, but more generally the men were Presbyterians from the Western Shires mixed with some Highland clansmen loyal to Argyll.³⁶² Despite their enthusiasm, the lack of military training amongst the volunteers proved a hindrance to a successful

³⁵⁷ *RPCS*, XIII, Letter to Major General McKay, Master of Forbes and Laird of Grant as Councillors, 27th March 1689, p. 381.

³⁵⁸ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 125.

³⁵⁹ Raffe, *Scotland*, p. 152.

³⁶⁰ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 124-125.

³⁶¹ Harris, *Revolution*, pp. 370-371.

³⁶² Andrew Crichton (ed.), *The Life and Diary of Lieut. Col. J. Blackadder* (Edinburgh, 1824), p. 28. *RPS*, 1689/3/72, Act approving the good services done by several persons belonging to Glasgow, Argyll and other wester shires, 28th March 1689.

siege. The *Proceedings* reported, prior to the Brigade's arrival, that the volunteers had dug trenches 'with so great ignorance' of siege tactics that Gordon 'might have killed the most part of them'.³⁶³ However, the pamphlet concluded that Gordon had shown restraint as he was reluctant to damage the town or injure its inhabitants.³⁶⁴

The Brigade's arrival would mean that the Convention no longer had to rely upon volunteers for their protection. Most of these men were released from service by the Convention on 28th March with only 800 of them retained as recruits for the Earl of Leven's regiment of foot, staffed by officers who had arrived with Leven in 1688 as part of the Dutch invasion.³⁶⁵ The Scots-Dutch officers quickly deployed their expertise on siege warfare from the continent as the haphazard trenches encircling the castle were ordered to be improved.³⁶⁶ Mackay instructed his men to requisition packs of wool from Edinburgh merchants to utilise them as makeshift 'fascines' (usually a bundle of wooden rods used to strengthen the sides of trenches) which could screen cannon fire from the castle's formidable batteries and ramparts.³⁶⁷ This, in turn, would protect soldiers digging new trenches toward the castle, a common tactic to allow besiegers to work as close to the walls of a fortification as possible in order to facilitate an easier assault.³⁶⁸ Batteries were raised so that artillery pieces could more effectively bombard the Jacobite garrison; these were placed at 'Collups' Castle, George Heriot's School and, lastly, at 'Mouterhouse hill'.³⁶⁹ Mackay also 'ordered a trench to be made about that part of the Castle... which lies towards the country, to hinder the communication of intelligence and provisions, with the

³⁶³ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 26th March 1689, p. 18.

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁵ *RPS*, 1689/3/72. *Melvilles*, Sir James Dalrymple of Stair to Lord Melville, 23rd March 1689, p. 3. Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 19th March 1689, p. 8.

³⁶⁶ Anon., *Edinburgh*, p. 47. *RPCS*, XIV, Act in favour of John Barclay, gardener, 26th September 1689, p. 341.

³⁶⁷ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 2nd April 1689, p. 25. Terry, 'Siege', pp. 166-167.

³⁶⁸ Childs, *Warfare*, pp. 145-150.

³⁶⁹ Terry, 'Siege', p. 166.

Duke of Gordon'.³⁷⁰ These renewed efforts contrasted greatly with the amateur, if uneventful, encirclement undertaken by the volunteers. The Brigade's efforts were noted by an anonymous member of the besieged garrison, who wrote an account of the siege in the months following its end.³⁷¹ The volunteers, he stated, did not possess the knowledge of military tactics to erect artillery batteries properly nor to operate their cannons so their attempts at bombarding the walls were ineffective.³⁷² However, this came to an end when the Brigade took over the siege and daily bombardments were undertaken alongside a more effective encirclement. Clearly, the Scots-Dutch officer corps' knowledge of siege warfare and modern techniques were critical to increase the effectiveness of the siege, encircling the castle completely and cutting off supplies.

This was not done without difficulty as progress on the trenches proved painfully slow under intense artillery fire and casualties were inflicted during the erection of the new batteries.³⁷³ It is worth briefly exploring the impact of the siege upon the Brigade as previous scholarship has not appreciated that they suffered considerable losses, even in the early stages of the investment. New knowledge of the impact upon the Brigade emanates from claims for financial compensation lodged by the inhabitants of Edinburgh with the privy council. Combined with sources which reveal the better-known military contours of the siege, such as the diary of Mr. James Nimmo, this new information about the Scots-Dutch Brigade's losses allows the appreciation of the importance of this engagement and offers further context for subsequent problems the Brigade encountered due to a lack of experienced men later that year.³⁷⁴ The nameless soldier within the castle

³⁷⁰ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 6.

³⁷¹ Anon., *Edinburgh*, p. 47.

³⁷² *Ibid.*

³⁷³ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁴ W.G. Scott-Moncrieff (ed.), *Narrative of Mr. James Nimmo written for his own satisfaction to keep in some remembrance the Lord's way of dealing and kindness towards him, 1654-1709* (Edinburgh, 1889), p. 92.

observed that 'The besiegers now, with the losse of men, finished a battery at... Collops... south of the garrison'.³⁷⁵ The siege intensified from 30th March onwards with 'great shooting' plaguing the inhabitants of Edinburgh, such as Nimmo, who wrote 'we could hardlie go out or in, but in vew of the Castle & they having killed some persons upon the streat'.³⁷⁶ This artillery fire combined with the commanding position of Edinburgh Castle caused several casualties amongst the Brigade.

Several Scots-Dutch soldiers were wounded or killed whilst working on the trenches. Due to their exposed positions, in view of the castles high ramparts, the survivors of the artillery fire were left where they lay for a number of days.³⁷⁷ Gordon called for a parley on 4th April, declaring in a message to Mackay that he was 'sensible divers of their [the Brigade's] Men were wounded in the Trenches' and Gordon offered to 'permit that their wounded... be carried off'.³⁷⁸ Mackay, however, keen to avoid a cessation in hostilities, halting efforts to force the garrison to surrender, bluntly rejected Gordon's overture, replying 'That they would take off their wounded... when they pleased, without his leave'.³⁷⁹ His experience of siege warfare appears to have put the continuation of the siege above all else, as the quicker the garrison was subdued the less costly the fighting would be. Gordon, for his own part, had called for the ceasefire to give his own men a break from the constant barrage from the Scots-Dutch batteries.³⁸⁰ The wounded Scots-Dutch soldiers were rescued in the following days, as trenches and screens were reconstructed in preparation for an assault.³⁸¹ The exact number of soldiers killed by this incident remains unknown, but the account of one soldier's death does

³⁷⁵ Anon., *Edinburgh*, p. 47.

³⁷⁶ *Nimmo*, p. 92.

³⁷⁷ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 4th April 1689, p. 27.

³⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁰ Terry, 'Siege', pp. 166-167.

³⁸¹ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 4th April 1689, p. 27. *RPCS*, XIV, Act in favour of John Barclay, gardener, 26th September 1689, p. 341.

appear in the privy council records. The soldier was carried from the trenches, heavily wounded, to be placed in the care of John Barclay, a gardener whose house near the West Kirk had been converted into a barracks.³⁸² Barclay had, voluntarily, cared for numerous wounded soldiers and had paid for the coffin for the unfortunate soldier 'to the satisfactione' of his captain, indicating that the man was likely a veteran well-known to the officers of the regiment.³⁸³ Mackay's officers returned the kindness by supporting Barclay's petition to the council for financial remuneration.³⁸⁴ Considering the losses they had suffered Mackay decided an assault on the castle would be too costly and decided to continue the encirclement alongside almost daily bombardment of the Jacobite garrison.

By 18th April, Viscount Dundee had begun to attract influential Highland chieftains, such as Sir Ewen Cameron of Lochiel, to his cause.³⁸⁵ This only increased concerns amongst the council, that a Highland incursion into the Lowlands was imminent, at a time when James' Irish army had besieged Derry.³⁸⁶ A large portion of the Scots-Dutch Brigade being engaged in the siege at Edinburgh was only compounded by the fact the Convention had to raise a new army for its defence. In the meantime, the Brigade were desperately needed to oppose Dundee's forces elsewhere. Moreover, the Scots-Dutch regiments need to recruit new men to strengthen their numbers would ensure the Edinburgh siege was a costly distraction the Williamites could ill afford. On the same day that Viscount Dundee had gained the support of several of the Highland clans, new cannons, mortars and grenades had arrived at Leith docks, shipped from London. This timely shipment of ordinance allowed the Brigade to increase the intensity of their bombardment of Edinburgh Castle as well as reduce the number of men

³⁸² *RPCS*, *Ibid.*

³⁸³ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁵ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 139.

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.* Childs, *Ireland*, p. 85.

committed to the siege.³⁸⁷ Equally, this shipment provided a timely reminder that the Scots-Dutch Brigade and, more generally, the Scottish Williamites, had access to significantly better supply lines than the Jacobites who had ensconced themselves in the Highlands. Mackay had left Edinburgh, by 30th April, to pursue Dundee with a sizeable detachment.³⁸⁸ Command of the siege was remitted to Mackay's lieutenant-colonel, and younger brother, James with Major John Sommerville of Ramsay's regiment acting as his second-in-command.³⁸⁹ This reliance upon Scots-Dutch officers to exclusively command the siege in his absence indicated Mackay's trust in the expertise of his officers. Batteries were again improved in May and June but the castle desperately held out despite dwindling supplies and a desertion of soldiers mid-siege.³⁹⁰ James Mackay and Sommerville ordered daily mortar bombardments, day and night, to keep the Jacobite garrison 'in motion, and without sleep'.³⁹¹ The final straw came when the Scots-Dutch officers ordered the 'Nor Loch', which supplied the castle's well with water, drained which forced Gordon to request a parley on 12th June 1689.³⁹² This was not a minute too soon for the Brigade as Gordon's request, reportedly came the same day that the Brigade had run out of ammunition and questions were raised by Lord Melville about the effectiveness of their tactics.³⁹³

Gordon and his men were allowed the privilege to march out of Edinburgh Castle in arms before the keys were surrendered to Lieutenant-Colonel Mackay and a new garrison of 300 Scots-Dutch soldiers installed.³⁹⁴ Gordon's only condition was that his men be spared any punishment, so long as they agreed not to take up arms for King James

³⁸⁷ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 18th April 1689, p. 45.

³⁸⁸ *Proceedings*, I, 30th April 1689, p. 62.

³⁸⁹ *RPCS*, XIII, 'Articles agreed upon for surrendering the Castle of Edinburgh', 13th June 1689, p. 431.

³⁹⁰ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 30th March 1689, p. 22.

³⁹¹ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 18th April, p. 45.

³⁹² *Ibid.*, 11th May 1689, p. 79.

³⁹³ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁴ *Blackadder*, p. 35.

again, electing not to request similar clemency for himself.³⁹⁵ It is worth noting that Gordon was allowed to quietly retire to private life, the Duke left for exile in France shortly thereafter.³⁹⁶ With that the Brigade had seized the most important garrison in Scotland at significant cost to themselves and to the Williamite government. Almost all of the 1,200 Scots-Dutchmen who arrived in Scotland had been engaged in the siege initially with a reduction to 300 men by its end.³⁹⁷ The siege was costly in terms of time and manpower, but the Brigade officers' knowledge of siege warfare combined with fresh supplies of artillery allowed them to outlast the tenacious Gordon and his beleaguered garrison. Securing Edinburgh Castle was a key moment in the early stages of the Highland War and assuaged concerns amongst the new government of the possibility of a two-pronged Jacobite assault on the capital from within and without. During the siege, however, other elements of the Brigade had been deployed to seize critical garrisons elsewhere and with much greater success.

Beyond Edinburgh, March-May 1689

William's instructions to Mackay, clearly stated that the castles of Edinburgh and Dumbarton were to be secured first and placed 'in the hands of confident persons, both commander and souldiers'.³⁹⁸ Edinburgh, as we have seen, was the focus of a prolonged siege before it was captured. Dumbarton's garrison, on the other hand, surrendered the castle to the Convention relatively early and was effectively placed under Scots-Dutch command when Major George Arnot was made Lieutenant-Governor there (although little remains known about the circumstances of his appointment).³⁹⁹ William, however,

³⁹⁵ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 11th May 1689, p. 79.

³⁹⁶ *ODNB*, Gordon.

³⁹⁷ Terry, 'Siege', pp. 171-172.

³⁹⁸ Mackay, *Memoirs*, 'Instructions to Mackay', 7th March 1689, p. 221.

³⁹⁹ *RPS*, 1689/3/152, Orders, 23rd April 1689. *RPCS*, XIII, Recommendation to the Earl of Argyle anent the castle of Dumbarton, 5th July 1689, p. 489.

forgot to include in his orders, perhaps, the most pivotal garrison in the Kingdom of Scotland, Stirling Castle. Stirling's importance, however, was not forgotten by Mackay nor its importance undervalued by the Convention. Dundee's departure, on 18th March, had caused panic amongst the meeting mainly because he had left Edinburgh on the road to Stirling via Linlithgow.⁴⁰⁰ The Viscount had arrived there on the following day with the intention to set up an alternate Convention, but with few peers or gentry electing to join him he instead decided to make an overture to the garrison to join his cause.⁴⁰¹ The garrison at Stirling only consisted of one company, numbering seventy-nine men in total, from the Mar's regiment of foot, the same regiment that had revolted in England and had made a break for their homeland before being unceremoniously captured.⁴⁰² The mutiny of their comrades in England appeared to cause some concern amongst the Convention due to the possibility that Viscount Dundee would convince Stirling Castle's garrison to defy them and that it would have to be besieged, akin to its equivalent in Edinburgh.

Stirling Castle's geographical position in central Scotland made it key to holding the southern Lowlands, whilst its domineering position over the crossings of the River Forth, made it a bulwark against any incursions from the Highlands.⁴⁰³ Mackay understood its importance, explaining in his memoirs that he ordered forces to march there 'both to secure that pass... and to be so much nearer to the province of Angus, where Dundee lay'.⁴⁰⁴ Furthermore, it played host to one of the largest royal magazines in Scotland, storing significant amounts of arms, ammunition and artillery.⁴⁰⁵ In other

⁴⁰⁰ *Proceedings*, I, 19th March 1689, p. 7.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰² *NRS*, E7/5, Treasury Register, 1688-1689, 'Garrison (Old Company) Stirling Castle', ff. 3, 15. Childs, *British*, pp. 21-22.

⁴⁰³ Chris Tabraham & Doreen Grove, *Fortress Scotland and The Jacobites* (Bath, 2001), p. 38. Carolyn Anderson & Christopher Fleet, *Scotland: Defending the Nation, Mapping the Military Landscape* (Edinburgh, 2018), 'Figure 3.5', pp. 58-59.

⁴⁰⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 6.

⁴⁰⁵ *RPCS*, XIII, Order to Anderson of Dowhill anent the arms and ammunition at Glasgow, 27th June, p. 468.

words, Stirling Castle was a key position that both the Jacobites and the Williamites wanted to secure for themselves. For the Convention, it would be needed both as bulwark against the Highlands, but also as a staging post for campaigns north of the Forth. The siege in Edinburgh very quickly proved, as we have seen, the Brigade's military expertise. The deployment of the Brigade to Stirling in these circumstances is a clear indication of the trust reposed in them by the Convention. Similar to William's distrust of non-Dutch troops in England, the Convention proved suspicious of James' former officers and soldiers in Scotland and this position was shared by Mackay. This would see Mackay rely upon the officers of the Brigade, with whom he was intimately familiar, for key charges such as Stirling Castle. This was enabled by the trust and esteem in which Mackay was held by the new Scottish government.

Dundee's overture to the garrison at Stirling to side with King James was rejected. Pragmatically, Mar's soldiers preferred to await their noble colonel to declare decisively for one side or the other.⁴⁰⁶ The mutiny in England did not reassure the new government in Edinburgh, nor Mackay, that Mar and his men were not planning to join with the Jacobites, especially if Viscount Dundee proved able to return with an army or significant reinforcements came from Ireland.⁴⁰⁷ Mar's company in Stirling continued to be treated with suspicion, particularly as Mar himself was thoroughly avoiding politics; instead retreating to Bath citing illness.⁴⁰⁸ This left the remnant of Mar's regiment in Scotland without direction and possibly susceptible to persuasion, coercion or a mixture of both. A further difficulty arose from the Earl of Mar's absence when it was made clear to Mackay that he could not be simply removed from his command as governor of Stirling Castle, as

⁴⁰⁶ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 5.

⁴⁰⁷ *Proceedings*, I, 26th-30th March 1689, p. 9.

⁴⁰⁸ Note: Mar is only mentioned in his son's ODNB entry and does not have an entry of his own. ODNB, Christoph v Ehrenstein, 'Erskine, John, styled twenty-second or sixth earl of Mar and Jacobite duke of Mar (bap. 1675, d. 1732), Jacobite army officer, politician and architect.'

it was a heritable position his family had held since 1566.⁴⁰⁹ The Convention proved unwilling to break with this tradition, further complicating matters.⁴¹⁰ Mackay later wrote that 'he did not much trust the Earle of Mar' but admitted that he could not be removed from his post without causing a political stir due to this heritable status.⁴¹¹ This made securing Stirling Castle a very politically sensitive issue as Mar had distanced himself from James' armed supporters, but proved unwilling, or unable, to fully declare support for the new regime either. Moving against the castle in force could be done, although it likely would have proved a costly and protracted affair, like the ongoing siege in Edinburgh. It may have, additionally, turned Mar, his family and his regiment against the government. The Brigade would have to take a more subtle approach.

Securing Stirling was one of the top priorities of the Brigade after they arrived in Scotland. On 27th March, just two days after their arrival, a detachment under command of Lieutenant-Colonel George Lauder, of Balfour's Regiment, embarked at Leith to be carried by small boats down the River Forth to Stirling.⁴¹² Additionally, the Royal Scots Dragoons, lately arrived from England, were dispatched by the Linlithgow road, the same Dundee had taken to Stirling.⁴¹³ The dragoons had been placed under command of the former Scots-Dutch officer Sir Thomas Livingstone, with whom Mackay had previously served.⁴¹⁴ Amongst Lauder's detachment was a new company of men 'lately levied' that Mackay had convinced Mar to allow 'to reinforce the garrison of the Castle'.⁴¹⁵ Mackay's gambit was to offer the new company to Mar under the guise, or 'pretext' as Mackay

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid. Henry Summerson, 'Erskine, John, seventeenth or first earl of Mar (d. 1572), magnate and regent of Scotland.'

⁴¹⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 5.

⁴¹² Ibid; *RPCS*, XIII, 27th March 1689, Letter from Col. Ramsay, p. 382.

⁴¹³ Ibid.

⁴¹⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 5.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid.

preferred, of reinforcing Mar's men in the castle.⁴¹⁶ He argued that Stirling was under imminent threat from an assault by the Jacobite Highland clans.⁴¹⁷ Eager to avoid being blamed for a Highland host laying waste to Stirling and assaulting the undermanned garrison, Mar agreed to give permission for Mackay to place 'a guard of fiftie men, with a captain...' in the town of Stirling to be 'dayly relieved into the Castle'.⁴¹⁸ This allowed these Scots-Dutch soldiers access to the castle and a permanent presence in the town Stirling to secure both for the Williamites.

Mackay explained that this strategy not only delivered control of Stirling Castle to the government, but gave the Brigade officers command of the Garrison overall.⁴¹⁹ Mackay explained this was 'because the officers of the Castle were but subalterns...' and the Scots-Dutch officers would outrank them. Analysis of Scottish Treasury accounts confirm this assertion, as the 'Old Company', Mar's men, did not have any officers above the rank of captain.⁴²⁰ The Scots-Dutch Brigade officers stationed there were effectively accorded *de facto* command of the castle and its original garrison due to received military convention. Initially, it fell under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Lauder, as he was the most senior officer present. By the beginning of April, Colonel Ramsay assumed the role, under the same circumstances as Lauder, but his appointment there was not permanent.⁴²¹ Both officers were needed to command elsewhere, as they each commanded a Scots-Dutch regiment. However, the importance of Stirling Castle would mean another loyal and reliable officer would be required to take over. Mackay's plan had delivered control of the castle to the Williamites, but they now had to hold it. The 'New Company' at Stirling, composed of Scots-Dutch soldiers, and was raised from fifty new

⁴¹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴²¹ *RPCS*, XIII, 27th March 1689, Letter from Col. Ramsay, p. 382.

recruits to one hundred.⁴²² Clearly, the Williamites felt the Scots-Dutch presence needed to be strengthened at Stirling. Although the Scots-Dutch officers outranked those of Mar's company, Mackay was keen to ensure his officers would be able to assert coercive control of the castle by ensuring the new company outnumbered the old.

Although the new company was part of the Brigade, many of the men were new recruits from Scotland. Uncertain of the loyalty of the new men, and the old, the appointment of a reliable officer to command them was paramount. Sir Charles Graham was chosen by Mackay and the appointment was quickly confirmed by the Scottish privy council on 18th July 1689.⁴²³ The council noted Graham was a 'major to the regiment under the command of General Major McKay'.⁴²⁴ Graham was a veteran officer of Mackay's Scots-Dutch regiment, he was first commissioned in 1675 and was promoted to lieutenant-colonel in the latter half of 1689 (See Appendix 2: Scots-Dutch Brigade Officers in Scotland, 1689-92).⁴²⁵ The council's willingness to commission Graham to command at Stirling confirms their confidence in Mackay's expertise as commander-in-chief. However, they decided not to rely upon traditional military practises and ensured Graham remained in command at Stirling; choosing, instead, to legitimise him by nominating him Lieutenant-Governor of the castle, second only to Mar whose continued absence ensured Graham's authority went unquestioned.⁴²⁶ Graham's warrant gave him further powers by making him 'commander of the forces in that town' in the absence of superior officers, such as Major-General Mackay.⁴²⁷ The councillors ordered that 'all inferior officers and soldiers' within the castle and the town were 'to give due obedience' to Graham both as

⁴²² *NRS*, E7/5, 'New Company Stirling Castle', 13th April 1689, f. 15.

⁴²³ *RPCS*, XIII, Commission to Sir Charles Graham, 18th July 1689, p. 532.

⁴²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁵ *Ibid.*; Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 479, 509-510, 516. Edinburgh University Library Special Collections [EUL], Laing MSS II.89, A True Account of the late Fight betwixt Genrall Major Mackay and the Viscount of Dundee on the plains of Gilliechrankie within the Country of Atholl, ff. 338-339.

⁴²⁶ *RPCS*, XIII, Commission to Sir Charles Graham, 18th July 1689, p. 532.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*

Lieutenant-Governor and the commander of all forces in Stirling.⁴²⁸ This appointment was especially significant as Stirling was the site of large encampment where much of the Scottish Williamite army was stationed with thousands of troops in the area.⁴²⁹ Essentially, Graham was made responsible for overseeing Scotland's largest military cantonment as well as the training and discipline of newly raised Scottish regiments and new companies of the Scots-Dutch Brigade posted there.⁴³⁰ This demonstrates that the trust afforded to Mackay by the Scottish Williamites, particularly the privy council, was not exclusive and that other Scots-Dutch officers were given important roles, usually at Mackay's behest, critical to the securing control of key areas such as Stirling.

Trust vested in Brigade officers was derived from the council's faith and trust in Mackay as William's appointed commander-in-chief in Scotland. The Williamites could have appointed other officers for such posts, but in an uncertain environment and their need to assert military control paramount they entrusted Mackay's to suggest suitably experienced and loyal officers. This proved critical to securing Scotland, or at least crucial areas of it, for the Williamite government in the early stages of the Highland War. However, Graham's appointment at Stirling also indicates tensions between the Scots-Dutch officers, particularly Mackay, and some of their non-Brigade counterparts due to William and the Scottish government's general distrust of Scottish soldiers and officers. Upon Mar's death in July 1689, his widow petitioned Queen Mary to allow her teenage son to inherit his father's command of Stirling Castle. The petition was flatly refused as the Scottish council refused to appoint a young nobleman, from a family with notable sympathy towards King James, into a position of command over the reliable Scots-Dutch

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁰ *RPCS*, XIII, Commission to Sir Charles Graham, 18th July 1689, p. 532.

officer they already had in place.⁴³¹ This illustrates that the deep distrust of non-Brigade officers on William's part was conveyed to the Brigade and informed practice in Scotland, particularly during the early stages of the Highland War. The Convention now turned parliament, offered the crown to William & Mary on 11th April 1689 and formed an interim government. This allowed the meeting to place the Brigade in command of places like Dumbarton, Stirling and Edinburgh to avoid the possibility of betrayal by a force sympathetic to James.⁴³² Mackay summarised it best when he wrote of the Stirling episode: 'By which intervention, that first post of the kingdom was by fair means, without giving offence or suspicion to the Earle [of Mar], secured for their Majesties service'.⁴³³

During the seizure of Stirling and the siege at Edinburgh, the Brigade were dispersed on duties in other parts of Scotland as well. This dispersal, as we have mentioned previously, placed a great deal of strain on the Brigade as they remained undermanned but overly relied upon for various duties and detachments. Ferguson argues that the Brigade failed to recruit to full-strength due to the fact they formed 'the backbone' of William's forces in Scotland.⁴³⁴ Although the sources do not provide us with a clear estimate of the Brigades strength at various points throughout the Highland War, we do know that the unit was in the process of increasing from 1,100 men to around 3,000 throughout the conflict.⁴³⁵ During these early stages, however, it would have been unlikely that they reached their maximum recruitment goal as the Scottish Williamite government was recruiting perhaps the largest expansion in the standing army of the period, as we shall see in Chapter five. Furthermore, the presence of recruiting officers like Colonel Fergus Francis O'Farrell, who sought men to fight in Flanders would have

⁴³¹ *Melvilles*, Countess of Mar to Queen, 22nd July 1689, pp. 185-186.

⁴³² *RPS*, 1689/3/152, Orders, 23rd April 1689. *RPCS*, XIII, Commission to Sir Charles Graham, 18th July 1689, p. 532.

⁴³³ Mackay, *Memoirs*, pp. 5-6.

⁴³⁴ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 482.

⁴³⁵ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 5.

put further strain on the available reserves of manpower in Williamite controlled localities.⁴³⁶ Hopkins has pointed out that up until the Battle of Killiecrankie, 27th July 1689, Mackay was supremely confident in the abilities of the Scots-Dutch Regiments and utilised them consistently throughout the months prior to that engagement.⁴³⁷ This section will argue that the Brigade were dispersed on duties around Scotland during the early stages of the war due to the trust and confidence Mackay vested in their loyalty to him and the military experience of his officers.

On 27th March, the same day Lauder was sent to Stirling, Mackay dispatched a detachment of 200 Scots-Dutch soldiers of his regiment, under command of Major John Buchan, to secure Dundee and arrest the eponymous Viscount thereof.⁴³⁸ After it became clear Viscount Dundee had departed the town, these men were kept in the city 'to keep the province of Angus in awe' as it was 'very disaffected'.⁴³⁹ When Mackay first marched northward with the Williamite field army in early April, composed of 2,000 men, he felt that a 'considerable part' of the Scottish soldiers under his command were 'traitors'⁴⁴⁰ From then until July, all of Mackay's expeditions to the Highlands contained detachments of the Scots-Dutch Brigade, most commonly 200 'old foot' of his own regiment.⁴⁴¹ Mackay would also request, via Brigadier Balfour, that significant detachments of the Brigade be sent to reinforce him; in one such instance 600 'chosen men' from the three Scots-Dutch regiments, under command of Ramsay, were sent to reinforce Mackay.⁴⁴² A Jacobite plot had emerged amongst the ranks of the Royal Scots Dragoons with the field army on 9th June 1689. The plotters planned to capture Mackay and defect to Viscount Dundee's

⁴³⁶ *RPCS*, XIII, Remit anent the officers of D'O. Ferrell's regiment, 28th June 1689, p. 472.

⁴³⁷ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 181.

⁴³⁸ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 482-483.

⁴³⁹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 12.

⁴⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 17.

nearby encampment, it was in situations like these that the presence of the loyal Scots-Dutch troops proved essential.⁴⁴³ Upon learning of the plot, Mackay ordered detachments of his own regiment and Balfour's, mostly grenadiers, to 'march in the front and rear of his party' to 'overawe' the disaffected dragoons present.⁴⁴⁴ This continued until Mackay was prepared to arrest the Jacobite plotters amidst the army and clearly deterred the dragoons from attempting their plan in the face of such vigilance and overwhelming odds.⁴⁴⁵ All of this indicates just how overstretched the Brigade were during the months leading up to the Battle of Killiecrankie. Whilst the activities of the Scots-Dutch detachments with Mackay have been discussed in detail by Hopkins, the role of the Brigade in other parts of the war has not, particularly the Scots-Dutch officers' role in organising the war effort.

The rapid pace of the Highland War meant that Mackay would have to split his forces between a field army, which would pursue the Jacobites, and the forces required to hold the Lowlands both south and north of the River Tay. The dispersal of the Brigade betrays Mackay's overreliance upon the Scots-Dutch soldiers and officers. Ferguson has argued the Brigade officers were at the core of the Williamite Scottish government's army and they 'supplied the officers to whom were intrusted the most important enterprises and posts'.⁴⁴⁶ This was certainly true as Mackay entrusted senior command of vital areas of Scotland to Scots-Dutch officers, as previously seen at the siege of Edinburgh, the garrisons at Dumbarton and Stirling. In the north-eastern Lowlands, Livingstone, the former Scots-Dutch officer mentioned earlier, was placed in command of a substantial garrison at Inverness and was given the responsibility of safeguarding the area from the

⁴⁴³ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 'The Journal of Major General Mackay's March against the Viscount of Dundee. In a Letter from a Gentleman in the Major General's Army, to a Friend. Dated from Alford, 9th June 1689', pp. 130-132.

⁴⁴⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 31.

⁴⁴⁵ Cameron, pp. 241-242.

⁴⁴⁶ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 482.

Jacobite army and the possibility of a sympathetic rising amongst its majority Episcopalian population.⁴⁴⁷ Livingstone was selected by Mackay due to the familiarity between the two; the fact that they corresponded in Dutch throughout mid-1689 betrays their distrust of Scottish Williamite officers with whom they were unfamiliar as well as constituting an astute strategy in making letters on military movements more concealed should they be intercepted by the Jacobites.⁴⁴⁸ In the south of Scotland, Brigadier Balfour was placed in command and, as a result, most of the Scottish Williamite army, as many regiments were still levying men there.⁴⁴⁹ Balfour's appointment effectively made him second-in-command to Mackay and his considerable experience was utilised as he oversaw the recruitment, mustering and training of new regiments as well as the logistics of the army as a whole.⁴⁵⁰

Balfour was often tasked with organising Scots-Dutch companies 'quartured at Dundie, Forfar and Coupar of Angus and Pearth' and was tasked to muster and prepare them 'to joyne Major Generall McKay' in the field.⁴⁵¹ This internal role as logistical organiser was assigned to Balfour, on 27th March, prior to Mackay's appointment as commander-in-chief of the Scottish Williamite forces, on 28th March.⁴⁵² Balfour's role in organising the Brigade was clearly defined beforehand as it occurred only days after their landing. With just over thirty years of service in the Dutch Republic, Balfour was senior even to Mackay in terms of experience and the Commander-in-Chief came to rely upon the Brigadier. When the Convention failed to appoint a muster-master general, a critical logistical role in ensuring new regiments were being raised, Mackay delegated the

⁴⁴⁷ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 13th June 1689, p. 227

⁴⁴⁸ *NRS*, GD26/9/255/1-3, Three Letters [in Dutch] from Sir Thomas Livingstone to Maj-Gen Hugh Mackay, April-June 1689. Note: These letters were not transcribed and translated prior to the Covid-19 outbreak and they remained inaccessible at the time of writing due to archive closures.

⁴⁴⁹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 17. Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 482-483.

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵¹ *RPCS*, XIII, Order for bringing some regiments together, 27th March 1689.

⁴⁵² *Ibid.*; Mackay, *Memoirs*, Instructions to Mackay, 7th March 1689, pp. 221-222.

responsibility to Balfour until July 1689.⁴⁵³ Critically, this gave Balfour the power to appoint 'such of the officers of the forces as he thinks fitt' to inspect those musters, meaning the Brigade did have some oversight into the structure and discipline of the Williamite army in Scotland.⁴⁵⁴ Ferguson mentioned the importance of the Scots-Dutch officers', but did not detail their role instead listing the names of officers involved, a critical endeavour that has left our understanding of the Brigade's role in the Highland War incomplete.⁴⁵⁵ Beyond the battlefield, officers like Balfour were instrumental in ensuring the Scottish Williamite army was brought together relatively quickly and soldiers were deployed to the parts of the country where they were needed. Nowhere was the Scots-Dutch officers' organisational influence more evident than in battle at Loup Hill, 16th May 1689.

Battle of Loup Hill, 16th May 1689

Hopkins article on the Battle of Loup Hill, broken into two parts, remains the only historical work upon the subject, alongside its mention in his monograph.⁴⁵⁶ The existence of those works means the events of the battle do not need significant revision and, so, details on the battle can be found there. For the purposes of this thesis, this section will only briefly cover events in order to explore the Scots-Dutch Brigade's involvement. It remains a little-known fact in the wider historiography, particularly broad political histories like those produced by Harris and Pincus, that this battle preceded Killiecrankie, 27th July 1689. Although it was smaller in scale, it proved no less important a part in the Highland War. Victory for the Williamites at the battle would ensure the security of the

⁴⁵³ *RPCS*, XIII, Order for mustering Lord Yester's troop of horse, 14th June 1689, p. 440; Act in Favour of Innegellie, 14th June 1689, p. 433.

⁴⁵⁴ *RPCS*, XIII, Order to Colonel Balfour, 28th May 1689, p. 387.

⁴⁵⁵ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 479-484.

⁴⁵⁶ Paul Hopkins, 'Loup Hill. 16th May 1689: The First 'Battle' of Dundee's Jacobite War – Part One & Part Two' in *The Kintyre Antiquarian & Natural History Society Magazine* [KANH] (June, 1998), pp. 6-7.

south-western coast of Scotland for the regime.⁴⁵⁷ Despite its position on the seemingly remote Kintyre peninsula, the area surrounding Loup Hill was critically important due to its proximity to the Irish sea. Those who possessed control of the peninsula would be able to prevent, or guarantee the safety of, vessels crossing from Ireland to the south-west of Scotland.⁴⁵⁸ In May 1689, the Jacobite army in Ireland appeared to have the upper hand in the there. As a result of this, local Jacobite clans in Kintyre rose in arms to seize control of Skipness Castle and the surrounding peninsula.⁴⁵⁹ Their actions could have provided a critical beachhead in Scotland for Irish reinforcements if James' forces were able to prevail there.

When news reached Edinburgh regarding the Jacobites in Kintyre, Balfour ordered, with the permission of the privy council, a detachment be formed to take back control of the area.⁴⁶⁰ The Brigade itself remained far too overstretched to provide yet another detachment for the Williamites. Balfour formed a force to secure Kintyre from amidst an ad-hoc collection of companies from the Scottish infantry regiments commanded by the Earl of Glencairn, Lord Bargany and Lord Blantyre.⁴⁶¹ Together they managed to provide Balfour with 500 men. However, it was Balfour's selection of commander for that force which proves to be of interest as he selected a previously unknown and non-Brigade officer. Captain William Young appears to have been an Irish Protestant refugee, one of the many who fled Ulster due to the Irish Jacobites incursions there, and had arrived in Scotland in early 1689.⁴⁶² He had no discernible military experience and, if he did, his career has been lost to historians as there are no known

⁴⁵⁷ Harris, *Revolution*, pp. 410-411. Pincus, *1688*, pp. 266-267.

⁴⁵⁸ Hopkins, 'Loup Hill – Part One', p. 6.

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶² *Ibid.*

records of previous service in the Scottish, English or Irish armies.⁴⁶³ Balfour selected Young either for his political reliability, due to his background as a Protestant refugee, or some sort of military experience. Regardless of his experience, Young led the detachment ashore, landing in small boats, on the Kintyre peninsula on 15th May 1689. On the following day, the Williamite force came across a group of 200 Jacobites, who landed their forces near Loup Hill.⁴⁶⁴ The two groups briefly exchanged volleys of musket fire before Young encouraged his men to charge Loup Hill, on which the Jacobites had positioned themselves.⁴⁶⁵ After a short engagement, the clansmen fled back to their own boats, sailing away from Kintyre as Young's detachment overran their former position. There were only two casualties on the Jacobite side and, remarkably, none on the Williamite side. The small Jacobite garrison at Skipness promptly abandoned the castle when word of the rout at Loup Hill reached them, leaving it empty for Young and his men to occupy a few days later.⁴⁶⁶

Captain Young had commanded admirably with his men advancing steadily under fire whilst maintaining discipline. This suggests that Young had some sort of experience of, or, at the very least, natural ability for, warfare.⁴⁶⁷ The privy council later wrote that Young's actions had demonstrated his 'fidelitie, couradge and good conduct' which lead them to place 'speciall [sic] trust and confidence' in him.⁴⁶⁸ Although the battle was a relatively small-scale engagement it was a critical early victory for the Scottish Williamites, organised by Balfour. More importantly, it greatly impaired the Jacobite supply lines from Ireland to Scotland. The council rewarded Balfour's chosen commander with a bounty of £100 and instructed Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan Campbell of

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁴ *RPCS*, XIII, Commission to Lieutenant Colonel William Young, 8th July 1689, p. 497.

⁴⁶⁵ Hopkins, 'Loup Hill – Part One', p. 6.

⁴⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁷ *RPS*, 1689/3/209, Missive letter from the estates to Captain Young, 21st May 1689.

⁴⁶⁸ *RPCS*, XIII, Commission to Lieutenant Colonel William Young, 8th July 1689, p. 497.

Auchinbreck to co-operate with Young to maintain the security of the west coast against further uprisings or incursions from elsewhere in the Highlands or from Ireland.⁴⁶⁹ Balfour's decision to send Young to Kintyre had undoubtedly paid off and the council was greatly appreciative. However, the events that followed Loup Hill coupled with Young's remarkable rise through the ranks, exposed tensions between the Brigade and some Scottish nobles, both ministers and army officers.

Tensions & Disagreements, May-July 1689

The tensions that emerged between the Scots-Dutch officers and their non-Brigade counterparts in Scotland were not straightforward. Despite the complaints of some minor officers and a major strategic disagreement between Melville and Mackay, for the most part the Scots-Dutch officers were accorded respect with regards to their military expertise. Thus, their pre-eminence within the Scottish Williamite army would go, largely, unchallenged until the aftermath of the Battle of Killiecrankie. During the first stages of the Highland War, however, Mackay's overreliance upon the Brigade brought forth strain in relations between the Scots-Dutch professional soldiers and Scottish Williamite noble officers. Within the army the Scots-Dutch officers caused consternation amongst some Scottish noble officers as disagreements surrounding organisation, discipline and professionalism arose. At the top level, the strategy pursued by Major-General Mackay was questioned by Lord Melville and this led to tensions surrounding military strategy in Scotland from March to July 1689. Ultimately, this discord heralded future problems that Mackay, and his Scots-Dutch officers, would face in the aftermath of Killiecrankie. However, prior to that battle these tensions were clearly linked to the Brigade's central role in the Scottish Williamite military, resultant from the degree of trust they were

⁴⁶⁹ *RPCS*, XIII, Order to James Oswald to pay to Captain Young £100 sterling, 4th July 1689, p. 485; Letter to Sir Duncan Campbell, 24th May 1689, p. 382.

accorded both by King William and the Scottish privy council, particularly Hamilton. In this final section, we will illustrate that although these tensions foreshadowed the decline in the Brigade's influence after Killiecrankie, they did not significantly challenge the ascendancy of professional Scots-Dutch soldiers in the senior ranks of the Scottish Williamite army.

Both Brown and Childs have noted the increasing professionalisation of the Scottish army during the reign of James VII.⁴⁷⁰ By 1689, Brown points out, the professionalism and hierarchy, or chain of command, was well understood by the Scottish aristocracy who dominated the army's officer corps.⁴⁷¹ A precedent that altered this predominance began in 1638, with the return of highly experienced Scottish officers from Europe to staff the armies of the Covenanters, as Brown has observed.⁴⁷² Reinforcing this, Childs has argued that James VII & II's reign saw an increasing professionalisation of the standing armies in Britain and Ireland.⁴⁷³ However, evidence in this thesis contradicts Brown and, to a lesser extent, Childs' assertions that the Scottish officer corps was completely resigned to obey the chain of command, serving beneath professional soldiers whose social standing was often lower than their own. At the beginning of the Highland War, the pre-eminence of the Scots-Dutch officers in the new army, or least in organising and commanding it, led to resentment amongst a minority of noble officers. Relations between the Brigade officers and non-Brigade officers proved complex as the majority of the latter did not express discontent with the former. Brown's contention that after 1685 the Scottish officer corps was dominated by the aristocracy is certainly true as all twenty-

⁴⁷⁰ Keith M. Brown, 'From Scottish Lords to British Officers: State Building, Elite Integration and the Army in the Seventeenth Century' in Norman MacDougall (ed.), *Scotland and War A.D. 79-1918* (Edinburgh, 1991), p. 140.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid.

⁴⁷² Keith M. Brown, *Noble Power in Scotland from the Reformation to the Revolution* (Edinburgh, 2013), p. 146.

⁴⁷³ Childs, *British*, p. 14.

three regiments and troops raised, between 1689 and 1690, were commanded by noblemen.⁴⁷⁴ Even the small cracks in the relations between the Scots-Dutch officers and their countrymen, both within the army and without, reveals that there was a degree of distance between the professional soldier and noble officer in Scotland, even during the Highland War.

To understand these tensions, we must first understand the Scots-Dutch perspective on the structure of the Scottish Williamite army and the ability of its officers. Mackay's memoirs, and letters, remain the only surviving Scots-Dutch perspective on this topic, but the actions of other senior officers, such as Balfour, also indicate a distrust or disdain for non-Brigade Scottish officers and, by association, their troops' abilities. For the Brigade officers there was not a blanket distrust of the Scottish Williamite officers, but rather a lack of faith in their general military experience as well as an implied superiority with regards to their own. Mackay argued that the issue with William's Scottish army was the Convention of Estate's distribution of commissions to 'such noblemen and gentlemen' who could levy regiments and 'gave pouer [sic] to the colonels, as well as to the captains of horse, to make all their officers'.⁴⁷⁵ The Scottish nobles clearly still domineered much of the military structure during the Highland War, as they had the former decades of the seventeenth century, with noblemen and gentlemen raising regiments through networks of kinship, lordship, and obligation tied to their territorial holdings.⁴⁷⁶ This aristocratic predominance was not necessarily negative, the nobles enthusiasm for war has been well noted in the seventeenth century.⁴⁷⁷ In 1689, Mackay explained that the 'chief officers' were 'all noblemen of no service' and argued that the lack of professional experience

⁴⁷⁴ Brown, 'Officers', p. 140.

⁴⁷⁵ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 7.

⁴⁷⁶ Brown, *Noble*, pp. 146-147.

⁴⁷⁷ Roger B. Manning, *Swordsmen: The Martial Ethos in the Three Kingdoms* (Oxford, 2003). Brown, *Noble*, p. 146.

greatly contributed to the lack of discipline amongst the Scottish Williamite regiments.⁴⁷⁸ He posited that the main failing had been that the noble officers 'chose the officers of their regiments... according as they had a kindness for their persons, or as they judged them popular, to get a number of men together, to the disorder of those troops'.⁴⁷⁹

This system had been somewhat mitigated in 1638-40 by the presence of thousands of veteran Scottish officers recently returned from service in Europe. However, as we have seen, the Brigade did not have the numbers of veterans to be dispersed throughout the regiments and troops of the army in a similar fashion to their predecessors.⁴⁸⁰ Mackay emphatically denied that the Scottish Williamite army's lack of discipline was a failing on his, or his officers', part as he contested that they were unable to ensure the 'composition or discipline' of the forces in Scotland.⁴⁸¹ He explained that he 'found himself presently engaged in the war' and, thus, he was unable to closely oversee the training of the army.⁴⁸² This was, at least to some extent, true. During the early months of the Highland War, the Brigade, and Mackay, were thrust into the centre of the conflict and thinly dispersed on a variety of duties. Coupled with William's distrust of the Williamite army's Scottish regiments and their noble officers we can understand why the Scots-Dutch Brigade's return does not correspond with that of the multitude of veterans who returned to serve the Covenanters. However, Mackay and the Scots-Dutch officers' low opinion of these noble officers, alongside William's mistrust of them, created the first cracks in the Brigade's position in Scotland. John Hay, Lord Yester, was a captain of a troop of horse who summarised this increasing resentment well when he wrote to his father, the second Earl of Tweeddale, 'even in our owne King [there was] an

⁴⁷⁸ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 7.

⁴⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁰ Furgol, 'Beating' in *Fighting*, pp. 38-39. Stewart, *Rethinking*, p. 180. Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 482.

⁴⁸¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 7.

⁴⁸² *Ibid.*

unwillingness to make use of us either out of distrust or dise[s]teeme'.⁴⁸³ Yester concluded this was a slight on Scotland's 'courage fidelitey and warlyk [sic] dispositione'.⁴⁸⁴

The 'disesteem' that Yester described was felt when Captain Young was appointed as third in command, only subordinate to Argyll and Glencairn, of a detachment of 3,000 soldiers based in Inveraray.⁴⁸⁵ Alexander Montgomery, ninth Earl of Eglinton, was a captain of a troop of horse and was particularly aggrieved when he was placed under Young's command.⁴⁸⁶ In the month before the expedition, Eglinton had been agitating for a commission to raise his own regiment based in part upon his experience as lieutenant-colonel in the Horse Guards under King James.⁴⁸⁷ Eglinton stated, in a letter to Melville, that whilst Argyll and Glencairn were absent, 'I find, I being but ane independent captane in ther absence, must obey the meanest feild [sic] officer; and hoping the King nor your Lordship will have such meane thoughts of me, that I should obey such persons'.⁴⁸⁸ Balfour's choice of Young had led to this previously unknown and, seemingly, unconnected soldier being promoted based on his actions rather than his social status. Eglinton's disdain was particularly directed at Captain Young, as he was of the same rank, albeit third in command of the entire western expeditionary force, but was obviously more generally targeted 'field officers' whom he considered his subordinates.⁴⁸⁹

The complaint proved pressing enough that the Scottish privy council responded only four days later by promoting Young to lieutenant-colonel citing their 'experience of his loyaltie to their Majesties King William and Queen Mary' as well as his good

⁴⁸³ Cambridge University Library [CUL], Add. MSS. 9362/57, 'Lord Yester to the earl of Tweeddale, 23 September 1689. Quoted in: Clare Jackson, *Restoration Scotland, 1660-1690: Royalist Politics, Religion and Ideas* (Woodbridge, 2003), p. 208.

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁵ *RPCS*, XIII, Missive to Major-General M'Kay, 3rd July 1689, pp. 482-483.

⁴⁸⁶ *Melvilles*, Eglinton to Melville, 4th July 1689, p. 139.

⁴⁸⁷ *Melvilles*, Earl of Eglinton to Melville, 18th June 1689, p. 61.

⁴⁸⁸ *Melvilles*, Eglinton to Melville, 4th July 1689, p. 139.

⁴⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

battlefield conduct at Loup Hill.⁴⁹⁰ The timing of the promotion, 8th July, may have been coincidence, but given Young's increased responsibility it seems likely that his promotion was conferred to him to reinforce his authority amongst his comrades as third-in-command, especially given the regular absences of Argyll and Glencairn. Similarly, the council had refused to place the teenage Mar in command at Stirling, preferring to keep the experienced Scots-Dutch Major Graham. They now favoured an officer selected by Balfour deferring to his expertise as a professional soldier. Clearly, the faith in the military experience of the Brigade led the council to side with experience and battlefield effectiveness over Eglinton's reverence for social status. The Scottish privy council placed its faith, and support, in the veteran officers of the Scots-Dutch Brigade, particularly Mackay.

Mackay and the Brigade were widely trusted by most of the Scottish Williamite government and officer corps. It was only in mid-1689, when disagreement arose surrounding the situation in Ireland and the failure to curtail Viscount Dundee's activities, that Mackay's strategy was called into question by Melville. Fears of an Irish invasion fuelled Melville's, and at times the Scottish privy council's, frustration at the lack of progress against the Jacobites, were only worsened by the continuation of the siege in Edinburgh. William's Scottish ministers continued to feel very insecure. Whilst it is tempting to view this disagreement as being fuelled by a division between professional soldiers, like Mackay, and Scottish nobles, like Melville, this view is not borne out by the result of the dispute. Mackay's authority in the military sphere was re-asserted with the backing of the Scottish privy council and Melville, and his adherents, acquiesced to Mackay's judgement in these matters. This is a far cry from the divisive gulf Brown has described when examining this division within the Scottish military in the seventeenth

⁴⁹⁰ *RPCS*, XIII, Commission to Lieutenant Colonel William Young, 8th July 1689, p. 497.

century.⁴⁹¹ However, to provide a better background the nature of the disagreement and the parties involved must be discussed, beginning with Melville.

As Scottish secretary of state for William, Lord George Melville had the unenviable job of co-ordinating between London, Edinburgh and, in military matters, the Williamite army and garrisons in Scotland. Melville was no stranger to war and had served as an officer in the Scottish army raised to put down the Bothwell Rising in 1679.⁴⁹² Additionally, he had, as an exile from James' government, assisted in preparations for William's invasion of England in 1688.⁴⁹³ Melville had gone into exile after he was accused of being associated in the Rye House Plot of 1683, which had sought to assassinate King Charles II and his brother James, the future monarch. Mackay and Melville's first meeting would have likely occurred in the Dutch Republic during the 1688 preparations. By mid-1689, Melville was at the heart of William's plan to secure Scotland, acting as his central co-ordinator between the crown in London and the government in Edinburgh. However, in spite of his brief military experiences, Melville, like many of the Williamite Scottish politicians, had a deep-seated fear of an invasion of Scotland by an Irish Catholic army. This arose most notably in the aftermath of Loup Hill. These fears led Melville to voice doubts about Mackay's strategy to defeat the Jacobites and attempt to effect a change in strategy, particularly as the expansion of the Scottish Williamite army was proving to be extremely costly. When George Mackenzie, first Viscount Tarbat, surrendered himself to the Williamite government he began to correspond with Melville on the possibility of bringing the Highland War to an end by bribing the Jacobite chieftains.⁴⁹⁴ Tarbat posited that if the Williamite government would loan him the money, as well as accord him the

⁴⁹¹ Brown, *Noble*, pp. 146-147.

⁴⁹² *ODNB*, John R. Young, 'Melville, George, fourth Lord Melville and first earl of Melville (1636-1707), politician'.

⁴⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁴ *Melvilles*, Tarbat to Melville, 1st June 1689, pp. 37-38.

power to offer indemnity from prosecution, he could convince his fellow Highlanders to lay down their arms, abandon Dundee and ensuring the collapse of the Jacobite cause in Scotland. He stated in a letter, dated 1st June, that Mackay's strategy to defeat the Jacobites through military means was unattainable because 'even the few engaged can not be easily nor speedily reduced, for it's not easy to force them to fight'.⁴⁹⁵ The 'very slow marches' of the Williamite forces, as described by Sir Ewen Cameron of Lochiel, a Jacobite chieftain, were proving ineffective enough according to Tarbat and Melville proved inclined to agree.⁴⁹⁶ Melville began plying King William with letters suggesting that the crown offer terms to the Jacobites in Scotland, with Tarbat as negotiator.⁴⁹⁷ Furthermore, he was far from alone in this perception as Bishop Burnet, later wrote that Mackay and his army were unable to catch the Jacobite forces in Scotland as the latter group was 'less encumbered with cannon and other baggage, and so marched quicker'.⁴⁹⁸

Tarbat and Melville's criticism of the conduct of the Highland War came at a time when resources were scarce and other fronts, Flanders, and Ireland, were pressing concerns for William. They could argue that this diversion 'of the Kings armes' was needless and they hoped their political strategy would provide an inexpensive and easy peace.⁴⁹⁹ William proved just as eager to bring about a swift end to the war in Scotland, mainly so he could deploy Scottish troops and the Brigade elsewhere. He agreed to offer an indemnity to any who surrendered their arms and recognised his government.⁵⁰⁰ Melville expressed his opinion, to Balfour and others, that he felt Mackay should be ordered to withdraw his field army from the Highlands and return to Stirling or

⁴⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁶ *Cameron*, p. 244.

⁴⁹⁷ *Melvilles*, The King's Exoneration to Tarbat, with His Majesty's letter to Lord Melville, 25th April 1689, p. 15.

⁴⁹⁸ Burnet, *History*, IV, pp. 47-48.

⁴⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁵⁰⁰ *CSP*, William & Mary, I, The King to the Earl of Leven, Viscount Tarbat, the Master of Melville, and Major-General Mackay, 1st June 1689.

Edinburgh to ensure the government's security.⁵⁰¹ William agreed to issue the order and, on 4th June, Melville informed Mackay that he was to return south with his forces 'upon consideration of what disadvantage it may be... to continue in the northern parts, in pursuit of Dundee and the Highlanders'.⁵⁰² Melville explained that the King felt the deployment of these forces would be considerably dangerous 'if any invasion should happen'.⁵⁰³ These orders marked the first real break between Melville and Mackay. The doubts raised by Melville surrounding the latter's ability command fostered an animosity between them that would only continue to grow for the remainder of the conflict.

Melville's concerns came from a genuine fear of that events in Ireland would turn against the Scottish Williamite government. His orders to Mackay reflect this, as upon his return south Mackay was to redeploy the forces he had with him, including his battalion of the Brigade, to reinforce Glasgow, the western shires, such as Ayrshire, and to protect Edinburgh.⁵⁰⁴ The distrust of elements of the Scottish Williamite army further fuelled this as fears of a fifth column of James' former soldiers and officers continued, William had even ordered a purge of his Scottish officer corps.⁵⁰⁵ The order Melville conveyed had to be reiterated to the Scottish privy council's president, Hamilton. Melville wrote to the council to ensure they would co-operate with his order to reassure them that the King wished 'in this present juncture, that the Major General should march southward'.⁵⁰⁶ Melville's own concerns appear to have coloured the tone of his advice. He criticised Mackay's strategy of launching significantly sized expeditions into the Highlands, stating that it would 'expose the south and west countries to great danger' citing the fact the Major-General and his army were deployed 'at so great a distance' as well as the lack of

⁵⁰¹ *Melvilles*, 'Melville to Colonel Balfour', 13th June 1689, p. 57.

⁵⁰² CSP, William & Mary, I, Lord Melville to Major-General Mackay, 4th June 1689, p. 135.

⁵⁰³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁵ *Melvilles*, King to Melville, 7th May 1689, p. 434.

⁵⁰⁶ *Melvilles*, Lord Melville to the Duke of Hamilton, 4th June 1689, p. 134.

forage for cavalry.⁵⁰⁷ A supplemental letter to Hamilton, dated the same, reveals that Mackay had objected to these orders arguing that the uncertainty surrounding the Jacobites strength and the amount of support the Viscount Dundee had garnered amongst the clans made the threat from the Highlands far more concerning than the possibility of an Irish invasion.⁵⁰⁸ The letter saw a further admission from Melville that King William now felt he 'could give no particular directions' to Mackay on military matters.⁵⁰⁹ William had effectively rescinded the order for the Scottish Williamite army in the Highlands to withdraw south. This statement unmistakably reveals that William elected to trust in Mackay's experience, expertise, and knowledge of the situation on the ground in Scotland.

William's re-assertion of confidence in Major-General Mackay was quickly followed by the Scottish privy council. On 8th June, the council issued a missive to Mackay in which they agreed with him that the field army should stay in the north 'to secure the countrie against the Viscount of Dundie'.⁵¹⁰ Even so, they did take Melville's suggestion that the English horse should 'march towards the westerne shyres' where they could rest their horses, who had been lacking sufficient forage in their expeditions to the Highlands, and to reinforce the area.⁵¹¹ The council appears to have been content to relegate itself to making the occasional non-binding recommendation to Mackay on military matters. However, the council recognised Mackay's military credentials as well as his knowledge of events on the ground and, as a result, reassured him that any decision on military matters would be left to him 'who can be judge therof'.⁵¹² As president of the council, Hamilton would have had a significant hand in this decision. He justified it in

⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁸ *Melvilles*, Lord Melville to the Duke of Hamilton – Supplemental Letter, 4th June 1689, p 134.

⁵⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁰ *RPCS*, XIII, Missive to Major-General McKay, 8th June 1689, p. 420.

⁵¹¹ *Ibid.*

⁵¹² *RPCS*, XIII, Missive to Major-General McKay, 8th June 1689, p. 420.

correspondence with Melville, on 8th June, by bluntly stating ‘all that countrey [north of the Tay] generally, lowlands as well as highlands, wold be in arms’ if Mackay was recalled ‘befor he disipats or beats Dundee’.⁵¹³ He assured Melville that the council had assured the security of the west coast by hiring two frigates, with crew, to ‘cruze there’ and argued that there was ‘litle fears of’ an Irish incursion in the absence of a sizeable French fleet.⁵¹⁴ By 3rd July, the council reported to Mackay that the frigates were ready and were to patrol from Glasgow to Inveraray.⁵¹⁵ The Scottish privy council, particularly Hamilton, appeared to throw their support behind Mackay and asserted they had full confidence in his strategy and his judgements on military matters.

With confidence re-asserted in Mackay, the Major-General began to promote a project to bring about an end to the war. Mackay planned to launch a sizeable expedition into the Highlands marching via Atholl to establish a fort at Inverlochry.⁵¹⁶ Hamilton informed Melville on 18th July, that Mackay intended to march within a week with a force of 5,000 men.⁵¹⁷ The west was now sufficiently secured with a force of 3,000 men stationed around Inveraray and the remaining bulk of the army at Stirling.⁵¹⁸ Again, the Scots-Dutch Brigade were split as Hamilton recorded that ‘two battalions of the troops come with Mackay’ were left behind in Edinburgh ‘to guard it and the Castle’.⁵¹⁹ Mackay had returned to Edinburgh in early July, as per Melville’s wishes, and attempted to push for reform of the Scottish Williamite army.⁵²⁰ The act stipulated that the forces raised should be ‘regularly and sufficiently cloathed’ with uniforms and that ‘good ordor and discipline

⁵¹³ *Melvilles*, Hamilton to Melville, 8th June 1689, p. 51.

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁵ James Grant (ed.), *The Old Scots Navy: From 1689 to 1710* (Edinburgh, 1824), Letter to Major-General Mackay stating that the frigates are to cruise in the W. Highlands, 3rd July 1689, p. 24.

⁵¹⁶ *RPCS*, XIII, Sederunt, 18th July 1689, p. 536.

⁵¹⁷ *Melvilles*, Duke of Hamilton to Lord Melvill, 18th July 1689, p. 174.

⁵¹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁰ *RPCS*, XIII, Act for better regulating of his Majesty’s forces, 23rd July 1689, p. 546.

be observed and keep amongst them'.⁵²¹ Mackay's influence was evident in the passage which outlined that soldiers should be admonished for 'curssing, swearing and profaneing of the Sabath' and that the officers should use 'their own good' behaviour as the most 'effectuall means to prevent' this.⁵²²

Mackay departed for Stirling on 22nd July, it was there he would muster his army before marching for Perth and then northward to Atholl.⁵²³ Baggage horses were to be provided from neighbouring shires surrounding Edinburgh for the army, whilst Mackay gathered 'pioneers', the equivalent of a military engineer, to build fortifications at Inverlochy when they arrived, although delays to these preparations proved significant.⁵²⁴ Despite the parliament's passage of an act to ensure the Scottish regiments were better regulated, Mackay found the tensions in the officer corps caused a small number of absences from his assembling army. The Earl of Annandale and Lord Ross had refused to attend their troops of horse in Stirling, despite Mackay repeatedly dispatching summons to the irascible officers in question.⁵²⁵ Mackay wrote to Melville, that both men 'offer' d [sic] to lay down their commissions rather than quit the Parlement to goe with mee to the feelds'.⁵²⁶ Mackay complained that despite Annandale and Ross protestations of loyalty to him and their supposed 'readynesse to follow my orders' they reasoned that their attendance at parliament was more important than assuming their posts at the head of their men.⁵²⁷ Another act of supply to finance the continuation of the war was being considered and both men were part of the opposition who wished William to pass significant constitutional and religious reforms before providing more supply to fund

⁵²¹ Ibid.

⁵²² Ibid.

⁵²³ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 22nd July, pp. 245-246.

⁵²⁴ RPS, M1689/6/17, Military preparations; commissioners appointed to meet; act approved, 23rd July 1689; M1689/6/18, Military preparations; commissioners appointed to meet, 25th July 1689.

⁵²⁵ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 24th July 1689, pp. 246-247.

⁵²⁶ Ibid.

⁵²⁷ Ibid.

William's army.⁵²⁸ Mackay despaired, writing to Melville, 'the King hath given mee to keep a kingdom peaceable where ther is so much division even betwixt such as love the present Government'.⁵²⁹ He concluded the letter by stating he 'chose rather to give permission to those noblemen to remain at Edinburgh though their troupes goe along with me'.⁵³⁰ Ultimately, allowing Annandale and Ross to retain their commissions was a prudent move, as both men were responsible for the upkeep of a troop of horse each. Furthermore, dismissing them from their commands may have caused political consternation amongst the membership of the parliament and delayed new commissions being drawn up in future. Despite their irreverence for the chain of command, Mackay pressed on without them, unknowingly marching to face the toughest test of his command yet, the Battle of Killiecrankie.

Conclusion

It remains clear that Mackay and the Scots-Dutch officers retained their position as an experienced military cadre at the heart of the Scottish Williamite army. Their positions as senior commanders, advisers, logistical officers, and the regiments use as special detachments for tasks of importance denotes their special position. The Brigade enjoyed the trust and confidence both from the crown and from William's new Scottish government. This has been highly underestimated by historians of the Revolution, the Highland War, and William's armies during this period. William's decision to send the Scots-Dutch Brigade to Scotland secured the country and ensure that a government favourable to him there had security was a deliberate strategic decision. The Scots-Dutch officers expertise proved critical to the early stages of the war against the Jacobites. The distrust of non-Brigade officers led to Mackay's appointment as commander in Scotland

⁵²⁸ Harris, *Revolution*, pp. 406-408. Raffe, *Scotland*, pp. 144-145.

⁵²⁹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 24th July 1689, pp. 246-247.

⁵³⁰ *Ibid.*

and this proved critical in placing the Brigade at the heart of efforts to secure key garrisons at Edinburgh and Stirling. Their political reliability would mean that they acted as a vanguard for the Williamite cause in Scotland, a fact that would remain true until the end of their involvement in 1691. That trust has proven critical to understanding why the Brigade were so central in the war against the Jacobites and why they were dispersed so widely throughout Scotland. In the aftermath of Loup Hill, Melville brought into question Mackay's strategy, but in spite of the tensions between the professional Scots-Dutch soldiers and their noble counterparts the Scottish privy council continued to have faith in both them and Mackay. The actions of a few noble officers, such as Annandale, and the complaints of others, such as Eglinton, appear to confirm Brown's notion that tensions between professionals and nobles remained high in Scotland. However, the fact remains, that the majority of Scottish officers did not openly espouse views against Mackay and, therefore, implicitly appear to have trusted in Mackay's abilities as well as the Brigade's expertise. The trust William placed in Mackay and the Brigade was beyond question. The distrust which William held for James' former officers, and soldiers in, disseminated into the Brigade. This left the Brigade thinly stretched as they were entrusted with such a variety of duties by their commander Mackay. He continued to rely heavily upon them is evident in the fact he selected three battalions to follow him to Killiecrankie. This dispersal stretched the Brigade's officers to their limit and led to an overall depreciation in the quality of their newly recruited companies, and the Scottish Williamite army overall, as the officers were not nearly numerous enough to be spread throughout the ranks of the new army as had been done in previous decades.

Chapter Two – Killiecrankie: The defeat of the Scots-Dutch Brigade, 27th July

1689

*Many a cocked hat and periwig was being smashed on their pates: red blood flowed in waves over the grass on the field.*⁵³¹

As the first sizeable engagement of the Jacobite Risings, Killiecrankie retains a place as one of the most well-known battles in Scotland's history; only to be outshone by the events at Bannockburn and Culloden in the popular consciousness.⁵³² Due to this fact, Killiecrankie remains the most familiar battle of the Highland War and, as such, is usually identified as the birthplace of the Jacobite movement in Scotland.⁵³³ The notability of Killiecrankie emanates from the triumph of the Scottish Jacobite army over the more 'modern' Williamite army and, of course, the Scots-Dutch Brigade, fresh from the cutting-edge warfare on the continent.⁵³⁴ The battle was a crushing defeat for the Scottish Williamite regiments, their English counter-parts and the Brigade. It also proved to be a major blow to Mackay's reputation as a military commander, particularly as Killiecrankie was his first pitched battle in Scotland as commander-in-chief.⁵³⁵ Accordingly, the significance of Killiecrankie has been noted widely ranging from military historians of early modern Europe, such as Geoffrey Parker, to political historians of the Revolution, such as Tim Harris and Steve Pincus.⁵³⁶ The former group has viewed Killiecrankie as an example of the ability of 'traditional' warfare methods to upset modern 'revolutionary' military innovations on the field of battle. Parker states that 'it is doubtful whether any

⁵³¹ Keppoch, 'Killiecrankie', p. 193.

⁵³² Tom Devine, *The Scottish Nation 1700-2000* (London, 2000), pp. 32-33. Alistair Moffat, *Scotland: A History from Earliest Times* (Edinburgh, 2015), pp. 273-274.

⁵³³ Lenman, *Risings*, pp. 28-50.

⁵³⁴ Murdoch & Grosjean, *Leslie*, pp. 30-33. Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the rise of the West 1500-1800* (Cambridge, 2016), pp. 18-20.

⁵³⁵ ODNB, 'Mackay'.

⁵³⁶ Parker, *Revolution*, pp. 34-35. Harris, *Revolution*, pp. 411, 413. Pincus, *1688*, p. 268.

conventional weapons of the day could have stopped 'Bonnie Dundee' and the Highland charge at Killiecrankie'.⁵³⁷ Similarly, historians of 'celtic' warfare, like James Michael Hill, have pointed to the Highland charge as the major reason the Jacobites achieved victory at Killiecrankie, but has added that the considerable losses inflicted upon the clans during said charge, as well as the loss of their leader the Viscount Dundee, made that victory a pyrrhic one.⁵³⁸

Broader political histories have, perhaps understandably, dedicated less time to the course of the battle and are more concerned with emphasising the outcome. Both Harris and Pincus characterise Killiecrankie as illustrating the potential of the 1689 Jacobite 'Rising', but agree that it was ultimately an indicator of its impending doom.⁵³⁹ Usually these histories utilise the battle by linking Dundee's death to the miraculous reversal of the Williamites fortunes at the Battle of Dunkeld (21st August 1689) and, perhaps with some illusion to the final pitched battle at Cromdale (1st May 1690), they conclude the Highland War.⁵⁴⁰ More recent contributions, like Raffe's monograph, have attempted to rectify this by examining the continuation of the conflict up until 1691, at least as it relates to the governance and politics of Scotland at the time.⁵⁴¹ Unsurprisingly, the notion that Killiecrankie heralded the end of the Jacobites' military operations has been regurgitated in popular histories of Scotland, namely those written by T.M. Devine and Alistair Moffat, and, thus, this notion has seeped into the popular version of events.⁵⁴² Like many battles throughout history, our perceptions of Killiecrankie have been significantly influenced by the subsequent confusion and propaganda surrounding the battle in its aftermath; good examples of this in the seventeenth century are the Battle of

⁵³⁷ Parker, *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁵³⁸ James M Hill, *Celtic Warfare, 1595-1763* (Edinburgh, 1986), p. 64.

