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PhD Thesis

The more the merrier?

**Overlap and forum-shopping in the EU and NATO
crisis management operations**

Feyyaz Barış Çelik

University of Kent

School of Politics and International Relations

2021

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Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the valuable and patient help of many individuals in the completion of this work. I owe a great debt of thanks to my supervisory team for demonstrating the benefits of mentors who recognise the value of sound scholarship and detail as well as that of exploring new perspectives. Professor Richard Whitman, my primary supervisor, has always offered his generous guidance despite the challenges of a global pandemic in the latter half of my research, while his mentorship helped keep the enthusiasm that spurred me on to undertake this project nearly three years ago. The feedbacks of Dr Tom Casier and Dr Toni Hastrup, my secondary supervisors, have also considerably helped enhance this work.

I am also indebted to many individuals who provided valuable insights for different parts of this thesis. Dr Benjamin Martill did far more than what was expected of a fellow conference panellist by keeping in touch throughout my PhD journey and setting an example for me as a future academic. The insightful professional experiences of Dr Muzaffer Kutlay and Dr Mustafa Kutlay immensely helped me in these first steps of my journey towards developing into a well-grounded academic. Dr Eske van Gils and Dr Johanna Schnabel did not spare their advice whenever I needed, be it about publication or my post-PhD options. Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters, who now proudly has a “Dr” in front of her name, helped me think more deeply about the theoretical and empirical aspects of this thesis. Filiz Doğan provided her meticulous comments on one of the articles published out of this thesis, as well as encouraging me with her keen interest in European security. Salih Tosun provided his generous feedback on earlier iterations of this project. Thanks also due to the academic staff at the University of Kent’s School of Politics and International Relations, where I completed this thesis. My conversations

with them as well as their feedback at different stages of this work helped crystallise some of the unfamiliar concepts.

When I started my PhD after leaving a career in diplomacy, it did not cross my mind that I would engage with more diplomats, military officers, and politicians than I did in my previous career. My interviewees have provided me with rich and valuable insights into the intricacies and backstage dynamics of the decision-making processes about many levels and phases of the EU and NATO operations studied in this thesis. Although I cannot thank them in these paragraphs individually as they requested anonymity due to the sensitive nature of their work, I am grateful for the invaluable evidence they provided for this thesis.

I am also grateful to the University of Kent and British International Studies Association for their financial support towards my conference trips and living expenses during my PhD.

The past three years would not have been the same without the support of my ‘UK family’. I wish to express my deep gratitude to Julie and James for their hospitality and care, as well as David, Jane, Joe and Thelma for their emotional support. I also thank those who I am fortunate and proud to have as friends: Umut Can Adisonmez, Daniel Dunleavy, Setenay Mutlu-Adisonmez and Dilara Özbek have been among those who made sure that my PhD journey is not a solitary and routine experience. Beyond Canterbury, Eray kept my spirits up with his unique company, as has been the case in whatever I pursued. I also shared the highs and lows of this journey over long phone calls with Ömer, an earnest diplomat and open-hearted friend.

Last but certainly not least, thank you Dee for being the most uniquely amazing companion I could ever ask for throughout this journey. And thank you Mum for sustaining my

determination to complete this thesis, which is a tribute to your infinite love, generosity, and encouragement.

Abbreviations

AA: Auswärtiges Amt

AFP: Agence France Presse

ANCOP: Afghan National Civil Order Police

ANA: Afghan National Army

ANP: Afghan National Police

AUP: Afghan Uniform Police

ANSF: Afghan National and Security Forces

BMI: Bundesministerium des Innern

BMVg: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung

BMJV: Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz

BMVBS: Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung

BMWi: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie

CDU: Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands

CICID: Comité Interministeriel de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement

CO: Cabinet Office

CSSF: Conflict, Stability and Security Fund

CSTC-A: Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan

CSU: Christlich-Soziale Union

CTF: Combined Task Forces

DfID: Department for International Development

DGRIS: Direction générale des relations internationales et de la stratégie

DFID: Department for International Development

DfT: Department for Transport

EDA: European Defence Agency

EEAS: European External Action Service

ESC: European Scrutiny Committee (House of Commons)

EU: European Union

EUC: European Union Committee (House of Lords)

EUTM: EU Training Mission

EUCAP: European Union Mission on (Regional Maritime) Capacity Building

EUPOL Afghanistan: European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan

EUISS: European Union Institute for Security Studies

FAC: Foreign Affairs Committee

FCDO: Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office

FCO: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

FDD: Focused District Development

FDP: Freie Demokratische Partei

FN: Front Nationale

FPA: Foreign policy analysis

GPPO: German Police Project Office

GPPT: German Police Project Team

GN: Gendarmerie Nationale

HMG: Her Majesty's Government

HO: Home Office

HoC: House of Commons

HoL: House of Lords

IISS: International Institute for Security Studies

IMB: International Maritime Bureau

IMO: International Maritime Organization

ISAF: International Security Assistance Force

MSCHOA: Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa

MdA: Ministère des Armées

MEAE: Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires Étrangères

MoD: Ministry of Defence

NAC: North Atlantic Council

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVCO: European Union Naval Coordination action

NSC: National Security Council

NTM-A: NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan

OAE: Operational Active Endeavour

OEF: Operation Enduring Freedom

OFpra: Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides

OOS: Operation Ocean Shield

OSG: Operation Sea Guardian

RN: Royal Navy

SAR: Search and rescue

SDP: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands

SGDSN: Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale

SHADE: Shared Awareness and De-confliction

SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

SNMG: Standing Maritime Group

UK: United Kingdom

UN: United Nations

UNCLOS: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

US: United States

Abstract

Undertaking similar tasks in same spaces and timeframes with separate chains of command and contingent of forces, overlapping crisis management operations of the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) present important decisions for member states, who have scarce resources to deploy in multinational crisis management operations. Whilst many different explanations are offered for member states' choices about which EU and NATO operation to support, very few of them pay systematic attention to why member states make such choices and how precisely they practice their choices. Those studies that analyse member states' choices within overlapping EU and NATO operations often do so by focusing on the processes at the inception of operations, such as planning and launch phases, and by applying various hypotheses in a disparate and unsystematic way. This leaves the question of whether member states might be choosing from the operations, or 'forum-shopping', as a result of multiple factors and exercising these choices in different ways. Furthermore, it has generally been assumed that because the operational stages in the EU and NATO are separate from each other, member states' policymaking processes regarding the EU and NATO operations are not linked within themselves. Therefore, it also remains underexplored whether member states' organisation of decision-making shapes the extent to which they can use the EU and NATO operations to accomplish their interests.

This thesis argues that investigating how member states' strategies shape, and are shaped by, the overlap between the EU and NATO crisis management operations calls for a different approach. At the centre of this thesis is a multifactor model based on literatures on the EU and NATO crisis management operations, regime complexity, and foreign policy analysis. This multifactor model offers a framework of analysis to the driving forces of member states'

choices about engaging a crisis situation through the EU and/or NATO, the ways in which member states exercise these choices, and member states' organisation of decision-making in foreign and security policy.

Using this multifactor model, this thesis pursues a threefold argument. First, the overlapping and sequential nature of member states' commitments under an operation shapes their decisions within the other operation. Second, rather than simply choosing the operations that are most favourable to their interests, member states exercise their choices by following different and heuristic practices. Third, how member states organise their relevant policymaking mechanisms and instruments is a strong indicator of the degree to which they can instrumentalise the EU and NATO operations to attain their goals. In developing this line of argument, this thesis outlines a research design based on in-depth case studies with a qualitative analysis of decision-making processes in France, Germany and the UK across the operational overlap between the EU and NATO in Afghanistan, the Gulf of Aden, and the Mediterranean. To test the multifactor model across these theatres of overlap through a case study method, the thesis uses an empirical perspective based on comparative foreign policy.

COVID-19 Impact Statement

This statement reflects on the impact of the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), more commonly referred to as ‘coronavirus disease 2019’ or ‘COVID-19’, on the design and conduct of this research. Like many social sciences research conducted in the same period, the COVID-19 pandemic has brought about disruptions to the planned research activities of this thesis. The in-person fieldwork that was initially planned to take place in Berlin, Brussels, London, and Paris had to be cancelled due to major local and international travel restrictions during the pandemic. Relatedly, lockdowns across Europe meant that the identified interview partners for this thesis had worked from sites other than their usual offices. In addition to interviews, this research partially relied on the evaluation of documents that would be accessible at the premises of the Templeman Library at the University of Kent. Due to curtailed access to these premises, it has not been possible to access the hard copies of resources that were identified as potential evidences for the analysis of this thesis.

A number of steps have been taken to address these challenges arising from the COVID-19. As stated, this project initially aimed at an in-depth unpacking of national decision-making processes within the realms of security and defence by accessing practitioners within these policy areas in-person. While this aim has been maintained as an overarching empirical objective of the thesis, due to the major COVID-19 outbreak in Europe and accompanying travel restrictions, the methods of the thesis has been adjusted to conduct interviews via virtual meeting platforms. Whilst making it possible to contact the interviews partners already identified before the pandemic, this adjustment altered the timing of the empirical research of this thesis: while the in-person fieldwork would have been conducted within the space of three months, virtual interviews were spread across an approximately one-year period. At the same

time, this expanded time period arguably made it possible to successfully reach out to more interview partners.

The limitations brought about by the curtailed access to documentary resources were sought to be mitigated by seeking online access to the required resources where possible. The Templeman Library at the University of Kent has provided online access to certain documents that were identified as evidence to assess the analytical claims made in this thesis.

While these adjustments have been made within the boundaries of legal limitations imposed as a response to the spread of COVID-19 pandemic, it is also important to acknowledge that the contribution and value of this thesis would have possibly been enhanced if the above research activities had not been curtailed. Throughout the pandemic, the videoconferencing tools used by the researcher such as Zoom raised security and privacy concerns. This was a legitimate concern particularly for this thesis, which relied on sensitive evidence from security and defence policy officials. After all, the kind of trust would have been different in the context of physical human interaction that is aided by eye contact and body language. At the same time, the researcher has realised throughout interviews that most interview partners were eager for conversation and reflected positively about their flexible working schedules. In addition, transitioning research efforts to online venues also brought about some ethical issues, which are addressed in the Participant Information Form in the Appendix B.

This research was not affected significantly by the COVID-19 challenges that many other social science studies faced during this period, such as additional caring responsibilities, health and well-being concerns, or quarantine or self-isolation requirements.

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1. Introduction

Contemporary security challenges often include complex and asymmetrical threats such as terrorism, internal conflict, transnational crime, human smuggling, and piracy. While crisis management operations have been among the instruments that states commonly used to assist countries suffering from these issues, intervening states are not always well disposed to unilaterally tackle these challenges, which entail several dilemmas, trade-offs and unanticipated outcomes (Penska 2010, 39). In seeking to provide stability and peace to other countries and regions, intervening states therefore use several multilateral frameworks such as the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the United Nations (UN).

In particular, there has been an increase in the crisis management operations of the EU and NATO in recent years. Since the first EU operation under the framework of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 2003, the Union deployed 37 missions and operations to provide security in different parts of the world (EEAS 2019; 2020b; di Mauro et al. 2017). In parallel, NATO deployed 28 operations after the Cold War with a widened scope of peacekeeping and peace enforcement tasks in the wider world (NATO 2020; Edström and Gyllensporre 2012, 12; Webber et al. 2012, 13; Meyer 2014, 6).

Interestingly, some of these EU and NATO interventions undertook similar tasks in the same spaces and times, albeit with separate chains of command and contingent of forces. For instance, between 2005 and 2007, the EU and NATO operated separate airlifts in Sudan as a response to the African Union's calls for logistic support to move its peacekeeping forces to Darfur region. Similarly, when NATO launched a mission to train the Afghan military and

police in 2009, there was already a mission under the EU flag to train the Afghan police officers. The two organisations also decided to address maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden through simultaneous but separate operations. In a similar vein, both organisations sought to tackle illegal arms and oil trafficking and provided maritime capacity building in the Mediterranean.

These parallel but separate EU and NATO crisis management operations often rely on the same reservoir of scarce and costly resources such as military hardware and strategic planning capabilities that can be, or have already been made, available to both operations (e.g. Howorth 2003; Schleich 2014; Smith 2015; Koops 2017; Fahron-Hussey 2019). Therefore, it might be intuitive from a cost minimisation perspective to use only one organisation to address a given crisis (e.g. Siegel 2009). Yet, in all of the aforementioned examples, member states of the two organisations decided to launch parallel but separate operations.

Whilst many different explanations are provided to this overlap between the EU and NATO crisis management operations, very few of them pay systematic attention to how precisely member states articulate their strategies within this overlap. Scholars have long deliberated the implications of the overlap between the EU and NATO in the field of crisis management from an organisational-level perspective (e.g. Cross 2010; Ginsberg and Penska 2012; Mattelaer 2013; Smith 2016; Johansen 2017). For some, the expansion of tasks of the two organisations after the Cold War resulted in a ‘functional overlap’ (Bierman 2008) or ‘functional convergence’ (Galbreath and Gebhard 2010) between them in terms of crisis management objectives: while NATO delivered higher intensity peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations, the EU focused on the ‘lower range of conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and post-conflict management’ (Schleich 2014, 188; also see Hofmann and Mérand 2012). Although obstacles for formal inter-operational cooperation remain, it was also

suggested that member states have been able to explore some informal mechanisms of cooperation that go beyond the formal obstacles (e.g. Græger 2014; 2016, 2017; Gebhard and Smith 2015; Smith and Gebhard 2017; Mayer 2017). For others, overlaps between the EU and NATO on the basis of membership, mandate and resources have ‘clearly impeded the development of an efficient division of labor [sic] between the two institutions’ due to a lack of sufficient inter-organisational coordination mechanisms as well as member states’ cross-organisational strategies (Hofmann 2009, 46).

Those studies that analyse member states’ preferences often do so by focusing on the processes at the inception of operations, such as planning and launch phases (e.g. Brummer 2013; Pohl 2014; Fescharek 2015). Although we know that member states can choose those EU and NATO operations that are most favourable to their interests (e.g. Fahren-Hussey 2019; Hofmann 2019), a behaviour referred to as ‘forum-shopping’, the question remains as to whether member states’ strategic movements between these operations can be informed concurrently by multiple factors and be practiced in different ways.

Additionally, it has generally been assumed that because the operational stages in the EU and NATO are separate from each other, member states’ parallel decision-making processes regarding the two organisations’ overlapping operations are not linked within themselves (e.g. Ginsberg and Penska 2012; Smith 2017). For instance, suggestions that member states can choose from the EU and NATO as a framework for intervention to respond a security threat leave the questions of how precisely these choices come about and whether member states’ policymaking about one operation can be related to the other (e.g. Dijkstra 2016; Fahren-Hussey 2019).

This thesis offers a different account of the overlap between the EU and NATO crisis management operations from a member state perspective. In doing so, it proposes a multifactor model of member states' strategies within the EU and NATO operations. Essentially, this multifactor model is built upon three elements. First, based on insights from the overlap between the EU and NATO in the field of crisis management, the multifactor model offers a framework for analysing member states' motivations in selecting particular frameworks of intervention in response to an issue. Second, taking inspiration from the regime complexity literature, the multifactor model examines different forms in which member states are involved in the EU and NATO operations. Third, based on comparative foreign policy analysis and policy coordination research, the model examines the role of member states' organisation of their security and defence policymaking arrangements on their strategies regarding the EU and NATO operations.

Using these elements of the multifactor model, this thesis pursues a threefold argument. First, in pursuing their objectives that are driven concurrently by multiple factors, member states articulate cross-operational strategies. That is, when the EU and NATO operations overlap, member states determine their strategies not just in consideration of one operation, but by taking into account what these strategies in one operation might mean for the other. Second, a catch-all concept of 'forum-shopping' struggles to cover the heuristic practices member states follow across the EU and NATO operations, as these practices go beyond selecting the operations most favourable for national objectives. Third, how member states organise their own decision-making structures in security and defence policy is strongly indicative of the degree to which they can instrumentalise the EU and NATO operations to accomplish their own objectives. In this way, this thesis suggests a change of attention from just how member states choose the framework of intervention that best fits with their national interests towards the

extent to which they can strategically manage the reality of operational overlap between the EU and NATO.

The multifactor model is deployed to examine the strategies of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK) within the overlapping operations of the EU and NATO in Afghanistan, the Gulf of Aden, and the Mediterranean. While these three member states are major players within both organisations due to, among other things, their pivotal role in the historical development of the two organisations as well as their material capabilities, selected operational theatres vary in their geographical location, their civilian or military nature, and the political risks they entail for member states. To test the multifactor model across the French, German and British strategies within these theatres of overlap, this thesis uses an empirical perspective based on comparative foreign policy approach. Through a case study method, member state strategies hypothesised by the multifactor model are checked against the patterns of events and features observed in the cases of operational overlap between the EU and NATO.

While this thesis is situated in the fields of research on the crisis management operations of the EU and NATO as well as in the literature on regime complexes, it also identifies with foreign policy analysis. As this thesis investigates member states' complex and parallel decision-making processes, it opens up a new research agenda for the intersection between European security and foreign policy analysis: it is often believed that the confidential nature of political and operational decisions about the EU and NATO crisis management operations precludes an in-depth analysis of dynamics about these operations (e.g. Armando et al. 2014; Sjørnsen 2018). Whilst agreeing that the secrecy of political and operational dynamics about the EU and NATO operations present limitations for empirical analyses of these operations, this thesis shows that using foreign policy analysis as a practical guidance supported by extensive

analysis of primary documents and interviews facilitates an in-depth examination of the intricacies and complexities of national decision-making processes regarding the EU and NATO and crisis management operations.

1.1. Why study operational overlap?

This thesis defines operational overlap between the EU and NATO as the two organisations' provision of similar types of crisis management operations in the same places and times, with separate chains of command and force contingents. Why, then, is it worthwhile to study member state strategies within such overlap? After all, because the overlap between the EU and NATO operations is not often created through deliberate decision-making, a member state may not articulate its policies regarding the overlapping EU and NATO operations at the same time. Additionally, decision-making processes related to these operations often follow a multi-level path: Member states first define their preferences domestically and then discuss their options at EU and NATO levels, while these two levels often operate concurrently during the operations (e.g. Schleich 2014, 199; Chelotti 2016, 43).

To begin with, operational overlap between the EU and NATO in crisis management matters for member states because member states' support to a particular operation is not equivalent to resourcing it. Indeed, planning and force generation processes are concurrent but separate processes in both organisations (Ginsberg and Penska 2012; Toczek 2006, 62). Hence, even though a member state can take part in temporally overlapping planning processes of EU and NATO operations, it can still choose the most convenient operational arrangements when it makes its decisions which operation to participate (interview 35: NATO official; see also Fahron-Hussey 2019).

Furthermore, a member state level perspective is essential for analysing dynamics about the operational overlap between the EU and NATO in the field of crisis management. The political will of member states is a central factor for the processes both before and during the EU and NATO operations. In NATO, for example, a draft of an operational document prepared by the organisation's international staff is considered as a 'good draft' only if it 'has a vision of Allies', meaning that organisational level actors need to take into consideration the diverse preferences of a member state (interview 33: NATO official). Literature on multinational military operations in general and the EU and NATO operations in particular also clearly show that dynamics within national capitals can greatly shape the force generation processes of operations (e.g. Ginsberg and Penska 2014; Auerswald and Saideman 2014; Peters et al. 2014; Mello and Saideman 2019). In addition, although member states agree on a supranational command structure within an EU or NATO operation, they can and do control the nature of their participation by implementing restrictions to how their forces can operate in the field, also known as caveats (Fermann and Frost-Nielsen 2019). It is also in their discretion to employ various degrees and strategies of delegation to operational planners at the EU- and NATO-levels (Dijkstra 2016). Therefore, member states and actors within them are the key players for the crisis management operations of the EU and NATO. This is not to suggest that actors at the EU and NATO levels are not important on their own right, but rather to recognise that the influence of organisational level actors are revealed by examining the preferences of actors at the national level (e.g. Pohl 2014; Chelotti 2016; Wright 2019; Fahron-Hussey 2019).

1.2. Thesis outline

Following this introduction, chapter 2 presents the multifactor model this thesis offers to analyse member states' strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO. It starts with a survey of the literature on the overlap between the EU and NATO in the field of crisis management. Highlighting the gaps within the research, the chapter then presents the multifactor model, which is built on three elements. First, the model identifies *why* member states make specific choices from overlapping EU and NATO operations in the first place. Subsequently, it turns to regime complexity research to understand *how* member states exercise these choices. Third, the chapter elaborates on the role of member states' policymaking arrangement in the extent to which they can instrumentalise the overlapping EU and NATO operations to accomplish their objectives.

Chapter 3 outlines the research design of the thesis as well the methods it employs for empirical analysis and data collection. It first discusses the research design of the thesis, which is based on small-N case study and 'pattern-matching' methods. The chapter then introduces the comparative foreign policy approach that will be used in empirical assessment of member states' strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO. Finally, the chapter discusses the logic behind selecting France, Germany, and the UK as member states of interest and Afghanistan, the Gulf of Aden and the Mediterranean as operational theatres by discussing how the variances they exhibit present methodological conveniences for this thesis.

Chapter 4 presents the institutional arrangements of decision-making and coordination in security and defence policies in France, Germany and the UK by paying particular attention to these member states' organisation of policymaking related to the EU and NATO crisis

management operations. In this way, this chapter provides a background to decision-making structures of the three member states, which are elaborated in empirical chapters (chapters 5, 6, and 7).

The multifactor model and research design of the thesis are applied in empirical analysis in chapters 5, 6 and 7, which examine member states' strategies within the operational between the EU and NATO in Afghanistan, the Gulf of Aden, and the Mediterranean respectively. To facilitate cross-case comparison, each case study follows a similar structure, starting with a background of the operation overlap, covering operation mandates, activities undertaken during operations and actors involved in the deployment and implementation of these operations. The chapters then touch on each member state's engagement with the region and relevant issues in question, followed by their organisation of decision-making and policy coordination within the particular context of the EU and NATO operations at hand. In line with the research design set out in Chapter 3, this will help identify each member state's relevant decision-making environments, including the participant actors and agencies in these environments. Subsequently, case studies proceed with empirical analysis of member states' strategies within the operational theatre in question.

Case study findings are drawn together in chapter 8, which offers concluding remarks on what drives member states make specific choices from overlapping EU and NATO operations, how they implement these choices, and whether and how their organisation of decision-making in foreign and security policy influences the degree to which they can effectively use the operational overlap to attain their goals. The chapter then discusses the implications of the argument for our understanding on the three strands of research this thesis is situated in, namely, research on EU and NATO crisis management operations, regime complexity, and foreign

policy analysis. Finally, the chapter touches on the limitations of the thesis and offers avenues for future research to address these limitations.

1.3. Conclusion

In this chapter, I conceptualised the operational overlap between the EU and NATO as the two organisations' provision of crisis management operations that undertook same or similar tasks in same places and times, albeit with separate command structures. I then argued that the existing research struggles to account for the dynamics of the operational overlap between the EU and NATO from a member state perspective. In order to address the resulting gaps, I briefly outlined a multifactor model based on the factors that affect member states' choices from the EU and NATO operations, the practices through which member states exercise these choices, and the organisation of member states' policymaking in articulating and pursuing their preferences and interests within the EU and NATO operations. The specific outlines of this model and a more detailed survey of the existing scholarship are provided in the next chapter.

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2. A multifactor model of national strategies within operational overlap

This chapter will make an original contribution to the research on the EU and NATO crisis management operations, regime complexity, and foreign policy analysis. By developing a new framework for understanding why and how member states choose certain EU and NATO operations when these operations take place in same times and places and conduct similar tasks, this framework also offers a perspective to understand whether and how member states' own policymaking structures and mechanisms influence the degree to which they can effectively pursue their preferences and interests through the EU and NATO operations. While much has been written on the overlap between the EU and NATO in the field of crisis management, existing studies have mainly focused on the level of the two organisations and been disparate and selective in terms of the hypotheses they offer. In order to address the resulting gaps, this chapter offers a multifactor model by combining insights from the research on the EU and NATO operations, regime complexity, and foreign policy analysis.

Research on the overlap between the EU and NATO in the field of crisis management sparked considerable interest in the last decade. Although these studies exhibit heterogeneity, they can be divided into two main categories: Those located within the broader debate on a division of labour between the EU and NATO in crisis management, and those that focus on specific cases of operational overlap. Despite being distinct in their focus and levels of analysis, I argue that these approaches are bound together in their underlying assumptions. Therefore, to understand how they conceive of member states' strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO, it is necessary to understand how they view member states' broader international political considerations such as their motivation to be involved in cooperative

frameworks, dynamics of domestic politics, contingent relations with the EU and NATO, and long-term orientations about the two organisations.

2.1. Division of labour between the EU and NATO

Central within the work on the operational overlap between the EU and NATO is the debate surrounding the division of labour between the two organisations in the realm of crisis management. Covering issues beyond the operations themselves, this debate touches on a number of interrelated topics, including post-Cold War adaptation of the EU and NATO, transatlantic relations, European security architecture, burden-sharing, and balance between the military and civilian elements of crisis management (Koops 2017, 317; Simón 2013, 216).

A starting point for this survey of the existing research can be found in how the overlap between the EU and NATO emerges in the field of crisis management. An argument about the emergence of overlap is based on the two organisations' expansion of activities outside their core fields of competence. In such a case, it is more likely for overlapping organisations to cooperate despite the resulting overlap, as the two organisations will be reluctant to share competences in their core fields of competence (Brosig 2010, 37). Applied to EU-NATO relations, this 'domain expansion' logic implies that the EU's steering into a core competence of NATO, namely military crisis management, generated an overlap between the two organisations in the field of crisis management operations (Koops 2017, 326; Biermann and Koops 2017). In addition to domain expansion, the EU and NATO operations may overlap also as a result of member states' dissatisfaction with the existing operational structures and procedures. For instance, member states can favour a new operation if they are dissatisfied with the capabilities of an existing operation, or if they consider more substantial concerns about

their strategic orientations towards the EU and NATO (e.g. Biehl et al. 2013; Faude and Fuss 2020).

Yet, existing research used the concept of ‘overlap’ rather unsystematically and often through an organisational level perspective, without using the concept as an explanatory or predictive tool for member state strategies (Koops 2017, 327; Schleich 2015). As stated previously, scholars diverge about the implications of the overlap between the EU and NATO in the field of crisis management. For some, such overlap brought about a division of labour between the two organisations, within which the EU undertakes tasks in the ‘lower range of conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and post-conflict management’, whereas NATO often focuses on higher intensity peace enforcement and peacekeeping tasks (Schleich 2014, 188; Whitman 2004; Biermann 2008; Mayer 2009; Galbreath and Gebhard 2010; Hofmann and Mérand 2012). For others, member states’ cross-organisational preferences have prevented the development of an efficient partition of work between the two organisations (Hofmann 2011, 114; Yost 2007; Giegerich 2012). According to this line of reasoning, while the two organisations had overlapping ambitions in crisis management, the strategic significance of the partnership has complicated a clear division of labour between them (Stewart 2011, 37).

Existing research also suggests that members of both the EU and NATO confront with multiple, potentially mutually contradictory, sets of choices within an overlap. That is, they enjoy certain forum-shopping opportunities within the overlap between the two organisations (Gehring and Faude 2014). In this vein, Hofmann (2009; 2011; 2019) explores the concept of ‘overlap’ in more detail in the context of the EU and NATO’s involvement in crisis management. Building on insights from regime complexity theory and institutionalist

approaches, Hofmann provides a conceptual approach to overlap that takes into consideration dynamics at the member state, institutional and international levels. Conceptualising overlap along the dimensions of membership, mandate and resource dimensions, Hofmann (2009, pp. 46-47; 2011, pp. 103-104) identifies certain strategies member states can follow within the context of overlap, including not only moving between organisations ('forum-shopping'), but also blocking one organisation from certain tasks ('hostage-taking'), 'turf battles' and 'muddling through'. Although this approach identifies member states' strategies within the context of overlap between the EU and NATO, how these strategies come about as well as the implications of this overlap for member states' policymaking processes are not explored in much detail.

With a more explicit focus on the operational overlap, Fahron-Hussey (2019, 6) asks 'why is authorization given to either NATO, the EU, or both NATO and the EU to launch a military crisis management operation?'. Using a principal-agent model, she argues that 'the collective principal will select the agent who has the more suitable agent characteristics for a specific task [and] if two potential agents have equally suitable agent characteristics, the principal will delegate the task to both of them' (Fahron-Hussey 2019, 11). For instance, she argues that member states decided to launch parallel EU and NATO operations in the Gulf of Aden as the 'agent characteristics' of both organisations, including their material and non-material capabilities, 'were equally suitable with regard to a military reaction to piracy' (Fahron-Hussey 2019, 237). Although this study has the benefit of explicitly focusing on the operational overlap between the EU and NATO, its substantial focus on member states' initial decisions on which organisation to choose as a framework for intervention compromises an in-depth study of practices during the operations. Member states may favour the deployment of those operations

they believe would fit with their interests, but they can later consider that particular dynamics necessitates alternative practices or forums of cooperation.

Overall, despite contributing to our knowledge on the partition of work between the EU and NATO when it comes to crisis management operations, these approaches on the division of labour and overlap between the two organisations yield few insights as to different practices through which member states can ‘forum-shop’ between the two organisations’ operations. They also struggle to account for the implications of member states’ organisation of policymaking for the way in which they articulate and pursue their own strategies.

2.2. Insights about on-the-ground dynamics

Empirical research tested, and were to some extent based on, these approaches on the division of labour between the EU and NATO. Similar to the aforementioned debate on the division of labour between the EU and NATO from a broader perspective, case study research on the overlap between the two organisations also diverges on the extent of inter-operational cooperation. Some scholars suggest that practices such as sharing the same operational headquarters and exchange of information make interoperability and cooperation easier between the two operations (Muratore 2010, 93; Smith 2011, pp. 243-257; Smith 2018, 612). In contrast, others suggest that even though such practices facilitate informal cooperation, there remains an element of ‘competition for influence and taking credit’ in a crisis situation, as both organisations tend to be reluctant to ‘cede leadership to the other’ (Ginsberg and Penska 2012, 204; McGivern 2010; Dombrowski and Reich 2018).

While the EU and NATO overlapped ‘with regard to the meanings and values they attach to future threats and the role of third parties and other international organizations’, there also ‘exists an elementary cultural difference in terms of the values attached to the use of force, the sanctioned range and type of missions, and the resources justified to carry them out’ (Zyla 2011, 681). As will be shown in the following paragraphs, these differences informed some of the hypotheses offered for member states’ choices from overlapping EU and NATO operations.

In this respect, member states’ contingent relations with the EU, NATO and the US form a prominent set of hypotheses in the existing research (Ginsberg and Penska 2012, 61; Merlingen 2012, 172). For instance, simultaneous involvement of the EU and NATO in the same contexts were seen as a ‘litmus test’ for transatlantic relations (Korski and Gowan 2009, 1; Islam and Gross 2009¹). In such operational contexts, such as the EU member states’ involvement in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, member states faced the options of not sending any EU forces, which may entail the risk of being marginalised by the US, and launching EU crisis management initiatives to support the existing US and NATO efforts (Islam and Gross 2009; Mattelaer 2011; Larivé 2012, 191; Rynning 2012; Pohl 2014, 118 Friesendorf and Krempel 2011, 13; Smith 2017, 150). Yet, the US positions may also be an obstacle for the EU’s crisis management efforts in the context of operational overlap. Due to concerns about duplication, for instance, Washington may be unwilling to support the EU operations, instead favouring NATO operations (Kempin and Mawdsley 2013, 67).

National dispositions about the roles of the EU and NATO as international security providers were also used in explaining member states’ preferences within the operational overlap.

¹ Islam and Gross’ policy report does not have page numbers.

Accordingly, some member states prefer EU operations as they seek to build up EU capabilities independently from NATO, while others more closely support NATO and the US when it comes to crisis management capabilities (Mowle 2004, 22). For instance, whilst being reticent about the EU's involvement in large-scale state-building tasks in Afghanistan, France rejected 'the idea that NATO should entirely evict the Europeans from this sector' (Fescharek 2015, 133). On the other hand, reflecting the UK's broad orientation about the role of the EU as a crisis management actor, London sought to make use of the EU mission to support the US and NATO efforts in the Afghan police reform (ibid, 118; Pohl 2014). Similarly, in the Gulf of Aden, Paris chose to intervene through the EU as it attempted to strengthen the EU's global role by giving the CSDP a 'true naval dimension' (Germond and Smith 2009, 584) while being 'very keen to demonstrate that the European members of the Western community could make a significant, autonomous contribution in supporting global security efforts' (Willett 2011, 20; Gros 2011). Emphasising member states' initial preferences on launching a new operation in addition to existing efforts, these approaches come short of investigating the unfolding strategies of member states throughout the operations. As a consequence, member states' preferences about the operational overlap are often conceptualised through a binary perspective, namely whether or not member states favour the deployment of an operation in the agenda-setting, planning and launch phases.

To be sure, existing research also examines member states strategies during the operations. Yet, these attempts often focus on the issues that inhibit formal cooperation between the EU and NATO around the strained relationship between Cyprus, a member of the EU but not NATO and Turkey, a member of NATO but not the EU (e.g. Græger and Haugevik 2011; Schleich 2014; Drent 2015; Cladi and Locatelli 2020). The political impasse between Turkey and Cyprus limited the working relationships between the EU and NATO crisis management

operations into informal practices, although this has not always resulted in inter-operational cooperation (e.g. ICG 2007, 8; Chivvis 2010). Yet, a number of analysts argue that there has been a working cooperation between the two organisations' crisis management operations despite these formal obstacles (e.g. Gross 2012; Græger 2014; Drent 2015; Szewczyk 2019).

Other studies probe EU- and NATO-level aspects surrounding the member states' decisions. Though member states' forms of control on the EU and NATO may significantly reduce the flexibility and agency of actors of these organisations, both organisations maintain a certain degree of autonomy from member states' control (Dijkstra 2016). According to this line of reasoning, the EU and NATO are more than instruments that member states use for their own agendas, as the practices and priorities of the two organisations can shape member states' preferred goals and cost–benefit calculations. Based on these assumptions, EU-level actors can encourage member states to support CSDP operations to demonstrate the EU's achievements in developing certain capacities such as strategic thinking beyond merely national interests, independently planning and running security missions, and identifying risks before they become threats (Germond and Smith 2009, 574; Johansen 2017, 521). Similarly, force generation processes in NATO can also generate pressures on member states to commit to operations relative to their strengths (Deni 2014, 188; Tuschhoff 2014).

An example to these approaches is the EU police mission in Afghanistan, where 'individual Council officials in Brussels desired to 'fly the EU flag' alongside NATO' (Ginsberg and Penska 2012, 62). In this operational theatre, EU-level actors were concerned about the EU's international profile in the same operational context with NATO (Mattelaer 2013, 123). Similarly, in the Gulf of Aden, EU-level actors shared a common desire with some member states to enhance the EU's global role and raise its international profile in a space in which

NATO was also involved (Cross 2010, 21; Ginsberg and Penska 2012, 46; Smith 2016, 131; 2017). Yet, while providing insights as to how the agency of the EU and NATO shape operational processes and practices, organisational level analyses do not pay much attention to how precisely member states' policymaking processes are affected by the reality of the operational overlap, instead indirectly focusing on the implications of operational overlap on member state preferences.

Empirical studies on the operational overlap between the EU and NATO also resonate with substantial theories of international relations such as variants of realism, liberalism and constructivism (Simón 2013). According to realist perspectives, member states' calculations about the EU and NATO operations are informed by their considerations about material resources and their strategic environments (Waltz 1979; Legro and Moravcsik 1999, pp. 16-17). Therefore, cooperation emerges out of a 'logic of expected consequences', which refers to 'a consequential frame [that] sees political order as arising from negotiation among rational actors pursuing personal preferences or interests in circumstances in which there may be gains to coordinated action' (March and Olsen 1998, 949).

For instance, in the context of operational overlap in the Gulf of Aden, it is argued that member states had 'a genuine strategic interest, insofar as piracy off the Somali coast threatened the security of a vital European trade and communication route connecting the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean' (Simón 2013, 228). In this sense, collective action against piracy through the EU and NATO operations was believed to have occurred out of a 'common problem definition' resulting in an operational overlap that was 'less driven by rivalries, clashing interests, or competition' (Bueger 2016, 408). A 'cooperative bargaining', 'characterized by (continuing) different preferences, combined with the political will to go beyond the lowest

common denominator’ (Palm 2018, 16), converged national agendas around the fight against piracy off the Somali coast (Bueger 2016, 408). Similarly, in the context of the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean, while some member states supported attempts to disrupt human smuggling networks that could generate a national security risk, others have ‘[embraced] the idea of maritime capacity-building and collaborating with NATO to embargo the flow of illicit weapons to Libya’ (Dombrowski and Reich 2018). However, these approaches on collective action through the EU and NATO operations do not directly address why member states made different operational choices over the course of the overlap, despite formally being able to take part in both operations within an overlap.

It is also argued that member states see the EU’s comprehensive approach as an advantage vis-à-vis the NATO operations from a rational-choice perspective. Several analysts point out that member states can prefer engaging in a crisis through the EU rather than NATO, as CSDP operations often use multitrack instruments by combining policies across different policy fields by combining humanitarian, developmental, civilian, and military instruments (Andersen 2009; Ginsberg and Penska 2012, 207; Muratore 2010; Smith 2011, 257; Koutrakas 2013, 123; Kaunert and Zwolski 2014; Ehrhart and Petretto 2014, 180; Smith 2016, pp. 119-200).

For example, some member states provided forces to the EU operations which are often embedded into a ‘comprehensive approach’ that sought to tackle the long-term causes of security problems, whilst the role of the NATO operations are generally based on deterring the immediate symptoms of deeper issues (Knutsen and Dønjar’s 2016, pp. 209-211). In the Mediterranean, for instance, some member states preferred the EU operation, which was part of the Union’s broader external and its internal security portfolios by seeking to handle migratory pressures through external action (Tardy 2015, 2; IISS 2015, vi). In these cases, some

analysts even argued that a ‘Berlin Plus in reverse’ can occur, where member states lend support to the EU’s operations over NATO frameworks (Gebhard and Smith 2015, 121; see also Græger 2017, 247). Despite their insights in understanding the role of different crisis management approaches and instruments of the EU and NATO in member states’ policies, however, these studies do not directly investigate how precisely the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’ is factored in the national decision-making processes where NATO options are also considered.

Empirical studies also generally agree that member states’ domestic politics play a key role in their engagement with the operational overlap between the EU and NATO. These approaches resonate with liberalism as a theory of international relations, which is a domestic theory of foreign policy ‘defined by the centrality of individual rights, private property, and representative government’ (Doyle 2012, 65). Liberalism assumes that ‘the fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups’ and, representing their domestic society, ‘state officials define state preferences and act purposively in world politics’ (Moravcsik 1993, 517).

For instance, in the Gulf of Aden, some member states promoted the EU operation to assuage domestic critics, as seen in France’s engineering of the EU mission to balance its return to NATO’s military command at the time (Koenig 2016, 107; Nováky 2018a). Member states’ concerns about diasporas they host can also lead them to support certain options within the operational overlap, as seen in the UK’s consideration of the concerns of its Somali diaspora when making its decisions in the Gulf of Aden (Koenig 2016, 107). These insights contribute to our knowledge on why member states make their specific choices between potential the EU and NATO options. However, they do not pay much attention to the question of whether and

how member states' policymaking processes are shaped by the operational overlap between the two organisations.

More theoretically informed explanations from a rational-choice perspective include the principal-agent theory, which provides an account of the processes about member states' delegation of powers to the EU and NATO. Dijkstra (2016, 207) suggests that while member states had found a common ground in addressing the issue of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Aden through the EU and NATO, they sought to keep the institutional agents under control by delegating only non-critical functions to them. Whilst Dijkstra's study in this way provides insights on how member states' may limit the role of international secretariats within the EU and NATO, it pays less attention to member states' delegation of powers to the EU and NATO in crisis management from a member state, as opposed to EU- and NATO-level, perspective.

Alternative to rational-choice perspectives, other studies consider normative issues surrounding the crises the EU and NATO operations seek to respond. Reflecting central tenets of the constructivist theory of international relations, these approaches emphasise a particular identity underpinning 'a peculiarly European approach to security and defence' (Howorth 2014, 209). In this sense, it is not only power and interests, but also rules, social structures, values, and common understandings that lead member states to contribute to the EU and NATO crisis management operations (Caporaso 1999, 627).

Following this line of reasoning, Riddervold (2011, 400) shows that some member states can choose EU operations, which provide a number of distinct features compared to their NATO counterparts. In the Gulf of Aden, for example, the EU operation did not only seek to

‘protect European shipping interests or to balance against other great powers [but also] to promote and uphold UN resolutions in a legitimate way’ (ibid). Securing the captured pirates’ human rights through its aspects such as the fair trial processes, EU operation provided a unique law-enforcement dimension compared to the NATO operation (Riddervold 2014, 555). In a similar vein, the launch of the EU’s maritime operation in the Mediterranean referred to EU-specific elements such as ‘the normative standards the EU has set for itself in its foreign policies’ (Riddervold 2018a, 159; 2018b, pp. 166-167). Yet, this approach essentially addresses the underlying logics member states follow when taking part in an operation, rather than seeking to explain how precisely these normative considerations shape the member states’ policymaking processes throughout the course of the operational overlap.

All in all, the utility of the aforementioned explanations diminishes when it comes to considering the drivers of member states’ choices on the overlapping EU and NATO operations together with the operational practices member states follow when making such choices. To begin with, existing research used the concept of ‘overlap’ to analyse the EU and NATO operations often at an organisational level, leaving questions about the implications of such overlap for member states unaddressed. Those studies that analyse member state preferences within overlapping EU and NATO operations generally focused on the inception of operations, such as planning and launch phases, while using a number of hypotheses in a disparate and unsystematic way.

As a result, existing research does not directly account for why member states make specific choices within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO and how precisely they practice these choices during the operations. Furthermore, a lack of attention on member states’ organisation and coordination of their own policymaking instruments leaves the question of

whether member states' decision-making processes about the EU and NATO operations might be interlinked within themselves. In fact, practitioners involved in the EU and NATO operations often mention that member states make their decisions about the two operations within an overlap not by isolating one operation from the other (Interview 35: NATO official; US Mission to the EU 2009a). For instance, member states weigh their contributions to a NATO operation by considering how they allocate their forces under other international task forces, including the EU operations (Interview 35: NATO official).