⁵³⁹ Harris, *Revolution*, p. 411. Pincus, *1688*, p. 268.

⁵⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴¹ Raffe, *Scotland*, pp. 153-154.

⁵⁴² Devine, *Nation*, pp. 32-33. Moffat, *Scotland*, pp. 273-274.

Wittstock, 24th September 1644, and the Battle of Marston Moor, 2nd July 1644.⁵⁴³ Despite modern understanding of Killiecrankie as a crushing military defeat, the events on the field have been significantly misunderstood due to that same sort of confusion that spread afterward. Significant parts of the battle, especially surrounding the Scots-Dutch Brigade's role, have been misrepresented by historians, in particular the epilogue of the battle after the Highland charge and their presence as part of the remnant force of the Williamites on the field. Finally, the fact that the remaining Williamites, led by Mackay, retired from the field in order has been widely ignored. This chapter will clarify what happened at Killiecrankie by re-examining the Scots-Dutch Brigade's role in the battle alongside the closing stages of the engagement in which surviving elements of the Brigade were so centrally involved.

The actual reasons behind the defeat of the Brigade, and, thus, the victory of the Jacobites, at Killiecrankie were far more nuanced than previous historians have allowed.⁵⁴⁴ This chapter will not seek to re-appraise the entirety of the battle stage by stage; mainly as this has been done by Hopkins and, more recently, by Oates.⁵⁴⁵ Instead we will focus upon two key areas of the engagement. Firstly, we will examine the role the Scots-Dutch regiments played at the battle, their positioning, their numbers, their performance, and the reasons behind the retreat of the bulk of these regiments. This does not seek to absolve Major-General Mackay of the tactical errors he made nor does it seek to redeem the Brigade's tarnished reputation. Instead, it will demonstrate the reasons behind Mackay and the Brigade's darkest moment during their campaigns in Scotland. We will first give a brief overview of the effectiveness of the tactics the Jacobite army

⁵⁴³ Steve Murdoch, Kathrin Zickerman & Adam Marks, 'The Battle of Wittstock 1636: Conflicting Reports on a Swedish Victory in Germany' in *Northern Studies: The Journal of the Scottish Society for Northern Studies*, Vol 43 (2012), pp. 71-109. Murdoch & Grosjean, *Leslie*, pp. 126-134.

⁵⁴⁴ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 157. Parker, *Revolution*, pp. 35. Hill, *Celtic*, pp. 64-68.

⁵⁴⁵ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 155-161. Oates, *Killiecrankie*, pp. 86-131.

deployed at Killiecrankie, namely the Highland charge, as well as the poor tactics and positioning of the Williamite forces; these two factors are less recognised in their contribution to the Jacobite victory. The composition of both armies will be examined to frame the battle appropriately. The Scottish Jacobite army has often been depicted as an exclusively 'Highland' formation, but this characterisation has overlooked the role of experienced army officers within the Jacobite ranks, including Dundee himself.⁵⁴⁶ Furthermore, the presence of former Scots-Dutch Brigade officers in the Jacobite army has also been underestimated as a factor in advising the clans, and Dundee, that the brunt of the assault should focus upon the Scots-Dutch regiments, particularly Mackay's. Moving on, the composition of the Williamite army will then be examined in order to contrast the effectiveness of the Scottish and English regiments present with their Scots-Dutch counterparts. Examining the latter will illustrate that the Scots-Dutch Brigade's veteran officers were disproportionately outnumbered by inexperienced men within their regiments.⁵⁴⁷ Whilst the majority of the rank and file of the Brigade remain anonymous, research undertaken here has revealed a small number of previously unknown soldiers through their widows' petitions.⁵⁴⁸ This renewed analysis of the composition of parts of both armies reveals new insights into both the Jacobite success and the Williamites defeat.

The following section will then examine the performance of the three Scots-Dutch Brigade regiments present. This will illustrate that in the lead up to the Highland charge the performance of these regiments varied significantly with effective musketry and drill proving a critical factor. This will illustrate that many of the casualties inflicted on the Jacobites by the Scots-Dutch were the result of effectiveness in both and Mackay's regiment proved to be particularly successful. The other Scots-Dutch units did not

⁵⁴⁶ See: Appendix 3: Jacobite Army Officers with previous military experience present at Killiecrankie.

⁵⁴⁷ See: Appendix 4: Scots-Dutch Brigade Officers present at Killiecrankie.

⁵⁴⁸ See: Appendix 5: Known Scots-Dutch Soldiers present at Killiecrankie.

manage to effectively maintain their fire and discipline and as a result their resolve crumbled as the Jacobite clansmen reached their lines, engaging them in melee combat. We shall then move on to the impact of the Highland charge and clarify the varied impact it had on different regiments of the Williamite army. Rather than full regiments of hardened continental veterans, the Scots-Dutch Brigade battalions, like much of the Williamite army present, were overwhelmingly made up of raw recruits with little experience of battle. We will argue that whilst the majority of the Brigade's soldiers did, indeed, flee in disorder after the charge, particularly those of the second and third regiments as well as Lauder's detachment, the veteran officers and soldiers, for the most part, did not. These men were either killed, captured, or wounded as a result of their unwillingness, or inability, to flee. The abandonment of the Scots-Dutch veterans by their new recruits was one of the primary reasons for the Brigade's abysmal performance on the day in question. This fact is one of the many nuances that have previously been overlooked or de-emphasised by historians in favour of a more simplistic portrayal of the Scots-Dutch Brigade's performance. This examination will bring us to the conclusion of the Highland charge.

The latter half of the chapter will focus upon the epilogue of the battle. This section will show that historians have either ignored or overlooked the concluding stages of Killiecrankie and the continued presence of a sizeable contingent of Williamite forces, including Mackay and officers of his regiment, upon the field of battle well after the Highland charge.⁵⁴⁹ Whilst this contingent was primarily composed of Leven's regiment of foot and Colonel Fernando Hastings' English dragoons, there were elements of Mackay's decimated Scots-Dutch regiment mixed in with those two regiments. Furthermore, a portion of the bloodied survivors of the Brigade's other regiments

⁵⁴⁹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, pp. 59-60.

remained close enough to the field that Mackay sent officers to attempt to regroup with them. Killiecrankie, like many battles of the period, unfolded in stages and this concluding stage has been overlooked in favour of the simplification that the Williamite forces fled the field *en masse* shortly after the Highland charge. This depiction has been propagated by a misunderstanding of contemporaneous testimony as well as the confused reports that emerged in the days and weeks following the engagement. As with any seminal event or moment in a divisive civil struggle, Killiecrankie was quickly surrounded by contemporaneous competing accounts that sought to utilise the battle as propaganda, mainly for the Jacobite side.⁵⁵⁰

The present reassessment will centre upon a close analysis of accounts written by two participants in the battle, either at the time or in the years afterward. There are two texts from key figures involved in the battle from each of the opposing sides, Major-General Mackay and Sir Ewen Cameron of Lochiel. Mackay's *Memoirs of the Scots War* were written shortly after the Highland War and prior to his death in 1692 at the Battle of Steenkerque 3rd August 1692. Despite remaining unprinted until the nineteenth century, research undertaken for this thesis has discovered that the memoirs were distributed as scribal publications amongst the British nobility.⁵⁵¹ Killiecrankie features prominently in Mackay's memoir and his account of it there will be examined alongside his letters sent in the aftermath of the battle as well as his official account submitted to the Williamite government on 17th August.⁵⁵² Murray-Scott, in his biography of Viscount Dundee, went so far as to dismiss the veracity of Mackay's account as mere 'protestations' in which the Major-General only sought to redeem his reputation.⁵⁵³ However, both Tony Pollard and

⁵⁵⁰ Dalrymple, *Memoirs*, II, pp. 86-90. Balcarres, *Memoirs*, pp. 46-47. Swift (ed.), *Creichton. Burnet, History*, IV, pp. 47-48.

⁵⁵¹ *BL*, Kings MS.277. *NLS*, MS.3739.

⁵⁵² Mackay, *Memoirs*, 'A Short Relation as far as I can remember, of what past before, in and after the late defaite in Athole, of a parte of their Majesties forces under my command', 17th August 1689, pp. 262-267.

⁵⁵³ Murray-Scott, *Dundee*, p. 186.

archaeologist Neil Oliver found from their own survey of the battle site that Mackay's memoirs were, overall, a 'reasonable account'.⁵⁵⁴ More recently an archaeological survey conducted in 2015 has re-asserted that Pollard and Oliver's conclusions were generally correct.⁵⁵⁵ Thus, despite Murray-Scott's dismissal of Mackay we can rely upon him as an eyewitness whose account is supported by archaeological evidence. On the other hand, Cameron's account was written by John Drummond of Balhaldie around fifty years after Killiecrankie, but this 'memoir' was compiled using the Jacobite chieftain's papers.⁵⁵⁶ Re-published in the nineteenth century it provides not only a critical counterbalance to Mackay's account, but a significant overlap with that work; both accounts contain similar details and both discuss the epilogue of the battle. Historians like Hill and Hopkins have neglected to utilise this aspect of Cameron's account.⁵⁵⁷ More recently Oates has presented both accounts side by side, but has not ventured to discuss the significant overlap between the two which, once attended to properly, can only reinforce the veracity of both as reliable sources.⁵⁵⁸ A further contemporary account, now present in Edinburgh University Library's Special Collections, by an anonymous participant of the battle from the Williamite side, provides an estimate of the numbers of Scots-Dutch soldiers present which both Mackay and Cameron neglect to mention.⁵⁵⁹

Finally, letters from Mackay as well as ministers in William's Scottish government, such as Melville and Hamilton, have been utilised to further analyse these accounts as well as provide third party perspectives.⁵⁶⁰ These have been further contextualised

⁵⁵⁴ Tony Pollard & Neil Oliver, *Two Men in a Trench: Uncovering the Secrets of British Battlefields* (London, 2003), pp. 240-241.

⁵⁵⁵ GUARD Archaeology, *Battle of Killiecrankie Survey* (Glasgow, 2015).

⁵⁵⁶ *Cameron*, pp. xl-li.

⁵⁵⁷ Hill, *Celtic*, pp. 72-73. Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 157-160.

⁵⁵⁸ Oates, *Killiecrankie*, pp. 112-117.

⁵⁵⁹ EUL, Laing MSS II.89, ff. 338-339.

⁵⁶⁰ *Melvilles*.

alongside the published *RPCS*, the Scottish treasury registers in the *NRS* and the *RPS*.⁵⁶¹ These governmental sources have provided insights into the Scots-Dutch officers involved in the battle from widows' petitions for financial relief, accounts of the battle itself and testimony of Williamite officers submitted to the Scottish parliament as part of forfeiture proceedings against prominent Jacobites.⁵⁶² The lack of muster rolls for the Williamite and Jacobite forces has led to the need to augment primary sources with works that reproduce contemporaneous sources. The Scots-Dutch Brigade's extant muster rolls do not cover their time in Scotland and for the period of 1688 and early 1689 are only available as reproductions in Ferguson's work.⁵⁶³ Ferguson's three volume monograph on the Brigade has been utilised alongside the work of Dalton on the Scots and English armies as well as D'Alton's work on the Jacobite Irish army.⁵⁶⁴ These sources have provided critical insight into the numbers and structure of the Brigade, the proportion of officers to soldiers present at the battle, the often overlooked presence of Jacobite professional soldiers and the proportion of experienced and inexperienced officers present in the Scots-Dutch battalions that day. It was this inexperience and lack of training that would be so fatal to many of the Scots-Dutch Brigade and this fact has remained unnoticed until now. However, before analysing the composition of the two armies, we must first, briefly, offer some insight into the circumstances and geography of the battle of Killiecrankie as well as the positioning of both armies.

⁵⁶¹ *RPCS*, Vols XIII-XIV. *NRS*, E7/5.

⁵⁶² *RPS*, A1690/4/19, Depositions of witnesses cited in the process of treason at the instance of the King's advocate against the Viscount Dundee and his accomplices, 12th May 1690.

⁵⁶³ James Ferguson, *Papers Illustrating the History of the Scots Brigade in the service of the United Netherlands 1572-1782*, Three Volumes (Edinburgh, 1899-1902).

⁵⁶⁴ Ferguson, *Papers*, I. Dalton, *Scots*. Dalton, *English*, III, 1689-94. John D'Alton, *Illustrations, Historical and Genealogical, of King James's Irish Army List, 1689*, Vol II (London, 1861).

Geography, Positioning & the Armies

On 24th July, Mackay had marched from Stirling with a significant detachment of the Williamite army alongside three battalions from the three Scots-Dutch regiments.⁵⁶⁵ The march of the army under Mackay's command had been planned as an expedition to reduce Lochaber in tandem with another force marching northward from Argyll, led by Archibald Campbell the eponymous Earl thereof.⁵⁶⁶ News that the Jacobites were besieging Blair Castle was brought to Edinburgh by Lord John Murray, first son of the Marquis of Atholl, and this message only hastened Mackay's resolve to march as soon as possible.⁵⁶⁷ Although the route had originally been planned to pass through Atholl, as the disobedience of the inhabitants had been troubling the Williamite government for some time, the Williamite army's march occurred at a much quicker pace than previously expected. The army departed Stirling on 24th July arriving at Perth on 25th July and then encamped at Dunkeld on the following day.⁵⁶⁸ These three days of consecutive marching would have put considerable strain on the Williamite troops before the battle as they had travelled through the Pass of Killiecrankie on the day of the battle, 27th July 1689.⁵⁶⁹ Furthermore, the march through the pass was arduous as the small cattle track only provided enough room for two to three soldiers to march abreast.⁵⁷⁰ The difficult terrain and narrow passage was only worsened by the local Atholl clansmen who, in direct contravention of their liege lord's acquiescence to the Williamite administration, began sniping at the column throughout the day.⁵⁷¹ Mackay had hoped that the swift pace of his army would catch the Jacobites off-guard at Blair Castle, but his enemies had been

⁵⁶⁵ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 24th July 1689, pp. 246-247.

⁵⁶⁶ *RPCS*, XIII, Missive to the Earl of Argyll, 25th July 1689, pp. 552-553.

⁵⁶⁷ *Melvilles*, Sir John Dalrymple to Lord Melvill, 28th July 1689, pp. 204-205.

⁵⁶⁸ Mackay, *Memoirs*, pp. 47-48.

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁵⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 50; Historic Environment Scotland [HES], BTL12, The Inventory of Historic Battlefields – Battle of Killiecrankie, 27th July 1689.

forewarned of the Williamites approach.⁵⁷² Major-General John Graham of Claverhouse, first Viscount Dundee, mobilised his army, mustering all the clans he could, to join the small force besieging Blair and had arrived there before Mackay. The Jacobite Army and Dundee now awaited the Williamites emergence at the mouth of the pass at Killiecrankie. After enduring a long day's march and the sporadic musket fire of the Atholl-men, the Williamite army proceeded from the pass only to find their route to Blair was screened by a small contingent of Jacobite cavalry.⁵⁷³ Mackay ordered Brigadier Balfour's regiment to march toward the enemy and secure the mouth of the pass so the army could march out and organise itself for the possibility of an engagement.⁵⁷⁴ The Jacobite horsemen wheeled about and appeared to be retreating northward.⁵⁷⁵ Marching onto the plains below Creag Eallich, a large hill overlooking the mouth of the pass to the north-east, the Jacobite army revealed itself atop this commanding incline. They had been awaiting Mackay and his army's arrival and the geography of the Williamite position would be a critical disadvantage in the coming battle.

On the slopes of Creag Eallich, Dundee had arrayed the Jacobite army, but by using his cavalry as a feint he had effectively lured the Williamites out into the open plains between the hill and the River Gary.⁵⁷⁶ By the time Mackay had realised the position he was in the Williamite army was already effectively stuck between the Jacobites atop the hill to their east and the river to their west with only the escape either to the south through the narrow pass or to the north to take the road to Blair.⁵⁷⁷ This geography was critical to Mackay's decision to engage the enemy that day. He ordered the Williamite army to turn '*Quart De Conversion*' to face the slopes of Creag Eallich before ordering the regiments to

⁵⁷² *Melvilles*, Sir John Dalrymple to Lord Melvill, 28th July 1689, pp. 204-205.

⁵⁷³ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 50. HES, BTL12, Inventory – Killiecrankie.

⁵⁷⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 51.

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁶ HES, BTL12, Killiecrankie.

⁵⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

advance to a small terraced area, where much of the fighting would take place.⁵⁷⁸ The reasoning behind this advance was not entirely flawed, as has previously been thought.⁵⁷⁹ Mackay recalled in his memoirs that the army's original position on the low ground by the river only provided 'a ground fair enough to receive the enemy, but not to attack them' and as the Jacobite army appeared to make no motion to attack he felt he had to move to ground more favourable to an offensive action before nightfall.⁵⁸⁰ Some historians, most recently Oates, have become confused about the positioning of the River Garry by Mackay's mention of the 'litle river' to the right of the Williamite army.⁵⁸¹ This was, undoubtedly, not the Garry itself, but rather a small tributary stream that ran down the slopes into the river; this stream acted as an additional geographical obstacle for Mackay and his men.⁵⁸² Donald McBane, a private in the Williamite army who later wrote a memoir of his life as a soldier and fencing master, recalled 'we drew up at the House of Runrawrie... having a great Water in the Rear, and another on the Right of our Line'.⁵⁸³ This first-hand account clearly indicates that the 'litle river' was not the Garry, which was

⁵⁷⁸ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 51.

⁵⁷⁹ Hill, *Celtic*, p. 69.


⁵⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸¹ Oates, *Killiecrankie*, p. 117. Mackay, *Short Relation*, p. 266.

⁵⁸² HES, BTL12, *Killiecrankie*.

⁵⁸³ McBane, *Sword-Man's*, p. 109.

the river behind the army, but the tributary stream to the right-hand side of the line (See below: Map 1).



Map 1: Geography of the Battle of Killiecrankie – The Blue line indicates the position of the Williamite Army and the Red indicates the position of the Jacobite Army. Image courtesy of The Battlefields Trust, Historic Environment Scotland, 2005.

Despite the disadvantage of turning his army to face the Viscount Dundee's forces, which would necessitate having the River Gary behind them, there were no real viable alternatives. Retreating would require some of the forces to fight a rear-guard action, whilst the rest filtered back into the Pass of Killiecrankie. Ignoring Dundee's forces would, equally, have the same result as the Jacobites would likely attempt to halt the Williamite army from advancing toward Blair. Either option would have been unacceptable as either would leave the Williamites open to attack and as a result incur dangerous losses. Despite this predicament, Mackay held one distinct advantage at Killiecrankie, the Williamite army's superior numbers. It must, however, be borne in mind that both the Jacobites and the Williamites in Scotland did not keep comprehensive muster rolls. In the case of the former, musters of the clans present were only taken sporadically throughout the war and

for the latter some rolls have not survived or are periodically absent. For the Scots-Dutch Brigade, the muster rolls of their time in Scotland are non-existent and, therefore, their numbers and officers have been pieced together from other sources, as mentioned earlier. Before examining the Williamite forces it will be useful to examine their opponent's numbers as well as the contingent of veteran 'Lowland' officers present within the Jacobite army.

The Jacobite army at Killiecrankie was between 1,800 and 2,000 strong, according to Cameron's estimate and an undated 1689 muster roll of the clans and regiments from the preceding months.⁵⁸⁴ Almost all of the Jacobite forces at the battle came from five Highland clans who organised themselves into regiments: the Macleans, the Camerons of Lochiel, the MacDonalds of Clanranald, of Glengarry, and of Glencoe.⁵⁸⁵ Historians' have consistently seized upon the Highland character of the Jacobite army. Stuart Reid states that the Jacobites clansmen at Killiecrankie were 'raw recruits'.⁵⁸⁶ Hill described Killiecrankie as 'the Highlanders most spectacular and pyrrhic victory' and centred his analysis upon the Jacobite clans entirely.⁵⁸⁷ Parker has, similarly, focused all of his attention on the innate martial prowess of the Highlanders and their deployment of the Highland charge, underlining its importance to the Jacobite victory.⁵⁸⁸ Oates has added to this perception, stating, 'The Jacobite army was an army of Highland Scottish irregulars with a few Irish troops'.⁵⁸⁹ Historians myopic focus upon the Highlanders and their 'natural' martial abilities does not entirely reflect the diversity of experience amongst the ranks of the Jacobite army. Many of the chieftains, and their clansmen, would have had 'modern' military experience. Whilst it is almost impossible to uncover the experiences of

⁵⁸⁴ Cameron, p. 268. NRS, GD26/8/71.

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid. Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 158. See also: D.J., MacDonald, *Clan Donald* (Loanhead, 1978).

⁵⁸⁶ Stuart Reid, *Battle of Killiecrankie: The Last Act of the Killing Times* (Barnsley, 2018), p. 16.

⁵⁸⁷ Hill, *Celtic*, p. 64.

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid. Parker, *Revolution*, pp. 34-35.

⁵⁸⁹ Oates, *Killiecrankie*, p. 60.

the common clansmen present, it is likely that some had either seen service on the continent or had served in a Scottish army in the previous decades. Aonghus MacCoinnich's research has illustrated that the Highland clans, particularly those of the western seaboard, retained their 'militaristic culture'.⁵⁹⁰ MacCoinnich points out that from 1603 onwards they had channelled this away from more traditional, and increasingly less acceptable, outlets in Ireland, eastward towards continental Europe.⁵⁹¹ Murdoch's study of the Highland military diaspora has further revealed the martial connection of the Highlands to Scandinavia throughout the seventeenth century.⁵⁹² His research illustrates that Highlanders were exposed to the 'Swedish discipline' and cutting-edge techniques of warfare serving on the continent.⁵⁹³ Therefore, it can safely be assumed that at least some of those clansmen serving in the Jacobite army had continental military training and experience. Those with identifiable military experience tended to be from the clan elite, such as Cameron of Lochiel.⁵⁹⁴ Discourses surrounding the clans' 'natural' military abilities can disguise the fact that men like Lochiel had decades of professional military experience.⁵⁹⁵ He was first commissioned as a colonel of foot and aid-lieutenant under General David Leslie, a veteran of the Thirty Years' War, as part of the Scottish 'Engager' army in 1648.⁵⁹⁶ This was compounded by his years of experience in clan warfare and his utilisation of guerrilla-like tactics in opposing the Cromwellian occupation of the 1650s.⁵⁹⁷ In part, the blanket depiction of Highlanders as 'irregular' fighters comes from the chieftains themselves; Cameron described the 'Highlanders' as retaining 'the old method'

⁵⁹⁰ Aonghus MacCoinnich, 'His spirit was given only to warre': Conflict and Identity in the Scottish Gaidhealtachd c. 1580-c. 1630' in S., Murdoch & A., Mackillop (eds.) *Fighting for Identity: Scottish Military Experience c. 1550-1900* (Leiden, 2002), p. 155.

⁵⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹² Steve Murdoch, 'More Than Just 'Mackay's' and Mercenaries: Gaelic Influences in Scandinavia. 1580-1707' in *Transactions of the Gaelic Society of Inverness*, Vol LX, 1997-1998 (Inverness, 2000), pp. 161-186.

⁵⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁴ *ODNB*, Edward M. Furgol, 'Cameron, Sir Ewen, of Lochiel (1629-1719)'.

⁵⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁷ Dow, *Cromwellian*, pp. 95, 97, 136-137.

of warfare.⁵⁹⁸ It can, therefore, be surmised that whilst the clans certainly deployed 'Gaelic' tactics and experience of that form of warfare at Killiecrankie, they also utilised veterans with regular military experience peppered throughout their ranks.

In contrast to historians, such as Hill, placing a consistent emphasis on the Highland clans' in the Jacobite army only Hopkins and Lenman have briefly mentioned the 'Lowland' contingent of cavalry present with Dundee.⁵⁹⁹ The only full regiment of non-Highland regulars were Colonel Nicholas Purcell's Irish dragoons, who had 300 men present at the battle.⁶⁰⁰ Between forty to sixty of the Scottish cavalry at the battle had previous military experience, a fact which has been overlooked by historians.⁶⁰¹ An analysis of these officers and gentlemen present reveals that this small contingent had a corpus of veteran officers at its core, including the Jacobite army's commander, Viscount Dundee. Dundee's military experience is well covered throughout the historiography of the Highland War and the Jacobite risings, but this tends to be de-emphasised in the analysis of Killiecrankie to give more weight to the Highland charge.⁶⁰² Dundee and the veteran officers accompanying him played a key role in directing where the weight of the clans' assaults upon the Williamite line should fall. By scrutinising Dalton's work on James VII & II's armies alongside D'Alton's Irish army list and Ferguson's work on the Brigade demonstrates that this group had decades of experience as well as in-depth knowledge of their opponents' strongest regiments.⁶⁰³ Scrutinising these sources in tandem with testimony from two Williamite officers captured by the Jacobites reveals that eighteen of the Jacobite officers present had prior military experience (see Appendix 3).⁶⁰⁴

⁵⁹⁸ Cameron, p. 251.

⁵⁹⁹ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 156. Lenman, *Risings*, pp. 33, 44-47.

⁶⁰⁰ D'Alton, *Irish*, p. 766.

⁶⁰¹ NRS, GD26/8/71.

⁶⁰² Hill, *Celtic*, p. 64. Lenman, *Risings*, pp. 44-47.

⁶⁰³ Dalton, *Scots*, pp. 78-87, 141-168. D'Alton, *Irish*, p. 766.

⁶⁰⁴ RPS, A1690/4/19.

Now we will examine the previous military experience of the Jacobite 'lowland' officer corps in more detail. Dundee himself had just under two decades of military experience and had served in Lockhart's Scottish regiment of foot in France from 1672 to 1674 before transferring to the Prince of Orange's Guard in Dutch service where he remained until 1680.⁶⁰⁵ After returning to Scotland, Dundee was a senior officer in the Scottish army and had risen to the rank of Major-General by 1688; he was appointed commander of James' forces in Scotland in the following year, no doubt due to his extensive military experience as well as well-known loyalty.⁶⁰⁶ The small troop of horse present at Killiecrankie not only contained noblemen and gentlemen, such as James Seton, fourth Earl of Dunfermline, whose sympathy to the Jacobite cause was his only qualification, but many Scottish veterans.⁶⁰⁷ Lieutenant James Colt of Colonel George Ramsay's Scots-Dutch regiment had been captured by the Jacobites during the first raid on Perth in May 1689.⁶⁰⁸ Colt provided critical testimony to forfeiture proceedings against Jacobites in the Scottish parliament in the following year because he was able to identify key figures whilst in captivity.⁶⁰⁹ Part of Colt's evidence related that a surfeit of experienced officers, many former veterans of King James' forces, had arrived in Mull with Purcell.⁶¹⁰ This contingent included prominent officers who had gained all of their experience in the pre-Revolution Scottish army, such as Sir William Wallace of Craigie and Lewis Creighton, the fourth Viscount Fren draught.⁶¹¹ With the arrival of Brigadier Alexander Cannon from Ireland, Wallace and Fren draught, like many of the senior Scottish officers and prominent supporters, were given commissions to raise new

⁶⁰⁵ *ODNB*, Magnus Linklater, 'Graham, John, first Viscount of Dundee [known as Bonnie Dundee]'.

⁶⁰⁶ Dalton, *Scots*, p. 142. Dalrymple, *Memoirs*, II, p. 300.

⁶⁰⁷ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 127, 157, 160.

⁶⁰⁸ *RPS*, A1690/4/19.

⁶⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶¹⁰ D'Alton, *Irish*, p. 766.

⁶¹¹ Dalton, *Scots*, pp. 142-143, 149-150. *RPS*, A1690/4/19.

regiments of dragoons and cavalry in Scotland, with Colt recalling that Wallace had been 'designed a colonel of horse'.⁶¹² Other less senior officers with experience in James' Scottish army included Dundee's brother, Cornet David Graham formerly of the King's Regiment of Horse.⁶¹³ The officers with no continental experience still brought critical knowledge in training, organisation and had some battlefield experience from putting down sporadic Covenanter uprisings from 1666 to 1685.⁶¹⁴ The officers with European military experience, including Dundee himself, brought critical knowledge and provided a hardened nucleus to the Scottish Jacobite army's officer corps.

Childs has pointed out that King James had sought to increasingly professionalise his armies in Britain and Ireland by bringing in reforms and foreign veterans to provide his forces with new officers and soldiers knowledgeable of the developments in European warfare.⁶¹⁵ This illustrates that in spite of historians general focus upon the Highland character of the Jacobite army, there were a significant minority within that force were highly trained and experienced. Of the eighteen Jacobite officers present at Killiecrankie, all but one had more than two years of military experience from serving on the continent or within Scotland, England or Ireland (See Appendix 3).⁶¹⁶ Nine of those officers known to be present at the battle had domestic military experience gained from serving in the armies of Charles II and James VII.⁶¹⁷ This, of course, means that the other half had experience garnered from serving on the continent, the majority had either served in

⁶¹² *RPS*, A1690/4/19. *NRS*, GD26/9/170, Commissions in Queen's Regiment of Dragoons by Colonel Alexander Cannon, 17th May 1689. *Creighton*, p. 268. Anon., *Memoir of Lord Dundee* (London, 1711), p. 31.

⁶¹³ Dalton, *Scots*, p. 142.

⁶¹⁴ John Childs, *The Army of Charles II* (Manchester, 1976), pp. 196-203.

⁶¹⁵ Childs, *James II*, p. 3.

⁶¹⁶ See Appendix 3: Colonel William Wallace, Colonel Lewis Creighton (Frendraught), Cornet David Graham, Captain William Charters, Lieutenant-Colonel William Oliphant, Major Robert Middleton, Colonel Nicholas Purcell, Major Duncan Menzies, Major John Hay.

⁶¹⁷ *Ibid.*

France or the Dutch Republic (See Appendix 3).⁶¹⁸ Five of the nine officers with continental experience were previously members of the Scots-Dutch Brigade; all of whom had returned to James' service in response to the 1688 recall.⁶¹⁹ The most prominent former Scots-Dutch officer was Brigadier Cannon, who had been a colonel with his own regiment in the Brigade before returning to James' service. He now continued that service with a commission to raise a new regiment of dragoons in Scotland, in which his fellow former Scots-Dutch companions would doubtlessly be granted employment. Cannon was accompanied at Killiecrankie by Major Henry Graham, Captain Gavin Hamilton, Major James Middleton, and Captain Alexander Bruce (See Appendix 3).⁶²⁰ All of these officers had roughly two decades of experience each within the Scots-Dutch Brigade. A prime example of this was Major Graham, often confused for Viscount Dundee's brother David, who had served with the Brigade since 1674 before leaving to obey the recall and joining a regiment of returning Scots-Dutch commanded by Colonel John Wauchope in 1688; he then transferred to the King's Regiment of Horse in the months leading up to the Dutch invasion.⁶²¹ Despite making up just twenty-seven percent of the Jacobite officers, they represented fifty-five per cent of the continental veterans present.⁶²² These men were to be formed into Cannon's new regiment of dragoons after Killiecrankie as the Brigadier had arrived with a commission from King James.⁶²³ These former Brigade officers, like Dundee, had previous experience of warfare on the continent, but critically they had fought alongside the Scots-Dutch regiments, and Mackay, in service of the Prince of Orange. However, before we examine how these officers had a disproportionate impact

⁶¹⁸ See Appendix 3: Major-General John Graham of Claverhouse (Dundee), Major Henry Graham, Brigadier Alexander Cannon, Colonel George Barclay, Captain Gavin Hamilton, Major James Middleton, Captain Alexander Bruce, Captain Robert Charters and Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Douglas.

⁶¹⁹ Jones, 'Recall', pp. 423-435.

⁶²⁰ Dalton, *Scots*, pp. 122, 142-144, 155, 157, 168. Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 478, 502-505, 510, 515. *NRS*, E100/8/1, Colonel John Wauchope's company at Musselburgh, 26th June 1688. *RPS*, A1690/4/19.

⁶²¹ Dalton, *Scots*, pp. 142-143. Ferguson, I, pp. 478, 502-503, 510, 515. *NRS*, E100/8/1.

⁶²² See Appendix 3.

⁶²³ *NRS*, GD26/9/170.

upon the battle, we must analyse the Scottish Williamite forces and the Scots-Dutch Brigade. This will illustrate that the Williamite army was woefully undertrained, inexperienced and the veterans present within their ranks were far outnumbered by those with little to no experience.

The estimated strength of the Williamite army at Killiecrankie has varied significantly. Historic Environment Scotland, in their inventory of Scotland's battlefields, illustrate that the range between the estimates for said army as they place it between 3,500 and 5,000 men; the higher estimate emanating from Captain John Creighton's memoirs.⁶²⁴ However, the latter figure can be easily discredited as Creighton had been one of the officers of the Royal Scots Dragoons involved in the plot to capture Mackay in June 1689.⁶²⁵ As a result, Creighton was not present at the battle, due to his imprisonment in relation to this plot, and, thus, his observations regarding Killiecrankie, including his estimate of the Williamite army's size, come from second-hand accounts and appear to be an attempt on his part to inflate the triumph of the Jacobite forces.⁶²⁶ In contrast, Mackay's own estimate states that he had 3,500 men in total: with 3,000 foot, 100 horse, and 300 dragoons.⁶²⁷ Cameron of Lochiel, of course present at Killiecrankie, corroborated Mackay's estimate and so we can safely assume that the Williamite army numbered closer to 3,400 than 5,000.⁶²⁸ In order to better explain the Williamites, and Scots-Dutch Brigade's, defeat at Killiecrankie it is important to understand the army's composition. The Scottish infantry regiments had 1,100 men in total with Leven's regiment numbering 500 men strong and Viscount Kenmuir's regiment numbering 600 men both with two battalions each.⁶²⁹ Both Leven and Kenmuir commanded personally at the battle. The

⁶²⁴ HES, BTL12, Killiecrankie. *Creighton*, p. 268.

⁶²⁵ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, p. 124.

⁶²⁶ *Creighton*, p. 268.

⁶²⁷ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 46.

⁶²⁸ *Cameron*, p. 265.

⁶²⁹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, pp. 47-48. Oates, *Killiecrankie*, p. 97.

Scottish horse was divided between two troops, Lord Belhaven and Annandale's with fifty men in each; however, only Belhaven was present in command of his troop as Annandale had elected not to accompany the army, as discussed in the previous chapter.⁶³⁰ The remaining Scottish Williamite forces were made up of a small unknown number of engineers and gunners to man the three leather cannons; relics from the Covenanters military procured from the private arsenal of Margaret Wemyss, third Countess of Wemyss, a few weeks before.⁶³¹ Finally, an independent company of 100 Highlanders was commanded by Captain Robert Menzies of Weem, son of the laird thereof.⁶³² Overall, the Scottish contingent of the Williamite army made up half of the total force with 1,500 men in total. The remaining half of the army was composed of English and Scots-Dutch auxiliary units.

The Brigade's numbers at Killiecrankie can only be determined by utilising Fergusons' reproduction of the muster rolls, written prior to the Highland War, alongside a contemporaneous pamphlet printed in the aftermath of the battle.⁶³³ Both Cameron and Mackay do not elect to mention the exact numbers of the Scots-Dutch present in their writings. Cameron's account simply noted the Scots-Dutch regiments were present.⁶³⁴ However, the Brigade was also explicitly identified by the Jacobites on the day, a fact we shall return to in due course. On the other hand, Mackay at least provided an outline of the Scots-Dutch presence as he wrote that there were 'three battalions', or one for each regiment, at the battle.⁶³⁵ Each battalion present had most of their officers including their colonels.⁶³⁶ The first regiment, sometimes referred to as the 'old regiment', was, of course,

⁶³⁰ Ibid.

⁶³¹ *RPCS*, XIII, Letter to the Countess of Wemyss, 15th July 1689, p. 516. Stewart, *Rethinking*, p. 186.

⁶³² Peter Simpson, *The Independent Highland Companies, 1603-1760* (Edinburgh, 1996), pp. 76-77.

⁶³³ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 478, 502-505, 510, 515. EUL, Laing MSS II.89, True Account, f. 338.

⁶³⁴ Balhaldie, *Cameron*, p. 268.

⁶³⁵ Mackay, *Memoirs*, pp. 58-59.

⁶³⁶ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 482-483.

commanded by Major-General Mackay, the second regiment was commanded by Brigadier Balfour and, finally, the third regiment by Colonel George Ramsay.⁶³⁷ A company of 200 'chosen' fusiliers, representing the best soldiers drawn from the ranks of the army as whole, was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel George Lauder, of the Second Scots-Dutch Regiment.⁶³⁸ Whilst nominally Scots-Dutch due to its commander, the mixed nature of the detachment has led us to include this 200 in the Scottish contingent to avoid inflating the number of Scots-Dutch soldiers present. The 'True Account' of the battle, written by an anonymous author, appears likely to have been taken either from a participant of the battle or someone who had spoken with the survivors afterward, either in Perth or Stirling. Whilst the author's anonymity may raise questions about the source's veracity, the details contained therein are corroborated by Mackay, Cameron, and McBane's accounts.⁶³⁹ The author informs us of the presence of three battalions of Scots-Dutch at the battle and confirms the size of these battalions.⁶⁴⁰ The account stated that Mackay had left Edinburgh for Atholl with three battalions of foot 'amounting to 1500 men' and made up of 'a third part of his [Mackay's] own [sic] regim[e]nt... ane other third part out of Ballfours... ane other third part out of Ramsays'.⁶⁴¹ This would mean that each of the Scots-Dutch battalions present had 500 men.⁶⁴² The *Proceedings* news pamphlet, published contemporaneously as previously mentioned, confirms this stating that the Scots-Dutch battalions numbered 1,500 men in total citing a report taken from 'Several Officers of the Army'.⁶⁴³ A typical battalion during the latter half of the seventeenth century was supposed to have 700 men.⁶⁴⁴ In Scotland, at least during the Highland War,

⁶³⁷ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 4.

⁶³⁸ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 48.

⁶³⁹ EUL, Laing MSS II.89, True Account, ff. 338-339. Mackay, *Memoirs*, pp. 58-59. Cameron, pp. 265-268. McBane, *Sword-Man's*, pp. 109-110.

⁶⁴⁰ EUL, Laing MSS II.89, ff. 338-339.

⁶⁴¹ *Ibid.*, f. 338

⁶⁴² *Ibid.*

⁶⁴³ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, pp. 186.

⁶⁴⁴ Childs, *Warfare*, p. 158.

it was stipulated, typically, that a regiment of foot should number no more than 600 soldiers with the proportion of officers largely determined by the number of suitable men available.⁶⁴⁵ Therefore, we can safely assume that the Scots-Dutch Brigade had 1,500 men at the Battle of Killiecrankie.

Ferguson has argued that the Brigade 'formed the back-bone' of the Williamite army at Killiecrankie.⁶⁴⁶ In terms of numbers, the Scots-Dutch Brigade were undoubtedly the 'back-bone' of William's forces that day as they represent the largest single unit present.⁶⁴⁷ They were, in addition, the largest 'foreign' auxiliary unit present as they only other foreigners, on the Williamite side, were Hastings' 300 English dragoons.⁶⁴⁸ Yet, the fact that the Scots-Dutch represented the mainstay of William's forces, in numerical terms, can be misconstrued due to the Brigade's reputation as a unit of battle-hardened veterans. The issues of the inexperience amongst the Brigade's ranks, and the numbers of those with experience, have been elided in previous accounts and instead must be unpicked.⁶⁴⁹ By undertaking an analysis of the Brigade's officer corps we can determine the number of officers present at the battle as well as their experience or lack thereof. Firstly, we must understand why there was such a dearth of experienced officers and soldiers within the Brigade at Killiecrankie.

The Scots-Dutch Brigade had entered Scotland with just one third of their usual strength, around 1,100 men in total, as mentioned in the previous chapter.⁶⁵⁰ Since their arrival in Scotland, the Brigade had been recruiting new men and just one month prior to Killiecrankie Major-General John Lanier wrote to Sir William Blathwayt, in London, from

⁶⁴⁵ *NRS*, E91/4, Account of money paid to the forces by James Oswald of Fingalton, commissary of the forces, 'Kenmuir, Grant & Argyll's regiments of foot', March 1689-June 1690, f. 3.

⁶⁴⁶ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 482.

⁶⁴⁷ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 46. Cameron, p. 265.

⁶⁴⁸ Dalton, *English*, III, 1689-94, p. 11.

⁶⁴⁹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 6.

⁶⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

Edinburgh, that 'the 3 Reg[i]m[en]ts that came from Holland' had 'about 8000 men newly rased'.⁶⁵¹ Although this number appears to be gross exaggeration, the anonymous account of the battle confirms that 'the rest of the Dutch regiments 12 companies wer left heer [sic] to guard the City and Castell comanded [sic] by Buchan Li[eu]t[enant] Collonell to Ramsay and Douglas Major to Ballfour' with the remainder 'at Stirling comanded by Sir Charles Gr[a]hame Major to Mackay'.⁶⁵² It remains unknown how many of these Scots-Dutch soldiers left behind were inexperienced recruits, but they held the important charge of keeping Edinburgh, the capital city, and Stirling, the premier military garrison, safe.⁶⁵³ At least two of the three officers mentioned, Graham and Douglas, had almost a decade of experience and the third, Thomas Buchan, had proven himself a capable commander during the siege of Edinburgh Castle.⁶⁵⁴ The transfer of veteran soldiers and officers out of the Brigade in England had a major impact on the Scots-Dutch regiments in Scotland. They were often overstretched on a variety of duties throughout the country. Mackay directly attributed 'the King haveing [sic] taken awa their best and oldest men to recruit the Dutch regiments in England' as a direct factor which impinged upon their ability to operate before they had even arrived in Scotland.⁶⁵⁵ Despite their best efforts to train new men, the rapid pace of the Scottish campaign and the Brigade's need for more recruits were clear obstacles for the Scots-Dutch officers.⁶⁵⁶ It can be argued that the reduction of the Brigade in England had a direct impact at Killiecrankie combined with the prevalence of less experienced officers, which we shall come to momentarily, and soldiers the unit was clearly diminished. As a result, the two of the three Scots-Dutch battalions present at the battle would perform poorly.

⁶⁵¹ *NLS*, MS 3740, Lanier to Blathwayt, Lanier to [unknown], Edinburgh, 23rd June 1689, f. 90.

⁶⁵² *EUL*, Laing MSS II.89, True Account, f. 338.

⁶⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵⁴ *Ibid.*; Ferguson, I, p. 479, 481, 509-510, 516, 517. *RPCS*, XIII, Commission to Sir Charles Graham, p. 532.

⁶⁵⁵ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 59.

⁶⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

Identifying the Scots-Dutch officers present at Killiecrankie, as well as the length of their service, remains a difficult problem to grapple with. Ferguson counts ten officers at Killiecrankie using Mackay's memoirs: Mackay himself, Brigadier Balfour, Colonel Ramsay, Lieutenant-Colonel Lauder, Lieutenant-Colonel James Mackay, Major Robert Mackay, Lieutenant Chambers, Lieutenant Peter van Best, Lieutenant James Colt, and Captain James Ferguson.⁶⁵⁷ Using the muster lists and commissions he found a further twelve not mentioned by Mackay: Lieutenant Arnot, Captain-Lieutenant Mackenzie, Captain Alexander Lamy, Captain Angus Mackay, Major John Somerville, Captain John Macleod, Captain Barthold Balfour Jr., Captain Walter Murray, Captain William Murray, Ensign Hugh Sutherland, Captain Everard Halkett, and Captain John Erskine.⁶⁵⁸ However, Mackay noted in his memoirs that he lost five to six subalterns (officers below the rank of captain) at the battle.⁶⁵⁹ Two of these men were identified by Ferguson utilising Mackay's memoirs and letters, albeit they remained nameless.⁶⁶⁰ Only one of these subalterns was named; Captain-Lieutenant Mackenzie listed as a casualty by Mackay in a letter dated 16th September 1689.⁶⁶¹ Ferguson was, thus, able to identify, using twenty-two officers present at Killiecrankie.⁶⁶² There could be yet more nameless officers who participated in the battle as Mackay later admitted, in his memoirs, that he was unable to recall the names of all Scots-Dutch officers wounded or killed during the fighting.⁶⁶³ Using the *RPCS*, the Scottish treasury registers, the *RPS* and the anonymous account of Killiecrankie, cross-referenced with Ferguson's muster rolls and officers mentioned by Mackay, this thesis has identified nine additional Scots-Dutch officers

⁶⁵⁷ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 483-485.

⁶⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 479, 481, 510.

⁶⁵⁹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 59; Major-General Mackay to Lord Melville, 16th September 1689, pp. 281-282.

⁶⁶⁰ *Ibid.*; Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 479, 481, 510.

⁶⁶¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 16th September 1689, pp. 281-282.

⁶⁶² *Ibid.*; Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 479, 481.

⁶⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

involved in the battle.⁶⁶⁴ It is also worth highlighting much of our information on the officers in this group (eight out of nine) comes from the widows petitions, mentioned previously.⁶⁶⁵ Single men are, therefore, likely to be under-represented in our analysis. Only one, Captain William Milne, was named by the 'True Account' as having been slain at the battle, but Ferguson's work does include a commission for Milne dated 29th March 1688.⁶⁶⁶ Milne was one such officer, killed during the battle, that had previously remained unknown.

The discovery of these nine additional officers brings the total number of known Scots-Dutch officers at Killiecrankie from twenty-two to thirty-one.⁶⁶⁷ These thirty-one officers were split across the three battalions, albeit unevenly, at Killiecrankie; Mackay had twelve officers, Balfour had nine and Ramsay had ten (See Appendix 4). As each Scots-Dutch battalion had 500 men, the proportion of officers, including known non-commissioned officers, to soldiers was extremely low, representing just two percent of the 1,500 Scots-Dutch soldiers present. Examining Ferguson allows us to roughly determine the level of experience these officers had from the year they were commissioned.⁶⁶⁸ Utilising commission dates can be arbitrary and can obscure experience gained prior to the soldier's entry into the officer corps or, indeed, their career prior to their enlistment with the Scots-Dutch Brigade. To offset these problems, these Scots-Dutch officers can be split into two distinct cohorts. The first group were men commissioned between the years 1674 and 1678; this aligns with the Brigade's participation in the Franco-Dutch War and infers a high probability of battlefield experience, particularly due to their status as an

⁶⁶⁴ See Appendix 4 – Please note officers with * against their forename are new officers uncovered by this research and not included in Ferguson's lists.

⁶⁶⁵ *RPCS*, XIV, pp. 225-226, 274, 280, 379, 391. *SSNE*, Graeme Millen, 'McLauchlane, Kathrin [SSNE 8279]'.

⁶⁶⁶ *EUL*, Laing MSS II.89, f. 339. Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 481, 505, 517.

⁶⁶⁷ See: Appendix 4: Scots-Dutch Brigade Officers present at Killiecrankie.

⁶⁶⁸ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 503-505, 506-517.

elite unit in the Dutch armies of the period.⁶⁶⁹ A total of thirteen of these officers present at the Battle of Killiecrankie were commissioned between these dates and can be referred to as veterans (see Appendix 4). Mackay himself had been with the Brigade since 1674, having fought in the latter stages of the Franco-Dutch War, from 1674 onwards, as well as his military experience serving in Monmouth's British brigade against the Dutch in the years prior.⁶⁷⁰ Others like Balfour, Ramsay, Captain Alexander Lamy and Everard Halkett had served since 1676.⁶⁷¹ Four of these veterans remain nameless and are only identifiable through their widows. Closkine Jacobs, Hester Geilmans, Kathrin McLauchlane, and Kathrin Michells had husbands who had served as corporals in Captain John MacLeod's company in Mackay's regiment.⁶⁷² Both MacLeod and his ensign, Hugh Sutherland, testified to the privy council that the nameless men had served the first Scots-Dutch regiment as 'faithfull souldiers' for fifteen years, since at least 1674.⁶⁷³ Out of the thirty-one Scots-Dutch officers present, those thirteen with significant military experience represented forty-two percent of said officer corps.

The second group were soldiers commissioned between 1679 and 1689, a period in which the Brigade were not involved in any major battles and were largely remitted to carry out uneventful garrison duty.⁶⁷⁴ This group had eighteen officers with less experience of combat than the previous cohort (see Appendix 4). This would, of course, mean that these officers with less experience represented fifty-eight percent of the Scots-

⁶⁶⁹ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp 479, 482, 507.

⁶⁷⁰ *ODNB*, 'Mackay'.

⁶⁷¹ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 503-504, 510.

⁶⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 570.

⁶⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 571-572; *RPCS*, XIV, Act in favour of four Dutchwomen who had their husbands killed at Killiecrankie, 5th September 1689, pp. 225-226.

⁶⁷⁴ Note: The notable, albeit slight, exception to this would be the invasion of England in November 1688 and the subsequent skirmish at Wincanton. However, given this event involved only a handful of soldiers and officers, no more than thirty, we can make a clear distinction between the first group's experience of open warfare during the Franco-Dutch War and the relatively minor experiences of the second. There is, currently, no evidence to suggest any of these men were present at Wincanton, as sources only mention Captain Campbell by name.

Dutch officer corps present at Killiecrankie. The build-up to the invasion of England, and the success of said enterprise, saw many new officers commissioned, including Captain James Ferguson. Further recruitment occurred when the Brigade returned to Scotland, with men, such as Captain Angus Mackay, joining the unit after their return.⁶⁷⁵ However, there were men like Captain Barthold Balfour Jr., Brigadier Balfour's son, who had been commissioned in the early 1680s and had likely had more experience in drilling and training recruits than the newer officers, albeit he lacked experience in terms of combat. Although these men had been deployed with the Brigade, either during the Monmouth Rising in 1685, or the invasion of England in 1688 or early small-scale sieges or skirmishes in Scotland in early 1689, none of them appear to have participated in a large-scale pitched battle until Killiecrankie.⁶⁷⁶

The proportion of the first cohort of veteran officers was outweighed by the presence of the second cohort of less experienced officers. The majority of inexperienced officers were concentrated in Balfour and Ramsay's battalions. Balfour had nine officers accompanying him, of which only three were veterans, including himself. This would mean that sixty-seven percent of Balfour's officers at Killiecrankie were less experienced. Ramsay had ten officers with his battalion, of which, again, only three, including him, were veterans. This represents only thirty percent of Ramsay's battalion's officers at the battle. As a result, this prevalence of less experienced officers in these two battalions can be directly correlated to their poor performance that day. In stark contrast, Mackay's battalion had eight veterans, including its commander, out of twelve identifiable officers, representing sixty-seven percent of the unit.⁶⁷⁷ Mackay had both the largest number of

⁶⁷⁵ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 513.

⁶⁷⁶ Note: All efforts have been made to verify if these men had any battlefield experience before joining the Brigade, no evidence was found to suggest this.

⁶⁷⁷ See Appendix 4: Major-General Mackay, Lieutenant-Colonel James Mackay, Captain Alexander Lamy, Ensign Hugh Sutherland and four unnamed corporals.

officers and veterans. Although the bulk of Mackay's men were broken by the Jacobite assault, they performed far better than their comrades. If we contrast these numbers against the small contingent of professional officers in the Jacobite army, eighteen in total, the proportion of veterans versus inexperienced men was a staggering ninety-four percent (See Appendix 3). Additionally, the Jacobite officers were not thinly spread across three battalions commanding 500 men each. This factor has not been discussed by historians before or has been dismissed out of hand, namely by Murray-Scott.⁶⁷⁸ It must be noted, however, that in spite of the advances by this thesis in identifying nine additional Scots-Dutch officers present at Killiecrankie, there may be more, as of yet, unidentified officers to discover. This could, in turn, alter the proportion of veteran officers present within both Balfour and Ramsay's battalions, particularly as Mackay's memoirs and letters are undoubtedly skewed towards the officers of his own battalion. However, unless additional sources come to light, this analysis illustrates that the Scots-Dutch battalions that broke at Killiecrankie had a higher concentration of officers with less experience on the battlefield.

The Scots-Dutch officers at Killiecrankie were, by and large, relatively inexperienced and the battalions they led into battle were, mostly, new recruits. Undoubtedly, these factors contributed greatly to the break in discipline and the rout of the bulk of Scots-Dutch battalions during the battle as inexperienced officers struggled to rally their men in the face of the Highland charge or to effectuate efficient musket volleys beforehand. Mackay directly cited the proportion of officers to soldiers as a major factor in their defeat. He drew a direct comparison between the rout of much of the Brigade and the discipline of Leven and Hastings' men. He stated that, both Leven and Hastings, 'had many more officers proportionable to the number of men than the three Dutch

⁶⁷⁸ Murray-Scott, *Dundee*, p. 186.

regiments'.⁶⁷⁹ A claim which can be, in part, confirmed by the fact that the bulk of those regiments did not leave the field until they were ordered to do so, later that evening. The *Proceedings* concurred with Mackay's assessment, stating only a few weeks later, that most of the Williamite army in Scotland were 'new-rai's'd men' and that their 'ill-discipline' had led to a partial rout.⁶⁸⁰ Without the bulk of their regiments behind them, the Scots-Dutch officers were left with a number of choices: to follow their men and flee, possibly with the hope of regrouping and returning, or to stand their ground. The latter course often resulted in death, injury or capture for the officers concerned, as we shall soon see. The relative inexperience of many of the Scots-Dutch officers was compounded by poor geographical positioning, especially in the case of the two battalions on the left wing, and the effectiveness of the Highland charge. We will now turn to the commencement of the battle itself, the charge and the Brigade's performance as it unfolded.

The Efficacy of the Highland Charge & the Scots-Dutch Musketry

Despite the lack of experience amongst the Brigade, and just over half of their officers, the Williamites held a major advantage in numbers as their 3,500 strong army overshadowed the Jacobites 2,000 men. This would override any misgivings Mackay held about engaging the Jacobite army at Killiecrankie. Drawing his men into position on the terraces below Creag Eallich, Mackay was forced to order the Williamite regiments to form a thinly stretched line to form a defensible front. Cameron recalled that the Williamites were forced to make ranks 'three men deep onely, which made a very long front' and left them bereft of reserves.⁶⁸¹ Generally, battalions were formed five to six soldiers deep in order to prevent an enemy charge breaking through the ranks and

⁶⁷⁹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 59.

⁶⁸⁰ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, p. 186.

⁶⁸¹ Cameron, p. 265.

compromising the line.⁶⁸² Additionally, most armies kept men in reserve behind the line to replenish the front should the soldiers tire or their regiments break during the fighting. The thin Williamite line at Killiecrankie was also impacted by the ground upon which its men stood. When the Williamite army advanced they had to march past *Runruraidh* House, positioned in its centre, to avoid it interrupting their line of fire.⁶⁸³ Beyond the house, however, Kenmuir's regiment found itself separated from the left wing, and Ramsay's regiment, by a small bog.⁶⁸⁴ The ground underfoot in this area was so bad Mackay reported he was unable to ride across it 'without hazard'.⁶⁸⁵ This hampered Mackay's ability to conduct both wings of the army himself, as he was unable to rapidly reach the left without putting himself at risk. As such, he took the decision to delegate 'the care of the left wing... to the Brigadier Balfour'.⁶⁸⁶ However, Mackay reasoned, in spite of this obstacle, there was space to position the army defensively there; whereas there was not the same ability to do so on the ground below *Runruraidh* House. Subsequently, Mackay 'resolved to make the best of that ground, and rather receive the check there in good order, than to put his men out of breath and in disorder, by attacking the ennemy against an hill'.⁶⁸⁷ He was able to oversee the right wing of the army, and as overall commander did not personally command his Scots-Dutch regiment at Killiecrankie, a task delegated to his Lieutenant-Colonel, and younger brother, James Mackay.⁶⁸⁸ Mackay's style of command also sharply contrasted with Dundee's. The former taking a more detached approach in an attempt to co-ordinate the Williamite army as a whole and move along his line to better direct his men where possible and necessary. The latter took a

⁶⁸² Childs, *Warfare*, p. 158.

⁶⁸³ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 53.

⁶⁸⁴ *Ibid*; Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 158.

⁶⁸⁵ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 53.

⁶⁸⁶ *Ibid*.

⁶⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁶⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

more personal approach to command and because of this Dundee was subsequently slain when leading his troop of horse in a charge against the Williamite lines.⁶⁸⁹ However, the bog in the middle of the Williamites stopped Mackay from co-ordinating both wings of his army effectively.

Returning to the right wing, Mackay ordered his men to hold their position as he feared that as 'the ennemy were so very close upon him' moving regiments any further forward might encourage a Jacobite charge and throw the Williamite regiments into disorder.⁶⁹⁰ For around two hours, the two armies stood facing one another with only some ineffectual cannon fire from the modest Williamite artillery followed by small skirmishes between the Scots-Dutch battalions and Jacobite sharpshooters.⁶⁹¹ At six o'clock in the evening, the stand-off gave way to a progressive advance from the Jacobite clans and whilst they were supported by a small contingent of cavalry, it was the Highland foot soldiers who were largely responsible for the victory at Killiecrankie.⁶⁹² This section will examine the efficacy of the Highland charge but will do so alongside an assessment of the Scots-Dutch attempts to counter it with musket volleys. The effectiveness of the Highlanders at Killiecrankie was compounded by the uneven performance of the Scots-Dutch regiments' musketry.

The Jacobite clans' formation was the antithesis of the Williamite army's line. The clans began to advance down the slopes, but divided themselves into 'bands' rather than marching in rank and file.⁶⁹³ They may not have been able to utilise volley fire tactics, as the Williamites could, but these bands were able to form deeply condensed units with

⁶⁸⁹ Ibid; Dalrymple, *Memoirs*, p. 88.

⁶⁹⁰ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 53.

⁶⁹¹ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 159.

⁶⁹² Ibid., pp. 158-159.

⁶⁹³ Balcarres, *Memoirs*, p. 46.

large gaps in between them.⁶⁹⁴ These deep column-like formations did not withstand musket fire well. However, they were able to advance vigorously down the steep terrain and, picking up momentum, broke through the Williamite regiments. Hill has noted that the use of aggressive shock tactics in pitched battles had been typical of Celtic cultures for centuries.⁶⁹⁵ The Scottish Gaels deployed these tactics, typically, when they held advantages in numbers or favourable terrain and, usually, only within their own territories.⁶⁹⁶ Dundee utilised his significant military experience to assess the terrain at Killiecrankie and, encouraged by the clans' willingness to fight, expertly deployed the Highlanders in a situation that favoured their fighting style over the numerically superior Williamites.⁶⁹⁷ At Killiecrankie, Hill has rightly pointed out that the Jacobite clans 'possessed a decided edge' over the Williamites as they could 'choose the point or points in the enemy line where the weight of their assault would fall'.⁶⁹⁸ However, without Dundee's choice of terrain, the slopes of Creag Eallich, the Jacobite clans abilities may have been squandered on ground less favourable to them. Undoubtedly, his experiences as an officer in the regular army, both at home and abroad, was as significant as the clans' 'innate' martial ability. The decision to utilise the terrain which maximised the efficacy of the Highland charge was ultimately Dundee's, as James' commander-in-chief in Scotland.

With the Jacobite clan chieftains keen to stand and fight at Killiecrankie, Dundee ordered them to prepare for an assault. The plan the Jacobite council of war agreed upon was to utilise the Highland charge to break through the Williamite line at various points. Prior to the melee assault, the clans utilised skirmish tactics. Mackay stated that the Jacobite clansmen initially advanced slowly until they were within firing range, upon

⁶⁹⁴ Dalrymple, *Memoirs*, p. 82.

⁶⁹⁵ Hill, *Celtic*, p. 68.

⁶⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

which the Highlanders opened fire.⁶⁹⁹ However, he argued, in his memoirs, that this type of musket fire ‘doth ordinarily little harm... because they [the Highlanders] keep no rank or file’ and, with the short-comings of seventeenth-century firearms, the accuracy of which could vary significantly.⁷⁰⁰ However, Mackay did concede that this skirmishing, or ‘ragged fire’ as he termed it, could be effective.⁷⁰¹ Earlier in the day, during the Williamites initial advance toward *Runruraidh* House, Mackay stated that he had been directly targeted by sporadic sniper fire.⁷⁰² He stated, that his presence, ‘drew their papping shot over all where he moved, whereby severals were wounded’.⁷⁰³ It is, thus, evident that the Highlanders, with their ‘ragged fire’, were able to effectively harass the Williamite soldiers, even outwith musket range. The other aspect of the Highland charge’s musketry was its use in the eponymous charge itself. The majority of the clansmen only opened fire when they were at extremely close range, between thirty and fifty metres according to Mackay.⁷⁰⁴ This volley apparently had little effect due to the column formation the Jacobite clans adopted.⁷⁰⁵ According to Childs, receiving musket fire without cover at such close range would have had a devastating psychological impact on even the best-trained soldiers.⁷⁰⁶ It can, therefore, be assumed that the Jacobites close-range volley would have a similarly detrimental effect upon the Williamite soldiers at Killiecrankie. When the Jacobite clansmen were done firing, Mackay recalled, ‘they threw away their snaphans [sic] and ran down the hill with drawn broad swords and targes’.⁷⁰⁷ This rapid charge closed the gap between them and the Williamite line thereby negating

⁶⁹⁹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 52.

⁷⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁷⁰² *Ibid.*

⁷⁰³ *Ibid.* *Dictionary of the Scots Leid* [DSL], ‘Papping – popping’.

⁷⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁷⁰⁵ Mackay, *Memoirs*, ‘Short Relation’, 17th August 1689, p. 264.

⁷⁰⁶ Childs, *Warfare*, p. 158.

⁷⁰⁷ Mackay, *Memoirs*, ‘Short Relation’, 17th August 1689, p. 264. Note: ‘snaphans’ refers to snapchance musket, a type of firearm named after the firing mechanism; the moniker is Dutch in origin.

much of the advantage conferred by rank and file firing techniques. Cameron testified that the Highlanders 'fell pell-mell among the thickest of them [the Williamites] with their broad swords'.⁷⁰⁸ McBane, present in the ranks of the Williamite army that day, perfectly encapsulated the rapidity with which the charge occurred when he wrote, 'they cast away their Musquets, drew their Broad Swords and advanced furiously upon us, and were in the middle of us before we could Fire Three Shots a-piece'.⁷⁰⁹ The overall failure of the Williamites regiments to keep up continuous effective musket fire allowed the Highland charge to inflict heavy casualties in the ensuing melee. However, this overall failure does not mean that the Scots-Dutch musketry was rendered completely useless.

The Highland charge was not without its drawbacks. The relative impunity with which the clans initially advanced soon gave way to the Williamites devastating musket volleys easily targeted at the dense columns of Jacobite clansmen. The Scots-Dutch Brigade's performance at the battle varied from battalion to battalion, particularly during the stages prior to the melee. At the effective musket range of seventy-five metres, the Williamite regiments began to open fire.⁷¹⁰ Mackay had ordered his army to fire 'by platoons, to discourage the approaching Highlanders... with continual fire'.⁷¹¹ The varied effectiveness of the three Scots-Dutch battalions indicates that both the terrain and the experience of their officers and soldiers would prove a critical factor in the Williamite defeat. The musketry of Mackay's regiment was relatively effective when compared with Balfour and Ramsay's units as well as Lauder's detachment.⁷¹² This maps on to what our research has discovered about the unequal distribution of veteran officers between the three Scots-Dutch battalions, with Mackay's retaining most of the known veteran officers.

⁷⁰⁸ Hill, *Celtic*, pp. 68-69. Cameron, p. 167.

⁷⁰⁹ McBane, *Swords-Man's*, p. 110.

⁷¹⁰ Childs, *Warfare*, p. 158. Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 55.

⁷¹¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 55.

⁷¹² Oates, *Killiecrankie* p. 123.

The Scots-Dutch officers were well-versed in Dutch military drills and would have employed the platoon firing technique, whereby a continual barrage was maintained by dividing a battalion into small groups that fired and reloaded in turns; this had, however, been gradually introduced to the Scottish army during the reigns of King Charles II and King James VII & II.⁷¹³ Cameron's account of the battle appears to reflect this as he states that the whole of the Williamite army's fire 'ran along from line to line'.⁷¹⁴ Cameron and his men were positioned opposite Mackay's regiment, on the right wing of the Williamite army, and he described the fire growing 'more terrible upon their nearer approach'.⁷¹⁵ Cameron and Sir Donald MacDonald's clans, alongside some of Dundee's horse, took incredibly punitive casualties as a result of the shape of their formations, their rapid advance and the increasingly effective musket volleys from Leven's, Mackay's and Hastings' men.⁷¹⁶ Mackay stated that his battalion 'made great fire, being well exercised thereto by his brother'.⁷¹⁷ James Mackay was an experienced soldier with almost as many years in continental service as his elder brother.⁷¹⁸ Clearly, Hugh Mackay was indicating that his brother had trained the men of the first battalion well, and had experience in ensuring proper musket drills from the battles of the Franco-Dutch War; James Mackay provides a good example of a veteran putting his experience on the continent to use in the Highland War.⁷¹⁹ Although James Mackay's maintenance of discipline and command over his men on the day was clearly important, the greater presence of veteran officers in that regiment would have been key to their good performance. The 'brisk fire' from the battalion of the first regiment inflicted heavy casualties on 'chief gentlemen of the name of

⁷¹³ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 55.

⁷¹⁴ Cameron, pp. 265-267.

⁷¹⁵ Ibid.

⁷¹⁶ Mackay, *Memoirs*, pp. 58-59.

⁷¹⁷ Ibid., p. 59.

⁷¹⁸ ODNB, 'Mackay'.

⁷¹⁹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 59.

Macdonald' according to Hugh Mackay.⁷²⁰ Cameron reinforced this, reporting that his clan suffered 120 casualties due to fire from Mackay's regiment as well as receiving fire from Leven's regiment on their flank.⁷²¹ Balfour and Ramsay's battalions were less effective with their volleys and this was mirrored by Lieutenant-Colonel Lauder's detachment of fusiliers.⁷²² The reason for this was, in part, to do with the experience of the officers, or lack thereof, as well as the nature of terrain over which the Jacobites were advancing toward them.

The left flank of the Williamite army was mainly composed of the Scots-Dutch Brigade, with Balfour, Ramsay and Lauder all in command of units there. Mackay recalled that 'Balfour's regiment did not fire a shot, and but the half of Ramsays made some little fire'.⁷²³ Mackay's 'Short Relation', written in the weeks after the battle for the privy council and William II, reinforces the account in his memoirs, as he similarly states that only half of Ramsay's battalion 'made prety fire', but that all of Balfour's men 'fled without firing'.⁷²⁴ Both Balfour and Ramsay's battalions had the smallest proportion of the experienced officers of the Scots-Dutch Brigade, as we have previously seen.. An equally important factor which could explain their poor performance could have been the inexperience of the bulk of their battalions. However, Mackay's regiment also suffered this general lack of experience amidst its ranks and performed far better in this stage of the engagement. Lauder and his 200 strong 'chosen detachment' appear to have performed the worst, in spite of supposedly being handpicked as the best soldiers from the entire army present.⁷²⁵ Mackay bluntly stated that in spite of being posted 'advantageously upon the left of all, on a little hill wreathed with trees...' Lauder 'did as

⁷²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

⁷²¹ *Cameron*, p. 270.

⁷²² Mackay, *Memoirs*, pp. 55-56.

⁷²³ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

⁷²⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, 'Short Relation', 17th August 1689, pp. 264-265.

⁷²⁵ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 48.

little as the rest of that hand'.⁷²⁶ A critical factor which explains the performance of Balfour, Ramsay and Lauder's men was the disadvantage of the terrain directly in front of them. Pollard and Oliver's archaeological study of the battle found more musket balls lodged in the hillside on the Williamite army's left flank as opposed to their right.⁷²⁷ This has been confirmed by more comprehensive archaeological surveys carried out in more recent years.⁷²⁸ As the Highlanders rapidly advanced, the Scots-Dutch regiments on the left found that their volleys were not proving as effective in halting the Jacobite columns. Pollard and Oliver concluded from their findings that the presence of a great deal of metal in the ground ahead of these regiments on the left indicated that their fire was ineffectual due to the undulating terraces prevalent there.⁷²⁹ This terrain would have shielded the advancing clansmen from the volleys Balfour and Ramsay's men did manage to fire, before the Jacobite clans closed in.⁷³⁰ The archaeological evidence is reinforced by Cameron's admission that when his men attacked Mackay's regiment on the right they 'payed dear enough for their victory' and that 'the greatest part of them fell within a few paces of their enemy when they received the last fire'.⁷³¹ Furthermore, the presence of a higher proportion of veteran officers within Mackay's regiment would mean his men were better drilled and directed on the day of the battle, despite the lack of time to train new recruits in the preceding months. Whilst the first regiment on the left were able to lay down more effective fire than the Second or Third on the right, this did not soften the brunt of the Jacobite assault on the latter as it did on the former. Still, when the clansmen closed the distance on both wings, they fought hand-to-hand with devastating results for

⁷²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

⁷²⁷ Pollard & Oliver, *Two*, pp. 231-233.

⁷²⁸ GUARD, 'Killiecrankie'.

⁷²⁹ Pollard & Oliver, *Two*, pp. 231-233.

⁷³⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷³¹ Cameron, p. 271.

the all three of the Scots-Dutch regiments present, albeit it had a much swifter result for Balfour, Ramsay and Lauder's men.

The Abandonment of the Scots-Dutch Veterans

The musketry of the Scots-Dutch regiments, no matter how effective, nor their Scottish or English counterparts could not prevent the Jacobite clans from launching a full-scale close-quarters assault on the entirety of the Williamite line. This assault was a critical moment in the battle as it saw the Jacobites break the Williamite army upon various stretches of the line and, ultimately, led to the flight of most the Williamite soldiers, both Brigade and non-Brigade. However, a crucial aspect of this attack has been undervalued by historians. The role in which former Scots-Dutch officers within the Jacobite ranks played in directing the assault against the Brigade, particularly Mackay's regiment. This aspect of the Brigade's defeat, in particular, has been critically misunderstood. Both Lenman and John Barratt conclude that once the Jacobites attacked the Williamite army was utterly defeated and a 'general panic' set in.⁷³² Hill concurs with this assessment, adding that a general rout set in very quickly and he quotes Mackay to reinforce this: 'in a very short tyme all did run'.⁷³³ The Scots-Dutch Brigade's battalions at Killiecrankie were, indeed, shattered by the Highland charge, as were most other regiments present. However, this brief quotation, from Mackay's 'Short Relation', has been misapprehended by many, most notably Hill, without presenting other aspects of the account, as well as other sources, that contextualise it.⁷³⁴ The other parts of the 'Short Relation', alongside Mackay's other letters and his memoir, illustrate that whilst the Scots-Dutch soldiers did flee the field, the veteran officers and soldiers, particularly those from

⁷³² Lenman, *Risings*, p. 31. John Barratt, *Battles for the Three Kingdoms: The Campaigns for England, Scotland and Ireland 1689-92* (Stroud, 2007), pp. 67-68.

⁷³³ Hill, *Celtic*, p. 73. Mackay, *Memoirs*, 'Short Relation', 17th August 1689, p. 265.

⁷³⁴ *Ibid.*

Mackay's regiment, did not and in instances where veteran Scots-Dutch officers did flee they had been almost entirely abandoned by the new men who made up the bulk of their regiments.

It has already been demonstrated that the Scots-Dutch battalions were largely made up of new men. It is now time to work through the implications of this and the implications it has for understanding the battle. This section will illustrate that the abandonment of the Scots-Dutch veterans by these 'new men' was as critical a factor in the defeat as the effectiveness of the Jacobite Highland charge or the Williamite tactics deployed during the battle. When the Jacobites engaged in close-quarters combat with the Williamites many of the soldiers did not withstand the clansmen's assault for long. Cameron recalled, after the charge, 'the noise seemed hushed; and the fire ceasing on both sides, nothing was heard... but the sullen and hollow clashes of broad-swords, with the dismall [sic] groans and crys of dyeing and wounded men'.⁷³⁵ The Highland charge had been devastatingly effective and was, as we shall see in due course, directed particularly at Scots-Dutch regiments. McBane stated those who fled the field within the first few minutes 'were for most part new men' and that they fled in all directions in a panic, including himself.⁷³⁶ Mackay was aware that the Williamite army, and a large portion of his Scots-Dutch battalions, were made up of 'new men unaccustomed with an ennemy'.⁷³⁷ The 'True Account' attests that when the left of the Williamite line, and part of the centre, folded the impact was felt amidst the ranks of the right. It stated when the Highlanders 'fell upon the baggadge in the rear... Mackays men cryed treachery and runn [sic]'.⁷³⁸ Whilst this could be taken to mean that Mackay's regiment fled in its entirety, the

⁷³⁵ Cameron, pp. 267-268.

⁷³⁶ McBane, *Sword-Man's*, p. 110.

⁷³⁷ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 54.

⁷³⁸ EUL, Laing MSS II.89, f. 339.

account continues 'many of Mackays men stood and fought it till ten a cloak att night'.⁷³⁹ Alongside Mackay's own testimony, as well as Cameron's, this clearly illustrates that part of Mackay's regiment, most likely inexperienced new recruits, fled after seeing the left flank fold, but that part of that regiment stayed to fight on. Mackay's own tract *Rules of War for the Infantry*, republished a year after his death in 1692, bluntly stated that officers should give orders 'in the hearing of all the Regiment, to kill without mercy, any that shall offer to break their Ranks, by falling off from the Battalion'.⁷⁴⁰ However, at Killiecrankie Mackay recalled he exhorted his men not to retreat from the field for more practical reasons. After emphasising the more ideological points of the conflict to his men, he added that 'their own safety' would be best assured 'if they kept firm and close' because if they did not 'they might freely conclude few or none of them should escape those... pursuers far speedier of foot than they'.⁷⁴¹ He finally concluded, that 'To avoid, then, those certain ruines, the only visible mean was to stand to it, like men fighting for their religion and liberty against invaders of both'.⁷⁴² Whilst not all regiments fled, as Hill has suggested, the Scots-Dutch officers on the left saw most of their soldiers run shortly after the initial melee.⁷⁴³ This abandonment was the result of the low proportion of officers to new men, the lack of veteran soldiers in the ranks and, of course, the effectiveness of the Jacobites tactics.

In his account to the government in Edinburgh and the court in London, Mackay did not blame the officers of the army for the poor performance at Killiecrankie. In fact, he did the opposite, declaring in the 'Short Relation' that, 'I could learn of no commanding officer that misbehaved'.⁷⁴⁴ The Jacobite poet John MacDonald of Keppoch triumphantly

⁷³⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁴⁰ BL, BN 5/2, *Rules of War*, 'Article III'.

⁷⁴¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 53.

⁷⁴² Ibid., p. 54.

⁷⁴³ Hill, *Celtic*, p. 68.

⁷⁴⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Short, p. 266.

declared, in his 'A Song to the Army of King James', 'In spite of their thrusting, though stubborn their will, they lost their ground and their lives to boot'.⁷⁴⁵ However, Cameron's account contradicts this as he recalled that many Williamite soldiers had stood their ground and that 'The enemy lay in heaps allmost [sic] in the order they were posted'.⁷⁴⁶ Many Williamite soldiers certainly fled the field at Killiecrankie, but those who lost their lives in the devastating melee were not inconsiderable. If we examine Mackay's account of the battle, alongside the contemporaneous letters of ministers in William's government, we can see that new recruits were repeatedly blamed for the defeat. Sir William Lockhart stated, 'The King's llos in the officers is unexpressable [sic], and its a pitie to give green men to good men to command them, for ther runing [sic] was the loss of all'.⁷⁴⁷ Whilst not present at the battle, Lockhart was one of the Scottish politicians to receive various reports about the outcome and his summary emanated from the eyewitness reports of officers, such as Mackay and Lauder.⁷⁴⁸ Lauder's report on the battle has been lost to historical record, but both Lockhart and the writer of the 'True Account' refer to Lauder as being among the first to return from the field with the dire news.⁷⁴⁹ As such, these two sources remain our only indication of the content of Lauder's report. The 'True Account' stated that 'Lieut Coll Lauder brought a very sad ac[c]ount of affairs on Sunday last but he had reason to believe what he said becaus[e] the Mholl [sic] men fell upon him & killed many of his men & forced him from the rest so that he was obliged to endeavour his escape'.⁷⁵⁰ As they were disproportionately outnumbered by their new recruits, the Scots-Dutch officers present suffered considerably as they were killed, wounded or captured as a result of their men abandoning them.

⁷⁴⁵ *Keppoch*, 'A Song to the Army of King James', p. 187.

⁷⁴⁶ *Cameron*, p. 270.

⁷⁴⁷ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Lockhart to Melville, 29th July 1689, p. 253.

⁷⁴⁸ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Sir William Lockhart to Melville, 28th July 1689, pp. 249-250.

⁷⁴⁹ *Ibid*; EUL, Laing MSS II.89, ff. 338-339

⁷⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, f. 339.

The veteran officers of the Brigade who were killed, captured, or wounded at Killiecrankie alongside the continued presence of Leven and Hastings' regiments does not correspond to historians' narrative of a full-scale Williamite rout. The performance of the Brigade overall was poor, but the reasons beyond the stellar battlefield performance and excellent tactics of the Jacobites have remained largely unexplored. The analysis of that new recruits were, largely, to blame extended downward from their commanding officers and the second-hand observers who relayed that testimony to others. These accounts do not support the narrative that Killiecrankie was a full-scale rout, particularly in the case of the first regiment of the Brigade. Furthermore, this testimony indicates that the remainder of Mackay's battalion that stayed fought alongside 'the English [sic] Regim[e]nt [Hastings Dragoons] and most part of Levins'.⁷⁵¹ Many soldiers did rout shortly after the melee began. The Scots-Dutch Brigade had arrived in Scotland with just one third of their strength, as mentioned earlier, and had come to Killiecrankie with more new recruits, of all ranks, than veterans. All three regiments of the Scots-Dutch Brigade saw significant numbers of their soldiers' rout, but these were, by all accounts, new recruits.⁷⁵² Mackay later argued that Brigadier Balfour's poor display at the battle, as he also fled the field, was the result of his regiment abandoning him, as opposed to his own lack of military virtue. Mackay stated that Balfour 'was killed labouring with a few persons by him to get off'.⁷⁵³

However, it was not only 'new' men in the Brigade who were to blame. Lieutenant-Colonel Lauder, a veteran with just over a decade of service, appears to have fled fairly quickly after the Highland charge reached the Williamite line.⁷⁵⁴ Lauder had

⁷⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵² Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 59. *Ibid.*, Sir William Lockhart to Melville, 28th July 1689, pp. 249-250.

⁷⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

made it back to Perth only a day after the battle, 28th July 1689, as illustrated by Lockhart's knowledge of events at Killiecrankie and his citation of the Scots-Dutch officer as his source, he promptly reported this in a letter dated the same day to Melville in London.⁷⁵⁵ Furthermore, Lauder provided the first eyewitness account of the battle to the Scottish privy council, which greatly exaggerated the extent of the defeat; he claimed that Mackay, Ramsay, Kenmuir, and Belhaven were all slain on the field.⁷⁵⁶ Clearly, officers like Balfour, Ramsay and Lauder did flee.⁷⁵⁷ However, Mackay reserved his harshest criticisms for Lauder, as his men were well positioned 'atop a small hill'.⁷⁵⁸ In spite of this, Mackay conceded, at least at the time, that Lauder was also 'abandoned of his party' and had 'labour'd without success to rallie them; Colonel Ramsay the same'.⁷⁵⁹ Even if Lauder fled before the other Scots-Dutch commanding officers, Mackay could not bring himself to fully condemn his comrades behaviour without adding the caveat that the rank-and-file had deserted the field first. Although the veracity of the officers' accounts of Killiecrankie proves difficult to fully verify, as there is a lack of corresponding evidence from regular solders. The only notable exception to this rule was, of course, McBane and he concluded that it was men like himself, who fled the field first not their officers.⁷⁶⁰

Despite his regiment's good performance during the initial stages of the battle, Mackay's men were devastated by the Jacobite clans' assault on the right. Mackay's regiment was targeted by Jacobite officers and this, in turn, allowed Leven's and Hastings' men to fare significantly better; the Scottish and English regiments of foot on the right wing remaining, largely, untouched by the Jacobite Highland charge.⁷⁶¹ Mackay

⁷⁵⁵ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Lockhart to Melville, 28th July 1689, pp. 249-250.

⁷⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵⁹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, 'Short Relation', 17th August 1689, p. 266.

⁷⁶⁰ McBane, *Swordsmens*, p. 110.

⁷⁶¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 59.

related this to Melville, writing that 'The most part of the officers of my battaillon were kill'd upon the spot'.⁷⁶² According to Mackay, they experienced such heavy losses because they were singled out by former officers on the Jacobite side, professional soldiers who had served in the Scots-Dutch Brigade and recognised their former comrades. Mackay later recalled, in his memoirs, 'that some, who were officers among the ennemy, had carried arms in the regiment abroad, and were of opinion if it were beat that it would facilitate the rest of the work'.⁷⁶³ As result, 'the greatest force... was poured upon that battalion'.⁷⁶⁴ The Jacobite officers who suggested the Jacobite clans attack Mackay's regiment exclusively, were men whom had served underneath the standard of the First 'Old' Regiment of the Brigade. This thesis has verified that six of the eighteen Jacobite officers at Killiecrankie were former members of the Scots-Dutch Brigade.⁷⁶⁵ In addition, this research has uncovered three Jacobite officers, in addition to Viscount Dundee, who had served in European armies.⁷⁶⁶ The testimony of Lieutenant Colt to the forfeiture proceedings in parliament, identified the presence of at least three of the former Scots-Dutch officers amongst the Jacobite officer corps at the battle.⁷⁶⁷ Colt reported that he saw Brigadier Cannon and Captain Robert Charters arrive with Purcell on the Isle of Mull in June 1689 and that Major James Middleton returned to Mull 'being then at that place in his way for Ireland to give King James an account of the fight at Killiecrankie'.⁷⁶⁸ All of these men had served with the Brigade up until King James VII's recall in mid-1688.⁷⁶⁹

⁷⁶² Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 16th September 1689, p. 281.

⁷⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

⁷⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶⁵ See Appendix 3: Henry Graham, Alexander Cannon, Gavin Hamilton, James Middleton, Alexander Bruce, and Robert Charters.

⁷⁶⁶ See Appendix 3: William Wallace of Craigie, George Barclay, and Archibald Douglas.

⁷⁶⁷ *RPS*, A1690/4/19.

⁷⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶⁹ *Ibid*; Dalton, *Scots*, pp. 142-143. Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 478, 502-503, 510, 515.

Critically, the presence of these former Brigade men within the Jacobite ranks, and Mackay's claim that they advised the clans to target his regiment, have been little mentioned within the historiography. This is especially surprising as Jacobite sources also acknowledged their presence. Cameron's account confirmed that the Jacobite command decided to focus their assault, on the right of the Williamite line, upon Mackay's battalion, the result of which was that 'few of them ever returned to their colours again'.⁷⁷⁰ If we examine the fate of Mackay's officers, at least those known to us, this does appear to be the case. Eight of Mackay's officers were killed in action, three escaped and one was severely wounded.⁷⁷¹ The focus of the Jacobite attack seems apparent from the severe losses amongst the officers of Mackay's battalion present that day. Lieutenant-Colonel James Mackay 'was killed upon the spot with severals of the old souldiers pickmen [sic], who stood by him after the shot had run away'.⁷⁷² This is further reinforced by the loss of several of Mackay's veteran officers and soldiers, recorded in petitions of widows. In total, seven officers from Mackay's regiment were killed and two wounded.⁷⁷³ The loss of these veterans or 'brisk fellows' was devastating for the regiment.⁷⁷⁴ Only one private soldier was named in the petitions regarding the Scots-Dutch soldiers killed at Killiecrankie, one Alexander 'Pargill'. His widow, Margaret Riperteze, recorded that he died fighting with Mackay's regiment, a fact reinforced by the attachment of his commanding officers name to the document, Captain Alexander Lammy.⁷⁷⁵ Only three of Brigadier Balfour's officers were killed, including Balfour himself, with four having escaped the field, including Lauder, and three taken prisoners by the Jacobites.⁷⁷⁶

⁷⁷⁰ Cameron, p. 271.

⁷⁷¹ See Appendix 4.

⁷⁷² Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 59.

⁷⁷³ SSNE, Graeme Millen, 'Geilmans, Hester [SSNE 8278]'; 'McLauchlane, Kathrin [SSNE 8279]'; 'Michells, Kathrin [SSNE 8280]'.

⁷⁷⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 16th September 1689, p. 282.

⁷⁷⁵ SSNE, Graeme Millen, 'Riperteze, Margaret [SSNE 8285]'.

⁷⁷⁶ See Appendix 4.

Similarly, Ramsay's battalion only suffered, amongst the known officers at least, three deaths as four officers escaped and two were taken prisoner.⁷⁷⁷ Most of the casualties in Ramsay's regiment were non-commissioned officers such as Corporal Thomas Walker, Sergeants Andrew Murray and George Lawson.⁷⁷⁸ It is also worth highlighting that these types of petitions reveal the names of some of the rank-and-file soldiers and, in other cases, enable us to identify anonymous men, via their spouses, from amongst the Brigade's ranks.⁷⁷⁹ In correspondence after the battle, Mackay was keen to note that the of his regiment, such as his younger brother James, Captain Alexander Lamy and Captain Angus Mackay, were 'as brave as any men could be' adding that they 'were shot, and afterwards abandoned of their men'.⁷⁸⁰ This evocation of abandonment in Mackay's memoirs, letters and contemporaneous testimony indicates that the loss of his officers, in particular, was felt on a personal level. Moreover, he was keen to stress that the rank-and-file's desertion of their officers completely undermined the position of his fellow Scots-Dutch officers commanding the battalions on the left. However, the fatalities among Mackay's battalion appear to have been higher, as the ferocity of the Jacobite assault saw many of the veteran officers and soldiers wounded; a fact which only hastened the rout of their men.

Mackay was incensed by the new recruits' abandonment of his officers whom he had served alongside for decades and were likely included family members and, in all probability, close friends.⁷⁸¹ He later stated that 'there was a great difference' between the regiments their Jacobite colleagues had known in the Dutch Republic and those that stood at Killiecrankie. Mackay was keen to underline that his regiment as well as 'the other two

⁷⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁸ SSNE, Graeme Millen, 'Lawson, Williamina [SSNE 8290]', 'Martize, Elizabeth [SSNE 8288]', 'Webb, Annabie [SSNE 8284]'.

⁷⁷⁹ See Appendix 5: Known Scots-Dutch Brigade soldiers at Killiecrankie.

⁷⁸⁰ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 16th September 1689, p. 281. Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 479-482.

⁷⁸¹ Ibid.

regiments come out of Holland... were mostly new levied men'.⁷⁸² In a letter to Melville, discussing the events at Killiecrankie, Mackay concluded, 'all the Captains of the battailon I had there, were either killed or doe beare the marks of their good behaviour'.⁷⁸³ Despite being abandoned by their men, these officers do not appear to have routed as quickly as the officers of the other Scots-Dutch battalions. The dead, wounded, and captured among Mackay's battalion demonstrates that his men did try to hold their positions before being overcome by Cameron and Sir Donald MacDonald's men. The attack was so bad that the regimental standard was reportedly captured, although Leven claimed, several years after Mackay's death, that he had recovered it single-handedly during the fighting.⁷⁸⁴ The survivors of Mackay's battalion drew off, but some managed to regroup not far from the remaining Williamite regiments left on the field, namely Leven and Hastings' regiments of foot. Cameron noted that some of the Scots-Dutch men regrouped with Mackay in the aftermath of his assault.⁷⁸⁵ According to Sir John Lanier, in a letter to Blathwayt, around 150 Williamite soldiers returned to the field and these were likely Scots-Dutch veterans as he noted these men 'had been in service abroad and remembered the ill consequences of such a flight'.⁷⁸⁶ This assertion can be further retrenched when we consider that the only Williamite regiments known for 'service abroad' were part of the Scots-Dutch Brigade. Mackay's battalion had been devastated by the Highland charge and the other battalions of the Brigade had lost their ground, but there remained a glimmer of opportunity for the Major-General to salvage victory. The Williamites still had two nearly intact regiments remaining on the field as the Jacobite clans dissipated, either in pursuit of fleeing soldiers and plunder, or to see to their wounded and bury their dead.

⁷⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 59.

⁷⁸³ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 16th September 1689, p. 282.

⁷⁸⁴ *NRS*, GD26/13/98, A true account of these things whereby some endeavour for their own ends and designs to misrepresent Melvill [Melville] and his sone to the King, 1696.

⁷⁸⁵ *Cameron*, p. 271.

⁷⁸⁶ *NLS*, MS 3740, Lanier to Blathwait, Edinburgh, 3rd August 1689, f. 96.

The Epilogue

A.H Miller's 1905 summary of the historiography surround the Battle of Killiecrankie remains strikingly relevant to this day. Miller wrote 'Dispute has arisen regarding the order of battle at Killiecrankie'.⁷⁸⁷ This disagreement over the course of events, Miller went on, particularly focused upon how the battle concluded. Historians have often finished their narrative of Killiecrankie by citing Cameron's account of an 'absolute and compleat victory' achieved by the Highland charge.⁷⁸⁸ This was not the case, a further reading of Cameron's testimony, alongside others, illustrates that in the aftermath of the charge Leven and Hastings' regiments remained. Furthermore, these regiments had been able to hold their original positions and soldiers from a variety of regiments, most notably Mackay's, were able to coalesce around them. Despite both Cameron and Mackay concurring with each other, historians have either ignored the general similarity of their accounts or have only briefly alluded to it. For example, Hill and Reid make use of these accounts and mention the similarities. On the other hand, Lenman and Hopkins have dismissed their narrative of the battle fairly quickly after the Highland charge.⁷⁸⁹ This section will demonstrate that in the aftermath of the bulk of the fighting, a remnant group of the Williamite army were left on the field and those that had fled, many of whom remained nearby, were exhorted to return by Mackay and his fellow officers. The popular version of a complete and panicked rout of the Williamites after the Highland charge ignores the fact that both Jacobite and Williamite witnesses agreed upon these events.⁷⁹⁰ Most recently, this argument of a general panic and rout of the Williamite army was utilised by Transport Scotland, as part of their evidence presented to a public

⁷⁸⁷ A.H. Millar, 'Killiecrankie Described by an Eye-Witness' in *The Scottish Historical Review*, Vol 3, No. 9 (October, 1905), p. 70.

⁷⁸⁸ Oates, *Killiecrankie*, p. 90. Cameron, pp. 271.

⁷⁸⁹ Hill, *Celtic*, p. 68. Reid, *Killing*, p. 85, 90. Lenman, *Risings*, p. 31. Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 159-160.

⁷⁹⁰ Cameron, p. 269-270. Mackay, *Memoirs*, pp. 59-60

inquiry into the A9 dualling programme at Killiecrankie; even though an expert witness argued against this.⁷⁹¹ Furthermore, Mackay, briefly, attempted to rally the Williamite forces in the hope of regaining the initiative and winning the battle by capitalising on the disorder amidst the Jacobite ranks, brought on by a significant portion of the clansmen pursuing fleeing soldiers from the field or pillaging the Williamite baggage train. The Scots-Dutch officers present in this remnant force were particularly active in trying to rally 'runaway' soldiers who remained close by and Mackay's leadership allowed parts of the army to regroup before a tactical withdrawal was decided upon. The confusion surrounding the concluding events at Killiecrankie is indicative of the confused reports in the immediate aftermath of the battle and the later attempts by writers, such as Balcarres, to utilise the Jacobite victory as propaganda. First, the events that occurred immediately following the conclusion of the Highland charge must be clarified.

Mackay had remained on horseback throughout the battle, in an attempt to better co-ordinate his forces. During the charge, he recalled witnessing Dundee's cavalry attacking in the middle of the line and, in response, attempted to organise Belhaven and Annandale's troops of horse to flank the attacking Jacobites.⁷⁹² He sought to send one troop to the left and one to the right in order to relieve the pressure on the Williamite regiments of foot.⁷⁹³ Witnessing the officers struggle to keep their troops in order, and mount a successful cavalry charge, Mackay decided to ride through the attacking clansmen 'thinking happily that the [troops of] horse would be picked [sic] to follow his example'.⁷⁹⁴ None of the troopers followed him, however, with only one servant riding after his master, only to have his horse 'shot in passing'.⁷⁹⁵ The Jacobite assault continued

⁷⁹¹ J., Dempsey, TS205, *A9 Dualling: Killiecrankie to Glen Garry – Battle of Killiecrankie Factual Report – Objector Report* (Edinburgh, 2019), pp. 42-43.

⁷⁹² Mackay, *Memoirs*, 'Short Relation', 17th August 1689, p. 265.

⁷⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 56.

⁷⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

unabated with the disorderly Williamite troopers crashing through the rear of Kenmuir's regiment of foot throwing that part of the line into chaos and 'the foot beginning to fall away'.⁷⁹⁶ In the confusion, Mackay now found himself on the slopes of Creag Eallich behind the Jacobites, completely isolated and alone. He remained adamant, in his memoirs, that 'if he had but fiftie resolute horse' he would have certainly 'recovered all'.⁷⁹⁷ Instead, Mackay stood in a position well-placed to survey the destruction of many of his regiments:

Having passed through the croud of the attacking Highlanders, he turned about to see how matter stood, and found that all his left had given way, and got down the hill which was behind our line... so that in a twinkling of an eye... our men, as well as the ennemy, were out of sight, being got down pall mall [sic] to the river where our baggage stood.⁷⁹⁸

Despite witnessing the 'sad spectacle' of the complete collapse of the left wing of his army, Mackay soon 'espyed a small hep of red coats' and, riding to meet them, found it was one battalion of Leven's foot, the other having lost their position slightly during the fighting.⁷⁹⁹ Cameron recalled that after the Highland charge, the Williamite left wing had folded leaving a 'large voyd space in the centre, opposite to which the battalion commanded by the Earl of Leven was posted'.⁸⁰⁰ Cameron admitted that the gaps between the Jacobite columns allowed Leven's battalion to remain intact and, more importantly, to continue firing at his men.⁸⁰¹ He added that Leven's men were joined in the barrage by Hastings battalions. The problem for the Jacobites attacking this part of the

⁷⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁷⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰⁰ *Cameron*, p. 269.

⁸⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 268-269.

Williamite army was the fact that the English regiment 'outstretched Dundee's lines so far on the left, that there was onely half of it assaulted and cutt [sic] off' with the other also remaining nearly untouched.⁸⁰² These two battalions, Cameron noted, 'remained still enteare' because of the focus upon Mackay's Scots-Dutch regiment.⁸⁰³ Reflecting this fact, Mackay reported that after the Highland charge, Leven had all of his chief officers as well as their subordinates and Hastings had enough surviving officers to regroup his other battalion after they had initially lost their ground during the assault.⁸⁰⁴ In total, Leven, Hastings, and a group of Williamite officers had managed to keep 400 men together throughout the Jacobites assault.⁸⁰⁵ A far different scene than the mass Williamite rout, which many historians conclude their relation of the battle.

The confusion of the battle has, unfortunately, spilled over into its historiography, but we can determine that the situation would have been confusing and chaotic with groups of men, including the sizeable remaining force, scattered on and around the field amongst the heaps of the dead. The remaining Williamite forces were not just made up of soldiers from Leven and Hastings regiments, but a sizeable minority of surviving Scots-Dutch officers and soldiers. Historians, such as Oates, have overlooked this electing to only discuss the remnant force as exclusively made up of Leven and Hastings' regiments.⁸⁰⁶ Yet, Mackay outlines that there was a great confusion amongst this remnant force with 'some few of other regiments' scattered amongst Leven and Hastings' formations.⁸⁰⁷ With men from different regiments mixed in together, Leven and Hastings' officers found it difficult to control this enlarged group. More importantly, upon his return, Mackay found that there were a good number of Scots-Dutch soldiers, particularly

⁸⁰² Ibid.

⁸⁰³ Cameron, p. 269.

⁸⁰⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 57.

⁸⁰⁵ Ibid; Cameron, pp. 269-270.

⁸⁰⁶ Oates, *Killiecrankie*, pp. 113-114.

⁸⁰⁷ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 57.

officers, present within this remnant force; further demonstrating that the Brigade did not rout *en masse*. Mackay's account of the latter stage of the battle paints a complex picture of this concluding stage of the battle. After the initial charge and resultant melee, the Jacobite clans attacking the right wing of the Williamite army had only been able to inflict serious damage on Mackay's regiment.⁸⁰⁸ Having suffered severe casualties the Camerons, Macleans, and MacDonalds, of various septs, withdrew a short distance from the Williamite line, unable to break through the remaining regiments entirely.⁸⁰⁹ The rest of the Jacobite army, including a small cavalry troop led by the Earl of Dunfermline, had overextended themselves in the pursuit of runaway Williamite soldiers and other clans were distracted with the looting of the baggage horses, albeit this was later vehemently denied by the chieftains concerned.⁸¹⁰ The overwhelming success of the assault on the Williamite left and centre meant that the Jacobites on the right lacked support; if the former group had halted their advance through the Williamite lines they would, undoubtedly, have been able to encircle the last of the Williamite regiments. This would have forced Leven and Hastings to capitulate, handing them a very valuable contingent of senior officers, or to fight on to the last man.⁸¹¹ With no more clansmen willing, or able, to break the remaining battalions the Cameron, Sir Alexander Maclean and Sir Donald MacDonald were left to face a strong Williamite force and no choice but to wait for reinforcements. The delay in the other half of the Jacobite army's return to the field and subsequent confusion offered Mackay a slim opportunity to reverse the Williamites fortunes thus far. He rode down the slopes of Creag Eallich to regroup with Leven, Hastings, and the survivors of the Scots-Dutch regiments.⁸¹²

⁸⁰⁸ *Cameron*, p. 271.

⁸⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸¹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹¹ *Ibid.*

⁸¹² Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 57.

Those who had fled the battle earlier were still littered in and around the battlefield, a fact that many historians have overlooked. This lull in the fighting provided an opportunity for Mackay to regroup the Williamite army. From his vantage point, Mackay had seen both the extent of the rout on the left wing and the remaining force on the right. He was able to use this knowledge to further regroup his forces by encouraging nearby stragglers to return.⁸¹³ On the other hand, the Jacobite army was in severe disarray and, when they finally returned to the field, Dunfermline and the Jacobite officers were reportedly 'much surprised to find these men standing entire, and upon the very ground where they were first posted'.⁸¹⁴ Leven and Hastings' forces had not been driven back nor routed, but had retained their positions according to both Cameron and Mackay's accounts.⁸¹⁵ Although they had held their ground, it soon became clear that the Williamite survivors would not be able to do so for much longer.

Officers from Mackay's regiment who had been lucky enough to survive began to return to the remaining forces. Mackay understood that they would be unable to withstand another concerted assault should the Jacobites get their men in order. Although Dunfermline, with sixteen other officers and gentlemen, attempted to organise the clansmen into attacking the Williamites remaining regiments they were only able to muster sixty men willing to do so.⁸¹⁶ When these clansmen saw the size of the force arrayed against them they refused to attack, in spite of exhortations from the officers, Dunfermline was forced to retreat.⁸¹⁷ It was around this time that the Jacobites began to learn that their leader and commander-in-chief, Viscount Dundee, had been slain during the course of the battle.⁸¹⁸ This lack of leadership, with the Jacobite army dispersed across

⁸¹³ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 57.

⁸¹⁴ Cameron, p. 269.

⁸¹⁵ Ibid; Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 59.

⁸¹⁶ Cameron, p. 269-270.

⁸¹⁷ Ibid.

⁸¹⁸ Ibid.

the field, temporarily stunned the remaining leaders into inaction. Mackay would seize upon this by ordering his officers reorganise the remaining the regiments. Captain Robert Mackay, Hugh Mackay's nephew and an officer in his regiment, was one such officer whose attempts to regroup the Brigade have gone unnoticed. Killiecrankie was Robert's first battle, only having joined the Brigade in 1688, but he had, Mackay noted, 'fought stoutly for his lyf[e], and disingadged himself, having received four considerable wounds of broad swords in his head and body'.⁸¹⁹ This illustrates that despite the general disadvantage lack of experience had on the Brigade during the battle, some of those newer officers could still perform admirably. After being given a horse by Leven, to allow him to leave the field, Robert Mackay instead elected to follow his uncle's orders and went 'after his runaways [sic] to exhort all officers, whom he could meet with, to keep up their men, and labour to bring them back to joyn[e]' with the remaining force.⁸²⁰ During the hour in which Robert was gone, the Jacobites attempted another attack, led by Dunfermline with a larger group, as many clansmen had begun to return to the field.⁸²¹ Mackay and Leven ordered the remaining Williamite regiments to withdraw to the safety 'of a gentleman's house that was near the field of battle'.⁸²² Urrard House, with its walled gardens, afforded Mackay's forces a highly defensible position, which Dunfermline's forces found 'it was in vain to attempt to dislodge them'.⁸²³ With the grounds of the house to protect them, Mackay noted that 'the enemy judging they were resolve to receive them briskly' again withdrew.⁸²⁴ After a close encounter with the Jacobite forces near Lauder's former position, Robert Mackay brought back news, to Urrard House, that 'all [their men] had gone clear away out of all reach, and that such as he had spoke to, noticed

⁸¹⁹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 16th September 1689, pp. 281-282.

⁸²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

⁸²¹ *Cameron*, p. 270.

⁸²² *Ibid.*

⁸²³ *Ibid.*

⁸²⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 58.

him not'.⁸²⁵ Major-General Mackay wished the officers remaining 'to doe their outmost endeavour to get as many rallied as possibly they could, but after neare an hours expectation, till it begun to be dark' it became clear that those stragglers hiding nearby hardly be persuaded to stay together for much longer nevermind 'to return back'.⁸²⁶ As it became clear that the Scots-Dutch stragglers, among others, were resistant to return to the field and that their officers, such as Colonel Ramsay, were struggling to keep them together; Mackay, Leven and Hastings agreed that it would be best for them to withdraw.⁸²⁷ Fortuitously, Robert Mackay had come across Lord Belhaven alongside a lieutenant and cornet of Annandale's troop, with five horsemen in tow, and these cavalry 'served for scouts... during the retreat'.⁸²⁸ As the darkness fell at Killiecrankie, Mackay recalled that the men they had left were now in disorder and 'receiving notic[e] that none of the officers could persuade their men to stand, much less to return back' he decided to order the Williamite army to retire 'in the best order wee could' over the tributary stream and back down the Pass of Killiecrankie.⁸²⁹ Oates states that Mackay's forces retreated across the River Gary, but it's clear that Mackay's account was, again, referring to the small tributary stream mentioned earlier.⁸³⁰ During this withdrawal Mackay came across another of his officers, Captain-Lieutenant Mackenzie, who had been 'left mortally wounded among the dead, and was helped of[f] ther[e]after when I marched of the feelds [sic] with the feu men that stood'.⁸³¹ Carrying Mackenzie off the field at the head of his force, Mackay and the battered remnant of the Williamite army finally withdrew from the field of battle and began the long, dangerous, march back to Stirling.

⁸²⁵ Ibid.

⁸²⁶ Mackay, *Memoirs*, 'Short Relation', 17th August 1689, pp. 265-266.

⁸²⁷ Ibid.

⁸²⁸ Ibid., p. 59.

⁸²⁹ Ibid., 'Short Relation', pp. 265-266.

⁸³⁰ Ibid., p. 60; Oates, *Killiecrankie*, p. 117.

⁸³¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 282.

Conclusion

Killiecrankie came after a long and difficult initial campaign. This afforded little opportunity for proper attention to be given to the discipline, or training, of the Brigade prior to the engagement; a lack of which ultimately led to the flight of the bulk of the Scots-Dutch battalions fleeing the field. The Scots-Dutch soldiers did, by and large, retreat from the field, but this rout was precipitated by rank-and-file soldiers abandoning their officers, mostly, as we have seen, 'new men'. The Brigade's officer corps were disproportionately outnumbered by their soldiers and, as such, struggled to retain control of their battalions. Furthermore, the officers were not all continental veterans with significant battlefield experience, as historians and contemporaries often implied.. In the instance of Mackay's battalion, their performance has been far underestimated, particularly with regards to the effectiveness of their musket volleys against the advancing clansmen. This was undoubtedly, due in large part to the greater presence of veteran officers, and presumably soldiers, within Mackay's regiment that day. The Highland charge was highly effective at Killiecrankie, but in demonstrating this many historians have de-emphasised the nuances of the Scots-Dutch Brigade's performance. The officers of Mackay's regiment suffered greatly as they were captured, wounded, or killed after the bulk of their battalion fled the field. The majority of the Scot-Dutch officers killed at Killiecrankie were officers serving in that battalion which makes it abundantly clear that Mackay's veterans held their ground and paid dearly for doing so. The majority of Balfour's and Ramsay's officers, abandoned by their men, fled the field comparatively quickly and as a result managed to escape, were captured or, in some instances, were killed. This was a key factor in the failure in discipline in the unit during the battle and that failure contributed significantly to the defeat of the Williamite army overall. Historians headline of Killiecrankie, particularly with regards to the Brigade, is often one

in which the 'irregular' Highland clansmen triumph over the modern, battle-hardened veterans. However, closer examination of the Jacobite army's officer corps reveals a significant minority of experienced officers and continental veterans, with a core group of former Scots-Dutch Brigade men Mackay and Cameron's accounts overlap considerably, and both include this epilogue of the battle whereby this remnant force was able to regroup and even deter further Jacobite assaults. Again, this has been largely ignored by historians in favour of underlining the triumphant and unassailable Highland charge. Killiecrankie was a resounding defeat for Mackay, Brigade and the Williamites, but his decision to regroup his forces and withdraw in order ultimately allowed the Williamites and, indeed, the Brigade to recover. Killiecrankie proved to be a watershed moment both for the Brigade and Mackay as it shocked the privy council into redoubling their efforts against the Jacobites. However, this effort would be accompanied by an increasing lack of confidence in Mackay and a funding crisis for the Williamites' military. The Scots-Dutch Brigade truly experienced a nadir in their long history in the weeks and months following defeat at Killiecrankie.

Chapter Three – ‘Intestine Commotions’⁸³²: The Scots-Dutch Nadir, Strategy and Power Politics in the Aftermath of Killiecrankie, August 1689-March 1690

*In the small tender birchwood that lay below the farm of George’s son, many a satin-clad warrior lay hacked down there.*⁸³³

The immediate violent impact of the battle at Killiecrankie was obvious to all those who had survived it, an extremely bloody victory for the Jacobites and a bruising defeat for the Williamites. Surveying the carnage in the failing evening light, Cameron of Lochiel recalled the wounds inflicted on the Williamite soldiers were so gruesome ‘even the victors could not look upon the amazing proofs of their own agility and strength without surprise and horror’.⁸³⁴ Celebrations amongst the Jacobite ranks were stifled as word spread of the loss of their charismatic and formidable leader, Viscount Dundee.⁸³⁵ Although the circumstances of his death remain hotly contested, with several differing accounts, the fact remains that Viscount Dundee had been killed leading his men.⁸³⁶ In all likelihood, the errant Viscount had been slain by the ball from a musket, perhaps emanating from notably effective volleys of the Brigade. Killiecrankie proved a costly battle and Historic Scotland has concluded that there were likely 2,800 casualties from both sides.⁸³⁷ Estimates as to the proportion of dead or wounded on each have varied, but most historians agree that the Williamite army suffered around 2,000 casualties, with an additional 500 men taken prisoner, and the Jacobite army around 800 casualties.⁸³⁸

⁸³² Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 8th April 1689, p. 29.

⁸³³ *Keppoch*, ‘Killiecrankie’, p. 191.

⁸³⁴ *Cameron*, p. 270.

⁸³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 269-270.

⁸³⁶ Oates, *Killiecrankie*, pp. 129-131. Murray-Scott, *Dundee*, p. 185.

⁸³⁷ HES, BTL12, Killiecrankie. Hill, *Celtic*, p. 73.

⁸³⁸ James Macpherson, *Original Papers containing the secret history of Great Britain*, (London, 1775), Volume I, ‘Account of the engagements that happened between the King’s party and the rebels in Scotland since May 1689’, 15th December 1689, p. 370. Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 160. Reid, *Killiecrankie*, p. 91. Barratt, *Battles*, p. 68. Oates, *Killiecrankie*, p. 120.

Although the Scottish Williamite army bore the brunt of the casualties, with well over half of the 3,500 men who had taken the field lost, the Jacobites suffered greatly as well as they had lost around a third of their force.⁸³⁹ The impact of Killiecrankie upon the Jacobite cause in Scotland has been explored in-depth, by historians like Lenman, Szechi, and Hopkins, and this chapter will instead pivot toward the toll it took upon the Williamites.⁸⁴⁰ In particular, it will examine the longer-term impacts of the battle upon the Scots-Dutch Brigade and Major-General Mackay. First, however, the historical discourse around the battle must be, briefly, discussed in order to challenge the long-held notion that the Jacobite victory at Killiecrankie effectively heralded impending doom for their cause.

The importance of Killiecrankie has long been known to historians, but its outcome has been the subject of misinterpretation and misunderstandings, akin to the discourse surrounding the battle itself. Political histories of the period, such as Harris, Kishlansky, and Vallance, have viewed the result of Killiecrankie as the effective, albeit temporary, end of the Jacobite threat in Scotland.⁸⁴¹ Similarly, biographers of Viscount Dundee have, perhaps unsurprisingly, argued that his death was the undoing of the Jacobites and foreshadowed the coming months; during which the Jacobites would fail to translate their hard-won victory into a wider success.⁸⁴² Although Dundee's death was an undeniable blow to the Jacobite cause, Lenman has pointed out that even prior to the battle, and the Viscount's death, the movement had struggled to attract 'enough political, military or social weight... to have any serious chance of effecting a counter-revolution in Scotland'.⁸⁴³ Even Hopkins, whose work represents the only dedicated study of the

⁸³⁹ Ibid; Hill, *Celtic*, p. 76.

⁸⁴⁰ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 160-161, 178-180. Lenman, *Risings*, pp. 31-32, 53-54. Szechi, *Jacobites*, pp. 66-67.

⁸⁴¹ Harris, *Revolution*, p. 411. Kishlansky, *Monarchy*, p. 300. Vallance, *Glorious*, p. 214.

⁸⁴² Murray-Scott, *Dundee*, p. 190.

⁸⁴³ Lenman, *Jacobites*, pp. 46-47.

entirety of the Highland War, dedicates much of the concluding part of his chapter on Killiecrankie to exploring what could have been had Viscount Dundee lived.⁸⁴⁴ Hopkins appears to agree that the downfall of the Jacobite cause in Scotland was inevitable from this point onward.⁸⁴⁵ What all of these interpretations have in common is that to some degree they rely on hindsight to discount the Jacobites continued ability to threaten the Scottish Williamite regime and, at the very least, their capacity to act as a harassing force to divert manpower and resources away from other theatres. More recently, new contributions in Scottish political and military history have offered an alternative interpretation of Killiecrankie's longer term implications for the Jacobites, and, therefore, the opposing Williamites.⁸⁴⁶ Raffe states that Dundee's death, although important, was only part of the reason the Jacobites had begun to lose the initiative: the other, perhaps greater, factor in their decline was the bruising defeat the Jacobite army suffered at the Battle of Dunkeld, 21st August 1689.⁸⁴⁷ Critically, he points out that with 'hindsight, the highland war was not much of a threat to the Williamite regime' in Scotland.⁸⁴⁸ Szechi has contested that the defeat of the Williamites at Killiecrankie actually encouraged more Jacobite clans to join the war against the new regime.⁸⁴⁹ Both points are critical to bear in mind, as hindsight has allowed historians to prematurely pronounce the Scottish Jacobite army as being de-fanged after Killiecrankie. Equally, Oates' military re-appraisal of the Highland War concludes that Killiecrankie, although a pivotal moment, was not the end of the conflict nor the Jacobite army's operations.⁸⁵⁰ This chapter shall build upon Raffe and Szechi's approaches in particular, as previous historians' pronouncements,

⁸⁴⁴ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 161.

⁸⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴⁶ Raffe, *Scotland*, pp. 153-154.

⁸⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

⁸⁴⁹ Szechi, *Jacobites*, p. 66.

⁸⁵⁰ Oates, *Killiecrankie*, p. 131.

unwittingly or otherwise, of the Scottish Jacobite army's demise, romantically linking it to the death of its first commander, immediately following Killiecrankie are premature and largely teleological.⁸⁵¹ The Williamite government did not, as we shall see, view the result of Killiecrankie, nor the outcome of the war in Scotland as assuredly concluded at that time.

This chapter will be divided into three sections to examine the longer-term impact of Killiecrankie upon the Scots-Dutch Brigade, Mackay and the Williamite war effort in Scotland. The impact of Killiecrankie spanned over the latter months of 1689 and would continue to have major ramifications for the Brigade and Mackay until early 1690, making up perhaps the darkest moment in both the unit's history and its commander's career. Firstly, the immediate ramifications of defeat at Killiecrankie will be analysed by investigating the order of events during the withdrawal of the remnant of the Williamite army. These survivors would face a gruelling three-day march, across rough terrain, southward to Stirling which led to Major-General Mackay's delay in returning from the battle. During this time, those soldiers, such as McBane, and officers, such as Lieutenant-Colonel Lauder, who had fled prior to the end of the battle spread a panic amongst the Williamite government in Edinburgh by reporting the demise of those they had left behind, including Mackay himself. In contrast to the notion that a Jacobite defeat was assured, this chapter will demonstrate that the immediate reaction of the Scottish Williamites underlined the deep anxiety felt in the aftermath of Killiecrankie. Moreover, their reaction to the news of said defeat was to panic at the prospect of an ebullient Jacobite army marching on Edinburgh and, as a result, they adopted considerable, albeit hastily arranged, defensive measures within days. The consequence of the accounts of these 'runaways', and this resultant panic, was to throw the Williamite strategy in

⁸⁵¹ Lenman, *Risings*, pp. 46-47. Murray-Scott, *Dundee*, p. 190.

Scotland briefly into confusion; a confusion which also spread to England as evidenced by the reactive mobilisation of Anglo-Dutch forces should they be needed north of the border. Although Mackay's absence proved brief, the ramifications of these doom-laden reports, particularly those given by Scots-Dutch officers, cannot be underestimated. The arrival of Major-General Mackay and his men proved a great relief to the government in Edinburgh and the court in London. This relief was further compounded by elation when news of Viscount Dundee's death reached them, but both events would, in turn, obscure the scale of the impact of Killiecrankie upon the Brigade.

The second section will examine the longer-term impact of that loss upon the Scots-Dutch Brigade, which had, indeed, lost many veteran soldiers and officers from an already diminished formation. The loss of veteran Scots-Dutch officers and soldiers not only hampered the Brigade's operational capacity, but impacted the overall war effort as weapons and equipment had to be diverted to re-equip surviving regiments along with the diversion of funds to facilitate a new wave of recruitment to replace those lost. Furthermore, the capture of loyal and experienced Scots-Dutch officers denied the Brigade use of those men until prisoner exchanges could be arranged. The Scottish Williamite government's lack of appreciation as to these impacts on the Brigade were due, again, to the relief they felt when Mackay returned alive, his loss having been considered a major blow, and Viscount Dundee's death. After their resounding defeat, however, they experienced a loss in reputation as continental veterans and because of this, and the severe losses at Killiecrankie, elements of the government in Edinburgh began to question the Brigade's utility. The impact upon the Brigade has hitherto remained unexplored by historians, except for Ferguson, but this chapter will tackle how the losses of men, particularly officers, impacted the ability of the unit to return to their previous role at the heart of the Scottish Williamite army. The Scots-Dutch regiments need to replace

manpower and equipment was impacted by organisational delays, particularly in obtaining new commissions from William, as Dutch Captain-General, in London. This impacted the Brigade's operational capacity as they struggled with re-organisation and this, in turn, impacted the Williamite war effort in Scotland. In relation to this, we will briefly examine Colonel George Ramsay's abortive involvement, or rather lack thereof, at the Battle of Dunkeld, 21st August 1689. The infamous battle will not be explored in-depth, as this has been plentifully explored elsewhere, namely by Hopkins and Oates.⁸⁵² Instead this section will investigate Ramsay's reluctance to engage at Dunkeld, in spite of his status as the nearest senior officer. This was the result of confusion surrounding the chain-of-command, his concern to keep his post at Perth secure, and, most importantly, the lack of experienced officers to lead new recruits into battle; a problem which would have, undoubtedly, been to the forefront of his mind due to his recent experience of abandonment at Killiecrankie..

The victory over the Jacobites at Dunkeld, miraculously achieved by a single Scottish regiment, preceded a period of disagreement over military strategy amongst the Williamites. The third, and final, part of this chapter will be devoted to exploring these divisions from September to December 1689 and will reprise Chapter one's theme of tensions between the officers of the Brigade, the Scottish Williamite officers, and ministers of the Williamite government, particularly Lord George Melville. As the foregoing parts of this chapter suggest, the concluding days of the 1689 campaign were a nadir for the Scots-Dutch Brigade. However, these months also proved to be just as difficult for Mackay as he found himself increasingly eclipsed in terms of influence, particularly in comparison to the opening stages of the Highland War. This section will briefly relate how a political impasse within the Scottish parliament, over constitutional reform and the

⁸⁵² Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 178-192. Oates, *Killiecrankie*, pp. 132-168. Reid, *Killing*, pp. 94-112.

royal prerogative, escalated into a financial crisis for the Scottish Williamites. These circumstances only compounded Mackay's frustration with William's leading ministers in Scotland and worsened disagreements over military strategy. The lines of communication between London, Edinburgh, and Mackay in the field led to further frustrations for the commander-in-chief as they stoked the fires of his own personal doubts as to King William's confidence in him and his abilities. This eclipse was the result of a desire amongst some ministers in the Scottish Williamite government, particularly Viscount Tarbat, to end the conflict through the offer of monetary bribes to those Highland chieftains whose clans made up the bulk of the Jacobite army. Alongside this will be an examination of the stagnation the Scottish Williamite army and the Brigade experienced, as well as an exploration of how divisions between Mackay and his political counterparts delayed any furtherance of the war against the Jacobites in the latter months of 1689. Mackay's perceptions of being undermined were often related to political issues the Williamite regime in Scotland faced, which usually emanated from the cantankerous mood amongst the Scottish parliament and the factions that emerged therein. It will illustrate that Mackay's strategy to neutralise the Jacobite threat, by establishing a new fort at Inverlochy and a corresponding ring of garrisons around the Highlands, proved beyond the financial means of the struggling Scottish Williamite regime in 1689. Before we move on to our first section, however, we must briefly deal with the practicalities of how the Highland War was managed via correspondence networks.

Much of this chapter will rely upon an analysis of correspondence networks and, as such, we must outline how they worked and how they were utilised by the Williamite regime to co-ordinate the Highland War. The maintenance of correspondence between the Williamite governments in Edinburgh and London proved critical to the co-ordination of the Highland War. Melville was central to this network and, as a result, to our analysis as

much of the correspondence survives as part of the Leven and Melville Papers, both transcribed into a printed volume and available to consult in the *NRS*.⁸⁵³ Additionally, many of these letters are reprinted as an addendum to the nineteenth century print version of Mackay's memoirs.⁸⁵⁴ Melville's role as Scottish secretary of state saw him travel, almost constantly, between Edinburgh and London to keep the court, in the latter, informed on affairs in Scotland and the progress of the Highland War. Moreover, Melville's collection of correspondence includes letters from all of those involved in managing and prosecuting the war, such as Mackay, Hamilton, amongst other councillors, Melville and King William II and III. We must additionally bear in mind the practicalities of these networks in relation to the Highland War. Firstly, within Scotland the privy council were responsible for the day-to-day co-ordination of the Williamite army there, with Mackay, as its commander-in-chief, remitted to direct the forces on the ground.⁸⁵⁵ Ease of communication was a major factor in shaping the reaction of the Scottish Williamite government to events, such as Killiecrankie, as well as in the formulation of strategy for the coming months. Rayner has recognised that although the council was usually able to act, and react, independently, King William's correspondence reveals the monarch to have had 'a fairly thorough knowledge' of matters in Scotland.⁸⁵⁶ She has identified the fact, albeit in relation to the treasury commission rather than the council, that this was due to the 'constant flurry of Scots travelling between Edinburgh and London or to the continual stream of letters that passed between the [Scottish & English] Courts'.⁸⁵⁷

⁸⁵³ *Melvilles. NRS, GD26/1, Papers.*

⁸⁵⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Appendix: Letters relative to military affairs in Scotland in the years 1689 & 1690, pp. 221-359.

⁸⁵⁵ Rayner, 'Tribulations', pp. 196-197.

⁸⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 197.

Rayner's contribution has been critical in framing these Scottish Williamite government structures, the council and commission, dealing with the daily realities of the civil war in Scotland.⁸⁵⁸ William II could, and did, issue orders regarding military decisions within the country, but, as Rayner points out, the council could also act independently, issuing their own orders.⁸⁵⁹ However, the conduct of the war on a daily basis was, at least in the military sphere, directed by Mackay as commander-in-chief; with the council deferring to him in military matters and William trusting him to be chief commander in his absence. This fact needs to be added to the governmental framework that Rayner has outlined as the council, and William, relied upon Mackay for his military expertise. This chapter will reveal that the formulation of responses to the Jacobites in Scotland were based upon this correspondence network, stretching from Mackay, and his officers, in the field to the privy council in Edinburgh and, finally, to London via the secretary of state.

Even so, Mackay was able to and, indeed, did bypass the council and secretary of state to appeal directly to the monarch and his advisers, most notably Hans Wilhelm Bentinck, first Earl of Portland. In the aftermath of Killiecrankie, the situation was extremely febrile and remained so until the early months of 1690. In the days following the battle, the extended lines of communication across Scotland and England only exacerbated the situation as uncertainty and confusion was gradually disseminated by early reports of defeat. This was, in large part, due to the time it took for word to reach the government in Edinburgh and the court in London. On average, a letter appears to have taken four days to travel from the former to the latter; in this instance Hamilton, from Edinburgh, sent a letter dated 14th June and Melville, in London, confirmed its receipt on

⁸⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

⁸⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 203-204.

the evening of 18th June 1689.⁸⁶⁰ This example letter contained important information on events in the Scottish parliament, military movements of the Williamite forces and the enemy as well as reports on the state of the Williamite army in Scotland. These letters were often sent via 'express', usually meaning a packet boat destined for London.⁸⁶¹ The distance and time which it took correspondence to reach its intended destination deeply affected the overall co-ordination of the war effort in late 1689 as well as the dissemination of misleading reports of soldiers who had fled Killiecrankie. Within Scotland, the poor infrastructure in the parts of the country, namely the Highlands and their surrounding frontier areas, made communication still more difficult.⁸⁶² Moreover, roads and bridges in Scotland were poorly maintained during the conflict, with the administrative disruption of the Revolution and increased fiscal strain of the subsequent war decreasing investment in infrastructure in the localities.⁸⁶³ At the best of times, word travelled relatively slowly from the Highlands to Edinburgh and the civil war did not help matters. This is critical to understand just how news of events at Killiecrankie spread, both the initial disastrous reports, the relief of Mackay's survival and the joy at Viscount Dundee's demise. The true impact of the battle was obscured by the pace of events and the lag in communications, and this had an impact on decisions made in its aftermath. This led to Scottish Williamites to seriously alter their strategic response in a panic as reports began to trickle in from the battlefield at Killiecrankie.

⁸⁶⁰ Mackay, *Memoirs*, The Duke of Hamilton to Lord Melvill, Edinburgh, 14th June 1689, pp. 228-229. & Lord Melvill to the Duke of Hamilton, 18th June 1689, p. 234.

⁸⁶¹ *RPCS*, Vol XIV, p. xxiii. Note: A packet boat was medium sized boat designed to carry post along the coast; these were utilised extensively in seventeenth century Europe and was the fastest method to send urgent correspondence from Edinburgh to London at the time.

⁸⁶² Rayner, 'Tribulations', p. 201.

⁸⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

The Aftermath of Killiecrankie: Reports, Confusion & Panic, July-August 1689

The Williamite contingent left behind at Killiecrankie consisted of the almost the entirety of Leven's regiment of foot and Hasting's regiment of dragoons alongside the battered and bloodied remnants of Major-General Mackay's Scots-Dutch regiment, with some survivors of Balfour and Ramsay's Scots-Dutch regiments mixed in.⁸⁶⁴ In total, this vestige of the Williamite army was 400 strong when Mackay gave the order to withdraw that evening, as mentioned previously.⁸⁶⁵ Leading the group back down to the pass, Mackay intended to cross over to the western side of the River Gary with the intention of skirting around the hills southward.⁸⁶⁶ At the mouth of the pass, the Williamite contingent came across the survivors of the two troops of Williamite horse, led by Lord Belhaven, who joined them.⁸⁶⁷ Mackay ordered his force to halt to ensure that 'all his men' would get across the river and 'to observe whether the ennemy would approach'.⁸⁶⁸ The Jacobites were, as it turned out, not inclined to pursue Mackay or his men; as they were fatigued by the battle and the day's march prior to it, according to Lochiel.⁸⁶⁹ Crossing the Gary, Mackay recalled he took this route 'to march into the Highlands three or four miles, and then over to Strath Tay'.⁸⁷⁰ It also served the purpose of guarding against a pursuit of the Jacobite cavalry. However, marching across this rough ground, combined with the more circuitous route, would mean Mackay and his men would arrive much later than their comrades who had fled earlier in the day. This was significant, as alongside Mackay were several senior officers of the army and the Brigade, such as Leven, Belhaven, and

⁸⁶⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 57.

⁸⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59.

⁸⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

⁸⁶⁹ *Cameron*, p. 271.

⁸⁷⁰ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 59.

Hastings, all of whom were presumed dead or captured. In the former group's absence, the latter would fuel a panic with confused and partial reports of that day's events.

The following night and day would see Mackay encourage his men on an almost uninterrupted march southward, noting in his memoirs of 'the necessity of his haste to Stirling'.⁸⁷¹ Mackay continued that he was keen to keep as many men with the group as possible, rather than leave the soldiers to fend for themselves and ride for Stirling as he could.⁸⁷² He later explained that 'he judged it would tend to the disreputation of the service, as of himself in particular, if after he had got off those few men in a body in presence of the enemy, they should happen by his leaving them to be dispersed'.⁸⁷³ Although the Jacobite army proved unwilling to pursue them, there were still rogue clansmen from Atholl engaged in ambushing Williamite stragglers, which we shall return to presently. Mackay did not, therefore, wish the group to be broken up as he clearly understood both their safety and his own were better served by remaining together, just as he knew his reputation could be damaged should he be accused of abandoning his men. On the morning of 28th July, Mackay's group met, around two miles away from the battlefield, 'Colonel Ramsay, who had kept... 150 runaways [sic] altogether almost without arms'.⁸⁷⁴ Joining these men to his party, now around 700 men, Mackay led the march across 'very ill ground over hills and boggs' toward Strathtay and the lands of Sir Alexander Menzies, 14th Laird of Weem, who was a supporter of the Williamite government and whose son, Captain Robert Menzies, had been commanding an Independent Highland Company within the Williamite army at Killiecrankie.⁸⁷⁵ Although

⁸⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷² *Ibid.*

⁸⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁸⁷⁵ *Ibid.*; Simpson, *Independent*, pp. 79-80. Note: Captain Robert Menzies had been present at Killiecrankie and his conduct during the battle had been praised by Mackay, who later recommended the young Captain for a promotion, but it remains unknown if he was present with Mackay during the march, presumably he was as he survived the battle and there are no sources to suggest he was captured.

he had been heavily defeated at Killiecrankie, Mackay's experience of war, as well as his officers, appears to have served him well as he sought to rectify the reversal by returning with as much of the surviving force as possible.

The sizeable group of survivors, equivalent to one full regiment of foot, now marched on for the settlement of Strathtay. They were shortly thereafter sighted by inhabitants, who sounded the alarm as they mistook the bedraggled group of soldiers for an advance party of the Jacobite army.⁸⁷⁶ In turn, a panic spread amongst the soldiers as they feared the inhabitants had turned against them upon news of the Jacobite victory.⁸⁷⁷ Mackay recalled 'our men, judging it to be the ennemy... began all to break off to the hills' but he 'and some officers on horseback... with their pistols in hand' managed to maintain discipline via threats.⁸⁷⁸ Still, around 100 men, by Mackay's estimate, managed to escape the group; their fate remains unclear.⁸⁷⁹ After the panic on both sides had died down, Mackay rested his men in Strathtay for the night before departing the following morning, via Castle Drummond, for Stirling and reaching the town on the evening of 29th July.⁸⁸⁰ Upon his arrival, he immediately wrote to Melville to inform him of the events that had taken place, as well as a detailed account of those officers who had survived.⁸⁸¹ The safe return of Mackay with senior officers of the Williamite army, such as Leven and Belhaven, as well as a sizeable contingent of Scots-Dutch officers, like Ramsay, would greatly benefit the Williamite war effort in the long-run. Although the more meandering route of Mackay's march kept him and his men safe, it would mean his return was delayed by three days. This absence undoubtedly inflamed the consternation emanating from the confused reports of panicked 'runaway' soldiers. These men reached safety before

⁸⁷⁶ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 61.

⁸⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 29th July 1689, p. 258.

Mackay and, critically, their affrighted incomplete accounts of the battle reached Edinburgh and London before news of his survival.

Before Mackay and the battered remnants of his army had even left the field at Killiecrankie, most surviving soldiers and officers had fled in confusion whilst the battle was still ongoing.⁸⁸² The route of those survivors who managed to escape capture or death proved critical to the proliferation of reports of the battle during Mackay's brief absence. They took a similar route to Mackay and his men at first, running back down the Pass of Killiecrankie along the course of the River Gary.⁸⁸³ Perhaps unsurprisingly, these fleeing soldiers did not take the safer and longer path of retreat, over rough terrain, that Mackay elected to follow to avoid pursuit. Instead, they retreated pell-mell towards the nearest Williamite garrison at Perth, taking the road via Dunkeld that they had marched to battle the day before.⁸⁸⁴ Many of these 'runaways' came from the left-wing of the Williamite army which, of course, contained the majority of the Scots-Dutch battalions, Balfour and Ramsay's, at Killiecrankie alongside Lauder's 'chosen' fusilier detachment.⁸⁸⁵ The author of the 'True Account' stated 'many men wer[e] killed by the Atholl men and by country men' who pursued the fleeing soldiers.⁸⁸⁶ Indeed, the quickest route to safety proved anything but safe as many men, such as Balfour, were killed whilst being pursued by locals sympathetic to the Jacobite cause.⁸⁸⁷ Mackay would later contend that the 'most parte of the slaughter and imprisonment of officers and souldiers was in the chasce' rather than in the battle itself.⁸⁸⁸ McBane, one of these runaway soldiers, recalled 'I made the best of my way to Dunkel[d], where I stayed untill what of our Men was left came up'.⁸⁸⁹ The

⁸⁸² McBane, *Sword-Man's*, pp. 109-110.

⁸⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, pp. 47-48.

⁸⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁸⁸⁶ EUL, Laing MSS II.89, f. 339.

⁸⁸⁷ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 483-484.

⁸⁸⁸ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 60.

⁸⁸⁹ McBane, *Sword-Man's*, p. 110.

small straggling groups of Williamites, or isolated survivors, proved easy prey for the marauding clansmen to corner, rob, capture or kill as they chose.⁸⁹⁰ Among the survivors that braved the treacherous road to Dunkeld were a number of Scots-Dutch officers, such as Captain Walter Murray, who chose to carry on their march all the way to Edinburgh rather than risk lingering too close to danger. These first groups of runaway soldiers and officers only arrived in Edinburgh on the following evening of 28th July 1689.⁸⁹¹

When these large bodies of soldiers, bloodied, wounded, or exhausted, arrived in Edinburgh the word of defeat quickly began to spread. Hamilton immediately wrote that evening to Melville, in London.⁸⁹² Hamilton explained that news had been brought to town 'by severall inferior officers and souldiers that is come here this evening'.⁸⁹³ These accounts, Hamilton went on, reported 'that after a sharp ingadgement, Dundie being much stronger, the Major-General was quite defeat'.⁸⁹⁴ The language used in Hamilton's letter nevertheless shows that, these reports, at least initially, were to be treated with a degree of scepticism. Common soldiers, such as McBane, who escaped Killiecrankie were not considered trustworthy sources, especially as their survival could be considered as an indication of cowardice. Additionally, the veracity of accounts given by surviving officers was in question as some, such as Lieutenant Waddell of Leven's regiment, were accused of fleeing prematurely.⁸⁹⁵ Hamilton lamented to Melville that he had 'heard of no officers of quality that is come off[f]' and 'the confusion is such here the particulars [are] hardly to be got'.⁸⁹⁶ The chaos and confusion of the surviving soldiers streaming into Edinburgh, many having been separated from their officers and units, clearly made getting an

⁸⁹⁰ *Ibid*; EUL, Laing MS II.89, f. 339.

⁸⁹¹ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 31st July 1689, pp. 185-186.

⁸⁹² *Melvilles*, Hamilton to Melville, 28th July 1689, p. 203.

⁸⁹³ *Ibid*.

⁸⁹⁴ *Ibid*.

⁸⁹⁵ Oates, *Killiecrankie*, p. 109.

⁸⁹⁶ *Melvilles*, Hamilton to Melville, 28th July 1689, p. 203.

accurate report of events difficult. Sir William Lockhart, William's solicitor general and privy councillor, perfectly summarised the consternation engulfing many in the capital city when he wrote, 'The excessive trouble we are all in cannot be expressed, both for the strock [sic] of the Kings affairs have received, and the loss of many brave men'.⁸⁹⁷ Another prominent councillor, Sir John Dalrymple of Stair, simply wrote, in another letter to Melville, 'we have no perfect accounts, bot ther[e] is great loss of officers'.⁸⁹⁸ The itinerant soldiers' presence in the town inevitably spread the word beyond the privy councillors with the *Proceedings* newspaper summarising that as 'the first News came... a very dismal story was told of Major General Mackay's being killed, all the chief Officers and Soldiers being either slain or made Prisoners by the Enemy'.⁸⁹⁹

What began to lend credence to these reports was the arrival of word from Perth, sent by senior officers who had fled there. Hamilton's recalled that he had word from 'Lieutenant-Colonel Lauther [sic], who my Lord Ruthven spoke with as he came from St. Johnston this day, and gives the same account of their being whol[l]y routed'.⁹⁰⁰ Not only was Lord David Ruthven, the second to hold the title, a fellow privy councillor, but Lieutenant-Colonel Lauder was second-in-command of Balfour's Regiment of the Scots-Dutch Brigade. Lauder's report was to be considered far more reliable than the stories of exhausted and wounded soldiers or lower ranking officers who had arrived in Edinburgh. After hearing Lauder's account corroborate the tales of other survivors, Hamilton concluded, 'now Dundie will be master of all the other side of Forth, where there are so great numbers of disaffected to join him; so the King must make hast[e]... to assist us to reduce him, for I fear wee shall not be able to defend this side of Forth long'.⁹⁰¹ Lauder's

⁸⁹⁷ *Melvilles*, Sir William Lockhart to Melville, 28th July 1689, p. 204. *RPCS*, XIII, Commission to Sir William Lockhart to be Solicitor, 9th July 1689, pp. 500-501.