Therefore, I argue in the rest of this chapter that investigating why member states make specific choices about the EU and NATO operations, how they exercise these choices, and how they organise their decision-making mechanisms calls for a different approach. Without a framework that recognises the simultaneous effect of multiple factors in member states' strategies, different types of involvement in the EU and NATO operations, and the role of national policymaking structures, it is difficult to have a more thorough understanding of member states' engagement with the EU and NATO crisis management operations. In the rest of this chapter, therefore, I develop a multifactor model to analyse member states' strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO.

2.3. A multifactor model of national strategies

In developing this model, I depart from three main assumptions. First, different drivers such as security-based interests and domestic political pressures may concurrently be at work in member state decisions (e.g. Pohl 2014). Second, member states' strategies continuously evolve not only at the time of the creation of the EU and NATO operations, but also throughout these operations (e.g. Koremenos, et al., 2001; Haftel and Hofmann 2017). Third, member states'

organisation of decision-making in foreign and security policy can be indicative of the extent to which they can use the operational overlap to accomplish their objectives (e.g. Wright 2019; Hutchings and Suri 2020).

Particularly useful in this vein is a multi-factor model based not only on the drivers of member states' strategies but also on the particular practices through which member states exercise these strategies and the ways in which they organise and coordinate their policymaking instruments. Such a model consists of three divergent, but related elements: drivers of member state strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO, types of these strategies, and member states' organisation of security and defence policymaking. The first element, namely, the driver of national strategies, synthesises the existing approaches on member states' preferences regarding the two organisations' operations. Although these approaches provide useful insights about why member states make certain decision about the EU and NATO operations, they have so far been deployed separately, leaving the question of whether multiple explanatory factors concurrently be at work in these decisions. Furthermore, hardly any of the existing hypotheses has been directly applied to member state strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO. Therefore, the underlying aim in this first element of the multifactor model is to explain why member states make specific choices across the EU and NATO operations when the option exists between whether to take part in one or both of the operations.

The second element of the multifactor model, the type of national strategies, helps identify member states' different forms of involvement in the EU and NATO operations. In this way, it supplements the approaches based on member states' initial preferences on which organisation to use to address a crisis situation with a second dimension concerning the particular practices

member states follow when making their choices from overlapping EU and NATO operations. These movements have so far been underspecified under an umbrella term of ‘forum-shopping’. On the other hand, the second element of the multifactor model takes into account different types of forum-shopping behaviour member states can exhibit within the overlapping EU and NATO operations.

Third and finally, the multifactor model considers member states’ institutional arrangements of decision-making regarding the EU and NATO operations. This element of the model aims to address a lack of knowledge in the existing literature on whether and how member states’ organisation and coordination of policymaking at national as well as EU and NATO levels can affect the extent to which member states can accomplish their objectives through the EU and NATO operations.

2.3.1. Why do member states choose certain operations? Drivers of national strategies

Based on the above survey of the literature, it could be said that member states’ preferences within the overlap between the EU and NATO in crisis management reflect the interplay between various factors, such as those at domestic and international levels, or material and non-material factors (Koops 2017, 321; also see Bennett et al. 1994, 73). Although existing research often use specific hypotheses without combining the multiple factors in the empirical analysis, I argue that member states’ engagement with the operational overlap between the EU and NATO is better understood from a multifactor perspective that takes into account the multiple variables that might be at work behind national strategies. Such a perspective recognises that foreign policy decisions ‘[emanate] from issues of both domestic and international environments’ (Carlsnaes 2012, 113). Therefore, the multifactor model offered here assumes

that member states' strategies within the EU and NATO operations lie at the intersection of factors such as transatlantic relationship, European security, and aspects of both organisations' roles in the European and international security architecture (e.g. Carlsnaes 2012, 113; Gegout 2012, 138). This in turn means that various driving forces may concurrently be at work behind member states' strategies within the overlapping crisis management operations of the EU and NATO.

To identify the potential *drivers* of national strategies, then, the model first synthesises the most notable factors identified in the current literature under three headings: security interests, domestic veto players, and preferences about means of intervention. It is worth noting at the outset that these potential drivers of national strategies are ideal types of variables that may inform member states' policymaking within the operational between the EU and NATO. As will be shown in the following paragraphs and in the presentation of research design and methodology in Chapter 3, the overall concern of the multifactor model is to identify the multiple but preeminent drivers of national strategies by assessing 'the overall pattern of results and the degree to which the observed pattern matches the predicted one' (Yin 2009, 140). In this understanding, the three potential drivers of national strategies do not necessarily preclude the influence of each other. In this chapter, I also use these three sets of factors to generate hypotheses about the drivers of member states' strategies within the overlapping EU and NATO operations, flesh out generic patterns through which each potential driver influences member states' strategies, and outline how these drivers will be assessed in empirical case studies.

2.3.1.1. Security interests

Because some EU and NATO crisis management operations are of necessity and others of choice, a key question regarding member states' strategies within these operations is who/what member states seek to secure through these operations. However, exploring each possible definition of a vastly broad conception such as security is not only beyond the scope of this thesis, but it would also compromise parsimony of analysis. Departing from a conception of security that 'makes sense against the background of threats' (Schmidt 2016, 207), therefore, I operationalise 'security interests' by focusing on the concept of 'threat' emanating from member states' external environments (Walt 1987, 5; 1997; Posen 2006).

Accordingly, member states' choices from overlapping EU and NATO crisis management operations are driven primarily by their motivation to respond an actual or potential, but direct, threat to their physical security, economy, or a natural resource of major economic or security significance (Davidson 2011). Therefore, security interests as used in the multifactor model refer to member states' motivations to eliminate direct threats against their physical security or economic wealth emanating from outside their borders (Moravcsik and Legro 1999). This way of operationalisation also helps distinguish security interests from other threats. While providing security in the contemporary context demands solutions that cut across various policy areas, core aspects of security still remain relevant (Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen 2011). Although threats such as poverty, environmental degradation, and repression of human rights may still affect member states' interests, they do not spring from a direct threat to the rather unambiguous conception of security interests described with a focus on external threats (Mattelaer 2013, pp. 73-74).

In operationalising member states' security interests, it is also important to distinguish the material and ideational facets of threats member states might face, not least because

policymakers can simultaneously use security-based and ethical commitments when justifying their countries' participation to expeditionary operations. In such cases, ethical commitments are often subsumed within a catch-all conception of national interest or they can be prioritised as ends in themselves (Gilmore 2014, 24). According to a logic based on security interests judged against external and material threats, however, non-material factors such as morality are seen as instruments states deploy to attain their underlying security interests, rather than following them as ends in themselves (Gegout 2012, 138; 2018, pp. 46-48). The reason is that security interests work from the standpoint that ethical rules and values serve as a means of responding to external security threats. In other words, ethical considerations are framed as instruments in support of security interests, rather than independent ends in themselves.

This operationalisation of security interests leads to a number of intervening factors that link member states' security interests to their strategies within overlapping crisis management operations of the EU and NATO. First, member states concerned with eliminating a threat against their security interests can assess the functionality of these operations. Member states can judge functionality against the degree to which operations could effectively address their own security concerns (Koenig-Archibugi and Macdonald 2012, 506). For instance, if an important trade route is at stake, member states can articulate their options on the basis of the operations' perceived ability to address and eliminate a threat on that particular trade route (Knutsen and Dønjar 2016). Moreover, comparative advantages of the operations, such as their ability to address the long-term aspects of the security threat at hand, can offer additional benefits for the preservation of member states' security interests (e.g. Andersen 2009; Ehrhart and Petretto 2014; Drent 2015; Tomić 2015). Member states can also be more likely to support an operation based on the suppression of a common threat, not least because such an operation

would generate collective as well as individual security benefits (Nováky 2018a; Dombrowski and Reich 2018; Palm 2018).

Not only advantages but also weakness of the operations judged against their potential to address a given security threat can also affect member states' strategies. Member states might be less willing contribute to an operation that they see inadequate to respond to a threat due to its limited capacity to use of force (Barrueco 2009; Norheim-Martinsen 2012). Similarly, incoherencies such as preferences conflicting with those of other member states within the operations or with those of organisational actors can undermine member states' support to an operation (Korski 2008, 12; Larivé 2012; Merlingen 2012, 174). Member states can also be reluctant to support operations with a weak or vague mandate, or operations with internal differences that can result in inefficiencies (Kempin and Steinicke 2009; Gourlay 2011; McNearney 2006, 36; Juncos 2018).

As a consequence of these considerations, the resultant hypothesis is that member states' strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO are driven by a motivation to address a direct threat against their physical security or their economic benefits. For this hypothesis to be confirmed, empirical evidence should reveal that member states were primarily focused on their perception about the extent to which the EU and NATO operations could effectively address a security threat at hand. Member states judge the functionality and effectiveness of the operations against the resources possessed by the operations; the speed at which the operation could be launched; and intra-operational coherence. Conversely, the absence of references to these aspects of operations to eliminate a threat would spell trouble for this hypothesis.




Figure 1. Generic pattern of security interests

Yet, explanations based on security interests can be challenged on a number of grounds. First, these explanations tend to overlook the aspects of security provision beyond benefits specific to member states. In contrast to a conception of security threats as purely ‘individual goods’, many contemporary security threats arise from both state and non-state actors, making security provision a cooperative attempt (Sperling 2018, 4). Furthermore, EU and NATO operations are not only aimed at pursuing material security interests, but also at upholding common values such as protection of human rights and prevention of human tragedies (e.g. Riddervold 2011; 2014; 2018; Pohl 2014; Nováky 2018b). Beyond suppressing security threats, ‘second order benefits’ of the operations can include the provision of a practical forum for cooperation and interoperability with a host of new security partners (Bridger 2013, 5).

In addition, member states do not always act out of a survival motive in the face of the external security environment. In fact, state leaders are also concerned about their parochial interests such as survival of their own governments (Narizny 2017, 181), which can also be an underlying determinant of national strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO. After all, it is national governments that decide on how to act about overlapping EU and NATO operations, meaning that national and sub-national perceptions on the roles the two organisations may well be decisive in the decision outcomes. These factors that are more closely related to domestic politics are given more weight by the explanations based on

domestic veto players, which is the second potential driver of national strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO.

2.3.1.2. Domestic veto players

In addition to security interests, particular preferences of political leaders, domestic institutions and public opinion within member states are also important factors that can shape national strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO (Haesebrouck 2016). Especially when member states' strategies are not driven primarily by security threats, domestic political risks and opportunities of their policies can play a key role in their strategies (Pohl 2014). In particular, I operationalise these domestic-level variables by veto players situated within member states' internal political structures (Mello 2014; Dorussen et al. 2009; Haesebrouck 2017). To be sure, potential roles of domestic veto players on member states' strategies brings to the fore the way in which member states organise their domestic decision-making in foreign and security policy. I elaborate member state-specific structures of foreign policy making in detail in Chapter 4. Here, I outline the potential domestic veto players that may in theory affect member state strategies within the EU and NATO operations.

Staying in office requires for member state governments to gain the support of a coalition of domestic voters, parties, interest groups and bureaucracies (Moravcsik 1993; Haesebrouck and van Immerseel 2020). As such, member states' options within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO are filtered by domestic-level factors such as bureaucratic politics, public opinion, and the role of national parliaments, which serve as the 'transmission belt by which the preferences and social power of individuals and groups are translated into foreign policy' (Moravcsik 2008, 237; Ripsman et al. 2016). Key at this domestic level are veto players,

referring broadly to individuals or collective actors whose agreement is required for a change of the status quo (Tsebelis 1995, 289).

In order to tease out veto players within member states in the context of the EU and NATO operations, it is important first to address how veto players within a member state's domestic political system can be identified. Veto players can be derived from a member state's constitutional and legal framework, for example, parliaments or presidents, whose *de jure* approval is required for policy proposal to be affective (Tsebelis 2002, pp. 19–20), or political parties, whose *de facto* support is required to implement policy change (Tsebelis 2000, 447). Furthermore, it is also important to note that the list of potential veto players within member states depend on the constitutional and political context (Greathouse 2010, pp. s70-71). What is critical, however, is that actors who are influential in policymaking but who do not have the potential to block policy change are not veto players as such, not least because a catch-all conception of domestic veto players might otherwise risk the concept's analytical usefulness (Oppermann and Brummer 2017). Relatedly, the policymaking influence of domestic veto players within a member state may differ. For instance, the relative significance of domestic veto players and their ability to influence policymaking might change due to certain veto players' willingness to use their veto powers (Ganghof and Schulze 2015). This might be related to the saliency of specific EU and NATO crisis management operations in the domestic arena compared to public policies and other security and defence issues (Oppermann and Brummer 2017).

Against this background, I specify veto players in the context of member states' choices of particular EU and NATO operations as national bureaucracies, public opinion, and national parliaments. Member states' bureaucracies are among the largest and most influential interest

groups in their foreign and security policymaking structures. Therefore, preferences of veto players within member states' foreign policy executives can explain member states' strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO (Brummer 2013; Ripsman et al. 2016). Since national bureaucracies, as well as key decision-makers, form a member state's 'community of strategic decision-makers', these attitudes then predispose member state governments towards specific decisions when they are faced with multiple options about the EU and NATO operations (Meyer 2005, 527; Matlary 2009; Smith 2010; Pohl and van Willigen 2015; Chappell et al. 2016; Biscop 2019; cf. Howorth and Menon 2009).

Within any member state government, it is possible to observe different interpretations of problems and calculations of policy responses to these problems. For instance, officials at a ministry of foreign affairs may have very different perspectives on an issue compared to their counterparts in the ministry of defence (Brummer 2013). Similarly, officials' perspectives may vary depending on whether they are based in the national capital or in their national representation to the EU or NATO in Brussels (Duke 2017; Michalski and Danielson 2019). In this sense, preferences of agencies within member states' governments can lead to specific national strategies within (Germond and Smith 2009, 584; Andersen 2009, 80; Gros 2009; Nováky (2018a, pp. 132-133).

The preferences of governmental agencies can be affected by the extent of their socialisation into the EU and NATO as well by the dense network of relationships between European and North American states (Reichard 2006, 24; Forsberg and Herd 2006, 35; Michalski and Danielson 2018). These preferences may also resonate member states' long-term attitudes within the debate on the roles the EU and NATO should take in international security and crisis management. In the context of the EU and NATO operations, member state governments can

seek to support the development of CSDP capabilities and resources that could allow the EU to act autonomously from NATO, or prefer NATO as a primary framework of intervention, while supporting EU capabilities if they are not possessed by NATO (e.g. Simón 2017, 72; Whitman and Tonra 2017). Furthermore, the value member state governments attach to their alliance with the US and NATO may also impact national strategies within the operational overlap. A member states' political leader or governing party, for example, may prefer keeping the US involved in European security concerns (Gross 2009a, 24).

In addition to these broad attitudes, veto players within member state bureaucracies may also reflect more particular circumstances and considerations about their relations with the EU, NATO, and the US. For instance, some domestic organisations within member states' policymaking processes may be particularly interested in fostering security and defence integration within the EU or NATO if such integration will serve to their organisational interest (Biehl et al. 2013; Dyson 2014; Wright 2019). Member state governments can also see the security protection from US an essential element of their security and defence outlook, which may lead them to support NATO operations, where the US is the primary national-level actor (Bennett et al 1994, 72; Davidson 2011, 15; Ringsmose 2010, 330–331; Baltrusaitis 2010, pp. 16-17).

Moreover, if an operation makes it difficult for a member state to mobilise its own bureaucratic agencies which may not be foreign policy oriented, it might be politically and financially costly for that member state to commit to such an operation (Korski and Gowan 2009, 35; Pohl 2014, 121). Resources required for certain crisis management operations may not only be limited, but they may also be dispersed among a wide range of different ministries within a member state (Dijkstra 2013; Juncos 2018). This might present challenges when cross-

governmental cohesion is required for a member state to allocate resources to a certain operation.

Governmental agencies within members states' decision-making structures may also have concerns about external perceptions of their countries, especially if defection from acting vis-à-vis a crises incurs costs for their countries' international recognition. In order to prevent such costs, governmental agencies within member states can instrumentalise EU and NATO operations to raise their country's international status or for a domestic audience relevant to the crisis situation, such as the diasporas they host, as well as to improve the prestige and standing of their own organisations, such as the reputation of the diplomatic network or the armed forces (Davidson 2011, 17; Gegout 2012, 138; 2018, pp. 46-48; Germond and Smith 2009; Nováky 2018a).

National decision-makers also have to consider the degree of public support for the EU and NATO in general and the two organisations' operations in particular. Where and through which cooperative framework to deploy military force is a key area of disagreement across the public opinion within member states (Matlary 2009, 66). Member state governments might be reluctant to commit to an operation that would impose heavy domestic political costs to politicians seeking to maintain their offices. For example, an operation with a wider and more positive perception in media or host community can be more preferable for a member state. Furthermore, in order to prevent reputation costs of inaction vis-à-vis a pressure from the public opinion to 'do something', member states may use an operation as a justification tool (Bache and Jordan 2006, 22). Additionally, an operation can function as a 'legitimiser of disinterest' (Bickerton 2011, 34) or as a 'tool for political decision-makers to demonstrate political unity and action to domestic audiences' (Johansen 2017, 552).

National parliaments may also drive how member states engage with the operational overlap between the EU and NATO. Through the agendas and ideological orientation of the political parties, parliaments can influence member state engagement with the operational overlap (Hofmann 2013; Haesebrouck 2017, 142; Schade 2018; Mello and Peters 2018). For instance, depending on their powers, parliaments can approve resources or introduce national caveats or not approve the deployment of forces under a particular operation (Hanagan 2017, 35). At the same time, few parliaments in Europe have strong powers about national troop deployments and many of them can only scrutinise deployment decisions without co-decision rights (Peters et al. 2014, 434). Moreover, while possessing a potential to prevent the passage of legislation, oppositional constraint to member state governments' policies can be less threatening than intra-government constraints for the policies or even the survival of member state governments (Kaarbo 1996; 2012).

All of these veto players, namely bureaucracies, public opinion, and national parliaments, can also reflect on the historical contexts which inform member states' long-standing and contextual decisions about foreign, security and defence policies. When faced with options of using certain EU and NATO operations to address security threats, these veto players may draw on pre-existing and deeply ingrained norms about their countries and external world (Meyer 2005). This relates member states' choices of specific EU and NATO operations to their strategic cultures, which refers to their integrated systems of norms, ideas, and symbols that act to establish their long-standing preferences on foreign, security, and defence policies (Wendt 1994; Johnston 1996; Malici 2006; Lantis 2009; Lantis and Charlton 2011; Britz 2016).

Member states' strategic cultures cover their long-held orientations towards issues such as integration in European security, broader geopolitical orientations, and the appropriate means of intervention. When it comes to each member state's stances towards the EU and NATO as international security providers, their strategic cultures can be categorised along the Atlanticism-Europeanism dimension (Howorth 2007, Chappel et al. 2016). While some countries have a long-standing preference for developing EU capabilities to enable it to respond to international crises autonomously from NATO, others are considered as the archetypical example of Atlanticism due to their stronger prioritisation of NATO instead of the EU in international crisis management (Nováky 2018, 45). The characteristics of member states' strategic cultures can also be derived from their broader geopolitical orientations (Biehl et al. 2013; Doeser 2017; Doeser and Eidenfalk 2019). For instance, national strategic cultures may endorse particular forms of international military presence, such as continental and maritime, as well as specific geopolitical focal points that include areas within and beyond Europe (Simón 2013).

At the same time, also worth noting is that a member state's strategic culture does not necessarily equal to its strategic decisions as such, especially if political actors and agencies within member states' decision-making processes are understood as "carriers" or "holders" of their countries' strategic culture (Gray 2006). Because these actors and agencies have different political interests, when a member state's choice of an EU and NATO operation is reflective of its strategic culture, this does not necessarily mean that strategic culture is that member state's only motivation (Schmitt 2012). Indeed, choices in line with strategic culture may be the result of political struggles within member state governments, looming electoral campaigns, or a strategic expression of a particular security threat for various purposes (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012).

While traditional emphasis in terms of who holds a country's strategic culture has been on policy elites as a strategic community of decision-makers (e.g. Gray 2006; Greathouse 2010), the interplay between elites and a more inclusive conception of "member state" can also determine how conflicting positions within a member state about the EU and NATO are balanced as a policy outcome within a member state (Biehl et al. 2013, 12). This stems from an understanding that not only the individuals with direct access to the security decision-making process, but also actors such as journalists, participants in policy debates, think-tanks, academics, and other policy networks can influence member states' decision processes (Greenhouse 2010, pp. 70-71). The roles of potential veto players in relation to the strategic culture of the member state they represent are discussed in the context of each member state of interest in Chapter 4.

In short, if member state strategies were driven by domestic veto players' pursuit of their own goals, then member states' preferences within the operational overlap would reflect these actors' specific preferences. Therefore, the resultant hypothesis is that member states' strategies primarily serve to promote the interests and views of domestic veto players. For this hypothesis to be confirmed, then, member states' strategies should primarily reflect their governmental actors' preferences that reflect long-term national orientations about the EU and NATO or more contextual organisational interests; member states' concerns about mobilising their own bureaucracies; their considerations about the domestic implications of not acting vis-à-vis a crisis situation; public support to the EU and NATO; and the constraining and enabling role of their parliaments. Conversely, the plausibility of this hypothesis would be diminished if member state strategies were not informed by the considerations of these domestic veto players.




Figure 2. Generic pattern of domestic veto players

However, the internal-external entanglement presented by many contemporary foreign policy issues may challenge these domestic-level explanations. As Carlsnaes (2012, 127) points out, ‘in the real world we find a number of actors, both domestic and international, who are closely involved in the formulation of foreign policy’. The combination of domestic and external factors is particularly relevant for the EU and NATO operations, where national strategies can be simultaneously influenced by both domestic and international variables (Brummer 2009, 14; Tuschhoff 2014, 202).

2.3.1.3. Preferences about means of intervention

In choosing particular EU and NATO operation to address a security issue, member states may also follow different approaches to use of force ranging from military interventionism to a preference for civilian forms of intervention (Irondelle and Schmitt 2013; Maull 1990). Put differently, member states’ attitudes about providing international security through crisis management operations can also influence national strategies within the operational overlap (Caporaso 1999, 624). I operationalise these attitudes by two features of member states’ preferences about means of intervention. These preferences may reflect member states’ conceptions on the conditions under which it would be appropriate to use military means – conceptions which lie at the centre of member states’ security cultures and engrained domestic

norms about the means of intervention in crisis management, such as conceptions on the use of force (Johnston 1995; Meyer 2004; Biava et al. 2011; Biehl et al. 2013). Yet, these preferences may also reflect member states' more practical considerations about the security conditions on the operational theatre and circumstances within member states' domestic politics.

First, member states may judge whether the instruments and approaches of an operation is appropriate with their domestically engrained preferences about means of intervention in crisis management (March and Olsen 1998). Member states' understandings about how to respond to a crisis situation vary given the absence of a common 'European security culture' that converges various national attitudes about the appropriate means to respond to external crises through the EU or NATO operations (Menon 2009, 237; Zyla 2011). In this sense, various member state preferences about the means of intervention are also resonated by different crisis management approaches and instruments of the EU and NATO, who diverge on the basis of use of military force within their crisis management operations (Kempin and Steinicke 2009, 145; Penska 2010; Page 2011; Larivé 2012; Merlingen 2012, 172).

That is, the EU operations often rely more on civilian means of intervention, whereas NATO operations tend to focus on more high-intensity and 'militarised' tasks (Kagan 2003, 1; Ikenberry 2008, 21; Manners 2008; Whitman 2011, 13). Although the EU's 'comprehensive approach' comprised of civilian and military crisis management instruments is questioned by some scholars, the Union's responses to security issues are different from those of NATO. Even realist scholars who are suspicious of a unified European strategic culture agree that there is a 'European consensus' based on good governance and effective multilateralism (e.g. Rynning 2003, 486; Norheim-Martinsen 2011). In this sense, assets in the EU's crisis management toolbox for carrying out an operation may be more in line with some member states (Martin

and Kaldor 2009; Ginsberg and Penska 2012, 11; Biscop and Norheim-Martinsen 2012, 65; Faleg 2017, 5; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen 2011; Stokes and Whitman 2013, 1095; Shepherd 2015; Juncos 2018; cf. Williams 2011²). Member states can also prefer those means of intervention that are deployed within internationally and regionally legitimate operations especially if they consider how the international community would perceive these operations (Finnemore 1996). On the contrary, member states may be less likely to intervene through an operation without an international support through, for instance, a UNSC resolution (Davidson 2013).

Second, there are also more practical elements of member states' preferences about means of intervention. That is, in addition to entrenched conceptions of appropriate instruments within crisis management, preferences about means of intervention also cover a more consequential logic about the suitable instruments judged against the circumstances on the ground on an operational theatre (e.g. Kisangani and Pickering 2007; Kreps 2008; Soeterz and Tresch 2010). For instance, a tendency towards risk-aversion under deteriorating security conditions on the ground might make a member state prefer military means of intervention, while another member state aiming for mission success may see it necessary to deploy similar or alternative means of intervention (Saideman and Auerswald 2012). Furthermore, domestic political dynamics might result in restrictions on the use of force. For example, if parliamentary approval is needed for the deployment of civilian or military resource to the EU and NATO operations, pressures from national parliament might force a member state government to apply caveats to force deployments (Auerswald and Saideman 2014; Huff 2015; Frost-Nielsen 2017).

² Williams (2011, 76) stresses that 'NATO viewed the comprehensive approach and the development of PRTs as a way to use the existing civilian and military capacity of the allies for tackling the wide range of problems associated with state-building'. However, 'the military dominated [NATO's] comprehensive approach in Afghanistan' (ibid, 67). This implies that there were still differences on how the comprehensive approach resonates in the EU and NATO.

Therefore, the resultant hypothesis is that national strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO are driven primarily by member states' preferences about means of intervention. For this hypothesis to be confirmed, member states' preferences should be informed by their engrained domestic norms about the means of intervention; considerations about whether an operation is appropriate with these predispositions; concerns about the different crisis management approaches and instruments of the EU and NATO; the legitimacy of the two organisations' operations; or more practical considerations about the suitable instruments to respond to a crisis situation. On the other hand, if the empirical evidence reveals that member states' strategies reflect preferences and operational practices that contradict their preferences about means of intervention in crisis management, then this hypothesis would be disconfirmed.




Figure 3. Generic pattern of the preferences about means of intervention

However, explanations based on preferences about means of intervention can be challenged from a number of perspectives. It is difficult to differentiate the EU and NATO according to their crisis management approaches, as for some scholars these approaches are essentially informed by a set of broad normative values the two organisations share (Zyla 2011; 677; Risse 2016, pp. 22-23). Furthermore, the differences between the two organisations' crisis management practices are not always clear cut. Indeed, in the contemporary context, NATO's crisis management roles moved beyond those of a defence alliance, reaching areas covering

conflict prevention and state-building, similar to the tasks ascribed to the EU (Flockhart 2011, 103). For its part, the EU, like NATO, has incrementally become an international security provider by developing security and defence policies to address Europe's modern security challenges, while continuing to promote its fundamental values (Smith 2018, 609).

2.3.2. How do member states exercise these choices? Types of national strategies

Despite the importance of identifying the potential factors for why member states choose from overlapping EU and NATO operations in the first place, it is one thing to identify these factors; but quite another to evaluate how exactly they practice these choices. After all, member state preferences during the inception of operations such as planning and launch can be more politicised processes than the operations themselves (Mattelaer 2013). Therefore, the multifactor model also seeks to understand the particular ways in which member states exercise their strategies during the operations.

Regime complexity research offers insights to understand the options available for members of elemental regimes that are involved in the same issue areas, often connoted with the keywords "forum-" or "venue-shopping". Using suggestions from the regime complexity literature, particularly those on the strategic interplay resulted by the choices of members of elemental regimes that form a complex, this section conceptualises crisis management operations as an area of overlap within the broader relationship between the EU and NATO. In this understanding, to develop the second element of the multifactor model, I argue that the parallel and sequential nature of the EU and NATO operations leads member states to take into account the effects of their actions regarding one operation when determining their action within the other operation that is also in place. In other words, when considering their options about one operation, member states determine their preferences in light of their commitments

in the other operation deployed in the same theatre (Schelling 1958, 205; Gehring and Oberthür 2009, pp. 135-141). Consequently, member states' strategies render them supporters of the needs of one operation when dealing with matters of the other (Gehring and Faude 2014).

2.3.2.1. Regime complexes

A regime complex can be defined as an 'array of partially overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions governing a particular issue area' (Raustiala and Victor 2004, 279). Understood in this way, regime complexes are comprised of functionally overlapping institutions 'that continuously affect each other's operations' (Gehring and Faude 2013, 120). Although alternative and more specific definitions refer to a lowest number of institutions in a regime for it to be named as a complex or certain dimensions such as membership (e.g. Orsini and Morin 2013), a widely-shared common focus across different conceptualisations of regime complexes is 'a set of overlapping and perhaps even contradictory regimes' (Alter and Raustiala 2018, 330). In this sense, regime complexes have been identified in a variety of areas including, but not limited to, genetic resources (Raustiala and Victor 2004), human rights promotion (Hafner-Burton 2009), climate change (Keohane and Victor 2011), maritime piracy (Struett et al. 2013), and energy governance (Urpelainen and van de Graaf 2015). These regime complexes exhibit both complementary and contradictory overlaps on the basis of 'principles, norms, rules, or procedures' (Orsini ad Morin 2013, 29).

Furthermore, a key feature of regime complexes is the absence of 'agreed-upon means to assert a hierarchy when rules or decisions backed by different institutions conflict' (Alter and Raustiala 2018, 331). In relation to this lack of common rules to regulate overlaps, regime complexes also influence actors' preferences and decisions by increasing their strategic action:

‘State and private actors understand that within a regime complex, decisions made in one forum can be influenced, revised, or undermined by decisions and politics within a parallel or overlapping domestic or international forum’ (Alter and Raustiala 2018, 331). Put differently, actors within a regime complex ‘will tend to shape their preferences and make their decisions within one elemental institution against the backdrop of the other institutions that form part of the complex’ (Gehring and Faude 2013, 122). Indeed, it is often assumed that states, especially those acting within regime complexes that are unregulated around rules to form hierarchies or conflict resolution mechanisms, often use their membership to elemental institutions within a regime complex in order to maximise their interests and minimise the transaction costs.

Using their memberships in this way, states also choose a framework when confronted with multiple venues in the same policy area, a behaviour referred to as forum-shopping (Busch 2007, 736; Alter and Meunier 2009). Existing research analyses forum-shopping as a general category that is separate from moving regulatory activities from one venue to another (regime shifting), attempting to bridge the gaps between regimes (brokering), and creating contradictory rules in a parallel regime to undermine the regulatory authority of a regime (strategic inconsistency) (e.g. Raustiala and Victor 2004; Alter and Meunier 2009; Goddard 2009). Therefore, existing research is not specific about how precisely forum-shopping occurs. On the other hand, I argue that states within a regime complex can practice forum-shopping in different ways.

2.3.2.2. Operational overlap as a subset of regime complex

In making this argument, within the vast literature on regime complexity, I focus on the insight from the behaviour of states that are members of elemental institutions forming a regime

complex. While crisis management constitutes a regime on its own, the crisis management operations of the EU and NATO is a subset within this regime with overlapping memberships, mandates, and resources (Hofmann 2009; 2013; 2019; Becker and Bell 2020). In this respect, I focus on states' behaviour within regime complexes helps to develop the second element of multifactor model, which sets out the types of national strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO.

Similar to the aforementioned implications of a regime complex, overlap between the EU and NATO in the field of crisis management presents member states a variety of options regarding the two organisations' operations. It is believed that the existence of the EU (through CSDP) and NATO as two distinct organisations with overlapping memberships, mandates, and resources spurs member states of the two organisations to resort to the forum most favourable to their interests (e.g. Biermann 2008; Hofmann 2009; 2019). As policymakers also recognise, 'it is unlikely that the [...] EU member states who are also NATO Allies will make decisions about NATO contributions in isolation from their decision-making about EU' (US Mission to the EU 2009a). In the words of a NATO official, for example, member states can 'tweak a particular planning process in the EU and that is also brought to the fore at NATO' (Interview 35: NATO official). Being a member of both organisations allows states to pursue their preferred policy options in the EU and/or NATO, depending on which organisational framework suits their preferences best. This flexibility 'mitigates the zero-sum logic that characterises single organisations by making it possible for states that want to cooperate more formally to do so, while accommodating reluctant states' (Hofmann and Mérand 2012, 151).

The range of strategies available to member states within an operational overlap can be identified by looking at their organisational positions and governmental preferences (Hofmann

2009; 2019). The member states analysed in this thesis, namely France, Germany and the UK, are represented both in the EU and NATO through membership. Such ‘dual members’ enjoy a strategic flexibility as they have access to multiple sources of information and ideas within both organisations (Weiffen et al. 2013). Based on their organisational positions as ‘dual members’, these states have a range of policy options available to them, such as selecting among organisations, influencing organisational processes, and mediating between the organisations to ensure cooperation (Hofmann 2019). In addition to institutional positions, the preferences of member states’ governments are also key in identifying the available national strategies within operational overlap, not least because crisis management operations of the EU and NATO are subject to permanent political control and oversight of national capitals (Mattelaer 2013; Howorth 2014).

As stated, extant literature does not specify how precisely members of an elemental institution forum-shop within the regime complex. Similarly, research on the overlap between the EU and NATO in the realm of European and international security is silent about the particular manifestations of this strategic interplay and forum-shopping behaviour. Instead, it adopts a rather general category of forum-shopping as a strategy that is separate from other strategies such as choosing to use veto powers within an organisation to influence the other (hostage taking), and foster inter-organisational cooperation (brokering) (Hofmann 2009; 2019).

This thesis offers a different approach by arguing that applying forum-shopping to the particular context of operational overlap between the EU and NATO requires a rethinking of the concept. While agreeing with the previous research that member states articulate their strategies according to their expectations of which operation will deliver a better outcome

according to their interests, I argue that these strategies include different and heuristic practices of engaging with the operations. That is, rather than a strategy that could be differentiated from others simply as a choice of an organisational venue that is most suitable for their own interests, member states can practice forum-shopping in different ways. In consideration of the institutional positions of France, Germany, and the UK as dual members, I argue that three distinct manifestations of forum-shopping can be identified as the ways these member states make sense of and use the operational overlap.

First, these member states can *exploit* the operational overlap by taking active part in both operations simultaneously or at different times to advance their interests (Henneberg and Plank 2019; Alter and Raustiala 2018). By being actively involved in both operations through force assets, dual members can seek to circumvent certain political and operational costs and obligations to pursue their policy goals or foster inter-operational cooperation (Goddard 2009). These member states can adopt this strategy if, for example, one of the operations is in line with their traditional choice of intervention, while the other favours their more practical preferences by being able to address the problem with a fuller spectrum of crisis management instruments (Henneberg and Panke 2020). For instance, in the context of operations dealing with illegal activities, one of the operations may be hosted by a member state's preferred framework for intervention, whilst the other may be supported with instruments such as legal transfer arrangement. In such a scenario, the first operation could address member states' long-term strategic orientations, and the latter could provide benefits for those member states who are unwilling to be involved in the trial and prosecution of the captured criminals. In this sense, exploitation can provide dual benefits to member states of both organisations: While upholding their specific operational preferences by taking advantage of the practical aspects of the operations, member states can make token contributions to the operations in order to

demonstrate their commitment to the EU and NATO. Therefore, different operations may present distinct advantages to member states to uphold their own agendas. To further their interests, member states may seek to benefit from having two multilateral frameworks in the same theatre. Such an overlap may in this way help member states to achieve their objectives through reducing transaction costs (Keohane and Victor 2011).

Second, member states can *accommodate* their preferences by adjusting their behaviour in line with political and operational realities in a way to implement policy options they initially did not prefer or even resisted against (Weiffen et al. 2013; Faude and Fuss 2020). Accommodation occurs as a result of member states' readjustment of their initial preferences about the EU and NATO operations. Insights from the regime complexity literature suggests that accommodation occurs when a member state's initially preferred policy options become untenable (e.g. Davis 2009; Murphy and Kellow 2013). For instance, despite taking part in an operation, member states can recalculate their choices due to intra-operational divisions (Henneberg and Panke 2020). Alternatively, preferences of other member states in one of the organisations might over time become closer to a member state's own positions, making it easier for that member state to find potential allies in addressing a problem (Urpelainen and van de Graaf 2015). Furthermore, member states' domestic political dynamics can induce them to change their operational preferences, especially if the approval of agencies within domestic politics is required for specific policies within the operational overlap (Panke and Henneberg 2017). Changes in member states' organisational positions, such as termination of membership, can also led them to accommodate their strategies by, for instance, making them project their preferences within the organisational framework where they would have stronger organisational position and hence more leverage (Hafner-Burton 2009; Keohane and Victor 2011; Hoffmann 2018). Yet, accommodation does not necessarily mean that member states

forgo their parochial interests. In fact, through accommodation, member states can demonstrate novel ways of engaging with an operation to pursue their own agendas. They can, for instance, take part in an operation to limit its functions, if this is in their interests (Hoffmann 2009).

A third strategy is *toleration*, where member states lend political or diplomatic support to an operation instead of force contributions. In cases where dual member states are not in a position to take part in an operation or adjust their behaviour due to the certain constraints such as of political and operational circumstances, blocking the launch of an operation is not an option. The reason is that both in the EU and NATO, proceeding along the phases of operational decision-making requires a unanimous political approval of member states (Mattelaer 2013, pp. 20-23; interviews 33 and 35: NATO officials). In the EU, unanimity rule remains within the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is responsible for political and strategic control and direction of the Union's crisis management operations (Europa 2020; Maurer and Wright 2021). In NATO, similarly, responding to a situation through crisis management instruments requires planning and deployment decisions that are taken collectively by the member states in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) (NATO 2005, 47). Hence, whilst not taking active part in one of the operations within the overlap, member states following the toleration strategy do not block that operation either.

In this strategy, member states approve the operational overlap as long as it does not cross their certain interests as 'national red lines'. For instance, member states may contribute force assets to an operation if they have a stronger influence due to their positions in the host organisation (Jupille et al. 2013). In addition, crisis management approaches of one of the organisations might be more in line with member states' preferences if, for instance, they think beyond specific issues to consider policies about a region more broadly (Yeo 2018, 169).

Moreover, member states may take part in an operation if they prefer the host organisation to lead in a specific context of crisis management (Kirchner and Sperling 2010; Biehl et al. 2013; Chappell et al. 2016). Member states' domestic politics can also prevent them to participate in one of the operations especially if contributing forces to each operation requires new parliamentary approvals. More practical reasons, such as a higher degree of operational capacity, one of the organisations' experience in dealing with an issue or faster deployment times, and the instruments or methods of an operation can also induce member states to take active part only in an operation (Henneberg and Panke 2020). Last but not least, member states may also use the operations in which they have more power, such as agenda-setting advantages due to holding a rotating presidency (Hafner-Burton 2009).

Finally, it is also worth touching on the link between the drivers and types of national strategies. In the EU and NATO operations, political driving factors and operational practices are not always consistent, as a result of which incongruencies between political considerations and operational planning can exist (Mattelaer 2013). Therefore, the multifactor model offered here does not propose a linear narrative about relationship between the drivers and types of national strategies. Instead, it argues that member states' particular forum-shopping practices within the EU and NATO operations can result from multiple forces that drive their preferences about these operations. When confronted with multiple EU and NATO operations to tackle a crisis, member states do not always use their memberships to both organisations in order to maximise their own interests. Instead, in the security realm, which often entails urgency and generates considerable domestic and international political pressure than many other political issues, member states' strategies are not only dependent on their rational assessments of transaction-cost reduction, but also on their broader calculations based on national interests, operational preferences, as well as their perceptions of security provision (Henneberg and Plank

2019; Urpelainen and van de Graaf 2015). This can then lead member states to select operations that are not fully efficient from a purely rational-choice perspective (Mérand and Rayroux 2016; Henneberg and Plank 2019).

For example, whilst a member state with significant security interests in a given issue can seek to exploit the operational overlap by making use of certain comparative advantages of both operations, its strategic orientations about the EU and NATO as international security providers or a motivation to appease domestic veto players can also make that member state follow the same strategy. Similarly, a strategy of accommodation can be a result of difficulties in implementing an initially favoured option due to domestic political pressures or long-standing preferences about the means of intervention (e.g. Pohl 2014; Nováky 2018a). A member state facing an acute security threat can tolerate an operational overlap while not actively participating in it, though the same strategy can also be followed out of more abstract foreign policy goals such as fulfilling commitments to the EU and/or NATO. Therefore, I argue that although each potential driver of national strategies can shape the type of these strategies, the relationship between these two elements is not a linear one. In other words, certain drivers of member states' strategies may translate into various practices of choosing from the EU and NATO operations.

The multifactor model offered in this chapter is summarised in Table 1.

| Drivers of national strategies | | Types of national strategies | |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------------------------|--|
| Security interests | Perceived strengths and weaknesses of operations; resources possessed by operations; intra-operational coherence | Exploitation | Being actively involved in both operations through force assets; fostering inter-operational cooperation; circumventing political and operational costs; using comparative advantages of both operations |
| Domestic veto players | Domestic preferences about the EU and NATO; challenges of mobilising national bureaucracies; popularity of EU and NATO; party ideologies and politics | | |
| Preferences on means of intervention | 'Appropriateness' of intervention; 'European difference'; legitimacy of operations | Accommodation | Readjustment of initial preferences; novel ways of engaging with operations |
| | | Toleration | Political or diplomatic support to an operation instead of force contributions; using comparative advantages of one of the operations; approving the operational overlap as long as it does not cross 'national red lines' |

Table 1. Multifactor model of national strategies within the operational overlap

2.3.3. What makes member states 'strategies effective? Organisation of national policymaking

In forming the third element of the multifactor model, namely the role of member states' organisation of their policymaking structures in security and defence policy on their strategies within the EU and NATO operations, I focus on foreign policy decision-making and policy coordination literatures. In this element of the multifactor model, I conceptualise member states as rational but non-unitary actors whose pursuit of interests through the EU and NATO operations is depended upon the way their policymaking instruments and mechanisms are organised (Morin and Orsini 2014, 306).

As the mandates and locations of the EU and NATO crisis management operations have expanded over time, the coordination of large national bureaucracies became a more relevant challenge for contributing member states to pursue their policies within these operations (Gross and Juncos 2011). Within complex decision-making contexts such as those presented by the overlapping EU and NATO operations, member states may have to adopt their policymaking strategies in taking steps to minimise political and operational costs while at the same time seeking to fulfil their interests (Jones et al. 2006). As a NATO official pointed out, although each member state might in theory have 'a fair shot to shape the operational mandates', there is a constant 'political control of the operational processes, where member states bring in what they want to see [in an operational mandate]' (interview 35: NATO official). These complexities may be exacerbated by the institutional arrangements of decision-making within member states. For example, while collectively contributing to specific decisions, the agencies within member state governments can also stay autonomous and separate from each other. This means that member states' 'rational choices' may become less clear when they are confronted

with options to simultaneously take part in both EU and NATO operations in the same spaces (Alter and Meunier 2009, 17).

What, then, can determine the extent to which member states can make use of the operational overlap between the EU and NATO to accomplish their objectives? First, the way in which member states make policy at the national as well as at EU and NATO levels can shape how they articulate and pursue their interests (Wright 2019). Although all states that are members of both organisations within an overlap can engage in forum-shopping across the two organisations' operations, it is often those with effective co-ordination mechanisms as well as administrative capabilities and experiences that are better placed to deal with the complexities presented by overlapping operations while seeking to pursue their interests (e.g. Drezner 2009, 67; Keane and Wood 2016).

I operationalise the organisation of member states' decision-making structures by the *centrality* of core executive, and the *autonomy* of core executive from the legislature (Baltrusaitis 2010). In a domestic decision-making system where the core executive of foreign policy is centralised with significant executive autonomy from the legislature, decision-making authority is often restricted to few governmental actors and agencies. In member state strategies with such decision-making structures, national strategies can depend on the preferences and beliefs of a lower number of stakeholders. Thus, initially articulated policy options and adaptations to evolving political and operational factors might be easier as a result of a coherent policy line formulated around a centralised organisation of policymaking (Baltrusaitis 2010, 26; Vis 2019).

On the other hand, in a member state where foreign policy decision-making processes involve a high number of actors and agencies, contextual factors within member states' domestic politics might have greater influence on member state strategies. If, for instance, the legislature enjoys significant oversight over national decisions about the EU and NATO operations or if decisions about these operations necessitate internal bureaucratic bargaining, member states' strategies might be articulated as a response to domestic political pressures, potentially resulting in sub-optimal strategies from the perspective of operational needs on the ground (Baltrusaitis 2010, 27; Kaarbo 2017; Oppermann and Brummer 2020).

However, the effectiveness of coordination does not necessarily translate into successful policy outcomes in line with member states' objectives. The capabilities required to pursue national preferences within an operational overlap is different from the capabilities required to address the issue itself. The success of member states' goal attainment could also be affected by, for example, the issue at hand (Wright 1996; May et al. 2006; Morin and Orsini 2014). A member state's technical expertise within an issue area, such as maritime operations, can make it better able to instrumentalise the operation to maximise their interests (Drezner 2009, 67). A member state with sectorised co-ordination mechanisms can nevertheless be highly effective at securing its favoured policy outcomes if the issue at hand is suitable for the preferences of diverse governmental agencies within its foreign policy decision-making structure (e.g. Brummer 2012; Wright 2018). Furthermore, a member state with a large and specialised diplomatic clout may enjoy advantages in dealing with the complexities of an operational overlap that contain both consistent and inconsistent elements (Hutchings and Suri 2020).

Despite the importance of member states in the dynamics of operational overlap, however, analysing domestic coordination of foreign policymaking in a European context involves a

distinctive supra-national space, namely the European foreign policy system (Hadfield et al., 2017). By projecting their preferences onto EU and NATO levels, member states reconfigure their strategies according to these larger organisational stages (Wong and Hill 2011; Schmidt 2014, 40). Therefore, a member state's coordination of policymaking between its national capital and representations in Brussels, as well as the policies made collectively at the EU and NATO levels themselves, are important determinants of the extent to which they can pursue their aims within the EU and NATO operations. As national and organisational level officials point out, the nature of cooperation between national capitals and Brussels-based representations, such as the frequency of meetings and flow of information, can determine the effectiveness of operational practices (interview 28: German official), while institutional actors can affect member states' calculations about operations (interview 35: NATO official). I elaborate more on these dynamics in the context of the EU and NATO crisis management operations in the next two chapters, where I present the empirical perspective through which the multifactor model will be assessed and each member state's policymaking arrangements respectively.

Overall, the last element of the multifactor model argues that the organisation of member state structures through which these strategies are articulated and pursued are key determinants of member states' strategies within the overlapping EU and NATO operations. In this way, this last element on the organisation of decision-making completes the multifactor model, which is formed of drivers and types of national strategies, and the way in which member states formulate and pursue their political and operational preferences.

2.4. Conclusion

This chapter presented a multifactor model to examine member states' strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO. The starting argument in this chapter was that existing explanations struggle to fully account for member states' articulation and pursuit of their strategies throughout the whole life cycle of operational overlap between the two organisations. Offering an alternative account of member state strategies, the multifactor model presented here is based on the drivers and types of national strategies, as well as the organisation of member states' decision-making processes in foreign and security policy. According to the first element of the multifactor model, namely, the drivers of national strategies, member states' choices within the operational overlap may be driven concurrently by a variety of factors. The second element, namely, the types of member states' strategies, helps understand the particular practices through which member states make their choices within the overlap between the EU and NATO operations. Finally, the third element, namely, member states' organisation of decision-making in foreign and security policy, helps understand how member states' institutional arrangements of foreign and security policy making can be indicative of the extent to which they can instrumentalise the overlapping EU and NATO operations to accomplish their objectives.

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3. Research design and methodology

This chapter discusses the research design and methodology of the thesis. First, the chapter elaborates on the methodology of the thesis based on qualitative case studies and ‘pattern-matching’. The chapter then situates the research design of the thesis according to the type and direction of inference the thesis attempts to make. In doing so, the chapter uses the distinction of ‘outcome-centric’ and ‘factor-centric’ research as referred to by the literature on research methods in political science. Subsequently, the chapter outlines the foreign policy analysis perspective through which the drivers and types of member states’ strategies, as well as the impact of their decision-making structures on these strategies, will be assessed in the cases of operational overlap between the EU and NATO. Finally, the chapter elaborates on how the evidence for empirical analysis information is to be gathered, and why the member states and operations of interest are chosen.

3.1. Research design: Case study and pattern-matching

This thesis uses a small-N case study method in empirically testing the multifactorial model. A case refers to ‘[...] an instance, or a data point, [...] [obtained] through an empirical examination of a real-world phenomenon within its naturally occurring context, without directly manipulating either the phenomenon or the context.’ (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999, 372). In this sense, a small-N case study is understood as ‘an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units’ (Gerring 2004, 342).

This thesis’ choice of small-N case study method is informed by three criteria, namely, the form of the research question; whether the researcher has control over behavioural events; and

whether the focus is on contemporary or historical events (Yin 2009, pp. 8-14). Types of research questions can be discussed by looking at their interrogative such as ‘what’, ‘how many/much’, ‘to what extent’, ‘who’, and ‘where’. ‘What’ questions can favour an exploratory case study method, whereas ‘how many/much’ and ‘to what extent’ questions can be more suitable for surveys, experiments, and archival analysis. Questions starting with ‘how’ and ‘why’ fit with explanatory case study methods, because ‘such questions deal with the tracing of operational processes over time, rather than the mere frequencies or incidence’ (ibid, 10). Case studies are also preferred when the researcher is interested in contemporary events where there is ‘a fluid rendition of the recent past and the present, not just the present’ (ibid, 12).

Judged against these criteria, the research question of this thesis, namely, ‘why and how do member states make their choices within the overlapping EU and NATO operations?’, is suitable for a case study method: First, the interrogatives of this research question (‘why’ and ‘how’) are explanatory in nature. Second, member states’ choices within overlapping EU and NATO operations cannot be manipulated as they are phenomena that already took place. Third, as outlined later in this chapter, the EU and NATO operations studied in this thesis were launched in rather recent past, with the oldest of them dating back to 2007. Therefore, the research design of this thesis is based on a qualitative and small-N case study of political and diplomatic practices of actors within decision-making processes in the member states of interest, namely, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

Selecting a small-N case study method has a number of implications for this thesis. Case studies allow for the provision of detailed information not only on member state strategies themselves but also how these strategies are made and implemented. They also allow for assessing whether the hypothesised drivers and types of national strategies match the observed

events and features. However, small- N case study method presents inevitable trade-offs between parsimony of analysis and richness of explanation (George and Bennett 2005, 31). Due to the low number of cases, small-N case study method raises concerns over bias in selection. This thesis seeks to address these concerns by triangulating the data sources it uses to collect evidence. As elaborated in detail later in this chapter, I combine an extensive analysis of official documents with elite interviews with officials at EU, NATO and member state levels.

The research design of this thesis can also be situated by reference to the literature on research methods in political science, particularly on the basis of the inference it tries to explore in answering its research question (Bennett and George 1997). A research design is ‘outcome-centric’ ‘if it focuses on explaining variance in outcomes in terms of the causal variables and contingent conditions that account for this variance’ (ibid, 18). In the outcome-centric research approach, ‘the goal is to comprehensively assess potential and alternative explanations by considering many independent variables [...] that *in toto* try to account for variance in the dependent variable [...] as completely as possible’ (Gschwend and Schimmelfennig 2007, 8). An outcome-centric research design includes ‘independent variables correlated with the outcome in order to increase the fit of the model, even if their omission would not bias the other effects in the model’ (Sieberer 2007, 170). In parallel, none of the independent variables have a superior status prior to examination in theoretical terms, even though some of them may emerge as more powerful predictors than others. The reason is that the underlying focus lies on explaining the variation in outcome rather than assessing the impact of a particular set of factors (ibid). Furthermore, theory-testing in an outcome-centric research design requires examining how certain phenomena are produced ‘and in which causal order they affect the outcomes’ (Schimmelfennig 2015, 100).

On the other hand, ‘factor-centric’ research designs are ‘interested in assessing the causal powers of a particular factor, [...] and exploring the contingent conditions under which the same values on this independent variable lead to different outcomes’ (Bennett and George 1997, 18). Put differently, the goal in a factor-centric research design ‘is to estimate the direction and size of a particular causal effect of one or a few independent variables [...] on a dependent variable, [...] and to assess their robustness’ (Gschwend and Schimmelfennig 2007, 8). In a factor-centric research design, the central aspect for making valid inferences is to ‘control for’, ‘account for’ or ‘hold constant’ ‘the influence of all potential confounding factors in order to separate out those effects from the causal relationship in which they are primarily interested’ (ibid, 9). Hence, independent variables other than those of interest ‘are only included if their omission would result in a bias when estimating the causal effect of the key causal variable(s)’ (Sieberer 2008, 168).

Choosing from these two types of research designs mainly depends on the research task at hand. Outcome-centric research design is suitable if the research is based on explaining the variance on a dependent variable. Thus, researchers often opt for an outcome-centric research design in theoretically less advanced fields, because they ‘try to explore new phenomena by focusing directly on the variance of the dependent variable’ (ibid). On the other hand, a factor-centric research design is more suitable for a theoretically more advanced field since the researcher focuses on the effect of a particular variable or a set of variables of a theoretical model on a given outcome with a view to have a better grasp of the variable of interest (i.e. what affects it generates). Therefore, if the research is driven by a theoretical interest in causal factors or mechanisms, a factor-centric design would be the most suitable.

This thesis selects an outcome-centric research design for two key reasons. First, the central question of this thesis, namely, ‘why and how do member states make their choices within the overlapping EU and NATO operations?’, makes an outcome-centric research design more suitable. This research question focuses more on explaining the variance in member states’ strategies within overlapping crisis management operations of the EU and NATO than focusing on the effect of a particular factor on member states’ choices within these operations. As outlined in Chapter 2, this model also gives equal logical importance to the independent variables it offers to explain member states’ strategies. Second, existing research on the EU and NATO crisis management operations is more descriptive and prescriptive than theory-driven, arguably because, among other things, it has tended to be policy-oriented (Nováky 2018a). Thus, research on the operational overlap between the EU and NATO in the field of crisis management is less advanced on theoretical terms than it is on analytical terms.

However, it is not a straightforward task to identify the drivers of national strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO, not least because in reality various factors may be simultaneously at work behind member states’ strategies. As stated, in contributing to an operation, member states may concurrently be motivated by their parochial security interests, seek to respond to domestic expectations, and follow a particular conception about appropriate means of intervention in crisis management operations. Therefore, complex correlations between member states’ choices from the EU and NATO operations, their specific practices to exercise these choices, and their organisations of policymaking may prevent ascertaining whether a specific driver was indeed instrumental in national strategies.

Because such variance is in itself insufficient for identifying the drivers and types of member states’ strategies as well as the role of their policymaking instruments and mechanisms,

explanations on member states' decision-making processes regarding the EU and NATO operations are more likely to be based on probabilistic hypotheses rather than causal explanations (Della Porta and Keating 2008, 24). In this sense, this thesis uses a qualitative research technique called 'pattern-matching', where it is checked whether a hypothesised pattern of events matches the observed pattern of events (Yin 2009). Accordingly, I assess the evidence from each member state's decision-making processes about the EU and NATO operations against the hypotheses informed by the multifactor model (see Kaarbo and Beasley 1999). These hypotheses include empirical expectations on the drivers of member states' choices, the kind of member states' involvement in the EU and NATO operations, and the influence of member states' policymaking arrangements in their strategies about the EU and NATO operations. The sets of expectations outlined in the previous chapter together constitute the expected patterns of events. For instance, as elaborated in Chapter 2, one of the hypotheses deduced from multifactor model is that a member state's choices from the EU and NATO operations are determined primarily by its own security interests, while it effectively pursues its own goals through both operations thanks to its centralised policy coordination structure. At the same time, to reduce the problem of indeterminacy, empirical chapters (Chapters 5, 6, and 7) develop a narrative of how member states articulated their strategies within a given operational overlap between the EU and NATO, rather than proposing clear causal processes. The influence of a certain factor in a member state's strategies therefore does not preclude the impact of other factors.

3.2. Assessing the national strategies: Comparative foreign policy as a method

I use a foreign policy analysis (FPA) perspective to empirically gauge the drivers and types of member states' strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO, as well as the impact of their policymaking arrangements on these strategies. So far, these strategies have not been assessed directly from an FPA perspective. To be sure, as seen in the above discussion on the extant research, the literature does present a number of examples focusing on member states' decisions about the EU and NATO operations from a (foreign) policymaking perspective (e.g. Gross 2009a; Brummer 2013; Pohl 2014; Nováky 2018). However, as discussed in Chapter 2, due to the lack of direct focus on the making and implementation of member state strategies, there is less FPA-guided evidence using a perspective on how member states articulate their strategies within the EU and NATO operations. In the following paragraphs, I argue that an FPA perspective is useful as a practical guidance to empirically establish the drivers and types of member states' strategies within overlapping crisis management operations of the EU and NATO, as well as to assess the role of member states' decision-making structures and mechanisms in member states' pursuit of their objectives through these operations.

Based on the 'decision-making approach' developed in late 1950s and early 1960s, FPA is a sub-discipline within international relations that seeks to explain the decisions taken by human decisionmakers in positions of authority to commit the resources of nation-states, regional and international organisations and non-governmental bodies (Snyder et al. 1962; Allison 1971; Allison and Zelikow 1999; Hudson 2005, 4; 2015; Brummer 2013; Thies 2018; Hudson and Day 2020; Aran et al. 2021). FPA, however, also represents a broad paradigm without a specific

level of analysis, theoretical model, or methodological approach (Drury et al. 2010). Instead, it covers a wide range of approaches to the analysis of foreign policy.

Among the perspectives within the FPA paradigm, this thesis will use the comparative foreign policy approach to test the multifactor model along French, German, and British policymaking arrangements in security and defence policy (Brummer and Hudson 2015; Kaarbo 2015). Allowing to compare similarities and differences across a small number of cases, comparative foreign policy approach helps draw conclusions on the degree to which each element of the multifactor model is observable in member states' preferences regarding the EU and NATO operations (Lantis and Beasley 2017). Moreover, comparative foreign policy approach assumes that domestic and international level factors are often interrelated (Hudson 2005; Verbeek and Zaslove 2017; Lantis and Beasley 2017). Implementing a comparative foreign policy approach to the investigation of member states' choices from the EU and NATO operations therefore requires examining the interplay between national imperatives over foreign policy making and the influence of dynamics within the EU and NATO (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014, pp. 11-34). In this vein, by following the comparative foreign policy approach, this thesis adopts an empirical perspective that encompasses the EU and NATO member states' foreign policies as well as the connection between these national policymaking processes and the (collective) foreign policy machineries of the two organisations (Hadfield and Hudson 2015).

I also combine rational and cognitive schools of thought in foreign policy analysis by conceptualising member states as boundedly rational and non-unitary actors (Mintz and Sofrin 2017; Rapport 2017). While assuming that material conditions are important for member states' choices from the EU and NATO operations, comparative foreign policy approach recognises

that subjective understandings and interpretations of individuals also shape these choices (Lantis and Beasley 2017). According to a rational-choice perspective, member states tend to favour those EU and NATO operations that are most suitable to their own interests (Morin and Paquin 2018, pp. 217-225). At the same time, member states' decisions may also be subject to distortions presented by the complexities of information gathering, time pressure, ambiguity, misperceptions, and dynamics at the EU and NATO levels (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 8; Wright 2019). Member states' rational choices about which EU and NATO operations to participate may thus become less clear when they are confronted with options to simultaneously take part in the EU and NATO interventions that operate concurrently in the same spaces (Alter and Meunier 2009, 17). In this vein, recognising that foreign policy decision-making is a multifactorial phenomenon, the comparative foreign policy approach is also compatible with the multifactor model presented in Chapter 2.

Because the comparative foreign policy approach essentially seeks to find explanations for foreign policy decision-making, implementing it as an empirical guidance would generally require paying particular attention to the preferences of actors and agencies within member states' governments, as they form the community of decision-makers who articulate and pursue member states' preferences and interests (Breuning 2007; Biehl et al. 2013; Alden and Aran 2017; Thies 2018; Hudson and Day 2020; Oppermann and Brummer 2020; Aran et al. 2021). Indeed, in the particular context of this thesis, which examines national strategies within overlapping EU and NATO operations, it is important to investigate the national level, where member states' policy objectives and preferences determined. Member states are key actors within the particular context of the EU and NATO crisis management operations, and the influence of actors at the organisational level (i.e. EU- and NATO-levels) are often wielded via member state governments (Pohl 2014; interviews 33 and 35: NATO officials). A key reason

for this is that the support of member state governments are necessary conditions for the EU and NATO operations to come into being (Ginsberg and Penska 2012; Edström and Gyllensporre 2012). As a NATO official highlights, an operation must be defined in such a way that member states would see it as an instrument of protecting their national interest (Interview 33: NATO official).

In assessing the potential drivers and types of national strategies, I therefore focus first on the views and beliefs of actors within member states' relevant decision-making processes. Following the comparative foreign policy approach, then, establishing the drivers and types of member states' strategies would require taking into account both the highest-level officials such as heads of governments and more peripheral but relevant ministries and departments (Gross 2009a, 12). I elaborate on each member state's decision-making arrangements in security and defence policies in the next chapter, while I outline the context-specific features of these arrangements in empirical chapters (chapters 5, 6, and 7).

Although the assumption here is that actors and agencies within member states are the key players for the crisis management operations of the EU and NATO, and that the influence of organisational-level actors would be revealed by examining the preferences of these actors, actors beyond member states are also considered within FPA, which include organisations such as the EU and NATO (Neack 2018). While member states' objectives are primarily defined at national level, coordinating with organisations such as the EU and NATO requires member states to deploy their time and expertise in complex and multi-level policymaking processes, for which the use of bilateral diplomatic networks, in addition to domestic inter-ministerial coordination, is a prerequisite (e.g. Wright 2019; Michalski and Danielson 2019).

In the EU, mobilisation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) instruments as well as coherence of policies and actions throughout the various phases of the crisis life cycle are ensured by the European External Action Service (EEAS) (Europa 2019). Although CSDP missions and operations draw directly on member state resources for their staffing, EEAS coordinates the civilian and military CSDP operations as a hybrid body comprised of officials from member states as well as relevant departments of the Council and the Commission, and led by the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy (interview 41: EU official; Europa 2020; Weston and Mérand 2015). Therefore, EEAS is a platform for national and EU level agents to influence the implementation and substance of the EU's conflict management operations (Gross and Juncos 2011, 150; Bátorá 2013; Aggestam and Bicchi 2019). Together with the work of EEAS, what member state representatives negotiate at other EU-level structures such as the Political and Security Committee (PSC), Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and the Committee of Permanent Representatives-II (Coreper - II) also form a key ingredient of policymaking at national capitals (Council 2017b; Wright 2019; Maurer and Wright 2021).

In NATO, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) is attended by member state ambassadors as permanent representatives, who are often more senior than their counterparts at PSC (Michalski and Danielson 2018). In addition to these weekly 'Permanent Council' meetings, NAC also meets at ministerial level normally twice a year. Much of NAC's work is prepared by the Senior Political Committee (SPC), consisting of deputy permanent representatives, who prepare NAC statements or communiqués (NATO 2005). Moreover, member state ambassadors as permanent representatives in the EU and NATO might have experience at both PSC and NAC, and they might have the same official acting as Military Representative to both the EU and NATO (Michalski and Danielson 2018; Wright 2019, 78). In short, member states' practices in 'Brussels bodies' are relevant to their strategies about the operations. Therefore, when

analysing member state strategies, I also take into account the structures of cooperation within the EU and NATO.

At the same time, there are a number of issues with situating this thesis within an approach situated within the FPA paradigm. Critiques have long argued that deriving particular foreign policy stances from decision-makers' perspectives would not be enough for a whole-of-government approach, as doing so would reduce foreign policy decisions to 'parochial preoccupations, ambitions and suspicions of the people responsible for making foreign policy and their bureaucracies' (Alden and Aran 2017, 49; also see Krasner 1972, 160; 't Hart and Rosenthal 1998, 236; Stern and Verbeek 1998, 206; Weldes 1998). Furthermore, in FPA, individual countries or case studies are examined to develop or discover generalisable patterns rather than as ends in themselves. Therefore, some argue that perspectives informed by FPA are not suitable for examining particular contingencies, which are more relevant to the cases in this thesis (Jervis 2006; Renshon and Renshon 2008). Finally, one could also question whether FPA as an empirical perspective is applicable to a European context. After all, FPA tradition was originally developed around and applied to a US setting, while foreign policy analysis has different ontological and epistemological differences across the Atlantic (Manners and Whitman 2001, 4; Carlsnaes 2012, 123; Hadfield and Hudson 2015).

In response, I argue that a comparative foreign policy approach can still inform the empirical aspects of a research that seeks to analyse the policymaking process of member states within the context of the operational overlap between the EU and NATO. There are three reasons for this. First, member states' strategies are embedded in bureaucratic processes by which actors within their foreign policy decision-making structures uphold certain goals. As a result, member

states' strategies are set in motion by the power, performance and preferences of these actors within member states.

Second, both the multifactor model and comparative foreign policy approach assume that member state strategies may be driven by multiple factors at the same time. Indeed, like the multifactor model, the comparative foreign policy approach acknowledges that multiple factors may concurrently drive member state strategies within the operational overlap, not least because member state governments are non-unitary actors. Instead, member states are comprised of various bodies, agencies and actors with certain veto powers and potentially conflicting interests.

Third, previous research showed that insights from the FPA paradigm is applicable to a European context 'to specify the key players and identify the relevant policy processes that lead to a policy decision', although such perspective has so far not been directly deployed to analysis of national strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO (e.g. Gross 2009a, 12; Brummer 2013; Brummer and Oppermann 2016). When applying FPA to a European decision-making context, however, researchers should be mindful of the distinct governmental processes such as the role of parliaments, political parties and the public sphere making (Gross 2009a, 12). These differences are elaborated in the next chapter.

Therefore, in gauging the potential drivers of member state strategies proposed in the multifactor model, this thesis follows the arguments in the recent FPA literature that government perspectives 'should be exploited more modestly to provide a conceptual lens to examine the intragovernmental level' (Alden and Aran 2017, 56). In this way, rather than attempting to develop causal relationships between the proposed drivers and types of national

strategies, this entails a focus on the insights from FPA, and in the context of this thesis, the comparative foreign policy approach, as a practical guidance to explore how the political power is dispersed and intragovernmental conflicts stem from incentive structures within member state governments (Kaarbo 1998, 73; White 2001, 40).

Following comparative foreign policy approach as an empirical guidance, the multifactor model seeks to establish the potential drivers of national strategies around three guiding questions, as shown in the Table 2.

| Guiding question | Operationalised question |
|---|---|
| Who are the participants? | <p>What was the decision structure?</p> <p>What were (if any) constitutional limitations, executive orders, or conventions?</p> <p>Who were the relevant actors in the wider governmental process (peripheral ministries, diplomatic networks, parliamentarians, think tanks, press)?</p> |
| What shapes participants' perceptions, preferences and stances? | <p>What were the participants' conception of how their countries' security interests would be served by engaging with the EU and/or NATO operations?</p> <p>What, were the priorities of the participants with regard to their countries' relations with CSDP, NATO, and the US?</p> <p>What were participants' conception about the appropriate means of intervention?</p> |
| What determines their impact on results? | <p>What was the formal authority and responsibility of the participants in question?</p> <p>What was their degree of control over resources in order to carry out an operation?</p> |

Table 2. Guiding questions for empirical analysis³

³ Adapted from Gross (2009, 13).

3.3. Collecting the data: Challenges and responses

In collecting the empirical evidence to test the multifactor model presented in Chapter 2, this thesis combines documentary analysis and interviews. Documentary analysis is seen particularly useful in the context of foreign policy decisions, although documents are often made public only after a certain period of time (Pohl 2014). Additionally, this method is also deemed useful for temporally distant cases, for which the possibilities of gathering data via interviews may become questionable (Nováky 2018a). When the scope of primary sources is widened to include all publicly available documents, this method can provide valuable insights about decision-making processes (Brummer 2013).

However, the often-confidential nature of the information required in foreign policy analysis presents a challenge for data collection (Armando et al. 2014; Sjursen 2018). For instance, it is very rare for outside analysts to be personally involved in the decision-making processes of the EU and NATO operations. Because they cannot observe the deployments of those operations directly when they take place, scholars studying these operations often rely on secondary accounts (e.g. Pohl 2014; Brummer 2013; Nováky 2018a). Therefore, in addition to the objective reality, the subjective interpretation of the EU and NATO operations supplemented by empirical facts is important in the analyses of these operations.

At the same time, concerns about access to data could be addressed by ‘consulting the widest possible range of empirical sources by looking at different data types and methods of data collection’ (Schimmelfennig 2006, 266). A way to do so is to conduct an in-depth analysis of a comprehensive corpus of publicly available primary sources and triangulating them with interviews and secondary sources. In this understanding, this research will use several sources

to gather qualitative and quantitative evidence to trace the causal mechanisms of member state engagement with overlapping EU and NATO operations (Yin 1994; Checkel 2006). For each case, this thesis will engage with three main sources of data: Primary documents, secondary documents, and interviews. To avoid selection bias in terms of primary sources, documents at both national and organisational levels are collected. The set of these documents, which can be seen more comprehensively in the 'Primary sources' section of Bibliography, consists of government and parliament reports, policy documents, proposals and action plans at the national, EU and NATO levels as well as US cables⁴. Furthermore, to extract the perspectives of governmental actors, I also used narratives of policymakers and politicians including speeches, press declarations and interviews given by high-ranking government officials. Secondary sources used in this thesis cover academic and policy research.

I also conducted 41 semi-structured interviews with national as well as EU and NATO officials. These officials included current and previous ambassadors, desk officers, mission and operational commanders, and civilian and military advisers as well as independent analysts who monitored the decision-making processes regarding the operations of interest. Practitioner interviewees were chosen on the basis of their direct or indirect involvement in the cases of member state decision-making of interest as well as their temporal closeness to the investigated decision-making environments. To explore how interviewees constructed reality (Yin 2008, 264), interviewees were asked to 'describe, from their perspective, the process that had led to the emergence for a particular operation, followed up by questions on who initiated and supported particular steps and for what motives, who resisted, what position they suspected behind others' behaviour, who contributed what kind of resources for which reasons, and which justifications were used by the relevant actors at each juncture' (Pohl 2014, 43). Interviews

⁴ Although the US cables that have been released by Wikileaks were written by American officials, 'they give valuable insight into the deployment process of several EU military operations' (Nováky 2018, 46).

were conducted in line with the provisions of the Participant Information Sheet (see Appendix B), which was sent to and consented by each interviewee in advance of interview. Participant Information Sheet also sets out the ethical review of this thesis' research methods, as approved by the Research Ethics and Governance officer at the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent. Apart from three exceptions, due to global restrictions to travelling and human contact with the rapid spread of the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), more commonly referred to as 'coronavirus disease 2019' or 'COVID-19', interviews took place virtually via MS Teams, Skype, Zoom, WebEx, or through phone calls or email exchanges, depending on the interviewees' preferences. A list of interviews is provided in the Appendix A.

The initially fieldwork and data collection have been an interruption due to the COVID-19 pandemic. If these research activities had not been curtailed, the anticipated contribution of this thesis would arguably have been enhanced by unpacking more intricacies of policymaking processes within the countries and operations of interest. For instance, in-person interviews have advantages in terms of eye contacts and body language, which might have facilitated the building of trust between the researcher and the interviewee. Therefore, although it has been necessary to conduct remote interviews for this thesis, it should be acknowledged that they often come at a cost to the richness of information produced by face-to-face interviews (Johnson et al. 2019). The effects of this adjustment to the conduct and design of this research have been outlined in the COVID-19 Impact Statement that could be found at the beginning of this thesis.

Furthermore, a particular challenge I encountered was reaching out to French officials to interview. This, however, is not an issue unique to this thesis. Recent research on France's preferences on crisis management operations also face this challenge, which it seeks to mitigate

through interviews with individuals who have experience in relevant decision-making processes⁵. In this respect, in addition to interviews with a number of French officials, this research cross-checks and triangulates the interview material from different sources.

At the same time, it is important to reflect on the potential biases due to the comparatively limited access to French officials, as shown in Appendix A. In order to compensate for the lack of access to officials that represented France during the time period of interest, I have asked the interviewees for recommendations for additional interview partners that could be insightful about the French positions with regard to the EU and NATO operations analysed in this thesis. This revealed some non-French interviewees who were previously not identified but were insightful about the French positions. Whilst semi-structured interviews helped avoid biased questions, these non-French interviewees reflected on how they or the countries they represented framed French positions. Their responses were then carefully triangulated with the evidence from governmental and parliamentary documents from France.

Another methodological challenge of this thesis is the temporal distance between the time the research was conducted and the decision-making processes examined. While the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean were launched in 2015 and 2016 respectively, the launch of the two organisations' operations in Afghanistan and the Gulf of Aden are at least ten years behind from the present day. Although this might give an advantage in terms accessing the primary documentation (because these documents are often made available few years after the launch of operations), such temporal distance may also pose questions about access to and reliability of evidence as far as the interviews are concerned. Indeed, reliance on interviews in

⁵ This information is based on my email exchange with a leading scholar on France's security and defence policy.

rather old case studies compromises the freshness of the interview data, and more importantly, diminishes the likelihood of access to interviewees.

I offer two responses to these concerns. Firstly, in addition to initial decisions regarding the operations, I also investigated member states' preferences and practices in the years after the launch of the operation. This not only narrowed the temporal gap between the time of interviews and the past decision-making processes, but also revealed information about member states' motivations about taking part in the EU and NATO operations initially, as well as about the consistency and changes in member states' preferences after these initial decisions. Furthermore, despite the challenges of temporal distance, I have been able to access a reasonable number of practitioners involved in the early stages of these operations, as outlined in Appendix A. Secondly, I gathered evidence from rather distant cases through an in-depth examination of the primary documents regarding the relevant decision-making processes (e.g. Nováky 2018a). After all, there are not many alternatives to relying on elite interviews for analysing decision-making processes related to national foreign policies, especially given the difficulties of gaining access to diplomatic archives in about recent issues (Pohl 2014, 43).

3.4. Selection of member states

This thesis selects France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK) as member states to analyse. The reasons for this selection are twofold. Firstly, these member states play a pivotal role in the EU and NATO, with the caveat that the UK left the EU as of 31 January 2020. The combination of this 'Big Three' is often sufficient to significantly shape a decision within the EU's crisis management operations, while in NATO, 'the balance of priorities and preferences among [them] remains key to the evolution of any debate within the Alliance', including crisis

management operations (Simón 2013, 53). Furthermore, in terms of military strength, measured against defence expenditure and deployable military forces, France, Germany and, the UK are among the major members of both organisations: the average number of French and British deployable troops between 2005 and 2014, for instance, constituted 37 per cent of the EU's total deployable forces (EDA 2014). In terms of active army personnel, France, Germany, and the UK rank within the top EU member states, while being also among top five NATO allies on both these figures (IISS 2009b). Moreover, on average, their defence spending between 2000 and 2017 were respectively 54.79, 40.6, and 53.07 billion US dollars (SIPRI 2017).

Second, the variance these member states demonstrate in terms of their foreign and security policy decision-making structure presents a methodological convenience from a foreign policy analysis perspective. How member states organise their domestic coordination and policymaking in security and defence is an important factor for their strategies about the EU and NATO operations, not least because these arrangements shape the process through which they seek to accomplish their objectives through these operations (e.g. Rosati 1981, 249; Wright 2019). Decision-making structure of a member state can be understood along two dimensions: the extent of centrality of decision-making around the core executive, and the core executive's degree of autonomy from the legislature (Baltrusaitis 2010). The organisation of decision-making authority varies from centralised to decentralised structures 'based on the number of bureaucratic agencies, ministries, and other governmental offices that have authority over a given issue' (ibid, 26). Accordingly, the fewer the number of government officials involved in the decision-making process, the more centralised the system is (ibid). The second dimension, the degree of executive autonomy from the legislature, categorises a decision-making structure as autonomous or non-autonomous (ibid). Accordingly, 'the greater the executive autonomy, the less control the legislature can exert over the content of a state's foreign policy' (ibid). In

this respect, decision-making structures of France, Germany, and the UK vary considerably in terms of organisation of decision-making and the core executive's degree of autonomy (Table 2). More details of each member state's institutional decision-making arrangements are presented in the next chapter, while context-specific arrangements are outlined in case study chapters (Chapters 5, 6, and 7).

| | Organisation of decision-making | Executive's degree of autonomy |
|----------------|--|---------------------------------------|
| France | Centralised | Autonomous |
| Germany | Decentralised | Non-autonomous |
| United Kingdom | (De)centralised | Autonomous |

Table 3. Decision structure in France, Germany, and the UK.

This being said, the selection of France, Germany, the UK poses challenges to the generalisability of findings of this thesis for two reasons: the number of countries of interest and their characteristics. First, it should be acknowledged that while a detailed investigation into the strategies of France, Germany, and the UK will enable ascertaining through which ways, how, and why these member states choose specific EU and NATO operations to address same or similar problems, analysing three countries within the EU and NATO results in a research design with small number of selected countries. As a consequence, the findings from in-depth case studies of these countries may not be extended to the wider cluster of member state within the two organisations.

Not only the number but also the characteristics of the selected countries may limit the generalisability of the findings of this thesis. As stated, France, Germany, and the UK represent the “Big Three” within the European security context not least because of their prominent role in the EU and NATO, as well as their political, economic, and military powers. On the other

hand, recent case study research suggests that member states other than the “Big Three”, such as those that are smaller in military size and politically less influential, may also play important roles in crisis management operations (e.g. Jakobsen et al. 2018). Moreover, the differences between France, Germany, and the UK on the one hand and other member states on the other can be mitigated due to the influence of actors and agencies at the EU and NATO levels, which may in turn provide more member states with particular opportunities to impact decision-making related to crisis management operations (Weiss 2019).

3.5. Selection of operations

As stated in Chapter 1, this thesis defines operational overlap between the EU and NATO in the field of crisis management as the provision of crisis management operations by the two organisations with temporal, geographical and task-based intersections, with separate chains of command and personnel contingents. Within this conceptualisation, I exclude the so-called “Berlin Plus operations” of the EU and NATO, where the EU formally relied on NATO’s capabilities and assets in planning, command and control. Judged against this definition, the potential cases of operational overlap in crisis management are identified in Sudan, Afghanistan, the Gulf of Aden, and the Mediterranean.

This thesis selects the EU and NATO operations in Afghanistan, Gulf of Aden, and the Mediterranean, as they match the above definition of operational overlap: In all these cases, the two organisations provided similar crisis management operations in the same places and times (see Appendix C), with separate chains of command and personnel contingents. Seeking to contribute to police reform in Afghanistan, the EU and NATO training missions in this country provided training to the same elements of the Afghan police and involved in the reform of same

structures of the Afghan government. Similarly, the two organisations' maritime operations were in place in the Gulf of Aden with intersecting areas of operation and tasks such as tackling piracy and armed robbery. In the Mediterranean, while the two organisations' crisis management operations were set out to address separate issues, over time they were both involved in issues including, *inter alia*, illegal arms and human trafficking as well as regional capacity building. Further details of these operations are provided in chapters 5, 6, and 7.

In addition to fitting with the definition of operational overlap and having different goals, the cases of operational overlap in Afghanistan, the Gulf of Aden, and the Mediterranean also provide other variations that are relevant to the multifactor model. In terms of their types of intervention, these cases include both civilian and military operations. The nature of the task in Afghanistan, namely, police reform, would seem to fit better with the EU's 'comprehensive approach' formed of civilian and military instruments, thereby providing an advantage for the EU vis-à-vis NATO. Furthermore, due to its civilian nature, police reform in Afghanistan was domestically less salient in Europe than the controversy over military intervention in Afghanistan. Whilst the EU and NATO operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Mediterranean were both naval operations, the EU operation in this region had a unique characteristic by being the first CSDP operation of this type, which might in turn present additional incentives for national and EU level actors, such as demonstrating the symbolic value of this operation by flying the EU flag on high seas. The EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean included unique political risks because they were geographically least distanced ones from Europe among the three cases, while cutting across humanitarian and geopolitical issues, such as preventing loss of lives as a result of dangerous seaward crossings and politics of regional stability in North Africa. To sum up, in addition to representing the cases of operational overlap between the EU and NATO as well as exhibiting diversity in geography and operation type, the

selected operations also relate to the multifactor model by presenting different benefits and trade-offs to member states.

One may wonder why the EU and NATO interventions in Sudan are not included within the operational contexts of interest. After all, similar to above cases, the two organisations were also involved simultaneously in same crisis situation by responding to the African Union's (AU) calls for logistic support to move its peacekeeping forces between 2005 and 2007: In 2005, the EU provided to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) the 'urgently needed equipment like vehicles, mobile generators and water tankers, but also with technical assistance, media support, police training, aerial observation capacity as well as strategic and tactical air transport for more than 2,000 troops' (Franke 2009, 258; Council 2005). In the same year, NATO responded to the African Union's calls for logistic support by 'help[ing] the AU expand its peacekeeping mission in Darfur [and] by providing airlift for the transport of additional peacekeepers into the region and by training AU personnel' without implying the provision of combat troops by NATO (NATO 2010b).

There are two reasons for not selecting the EU and NATO missions in Sudan. First, these EU and NATO support missions are least likely to fall into the category of crisis management operations: Instead of engaging directly through a civilian or military capacity to respond to the violent conflict erupted between government forces and rebels from the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement in Sudan, the EU and NATO undertook logistical or developmental tasks for different reasons (Toje 2008b; Cumming 2015). From a conflict management operations perspective, therefore, the EU and NATO missions in Sudan were seen as 'non-interventions' or efforts to support another actor who undertook the direct military

intervention namely AU (Williams and Bellamy 2005, 43; Whitman and Haastrup 2013, 69; cf. Besenyő 2015).

The second reason is related to the nature of the data necessary for an in-depth examination of processes about the EU and NATO interventions operations in Sudan. First, as these interventions date back to at least 2005, they are temporally most distant ones from the present day among the potential cases of operational overlap between the EU and NATO according to the abovementioned definition. This poses a problem for this thesis which relies on, among other things, interviews as a data collection method. Such temporal distance can create issues about the feasibility and reliability of evidence. Although this problem could be partly dealt with by gathering information from primary sources, one also needs to consider an issue that is particularly related to the NATO's support mission in Sudan: as NATO was not directly involved in the crisis context in Sudan, its presence substantially based on providing mainly logistical assistance to AMIS. Given the already less available primary sources in NATO's more direct and longer-term interventions (Armando et al. 2014; Sjørnsen 2018), finding primary evidence regarding NATO's assistance to another mission is a serious question mark.

3.6. Conclusion

This chapter outlined the method of analysis and research design of the thesis, which are based on small-N case studies and pattern-matching. The chapter then situated the thesis within the research designs in political science, with reference to the inference it tries to make. Subsequently, the chapter outlined the empirical perspective that will guide the analysis of case studies, namely a perspective based on foreign policy analysis. The chapter concluded by

outlining the methods it will follow to collect evidence to test the multifactor model, as well as the logic behind selection Germany, France, and the UK as member states of interest, and Afghanistan, the Gulf of Aden, and the Mediterranean as theatres of operational overlap as interest. A core argument in this chapter was that selecting Germany, France and the UK presents certain methodological advantages as country cases, because these three member states play a pivotal role in European security and demonstrate variation in their decision-making structures. Furthermore, the chapter also argued that the EU and NATO operations in Afghanistan, Gulf of Aden, and the Mediterranean match the definition of operational overlap presented earlier in the thesis, while offering additional methodological conveniences in relation to the multifactor model presented in Chapter 2. The next three chapters analyse this multifactor model presented in the light of the empirical evidence from the cases of operational overlap between the EU and NATO.