⁸⁹⁸ *Melvilles*, Sir John Dalrymple to Melville, 28th July 1689, p. 205.

⁸⁹⁹ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 31st July 1689, p. 185.

⁹⁰⁰ *RPCS*, XIII, Hamilton to Melville, 28th July 1689, p. 203.

⁹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 203-204.

confirmation of such doom-laden reports would spark a full blown panic amongst William's Scottish government. Following word from the Scots-Dutch officer, the privy council met to discuss the battle in an 'extraordinary session' on that very evening.⁹⁰² The minutes of this emergency meeting stated that the army 'hade been defeatt [sic] and many of the officers killed'.⁹⁰³ They felt strongly enough about the veracity of Lauder's account, reinforcing those they had heard earlier in the day, to send a missive to the Earl of Argyll at Inveraray, where he was stationed with a sizeable detachment of 3,000 men, ordering him to march for Stirling at once.⁹⁰⁴ Critically, the order directly cited these accounts, stating, 'Informatione being come by severall of the officers and souldiers who attended Major Generall McKay in this expeditione to the north'.⁹⁰⁵ Furthermore, more orders were dispatched from the council to muster various regiments and local militias across central Scotland citing 'ane express from Pearth [sic]' as the source of the news of total defeat, with a postscript informing these commanders that the army at Killiecrankie 'is just brock [sic] and many of the officers killed'.⁹⁰⁶ This 'express', which spread the word of Mackay's, among others, death, was, in all likelihood, Lauder's account relayed via his conversation with Lord Ruthven at Perth that day, 28th July.⁹⁰⁷ Lauder reported that the Williamite army at Killiecrankie had been resoundingly defeated which was true, but he added to the council's consternation by speculating that several senior officers were either dead or captured; a fact which he may well have earnestly believed considering he had fled before Mackay had rallied the remaining regiments at Killiecrankie.

⁹⁰² *RPCS*, XIII, Report of the battle of Killiecrankie, 28th July 1689, p. 565.

⁹⁰³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰⁴ *RPCS*, XIII, Missive to the Earl of Argyll, 28th July 1689, pp. 565-566.

⁹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰⁶ *RPCS*, XIII, Missive to the Earl of Dundonald, Missive to Lord Carmichael, Missive to Sir Archibald Cockburn of Langton, 28th July 1689, p. 566.

⁹⁰⁷ *Melvilles*, Hamilton to Melville, 28th July 1689, p. 203.

Unfortunately, Lieutenant-Colonel Lauder's report does not survive, but we can glean some insight into its contents via the privy councillors who first read and then heard it, before letters to London based on its contents were subsequently drafted. Lockhart, in his own letter to Melville, stated 'we dou[b]t not but the Major-Generall[,] Ramsay, and Ballfour [sic], with all officers of ther[e] regiments that wer[e] ther[e], L. -C. Lauther on[e] excepted, are cut off'.⁹⁰⁸ Lauder went on, at least according to Lockhart, to assert that 'Lord Kenmoor [sic] and Belhaven are cert[a]inly killed'.⁹⁰⁹ To Williamite ministers in Edinburgh, the loss of such a contingent of officers, particularly Mackay and his Scots-Dutch cohorts, was extremely concerning. Although these officers would soon enough appear, alive and well, Lauder's account, placed amongst those of lower-ranking officers and soldiers, was considered accurate enough for the Scottish Williamite government to rapidly alter its military strategy. The strategic ramifications of the loss of many of the senior officers of the Brigade and the Williamite regiments shook the Edinburgh administration to its core. The council ordered the bulk of the Williamite army to assemble at Stirling, appointing Major-General Sir John Lanier as temporary commander-in-chief, as the Englishman was the most senior and experienced officer in Mackay's absence.⁹¹⁰ Lanier had a similarly lengthy career as a professional soldier and had risen through the ranks of the English army since his enlistment in the 1670s.⁹¹¹ The council decided to position their forces in a defensive line just below the River Forth, a move which would have effectively abandoned all north of it to the Jacobites. The only notable exception was Inverness where the Williamite government left Sir Thomas Livingstone isolated, but with around 1,000 men at his command.⁹¹² The privy council did

⁹⁰⁸ *Melvilles*, Sir William Lockhart to Melville, 28th July 1689, p. 204.

⁹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹¹⁰ *RPCS*, XIII, Missive to the Earl of Argyll, 28th July 1689, pp. 565-566. Melville (ed.), *Leven*, Hamilton to Melville, 28th July 1689, p. 204.

⁹¹¹ *ODNB*, Piers Wauchope, 'Lanier, Sir John (d. 1692), army officer.'

⁹¹² Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 13th June 1689, p. 227.

not, however, have confidence in the ability of their remaining forces to hold the line at the Forth should the Jacobites descend upon the Central Lowlands.⁹¹³ Critically, the Scottish Williamites appear to have no faith in the ability of their army to defeat the Jacobites at this juncture. This was, in no small part, due to Lauder's report. In a letter to Melville, dated 28th July 1689, Lockhart relayed the Scots-Dutch Lieutenant-Colonel's opinion on the situation, writing 'I have spoke [with] L.C. Laudor [sic], who says except the Dutch dragoons and som[e] other such force, he does not see...' how the Jacobites could be defeated.⁹¹⁴ Hamilton also stressed, to Melville, the need for reinforcements, declaring 'The King wold [sic] hast[e] some of his best troops here, and especially foot, for our new raised men will not be able to stand the Highlanders'.⁹¹⁵ Lauder's reports, when combined with the widespread news of Mackay's, along with several seniors officers, demise severely undermined the Scottish Williamite government's conviction that their substantial army could defeat the Jacobites in the field. Therefore, the impact of Lauder's account of Killiecrankie cannot be underestimated as it not only instilled severe doubt in the Scottish Williamite forces but caused the privy council to adopt an overly defensive strategy, concentrating all of their forces in Stirling with the hope that William would dispatch significant reinforcements.

This crisis in confidence was not confined to the council's chambers nor the writing desks of senior Williamite ministers. Low morale quickly spread amongst the ranks of the Scottish Williamite forces in Mackay's absence. At the first sighting of Jacobite raiding parties, soldiers garrisoning Perth abandoned their posts and fled for Edinburgh.⁹¹⁶ Critically, the abandonment of the town allowed the Jacobite army to carry

⁹¹³ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 180.

⁹¹⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Lockhart to Melville, 29th July 1689, p. 253.

⁹¹⁵ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Hamilton to Melville, 29th July 1689, pp. 251-252.

⁹¹⁶ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 180.

off much needed supplies of ammunition, arms and public revenues, which were stored in the town.⁹¹⁷ This was the second time, since May, that Perth had fallen to the Jacobites.⁹¹⁸ The Scottish parliament were, according to Balcarres who was at the time a sitting M.P., so shaken by events that some members 'were for retiring to England, others to the Western Shires of Scotland'.⁹¹⁹ Furthermore, the panic heralded a paralysis in military terms as the council seemed unable to determine what they should do with the surviving soldiers from Killiecrankie. Hamilton begged Melville request King William to 'give his directions as to those officers and sojourns that has come of[f] from the fight'.⁹²⁰ A stream of letters sent to London by Scottish councillors spread the grim news of defeat at Killiecrankie further still.⁹²¹ Writing from the court, Melville confirmed that he had received this wave of concerning correspondence. Replying to one such letter, sent by William Lindsay, eighteenth Earl of Crawford, dated 30th July, Melville wrote, 'I am much troubled with the relation yow give me... Things seeme to have a very sad prospect'.⁹²² His disquiet with Scottish affairs contrasts greatly with Lenman and Hopkins' suggestions that even in the jaws of defeat the Williamite government in Scotland and the court in London remained unperturbed by the Jacobite victory.⁹²³ Mackay's death, if true, would have left William and his Scottish government without an experienced commander to lead their army in Scotland, which was made up of largely inexperienced recruits.⁹²⁴ Furthermore, the impact of the loss of several prominent Scots-Dutch officers, many of whom had been in the Prince's service for decades, cannot be underestimated. Moreover, the loss of Brigade officers left William with less of his trustworthy vanguard on the

⁹¹⁷ Ibid.

⁹¹⁸ *RPS*, A1690/4/19.

⁹¹⁹ Balcarres, *Memoirs*, p. 48.

⁹²⁰ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Hamilton to Melville, 29th July 1689, p. 252.

⁹²¹ *Melvilles*, Hamilton to Melville, 29th July 1689, pp. 205-206.

⁹²² *Melvilles*, Lord Melville to the Earl of Craford, 30th July 1689, p. 210.

⁹²³ Lenman, *Jacobites*, pp. 46-47. Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 161.

⁹²⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Lockhart to Melville, 29th July 1689, p. 253.

ground in Scotland, including, it appeared, his chief officer there, Mackay. William did not have an alternative whom he could fully trust to replace Mackay, and likely would have had to divert one of his other senior officers, such as Ginkel, Frederick Schomberg or Tollemache, to take over.⁹²⁵

The nature of the reports from Killiecrankie were considered so serious that William ordered the testimony be verified by first-hand witnesses, in person, in London. On 29th July, Hamilton sent a letter bearing urgent news to Melville.⁹²⁶ What was remarkable about this further piece of correspondence, sent hardly a day after the last, was the messenger, an unnamed 'Dutch man, who is a lieutenant in Mackayes regement'.⁹²⁷ This Scots-Dutch officer was likely Captain Pieter Watkins, the only known Dutch national within Mackay's officer corps during its time in Scotland. Although his surname was English in origin a 1690 petition, which Watkins sent to King William, protested he had been passed over for promotion, despite his considerable years of experience, due to his imperfect grasp of English.⁹²⁸ Furthermore, Watkins does not appear amongst the casualties mentioned by Mackay and, therefore, was undoubtedly one of the officers who escaped after being separated from his regiment.⁹²⁹

After giving his account of the battle to the Scottish privy council, Watkins was dispatched to London carrying a written assurance from Hamilton that this officer could give 'his Majestie... as good account as any that is yett come'.⁹³⁰ The details of Watkins'

⁹²⁵ Childs, *British*, pp. 24-25. *ODNB*, Robert Dunlop and Harman Murtagh, 'Schomberg, Frederick Herman de [formerly Frederick Herman von Schönberg], first duke of Schomberg (1615–1690), army officer'.

⁹²⁶ *Melvilles*, Lord Melville to the Earl of Craford, 30th July 1689, p. 210.

⁹²⁷ *Melvilles*, Hamilton to Melville, 29th July 1689, p. 205.

⁹²⁸ *NRS*, GD26/9/309, Petition to the King by Captain Peter Watkin [see also Watkins] asking to have the titular honour of Lieutenant-Colonel conferred on him because, although he had 29 years service as captain, he had lately been passed over for promotion to Major because he could not speak English perfectly, and a captain with only 3 years service in that rank had been promoted in his stead, 1690. Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 479, 499.

⁹²⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹³⁰ *Melvilles*, Hamilton to Melville, 29th July 1689, p. 205.

report differed little from Lauder's, particularly in terms of its grim prognosis. After arriving in London, on 2nd August, Watkins presented his account at court. The Dutch officer's report was judged so alarming, alongside additional letters he carried from the council regarding the situation, that William ordered the Anglo-Dutch forces stationed at Chester, then under command of Marshal Schomberg, to prepare to march for Scotland instead of taking ship for Ireland, as had been originally intended.⁹³¹ The magnitude of such an order cannot be understated as the war in Ireland was, at this time, at a particularly critical stage. The siege of Derry was about to be lifted, but the large Irish Jacobite army remained a threat and Schomberg's force would have provided much needed reinforcements to Williamites there.⁹³² Yet, the fear of a triumphant Jacobite army in the Scottish Highlands descending into the Lowlands, led by Viscount Dundee, briefly trumped Ireland as a priority, reminding us of how critical securing Scotland was to William's wider strategy. Further English and Dutch forces, under command of Ginkel, stationed around Berwick were ordered to remain alert and reinforce Edinburgh if necessary.⁹³³ This diversion of precious manpower to Scotland due to the reports of the defeat at Killiecrankie, and the fact that Mackay was still missing, illustrates just how concerned William and his advisers were by this news. For a long time, it has been well understood by historians that William primarily wished to focus upon Ireland, to resolve the conflict there and then turn his full attention, and the manpower of the Three Kingdoms, to Flanders.⁹³⁴ The reaction from William and his advisers in London to the developments in Scotland illustrate that the Highland War was also a strategic priority for the Dutch King, if an unwelcome one. The bleak account of Killiecrankie caused similar

⁹³¹ *RPCS*, XIV, Letter from the King anent more troops against Dundee, etc., 5th August 1689, p. 14. Mackay, *Memoirs*, Melville to Hamilton, 8th August 1689, p. 261.

⁹³² Childs, *Ireland*, p. 136.

⁹³³ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Melville to Hamilton, 8th August 1689, p. 261.

⁹³⁴ Childs, *Ireland*, p. 136. Childs, *Nine*, pp. 116-119.

consternation in the English parliament on 3rd August 1689.⁹³⁵ Narcissus Luttrell, a member of the House of Commons and famed diarist, recorded in his journal that the 'Letters from Scotland' revealed 'the fight [at Killiecrankie] was maintained very sharply for some time, but two of the Scotch regiments (that came from Holland) would not fight, which occasioned a disorder among our men'.⁹³⁶ The reports from Scotland now began to spread in England and the blame for the defeat was firmly placed upon the Scots-Dutch Brigade, a theme which would become increasingly prevalent over the next few months.

The panic, however, would be short lived as by 30th July, Mackay's letter from Stirling, reporting his survival was placed in the hands of the privy council in Edinburgh.⁹³⁷ This news created a wave of palpable relief amongst many of William's ministers and supporters. Sir John Hay of Park, a privy councillor and member of the Scottish parliament, wrote, 'Our newes hear [sic] wer[e] verie bad and greivous, bot, blest be God, they ar[e] this day better. Most of our officers comd off, that wer said to be kild, safe'.⁹³⁸ Similarly, Lockhart summarised the mood when he declared to Melville, in a letter dated 30th July, 'It's hardly possible to express the satisfaction all honest men are in, from the surprising news we have received of the Major-General arrival at Stirling'.⁹³⁹ This relief was only bolstered by the wider spread of reports that Mackay and his fellow officers, including Lord Melville's son the Earl of Leven, were alive and safe with him in Stirling, as reported in the *Proceedings* pamphlet the following morning.⁹⁴⁰ For his own part, Mackay immediately wrote a corresponding letter for Melville in London, again

⁹³⁵ ODNB, Henry Horwitz, 'Luttrell, Narcissus (1657-1732), annalist and book collector'. Anon (ed.), Narcissus Luttrell, *A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs from September 1678 to April 1714*, Vol II, 1689-1692 (Oxford, 1857), 3rd August 1689, p. 565.

⁹³⁶ Luttrell, *Brief*, II, 3rd August 1689, p. 565.

⁹³⁷ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Hamilton, 29th July 1689, pp. 254-256.

⁹³⁸ *Melvilles*, Sir John Hay of Park to Melville, 30th July 1689, p. 212.

⁹³⁹ *Melvilles*, Sir William Lockhart to Melville, 30th July 1689, pp. 212-213.

⁹⁴⁰ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 31st July 1689, p. 186.

dated 29th July, to be relayed via the council in Edinburgh.⁹⁴¹ He expressed regret that the army had been defeated, declaring, 'none is more grieved that any thing prejudiciall [sic] to their Majesties service should fall...' but added 'so non[e] shall use more diligence to repaire [sic] the losses... then myself'.⁹⁴² Criticism of Mackay's command was, at least in part, temporarily staved off by relief at his survival as well as the fact he and his men demonstrated that a part of the Williamite army had not completely routed at Killiecrankie. Those who had fled the field before Mackay, men like Lauder and Waddell, were increasingly criticised for doing so. Sir John Dalrymple, in a letter to Melville, dated the same, lamented that 'several persons who had given evidences of their firmness in other occasions... to cover their own hastiness, did report such lies of the persons they had seen dead, that men were forced to beleive [sic] them'.⁹⁴³ It was, perhaps, understandable that Lauder's report was incomplete as his regiment had been among the first to flee the field and he was forced to abandon his position almost as soon as the melee began.⁹⁴⁴ Dalrymple made it explicitly clear that whilst it was 'shamfull that new trained men' caused the other soldiers to flee, this did not excuse veteran officers, undoubtedly referring in part to Lauder and Watkins, from doing the same.⁹⁴⁵ Captain John Blackadder, a Scottish officer in the Earl of Angus' Regiment of Foot, wrote in his diary, 'the terror of the fugitives had multiplied their own losses, and spread a needless alarm'.⁹⁴⁶ In a letter to Melville, dated 30th July, Dalrymple concluded, 'I fear these rumours will prejudge his Majesties affairs els[e]where, before the reports can be contradicted'.⁹⁴⁷

⁹⁴¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 29th July 1689, p. 257.

⁹⁴² *Ibid.*

⁹⁴³ *Melvilles*, Dalrymple to Melville, 30th July 1689, pp. 214-215.

⁹⁴⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 56.

⁹⁴⁵ *Melvilles*, Dalrymple to Melville, 30th July 1689, pp. 214-215.

⁹⁴⁶ *Blackadder*, p. 40.

⁹⁴⁷ *Melvilles*, Dalrymple to Melville, 30th July 1689, pp. 214-215.

Whilst the confirmation of Mackay's survival was welcome news, the frustration caused by Lauder's and Watkins' reports was palpable amongst the Scottish privy council. Not only had the spread of these reports, now confirmed to be false, caused a time consuming re-organisation of William's forces in England, albeit temporarily, it had also provided a morale boost to Jacobites in Ireland, England, and Williamite controlled areas of Scotland, as erroneous reports of Mackay's death, alongside several of his senior officers, spread. Later reflecting upon Killiecrankie, Cameron of Lochiel would argue that 'the general consternation wherewith all those of the contrary party were seized' was 'the greatest proof of the importance' of the Jacobite army's victory at Killiecrankie.⁹⁴⁸ The impact the short panic had on the Scottish Williamites response has been vastly underestimated within the historiography. The second sacking of Perth at the hands of the Jacobite army was deeply humiliating for the Scottish Williamite government. The privy council only added confusion to the situation when they ordered all forces to muster in defence of Stirling. Mackay recalled finding, upon his return, that the council's strategy 'tended to abandon the northern counties of Scotland to the enemy's'.⁹⁴⁹ According to him, the defensive strategy could not be maintained because if the Jacobites were left in control of the northern shires they would not only have 'the best men of that kingdom for the war' but 'possession of towns and... publick revenues, whereby they could form a fashion of government'.⁹⁵⁰ Access to manpower and revenue would have bolstered the Jacobite army at a critical stage in the conflict.⁹⁵¹ The occupation of several key towns, such as Inverness and Aberdeen, would have allowed them to set up an opposition government, allowing them to levy taxes and conferring a much needed wider sense of legitimacy. Utilising the bulk of their army to form a passive defensive line the Scottish

⁹⁴⁸ Cameron, p. 281.

⁹⁴⁹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 62.

⁹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

Williamites had also left Livingstone, whom we must not forget was both Mackay's appointed commander in the north and former comrade, isolated.⁹⁵² Furthermore, such drastic measures would also leave the pro-Williamite clans of the northern Highlands, such as the Munros, Grants, Frasers and, of course, the Mackays, vulnerable to attack.⁹⁵³ Mackay resolved to quickly countermand the council's orders, in hopes of redeeming his reputation as well as countering the Jacobite advantage. He later recalled that he knew, 'how hard a pull he would have' in the realm of military strategy.⁹⁵⁴ As he did so, more rumours emerged regarding the death of the Jacobite commander at Killiecrankie.

On 1st August, word arrived in Edinburgh that the Viscount Dundee had been slain in the recent engagement.⁹⁵⁵ This provided a much-needed morale boost to William's nervous Scottish ministers, turning Killiecrankie from a resounding defeat into a pyrrhic victory. Even Mackay, at least in the days following, felt confident enough to assure Melville that with Dundee dead the Scottish Jacobites would become restless and those 'rebels' in arms would surrender soon.⁹⁵⁶ Hamilton immediately wrote an urgent dispatch to London, stating that it was now confirmed 'that Dundie is certanely killed, and some other considerable persones of the Highlanders, we conceive our advantadge is more then [sic] our loss'.⁹⁵⁷ Much has been written regarding the impact of Dundee's death and although this has been grossly overstated at times, the loss of such an astute tactician and brave professional soldier was indeed a blow for the Jacobite army in Scotland.⁹⁵⁸ Whilst correspondence was dispatched from Edinburgh, confirming the news of Dundee's

⁹⁵² ODNB, 'Livingstone'. Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 480.

⁹⁵³ Allan I. Macinnes, *Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788* (East Linton, 1996), p. 179.

⁹⁵⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 62.

⁹⁵⁵ *Melvilles*, Duke of Hamilton to Lord Melvill, 1st August 1689, p. 218.

⁹⁵⁶ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Hamilton, 2nd August 1689, p. 260.

⁹⁵⁷ *Melvilles*, Duke of Hamilton to Lord Melvill, 1st August 1689, p. 218.

⁹⁵⁸ Murray-Scott, *Dundee*, p. 192.

demise , these letters did not arrive in London until 7th August.⁹⁵⁹ Therefore, this development remained unknown to Melville and, by extension, King William for around a week, with receipt confirmed on 8th August by the former in letters to Hamilton and Crawford.⁹⁶⁰ Events were now clearly outpacing the capacity of the Williamite correspondence network to pass news and relay corresponding orders back and forth between Edinburgh and London.

There was a small yet significant time-lapse between these feverish waves of correspondence sent to and from Scotland. The periodic gaps in the sharing of critical intelligence was a major factor in disrupting the Williamites strategy not only in Scotland, but in England and Ireland as well. The situation in Scotland changed daily, between 28th July and 2nd August, as updates from the field came into Edinburgh. However, the delayed response of the crown and resultant confusion was due to the logistical realities of co-ordinating the Highland War, in part, from London. In turn, this caused frustration at court as the Williamite crown was unable to take decisive action. In a letter to Hamilton, dated 8th August, Melville wrote, 'I have communicate all your Grace did writ[e] to me, to the King, upon the first and second relation of the engagement betuixt [sic] Generall-Major Mackay and the Viscount of Dundee'.⁹⁶¹ Indicating his own, as well as the King's, Melville rebuked Hamilton for the panic and confusion the Scottish Williamites premature reports had caused. He declared, 'his majestie understood affaires wer[e] not so badd as at first represented'.⁹⁶² The Scottish Williamites were told 'the forces you have already may be sufficient to repress those that ar[e] in armes against you'.⁹⁶³ The order to Schomberg and his Anglo-Dutch army at Chester to mobilise was rescinded,

⁹⁵⁹ *Melvilles*, Earl of Craford to Melville, 6th August 1689, p. 236. Melville to Hamilton, 8th August 1689, p. 241.

⁹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶¹ *Melvilles*, Melville to Hamilton, 8th August 1689, p. 241.

⁹⁶² *Ibid.*

⁹⁶³ *Ibid.*

there would be no major reinforcements sent to Scotland at this time.⁹⁶⁴ Luckily for William, the mobilisation of these forces had been slow and no significant progress had been made in the intervening days. However, the confusion would have undoubtedly proven costly in logistical terms as William and his advisers in London now had to re-organise the transport of that army to Ireland. Additionally, William was clearly displeased with the lack of resolve amongst the Williamites in Scotland. The redeployment of forces intended for Ireland was not an inconsiderable inconvenience, as William and his generals faced the tactical dilemma of leaving Sir Percy Kirke's relief force, having lifted the siege of Derry on 1st August, isolated.⁹⁶⁵ Whilst news of the Irish Jacobites failure at Derry was welcome, the Irish Jacobite army had retired to Dublin relatively unscathed and remained a significant threat to the Williamite regime's security both in Scotland and in England.⁹⁶⁶

Whilst Ireland's importance has been well established, the role of correspondence in perpetuating alarming reports from Scotland, the concomitant confusion it engendered and the impact this had upon the Williamites' broader military organization has not been hitherto explored. Szechi has recognised that Williamite defeat at Killiecrankie had rallied the Jacobites in Scotland.⁹⁶⁷ Although Mackay's survival, and Dundee's death, had lessened the impact of Killiecrankie, Szechi has pointed out that valuable troops and funds, desperately needed elsewhere, would have to be diverted to Scotland.⁹⁶⁸ He has, however, overestimated the size of that English contribution in Scotland, going so far as to posit that the English military ultimately defeated the Scottish Jacobites.⁹⁶⁹ The crown did order three English regiments, two of horse and one of dragoons, to reinforce the Scottish

⁹⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁶⁵ Childs, *Ireland*, p. 136.

⁹⁶⁶ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Melville to Hamilton, 8th August 1689, pp. 261-262.

⁹⁶⁷ Szechi, *Jacobites*, p. 66.

⁹⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁶⁹ Ibid.

Williamites, but the bulk of the effort in defeating the Jacobites was undertaken by the Scottish Williamite army and the Scots-Dutch Brigade.⁹⁷⁰ For his own part, Mackay did not request significant reinforcements upon his return. On 2nd August, he stipulated, in another letter to London, that all he would require were a few battalions of regular foot with some dragoons or horse.⁹⁷¹ It is indicative of the trust vested in Mackay's expertise that William only sent the modest forces the Scots-Dutch commander requested. On the other hand, Harris has argued that the deployment of more English forces to Scotland illustrates that William was not unconcerned about the war in his northern kingdom.⁹⁷²

The confusion reports from Scotland had propagated caused a great deal of consternation for the crown. Melville now began to interrogate the source of the earliest doom-laden reports from the battle, those composed by the two Scots-Dutch officers. Writing on 8th August, Melville informed Mackay, 'The gentleman, I think be a Lieutenant in one of your regiments, that came here expresse, gave but a very sorry account of your affairs. I believe he judged all was lost when he came here'.⁹⁷³ Mackay had protested, as early as 29th July, that Lauder's and Watkins' accounts had been unreliable, declaring that 'none of those who fled to Dunkell and St. Johnston could say any thing of mee, for they were gone neare an houre befor I caryed off[f]'.⁹⁷⁴ Although it had become clear that those reports had been premature, and subsequent orders to reinforce Scotland had been cancelled, the longer term impact of the confusion surrounding Killicrankie should not be underestimated.⁹⁷⁵ The same relief which was felt at the news of Mackay's survival in Scotland, which was delayed by a week in its meandering journey to London. When the

⁹⁷⁰ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 62. *Leven*, Hamilton to Melville, 6th August 1689, pp. 235-236.

⁹⁷¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Hamilton, 2nd August 1689, p. 259.

⁹⁷² Harris, 'Scotland' in *Final*, p. 130.

⁹⁷³ *Melvilles*, Melville to Mackay, 8th August 1689, p. 242.

⁹⁷⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 29th July 1689, p. 257.

⁹⁷⁵ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Lockhart to Melville, 29th July 1689, p. 253. *Melvilles*, Hamilton to Melville, 29th July 1689, p. 205.

news broke, Melville wrote to Mackay, on 8th August, to ‘heartily congratulate both your safety in so great a danger, and your good success’.⁹⁷⁶ He added that King William and his advisers, who knew Mackay well from the Revolution, had been similarly anxious at the first grim reports of the battle they had received.⁹⁷⁷ In both London and Edinburgh, relief combined with the elation at the news of Viscount Dundee’s death obscured the true impact of Killiecrankie upon the Brigade, as we shall see in the following section. The panic amongst William’s ministers in Scotland, such as Hamilton and Lockhart, would only increase the lack of confidence inculcated in Edinburgh by the defeat of Mackay, the Scots-Dutch regiments and the Scottish Williamite army at Killiecrankie.

The Scots-Dutch Nadir: Dunkeld and the Williamite Crisis, August-September 1689

The months following the Brigade at Killiecrankie proved to be the lowest ebb for the unit and its commander. This section will examine this nadir in the Brigade’s history as they struggled to maintain operational effectiveness and efficiently carry out their previous central role. The impact upon the Brigade was, in some ways, exemplified by the Brigade’s involvement, or lack thereof, in the Battle of Dunkeld. The infamous victory of the Cameronian Regiment, on 21st August 1689, over a newly emboldened Jacobite army would be the incident which revealed that the Scots-Dutch Brigade’s operational effectiveness was temporarily hampered, as Colonel Ramsay hesitated to reinforce the beleaguered troops in Dunkeld town. Although later critiqued by Mackay in his memoirs, Ramsay’s decision to stay in Perth was related to his lack of confidence in his less experienced officers to instil discipline amongst their men in the face of a much larger enemy force at Dunkeld, a fear that was undoubtedly informed by events at Killiecrankie. Additionally, Ramsay proved unwilling to risk being directly responsible for the loss of

⁹⁷⁶ *Melvilles*, Melville to Mackay, 8th August 1689, p. 242.

⁹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

Perth, where he had been recently installed as garrison commander. The lack of sufficient numbers of officers alongside a general lack of experience in the Brigade, further diminished by Killiecrankie, would create major logistical problems over the coming months as Brigade officers struggled to train new men as commissions to replace officers stalled and money to equip their battalions was scarce.

The Brigade's nadir intersected with larger logistical and structural issues which saw the paralysis of the Scottish Williamite war effort, as the government struggled to pay its army and re-equip surviving regiments that had been at Killiecrankie. These issues would be worsened by an ongoing political crisis in the Scottish parliament which saw the crown in a stand-off with the opposition and led to a complete financial stagnation for the Scottish Williamites army, which although well-known is worth briefly revisiting to provide context. Mackay's loss of influence and the increasingly fractious nature of his relationship with the Scottish privy council, Melville, and, towards the end of the year, his own doubts about King William's confidence in him would lead to communication issues and a disruption of the Williamite strategy in Scotland. This would, ultimately, prolong the conflict and allow the Jacobites to regroup after their loss at Dunkeld, albeit they would refrain from campaigning until the following spring. Disagreements over strategy between Mackay, Melville and the privy council prevailed as William and his advisers in London remained incensed at the Scottish parliament's intransigence and distracted by the course of the Nine Years' War in Ireland, Flanders, and the war at sea. Although this 'eclipse' would prove temporary, with William re-asserting his confidence in the Major-General by the close of the year, it would nearly see Mackay quit his post and the prolonging of the Highland War. Firstly, however, we will outline the strategic position of Mackay and the Scottish Williamites in August 1689 as well as the threat the Jacobites continued to pose.

Mackay's strategy after Killiecrankie was not greatly altered from the one he had practised beforehand. He continued to briefly enjoy the confidence of the Williamite government in Scotland, in part due to the panic that had occurred in his absence. Equally, concern surrounding the state of the Scots-Dutch regiments, namely the prevalence of 'new' men, seemed to dissipate as Mackay re-asserted his authority over military affairs. In spite of the loss at Killiecrankie, Mackay was determined to reverse both his and the Williamites fortunes.⁹⁷⁸ In the early weeks of August, he ordered another offensive against the Jacobites in the hope of pursuing them and engaging them on more favourable terms. Although this insistence proved successful in persuading the reluctant privy council away from a defensive strategy, there was muted criticism of the Major-General's leadership at Killiecrankie and questions surrounding his competence to continue as Scottish commander-in-chief. Corresponding with Melville, Dalrymple reported that some said 'McKay was in confusion... and no rational man would have done so ridiculous [sic] a thing as to march fourteen miles and to fight that same day'.⁹⁷⁹ These critics were briefly silenced by Mackay's re-capture of Perth from the Jacobites on 4th August, albeit only small groups of Highlanders remained in the town.⁹⁸⁰ Hopkins argues Mackay also lost confidence in the Scots-Dutch Brigade after Killiecrankie and began to overly rely upon cavalry within his field army.⁹⁸¹ In spite of the cavalry's supposed predominance, with 600 horsemen added to the reconstituted field army, Mackay continued to rely upon Scots-Dutch soldiers to make up the bulk of his infantry, with two of the 'new' battalions, who had not been present at Killiecrankie, marching with him to Perth.⁹⁸² This indicates Mackay had not completely lost faith in the Scots-Dutch regiments.

⁹⁷⁸ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 160-161. Hill, *Celtic*, p. 73. Oates, *Killiecrankie*, pp. 117-122. Harris, *Revolution*, p. 411. Parker, *Revolution*, pp. 34-35.

⁹⁷⁹ *Melvilles*, Dalrymple to Melville, 30th July 1689, p. 215.

⁹⁸⁰ *Melvilles*, Hamilton to Melville, 2nd August 1689, p. 229.

⁹⁸¹ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 181.

⁹⁸² *Melvilles*, Hamilton to Melville, 2nd August 1689, p. 229.

Scottish privy councillors began to harangue Mackay about the day-to-day operations of the army and his lack of progress. They exchanged letters with one another regarding their lack of confidence in the Scottish Williamite regiments.⁹⁸³ A letter from Dalrymple to Melville, dated 7th August, boldly declared that the Scottish 'army is worth nothing'.⁹⁸⁴ In a missive sent to Mackay, dated 9th August, the council outlined its 'opinion that the forces should not be so much devydit [sic], but that they should be kept together [sic] in two bodies'.⁹⁸⁵ Clearly, the Scottish Williamites were fearful of a similar reversal as they had recently suffered at Killiecrankie. Mackay, however, did share their anxieties and continued his pursuit of the Jacobite army. As indicated earlier, Mackay felt that if the forces were simply concentrated around the central lowlands, as the privy council proposed, they would effectively cede large swathes of the country to the Jacobites. Mackay argued, in his memoirs, that the abandonment of the north of Scotland could have encouraged clans loyal to William to come under pressure, as the Jacobite army would force 'great numbers to joyn' their ranks, or face severe reprisals.⁹⁸⁶

It must be understood that the Williamite regime in Scotland, albeit buoyed in confidence due to Viscount Dundee's death, did not view the Jacobite threat as having passed. Mackay himself did not view the Jacobite army as an inert force, as illustrated by his continuation of the offensive against them in the face of opposition from the council. Lenman has dismissed the Jacobites as a spent force after Killiecrankie but both Pincus and Szechi have sought to counter his assertion by arguing that the conflict simply entered a new stage after Killiecrankie.⁹⁸⁷ Within a few weeks of the battle, the Jacobite army saw its ranks bolstered from 1,300 men in the field to as many as 4,000.⁹⁸⁸ The

⁹⁸³ *Melvilles*, Dalrymple to Melville, 7th August 1689, p. 239.

⁹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸⁵ *RPCS*, XIV, Missive to Major General McKay, 9th August 1689, p. 27.

⁹⁸⁶ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 62.

⁹⁸⁷ Lenman, *Rising*, pp. 31-32. Pincus, *1688*, pp. 267-268. Szechi, *Jacobites*, pp. 66-67.

⁹⁸⁸ HES, BTL 32, Inventory of Historic Battlefields – Battle of Dunkeld, 21st August 1689.

Jacobites in Scotland had not been cowed by the loss of Viscount Dundee, if anything it appears to have galvanised their support. Under the leadership of Brigadier Alexander Cannon, Dundee's replacement, the renewed Jacobite army marched for the north-east Lowlands in the hope of garnering further support there.⁹⁸⁹ Cannon's appointment was significant as he had previously served as a colonel of the Scots-Dutch Brigade; having obeyed King James' 1688 recall prior to the Revolution.⁹⁹⁰ Mackay had served alongside Cannon during that time and was familiar with his credentials as a fellow professional soldier from Dutch service. However, uncharacteristically Mackay stated that Cannon was 'of no reputation or esteeme' and that his former Scots-Dutch comrade and his second-in-command, Lord Dunfermline, reportedly 'doe nothing but drink acquavity'.⁹⁹¹ Mackay's comments were clearly an exaggeration to reassure his political counterparts of his own ability to best his Jacobite counterpart in the field. The privy council, meanwhile, continued to acquiesce to Mackay's authority in military matters, conceding their suggestions were, of course, 'all to be furd[e]r considered and determined by yourself'.⁹⁹² This would allow Mackay to continue pursuing his strategy freely for the next month; pursuing the Jacobite army with a highly mobile detachment of cavalry and a small cohort of infantry.⁹⁹³ More importantly, King William II expressed his confidence directly to Mackay, conveyed via a letter from Melville, noting his Majesty's 'thanks for your care and zeal... your prudence and good conduct, knowing that you will do what you judge best for his service'.⁹⁹⁴ Additionally, this expression of confidence from the monarch was mirrored in the attitude of the privy council.⁹⁹⁵ Such was the Williamite court's trust in

⁹⁸⁹ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 485-486.

⁹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 10th September 1689, pp. 277-278.

⁹⁹² *RPCS*, XIV, Missive to Major General McKay, 9th August 1689, p. 27.

⁹⁹³ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 67.

⁹⁹⁴ *Melvilles*, Melville to Mackay, 8th August 1689, p. 243.

⁹⁹⁵ *RPCS*, XIV, Missive to Major General McKay, 9th August 1689, p. 27.

Mackay, that Melville informed him that although reinforcements from England would be greatly reduced, to send word 'timously' if he felt 'mo[re] forces necessary'.⁹⁹⁶ This demonstrates the degree of trust William invested in Mackay as commander in Scotland entrusting the Scots-Dutch officer's expertise on the military situation there. However, this confidence was not to last as severe financial difficulties began to disrupt the Scottish Williamite army's operations. These difficulties arose due to a political crisis in the Scottish parliament, which we shall turn to now.

When the Brigade initially arrived in Scotland, the Convention of Estates were inclined, overall, to welcome William of Orange's military intervention.⁹⁹⁷ When William and Mary accepted the offer of the Scottish crown, on 11th May 1689, the Scottish Convention subsequently transitioned to a parliament, on 5th June 1689.⁹⁹⁸ Relations between the Scottish estates and their new monarchs soon began to sour over the issue of constitutional reforms.⁹⁹⁹ This break between the parliament and William's Scottish government, and, indeed, William himself, caused serious logistical issues for their army at a critical moment. Unfortunately for the Williamites, the opposition utilised the government's desperation for an act of supply, which provided funding for the army, as a form of legislative leverage to pressure the monarchy into conceding constitutional reforms; these would, in turn, greatly increase the power of parliament to table legislation, such as an act of supply.¹⁰⁰⁰ To better understand how this affected the Brigade, Mackay and the Scottish Williamite army we must understand the political roots of the financial crisis and the chief actors in the opposition that organised it. The push for constitutional reform, and the withholding of supply, emanated from a political party known as the

⁹⁹⁶ *Melvilles*, Melville to Mackay, 8th August 1689, p. 243.

⁹⁹⁷ Raffe, *Scotland*, pp. 133-134

⁹⁹⁸ Harris, *Revolution*, pp. 406-407. *RPS*, 1689/6/1, Procedure: opening of parliament, 5th June 1689.

⁹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰⁰ Raffe, *Scotland*, pp. 144-145.

Club. Many historians, such as Harris, Raffe and Riley, have written more extensively about the politics of the Club.¹⁰⁰¹ The Club had only supported William and Mary's claim to the Scottish throne on the condition that they subscribed and implemented the reforms attached, detailed in the Articles of Grievances.¹⁰⁰² These demands included a reduction of the royal prerogative, which had characterised Charles II and James VII's parliamentary management.¹⁰⁰³ The Lords of the Articles were viewed as the Scottish crown's principle organisational power in parliament and they were thought to, at least by the opposition in 1689, effectively set the agenda by laying out a framework of legislation which the meeting could debate and vote upon.¹⁰⁰⁴ The removal of the Lords of the Articles was one of the Club's key objectives, but for the Williamite government and crown the loss of control of the legislative agenda, particularly during a pan-European war and civil war, was considered undesirable.¹⁰⁰⁵ On 6th August 1689, the Scottish Williamite government, under pressure from William, declared war on France, four months after England had done so, on 17th May 1689.¹⁰⁰⁶ However, prior to this, the Williamite government in Scotland had already been engaged in maritime actions against the Jacobites, as well as commissioning Scottish vessels to patrol the seas from the Isle of Skye to Cornwall.¹⁰⁰⁷ The Scottish Convention parliament balked at the cost of both combatting the Jacobites, on land and at sea, and the prosecution of a costly war with France, an important market for Scottish maritime trade; this only bolstered the ranks of the opposition to the Williamite government.¹⁰⁰⁸

¹⁰⁰¹ Harris, *Revolution*, pp. 406-408. Raffe, *Scotland*, pp. 131-156. Riley, *Scots*, pp. 22-46.

¹⁰⁰² Harris, *Revolution*, pp. 406-408.

¹⁰⁰³ Amy Blakeway and Laura Stewart, 'Writing Scottish Parliamentary History, c.1500-1707' in *Parliamentary History* (2021), p. 109.

¹⁰⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Harris, *Revolution*, pp. 406-408.

¹⁰⁰⁶ *RPCS*, XIV, pp. 17-18.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Murdoch, *Terror*, p. 284.

¹⁰⁰⁸ *Ibid.* See also: Siobhan Talbott, *Conflict, Commerce and Franco-Scottish Relations, 1560-1713* (Leiden, 2014).

William and Mary had accepted the Claim of Right in principle when they accepted the Scottish throne, but William, and his ministers, had serious reservations about the concession of major legislative powers to the parliament. It became clear, by June-July of 1689, that William's government did not intend on implementing these constitutional powers to the parliament and as a result the session became unruly. Complicating matters was the Club's alliance with the Episcopalian party. Macinnes and Hopkins characterised the Episcopalian Party as consisting of crypto-Jacobites as well as more moderate former supporters of King James.¹⁰⁰⁹ This group joined the chorus of opposition in the Scottish parliamentary sessions as a means to avenge their loss of government positions during the Revolution but also, particularly the former, to disrupt the Williamite government's military organisation via political means.¹⁰¹⁰ The leader of the Club was Sir James Montgomerie of Skelmorlie, an exile who had returned to Britain with William in 1688.¹⁰¹¹ Montgomerie was appealed to by William's advisers, chiefly Portland and fellow former exile William Carstares, with the offer of concessions if the Club would pass an act of supply, but they stopped short of meeting his demands wholesale.¹⁰¹² Montgomery and the Club rejected these piecemeal concessions and reiterated their demands, worsening the legislative impasse. The Scottish Williamite government eventually had to adjourn the parliamentary session on 2nd August 1689, without an act of supply.¹⁰¹³ A course of events which would leave the Scottish Williamite army without funds from August 1689 to May 1690.

Despite the financial problems looming on the horizon, the military campaign reverted to its pre-Killiecrankie state, with Dalrymple summarising that both armies were

¹⁰⁰⁹ Macinnes, *Union*, pp. 87, 90. Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 207-208.

¹⁰¹⁰ Hopkins, *Ibid.*, p. 201.

¹⁰¹¹ *ODNB*, Paul Hopkins, 'Montgomery, Sir James, of Skelmorlie, fourth baronet (c. 1654–1694), politician and Jacobite conspirator'.

¹⁰¹² Harris, *Revolution*, pp. 411-412.

¹⁰¹³ *RPS*, 1689/6/46, Act of adjournment, 2nd August 1689.

'daily in sight of each other, and exchanging bravadoes to fight'.¹⁰¹⁴ A series of marches and counter-marches occurred, again, which continued until the Battle of Dunkeld on 21st August 1689. In the days surrounding the infamous battle, plentifully covered elsewhere, two battalions of the Earl of Angus' foot, better known as the Cameronians, were left isolated to face the entire Jacobite army.¹⁰¹⁵ In a remarkable feat of arms the beleaguered Presbyterian soldiers managed to make the Jacobite assault so costly that the Jacobites had no other choice than to retreat. The Cameronian victory at Dunkeld dealt a significant blow to Jacobite morale at an opportune moment.¹⁰¹⁶ However, less well known is the fact that Colonel Ramsay was viewed as being remiss in his duties as the most senior commander and nearest to Dunkeld, as he was stationed in Perth.¹⁰¹⁷ Moreover, Ramsay had under his command the three battalions of the Scots-Dutch Brigade which had not been present at Killiecrankie.¹⁰¹⁸ Rather than intervene to assist the Cameronians, or order their withdrawal, Ramsay chose to delay intervening in the day prior to the battle, in spite of having plenty fresh troops of the Scots-Dutch battalions under his command and explicit orders from Mackay to do so.¹⁰¹⁹ Through briefly examining the days surrounding the battle as a case study we can illustrate two things. First, that Ramsay's hesitancy was caused by his awareness of the Scots-Dutch Brigade's diminished operational capacity due to their losses at Killiecrankie, a problem which would persist for months. Secondly, that Mackay's command was beginning to be undermined by the privy council, among others, and this would continue in the coming months.

The circumstances which led to the isolation of the Cameronian regiment at Dunkeld, and, thus, the extraordinary battle itself, arose out of a strategic disagreement

¹⁰¹⁴ Balcarres, *Memoirs*, p. 49.

¹⁰¹⁵ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 183-190. Oates, *Killiecrankie*, pp. 132-168.

¹⁰¹⁶ Szechi, *Jacobites*, p. 66.

¹⁰¹⁷ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 70.

¹⁰¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

¹⁰¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

between Mackay and the privy council as well as a lack of co-ordination of officers in the area. Despite appearing to acquiesce to Mackay's assertion of the need to remain on the offensive, the council were extremely anxious about the possibility of the Jacobite army descending upon the central lowlands via Atholl and Perth, which, as mentioned earlier, had already been raided twice that year.¹⁰²⁰ Responding to the council's calls to garrison more forces in Atholl, Mackay wrote to Melville, on 17th August, stating, 'I doe things as I judge them most advantagious [sic] for the service, and not to satisfy every critique fancy'.¹⁰²¹ With a sizeable garrison at Perth and an even larger presence at Stirling, Mackay felt the Lowlands were already sufficiently protected.¹⁰²² The council was unimpressed by Mackay's brusque rebuttal of their suggestion and ordered the Cameronian regiment to garrison Dunkeld.¹⁰²³ This order undermined Mackay's authority, as commander-in-chief, over military affairs.¹⁰²⁴ Additionally, Mackay voiced concerns about the use of the Cameronians as their religious intolerance made them 'generally hated and feared in the northern countries' where, he judged, the majority of the population were Episcopalian.¹⁰²⁵ At the same time, the Jacobite army was pressed southward into Atholl, again, as Mackay attempted to block them from entering the North-Eastern shires.¹⁰²⁶ Mackay's fears about the local populace's antipathy towards the Cameronians proved correct as Brigadier Cannon was passed information by locals, notifying him of the Cameronian regiment's occupation of Dunkeld.¹⁰²⁷ Moreover, Mackay could not relay orders for the Cameronians to withdraw from the town, as the

¹⁰²⁰ RPS, A1690/4/19. Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 139.

¹⁰²¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 17th August 1689, p. 268.

¹⁰²² *Ibid.*

¹⁰²³ RPCS, XIV, Order to Lord Angus's regiment, 12th August 1689, p. 34.

¹⁰²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰²⁵ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 69.

¹⁰²⁶ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 198-199.

¹⁰²⁷ Gabriel Neil (ed.), 'Journal of a soldier in the Earl of Eglington's troop of horse, Anno 1689.' in *Transactions of the Glasgow Archaeological Society*, Vol I (Glasgow, 1868), p. 44.

Jacobite army blocked his messengers routes south.¹⁰²⁸ The responsibility for the Cameronian regiment fell to either the privy council or, more locally, to Colonel Ramsay. When the Jacobite army reached the outskirts of Dunkeld, on 19th August, Lieutenant-Colonel William Clelland, commander of the regiment there, opted to contact Ramsay first, ordering a rider to carry a request to him at Perth.¹⁰²⁹ Clelland's message was clear, he asked that his men be allowed to withdraw or that Ramsay bring up reinforcements.¹⁰³⁰ There were issues surrounding communication between Williamite officers in the area as Ramsay and the Cameronians, twelve miles distant at Dunkeld, struggled to co-ordinate a swift response to the Jacobite army's rapid advance on the town. Additionally, Ramsay's distance from Edinburgh, forty-five miles away, would mean he could not request permission for the privy council to order a withdrawal. Mackay argued that it was Ramsay's responsibility, not the council's, to make a decision regarding Dunkeld that day. He later utilised Dunkeld, in his memoir, as an example that, 'all officers who are not tied by express orders from their superiors... are answerable for the neglects of the service... when they by their rank fall to command in chief a body of forces'.¹⁰³¹ Mackay felt that his subordinate did not exercise sufficient initiative to prevent Dunkeld. Ramsay's hesitancy was, however, was due to a variety of factors, including the ill-prepared status of the Scots-Dutch regiments under his command.

Clelland's dispatch rider reached Perth on the same day and Ramsay responded by sending a small detachment of cavalry, under command of Lord Cardross, He to reconnoitre the enemy presence in the area.¹⁰³² Cardross' after-action report provides vital testimony on the events leading up to the Battle of Dunkeld and Ramsay's hesitancy to

¹⁰²⁸ Mackay, *Memoirs*, pp. 69-70.

¹⁰²⁹ NRS, GD26/9/229, Letter from Lord Cardross giving news of a march with his troops to Dunkeld and of sighting part of Jacobite forces there, 25th August-3rd September 1689.

¹⁰³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰³¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 71.

¹⁰³² NRS, GD26/9/229.

intervene there prior to the Jacobite attack.¹⁰³³ When he arrived in the town that evening, Cardross recalled that the Cameronian sentries reported that 400 Jacobite clansmen had been sighted, 'about a quarter of a mile from the [Dunkeld] house, besydes severall other lesser companies that appired [sic] on several hills on all hands, the night before'.¹⁰³⁴ Cardross decided to remain in Dunkeld that night and testified that the Jacobites were encamped so close that 'they wer heard [to] call us [traitors] and rebels'.¹⁰³⁵ In response, he ordered his troopers out onto a patrol to gather intelligence and they returned with two or three captured Highlanders.¹⁰³⁶ Interrogating the prisoners it became clear to the Williamites that the entire Jacobite army surrounded them and intended to attack the following day.¹⁰³⁷ That morning, on 20th August, a rider from Perth arrived carrying orders from Colonel Ramsay; Cardross and his troopers were to withdraw to the safety of the garrison, but there was no mention of the Cameronians.¹⁰³⁸ Cardross prepared his men to leave, 'but before we wer[e] drawn up the rebels having appired both hors and foot, this made me stay notwithstanding of Ramseys orders'.¹⁰³⁹ Cardross' troop of horse engaged in a small skirmish with Jacobite forces around Dunkeld House, successfully repelling the Jacobites with sustained musket fire. However, it now became clear that the Jacobites intended to attack.¹⁰⁴⁰ In light of the skirmish, and the clear presence of many Jacobite soldiers, Cardross sent a rider to Ramsay at Perth to acquaint him with the situation on the ground and the risk of leaving Dunkeld exposed.¹⁰⁴¹ Despite Cardross' advice that an assault on the town was imminent, he stated that Ramsay sent 'ane order

¹⁰³³ Ibid.

¹⁰³⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰³⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰³⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰³⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰³⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰³⁹ *NRS*, GD26/9/251, Part Letter Lord Cardross describing a skirmish with Jacobites. Dunkeld; [this is the middle of GD26/9/229], August 1689.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴¹ Ibid.

for me to returne to Perth though he knew not if we met in a condition to obey it'.¹⁰⁴² Shortly after Cardross departed, the Jacobite army launched its attack and after three hours of street-to-street fighting the Cameronians emerged victorious against all odds.¹⁰⁴³ This broke the momentum of the Jacobite army after Killiecrankie, but it did not break the Jacobite cause. Due to the exhortations of Cardross, Ramsay marched out of Perth that evening with the Scots-Dutch battalions only to arrive at the devastated town the day after the Jacobite army had withdrawn.¹⁰⁴⁴

Although Dunkeld was an astounding victory for the Williamites, it came at a great cost to the Cameronian regiment. More importantly, for the Williamites, the battle had demonstrated an embarrassing lack of co-ordination amongst their forces. Sadly, we do not have any testimony from Ramsay on the events surrounding Dunkeld. However, the context of Cardross' testimony, and Mackay's letters regarding the battle, exposed the impact of Killiecrankie upon the Brigade and the reasons behind Ramsay's lack of action. Chief among the latter was confusion surrounding the chain of command in the wake of the council subverting Mackay's authority, as well as questions surrounding Lanier's new status as commander of forces in the south, a post previously held by Mackay's deceased second-in-command, Brigadier Balfour.¹⁰⁴⁵ Retrospectively, Mackay asserted, in his memoir, that Ramsay's failure came from 'too much respect for the council's order, which he ought to have considered conditionally'.¹⁰⁴⁶ According to him, Ramsay complained at the time that Lanier delayed in taking action, but Mackay felt that this was understandable as Lanier was relatively unfamiliar with Scotland.¹⁰⁴⁷

¹⁰⁴² Ibid.

¹⁰⁴³ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 189.

¹⁰⁴⁴ NRS, GD26/9/251.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Dalton, *English*, III, 1689-1694, pp. 10- 11. NLS, MS3740, Lanier to Blaithewait, Edinburgh, 3rd August 1689, f. 96.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 71.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Ibid.

Although he blamed Ramsay, in part, Mackay argued that the largest portion of the blame lay squarely with the privy council for 'giving special order for the posting of forces, which they ought to have left to the judgement of officers'.¹⁰⁴⁸ For Mackay, the victory at Dunkeld was not to be celebrated as it only exposed further failings and flaws in the Scottish Williamites military strategy. He would later assert that had Ramsay and Lanier 'unitedly march to Dunkeld' they perhaps could have decisively defeated the Jacobite army there and ended the war in its first year.¹⁰⁴⁹ However, Ramsay may have declined to use his forces to confront the Jacobites at Dunkeld because he judged that Perth was a more important, and more vulnerable, post to defend.¹⁰⁵⁰ Additionally, Ramsay may have considered that the Scots-Dutch battalions under his command, which made up the bulk of his infantry, were not in a state to fight an isolated battle against the entirety of the Jacobite army.¹⁰⁵¹ Dunkeld exposed the weaknesses of the Scots-Dutch Brigade during this period: this underpinned Ramsay's lack of confidence in his men and his abandonment of the Cameronians to their bloody fate.

The loss of personnel at Killiecrankie had a variety of impacts upon the structure of the Scots-Dutch Brigade during the latter months of 1689. Ferguson has touched upon this impact when he pointed out 'the personnel of the Brigade must have changed much... so many having fallen at Killiecrankie'.¹⁰⁵² However, Ferguson does not fully draw out the implications of these losses.¹⁰⁵³ Equally, Ferguson seems to underestimate the length of the impact the battle had had upon the Scots-Dutch regiments. Ramsay knew that the battalions that had not been present at Killiecrankie were mostly made up of new

¹⁰⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

¹⁰⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71.

¹⁰⁵¹ *Melvilles*, Hamilton to Melville, 2nd August 1689, p. 229.

¹⁰⁵² Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 481.

¹⁰⁵³ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 481.

recruits.¹⁰⁵⁴ Having been present at that battle, Ramsay had first-hand experience of his Scottish recruits abandoning him and other veteran officers, which caused the deaths of many of his comrades, some of whom he had served alongside for well over a decade.¹⁰⁵⁵ The Scots-Dutch Brigade was already a diminished formation when it arrived in Scotland in March 1689, as we saw in Chapter One, when they first arrived, they had 1,100 men which only represented one-third of their usual strength.¹⁰⁵⁶ By Killiecrankie, 27th July 1689, the Brigade had managed to recruit back to its full strength, with just over 3,000 men.¹⁰⁵⁷ At first glance this recruitment would appear to have resolved the issue that the Scots-Dutch regiments were understrength when they arrived as they had filled their ranks with new recruits.¹⁰⁵⁸ However, these inexperienced new soldiers far outnumbered the experienced officers as well as veteran non-commissioned officers and soldiers within the ranks.¹⁰⁵⁹ Many of the experienced soldiers amidst the rank-and-file appear to have been killed or wounded at Killiecrankie.¹⁰⁶⁰ When Mackay was presumed dead, Hamilton wrote to Melville, in a letter dated 29th July, regarding his concern about the Scots-Dutch Brigade, stating 'there is thrie of the battalions of those that came down with Mackay here [Edinburgh] and at Stirling, but most of them new men'.¹⁰⁶¹ Such concerns appear to have been all but forgotten when Mackay returned and seem to have evaporated after the council learned of Viscount Dundee's death.

These anxieties about the Brigade's composition had been largely forgotten by Williamite ministers prior to Dunkeld but appear to have become more prevalent again in the wake of the battle. Mackay stated, in a letter dated 30th August, to Melville that 'our

¹⁰⁵⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Hamilton to Melville, 29th July 1689, p. 252.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Mackay, *Memoirs*, 'Short Relation', 17th August 1689, p. 265.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 5.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Hamilton to Melville, 29th July 1689, p. 252.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 30th August 1689, p. 272.

¹⁰⁶⁰ See Appendix 5: Known Scots-Dutch Soldiers present at Killiecrankie.

¹⁰⁶¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Hamilton to Melville, 29th July 1689, p. 252.

new recruits have be[e]n in good order before they were shater'd [sic] at the late bad reconte [sic]'.¹⁰⁶² It is telling that the earlier mentioned petitions of widows of the Scots-Dutch soldiers and officers present at Killiecrankie reveal many of the veterans killed had wives, who in turn cited their spouses length of service to strengthen their case for financial assistance.¹⁰⁶³ For example, Captain Joost van Best, of Ramsay's Regiment, wrote a certificate, in Dutch, supporting Williamina Lawson's plea for monetary aid to return to the Dutch Republic. He stated that her husband, 'George Lawson Sergeant of Colonel Ramsay's regement has served five years' adding that he had always been a 'first rate' soldier.¹⁰⁶⁴ The men killed at Killiecrankie were, usually, more experienced than the new recruits they fought alongside, who now dominated the Brigade's ranks. Equally, the need to staff all the battalions in Scotland with some officers of experience would mean the veteran officers left in the Brigade were thinly spread, even within the unit. Mackay protested as much to Melville, on 30th August, that 'the small number [of officers] allowed us in the three regiments upon such strong companies, hath no question contributed to their disorder, in the late occasion'.¹⁰⁶⁵ Mackay would later reiterate this in his memoirs, reflecting 'The reason of the firmity of Levins [sic] regiment, was... that he had many more officers proportionable to the number of men than the three Dutch regiments'.¹⁰⁶⁶ However, even the Scottish regiments, who had been present at Killiecrankie, had been impacted by the losses and the scarcity of experienced professionals. Mackay felt that many of the Scottish Williamite officers and soldiers were 'ill men... unfit for service' and

¹⁰⁶² Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 30th August 1689, p. 272.

¹⁰⁶³ For example see: *SSNE*, Graeme Millen, 'Lawson, Williamina [SSNE 8290]'.

¹⁰⁶⁴ *NRS*, E28/470/14, Commissioners of Treasury: Charity - Certificate of Captain J.V. Best, undated [September-October 1689]. *RPCS*, 14, Grant to the daughter and widows of persons killed at Killiecrankie, 8th October 1689, p. 391. Note: Many thanks to fellow PhD candidate Gillian MacDonald for lending me her transcriptions of E28/470 during the COVID-19 Pandemic, this allowed me to cross-reference my own research with the material she had discovered pertaining to Scots-Dutch Brigade widows.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 30th August 1689, p. 272.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 59.

that their regiments had 'great want of experienced officers'.¹⁰⁶⁷ The problems of the Brigade only compounded the general lack of experience within the Williamite forces and the malaise they experienced in the wake of Killiecrankie.

It remains clear, that the proportion of experienced officers per company both in the Brigade and the Williamite regiments was outweighed by inexperience. Although the exact numbers remain elusive, correspondence reveals that this was, in the Brigade at least, worsened by their significant losses at the Battle of Killiecrankie. Issues surrounding communication only worsened the logistical issues the Brigade were facing on the ground, as we have already seen with regards to Dunkeld. Communication between Edinburgh and the officers on the ground had proved challenging, but communications between the Scottish capital and London were severely limited by the long-distance and logistical constraints of the period. The Brigade, as Dutch regiments, had to await new commissions from their Captain-General, King William. Officers required these commissions to take the place of their comrades that had been slain, wounded, or captured at Killiecrankie. Without these commissions the Brigade experienced an organisational paralysis. In a letter, dated 30th August, Mackay complained to Melville regarding the lack of new commissions and suggested this was hampering the Brigade's ability to operate.¹⁰⁶⁸ He went so far as to argue for an increase in his own remit to issue these commissions directly, stating that, 'in tyme of war; and at this distance it ought to be much left to the Commander-in-Chief to place officers'.¹⁰⁶⁹ Officers like Brigadier Balfour and Lieutenant-Colonel James Mackay, for instance, had just over sixty years of experience between them (for more see Appendix 4 & 5).¹⁰⁷⁰ The distance between the

¹⁰⁶⁷ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 10th September 1689, p. 278.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 30th August 1689, p. 272.

¹⁰⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷⁰ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 480, 482, 484, 504, 511.

Scots-Dutch regiments and William, complicated matters. For instance, after Balfour's death at Killiecrankie, Mackay recommended Lieutenant George Arnot be promoted to captain not only because he had 'behaved himself very honestly, and is a carefull officer' but because he 'had his Colonel's promis[e] to be recommended to the first vacant companie'.¹⁰⁷¹ Arnot was eventually awarded this commission, although it remains unclear when it arrived, but more general problems continued. Balfour's regiment had to operate without a commander from August until October.¹⁰⁷² These disruptions only worsened the impact of Killiecrankie upon the Brigade. In addition to these delays, the Brigade would experience a heavy logistical cost related to the battle.

Killiecrankie was a logistical, as well as human, disaster for the Williamite forces in Scotland. The Jacobite army had captured a considerable train of baggage horses packed with supplies, arms, and ammunition as well as three leather cannons the Williamites had brought with them.¹⁰⁷³ This seizure of critical supplies, which the Jacobites were desperately short of, were augmented by the money and provisions captured during their second raid on Perth.¹⁰⁷⁴ The majority of the weapons, equipment, and even clothing the Williamite soldiers had was discarded, usually as they fled, only to be appropriated by Jacobite clansmen, or lost completely.¹⁰⁷⁵ During the Battle of Killiecrankie, Lieutenant-Colonel John Buchan, of Mackay's regiment, had been left behind with the Scots-Dutch battalions in Edinburgh. Due to Buchan's temporary command of the garrison in Edinburgh Castle, he was placed in charge of refitting the battalions that were present at the engagement.¹⁰⁷⁶ As Mackay rapidly returned to command an army in the field, he ordered Buchan to write to London to report the state

¹⁰⁷¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 30th August 1689, p. 272.

¹⁰⁷² Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Hamilton, 11th October 1689, pp. 283-284.

¹⁰⁷³ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Lord Cardross to Melville, 30th July 1689, p. 253.

¹⁰⁷⁴ *RPS*, A1690/4/19. Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 139.

¹⁰⁷⁵ EUL, Laing MSS II.89, ff. 338-339.

¹⁰⁷⁶ *RPCS*, XIII, Act ratifying the capitulation of the Castle of Edinburgh, pp. 431-432.

of these surviving battalions.¹⁰⁷⁷ Buchan was to request funds, alongside new commissions, to facilitate a new wave of recruitment in order to revitalise these battered units. However, the lack of communication becomes apparent in a letter Buchan sent to court, dated 5th September 1689. Buchan wrote, 'judgeing it absolutely for the interest of ther[e] Majesties service, I have tuice wreaten [sic] to the Earle of Portland, representing the condition of the companies soe brok[e] in that unhappy action'.¹⁰⁷⁸ He went on:

That they [the battalions] have lost, even of these soldiers that are gott of, all their armes and cloathes, and that it is ane impossibility for the captains to arme, cloath, and make up ther[e] companies again without some help of money from the King to doe it with, the capta[i]ns being all soldiers of fortune, and haveing noething but ther[e] dayly pay; as alsoe, every captain ther[e], besides his particular loss of his own litle stock of cloathes and equipage, did acutaly loss a monthes pay for his whole companie, which was taken along in money.¹⁰⁷⁹

Even with new recruits to replace those killed or captured at the battle, the Scots-Dutch Brigade did not have the means to equip them. Their post in Scotland separated them, by a great distance, from the Dutch army and, as a result, their financial support system. As the Brigade was not paid by the Scottish Treasury, the captains struggled to replenish, resupply and maintain their companies during this time. Moreover, the lack of a new act of supply left the Scottish Williamites unable to offer even temporary financial support to the unit, particularly to replace equipment lost at Killiecrankie.

During these months, the three Scots-Dutch regiments lacked 'Cloaths' and 'Hatts' as well as other pieces of important equipment. This was only resolved in March 1690,

¹⁰⁷⁷ *Melvilles*, Lieutenant-Colonel Buchan to (Mr. Nairne?), 5th September 1689, p. 271.

¹⁰⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

when these items were imported.¹⁰⁸⁰ Mackay explained to Melville that ‘the raison of the want of money is, that the troupes were so suddenly called out, and such as are pay’d out of England had no tyme’ to collect their pay in Edinburgh.¹⁰⁸¹ More importantly, Mackay had the somewhat unreasonable expectation for his officers to ensure, regardless of cost, the speedy recovery of their companies without the resources to do so. In response to this expectation, Buchan pointed out, ‘I doe not see how it is possible the companies can be made up in all haste, as the Major-Generall hath ordered; and consequently the regements [sic] in a condition to serve his Majesty’.¹⁰⁸² Mackay seems to have realised the severity of the difficulties these regiments were facing as he wrote, in a letter to Melville, dated 12th October 1689, ‘I doe not know what will becom [sic] of our regements except their [be] som[e] mon[e]y sent down... for wee can draw none here’.¹⁰⁸³ Many of the Scots-Dutch officers had to draw credit personally in order to maintain their companies.¹⁰⁸⁴ Facing these circumstances many of the captains found it almost impossible to return their formations to their pre-Killiecrankie state. Mackay requested Melville ensure precepts were sent to pay wages until ‘the end of Novembre’ adding that the Dutch secretary ‘Vander Esch knows how much of it wee want as yet’ and ‘If this occasion be let Passe, wee may be reduced to great necessity’.¹⁰⁸⁵ Yet, this desiccated version of the Brigade had to limp forward as it remained at the heart of the Williamite army in Scotland. The strain upon the Brigade was only worsened by the lack of confidence and trust the Scottish

¹⁰⁸⁰ *NRS*, PC12/15/49, Privy Council Papers 3rd Series, Supplies for the use of Mackay & Brigade, 1st March 1690.

¹⁰⁸¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 17th August 1689, p. 268.

¹⁰⁸² *Melvilles*, Lieutenant-Colonel Buchan to (Mr. Nairne?), 5th September 1689, p. 271.

¹⁰⁸³ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 12th October 1689, p. 288.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Note: Scots-Dutch officers, like many of the period, engaged creditors to provide them with ready sources of money to pay, clothe, equip, and maintain regiments. These sums would usually be recorded by a secretary or subaltern with the regiment and then later submitted to the government for reimbursement. See: *RPCS*, Vol XIII, Warrant for payment for sheep for the army, 15th June 1689, p. 582. *NRS*, E93/20/2, Commissaries of forces: Accounts of Provisions furnished to Major-general Mackay’s regiment, 1690. See also: David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2012).