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4. Decision-making structures in France, Germany and the UK

As stated previously, this thesis assumes that national strategies within the EU and NATO operations are articulated by member states' governments, who seek to offer policies that will fulfil a variety of tasks, such as upholding their country's political and operational interests, appealing to their electorate, following their particular conceptions about crisis management, or reflecting individual beliefs of their leaders (Haesebrouck 2016; Wagner et al. 2017). This being said, as stated in Chapter 2, a veto player approach provides a framework to analyse the behaviour of actors across different political systems and regime types. In this light, this chapter provides a basis for identifying the domestic constraints and the weight of different domestic actors in France, Germany, and the UK in terms of these countries' foreign and security policymaking. In line with the domestic veto player approach introduced in Chapter 2, the premise of this chapter is therefore that constitutional rules and delegation mechanisms within member states can enhance or restrain the authority of core executives within member state governments in terms of making choices from the EU and NATO operations (Harnisch, 2009). In this vein, member states' policymaking system also include different veto players whose support is crucial for member state governments' choices about EU and NATO operations. In addition to their individual and organisational interests, these veto players can also support elements of their countries' strategic culture.

Central to this assumption is the comparative foreign policy perspective outlined in the previous chapter, which pays particular attention to the institutional decision-making arrangements of each member state of interest, namely France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK). In this understanding, this chapter outlines the security and defence policymaking structures of these member states. While this chapter elaborates on national

policymaking instruments and mechanisms regarding the EU and NATO operations in general, context-specific features of these arrangements are presented in empirical chapters.

I discuss the decision-making structures of France, Germany, and the UK on the basis of two dimensions: first, the number of bureaucratic agencies, ministries, and other governmental offices that are meaningfully involved in these member states' decision-making processes about the EU and NATO crisis management operations, and second, the degree of the executive's autonomy from the legislature's control in these decisions (Baltrusaitis 2010).

4.1. France: Centralised organisation, autonomous executive

Foreign policy decision-making structure in France is highly centralised around a strong executive branch, within which security and defence policies are seen as the president's reserved domain (*domaine réservé*) (Schmitt and Rynning 2018; Irondelle and Schmitt 2013). The Constitution of the Fifth Republic designates the President as 'the guarantor of national independence [and] territorial integrity', making security and defence policy a core responsibility of the President (Constitute Project 2020; Treacher 2003; 2011, 100; Keonig-Archibugi 2004, 166; Safran 2009; Drake 2011; Schmitt and Rynning 2018, 38). Decisions regarding France's participation to crisis management operations are taken at the National Defence and Security Council (*Conseil de Défense et de Sécurité Nationale*) presided over by the President (Irondelle and Schmitt 2013, 129). At the same time, presidential authority partially depends on the degree of convergence between the President and the majority in the parliament. When the President's political party is different from the one holding the parliamentary majority, a government configuration known as 'cohabitation', the Prime

Minister may be more likely to interpret the constitutional stipulations in a way to see security and defence policies as a shared domain (Irondelle and Schmitt 2013, 128; Safran 2009).

Prime Minister's involvement in the formulation of the French security and defence policies is seen by some analysts as a 'marginal' involvement (Koenig-Archibugi 2004, 167). Although the prime minister enjoys latitude in the day-to-day EU affairs especially in economic, cultural and scientific issues, Prime Ministry's key function in France's European policymaking is limited to interministerial coordination of French Government's overall policy in a number of policy areas. For some analysts, however, prime ministerial roles are in fact wider than the aforementioned constitutional arrangements suggest (Lakomy 2013, 17). For instance, the work of its General Secretariat of the Interministerial Committee, which became General Secretariat for European Affairs in 2005 (*Secrétariat général des affaires européennes* - SGCE), 'instructs and prepares the positions to be expressed by France within the institutions of the European Union [and] it ensures the interministerial coordination necessary for this purpose' (Premier Ministre 2005).

If national security and defence is the *domaine réservé* of the President, the overall lead in France's CFSP policies can be seen as the *domaine réservé* of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (*Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires Étrangères*, MEAE) (Morisse-Schilbach 2003, 119). Yet, partly due to France's decision-making organisation which is centred around the President, the key roles *Quai d'Orsay* plays in setting the parameters of France's CFSP policymaking are not substantially distinct from the roles many other European foreign ministries play. These roles include, *inter alia*, being regularly involved in representing French positions in EU and NATO meetings (Morisse-Schilbach 2003, pp. 115-116). At the same time, despite having a Directorate of Security and Defence Cooperation (*Directeur de la coopération*

de sécurité et de défense) and a Deputy Directorate for External Relations of the EU (*Sous-directeur des relations extérieures de l'Union européenne*), MEAE does not have a body dedicated to dealing specifically with CSDP and/or NATO issues (MEAE 2019). A key strategic line pursued by the Presidency but also supported by MEAE is leading the development of capabilities under the EU to enable it to act autonomously from NATO and the US, and to be used as a leverage to French interests (Simón 2017). This orientation about the roles of the EU and NATO as international security providers was shaped by France's long-term exile from NATO's military structure between 1966 and 2009. At the same time, MEAE has been 'willing to consider NATO, bilateral cooperation or unilateral action ahead of the CSDP if they are more likely to be successful' (Chappell et al. 2016, 171).

As another key agency, the Ministry of Defence (*Ministère des Armées*, MdA⁶) has important roles and responsibilities in France's defence policy. It provides input to national defence policy, including security and defence cooperation through the EU and NATO, while also drafting and updating doctrinal documents such as defence and national security white papers (French Government 2018; DGRIS 2019). MdA is also involved in the preparation of French positions ahead of the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Military Committee as well as for NATO summits, ministerials and NATO's Military Committee meetings (Ministère de la Défense 2016). In terms of conflict prevention and intervention capabilities, MdA tended to endorse a 'hybrid power' approach, meaning that France has continental and maritime, as well as European and extra-regional geopolitical foundations underpinning its foreign and security policy (MdA 2008; 2013; 2017; Simón 2017). This reflects France's 'long-established tradition of military interventionism in order to secure political objectives' in line with defence ministry's 'NATO-oriented nature', despite officially

⁶ The defence ministry in France is currently named as *Ministère des Armées*, a name change from *Ministère de la Défense* in 2017.

acknowledging that the use of force is a last resort (Irondelle and Schmitt 2013, pp. 134-135). Importantly, defence ministry's involvement and role in France's decision-making processes about the EU and NATO operations also depend on the presidential predominance as well as the defence minister's relationship with the President and the Prime Minister (Gregory 2000, 28; Treacher 2011, 99; Irondelle and Schmidt 2013, pp. 128-129).

In France the constitutional requirement for the overseas deployment of troops do not have to be approved by the parliament (*l'Assemblée Nationale* and *Sénat*) before the planned deployment (Forster 2006, 31). Article 35 of the Constitution, which was revised in 2008, stipulates that 'the Government shall inform Parliament of its decision to have the armed forces intervene abroad, at the latest three days after the beginning of said intervention' (Constitution Project 2020). Furthermore, when a deployment exceeds four months, 'the Government shall submit the extension to Parliament for authorisation' (ibid.). For several commentators, this does not always translate into a meaningful parliamentary involvement in the decision-making processes about France's participation to crisis management operations (Forster 2006, 30; Irondelle and Schmitt 2013, 129; Pannier and Schmitt 2014, 280). For Koenig-Archibugi (2004, 167), 'the parliament of the Fifth Republic represents an extreme example of the disempowerment of parliamentary institutions in modern representative political systems'. Indeed, the French parliament's roles are mainly related to a deadline by which it should be informed by the government, rather than a power to *ex ante* authorise troop deployments (Irondelle 2012, 55).

France's foreign and security policy decision-making structure is illustrated in Figure 4.




Figure 4. France's foreign and security policy decision-making structure
(Source: Author)

4.2. Germany: De-centralised organisation, constrained executive

Germany's domestic decision-making structure regarding the EU and NATO operations is much more sectorised than France, both in terms of its organisation of policymaking and the autonomy of the executive from the legislature. The core of the domestic policymaking network is comprised of the Chancellery (*Bundeskanzleramt*), the Federal Foreign Office (*Auswärtiges Amt*, AA) and the Federal Ministry of Defence (*Bundesministerium der Verteidigung*, BMVg). In administrative terms, the highest source of authority is the Chancellor's Office (*Bundeskanzleramts*) (Bundesregierung 2021). The principle of '*Kanzlerprinzip*' makes the Chancellor responsible for determining the guidelines of policymaking, while the principle of guideline competency (*Richtlinienkompetenz*) enables the Chancellor to claim responsibility for broad framing-off of policy guidelines in any subject under discussion, including security and defence (Beichelt 2007, 427; Miskimmon 2007, 13). The Chancellery also oversees Germany's EU foreign policymaking through its Foreign, Security and Development Policy Department (*Abteilung 2 – Außen-, Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik*), and European Policy Department (*Abteilung 5 – Europapolitik*) (Bundesregierung 2014). At the same time, the Chancellery does not always get closely involved in security and defence policymaking, instead leaving these areas to individual ministries (Interview 28: German official).

In practice, however, the Chancellor's potential to exercise executive power is more limited. In the context of cabinet or coalition governments which are rules rather than exceptions in Germany, the central actor within the core executive is often constrained by a set of checks and balances (Goetz 2003, 64; Miskimmon 2007; Brummer and Oppermann 2016). As the following paragraphs will show, the specific political and institutional domestic context have

significant implications for the core executive's ability to push its broader political agenda through the national parliament.

In this respect, the Federal Foreign Office (*Auswärtiges Amt*, AA) is a crucial actor in Germany's policymaking in security and defence. The Federal Foreign Office has been a key agency in the direction of Germany's geopolitical role after the Cold War, especially in terms of cooperation with key regional organisations such as the EU and NATO (Wusten and Dijink 2002). During this time, it has acted as a promoter of Germany's role as a 'civilian power' who relies on multilateralism and tends to avoid using military force (Mauß 1990). In addition to having the benefit of overseeing specialist resources such as a network of embassies around the globe, AA coordinates Germany's positions vis-à-vis the EU's crisis management operations and coordinates Germany's stances concerning the transatlantic security policy (AA 2019a; AA 2019c; Regelsberger 2002, 139; Dyson 2008, 27; Paterson 2010, 501). In particular, its Directorate-General for Humanitarian Assistance, Crisis Prevention Stabilisation and Post-Conflict Reconstruction is a key shareholder of the Centre for International Peace Operations (*Das Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze*, ZIF), which is a body responsible for bringing together Germany's resources for crisis management operations (AA 2021). More recently, however, some analysts asserted that AA has lost some of its influence on Germany's foreign policymaking, where the Chancellor became more closely involved and concentrated power at the expense of foreign ministry (Techau 2015; cf. AA 2014b, 11).

The Federal Ministry of Defence (*Bundesministerium der Verteidigung*, BMVg) is another key agency in the Germany's European policy making (Dyson 2011). In line with Germany's strategic culture, BMVg has followed the 'culture of reticence' referring to a tendency to show


military restraint when it comes to responding to emerging security threats (Malici 2006, 38). BMVg also engaged closely with both the EU and NATO for collective capacity building initiatives and to support inter-organisational partnership (Chappell et al. 2016, pp. 174-175). Reports sent from Germany's representations to both organisations in Brussels to Berlin on the matters related to the EU's crisis management operations are first agreed by the desk officers in the BMVg before the domestic lead in Berlin transfers this information to relevant CSDP units in AA, which provides the technical details about the operation (BMVg 2011; Wright 2019, 153). Furthermore, BMVg's Strategy and Deployment unit (*Strategie und Einsatz*, SE) regularly instructs the German military representative at the EU and NATO military committees (Spalj 2016).

As stated in Chapter 2, whether potential veto players qualify as effective veto players depends on how the process of security and defence policymaking is organised within each member state. In this sense, the coalition dynamics in Germany affects the roles of federal foreign and defence ministries in the making of security and defence policy. Coalition dynamics are seen as 'the main political fault line in Germany's parliamentary system' (Brummer and Oppermann 2016, 15; Wright 2019). Whilst 'the senior coalition partner in the Federal Government has often attempted to dominate junior coalition partners in foreign policy-making within the government', the junior coalition partner usually holds the position of foreign minister (Miskimmon 2007, 46; Paterson 2011, 63; Kaarbo 1996). Indeed, in Germany the junior coalition partner effectively acts as an additional veto player especially if it is pivotal to the coalition (Brummer and Oppermann 2016, 16). In cases of disagreement between ministries held by different members of a given coalition, the Chancellery can act as a 'referee' who resolves inter-ministerial divergences (Interview 28: German official).

In addition to this Berlin-centred decision-making, more peripheral units such as Germany's Permanent Representation to the EU are also important actors in the policymaking processes. Unless problems occur in a ministry's area of responsibility, 'a low level civil servant may formulate a German EU position which later – sometimes by an official of the Permanent Representation, but sometimes even by that very same civil servant – will be carried forward in Brussels' (Beichelt 2007, 425; also see Wright 2019, 152).

Another distinct characteristic of foreign policymaking in Germany is the extensive roles held by the national parliament. Germany's bicameral parliamentary system consists of a directly elected lower house (*Bundestag*) and a representation of state governments in the upper house (*Bundesrat*) (Brummer and Oppermann 2016, 14). *Bundestag* has a constitutionally enshrined institutional control of the deployment of armed forces for expeditionary operations (Biermann 2004, cited in Junk and Daase 2013, 142). Accordingly, it can approve and renew mandates of German troops that are to be deployed in overseas missions, and vote about the withdrawal of these forces. Whilst the Federal Government can send troops abroad without immediate mandate by the parliament in emergency situations, it must secure a *Bundestag* approval as soon as possible (Junk and Daase 2013, 143). For its part, *Bundesrat* can have a role especially in Germany's decision-making about civilian operations, for instance when police officers are drawn from federal states (interview 13: German official). As a key element of Germany's strategic culture, Federal Armed Forces are thus considered as a 'parliamentary army', with small room for manoeuvre compared to the amount of institutional independence the US, UK, or French armed forces enjoy (Giegerich 2008, 79; Schockenhoff and Kiesewetter 2012; Meijer and Wyss 2018, 52).

Germany's foreign and security policy decision-making structure is illustrated in Figure 5.



*Figure 5. Germany's foreign and security policy decision-making structure
(Source: Author)*

4.3. United Kingdom: Uncodified organisation, autonomous executive

The UK has a distinct system of security and defence policymaking, not least due to an absence of constitutionally and legally established rules that codify its foreign policy decision-making structure. The government exercises the royal prerogative acting on behalf of the monarch, based on the progressive devolution of this prerogative to the elected government since the Bill of Rights in 1688 (Cornish 2013, 374). In the modern context, such devolution gives the Prime Minister and the cabinet a considerable manoeuvring space in security and defence policymaking, including the UK's participation to crisis management operations. Furthermore, the lack of codified decision-making rules brings to the fore the contextual factors such as the contingent relationships within the actors and agencies that make up the foreign policy executive, as well as the particularities of the issue in question (Kassim 2011). At the same time, decision-making powers of the Prime Minister's Office in the UK creates a particular hierarchy and a distribution of power within the cabinet.

The Prime Minister, his or her Office (also known as 10 Downing Street), and the Cabinet Office (CO) operate at the centre of the government, thereby forming the central element of the foreign policy executive. CO is involved in the UK's policymaking regarding international crisis management through its security-related secretariats, such as the National Security Secretariat, the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat (CO 2012). At the same time, some authors see the Prime Minister's Office and the CO as the two 'prime ministerial departments' (e.g. Heffernan 2003; also see Cornish 2013, 375) by referring to the unclear boundaries between 10 Downing Street and the CO (HoL Select Committee on the Constitution 2010, 11).

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has been a leading agency in UK's foreign and security policymaking. Although the FCO is merged with Department of International Trade and Development (DFID) and as a result a new department called the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) was launched in September 2020, FCO was still in place during the EU and NATO operations and the relevant time period of interest in this thesis. Whilst the UK Government's expectation from the merger was to enable Britain to "speak with one voice internationally" by combining foreign and development policy in one department (Johnson 2019⁷), during the time period when the EU and NATO interventions analysed in this thesis were operable, FCO enjoyed unique resources such as the capability to wield information about the workings of foreign governments and the vast network of British embassies (FCO 2010). Thus, during this time many strategic questions often compelled the Prime Minister to have the FCO's and foreign secretary's acquiescence in terms of the policy being pursued (ibid). In this vein, FCO has been a key promoter of the UK's role as an interlocutor between the EU and NATO in the transatlantic security context (Whitman and Tonra 2017). Nonetheless, the absence of codified decision-making rules meant that the significance of FCO's leadership in the UK's security and defence policymaking could depend on more contextual factors, such as the foreign secretary's relationship with the Prime Minister and the extent to which the Prime Minister chooses to delegate foreign policy strategy to the FCO (Crawford et al. 2020, 173).

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) is involved particularly in the articulation of the UK's positions vis-à-vis the conflict response operations of the EU and NATO. Compared to French and German defence ministries, MoD puts a particular emphasis on the maritime power of the

⁷ <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-statement-to-the-house-of-commons-16-june-2020>

country it represents (Simón 2013, 44). The UK's prominent member in NATO as a major European Ally and the decades-long working with and within NATO both in London and Brussels has made the MoD a supporter of options involving NATO in crisis management, but MoD has also supported the development of crisis and conflict management capabilities in the EU as long as the needed capabilities are not possessed by NATO (Chappell et al. 2016; Smith 2010). While MoD has a large number of personnel embedded within the UK's Permanent Delegation to NATO (UKDel), the MoD's involvement in EU business has often been more limited (Aktipis and Oliver 2012, pp. 80-82; Wright 2019, 79). However, its role in the UK's policymaking in EU matters increased with the emergence of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), after which more MoD personnel became embedded in the UK's Permanent Representation to the EU (UKRep⁸) (Interview 1: NATO official).

Moreover, particular areas of the EU and NATO operations can be managed by agencies that are otherwise more peripheral to the UK's security policy. An important agency in this respect is the Department for International Development (DfID), which has a noticeable involvement in the civilian than military aspects of the issues these operations seek to address (Wright 2019, 74). The close cooperation between FCO, MoD, and DfID has resulted in a model of civilian-military cooperation based around an 'integrated' planning process (HoC Defence Committee 2010).

The UK Parliament, formed of the House of Commons and the House of Lords, has no constitutionally and legally established role in the UK's participation in crisis management operations. As the government is not under a legal obligation to inform the UK Parliament

⁸ Each EU member state maintains a permanent representation in Brussels to manage its relationship with the EU. As the UK left the EU, its permanent representation is now the UK Mission to the EU, also known as 'UKMis Brussels' (FCO 2021).

about the conduct of foreign policy, the decision-making powers of the UK Parliament are relatively weak (Mills 2018, 9). Furthermore, due to a lack of conventions or long-standing political practices about the parliament's involvement in the decision-making process regarding the UK's use of armed forces in crisis management operations, the government can also decide whether or not to consult the parliament about the UK's participation to these operations (Jenkins 2011, 18).


Yet, it is considered to be inconceivable in practice that the decision to deploy the armed forces would be made by the Prime Minister and the cabinet without consulting the Parliament in one way or another (Hague 2007). Indeed, both houses of the UK parliament (House of Lords and House of Commons) have had a certain place and role about the deployment of the UK's overseas deployments, albeit often on consultancy basis. A prime source of this role is the select committees that were created 'to establish a greater degree of accountability in the conduct of government business' (Dickie 2004, 139). During the time period of interest for this thesis, most prominent of these in terms of foreign, security and defence policies were the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) and the European Scrutiny Committee at the House of Commons and the European Union Select Committee at the House of Lords (Gaskarth 2013, 28). Yet, as their members are appointed by the political party leaders, these committees have been to an important extent dependent on the government. A government minister can also reject to be inquired by these parliamentary committees (Forster 2006, pp. 28-29), while ministries such as FCO and MoD can withhold information from relative Commons and Lords committees (Koenig-Archibugi 2004, 171).

UK's Permanent Representation to the EU (UKRep⁹) was 'one of the UK's busiest posts' before the UK's exit from the EU (HM Government 2019). Over 20 government departments (including FCO and MoD) worked as part of UKRep in order to ensure that UK positions were explained to other EU member states and institutions (ibid). Rather than just an instrument of communicating instructions generated by London to the EU partners, UKRep was also an integral part of policymaking both in London and Brussels (FCO 2016b; Wright 2019, 78). Known in Brussels as 'effective, efficient, and frequently in a position to craft compromises' (Wright 2019, 79), UKRep's ability to control the flow of UK's cooperation with major member states such as France and Germany was also assessed to be higher than other member states' permanent representations to the EU (Mérand et al. 2011, pp. 129-131).

UK's Delegation to NATO (UKDel) promotes British interests in NATO and keeps governmental departments informed about discussions and developments within the Alliance (HM Government 2020). It also ensures that 'NATO military operations meet UK strategic objectives' and that the 'UK plays a full and influential role in the North Atlantic Council, the Military Committee and across the spectrum of NATO activities' (ibid). UK has the same official acting as Military Representative to both NATO and the EU, who normally attends up to two NATO Military Committee meetings per week, as well as the North Atlantic Council meetings, weekly EU Military Committee meetings, and the EU's Political and Security Committee meetings (Wright 2019, 79).

UK's foreign and security policy decision-making structure is illustrated in Figure 6.

⁹ After the UK's exit from the EU, its permanent representation is renamed as the UK Mission to the EU, also known as 'UKMis Brussels' (FCDO 2021).



*Figure 6. UK's foreign and security policy decision-making structure
(Source: Author)*

4.4. Conclusion

In this chapter I outlined the organisation of decision-making arrangements in security and defence policies in France, Germany, and the UK. In so doing, specific attention was paid to member states' policymaking mechanisms and instruments regarding their preferences about the EU and NATO crisis management operations. I also categorised these member states' decision-making structures according to the degree of centralisation of decision-making around the core executive, and the executives' autonomy from the legislature's control. The chapter showed that due to the particularities of policymaking arrangements and more contingent factors such as the intragovernmental relations, the extent to which the core executive can exert control within relevant decision-making processes vary across the three member states. Whilst in France the core executive has a relatively high degree of autonomy, Germany's sectorised

decision-making system gives more scope of manoeuvre to individual ministries. On the other hand, in the UK, a lack of a codified decision-making arrangement increases the importance of contextual factors such as prime minister's relations with the foreign and defence secretaries. In short, both highest-level officials such as heads of governments and different ministries and departments may participate in decision-making in each of these member states, depending on domestic arrangements and the issue at hand. Overall, this chapter provided a background of each member state's decision-making environments regarding the EU and NATO operations, while context-specific features of these environments are provided within the following empirical chapters.

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5. Afghanistan: The ‘5,000-kilometer screwdriver’

5.1. Introduction

Afghanistan’s political transition and the overall statebuilding agenda was based on a division of efforts among a number of willing nations. In the April 2002 donors conference in Geneva, it was decided that five willing nations will take the lead in each designated areas within the reconstruction of Afghanistan, namely justice (Italy), disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (Japan), counternarcotics (UK), building of a new Afghan army (US), and police reform (Germany) (UNODC, 2006, p. 1).

Within these five pillars of Afghan reconstruction, the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan, hereafter EUPOL) was launched in 2007 to support police reform. The mission was aimed to ‘contribute to the establishment under Afghan ownership of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements, which will ensure appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice system, in keeping with the policy advice and institution building work of the [EU], Member States and other international actors’ (Council 2007). In implementing this mandate, the EU mission adopted a ‘community policing’ approach, which sought to build a civilian police structure that operates within a legal framework and with respect for human rights (Tardy 2018; Ansorg and Haastrup 2018).

NATO’s involvement in the training of Afghan security forces began with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). As a military force, however, ISAF did not have the appropriate expertise to train police, while its contribution was largely based on training during its joint patrols with the Afghan National Police (ANP). Moreover, although ISAF’s role in

police training has been extended to other parts of the country through NATO's provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), the impact of their activities has mostly been local and did not affect the overall reform of the ANP (Murray 2007, 111).


NATO's more direct involvement with police training in Afghanistan began with the launch of NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) in April 2009, two years after the deployment of the EU mission. Aimed to contribute to the training of both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), the NATO mission was set out to support the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which includes both ANA and ANP, in developing leaders and establishing enduring institutional capacity (NATO 2010a, 5; NATO 2009a; 2009b). Another key objective of the NATO mission was 'to train, to educate, to advise, to instruct [and] to prepare the [Afghan] security forces so that they can take the lead, and [...] so that they can develop the systems to sustain those forces' (Caldwell 2011c, pp. 3-4).

In contrast to the EU mission's 'community policing' approach that focused overwhelmingly on strategic level advice, moreover, the NATO mission was mandated 'to deliver the large-scale recruitment, equipping and training of all ANA and ANP across the country', though it also included elements such as attrition and illiteracy (HoL 2010). As will be seen in more detail throughout the case studies in this chapter, these different training approaches of the EU and NATO missions were among the key fault lines of political and operational dynamics in Afghanistan (US Mission to the EU 2008a; Tardy 2018; Ansorg and Haastrup 2018).

After the launch of the NATO mission, the intention was to use the EU mission to train higher level civilian personnel, and channel NATO mission's instruments to lower level and paramilitary training (Simón 2013, 223). Yet, the EU and NATO missions came to provide

training and mentoring to the same elements of the Afghan police (Cladi and Locatelli 2020). EUPOL took the lead in the training of Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), an element of ANP that mainly undertakes criminal investigation functions (HoL 2011, 15; also see NATO 2010c). Similarly, the NATO Mission also helped recruiting personnel for AUP, while also contributing to the doctrinal development, training and advising of the ANP and ministerial development programmes (NATO 2010c, 16; Dalenberg and Jansen 2016, 235). The NATO mission also provided most of the supporting personnel for Afghan Ministry of Interior's International Coordination Cell (MICC), an organisation that facilitated the cohesion between donor programmes and ministry's requirements (NATO 2010c, 22).

This evolution of overlap between the EU and NATO missions in Afghanistan is summarised in Figure 7.



*Figure 7. Timeline of overlap in Afghanistan
(Source: Author)*

5.2. France: The “trojan horse”

5.2.1. *The context of France’s engagement with the reconstruction of Afghanistan*

Although France did not sign up as a lead nation in a specific area of Afghan reconstruction, training of the Afghan security forces were a part of France’s broader commitments to supporting the police and military training efforts in Afghanistan. Between 2002 and 2014, France provided a range of training and advice to the Afghan National Army (ANA) as part of the *Epidote* mission (La France en Afghanistan 2015). Over time, *Epidote* was incrementally upgraded to a mentoring and advising mission and focused on Afghanistan’s National Military Training Academy, Command and Staff College, and Combat Service Support School, which it supported in logistics, financing and human resources (Cizel and von Hlatky 2014, 359). Furthermore, France assumed responsibility of military operations in Kapisa and Sarobi districts in 2008 and doubled its national budget for civilian cooperation as well as making additional funds available for development projects via its own Stability Pole (*Pôle de Stabilité*).

Also worth noting as a background for France’s engagement with the EU and NATO missions is Afghanistan is the leadership change in Paris change throughout these training missions. Nicolas Sarkozy took office as President in 2007, two weeks before the Council decision establishing the EU mission and was replaced by François Hollande in 2012. Soon after becoming President, Sarkozy announced in a NATO Summit in Bucharest the deployment of 800 more French troops to Afghanistan as requested by the Alliance (Jankowski 2013, 15). Although this decision was in part triggered by the killing of 10 French soldiers in Sarobi district in August, it was also considered as one of the first moves that laid the groundworks for

France's reintegration to NATO's military command in 2009 (Rynning 2012, 150; Allen 2008). At the same time, there was a decrease in public support for France's involvement in Afghanistan campaign. For example, although 343 members of the National Assembly voted in favour of maintaining French troops in Afghanistan in the first parliamentary vote in September 2008, the number of those who voted against this deployment (210 members) suggested that there was not a domestic consensus on the French participation to Afghanistan campaign (Jankowski 2013; Hatto 2015).

5.2.2. Domestic decision-making structure

The political leadership and strategic management of France's policies regarding the police training missions of the EU and NATO in Afghanistan were exercised by a number of governmental bodies. In 2008, a Crisis and Support Centre (*Centre de crise et de soutien*, CDSC) was established under the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs (*Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires Étrangères*, MEAE) with a view to 'monitor the development of risks and threats and, in some cases, launch emergency operations' (MEAE n.d.). CDSC was tasked with enabling the foreign ministry to 'manage external crises on an operational and inter-ministerial basis regardless of the nature of such crises' and 'be responsible for advance planning, execution and termination of international crisis management activities [by facilitating] mobilisation of civilian experts belonging to the Civil Service' (ibid). This interagency team also assisted the French Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan (Grare 2015, 115). France's policy inputs into the EU and NATO were based and controlled by its Brussels-based representations in the two organisations (La France en Afghanistan 2015).

In terms of on-the-ground coordination in Afghanistan, a Chief of Project for Kapisa and Sarobi provinces led the process, based at the French Embassy in Kabul but in liaison with a

Development Advisor embedded with the French forces (ibid). An additional cooperation mechanism between civil and military lines of policymaking was the Stability Pole (*Pôle de Stabilité*), based in the military bases in Kapisa and Sarobi and composed of civilian experts in the fields of governance and socioeconomic development (interview 6: French official). A unit set up by the MEAE to coordinate the French Government's socio-economic development policies in Afghanistan, Stability Pole focused on agricultural development, education, and health (Ministère de la Défense 2011; Fescharek 2015, 132). Projects developed by this unit were implemented by an interministerial Afghanistan-Pakistan Cell and the Kabul Embassy (ibid).

Another body responsible for intra-governmental cooperation was the Interministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development (*Comité interministériel de la coopération internationale et du développement*, CICID). Created in 1998 and chaired by the Prime Minister, CICID guides France's international cooperation and development aid policies. Whilst several ministries, including foreign and interior, are also members of the Committee, the secretariat of CICID is led jointly by MAEA, Ministry of Interior (*Ministère de l'Intérieur*) and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (*Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances*).

Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence was involved in decision-making processes through some instruments at its disposal, such as the Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrines and Experiments (*Centre Interarmée de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentation*, CICDE). CICDE was in charge of shaping the French comprehensive approach that was also implemented in Afghanistan, which increasingly became a central theme with the entry of NATO into some domains of civilian engagement in Afghanistan (Wendling 2010, 63). Finally, France's National Gendarmerie (*Gendarmerie Nationale*) was a major player in France's

involvement in Afghanistan, as France focused on using its gendarmerie deployment for police training in Afghanistan (interview 6: French official). Whilst the National Gendarmerie was attached to Ministry of Defence, in 2009 it was brought to the control of the Ministry of Interior (Gendarmerie Nationale 2016).

France's decision-making structure regarding the EU and NATO missions in Afghanistan is illustrated in Table 7.




Figure 8. France's decision-making structure regarding the missions in Afghanistan
(Source: Author)

5.2.3. Initial engagement with EUPOL: A dilemma

The EU has been a central platform for France to contribute to 'rebuilding an effective and democratic military, police and judiciary [and] restoring or consolidating stability and prompting a return to political and economic normality' in fragile states (France Cooperation 2007, 3). France saw it an important element of its EU policy to make an active contribution to

the principles developed in assisting fragile states (ibid). The importance accorded to the EU in civilian aspects of crisis response was also reflected during the French Presidency of the Council in the latter half of 2008, when member states decided to create a Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) in the EU (Interview 41: EU official). Initially a Franco-British proposal dating back to 2007, CMPD was created by integrating formerly separate civilian and military directorates (US Embassy Paris 2008d; Hynek 2010, 4). The creation of CMPD was also in line with France's 2008 white paper's emphasis on the link between civilian and military aspects of crisis response (Ministère de la Défense 2008).

In addition to the importance of the EU in terms of civilian security sector reform, both civilian and military decision-makers in France argued that the reconstruction of Afghanistan is not a purely military endeavour. Key decision-makers acknowledged that France is not in a 'Clausewitzian type of scheme' in Afghanistan, adding that success in this country 'is not a question of destroying an identified enemy, nor of conquering territories [but] a combined civil-military enterprise, which includes development actions in all branches of activity' (Assemblée Nationale 2008d). For instance, according to Bernard Kouchner, Minister for Foreign and European Affairs, Afghan reconstruction '[was] not only military and cannot be only military; it [was] a comprehensive political approach implemented with and for the Afghan people, with and for their elected government' (Assemblée Nationale 2008c). Pointing out that a military solution alone would not be sufficient for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, Kouchner also stated that the aim of this strategy would be 'to provide military assistance to the civil and political solution' (ibid) (Assemblée Nationale 2008f). Similarly, French Ambassador to Afghanistan at the time outlined his country's approach as 'civilisation', 'reconciliation', and 'Afghanization' (Assemblée Nationale 2008e). Military officials in France also highlighted this 'hybrid' nature of Afghan reconstruction. For example, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces

argued that ‘the international community must [...] make the capabilities of the ISAF command more flexible with respect to all the forces at its disposal, steadfastly pursuing the objectives, both civilian and military’ and that ‘the training of the country’s army and police must continue, despite criticism and despite the incidents that will undoubtedly occur’ (ibid).

Therefore, despite contributing to military training in Afghanistan bilaterally, France’s initial approach to Afghan reconstruction also relied on civilian efforts. While arguing for the necessity of ‘an autonomous European military command system’, high-level decision-makers also took into account ‘the civilian aspects of stabilisation and reconstruction’ and thought that the EU ‘is the only body with the full range of resources, including police forces’ (Assemblée Nationale 2008a).

Despite the importance it accorded to a civilian approach and the role ascribed to the EU in its implementation, however, France did not join to the civilian-led EU mission. Instead of Afghanistan, Paris considered West Africa as a primary area of concern for the use of developing civilian EU instruments and committed to ‘present proposals directed towards that region’ (ibid). French officials underlined that the EU was not the right player for Afghanistan’ (Pohl 2014, 106). Furthermore, high-ranking French diplomats viewed the EU mission as essentially a ‘German-but not our-baby’ and that the mission was ‘a logistical failure [and] Europe [was] simply not prepared yet for such a theatre’ (Fescharek 2015, 133).

In addition to France’s question marks about the role of the EU in Afghanistan, France was also revising its aforementioned emphasis on a crisis management approach as a blend of both civilian and military needs. With deteriorating security situation in the East and South of Afghanistan, a National Assembly commission trip concluded that ‘the solution to the Afghan

file can only be military' (Assemblée Nationale 2008b). Over time, France became increasingly dissatisfied with the EU mission's civilian approach, which was perceived to be overly prudent and not sufficiently supported by military means. This was also evident in France's reluctance to commit resources to the EU mission (Interview 11: Academic expert). The number of French personnel in the EU mission were considerably lower than those of Germany and relatively lower than those of the UK. Whilst Germany and the UK deployed on average 26 and 9.8 personnel respectively during the years the mission had been operable, this figure was 5.1 for France¹⁰. Although it was consistently claimed that the EU mission's focus was quality rather than quantity, a substantial number of staff still had to be provided to the mission's effectiveness (Interview 17: EU official). Furthermore, key managerial positions of the EU mission, such as the (deputy) mission heads, were also provided by Germany and other member states, but not by France.

Overall, France's initial political support unmatched by its contributions. This was reflected through a unified approach within the French government recognising the changing needs of Afghan reconstruction, according to which military instruments were becoming increasingly important. Whilst France politically supported the EU mission as well as initially adopting a civilian-military approach, its contributions to this mission were lower than a number of other member states. This kind of engagement with the EU mission can be seen as a balancing act to get out of a dilemma: On the one hand, an EU police training mission appeared to be suitable for French Government's support to the further development of the EU's civilian capabilities. On the other hand, Afghanistan was not primary place Paris had in mind to use these capabilities, as well as its support for a civilian approach. In addition, both civilian and military

¹⁰ For Finland and the Netherlands, these figures were 21,9 and 17,9 respectively. Yearly breakdown of member state contributions to EUPOL Afghanistan is based on SIPRI data sent to the author via email by a researcher at SIPRI.

decision-makers in France came to agree that the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan necessitated more emphasis on the military means of intervention in the country. The choice to keep a low profile in the EU operation is indicative of domestic policy coordination that ensure an agreed position on issues of key importance, as both civilian and military elements of decision-making in Paris followed similar stances.

5.2.4. Engagement with NTM-A: The French “trojan horse”

As stated, France’s emphasis on the civilian means of intervention changed after an increasing insecurity in Afghanistan. The launch of the NATO Training Mission (NTM-A) in 2009 corresponded to this deteriorating security situation in the country. Immediately after the launch of the NATO mission, President Sarkozy announced the deployment of a French gendarmerie dispatch of around 150 officials in the framework of European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) under the NATO mission (French Embassy in London, 2010). The key mandate of this French deployment was related to the delivery of training to two components of the Afghan police: First, Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), which was being trained as a paramilitary police force for counter-insurgency operations and riot controlling that were to take place mainly in remote and high-threat areas of Afghanistan (Interview 6: French official; Wilder 2007, 11). Secondly, the French gendarmerie was also tasked with the training of the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) which was responsible for day-to-day police activities such as criminal investigations, protecting public and private property and regulating the road traffic (Wilder 2007, pp. 10-11).

In this section, I argue that France’s choice to be a key contributor to the NATO mission was informed by the role of specific actors within the French Government and that France exercised this choice in line with a strategy of accommodation. In order to develop this argument, I focus

on two elements of France's approach on the Afghan reconstruction: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and European Gendarmerie Forces (EGF). These were the key guiding elements of how France approached and made its decisions about the EU and NATO missions after the launch of NTM-A.

5.2.4.1. French stance on PRTs

Introduced by the US and the UK in 2002, PRTs were civilian-military units embedded in NATO and based on the idea of extending the Afghan government's legitimacy and authority beyond Kabul and to facilitate reconstruction (Stapleton 2007, 11). The tasks of PRTs included infrastructure development and delivery of basic services needed to boost the Afghan economy (Morelli and Belkin 2010, 499). Moreover, PRTs were initially geared towards the protection of the civilian and military reservists who provided the reconstruction and development expertise in the country (Stapleton 2007, 11). In this sense, NATO sought to link PRTs with a comprehensive approach 'as a way to use the existing civilian and military capacity of the allies for tackling the wide range of problems associated with state-building' (Williams 2011, 76).

Whilst some member states including Germany accepted PRTs as key instruments of their contributions to the Afghan reconstruction through NATO, France did not support PRTs and declined to follow the argument that PRTs can play a meaningful statebuilding role in Afghanistan (Morelli and Belkin 2010, 21). Instead of having a PRT of its own, Paris chose to maintain its focus on its own rotating military task forces, which took over responsibility for Kapisa province, making France among the top military contributors to NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (Foust 2012, 94). This turned the common allocation of work between European and US task forces other way around: While the common practice on many

PRTs was based on the idea that Europeans will run the PRT and US will provide the protection, France's refusal of using a PRT brought about a unique partnering situation, leaving civilian actions to an American PRT and conducting combat operations to French military forces (Foust 2012, 88; Schmitt 2017, 582).

I argue that France's rejection to create its own PRT is informed by two factors that are beyond the practical needs emanating from the security situation in Afghanistan: a domestic conception of comprehensive approach, and preferences of decision-making agencies in Paris about the role of NATO as an international security provider. As shown below, these political orientations and contextual concerns were interlinked.

Within the debates on NATO's shift to a comprehensive crisis management approach to complement the Alliance's military-led crisis management efforts with civilian means, Paris insisted that NATO 'should neither develop civilian capabilities of its own nor attempt to coordinate other international organisations or actors' and that 'the military should concentrate on reconstruction and training tasks' (Simón 2013, 219). Furthermore, France was reluctant to align itself with the US or NATO models, instead preferring to underline its own commitment to a 'Europe of Defence' (Wendling 2010, 67). For instance, despite long years of experience in working with NATO, the defence ministry argued that PRTs watered down the purpose of what is supposed to be a defensive European Alliance by making NATO more as 'an offensive statebuilding Alliance' (Interview 6: French official). Instead, Paris preferred to keep NATO's global role as focused as possible to military deterrence (Interview 37: French official). French diplomats within NATO at the time thought that comprehensive approach should be a remit of the EU rather than NATO and constantly resisted to proposals in the opposite direction (Interview 40: NATO official).

Therefore, France used its commitment to the NATO mission via paramilitary forces as an objection to a NATO endowed with civilian crisis response experience that could risk the EU work in this area (Rynning 2012, 100; Fescharek 2015, 132; Foust 2012). To implement this approach within its contributions through NATO, France used its institutional position in the Alliance after its reintegration to NATO's military structures, before which NATO meetings with French officials were held 'with a sign of informality hanging on the door' (Interview 4: NATO official). France rejected to include the ministerial level mentoring of the Afghan police in NATO Mission's portfolio (Mattelaer 2013, 123). This was a 'notoriously difficult French position' at the North Atlantic Council [NAC] at the time, as it was an obstacle to NATO's aspirations to complement its military-led crisis management toolbox with civilian instruments (Interview 40: NATO official). Moreover, in a June 2009 NAC meeting, France approved to deploy NATO's Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (POMLTs) for the training of ANP. Importantly, it was clear at the outset that POMLTs would consist mostly of military rather than civilian personnel, in line with France's reluctance against a NATO involvement in the civilian matters of police training (Interview 6: French official). Appeasing the French concerns, 'the Deputy SACEUR had to make clear NTM-A would not duplicate EUPOL's civilian capabilities' (Mattelaer 2013, 125). Given France's strong objections against embedding civilian instruments into NATO's crisis management toolbox, NATO's implementation of comprehensive approach was shaped less around civilian and more around military tasks (Interview 40: NATO official).

France's National Gendarmerie (*Gendarmerie Nationale*, GN) also acted as a domestic veto player within France's strategies about the operational overlap between the EU and NATO in Afghanistan. A senior official stated that GN sought to have at their disposal the same means

enjoyed by their US counterparts in Afghanistan (Interview 6: French official). Furthermore, GN was also concerned about its prestige in an overseas mission. NATO and the US officials in Afghanistan highly regarded GN's contribution as a means to provide the 'robust training and advise' for the Afghan police and as a force that is easily deployable in conflict situations (Interview 6: French official). GN was also concerned 'to show the real value of the EGF' in Afghanistan after questions about its usefulness (Interview 6: French official). In consequence, a specific role-sharing occurred between France's civilian and military personnel, where the overall leadership of civilian assistance was led by the ministry of foreign affairs, while the geographical allocation of civilian projects was discussed between civilian and military task forces (Interview 6: French official).

Overall, Paris preferred a military-focused approach when emphasising the integration of civilian and military aspects of Afghan reconstruction. This was evident in the absence of a French PRT as well as in France's modification of some PRT practices such as the use of protection from the US forces. Although different actors within the French Government acknowledged the dual (i.e., civilian and military) nature of this task, they were reluctant about NATO mission's involvement in reconstructing the civilian aspects of the Afghan security forces (Interview 35: NATO official). GN's preferences about its organisational interests and international prestige also facilitated the integration of French forces into the NATO mission.

5.2.4.2. France's use of its paramilitary forces

I argue that France's pursuit of such an approach within the NATO mission is also relevant to France's changing preferences about using its paramilitary forces in Afghanistan. France

initially preferred to deploy its gendarmerie forces to the training of Afghan security forces, including the Afghan police, via European Gendarmerie Force (EGF).

EGF was first proposed by the then French Minister of Defence Michelle Alliot-Marie on the margins of an informal EU defence ministers meeting in Rome on 3 and 4 October 2003 (Lalinde 2005, 1). Rather than an EU-wide proposal, the framework was to include four other European states with paramilitary police forces, namely, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Hence, early at this stage, it became clear that EGF would be a ‘club’ of member states with appropriate national forces. For instance, the then German Defence Minister Peter Struck ruled out his country’s involvement in EGF by referring to the ‘clearly distinct’ tasks of the German police force from those of the armed forces (EUobserver 2004).

EGF was created in 2004 to provide capability to police missions, offer a multinational operational structure, and participate other international crisis management initiatives (EUISS 2005, 236). Making an explicit reference to the EU’s Helsinki Headline Goals as well as the Petersberg Tasks, EGF was intended to be available ‘first and foremost’ to the EU, while also being available to other organisations including NATO (ibid, 237). In parallel, Paris argued that the project should be a ‘European framework’ without duplicating existing EU capabilities (Lalinde 2005, 2; de Weger 2009, 12).

However, divisions within the EGF made it difficult for France to use this framework as a means of deploying its gendarmerie forces to the training of the Afghan police. When EGF started training the Afghan National Police (ANP) under NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan in December 2009, an initial problem was the Franco-Italian divergence dating back to the early discussions on EGF. Whilst Italy proposed that a Multinational Specialised

Unit (MSU) concept (developed and implemented within NATO under the Italian leadership) adopted within the EGF, France rejected this proposal due to its preference for EGF as a European framework (Arcudi and Smith 2013, 5). As argued by Kouchner, EGF's role in Afghanistan should be an 'independent European contribution' and NATO's support to it should be kept on an ad hoc basis (US Embassy Berlin 2009c). French diplomats confirmed that if a fully independent EGF presence would not be possible due to aforementioned political obstacles, they would first attempt to deploy EGF through the EU, then preferring to deploy EGF under the NATO Mission only as a 'last resort' (US Embassy Berlin 2009b). As a French diplomat stated, 'from the beginning France proposed a "European" structure rather than a bilateral national initiative to facilitate the participation of other European partners' (US Embassy Paris 2009b).

A second option was to use EGF contributions under an EU framework. Yet, this option also faced problems due to the questions it raised within the Union about the 'costs should lie where they fall' principle (Interview 17: EU official). A more particular objection came from Germany, which argued that the NATO mission would be the ideal framework for the proposed EGF deployment in Afghanistan, as doing so would meet the necessary logistical requirements and establish force protection from NATO (US Embassy Berlin 2009b).

In the light of these obstacles, France began to consider the 'last resort' option of using a NATO framework. This was facilitated by the view within the French Government at the time that the nature of the Afghan National Police (ANP) aligned with France's *Gendarmerie Nationale* model. Defence minister Hervé Morin stated that the French gendarmerie forces

‘... are passionate about [officer training in Afghanistan]. But it is more difficult to train police than military. Indeed, the former do not only carry out security operations: they must also know the judicial procedure, be able to conduct interrogations, have good contact with the people and be respected by it’ (Assemblée Nationale 2010).

Alain Juppé, Kouchner’s successor as foreign minister, also emphasised that the Afghan police ‘plays more of a gendarmerie role than police proper [and] this is a profession different from that of weapons [...] if the army aims to destroy an adversary, the gendarmerie aims to protect the population (Assemblée Nationale 2012a). Practitioners in the field also believed that French gendarmerie forces’ police experience in France may facilitate their contribution to the Afghan police training (Interview 17: EU official).

The aforementioned conception of comprehensive approach, which increasingly prioritised military rather than civilian instruments of police training, also shaped French preferences about the role of its gendarmerie forces in the training of the Afghan police (Interview 6: French official). As stated, among the elements of the ANP, French gendarmerie was heavily involved in the training of Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), which was more of a paramilitary police component for counter-insurgency operations and riot controlling. Furthermore, the French Government’s target about the number of the Afghan security forces ‘to reach a workforce of 400,000 men able to guarantee the stability of the country’ was in line with the NATO mission’s ability to recruit more police officers in a shorter period of time, compared to the EU mission (Assemblée Nationale 2010). At the same time, France’s focus was beginning to shift from a staffing target in Afghan National Army (ANA) and ANP towards incrementally transferring responsibility to the Afghan authorities. Gérard Longuet, Morin’s

successor as the defence minister, presented a change from the abovementioned emphasis on increasing the number of trained army and police personnel:

‘In view of the definition of the format of the future Afghan National Army at the NATO Summit to be held in Chicago on May 20, it is also necessary to ask whether the rise in total numbers 352,000 is relevant, given that the final and sustainable format of the Afghan National Security Forces - army and police - will be significantly lower. The first objective is therefore to slow down recruitment and ensure its quality by putting in place - which is technically possible - an individual follow-up of the recruits and their career path’ (Assemblée Nationale 2012a).

Against this background, while presenting the idea of using EGF under the NATO mission as a ‘last resort’ policy, France readjusted its stance to the extent of acting as a lead-nation in the NATO mission, as seen in its leadership in the National Police Training Centre Wardak and a Regional Training Centre in Mazar-e Sharif (Fescharek 2015, 128).

The decision to use the EGF deployment under the NATO mission was also affected by President Sarkozy’s willingness ‘to show US that France is integrated to the NATO military command’ (Interview 6: French official). Sarkozy attempted to use France’s engagement in Afghanistan during 2007-2008 to rebuy some weight in NATO and to increase France’s reputation. It is therefore not a coincidence that the launch of the NATO mission was announced in the same NATO summit where France’s return to NATO’s integrated military command was officially welcomed (NATO 2009b).

5.2.5. Conclusion

In this chapter I discussed France's strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO in Afghanistan. I argued that France's strategies were mainly driven by specific preferences of domestic veto players within the French government and its changing preferences about the means of intervention, informed both by the practical needs on the ground and political considerations about the role of NATO in Afghanistan. France's initial engagement with the EU mission was a balancing act to find a way out of a dilemma: though the EU mission appeared to be suitable for France's support to the further development of the EU's civilian capabilities, Afghanistan was not France's primary target to use these capabilities. As both civilian and military decision-makers in Paris became increasingly disillusioned by a civilian approach towards Afghan police training, France provided mainly diplomatic support to the mission initially and lower level of contributions than other major EU member states.

As both civilian and military decision-makers agreed that the French contribution to Afghan reconstruction should increasingly include military elements of crisis management, French decision-makers favoured a military approach as a more effective means to enable Afghan forces to uphold security in the country. Under these circumstances, France saw the deployment of its paramilitary gendarmerie forces as a suitable means to provide training to the Afghan police.

There was, however, an important decision to be made for France as to the multilateral framework to use to deploy its gendarmerie forces to train the Afghan police. Doing so through the EU mission or an alternative, independent European framework became untenable due to divergences within the EU and the European Gendarmerie Forces (EGF). On the other hand,

the NATO mission had practical benefits such as being able to recruit more police officers at a shorter time. Key domestic stakeholders in France, such as foreign and defence ministries, also argued that the military-led NATO mission could in fact be an opportunity for France to uphold its long-term strategic preference of keeping NATO as a collective defence alliance in Afghanistan. Therefore, France's strategies within the NATO mission were articulated in consideration of the role of the EU as an international security provider, which Paris preferred as a primary multilateral framework of intervention in civilian crisis management in areas of interest for the French foreign policy. Moreover, contributing to a NATO mission aligned with President Sarkozy's agenda of demonstrating France's commitment to NATO at a time when it returned to the Alliance's military command. For its part, the *Gendarmerie Nationale* used the NATO deployment as a means to raise its profile in an overseas mission, while the NATO mission also presented for the *Gendarmerie Nationale* an opportunity to show the value of EGF, which was questioned due the delay in its deployment to Afghanistan. As a result, France resorted to the option of deploying its trainers under the NATO mission, which was initially considered as a 'last resort' option. In this sense, French strategies epitomise an accommodation strategy.

Table 4 illustrates this concluding discussion on the drivers and type of France's strategies in this context of operational overlap.

| Drivers of France's strategies | | Type of France's strategies |
|---|--|---|
| Security interests | No significant security threat posed to France; risks were mainly related to deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan | Accommodation ‘Independent European options’ became untenable, France used the ‘last resort option’ by taking active part in the NATO mission. |
| Domestic veto players | Cross-governmental emphasis on the need for military-led training; prestige concerns of <i>Gendarmerie Nationale</i> ; Sarkozy's willingness to show France's commitment to NATO | |
| Preferences about means of intervention | A particular conception of comprehensive approach that was closer to the military end of crisis management, mainly due to the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan | |

Table 4. France's strategies within the operational overlap in Afghanistan

France's strategies within the overlap between the EU and NATO missions in Afghanistan offer support to the threefold argument presented in Chapter 2. First, France made cross-operational strategies within the EU and NATO missions in Afghanistan. France was reluctant to take an active role in the EU mission, but acting as a key contributor to the NATO mission, France also sought to ensure that NATO's involvement in police training in Afghanistan would not limit the EU's distinct capabilities in crisis management.

Second, in line with the argument that member states exercise their choices from the EU and NATO operations in different and heuristic ways, France followed a particular type of forum-shopping practice throughout the overlap. France's strategy within the operational overlap in

Afghanistan exemplified a strategy of accommodation. After failing to set into motion its preferred choices about the framework of intervention, France used a policy option that it did not initially consider as the first choice, namely, taking part in the NATO operation. This was a heuristic choice, since by taking part in the NATO mission as a leading contributor, France in fact sought to undermine NATO's ambitions to be involved not only in military but also in the civilian domains of Afghan reconstruction. Therefore, in recalculating its preferences, France did not give up on its long-term strategic orientations about the role of the EU and NATO as international security providers. Furthermore, as stated, France took into account the effects of its (para)military-led involvement in the NATO mission on the EU's civilian presence in Afghanistan.

Third, the findings from this case study supports the argument that member states' policymaking arrangements are indicative of the extent to which they can use the EU and NATO operations in line with their preferences and interests. A centralised coordination mechanism helped France exercise its preferences without significant intragovernmental resistance. France's centralised decision-making structure also facilitated its constant reconsideration of its preferences by pursuing a more or less coherent line of policy that Afghan reconstruction should increasingly include military elements due to practical and political considerations. As this case study showed, this mainly coherent policy stance that was supported by both civilian and military elements of policymaking, as well as the dominance of the foreign and defence ministries and the presidency, also minimised potential intragovernmental divergences.

5.3. Germany: Holding hands with the EU, keeping NATO at arm's length

5.3.1. The context of Germany's engagement with the reconstruction of Afghanistan

As the 'lead nation' in police reform in Afghanistan, Germany had already been supporting the Afghan police prior to the EU and NATO missions. The Federal Government's police training efforts in Afghanistan during the 2000s were initially implemented through the German Police Project Office (GPPO). Started out in 2002 mainly as a consulting organisation for the Afghan Police Academy, GPPO began its work 'with a team of about 10 German police officers from the German Federal Police (*Bundespolizei*), Federal Investigation Department (*Bundeskriminalamt*) and from the State Police Forces (*Länderpolizeien*)' (Feilke 2010, 7), also supporting the US-led training projects (Fescharek 2013, 14). During this time, Germany's contribution was rather small-scale, with 'a little over 10 million euros spent annually during the first few years' (Friesendorf 2013, 338; Fescharek 2013). Overall, Germany's international policing assistance through its bilateral mission at this time was considered 'modest', including an average of 40 police trainers between 2002 and 2009 with 70 million euros spent on police reform (Noetzel and Rid 2009, 73; ICG 2007, 7). As a result, these funds and personnel were considered insufficient to achieve the goals that had been set, and Germany's bilateral police training efforts therefore came short of providing substantial number of qualified police officers (Kempin and Steinicke 2009, 137; Harnisch and Wolf 2010, 51).

5.3.2. Domestic decision-making structure

Germany's response to challenges connected with capacity building in Afghanistan had been informed by a cross-departmental collaboration between different branches of the Federal

Government (Fescharek 2013, 17). Reflecting Germany's sectorised structure of decision-making, the Federal Government's policymaking approach about assistance to fragile states was also based on a collaborative decision-making approach known as 'networked security' (*Vernetzte Sicherheit*). Introduced by the 2006 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, networked security was formed of three main elements: a combination of military and civilian tools to be used in foreign policy, multilateral cooperation to uphold Germany's interests, and an interministerial approach to foreign and security policymaking (BMVg 2006, 22). Moreover, the Federal Government also recognised in its 2007 Afghanistan concept that there is 'no security without reconstruction and development' (Die Bundesregierung 2007c). Berlin maintained this understanding of Afghan reconstruction, including police reform, as 'an interministerial task requiring a comprehensive approach – an approach which takes more than the concerted efforts of foreign, development and security policy' (Bundesregierung 2012, 59). Therefore, a number of governmental agencies were involved in Germany's policymaking about police reform in Afghanistan. Whilst the overall policy guidance was led by the Chancellery, it was not routinely involved in the relevant decision-making processes (Interview 25: German official).

Financial resources for police training mainly came from the budget of the Federal Foreign Office (*Auswärtiges Amt*, AA) (Interview 22: German official). On the other hand, Germany's development aid budget was a competence of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (*Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung*, BMZ). BMZ disbursed a large portion of Germany's development and humanitarian assistance, much of it via the German Corporation for International Cooperation (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit*, GIZ) (Friesendorf 2013, 336). The latter's assistance to

Afghanistan focused mainly on long-term development projects, principally in the areas of energy, water, education and sustainable economic development (US Embassy Berlin 2009e).

AA also hosted a Special Task Force on Afghanistan and Pakistan to coordinate between the work of the Chancellery, AA, BMVg, BMI and BMZ (Jacobs 2012, 479). In order to improve the interministerial work and coordination regarding Germany's regional policy, a Crisis Response Centre was also established within the AA (BMVg 2006, 23).

The implementation of police projects was led by the Federal Ministry of Interior (*Bundesministerium des Innern*, BMI) (Interview 22: German official). Within BMI's Police Department, the unit dealing with international police operations (*Referat B4*) covered conceptual, political and operational aspects of Germany's contribution to international police missions. In 2007, a new unit of International Developments (*Referat G II 1*) was established with the task of tracing international security developments and conducting threat perception analysis. Moreover, this unit provided strategic advice to the minister of interior (Jacobs 2012, 480). Because BMI administers Germany's contribution to international police missions, top government officials and non-police bureaucrats relied heavily on the expertise of officials in these bodies dealing with international police missions (Noetzel and Rid 2009, 73; Friesendorf 2013, 332).

Although not being directly involved in civilian police training, the Federal Ministry of Defence (*Bundesministerium der Verteidigung*, BMVg) was also participated intragovernmental discussions about Germany's contribution to police reform in Afghanistan (Interview 22: German official; Bundesregierung 2007b, 2). BMVg's involvement was most directly seen in the German Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. Having

majority of their (military) personnel from BMVg, German PRTs managed development and good governance projects through a civilian command (AA) (Wendling 2010, 72). In addition, BMVg also hosted German police officers within the PRTs in Afghanistan and prepared draft papers on Germany's contribution to police training in Afghanistan, alongside with AA and BMI.

The implementation of this interministerial policymaking also involved think tanks into the above network of domestic institutions (Interview 22: German official). Prominent among these institutions is the Centre for International Peace Operations (*Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze*, ZIF) provides analysis and studies about security training and the recruitment of civilian experts for Germany's contribution to international peace operations.

The role and involvement of the national parliament (*Bundestag*) in Germany's contribution to the EU and NATO training missions was more limited compared to the country's involvement in multinational military operations. In contrast to military deployments where Bundestag decides on issues such as troop size, area of deployment and rules of engagement, the Federal Government have the competence to commit necessary resources without asking parliament for approval regarding Germany's engagement with international police missions (Interview 22: German official). As a consequence, Germany's contribution to the EU and NATO training missions in Afghanistan was discussed at Bundestag on a less frequent basis. Despite Germany's engagement with police training in Afghanistan since 2002, the first *Bundestag* plenary where the German police programme in Afghanistan was discussed took place in 2007 (Friesendorf 2013, 332). At the same time, the Federal Government still needed a parliamentary approval for the allocation of resources for police training programmes, including engagement with multilateral initiatives such as the EU and NATO missions

(Interview 22: German official). Although *Bundestag*'s influence is not as direct as it is in a military mission, it still led the public debate and had an important role, 'especially when it comes to broader budget issues and the number of personnel that is sent' (Interview 25: German official). Neither could the federal state (*Länder*) parliaments formulate precise mandates for these missions (Interview 22: German official).

Germany's decision-making structure regarding the EU and NATO missions in Afghanistan is illustrated in Figure 8.




Figure 9. Germany's decision-making structure regarding the operations in Afghanistan
(Source: Author)

5.3.3. Initial engagement with EUPOL: A rocky start

In her November 2007 visit to Kabul, Chancellor Merkel stated that Germany would commit more resources than before to the training of Afghan police. Reflecting Germany's reluctance to use force and preference to use civilian means of crisis management, Merkel underlined that

‘if there is one area in which Germany should do more, it is in building up the police force’ (Merkel 2007). According to Frank Walter-Steinmeier, the foreign minister of the time, Germany’s task of providing the people of Afghanistan was ‘becoming more and more intense in civilian terms, and perhaps even weaker in military terms’ (Bundestag 2007, 11522) and Germany should focus on ‘civilian engagement in addition to the military commitment’ in Afghanistan (Bundestag 2008g, 20341). It is within these parameters around a civilian approach that Germany’s strategies about police reform in Afghanistan were shaped following the launch of the EU mission. As the statements from Merkel and Walter-Steinmeier show, Germany’s approach to Afghan police reform was based on a preference towards the use of civilian means of intervention.

In implementing this approach, Germany selected the EU to externalise ‘the difficult task of police reform’ (interview 2: EU official) and to ‘beef up’ Germany’s own police reform efforts (interview 13: German official). The Federal Government initiated the EU mission during its Council Presidency with a view to complement ‘the successful work of Germany in the reform of the Ministry of Interior and accelerate[d] the training of the Afghan National Police’ (Die Bundesregierung 2007b, pp. 11-12). In line with Germany’s intention to generate a ‘momentum of change’ in Afghan police reform, the EU mission’s work in collaboration with Germany’s Kabul Embassy, which was instrumental in providing a mission headquarters and providing accommodation for police officers, initially provided faster results compared to Germany’s own efforts (Interview 17: EU official). Germany also supported the EU mission’s leadership by providing the first two heads of the mission (Bundesregierung 2007b, 38). Directed by this leadership, the EU mission undertook the responsibilities of preparing the curriculum for police training and coordinating the police reform (Bundesregierung 2007b, 25; Feilke 2010, 15).

Having led the EU mission provided Germany certain advantages. As stated, resources from Germany's own police project team¹¹ were used to build up the EU mission in Kabul (interview 13: German official). Furthermore, thanks to its leadership of the EU mission, Germany also projected its civilian-led approach to policing to the EU mission. In the view of the Federal Government, one of the EU mission's strategic objectives was 'to help build a police force that has the confidence of the people, follows constitutional principles, guarantees human rights and increasingly meets security requirements in Afghanistan' (Die Bundesregierung 2007b, 25). Aligning with the aforementioned emphases on expanding Germany's civilian contribution in Afghanistan, the EU mission also had the objective of '[assisting] and supporting the development of a police service which citizens trust, which works with integrity within the framework of the rule of law and which respects human rights' (Council 2008b, 13).

Despite the German sponsoring of the EU mission, however, the mission got off to a rocky start. A problem about the leadership of the mission occurred between Germany and other key member states. The first head of the EU mission, who was a German brigadier general, resigned a few months after the launch of the mission, following allegations of contentious relations the EU's special envoy to Afghanistan who complained about the mission head's 'management style, and EU leaders' serious concerns regarding EUPOL's then weak start' (US Mission to the EU 2008b; Sedra 2008, 202). The new head of the EU mission, also a German officer, was 'strongly supported by his native Germany, but widely seen as a failure by key member states, working-level Council officials, and U.S. observers in Kabul' (US Mission to the EU 2008b). Member states and the EU's civilian operations command viewed him 'ineffective' 'because he is reluctant to travel to the various provinces where the EUPOL mandate extends and because he is erratic in his dealings with Brussels and the International Community' (ibid). In the face

¹¹ German Police Project Office (GPPO) was replaced by German Police Project Team (GPPT) in 2007.

of these pressures, he was replaced in October 2008 by a senior Danish police commissioner despite member states' reluctance to remove the second German commander within the same year (ibid; Jozwiak 2008).

Another challenge Germany faced was the expansion of the geographical scope and tasks of the EU mission. As stated in the previous case study, the launch of the EU mission coincided with an increasing control of insurgents especially in the Eastern and Southern parts of the country, making physical safety more pressing than broader agenda items such as state-building, good governance and democratic reforms (Heiduk 2011, 374). Acknowledging this need to extend the mission's efforts to remote districts outside Kabul, the US officials put pressure on European states to increase their efforts in Afghanistan and particularly on Germany to extend police support to these districts (Friesendorf 2013, 340). Noting that a divide within the EU would be 'a recipe for policy blockage' at a time when 'continued dysfunction at EUPOL is in nobody's interest', US diplomats in Brussels conveyed to their German counterparts that 'Germany should be urged to accelerate the deployment of EU trainers to Afghanistan, increase the number of trainers, and broaden the geographic range of activities' (US Mission to the EU 2008b).

Whilst a number of senior German diplomats recognised this need for the EU mission to devote more attention to district-level training (US Embassy Berlin 2008b; 2009a), Germany was still reluctant to deploy troops to southern and western areas in Afghanistan, where international forces were facing attacks from an increasing insurgency and sought more force protection to respond the growing number of attacks (Merz 2007, 11). There have even been periods when 'police posts are attacked more often than military targets by insurgents and factional fighters, and there are more police killed and wounded than there are Afghan military

casualties' (Murray 2007, 118). On the other hand, Northern and Western parts of Afghanistan presented a relatively secure environment to German contingents (Noetzel and Schreer 2009, 532). As a result, German police officers under the EU mission were deployed to relatively safe districts of Afghanistan in order to avert further security risks. These casualty-averse tendencies in Berlin reflected Germany's particular preferences about the means of intervention. Reflecting a preference towards civilian means of intervention, German practitioners argued that deploying under the EU mission was more in line with Germany's civilian-led policing approach and identity (interview 5: German official).

As far as the broadening of the EU mission's tasks (in addition to its geographical reach) is concerned, Germany faced an intragovernmental divergence, especially from actors whose approval is needed to be mobilised for Germany's contribution to Afghan police reform. German officers argued that 'many police officers assigned to EUPOL had been disappointed that the bulk of their time was spent doing bureaucratic tasks [and] EUPOL needed to become "more operational" by shifting its focus to the training and mentoring of Afghan police' (US Embassy Berlin 2009a). The head of the EU mission pointed out that the mission's objectives and capabilities were 'often misunderstood', as 'the mandate [was] meant to support a sustainable command structure from Kabul down to the Districts, rather than to train police specifically' (US Mission to the EU 2008c).

This brought about a discrepancy within the Federal Government as to the tasks of the EU mission. The Federal Ministry of Interior (BMI) and the Federal Foreign Office (AA) were divided on whether field-level training should be introduced via Germany's own police reform efforts or under a collective European framework. On the one hand, motivated to prove that 'it can do things outside Germany's borders', BMI was against simply transferring Germany's

bilateral efforts to the EU, arguing that such a move would mean Germany's acceptance of its failure (Interview 5: German official). On the other hand, for AA and the Chancellery were pushing for more German support to the EU mission, even if this meant reducing Germany's bilateral efforts (Interview 5: German official).

As a result of these intragovernmental divergences in Berlin, Germany sent personnel to southern districts such as Uruzgan as 'token contributions' 'to show that Germany was also working in more fragile and difficult areas' (Interview 13: German official). Instead of offering concrete proposals to extend the EU mission's geographical scope, Germany opted to contribute more personnel to the US-led Focused District Development (FDD) program, 'either in addition to or instead of EUPOL' (US Mission to the EU 2009a). Indeed, German officers worked on plans with their FDD counterparts to share police reform responsibilities in various regions of Afghanistan (Interview 13: German official). FDD also came to be in line with Germany's concerns about the legitimacy of intervention, which aimed to have more accountability among the Afghan population and convey the message that 'the police is something positive' (Interview 13: German official).

Germany's support to the US-led programmes was also related to the Federal Government's preference to maintain good relations with Washington before the upcoming federal elections. When the US started additional troops for combat operations in Afghanistan, the question for Berlin was 'what Germany could do to match US efforts' and that 'if we [Germany] can't do military stuff, what substitutes do we [Germany] have?' (Interview 5: German official). Furthermore, as Germany was about to face federal elections in September 2009, German leaders wanted to be viewed by their populations as close to the US administration 'to gain from President Obama's popularity' (US Mission to the EU 2009a). Germany also viewed its

bilateral contributions to Afghan police reform as preferable than the EU mission ‘for gaining credit’ with the US administration’ (ibid).

At the same time, Germany was still concerned that leaving the US involvement in police training unchecked could undermine Germany’s civilian-led policing efforts. To address this concern, Germany deployed a liaison officer in the US-led Combined Security Transition Command (CSTC-A), to ‘have an eye and an ear in what Americans are doing (Interview 13: German official).

In sum, Germany’s initial engagement with the EU mission was affected by preferences about means of intervention and the role of domestic veto players: The key factors that shaped Germany’s strategies within the EU mission were a motivation to follow a culture of civilian policing, considerations about the legitimacy of intervention, divergences within the Federal Government, and the Federal Government’s concerns about maintaining good relations with Washington. Moreover, in order to ensure a separation of civilian and military lines of effort, Germany acted strategically by placing officers in US-led military contributions.

5.3.4. Engagement with NTM-A: Further dilemmas

With NATO’s more direct involvement in the Afghan police reform through a new training mission, namely, NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A), the nature of police training became an even more prominent issue in Germany’s own police reform efforts. As stated in the beginning of this chapter, the tasks of the NATO mission included mentoring, partnership, supporting, advising, and training of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) at the district and municipal levels (NATO Public Diplomacy Division/Press and Media Section 2010). The NATO mission was also mandated to coordinate international efforts to train and

equip these forces with a view to help the Afghanistan government to develop sustainable security structures that can take responsibility for their own security (Caldwell 2011a). To a certain extent, the NATO mission addressed some of the problems its EU counterpart faced, such as the insufficient number of trainers, lack of lower- and local-level police training and low visibility compared to the existing US programmes (Caldwell 2011b). Indeed, additional financial and human resources support for the police sector allowed the deployment of more trainers and increased the number of Afghan security officers trained as well as helping to build new training centres in the country (Caldwell 2011b).

Although these factors might suggest some comparative advantages for the NATO mission that Germany could use to amplify its police training agenda, there were divisions within NATO about the core purpose of its presence in Afghanistan: whether NATO troops operate in the country as ‘counter-insurgency’ or ‘stability and reconstruction’ units (Noetzel and Scheer 2009, 532). Moreover, the launch of the NATO mission presented a ‘conceptual change’ about NATO’s purpose in Afghanistan from a purely counterinsurgency to a stabilisation presence with not only military but also civilian tools (Rynning 2012, 186; Mattelaer 2011). Yet, with collective defence as one of its primary *raison d’être*, NATO has not originally been built for the stabilisation tasks of counterinsurgency operations.

These apparent changes in NATO’s role in Afghanistan were factored in in Germany’s strategies vis-à-vis the EU and NATO training missions in the country. Because the German constitutional law separates police and military functions, engaging with a new military-led operation such as NTM-A would require an additional *Bundestag* mandate. From the Federal Government’s perspective, getting parliamentary approval for civilian projects such as police training was relatively easier than securing approval for military projects (Interview 22:

German official). Thus, the Federal Government was initially reluctant about creating a new training mission under a NATO framework, which would be domestically controversial before the approaching September 2009 federal elections (US Embassy Berlin 2009b; Farrell 2017, pp. 271-272). Given Berlin's reluctance, US officials reassured their German counterparts that they were 'not proposing to create new structures, but rather just suggesting to dual-hat the CSTC-A commander' (US Embassy Berlin 2009d)¹². Consequently, Germany welcomed the NATO mission as a 'step toward the goal of bringing all military operations under one command (ISAF) and thereby improving unity of effort' (US Embassy Berlin 2009d).

Furthermore, Germany was also cautious about the US approach to police training, which substantially informed the NATO mission's methods. Similar to the US approach that 'focused on rapid training rather than fostering long-term institutional change', the NATO mission's approach was based on visible and fast recruitment of Afghan police officers (Gross 2009b, 27). In contrast, German police training approach adopted a more civilian and human rights-focused methods, replacing 'the US-style training relied on basic training for the use of force only' (Interview 25: German official). Although Germany also provided combat training to Afghan police officers, this was seen more as a practical necessity to 'ensure that these police officers can survive at the checkpoints when the insurgents were coming' rather than an underlying approach to police training (interview 13: German official). Moreover, whilst the EU mission was originally led by the German Federal Police, the NATO mission was integrated in the German Police Training Centre in Mazar-el-Sharif (Interview 25: German official). The latter mission's focus was prominently on increasing the number of trained Afghan police

¹² Launched in 2005 as an integral component of Operation Enduring Freedom, CSTC-A was a US-led programme implemented by the Department of Defence. CSTC-A carried out training activities in support of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) (Perito 2009).

officers, which was justified by preparing the Afghan police for counterinsurgency (Friesendorf 2013, 338).

At the same time, Germany did recognise some practical advantages of the NATO mission. Germany's specific training targets such as a minimum of three years of training became difficult to achieve given the high numbers of Afghan officers need to be trained (Interview 17: EU official). While the tasks associated with the EU mission such as 'mentoring and advising are long term measures which are not easy to control and to evaluate', areas of urgency such as training, equipment and construction were addressed better by the NATO mission (Feilke 2010, 10). Indeed, there was also an overarching emphasis in Berlin on the comparative advantages of the NATO mission. According to AA, 'NTM-A currently provides by far the largest number of internationally deployed trainers for the training, equipment and payment of Afghan security forces' (Bundesregierung 2010c, 19) and it 'has a special significance in terms of human and financial resources' (ibid, 25). Moreover, the EU mission's personnel was 'extremely dependent' on the military protection, including protection by NATO forces (Interview 2: EU official). Similarly, for BMI, the training of the EU mission '[was] limited to Afghan police officers [whereas] NTM-A [was] providing field police training in Afghanistan with Police Operational Mentor Liaison Teams', and both GPPT and EUPOL Afghanistan follow[ed] a civilian police approach (Bundesregierung 2010b, 30). Of importance in BMI's statement is the stress on the word 'police', as in contrast to Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams (OMLTs), Police OMLTs was responsible for the start-up of a functioning police force, rather than training and mentoring the Afghan National Army (ANA) to develop into self-sufficient professional armed forces (Olsthoorn et al., 254).

Given these advantages of the NATO mission, a German diplomat ‘confirmed German support of NTM-A, but on the understanding that German participation in the Focused District Development (FDD) police training program would continue to be conducted on a bilateral basis in cooperation with CSTC-A, and not integrated into NTM-A’, because ‘it would cross a red line for German civilian police officers, serving as trainers/mentors, to be put under military command’ (US Embassy Berlin 2009d). In the words of a German officer, Berlin was against ‘confusing the butcher with baker’ when it comes to international policing assistance in Afghanistan, implying that the involvement of military should not detriment the prominence on the civilian approach (interview 13: German official).

It was also a ‘red line’ for Germany that police should not be under military command, a view emanated from Germany’s domestic culture of policing and military restraint (Interview 2: EU official). Due to similar reservations about the blurring of the lines between civilian and military approaches to police training, German police officers did not participate in the French-led European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) either (Harnisch and Wolf 2010, 48). Such differences were also brought up in Germany’s domestic political context. For example, a group of *Die Linke* parliamentarians pointed out that ‘it is not clear to what extent the German police officers are able to detach themselves from the predominantly militarily motivated deliberations of the leading NATO Training Mission Afghanistan’ (Bundesregierung 2011, pp. 1-2). In short, Germany faced a dilemma in terms of its options about the NATO mission. On the one hand, the mission had certain advantages in terms of police recruitment. On the other hand, it was not in line with Germany’s conception of policing based on civilian instruments.

Interestingly, the more NATO-oriented Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg) did not exploit these deficiencies of the EU mission to promote further engagement with the NATO mission,

despite the fact that it was involved in police-related issues due to a desire in Berlin to balance these contributions (also taking account the aid policy) through a ‘steady dialogue’ (Interview 5: German official). Despite being ‘firmly wedded to the NATO alliance and to transatlantic cooperation’ and cautious towards the development of EU capabilities in security and defence (Miskimmon and Paterson 2006, 36), in Afghanistan BMVg also emphasised that it was the EU mission that was in line with the Federal Government’s police training approach by declaring that ‘the civilian police expertise available to EUPOL [...] seems appropriate and in line with the German government’s vision of EUPOL’s role in police building in Afghanistan’ (Bundesregierung 2010a, 23).

Coalition politics were also an important determinant of Germany’s strategies about the EU and NATO mission in Afghanistan. A German official pointed out that the CDU/CSU¹³-led BMI ‘always wanted to have a strong pillar in the EU and eager to cooperate with BMVg’, while SPD¹⁴- and then FDP¹⁵-led AA stance was against police involvement in military operations, as working in ‘real hotspots’ would be difficult for the police (Interview 5: German official). Despite potential coordination problems these divergences might trigger, as ‘some ministers were interested more than others in Afghanistan’ (Interview 5: German official), however, ‘there was no fundamental divergence’ within the Federal Government (Interview 25: German official). For some analysts, Germany’s police training efforts in Afghanistan have been ‘the closest military-police cooperation in the history of the Federal Republic’ (Friesendorf and Krempel 2011, 18).

¹³ Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands/Christlich-Soziale Union

¹⁴ Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands

¹⁵ Freie Demokratische Partei

A key reason for Germany's pursuit of a consistent policy line in Afghanistan, namely that police training should be based on a civilian-led approach, was the cross-governmental agreement on following Germany's culture of civilian policing and avoidance from use of force. Indeed, major domestic actors such as the Federal Ministry of Interior (BMI) and the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg) '[worried] about the political fallout should a police officer be killed abroad' (Friesendorf 2013, 336). In BMI's view, for instance, 'the security situation [remained] tense in Afghanistan, and the threat [remained] significant', as 'more than 90 percent of the incidents [were] in the south and east (in particular, the provinces at or near the Pakistani border), less than ten percent to the west, the north and the state capital Kabul' (Die Bundesregierung 2009, 7). Similarly, the Federal Foreign Office argued that it would be difficult to make the police work in 'real hotspots' and that there would be no advantages of doing so (Interview 5: German official). In the words of a German official Germany's engagement with police training in Afghanistan was 'a purely domestic problem, nothing to do with Afghanistan' (Interview 5: German official).

While pursuing its police training agenda through the EU mission and by lending diplomatic support to the NATO mission, the Federal Government also increased its bilateral training programme personnel alongside its pledge to contribute more police experts to the EU mission (Westerwelle 2010). This choice of continuing its bilateral programme showed Germany's acknowledgement of aforementioned problems within the EU mission. Similar to Germany's call for the EU support for its 'failing' bilateral training efforts, Germany wanted to maintain its bilateral efforts when it saw that the EU was also struggling to deliver a meaningful police training (Interview 5: German official). However, Berlin's decision to maintain resources in the EU mission also suggests that Germany still regarded the civilian-oriented programmes to be

the primary tools of its long-continued engagement with police training in Afghanistan (Interview 22: German official).

Over time, Berlin came to recognise that ‘the impact of German involvement alone would not be reputable because the multitude of activities of all international and national actors interact and reinforce each other’ (Bundesregierung 2011, 5). Given the comparative advantages of the NATO mission but also the difficulty of taking an active role in it due to challenges presented by its means of intervention as well as domestic pressures from Berlin, Germany tolerated the NATO mission as part of the military engagement in Afghanistan and as a means to complement the EU’s civilian policing assistance. German officials engaged with the NATO Mission’s staff at a personal and ad hoc level (interview 13: German official) and cooperated with the NATO mission ‘by discussing how [they] can divide the military aspects from the police aspects of training, what can military do for [civilian trainers], like shooting training’ (Interview 13: German official).

All in all, Germany’s concerns about following a civilian policing approach as an appropriate means of intervention trumped the incentives stemming from practical benefits of the NATO mission. Indeed, Berlin consistently emphasised the civilian policing instead of military development aspects of security sector reform in Afghanistan when considering options about the EU and NATO missions. Although Germany worked ‘very closely’ with the NATO mission, on the police training side, its primary choices of intervention for police reform in Afghanistan were the EU mission and its own bilateral efforts (interview 13: German official). In the words of a German official, ‘NATO could not understand’ the complexities of policymaking dynamics in Berlin (Interview 5: German official).

5.3.5. Conclusion

In this section I summarised and discussed the evidence from the case of Germany's engagement with the operational overlap between the EU and NATO in Afghanistan. Overall, the evidence suggests that Germany's strategies were informed primarily by Germany's preferences about means of intervention in crisis management and the role of veto players within Germany's policymaking processes about police reform in Afghanistan. Germany constantly considered whether the EU and NATO missions would be appropriate with Germany's own culture of civilian policing and historical culture of military restraint. In this sense, Berlin's considerations about different crisis management approaches and instruments of the EU and NATO were a crucial factor that shaped Germany's strategies within the overlap. Furthermore, the reluctance of German police officers to be involved in the EU mission, divisions within the federal foreign and internal ministries, and Federal Government's concerns about maintaining good relations with the US before the upcoming federal elections led Germany to prefer the EU mission, while lending informal and ad hoc support to the NATO mission. As stated, Germany's concerns to follow own approach of civilian policing as an appropriate means of intervention trumped the incentives provided by the practical advantages of the NATO mission.

Table 5 outlines this overview of the drivers and type of Germany's strategies within the operational overlap in Afghanistan.

| Drivers of Germany's strategies | | Type of Germany's strategies | |
|---|--|------------------------------|---|
| Security interests | No significant security threat posed to Germany; risks were mainly related to deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan | Toleration | Leading the EU mission and recognising the advantages of the NATO mission, but not taking part in the latter due to domestic political constraints. |
| Domestic veto players | Federal Government's concerns about maintaining good relations with the US; divergence between foreign and internal ministries; parliamentary criticism against the NATO mission | | |
| Preferences about means of intervention | Following a domestic culture of policing as an appropriate means of intervention | | |

Table 5. Germany's strategies within the operational overlap in Afghanistan

Therefore, Germany's strategies within the overlap between the EU and NATO mission in Afghanistan lend support to the threefold argument presented in Chapter 2. First, Germany followed a logic of cross-operational strategy-making throughout the overlap between the EU and NATO missions in Afghanistan, as it sought to separate the EU's civilian training from NATO's military-led training approach.

The evidence from this case study also supports the claim that member states follow particular forum-shopping practices. Indeed, despite taking part in the EU mission, Germany also lent political and diplomatic support to the NATO mission despite not being formally involved under its command, in line with the empirical expectations of toleration strategy. Yet, it is important to note that although Germany recognised the practical benefits of the NATO

mission in terms of faster recruitment of police officers, it was also cautious about this mission's military-led approach.

Third, despite its sectorised policymaking and domestic coordination structure, Germany consistently followed a policy line that was endorsed by both civilian and military elements within Germany's decision-making environment. This cross-governmental approach also helped minimise potential policymaking problems despite the initial friction between the interior and foreign ministries around Germany's support to the EU mission. However, in line with the point made in Chapter 2 about the link between effectiveness of policy cooperation and successful pursuit of policy outcomes, such effective cooperation of decision-making did not necessarily increase Germany's ability to make use of the operational overlap to accomplish its objectives. Indeed, despite the NATO operation's numerous advantages about police recruitment in Afghanistan, Germany's cross-governmental view that favoured a civilian approach to police training made it difficult for Germany to recalibrate its strategies in line with the evolving operational and political conditions on the ground. In line with the third element of the threefold argument of the thesis, this shows that it is not only the effectiveness of policy coordination, but also the issue at hand, that determines the extent to which member states can instrumentalise the operational overlap in line with their goals.

5.4. United Kingdom: Straddling and flexibility

5.4.1. The context of the UK's engagement with the reconstruction of Afghanistan

Since the initial deployment of British troops in Afghanistan in 2001, the UK's involvement in the country has been extended into the realms of counterinsurgency, counter-narcotics, protection of human rights, and state-building (FAC 2009, 84). As stated, the UK was designated as the 'lead nation' in counter-narcotics enforcement in Afghanistan at the April 2002 donors conference in Geneva. In parallel, the UK's broad objective about the Afghan security sector reform was based on enabling Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to protect the Afghan people from security threats, facilitating an Afghan-led political settlement, and regional political and security co-operation (FAC 2011a, Ev 1). In this context, the launch of the EU and NATO missions in Afghanistan presented additional venues for the UK to accomplish its own objectives about the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

5.4.2. Domestic decision-making structure

Similar to France and Germany, multiple UK governmental agencies were involved in the making of British strategies vis-à-vis the EU and NATO training missions in Afghanistan. Broadly speaking, integration of various UK capacities for responding to post-conflict environments centred on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Department for International Development (DfID) and the Stabilisation Unit (SU) (Gordon 2010, 369). FCO retained control on the management and delivery of the programmes about the civilian aspects of stabilisation such as the rule of law, justice and governance, which were also areas that formed part of DfID's portfolio (ibid, 373). FCO also

decided the roles the UK government could take on the basis of strategic priorities for a peacebuilding mission, while SU was responsible for managing the recruitment and deployment process for those roles (HMG 2012b). Peace support and stabilisation pillar of the UK's international policing assistance strategy was 'predominantly the domain of the FCO, the Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) and the Security Services' (Sinclair 2012, 58). Funding for the UK's contribution to the EU mission, for instance, came from the UK's overall civilian programme expenditure comprised of a Stabilisation Aid Fund including FCO, MoD and DfID, with contributions from the jointly managed Conflict Pool (ESC 2008b, 66; FAC 2011a, 19).