¹⁰⁸⁵ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 12th October 1689, p. 289.

Williamite ministers vested in their army. Against this backdrop, Mackay's authority as commander-in-chief was increasingly challenged by those ministers as well as by Melville, in his capacity as secretary of state. These factors would lead to a paralysis amongst the Williamites, with regard to their military strategy, as the severe logistical and organizational problems within the Scots-Dutch Brigade were compounded by worsening disagreements and internal political conflicts..

Mackay's Eclipse: Strategic Disagreements and Politics, Winter 1689

At Dunkeld, the Williamite forces failed to inflict a decisive defeat upon the Jacobite army. Despite retaining their central role, the Brigade, as we have seen, had fallen into a state of disorder due to their losses at Killiecrankie and challenges they faced as a result. Seeing that the Williamite army were unlikely to corner the Jacobites into another pitched battle, Mackay returned to a strategy he had mooted in the weeks prior to Killiecrankie. This was his plan to plant a sizeable garrison, with modern fortifications, in the midst of the Jacobite heartlands in the Western Highlands. This section will illustrate that this strategy was viewed as untenable by the privy council and Lord Melville, due in large part to the worsening finances of the Scottish Williamite government after the adjournment of parliament without the passage of a new act of supply. The strategic disagreements which subsequently arose between Mackay, the privy council and Melville as well as William and his advisers have, hitherto, been little discussed. Building upon Rayner's identification of the role of the privy council in the co-ordination of the conflict, this thesis adds to our understanding by appending the commander-in-chief to this framework. This section will demonstrate that the commander-in-chief of the Williamite army in Scotland was similarly important in this organizational network, particularly in the direction of the military strategy on the ground. Furthermore, the relationship between Mackay, as William's preferred appointee, and the government in Edinburgh

became increasingly tense in the aftermath of Killiecrankie. By examining Mackay's place in the Williamite correspondence network, this section will explore the disruption of the war effort against the Jacobites in 1689 and the prolongation of the conflict into the following year.¹⁰⁸⁶ This network had to co-ordinate between the army on the ground, the privy council in Edinburgh, and the court in London, via Melville. This reveals that Mackay's perceived political 'eclipse' outlines the role of the Scottish commander-in-chief within the Scottish Williamite government's structure as well as how the administration conducted the conflict against the Jacobites. Firstly, we must examine the strategy Mackay was proposing to end the Highland War in 1689.

The Jacobite determination to maintain the fight against William's regime after Dunkeld has been underestimated. The Jacobite leaderships refusal of an early offer of indemnity, 23rd August, and 'insolent' response, in a letter to Mackay, indicates that they were unwilling to surrender at this juncture.¹⁰⁸⁷ Mackay's strategy was now to maintain pressure upon the Jacobite army by pursuing them and blocking them from going into the North-Eastern Lowlands, whilst shoring up garrisons surrounding the Highland frontiers, such as Atholl.¹⁰⁸⁸ In a letter dated 30th August, Mackay argued that if they could, 'confine the rebels so within their own hills as that they cannot trouble the government, or that they happen to submit to it' then they would, at the very least, not pose a considerable threat until spring of the following year.¹⁰⁸⁹ This did not, however, signal Mackay's complacency regarding the Highland Jacobite clans' ability to launch disruptive raids across the frontier. He would later recall that soldiers were having to work doubly hard in certain areas, such as Aberdeenshire, to guard against such raids.¹⁰⁹⁰ These raids were not

¹⁰⁸⁶ Rayner, 'Tribulations', p. 199.

¹⁰⁸⁷ *RPCS*, XIV, 1689, 'Missive to Major General McKay', 23rd August 1689, p. 83. *NRS*, GD406/1/346, Melville to Hamilton, London, 8th August 1689.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 181. Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 67.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, 'Mackay to Melville', 30th August 1689, p. 272.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 67.

carried out with the hope of simple profit, they targeted Williamite supporters' lands and seized their resources to continue their armed opposition against the new regime.¹⁰⁹¹ Mackay summarised the extent of the challenging nature of this non-linear warfare in his memoir: 'separate forces [had to be kept] about 250 miles [of territory], to secure the low countries from the ennemy's attempts'.¹⁰⁹² At the same time, the political divisions that had become evident in the Scottish parliament, Mackay felt, were encouraging 'Jacobite morale'.¹⁰⁹³ The lack of a new act of supply raised the possibility that the crown would reduce the Scottish forces significantly. William informed Mackay, via Melville, that he was 'resolved to break some of the regiments paid with Scots money, because the parliament was not like to grant new subsidies'.¹⁰⁹⁴ Yet, William wished to delay this proposed disbandment for as long as possible.¹⁰⁹⁵ This indicates he understood the continued capacity of the Jacobites in Scotland to threaten security there. For his own part, Mackay strongly argued against disbandment, at all costs, 'it is absolutely dangerous to disarm in the countrey... having so great a circuit of countrey to garde, and so many bosom ennemies [sic]'.¹⁰⁹⁶ Moreover, a disbandment of any of the Scottish regiments, whom were still owed pay, raised the spectre of demobilized soldiers of defecting to the Jacobite side. This was an especially pressing concern given that William, Mackay, and the council's shared lack of trust in non-Brigade Scottish troops. Mackay posited 'wee may haply have many of those wee dismiss, nixt [sic] day in arms against us, so that it were better never to have levyed them then disband them during the Rebellion'.¹⁰⁹⁷

¹⁰⁹¹ RPS, A1690/4/19. Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 139.

¹⁰⁹² Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 74.

¹⁰⁹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

¹⁰⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 30th August 1689, p. 274.

¹⁰⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

Mackay's long-term strategy was to establish his major garrison at Inverlochy, using the natural port at the head of Loch Linnhe as a staging post for expeditions into the Western Isles and Highlands.¹⁰⁹⁸ Here, he argued, Royal Navy frigates, then operating out of Glasgow, could be more effectively used against these areas, 'for they could burn and ruine their [the Jacobites] countreys'.¹⁰⁹⁹ This plan received little attention from Melville, Hamilton and the rest of the Scottish privy council. Government impatience with Mackay's methodical military strategy was increasing. Cardross wrote to Melville regarding this, stating, in confidence, 'People that ar[e] honest ar[e] not satisfied [with] our great man'.¹¹⁰⁰ Whilst the Williamite forces in the field struggled to maintain their campaign, taking the submissions of the Atholl gentry and encamping there in severely wet weather conditions, confidence in Mackay's command was waning amongst government ministers in Edinburgh. There was, then, no appetite from, nor the fiscal means for, the Scottish Williamite regime to grant Mackay the resources to carry out his grand before the onset of winter.

Unable to carry out this plan, Mackay's existing military expeditions were severely curtailed due to the Scottish Williamite government's financial woes. In mid-August, he had already indicated, several times, that severe shortages of crucial supplies were limiting the army's ability to campaign.¹¹⁰¹ Cardross informed the court in London, that the Mackay found, 'the army cannot march three days from a town but the forces will run the hasard [sic] of sterving'.¹¹⁰² The Scottish Williamites proved unable to even continue practising their pre-Killiecrankie strategy in the latter months of 1689. Instead, Mackay had to content himself with marching the field army between towns and garrisons, in

¹⁰⁹⁸ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, Strathboggie, 17th August 1689, p. 268.

¹⁰⁹⁹ *Ibid.* Murdoch, *Terror*, pp. 284-290.

¹¹⁰⁰ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Cardross to Melville, 30th July 1689, p. 258.

¹¹⁰¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 17th August 1689, p. 268.

¹¹⁰² Mackay, *Memoirs*, Cardross to Melville, 3rd Sept 1689, p. 275.

order to keep the forces supplied whilst deterring any major Jacobite incursions.¹¹⁰³ Other commanders, such as Argyll, had similar issues when they ventured out into the field with detachments.¹¹⁰⁴ In fact, Argyll's regiment of foot was directly impacted by the Brigade's logistical issues during these months. The Scots-Dutch battalions need to replace the armaments abandoned at Killiecrankie would see new weapons diverted away from Argyll's regiment. When Argyll requested more modern 'fyrelock' muskets, to replace the outmoded matchlocks his men had, the privy council informed him they could not grant his request 'at this tyme, ther[e] haveing come only twalve hundred from London which are disposed of to arme... the standing forces who in the late ingadgment lost their own armes'.¹¹⁰⁵ The lack of supplies and equipment had been an ongoing issue, as Mackay wrote, as early as 17th August 1689, 'I am so unprovided of all things for the subsistence of the troops as to money provision and tents, that if the ennemy knew our inconvenience, the would oppiniatre [sic] the more without doubt'.¹¹⁰⁶ Mackay was resigned to the fact that any new strategy to combat the Jacobites would now have to wait to the following year. Writing to Melville, he complained:

I am now about the garisoning of som[e] place in the nearest highlands, it being impossible without sterving of the forces, to think to place any forces at Innerlochty for this yeare, the saison [sic] being so far advanced, that wee cannot expect much more faire weather, and no possibility to be supply'd with victualls but by sea, which is very uncertain¹¹⁰⁷

In the days and weeks surrounding Killiecrankie, that delays in relaying information considerably slowed the Williamite government's reaction to events, as seen in the

¹¹⁰³ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 67.

¹¹⁰⁴ *RPCS*, XIV, Missive to the Earl of Argyll, 6th August 1689, pp. 16-17.

¹¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰⁶ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 17th August 1689, p. 268.

¹¹⁰⁷ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 30th August 1689, p. 271.

previous section. Similar delays would now lead to a lack of co-ordination between Edinburgh and London, regarding the financial crisis now plaguing the Williamite army' in Scotland. This stagnation in the war effort would culminate in disagreements over strategy, fuelled by a sense of insecurity.

The period of September to December 1689, would prove particularly difficult for the Scottish Williamite army and for Mackay, as its commander. Mackay would later write, in his memoirs, that his correspondence with Melville was becoming increasingly frustrating as the secretary of state did not appear to be fully conveying Mackay's advice or recommendations regarding the military situation in Scotland to William.¹¹⁰⁸ Despite logistical obstacles, Mackay did manage to disarm the gentry of Atholl by garrisoning the field army there in late August and September. At the same time, Mackay's continued manoeuvres against the Jacobite army would mean they found themselves unable to fully take advantage of the political-financial crisis during the final months of the campaigning season.¹¹⁰⁹ By August, those amidst the Jacobite ranks were agitating their leaders to allow them to return to their lands to take in their harvests. Although the Jacobite leadership, particularly Cannon, wished to take full advantage of the situation, the agrarian nature of the clans, that made up the bulk of the army, forced their hand. The clans were allowed to return home, but, nevertheless, signed a bond promising to appear in arms again, with at least 1,100 men.¹¹¹⁰ At first glance, this would seem to indicate the Jacobite threat had passed, at least temporarily, but the clans maintained the conflict by undertaking small-

¹¹⁰⁸ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 75.

¹¹⁰⁹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 10th September 1689, p. 276. *NRS*, GD26/8/35 – Brea of Ranoch [Brae of.]. Letter from John, Lord Drummond, 'wee are pressed by the enemie that unless ther come a speedie releife wee will not be able to hold utt. Lord James Murray and the Atholl men hath capitolat with McKay and wee are goinge to Lochwaber to make the best defence wee can.', 29th August 1689.

¹¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, GD26/8/30 – Agreement by Lord James Moray, Patrick Steuart of Bellechane (Ballechin), Sir John Mclean, Sir Donald Mcdonald, Sir Ewen Camerone, Glengerie, Beanbecula, Sir Alexander Mclean, Appin, Envereye, Keppoch, Glencoe, Streuane, Calochell (Callachilly), Lt Col Mcgrigor, Barn (?), Largie and Mcnaughton to meet at [blank] in September with the specified numbers of fencible men. Signed by eleven of the chiefs, 24th August 1689.

scale punitive raids on Williamite lands, as mentioned earlier.¹¹¹¹ Mackay felt that the Jacobites could 'do no considerable harm' but continued to underline to Melville and the privy council the 'skearcity of money' to pay the Williamite regiments.¹¹¹² It was during this period that Mackay felt that divisions amongst William's Scottish supporters would disrupt the Williamite army's ability to prepare for the next campaign. More importantly, both he and the government were increasingly at odds over strategy.¹¹¹³

In the face of increasing financial woes, the Scottish Williamite government began to seek alternative solutions to the Jacobite problem. One figure offered an expedient, and cost-effective strategy to end the Highland War, the Viscount Tarbat. Melville, had been assured by Tarbat that the Jacobite chieftains could be bribed to lay down their arms. He argued that the stinging defeat at Dunkeld had soured the mood of many of the clans then fighting against them.¹¹¹⁴ Tarbat's proposal has been retrospectively viewed with some suspicion, due to his support for King James during the Revolution, but it appears that his intent was, to some extent, genuine and that he sought to end the war by non-violent means.¹¹¹⁵ Tarbat, a Highlander himself, managed to convince Melville that bribery was the best way to weaken or neutralise the Jacobite cause, especially given the current financial predicament the Scottish Williamite government found itself in. Furthermore, William's desire to send more troops to Ireland and Flanders in the following year put pressure on Melville to provide said soldiers from Scotland.¹¹¹⁶ He began to promote the idea of bribery as a means of augmenting Mackay's military strategy; positing that the pressure exerted by military forces could be reinforced by offers of a financial

¹¹¹¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 67.

¹¹¹² *Ibid.*; p. 75; Mackay to Melville, 30th August 1689, p. 273.

¹¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹⁴ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 209.

¹¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 210; Alan Kennedy, 'Managing the Early Modern Periphery: Highland Policy and the Highland Judicial Commission, c. 1692-c. 1705' in *Scottish Historical Review*, Vol XCVI, 1, No.242 (April, 2017), p. 36.

¹¹¹⁶ *ODNB*, Colin Kidd, 'Mackenzie, George, first earl of Cromarty (1630–1714), politician and polymath'.

incentive.¹¹¹⁷ If the chieftains were willing to negotiate unilateral terms, without King James or Brigadier Cannon's consent, then the Scottish Jacobite army would, indeed, crumble.¹¹¹⁸ However, this ignored the flagrant intransigence of the Jacobite chiefs in the latter months of 1689 and the encouragement they felt from Jacobite successes in Ireland and French victories on the continent and at sea.¹¹¹⁹ It was during these months, Mackay would state he felt 'a real distaste of the country and service'.¹¹²⁰ Mackay's continued promotion of the strategy to place a fort in the Highlands was not considered, amongst Melville or other ministers, as particularly helpful given the financial restrictions they were facing.¹¹²¹ Mackay's frustration at the supposed 'eclipse' of his authority and influence became more evident as he continually petitioned ministers, in both London and Edinburgh, for money to maintain the army and to prepare for next year's campaign. He would later, in his memoir, lay much of the blame upon the 'politick and double dealing of Tarbat and others of his principles'.¹¹²² Subsequently he portrayed his countrymen, at the time, as governing 'themselves neither by the interest of Kings, Country or Religion, but by their own, in all their actings'.¹¹²³ At the time, Mackay haughtily informed Melville, that without money for the forces the only way to wage war was to 'make war as the Highlanders, by giving liberty to commit all sorts of disorders and violence... but I wo[u]ld never be the Commander of such an army'.¹¹²⁴

Beyond Mackay's vociferous anti-Gaelic characterisation of the Jacobite army, his disenfranchisement, due to the lack of communication on strategy, becomes clear. Mackay

¹¹¹⁷ CSP, William and Mary, I, The King to the Privy Council of Scotland, 8th August 1689.

¹¹¹⁸ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 210.

¹¹¹⁹ NRS, GD26/8/30. Murdoch, *Terror*, pp. 286-287. Colin Helling, 'The Royal Navy in Scotland 1603-1714: Naval and State Development in Regal Union' (Unpublished thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2016), pp. 131-137.

¹¹²⁰ Mackay, *Memoirs*, pp. 77.

¹¹²¹ Raffe, *Scotland*, pp. 144-145. Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 209.

¹¹²² Mackay, *Memoirs*, pp. 75-76.

¹¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹¹²⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 30th August 1689, p. 273.

began to request William either remove him from his post or to allow him to go on leave to spend the winter with his family in Guelderland.¹¹²⁵ In his memoirs, he would recall that he corresponded with Portland regarding 'how little was taken of what he proposed' and stating that 'if the King did not judge him capable... it were the interest of his service as well as the Generals desire to be removed out of that command'.¹¹²⁶ Mackay's strategy and military proposals were, indeed, being ignored, but this was not, as he assumed, due to a lack of respect for his military expertise. The inability of Melville, the Scottish privy council and the crown in London to facilitate his operations was due to genuine financial pressures faced by the government and the shortcomings of the correspondence network through which the Williamite war effort was co-ordinated. The preoccupation of Melville, and others, with political divisions in Scotland, as well as the attempts to find a settlement that prove acceptable to all parties there, left him with a considerable brief to manage. This would mean that Mackay's soldierly suggestions were not always practicable.¹¹²⁷ One of the few surviving letters from Melville to Mackay illustrates this, as he seeks to assure Mackay, 'I was allways cairfull [sic] both to represent what you desired and exactly to follow his Majesties commands in making return to you'.¹¹²⁸ For Melville, and the ministers of William's government, the main issue was, as expressed to Mackay in that same letter, 'want of money' which proved 'a great hinderance'.¹¹²⁹ Furthermore, Melville underlined that William's confidence in his Scottish commander-in-chief had remained unshaken, adding that he did not doubt 'your zeall for the present interest, and sincere affection'.¹¹³⁰ The lack of communication from William, who faced a plethora of political and military issues in the Three Kingdoms, exacerbated

¹¹²⁵ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 79.

¹¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹²⁷ *Melvilles*, Craford to Melville, 24th October 1689, p. 308.

¹¹²⁸ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Melville to Mackay, 5th November 1689, p. 294

¹¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

Mackay's feelings of isolation and his suspicion that his authority was being quietly undermined.

The stagnation of the war into the winter of 1689 would be further worsened by the lack of certainty surrounding the size of the Scottish Williamite army to be kept on foot in the following year. This was, of course, due to uncertainty regarding the level of financial support the Scottish parliament would offer the government at the next parliamentary session. In a letter to Melville, dated 5th November 1689, Mackay declared, 'I expected long er this that I should have received his Majesties finall orders concerning the force pay'd in Scotland'.¹¹³¹ This uncertainty left the army without pay during the winter months. Other officers of the forces in Scotland, such as Sir James Leslie, sent letters to Melville regarding the lack of funds. The bleak situation was laid bare by Leslie when he wrote, 'the forces that are here are soe ill paid, that a great many of them are quartering up and downe the countrey' and that this dispersal of men 'weakens the companies verry [sic] much, soe that I cannot draw them soe easiely together [sic]'.¹¹³² The lack of money to pay for quarters combined with the cold weather in forcing regiments to quarter their men wherever accommodation was freely available. Mackay reiterated his opinion the whole army should be retained 'till things be further advanced and secured in Ireland'.¹¹³³ This further illustrates that the Highland War was interconnected with the neighbouring conflict there. Mackay directly linked the proposed disbandment in Scotland with the possibility of a reversal of Williamite fortunes there. More importantly, less standing forces, he argued, would raise the distinct possibility of more Irish troops being deployed to support the Scottish Jacobites and would leave the

¹¹³¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 5th November 1689, p. 295.

¹¹³² Mackay, *Memoirs*, Sir James Leslie to Melville, 6th December 1689, p. 300.

¹¹³³ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, Edinburgh, 31st October 1689, p. 292.

Williamites in Edinburgh without adequate defence.¹¹³⁴ By December, Mackay had changed tack, acknowledging the reality of the political and financial situation as well as offering more constructive suggestions to maintain the standing army in the interim. He proposed the possibility of taking loans from Edinburgh merchants for the purpose of paying the Scottish regiments, stating that:

the readiest wayes [sic] for supplying of them with money for som[e] mounths wo[u]ld be, to ingadge such branc[h]es of the King revenues as doe not deppend of a gift of Parlement [sic], to such persons as wo[u]ld advance money upon them till they be repayed of what soums they shall advance, that being the most necessary charge which his Majestie can be at here.¹¹³⁵

Lending further credence to Mackay's proposal was the fact that such a proposal had already been carried out. When the Convention of Estates found itself in desperate need of an army in March 1689, the merchants of Edinburgh had offered them a short-term loan to pay and equip this force.¹¹³⁶

Finally, in mid-December, William apparently alarmed at the prospect of his chief Scottish commander quitting his post and displeased with the lack of reports he had received – wrote to Mackay 'desiring to know what methods he would propose for the timely subduing of the Highlanders; his Majesty being also of opinion that the sooner the General should endeavour it the better, that he might make use of some of those forces for the expedition of Ireland.'¹¹³⁷ What is notable about this letter is the fact that William's communique came after Mackay's practical proposals to ameliorate the financial crisis in

¹¹³⁴ Childs, *Nine*, p. 21. Childs, *British*, p. 7.

¹¹³⁵ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 31st October 1689, p. 292.

¹¹³⁶ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 21st March 1689, p. 10.

¹¹³⁷ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 79. NRS, GD26/1/1, Leven and Melville Muniments: Warrant by King William III to David, Earl of Leven & Maj-Gen Mackay authorising the raising of new regiments, 18th December 1689, f. 47.

the Scottish Williamite forces. By utilising his direct connection with Portland, Mackay had managed to by-pass Melville. His concerns regarding the financial state of the army and his new strategy had now garnered William's attention. Melville clearly valued Mackay's opinion in the realm of military strategy but had, to some degree, felt that his letters demanding support were not particularly helpful given the dearth of financial resources in Scotland. Finally, the crown's own resources, along with England's, were currently engaged in funding the forces in Ireland and, in part, the British regiments in Flanders in combatting much larger Jacobite and French forces in said theatres.¹¹³⁸ Regardless of Mackay's sore feelings about the lack of communication over the previous months, his 'eclipse' was now over as William sought to re-assure him of his confidence directly.¹¹³⁹ Although the 1689 campaign had ended in frustration and confusion, this signalled the beginning of a significant re-organisation of the war effort in Scotland. Moreover, Mackay's responsibilities for the army, particularly in logistical terms, were lessened by the introduction of the veteran Sir George Munro of Culrain and the young Earl of Leven as his adjutants.¹¹⁴⁰ This would help spread the burdens of maintaining the army as well as ensuring it was properly disciplined and trained. With their assistance, Mackay would begin organising the army for the next campaign.

Conclusion

The 1689 campaign had ended ignobly for Mackay, the Scots-Dutch Brigade and the Williamite army. The Williamite state in Scotland found itself paralysed by a political crisis and financial woes. The sizeable standing army the Williamites had managed to raise became a considerable financial burden. After Killiecrankie, the Scots-Dutch Brigade

¹¹³⁸ Stapleton, 'Dual', pp. 70-71.

¹¹³⁹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 79. *NRS*, GD26/1/1, William to Leven and Mackay, 18th December 1689, f. 47.

¹¹⁴⁰ *RPCS*, XIV, Letter from his Majesty anent the payment of three regiments of foot and others therein mentioned, 31st December 1689, pp. 605-606.

was not in a fit state to fulfil their previous role as an experienced vanguard as their operational effectiveness was hampered by the impacts of that battle. Killiecrankie had much longer-term impacts than has previously been acknowledged in the historiography. The confusion surrounding the battle propagated a panic which was, in turn, followed by an obfuscation of the realities on the ground. The loss of veteran officers from the Brigade was obscured both by the news of Mackay's survival and, subsequently, of Viscount Dundee's death. Finally, the miscommunication which occurred in the months after Killiecrankie would severely affect the relations between government ministers and Mackay. This would eventually lead Major-General Mackay to seriously consider quitting the service and leaving the country altogether. This was prevented by a timely intervention from William II and II, but these tensions would never completely dissipate for the rest of the Brigade's time in Scotland. Despite these difficulties, Mackay sought to re-organise the Scottish Williamite forces and execute his garrison strategy to bring the Highland War to a close.

Chapter Four - 'Bridling' the Highlands: The Fort William Expedition,

Garrisons, and the End of the Highland War, 1690-1691

they could not be subdued without garisons [sic] in the midst of their country, whereby they should either be obliged to live summer and winter in their hills... or be so exposed to the enterprizes [sic] of the garrisons... that at last they should be forced to obedience.¹¹⁴¹

From May to June 1690, Major James Ferguson and a 600-strong detachment of 'choise men', many of them soldiers of the Scots-Dutch Brigade, disembarked from boats onto the Isles of Gigha, Cara, Colonsay, Jura, Mull, Coll, Rhum, and Eigg.¹¹⁴² These islands

¹¹⁴¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, 'Advantage of the Highlanders', p. 116.

¹¹⁴² Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 234-235. Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 97.

were strongholds of the Scottish Jacobite cause, with Mull serving as a base for the army's leadership as well as a safe haven through which a trickle of reinforcements and arms from Ireland could enter Scotland.¹¹⁴³ Ferguson and his men were conveyed and assisted by a squadron of frigates from both the Royal Navy and the Scottish Williamite government's modest flotilla, commanded by Captain Edward Pottinger.¹¹⁴⁴ Pottinger described these raids on the Western Isles in vivid detail: 'Upon some Islands... The Souldiers have [left] scarce a beast, nor a Hutt to shelter in'.¹¹⁴⁵ Ferguson was held in high regard by Mackay, who described the young officer as a '*personne de probite et d'honneur*'.¹¹⁴⁶ However, when a soldier was killed by the inhabitants of Eigg, Ferguson ordered his expedition to return to the island. When the soldiers landed they massacred the inhabitants, reputedly at the behest of Pottinger, but, likely, overseen by Ferguson.¹¹⁴⁷ A second-hand account of the massacre, published as part of a collection in the eighteenth century, recorded that the soldiers 'clad with red coats, some with white coats and grenadier caps... armed with sword and pike' began 'to use all acts of hostility, as killing, burning, tirling [sic], and deforcing of women'.¹¹⁴⁸ When Captain Pottinger was called to make a report to the Admiralty Board, regarding the events on Eigg, he denied the allegations made by the island's inhabitants; unsurprisingly the ships-logs did not contain any information pertaining to the massacre.¹¹⁴⁹ Yet, it must be admitted that it would be unlikely that either Pottinger or Ferguson, would have incriminated themselves by

¹¹⁴³ RPS, A1690/4/19.

¹¹⁴⁴ *National Archives [NA]*, ADM 106/399/355, Navy Board: Records - Captain Edward Pottinger, the Dartmouth, Duart Road, Isle of Mull. 19th June 1690. Murdoch, *Terror*, pp. 286-288. Helling, 'Royal Navy', p. 65.

¹¹⁴⁵ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 234.

¹¹⁴⁶ Translation: a person of probity and honour. See: Mackay, *Memoirs*, 'Mackay to Portland, 16th April 1690, p. 178.

¹¹⁴⁷ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 234-235. Grant, *Scots Navy*, 'Letter from Captain Pottinger to the Earl of Melville, on his proceedings against the rebels, 19th July 1690', pp. 71-73.

¹¹⁴⁸ Donald McLeod, *Treatises on Second Sight* (Glasgow, 1763), 'John MacDonald', pp. 71-72. Allan I. Macinnes, 'Slaughter Under Trust: Clan Massacres and British State Formation' in Mark Levene & Penny Roberts (eds.), *The Massacre in History* (Oxford, 1999), p. 137.

¹¹⁴⁹ NA, ADM 106/399/355.

leaving any written trace of their men's actions that day; Pottinger was never held to account by the Admiralty, due in large part to his untimely death in a shipwreck off the coast of Mull.¹¹⁵⁰ Corroborative evidence for the violence on Eigg might be found in the fact that Mackay would later promote similar tactics in the Highlands. Attached to his memoir of the Scottish conflict is a list pertaining to the 'problem' areas of the *Gàidhealtachd*. This declares that only the plantation of garrisons amongst such areas would halt the Jacobite clans from campaigning, as the clansmen would be hesitant to leave their 'wives, children, cattle and houses to the mercy of the garrison'.¹¹⁵¹

Ferguson's amphibious expedition to the Western Isles was just the prelude to a much larger campaign, which sought to establish a fort at head of Loch Linnhe, Inverlochy. This new fort would soon be known as Fort William, named, of course, after William II and III. In this final chronological chapter, we will examine the penultimate campaign of the Highland War which proved to be the beginning of the end of the conflict and, subsequently, the Brigade's time in Scotland. This chapter will begin by exploring the case for extending the narrative of the Highland War beyond the battle of Cromdale, 1st May 1690. Although Cromdale was a critical victory for the Williamites, and, crucially, a major defeat for the Jacobites, it did not signal the end of the conflict. In actuality, the engagement was only the prelude to the campaign to establish Fort William. The section following this will briefly examine the strategic situation in Scotland after Cromdale, before moving on to discuss the difficulties faced in preparing the Williamite army for the expedition to Inverlochy, henceforth referred to as the Fort William expedition.. The main obstruction to these preparations, for Mackay and his officers, was the reluctance of the Scottish Williamite regime to invest the significant amounts of money, and manpower

¹¹⁵⁰ Grant, *Scots Navy*, 'London Gazette- Announcement of the wreck of the Dartmouth and Death of Captain Pottinger, 23rd October 1690', p. 76.

¹¹⁵¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 108

required for this project. By the end of May 1690, King William had to, yet again, re-assert Mackay's authority to conduct the military strategy in Scotland as well as offer a political compromise to the Scottish parliament to secure a much needed new act of supply. With the financial crisis resolved, and William's backing, Mackay re-asserted himself to oversee the largest and most complex operation of the Highland War. The third section will relate the arduous campaign undertaken to establish Fort William. This entailed a major military operation which saw an army march overland through Jacobite held areas of the Highlands to reach Inverlochry as well as a marine operation carried out in support of this. At the heart of this campaign was the Brigade, who, again, formed the nucleus of the both the army marching across the Highlands, engaging in a number of skirmishes in Glen Spean, and as an advance party, landed ahead of the main force by Pottinger's naval squadron. The campaign to establish Fort William was a significant military feat that took a considerable amount of co-ordination across large swathes of Scotland to occupy and maintain a permanent military presence amidst the Jacobite Highlands. More importantly it would be this operation, not the battle of Cromdale, that prove to be pivotal in turning the tide of the war and, ultimately, forcing the Jacobite surrender in late 1691.

This strategy, proposed by Mackay in the previous year, saw the plantation of a significant force in the heart of the Jacobite Highlands. This would grant the Williamites the ability to launch punitive raids on clan lands. These reprisal tactics ensured that the majority of the Jacobite Highlanders became hesitant to continue engaging in the conflict beyond the borders of their own territory. The establishment of Fort William was the blow which reinforced the scale of the defeat of the Jacobite army in the field at Cromdale. The significance of the Fort William expedition has been largely underplayed by historians, particularly those studying Jacobitism who often pivot the narrative toward the larger conflict in Ireland in mid-1690. Whilst the events in Ireland were, of course, significant,

the fact remains that the war in Scotland continued until 1691. Without an exploration of events in Scotland after Cromdale, the reasons behind the Jacobite capitulation and, thus, the end of the Highland War cannot be fully understood. Although the establishment and maintenance of Fort William was fraught with difficulties, it marked a shift in the conflict from its earlier, indecisive, stages. The last section of this chapter will discuss the concluding stage of the Highland War, from August 1690 to late 1691. During this period, as the Scottish Williamite State's military presence in the Highlands began to effectively negate the Jacobite threat, the Jacobite army in Scotland began to disintegrate. The Jacobite commanders in Scotland found themselves bereft of the support they had previously enjoyed and, in turn, unable to field an army. These officers became fugitives in Scotland, pursued by the Williamite field army, and the increased military presence in sympathetic areas left them without an effective base of operations. This, in turn, saw a change in strategic priorities for the Scottish Williamite state and the crown, with the Scots-Dutch Brigade gradually withdrawn from Scotland as the Highland War fizzled out.

The conflict did, however, continue into 1691 as Jacobite clans' resorted to guerrilla style warfare and the Jacobite leadership managed to evade capture. Crucially, however, the Williamites judged that the situation was stable enough to allow the redeployment of military forces from Scotland to other theatres, particularly the Scots-Dutch Brigade. As explored earlier, William was, throughout the Nine Years' War, in desperate need of trustworthy senior officers and veteran soldiers in all theatres of that conflict. The gradual dispersal of the Scots-Dutch regiments from Scotland to Ireland and Flanders was akin to their dispersal within Scotland in the earlier stages of the conflict: on both occasions they were deployed to critical areas where their expertise and abilities could be put to good use. The first and second regiments were the first to leave their 'homeland', as the formations were transferred back to the Dutch Republic to defend the border forts.

Mackay, however, was seconded to the general staff of the army in Ireland with a promotion to the rank of lieutenant-general attached. The third regiment of the Brigade remained deployed in Scotland until the final months of 1691, where they were involved in clean-up operations besieging Jacobite holdouts and taking part in policing actions in 'problem' areas. Finally, the last section will investigate the pressure the garrison strategy exerted upon the Scottish Jacobites in the conflicts final year. Alongside counter-Jacobite operations of the Brigade, the military encirclement of their Highland heartlands would see the Scottish Jacobites seek peace terms with the Treaty of Achallader, 31st July 1691. The agreement saw Jacobite chiefs assent to a cessation of hostilities; this was, at least initially, a measure utilised to relieve pressure upon the clans and in the hope that external support from Ireland would be forthcoming. By the end of that summer, events in Ireland proved to the Scottish Jacobites that the Highland War was over, and, with King James' permission, they sought to finalise terms with the new regime. This would lead to end of the Highland War and the withdrawal of the remaining regiment of the Brigade. At the outset of 1690, however, the situation was vastly different.

The Battle of Cromdale, 1st May 1690: the end of the war?

The defeat of the Jacobite army at Cromdale, 1st May 1690, was undoubtedly a key moment in the Highland War. At the beginning of the campaigning season, 1st April 1690, the Jacobites had only managed to muster 1,500 men, a number which paled in comparison to the previous year.¹¹⁵² At the conclusion of the 1689 campaign, King James dispatched from Ireland another small group of regular soldiers to assist the Scottish Jacobites, this time led by Major-General Thomas Buchan, who, as a higher ranking

¹¹⁵² HES, BTL20, Inventory of Historic Battlefields – Battle of Cromdale, 1st May 1690. HES, BTL 32, Dunkeld, 21st August 1689.

officer, assumed joint command of the army with Brigadier Cannon.¹¹⁵³ The men worked well together as Buchan was another veteran of the Scots-Dutch Brigade who had also returned during the 1688 recall.¹¹⁵⁴ From the outset, they decided they would utilise their familial connections to, and knowledge of, the North-Eastern Lowlands of Scotland in an attempt to gather further military support outwith the Highlands.¹¹⁵⁵ It was this purpose that led them to be encamped at Cromdale, Strathspey, having been pursued by various Williamite detachments over the course of a month.¹¹⁵⁶ They thought themselves out of reach of the Williamite forces on the night of 30th April 1690 and, accordingly, did not expect Sir Thomas Livingstone, of course, another former Scots-Dutch officer, to march upon their position through the night from Inverness.¹¹⁵⁷ Livingstone, and his force of 1,200 men, launched a surprise attack launched in the early hours of the morning of 1st May; the subsequent engagement saw the Williamites rapidly overrun a confused and disorganised Jacobite army, as we saw at the very start of this thesis.¹¹⁵⁸ The Jacobite army was scattered at Cromdale and Buchan would find himself unable to muster a field army of a similar size for the remainder of the Highland War.

Cromdale was a pivotal moment in the Highland War which saw a number of prominent veteran officers, formerly of Dutch service, participate in the battle on both sides.¹¹⁵⁹ Despite the fascinating connections of these former Scots-Dutch officers at Cromdale, the Scots-Dutch Brigade were not directly involved in this engagement. A battalion of Ramsay's Scots-Dutch regiment had been dispatched from Aberdeen, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel John Buchan, the Jacobite commander Thomas

¹¹⁵³ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 94. *ODNB*, Paul Hopkins, 'Buchan, Thomas (c. 1641–1724), Jacobite army officer'.

¹¹⁵⁴ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 509.

¹¹⁵⁵ HES, BTL20, Cromdale.

¹¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵⁷ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 93.

¹¹⁵⁸ HES, BTL20, Cromdale.

¹¹⁵⁹ Carleton, *Memoirs*, pp. 28-29. *Melvilles*, Livingstone to [Mackay] – Account, 2nd May 1690, pp. 152-153.

Buchan's younger brother, but they only reached Inverness after Livingstone had departed.¹¹⁶⁰ Additionally, Mackay had gathered an army of 3,000 men at Perth, in preparation for the forthcoming expedition to Inverlochy. He had intended to march to Livingstone's aid, but news of the Jacobite defeat arrived before he could prepare a detachment to do so.¹¹⁶¹ Therefore, as this thesis focuses upon the Scots-Dutch Brigade's involvement in the Highland War, the events of Cromdale will not be related in great detail here, especially as scholars have already established the contours of the engagement.¹¹⁶² Livingstone's shocking victory at Cromdale has often been seen by historians, particularly of the Revolution, as the effective end of hostilities in Scotland.¹¹⁶³ In actuality, the Highland War entered a final phase as the blow inflicted on the Jacobites in the field had to be reinforced with an offensive strike against their base of support, the western Highlands. Jacobite scholars, most notably Lenman, have asserted that Cromdale was a 'fiasco' from which the Jacobites could never recover.¹¹⁶⁴ Hopkins has contested this, stating that such projections of a total Jacobite defeat at Cromdale are, at worst, teleological in nature and, at best, dismissive.¹¹⁶⁵ More importantly, he adds that by conceptualising Cromdale as a 'decisive stage' in the dissolution of the Jacobite army, as opposed to a conclusion of the conflict, the Highland War can be better understood.¹¹⁶⁶ Therefore, as Hopkins has established the case for the conflict entering a new phase after Cromdale, this section will draw out the ramifications of the of the Jacobite defeat there.¹¹⁶⁷

¹¹⁶⁰ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 94. Anon., *Proceedings*, Vol II, 29th April 1690, p. 146.

¹¹⁶¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 93.

¹¹⁶² Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 215-220. Oates, *Killiecrankie*, pp. 169-189.

¹¹⁶³ Harris, *Revolution*, p. 411. Pincus, *1688*, pp. 268-269.

¹¹⁶⁴ Lenman, *Jacobites*, p. 49.

¹¹⁶⁵ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 6.

¹¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 219, 232.

¹¹⁶⁷ Oates, *Killiecrankie*, pp. 183, 199. Raffe, *Scotland*, pp. 154-156.

Cromdale was a critical battle in the Highland War, but it did not grant William's regime full control of Scotland.¹¹⁶⁸ Building upon Hopkins's contribution, Szechi has also recognised this fact. He argues that the defeat put the Jacobites 'firmly on the defensive' for the remainder of the conflict.¹¹⁶⁹ However, the broad nature of Szechi's study of the Jacobite movement means we have seen little expansion of our understanding of the remainder of the Scottish conflict in 1690 and 1691. This has led to the misapprehension of the critical aspects of the campaigns which brought the Highland War to a close.¹¹⁷⁰ By expanding upon the contributions of Hopkins and Szechi, this chapter can illustrate that victory at Cromdale, although vital, was not the decisive element in the Williamite victory in Scotland. Instead, the Fort William expedition, or 'Williamite Offensive' as Hopkins termed it, was the deciding factor in the dissolution of the first Scottish Jacobite army. Moreover, the Scots-Dutch Brigade were at the heart of this offensive against the Jacobite heartlands. Their presence at the core of the forces involved and in the co-ordination of the strategy to encircle the Highlands. This would involve the utilisation of brutal punitive tactics which targeted the lands, livelihoods and people of the Jacobite clans. It was this, we will argue, and not the Battle of Cromdale, which forced the Jacobites to capitulate, alongside the reversal of Jacobite fortunes in Ireland, in the coming year. The first step in that offensive came with the Williamite marine expedition to the Western Isles expedition and the significant preparations required prior to the march of the Williamite army for Inverlochy.

Preparations, May-June 1690

¹¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁶⁹ Szechi, *Jacobites*, pp. 66-67.

¹¹⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 66, 71; Raffe, *Scotland*, pp. 155-156. Pincus, *1688*, pp. 268-269.

From the beginning of the year, the Scottish Williamite government had struggled to re-organise and sustain their army as the new campaigning season loomed.¹¹⁷¹ The political impasse in the Scottish parliament, encouraged by the Club, continued until 7th June 1690 when an accommodation was reached to allow the passage of a new act of supply.¹¹⁷² Prior to this, however, Mackay continued to petition the Scottish privy council, Melville and King William for more resources to properly prepare the army for the campaign season. Mackay, now mindful of financial constraints the government faced, continued to offer constructive suggestions, but still faced a degree of opposition from amongst William's Scottish ministers. Whilst Melville and Tarbat began to tacitly support Mackay's proposal to establish 'a fit garrison on the west coast', yet both politicians remained unsure how this was to be funded, particularly in lieu of new public revenues.¹¹⁷³ Additionally, Mackay's intention to launch a new major offensive was no secret, the *Proceedings* news pamphlet, as early as March 1690, reported 'Major-General Mackay makes all possible haste to be in a readiness to take the Field'.¹¹⁷⁴ The details of said offensive were unknown, as was its target, Inverlochy, but the Jacobites were now anticipating the Williamites next move and began to prepare accordingly.¹¹⁷⁵ In lieu of political or financial support, Mackay mobilised other senior officers in the Scottish Williamite army to communicate their support for the Fort William expedition.

On 1st March 1690, Argyll wrote to William as part of a group of officers in favour of the strategy. They expressed their concern that should preparations be any further delayed, then the Highlanders could 'fall down upon the low countries where they please,

¹¹⁷¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 6th February 1690, pp. 324-325.

¹¹⁷² *RPS*, 1690/4/44, Act for raising a supply offered to their majesties, 7th June 1690.

¹¹⁷³ *CSP*, William and Mary, II, Tarbat to the King, 13th April 1690.

¹¹⁷⁴ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 14th May 1690, p. 167.

¹¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

and retire before the forces... can reach them'.¹¹⁷⁶ Argyll added, 'The subsistence of your army has so exhausted your revenue, that there can be no more expected from your Treasury here'.¹¹⁷⁷ He concluded the letter by advising his monarch to provide £4,000 to £5,000 as an advance to facilitate the expedition.¹¹⁷⁸ Mackay pointed out to Portland, in a letter dated 13th March 1690, that 'The sum demanded to facilitate this project is scarcely more than half a month's pledge to the troops whom the King sold here from England'.¹¹⁷⁹ Clearly, Mackay felt that this advance was little to ask to ensure, to his mind, the defeat of the enemy. Victory in Scotland would, also, reduce the need for the Williamites to maintain a large standing army there, as well as hasten the redeployment of expensive foreign auxiliary units, like the Scots-Dutch Brigade, to other theatres.

Whilst Mackay's new strategy had gained some traction amongst the Scottish Williamite officer corps, there was still a reluctance from Melville and Tarbat to pursue a purely military solution to the Jacobite problem. Fort William was, they argued, to be augmented by bribery with Tarbat acting as a negotiator to the Jacobite chieftains. Their aim was to ply the chiefs with overtures to surrender accompanied with the offer of financial incentives to do so.¹¹⁸⁰ Instead of attempting to undermine Mackay, Tarbat now saw the need for a coercive force with which the Jacobites could be threatened and even managed to gain the post of governor of the prospective fort for his friend, Colonel John Hill.¹¹⁸¹ Hill was an English officer and veteran of the Cromwellian occupation of Scotland. He had previously commanded a garrison which the English forces had built at

¹¹⁷⁶ CSP, William and Mary, Vol II, The Earl of Argyll, Alexander Melville, and others to the King, 1st March 1690.

¹¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁷⁹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Letter to Portland, 13th March 1690, p. 174

¹¹⁸⁰ *Melvilles*, (Copy) His Majesties Warrant to George Viscount Tarbat to treat with the Highlanders, 25th March 1690, p. 422.

¹¹⁸¹ Ibid.

Inverlochy in the 1650s, which would soon become the site of the new fort.¹¹⁸² Hill lended his support to Mackay as a fellow soldier. In one such instance, he wrote to Leven, defending 'Major-Generall McKayes well-contrived methods...' and advocating that these 'should be pursued' as 'the sword in hand will helpe them [the Jacobites] to comply'.¹¹⁸³ In Hill, Mackay found a well-connected ally with whom the Scottish Williamite ministers were familiar and deployed him to further his design. Mackay recalled that he argued, in April-May 1690, that the expedition must get underway as soon as possible as 'the proper season for such an enterprize... doth not last long in the Highlands, where the rains, rend[e]ring the ways as well as the works impracticable, begin early among those mountains'.¹¹⁸⁴ However, the Scottish Williamite government refused to release any funds, in spite of the victory at Cromdale, until they secured more funding from parliament.¹¹⁸⁵

To remove Melville's obstructions, Mackay dispatched Hill southward to Chester on 1st May 1690. He ordered the English officer to petition William and his advisers to lend their weight to the project by reassuring Scottish Williamite ministers that funds would be forthcoming.¹¹⁸⁶ Mackay recalled that he made it clear to William, via a letter delivered by Hill, that 'there were no effectual measures to force those people to obedience, but by garrisons'.¹¹⁸⁷ Additionally, Mackay noted that the establishment of Fort William was, to his mind, the best plan to pacify Scotland so that the country could 'be so quieted and the combined Highlanders bridled, that the King might have no apprehension from that hand when he should pass the sea into Ireland'.¹¹⁸⁸ The

¹¹⁸² Dow, *Cromwellian*, p. 245.

¹¹⁸³ *Melvilles*, Colonel Hill to the Earl of Leven, 17th April 1690, pp. 425-426.

¹¹⁸⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 91.

¹¹⁸⁵ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Hamilton, 18th June 1690, pp. 326-327.

¹¹⁸⁶ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 98.

¹¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

¹¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

undertaking of the expedition to the Highlands, for Mackay, was presented as a means of freeing William, and his forces in England, to redouble their military presence in Ireland without worrying about the security of the Scottish Williamite regime. Arriving on 15th May 1690, Hill was granted an immediate audience with Portland, to whom he presented Mackay's letter.¹¹⁸⁹ Portland, in turn, brought these concerns directly to William, who was, at that time, preparing to embark for Ireland personally.¹¹⁹⁰ William was considerably irritated by the news that his Scottish government would not fully lend their support to his commander-in-chief.¹¹⁹¹ On 9th June 1690, William wrote to Melville, stating 'I was informed by General Major Mackay of the arrangements he made of the troops... what he designs is feasible'.¹¹⁹² Portland wrote to Melville encouraging him to facilitate Mackay's plan. Concurring with William, he stated, 'It is very necessary, Sir, that you live well with him [Mackay], that is to say that you show him confidence, that you consult with him on the said matters, and that you provide all possible assistance with a prompt manner'.¹¹⁹³ It can surmised, then, that Melville was still obstructing the preparations for the Fort William expedition by early June. Portland concluded, 'The enterprise of Ennerloch, I assure you it is of great importance... that the King approves of his [Mackay's] plan' and that the offensive was of as much importance to the security of 'the rest of Scotland as to the borders of England'.¹¹⁹⁴

By June 1690, Melville had already been given instructions to settle the constitutional and religious impasse in the Scottish parliament.¹¹⁹⁵ In political terms, this

¹¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

¹¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹¹ *RPS*, 1690/4/44.

¹¹⁹² *Melvilles*, King to Melville, 9th June 1690, p. 441.

¹¹⁹³ *Melvilles*, Portland to Melville, 9th June 1690, p. 442.

¹¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹⁵ *Melvilles*, King to Melville, with Remarks on the Act for Settling Church Government, 22nd May 1690, pp. 436-438; Additional Instructions to our Right trustie and intirly beloved Cousin and Councillor, George Earle of Melvill, our Commissioner, 30th May 1690, pp. 438-439.

would, shortly afterward, lead the opposition to crumble as the myriad parties split from the Club and accepted compromise, which, in turn, allowed the passage of a new act of supply.¹¹⁹⁶ In military terms, however, Portland and William's exhortations to Melville broke the stalemate between Mackay and the executive of the Scottish Williamite government.¹¹⁹⁷ Furthermore, this, again, underlines the fact that the conflict in Scotland was not a 'sideshow', as Szechi has termed it.¹¹⁹⁸ Instead, Scotland's security, and the Highland War, must be seen as one of William's many geo-strategic priorities. Regardless, with the financial security of supply the Scottish Williamite regime offered Mackay more support for the army and the new offensive. For example, Melville gave orders for provisioning the field army at Perth with food and equipment and authorised the purchase of building-materials and employment of 'pioneers', to build the fortifications.¹¹⁹⁹ Additionally, he secured the earlier suggested £4,000 sum from the crown for the use of the Scottish commissary-general, an officer who organised provisions within the Scottish army, so that Mackay could begin preparing to march northward as soon as possible.¹²⁰⁰

Much of Mackay's strategy and, thus, the Williamite military strategy in Scotland was influenced by the campaigns of the Cromwellian general George Monck.¹²⁰¹ Monck approached the threat from the Highlands in the 1650s by sealing off the Lowlands and depriving Highland clans of supplies of horses and manpower from sympathetic areas, as Frances Dow points out.¹²⁰² Illustrating this influence, Mackay would later recall, in his memoir, that he 'designed the fort according to the description he had of it from Ingeneers

¹¹⁹⁶ *RPS*, 1690/4/44.

¹¹⁹⁷ *Melvilles*, King to Melville, 9th June 1690, p. 441. *Ibid.*, Portland to Melville, 9th June 1690, p. 442.

¹¹⁹⁸ Szechi, *Jacobites*, p. 67.

¹¹⁹⁹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 92.

¹²⁰⁰ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 92.

¹²⁰¹ *ODNB*, Ronald Hutton, 'Monck [Monk], George, first duke of Albemarle (1608–1670), army officer and naval officer'.

¹²⁰² Dow, *Cromwellian*, p. 124.

[sic] who had been there'.¹²⁰³ Clearly, Mackay relied upon Hill as well as Scottish engineers who had overseen the erection of the Cromwellian-era fortifications at Inverlochy. To re-establish a fort in this area would be a considerable undertaking, Mackay stipulated that his force would consist of 3,000 men; each armed with an up-to-date 'firelock' musket as the Scottish regiments were 'ill armed, and picks [sic] not usefull in those Highland wars'.¹²⁰⁴ The bulk of the Scots-Dutch Brigade regiments would act as the vanguard of this force.¹²⁰⁵ The army destined for Inverlochy would need two months provisions and 400 pack-horses to carry supplies across hundreds of miles of terrain.¹²⁰⁶ On top of this, 2,000 spades, shovels and pick axes were to be transported by merchant ships from Glasgow to Dunstaffnage Castle, Argyll, where they could then be ferried north.¹²⁰⁷

In the previous year, Mackay had struggled to work within the severe financial constraints imposed upon him by the refusal of supply. He later wrote of his service in Scotland that, by winter 1689, he had resolved, 'from that time forward to disengage himself out of it as soon as possible'.¹²⁰⁸ Despite this, Mackay would not leave Scotland before 'the service could allow': evidently, he understood the Highland War was far from over in early 1690.¹²⁰⁹ He was correct, in spite of the ramifications of Cromdale for the Jacobite army they still maintained a capacity to revert to guerrilla style tactics and harass Williamites across the Highland-Lowland frontier. Mackay argued that establishment of a fort at Inverlochy 'would be the readiest way to secure us from the Highlanders, which I considered as the most dangerous ennemy we could expect'.¹²¹⁰ The encirclement of

¹²⁰³ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 80.

¹²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*; Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 485-486.

¹²⁰⁶ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 80.

¹²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰⁸ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 77.

¹²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²¹⁰ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 98.

Jacobite clans within their own lands would halt them from joining excursions led by Major-General Buchan and Brigadier Cannon. This deprived Buchan and Cannon of a sizeable body of infantry who could, when deployed in the proper manner, defeat a much larger force of regular soldiers in the field. Lastly, if the Jacobites managed to win in Ireland, a conflict which also continued unabated, they could utilise the Highlands as a foothold from which a significant detachment of Irish forces could reinforce the Scottish Jacobites. They had already been promised such a force, in February 1690, to be led by King James' illegitimate son, James Fitz-James, first Duke of Berwick.¹²¹¹ As long as the Scottish Jacobites retained the ability to field an army, rapidly raised from amongst the Gaelic clans, then they would remain a threat. Mackay's continued engagement in Scotland came partly as the result of his conviction that the clans remained a threat so long as they enjoyed the safety of 'their hilly confidence and refuge'.¹²¹²

Fort William Campaign, Summer 1690

On 18th June, Mackay ordered the field army at Perth to march, leaving word to be sent to Major Ferguson's marine expedition to sail for Inverlochy at the first opportunity.¹²¹³ Mackay's eagerness was evident, when wrote, in a letter to Hamilton, that he intended 'to make feu halts till I be in the rebells countrey'.¹²¹⁴ Indicatively, the Fort William expedition was to be undertaken rapidly in order to stun the Jacobite clans into paralysis and prevent the possibility of the Jacobite command regrouping their forces. The army crossed the River Tay at Dunkeld on 23rd June, but Mackay was concerned as the wrights and engineers departure had been delayed due to a lack of tools and materials procured by the Scottish Williamite government; they were still waiting for large 'deals',

¹²¹¹ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 212, 276.

¹²¹² Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Hamilton, 29th July 1689, p. 255.

¹²¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

¹²¹⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Hamilton, 18th June 1690, pp. 327-328.

or planks, of wood that would make up the palisades surrounding the fort.¹²¹⁵ Mackay pressed on, electing to avoid areas sympathetic to the Jacobites, such as Badenoch. This would prolong the length of the march, but would avoid the possibility of the Jacobite army intercepting them.¹²¹⁶ Justifying this strategy in his memoirs Mackay reasoned, 'I had not a mind to venture in action, till I had joyned the forces from the north under Livingston; it being a maxim in our trade, without necessity to put nothing to an apparent hazard, when the success is of great importance'.¹²¹⁷

Within four days, 26th June, the Williamite expedition had reached Livingstone's position at Strathspey, they began to march west through Badenoch and toward Spean Bridge.¹²¹⁸ With Mackay's army reinforced by Livingstone's detachment the force was now at least 4,000 men strong.¹²¹⁹ One of the key sources regarding the expedition was the journal of young troop of horse within the Williamite army's ranks, kept by an Alexander R. (his surname is obscured by damage to the manuscript) who then served in Eglinton's troop.¹²²⁰ Alexander and some of his comrades were detached from the main army to meet with a battalion of Colonel Ramsay's regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Buchan. Buchan and his men had been stationed at Aberdeen, before they were issued orders to join with Sir Thomas Livingstone's force at 'Colinakyll on the water of Spey'.¹²²¹ From there Alexander provides us with, perhaps, the only account of the expedition from the perspective of an enlisted man as well as insight into the involvement of the Brigade's role.¹²²²

¹²¹⁵ Ibid.

¹²¹⁶ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 98.

¹²¹⁷ Ibid.

¹²¹⁸ Ibid.

¹²¹⁹ Ibid., p. 93.

¹²²⁰ Neil (ed.), 'Journal', pp. 38-50.

¹²²¹ Ibid., pp. 46-50; Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Privy Council, 28th June 1690, pp. 327-331.

¹²²² Neil (ed.), 'Journal', p. 47.

As Mackay and Livingstone rendezvoused, Major Ferguson led his marine detachment ashore at Inverlochy.¹²²³ They made for Cameron of Lochiel's house at Achnacarry 'where they intrenched themself[e]s till general McCaie [sic] and his armie cam[e] up'.¹²²⁴ This daring amphibious raid not only secured a prominent fortified house in the area, but saw the deployment of four Royal Navy 'men of war' to overawe Loch Linnhe and guard against French privateers.¹²²⁵ By now, local Jacobites were beginning to rally against the Williamite forces at the north-eastern end of Glen Spean, where the Williamite field army had encamped.¹²²⁶ The Jacobite clans mustered near Glen Roy to block Mackay's shortest approach toward Inverlochy and, more importantly, Achnacarry where Ferguson's men were waiting.¹²²⁷ Rather than face the assembled clans in Glen Roy, Mackay made a feint with a rear guard of 'four troops of horse and dragoons... where the ennemy expected me'.¹²²⁸ This diversionary tactic would allow the rest of the Williamite army to avoid giving battle to the Jacobites.

Mackay's reasons for avoiding battle were sound. The restrictive terrain of the glens would not have allowed Mackay to properly deploy his forces and would have granted the Jacobite clans similar advantages to those they had exploited so well at Killiecrankie.¹²²⁹ Therefore, Mackay elected to divert his route to Inverlochy with the hope of avoiding confrontation until the army reached Loch Linnhe. Captain George Carleton, mentioned earlier in the introduction, was also part of the Fort William expedition. Serving again under Livingstone's command, Carleton recorded that the march to Inverlochy had been a 'most dismal peregrination'.¹²³⁰ Trooper Alexander recalled that

¹²²³ *Ibid.*, p. 48; Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 236.

¹²²⁴ Neil (ed.), 'Journal', p. 48.

¹²²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²²⁸ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 98. Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 236.

¹²²⁹ See Chapter Two.

¹²³⁰ Carleton, *Memoirs*, p. 26.

soldiers of the army were 'straitened for provisione'.¹²³¹ This dearth of food led to soldiers going off in parties to search for 'Cous or yeous' and, on one occasion, this scavenging led to a friendly fire incident.¹²³² In this instance Scots-Dutch soldiers happened upon 'thrie or four cous and fyryng at y[he]m, on[e] of McCaies regiment shot one of Argyls regiment [sic]'.¹²³³ In spite of the desperate lack of supplies, the Williamite army continued to make progress. Mackay acknowledged that he had to march his men 'through mountains and boggy ways' into Lochaber to avoid the Jacobite clans amassing at Glen Roy.¹²³⁴ Carleton recalled that the paths in these areas were so narrow that soldiers 'could but very rarely go two on a breast, and oftener, like geese in a string, one after another'.¹²³⁵ He painted a vivid picture when he described the Williamite army as 'sometimes, or rather most commonly' stretching across 'an extent of many miles'.¹²³⁶

Despite the overwhelming size of the Williamite force, this overstretched column was a prime target for local Jacobite sharpshooters as well as sporadic ambushes. The deployment of guerrilla-style tactics, harassed the Williamites with sporadic musket fire and skirmishes in an attempt to delay their advance. The Jacobites targeted particularly vulnerable parts of the army, such as the baggage horses carrying much-needed supplies. Trooper Alexander's journal described these attacks in detail. He recalled that the attackers were 'beat back' by 'our rire [sic] guard, losing y[he]r[e] highland pla[i]ds w[i]t[h] what baggage they had'.¹²³⁷ Carleton adds to this, describing regiments harassed by Jacobite snipers, using accurate hunting muskets, who possessed extensive knowledge of the terrain and proved able to pick off soldiers 'from their summits' above the glens.¹²³⁸

¹²³¹ Neil (ed.), 'Journal', p. 47.

¹²³² Ibid.

¹²³³ Ibid.

¹²³⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 98.

¹²³⁵ Carleton, *Memoirs*, pp. 26-27

¹²³⁶ Ibid.

¹²³⁷ Neil (ed.), 'Journal', p. 47.

¹²³⁸ Carleton, *Memoirs*, p. 27.

This continued throughout the march, from Glen Spean to Inverlochy, and was made all the worse by the soldiers' inability to respond. Carleton explained, 'for as they popped upon us always on a sudden, they never stayed long enough to allow any of our soldiers a mark, or even time enough to fire.'¹²³⁹ This harassment continued throughout the day and into the evening of 2nd July 1690.¹²⁴⁰ The Williamite army encamped in a hollow near an unknown river, but the sniper fire continued throughout the night. Eventually the Jacobites 'highland men cam[e] to the brink' of the Williamite camp 'and fyred neir a hundred shot... which med a grait alarm, the wholl camp standing at y[he]r[e] arms all night'.¹²⁴¹ On the morning of 3rd July, the Williamites set off again, but the Jacobites gathered 200 clansmen and directly assaulted Mackay's Scots-Dutch battalion, serving as the vanguard of the advancing army.¹²⁴² Trooper Alexander, recording the skirmish in his journal, wrote, 'Major McCaies company ingaging first w[i]t[h] y[he]m, and ther was twelv[e] of y[he]m [Jacobites] kiled, and som taiken prisonars [sic]'.¹²⁴³ This successful skirmish illustrates the Brigade had learned a hard lesson from Killiecrankie. The defeat of this small group of clansmen allowed the Williamite army to reach Achnacarry House, Mackay had successfully avoided battle and was now a short distance from Inverlochy.

The Williamite army, now joined by Ferguson's men, arrived at Inverlochy only two days after the dramatic Battle of the Boyne in Ireland, 1st July 1690.¹²⁴⁴ As word of the Williamite victory there was began to spread in Scotland, Mackay and his men set to work at Inverlochy.¹²⁴⁵ Crucially, however, it would become clear that although the Williamites in Ireland had emerged victorious, the Irish Jacobite army had retired in order

¹²³⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁴⁰ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 98.

¹²⁴¹ Neil (ed.), 'Journal', p. 47.

¹²⁴² Ibid.

¹²⁴³ Ibid., pp. 47-48.

¹²⁴⁴ Childs, *Ireland*, p. 215.

¹²⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 223.

with most of its troops reaching the safety of Limerick.¹²⁴⁶ Pacifying the Highlands would become crucial in the coming months as William now found himself engaged in a protracted siege against the Irish city, which he would have to lift on 30th September 1690 as the campaigning season drew to a close.¹²⁴⁷ This would mean that the success of the Fort William expedition, and victory in Scotland, would become increasingly important. The defeat of the Jacobites in Scotland and the closure of the Scottish front would allay the considerable expenses of manpower and money in the country. Moreover, events in Flanders proved no better as the Allied army secured a costly victory at the Battle of Fleurus, 1st July 1690.¹²⁴⁸ As a result, the Dutch were unable to maintain their momentum against France and were also forced to return to winter quarters in September.¹²⁴⁹

These wider dimensions played into the deployment of the garrison strategy in Scotland and the eagerness of both Mackay and the Williamite government to bring an end to the Highland War as soon as possible. This illustrates that Scotland was part of a wide-spread and multi-dimensional conflict. In its aftermath, the result of the Battle of the Boyne would be hotly contested by both sides, but King James' panicked flight to France proved to be a major blow for the Scottish and Irish Jacobites. Moreover, the need for more soldiers in Ireland and Flanders for renewed campaigns in the following year would make Mackay's efforts at Inverlochy a priority. Fort William offered a means to coerce the Jacobite clans into peace as well as the reduction of the field army in favour of more modest garrison force. In the short term, however, the news from Ireland sparked panic amidst the Scottish Williamites as they feared the confused version of events would encourage Scottish Jacobites to stage an uprising whilst Mackay and his army were in the

¹²⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 223-225.

¹²⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 225, 264-265.

¹²⁴⁸ Childs, *Nine*, pp. 133, 146.

¹²⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 150.

Highlands. We will return to this in more depth shortly, but for now it is worth drawing a parallel with the panic provoked by the waves of misinformation after Killiecrankie.

The multi-faceted offensive on Inverlochy, and the Western Highlands more generally, was only the first step of Mackay's plan. He, his soldiers, and the engineers would now face the arduous task of constructing the fortifications on the ground of the old Cromwellian fortress which had lain in ruins since 1660.¹²⁵⁰ Mackay's initial impression was not favourable, later stating 'the situation of the old fort did not please me, being commanded from a near hill, but could not [sic] change it, there being none else so fit'.¹²⁵¹ After a few days' rest, Mackay ordered his men to begin work on the fort by piling earth '20 foot from the bottom of the fosse'.¹²⁵² According to Mackay, however, it would take eleven days to get these earthwork walls to their full height.¹²⁵³ Regardless, reconstructing them would be hard work with soldiers, exhausted from their long march, having to shovel and move earth. Trooper Alexander outlined the arduous nature of the labour, recalling 'we stayed neir a [sic] 20 days... till such tym[e] as the trench [sic] was mad[e] up'.¹²⁵⁴

Although there had been plans to improve upon the simple Cromwellian design at Inverlochy, it was decided that this would be too expensive and time-consuming.¹²⁵⁵ Mackay contented himself with having the fortress rebuilt as a simple earthwork citadel; an 'irregular' pentagon with a three-pointed bastion facing the loch and a wooden palisade, a wall made of large timbers, around the top.¹²⁵⁶ Whilst the new fort followed the Cromwellian layout, Mackay did order some small improvements to the fortifications.

¹²⁵⁰ Mackay, *Memoirs*, pp. 98-99. Anderson & Fleet, *Defending*, pp. 50-51.

¹²⁵¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 98

¹²⁵² *Ibid*; *DSL*, 'Fosse - A ditch, esp. one made for defence.'

¹²⁵³ Mackay, *Memoirs*, pp. 98-99.

¹²⁵⁴ Neil (ed.), 'Journal', p. 48.

¹²⁵⁵ Anderson & Fleet, *Defending*, p. 51.

¹²⁵⁶ *Ibid*.

The addition of a '*chemin couvert* and *glacis*' would, in his opinion, provide 'a perfect defence against all attempts' of the Jacobite army to successfully besiege the fort.¹²⁵⁷ With no artillery train to speak of, the Jacobite army would, if they wished to capture Fort William, have to rely upon a frontal assault. This would prove extremely costly in terms of lives, even with the simplest of fortifications in place since it would be defended by a garrison of 1,200 men.¹²⁵⁸

Fort William's construction was still ongoing, and whilst it was in this incomplete state Mackay could not depart with the bulk of the army to return to the Lowlands. Supply issues were becoming more evident as the Williamites lingered there. Mackay reported that his troops had eaten the entire supply of meal brought up by ship, originally intended for the use of the garrison, as the men 'had nothing else to eat'.¹²⁵⁹ The surrounding countryside proved inhospitable not only because of the predominance of Jacobite clans in the area, but the remote location of the garrison. Mackay wrote to Hamilton, stating that raiding parties had 'met with no castle within 20 miles'.¹²⁶⁰ The remote location also created issues for supply and communication for the garrison. This was underlined by Mackay when he complained of receiving 'feu expresses' or letters from the government in Edinburgh during his time in the Highlands.¹²⁶¹ The provisioning of Fort William, even during its construction, proved a considerable obstacle for the Scottish Williamite government and its army to overcome.

¹²⁵⁷ Ibid; Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 99. Please note: a *chemin couvert*, or 'covered way', refers to a path which provided the garrison with a covered walkway on top of the counterscarp, or outer wall, in front of the trench and the main walls. This allows the garrison a forward position of defence in front of the trench as well as providing a contiguous path for communication between the outer-walls and the inner-fortress. A *glacis* was an artificial slope which slightly inclined toward the walls to make an attacker's approach extremely dangerous as it provides a clear line of fire for defenders as they approached. See also: Childs, *Warfare*, 'Fig: Cross-section of the bastion system', p. 141.

¹²⁵⁸ Childs, *Warfare*, pp. 141-142. Jeremy Black, *A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1550-1800* (London, 1991), pp. 53-57.

¹²⁵⁹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Hamilton, 10th July 1689, p. 334.

¹²⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹²⁶¹ Ibid., p. 335.