The UK's counter-narcotics strategy in Afghanistan, led by FCO, MoD and DfID, was formed of five pillars: interdiction, eradication, alternative livelihoods, public information, and law enforcement (interview 3: UK official). Furthermore, a cross-governmental Afghanistan Communications Team, UK Embassy at Kabul (which had a counter-narcotics team) and the UK's Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Lashkargah, as well as other relevant UK Embassies and delegations attended to the CO-led cross-governmental committees where issues regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan were regularly discussed (FAC 2011a, Ev 5). Additionally, three cross-governmental teams in Whitehall tasked with working on issues related to the reconstruction of Afghanistan: the Afghanistan Drugs and Justice Unit, Afghanistan Communications Team, and the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat in the CO (FAC 2011a). MoD had the leading role in terms of recruitment and deployment of the UK personnel to the NATO mission¹⁶.

It is also worth noting that the institutional arrangements within Whitehall for dealing with the UK's Afghanistan policies changed with the creation of the National Security Council

¹⁶ Email communication with FCO's Central Freedom of Information Unit

(NSC) in 2010. NSC succeeded the National Security, International Relations and Development Cabinet Committee (NSID), established in 2007 as a consultative forum for debate on foreign policy. NSID was formed of several sub-committees, one of which was on Afghanistan and Pakistan (Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy 2010). Under the NSC structure, Afghanistan became an item discussed every fortnight by the NSC (FAC 2011a, 90). NSC's foreign policy agenda was led by FCO and covered a range of priorities including Afghanistan and Pakistan (FAC 2011a, Ev 4).

The UK's decision-making structure regarding the EU and NATO missions in Afghanistan is illustrated in Figure 9.




Figure 10. The UK's decision-making structure regarding the EU and NATO missions in Afghanistan.
(Source: Author)

5.4.3. Initial engagement with EUPOL: Using niche European capabilities

As stated, the UK was the lead nation in the counter-narcotics enforcement pillar of Afghan reconstruction. By seeking to facilitate the development of Afghan National Police (ANP), the EU mission presented an opportunity for the UK to uphold its counter-narcotics agenda in Afghanistan. ANP had a key responsibility in the enforcement of drug eradication strategies, which was ‘a leitmotif of police reform’ since the beginning of the international engagement in the reconstruction of Afghanistan (Murray 2007, pp. 114-115). At the same time, the UK had a ‘wait and see’ approach when the EU mission was launched, as it initially preferred to second its current officers in the country to secure key positions in the mission by double-hatting its police mentors in Helmand province, rather than sending new personnel to the EU mission (ESC 2007, 73). During this stage, the delivery of most of the police training was funded by the US State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, with the support of private security company DynCorp International (Dirkx 2017, 41). In parallel, a key role London ascribed to the mission was the coordination of different policing efforts in Afghanistan through the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) (ESC 2008a, 28). The UK supported the argument that EU should hold the secretariat position of this role (ibid). Therefore, the UK was considering a division of labour between the EU mission and ongoing US programmes.

During the agenda-setting and planning stages of the EU mission, the UK ramped up its activity to try and shape the EU mission’s mandate. After diplomatic efforts in Brussels, the UK ‘secured a mandate that makes the linkages between police reform to the wider rule of law explicit, and that has countering narcotics as a crosscutting priority’ (ESC 2007, 73), while at the same time encouraging ‘EU partners to contribute less in military terms in Afghanistan to put more resources into the civilian effort’ (US Mission to the EU 2007b). A reason behind

prioritising the rule of law dimension was that the law enforcement was the fundamental pillar of the UK's aforementioned counter-narcotics strategy, the other pillars being interdiction, eradication, alternative livelihoods, and public information (interview 3: UK official). The UK argued that 'developing an effective criminal justice system would be key [as] there was no point in developing good policing, if [Afghan] authorities could not effectively prosecute and punish criminals' (US Mission to the EU 2007a).

The UK Government also thought that the EU mission's civilian nature is one of the mission's distinctive features in narrowing the knowledge gap that existed in the police-building efforts in Afghanistan. When the EU mission was launched, there were few international advisers in the Afghan police sector 'with knowledge and experience of strategic and corporate planning, management of organizational change, human resource management, development of police policies and procedures or monitoring and evaluation of police performance' (Murray 2007, 119). According to London, the EU mission's efforts to strengthen 'the capacity of the Afghan Inspector General's Office (IGO) to prevent, investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute wrongdoing within the ranks of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and ANP [Afghan National Police]' was an important factor for the UK support to the mission (HMG 2011). The UK's emphasis on the EU's expertise in these areas is manifested by the view that the EU mission should 'consolidate its lead on civilian policing, making best use of its niche expertise', because it suggests that civilian policing is an area that EUPOL could best deliver (ESC 2009, 29). A senior FCO official indicated that the EU could utilise its already-established civilian project cells in the EU security sector reform missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC DRC and EUPOL DRC) (ESC 2009). This civilian nature of the EU mission was applied in its training of the two pillars of the Afghan National Police: Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) and the Anti-Crime Police.

Yet, the UK was not promoting the EU's civilian approach as an end in itself. Instead, the civilian expertise offered by the EU mission was important for the UK due to its practical benefits, namely, its potential to address issues related to the cultivation and trade of narcotics products in Afghanistan. This was a key UK focal point since the issue presented 'an area with serious implications on our own streets, where 90% of heroin is sourced from Afghanistan' (ESC 2008a, 60). The production and trade of drugs in Afghanistan was seen as a threat from which the 'UK streets' must be protected, and counter-narcotics enforcement by the Afghan police as a measure for protection from this security threat. Therefore, by seeking to facilitate the development of ANP, the EU mission presented an opportunity for the UK to uphold its security interests by supporting counter-narcotics enforcement in Afghanistan. Hence, the EU mission's added value lied in the UK's security interests, namely its potential to eliminate the external threat emanating from the production and trade of narcotics in Afghanistan.

At the same time, some actors in the UK Government questioned how effective this civilian approach could be. For instance, there were views within the Cabinet Office that the EU mission's police training approach was 'softer' than the 'UK niche' on 'hard edge' aspects of counter-narcotics such as enforced interdiction (interview 3: UK official). On the basis of these question marks around the EU mission, the UK created a specific division of labour between EUPOL and the two ongoing US-led training programmes, namely, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, (CSTC-A) and Focused District Development (FDD) (which the UK also contributed personnel): Whilst the EU mission 'concentrated at the strategic level [...] the US programmes focussed on district by district training, and working with the Afghan Border Police to support them in gaining control over Afghanistan's large and porous border' (ESC 2009, 26). In parallel, the UK perceived that the EU mission's focus is on

‘classical policing, rather than counterinsurgency tactics, as one example of a difference in approach between the United States and the EU’ (US Mission to the EU 2009d).

While also thinking that the EU mission was ‘an essential complement to the large US investment in police reform (\$2billion) (ESC 2008a, 17), however, London was also wary that ‘continued overarching US focus on counterinsurgency’ in Afghanistan might be criticised by the EU, and recognised that ‘some in the EU were concerned that putting EU instruments in service of this goal changed those instruments’ (US Mission to the EU 2009d).

Overall, the UK thought that the EU mission provided ‘civilian policing expertise to focus on the strategic and institutional issues that will determine the success of police reform in the long term’ (ESC 2008a, 17). This shows that the UK’s initial engagement with the EU mission was informed primarily by a strategy of using the mission for the elimination of production and trade of narcotics in Afghanistan, which was a security threat for the UK. In accomplishing its objectives around its counter-narcotics strategy, the UK sought to create a division of labour between the EU mission and ongoing US programmes. I argue that this approach based on using the comparative advantages of different frameworks also informed the UK’s strategies after the launch of the NATO mission.

5.4.5. Engagement with NTM-A: Taking advantage of advantages, loose relations with Europeans

As stated in the previous case studies, the NATO mission epitomised NATO’s move into the civilian and military aspects of police training and towards a ‘comprehensive approach’, an aspect that was often associated with the EU. Particularly relevant for the UK was this ‘fundamentally new’ NATO approach to train the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF),

including the Afghan police forces, known as ‘embedded partnering’. This model ‘include[d] the Afghan National Police (ANP), ANA [Afghan National Army] logistics units, and other combat support multipliers’, enabling NTO-led ISAF units to ‘develop metrics to track and evaluate progress of partnering and its effectiveness with both the ANA and ANP’ (McChrystal 2009, 4). Despite the fact that the NATO mission’s officially-stated top priority was the leader development in Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the mission also had a specific approach towards civilian policing based on an ‘infantry-centric’ police force with counter-insurgency capabilities (NATO 2010c, 4). In doing so, the NATO mission focused on three steps for training: train Afghan recruits, train Afghans to be trainers (train-the-trainer), and train Afghans to run systems and institutions (NATO 2010c, 12).

In this sense, the involvement of NATO in Afghan police reform seemed to be in line with the UK’s preference for a division of labour between different police training framework in Afghanistan. However, London also had to consider the marked differences between the EU and NATO missions. In contrast to its EU counterpart, NATO mission’s approach was based on the creation of a local auxiliary police in Afghanistan. According to an official NATO document reviewing the missions’ achievements in its first year, the task of this police unit (officially termed as the Afghan Local Police) ‘[was] defensive in nature, serving as a “neighborhood watch” that would alert the AUP [Afghan Uniform Police] to respond to illegal activity; [...] armed with AK-47s for self-defense and [had] no arrest or investigative authority’ (NATO 2010c, 24).

Although this approach was in line with the aforementioned emphasis on the ‘UK’s niche’ in ‘hard edge’ of police training, it received some domestic criticism in London. A report of the House of Lords European Union Committee argued that such an auxiliary police unit reflects

‘a fairly serious push to arm and equip informal policing forces in Afghanistan’ (EUC 2010a, 10). It also noted that ‘the creation of the local auxiliary police in Afghanistan, which aims to fulfil a guard role [...] poses a serious risk that armed groups outside formal structures could challenge the authority of the state, collude with local warlords, use their firearms improperly, instil fear in the population, and engage in corruption or the drug trade’ (ibid, 20). Despite these concerns, however, the UK trainers on the ground looked at the Afghan police as an ‘additional light infantry’ due to a lack of combat power and opined that the required skillset for this role can be provided by the British Army, partly embedded into NATO command (Interview 26: UK official). Therefore, the parliament’s influence as a potential domestic veto player was rather limited in the UK’s strategies at this stage.

In addition to these different approaches between the EU and NATO missions, the UK officials had a better relationship with their US counterparts compared to their EU counterparts. In the words of a British official, the UK was ‘extremely close to Americans [and that] I was meeting with my US counterparts almost every day’, whereas the UK officials had ‘very little engagement with Europeans’ (interview 3: UK official). Other UK officials recall that ‘the fundamental relationship [in Afghanistan] was between UK and the US’ (Interview 18: UK official) and ‘there was a limited need to work with the Europeans’ (Interview 16: UK official; Interview 17: EU official).

5.4.6. Transition: Shifting EU roles to NATO

Rather than changing the UK’s approach about the two missions, further developments about the politics of Afghan reconstruction reinforced London’s move towards the NATO mission. In late 2009, US President Barack Obama announced the incremental drawdown of the US forces out of Afghanistan, the major military presence in the country since 2001 (The White

House 2009). At the time, there was reportedly a cross-Whitehall agreement to avoid any public perception of a discord with the US in Afghanistan (US Mission to the EU 2009a). Indeed, some policymakers mentioned that the UK was concerned with ‘being a good ally to the US’ in Afghanistan to the extent where fight against terrorism became a secondary interest (Interview 26: UK official).

After Obama’s announcement, Prime Minister David Cameron stated in June 2010 that British troops will also incrementally withdraw from and will not have a combat role in Afghanistan beyond 2015 (FAC 2011a, Ev 64). In the following paragraphs, I argue that this governmental decision and the emerging withdrawal timeline have dramatically changed the context of the UK’s policing assistance in Afghanistan through the EU and NATO.

Before going into details about the implications of Cameron’s withdrawal announcement, it is important to understand the nature of the process that led to this decision, as this process suggests implications about the effect of the UK’s policymaking arrangement on the extent to which London had managed to effectively accomplish its objectives through the EU and NATO missions in Afghanistan. Domestic veto players in London had rather a limited effect in the UK’s withdrawal decision. A report from the Public Administration Select Committee (2010, 28) indicated that during the discussion about the withdrawal decision, the National Security Council (NSC) had worked ‘as a clearing house than as an organ of critical assessment’ where inputs of different Whitehall departments would have been factored into the withdrawal decision. According to the FAC (2011b), the withdrawal decision was not made collectively in the NSC but by a small group of decision-makers led by Cameron. William Hague, the Foreign Secretary of the time, confirmed that withdrawal decision was not a ‘formal item’ in the National Security Council (FAC 2011c, Ev 62). Therefore, the UK’s organisations of

policymaking based on a centralised executive that is also relatively autonomous from the legislature's control gave David Cameron considerable manoeuvring space in making the withdrawal decision.

In addition to his withdrawal announcement, Cameron asserted in December 2010 that '[...] as the capability of the Afghan National Security Forces increases, and the process of security transition is taken forward, the role of the international troops in Afghanistan will over time focus less on combat and more on training and mentoring the Afghan National Army and Police' (FAC 2011a, Ev 84). Although this suggests that the main thrust of the UK's training approach included a civilian and long-term police training, Cameron's 'firm deadline' presented a new aspect for the parameters of UK's policing assistance to Afghanistan (BBC 2010).

Moreover, despite Cameron's public statements favouring 'less combat and more training', the Cabinet Office (CO) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) were in fact interested in initiatives that could yield 'tangible results in the short term' to prevent drug trafficking (Interview 3: UK official). Although pre-transition period saw the 'apex of collaboration' across different Whitehall departments, the 'political imperative to get out [of Afghanistan]' brought CO and FCO to the fore during the decision-making process (Interview 15: UK official). This is key in terms of understanding the role of dominant decision-making agencies not only on civilian but also on military side, not least because in a field such as police training 'whatever MoD was doing in terms of policing would be influenced by a level of civilian side' (Interview 15: UK official). Although the stances of CO and FCO were challenged by the Department for International Development (DfID), which argued for balancing the UK's engagement in Afghanistan with a focus on more districts through long-term development

projects, these counterarguments did not resonate in London's policing assistance strategies (Interview 18: UK official). In the end, the pressure from CO and FCO dominated the decision-making in London (Interview 16: UK official).

British officials noted that these policy positions favoured by the CO and FCO were affected by the US pressure on the UK to deliver security and development plans with a faster pace (Interview 15: UK official). Despite emphasising the speed of police recruitment, these two Whitehall departments viewed the effects of police training on drug trafficking as less measurable and harder to quantify than promoting legal economic activity by building schools, clinics, and roads (Rundell 2015, pp. 295-296). This created tensions with the previous focus on civilian and long-term police training methods on the one hand, which was associated with the EU's expertise, and the emerging need for fast and visible recruitment of police officers on the other (Interview 16: UK official).

In the face of these tensions as, well as the introduction of a withdrawal timeline and an accompanying transition process, key UK objectives focused increasingly on the creation of security conditions in Afghanistan that will facilitate the withdrawal of the British forces by 2015 (FAC 2011a, 38). An additional focal point for the British planning on police training became ensuring sufficient quantity of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) officers for the protection of the Afghan public after the transition process. In pursuing these objectives, the UK argued that the NATO mission provided 'greater training and equipment to help the police to defend themselves', in contrast to its EU counterpart (CO 2011). Furthermore, London argued that 'many parts of Afghanistan [were] not yet ready for civilian policing, so the EUPOL's ability to demonstrate impact [was] limited compared to its military partner, NTM-A' (CO 2011). This was already evident in the fact that

a key goal of the NATO mission was to increase the size of the police force by increasing the number of ANP forces up to 135,000 by 2014 (EUC 2010a, 9). In addition, the UK supported US-funded military camps to allow the British trainers mentor Afghan police officers while waiting for the EU to take over, which has a considerably longer process than the more ‘agile’ US’ funding processes (Interview 26: UK official). Hence, unimpressed by the EU mission’s progress, London hoped that the cooperation with NATO and the US would enable the Afghan police towards assuming the lead responsibility for security after the transition (McChrystal 2009, 2; Farrell 2017; 376). As stated by a British diplomat, the EU mission ‘should complement the large-scale training efforts led by NATO and the United States’ (EUC 2010, 29).

The UK also justified its contribution to the NATO mission by referring to the goal of ‘[providing] strategic level advice on all aspects of civilian policing’ (FAC 2011a, Ev 6). Importantly, the UK followed cross-operational strategies not only to create a partition of work between the EU and NATO missions, but also to shift some of the tasks of the EU mission to its NATO counterpart. As noted above, although ‘strategic level advice’ on civilian policing used to be an element London distinctively associated with the EU mission, it has now been linked to the value added of the NATO mission after the emergence of a withdrawal agenda and timeline. This also changed the EU mission’s priorities from a broad focus on strategic advice at a ministerial level to the delivery of security in the cities (EUC 2010a, 48). Moreover, although the UK supported that the International Police Coordination Board’s (IPCB) secretary role should be held by the EU mission, IPCB was regarded by the US as non-binding not least due to the insufficient European efforts in the field of police assistance (Interview 17: EU official). Given this US reluctance about supporting the IPCB, the UK increasingly emphasised the role of Afghan MoI’s International Coordination Cell (MICC), which was led and

coordinated by the NATO mission. According to a senior NATO official in Afghanistan, the UK's idea in putting 'few but significant' police forces into the NATO mission was to 'try and bridge the gap between NATO/US military approach and the police expertise' (Interview 1: NATO official). In consequence, London 'welcomed' the NATO mission's taking over of the lead responsibility in areas such as literacy training to ANP (CO 2011).

The UK's increasing emphasis on the military-led NATO mission was in contrast with the UK's working together with the Afghan Ministry of Interior through the DfID-led Strategic Support to the Ministry of Interior (SSMI) (Interview 18: UK official). Thus, although the 'strategic level advice' on civilian policing used to be an element that the UK distinctively associated with the EU mission, following Washington's critical evaluation after the emerging withdrawal timeline, London began to link it to the value added of the NATO mission. The importance the UK attached to the NATO mission in terms of leading the MICC shows that what was previously accepted as a distinctive function of the mission, namely the coordination for various police training efforts, was now being associated with the NATO mission.

Hence, the UK Government's withdrawal decision and its concern to maintain good working relations with the US significantly affected the UK strategies in police training in Afghanistan, bringing the UK closer NATO rather than the EU mission over time. Furthermore, the increasing focus on fast and visible recruitment of Afghan police officers also compromised London's attention on counter-narcotics enforcement. As a UK official recalls, 'as soon as Barack Obama announced a limit to his commitment to Afghanistan, long-term projects were hugely undermined' (Interview 26: UK official). For instance, the UK closed down the public information element of the counter-narcotics team in the Kabul Embassy in 2011, which is seen as a key 'soft edge' part of the UK's counter-narcotics strategy (Interview 3: UK official). This

reflected the coordination challenges within the UK's Provincial Reconstruction Team in Helmand, which was otherwise deemed an exemplary method of 'joint civilian-military co-operation' between FCO, MoD, and DfID (HoC Defence Committee 2010).

Given that counter-narcotics enforcement was an area that the UK Government sought to address through, among other things, the EU's civilian expertise, the EU mission also became a less important ingredient of the UK's Afghanistan policies. While the Home Office 'was completely obsessed with a drugs strategy' whereas 'the evidence just didn't come into it', FCO was 'trying to convince the Home Secretary that the counter-narcotics strategy was completely counter-productive because this was about the hearts and minds, you [sic] can't do that if the Afghan people associate you [sic] with destroying their livelihood' (Interview 24: UK official). The UK's decreasing emphasis of civilian police training implies that London has not only made a compromise in its internationally-recognised lead in counter-narcotics enforcement, but also minimised the potential intragovernmental resistance to its overall policy.

In the meantime, domestic criticisms against the UK's prioritising of the NATO mission continued. A report of the parliamentary House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee indicated that the slow pace of the EU mission's efforts were was mitigated by trainers and advisers from the US military, which [ran] the risk of creating a para-military style police as opposed to the civilian force which was originally envisaged and which [would] be needed in the future' (HoC Foreign Affairs Committee 2009, 37). Evidence collected by the House of Lords also raised concerns about 'a serious push to arm and equip informal policing forces in Afghanistan' (EUC 2010a, 10). A report from its EU Committee (EUC 2011b, 20), for instance, emphasised that the NATO missions' predominantly militarised police training approach raised

questions as to how such difference can create a division of labour in the field, which could in turn detriment the UK's fight against drug trade in Afghanistan.

In addition to this interest from the Parliament, incidents that could be related to the UK's engagement with police training in Afghanistan were also covered by media at the time. For example, the shooting of five British military personnel by an Afghan police officer in November 2009 raised questions over the military-led training regime (BBC 2009). Nonetheless, rather than changing the strategy after this scrutiny at the domestic level, the UK Government continued to place police experts into the military-led police training provided by the NATO mission to 'try and bridge the gap between NATO/US military approach and the police expertise' (Interview 1: NATO official).

Despite these continued criticisms, the UK Government recognised the challenge of how and at what pace 'to introduce civilian policing whilst ensuring that the ANP have the skills needed to provide basic security and defend themselves against the existing security threat' and that 'the priority in much of the country is for the police to defend themselves and the public against the insurgency' (CO 2011). Although London agreed 'that the ANA and ANP should have distinct roles, with the ANA having responsibility for fighting the insurgency whilst the ANP lead on public protection issues [...] the nature of the environment in Afghanistan [meant] that sometimes these lines [were] blurred on the ground' (CO 2011). In this understanding, the UK endorsed a 'flexible model' to improve security conditions in Afghanistan by developing civilian policing skills to be undertaken 'concurrently with the development of security skills'. Therefore, the UK sought to remain committed to the EU mission while working closely with the NATO mission to ensure that civilian policing skills are incorporated into the standard training packages delivered to new and existing recruits' (CO 2011).

In order to exercise such a flexible model of engagement, cooperation between the EU and NATO missions remained an important objective for the UK. That said, rather than NATO's provision of security protection to the EU mission, the UK's emphasis on inter-operational cooperation between the EU and NATO was based on ensuring the establishment of sufficient conditions for withdrawal of British troops from Afghanistan. Despite concerns about the security context in the country especially after the aforementioned murdering of five British officers by a man wearing Afghan police uniform in November 2009, the UK government did not appear to have considered increasing security protection to the EU mission. A view in the FCO was that despite the lack of formal EU-NATO agreement that deprives the EU mission personnel from NATO protection outside of the cases of emergency ('in extremis support')¹⁷, the EU mission secured protection from the private security firms and did not rely on military support (EUC 2010a, 6).

Over time, to ensure such compatibility between two missions, senior officials of the NATO mission have been drawn to the high-level command of the EU mission (EUC 2011b, 30). It was even argued that the NATO mission 'absorbed' its EU counterpart, while the latter continued to undertake specific tasks such as curriculum and training for the police staff college (EUC 2011b, 36). In 2011, no less than 87% of ANP staff operating in key terrain districts were partnered with ISAF units, of which the NATO mission was a part (Chaudhuri and Farrell 2011, 279).

¹⁷ Another development that appeased the UK concerns about its officers is the omission of the phrase 'in extremis support' from ISAF documents. The UK Government stated that 'as a result of the efforts of the UK and our international partners, on 12 October [2010], the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) approved a [...] new language on support to non-NATO actors [which] omits the caveat "in extremis"' (HoL 2010a, 45).

Despite shifting some of the EU mission's key responsibilities to its NATO counterpart, however, London followed cross-operational strategies within the operational overlap in order to use each operation's comparative advantages. Indeed, the UK Government did not refrain from making use of the operational overlap in Afghanistan by taking advantage of the distinct features of the two missions. The UK Government argued that 'EUPOL [brought] expertise that others do not and that it is playing an essential role in the professionalisation of the ANP' (CO 2011). For instance, whilst the US civilian aid focused 'heavily on infrastructure projects (roads and power), economic development, education, and alternative (agricultural) development/counter narcotics programs', the European assistance prioritised 'governance, justice/rule of law, and health' (Flanagan et al. 2011, 197). Interviews also suggest that European countries have added 'a counter viewpoint because they thought differently from the Anglo-Saxon thinking' (Interview 26: UK official). A NATO official described the UK's strategy of keeping seconding police staff to the EU mission during the incremental withdrawal process as 'straddling' between the EU and NATO missions (Interview 1: NATO official). EU officials, on the other hand, described the UK's approach as 'professional and practical' (Interview 17: EU official).

While supporting the NATO mission during the transition process, the UK Government was also concerned that 'a failure, or perceived failure of EUPOL [...] could spell trouble for the whole future of civilian European Security and Defense Policy operations' (US Mission to the EU 2009a). This concern was evident in the UK's continued linkage of some civilian aspects of its counter-narcotics strategy with the EU mission, which was more in line with some elements of the UK's counter-narcotics enforcement efforts compared to the NATO mission (Interview 1: NATO official). The UK was at the same time trying to convince its US partners

to stop building the police staff, ‘which was completely unsustainable’ and that ‘the Americans [sic] did not understand stabilisation whereas the Europeans did’ (Interview 24: UK official).

5.4.7. Conclusion

In this section I discussed the UK’s strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO in Afghanistan. The evidence suggests that during the planning and agenda-setting stages, the UK sought to shape the EU mission in such a way that the mission would serve as a leverage for London’s efforts to prevent the production and trade of narcotics in Afghanistan, which the UK saw as a security threat. During this period, a comparative advantage of the EU mission for the UK was based on the ‘software’ of police reform, such as addressing the leadership weaknesses, dismantling the misuse of policing powers and dysfunctional police culture in the Afghan police. On the other hand, London attempted to use the NATO operation for the ‘hard-edge’ of policing in Afghanistan.

With David Cameron’s announcement of the incremental withdrawal of British troops from Afghanistan in June 2010, however, the role of veto players within the UK’s domestic political environment became more prominent drivers of the UK’s strategies in Afghanistan. In addition to Cameron’s withdrawal announcement, which reflected the dominance of the core executive and the limited role of the parliament, the Cabinet Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office dominated the Afghanistan dossier. As a result, the UK Government’s preference for faster and more visible outcomes increased the UK’s support to NATO operation.

Table 6 outlines the drivers and type of the UK’s strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO in Afghanistan.

| Drivers of the UK's strategies | | Type of the UK's strategies |
|---|---|---|
| Security interests | Narcotics as a security threat to the UK homeland | Exploitation Using the EU and NATO missions to pursue the UK's objectives about counter-narcotics; fostering cooperation and division of labour between the two missions |
| Domestic veto players | Dominance of the Cabinet Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office; the government's concerns about maintaining good relations with the US | |
| Preferences about means of intervention | Practical benefits of using the EU's civilian training approach; a preference over the UK's expertise on the 'hard edge' of police training | |

Table 6. The UK's strategies within the operational overlap in Afghanistan

In this sense, the UK's strategies within the overlap between the EU and NATO missions in Afghanistan offer significant support to the threefold argument presented in Chapter 2. First, in line with the argument that member states consider the implications of their strategies for both operations, the UK articulated and implemented cross-operational strategies. This was evident in the division of labour the UK established between the two missions on the basis of long-term stabilisation (EUPOL) and rapid delivery of counter-insurgency capabilities (NTM-A). At the same time, the UK attempted to ensure that EU-level coordination did not hamper the effectiveness of coordination at NATO level. The UK also worked to mitigate the gaps between the EU and NATO missions by arguing that EUPOL's role should be to complement NATO efforts. Moreover, despite shifting some of the EU mission's tasks to the NATO mission during the transition process, the UK Government did not refrain from taking part in the EU mission

in order to use its comparative advantages that were perceived to be supportive of the NATO mission.

Second, the UK's strategies confirm the claim that member states follow particular forum-shopping practices across the EU and NATO operations. In Afghanistan, the UK followed an exploitation strategy by taking part in both EU and NATO missions by considering 'functionality' of each mission in terms of addressing an external security threat, namely the production and trade of narcotics in Afghanistan. The UK preferred to keep the EU mission as a small-scale mission with a 'niche' focus on developing qualified personnel, while increasing its support to NATO mission for faster and more visible recruitment of Afghan police officers who could uphold security in the country after transition. Furthermore, the UK also constantly sought to foster complementarity and cooperation between the two missions, though it shifted some of the EU mission's tasks to the NATO mission during the transition process.

Third, the UK's centralised organisation of policymaking facilitated its use of the EU's expertise in crisis management to supplement NATO efforts as well as in maintaining good relations with the US administration. The UK's decision-making environment that was centralised around the Cabinet Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence, as well as its institutional mechanisms to ensure intra-governmental coordination such as the Stabilisation Unit, minimised the potential substantive incoherency within policymaking. Furthermore, the UK Government's decision to incrementally withdraw British troops from Afghanistan was also facilitated by the UK's organisation of policymaking where the executive is relatively autonomous from the control of the legislature.

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6. Gulf of Aden: We are in this together

6.1. Introduction

In 2008, there was an 11% worldwide increase in the number of incidents of piracy or armed robbery at sea against ships, with nearly 38% of these incidents occurring off the coast of Somalia (UNSC 2009, 1). Furthermore, in 2008, 51 piratical attacks were reported in the Gulf of Aden that resulted in 26 hijacked vessels and 537 crew members taken hostage (Møller 2009, 1). With this rise in piracy and armed robbery incidents there was an international recognition that piracy in the region has become a ‘sophisticated and well-organized industry’ (UNSC 2008c, 27). In addition to the risks the issue of piracy presented for safety of maritime trade transiting the Horn of Africa, a particular concern was the World Food Programme’s (WFP) aid deliveries to Somalia, which were suspended as a result of pirate attacks (Murphy 2011). There was a wide recognition in the international community that ‘without the naval escorts and the regular delivery of food aid, Somalia’s food stocks were seriously threatened’ (Middleton 2008, 10). Apart from more deep-rooted issues such as a lack of functioning central government in Somalia, which relied on imported food aid to provide supplies to its people, delivering this aid through land was practically too risky due to the hold of militias and criminal gangs in much of Somalia’s countryside as well as in regional countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya (Middleton 2008, 10; Nováky 2018a, 134).

Internal discussions within NATO about an initiative to address Somali piracy began in the summer of 2008. In June, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for a NATO operation to address piracy in the region. In July 2007, NATO established an intermittent regional presence with its ‘Round Africa’ deployment. Frigates

within NATO's Standing Maritime Group 2 (SNMG 2) were deployed to escort WFP ships and to conduct anti-piracy patrols (IISS 2009a, 2). In August 27, the US raised the possibility of a NATO counter-piracy role including, but not limited to, using NATO's Standing Maritime Groups (Secretary of State 2008b). Yet, key actors at NATO level, such as the Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, noted that without appropriate operational planning, the inaction of Standing Maritime Groups may 'embarrass NATO if there is no anti-piracy policy in place' (US Mission to NATO 2008b).

Given the aforementioned rise in piracy incidents and the resulting economic and humanitarian urgency of the issue, NATO launched its first counterpiracy operation in the region in October 2008. Named Operation Allied Provider, this was an interim and rapid response to piracy in the Gulf of Aden, as the intention was to replace this NATO task force with EU forces once the latter becomes operational (SHAPE 2020; Seibert 2008).

Indeed, the EU was already running parallel operational planning processes around March and April 2008, which led to a more developed crisis response planning process led by the EU Military Staff (EUMS) in the summer of 2008 (Peters et al. 2014, 433). Together with EU Military Committee (EUMC), EUMS assessed the situation and reviewed various options to react to the crisis by drafting a crisis management concept on 5 August 2008 (Auswärtiges Amt 2009, 30). The crisis management concept was then passed on to the Council on 31 July, which adopted the document on 5 August (Peters et al. 2014, 433). Based on the crisis management concept, EUMS produced a list of Military Strategic Options (MSOs), which included '(1) maritime surveillance without close protection (deterrence by presence), (2) convoy escorts, and (3) surveillance with close protection' (Peters et al. 2014, 433). The Council then decided in favour of the third option on 15 September.


Eventually, the Council adopted the Joint Action to launch EUNAVFOR Atalanta on 10 November 2008 (Council 2008a). Atalanta, which is an ongoing operation as of June 2021, became operational in December 2008. Taking piracy-related UNSC Resolutions 1814, 1816, and 1838 as an international legal basis, the EU operation's main tasks are 'protection of vessels of the WFP delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia', deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery, protection of vulnerable shipping coast, and contributing to the monitoring of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia (Council 2008a, 4; Bratosin and Paronjana 2014, 2). Moreover, in order to address the long-term causes of piracy, the EU also formulated a 'Strategy for the Horn of Africa' and appointed a Special Representative for the region, as well as launching the EU Training Mission Somalia (EUTM Somalia), a programme to 'train the security forces and strengthen the Somali government' (Council 2010; Wehrey 2013). The EU also launched the EU Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR) to strengthen the rule of law in the regions of Puntland and Somaliland by supporting the development of a judiciary and coastal police force (Council 2012).

As stated, NATO's initial involvement in the region was meant to come to an end once an EU operation is deployed (Seibert 2008). Although the EU's take over from NATO was 'widely hailed for its pragmatism' (Willett 2011, 21), NATO launched two follow-up operations. Similar to its first operation in the region (Allied Provider), NATO launched Operation Allied Protector as a short-lasting task force in March 2009. In the words of NATO Secretary General Scheffer, Operation Allied Provider 'provided the [NATO] with useful experience as [NATO] consider[ed] possible long-term counter-piracy efforts in the months ahead' (US Mission to

NATO 2008d; SHAPE 2008). Indeed, when this operation ended in August 2009, NATO launched its longest naval operation in the region, called Operation Ocean Shield.

NATO's longest counter-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden, Operation Ocean Shield had four main objectives: 'deterring and disrupting pirate operations at sea, co-ordinating international counterpiracy efforts, enhancing the maritime community's capacity to counter piracy effectively, and developing a regional counter-piracy capability' (NATO 2019; Allied Maritime Command, n.d.). In addition to fight against piracy, this NATO operation also offered assistance to regional states 'in developing their own capacity to combat piracy activities' (NATO 2019). Operation Ocean Shield was therefore different from its predecessors with its regional capacity building tasks (Strickmann 2009, 3; Kupferschmidt 2011, 63; Knops 2012, 8; Ehrhart and Petretto 2012, 7). NATO's Operation Ocean Shield ended in November 2016, According to a senior NATO official, member states' decision to terminate the operation was based on their reluctance to keep the operation intact despite the decreasing levels of piracy incidents in the region (Interview 33: NATO official).

As seen in above presentation of the EU and NATO operations in the Gulf of Aden, the two organisations' operations overlapped temporally and geographically (see also Figure 11 below, as well as Appendix C), while also having conducted similar tasks to address the same issue, namely piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Aden. For some analysts, piracy presented a 'perfect stage' for each organisation's political desire to be seen to be doing something and prove its superiority (Willett 2011, 21). Figure 11 summarises the evolution of overlap between the EU and NATO operations in the Gulf of Aden.



*Figure 11. Timeline of overlap in the Gulf of Aden
(Source: Author)*

6.2. France: Pragmatism with national red lines

6.2.1. The context of France's engagement with counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden

Before the EU and NATO operations, France contributed to the fight against piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Aden through the ad hoc French initiative called 'Operation Alcyon' and through the US-led Combined Task Force-150 (CTF-150), a naval component of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Operation Alcyon was launched in November 2007 to protect food aid to Somalia by escorting World Food Programme (WFP) vessels (Agence France Presse 2007). Bernard Kouchner, French foreign minister at the time, was personally interested in this naval patrol that was planned to last for two months. As a key figure among humanitarian NGOs with a long experience in the field as the co-founder of the *Médecins sans Frontières* and *Médecins du Monde*, Kouchner believed that the French Navy should ensure a humanitarian corridor to World Food Program's (WFP) humanitarian aid delivery (Kouchner 2009a; Schmitt 2012, 72).

French forces also operated under the US-led CTF-150, a component of OEF with a broad focus on 'disrupting terrorist organisations and their related illegal activities by restricting their freedom of manoeuvre in the maritime domain' in the Red Sea, the Sea of Oman, the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa (CTF 2020a). French contribution to this task force was regarded by the US as a facilitating factor to achieve 'a good degree of interaction and cooperation in this key region' (US Embassy Paris 2006).

Importantly, an additional parameter for France's engagement with counter-piracy was the attacks on French ships transiting the region. With incidents such as the hijacking of two French

yachts *Le Ponant* and *Carre d'As* in April and September 2008 respectively, France came to acknowledge that Somali piracy also constituted a threat to French citizens and the issue consequently became more salient in domestic politics (AFP 2008a). As a result, France not only continued its determination to actively support counter-piracy efforts during this period, but also became more vocal about 'internationalising' its own counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, which culminated in an increasing framing of Somali piracy as a global issue. As Kouchner indicated, 'the fight against piracy has become a global issue [and] it is also a laboratory where prospects for the world of tomorrow are emerging' (AFP 2009a). Defence minister at the time, Herve Morin, also argued that France's efforts should be supported by other international actors (Agence France Presse 2007).

Paris initially looked at the UN as a source of such support. Kouchner asked the UN Security Council (UNSC) to authorise regularly monitoring of the area off the Somali coast, while also stating that France considers it necessary to further its unilateral counter-piracy effort 'particularly in the UN framework' (AFP 2008d; 2008b). Similarly, Morin called for 'an international initiative' to address the issue, 'probably through the United Nations' (La Presse Canadienne 2008a). In line with this objective, France and the US co-sponsored a series of UNSC resolutions that would allow states to deploy naval assets to tackle piracy in Somalia's territorial waters. In addition to tackling piracy, Paris also argued that a UNSC resolution should not hamper operation Alcyon's rules of engagement (US Secretary of State 2008a). On a draft circulated on 28 April 2008, Washington supported the French wording of using 'all necessary means to identify, deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery' within the territorial waters of Somalia, which culminated in the UNSC Resolution 1816 of 2 June 2008 (Dijkstra 2016, 203; UNSC 2008a, 3).

6.2.2. Domestic decision-making structure

France implemented different modes of coordination in ‘a pragmatic way’ to facilitate interministerial policy coordination in producing its counterpiracy strategies (Premier Ministre 2019, 47). Reflected France’s institutional decision-making arrangements in security and defence policy as outlined in Chapter 4, which was centred around a strong core executive, this way of policy coordination was evident in a sparse yet centralised domestic decision-making network. Within this network, central coordination of different domestic and institutional policy lines was undertaken by actors and agencies within the core of the foreign policy executive.

In the context of France’s counterpiracy efforts, the task of harmonising inputs from different governmental stakeholders was mainly undertaken by the General Secretariat of National Defence and Security (*Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale*, SGDSN), headed by the President but formally in the auspices of the Prime Ministry. SGDSN was directly involved in the development of governmental policies to tackle maritime piracy (French Government 2020). SGDSN also led a national security alert system termed *Vigipirate*, created in order to protect the French territory and citizens abroad in case of a terrorist attack. This system is comprised of a series of ‘pirate’ intervention plans, with a component called ‘PIRATE-MER’ devoted to maritime terrorism and piracy (Horațiu and Alexandru 2008, 167).

At the same time, SGDSN undertook this role in collaboration with a number of other agencies. From a broad perspective, diplomatic tasks such as the negotiation of international documents were coordinated by the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (*Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères*, MEAE), while the Ministry of Defence (*Ministère des Armées*, MdA) provided input to operational aspects in collaboration with MEAE’s Directorate of Security and Defence Cooperation (SGDSN 2016, 16).

A General Secretariat for the Sea (SGMer) within the Prime Ministry was involved in the coordination of the government's policies in maritime matters, while also monitoring and evaluating France's maritime policy (French Government 2020). When necessary, a committee chaired by SGMer convened with the participation of, among other actors, the Secretary General of Defence and National Security and the Chief of the Naval Staff (French Government 2020). Interministerial Committee for the Sea (CIMer) was an additional decision-making tool for all matters relating to the sea and the oceans, convening annually under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister and attended by the ministries that deal with maritime issues (French Government 2019).

Moreover, 'a counsellor for African affairs worked directly under the supervision of President Nicolas Sarkozy and his diplomatic advisor' (Gegout 2018, 137). Sarkozy also brought together a number of key figures to discuss crisis situations related to Somali piracy, including Bernard Kouchner (Minister of Foreign and European Affairs), Hervé Morin (Defence Minister), Admiral Édouard Guillaud (Chief of the Military Staff), General Jean-Louis Georgelin (Chief of the Defence Staff), and Claude Gueant (Chief of Staff of the President), and Jean-David Levitte (Sarkozy's diplomatic advisor) (Guisnel 2008).

The multilateral dimension of France's engagement with piracy occurred through three main institutional fora: UN, EU and NATO. Main diplomatic channels between these levels and the domestic level are kept by France's Permanent Representations to these organisations, although they shared this role with MEAE's political director and MdA's strategic affairs delegation (Mérand et al. 2011).

France's decision-making structure regarding the EU and NATO operations in the Gulf of Aden is illustrated in Figure 10.




Figure 12. France's decision-making structure regarding the EU and NATO operations in the Gulf of Aden.
(Source: Author)

6.2.3. Engagement with NAVCO and Allied Provider: Independent but urgent European action

An important determinant of France's initial engagement with counter-piracy was its Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2008. Paris used its this institutional position in the EU to set the agenda for a potential EU solution to Somali piracy. Initial considerations in Paris about what could be achieved through the EU focused on combined naval capabilities to combat piracy as well as other key concerns such as terrorism and trafficking (US Embassy Paris 2008c). French Government encouraged its EU partners to contribute more resources and generate political support for expanding existing efforts into an

ESDP naval operation (US Embassy Paris 2008e). This was evident in defence minister Morin's argument that Paris favours 'an exercise that must be at least European, if not international' (AFP 2008d). Kouchner also referred to the protection of maritime trade route in the region to give counter-piracy efforts a 'common European interest' dimension (Kouchner 2009a). Kouchner further explained that although the World Food Programme (WFP) ships were the main targets of pirates at the beginning, protection of merchant ships sailing off the Somali coast also became an urgency (AFP 2008f). The importance of this issue was reinforced by Michel Barnier, French Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries of the time, who called for a European response to piracy attacks to protect the commercial European vessels in this area and humanitarian aid convoys (AFP 2008e).