The difficulty of communication only worsened the dearth of provisions as any unexpected needs of the garrison at Fort William could not be met rapidly. The delay in finishing construction, due to a lack of materials, particularly wooden planks, was a direct result of the limitations of such a location and contemporary supply networks.¹²⁶² The Williamite government was still having funding issues, but on 7th July 1690 Mackay made clear to the privy council that Fort William must be supplied with funds to offset its far removed position.¹²⁶³ He argued that the soldiers and officers ‘which are left here... [must] be encouradged, by providing liberally for them, for the countrey is not very tempting’.¹²⁶⁴ However, Mackay remained resolute to not leave Inverlochy until the garrison was ‘in a posture of defence’ adding ‘to which the speedy arryvall of the plancks [sic], canon and other materialls, wold contribut much’.¹²⁶⁵ Hill reinforced Mackay’s calls by adding that if there were no planks to build a barracks as well as store buildings, then the first bout of ‘foul weather’ might ruin the entire project.¹²⁶⁶ Mackay emphasised this again, pleading with the council, to ensure ‘the speedy supplying of this important poste, from the west, of such necessarys... otherwyse all the pains and expences men have been at may prove fruitlesse’.¹²⁶⁷

The problem with supply lines and communication at Fort William made Mackay anxious about the project’s success. He worried because the Jacobites in the Highlands did not seem like they would ‘submit till the winter force them’.¹²⁶⁸ Hill, as governor of the fort, reiterated Mackay’s concerns, explaining to Melville that the Jacobite clans resolution did not seem to have faltered and that they were ‘more sturdy then before’.¹²⁶⁹

¹²⁶² Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Privy Council, 7th July 1690, pp. 331-332.

¹²⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 332.

¹²⁶⁶ *Melvilles*, Colonel Hill to the Earl of Melvill, 10th July 1690, p. 468.

¹²⁶⁷ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Privy Council, 7th July 1690, p. 332.

¹²⁶⁸ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Hamilton, 10th July 1689 p. 335.

¹²⁶⁹ *Melvilles*, Colonel Hill to the Earl of Melvill, 10th July 1690, p. 468.

More workers with materials arrived by ship from Leith around 10th July, but the lack of supplies made the continued presence of the Williamite army untenable. In addition to the 4,000 Williamite soldiers, there were a considerable number of workers and baggage attendants present. Trooper Alexander estimated there could be as many as 8,000 men encamped at Inverlochy.¹²⁷⁰ The expedition had been planned based upon the understanding resupply ships would be regular. Therefore, soldiers had been instructed only to take enough provisions for the march itself. Trooper Alexander explained they were 'sore straitned for provisione by reasone we expected the ships wold [arrive], and furnished us'.¹²⁷¹ The extended stay of the Williamite army at Fort William, coupled with the backbreaking labour of constructing its walls, left many of the soldiers starving and ill.

The situation became so desperate by 10th July, that Mackay reported, 'Many of our baggage men desert us with their horses, most whereof fall into the hands of the ennemy'.¹²⁷² Mackay seemed resolved to stay in Inverlochy until more supplies of meal from Glasgow were sent up by ship to provide the garrison with a store of food.¹²⁷³ Mackay's plan to have a sizeable force in the midst of the Highlands was proving to be a challenging and costly endeavour, but it was viewed to be effective, at least within the Williamite officer corps. If the garrison could be maintained, then it would keep the Jacobite clans trapped within the Highlands, forced to protect their own lands from the possibility of raids and, in turn, prevent them from campaigning as they had done in 1689 and the early months of 1690.

During Mackay's stint in the Highlands, the ministers in William's regime were concerned by the absence of the bulk of their forces from the central lowlands for so long.

¹²⁷⁰ *Melvilles*, Mackay to Hamilton, 10th July 1690, p. 333. Neil (ed.), 'Journal', pp. 47-48.

¹²⁷¹ Neil (ed.), 'Journal', p. 48.

¹²⁷² Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Hamilton, 10th July 1689, p. 334.

¹²⁷³ *Ibid.*

For instance, William Carstares, an exiled Scot who had advised William since 1688, on a visit to Scotland reported that Mackay, 'hath been for some time at the place where he designs to make a fort for securing the peace of the Highlands'.¹²⁷⁴ Although Mackay's return was expected, daily, Cartstares surmised that there was a general anxiety during the Major-General, and his army's, absence: 'the distance of the armie [sic] from this [sic] makes malecontents here, and upon the borders, mighty insolent'.¹²⁷⁵ Clearly, it was felt that the considerable drain of manpower to establish Fort William would encourage covert Jacobites in Williamite controlled areas to consider the viability of an uprising. This anxiety was fuelled, in large part, by the discovery of the 'Montgomery plot'; whereby Sir James Montgomery, a prominent opposition member of the parliament, was revealed to be in communication with Jacobite agents and King James. The details of this plot have been plentifully covered elsewhere, such particularly by Harris and Riley, but the panic which the plot sparked within the Williamite government has not been fully appreciated.¹²⁷⁶ With Mackay, and a great deal of the Williamite army, stationed so far away, the Montgomery Plot made the Williamites in Edinburgh increasingly concerned. Equally, Carstares reported that the Jacobites in Scotland were spreading rumours, 'that there is to be shipt from Ireland a body of 1200 horse and dragoons, and some thousands of foot'.¹²⁷⁷ The lack of certainty surrounding the ramifications of the Battle of the Boyne exacerbated the fears amongst Williamite ministers that even these modest reinforcements could invigorate the Jacobite cause elsewhere in Scotland. An uprising in the disaffected areas of the North-East Lowlands or in the Anglo-Scottish Borders may

¹²⁷⁴ *Melvilles*, Mr William Carstares to [unknown], 9th July 1690, p. 465

¹²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷⁶ Harris, *Revolution*, pp. 411-412. Riley, *Scottish*, pp. 39-41.

¹²⁷⁷ *Melvilles*, Mr William Carstares to [unknown], 9th July 1690, p. 465.

have proven disastrous for the Williamites. Only one day later, Melville communicated to the court in London his concern:

You may easily judge the disadvantage I am at... the King at such a distance; all intelligence cutt off; the strength of our forces in the Highlands wher communication is cutt; such a Generall as would follow no councill... threatened with an invasion, which the Jacobins ar daily and hourly expecting ; neither haveing armes, amunition, or officers; so many disaffected people waiting but an opportunity to break out, and weel appointed for it, and, one of the greatest disadvantage of all, traitors in our bosome; so that we cannot promise ourselves 24 hours quiet.¹²⁷⁸

For Melville, and many within the Scottish Williamite government, the departure of both the King for Ireland as well as Mackay for the Highlands with the army appeared now to only offer a prospect for an uprising in another part of Scotland to occur backed by the landing of an Irish detachment.¹²⁷⁹ Melville now returned to criticising Mackay's strategy as an 'expense and hazard' without which 'much of our danger might have been easily prevented'.¹²⁸⁰ These fears amongst the government in Edinburgh were soon reinforced with anxieties from Queen Mary and the court in London, who had been left to govern in William's absence. Mary instructed her trusted adviser, Daniel Finch, second Earl of Nottingham, to share reports with Melville about the possibility of a rising in the Anglo-Scottish Borders and the deployment of more Anglo-Dutch forces there to prevent it.¹²⁸¹ These fears and anxieties only worsened as construction of Fort William continued at a slow-pace and the army remained at Inverlochy into mid-July.

¹²⁷⁸ *Melvilles*, Earl of Melvill probably to Monsieur D'Allone, 10th July 1690, p. 466

¹²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸¹ *Melvilles*, Earl of Nottingham to the Earl of Melvill, 12th July 1690, p. 468.

On 17th July, the remoteness of Mackay and the field army's position became untenable for both the government in Edinburgh and Queen Mary in London. News of the Anglo-Dutch fleet's heavy defeat at the hands of the French at Beachy Head, 10th July 1690, raised the spectre of a French invasion in the minds of the Williamites.¹²⁸² Mackay received an express from the privy council 'desiring me to repair with all speed south with the forces' and, on the following morning, he gave the order for the army to set out southward through Badenoch.¹²⁸³ He sent ahead Ferguson's marine detachment, aboard the Royal Navy frigates, to provide security for the West Coast and prevent any possible landing from Ireland.¹²⁸⁴ Mackay recalled that 'each souldier' was ordered to 'carry 8 days provisions of meal' because of the scarcity of baggage horses due to their loss on the march and desertion of their handlers, usually with their horses in tow.¹²⁸⁵ He left behind him Colonel Hill with 1,000 men under his command; the garrison was well supplied with meal, thirty barrels of 'acquavitae', £500 and sixty 'fat cows' for its use.¹²⁸⁶ Amongst those soldiers, McBane, the solider who had survived Killiecrankie.¹²⁸⁷ On the march back to the Lowlands, Mackay installed Lord Rae's Independent Highland Company, 140 men, in the ruins of Badenoch Castle.¹²⁸⁸ This would provide a garrison nearer to Fort William, which could facilitate communications overland and provide support.¹²⁸⁹ The Williamite field army arrived safely in Perth on 23rd July 1690, with the Jacobite clans offering little to no resistance as during their march through the glens.¹²⁹⁰ However, the return journey proved no less arduous as the severely weakened Williamite soldiers now

¹²⁸² Philip Aubrey, *The Defeat of James Stuart's Armada 1692* (Bristol, 1979), pp. 49-51. Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 99.

¹²⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸⁷ McBane, *Sword-Man's*, pp. 110-111.

¹²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*; Neil (ed.), 'Journal', p. 48.

¹²⁸⁹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 99.

¹²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

succumbed to the 'sickness which began to infect [sic] them at... Fort William'.¹²⁹¹

Mackay reported to the privy council, from Perth, that many of the soldiers, likely due to the lack of food, had come down with 'the bloody flux, so that if we expect more service of them... there is a necessity to lay them for a little tyme in quarters, of a refraishment, which I have accordingly order'd'.¹²⁹²

After a short period of rest those regiments on the expedition, particularly the Brigade, were dispatched to different quarters around the Kingdom to deter possible uprisings and guard against a possible invasion. Mackay's regiment were placed at Stirling, Ramsay's regiment were sent to guard Linlithgow, and Lauder's regiment was remained at Perth.¹²⁹³ Into the latter stages of the 1690 campaign, even as the Jacobites struggled to maintain the war, Mackay continued his pursuit of the Jacobite commanders and the small contingent of forces they gathered around them. The Brigade remained at the heart of the military strategy, with Mackay writing to Melville, in a letter dated 29th August 1690, that he intended to lodge 'our three Dutch battailons' at Inverness until the end of the campaigning season as this would put them in a position to pursue the Jacobites out of the North-East Lowlands and push them back into the Highlands, where the new Williamite garrisons and patrols troops awaited to entrap them.¹²⁹⁴ With garrisons already entrenched in areas to the south, such as Atholl and Stirling, the Jacobites ability to manoeuvre was severely restricted and their ability to muster forces with impunity was brought to an abrupt end. Attempts to gather together another 'Highland army' were overwhelmed by the field army and troops in local garrisons. The most notable instance of this was in the case of Kenneth Mackenzie, the fourth Earl of

¹²⁹¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Privy Council, 23rd July 1690, p. 340.

¹²⁹² *Ibid.*

¹²⁹³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 29th August 1690, p. 347.

Seaforth's abortive attempt to rouse 1,000 of his clan against the Williamites in the latter months of 1690.¹²⁹⁵ Threats to Mackenzie clan lands, in both the Highlands and the Lowlands, as well as the appearance of a modest Williamite field detachment under Mackay's command, encouraged Seaforth's relations to advise him to surrender himself at Inverness, which he accordingly did.¹²⁹⁶

The expedition to Inverlochy and subsequent establishment of Fort William effectively isolated the Jacobite heartlands in the Highlands from other possible areas of support. Mackay reported, as early as 7th July 1690, that 'Buchan, with Dunfermeling and such other low country gentlemen as were with them, are gone by way of Baidenoch... but not one man of this country with them'.¹²⁹⁷ They took this route hoping to encourage a parallel uprising in areas surrounding Inverness and, in particular, Aberdeen.¹²⁹⁸ However, they proved incapable of garnering significant backing in the area and only small groups of gentry elected to join them, periodically deserting them over the coming months. The Jacobite leadership proved unable to gather forces. In July 1690, Brigadier Cannon only had a force 'of no more than 150 foot and 60 horse' before he entered Stirlingshire to encourage the local gentry to join him, tellingly none of them chose to do so.¹²⁹⁹ Mackay's strategy separated the Scottish Jacobite army's commanders from their main constituency of support, several of the major Highland clans. Although these clans would remain in arms to protect their own territories from Williamite incursions, many would not elect to respond to calls to muster over the coming months; citing the threat the

¹²⁹⁵ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 244-246.

¹²⁹⁶ *ODNB*, Paul Hopkins, 'Mackenzie, Kenneth, fourth earl of Seaforth and Jacobite first marquess of Seaforth (bap. 1661, d. 1701), clan chief'.

¹²⁹⁷ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Privy Council, 7th July 1690, p. 332.

¹²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹⁹ *Melvilles*, Mr William Carstares probably to Monsieur D'Alone, 13th July 1690, p. 469.

garrison at Fort William, Ruthven and other garrisons encircling the Highland frontier now posed to them.¹³⁰⁰

The Scottish Williamite army's ability to launch reprisal raids from garrisons effectively halted the Jacobite chieftains, most notably Cameron of Lochiel, from deploying significant numbers in the field, as they had done in the previous two years of the conflict. Cameron would later recall that Fort William afforded the Williamites 'so strong a body of troops' in the Highlands that the clans could no longer effectively oppose them in 1691.¹³⁰¹ In his memoirs, Balcarres suggested that the major Jacobite misstep was not to seek a truce with Williamite ministers, like Melville and Tarbat, after the defeat at Cromdale. He argued that this would have at least gained time 'for the Highlanders to put themselves in a posture of defence'.¹³⁰² Major John Bernardi, an English Jacobite officer and military adviser to Seaforth, reported that Williamite 'Parties were continually almost [sic] scouting about the Country in the Day Time'.¹³⁰³ This made communications between the straitened Jacobite clan chieftains, in the west, and the Jacobite general-staff, in the east, all the more difficult. Colonel Richard Cunningham, a Williamite dragoon commander dispatched north, illustrated the separation which existed amongst the Jacobites, stating:

My party [of 600 men] is stronger than any they can bring to the feilds [sic], and this is the only time in the year to ruin their countrey, just when they have taken in their cornes, which is the most part of their subsistance for the winter time... I shall

¹³⁰⁰ Mackay, *Memoirs*, 'Advantage of the Highlanders', p. 116.

¹³⁰¹ *Cameron*, p. 299.

¹³⁰² Balcarres, *Memoirs*, p. 63.

¹³⁰³ *ODNB*, T.F. Henderson & John Childs, 'Bernardi, John (1657–1736), army officer and Jacobite conspirator'. Bernardi, *Short*, p. 76.

be somewhat troublesome to them blades in the hills, if they have any thing to
loose [sic].¹³⁰⁴

By October 1690, the privy council reported to Melville, 'The state of the rebels in the highlands becomeing desperat [sic], hes obleidged severall of the chieff of them... to render themselves prisoners, and submitt [sic] to his Majesties mercie'.¹³⁰⁵ When Livingstone succeeded Major-General Mackay as Scottish commander-in-chief, in December 1690, he underlined the need to stick with his predecessor's strategy: 'The Fort [William] is secure and weell yett [sic], and, if it be not neglected to send provisiones in due tyme [sic], and allways befor[e] hand, ther is no fear of it'.¹³⁰⁶

Although Fort William did not, in and of itself, end the Highland War it proved a decisive factor in confining the Jacobite clans to the Highlands and allowing the Williamite regime to redeploy regiments stationed in Scotland to other theatres of the Nine Years' War. Even Viscount Tarbat admitted, whilst critiquing Mackay's strategy as a needless expense, that the Fort William expedition had meant 'the Highlanders did not draw to a body, but each clan stayed on their own lands'.¹³⁰⁷ The establishment of a sizeable garrison at Inverlochy had been an expensive and arduous process, but the Williamite offensive in the summer of 1690 had, ultimately, stunned the clans into inaction for the remainder of the conflict. During this final phase, both the Jacobites and the Williamites in Scotland were weakened by the protracted campaigning of the Highland War. For the latter, the considerable expense of maintaining an enlarged standing army proved too much. The end of the Highland War would only come as a

¹³⁰⁴ *Melvilles*, Colonel Richard Cunningham to Melville, Aberdeen, 15th September 1690, p. 158.

¹³⁰⁵ Mackay, *Memoirs*, The Privy Council to Lord Melvill, Edinburgh, 16th October 1690, pp. 358-359.

¹³⁰⁶ *Melvilles*, Sir Thomas Livingstone to the Earl of Melvill, 16th December 1690, p. 583.

¹³⁰⁷ CSP, Domestic Series, William and Mary, November 1691- December 1692, Vol III, Viscount Tarbat to the King, Undated 1691.

result of interconnected events in the greater pan-European conflict occurring in Ireland and in Flanders.

The End of the Highland War, 1690-1691

The beginning of the end for the Highland War came after the establishment of Fort William at Inverlochy. This was reflected in the Williamite Scottish military overall as the government found that it could effectively maintain pressure on the Jacobite clans with fewer soldiers in garrisons and at much lesser cost.¹³⁰⁸ As early as November 1690, the Scottish Williamite government had been instructed to release the first and the second Scots-Dutch regiments, Mackay and Ramsay's respectively, from service in Scotland. They were to be dispatched to the Dutch Republic to be utilised there.¹³⁰⁹ Furthermore, they were to be accompanied by the Cameronian regiment of foot and a battalion of the Scots Guards.¹³¹⁰ By July 1691, they could be seen in the ranks of William's 'Royal Confederate Army' in Flanders; serving in the left wing of the infantry contingent.¹³¹¹ Major-General Mackay did not join his men in Flanders, as his 'long experience' as a military commander was deemed needed in Ireland.¹³¹² After convalescing in Guelderland for the winter, Mackay would land at Mullingar on 28th May 1691, accompanied by Thomas Tollemache, his former comrade from Dutch service.¹³¹³ Mackay's advice would prove critical in General de Ginkell's decision to fight a pitched battle at Aughrim, 12th July 1691, where the Williamites won a decisive victory and the Jacobites received a heavy blow following

¹³⁰⁸ *NRS*, E7/5, Treasury Register, 1688-1690 'Precept. For 5000lb Sterl to Major Genrall Mackay', 14th June 1690, p. 420. PC12/15/113, For raising a regiment for Colonel Hill and reducing others, 29 November 1690.

¹³⁰⁹ *NRS*, GD26/9/285, Letters (2) signed by William Blathewayt on behalf of the King, to the E. of Melville, regarding the sending of the regiment commanded by Major-General Mackay and Col. Ramsay, a battalion of the Scots Guards, and the E. of Angus' Reg of foot, to Flanders, November 1690.

¹³¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹¹ *National Army Museum [NAM]*, 1999-02-115-1, Exact List of the Royal Confederate Army in Flanders, 27th July 1691.

¹³¹² *ODNB*, Mackay. Childs, *Ireland*, p. 334.

¹³¹³ *Ibid.*

the death of the French marshal, Charles Chalmot de Saint Ruhe.¹³¹⁴ Mackay was present at second siege of Limerick, August-October 1691, and at the signing of the Treaty of Limerick, 3rd October 1691, which saw the war in Ireland end.¹³¹⁵

Left behind in Scotland, however, in 1691 was the third Scots-Dutch regiment, commanded by Colonel George Lauder.¹³¹⁶ Throughout that year, Lauder's men acted as the remaining corps of continental veterans in Scotland and were deployed on a variety of operations during that time. However, the defeat of the Irish Jacobites at Aughrim coupled with the encirclement and policing of the Highlands, saw the Scottish Jacobite army lose its main constituency of support from the clans in those areas and, therefore, the ability to field a force of significant size. Fort William was the lynchpin of the success of this strategy as the perpetual presence of troops in Inverlochy would keep the Camerons of Lochiel from taking the field or encouraging others to do so under King James' banner. This paralysis of the Jacobite Highlands continued unabated. Moreover, the Williamite government's considerable military presence in the North-East Lowlands kept most Jacobite sympathisers in awe. It is telling that most of the areas with a sizeable Episcopalian populace, such as Aberdeenshire, Inverness, Montrose, and Angus, did not venture to join the Jacobite army in any great numbers during the Highland War. In fact, as early as January 1691, the crown and the Scottish Williamite government began discussing proposals to significantly reduce their standing army.¹³¹⁷ By 30th June 1691, the Jacobite clans' resolve, and that of their commanders, had been truly broken as they agreed 'to forbear acts of hostility by Sea or Land' in the truce signed at Achallader.¹³¹⁸ The Williamite regime in Scotland was evidently confident that the Jacobite forces could

¹³¹⁴ Ibid.

¹³¹⁵ Childs, *Ireland*, pp. 385-394.

¹³¹⁶ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 486.

¹³¹⁷ *RPCS*, XVI, Letter from his Majesty anent disbanding of the forces, 6th January 1691, p. 8.

¹³¹⁸ Duncan Forbes (ed.), *Culloden Papers* (London, 1815), Cessation of Hostilities for a stated Time, 30th June 1691, p. 18.

do them little harm, a confidence which had only grown over the last year.¹³¹⁹ The Jacobite chieftains agreement to a truce until October 1691 was, in essence, an implicit admission of defeat as the summer campaigning season was vital for the clans, as Gaelic warfare was still structured around the agricultural calendar.¹³²⁰ The same was not true of the Williamite standing army which, with the help of well-placed garrisons, like Fort William and Ruthven, could operate all year round.¹³²¹ This, not Cromdale, marked the end of the Highland War. Indeed, this new-found confidence allowed the Williamite regime to begin levying Scottish men to reinforce the Scots-Dutch regiments in Flanders, and Lauder's Scots-Dutch regiment was destined to join their comrades in the Low Countries by the end of 1691.¹³²²

Conclusion

The impact of the establishment of Fort William upon the Highland War cannot be underestimated. This large-scale expedition marched across the Highlands and established a garrison which would remain a permanent presence in the area for the better part of the next century. Moreover, the impact of the garrison at Inverlochy can be felt to this very day as the town surrounding it now bears its name, Fort William in English, and the colloquial Gaelic place name of '*An Gearasdan*', or 'the Garrison'. The final stages of the Highland War, from mid-1690 to late 1691, were characterised by a weakening of resolve on both sides. The Scottish Williamites did not have the resources nor the political will to continue campaigning in the Highlands indefinitely and the Jacobites, particularly the Highland clans, could not maintain their cause in the face of relentless harassment and pursuit without external support. Both sides were exhausted by

¹³¹⁹ *RPCS*, XVI, Letter from his Majesty anent disbanding of the forces, 6th January 1691, p. 8.

¹³²⁰ *RPCS*, XVI, Establishment for the pay of their Majesties' forces in Scotland', 1st January 1691, p. 10.

¹³²¹ *Ibid*; Hill, *Celtic*, pp. 1-6.

¹³²² *RPCS*, XVI, Act for levying recruits, 17th November 1691, pp. 601-602.

1691, as Szechi has pointed out.¹³²³ The logistical problems faced by the Scottish Williamites in establishing Fort William only continued as they were forced to maintain the garrison there. The fortress had been the lynchpin of Mackay's plan to end the war and although it was not entirely successful the garrison was adequate to keep Jacobite forces preoccupied in the Highlands as they had not been in previous years of the conflict. Nevertheless, the Jacobite threat lingered until the defeat of James' forces in Ireland and the withdrawal of French support there. Equally, William of Orange wished his Scots-Dutch, English, and Scottish regiments to be redeployed from Scotland to Flanders. The end of the Highland War was not decided by a single battle, but a gradual process of attrition on both sides framed by William's geo-political objectives.

Chapter Five - The Scottish Williamite State and the Highland War

Previous chapters have critically re-examined the course of the Highland War, exposing the Scots-Dutch Brigade's central role in the conflict. In the final chapter of this thesis, we will explore how the Scottish Williamite state reacted to the Highland War and

¹³²³ Szechi, *Jacobites*, pp. 71-72.

the impact which war had upon the state's structures and finances. Historians, like Brewer and D.W. Jones, have identified the Revolution and subsequent Nine Years' War as a foundational moment in the rise of the 'fiscal-military' state in Britain.¹³²⁴ However, much of the research on the development and operation of the fiscal-military state in a British context has, in fact, focused solely upon England.¹³²⁵ Braddick goes so far as to argue that, post-1688, the English army was unassailable, leading into a narrative of the predominance of the English state in Britain.¹³²⁶ Such a narrative easily lends itself to the notion that the Scottish state was, by comparison, less developed and less effective than its southern counterpart.¹³²⁷ Moreover, this has been reinforced by the contention that the post-Revolution Scottish Williamite army was effectively an extension of the English, or proto-British, state.¹³²⁸ Whilst the 'Royal Scots Army', or Scottish government's army, was certainly more co-operative with its English counterpart from 1660 onwards, the notion that the Scottish state was simply an extension of the English one is far too simplistic.

Such misconceptions do not allow scholars to adequately explore the nuances of the Scottish state in its twilight years, from 1689 to 1707. However, a more recent revival of interest in the vitality of the Scottish state, particularly the Scottish parliament, during this period has helped to challenge such assertions.¹³²⁹ The military finances of the Scottish Williamite state and the scale of its army during this period has, on the few occasions it has been considered, been unhelpfully compared to its larger southern

¹³²⁴ Brewer, *Sinews*, p. 250. Jones, *War*, p. 7.

¹³²⁵ *Ibid*; Braddick, 'Rise' in *Companion*, pp. 69-87.

¹³²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

¹³²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³²⁸ Fortescue, *British*, I, pp. 307, 360, 378, 381.

¹³²⁹ Young, 'securing' In A. Soddu & F. Soddu (eds.), *Assemblee*, pp. 229-238. Whatley, *Scots*. Macinnes, *Union*. D. Szechi, & D. Hayton, 'John Bull's Other Kingdoms: The Government of Scotland and Ireland' in C. Jones, (ed.), *Britain in the First Age of Party, 1680-1750* (London, 2003), pp. 241-280.

neighbour's greater financial and military capacity.¹³³⁰ Viewed within the long-shadow of the Anglo-Scottish Union it is easy to consider the Scottish state and army as simply an addendum to an Anglo-dominated British state structure. However, this has led to a serious gap in our understanding of Scotland during the period after 1688; a conspicuous absence of work on this era has been noted by scholars, namely by Brown and Morrill.¹³³¹ The lacuna surrounding this period has, it must be said, been partly redressed in recent years, most notably by Raffe.¹³³²

In the context of the Highland War, we can see this narrative of English predominance has affected scholars, such as Szechi. He declares the conflict in Scotland was only won with the intervention of English troops and the injection of English capital.¹³³³ Previous chapters have illustrated that this was not the case. Although the military aid of English regiments was welcomed by Scottish Williamites, their presence was relatively modest compared to the Scottish regiments raised for the cause by the government in Edinburgh. Equally, Szechi, among others, has co-opted the Scots-Dutch Brigade into this English contingent due to confusion surrounding the manner in which the Scots-Dutch regiments were paid during their incursions in England and Scotland.¹³³⁴ We shall demonstrate, in due course, that the Brigade, although paid via the English Treasury, was not co-opted into the English establishment and, thus, cannot be considered part of the English military presence in Scotland. The case for English aid to the Scottish Williamite state proves more compelling, as the importation of up-to-date firearms, artillery, ammunition, and money proved critical to sustaining the Scottish Williamite

¹³³⁰ S.H.F., Johnston 'The Scots army in the reign of Anne' in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th Series, 3 (1953), pp. 10-16. R.E. Scouller, *The Armies of Queen Anne* (Oxford, 1966), pp. 80-82. G.M. Trevelyan, *England Under Queen Anne: Ramilles and the Union with Scotland* (London, 1948).

¹³³¹ Brown, 'Scottish', pp. 5-24. Morrill, 'Sensible' in *Anglo-Dutch*, pp. 73-104.

¹³³² Raffe, *Scotland*.

¹³³³ Szechi, *Jacobites*, pp. 71-72.

¹³³⁴ *Ibid*; Childs, *British*, p. 55. Childs, 'Scottish', pp. 59-61. Childs, *Nine*, p. 20.

military and maintaining its war against the Jacobites.¹³³⁵ The cost of English military aid, land and sea, would further belie the suggestion that William did not pay attention to Scotland during the Highland War. Devine has argued, akin to many other historians, that Scotland was denied naval support from the crown.¹³³⁶ This has, more recently, been countered by work of Murdoch and Colin Helling, both of whom illustrate that William proved more than willing to deploy his newly acquired navy to Scotland, with sixteen Royal Navy warships deployed to Scottish waters in late 1689 alone.¹³³⁷ However, the focus of this thesis remains the Brigade and, in this chapter, one aspect of the Scottish Williamite state's military finances, the army's personnel related costs. More work needs to be done on the financial and logistical contributions, during the Highland War, particularly regarding the importation and purchase of more up to date military equipment for the use of the Scottish Williamites.¹³³⁸ More importantly, the injection of capital and supplies from the English state does not negate the significant financial costs the Scottish state incurred in waging the Highland War.

In this chapter, we will examine the efforts of the Scottish Williamite state to combat the Jacobites. It will demonstrate that the Scottish Williamite state was able to drastically expand its fiscal-military capacity during the Highland War. The seriousness with which the government in Edinburgh took the Jacobites is made clear by the significant investment of public revenues into levying and maintaining an enlarged standing army. An investigation of one aspect of that expansion brings a new perspective to the development of the fiscal-military state in Scotland during this period; one that

¹³³⁵ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 18th April 1689, p. 45. *RPCS*, XIV, Missive to the Earl of Argyll, 6th August 1689, pp. 16-17. *NRS*, E96/34, Artillery and military stores – Papers relating to artillery, Feb 1690-Dec 1691.

¹³³⁶ Tom Devine, *Scotland's Empire, 1600-1815* (London, 2003), pp. 41, 65.

¹³³⁷ Murdoch, *Terror*, p. 286. Helling, 'Royal Navy', pp. 135-137, 182-186.

¹³³⁸ Note: A good example of this type of financial contributions was the donation of a sum of £5,000 from the English Treasury, but it was stipulated by the crown that the money should be outlaid for the Fort William expedition's use in 1690. See: Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 92. *CSP*, William and Mary, Vol II, The Earl of Argyll, Alexander Melville, and others to the King, 1st March 1690.

initially differed from developments in England. Raising, supplying, and maintaining a standing army during this period, even a relatively small force, required vast amounts of capital and effort. Even if the results were less than magnificent, the Scottish state's ability to navigate financial crises incurred by rising costs, resultant debt, and political impasse from this almost unprecedented expansion of their army demonstrates a certain durability. Despite ultimately accruing huge debts to finance the Highland War and increase the military presence in the Highlands, the state was able to survive the significant challenges they faced, eventually leading to the capitulation of the Scottish Jacobite army.

This chapter must be considered as a prospective survey of the Scottish Williamite state's fiscal-military capacity during the conflict. There proved to be a large and varied corpus of material, mainly in the Scottish treasury and exchequer collections of the *NRS*, related to provisioning, arms importation, contracting craftsmen to produce equipment, and the use of credit by officers to maintain their regiments. Therefore, this is, by no means, the last word upon the subject and the chapter has been deliberately limited in scope to the active stages of the Highland War, 1689-91, and to one aspect of the Scottish fiscal-military state's spending and expansion, army personnel related costs. The army's personnel related cost is an especially helpful way into this topic. It not only gives us an account of the fluctuation in the expansion of the Williamite state's military capacity, but an indication of the impact of the war upon the state's finances. In future, this study could be expanded to encapsulate the full military expenditure of the Scottish state during the Highland War as well as the longer-term financial impact of the conflict upon Scotland. For now, this chapter will focus upon the cost of the Williamite army's personnel during the war years. It must be noted that army personnel related costs do not necessarily correlate to the real payment of the forces at that time, but rather to the sum of money the

state was having to outlay upon recruiting and maintaining soldiers themselves. The Williamite state in Scotland accrued significant debts, many of which were not immediately repaid. Instead, throughout the war, the state operated with a deficit in its finances and offered regiment's officers precepts for them to draw upon creditors, allowing their regiments access to specie from local government officials or private citizens, most commonly merchants.

The first section will provide an explanation of the structures of the Scottish state during this period as well as an analysis of how this has been treated within the historiography. It will explore the Scottish state's utilisation of precedents from previous administrations to raise, organise and maintain an army effectively. The section will then contextualise the development of state structures immediately prior to and during the Highland War. This will delineate these structures to give the reader a better notion of which precedents the Scottish Williamite government modelled their approach upon and how these structures interacted and worked together; most notably the Scottish privy council and treasury commission along with the officers of state attendant upon these bodies.¹³³⁹ Additionally, the structures that worked close with these branches of government, such as the parliamentary committees, shire committees, local government officials, as well as the officers and commissaries of the army, will be examined. This reveals that the state in Scotland had elements of continuity in the way it waged war. The changes to the Scottish state were neither radical nor revolutionary, but incremental and evolutionary, with a preference for building upon preceding fiscal-military innovations of the mid-1600s and the Restoration period.

The second section will provide an examination of the Scottish crown's finances and the Williamite army by analysing the government's annual average income,

¹³³⁹ Rayner, 'Tribulations', p. 193.

expenditure, and surplus from 1686 to 1691; in other words, from the pre-Revolution period to the end of the Highland War. This will demonstrate that the state in Scotland generally expanded from 1688 onwards with an exponential increase in its military capacity during the Highland War. Corresponding graphs for the average crown finances (Table 1.0) and the annual army personnel related costs (Table 1.1) will illustrate the dramatic increase of the Scottish Williamite army after the Revolution. This will be accompanied by a brief aside on the Scots-Dutch Brigade's finances and the way they were maintained during their sojourn to Scotland. In spite of being paid via the English Treasury, this section will elucidate the fact that the Brigade remained a part of the Dutch army establishment and, ultimately, the money they were paid was reimbursed by the Dutch States General at the end of William III's reign, 1702.

The third, and final, section of this chapter will analyse the personnel related costs of the Scottish government's army from King James VII's pre-war establishment in 1688 to the Williamite establishment from 1689 to 1691. This will be carried on a year-by-year basis, with a corresponding analysis accompanying the graphs and figures to better explain the changes in these costs during the aforementioned period. Personnel related cost represents the best and most consistent evidence which illuminates our understanding of the expansion of the Scottish Williamite state's fiscal-military capacity, from the foundations of the standing army established by James to the enlarged force raised on behalf of William & Mary. Army personnel related costs can be defined here as any cost incurred concerning personnel; wages, subsistence and clothing payments made to the regiments as well as the costs incurred maintaining soldiers in garrisons.¹³⁴⁰ Each year

¹³⁴⁰ *NRS*, E7/5, Treasury Register, 1688-1689; E91/2, Exchequer Records: Army accounts - Account of money paid to the forces, November 1689-June 1701; E91/3, Exchequer Records: Army accounts - Account of Sir George Hamilton of Barnton, commissary general, audited 6 Mar 1695, July 1689-June 1690; E91/4, Exchequer Records: Army accounts - Account of money paid to the forces by James Oswald of Fingalton, commissary of the forces, March 1689-June 1690; E91/5, Exchequer Records: Army accounts - Account of

has been broken down into a month-by-month analysis of this expenditure of the army, rounded up to the nearest pound Sterling, and is accompanied by a corresponding graph.¹³⁴¹ This section will be introduced by a short segment outlining intricacy of these records along with some background on the Scottish economy during this period and a graph of overall crown finances, income and expenditure, for the period of 1686 to 1692.¹³⁴² It must also be clarified that the Scottish crown's financial accounts and the army's accounts utilised different currencies in their records, pounds Scots and Sterling. By comparing the overall finances of the crown and the personnel related costs of the 1688 army, this section will demonstrate that there was an exponential increase in the size of the government's standing army, and subsequently a rise in the money required to maintain it, during the Highland War. For example, in 1688 the total personnel related costs of the Scottish standing army was £46,076, but by the following year, 1689, it had almost doubled with the army requiring £76,277 in total.¹³⁴³ Although the Williamite state would struggle to pay for this rising cost, it continued to expand its army into the following year, weathering financial crisis and political uncertainty as well as civil war.

Since this is the first examination of the Scottish Williamite army's finances during the Highland War it is worth briefly explaining the sources utilised. The *NRS* has many exchequer records for this period. The personnel related costs of the army from 1688 to 1691 was calculated using data collated from two main collections of these records. The

money paid to the forces by James Oswald and James Dunlop, commissaries of the forces, June 1690-February 1691.

¹³⁴¹ See below: Tables 1.1, 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3.

¹³⁴² *NRS*, E26/12/2, Exchequer Records: Volume of Treasury Accounts - William, Marquess of Queensberry, Treasurer, and John Drummond of Lundin, Treasurer-depute, audited 14 Apr 1688, 5 March 1686-15 August 1688; E26/12/3, Exchequer Records: Treasury Accounts, Volume of Treasury Accounts - Lord Commissioners of the Treasury, audited 15 Aug 1688, 19 April 1684-1 March 1686; E26/12/4, Exchequer Records: Treasury Accounts, Volume of Treasury Accounts - Lord Commissioners of the Treasury, audited 16 Dec 1696, 15 August 1688-1 March 1692.

¹³⁴³ *NRS*, E7/4, Treasury Accounts, 1686-88; E91/4, Treasury Accounts 1689-90; E7/5, Treasury Accounts, 1688-90.

first of these was the E7 Treasury Registers, which contain minutes of the money disbursed to the regiments and garrisons of the Scottish government's army.¹³⁴⁴ Gaps in these records were augmented by a survey of the E91 army accounts, for the same period, comprised of volumes relating specifically to the army's finances as well as general accounts from the commissaries for paying regiments and garrisons.¹³⁴⁵ There was some minor overlap between E91/2, which covered 1689 to 1701, and E91/4, covering 1689 to 1690. To minimise this, and avoid duplicate sums of money, army payments relating to personnel from these accounts were cross-referenced with the exchequer records, specifically E26/12/4. Additionally, the E91/4 accounts utilised pounds Scots and were kept by Sir James Oswald. On the other hand, E91/2 and E91/5 both utilised pounds Sterling but were kept by two separate accountants. The first was drawn up by Sir Thomas Moncrieffe and his servant David Callendar. The second was authored by Oswald, but this time with the assistance of James Dunlop and with Sterling as the denomination.¹³⁴⁶ Further complicating matters was the lack of clear written denominations throughout all of the aforementioned accounts, except in a few instances. These instances proved critical to discerning which denomination each army account was kept in. Below are a series of examples (Figures 1, 2 & 3) which illustrate the palaeographical differences between the abbreviation of each currency.

¹³⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁴⁵ *NRS*, E91/2, Account of money paid to the forces, 1689-1701. Ibid., E91/4, Account of money paid to the forces by James Oswald of Fingalton, commissary of the forces, March 1689-June 1690. Ibid., E91/5, Account of money paid to the forces by James Oswald and James Dunlop, commissaries of the forces, June 1690-February 1691. Ibid., E91/6, List of precepts drawn by the lords of the treasury and committee of Parliament on George Bailie of Jerviswood, showing the shires, burghs and individuals upon whose accounts they were drawn, and regiments, troops etc., for which they were paid, 1689-1691.

¹³⁴⁶ Note: This change in denomination likely came at the treasury or the crown's behest to bring Oswald's army accounts into line with the others and to make them easier to understand in London, where William was, of course, usually based during this period.




Figure 1: NRS, E7/4, 'Sterling' – example from 1686-88.




Figure 2: NRS, E91/2, 'Sterl' – example shows an abbreviation of Sterling within the army accounts written for the period 1689-90.




Figure 3: NRS, E7/5, 'Scots' – example shows an account with the denomination noted as Scots, 1687-88.

All of the above sources were audited internally by the Scottish treasury commission, before being examined as part of the overall crown expenditure, income and

surplus, in the years following the Highland War.¹³⁴⁷ The Lord Commissioners of the Treasury were responsible for every penny when the crown's appointed auditors examined the state's income and expenditure, albeit this usually occurred a few years later than those years the accounts concerned. For example, the treasury's finances for the period of 1688 to 1692 were not audited until the year 1696.¹³⁴⁸ Additionally, the treasury commission was, at the time, overseen by the Scottish privy council which, as the effective executive of day-to-day governance, supervised and directed much of the state's finances.¹³⁴⁹ Therefore, as these figures were both audited and overseen by other arms of the Scottish state we can assume the accounts were broadly accurate. These sources, however, only covered domestic revenues utilised to pay for the Highland War. The discovery that the conflict was partly funded by foreign investment emanated from an investigation of the *Calendar of State Papers [CSP]* or *English Treasury Papers*, albeit these will not be explored in this thesis.¹³⁵⁰ Furthermore, this analysis of the quantitative data from the treasury has been expanded by an examination of contemporaneous sources which provide observations on the Highland War and the Scottish Williamite state; this provides perspectives on the expansion of the standing army from its officers, such as Major-General Mackay, Scottish Privy councillors, King William's secretaries, such as Lord Melville and William Blathwayt, and, in rare cases such as William McBane's, from soldiers serving in the Williamite ranks.¹³⁵¹ These observations provide us with an understanding of the impact of the Highland War upon Scottish state structures and how these structures dealt with said conflict. The management and co-ordination of the Williamite war effort has been gleaned from the *RPCS* and the *RPS*, both of which co-

¹³⁴⁷ *NRS*, E26/12/2 Treasury Accounts, 1686-1688; E26/12/3, Treasury Accounts, 1684-1686; E26/12/4, Treasury Accounts, August 1688-1692.

¹³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴⁹ Rayner, 'Tribulations', p. 198.

¹³⁵⁰ *CSP*, Domestic, William and Mary, Vols I-III, 1688-1691.

¹³⁵¹ *NLS*, MS3740, Letters & Documents. Mackay, *Memoirs. Melvilles.*

ordinated the army by providing orders, recommendations and directions as well as accompanying legislation.¹³⁵² In order to fully understand the scale of the expansion of the Scottish state's fiscal-military capacity during this period, we must first turn to the structures and precedents upon which that expansion was built.

Structures & Precedents: The 'Fiscal-Military' State in Scotland

When the Highland War erupted in March 1689, the Scottish state was completely unprepared for a domestic conflict. The collapse of King James' regime in 1688 led to both the disbandment of the Scottish government's army and a lack of funds due to a lapse in collection of revenues across localities in Scotland.¹³⁵³ In Chapter one, we detailed how the Scottish Convention of Estates formed an interim administration and when Viscount Dundee raised the Jacobite standard the Williamites had to rapidly take steps to levy an entirely new army.¹³⁵⁴ As a result, the Scottish Williamites found themselves drawing upon tried and tested precedents to hastily organise and finance their defence. The Scottish privy council found it needed external support from the Prince of Orange in England to reinforce their security and provide initial funds. Critically, William had planned to send the Scots-Dutch Brigade and other auxiliary forces to Scotland prior to the outbreak of the Highland War which provided the Convention with prepared military forces which could ensure their immediate security as well as provide much needed military expertise.¹³⁵⁵ Equally, the reality of the impending civil war shocked the Convention into passing financial legislation, known as an act of supply, to utilise public funds to defend itself from the counter-revolutionary threat of the Jacobites.¹³⁵⁶ The

¹³⁵² *RPCS*, Vol XIII-XVI, 1686-1691.

¹³⁵³ Raffe, *Scotland*, pp. 109, 152-153.

¹³⁵⁴ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 26th March 1689, p. 18. Smyth (ed.), *Letters*, 'For his Grace the Duke of Hamilton', 27th March 1689, pp. 32-34.

¹³⁵⁵ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Instructions to Mackay, 7th March 1689, p. 221.

¹³⁵⁶ *RPS*, 1689/3/72, Act approving the good services done by several persons belonging to Glasgow, Argyll and other western shires, 28th March 1689.

Williamites seizure of political control at the Convention of Estates lent them *de jure* control of the country and this legitimacy, in turn, allowed them access to the bulk of Scotland's public revenues.¹³⁵⁷ For much of the Highland War, the collection of funds could not keep pace with the Williamite government's expenditure, especially given the rapid outbreak of the conflict. The need to keep an expanded standing army on foot and the maintenance cost of key garrisons for securing the Highland-Lowland frontiers only compounded the issue. However, the state was kept financially solvent by the episodic injection of capital from the crown from April 1689 onwards. Credit played a critical role with the Williamite state often encouraging army officers to maintain their regiments at their own expense, particularly during times of dearth, and offering reimbursement from the Treasury later.¹³⁵⁸ In fact, although personnel related costs were calculated on a month-to-month basis, regiments were often paid intermittently with only small amounts of 'subsistence money' offered for basic necessities, such as food and board. Matters were particularly challenging because even before the Highland War began, the Scottish state's finances were in a precarious position.

The background of Restoration state finance is particularly important to revisit before delving into the structure of the Scottish state during the Highland War. Successive regimes in Scotland, from 1660 onwards, wished to keep a standing army on foot and this desire for security led to increased expenditure, which was managed via borrowing precedents. Charles II's government of Scotland has been noted for its revival of the standing army in Scotland.¹³⁵⁹ His regimes, and that of his successor, James VII, sought to maintain a professional military establishment for 'internal security'.¹³⁶⁰ Roy Wallace

¹³⁵⁷ Raffe, *Scotland*, pp. 133-134, 152-153.

¹³⁵⁸ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Sir James Leslie to Melville, 6th December 1689, p. 300.

¹³⁵⁹ Childs, *Charles II*, p. 197.

¹³⁶⁰ Ronald Arthur Lee, 'Government and Politics in Scotland, 1661-1681', (Unpublished thesis, University of Glasgow, 1995), p. 137.

Lennox has pointed out, that the Scottish state during this period, 'did not scorn using the fiscal innovations of the Covenanting rebels... if they proved profitable'.¹³⁶¹ The Covenanters required extraordinary levels of public revenue to fund their war efforts of the mid-century and, thus, could not afford to be content with the outmoded taxation system that preceded them.¹³⁶² Although Charles II's Scottish force was only 2,500 men strong, effective access to revenues would be required to maintain an 'effective standing army'.¹³⁶³ This was seen as paramount to the maintenance of security for the Scottish regimes of Charles II and James VII.¹³⁶⁴ Lee has equally underlined this, stating 'The need to pay the army proved to be the biggest problem facing the Treasury' in Scotland.¹³⁶⁵ The standing army consistently increased in size during this period (1661-1688), but this would mean the government increasingly required grants of taxation to continue expanding the size of said army.¹³⁶⁶

The Restoration relied upon precedents, but sought to bring in incremental improvements with the inland excise forming the backbone of the state's fiscal system.¹³⁶⁷ Additionally, the collection of cess provided vital funds to maintain the army, albeit proved to be a less reliable source of income.¹³⁶⁸ Lennox stated 'Although in principle the inland excise supported the standing army, the realities of fiscal administration demanded occasionally that other sources of income be utilized'.¹³⁶⁹ These alternative sources of income, most notably customs on foreign imports, were required to finance the security of the Restoration governments in Scotland. Just as war was the catalyst for

¹³⁶¹ Roy Wallace Lennox, 'Lauderdale and Scotland: A Study in Restoration Politics and Administration, 1660-1682', (Unpublished thesis, Columbia University, 1977), p. 44.

¹³⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 46.

¹³⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 331-332. Lee, *Government and Politics*, p. 104. Raffe, *Scotland*, p. 27.

¹³⁶⁴ Note: With a degree of good reason as the multiple Covenanter risings in 1666, 1679, and 1685 attest.

¹³⁶⁵ Lee, *Government*, p. 104.

¹³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶⁷ Lennox, *Lauderdale*, p. 308.

¹³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 336.

expansion of other European monarchies access to financial resources, the maintenance of internal security had the same effect in Scotland.¹³⁷⁰ Direct taxation became an increasingly important source of revenue and this, in turn, created the need for the Scottish parliament to provide warrants for this.¹³⁷¹ Goodare and Hoppitt have contested that during the Restoration period, and prior to the union of 1707, there were strong pressures to limit the central government's spending and its access to revenues.¹³⁷² Hoppitt emphasised that taxes fell after 1688, unlike in England, due to 'economic and demographic' tribulations in Scotland.¹³⁷³ However, Murdoch has pointed out that such economic difficulties may have been limited to the Scottish Treasury as mercantile networks continued to generate profits for private individuals and consortiums, as opposed to providing adequate revenue for the central government.¹³⁷⁴ Regardless, the Restoration governments in Scotland found themselves trapped in a vicious spending cycle related to the military, whereby they had to increase taxation to pay for more troops, but required more soldiers to collect the said revenue and ensure their security.¹³⁷⁵ In spite of this, the Restoration regimes managed to maintain the standing army from the 1660s onwards and their utilisation of fiscal precedents set a clear example for the Scottish Williamite government in 1689. This fiscal balancing act, between the size of revenue and the size of the army, would continue to be a problem for James' successor.

After the Williamite government seized political power, in March 1689, it afforded them legitimacy and, in theory, access to public revenues. However, it raised an insurgent military opposition would require a rapid response.¹³⁷⁶ The Williamites seizure of the

¹³⁷⁰ Lee, *Government*, pp. 137-138.

¹³⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 105, 137-138. Julian Hoppitt, 'Scotland and the Taxing Union, 1707-1815' in *SHR*, Vol XCVIII, 1, No. 246 (April 2019), p. 45.

¹³⁷² Hoppitt, 'Taxing', pp. 49-50.

¹³⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷⁴ Murdoch, *Network North*, p. 244.

¹³⁷⁵ Lennox, *Lauderdale*, p. 308.

¹³⁷⁶ Oates, *Killiecrankie*, pp. 54-55. Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 128.

reins of government during the Convention of Estates effectively allowed William's Scottish supporters to seize power *de jure*. However, their lack of power *de facto* in parts of Scotland, particularly north of the Tay and in the north-western Highlands as well as Western Isles, threatened the fledgling regime's overall security.¹³⁷⁷ The need to exert coercive military control in Scotland, fuelled by William's desire to secure that kingdom as part of his wider European strategy, drove the Convention to rely upon their *de jure* powers as they asserted their authority as the 'legitimate' Scottish government. They brought to bear the financial levers of the state, and these would be critical to the funding of their re-establishment and subsequent expansion of the standing army. Crucial to the co-ordination of the war against the Jacobites was the executive committee of the Convention of Estates; composed of a rump of twenty-four members from each of the three groups that made up the meeting.¹³⁷⁸ This was initially known as the 'Committee for Settling Government', opting to change its title to the Committee of Estates.¹³⁷⁹ This committee was expressly empowered to oversee and manage 'the public affairs of the nation'.¹³⁸⁰ By resolving the constitutional crisis quickly, and in their favour, the Williamites were able to utilise the Convention to allow them to begin governing the country including, importantly, beginning the collection of revenues from the areas they controlled. When Viscount Dundee left the meeting, the Convention was quick to issue a proclamation ordering all arrears owed in public funds were to be collected as soon as possible.¹³⁸¹ According to the *Proceedings* newspaper the Convention initially intended to include in this proclamation 'the words, For Raising Forces'.¹³⁸² After a brief debate

¹³⁷⁷ *Melvilles*, Hamilton to Melville, 8th June 1689, p. 51.

¹³⁷⁸ *RPS*, 1689/3/200, Commission to the committee of estates, 29th April 1689.

¹³⁷⁹ *RPS*, 1689/3/64, A proposal to name a committee for settling the government, 26th March 1689; 1689/3/200, Commission to the committee of estates, 29th April 1689.

¹³⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸¹ *RPS*, 1689/3/25, Proclamation for bringing in the bygone arrears of the public revenue, 18th March 1689.

¹³⁸² Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 18th March 1689, p. 7.

amongst the members, the meeting felt it would be expedient to remove these words. Clearly the Convention expected that conflict was inevitable after Dundee's departure and events in Ireland.

The preparations for the conflict began immediately after Dundee's removal from Edinburgh. The Convention of Estates hurriedly ordered the formation of the 'committee for securing the peace' to organise measures for their defence.¹³⁸³ Their first order of consequence was for Leven to raise a regiment of 800 foot.¹³⁸⁴ The first stages of the war, moreover, were very close to home as Jacobite soldiers occupied Edinburgh Castle and threatened the possibility of bombarding the city, and the Convention, with artillery from the commanding heights.¹³⁸⁵ The small force the Convention had to hand was, thus, not deployed to some far away 'periphery', but engaged in a siege in the streets of the capital city; not far from where the members sat at Parliament House.¹³⁸⁶ In light of the proximity of the conflict, at least in its initial months, we can see that the swift organisation of the war effort would be tantamount to the Williamites in Scotland. This was largely achieved by organising the war via a committee system. Committees would be central for the government in their organisation of the war effort as they had been under the Covenanting regime. Learning from the experiences of the Covenanters, the Williamites knew that committees allowed for the co-ordination of central and local government to effectively deploy revenues, raise, and equip the soldiers they required.¹³⁸⁷ Stewart has pointed out the importance of 'war committees' to the Covenanted state during the wars of the mid-century and has argued that this system allowed the Scottish state to raise and

¹³⁸³ *RPS*, 1689/3/25, Report of the committee for securing the peace, 18th March 1689.

¹³⁸⁴ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 18th March 1689, p. 8.

¹³⁸⁵ Anon., *Edinburgh*, p. 47. *RPCS*, XIV, Act in favour of John Barclay, gardener, 26th September 1689, p. 341.

¹³⁸⁶ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 19th March 1689, p. 8.

¹³⁸⁷ Stewart, *Rethinking*, pp. 180-181

maintain an army.¹³⁸⁸ This same system would prove critical to the Williamites during the Highland War.

The Convention offered the crown to William and Mary on 11th April 1689, an offer which they would ultimately, albeit reluctantly, accept by 11th May 1689.¹³⁸⁹ In the interim, the Convention's leading committee, the Committee of Estates, acted as a transitional executive for the government.¹³⁹⁰ The committee reasoned that since 'the nation cannot be without government' during this period they would 'continue in the government as formerly until their majesties' acceptance of the crown and their taking of the said oath be made known to them'.¹³⁹¹ This not only allowed the Convention to begin fiscal-military organisation relatively quickly but to anticipate a possible rejection of their offer of the crown and, in turn, remain in government.¹³⁹² The inner group of members, twenty-eight in total now, further retrenched their executive powers with the formation of the Committee of Estates, on 29th April 1689, to steer business in the meeting.¹³⁹³ The committee acted as a *de facto* privy council and were able to carry out executive actions including the levying of military forces and deploying them 'as they shall think fit'.¹³⁹⁴ The decisive outcome of the Convention of Estates allowed the Scottish Williamites to effectively begin preparations for the war before their official inauguration as William's government. Additionally, it made clear that this government would utilise the committee system to organise themselves and provide the army with necessary funds. The rapidity with which the Convention began collecting income for the army allowed them to put

¹³⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

¹³⁸⁹ Harris, *Revolution*, pp. 406-408.

¹³⁹⁰ *RPS*, 1689/3/64, A proposal to name a committee for settling the government, 26th March 1689; 1689/3/200, Commission to the committee of estates, 29th April 1689.

¹³⁹¹ *RPS*, 1689/3/110, Act declaring that the estates are to continue in the government until the king and the queen of England accept the crown, 11th April 1689.

¹³⁹² *Ibid.*

¹³⁹³ *RPS*, 1689/3/200, Commission to the committee of estates, 29th April 1689.

¹³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

their best foot forward in re-establishing the army to face the rapidly assembling Jacobite clans. It is important to understand that the Convention was effectively a transitional government. Ultimately, the formation of this interim administration gave the Williamites a slight advantage at the outset of the Highland War, particularly with regards to the pace of income collection and mustering of new regiments. Equally, when William and Mary accepted the crown this allowed this Scottish Williamites to rapidly put a privy council officially in place of the executive committee.¹³⁹⁵

William and Mary's acceptance of the Scottish throne allowed the Scottish Convention to fully transition from an interim regime to a fully legitimised government. The committee system would continue to be utilised to co-ordinate the war effort on the ground, but the establishment of a privy council would supersede the committee of estates, albeit there was significant overlap in membership between the two.¹³⁹⁶ From 1603 onwards, Scotland had, largely, been an absentee monarchy and the privy council had become the *de facto* 'supreme executive authority with a general political competence that allowed it to intervene in almost any of government'.¹³⁹⁷ During the reign of James VI (1567-1625) the council consisted of thirty to fifty nominal members with business usually carried out by an inner group, akin to the Committee of Estates.¹³⁹⁸ William & Mary's reign saw the privy council similarly split, with around forty councillors in total and an inner circle of fifteen to twenty select members.¹³⁹⁹ The increased importance of the council in the seventeenth century derived from the work of these core councillors and

¹³⁹⁵ *RPCS*, XIII, Question as to the position of the Council in consequence of a new commission to be referred to the Estates, 24th May 1689, p. 377.

¹³⁹⁶ *RPS*, 1689/3/200, Commission to the committee of estates, 29th April 1689. *RPCS*, XIII, Sederunt, 27th May 1689, pp. 337-338.

¹³⁹⁷ Julian Goodare, *The Government of Scotland 1560-1625* (Oxford, 2004), p. 128. Note: Except, of course, three monarchs: James VI in 1617, Charles I in 1633 and 1641, and Charles II in 1650-51.

¹³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

¹³⁹⁹ *RPCS*, XIII, Commission of Council, 27th May 1689, pp. 378-381; Sederunts, 24th May, 3rd June & 13th July 1689, pp. 377, 403, 510.

these men were often also officers of state at the heads of critical aspects of government, as Goodare has pointed out.¹⁴⁰⁰ Throughout the seventeenth century the council had been led by the chancellor and this practice remained in place until the Revolution in 1688.¹⁴⁰¹ From 1689 onwards, the official leader of the council was its president; Hamilton, was appointed to the post for the duration of the Highland War.¹⁴⁰² His role was to officiate proceedings but in the context of the army, and its finances, he was also responsible for ordering precepts. These were financial writs, issued by the Treasury, used by the army to pay out wages to officers to be, in turn, paid to their men and sometimes used to purchase supplies, arms or equipment. However, the war saw an increased need for co-ordination between Edinburgh and London.

Melville, took on much of this communication and as part of his role as secretary of state and became the effective leader of William's privy council and government.¹⁴⁰³ As a result of his frequent correspondence with, and regular travels to, the court in London Melville's importance greatly increased during this period. Scholars, such as Young and Rayner, have recognised this importance and the fact that the Revolution had changed the way the internal workings of the council.¹⁴⁰⁴ Riley has underlined this importance, pointing out that Melville was able to effectively manage and influence appointments within the Scottish Williamite government; a position which saw the employment of many of his kinsmen and favoured friends.¹⁴⁰⁵ This 'patrimonial bureaucracy', as Goodare termed it, had long proliferated within the Scottish government and it had been in place for at least a century.¹⁴⁰⁶ Goodare has identified that the nature of government in Scotland

¹⁴⁰⁰ Goodare, *Government*, pp. 149-152.

¹⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰² *ODNB*, 'Hamilton'.

¹⁴⁰³ *ODNB*, 'Melville'.

¹⁴⁰⁴ Young, 'securing' In A. Soddu & F. Soddu (eds.), *Assembly*, pp. 229-238. Rayner, 'Tribulations', pp. 193-210.

¹⁴⁰⁵ Riley, *Scottish*, pp. 48-49.

¹⁴⁰⁶ Goodare, *Government*, p. 68.

during the early modern period 'allowed nobles as patrons to scatter networks of their clients through the system in an advantageous way.'¹⁴⁰⁷ Whilst this could be problematic, it also facilitated a network of officers of state whom were closely interlinked by these connections. Melville was, thus, able to effectively direct the Williamite government's war effort in Scotland, via his correspondence networks. This saw him communicate between the army in the field and the government's in Edinburgh and London, effectively acting as a co-ordinating officer through his trusted appointees.

In fiscal-military terms, Melville was to provide details of the requirements and preparations of the Williamite Scottish army to the monarch in London. However, Melville was also able to dispute orders when he felt they were not suitable. A prime example of this came with William's order to significantly reduce the Scottish Williamite army in December 1689; due in large part to the mounting financial pressure on the government, as explored in Chapter three.¹⁴⁰⁸ With the backing of Mackay, Melville was able to argue that a reduction in forces of the size William desired would significantly endanger the security of the government.¹⁴⁰⁹ An amendment to the instructions followed shortly afterward, this left the re-organisation of the army to the Scottish Williamite government, consulting closely with Mackay as commander-in-chief.¹⁴¹⁰ This demonstrates that while the crown retained overall authority over the military, the council's command of detail in day-to-day governance meant they could expand or elaborate upon the monarch's orders or register opposition to changes it felt were detrimental. Additionally, the privy council handled the financial administration of the

¹⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰⁸ NRS, GD26/1/1, Leven & Melville Muniments: Instructions to Leven & Mackay [from King William] referred to in previous, 18th December 1689, f. 48.

¹⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴¹⁰ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Additional Instructions to our right trusty, and welbeloved Cousin and Councillor, and our right trusty and welbeloved Councillors, David Earle of Leven, Hugh McKay, Major-Generall of our forces, and Sir George Munroe of Culrain, 4th January 1690, pp. 319-320.

Treasury until the re-establishment of the treasury commission in December 1689.¹⁴¹¹ From that moment onward, the council co-operated with the reinvigorated commission. This would see the council scheduling relevant legislation for the army and arranging for further funds from the Scottish parliament when needed, via Hamilton's additional role as high commissioner in the parliamentary session. At a localised level, the council was able to directly intervene in matters where required; ordering purchase of arms, contracting craftsmen to furnish equipment or ordering local collectors to allow regiments their pay out of the revenue. Furthermore, they were instrumental in co-ordinating the shires and localities during the war. They granted commissions to raise regiments, repaid debts for provisions or wages to creditors or reimbursed locals for theft or damages committed by their soldiers. All funds and precepts were, however, disbursed directly from the Treasury.

The treasury commission was the body responsible for the collection of revenue, the disbursement of those funds and keeping the accounts of both. It had been originally established in 1667 and had become a permanent fixture of the government by the time of the Highland War.¹⁴¹² Before this commissions had only been used as temporary expedients within the Scottish treasury.¹⁴¹³ The commission was officially a separate entity from the council but, in reality, both had significant number of shared members. This ensured that the relations between the two were symbiotic and facilitated effective co-ordination between them throughout the Highland War.¹⁴¹⁴ After the appointment of the commission, the lords of the treasury were able to submit recommendations to the council to rectify payments, facilitate collections or other such actions as were needed.¹⁴¹⁵ For

¹⁴¹¹ Rayner, 'Tribulations', p. 198.

¹⁴¹² Rayner, 'Tribulations', p. 194. Athol L. Murray, 'The Scottish Treasury 1667-1708' in *The Scottish Historical Review*, Vol 45, No. 139, Part I (Apr 1966), p. 90.

¹⁴¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴¹⁴ Rayner, 'Tribulations', p. 194.

¹⁴¹⁵ Ibid., p. 195.

example, when it became apparent Major John Forbes, as governor of Fort William in 1692, had been unpaid since May 1691 the commission were able to 'recomend to the Earle of Craufurd... to speak with the Secretaries thereupon, that So your Ma[jes]ties Pleasure as to the Governour's Setled [sic] allowance, and the time of its commencement might be known'.¹⁴¹⁶ It was through such recommendations that the commission was able to communicate financial orders or request assistance from the council during the war, and even discuss matters with the crown directly via its members, as in the former example.

The treasury commission's membership was divided between two groups, firstly, the five lord commissioners of the treasury who oversaw the accounts and, secondly, a larger unknown number of administrative staff, led by prominent civil servants, who carried out the day-to-day work of accounting and organised practical aspects of the Treasury's work, such as the payment of regiments.¹⁴¹⁷ Indicative of the 'symbiotic' relationship of the commission to the privy council, and vice versa, all five lords were also members of the council.¹⁴¹⁸ The Earl of Crawford was chancellor of the Scottish exchequer and was, thus, responsible for conveying the financial affairs of the country to the council and the crown when necessary.¹⁴¹⁹ Athol L. Murray has noted that relations between the council and the commission were carried out on the 'assumption that each was sovereign in its own sphere'.¹⁴²⁰ However, many of the privy councillors were also appointed to the treasury commission creating a significant overlap between the two bodies and this facilitated a great deal of co-operation between the two, as Rayner has pointed out.¹⁴²¹ The

¹⁴¹⁶ *NRS*, GD26/9/119, Memoir to the King regarding the Garrison at Fort William from Maj. John Forbes, 1691-2.

¹⁴¹⁷ Rayner, 'Tribulations', pp. 194-195. Murray, 'Treasury', p. 90.

¹⁴¹⁸ *RPCS*, XIII, Commission of Council, 27th May 1689, pp. 378-381. Rayner, 'Tribulations', p. 195.

¹⁴¹⁹ Rayner, 'Tribulations', p. 195.

¹⁴²⁰ Murray, 'Treasury', pp. 101-2.

¹⁴²¹ Rayner, 'Tribulations', p. 195.

council lacked authority to organise financial resources on its own and so it relied upon the treasury commission. The privy council could offer recommendations to the treasury commission to facilitate the transfer of resources to areas where they were needed. It proves useful to consider a few examples of this relationship from the Highland War.

On 20th April 1691, the council requested the commission to consider ‘how the nation may be putt in a posture of defence’.¹⁴²² The main difference between the two bodies’ recommendations was that the privy council appears to, at least in the realm of military finances, have used recommendations to specify courses of actions or tasks that needed resolution. When Colonel Hill’s new regiment, garrisoned at Fort William, needed more muskets in October 1690, the council issued a recommendation specifying that 1,000 firelocks should be purchased by James Dunlop, a commissary of the army.¹⁴²³ Turning to the Williamite state’s income, by contrast, taxation, which determined the money available to the state, had to be approved by the Scottish parliament.¹⁴²⁴ Once the proportions to be collected were agreed between the council and the parliament, the commission were then able to calculate what they could feasibly spend, or borrow, against the income to be collected. The state did have access to crown incomes, but taxation was the main financial lever which the state could deploy to boost its income above ordinary levels.

Many of the records emanating from the Scottish Treasury during this period were created by the clerk, Sir Thomas Moncrieffe. Moncrieffe was a veteran civil servant with roughly four decades of experience and his presence as clerk ensured that the financial administration of Scotland did not collapse completely during the 1688-89

¹⁴²² *NRS*, E96/40/9, Exchequer Records: Army establishments and miscellanea - Recommendations to Treasury & other extant acts (June 1689-August 1691), 20th April 1691.

¹⁴²³ *NRS*, E96/40/9, ‘Recommendation to the Treasury to buy a thousand fire locks’, 20th October 1690.

¹⁴²⁴ Rayner, ‘Tribulations’, p. 197.

'interregnum'.¹⁴²⁵ Alongside his servant, David Callendar, he ensured that the Williamite army's finances continued operating from March to December 1689.¹⁴²⁶ Murray noted this, when he wrote, 'During the period of the Revolution Moncrieffe played a valuable role in ensuring that the financial administration continued to function'.¹⁴²⁷ Moncrieffe attended the Convention of Estates, parliament and the council constantly in order to have precepts for the army drawn up as efficiently as possible.¹⁴²⁸ Another key figure in the organisation of military finances was Sir James Oswald of Fingalton, who was appointed the general receiver for the inland excise and commissary of the army as well as collector of the cess, or supply.¹⁴²⁹ Sir Patrick Murray of Pitdunes was appointed general receiver of the crown rents as well as foreign customs and excise.¹⁴³⁰ Both had been in office prior to the Revolution as collectors of the public revenues, but had been reappointed by the Convention, most likely due to their experience. During the Convention, the meeting had ordered Oswald to give account of what tax revenues could yield to the government.¹⁴³¹ When Oswald's commission to collect supply and excise was passed in parliament in May 1689, his 'experience' and the 'trust and confidence' which the convention had in him were noted.¹⁴³²

The revenues Oswald and Murray collected were used to directly pay the army and were also drawn upon in precepts for weapons, equipment, and provisions. They became central to the Scottish state's financial management during the Highland War, especially in terms of its mundane operations. Both were responsible for managing

¹⁴²⁵ Murray, 'Treasury', pp. 94-95.

¹⁴²⁶ *RPCS*, IX-XIV, Treasury Register, VI, p. 53. Murray, 'Treasury', pp. 94-95.

¹⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴²⁹ *RPS*, 1689/3/24, Proclamation for bringing in the bygone arrears of the public revenue, 18th March 1689.

¹⁴³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴³¹ *RPS*, 1689/3/91, Reference anent the accounts of the public revenue, 2nd April 1689. Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 1st April 1689, p. 23.

¹⁴³² *RPS*, 1689/3/208, Commission to James Oswald [of Fingalton] for uplifting the four months' supply imposed by the estates and a quarter's excise, 21st May 1689.

collectors and tacksmen collecting revenue and disbursing precepts to officers or commissaries of the army to pay regiments. Their collectors, such as Mr. William Rodger of Kilwinning, in the localities of Williamite controlled Scotland would try to, reluctantly or otherwise, collect the crown's dues.¹⁴³³ If localities failed to pay their dues then the penalty would be the quartering of soldiers upon the local inhabitants, as happened in Shetland on 2nd July 1691, and if they persisted their goods and lands would be seized by the crown.¹⁴³⁴ When the public revenues could not be collected fast enough for the needs of the state, then credit would be sought from private-financiers to facilitate spending in the interim. When initially raising the army the Convention recognised that credit would be essential. This was demonstrated when the *Proceedings* reported, 'the Publick Revenues cannot be got in so soon as is necessary, for paying off the Soldiery; The Merchants of Edinburgh have offered to advance it immediately upon the Security of the Convention'.¹⁴³⁵ When items were not purchased on credit, payments out of the Treasury were made in both pounds Scots and Sterling with accounts usually kept in the latter rather than the former. Money going out of the Treasury to the forces was always given via a precept or warrant which made the government liable for payment to creditors or allowed officers to draw upon local collectors, the muster-master general or commissaries of the army. The Scots-Dutch officers serving in Scotland, without the assistance of the Scottish Treasury, prove to be a perfect example of the way officers would draw upon their private credit.

Mackay and his officers could, and did, utilise their private credit to pay the wages of the army on a day-to-day basis. The officer corps of the Scottish Williamite army were,

¹⁴³³ *RPS*, 1689/3/43. Act Appointing Mr William Rodger collector of the supply in the shire of Ayr, 20th March 1689.

¹⁴³⁴ *RPCS*, XVI, Act anent public dues in Zetland, 2nd July 1691, p. 388.

¹⁴³⁵ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 21st March 1689, p. 10.

as with previous armies, composed almost entirely of nobles and gentlemen. These men had sufficient wealth to provide patronage to recruit, equip and even, periodically, pay their regiments.¹⁴³⁶ This is akin to the model of entrepreneurial commanders described by David Parrott during the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648).¹⁴³⁷ Whilst in the latter half of the seventeenth century state involvement in financing war was increasing, officers still found themselves utilising their private credit to 'raise the funds required for recruitment...' and 'to ensure that their troops were fed and equipped.'¹⁴³⁸ Parrott points out that completely centralised control over supply of armies was not achieved until the 1760s.¹⁴³⁹ The adoption of standing armies was a step toward this in the 1680s but 'At the most basic level... the officers remained the creditors of the crown, lending money to feed, clothe or pay the basic wages of their troops when central funds and provisioning proved inadequate.'¹⁴⁴⁰ In Scotland, a network of officers facilitated the paying of precepts for wages and provisions on the ground with the backing of the state; essentially, they were utilising their own credit with the crown acting as their guarantor. Such a network was essential to the mundane administration of the Scottish Williamite army throughout the Highland War. Scotland was not late to the concept of a standing army, the first being the Army of Covenant in 1639-41, but during this period it operated a comparatively smaller army to other states with an arguably greater degree of efficiency.

The deployment of these committees by the Scottish government, both centrally and locally, provided a fiscal-military infrastructure during times of crisis. This system was familiar as committees had already been developed and utilised by the state in previous decades. From 1639 to 1651, the governments of the Covenanters had utilised

¹⁴³⁶ Goodare, *Government*, p. 68.

¹⁴³⁷ Parrott, *Business*, p. 1.

¹⁴³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

¹⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 284-295.

committees to great effect in collecting funds and organising levies for their formidable armies. The research of scholars, particularly Young, Stewart and Edward M. Furgol, has illustrated that there was significant development of these apparatuses during the middle of the seventeenth century.¹⁴⁴¹ The raising, supplying and fielding of armies was the impetus that drove the development of the state in Scotland during that period.¹⁴⁴² The similarities between the Williamites committee system and that of their predecessors is so striking that it is obvious it was modelled upon them, albeit the Williamites' execution proved less efficient than the Covenanters. Whilst the privy council was the executive, subordinate committees were delegated responsibilities for specific aspects of administration or to tackle issues. The committees within central government were responsible for issues of 'national' importance. The committee of supply, for example, was tasked with calculating the contributions each locality could feasibly contribute and the total sum required for the army.¹⁴⁴³ Additionally, a centralised committee was given the task of inspecting the condition and quantities of 'public arms' in magazines around the country.¹⁴⁴⁴ Membership of these committees had less overlap than that between the council and treasury commission with tasks and responsibilities delegated by parliament to spread the burden amongst the government supporters.¹⁴⁴⁵ Mostly members were appointed based upon their expertise, such as Argyll's leadership of the committee on the Highlands.¹⁴⁴⁶ Such central committees effectively advised the Williamite government upon solutions to tackle issues, such as 'lawlessness' in the Highlands and how best to

¹⁴⁴¹ John R. Young, 'The Scottish Parliament in the Seventeenth Century: European Perspectives' in Allan I. Macinnes, Thomas Riis and Frederik Pedersen (eds.) *Ships, Guns and Bibles in the North Sea and the Baltic States, c.1350-c.1700* (East Linton, 2000), pp. 139-172. Stewart, *Rethinking*, p. 171. Edward M. Furgol, 'Scotland turned Sweden: The Scottish Covenanters and the Military Revolution, 1638-1651' in John Morrill (ed.), *The Scottish National Covenant in its British Context* (Edinburgh, 1990), pp. 134-154.

¹⁴⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴³ *RPS*, 1690/4/172, Remit of parliament to the committee anent the supply, 22nd July 1690.

¹⁴⁴⁴ *RPS*, 1689/3/47. Committee Membership: public arms, 21st March 1689.

¹⁴⁴⁵ Young, 'Parliament' in *Ships*, p. 147.

¹⁴⁴⁶ *RPS*, 1689/3/29, Committee Membership: highlands, 18th March 1689.

achieve this. These central committees' recommendations could then be passed down to local organising committees to deploy resources to particular problem areas. In this instance, Argyll was given command of a sizeable army detachment based around Inverlochy and ordered to secure this part of the Highlands and protect the Western Lowlands.¹⁴⁴⁷

Looking beyond Edinburgh, the localities had their own committees to oversee and organise their contributions to the war effort. This ranged from facilitating revenue and tax collection to levying and equipping men to supply to the forces to providing necessary provisions to regiments stationed in their area. Membership was comprised of local nobles and gentlemen nominated by the council and warranted by the Scottish parliament. Utilising these local committees, the central government was able to effectively oversee collection of revenues and war preparations. When the militia was mustered in April 1689, the council ordered the local committees in Roxburgh, Selkirk, Inverness, Sutherland and Caithness to raise men and provide horses for cavalry troops.¹⁴⁴⁸ In this instance, the central government was able to set the proportions of cavalry to be raised using a 1663 piece of legislation as a precedent and thus quickly specify the numbers of troopers to be raised and equipped by these shires.¹⁴⁴⁹ The oversight of the central government was complimented by their own committee's abilities to intervene and conduct affairs in the localities. In May 1690, after the passage of a further act of supply in parliament, a central committee was assigned to re-assess what each locality could feasibly provide to the government.¹⁴⁵⁰ Dislocation between the centre and localities was a constant risk for early modern states, yet smaller countries like

¹⁴⁴⁷ *RPCS*, XIII, Missive to the Earl of Argyll, 28th July 1689, pp. 565-566.

¹⁴⁴⁸ *RPS*, 1689/3/129, Act for a levy of horsemen out of several shires, 18th April 1689.

¹⁴⁴⁹ *RPS*, 1663/6/64, Declaration: offer of forces to the king, 23rd September 1663.

¹⁴⁵⁰ *RPS*, 1690/4/24, The committee for granting supply to their majesties, 9th May 1690.

Scotland were able to more effectively manage this. Stewart has noted this in the context of the 1640s Scotland drawing on Glete's observations that smaller states were able to level the playing field 'by creating more effective structures for accessing and mobilizing resources'.¹⁴⁵¹ Committees in Scotland led to the effective management of limited resources.¹⁴⁵²

The limitations of the model utilised by the Scottish Williamite regime was that the highly localised system was, especially during times of civil war, open to inefficiency often fuelled by disaffection to the central government. Due to the fractious nature of the Revolution, Convention, and subsequent civil war, some committees found their members unwilling to attend. On 21st May 1689, the government reported that 'several shires... did not meet a quorum of the commissioners for the supply upon the 14th [May]' and that those who had attended had failed to carry out responsibilities 'committed to them'.¹⁴⁵³ The Williamite government was able to resolve such impasses by holding local committees responsible for not meeting their quotas, often demands for resources would have an addendum threatening those who did not would 'be answerable on their peril'.¹⁴⁵⁴ Determined resistance would result in the replacement of local commissioners, as occurred in Aberdeen in this instance.¹⁴⁵⁵ The Scottish Williamite government through the committee system was able to effectively supervise and intervene to ensure the collection of revenues continued in shires alongside other actions needed to maintain their military control of Scotland. In turn, the committees were able to communicate to the central government their capacity to provide what was being requested. This reinforces

¹⁴⁵¹ Stewart, *Rethinking*, p. 171. Jan Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as fiscal-military state, 1500-1660* (London, 2002), p. 158.

¹⁴⁵² Stewart, *Rethinking*, p. 172.

¹⁴⁵³ *RPS*, 1689/3/211, Act for a new meeting of the commissioners of supply in some shires, 21st May 1689.

¹⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵⁵ *RPS*, 1689/3/212, Act containing a new nomination of commissioners for the supply in the shire of Aberdeen, 21st May 1689.

the fact that the state did not radically alter its structure in 1689, but instead utilised the pre-existing committee model to facilitate collection of revenues to fund their standing army.

Williamite government's organisation of the war effort was further served by an administrative structure within the army itself. This operated separately from the branches of government, but worked in tandem with both the central and the local committees. The actual task of financial administration within the army was undertaken by its commissary officers. The Commissary General, Sir George Hamilton of Binnie, was responsible for overseeing the finances of the army as well as interacting with civil servants in the government to communicate the army's wants and needs.¹⁴⁵⁶ Underneath Binnie was a network of supply officers, usually referred to as secretaries, who oversaw the logistics of pay and provisioning of the army.¹⁴⁵⁷ As with any army, these officers answered to their senior commander, the commander in chief, who organised the army as a whole. From 28th March 1689 until December 1690, the commander in chief of the Williamite Scottish army was, of course, Major-General Mackay.¹⁴⁵⁸ Mackay's power not only covered military strategy, but encompassed supervision of the financial dealings for forces in the field.¹⁴⁵⁹ For example, when Mackay arrived in Scotland, he ordered the magistrates of Edinburgh to provide his men with carts and horses for the transportation of supplies from Leith docks.¹⁴⁶⁰ However, Mackay's administrative role was usually

¹⁴⁵⁶ *RPCS*, XIII, Commission to George Hamilton of Binnie to be commissary general of the forces, 3rd June 1689, pp. 403-404.

¹⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵⁸ *RPS*, 1689/3/70, Commission to Major General MacKay to command the forces, 28th March 1689.

¹⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶⁰ *RPS*, 1689/3/68, Order to the magistrates of Edinburgh to furnish carts and horses for transporting arms and ammunition, 27th March 1689.

intermittent, especially given his duties in the field, and thus logistical organisation was remitted to the Commissary-General and his staff.¹⁴⁶¹

Operating as part of Mackay's general staff were the commissaries of the army, as previously mentioned. The commissary general oversaw and organised subordinate commissaries, storekeepers and other contractors who were involved in the financial administration and supply of the army. Binnie was made Commissary-General in April 1689, but he also held the office of secretary of war.¹⁴⁶² He was responsible for ensuring the army was supplied with money and provisions throughout the war. Thus, secretaries and commissaries were critical to the function of the army. However, the commander could authorise or order the commissary general as his subordinate to carry out specific actions. For example, in 1689, Mackay ordered Binnie to 'nominat[e] and appoynt Thrie Deputs [sic] in the said officer of secretary of warr [sic]'.¹⁴⁶³ Whilst the paymaster, or muster-master general, was responsible for disbursing wages to specific regiments, the commissary general was needed to command such a structure. Mackay was both the head of the army and a clerical network of officers, such as Oswald and Murray who held commissions as commissary officers in addition to their positions in the Treasury. For example, when Stirling castle needed repairs Murray evaluated the cost as well as examining the condition of meal stored there.¹⁴⁶⁴ The overlap in personnel indicates that the army's operation was not just handled by the privy council or the treasury commission but was co-ordinated by the army's secretarial structure. Unlike the relationship between the commission and council, the administration of the army was more hierarchical, as military structures tend to be. The commissaries could be drawn

¹⁴⁶¹ *RPS*, 1689/3/171, Commission to Major [Hugh] Buntine [of Kilbride] to be general muster-master, 25th April 1689.

¹⁴⁶² *NRS*, E99/39/3, Order from Major General Mackay for 3 clerks or dept Secretary at War, [1689].

¹⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶⁴ *RPS*, 1689/3/206, Warrant to Sir Patrick Murray [of Pitdunnies], 21st May 1689.

upon for pay, but, in other instances, regiments had to be inspected by the muster-master general before pay was released to them.

This section has illustrated that the Scottish Williamite government was able to draw on a variety of precedents from previous administrations in order to organise itself and prepare for war. This demonstrates that rather than a Revolutionary overhaul of the fiscal-military state, as seen in England, the Scottish state was content to evolve its practices based on tried and tested methods. The committee system allowed the central government to communicate between both the localities, to organise collection of revenues and resources, and the army, to allocate those resources. Moreover, the army's administrative staff were able to manage distribution of those resources to regiments in the field as well as garrisons, removing the need for the central government to manage this aspect of the Highland War. Key to all of this was the close co-operation and overlap in personnel between the different arms of government. Although this heavily favoured nepotistic appointments by powerful figures, such as Melville, the swift erection of a structure to organise and allocate resources allowed the Scottish Williamites to rapidly expand their military capacity in 1689. This, as we shall see, was indicative of a wider trend of rapid expansion based on precedent for the Scottish state during the Highland War.

Crown Finances and the Army

The experience of conflict was framed and influenced by the country's overall economic conditions. To fully understand military expenditure, we first need to set the scene of the economic backdrop against which the war took place within which crown

finances were situated. Scotland's economy during the late seventeenth-century has traditionally been characterised as 'underdeveloped'.¹⁴⁶⁵ Reputedly, this was, in part, due to Scotland's smaller population compared to its neighbours. It has been estimated that in 1691 the population of Scotland was only one million; by way of comparison Ireland had two million people and England had six million.¹⁴⁶⁶ Rosalind Mitchison characterised the Scottish economy as being reliant upon agriculture with little impetus for improvement amongst the landowning classes.¹⁴⁶⁷ Despite the internal warfare from 1689 to 1691, grain prices appear to have remained relatively low and stable during that time.¹⁴⁶⁸ This is corroborated by evidence that the army found little trouble in supplying itself with grain, oats and meal throughout the conflict.¹⁴⁶⁹ The domestic market appears to have suffered little disruption due to the civil war. The economic prosperity of Scotland was not, however, reliant upon domestic trade. Instead, the economy of Scotland was heavily dependent upon engagement in international trade.¹⁴⁷⁰ The price of imported goods, such as iron and wood, increased or remained stagnant throughout the 1690s.¹⁴⁷¹ Smout has argued that the Scottish foreign import trade was severely affected by the Nine Years' War and French privateers; including the importation of arms and munitions, which was notably expensive.¹⁴⁷² He goes on to state that this 'sting of commercial troubles' would mean that Scotland went 'from a position of narrowly making ends meet into conspicuous failure to do so'.¹⁴⁷³ Tariffs rose after war was declared on France and several key foreign markets were either closed or threatened.¹⁴⁷⁴ Maritime trade was critical to

¹⁴⁶⁵ T.C. Smout, *A History of the Scottish People, 1560-1830* (Edinburgh, 1969), p. 241.

¹⁴⁶⁶ Whatley, *Scots*, p. 111.

¹⁴⁶⁷ Rosalind Mitchison, *Lordship to Patronage: Scotland, 1603-1745* (Edinburgh, 1983), p. 95.

¹⁴⁶⁸ Smout, *Eve*, p. 23.

¹⁴⁶⁹ *RPCS*, XIII, Provisions for the troops from Perth and Montrose, 31st May 1689, p. 398.

¹⁴⁷⁰ Smout, *Eve*, p. 23.

¹⁴⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 256.

¹⁴⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 242.

¹⁴⁷³ Mitchison, *Lordship*, p. 107.

¹⁴⁷⁴ Smout, *Eve*, p. 244.

sustaining the Scottish Williamite state's war against the Jacobites, particularly in importation of specialists, like the officers of the Brigade. During the Highland War, these impacts were not at their worst, but Smout argues that the 'first three years of William III's reign were easily the most depressed merchants had known for a generation'.¹⁴⁷⁵ However, this negative depiction of the Scottish economy, and the impact of the Nine Years' War upon overseas trade and the domestic economy has been grossly overstated.

There is a growing critique amongst scholars regarding Smout's position on the Scottish economy.¹⁴⁷⁶ In spite of agreeing with Smout's views, overall, Christopher Whatley has added the caveat that whilst Scottish ports in the east did, indeed, struggle due to the war, those in the west continued business in the Atlantic largely unhindered.¹⁴⁷⁷ More recently, various historians have emphatically disproven Smout's gloomy economic assessment by demonstrating the unhindered continuation of Scotland's trade with Europe. These studies have shown that commercial interruption during the Highland War was minimal. Murdoch notes that the threat to trade from French privateers proved to be, in actuality, trivial.¹⁴⁷⁸ Scottish ships continued to sail out of France 'quite unmolested by the French privateering fleet'.¹⁴⁷⁹ The impact these privateers had upon Scottish commerce was highly dependent upon the ports said Scottish ships were sailing to and from. Scottish Baltic traders, such as those in Aberdeen, suffered more than their fellow countrymen who dealt, primarily, in French goods, such as those sailing out of Leith.¹⁴⁸⁰ Furthermore, the works of Kathrin Zickermann, Nina

¹⁴⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 253.

¹⁴⁷⁶ Ibid. See also: T.C. Smout, 'The Road to Union' in G. Holmes (ed.), *Britain After the Glorious Revolution* (London, 1969), pp. 176-196.

¹⁴⁷⁷ Whatley, *Scots*, p. 130.

¹⁴⁷⁸ Steve Murdoch, *The Terror of the Seas? Scottish Maritime Warfare, 1513-1713* (Leiden, 2010), pp. 319, 321.

¹⁴⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 319.

¹⁴⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 295, 319, 321. See also: Eric Graham, *A Maritime History of Scotland, 1650-1790* (Edinburgh, 2002), pp. 83-84.

Østby Pedersen, Grosjean and Murdoch have demonstrated consistent, and thriving, commerce was maintained between Scotland and the area in and around the Baltic and north-western Europe.¹⁴⁸¹ For example, Zickermann has illustrated that the Scottish herring trade with the Elbe-Wesser region, now in modern Germany, actually benefitted from the European conflict. Due to conflict with the French, the Dutch fisheries operations were disturbed which, in turn, allowed Scottish traders to enhance their opportunities within that commodity in the markets based around Hamburg and Bremen.¹⁴⁸² The work of Siobhan Talbott has furthered debunked claims that Scotland's trade was 'declining or stagnant' by successfully demonstrating the perpetuation of Scottish commercial privileges in France.¹⁴⁸³ Scottish port records, examined by Talbott, corroborate the fact that Scots continued trade with France for the entirety of the Nine Years' War, even in defiance of prohibitive economic legislation.¹⁴⁸⁴ Crucially, she underlines the fact that 'Early modern nations did not seek to cripple established international trade links' and posits that traders would have been familiar with mitigating the impacts of conflict upon their businesses.¹⁴⁸⁵ Claire McLoughlin has further added to this case by pointing out that Scottish merchants continued their prolific import trade of French goods, particularly wines, through Iberian ports.¹⁴⁸⁶ McLoughlin asserts that this French trade was important and profitable enough for Scottish merchants and skippers to risk the possibility of being targeted by privateers as well as employing inconvenient defensive measures to facilitate

¹⁴⁸¹ Kathrin Zickermann, *Across the German Sea: Early Modern Scottish Connections with the Wider Elbe-Wesser Region* (Leiden, 2013), pp. 101, 107, 113, 126-127. Nina Ostby Pedersen, 'Scottish Immigration to Bergen in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries' in *Communities*, pp. 151, 155, 162-164. Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch, 'The Scottish Community in Seventeenth-century Gothenburg in *Communities*, pp. 191-224.

¹⁴⁸² Zickermann, *Across*, p. 101.

¹⁴⁸³ Talbott, *Franco-Scottish*, p. 114.

¹⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 121-123, 134.

¹⁴⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

¹⁴⁸⁶ Claire McLoughlin, 'Scottish Commercial Contacts with the Iberian World, 1581-1730' (Unpublished thesis, St Andrews, 2014), pp. 157-160, 171.

it; most notably by utilising convoys and neutral ships to transport goods.¹⁴⁸⁷ In sum, the Scottish overseas trade did not suffer a significant downturn during the Highland War, or the Nine Years' War, as Smout and Whatley et al have asserted.¹⁴⁸⁸ Instead, Scottish overseas trade continued unabated and was based upon well-established commercial links with Europe, often facilitated by expatriate Scottish communities.¹⁴⁸⁹ The major disruption to the Scottish economy occurred domestically, within areas directly impacted by the civil war, which we shall turn to now.

The Highland War saw large swathes of frontier areas surrounding the Highlands, as well as areas within the region, laid to waste by raids from both sides. This impacted not only tenantry but landowners, as they were targeted for their political affiliations. Towns, such as Perth and Inverness, were yoked with a heavy military presence. Disruption in economic activity occurred as a result, particularly in the former, and in some instances the crown's collection of income was also impacted; when the Jacobite army raided Perth for the first time, they managed to seize £300 Scots worth of revenue.¹⁴⁹⁰ On the other hand, the war benefitted the economy of many areas, at least initially, as soldiers throughout the Kingdom required provisions and goods which could, of course, be provided by the local inhabitants. Garrisons, barracks, and encampments created jobs in the provisioner trades throughout the country.¹⁴⁹¹ Soldiers could be troubling for locals, but they brought economic activity to many areas and many town councils and burghs petitioned the government for the installation of garrisons in their respective areas.¹⁴⁹² Furthermore, craftsmen and weapons makers were given contracts to

¹⁴⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 169-170.

¹⁴⁸⁸ Smout, *Eve*, p. 244. Whatley, *Scots*, p. 130.


¹⁴⁸⁹ Steve Murdoch, *Network North: Scottish Kin, Commercial and Covert Associations in Northern Europe, 1603-1746* (Leiden, 2006), pp. 240, 242-243.

¹⁴⁹⁰ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 139.

¹⁴⁹¹ Whatley & Patrick, *Scots*, p. 130.

¹⁴⁹² Ibid., pp. 130-131.

supply the army with necessary equipment. Maritime traders also gained domestic contracts to supply garrisons in remote areas, such as Fort William.¹⁴⁹³ The latter half of the seventeenth century saw a period of significant inflation and by 1650 the prices of goods in Scotland were higher than those in England by at least a quarter, with some goods doubling in price.¹⁴⁹⁴ During the Highland War, neither wages nor prices fluctuated significantly. Having considered the general economic background, let us now turn to the overall picture of crown finances in this period.



The above table (1.0) illustrates the Scottish crown's average annual charge and discharge from 1686 to 1691. The Scottish Treasury of this period, like many European countries, utilised 'charge and discharge' accounting: whereby the charge referred to sums of money due to be paid and the discharge was the total of actual expenditure plus

¹⁴⁹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹⁴ A.J.S. Gibson & T.C. Smout, *Prices, Food and Wages in Scotland, 1550-1780* (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 6-7. L.M. Cullen, T.C. Smout & A. Gibson, 'Wages and Comparative Development in Ireland and Scotland, 1565-1780' in R. Mitchison & P. Roebuck (eds.), *Economy and Society in Scotland and Ireland* (Edinburgh, 1988), pp. 105-116.

allowances for income which was not received.¹⁴⁹⁵ To compare the Williamite regime's finances to that of its predecessor, the analysis has been divided between the pre-Revolution period (1686-1688) and the post-Revolution period (1689-1691). Crown income in this period was not always audited consistently on a twelve-monthly basis.¹⁴⁹⁶ Accordingly, the records are organised in such a way that it is most helpful to compare Scottish crown finances from the two separate regimes over three financial periods, with the overall totals of charge and discharge in this period calculated into yearly averages.¹⁴⁹⁷ James VII's finances in Scotland were separated into two periods by the Treasury with the first covering 1685 to March 1686 and the second covering March 1686 to August 1688.¹⁴⁹⁸ During the first period, the Scottish crown saw an annual average charge of £1,460,580 Scots and an annual average discharge of £1,475, 148 Scots.¹⁴⁹⁹ In the second period, the bulk of James' reign, the Scottish crown saw an average annual charge of £1,609,490 Scots and an average annual discharge of £1,604,768 Scots.¹⁵⁰⁰ Comparatively, after the Revolution, the crown saw only a minor expansion in average annual charge and a slight contraction in average annual discharge. From August 1688 to March 1692, the Scottish crown's average annual charge was £1,619,716 Scots and its discharge was £1,462,401 Scots.¹⁵⁰¹ This represents a trend of fiscal expansion in charge under William II's reign, as compared to his predecessor's, but with discharge, or real expenditure, decreasing. The decrease in the latter does not provide the whole story due to the large amounts of credit the Scottish Williamite government had accrued during the Highland War, much of

¹⁴⁹⁵ William T. Baxter, 'The Account Charge and Discharge' in *The Accounting Historians Journal*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring, 1980), pp. 69-71.

¹⁴⁹⁶ NRS, E26/12/3, Treasury Accounts, 1686-1688, f. 196.

¹⁴⁹⁷ NRS, E26/12/4, Treasury Accounts, 1689-1692, f. 316

¹⁴⁹⁸ NRS, E26/12/2, Treasury Accounts, 1684-1686, f. 138. E26/12/3, f. 196.

¹⁴⁹⁹ NRS, E26/12/2, f. 138.

¹⁵⁰⁰ NRS, E26/12/3, f. 196.

¹⁵⁰¹ NRS, E26/12/4, f. 316

which was not repaid until the years following that conflict's conclusion.¹⁵⁰² However, in spite of this slight decrease in average annual spending, the army's personnel related costs of the Scottish Williamite army increased exponentially.

In disaggregating our case-study of personnel charge from the overall picture of crown finances, there are several additional considerations to be borne in mind. An in-depth examination of the Scottish Williamite army's finances during the Highland War has never been undertaken before and, as we saw in the introduction to this chapter, the records utilised are far from perfect. The incomplete and erratic nature of the Scottish Treasury and army accounts during the latter half of the seventeenth-century has proven to be a general problem for historians. Dalton's edited collections of source material, collated at the turn of the twentieth century, were the first attempt to provide an overview of the pre-Revolution army establishment in Scotland. His volumes on William's reign relate, largely, to England and his book *The Scots Army* regretfully ends its chronological journey in 1688.¹⁵⁰³ This chapter will explore the cost of the Highland War for the Scottish Williamite state by examining the army's personnel related costs. The personnel related costs refer to the price of each regiment, troop, company, or garrison by collating the wages of the rank-and-file, the wages of officers, subsistence pay (paid to regiments in lieu of wages), and clothing money as well as coal and candle payments made to garrisons.¹⁵⁰⁴ In sum, all of the costs related to recruiting and maintaining the personnel of an army. These costs, however, were not always immediately met: payments were often made irregularly and officers were usually given precepts, a writ or warrant, to facilitate them drawing upon credit networks, either local collectors of revenue or private

¹⁵⁰² *RPCS*, XVI, 'Act and remit, Lilius Fleeming, 20th January 1691', p. 42. *NRS*, RD 3/76/100, 'Band, Mr Archibald Rollo, major in Argyll's regiment to the town of Glasgow', 22 June 1691.

¹⁵⁰³ Dalton, *English*, III, 1689-1694. Dalton, *Scots*.

¹⁵⁰⁴ Note: Wages of officers were, usually, not included within the wages of the rank-and-file soldiers of a regiment during the early modern period.

mercantile citizens, to actually pay out sums.¹⁵⁰⁵ Personnel related costs are, therefore, a manageable facet of the Scottish state's fiscal and military expansion in this period but it does allow us to explore trends related to the whole. It must be borne in mind that personnel related costs are far from exhaustive when examining the overall cost of the Highland War for the Williamites. There remains a plethora of other material which could be incorporated into a far larger study of the fiscal-military state in Scotland during this period, as previously mentioned.¹⁵⁰⁶ Yet, examining the cost of the Williamite military personnel allows the exploration of how state finances mapped on to military activity in this period, particularly the expansion and contraction of the army's personnel. All figures are provided in pounds Sterling unless otherwise stated, as this was the denomination generally preferred by the Scottish Treasury in army accounts – although it was not exclusively used as we have previously explained.¹⁵⁰⁷

Constructing totals for army personnel pay is not straightforward and must be briefly explained. Payments to soldiers discharged due to age or infirmity, known contemporaneously as 'invalids', have been deliberately excluded from this analysis. This was carried out in order to focus upon serving soldiers within the army and garrisons.¹⁵⁰⁸ Equally, this investigation has not included the Scottish Williamite government's navy nor the marine detachments that served upon them. The decision was taken to focus solely upon the army.¹⁵⁰⁹ Payments to army personnel were not made on a calendar monthly basis; a payment of wages could cover uneven periods. For example, a part of

¹⁵⁰⁵ *NRS*, E91/2, 'Earle of Mar's Regt', f. 15.

¹⁵⁰⁶ *NRS*, E91/3. *Ibid.*, E91/6.

¹⁵⁰⁷ Two of the army accounts, *NRS*, E91/4, for the period (1689-91) utilised pounds Scots but only covers the period (March 1689-February 1690). *NRS*, E91/2, utilised Sterling (1689-1701). These were collated to provide the figures and cross-referenced, due to overlaps between them, to prevent duplicate costs being counted as part of the overall figures.

¹⁵⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰⁹ Note: For more on the marine expeditions carried out during the Highland War please see: Murdoch, *Terror*, pp. 319, 321. Graham, *Maritime*, pp. 83-84. Helling, 'Royal Navy', pp. 131-137, 182-186. See also: Grant, *Scots Navy*.

Lord Blantyre's Regiment of foot was paid £300, from 3rd June to 1st July 1689.¹⁵¹⁰ Precepts could be delayed and, in some instances, were deliberately withheld until regiments were inspected by the muster-master general.¹⁵¹¹ There were a few ways in which the regiments of the army could be paid. Theoretically, if the money was actually disbursed from the Treasury it could remain with the commanding officer to be paid out by the regimental pay-master.¹⁵¹² More commonly, the commanding officer, and his captains, were issued with precepts which they could use as promissory notes to draw credit from local collectors of public revenue, burgesses or merchants.¹⁵¹³ They would then disburse funds to the regiment for their costs, the precept could be passed to the creditor to seek reimbursement from the Treasury.¹⁵¹⁴ Alternatively, officers, in lieu of funds or precepts from the government, would utilise their own personal credit to maintain their companies or regiments.¹⁵¹⁵ This was usually only done when absolutely necessary, as it entailed significant risk to an officer's personal finances. For example, when the Scots-Dutch Brigade officers found themselves lacking precepts or funds, which had to be sent from Dutch military attachés in London, they took out credit with local merchants and burgesses to keep their regiments afloat.¹⁵¹⁶ The system for paying the Williamite regiments was imperfect and riddled with delays in disbursing funds to the commanders and officers of the army.¹⁵¹⁷ Payments would roughly correspond to the accounted costs generally, but in some instances regiments or garrisons could be neglected by accident. In

¹⁵¹⁰ E91/4, Treasury Accounts, 'Lord Blantyre's Regiment, May-October 1689.'

¹⁵¹¹ *RPS*, 1689/3/142, Act for modelling the 500 horses in ten troops, 22nd April 1689. *RPCS*, XIII, Act for better regulating of his Majesty's forces, 23rd July 1689, p. 546.

¹⁵¹² Childs, *British*, pp. 67-69, 140.

¹⁵¹³ *NRS*, GD26/9/11, Accounts and other papers relating to the supply of arms, equipment, and clothing to the Earl of Leven's Regiment, 1689-1697.

¹⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹⁵ Parrott, *Business*.

¹⁵¹⁶ *NRS*, E93/20, Accounts of Provisions furnished to Major-General Mackay's regiment (1690-91). *NRS*, E93/21, Accounts of Provisions to Colonel Ramsay's regiment (1690-1691). *NRS*, E93/22, Accounts and Vouchers of Provisions furnished to Col Lauder's Reg (1690).

¹⁵¹⁷ *RPCS*, XIII, Act John Lord Hay of Yester, 12th July 1689, p. 509.

late 1688 to March 1689, the Treasury paid the army in a slightly different manner with some payments in the former covering backdated periods between three to six months.¹⁵¹⁸


Comparing the army personnel related costs under James' regime to that of the of the Scottish Williamites reveals an interesting picture. The Scottish Williamite state's personnel costs increased rapidly during the Highland War. This growth in cost broadly correlated with the increasing numbers of men enlisted by the army, albeit there were other reasons for the increasing price of certain regiments.¹⁵¹⁹ Table 1.1 (below) illustrates that the annual personnel related costs of the army increased steadily, from 1688 to 1689, before peaking, in 1690 and, finally, stabilising, in 1691, with the de-escalation of the conflict.¹⁵²⁰ Overall, the army personnel related costs reveal that the Scottish fiscal-military state saw an expansion of its personnel and a corresponding increase in cost, with levels of spending outlaid for the payment of soldiers well above the modest pre-Revolution army establishment. This is, perhaps, unsurprising, given the fact that King James' Scottish army was, for much of its existence, a peacetime formation. On the other hand, William and Mary's early years in power were characterised by a rapid and chaotic civil war. What this increasing cost illustrates, is the fact that the Scottish Williamite state expanded its standing army in a haste to combat the Jacobites and that the size and cost of this far outweighed those of their immediate predecessors. Therefore, in spite of the financial difficulties the Scottish Williamite regime would face in financing its army, it nonetheless continued to raise forces into early 1690. It would appear that the Williamite government, and indeed William himself, felt that it was hard to put a price on victory and the security of the new regime. We will now turn to the annual army personnel related costs, from 1688 to 1691.

¹⁵¹⁸ NRS, E7/5.

¹⁵¹⁹ NRS, E26/12/2-4, 1686-1691, ff. 67-201.

¹⁵²⁰ NRS, E7/2,4-5. E91/2-5.

Army Personnel Related Costs, 1688-1691



There was a steady increase in army personnel related costs in line with the re-establishment of the standing forces from 1688 to 1689.¹⁵²¹ Prior to the Dutch invasion of England in November 1688, James VII had a standing army of just under 3,000 men in Scotland, this modest standing force was inherited from the efforts of his brother and predecessor Charles II (1660-1685).¹⁵²² In the aftermath of the Revolution, James' Scottish field army was disbanded after the events at Salisbury Plain, leaving only a miniscule remnant of the professional force in Scotland.¹⁵²³ Due to this dramatic dissolution, the Williamites had to re-establish the army wholesale. This caused a rapid expansion of the standing army under the Williamites. Subsequently, the army's personnel related costs increased from £46,076 in 1688 to £76,277 in 1689, an increase of sixty-five percent.¹⁵²⁴ Recruitment would take time and the build-up of a large army in 1689 took several months. The reason we cannot use overall army personnel related costs as a direct cipher for the size of the Williamite forces under arms was that pay varied considerably between

¹⁵²¹ *NRS*, E7/2; E7/4, 1686-1688, ff. 438-442, 444-446, 486-489, 515; E7/5, 1688-90, ff. 5-6, 9, 41.

¹⁵²² Childs, *Charles II*.

¹⁵²³ Dalton, *Scots*, pp. 86-87.

¹⁵²⁴ *NRS*, E7/4, ff. 438-442, 444-446, 486-489, 515; E7/5, ff. 5-6, 9, 41.

different types of regiments and troops as well as amongst soldiers of differing ranks. A regiment of foot cost between £500 and £750 per month on average, numbering around 700 men.¹⁵²⁵ A foot soldier of the Scottish Williamite army was paid six pence and a commissioned officer was paid between eight shillings, for a colonel, and four to three shillings, for a lieutenant or ensign, per day.¹⁵²⁶ A cavalry troop comprised fifty men per troop but was proportionately more expensive, when compared with a foot regiment, at just under £200 per month.¹⁵²⁷ This was due to their sought-after horsemanship skills and the higher associated costs an individual trooper incurred in maintaining his mount and his equipment. A cavalry trooper was paid around fourteen shillings per day with the officers on similar wages to their infantry counter-parts.¹⁵²⁸ Regiments of dragoons were highly mobile mounted infantry who fought primarily on foot but could also fight on horseback. The Scottish Williamites raised relatively few regiments of dragoons, three in total.¹⁵²⁹ Due to their mobility, and versatility, dragoons regiments were often highly paid with Cardross' regiment of around 300 men paid £840 per month in 1689.¹⁵³⁰ Comparing this to Blantyre's regiment of foot, with 550 men, reveals that they were paid between £700 and £800 per month in the same year.¹⁵³¹

The common soldier's dealings with the Scottish army's financial structure demonstrates its short-comings as well as the low-level corruption amongst its ranks. The example of McBane, serving as a private in the Laird of Grant's regiment of foot, is

¹⁵²⁵ *NRS*, E91/4, 'Kenmuir, Grant & Argyll's regiments of foot, August-October 1689', f. 3.

¹⁵²⁶ *NRS*, E7/5, 'Marr's regiment, March 1689', f. 5.

¹⁵²⁷ *NRS*, E91/2, 'Lord Belhaven's Troop of Horse', f. 95. *NRS*, E91/4, 'Newbattle & Ross' troops of horse, May-Sept 1689', f. 5.

¹⁵²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵²⁹ *RPCS*, XIII, Act, the Lord Cardross, 15th July 1689, pp. 515-516. *RPCS*, XVI, Establishment for the pay of their Majesties' forces in Scotland, 1st January 1691, p. 10. *NRS*, E91/2, 'Lord Newbattle's Regt of Dragoons', 1st February 1691, f. 156.

¹⁵³⁰ *NRS*, E91/4, 'Cardross' regiment of dragoons, Sept-Oct 1689', f. 4.

¹⁵³¹ *NRS*, E91/4, 'Lord Blantyre's Reg of Foot', f. 2.

telling.¹⁵³² McBane recalled that it was not uncommon for older soldiers, with the complicity of their superior officers, to exploit the less experienced recruits, particularly with regards to pay.¹⁵³³ His memoir reveals one such instance in which an 'Old Soldier' was ordered by an officer:

to take care of me, and to manage my pay as he pleased; he gave me nothing but what he thought fit, when I asked him for Money he would for ordinary give me a Blow... I complained to my Officer but found it in vain.¹⁵³⁴

McBane was only able to recover his pay by disputing the issue violently, at the point of swords, with his mentor.¹⁵³⁵ This culture of exploitation was interlinked with the traditional networks of patronage of noble officers in the Scottish armies, and indeed, many other armies of this period. Mackay highlighted this culture in his memoir when he pointed out the fact that noble Scottish officers picked men, to staff their regiments, whom they either favoured personally or for their abilities to control large groups of fellow soldiers.¹⁵³⁶ Such a culture would easily lend itself to 'false musters' whereby officers reported non-existent soldiers in their ranks in order to embezzle state funds. This was a particular problem for William's English and Scottish armies in the early stages of the Nine Years' War, as Childs has pointed out.¹⁵³⁷

Therefore, the variances in cost due to the aforementioned factors mean that we cannot necessarily map personnel costs neatly onto the overall size of the Scottish Williamite army. However, we can surmise that the efforts of the Scottish Williamite government, and the efforts of the crown, to reform the army did, to some extent, negate

¹⁵³² McBane, *Sword-Man's*, pp. 108-109.

¹⁵³³ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

¹⁵³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

¹⁵³⁶ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 7.

¹⁵³⁷ Childs, *British*, pp. 27-29.

practices like false musters.¹⁵³⁸ For instance, an act ‘for better regulating of his Majesty’s forces’ was passed, on 23rd July 1689. This signalled an endeavour, by the central government, to ensure the forces levied were, ‘regularly and sufficiently clothed and that good order and discipline be observed and kept [sic] amongst them, and that all false musters in tyme coming [sic] may be prevented’.¹⁵³⁹ In light of the legislative attempts to suppress poor practices, such as false musters, we can assume that these acts of corruption were not so rampant and that the majority of the musters were inaccurate. Furthermore, an examination of the E91/2 army accounts, which were audited in 1701, gives us an idea of the strength of many of the regiments at various points in the campaigns. As part of the audit, officials record their examination of muster rolls for various points during the campaign, notably for late 1689 and mid-1690. Moreover, we can see that there was a sizeable expansion, at least on paper, in the standing army from its 1688 formation, around 3,000 men strong, to its post-Revolution formation with just over 6,000 in the field army alone by the end of 1689.¹⁵⁴⁰ In 1690, the Williamite forces in Scotland were expanded further to 9,000 men in total and this was reflected in the army’s personnel costs, increasing from £76,277, in the previous year, to £153,114. This represented a one-hundred percent increase in the costs of the Scottish Williamite army and almost certainly corresponded to the successful efforts to raise a larger force to counter the Jacobite threat. This was followed by a reduction in the forces in Scotland in 1691 and, correspondingly, a stabilisation in the personnel related costs to £61,376 for the final year of the war.¹⁵⁴¹ This represented a sixty percent decrease, from the previous year,

¹⁵³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 46-48.

¹⁵³⁹ *RPCS*, XIII, Act for better regulating of his Majesty’s forces, 23rd July 1689, p. 546.

¹⁵⁴⁰ *NRS*, E7/5, ff. 5-6, 41, 77.

¹⁵⁴¹ *NRS*, E91/4-5.

in the personnel related costs of the Williamite army. In total, the Scottish state's personnel related costs for the army amounted to £290,767 Sterling from 1689 to 1691.¹⁵⁴²

Before we delve into a year-by-year analysis of the cost of the Scottish army during this period, it is useful to briefly outline how foreign auxiliary regiments present in Scotland were financed. The previous chapters have demonstrated the critical role of the Scots-Dutch Brigade and as such we will now take a look at how these regiments were paid during the Highland War. On 26th March 1689, the Convention of Estates had mooted the possibility that the Brigade should be paid, along with regiments from England sent to aid them, out of the customs and excise of Scotland.¹⁵⁴³ As it turned out, the Brigade did not require this nor did the English regiments, with the Convention pragmatically rescinding the offer promptly.¹⁵⁴⁴ However, this has led to confusion amongst historians as to how the Brigade was paid during the Highland War. It has led some to conclude that the Scots-Dutch regiments were re-incorporated into the Scottish Williamite army for the duration of the conflict.¹⁵⁴⁵ There is no evidence to support this claim, with the exception of the Convention of Estates' rejected proposal. The only payments made to the Brigade from the Scottish Treasury during this period were for the purchase of provisions, weapons or equipment.¹⁵⁴⁶ Instead, the Brigade was paid through the English treasury, but as part of the Dutch army establishment.¹⁵⁴⁷ This temporary financial arrangement cannot, however, be marshalled as evidence for the long-standing misapprehension that the Scots-Dutch regiments were subordinated to the Anglo-Dutch Brigade; the latter was co-opted into the English army in 1688.¹⁵⁴⁸ In reality the Brigade

¹⁵⁴² Ibid.

¹⁵⁴³ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, 26th March 1689, p. 10.

¹⁵⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴⁵ Oates, *Killiecrankie*, pp. 24-25.

¹⁵⁴⁶ *NRS*, E93/20, Commissaries of forces: Accounts of Provisions furnished to Major-general Mackay's regiment, 1690-1691.

¹⁵⁴⁷ *CTB*, IX, 15th March 1689, p. 15.

¹⁵⁴⁸ Childs, 'Scottish', pp. 60-61.

remained part of the Dutch establishment throughout their time in Scotland and were paid on a similar basis to other Dutch regiments serving in England and Ireland.

When the Scots-Dutch Brigade arrived in Scotland they not only brought experienced soldiers and officers but an important cargo of £10,000 from the English treasury.¹⁵⁴⁹ This sum was shipped, in the wake of their departure from London, by one Mr. Joseph Watts, a merchant or shipowner based there.¹⁵⁵⁰ This money was not to pay the Brigade, but to be utilised in levying and equipping forces in Scotland, as mentioned earlier.¹⁵⁵¹ Instead, the Brigade's wages were recorded in the English treasury accounts as being paid to them a day before their departure, 12th March 1689, and amounting to an additional £7,500.¹⁵⁵² This was the equivalent of twelve months of pay for an infantry regiment in England during the same period.¹⁵⁵³ Oates has extrapolated from these payments, the argument that the Brigade was part of the English army during the Highland War.¹⁵⁵⁴ The Brigade's pay did, indeed, come directly from £20,000 of customs revenue levied in England.¹⁵⁵⁵ However, payments to Dutch regiments out of the English Treasury were repaid by the States General – as such, we can see these as part of a broader reliance on credit to fund armies in this period, albeit with a transnational twist. Payments to the Brigade were made by the Earl of Ranleagh, as paymaster general of William's English and Irish forces.¹⁵⁵⁶ The Scots-Dutch Brigade's pay was accounted for by Mr Jacob Vander Esch, paymaster to the Dutch army that had landed with William in England in 1688.¹⁵⁵⁷ This was recorded in testimony given by Ranleagh to the 'Commissioners of

¹⁵⁴⁹ *CTB*, IX, 15th March 1689, p. 15.

¹⁵⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵² *CTB*, IX, 12th March 1689, p. 6.

¹⁵⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵⁴ Oates, *Killiecrankie*, pp. 24-25.

¹⁵⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵⁶ *ODNB*, C.I McGrath, 'Jones, Richard, earl of Ranelagh (1641–1712), politician'.

¹⁵⁵⁷ *CTB*, IX, 12th March 1689, p. 6. Anonymous (ed.), *Journals of the House of Commons*, October 20th 1702 to March 14th 1704, Vol 14 (London, 1803), Earl of Ranleagh's accounts, 30th November 1702, p. 54.

Accounts' in the English House of Commons on 30th November 1702; Ranleagh's account was part of a larger statement surrounding the propriety of army pay since the start of William and Mary's reign.¹⁵⁵⁸ When considering such payments, as the above, and Vander Esch's role, Ranleagh recalled that King William 'would not, for many years after his Accession to the crown, suffer his Dutch forces either to be mustered, or paid, but according to their own Method'.¹⁵⁵⁹ This corroborates the financial evidence that Dutch regiments, like the Brigade, were paid via the English treasury, but with such payments accounted for by Vander Esch as paymaster of Dutch forces in England, Scotland and Ireland.


The significant increase in personnel related costs from 1688 to 1689 illustrates that the Scottish state rather than simply contracting under William's reign, as Szechi has suggested, expanded its fiscal-military capacity.¹⁵⁶⁰ Although this expansion was brief, only lasting two years, and was not straightforward, its decline was gradual, stable and, by 1691, still remained above the cost of the 1688 Scottish army establishment. Furthermore, the contraction of the army, both in size and cost, was in-line with the changing security needs of the state in 1691. This section will provide month-by-month totals of the personnel related costs for each year and will provide some insights into the fluctuations in state investment in the military during the conflict. First, we will provide a comparison of the Williamite state's predecessor, James' Scottish army, and examine its personnel related costs in the last year of King James' rule over Scotland. Although Childs, among others, has rightly pointed out that the standing army in Scotland was

¹⁵⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶⁰ Szechi, *Jacobites*, pp. 66-67.

greatly expanded during James' reign, we will reveal that the Williamite expansion of their Scottish army, and the cost thereof, far outweighs its predecessor.¹⁵⁶¹



In the year prior to the Highland War, the 'Royal Scots Army' was modest in size and, as table 2.0 shows, this was reflected in its personnel costs. At the beginning of James' reign, 1685, the size of the force remained relatively consistent with the formation raised by Charles II.¹⁵⁶² James did, however, oversee an expansion of the Scottish standing army in 1686, from 2,500 to 3,525 soldiers. When the Scottish army marched southward in September 1688 it had over 3,500 soldiers, organised into ten regiments: two of infantry, one of dragoons and seven troops of horse.¹⁵⁶³ Comparatively, James' English and Irish armies numbered 24,000 and 2,820 men respectively.¹⁵⁶⁴ In Scotland, a further 268 soldiers were garrisoned at Edinburgh, Stirling, Dumbarton and Blackness castles as well as on the Bass Rock.¹⁵⁶⁵ At first glance, it appeared that Scotland had been left largely undefended outside of these garrisons, but Childs has pointed out a further 5,573 men were organised

¹⁵⁶¹ Childs, *British*, p. 14. Childs, *James II*, p. 206.

¹⁵⁶² Childs, *James II*, p. 4.

¹⁵⁶³ Ibid. Raffe, *Scotland*, p. 27.

¹⁵⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶⁵ Ibid; Childs, *British*, p. 153.

into local militias and independent companies augmented by small contingents of regular soldiers.¹⁵⁶⁶ Childs has estimated that James' Scottish army cost his government £80,000 per annum compared to the £620,322 spent on its English counterpart.¹⁵⁶⁷ Table 2.0 suggests that approximately half of the army's total budget was spent on personnel costs. From January to August 1688, the army's personnel related costs remained relatively stable.¹⁵⁶⁸ The army mustered in February of that year cost £6,492 and by June this had fallen to £5,661, decreasing by thirteen percent.¹⁵⁶⁹ Troop strength remained relatively stable with little fluctuation throughout the year; the major exception to this was the addition of two new regiments of foot to be officered by Scots-Dutch returnees.¹⁵⁷⁰ However, these figures only provide a partial picture of the cost of James' Scottish army. The army accounts of this period only record the full personnel costs of the army from January until August, whereafter the bulk of the forces were deployed to England and paid via the English Treasury for their service in defending that country from the Dutch invaders.¹⁵⁷¹

The mobilization of forces in September increased personnel expenditure.¹⁵⁷² However, this was followed by a dramatic decrease of eighty-four per cent, from £7,370 in September to £856 in December.¹⁵⁷³ This was due to the aforementioned departure of most of the Scottish army for England.¹⁵⁷⁴ However, the collapse of James's regime in England saw the monarch order an ill-advised withdrawal to London from Salisbury Plain before a

¹⁵⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

¹⁵⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶⁹ *NRS*, E7/4, ff. 374, 446-7, 515.

¹⁵⁷⁰ *NRS*, E7/4, 'Accompt of the pay of the Garisones & Artillary (besyds Retention money) with allowances for coall & candle to these Garisones, for the months of May June & July 1688', f. 489. Raffe, *Scotland*, p. 27.

¹⁵⁷¹ Dalton, *Scots*, pp. 79-80. Childs, *James II*, p. 184.

¹⁵⁷² *NRS*, E7/5, ff. 5-6, 9, 41.

¹⁵⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

general disbandment of all the forces in England was issued in early December 1688.¹⁵⁷⁵ When James fled into exile later that month the Scottish army had effectively dissipated and the government could not afford to recruit further regiments. This rapid decline in costs and personnel was due to that disbandment and the long march back to Scotland that occurred in its aftermath.¹⁵⁷⁶ Devoid of direction the commander in chief of the Scottish army, Lieutenant-General James Douglas, resigned his commission on 17th December.¹⁵⁷⁷ Prior to his resignation, Douglas had secured permission from the Prince of Orange to march his soldiers back to Scotland.¹⁵⁷⁸ Having been made defunct the Scottish army now found that they had no means of financial subsistence. In this political quagmire the remnant of James' regime in Scotland found it could no longer pay for its army and the new interim government in England had no desire to finance a Scottish force that had shown little support for William and Mary. The only regular forces retained by the Scottish administration were four companies of infantry, a meagre 120 foot, alongside a single troop of 50 horse and the garrisons mentioned earlier.¹⁵⁷⁹ The majority of the soldiers appear to have either returned home or lingered in Edinburgh, but there are no sources to prove this conclusively. The inadequate remnant of the Scottish army found itself unable to secure the regime by force. This effectively allowed their opponents to freely dismantle James' government via political means.¹⁵⁸⁰ The rapid outbreak of the Highland War, after the tumultuous events of the Convention, in March of the following year, would see a significant reinvestment in a Scottish army and an expansion which would surpass James' previous efforts.

¹⁵⁷⁵ Harris, *Revolution*, p. 275.


¹⁵⁷⁶ Childs, *James II*, p. 183.

¹⁵⁷⁷ Dalton, *Scots*, p. 83.

¹⁵⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷⁹ *NRS*, E7/5, f. 41.

¹⁵⁸⁰ Harris, *Revolution*, p. 379.



The comparatively low personnel related costs of the army before the Convention gathered underscores the significance of the meeting in breaking the constitutional impasse and, equally, the vulnerable position from which the nascent Williamite regime began. From January to March 1689, the personnel related costs of the army only amounted to £1,128 in total.¹⁵⁸¹ The state, struggling with law and order generally, found itself unable to collect income properly in some of the localities.¹⁵⁸² Compounding this was the council's earlier decision to disband the militias on 7th December of the previous year; a decision which left them completely bereft of even an ad-hoc military force.¹⁵⁸³ The main result of this 'interregnum' was that neither the Jacobites nor Williamites had a military organisation in Scotland until March-April of 1689. There were some demobilised soldiers of James' army in the country. Without leadership these men remained listless, but the fear amongst the Convention was that they harboured their loyalty to their exiled sovereign. These anxieties led the Convention to remain suspicious of veterans from James' army and some of these men were effectively blacklisted. For example, in March

¹⁵⁸¹ NRS, E7/5; E91/4.

¹⁵⁸² Raffe, *Scotland*, pp. 108-109.

¹⁵⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 109-111

1689, a Catholic officer, Colonel Rattray, was imprisoned simply under the suspicion of his military service to James and his confessional beliefs.¹⁵⁸⁴ Although William of Orange had been given authority over the defence of Scotland, the Convention was effectively responsible for organising forces on the ground.¹⁵⁸⁵ The Williamites only had a small scale force of regular troops at the outset of the conflict; composed of the Earl of Leven's new regiment of foot and the garrison forces left from the previous regime. This was augmented with thousands of armed volunteers who flooded into the capital from the Covenanted heartlands in the Western shires and the Convention issued orders to mobilise the militia across the country.¹⁵⁸⁶ Additionally, as we have already seen, foreign auxiliary forces from the Dutch and English armies were dispatched to Scotland to reinforce William's supporters. However, it became quickly apparent to William, his advisers in London and his new Scottish government that the security of the kingdom he was soon to rule over would require a sizeable standing army. The interim government in Edinburgh had already begun issuing calls for noblemen and gentry to step forward and accept commissions to raise new regiments. From the outbreak of the conflict, 18th March 1689, up until the first major engagement at Killiecrankie, 27th July 1689, the new regime would rapidly expand its army, and this was followed by a steady, yet sizeable, increase in monthly army personnel related costs (see table 2.1). The haste of this Williamite effort was a direct response to the threat of the Scottish Jacobites support amongst certain Highland clans and the intrinsic military capacity of said clans as well as the possibility external support arriving from the appreciable Jacobite constituency in Ireland.

It was well known by contemporaries within Scotland that the Highland clans, whom Viscount Dundee was in the process of mobilising, were able to gather fighting-

¹⁵⁸⁴ *RPCS*, XIII, Order anent Colonel Rattray, 31st May 1689, pp. 398-399.

¹⁵⁸⁵ Anon., *Proceedings*, I, p. 26.

¹⁵⁸⁶ *RPS*, 1689/3/27. 1689/3/31.

men in an exceptionally rapid fashion.¹⁵⁸⁷ Although these 'traditional' fighters lacked modern military training, they were well utilised in irregular warfare and in compact mobile armies to great effect. Moreover, within the Highlands, and upon its frontiers, these forces were cheap to maintain, due to the reliance upon raiding for additional supplies in the field, and flexible, due to the command structure, which was based upon Gaelic social structures.¹⁵⁸⁸ In other words, the Scottish Jacobite army was the antithesis of the Scottish Williamite Army. This flexibility was illustrated in Chapter two as the Jacobite forces proved their adaptability at Killiecrankie, ensuring they attacked from terrain which suited their method of warfare. Once Dundee secured the support of key chieftains, such as Cameron of Lochiel, he was soon able to muster an army of nearly 2,000 men within weeks of his departure.¹⁵⁸⁹ Manning has commented that the remarkable demographic capacity within the Scottish Highlands far outstripped that of the Lowlands in military terms during this period.¹⁵⁹⁰ Whilst this is certainly true, to a degree, the Lowlands remained able to muster a sizeable standing army due to its similarly sizeable population, as the Williamites demonstrated in 1689. Moreover, the Scottish Lowlands possessed the fiscal levers required to levy and maintain a modern standing army, whereas the Highlands did not – instead opting to rely on more convenient and expedient military networks of obligation. When Mackay was ordered to abandon the lands north of the Tay, in the wake of Killiecrankie, he argued against this as it would give the Jacobites access to public revenues from the north-eastern lowlands and the ability to augment

¹⁵⁸⁷ Hill, *Celtic*, pp. 1-4. Grosjean and Murdoch, *Leslie*, p. 14. Manning, *Swordsmen*, p. 25. MacCoinnich, 'Spirit' in Murdoch & Mackillop (eds.) *Fighting*, pp. 133-161. Note: For an earlier example of the capacity of the clans rapid levy system see Jane E.A. Dawson, *Campbell Letters 1559-1583* (Edinburgh, 1997), '41. - Argyll to Glenorchy, 5th July 1565', p. 99.

¹⁵⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸⁹ *Cameron*, p. 268.

¹⁵⁹⁰ Manning, *Apprenticeship*, pp. 375-376.

their formidable contingent of Highland foot with recruits from amidst the north-east population, particularly for cavalry.¹⁵⁹¹

In April, the Scottish Williamite government re-established the army by commissioning nine regiments of foot, one regiment of dragoons, twelve troops of horse and at least two Independent Highland companies alongside garrison forces.¹⁵⁹² Yet, it took time to recruit soldiers and troopers for the new army and this was reflected by the relatively low cost in these early months. In April 1689, the army's personnel related costs amounted to just £1,503.¹⁵⁹³ At the same time, the Williamite government lacked funds to pay for the expansion of the forces immediately, as evident in the Convention's repeated calls for all arrears in public revenue to be collected.¹⁵⁹⁴ As the Convention formed the new government, they were, however, able to begin mobilising collectors of revenue in the localities to begin pursuing such arrears after passing a new act of supply on 27th April (see Table 2.1).¹⁵⁹⁵ Hopkins has pointed out that the new regime in Scotland 'demanded a far higher rate of permanent taxation'.¹⁵⁹⁶ The main reason for this was, of course, the need to re-establish the standing army to meet the Jacobite threat. However, the portions of revenue outlaid to pay for said army, by the Scottish parliament, could not meet the expanded fiscal-military demands of the Williamite state. The proportion set out for the crown's use amounted to £24,000, or £288,000 Scots.¹⁵⁹⁷ This sum covered the army's personnel related costs, with £22,429 Sterling accrued by June of that year.¹⁵⁹⁸ Crucially, some of the initial cost of raising new regiments was met by the £10,000, from the English Treasury, which the Scots-Dutch Brigade had brought to Scotland; their orders expressly

¹⁵⁹¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melville, 13th June 1689, p. 227.

¹⁵⁹² *RPS*, 1689/3/135. *RPS*, 1689/3/155. *RPCS* XIII, p. 383. *RPS*, 1689/3/143, 1689/3/144.

¹⁵⁹³ See: Tables 2.0 & 2.1

¹⁵⁹⁴ *RPS*, 1689/3/24.

¹⁵⁹⁵ *RPS*, 1689/3/189.

¹⁵⁹⁶ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, p. 133.

¹⁵⁹⁷ *RPS*, 1689/3/189, Act for raising four months' supply, 27th April 1689.

¹⁵⁹⁸ *Ibid*; *RPS*, 1689/3/208. *NRS*, E7/5, E91/2, E91/4-5.

stated that this money was for raising new forces in Scotland and not for the Brigade's own use, as Oates has previously suggested.¹⁵⁹⁹ From May to July 1689, the Williamite Scottish army's personnel related costs grew rapidly from £4,886 to £8,759, an increase of seventy-nine percent.¹⁶⁰⁰ It is difficult to tell the exact numbers of men levied for the Williamite army during these months as muster rolls were either not kept at all or appear infrequently, depending upon the regiment.¹⁶⁰¹ Therefore, the demographic difficulties in the Lowlands to which Manning refers to do not seem to have been as important in terms of numbers for the Scottish Williamite government which expanded its army by at least 3,000 soldiers compared to James' Scottish army of 1688. The lack of a major battle in the initial months of the Highland War would mean there were few casualties on either side. This sense of a robust financial position is supported by Mackay's observation that 'during the first six or seven Months' the army was 'very punctually paid.'¹⁶⁰² This roughly matches the trend of an overall steady increase in the army's personnel related costs to match the recruiting drive undertaken by the Williamites during these months.

It became apparent, in the months leading up to the Battle of Killiecrankie, that further funds would be required to maintain the re-established and expanded Scottish Williamite army. The privy council appealed to parliament to pass another act of supply to facilitate this. On 5th July 1689, Hamilton gave a speech to the parliament which concluded with an appeal for the members to 'consider a further supply for maintaining the forces' before they moved to consider other issues, such as constitutional or religious reforms.¹⁶⁰³ Parliament agreed in principle, but considered the issue of further supply at a ponderous pace over the course of July.¹⁶⁰⁴ Clearly, the members would only reconsider

¹⁵⁹⁹ *CTB*, Vol IX, Part I, 15th March 1689, p. 9. Oates, *Killiecrankie*, pp. 24-25.

¹⁶⁰⁰ See: Table 2.1.

¹⁶⁰¹ *NRS*, E7/5.

¹⁶⁰² Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 7.

¹⁶⁰³ *RPS*, M1689/6/10, Act read; new supply to be considered; continuation, 5th July 1689.

¹⁶⁰⁴ *Ibid*.

another act of supply when it suited them and events would quickly overtake them in the coming month. The Battle of Killiecrankie proved to be a rude awakening for many sitting in the parliament, the defeat had an immense impact on the Williamite army. News of the catastrophe greatly alarmed members and they quickly assented to pass a further act of supply on 2nd August 1689.¹⁶⁰⁵ The Williamite army itself suffered an estimated 2,000 casualties at Killiecrankie, the exact figures remain unknown.¹⁶⁰⁶ Regiments would have to be replenished with new recruits and the men that had survived the battle now had to be re-equipped, especially with arms.¹⁶⁰⁷ It must be borne in mind, however, that four of these regiments were not part of the Scottish Williamite army establishment and, thus, not on the pay roll of the Williamite Treasury in Scotland.¹⁶⁰⁸ It is difficult to tell if the casualties amongst the Scottish Williamites regiments had a financial impact. What can be discerned from the figures, was that the Williamites army personnel costs increased by a modest fourteen percent.¹⁶⁰⁹ Moreover, this trend continued with personnel costs rising from £9,989 in total for August to £11,555 in total in September; representing an increase of sixteen percent.¹⁶¹⁰ It is more than likely that the losses at Killiecrankie led to a redoubled effort to recruit more men for the Scottish Williamite regiments. Equally, the anxiety amongst Williamite ministers, and certain members of the Scottish parliament, regarding a Jacobite incursion into the Scottish Lowlands, possibly supported by Irish forces invading from the west, underlined the need to maintain and expand the new

¹⁶⁰⁵ *RPS*, M1689/6/22, Proportions of act of supply; parliament adjourned, 2nd August 1689.

¹⁶⁰⁶ HES, BTL12, Battle of Killiecrankie, 27th July 1689.

¹⁶⁰⁷ *RPCS*, VIV, Missive to the Earl of Argyll, 6th August 1689, pp. 16-17.

¹⁶⁰⁸ Note: These regiments were, of course, the three regiments of the Scots-Dutch Brigade and Colonel Hasting's English regiment.

¹⁶⁰⁹ See: Table 2.1.

¹⁶¹⁰ E91/4.

army. Critically, the new act of supply utilised the precedent of proportions of money that each locality was to contribute from an act of supply passed in 1678.¹⁶¹¹

Whilst this would provide a quick and easy model upon which to collect new funds, thus saving time, inflation would leave the Williamite government short of funds later in the year. The reliance upon precedent was clear as the Scottish Williamites, panicked by the defeat of their army at Killiecrankie, sought to expand their forces further to overwhelm the Jacobites. However, this saw the Scottish Williamite state overextend itself as the latter months of 1689 were characterised by a recession in the finances of the state alongside the continued expansion of the army and its cost. The 1678 act had been written to fund Charles II's much smaller standing army, of 2,500 men, than the Williamites now had on foot.¹⁶¹² By November 1689, muster rolls had been taken for every regiment revealing that, by the latter months of that year, the Scottish Williamite army had just over 6,000 men in the field army; composed of 5,165 foot, 298 dragoons, 546 cavalry and 330 men in the independent companies.¹⁶¹³ It is difficult to determine the numbers of men in garrisons at this time, as muster rolls remained inconsistent, but as the state expanded the number of castles and houses it occupied, from five in 1688 to twelve in 1689, we can safely assume the personnel stationed in garrisons increased.¹⁶¹⁴ The act of supply of August 1689 offered an additional sum of £138,461 to the government but this was not enough to cover the personnel costs of the army during the latter half of 1689.¹⁶¹⁵ The act stipulated that the 1678 proportions were, again, to be re-used with two halves of cess raised to fund the military, the first half to be collected by 11th November 1689 and

¹⁶¹¹ *RPS*, M1689/6/22, Proportions of act of supply; parliament adjourned, 2nd August 1689; 1678/6/22, Act of the convention of estates of the kingdom of Scotland etc. for a new and voluntary offer to his majesty of £1,800,000 Scots, 10th July 1678.

¹⁶¹² Childs, *Charles II*, p. 197. *RPS*, 1678/6/22.

¹⁶¹³ *NRS*, E91/2.