At the same time, Paris left open the UN and other channels, such as the US-led Combined Maritime Task Forces (CTF) (Interview 29: German official). Indeed, France was also considering a potential joint anti-piracy framework via the US-led Combined Maritime Task Force (CTF-150), as well as the expansion of CTF-150's roles after France's unilateral operation Alcyon terminates (US Mission to UN 2007; US Embassy Paris 2008b). Moreover, Paris was also concerned with the speed at which the planned EU operation could be launched by acknowledging that a formal EU operation would 'take a lot of time' to be fully deployed (AFP 2008e). 'A credible EU mission would need a minimum of three ships' and no member state had confirmed the participation of any specific ships at the time (US Embassy Paris 2008d). Even upon assuming the rotating Council Presidency, the French government acknowledged that a full-fledged EU operation might take longer time than France's six-month Council Presidency (US Embassy Paris 2008f). Moreover, Javier Solana, EU's High Representative at the time, was unsure if a European naval mission would even be 'necessary', while welcoming the coordination cell as 'a very good step in the right direction' (AFP 2008e).

Nevertheless, as Paris wanted to ‘have something in place’ as soon as possible, it chose to use an EU initiative to coordinate existing member state efforts and facilitate a move to a formal naval operation under the EU (US Embassy Paris 2008e). In this understanding, a four-person coordination cell (NAVCO) was created within the EU on 19 September. The aim was ‘to coordinate the efforts of the individual member states in the fight against piracy’ (US Embassy Paris 2008e; Dijkstra 2016, 189). For Kouchner, NAVCO was important not only for the protection of WFP deliveries to Somalia, but also for ‘the entire European fishing fleet in the region’ (AFP 2008f).

France’s emphasis on protection of shipping industry also prompted France to focus on laying the legal groundwork for a more robust EU initiative. Paris drafted UNSC resolutions as a legal basis ‘to set the scene for an autonomous ESDP operation’ (US Embassy Brussels 2008). After UNSC resolution 1816, French delegation to the UN came to be in favour of a robust resolution due to concerns about shipowners’ reliance on insurance companies for the payment of ransoms to the pirates, as pirates were believed to use the ransom money to purchase more sophisticated capabilities to carry out their actions (US Embassy Paris 2008g). The following UNSC resolution (1838) of 7 October 2008 commended the work of NAVCO as well as ‘the ongoing planning process towards a possible European Union naval operation’ (UNSC 2008b). Kouchner argued that these resolutions gave France ‘the opportunity to demonstrate strongly in international waters that it was capable of intervening in Somali waters against pirates (La Presse Canadienne 2008b).

In addition to security-related concerns, the French Government was also looking to set the EU operation independently from the US. As stated, during the initial negotiations on the

French draft resolution, Washington was favouring the deletion of the phrase ‘all necessary measures’ (US Secretary of State 2008c). Yet, US diplomats admitted that they ‘had difficulty providing substantive responses to EU Presidency diplomatic approaches as the EU prepared for the Somalia anti-piracy mission’ (US Mission to the EU 2009c). Eventually, a compromise was found in the wording of the resolution, which called upon states to use ‘the necessary means, in conformity with international law, as reflected in the Convention, for the repression of acts of piracy’ (UNSC 2008b).

France’s search for alternative solutions to address the security challenges posed by piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Aden shows the significance of the issue for France’s security interests based on the safety of its own citizens and that of the trade route transiting the region. Although France did not commit resources to the NATO Operation Allied Provider, which was launched before the EU operation, it did not block the launch of this operation at the North Atlantic Council. In contrast to the perception in NATO at the time that France was almost constantly vetoing certain operational planning processes, France chose to cooperate with other NATO countries in the context of fight against piracy (Interview 4: NATO official). A French diplomat noted that there was ‘room for everyone’ in a such a vast geographical area and France’s goal was essentially pragmatic in having a swift deployment of as many assets as possible deployed to the region (US Embassy Paris 2008e).

At the same time, from a NATO-level perspective, France as a non-contributing nation did not have much of a say in the direction of the NATO operation (Interview 33: NATO official). However, France still sought to control NATO’s involvement in the region in such a way that it would not prevent an independent EU presence. Even during its absence from NATO’s military command, France was able to bring its positions without ‘dancing at two weddings at

the same time' (Interview 35: NATO official). In this sense, Paris argued that a NATO initiative may negatively impact the EU's work by causing institutional coordination problems (US Embassy Paris 2008e). To ensure this complementarity, defence minister Morin acted as a gatekeeper between the EU and NATO by taking an active role in the coordination of the two organisations' initiatives (Interview 37: French official). Therefore, despite not taking part in the NATO operation, France was considering the implications of NATO's involvement in the Gulf of Aden for the EU's presence in the region.

Overall, holding the Presidency of the EU Council, France sought to promote an independent European initiative, but it did not rule out alternative options mainly due to the urgency of the issue of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Aden (Interview 28: German official). Non-EU options included the US-led CTF-150 to perform general surveillance, calling for additional EU member states on an ad hoc basis, and 'securing additional counter-piracy capabilities through NATO if the Alliance so decides' (US Embassy Paris 2008g). Despite using multiple channels to generate support to tackle Somali piracy, however, Paris was cautious about NATO's involvement in the region especially if this would have negative consequences for an independent EU task force. Hence, French efforts to generate international support to address Somali piracy co-existed with preferences about an institution of choice and France's cross-operational strategies in the region.

6.2.4. Engagement with the EU and NATO operations: Advantageous but conditional support

Being absent from the NATO operation, France was also reluctant about *ad hoc* frameworks including actors such as China, Russia and India. The reason was France's lack of previous experience in working with these actors in (naval) crisis management settings (US Embassy

Paris 2008a). This kept France's attention on the EU and NATO options. At the same time, given the increase in pirate attacks, the imperative for a robust and effective counterpiracy mandate became more urgent for France, which was already concerned about the implications of pirate attacks for its citizens and economy (Interview 36: French official).

Such a mandate, however, was lacked by existing task forces such as the US-led CTF-151. This task force had 'the sole mission of conducting anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Somali coast in the Indian Ocean' (Ploch et al. 2011, 25). As a *Sénat* report highlighted, it was not certain whether counter-piracy is the main objective of CTF-151, the main strengths of which were seen as intelligence capacity and military power (Ménard 2009). On the other hand, the EU was 'the most focused and dedicated operation' in terms of the fight against piracy and armed robbery (Interview 30: German official). Therefore, France's preference was to complement other task forces in the region rather than replacing them, provided that an autonomous European initiative would not be undermined by other task forces (Interview 33: NATO official; US Embassy Djibouti 2009; Le Figaro 2008). As foreign minister Kouchner argued, the EU and NATO operations ought to work as 'two complementary tools' in the fight against piracy (Kouchner 2009b).

When the EU operation Atalanta was eventually launched, France joined with three frigates, one submarine and a maritime patrol aircraft (IISS 2009b). On the other hand, France did not commit resources to NATO's new operation, Allied Protector. France was 'very keen on pursuing a particular line' based on the autonomy of the EU operation (Interview 35: NATO official). In order to consolidate the independent EU effort to tackle Somali piracy in terms of resources, France was also wary about a potential resource competition between the EU and NATO operations (Interview 37: French official), while at the same time arguing that NATO

should draw on new, non-EU resources rather than to the pool already operating in Atalanta (US Embassy Paris 2009a). Having reintegrated into the Alliance's military command, France has been better able to bring these 'pro-EU perspectives' to NATO's decision-making processes (Interview 33: NATO official). As a 'hard core of Allies' that bring such perspectives to NAC meetings, France pursued a pro-EU approach in relation to what NATO should be focusing on in crisis management, namely military-focused tasks (Interview 40: NATO official). In the words of a NATO official, these meetings were sometimes too much focused on 'dealing with the EU' rather than discussing NATO's roles (Interview 40: NATO official).

6.2.4.1. Comparative advantages of the EU operation: Legal dimension, addressing the root causes of piracy, and symbolic value

As the maturing of the EU operation coexisted with an increase in pirate attacks on French ships transiting the region, Paris came to recognise that 'military action will come to nothing' without 'punishment of pirates' (Maylis 2009). In order to complement military deterrence efforts, the option of bringing pirates to France for trial began to be discussed more seriously (Le Figaro 2009). During this time, however, French law provided a basis for the arrest of individuals involved in the crimes in high seas related to illicit drug trafficking and illegal immigration, rather than piracy (Ménard 2009). Therefore, France transferred the captured pirates to internationally unrecognised Puntland, with which France had a bilateral transfer agreement. Yet, Puntland was seen by the EU as lacking the sufficient legal framework to observe human rights guarantees (Ménard 2009). French forces operating under the EU operation thus had to opt out of its command to transfer the captured pirates to Puntland (Interview 36: French official). Additionally, a Sénat report of May 2009 stated that prosecuting the captured pirates in France could compel the French forces to leave the operational theatre

to bring the pirates to France, which would in turn cost considerable time and money (Ménard 2009). France also opposed the German proposal of creating an international tribunal to deal with piracy prosecutions (US Secretary of State 2009), instead arguing that the location of trial should be decided by national authorities on a case-by-case basis (Interview 20: Academic expert).

Over time, the EU signed transfer agreements with a number of regional countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, Mauritius, and the Seychelles, a development welcomed by a *Sénat* report which argued that the EU operation overcame the ‘judicial deadlock’ in France (Ménard 2009). Although acknowledging that the deployment of NATO forces in the region was ‘a very useful contribution’, the report pointed out that Operation Allied Protector ‘suffer[ed] from a clear lack of legal cover for its operations’, as its ‘mandate [did] not allow it to detain pirates’ (Ménard 2009). Therefore, France considered that the EU’s transfer agreements presented a ‘comparative advantage’ for the EU operation vis-à-vis other multilateral task forces in the region (Interview 36: French official).

Paris also considered the long-term causes of Somali piracy. Such a focus on the root causes of piracy was in line with France’s ‘more Africa’ policy, outlined in the 2008 White Paper as a framework to change the existing defence and military cooperation between France and Africa (Ministère de la Défense 2008, 6). Because it was home to the only military operation exclusively carried out by the African Union at the time, Somalia was an important country for France’s regional objectives such as training the forces of other regional countries like Uganda and Burundi (Kouchner 2009b). Moreover, President Sarkozy argued that whilst military action is an indispensable element of the fight against piracy, it was also necessary to rebuild the political institutions in Somalia, strengthen the Somali security forces, and support the African

Union Mission in Somalia (Sarkozy 2009). In parallel, Kouchner stressed that the main causes of piracy laid in Somalia, ‘the fight against piracy [was] the fight for development’ (Le Figaro 2009), and that ‘it would obviously be useless to send more troops to Somalia, a huge territory without a state structure, without fighting poverty there’ (De Montety 2009). For Morin too, the EU needed ‘not just to address the consequences of the collapse of a country (Somalia), which is the source of the piracy, but also to address the causes of the restoration of a state’ (AFP 2009b).

Despite the fact that NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield also had a local capacity-building mandate, Paris drew on the EU’s expertise of linking ‘first pillar instruments’ in the region such as development aid to judicial agreements with countries in the region (Riddervold 2014, 559; Council 2009). Similarly, additional EU instruments included the military training mission EUTM Somalia (Council 2010), the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa (Council 2011), the maritime capacity building mission EUCAP Nestor (Council 2012), as well as European Development Fund support to regional capacity building in the rule of law sectors (Council 2013b). In addition to the fit between the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’ and France’s motivation to tackle the root causes of piracy in the region, France’s preference to engage with counter-piracy through the EU rather than NATO also had a practical benefit due to an EU operational centre being based in Djibouti, where France also had a military base (interviews 36 and 37: French officials).

The EU operation also had a symbolic value for France on two aspects. First, it epitomised the France’s co-leadership with the UK behind the EU’s role as an international security provider. Sarkozy stated in 2009 that Atalanta was launched as ‘the first EU naval operation, the first operation defending purely European interests and, what’s more, the first EU military

operation commanded by the United Kingdom' (Sarkozy 2009). Given the UK's offer to make its Operational Headquarter in Northwood and a British operations commander available to Atalanta, Kouchner stated that Atalanta is 'a beautiful symbol' of Franco-British cooperation (De Montety 2009). Kouchner also highlighted the timing of the EU operation, which coincided with tenth anniversary of the Franco-British St Malo Declaration of 1998 (Miliband and Kouchner 2008).

Second, the EU operation reflected France's *l'Europe de la défense* policy based on promoting the development of a CSDP that can act independently from the US (Rieker 2017, 26). Defence minister Juppé stated that Atalanta is 'an example of what we want to do together in terms of European military cooperation' (Sénat 2011). Other high-level officials also emphasised that Atalanta showed 'what the European Union can do when it wants to' (Assemblée Nationale 2012b). A NATO official approvingly stated that France's participation to the EU instead of NATO operation was linked to its leadership within the EU at the time as well as its preference for a separate EU command in the region (Interview 33: NATO official). At the same time, not only the institution of choice but also 'operational efficiency' was a key concern for France, which would have used the bilateral option if that was the more efficient course of action (Interview 36: French official). Paris maintained that the EU operation 'provide[d] only a military answer to the question of piracy' and there was a need 'for the international community, and in particular for the European Union, to get more involved in solving this crisis' (Sénat 2011).

Overall, in the Gulf of Aden, France chose the EU operation as a framework for intervention, while diplomatically supporting the NATO operation. In line with security interests, this choice was informed by the EU operation's more robust response to the threat of piracy through a

wider range of instruments as well as the fit between France's and the EU's regional policies. Domestic veto players were also instrumental in France's decision to lead and join the EU operation, as was evident in key decision-makers' determination to use the EU operation as a symbol of the French leadership behind external EU action.

6.2.5. Conclusion

In this section I assessed whether the empirical evidence on France's strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO matches the pattern of events predicted by the multifactor model presented in Chapter 2. The evidence suggests that the EU has been the primary framework of intervention for France to address piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Aden, which was a significant security threat to French citizens and economy. While not taking part in the NATO operation, France argued within NATO's decision-making processes that the role of NATO should be to support the EU operation's activities, rather than duplicating them. In addition to France's security interests, the role of veto players within France's domestic political environment also played a key role in France's strategies about the EU and NATO operations in the Gulf of Aden. That is, the French Government's willingness to demonstrate France's leadership behind CSDP, its emphasis on European military cooperation and parliamentary reports favouring the EU operation were contributing factors to France's decision to take part in the EU operation and not blocking NATO's involvement as long as it did not draw on the pool of resources available to the EU operation.

The drivers and type of France's strategies in the Gulf of Aden are illustrated in Table 7.

| Drivers of France's strategies | | Type of France's strategies |
|---|--|---|
| Security interests | Piracy and armed robbery posed a threat to French citizens and economy | Toleration Advantageous institutional position in the EU; EU operation's comparative advantages; emphasis on an independent EU operation; approving NATO's involvement provided that it does not negatively affect the EU operation. |
| Domestic veto players | Sarkozy's and foreign ministry's emphasis on French leadership behind CSDP; defence ministry's emphasis on European military cooperation; parliamentary reports favouring the EU operation | |
| Preferences about means of intervention | Need for a robust intervention including legal arrangements to avoid bringing captured pirates to France for trial | |

Table 7. France's strategies within the operational overlap in the Gulf of Aden

The evidence from this case study offers support to the threefold argument of the thesis. First, in line with argument that member states articulate and pursue cross-operational strategies across the overlapping crisis management operations of the EU and NATO, France considered the implications of its strategies about one operation for the other. While tolerating the involvement of NATO task forces in the region, France constantly attempted to block NATO attempts that could have negative consequences for an independent EU operation. Therefore, despite not taking part in the NATO operation, France was considering the implications of NATO's involvement in the Gulf of Aden for the EU's presence in the region.

Second, France exercised its choices about the EU and NATO operations through particular practices of forum-shopping. In line with the strategy of toleration as outlined in Chapter 2, France took part only in the EU operation, while offering political and diplomatic support to the NATO operation. Importantly, such support to the latter operation was conditional upon ensuring that NATO's involvement would draw on assets separate from those available in the EU pool and thereby not prevent an independent EU operation.

Third, the evidence also offers support to the third element of the multifactor model which emphasises the role of the organisation of national policymaking in the effective articulation and pursuit national strategies. France's organisation of foreign and security policymaking facilitated a consistent line of policy throughout France's strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO in the Gulf of Aden. While demonstrating a continued readiness to actively assess a cascading list of options to tackle piracy due to the urgency of dealing with piracy, key decision-makers were unified around the idea of taking part in the EU operation and not blocking the NATO operation as long as it provided a politically acceptable leverage to efforts to tackle piracy in the region. President Sarkozy and foreign ministry owned the EU operation as it symbolised France's leadership behind the development of CSDP, while the defence ministry thought the operation would reinforce the military cooperation with European partners. Moreover, parliamentary committee reports favoured France's participation to the EU operation rather than the NATO-led task forces. France also had more power in the EU during especially during the initial phases of operations, when it held the rotating Council Presidency.

6.3. Germany: Fulfilling responsibilities with limited multilateralism

6.3.1. The context of Germany's engagement with counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden

Before the EU and NATO operations, Germany was involved in the Gulf of Aden through Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), though Germany's participation in this operation did not explicitly cover fight against piracy and armed robbery in the region (Bundestag 2008b, 19755). German forces' mandate and rules of engagement in this operation were also restrictive in that German soldiers were not able to board the ship that was subject to an attack without the approval of that ship (Petra 2008; Birgitta 2008; NATO 2017). As German forces' response to calls from civilian vessels passing by the region was therefore reactive, Germany was also reluctant to escort World Food Programme (WFP) convoys during the increased pirate attacks in late 2007 (Der Spiegel 2008; AFP 2008c).

German forces also took part in NATO's Standing Maritime Group 2 (SNMG-2) operating in the Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf at the time (Nováky 2018a, 146). Similar to German forces under OEF, however, SNMGs were normally not used for NATO's maritime security operations (Interview 35: NATO official). Therefore, German forces under SNMG-2 were unable to provide immediate aid to civilian vessels in need (e.g. Die Welt 2008a). Instead of responding to piracy, Berlin saw Germany's presence in SNMGs as a strategic priority to ensure that 'Germany is generally represented in the NATO Response Force at all times' (BMVg 2006, 95).

With an increase in pirate attacks on vulnerable vessels in mid-2008, Germany came to acknowledge the need for a more proactive response to piracy incidents in the region. According to defence minister Franz Josef Jung,

“Any threat to the flow of goods affects [Germany’s] economy. In addition, Germany has the third largest merchant fleet in the world according to the nationality of the owner. Germany is by far the largest owner nation of the container ship fleet” (Bundesregierung 2008a).

Similarly, senior officials from the Federal Ministry of Defence (*Bundesministerium der Verteidigung*, BMVg) emphasised that such incidents in the region were a concern for Germany due to risks posed to the international trade route transiting the region (Kossendey 2008). This emphasis on Germany’s economic interests in the maritime domain resonated a key element in the 2006 ‘White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr’, which stressed that the Federal Armed Forces’ tasks in the maritime domain included the protection of free trade security, and particularly the protection of maritime trade routes (BMVg 2006, 95). The White Paper also stated that ‘the unhindered exchange of goods and the security of transport routes are essential criteria for the tasks of the Bundeswehr [Federal Armed Forces], especially on a global scale’ (Bundesregierung 2008a, 47). Furthermore, the Federal Government’s Maritime Agenda 2025 document, prepared by BMVg, saw the protection of maritime trade ‘as the basis of German and European prosperity’ and identified the protection of maritime trade as a key task of the German Navy (BMVg 2008, 1).

6.3.2. Domestic decision-making structure

Similar to Germany's engagement with police training in Afghanistan through the EU and NATO, a host of federal ministries assumed various tasks regarding the country's engagement with counterpiracy in the Gulf of Aden, reflecting Germany's governance mantra of 'guideline competence' (*Richtlinienkompetenz*). As stated, Germany endorsed a dense decision-making network through a concept of 'networked security' (*vernetzte Sicherheit*). Accordingly, it is essential to have

'... a shared situational understanding of all the actors form the basis for security policy decisions, at national and international level. In developing a picture of the national situation, an interministerial approach is needed that considers and brings together all aspects' (BMVg 2006, 22).

In this respect, policymaking roles with regards to the EU and NATO operations in the Gulf of Aden were coordinated at cabinet level, while individual departments led policymaking in more specific areas. The Chancellery's (*Bundeskanzleramts*) decision-making roles and responsibilities in Germany's counterpiracy strategies mainly lied in concluding the general guidelines for governmental action as well as coordination and strategic direction of policy inputs of various departments (Jacobs 2012, 472). In this vein, management of operations and technical details of external deployments of the German military were dealt with relevant governmental agencies possessing a high degree of autonomy from the central administration thanks to what is known as *Ressortprinzip*. Furthermore, Chancellor Merkel engaged much less with the issue compared to federal foreign and defence ministers at the time (Brummer 2013, 217). To the extent when the Chancellery was involved, it acted more as a mediator to smooth out possible interministerial disagreements (Interview 29: German official).

Federal Foreign Office (*Auswärtiges Amt-AA*) was the main ministry that represented Germany's positions during international negotiations on the fight against piracy, such as those under the EU, NATO, and the UN. In addition, AA officials also took part in international working meetings on the issue such as the framework of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). Depending on the particular dimension of piracy, officials from the Federal Ministry of Interior (*Bundesministerium des Innern-BMI*) and the Federal Ministry of Traffic, Construction and City Development (*Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung-BMVBS*) also attended these working meetings (Auswärtiges Amt 2014a, 29). A dedicated Crisis Response Centre (*Krisenreaktionszentrum*) located at AA prepared detailed analysis for rapid measures to be taken in crisis situations (Auswärtiges Amt 2019b).

As another key domestic agency, Federal Ministry of Defence (*Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, BMVg*) was involved in operational aspects by virtue of having a control over the use of Germany's relevant instruments such as armed vessels (Ehrhart et al. 2012, 16). Moreover, AA and BMVg together managed and directed German policymaking regarding CSDP questions. In the EU, Germany's Ambassador to PSC (Political and Security Committee) was supported by a team of officials including military advisor from BMVg (Wright 2019, 153).

Other ministries situated at the periphery of this core network of ministries also undertook certain roles in maritime security policymaking. BMI controlled over the country's various police structures if a German ship was attacked outside the German territorial waters (Interview 28: German official). In case of criminal investigations, these authorities were the Federal Police (*Bundespolizei*), the Federal Criminal Police (*Bundeskriminalamt-BKA*) and, depending

on local jurisdiction, State Criminal Police Offices (*Landeskriminalämter-LKÄ*) (Ehrhart 2012, 16). BKA and the Federal Police were also part of a joint national crisis team attended by representatives from the Chancellery, AA, BMI, and BMVg (BMWi 2011, 12). Moreover, working closely with BMI, BMVBS was responsible for planning the measures for the protection of German merchant ships, as well as checking the ships' compliance with the relevant safety regulations (Bundestag 2011, 8). Federal states (*Länder*) were also involved at the political level through taking part in the regular conferences and working meetings of the interior state ministers of the states (Ehrhart et al. 2012, 15).

The work of these agencies was coordinated through working groups such as the maritime security working group (*Ressortarbeitskreis Maritime Sicherheit-AK MarSi*), an informal mechanism formed of various ministries including BMI, BMVg, BMF¹⁸, and BMVBS at State Secretary (*Staatssekretär*) level (Petretto 2013, 157).

In contrast to France and the UK, Germany's participation to operations in the Gulf of Aden required *ex ante* parliamentary approval. Because of the important role of the parliament, the Federal Government 'consult[ed] with representatives of all political parties in parliament (the so-called '*Obleute*') early on to take their concerns into account' (Peters et al. 2014, 435). The German parliament (*Bundestag*) not only held the Federal Government accountable for the deployment of German forces to the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden, but also guided and controlled this deployment via its plenaries and committees. Foreign Affairs (*Auswärtigen Ausschusses*) and Defence (*Verteidigungsausschuss*) Committees held meetings and provided recommendations and reports on the *Bundestag* for decisions on deployments abroad. These committees also received reports from the Federal Government on the situation in the areas of

¹⁸ Federal Ministry of Finance (*Bundesministerium der Finanzen*)

operation (Interview 8: German MP). Because a deployment must have a legal basis (e.g. UNSC Resolution, NATO treaty) and conform with domestic legal provisions (Paulus and Commick 2011, 78) in order to have a parliamentary approval, *Bundestag* witnessed at times fierce inter-party debates around the issue, as will be seen in the following paragraphs.

Germany's decision-making structure regarding the EU and NATO operations in the Gulf of Aden is illustrated in Figure 11.




Figure 13. Germany's decision-making structure regarding the EU and NATO operations in the Gulf of Aden.
(Source: Author)

6.3.3. Road to counterpiracy: A fierce domestic debate

Germany's road to being involved in counter-piracy efforts through the EU and NATO was far from straightforward. I argue that the complexities Germany faced about this issue were

based on contrasting stances of key domestic stakeholders in Berlin, both within and outside the Federal Government.

A starting point to look at these domestic issues of concern is the legal basis of Germany's contribution to the international fight against piracy. According to German law, both the Federal Armed Forces (*Bundeswehr*) and the Federal Police may be involved in responding to the crime of piracy (Paulus and Cornick 2011, 80). At the same time, Article 87a (2) of the German constitution stipulates that the *Bundeswehr* may only be deployed with exclusive permission such as in case of natural disaster or emergencies that endanger the territory of more than one federal *Land* (BMJV 2020). Taken together with other relevant domestic law, namely the Maritime Duties Law (*Seeaufgabengesetz*) and the Federal Police Law (*Bundespolizeigesetz*), this means that fight against piracy is a responsibility of the Federal Police both in and outside of German coastal waters (Maihold and Petretto 2008, 3). Nonetheless, because the German law did not explicitly state that only the Federal Police may carry out this task, a potential deployment of the armed forces was still an alternative option for Germany.

Instead of making public comments explicitly related to the question of piracy, Chancellor Merkel's earlier statements on the issue focused on the security situation in Somalia. In a speech to the African Union (AU) in October 2007, for example, she described the situation in Somalia as 'a catastrophe for the people', which would also entail 'considerable dangers for the region and beyond', while also underlining Germany's willingness to help Somalia by saying that 'we [sic] offer all our [sic] help' (Bundesregierung 2007a). Addressing the *Bundestag* in November 2008, Merkel emphasised that Germany would 'assume its responsibility' to protect 'the security of business', which includes the safety of transport routes (Bundesregierung 2008b). Likewise, Chancellery officials did not normally attend parliamentary plenaries where the issue

was discussed, while the Chancellor only occasionally attended the meetings of the parliament's foreign affairs committee (Interview 8: German MP).

On the other hand, the issue was watched closely by the ministries dealing with Germany's participation to counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. As stated, Germany's policymaking about its engagement in the region through the EU and NATO was led by the Federal Foreign Office (*Auswartiges Amt*, AA) and Federal Ministry of Defence (*Bundesministerium der Verteidigung*, BMVg). AA argued that instead of a new domestic mandate, existing UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provided sufficient legal bases for German forces to participate multilateral counter-piracy frameworks that are already operable in the region, such as NATO's Allied Provider (UNSC 2008a; 2008b; UN 1982; Bundestag 2008a, 2; Die Welt 2008b). Moreover, key figures from SPD, which was the coalition partner leading the AA, were hesitant to engage in a new counter-piracy operation (Interview 8: German MP). In short, AA initially saw no need for a new parliamentary process (such as a change in the constitution or a new *Bundestag* approval) for the deployment of the armed forces in the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

In contrast, for BMVg, it was not clear whether existing operations were explicitly mandated with counter-piracy through robust rules of engagement. Indeed, BMVg argued that a new legal basis should be provided for the *Bundeswehr* to be used in the fight against piracy. For BMVg, 'the right to take action against pirates [...] is not to be contradicted by the fact that piracy is a police task' and that 'already in the past, the Bundeswehr has explicitly taken on police tasks abroad, for example in Kosovo or Afghanistan.' (Bundestag 2008f, 1). Therefore, Franz Josef Jung, federal minister of defence at the time, stated that 'it is not yet clear' if existing operations

such as NATO's Operation Allied Provider were related to piracy at all (Der Tagesspiegel, 2008). BMVg further argued that existing operations 'included only protective measures for WFP ships, [and] the arrest/detention of pirates was not planned' (Bundestag 2008i, 11). BMVg also believed that a temporary NATO operation would be an ineffective response to piracy off the Somali coast because 'once the raid [was] over, when the pirates take off with the ship and have captured the crew, pursuit by German naval units [was] no longer possible' (Deutsche Welle 2008).

Indeed, because UNCLOS provisions did not apply to the territorial waters of a state, in an incident in 2009, German naval forces had to release a group of captured pirates at sea (HoL 2009b, 11). Hence, according to BMVg's view, a lack of 'clear constitutional basis' was preventing a potential *Bundeswehr* deployment in the region (Deutsche Welle 2008). Additionally, BMVg was concerned that Germany's other commitments at the time was constraining Germany's potential participation to a counter-piracy operation. In the words of a German official, '[participating in NATO operations in the region] was not really discussed anymore because there was no need and not enough [German] ships' (Interview 29: German official).

The debate about whether Germany can already join the international fight against piracy through the EU and NATO was also resonated in the German parliament. Referring to the disagreement between the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of Defence about how Germany should and could be involved in a counter-piracy operation, some members of the *Bundestag* argued that the two ministries were 'hopelessly divided' on the issue (Bundestag 2008e, 19758). Responding to these criticisms, CDU, the leading coalition partner assuming the leadership of the BMVg, argued that the aim of the Federal Ministry of Defence was not to

confuse the internal and external missions of the armed forces, but instead to provide ‘clarity in the German legal framework so that we [sic] can meet the obligations under the Convention on the Law of the Sea and the need to combat modern piracy’ (Bundestag 2008b, 18443). Furthermore, a *Bundestag* member from CDU argued that the German Navy could be empowered to act against piracy outside of emergency aid by creating ‘a reliable, clear legal basis’, which could be achieved by changing and expanding the relevant constitutional provisions (Bundestag 2008b, 18443). According to another CDU member,

“As soon as the robbery is no longer present, for example if the pirates depart with the hijacked ship, persecution by German naval units is no longer possible for legal reasons. [...] We [sic] have to think about an amendment to the Basic Law that will allow our navy [sic] to take action against pirates.”
(Bundestag 2008e, 19768)

Yet, BMVg’s stance faced resistance from some politicians from SPD, which was, as stated, holding the AA leadership. *Bundestag* members from SPD argued that CDU and BMVg were attempting to give the armed forces more scope for action. According to this line of argument, BMVg’s stance was an attempt by the CDU to ‘blur the lines between internal and external security’ (Bundestag 2008b, 18443).

Another key stakeholder within the government was the Federal Ministry of Interior (*Bundesministerium des Innern*, BMI) due to the possibility of deploying the Federal Police for international counter-piracy tasks. Yet, BMI did not favour this option. Instead, it believed that the armed forces could take action against piracy on the basis of German constitution (Bundestag 2008c, 5).

BMI was also concerned about the capability of the Federal Police to tackle piracy in international waters. As the Federal Minister of Interior Wolfgang Schäuble pointed out, '[...] if the Federal Police should do that [counter-piracy], then it needs the logistical capabilities for a fast transport - it does not have them - and a base if it has to operate from the sea' (Bundestag 2009a, 24185). Indeed, the short-term deployment pattern and experience of the maritime division of the Federal Police (GSG9, Aviation Group) were deemed insufficient to conduct policing tasks the sea in line with the UNSC resolutions' requests for long-term deployments (Paulus and Cornick 2011, 78).

There were also concerns raised from outside the coalition government. For instance, *Die Linke* faction in *Bundestag* 'categorically rejected' the option of to approve *Bundeswehr*'s undertaking of tasks that were legally assigned to the federal foreign police. As stated by a *Die Linke* parliamentarian, the EU operation was about 'further advancing the assumption of police tasks by the military, that is, about dissolving the strict separation of these two forces enshrined in the constitution' (Bundestag 2009b, 856). A commentator at the time also argued that 'when the *Bundeswehr* [was] sent on missions abroad, it is assigned [...] police tasks, namely functions for which it is actually not responsible and that constitute a growing burden on it' (Steinhilber 2008, 35).

Engaged with such domestic political debates, Germany was limited in influencing the mandates of the EU and NATO operations despite the urgency caused by rising incidents of piracy and armed robbery in the region (US Embassy Nairobi 2008). The lack of agreement between foreign and defence ministries prevented Germany to take part in the already existing NATO operation Allied Provider (US Mission to NATO 2008a). Although Germany proposed

a mandate to allow NATO states to engage pirates (US Mission to NATO 2008c), BMVg was still against an ad hoc counter-piracy operation such as Allied Provider, which was even perceived to have ‘nothing to do with counter-piracy’ (US Embassy Berlin 2008a). During this process, there have been hours-long negotiations within the North Atlantic Council as national representatives tried to come to an agreement about the rules of engagement of the planned operation (Interview 33: NATO official). Therefore, Germany’s engagement with the EU and NATO operations during the agenda-setting and planning stages were limited as a result of the Federal Government’s engagement with a domestic debate about the appropriate multilateral framework through which Germany could contribute to the international fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

6.3.4. Launching of the EU operation: Making everyone happy

At the same time, before the launch of the EU operation, there was already some domestic support for the involvement of Germany in the fight against piracy, albeit indirectly. The motion that the Federal Government proposed to *Bundestag* for the continuation of Germany’s contribution to NATO’s Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) for tasks that were not directly related to the fight against piracy, such as reconnaissance, surveillance and situation mapping in the Horn of Africa, was approved in *Bundestag* with 428 approvals and 130 rejections (Bundestag 2008d, 2; Bundestag 2008h). During parliamentary plenaries where the prolongation of Germany’s participation to NATO-led OEF was discussed, some *Bundestag* members argued that the separation of the fight against terrorism and piracy is a ‘hair splitting discussion’ and that the Federal Armed Forces should be involved in both tasks (Bundestag 2008e, 19762). Similarly, the view in the CDU/CSU was that counter-terrorism operations such as OEF were intended to ensure that ‘the sea passages in the Horn of Africa, which are

strategically important for world trade, are also secured' (Bundestag 2008e, 19764). Therefore, the initial perception was that counterterrorism would also address piracy in the region.

However, the particular emphasis made on counterpiracy as a task on its own right increased with the launch of the EU operation Atalanta, after which the Federal Government agreed that a parliamentary mandate should be secured for Germany to participate in this operation. In proposing the deployment of German troops under the EU operation, the Federal Government initially suggested that a flexible approach could be followed in case NATO task forces would once again be involved in the region. Indeed, the deployment of NATO's Operation Allied Provider in October 2008 presented a new opportunity for Germany to participate in a multilateral operation to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden. As stated, NATO decided to deploy its Standing Maritime Groups-2 (SNMG-2), in which Germany was already taking part. Under this operation, German warships escorted WFP ships and conducted patrols off the Somali coast to help stop acts of piracy. However, the Federal Government was reluctant to relocate Germany's forces from SNMG-2 to the NATO operation due to operational concerns, because such a move was believed to incur operational difficulties especially when Germany is the force commander in Standing Maritime Groups (US Embassy Berlin 2008a).

At the same time, Germany argued that SNMGs can be used to support the EU operation, hence preferring a 'pragmatic resource management' approach in order to prevent potential duplication of existing NATO efforts with a parallel EU operation (Bundestag 2008d, 4; Bundestag 2008e, 19766). With the launch of the EU operation Atalanta in December 2008, NATO's Operation Allied Provider, which Germany has not been able to participate due to aforementioned debate between key stakeholders in Berlin, ceased its operations.

However, domestic-level factors limited Germany's ability to practise a pragmatic approach across the EU and NATO operations. In order to secure a broad parliamentary consensus in favour of the EU operation¹⁹, Federal Government's statements heavily focused on and highlighted the comparative advantages of the EU operation. Chancellor Merkel described Germany's participation to the EU operation as 'another important task' of *Bundeswehr* in fulfilling Germany's national and international responsibilities as a 'part of the international community' (AFP 2008g).

The federal foreign minister of the time, Frank Walter-Steinmeier, was another key promoter of Germany's participation to the EU operation. Welcoming the EU operation, he mentioned that a robust response to piracy in the Gulf of Aden was allowed under an EU mandate (Bundestag 2008g, 21058). Steinmeier also emphasised the solidarity between Germany and the EU and the long-term causes of Somali piracy by stating that 'Germany and the European Union [were] sending out an important message: for the people of Somalia, for security in the region and for international solidarity' (Bundestag 2008g, 21058). Linking the operation to the promotion of democracy and functioning state mechanisms in Somalia, he further argued that:

"Everyone knows that the causes of piracy are in fact not at sea. For this, one needs functioning state structures on land [...] The EU mission makes an important contribution to this indirectly" (Bundestag 2008g, 21058).

This suggests that, for Berlin, the EU operation possessed some comparative advantages vis-à-vis its NATO counterpart, such as presenting a direct response against piracy and a perceived indirect contribution to the long-term causes of the issue. The Federal Government believed

¹⁹ The first Federal Government proposal on Germany's participation to Atalanta was approved by 491 'yes' votes against 55 'no' votes on 19.12.2008.

that NATO's Operation Ocean Shield, which was launched in August 2009, focused on counter-piracy with a 'purely naval approach', whereas the EU's comprehensive approach addressed not only military action but also issues about food security, education, and health (Bundestag 2012, 20592).

Political parties within the parliament also stressed that piracy is a symptom of more fundamental problems in mainland Somalia and that the Federal Government needs to address these issues via a comprehensive strategy. SPD, for instance, called the Federal Government to embed Atalanta into a more comprehensive security strategy to address the longer-term issues in Somalia (Bundestag 2008c, 1007; Bundestag 2009b, 852; Bundestag 2009c, 1001).

The leadership of the Federal Foreign Office changed from SPD to FDP after September 2009 federal elections. Guido Westerwelle, Steinmeier's successor, emphasised that as a trading nation, Germany cannot leave its European partners alone in the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden (Gathmann 2012). Despite being more hesitant about military engagement with the pirates at sea and arguing that a land operation might be needed, Westerwelle supported Germany's participation to the EU operation as a 'pragmatic idea' of 'doing the first things first' (interview 8: German MP). Therefore, Germany's choice of joining the EU operation without taking part in the NATO operation was informed by comparative advantages of the EU operation in terms of addressing the long-term causes of piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

As stated, BMVg was already more enthusiastic than AA in German armed forces' involvement in the fight against piracy through a new operation that is explicitly tasked with counter-piracy. BMVg's support for Germany's participation to EU operation was 'based on the more robust mandate was provided by the EU' compared to the previous NATO operation

(Interview 30: German official). For Karl Jozef Jung, the federal minister of defence, if a ‘European mission that provides for a deployment only in front of the Somali coast for a certain period of time and the *Bundestag* agrees to that, then the *Bundeswehr* can participate’ (Bundesregierung 2008a, 47).

By giving an exclusive responsibility for the German armed forces, the EU operation also presented an opportunity for the Federal Ministry of Defence to rule out the involvement of the federal police in this issue. In the view of the Federal Ministry of Defence, the aforementioned uncertainty about the mandate of a new multilateral counter-piracy operation Germany could participate also disappeared when it became made clear that the EU operation would aim the ‘deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast’ (Interview 30: German official; Council 2008a). As Jung stated, ‘anti-piracy [was] initially a task for the police [...] but in the system of mutual collective security with a European mandate and on the basis of the international law of the United Nations, [Germany Navy] can effectively and actively combat piracy’ (Bundestag 2008g, 21062).

At the same time, German decision-makers, both civilian and military, were concerned about following Germany’s domestic culture of military restraint throughout the EU operation. German forces were constantly instructed by Berlin that there is no need to ‘war fighting in the area’ (Interview 30: German official). Indeed, BMVg also accepted the operation as ‘indispensable’ for paving the way for a sustainable political framework in Somalia by preventing maritime piracy (Bundestag 2010, 8173). Jung’s successor as federal minister of defence, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, acknowledged that a purely military approach to address the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Aden would be insufficient, but he accepted the EU operation as ‘a small, useful, additional military option’ to tackle the threat of piracy (Die Welt 2012).

Similarly, the domestic opposition in Germany, including members of parliament from *Die Linke* and *Die Bündnis 90/Die Grünen* factions, followed a similar line of argument, suggesting that Germany's response to piracy in the Gulf of Aden should not be used as an excuse for a continued military presence in the region and that counter-piracy not be military-led (Bundestag 2009c, 1002; Bundestag 2008e, 19759; Bundestag 2009b, 855; Bundestag 2009c, 1004).

6.3.5. Conclusion

In this section, I discussed Germany's strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO in the Gulf of Aden. A central finding is that Germany's strategies were driven primarily by the role of veto players within Germany's domestic political environment and preferences about Germany's means of intervention. While disagreements between the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of Defence led Germany to refrain from taking part in the NATO operation, the EU operation helped resolve this intragovernmental disagreement by offering distinct advantages to each stakeholder. For Merkel, the EU operation was a means for Germany as a trading nation to demonstrate its willingness to work with the international community in the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden. For the Federal Foreign Office, the EU operation offered a robust response to piracy and a potential to address the long-term causes of the issue. For the Federal Ministry of Defence, it presented an opportunity to deploy the armed forces to an international task force against piracy. In addition to these domestic political factors, Germany's culture of military restraint and reluctance to use force also informed Germany's decision to join the EU operation instead of its NATO counterpart. The civilian and military stakeholders within Germany's relevant policymaking processes, as well as the government and opposition parties at *Bundestag* argued that Germany should avoid excessive use of force in counter-piracy operations.