¹⁶¹⁴ *NRS*, E7/5, 'Accompt of the pay of his Garisons (besydes Retention money) for the month of August September & October last past, 13th November 1688', f. 41.

¹⁶¹⁵ *NRS*, E91/4, August-November 1689, ff. 1-7.

the second by 8th June 1690.¹⁶¹⁶ Mackay was warning government ministers, as early as the end of August 1689, that the forces were struggling to subsist due to 'the slow and irregular methods of the government' and 'the skearcity of money'.¹⁶¹⁷ Effectively, the inadequacy of the supply alongside the length between collection dates forced the crown's finances in Scotland into a slump lasting from November 1689 until May 1690 (see tables 2.1 & 2.2).

Despite subsequent victory over the Jacobites at the Battle of Dunkeld, 21st August 1689, the Scottish Williamite state did not relax its efforts to expand the army. Dunkeld had not deterred the Jacobite chieftains to discontinue their support for the Jacobite cause. The chiefs agreed to return to their new commanders, Brigadier Alexander Cannon and Major-General Thomas Buchan, with an army of at least 1,100 clansmen after the winter of 1689-90.¹⁶¹⁸ John Drummond, a Jacobite, wrote in the wake of Dunkeld that he was concerned that the government army was 'pourfull [sic] both in horse and foot' but that he was confident that his own side could achieve victory 'by ane pourfull and speedie recovre [sic]'.¹⁶¹⁹ This determination amongst the Jacobites coincided with a fiscal crisis for the Williamite Scottish government when their treasury was unable to pay the increasing wages of the army and the collection of income inadequate to meet month-to-month army personnel costs. Expenditure on army personnel dropped sharply from £11,555 in September to £8,430 in October, decreasing by twenty-seven percent, as the state found itself only able to issue precepts for subsistence pay.¹⁶²⁰ Reiterating his earlier warnings

¹⁶¹⁶ *RPS*, M1689/6/22; 1678/6/22.

¹⁶¹⁷ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Major-General Mackay to Lord Melville, 30th August 1689, pp. 272-273.

¹⁶¹⁸ *NRS*, GD26/8/30, Agreement by Lord James Moray, Patrick Steuart of Bellechane (Ballechin), Sir John Mclean, Sir Donald Mcdonald, Sir Ewen Camerone, Glengerie, Beanbecula, Sir Alexander Mclean, Appin, Envereye, Keppoch, Glencoe, Steuane, Calochell (Callachilly), Lt Col Mcgrigor, Barn, Largie and Mcnaughton to meet at [blank] in September with the specified numbers of fencible men. Signed by eleven of the chiefs, 24th August 1689.

¹⁶¹⁹ *NRS*, GD26/8/35, Brea of Ranoch [Brae of] Letter from John, Lord Drummond, 29th August 1689.

¹⁶²⁰ *NRS*, E91/4.

Mackay wrote, in the same month, that failure to pay the army's proper wages would lead to its disintegration and suggested that they 'ingadge such branches of the Kings revenues as doe not deppend on a gift of Parlement'.¹⁶²¹ He suggested that private financiers could 'advance money upon them [the army] till they be repayed'.¹⁶²² Williamite army personnel costs increased by forty-six percent, rising from £8,430 in October to £12,275 in November.¹⁶²³ The financial crisis the Scottish Williamite state now found itself in, in part due to an overextension and a brewing political crisis in parliament, saw the army personnel costs continue to mount with a stagnation in the issuing of precepts or specie to cover said costs. In other words, the crown was not paying on time and so accrued significant debt.

This led William to order a drastic re-organisation of his Scottish forces on 18th December 1689.¹⁶²⁴ Instructions were issued to the council to reduce the number of soldiers in six of the regiments of foot by amalgamating a company from each into a new regiment, under command of Colonel Richard Cunningham.¹⁶²⁵ Cunningham was a Scots-Dutch officer who had arrived in Scotland with the Brigade. This sought to reduce the financial pressure upon the Scottish Williamite state and the regiments' officers by decreasing the men they had to maintain during this financial dearth. A proposal was mooted to send four of these regiments to Ireland in the coming year, which would leave five stationed in Scotland.¹⁶²⁶ Mar, Blantyre and Bargany were to have their regiments disbanded completely and their men redistributed to Cunningham's new formation as well as to the remaining regiments of foot.¹⁶²⁷ The proposal sought to reduce costs by

¹⁶²¹ Mackay, *Memoirs*, Mackay to Melvill, 31st October 1689, p. 292.

¹⁶²² *Ibid.*

¹⁶²³ *NRS*, E91/4


¹⁶²⁴ *NRS*, GD26/1/1, 18th Dec 1689, f. 48.

¹⁶²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁶²⁷ *Ibid.*

slightly reducing the army to 5,460 men in total.¹⁶²⁸ William also requested the government reduce garrison expenditure by only keeping those that were ‘absolutely necessary’.¹⁶²⁹ Overall, these instructions indicate the monarch’s frustration with the political, financial and military situation in which his government in Scotland had found itself.¹⁶³⁰ He stressed the need for his Scottish army to be financially stable but also underlined the need for the parliament to pass another act of supply in the coming session of 1690.¹⁶³¹ The Scottish Williamite state demanded far greater sums of income and it became increasingly clear that, in the long term, this level of investment, and size, of the army could not be maintained by the revenues available. The lower the personnel costs of the army, the less the Scottish Williamite government would have cause to return to the Scottish parliament seeking acts of supply. Despite these efforts to reduce personnel and decrease resultant costs, the year 1690 saw a peak in both army personnel related costs and levels of manpower invested in the war against the Jacobites (see table 2.2 below).



¹⁶²⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶²⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶³⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶³¹ Ibid.

At the outset of 1690 William's ambitious plans to remodel his Scottish army were diluted significantly after Mackay and Melville lodged their concerns about the security of the government. The Williamite Scottish army could not yet be reduced as both Mackay and Melville pointed out that the Jacobites continued to pose a significant threat.¹⁶³² In spite of the disbandment of Bargany's and Blantyre's foot regiments, the Scottish Williamite army's total personnel actually expanded with the disbanded foot soldiers simply transferred to existing or new regiments.¹⁶³³ Although the financial-political crisis continued into the new year, personnel costs rose steadily by fourteen percent, from £10,466 in December 1689 to £11,942 in January 1690 (see in table 2.2).¹⁶³⁴ In reality, however, these increasing costs were not being paid out to the regiments. Mackay recalled that the Treasury could only grant subsistence payments for the Scottish forces; in one such instance this amounted to twenty pounds for an entire company of foot, around sixty men, seventy pound for a troop of horse and fifty pound for a company of dragoons.¹⁶³⁵ Subsistence payments were paid in addition to wages and were utilised to offset the costs of feeding the army. Subsistence, Mackay wrote, only served 'to satisfy a little of the souldiery, but not to make them subsist, nor that with so little pay the could live without troubling the inhabitants'.¹⁶³⁶ William's additional instructions concerning the forces illustrate his frustration with the financial situation. William responded poorly to the privy council's claims that the regiments of foot were understrength, and their claim that could ill afford the disbandment of a company from each of those units. He accused them and, by extension, the Scottish officers of his army of engaging in false musters.¹⁶³⁷ He

¹⁶³² Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 79. *NRS*, GD26/1/1, William to Leven and Mackay, 18th December 1689, f. 47.

¹⁶³³ *NRS*, E91/4-5. Note: The Earl of Mar's regiment of foot was retained until the end of 1690.

¹⁶³⁴ *NRS*, E91/4.

¹⁶³⁵ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 84.

¹⁶³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁶³⁷ *NRS*, GD26/1/1, Additional Instructions to forces in Scotland, 4th January 1690, p. 49.

went on to state that there would be no financial support from London to resolve the crisis and he recommended they:

Consider for how many you can find Subsistance by methods within your Owne Power... & after you have found what funds will Sustain you are then to proceed to modell them [the regiments] accordingly & to disband the rest for making up of the Regiments and Troops that are to Stand for your better performance.¹⁶³⁸

It became clear that William was not willing, or was unable, to send funds to rectify the financial situation the Scottish Williamite government found itself in. Under no circumstances, William exhorted, should the government, 'Levy any more Foot for making up the Seven Regiments untill [sic] Some new fond [sic] be condescended upon for their Subsistances'.¹⁶³⁹ Still, the Scottish treasury commission wrote to William citing 'the emptiness of their coffers'.¹⁶⁴⁰ Mackay continued to warn against re-modelling the forces 'till the inconveniences thereof in the unpaid state of the army...' were resolved.¹⁶⁴¹ During that winter it was reported, by Mackay, that there was no money for subsistence, in provisions or other necessary supplies.¹⁶⁴² Quarters could not be found for all of the soldiers and there were not enough tents nor money to buy them.¹⁶⁴³ In some areas of the Highlands, such as Ruthven, garrisons were abandoned for lack of provisions or pay. Regarding these garrisons, Mackay recalled that 'the ennemy become masters of them during that winter'.¹⁶⁴⁴ Ruthven had to be re-established in the following summer as part of the Fort William expedition, detailed in Chapter four.¹⁶⁴⁵ Therefore, the lack of revenue

¹⁶³⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴⁰ Mackay, *Memoirs*, pp. 85-86.

¹⁶⁴¹ Ibid., p. 83.

¹⁶⁴² Ibid., p. 82.

¹⁶⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴⁵ NRS, E91/4.

to pay the forces was not only affecting the lives of the soldiers but the strategic position of the Williamites in military terms. Mackay concluded that if he,

had not enjoyed [sic] the officers commanding the several quarters and garrisons, to take subsistence for the men, and forage for their horses, where it was to be found, provided it were taken orderly by measure and weight, and receipts given to the owners, to be shortened of their arrears when they happened to be paid.¹⁶⁴⁶

Again, officers had to rely upon their credit to afford them supplies but in this situation the seizure of civilian goods was, largely, permitted by officers desperate to keep their regiments together. These desperate measures took a further toll on the localities of Scotland. For instance, in 1690, Thomas Hay of Ballousie submitted a petition for himself and on behalf of his tenants against the soldiers of the Williamite army.¹⁶⁴⁷ The petition noted that soldiers had seized cows and hay 'without satisfaction'.¹⁶⁴⁸ The cows were 'destroyed and carried away By Scots and English souldiers that wer under ye Comand of Generall Major Mccay [sic]'.¹⁶⁴⁹ Ballousie pleaded with the privy council to 'bein pleased to declar ye will ordor pay[men]d to be maid to ye parties' but noted that similar petitions had failed to illicit any such order for payment for livestock or goods.¹⁶⁵⁰ A committee determined that this offence had been carried out by officers and soldiers of Hayford's dragoons, an English regiment, and that the damage was estimated to be worth £1,416 Scots.¹⁶⁵¹ These illegal actions, from a detachment under Mackay's direct command, and other incidents, indicate how severe the financial crisis was in the Winter of 1689-90. Mackay was renowned by contemporaries for his rigorous application of military

¹⁶⁴⁶ Mackay, *Memoirs*, pp. 82-83.

¹⁶⁴⁷ *NRS*, PC12/15/82, Petition of Thomas Hay of Ballousie for himself and in name of his Tenents, 1690.

¹⁶⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵¹ *NRS*, PC12/15/83, Report of the Committie anent The Laird of Balhousie Damnage Done by the English Forces, 18th April 1690.

discipline and his piety.¹⁶⁵² Burnet wrote of him, 'He took great care of his soldiers' morals and forced them to be both sober and just in their quarters'.¹⁶⁵³ He would likely not have been at ease in giving the order for his men to seize supplies and live on free quarter outwith the law. Mackay himself, argued that he judged the illegal seizure of supplies and the free-quartering of soldiers upon civilians as the lesser of two evils.¹⁶⁵⁴ He added, 'that no well constitute parliament would accuse an officer who broke... their laws but for their own safety, and security of their service'.¹⁶⁵⁵ The army, Mackay judged, was better to be kept on foot to prevent the possibility of the Jacobites regaining control of the country and, to his mind, subjecting the civilian population to the tyrannical rule of King James and his supporters. Therefore, the regiments and troops of the Scottish Williamite Army were flagrantly permitted to seize whatever supplies and quarters they required to ensure they kept the army prepared for the next campaign. However, this struggle for survival, and resultant contraction in personnel costs, was to be halted by the resolution of the political crisis in the Scottish parliament and, in turn, the injection of new funds via an act of supply.

That spring saw a fluctuation in the Williamite state's personnel related expenditure as it attempted to rebalance itself following the winter. From February to March 1690, the monthly costs of army personnel rose from £12,817 to £13,670, representing an increase of seven percent,. In April of that year, the personnel costs decreased slightly to £11,810 followed by a steady rise from May onwards (see table 2.2.).¹⁶⁵⁶ This increase in personnel costs likely represents the re-organisation of forces in the build up to a new Williamite offensive against the Jacobites in the summer. The

¹⁶⁵² ODNB, 'Mackay'.

¹⁶⁵³ Burnet, *History*, p. 349.

¹⁶⁵⁴ Mackay, *Memoirs*, p. 83.

¹⁶⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵⁶ NRS, E91/4.

Scottish Williamite army retained the same number of regiments, troops and independent companies as in the previous year.¹⁶⁵⁷ The major change came in the redistribution of foot soldiers from Bargany and Blantyre's disbanded regiments to the Cunningham's new regiment, among others. Other changes were more incremental with new captains of horse appointed to lead existing troops, such as Lord Ross' troop which was taken over by Major Samuel Stewart.¹⁶⁵⁸ When parliament resumed on 15th April 1690, the supply question was top of the government's agenda shadowed closely by the opposition's proposals for constitutional reform.¹⁶⁵⁹ The politics of that session have been covered in more depth in Chapter three, but the result of the settlement between the two parliamentary sides ensured that a new act of supply was passed on 7th June 1690.¹⁶⁶⁰ This resolved the immediate financial crisis for the Williamite army in Scotland. This came directly in the wake of the Williamite army's victory over the Jacobites at the Battle of Cromdale, 1st May 1690. Undoubtedly, the victory achieved at Cromdale convinced the Scottish parliament of the ability of the army to defeat the Jacobites in the field and therefore the necessity of funding to mount a new offensive in the Highlands. Moreover, the uncertainty of the course of the parallel conflict in Ireland galvanised political will amongst William's supporters to secure their hold over Scotland against the Jacobite threat, both internal and external. As a result, the new act of supply offered to raise £155,364 Scots and was to cover the crown's costs for the next two years.¹⁶⁶¹ Further funds would be granted with £577,0666 Scots to be raised from eight months of cess and then in the following year the crown would be granted £360,666 Scots for five months.¹⁶⁶² The

¹⁶⁵⁷ Note: Nine regiments of foot, one regiment of dragoons, twelve troops of horse and four independent companies.

¹⁶⁵⁸ *NRS*, E91/5, 'Lord Steuarts Troop', f. 5.

¹⁶⁵⁹ *RPS*, 1690/4/1, Procedure: opening of parliament, 15th April 1690.

¹⁶⁶⁰ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 213-214.

¹⁶⁶¹ *RPS*, 1690/4/44, Act for raising a supply offered to their majesties, 7th June 1690.

¹⁶⁶² *Ibid.*

latter sum would continue to be raised annually until 1694; thereby effectively securing the crown a guaranteed income from the cess for the next five years.¹⁶⁶³

Rather than re-use a piece of earlier legislation, as with the 1678 act of supply repassed in the previous session, the new act of supply granted increased levels of income for the crown and re-assessed proportions to be collected from the localities.¹⁶⁶⁴ In addition to taxation income, money was to be raised from annualrents, interest payments and annuities payable by debtors to lenders, at proportions prescribed by the 1633 valuation; to be collected by November 1690.¹⁶⁶⁵ A poll-tax was passed and to facilitate effective collection landowners and others 'liable in payment' of supply could apply this tax to their 'vassals and feuars, who pay no part of the said supply'.¹⁶⁶⁶ This allowed them to tax their tenants or dependents up to £6 Scots per man, £4 for their wives or children and £20 for tradesmen or cottars.¹⁶⁶⁷ Furthermore, a 'hearth tax' of 14s Scots, about one shilling Sterling, per hearth was introduced.¹⁶⁶⁸ The collection of new revenues and uplifting of new taxes allowed the state to begin regularly paying their regiments and garrisons again from June 1690 onwards. However, the Williamite army's personnel costs caused them significant issues in this regard, as regiments had to be awarded back-pay on top of their most recent wages.¹⁶⁶⁹ This coincided with the commencement of the Williamite offensive in the Highlands that summer. At this point, muster rolls from the Treasury place the field army's total manpower at 9,095 made up of 7,889 foot, 298 dragoons, 578 troopers and 330 Highlanders in the independent companies.¹⁶⁷⁰

¹⁶⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶⁴ *NRS*, E91/5, ff. 1-2.

¹⁶⁶⁵ *RPS*, 1690/4/59, Act for additional supply out of the annualrent of money, 14th June 1690.

¹⁶⁶⁶ *RPS*, 1690/4/58, Act for poll-money, 14th June 1690.

¹⁶⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶⁸ *RPS*, 1690/9/14, Act and offer to their majesties of three months' cess and hearth money in lieu of the sixth part of annualrents, 10th September 1690.

¹⁶⁶⁹ *NRS*, E91/5, f. 10.

¹⁶⁷⁰ *NRS*, E91/5, ff. 1-7.

Consequently, from June to July 1690, army personnel related costs increased from £13,041 to £15,499; the latter of which represented an increase of nineteen percent as well as the total peak of the Williamite military's personnel costs during the Highland War.¹⁶⁷¹

In September 1690, it became clear that the costs of the war, and the new act of supply to meet said cost was placing too much financial pressure on the kingdom in general. A new grant of cess and hearth money was passed on 10th September of that year.¹⁶⁷² This replaced the tax of one sixth of annualrents, passed on 14th June, and allowed debtors to keep that part of the annualrent payments, which were originally to be paid in tax and would now be paid to creditors.¹⁶⁷³ The supposed reason for this was that, in absence of the tax on annualrents, the financial burden would be shouldered by crownrents and burghs, with no contribution made by 'personal estates of money'.¹⁶⁷⁴ The act elaborated that the crown owed a considerable sum 'to the several shires and burghs of this kingdom, furnished, advanced or paid by them to their majesties forces and of the previous arrears due to the army'.¹⁶⁷⁵ They owed private individuals as well as town councils, burghs and shires sums of money advanced to the forces for 1689-90. In reality, the new taxes were significantly scaled back and the Williamites elected to allow what was owed to them to be offset against the considerable debts they now owed their subjects; the Scottish Williamite government was, in essence, attempting to cancel out its considerable debts.¹⁶⁷⁶ From here on, September to December 1690, we see a steady decline in the Williamite army's personnel costs in Scotland (see table 2.2). In September, the army's personnel costs amounted to £13,310, but by December they had sunk to

¹⁶⁷¹ *Ibid.* See also: Table 2.2

¹⁶⁷² *RPS*, 1690/9/14.


¹⁶⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁷⁶ *RPS*, 1690/4/59.

£10,555, decreasing by twenty-one percent in total.¹⁶⁷⁷ This was part of a wider trend as the changing strategic situation lessened the need, or the desire, amongst the Williamites to keep the entirety of the enlarged Scottish army on foot. Declining personnel costs were, in part, a reaction to Scotland's inability to meet the fiscal-military burden of an expanded standing army. It is incontestable that this coincided with the de-escalation of the Highland War. Furthermore, the Jacobite threat receded considerably in the latter half of 1690 as garrisons, such as Fort William, gave the Williamite government a far greater advantage in confining their enemy within the western Highlands. The change in strategic priority saw regiments on the Scottish Williamite army establishment, along with many foreign auxiliaries in the country, deployed to other theatres of the conflict, such as Flanders and Ireland. The nature of the Highland War changed markedly as the Jacobites struggled to respond effectively to the Williamite government's new strategy. The final year of the conflict would be characterised by the shift from open warfare to guerilla warfare and this change would drastically impact the Scottish Williamite army's personnel related costs.



¹⁶⁷⁷ NRS, E91/5, ff. 1-7.

The final year of the conflict, 1691, saw an initial contraction in the army and the Scottish Williamite fiscal-military state's personnel related costs followed by a period of relatively controlled costs, at least in military terms. The beginning of the year saw the army drastically re-structured with only three regiments of foot, two smaller regiments of dragoons and four independent companies. All twelve of the troops of horse were disbanded. This is reflected in the army's personnel related costs (see table 2.3) which decreased by a staggering forty-nine percent between January, £9,303, and February, £4,733.¹⁶⁷⁸ The latter figure represented the re-organised Scottish Williamite army and would remain consistent for the remainder of the year.¹⁶⁷⁹ In the aftermath of two years of conflict, the Scottish Williamite state was able to reduce the financial cost of its standing army significantly and maintain fiscal stability for the military. This reduction occurred in tandem with the curtailment of the Scots-Dutch Brigade's involvement in the Highland War and the de-escalation of that conflict during 1691. The withdrawal of the bulk, two regiments in total, of the Brigade and the redeployment of its commanding officer, and Scottish commander-in-chief, Major-General Mackay reflected a wider trend in the army's personnel related costs.¹⁶⁸⁰ There was a dramatic decline in the spending outlaid upon personnel as Scottish regiments, such as the Cameronians, were redeployed to other, now more strategically important, theatres.¹⁶⁸¹ The retreat of the Jacobite threat in Scotland concomitantly saw less need for investment in a large standing army as the plantation of garrisons, particularly Fort William, in and around the problematic areas of the Highlands saw more need for smaller garrison forces augmented by modest field forces to undertake

¹⁶⁷⁸ *RPCS*, 3rd series, Vol XVI, 1691 ' Establishment for the pay of their Majesties' forces in Scotland, 1690 [sic]', 6th January 1691, pp. 10-13.

¹⁶⁷⁹ See: Table 2.3.

¹⁶⁸⁰ *NAM*, 1999-02-115-1, Royal Confederate Army in Flanders, 27th July 1691.

¹⁶⁸¹ *NRS*, GD26/9/285, Letters (2) signed by William Blathewayt on behalf of the King, to the E. of Melville, regarding the sending of the regiment commanded by Major-General Mackay and Col. Ramsay, a battalion of the Scots Guards, and the E. of Angus' Reg of foot, to Flanders, November 1690.

punitive expeditions.¹⁶⁸² Action had to be taken to begin repaying the many creditors who had advanced money to the war effort over the previous years. The financial pressure this put upon the state was clear from the outset of 1691. In a letter to the privy council, dated 30th December 1690, the King ordered the disbandment and re-organisation of the Scottish Williamite army.¹⁶⁸³ He wrote that the maintenance of the enlarged army in Scotland was no longer acceptable as the costs 'exceed the funds out of which the same is to be payed'.¹⁶⁸⁴ The Scottish Williamite government resolved to no longer continue paying for an army it could not afford, especially in light of the arrears it now owed to creditors due to the army.

The privy council delegated the disbandment to a committee and they were to work in conjunction with the army's new commander in chief, Sir Thomas Livingstone.¹⁶⁸⁵ However, unlike the 1689-90 endeavour to disband a number of regiments this would be successful and the army was reduced to a total of 3,856 men.¹⁶⁸⁶ The field army made up the bulk of this number with two new regiments of dragoons, with 142 men each, under Colonel Cunningham and Lord Newbattle, three regiments of foot commanded by Argyll and Buchan, both of whom commanded 800 men each, and Colonel Hill, who would command an enlarged regiment of 1,152 men, as well as five independent companies with 540 men in total.¹⁶⁸⁷ The five key garrisons, which remained staffed, were to have 471 soldiers split between them.¹⁶⁸⁸ On average, a regiment of foot would cost £25 per day, dragoons £5 per day and a garrison £1 per day.¹⁶⁸⁹ Overall, the army was projected to cost

¹⁶⁸² *RPCS*, XVI, Letter from his Majesty anent disbanding of the forces, 6th January 1691, p. 8.

¹⁶⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁶⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸⁵ *RPCS*, XVI, Nomination of a committee anent the disbanding of the forces, 6th January 1691, p. 7.

¹⁶⁸⁶ *RPCS*, XVI, Establishment for the pay of their Majesties' forces in Scotland, 6th January 1691, pp. 10-13.

¹⁶⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

£61,376 Sterling per annum.¹⁶⁹⁰ This brought it more in line with its pre-war predecessor. This represented an acknowledgement of the strategic change in Scotland with the Jacobites being largely confined to the western Highlands and a smaller presence required to police the country and guard against foreign invasions. Even so, this did not mean an immediate reduction in expenditure. Sir Thomas Livingstone, the newly appointed commander-in-chief of the Scottish Williamite army, recommended the commissary-general be given precepts to pay off disbanding regiments with a month's pay. He warned at the end of January that if demobilisation went ahead without money 'it may draw to a worse consequence'.¹⁶⁹¹ Regiments to be disbanded received their last payments in January 1691.¹⁶⁹² Some officers and soldiers were to be reincorporated into the independent companies as the King argued this would make them more 'fitt for our service' due to their accrued experience.¹⁶⁹³ The desire not to lose experienced troops can be related to the difficulty in raising and maintaining the standing army that the Scottish Williamites experienced during the initial stages of the conflict. Moreover, until the Treaty of Achallader was signed the Scottish Williamite government was still keen to keep a corps of experienced soldiers on foot lest they be left bereft of forces with experience of fighting the Jacobites should they find renewed strength or be reinforced from France.¹⁶⁹⁴ Although the forces were drastically reduced, the cost and size of the Scottish Williamite army's personnel remained above that of the pre-Revolution establishment. This means that the Scottish fiscal-military state, under the Williamites, saw a modest, yet significant, expansion during the course of the Highland War and this was maintained in a scaled-back form after the conflict ended.

¹⁶⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹¹ *RPCS*, XVI Proposals made by Sir Thomas Livingstone to the Council and their answers thereto, 31st January 1691, pp. 78-79.

¹⁶⁹² *RPCS*, XVI, Order for disbanding the forces etc., 7th January 1691, pp. 15-16.

¹⁶⁹³ *RPCS*, XVI, Letter from his Majesty anent five independent companies, 13th January 1691, p. 18.

¹⁶⁹⁴ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 212, 276.

The reduction in personnel related expenditure during 1691, as we can see from table 2.3, was in line with the reduction in the Jacobite threat and the repositioning of forces to other theatres of the Nine Years' War and payment of those forces on either the English or Dutch establishment.¹⁶⁹⁵ Initial research suggests that the state owed significant debts to creditors within Scotland, particularly from the merchant community, who had advanced funds to officers for the maintenance of their regiments. For instance, creditors such as Lilius Fleming, widow of a merchant from Glasgow, petitioned the council in 1691 for the repayment of £14 Scots owed to her by Major John Rollo of the Earl of Argyll's regiment.¹⁶⁹⁶ She directly cited the act for hearth money which she summarised, did 'declare that the three months' supply and hearth money given to their Majesties shall be first applied to payment of the sums due to the shires and burghs for advances to the forces.'¹⁶⁹⁷ The burgh of Aberdeen was also in the process of claiming over £1,000 Scots it had advanced to the forces quartered within its bounds.¹⁶⁹⁸ Mar's regiment had been given £300 Scots on credit 'for sustenance of the regiment...' while they were quartered there.¹⁶⁹⁹ Captain Steill of Cunningham's dragoons were advanced £192 Scots for the 'maintenance of soldiers'.¹⁷⁰⁰ Both the treasury commission and the privy council disputed the accuracy of the Aberdeen burgesses claim.¹⁷⁰¹ In one instance, some subjects who had extended credit to Lieutenant William Anderson, also of Cunningham's regiment, were so desperate for repayment they had him arrested by the magistrate and placed in the tolbooth in Edinburgh whilst he was there.¹⁷⁰² It took the intervention of the council to have Anderson set free and this only occurred because he had been in Edinburgh in

¹⁶⁹⁵ Childs, *Nine*, pp. 50, 56.

¹⁶⁹⁶ *RPCS*, XVI, Act and remit, Lilius Fleming, 20th January 1691, p. 42. *NRS*, RD 3/76/100. Band, Mr Archibald Rollo, major in Argyll's regiment to the town of Glasgow. Registered, 22 June 1691.

¹⁶⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁹⁸ *RPCS*, XVI, Act, town of Aberdeen anent accounts, 20th January 1691, pp. 43-44.

¹⁶⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰² *RPCS*, XVI, Act in favour of Lieutenant Colonel Gordon, 15th January 1691, pp. 31-32.

service to the commander in chief; other officers or soldiers may not have been so lucky.¹⁷⁰³

The army's personnel related costs during this period, 1688 to 1691, illustrate that the Highland War saw a significant increase in the cost of the Scottish Williamite state compared to its predecessor. The personnel related costs of the Scottish army from 1688 to 1689 almost doubled. The first year of the Highland War saw a significant expansion of the army matched by the Williamites investment in its personnel costs, this new investment had not been seen since the armies of the Covenanters.¹⁷⁰⁴ Utilising legislative precedents and structures gave the Scottish Williamite government the ability to raise, organise, and for some time, maintain a larger standing army than King James' Scottish administration (see tables 1.1, 2.0 and 2.1). The peak of the Scottish Williamites army's personnel costs were only reached in 1690 with the escalation of the conflict (see table 2.2). However, by the final year of the conflict, 1691, the cost of this rapid expansion in manpower, and therefore in costs, was untenable (see table 2.3). The Williamites reduced their standing army to a much more manageable size. Yet, even with this contraction we still see that they maintained a slightly larger and more costly force than the Scottish standing army of 1688. This would indicate that even as the conflict de-escalated, the Williamite Scottish government had to retain an army capable of securing their continued rule over the country.

Conclusion

Commentary on the Scottish state has usually concluded that the Scottish state effectively ceased to exist after 1688.¹⁷⁰⁵ This chapter has shown that, in reality, faced with

¹⁷⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰⁴ See: Edward M. Furgol, *A Regimental History of the Covenanting Armies, 1639-51* (Edinburgh, 2001).

¹⁷⁰⁵ Brown, 'Officers', p. 140.

a challenging civil war the nascent Williamite Scottish state not only continued to operate day to day governance in Scotland, but they managed the military affairs of Scotland during the conflict, with oversight from the crown in London and support from allied powers abroad, particularly England and the Dutch Republic. The Scottish Williamite state did not radically overhaul its structure to wage the Highland War but rather drew upon tried and tested precedents which, whilst not always efficient, proved generally effective. The models Scotland utilised were part of a 'superior operational capacity' whereby smaller states were able to utilise their size to manage themselves more effectively, as Glete has argued.¹⁷⁰⁶ Stewart applied this model to Scotland in her study of the Covenanter regimes of the 1640s and this model can be further applied to Scotland during the Highland War.¹⁷⁰⁷ Scotland did not have the radical increase in its financial capacity, related to the creation of a national debt and bank, as England had, but the Williamite Scots superior operational capacity, compared to a larger state like England, gave them the ability to micro-manage their collection of income and mobilisation of forces to greatly expand the standing army in 1689-90. This does not, however, mean that the Scottish Williamite state was able to sustain this effort without difficulty. In fact, the opposite occurred with the state experiencing significant challenges toward the end of 1690 and the beginning of 1691. This chapter has been a survey of one aspect of the Scottish Williamite state's fiscal-military expansion. However, it illustrates that the picture was much more nuanced than historians of the British fiscal-military state, such as Brewer, have given credit for. Scotland, as a smaller country, was able to utilise precedents of previous decades to rapidly maintain an army which would be judged far beyond its fiscal-military capacity of scholars of the period.¹⁷⁰⁸

¹⁷⁰⁶ Glete, *State*, p. 158.

¹⁷⁰⁷ Stewart, *Rethinking*, pp. 180-181.

¹⁷⁰⁸ Braddick, 'Rise' in *Companion*, pp. 69-87. Brewer, *Sinews*, p. 250. Jones, *War*, p. 7.

Conclusion

In Westminster Abbey there stands a monument, erected in 1711, to the memory of Sir Thomas Livingstone, the Scots-Dutch officer who offered quarter to his former comrades at Lethendry Castle.¹⁷⁰⁹ It bears a Latin inscription, which states that Livingstone, the son of a Scots-Dutch Brigade officer and brought up in the Dutch Republic, was:

From his childhood... conversant with arms and with glory advanced to several military titles, was at length in the reign of William III (under whom, while Prince of Orange, he had long and bravely fought, and whom he attended into Britain as a Colonel of Foot), made Lieutenant General in the army and General of the Scots Forces... While Scotland was inflamed with civil broils, he happily engaged the enemy at the river Spee [sic]; by that means securing peace in his country, and the nation to the king; for which brave actions he was by his grateful prince added to the nobility.¹⁷¹⁰

It is fitting that Livingstone's memorial concluded with what would be considered his finest military achievement, the surprise assault on the Jacobite army encamped upon the 'Haughs' of Cromdale.¹⁷¹¹ The full implications of the victory were not immediately clear to the Williamites nor, indeed, to the Jacobites until mid-1691. The Williamite offensive which followed Cromdale, in the summer of 1690, was needed to reinforce the blow, as revealed in Chapter four of this thesis. It was the plantation of garrisons in and around the Highlands coupled with punitive raids on troublesome Jacobite lands, in the

¹⁷⁰⁹ Carleton, *Memoirs*, pp. 28-29. *Melville's*, Livingstone to [Mackay] – Account, 2nd May 1690, pp. 152-153.

¹⁷¹⁰ Westminster Abbey, 'Thomas Livingstone, Viscount Teviot. Soldier.', translation of inscription available at <https://www.westminster-abbey.org/abbey-commemorations/commemorations/thomas-livingstone-viscount-teviot>.

¹⁷¹¹ ODNB, 'Livingstone'.

1691 campaign, which, along with the Jacobite loss of Ireland, caused the end of the Highland War.¹⁷¹² Crucially, Livingstone would remain in post in Scotland until 1696, when the Jacobite threat was finally judged to have passed.¹⁷¹³ He was, thereafter, briefly reassigned to command a Brigade of English and Scottish regiments in Flanders, playing a role in the conclusion of the Nine Years' War in 1697.¹⁷¹⁴ The upwards trajectory of Livingstone's career was typical of his fellow Scots-Dutch officers in the aftermath of the Revolution and the Highland War.¹⁷¹⁵ The illustrious careers of these men are worth dwelling upon, as they underscore one of the main arguments advanced in this study: the Scots-Dutch officers who served in Scotland were amongst the most trusted, loyal, and reliable soldiers of William's armies. This, in turn, would mean that they played a major role in the Scottish campaigns and, in doing so, converted William's theoretical claim to the Scottish throne into *de facto* power over the kingdom.

This thesis has demonstrated the Scots-Dutch Brigade's centrality to the Williamite war effort in Scotland. The fact that the Highland War merited the involvement of the Brigade and their continued participation until its closing stages should alert us to the fact that this was viewed by contemporaries as a significant conflict – a fact which unhelpful comparisons to the parallel conflict in Ireland has hitherto obscured.¹⁷¹⁶ As a result, the Highland War has been misunderstood by historians of the Revolution and of Jacobitism as a minor rebellion, or uprising, rather than a full-scale civil war.¹⁷¹⁷ The Battle of Killiecrankie is demonstrative of this, as one of the bloodiest battles of the Jacobite period

¹⁷¹² Childs, *Ireland*, pp. 385-394.

¹⁷¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹⁴ *Ibid.*; John A. Lynn, *The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667-1714* (London, 1999), p. 132.

¹⁷¹⁵ Please note that the following is just a small initial sample of the Scots-Dutch officers, discovered in the course of researching this thesis, who achieved senior ranks, ranging from colonel to lieutenant-general, in the armies of King William and his successor, Queen Anne: Hugh Mackay of Scourie, George Lauder, George Ramsay, James Ferguson, Aeneas Mackay and Sir Charles Graham.

¹⁷¹⁶ Harris, *Revolution*, p. 35, 364. Pincus, *1688*, p. 254.

¹⁷¹⁷ Harris, *Revolution*, p. 410. Petrie, *Movement*, pp. 81-86. Lenman, *Risings*, pp. 28-29.

with, at least, 2,700 men killed, and an unknown number wounded, compared to 2,500 casualties at the battle of Sheriffmuir, 13th November 1715, and around 1,800, including wounded, at the battle of Culloden, 16th April 1746.¹⁷¹⁸ Previously, the scale of Killiecrankie has been only understood in relation to the battle itself and this thesis has, in Chapter three, demonstrated that its impacts stretched far beyond the day in question.¹⁷¹⁹ The paralysis of the Williamite army in Scotland after Killiecrankie can be, in part, related to the losses inflicted upon the Brigade and the field army, which caused serious logistical issues. Chapter four highlighted that the Highland War continued long after Cromdale and that this phase of the campaign saw a significant investment of manpower, equipment, and expertise in Scotland. Both the Western Isles and Fort William expeditions saw significant forces go on the offensive in the rebellious areas of the Highlands and Western Isles, which were logistically challenging to operate in, to establish military control of these areas for the Williamite regime. The fact that these efforts came after Cromdale means that both Jacobite and Revolution scholars have little explored the scale of these efforts.¹⁷²⁰

This, then, was a large-scale conflict which entailed the need for significant military expansion on the Williamite side. The concomitant implications this had for William's government is the clearest evidence for the depth of the impact of the conflict upon the Scottish state and, in turn, the people it ruled over. This may have been brief, as this thesis illustrated, but it was significant, nonetheless. Chapter five has underlined this sense of scale as it showed the expansion of the Scottish State's military capacity after the Revolution and substantial financial cost incurred by the Highland War. The Scottish

¹⁷¹⁸ HES, BTL12, Inventory, Killiecrankie, [2,700 killed, wounded]. HES, BTL17, Inventory of Historic Battlefields – Battle of Sheriffmuir, 13th November 1715, [2,200-2,500 casualties, including wounded]. HES, BTL6, Inventory of Historic Battlefields – Battle of Culloden, 16th April 1746, [1,550 killed, 259 wounded].

¹⁷¹⁹ Hopkins, *Glencoe*, pp. 157-161. Lenman, *Risings*, pp. 31, 49.

¹⁷²⁰ Lenman, *Risings*, pp. 28-29, Petrie, *Movement*, pp. 85-86. Harris, *Revolution*, pp. 411. Pincus, *1688*, pp. 268-269. Kishlansky, *Monarchy*, p. 300.

standing army rose from just over 3,000 men under King James in 1688 to nearly 9,000 under William in 1690.¹⁷²¹ The personnel related costs of the Scottish Williamite army in 1690 was just over £150,000.¹⁷²² Although this fiscal-military expansion proved unsustainable, partly for political reasons, the most significant contraction of personnel and, therefore, costs did not come immediately after Cromdale, but after the expedition to establish Fort William. The Highland War must henceforth be understood not as a minor rebellion or rising, but as a sizeable civil war which ensnared the resources of the Scottish Williamite state at a critically weak point.

Appreciating the scale of the Highland War also allows us to see that the conflict in Scotland was an important aspect of the Revolution and so, concurrently the international geo-politics of that event's aftermath. The Brigade had long been considered one of the elite regiments of the Dutch army and their deployment to Scotland, during a pan-European conflict, was a deliberate strategic decision.¹⁷²³ Securing Scotland was considered critical enough to divert a critical group of experienced soldiers to the country. The Brigade formed the vanguard of William's cause in Scotland and this position of trust saw them form the 'backbone' of his forces in the country.¹⁷²⁴ In Chapter three, we saw that the defeat of William's forces at Killiecrankie was considered of significant concern, particularly in the weeks following the battle when it appeared William would have diverted the Anglo-Dutch army intended to reinforce Ireland to Scotland.¹⁷²⁵ This belies the notion that Scotland was considered of less importance than any other theatre of the Nine Years' War. This thesis has demonstrated that Scotland was firmly encompassed in William's strategy – and this also means that events in Scotland must be seen in the

¹⁷²¹ Childs, *British*, p. 4. *NRS*, E7/5, 'August 1689', ff. 237-300.

¹⁷²² *NRS*, E26/12/3-4; E91/2-5, 1689-1701; See also: Chapter 5 – Tables 1.0, 1.1 & 2.1.

¹⁷²³ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. ix, 3-4.

¹⁷²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 482.

¹⁷²⁵ *RPCS*, XIV, Letter from the King anent more troops against Dundee, etc, 5th August 1689, p. 14. Mackay, *Memoirs*, 'Melville to Hamilton, 8th August 1689', p. 261. Childs, *Ireland*, p. 136.

context of William's wider European perspective. By viewing the conflict with reference to its broader European contexts we have illustrated how the new monarch in London was forced to consider Scottish issues in relation to the pan-European conflict in which he was engaged.

William's indifference to Scotland, particularly from the latter years of his reign, has long been pointed to as an indicator of his unwillingness to engage with Scottish issues during the Highland War, a misapprehension which in turn contributed to the lack of appreciation scholars have shown for the scale of the war.¹⁷²⁶ Brewer went so far as to state that, during the Nine Years' War, there was a 'virtual absence of hostilities within Britain. Except during the Irish campaign of 1689-92'.¹⁷²⁷ This thesis has illustrated that this was simply not the case. In fact, at various points of the Scottish conflict, William had to consider Scotland as part of his wider strategy to secure the Revolution and, thus, his rule over the Three Kingdoms. William's takeover of the Three Kingdoms has been considered to have drawn England into a European confederation with the Dutch Republic and sparking the outbreak of war in Ireland. This analysis has not, however, included Scotland, and the Highland War, without which historians cannot fully understand the ramifications of the Revolution and William's reign nor the full impact of those events upon Scotland, the Three Kingdoms, and Europe as a whole.¹⁷²⁸ There is little evidence of William's supposed lack of interest in Scottish affairs during the Highland War, particularly in military terms. Regardless of the Dutch monarch's personal feelings toward the country, he was forced to engage with Scottish affairs throughout the conflict in order to secure that kingdom and, thus, secure England's northern flank. Moreover, Scotland's usefulness as a source of additional manpower for William's European wars

¹⁷²⁶ Harris, *Revolution*, p. 410. Petrie, *Movement*, pp. 81-86. Lenman, *Risings*, pp. 28-29.

¹⁷²⁷ Brewer, *Sinews*, p. 46.

¹⁷²⁸ David Onnekink, *Reinterpreting the Dutch Forty Years War, 1672-1713* (London, 2016), pp. 67-69.

has been underestimated, as Riley points out.¹⁷²⁹ William fully understood the invasion of England would have wider ramifications in Scotland, Ireland and Europe.¹⁷³⁰ The Highland War must, therefore, also be understood as part of an important process in which William secured the Three Kingdoms as part of an anti-French coalition which sought to curb Louis XIV's ascendancy in continental Europe.¹⁷³¹ This thesis has illustrated that we must view the Highland War as being interconnected with the wider war ongoing in Europe. Just as the Williamite War in Ireland (1688-1691) has been reappraised by historians, both as a conflict of scale and international importance, so too must historians begin to do so for the war in Scotland.¹⁷³²

The Highland War's scale afforded it an importance beyond Scotland's borders and the scale of the Scots-Dutch Brigade's involvement which this study has uncovered exemplifies this. Looking beyond the immediate confines of the Highland War, this has two major historiographical implications. Firstly, that the Anglo-Dutch Moment is woefully outmoded as a historical label for the Revolution and its consequences in Britain. Secondly, that, we have underestimated the impact of the Highland War upon the Scottish state and, as a result, have underestimated the scale of the expansion of the state's fiscal-military capacity at this juncture. Taking the Anglo-Dutch Moment first, this thesis has illustrated that the conception of the Revolution as an exclusively Anglo-Dutch moment cannot be sustained, particularly when we consider the Brigade's involvement in these events.¹⁷³³ Although the Brigade's role has been somewhat recognised, particularly by historians of the Revolution, this thesis has shown that this was far more significant

¹⁷²⁹ Riley, *Scottish*, p. 1.

¹⁷³⁰ Harris, *Revolution*, p. 368. EEBO, William, *DECLARATION*.

¹⁷³¹ Childs, *Nine*, p. 21. Childs, *British*, p. 7.

¹⁷³² Childs, *Ireland*. Pdraig Lenihan, *Battle of the Boyne 1690* (Gloucester, 2003). Stephen McGarry, *Irish Brigades Abroad: From the Wild Geese to the Napoleonic Wars* (Dublin, 2014), pp. 46-62, 63-72. S.J. Connolly, *Divided Kingdom: Ireland 1630-1800* (Oxford, 2010), pp. 181-194. David Dickson, *New Foundations: Ireland, 1660-1800* (Dublin, 2000), pp. 31-66. Szechi, *Jacobites*, pp. 63-72.

¹⁷³³ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 477-478.

than previous studies have allowed.¹⁷³⁴ Establishing the centrality of the Scots-Dutch officer corps to the Williamite war effort in turn exposes the importance of Scots, and long-established Scottish connections to the continent, to regime change across the Three Kingdoms in this period. One of the major outcomes of the Revolution was the subsequent civil war in Scotland, as well as Ireland, and the role of the Brigade illustrates that such an exclusive terminology cannot encompass the Scottish context of the Revolution nor its longer-term impacts. Moreover, the conception of the Revolution as an Anglo-Dutch moment masks the English contribution to the conflict in Scotland, particularly in military terms with several English regiments serving as key auxiliaries during the Highland War.¹⁷³⁵ The notion of an Anglo-Dutch Moment, thus, on a number of levels obscures a fuller understanding of the Revolution and its consequences in a wider European context, as well as underpinning the erroneous assumption that the Revolution was secured in 1688; in actuality, it took three years of conflict in Scotland and Ireland to do so.

The second major historiographical contribution of this thesis outwith the Highland War is to our understanding of the Scottish state in its twilight years, prior to its amalgamation with England in the Anglo-Scottish parliamentary union of 1707. Chapter five has shown that the comparison of the Scottish fiscal-military state to its English equivalent, during this period, is impractical. This thesis proposes an alternative model for the Scottish state as evolutionary rather than revolutionary, operating based on precedents which had proven successful in the past. Previous historiography of the period has focused on the overall narrative of contraction of the Scottish state between the Revolution and the parliamentary union, but this has ignored the temporary but

¹⁷³⁴ Israel & Parker, 'Providence', pp. 354-355. Israel, *Dutch*, p. 850.

¹⁷³⁵ Reid, *Killing*, pp. 148-151.

significant expansion of the Highland War.¹⁷³⁶ The thesis has illustrated that the Highland War was a significant conflict which called for a significant response from the Scottish state. This thesis' analysis of a singular aspect of the Scottish state's fiscal-military capacity, army personnel costs, reveals the Highland War as a moment of unprecedented expansion of that capacity, which has been largely ignored by historians.¹⁷³⁷ Moreover, the focus upon contraction has skewed the narrative as this takes no account of the shift in strategic priorities from 1689, when the Highland War broke out, and 1691, when the conflict ended.

In addition to these two major historiographical interventions, this reappraisal of the Highland War allows us to make a few more tentative suggestions as to areas which merit further consideration. The first arises from the Scots-Dutch Brigade's participation in the Highland War, their subsequent redeployment to other key areas of the Nine Years' War and their resulting prominence within the Scottish element of King William's and, later, Queen Anne's armies.¹⁷³⁸ This suggests we may need to revise the accepted narrative surrounding the professionalisation of Scotland's standing army in the late seventeenth century and the legacies of that formation in the Scottish contribution to the new British army, established after 1707. It is revealing, for example, that three of the four officers to hold the post of Scottish commander-in-chief between 1689 and 1714 were veterans of the Scots-Dutch Brigade.¹⁷³⁹ The Scots-Dutch officers who had landed in Scotland in March 1689 had originally been sent there to act as a cadre of veteran professionals, who could impart military expertise learned in the Dutch Republic to the nascent Williamite Scottish army. This thesis has illustrated that the Brigade, from their

¹⁷³⁶ Whatley, *Scots*, pp. 139-184. Brown, 'Lords', pp. 133-169. Manning, *Apprenticeship*, pp. 375-401. See also: Johnston 'Scots', pp. 10-16. Scouller, *Armies*, pp. 80-82.

¹⁷³⁷ Braddick, 'Rise', pp. 69-87. Brewer, *Sinews*. Jones, *War*.

¹⁷³⁸ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 504-514. Lynn, *Louis*, p. 132.

¹⁷³⁹ Ferguson, *Papers*, I, pp. 504-507. *ODNB*, 'Mackay'.

arrival in Scotland, assumed the role of a trusted vanguard of William's cause. They were dispersed throughout Scotland during the Highland War to form the heart of William's Scottish forces. The end of the Highland War saw them scattered further afield with many selected for positions of seniority in William's multi-national confederation of armies.¹⁷⁴⁰ The prominence of Scots-Dutch Brigade officers in William's armies after the Highland War has not been fully appreciated. Childs asserts that the professionalisation of the standing armies of the Three Kingdoms came under King James VII & II. Focusing largely upon England, Childs credited James with encouraging the return of veteran soldiers from foreign service to instil his armies with a professional ethos and the latest martial expertise, even going so far as to state that William II & III benefited from James' legacy immensely.¹⁷⁴¹ This may be true in England, but it does not map onto the Scottish context: this study has shown that William's Scots-Dutch officers came up against issues of discipline in the Scottish forces raised in 1689 and a lack of enthusiasm for the more meritocratic emphasis upon expertise and experience which the Brigade brought with them from the Dutch Republic. The ethos of the professional soldier, which Childs identified with James' rule south of the border, and by implication extended to his Scottish forces, was less evident in Scotland when the Brigade first arrived.¹⁷⁴²

Evidence for this is scattered throughout this thesis, suggesting a future study could approach the issue of professionalisation from a number of angles and employ a large range of sources. The Scots-Dutch officer's contributions in expertise can be seen in instances like the siege of Edinburgh Castle, March-July 1689, where they deployed up to date tactics and artillery as well as their performance at Killiecrankie where their utilisation of the platoon firing technique inflicted severe losses on the victorious Jacobite

¹⁷⁴⁰ Onnekink, *Reinterpreting*, pp. 67-69. Troost, *William*, p. 240.

¹⁷⁴¹ Childs, *British*, p. 14. Childs, *James II*, p. 206.

¹⁷⁴² *Ibid.*

army. The longer-term impact of the Brigade's time in Scotland remains unclear, but the prevalence of Scots-Dutch veterans in the Scottish forces of William's successor, Queen Anne, during the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1714), indicates a significant contribution caused by the wider dispersal of this cadre of veteran Scots-Dutch officers. These men were at the core of the Scottish military contribution to Anne's proto-British forces. The prominence of the Scots-Dutch Brigade during the conflict and afterward signifies that the most meaningful injection of professional soldiers in Scotland, for this period, perhaps came after the Brigade's participation in the Highland War and not during James VII's reign, as has been previously postulated.¹⁷⁴³

The second of this thesis' tentative suggestions has been the need for a broader understanding of the Highland War's place as part of a formative constitutional moment in Scotland and Britain's history. The longer-term implications of the Highland War on the 'eve of union', as T.C. Smout once termed it, have yet to be fully understood.¹⁷⁴⁴ The conflict was a precursor to the political instability of the Revolution Settlement and William and Mary's reign in Scotland.¹⁷⁴⁵ Many of the issues faced by William's Scottish government would continue to plague the crown for much of his reign.¹⁷⁴⁶ The Highland War not only represented the advent of the Jacobite movement in Scotland, but the beginning of the end for many of Scotland's national political institutions. The twilight decades of the Scottish state saw an emboldened Scottish parliament, with a constitutional settlement that balanced power in their favour, increasingly at odds with the crown in London.¹⁷⁴⁷ Similarly, the political tumultuousness of William's Scottish supporters left the crown with little choice, but to relinquish vital powers to said parliament. This could,

¹⁷⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴⁴ Smout, *Eve*, p. 23.

¹⁷⁴⁵ Raffe, *Scotland*, pp. 158-159.

¹⁷⁴⁶ Harris, *Revolution*, pp. 494-496.

¹⁷⁴⁷ Szechi, & Hayton, 'John Bull's', pp. 245.

perhaps, have been partly fuelled by the expansion of the Scottish military, on a level which had not been seen since the Covenanting governments of the mid-1640s and early 1650s.¹⁷⁴⁸ Under the new Williamite regime the army rapidly expanded to counter the Jacobite threat, but the Scottish Estates balked at the cost of maintaining it, as seen in Chapters three and five. This frustration of the crown's agenda and the government's policies in Scotland has been identified by political historians as an issue with long-term ramifications, leading to the union of 1707 and the resultant settlement 1707-1714.¹⁷⁴⁹ Although the issue of security has been identified by scholars, particularly surrounding the Act of Security in 1704 and possible deviation from England over the Act of Succession, the lineages of this instability have often not been connected to the Highland War.¹⁷⁵⁰ Contentious issues like the standing army and the public revenues required to maintain it remained problematic for William throughout his reign.¹⁷⁵¹ These problems were not resolved, but rather inherited by his successor, Anne, who, in 1702, found herself and her kingdoms amidst another European war and a resultant threat of a revised Jacobite insurgency.¹⁷⁵²

The logistical and strategic problems Anne's regime faced had already manifested themselves during and after the Highland War. For as long as there was the possibility of deviation between Scotland and England, particularly in the issue of the succession, it raised the spectre of civil war and war in the Three Kingdoms.¹⁷⁵³ Strategically, Scotland

¹⁷⁴⁸ Stewart, *Rethinking*, pp. 177-192.

¹⁷⁴⁹ Raffe, *Scotland*, p. 160. Harris, *Revolution*, pp. 494-496. Whatley, *Scots*, p. 184.

¹⁷⁵⁰ Mark Goldie, 'Divergence and Union: Scotland and England, 1660-1707' in B. Bradshaw & J. Morrill (eds.) *The British Problem, c.1534-1707: State Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago* (Basingstoke, 1996), p. 236.

¹⁷⁵¹ Macinnes, *Union*, pp. 243-244. Manning, *Apprenticeship*, p. 419.

¹⁷⁵² Trevelyan, *Ramilles*. Matthias Pohlig and Michael Schaich (eds.), *The War of the Spanish Succession: New Perspectives* (Oxford, 2018). Szechi, *Jacobites*, pp. 114-131.

¹⁷⁵³ Riley, *Scots*, p. 161.

was increasingly vital to England's geo-strategic security.¹⁷⁵⁴ The Highland War was a precursor to these geo-political strategic considerations as the need to militarily secure Scotland to safeguard England was recognised by William, as seen in Chapter one. Although the Union of 1707 was supposed to achieve this, the continuing threat of the Jacobites made greater military investment in Scotland an unavoidable necessity and, ultimately, the conflicts and divisions started in 1689 would not be concluded until 1746. The British state's robustness in resolving that problem, militarily, came because of the issues and problems faced by the Williamite Scottish regime from 1689 to 1691.

This study began as a simple regimental history of the Scots-Dutch Brigade, but it has become a re-examination of a critical domestic conflict in Scotland's history; one which formed part of the turbulent regime change initiated in 1688 which, in turn, ushered in the beginning of the end for the Scottish state and the rise of a British one in its stead. The centrality of the Brigade in the Williamite war effort against the Jacobites illustrates both the scale of the conflict in Scotland and its importance to securing the Revolution in the Three Kingdoms. The Revolution was not secured in Scotland until the end of the civil war in 1691. Moreover, the international connotations of the conflict have become clear from the Brigade's intervention in the politics of their homeland. The Highland War was not, as we have seen, a parochial uprising, but instead, a conflict with international importance; demonstrated by the fact that the conflict had been sparked by events in England, in 1688, and dulled by events in Europe, particularly in neighbouring Ireland, in 1691. William II and III was an international figure and the aim of his geo-political strategy, in invading England and intervening in Scotland and Ireland, had been to secure the support of the Three Kingdoms against the French. This contradicts the

¹⁷⁵⁴ Macinnes, *Union*, pp. 243-244. Christopher Storrs, 'The Union of 1707 and the War of Spanish Succession' in *SHR*, Vol LXXXVII (2008), pp. 31-44.

notion that he was 'disinterested' in Scotland, at least during the Highland War.

Considering this renewed view of the Highland War as a conflict of scale and international significance we can conclude that there is a need for historians of the period to fully engage with the events of the Highland War when discussing the Revolution and its wider implications, both in Britain and in Europe.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Scots-Dutch Brigade Officers, Revolution 1688-89

Name	Rank	Regiment
Hugh Mackay of Scoury	Major-General	1st 'Old' Regiment - Mackay's
Sir David Colyear	Lieutenant-Colonel	1st 'Old' Regiment - Mackay's
John Buchan	Major	1st 'Old' Regiment - Mackay's
Aeneas Mackay	Captain	1st 'Old' Regiment - Mackay's
Walter Bowie	Captain	1st 'Old' Regiment - Mackay's
Pieter Watkins	Captain	1st 'Old' Regiment - Mackay's
George Connock	Captain	1st 'Old' Regiment - Mackay's
Sir Charles Graham	Captain	1st 'Old' Regiment - Mackay's
Everard Halkett	Captain	1st 'Old' Regiment - Mackay's
Alexander Lamy	Captain	1st 'Old' Regiment - Mackay's
Campbell	Subaltern	1st 'Old' Regiment - Mackay's
Mackenzie	Captain-Lieutenant	1st 'Old' Regiment - Mackay's
Angus Mackay	Captain	1st 'Old' Regiment - Mackay's
Robert Mackay	Captain	1st 'Old' Regiment - Mackay's
Anonymous	Corporal	1st 'Old' Regiment - Mackay's
Anonymous	Corporal	1st 'Old' Regiment - Mackay's
Anonymous	Corporal	1st 'Old' Regiment - Mackay's
Anonymous	Corporal	1st 'Old' Regiment - Mackay's
Barthold Balfour	Brigadier	2nd Regiment - Balfour's
Barthold Balfour Jr.	Captain	2nd Regiment - Balfour's
Sir Thomas Livingstone	Lieutenant-Colonel	2nd Regiment - Balfour's
George Lauder	Major	2nd Regiment - Balfour's

Alexander Livingstone	Captain	2nd Regiment - Balfour's
Richard Cunningham	Captain	2nd Regiment - Balfour's
James Ferguson	Captain	2nd Regiment - Balfour's
Walter Murray	Captain	2nd Regiment - Balfour's
Thomas Erskine	Captain	2nd Regiment - Balfour's
William Mammy [Nanning]	Captain	2nd Regiment - Balfour's
Chambers	Captain	2nd Regiment - Balfour's
George Ramsay	Colonel	3rd Regiment - Ramsay's
James Mackay	Major	3rd Regiment - Ramsay's
William Murray	Captain	3rd Regiment - Ramsay's
Walter Corbet	Captain	3rd Regiment - Ramsay's
John Sommerville	Captain	3rd Regiment - Ramsay's
Henry Erskine, 3rd Lord Cardross	Captain	3rd Regiment - Ramsay's
Sir Duncan Campbell of Auchinbreck	Captain	3rd Regiment - Ramsay's
William Milne	Captain	3rd Regiment - Ramsay's
John Clerk	Captain	3rd Regiment - Ramsay's
John Gibson	Captain	3rd Regiment - Ramsay's
William Douglas	Major	3rd Regiment - Ramsay's
James Colt	Lieutenant	3rd Regiment - Ramsay's

Appendix 2: Scots-Dutch Brigade Officers, Highland War 1689-91

Name	Highest Rank attained during	Date Commissioned
Hugh Mackay of Scourie	Major-General	1674
James Mackay	Lieutenant-Colonel	1678
Sir Charles Graham	Lieutenant-Colonel	1675
Robert Mackay	Major	1688
John Buchan	Lieutenant-Colonel	1688-89
Angus Mackay	Captain	1688

Alexander Lamy	Captain	1676
John Macleod	Captain	1689
George Connock	Captain	1688
Aeneas Mackay	Captain	1689
Mackenzie	Captain-Lieutenant	1688
James Colt	Lieutenant	1688
Pieter Watkin[s]	Captain-Lieutenant	1662
Joost Van Best [Beest]	Captain-Lieutenant	1688
Barthold Balfour	Brigadier	1676
George Lauder	Colonel	1678
James Ferguson	Lieutenant-Colonel	1688
Walter Corbet	Captain	1685
John Somerville	Major	1688
Boyd	Captain	1688
[William] Douglas	Major	1682
William Milne	Captain	1688
James Blair	Captain	1689
[George] Arnot [Arnault, Arnett]	Major	1688
Everard Halkett	Captain	1676
John Erskine	Captain	1688
Hugh Sutherland	Captain	1688
William Murray	Captain	1676
Walter Murray	Captain	1688
Barthold Balfour Jr.	Captain	1684
Thomas Walker [Walters]	Captain	1688
Chambers	Lieutenant	1688

Appendix 3: Jacobite Army Officers with previous military experience present at Killiecrankie

Name	Title	Highest rank held at Killiecrankie	Years of service	Previous Regiment(s)
John Graham of Claverhouse	1st Viscount of Dundee	Major-General/Commander in Chief	1672-1689	Lockhart's Regiment, Prince of Orange's Guards, King's Reg of Horse
William Wallace of Craigie	Sir	Colonel	1685-1689	Dumbarton's Foot, King's Regiment of Horse
Henry Graham		Major	1674-1689	Scots-Dutch Brigade, Wauchope's Scots Foot, King's Regiment of Horse

Alexander Cannon		Brigadier-General	1680-1689	Scots-Dutch Brigade, Wauchope's Scots Foot, Queen's Reg Dragoons
George Barclay	Sir	Colonel	1680-1689	Unknown Foreign Service, Hales' English Foot, Inspector of Scots Forces, Barclay's Troop of Horse.
Gavin Hamilton		Captain	1683-1689	Scots-Dutch Brigade, Wauchope's Scots Foot
Lewis Creighton	4th Viscount Fren draught	Colonel	1688-	Regiment of Foot Guards, Fren draught's Horse
James Middleton		Major	1685-1689	Scots-Dutch Brigade, Wauchope's Scots Foot, Mar's Foot
David Graham		Cornet	1685-1689	King's Regiment of Horse
William Charters		Captain	1685-1689	Regiment of Foot Guards, Purcell's Dragoons
William Oliphant		Lieutenant-Colonel	1685-1689	Regiment of Foot Guards, Fren draught's Horse
Robert Middleton		Major	1685-1689	Regiment of Foot Guards
Nicholas Purcell		Colonel	1686	Purcell's Regiment of Dragoons
Duncan Menzies		Major	1672-1689	Mar's Foot, Buchan's Foot
Alexander Bruce		Captain	1680-1689	Reg of Dragoons 1683, Scots-Dutch Brigade 1680, Regt of Dragoons 1685-1688
Robert Charters		Captain	1672-1689	Lockhart's Reg, Dumbarton's reg, Buchan's Reg, Mar's Foot, Purcell's Dragoons
Archibald Douglas		Lieutenant-Colonel	1672-1689	Dumbarton's Foot, Tangier garrison, Cannon's Dragoons
John Hay		Major	1685-1689	Regiment of Foot Guards, Dundee's Troop of Horse

Appendix 4: Scots-Dutch Brigade Officers present at Killiecrankie

Name	Rank	Regiment/Company	Commissioned into Brigade	Status
Hugh Mackay of Scourie	Major-General/Col.	Mackay's/Mackay's	1674	Escaped
James Mackay	Lieutenant-Colonel	Mackay's/Mackay's	1678	KIA
Robert Mackay	Major	Mackay's/Mackay's	1688	Wounded
James Colt	Lieutenant	Ramsay's-Erskine's	1688	POW
Arnault (Arnot)	Lieutenant	Balfour's	1688	POW
George Ramsay	Colonel	Ramsay's	1676	Escaped
George Lauder	Lieutenant-Colonel	Balfour's	1678	Escaped
Barthold Balfour	Brigadier	Balfour's	1676	KIA
Mackenzie	Captain-Lieutenant	Mackay's	1688	KIA
Alexander Lamy	Captain	Mackay's	1676	KIA
Angus Mackay	Captain	Mackay's	1688	KIA
Thomas Walker*	Corporal	Ramsay's/Sommerville's	Unknown	KIA
Andrew Murray*	Sergeant	Ramsay's/Murray's	Unknown	KIA
John Somerville	Major	Ramsay's/Sommerville's	1678	Escaped
Chambers	Lieutenant	Balfour's	1688	KIA
James Ferguson	Captain	Balfour's	1688	POW
[Peter] van Best	Lieutenant	Ramsay's	1688	POW
John Macleod	Captain	Mackay's/Macleod's	1689	Escaped
Barthold Balfour Jr.	Captain	Balfour's	1684	POW
Walter Murray	Captain	Balfour's	1688	Escaped
William Murray*	Captain	Balfour's	1676	Escaped
George Lawson*	Sergeant	Ramsay's/Sommerville's	Unknown	KIA
Fleck*	Sergeant	Balfour's	Unknown	KIA
Anonymous*	Corporal	Mackay's/Macleod's	1674	KIA

Anonymous*	Corporal	Mackay's/Macleod's	1674	KIA
Anonymous*	Corporal	Mackay's/Macleod's	1674	KIA
Anonymous*	Corporal	Mackay's/Macleod's	1674	KIA
Hugh Sutherland*	Ensign	Mackay's/Macleod's	Unknown	Escaped
Everard Halkett	Captain	Ramsay's/Halkett's	1676	Escaped
John Erskine	Captain	Ramsay's-Erskine's	1688	Escaped
William Milne	Captain	Ramsay's	1688	KIA

Note: An asterisk beside a name denotes a new officer found by this research.

Appendix 5: Known Scots-Dutch Brigade soldiers at Killiecrankie

Name	Spouse/Widow	Regiment-Company	Status	Sources
Unnamed	Cathrin Laflour	Unknown	KIA	<i>SSNE 8272. RPCS, XIV, p. 98. NRS, E7/5, f. 178.</i>
Unnamed	Issobell Greenlands	Unknown	KIA	<i>SSNE 8273. RPCS, XIV, p. 98. NRS, E7/5, f. 178.</i>
Unnamed	Cathrine Stivensone	Unknown	KIA	<i>SSNE 8274. RPCS, XIV, p. 98. NRS, E7/5, f. 178.</i>
Unnamed	Mary Walker	Unknown	KIA	<i>SSNE 8275. RPCS, XIV, p. 98. NRS, E7/5, f. 178.</i>
Unnamed	Magdallen Addeross	Unknown	KIA	<i>SSNE 8276. RPCS, XIV, p. 98. NRS, E7/5, f. 178.</i>
Anthonie Meir	Margaret Henrick	Unknown	KIA	<i>SSNE 8282. RPCS, XIV p. 232. NRS, E7/5, f. 186.</i>
Alexander Pargill	Margaret Ripertze	Mackay's-Lammy's	KIA	<i>SSNE 8285. RPCS, XIV, p. 351. NRS, E7/5, f. 223.</i>
Alexander Milne	Janerus Milne	Ramsay's-Halkett's	KIA	<i>SSNE 8286. RPCS, XIV, p. 379. NRS, E7/5, f. 233.</i>
Will Stivensone	Elizabeth Stevensone	Ramsay's-Halkett's	KIA	<i>SSNE 8287. RPCS, XIV, P. 379. NRS, E7/5, f. 233.</i>
Thomas Winraham	Agnes Lindsay	Ramsay's-Sommerville's	KIA	<i>SSNE 8289. RPCS, XIV, p. 391. NRS, E7/5, f. 235.</i>

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Beanbecula, Sir Alexander Mclean, Appin, Envereye, Keppoch, Glencoe, Streuane, Calochell (Callachilly), Lt Col Mcgrigor, Barn (?), Largie and Mcnaughton to meet at [blank] in September with the specified numbers of fencible men. Signed by eleven of the chiefs, 24th August 1689.

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