Table 8 summarises Germany's strategies regarding the EU and NATO operations in the Gulf of Aden.

| Drivers of Germany's strategies | | Type of Germany's strategies |
|---|---|---|
| Security interests | Security interests were based on a rather vague conceptualisation of Germany as a 'trading nation' | Toleration The EU operation helped resolve the intragovernmental disagreements in Berlin; EU operation's comparative advantages; domestic constraints leading to only diplomatic and political support to the NATO operation |
| Domestic veto players | Merkel's view that Germany should fulfil its responsibilities; Federal Foreign Office's preference for a robust and comprehensive response to piracy; the preference of the Federal Ministry of Defence for an explicit counter-piracy mandate; parliamentary consensus for the EU operation's comprehensive approach | |
| Preferences about means of intervention | Following Germany's culture of military restraint | |

Table 8. Germany's strategies within the operational overlap in the Gulf of Aden

The evidence presented in this section lends partial support to the threefold argument. First, in contrast to the argument that member states articulate and pursue cross-operational strategies, Germany did not explicitly refer to both EU and NATO operations during the intensive domestic debates about its participation to the international fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden. In order to minimise the potential negative effects of this debate on Germany's response to piracy, the Federal Government framed the EU and NATO presences in the region in

different ways. While the Federal Government presented the EU operation to the parliament as an initiative that deals exclusively with counterpiracy through a humanitarian approach, NATO's presence in the region was framed as a counterterrorism task force.

Second, the evidence offers low level of support to the argument that member states follow different, potentially flexible, forum-shopping practices to uphold their preferences and interests within the EU and NATO operations in the region. On the one hand, Germany's strategies were somewhat in line with toleration strategy, as it lent diplomatic support to the NATO operation by not blocking its planning processes. On the other hand, however, in addition to refraining from contributing force assets to the NATO operation, Germany also did not engage with this operation in alternative ways such as representing the EU operation's added value in NATO's decision-making processes or fostering inter-operational cooperation.

Finally, the evidence lends significant support to the third element of the threefold argument, namely that member states' organisation of decision-making in foreign and security policy affects the extent to which member states can instrumentalise the operational overlap to accomplish their own objectives. Indeed, Germany's decentralised structure of coordinating its policymaking as well as the executive's limited autonomy from the legislature significantly restricted Berlin's ability to readjust its strategies within the EU and NATO operations in the Gulf of Aden.

6.4. United Kingdom: Making the most of it

6.4.1. The context of the UK's engagement counter- piracy in the Gulf of Aden

Before the launch of the EU and NATO counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, the UK already had a presence in the region to undertake a number of tasks including counterterrorism and counterpiracy. For instance, it had been running Operation Calash since 2003, a unilateral initiative operated in the Gulf of Aden with maritime counterterrorism and counterpiracy tasks (Roberts 2009, 321). London also adopted a strategy in 2004 to address piracy, with a view 'to strengthen the protection of UK seafarers from acts of piracy and violent maritime armed robbery around the world; and to assist foreign states which have the highest concentration of attacks within their territorial waters' (HoC Transport Committee 2006). The UK was also a penholder of key international resolutions on the issue, such as the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) 2005 resolution on piracy in Somali waters, which 'recommended a number of measures to protect ships from piracy and armed robbery attacks in waters off the coast of Somalia' (IMO 2007, 2).

Furthermore, in 2007-2008 Department for International Development (DfID) allocated £25 million 'to support efforts to tackle the instability in Somalia which create[d] the conditions allowing piratical activity to flourish' (HoC 2008e). This aid was channelled to Somalia's capacities to conduct its elections, education and health sectors, food and livelihood support and implementation of the Djibouti Peace Agreement that sought to end hostilities between the Transitional Federal Government and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (HoC 2008g).

At the same time, the issue of piracy and armed robbery was not the primary focus of the UK's presence in the Gulf of Aden. The Royal Navy (RN) had been involved in no more than three incidents of piracy between 2003 and 2008 off the Somali coast (HoC 2008a). Instead, the UK was involved in task forces that were indirectly linked with counterpiracy, such as the US-led Combined Maritime Force 150 (CTF-150) (HoC 2008d). CTF-150 was relevant to UK's regional policies as it was essentially gravitated around the challenges against order at sea that emerge from non-state actors (Interview 21: Think-tank expert). Furthermore, despite supporting a long-term solution for the protection of food aid shipments from the threat of piracy (HoC 2008b), escorting World Food Programme (WFP) ships was not a top priority for the UK at the time (US Embassy London 2008). Therefore, London did not provide operational support to existing task forces that were aimed to escort WFP deliveries, such as France's unilateral operation *Alcyon* (HoC 2007).

Instead of adopting counterpiracy as a main task, the UK task forces in the region kept fulfilling supporting roles until early 2008 (HoC 2008a). However, the rise in piracy incidents in the Gulf of Aden in 2008 generated some momentum in the UK to more actively protect freedom of navigation in the region. For instance, the number of attacks on UK-flagged ships and ships that are managed or controlled by the UK companies increased from 10 in 2007 to 18 in 2008 (IMB 2009).

6.4.2. Domestic decision-making structure

The UK's policies about piracy in the Gulf of Aden were shaped by an intragovernmental workstream composed of a dense network of Whitehall departments and diplomatic missions. The Cabinet Office (CO) determined the broad outlines of the UK's strategies about responding to piracy in the Gulf of Aden as well as the government's wider Somalia agenda. Yet, CO was

not routinely involved in the technical and operational details of the UK's strategies in the region. Instead, different aspects of counterpiracy in the Gulf of Aden, such as the need for immediate response to attacks and hijackings as well as longer-term projects in mainland Somalia, were dealt with through a cross-Whitehall division of responsibilities.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) led the coordination of the UK's overall action against piracy off the Somali coast, as well as the UK's policies in international political coordination and capacity building programmes in regional states, ransom payments and travel advice and other consular issues (Interview 12: UK official). FCO also led the negotiation of agreements between the UK and regional states about the transfer of detained pirates (FAC 2011d, Ev 26). Its counterterrorism directorate had key responsibilities 'on all UK hostage situations, which would include hostages who were taken by pirates' (FAC 2011d, Ev 23). Operational costs of the UK assets deployed to the EU operation were carried by a peacekeeping budget shared between FCO, Ministry of Defence (MoD), and Department for International Development (DfID) (EUC 2009b, 19). Furthermore, FCO provided aid to enhance Somaliland Coast Guard capacities in the safety and security of the coastal population of Somaliland (HoL 2011b, 52).

Ministry of Defence (MoD) led the UK's military response to piracy and set the rules of engagement of British task forces in the region (FAC 2011c). In addition to its roles and responsibilities by virtue of having a control of Royal Navy assets, MoD had a particular importance due to being both a department of state responsible for defence and hosting the highest level military headquarters in the UK, namely the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) (Interview 9: UK official). As the UK hosted the operational headquarters (OHQ) for both the EU and NATO as well as the NATO Shipping Centre (NSC) in Northwood, MoD was

also in a key position throughout London's decision-making processes²⁰. MoD was also a point of contact between these OHQs and London (Admiralty n.d.). Also in Northwood was the EU's Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), a coordination centre for mariners transiting the region and staffed by both military and merchant navy personnel (Muratore 2010, 98).

MoD also possesses an organisational capability called UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) 'to response to the threat of terrorism, regional instability and also the threat from piracy'. Based in Dubai, UKMTO '[provided] the operational liaison and interaction between military commanders and the merchant shipping community'. Moreover, Maritime Trade Information Centre (MTIC) at the disposal of the Royal Navy provided a hub for the worldwide provision of information pertinent to merchant vessels operating in designated operational areas including the Indian Ocean (Admiralty n.d.).

The UK's designation of counterpiracy as a constabulary task also brought a more diverse range of Whitehall departments into relevant decision-making processes (interview 9: UK official). This framing of the issue paved the way for a direct and active involvement from various state departments that would otherwise may not find a decision-making seat for themselves within an external security issue. Department for Transport (DfT) was involved in setting out the operational aspects of Royal Navy activities off the Somali coast. Furthermore, because the MoD was more closely engaged with Afghanistan at the time, the British forces at times received more ministerial interest from DfT than MoD as 'ultimately it was the British

²⁰ NATO's first counter-piracy operation in the region, namely Allied Provider that operated between October and December 2008, was conducted under the operational control of the Allied Maritime Component Command Headquarters Naples.

shipping industry and [the UK's] trade that was impacted from piracy' (Interview 10: UK official).

DfT also led a number of key areas, such as UK-flagged vessels' compliance with international regulations and in terms of the guidance it provided to shipping companies about the use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) (FCO 2012, 12). DfT also shaped the governmental policy regarding practical advice on seafarers transiting the Gulf of Aden, such as the use of PMSCs on board civilian vessels and designation of safer routes to be used to avoid pirate attacks (FAC 2011d, Ev 22). Furthermore, DfT chaired a cross-Government National Maritime Security Committee, participated by officials from the Cabinet Office, the Home Office (HO), FOC, MoD as well as a number of other Whitehall agencies (HMG 2014, 43). Furthermore, HO regulated the use of firearms on board the UK vessels, including those transiting the Gulf of Aden (FCO 2012,12).


As far as the UK's longer-term development agenda for Somalia is concerned, Department for International Development (DfID) was the leading Whitehall department (FCO 2012,12). Africa a particular region for DfID's work, having climbed in the UK's foreign policy priorities at the time (Porteous 2005, 281).

In order to enhance cross-governmental coordination through a workstream with a focus on counterpiracy, the UK Government also established a Ministerial Working Group on Counter-Piracy. Chaired by the FCO's Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, this working group was participated by officials from CO, MoD, DfT, HO, the Ministry of Justice, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (HMG 2014, 43).

As stated in the UK's engagement with the EU and NATO missions in Afghanistan, a National Security, International Relations and Development Cabinet Committee (NSID) provided a more consultative forum for debate on foreign policy. NSID was replaced by the National Security Council (NSC) under the coalition government in 2010. NSC was also attended by a variety of Whitehall departments depending on the issue at hand, and it steered the cross-governmental strategy regarding the underlying and more deep-rooted problems in mainland Somalia. These policies also addressed the issue of piracy, although this was done from a much broader perspective compared to the operational aspects that were mainly shaped by relevant state departments (FAC 2011d, Ev 71).

Moreover, the UK's permanent representation to the EU and its delegation to NATO regularly attended the Political and Security Committee and North Atlantic Council meetings respectively. In addition to the EU and NATO frameworks a 'primary diplomatic focus' for the UK was the frameworks under the UN (Interview 9: UK official). Indeed, as shown in the following paragraphs, the UK diversified its contribution to the international fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden by using a number of multilateral frameworks.

The UK's decision-making structure regarding the EU and NATO operations in the Gulf of Aden is illustrated in Figure 12.



*Figure 14. The UK's decision-making structure regarding the EU and NATO operations in the Gulf of Aden.
(Source: Author)*

6.4.3. Engagement with the EU and NATO operations: A focus on comparative advantages

Although the UK argued that fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden ‘[would] be best achieved with international partners including NATO, the EU and coalition forces already in the Gulf of Aden’ rather than fulfilling counterpiracy tasks unilaterally, there were different views in Whitehall as to how this the UK should engage with multilateral frameworks (HoC 2008c). For instance, although the Ministry of Defence (MoD) ‘was happy to take a more robust approach against pirates’, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) thought that piracy in the Gulf of Aden ‘should go away without loss of lives’, while the Department for Transport ‘wanted to keep the guns as far away from ships as possible’ (Interview 9: UK official).

At the same time, the UK was already seeking to keep a close link between the EU and NATO at early stages of the two organisations' operations. For instance, as the planning process within the EU progressed further, London suggested that the EU officials would meet daily with NATO's liaison team to preserve the link between the two organisations (HoC European Scrutiny Committee 2008a, 36). Similarly, MoD officials argued that a potential EU counterpiracy operation should be closely coordinated with the US-led CTF-150 (US Secretary of State 2008d).

When NATO's Operation Allied Provider was launched in October 2008, two Royal Navy ships (HMS Montrose and HMS Northumberland) were already operating under NATO's Standing Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2), albeit not mandated with counterpiracy (FAC 2011d, Ev 74). However, the UK was 'less than enthusiastic' about a potential EU operation, instead preferring a maritime operation coordinated with US- and NATO-led task forces already in place such as Combined Maritime Forces (CTF-150) and Allied Provider (US Embassy London 2008). That said, London supported EU initiatives such as coordination cell (EUNAVCO) as 'low cost and effective way to support delivery of humanitarian assistance' (US Secretary of State 2008d).

Moreover, seeing CTF-150 essentially as a counterterrorism effort, and having provided warships and a Deputy Commander to CTF-150 (HoC 2010), MoD initially suggested that the UK uses this operation for 'destabilising piracy' in the Gulf of Aden (HoC 2008d). These preferences reflected the MoD's concerns about fulfilling the responsibilities of the UK as a foundational member of the Combined Maritime Forces and a key NATO Ally, as well as the UK Government's concerns about being a 'strong ally of the US' (Interview 12: UK official).

It was, however, unclear whether MoD's proposal to use CTF-150 as the framework of the UK's contribution to counterpiracy would provide a robust response to piracy, as this task force was mandated with and resourced for undertaking counterterrorism tasks (Interview 7: ICC²¹ official; CTF 2020b). Indeed, CTF-150 had difficulties 'due to the lack of adequate rules of engagement' (Jopling 2009, 11). Although a vessel that was tasked with counterterrorism could respond to piracy incidents, a more ideal option was to be placed under a task force that is explicitly and robustly mandated with counterpiracy (Interview 7: ICC official). Therefore, MoD revised its position to suggest maintaining UK assets attached to this task force and leaving essential counterpiracy tasks to other contributing member states (Interview 9: UK official).

With the rise in pirate activity in the Gulf of Aden in 2008, the UK reviewed its stance on the issue to adopt 'a more proactive posture whereby Royal Navy units in the region [would] actively seek out pirates [...] with more robust guidance to deal with any pirates encountered' (HoC 2008d; HoC 2008e). Thus, despite taking a backseat during the early stages of the EU planning process, the UK changed its strategy first to provide political support for, and then to take a leading role in the conduct of, the operation. Indeed, with increasing support for an EU operation from a group of member states led by France and Spain, the UK declared that it would not block a separate EU maritime operation in the region, while stressing that it would not be in a position to offer any resources (US Embassy London 2008a).

Importantly, London attached two underlying conditions for its support to the further planning of the EU operation: First, full co-ordination and co-operation with other international and national actors in the region, including NATO's Operation Allied Provider and the US-led

²¹ ICC: International Chamber of Commerce

CTF 150, and second, the establishment of the ‘smallest possible scale command structure, not least to ensure that the operation is affordable and constructed in a cost effective way to ensure it remains that way’ (HoC 2008e). In order to fulfil these preferences, the UK followed a cross-operational strategy by offering the operational headquarters (OHQ) to the EU operation and to provide it with its first operational commander. In the words of UK officials, the UK took essentially the ‘political view’ of preventing the development of an EU OHQ that could duplicate NATO (Interviews 9 and 12: UK officials). At a time when other potential EU member state OHQs were dedicated to other EU operations, namely EUFOR RCA Tchad and EUFOR RD Congo, the EU welcomed UK’s offer (Gros 2011, 219). Additionally, the UK saw contributing OHQ for the EU operation as an opportunity to share the British experiences with other member states (Interview 12: UK official).

Offering the EU operation the required leadership was thus in line with the forum-shopping practice labelled as ‘exploitation’ in Chapter 2, as the UK attempted both to avoid shouldering a significant share of operational costs and to keep the operation as close as possible to NATO. Commanding the operation gave the UK ‘an opportunity to influence the shaping of the political direction that was given to the EU operation’ (EUC 2009b, 2). Indeed, the British commander of the EU operation was accountable to the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC), which in turn was reporting regularly to the Council on the progress of the EU operation (HoC 2009a). In short, with this strategy, the UK placed itself in a strategic position where it was able to control the direction of the EU operation while avoiding significant costs by commanding the EU operation while also continuing contributions to the NATO-led task forces the region.

This strategy was facilitated by a partition of work in Whitehall. While MoD was shaping the operational dimension of the UK’s response to piracy, it left ‘purely political questions to

FCO, whose focus was more on the UK's broader development agenda in the region than on the counterpiracy (AFP 2008e). FCO saw military activity against pirates as part of a 'cascading strategy' including the EU's work to try and build capacity in that region, so that regional countries would ultimately be able to take control of tackling piracy. As an FCO official pointed out:

"[...] what the EU particularly brings to the international effort here is that because it is a soft power—it is perceived in that way by nations in this region and perhaps more widely in that way—it has been able to unlock doors in some of the relevant countries, to help bring about this comprehensive approach going and looking at judicial issues, in a way I think [sic] NATO would have struggled to because it [was] perceived in a very different way."

(HoL European Union Sub-Committee for External Affairs 2012, pp. 139-140)

This focus was congenial to the Cabinet Office's (CO) interest in 'what was going on in Somalia' onshore (Interview 9: UK official). A British official even noted that 'the UK's real position was not a problem of sea but a problem on land' (Interview 9: UK official). Hence, the UK favoured developing broader and potentially longer-term regional solutions such as financial aid to Somaliland Coast Guard and support to programmes led by the UN office on Drugs and Crime's effective Counter Piracy Programme (CPP) (EUC 2009c, 23; EUC 2011a, 52).

Despite being wary of the EU operation's potential duplication of NATO presence in the region, the UK also recognised the EU's comparative advantages in terms of addressing the

long-term causes of piracy. To this end, the UK acted through other CSDP instruments in the region, which were not possessed by NATO and served as a ‘force multiplier’ for the UK’s military response (EUC 2009b, 39; HoL European Union Sub-Committee for External Affairs 2012, 149). London saw instruments such as EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor advantageous in terms of the preferences of regional countries’ governments, whose sensitivities to the presence of other organisations made non-EU actors unable to agree a mandate (HMG 2018). Foreign Secretary David Miliband emphasised that Atalanta ‘is no substitute for a political and security process on the ground in Somalia, but it is vital none the less’ (HoC 2008f). Moreover, Miliband’s broader view of security and defence integration within the EU at the time was based on:

“[...] a more joined-up civilian-military strategic level planning structure in Brussels to ensure greater coherence between the EU institutions, civilian and military planners, and the EU and NATO. It also mean[t] measures to encourage investment in the right kind of capabilities, and a new ESDP ambition to reflect the wide range and complexity of the missions that Europe is increasingly undertaking, whether through the EU or NATO—involving not only soldiers, but policemen and judges, aid workers and customs officials.” (HoC 2008f)

A pragmatic approach to the EU and NATO operations was also evident in the UK’s operational practices. Having been reluctant to bring the captured pirates to the UK due to concerns that these suspects might be entitled to claim asylum especially if the prosecution would fail due to lack of sufficient evidence, the UK ‘chopped’ its force assets to the EU command to be able to use the EU’s agreements with regional countries on the transfer of

captured pirates (Interview 9: UK official). Despite concerns about law enforcement capacities and inhumane treatment or death penalty in the regional states (e.g. HoC 2008b, 91), the UK continuously followed this flexible strategy across different task forces in the region (Interview 12: UK official).

At the same time, NATO's Operation Ocean Shield also had advantages from the UK's perspective. Whilst recognising that 'the EU's military, diplomatic and aid arm joined up as one ecosystem' was better than NATO in eradicating piracy, the UK saw NATO operation as a more capable initiative in terms of fulfilling higher-level military tasks (interviews 9 and 10: UK officials). In the words of a British official, a particular strength of NATO's Operation Ocean Shield was its activities to counter misinformation in the region to point out that piracy was a maritime crime and not a 'Robin Hood type' activity that aided the Somali population (FAC 2011d, Ev 23). Officers within the EU operation also admitted that 'NATO [brought] skills to the operation which the EU [did] not necessarily have in some fields, [such as] some of the intelligence analyst posts, some of their co-ordination skills that they use for maritime patrol aircraft' (EUC 2009a, 32). Thus, the UK maintained a flexible approach based on relocating its force assets across the EU and NATO operations in the Gulf of Aden (Interview 9: UK official; FAC 2011d, Ev 74).

Another reflection of London pragmatic approach was its attempts to 'plug the gap' on the ground between different task forces (Interview 12: UK official). In cases of delays within NATO's force generation, the UK provided assets to the EU operation (Interview 12: UK official). For instance, although HMS Chatham and HMS Montrose were deployed to Operation Ocean Shield and HMS Richmond to Atalanta from January 2010 to July 2011, British force assets came out of the EU operation in the latter half of 2011 and maintained within the NATO

operation (FAC 2011d, Ev 38). All of these contributions to the EU and NATO operations were rather short-term and lasted no longer than six months (FAC 2011d). By relocating its force assets across EU and NATO operations on the basis of each operation's comparative advantages, the UK has also been able to show to its EU and NATO partners that it was keen to work cooperatively with them during tackling the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Aden (Interview 10: UK official). Furthermore, the UK was a keen participant of Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) Group, created in December 2008 to reduce conflict and duplication in naval efforts in the region (Muratore 2010, 100). Bringing together EU and NATO representatives to discuss counterpiracy efforts, a number of SHADE meetings were led by a RN Flag Officer (HoL 2010a, 54).

The UK's strategy of making the most of the overlap between the EU and NATO operations to accomplish its objectives about fighting against piracy was not limited to operational support. It used a diverse range of diplomatic activities to have a control over the dynamics about the operational overlap between the EU and NATO in the Gulf of Aden. In the words of a UK official,

'[the UK] identified the ways in which [it] can have a greater say in the multinational operations. This could be command, diplomatic support, financial investment to regional states or to the UN. [The UK] wanted to have the greatest impact' (Interview 12: UK official).

Indeed, in order to foster inter-operational cooperation, the UK used its 'convening power' and ability to draft statements quickly by taking into account other stakeholders' concerns to resolve ambiguities and show leadership in coordination efforts (Interview 12: UK official).

For instance, British diplomats played active roles within the International Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), a mechanism created in response to the UNSC Resolution 1851 to develop collective action against different aspects of Somali piracy. According to London, CGPCS' strength lied in its 'diverse and comprehensive membership that comprises military commanders and key multilateral and regional organisations including UN, EU, NATO' (EUC 2011a, 47). FCO chaired a working group of CGPCS, which addressed activities related to military and operational coordination, information sharing and maritime capacity building in the regional countries (HoC 2009b). This was mainly complementary to the work of Northwood-based Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), the EU mechanism that shared merchant vessels' details with NATO forces so that transiting vessels could use suitable routes to avoid pirate attacks (Muratore 2010, 98).

Moreover, as a 'global navy' and a host of 'an international shipping hub' in London where bodies such as International Maritime Organisation (IMO), International Chamber of Shipping as well as prominent insurance broking organisations for maritime trade and private military security companies are based, the UK had an imperative to be involved in the fight against piracy through various channels (Interview 10: UK official). In other words, as a maritime nation, the UK felt a 'need to do something' not only because economic and human security imperatives but also due to the fact that the majority of shipping community was based in London (Interview 12: UK official).

The government's relative autonomy from potential domestic veto players facilitated this flexible approach based on engaging with the EU and NATO operations based on their comparative advantages. Despite parliamentary scrutiny of the UK's actions in the region, the government's policy was 'firmly held within Whitehall' (Interview 14: Think-tank expert).

Although the Parliament highlighted issues that the policymakers and civil service needed to address, it did not enjoy a significant leverage over the Government's counterpiracy policies and the Government's responses were ahead of the parliamentary scrutiny (Interview 14: Think-tank expert). Furthermore, despite the media coverage of Somali piracy increased with events such as the hijacking of the Saudi supertanker *Sirius Star* and the kidnapping of British citizens by the pirates, domestic attention 'strayed quickly' as the pirate attacks dwindled (Interview 12: UK official). In addition, British forces on the ground also enjoyed 'a lot of flexibility from London as long as [they] stayed within the tramline [sic]' (Interview 10: UK official).

There were, however, political limits of the UK's such active efforts of inter-operational coordination and cooperation. In the words of a British commander:

"Looking at the reality of the forces that are conducting counter-piracy in the area, I think it is probably unrealistic to expect that any greater degree of fusion of the command and control structure is going to happen. [...] I do not think it is realistic politically to expect any closer linkage of the command and control than that. [...] My sense is we have taken that co-ordination about as far as we are going to get it politically" (EUC 2010b, 6).

Moreover, the change of leadership in the UK after 2010 elections, which resulted in a coalition government led by a Eurosceptic Conservative Party, brought about suspicions among some EU member states. With the coming into power of the Conservative-led coalition government in London, some EU member states thought that the UK could play its 'political card' within the EU operation through its commanding position in Northwood (Interview 10:

UK official). A former British commander of the EU operation recalls spending his first six months under the EU operation to create confidence among his EU colleagues, trying to demonstrate he was not ‘just playing the political role the UK would want to play’ (Interview 10: UK official).

At the same time, the change of government did not substantially alter the Cabinet Office’s interest in piracy brief due to the imperatives related to economic implications, security of British citizens transiting the region and links to the wider issues in Somalia and the Horn of Africa (Interview 12: UK official). In fact, the Conservative Party was already supportive of the UK action against piracy even when they were in opposition (Interview 14: Think-tank expert). Hence, a narrative of ‘global leadership in the maritime domain’ fitted ‘quite nicely’ to the Conservative-Liberal coalition government in 2010 (Interview 16: UK official).

The more substantive change the new government brought was the revision of the UK’s commitment to multilateral counter-piracy task forces as a result of resource constraints. In the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), the government rolled out ‘a new programme of less expensive, modern frigates, more flexible and better able to take on today’s naval tasks of tackling drug trafficking, piracy and counter-terrorism’ (HMG 2010, 5). Recognising a downsizing in British frigates and destroyers from 23 to 19, London acknowledged that ‘whilst [it] remain[s] committed to identifying opportunities for vessels to participate in multinational naval operations in the region, this must be seen in the context of wider priorities as set out in SDSR’ (HMG 2012a). In this respect, whilst supporting the ‘important initiatives of the previous Labour Government’, the new government recognised that the UK has ‘a responsibility to match ambition with resources, [its] expectations with a good understanding of realities, and [its] hopes for quick results with the likely need for patient and

long-term engagement” (HoC 2012). CO and FOC converged around this focus on the ‘root causes rather than symptoms’ approach, while MoD was willing to leave ‘political issues’ to FCO (Interview 12: UK official). It is also worth noting that in addition to the EU, NATO, and US-led task forces, Royal Navy occasionally conducted counterpiracy tasks in the region through the UK’s own Operation Kipion that replaced Operation Calash in June 2011, (HoC 2020, 1). Thus, despite having faced resource constraints, the UK had an enduring commitment to diversify its contributions to the EU and NATO operations.

6.4.5. Conclusion

In this section, I showed that the UK engaged with the operational overlap between the EU and NATO in the Gulf of Aden by focusing on each operation’s distinct advantages. The UK sought to make use of the operational overlap to reduce the costs of its own contributions to the international fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden and to ensure that the EU operation would not duplicate NATO’s presence in the region. I argued that the most prominent driver of the UK’s objectives were domestic veto players, as was evident in the UK Government’s willingness to follow a long-term political orientation of maintaining complementarity and avoiding duplication between the EU and NATO as well as fulfilling Britain’s role as a maritime nation. Furthermore, in pursuing its objectives, the UK sought to foster inter-operational cooperation through a variety of operational practices and diplomatic channels. Therefore, the UK’s strategies within the operational overlap in this context are in line with the practices outlined by the exploitation strategy.

The observed drivers and types of the UK’s strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO in the Gulf of Aden are summarised in Table 9.

| Drivers of the UK's strategies | | Type of the UK's strategies |
|---|---|--|
| Security interests | Piracy as a threat to the UK's shipping industry | Exploitation Using the EU and NATO operations to pursue the UK's strategic and practical objectives; reducing the costs of the UK's involvement in the international fight against piracy fostering intra-operational cooperation |
| Domestic veto players | The Government's preference to pursue complementarity between the EU and NATO; division of labour between the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence; reluctance to bring captured pirates to the UK for trial; fulfilling the UK's role as a maritime nation | |
| Preferences about means of intervention | Practical benefits of the EU's multitrack instruments and NATO's military-led response | |

Table 9. The UK's strategies within the operational overlap in the Gulf of Aden

The case of the UK's engagement with the operational overlap between the EU and NATO in the Gulf of Aden offers significant support to the threefold argument developed in Chapter 2. First, the argument that member states articulate their strategies within in operation by considering the implications of these strategies for the other operation is confirmed by the UK's cross-operational strategies. At the planning stages of both the EU and NATO operations, the UK was already seeking to foster inter-operational cooperation by offering leadership to the EU operation, which presented an opportunity for the UK to uphold the UK's long-term orientation about the role of the EU and NATO as international security providers. This orientation led the UK to favour policies that would avoid EU's potential duplication of NATO structures and uphold complementarity between the two organisations.

Second, the argument that member states demonstrate particular forum-shopping practices in seeking to accomplish their objectives is also vindicated by the empirical evidence in this

case. Rather than simply shifting its force assets between the EU and NATO operations, the UK's exploitation strategy included fostering inter-operational cooperation, fulfilling operational force needs when needed, as well as exploring further synergies between the EU and NATO operations in not only in the ground but also in diplomatic venues.

Finally, the evidence supports the argument that member states' organisation of their policymaking indicates the extent to which they can use the EU and NATO operations to uphold their preferences and interests. The UK's flexible strategy of using each operation's distinct advantages to uphold its own interests was facilitated by a policymaking environment where different decision-making units delivered a more or less coherent message across the operations. This was evident in the division of labour in London, where the CO and the FCO developed the political aspects of the UK's policies, while MoD, and to a certain extent DfT, led the operational policymaking. Moreover, the role of the parliament in the UK's strategies within the overlap was also rather limited. Despite concerns raised by the parliament about the treatment of suspects in regional countries, the UK continued to choose the EU operation to transfer captured pirates to third countries in the region. Additionally, the change of leadership after the 2010 elections continued the emphasis on the importance of the UK's role in the international fight piracy, though the coalition government made a revision of the UK's strategies based on resource constraints.

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7. The Mediterranean: Planning for Pluto but going to Venus

7.1. Introduction

The year 2015 marked a surge in migration to Europe across the Mediterranean. As figures for asylum applications in EU member states doubled the 2014 figures by exceeding 1.2 million, the issue increasingly became a concern for member states (Eurostat 2016). Crossings through the Mediterranean were often made on board unsafe and crowded vessels that could easily capsize or sink (Nováky 2018b, 200). This brought about several major incidents. In 2015 alone, for instance, 3771 people died or went missing while attempting to cross the Mediterranean (UNCHR 2019). As a result, irregular crossings through the Central Mediterranean became a wider concern in Europe not only in terms of migratory pressures on governments but also in relation to the humanitarian aspect of the issue (Drent 2018). A particularly salient incident was the capsizing of a ship off the Libyan coast on 19 April 2015, resulting in the death of more than 800 people. The EU described this incident as ‘the worst refugee crisis since the Second World War’ (Commission 2015). After this incident, the problem of illegal human trafficking became a more collective problem of EU states, at least at a discursive level (Nováky 2018b; Riddervold 2018a).

It was within these parameters that the EU operation EUNAVFOR MED Sophia (hereafter Sophia) was launched in June 2015. The urgency of the issue of illegal human trafficking, which presented the main circumstance under which the EU operation was planned and launched, was evident in the ‘unprecedented’ short time between the planning and launch of the operation (interview 41: EU official; Drent 2015, 1). The international legal background of the EU operation was based on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2240 in 2015,

which authorised UN Member States ‘acting nationally or through regional organizations, including the EU’ to use ‘all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances in confronting migrant smugglers or human traffickers’ carrying out these illegal activities ‘on the high seas off the coast of Libya’ (UNSC 2015, 4). The EU operation’s overall objective was the ‘disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean, [...] identify, capture and dispose of vessels and assets used or suspected of being used by smugglers or traffickers’ (Council 2015).

Additionally, the operation had a phase-based approach (Council 2015). The first phase would focus on ‘information gathering and patrolling of the high seas to monitor migrant smuggling activities’ (Riddervold 2018a, 161). At the second phase, the operation would conduct ‘boarding, search, seizure and diversion of the vessels suspected of participating in human smuggling or trafficking on the high seas’ (ibid). This phase was also to be extended to the territorial waters of Libya, provided that the EU obtains a UNSC backing or the approval of the Libyan authorities (ibid). In the third phase of the operation, which was also conditional on UN authorisation or Libyan consent, the tasks would be expanded to ‘disrupt[ing] the smugglers’ networks by disposing of the suspected vessels or rendering them inoperable’ (ibid).

Similar to the EU’s Operation Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden, Operation Sophia was also part of a broader EU strategy aimed at contributing to the region’s stabilisation (Interview 41: EU official). Major EU instruments in the region included the EU Border Assistance Mission Libya (EUBAM Libya), a CSDP civilian mission launched in 2013 to support the Libyan authorities in protecting their country’s borders, and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, which was formed in 2016 (Council 2013a; de Guttry et al. 2017, 50).

The launch of the EU operation had been ‘watched very closely by NATO’, which was already involved in the Mediterranean through its Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) since 2001 (de Guttery et al. 2017, 50). Initially launched as a support to the US-led fight against terrorist networks after the September 11 attacks, OAE was an anti-terrorism operation based on Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, also known as the ‘collective defence’ article (ibid).

At the NATO Warsaw Summit in July 2016, NATO members announced the transformation of OAE into a new, non-Article 5 maritime security operation called ‘Sea Guardian’ (Allied Maritime Command 2020). In addition to ‘[providing] maritime situational awareness, upholding freedom of navigation, conducting interdiction tasks, maritime counter-terrorism, contributing to capacity building, countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and protecting critical infrastructure’, Operation Sea Guardian also sought to provide information to the EU’s Border Management Agency, Frontex²², on irregular migrant flows through the Eastern Mediterranean route passing from Turkey to Greece across the Aegean Sea (Allied Maritime Command 2020; NATO 2016). As the Eastern Mediterranean route was the most commonly used route at the time, NATO’s contribution to existing efforts in controlling irregular migration in this area was based on operational cooperation with between the EU and NATO (Frontex 2016).

Similar to its EU counterpart, the NATO operation also operated in stages. At a first stage, the operation focused on intelligence gathering in the Mediterranean by tracking vessels and conduct boardings when there is suspected illicit activity. Subsequently, the operation focused on rapid response through ‘on-call’ national assets that are ready to the operation at short notice to conduct interdiction operations when required (Johnstone 2017; HoL 2016b).

²² Frontex was rebranded as the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in 2016.


In contrast to the EU operation, however, the NATO operation was not confined to a particular area within the Mediterranean (Interview 35: NATO official). Furthermore, the two operations were essentially aimed at different tasks. While the EU operation was initially aimed solely at disrupting human smuggling networks operation in the Central Mediterranean, the NATO operation focused on broader maritime security tasks such as counter-terrorisms, surveillance, and provision of situational awareness.

However, the two operations overlapped on a number of issues ranging from illegal human and arms trafficking to capacity building (Cordy 2018; Bendiek 2017; Cole 2018). As a NATO Parliamentary Assembly report stated, the NATO operation had ‘overlapping equities’ with the EU operation in addressing illegal migrant trafficking from Libya (Moon 2016, 14). Indeed, a broadening of the EU operation’s tasks since its inception in 2015 brought about more intersection between the two operations’ activities. Throughout its mandate expansions over time, the EU operation included two additional tasks of supporting the implementation of the UN-imposed oil and arms embargoes on Libya, and providing training to Libyan Coast Guard and Navy (Council 2016a; 2017a; 2018; 2019). In this sense, over time, the EU became more akin to a traditional naval situational awareness and capacity building operation (Drent 2018, 3).

In March 2019, however, EU member states agreed to withdraw their forces from the operation, while extending its mandate for another six months (Council 2019). Keeping their political support to the operation during this time, member states focused on ‘air surveillance and [...] cooperation with the Libyan coast guard’ (Interview 41: EU official; Barigazzi 2019). In March 2020, Operation Sophia came to an end and replaced by EUNAVFOR MED

Irini, which aims ‘to contribute to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on Libya and to promoting peace in our neighbourhood’ (EEAS 2020a).

The timeline of overlap between the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean is illustrated in Figure 15.



*Figure 15. Timeline of overlap in the Mediterranean
(Source: Author)*

7.2. France: When overlap challenges national policy

7.2.1. The context of France's engagement with the operational overlap in the Mediterranean

To address key security issues in the Mediterranean, France's naval and air assets were deployed to Frontex for border control and search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean via Operation Triton, launched in 2014 (Premier Ministre 2015, 30). Frontex was also cooperating with NATO's Standing Maritime Group-2 (SNMG-2), which was conducting training activities under Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) in the Mediterranean. This NATO force was moved to the Aegean Sea to undertake reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance tasks to prevent illegal crossings, and shared information with Frontex as well as with Greek and Turkish coast guards to stem the flow of irregular migration and illegal human trafficking (Sarantaki 2019, pp. 12-13; Lindsay 2016, 8). France saw this NATO deployment instrumental in facilitating cooperation between Greece and Turkey in preventing smugglers' activities in the Aegean Sea (Sénat 2016a). Especially after the incidents believed to manifest the broader unrest in the Middle East and North Africa such as the Paris attacks in November 2015, France favoured increased EU engagement to prevent irregular crossings to Europe through the Central Mediterranean (Rieker 2014, pp. 141-142). I argue in this section that France's policies about the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean are closely related to its engagement in the Sahel to tackle the security threats believed to be stemming from the region.

An underlying factor behind the French activity against illegal human trafficking was the perceived threat posed by the instability in Europe's southern neighbourhood to France's national security (Rieker 2018, 6). France sought to prevent terrorist-designated groups from

crossing to Europe via the Mediterranean route (Assemblée Nationale 2016c). In this respect, Paris approached the issue of illegal human trafficking in the Mediterranean by close reference to conflicts in this region (Bøås et al. 2018, 10). Strategic documents such as the 2013 defence white paper described Mediterranean as a “strategic space” and a “strategic border”, where terrorism and trafficking were perceived as common security concerns for the Mediterranean and southern Europe (Ministère de la Défense 2013, 53). Moreover, the National Strategy for the Security of Maritime Areas of 2015 emphasises that ‘the presence of a large number of potential candidates for immigration in the Mediterranean basin requires the [French] State, in a European context, to seek and provide appropriate solutions to the resulting migratory flows at sea’ (Premier Ministre 2015, 30). The 2017 Defence and National Security Strategic Review also identified the southern regions of the Mediterranean as ‘risk areas’ (French Government 2017, 24). Against this background, in addition to its response via mechanisms such as Frontex, France conducted bilateral capacity development programmes with Morocco, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia to support these countries’ maritime security structures and policies (Interview 37: French official).


7.2.2. Domestic decision-making structure

French Government’s naval engagement in the Mediterranean was coordinated through an interministerial policymaking environment. A number of governmental agencies were involved in the political and operational direction of France’s maritime activities in the region, but main responsibilities regarding France’s decisions to participate the EU and NATO operations were held by the foreign policy executive, within which three governmental agencies have considerable influence: the Prime Ministry, Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (MEAE), and the Ministry of Armed Forces (MdA), and Ministry of Interior (Interview 36: French official; Interview 19: Academic expert; also see David 2011, pp. 57-58).

The General Secretariat for the Sea (*Secrétariat Général de la Mer*, SGMer) coordinated the Government's action on issues related to maritime security. Advising the Prime Minister on maritime issues, SGMer was also involved in the decision-making processes related to maritime search and rescue operations through an organisation called SECMAR (Study and Coordination Body for Search and Rescue at Sea) (Chaumette 2018), which articulated the guiding principles of maritime search and rescue operations. SECMAR also ensured coordination between different ministries involved, which included ministries of defence, civil security, transport, and the sea (Journal Officiel de la République Française 2014).

Within SGMer was also a coast guard function (*Centre opérationnel de la fonction garde-côtes*, CoFGC), which was created in 2010 to facilitate national integration of the French government's action at sea. CoFGC is itself an inter-ministerial organisation that coordinates the work of different governmental agencies involved in France's maritime policies in general (Premier Ministre 2015, 11; de Tréglodé and Frécon 2020, pp. 79-79).

France's decision-making structure regarding the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean is illustrated in Figure 13.



*Figure 16. France's decision-making structure regarding the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean.
(Source: Author)*

7.2.3. Initial engagement with the EU operation: Amplifying France's security policies

France joined the EU operation in its first phase, which covered tasks including gathering intelligence on the business model of human smuggling networks (Interview 38: French official). During this stage, French units in the EU operation carried out maritime surveillance flights, while France also provided an operational commander to the EU task force (Assemblée Nationale 2015). In the second phase of the EU operation, where the participating forces were to engage smuggling boats and arrest suspected smugglers in the international waters in the Mediterranean, French force assets maintained their focus on maritime situational awareness and surveillance by contributing a helicopter-carrying frigate and additional intelligence gathering resources (Sénat 2016c). This phase also included the expansion of activities to the Libyan territorial waters, provided that a UNSC mandate or the Libyan authorities allow for

this. France was also supportive of the proposal that the EU operation should act onshore Libya where human smugglers were believed to be based (Assemblée Nationale 2015; Roberts and Kingsley 2016, 3).

In allocating force assets with a focus on situational awareness and surveillance tasks was that, rather than migration, Paris was primarily concerned with human trafficking and its security implications, rather than more direct implications of irregular migration as such (Interview 36: French official). Indeed, key French decision-makers justified France's participation to the EU operation by referring to concerns about security threats emanating from North Africa. For instance, foreign minister Jean-Marc Ayrault considered that 'in the central Mediterranean, the fight against migrant smugglers and arms traffickers [...] are often the same people' and 'the migration routes from Libya arrive directly in Italy, then in France' (Assemblée Nationale 2016b). Similarly, according to defence minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, 'to guarantee our own security, the government of national unity [in Libya] must authorise Sophia to enter Libyan territorial waters to intervene in the face of the smuggling of migrants and arms, or that it constitutes for these purposes its own security force' (Assemblée Nationale 2016d).

These aforementioned concerns of French decision-makers were based on reports suggesting most of the '[ISIS] militants involved in the attacks carried out in Paris in November 2015 and in Brussels in March 2016 entered the EU by crossing the Mediterranean Sea hidden among Syrian refugees' (Dibenedetto 2017, 11). Indeed, the public outcry over certain events such as the attack on the Bataclan nightclub in Paris generated a domestic pressure for the French Government to act (Funk et al. 2019, 113). In turn, France thought that the EU operation was a suitable instrument to prevent such security risks that could end up in Europe through the central Mediterranean (Interview 37: French official).

Moreover, during the increasing migratory flows to Europe through the Mediterranean between 2015 and 2016, France experienced a relatively slower and more regular flow of migrants compared to a number of other EU states (Funk et al. 2019, 100). Additionally, the origins of asylum seekers in France did not necessarily reflect the crises in the Middle East at the time (OFPRA 2018), while the extent to which the public opinion in France saw migrants as a burden on the country was less than many other EU countries (European Commission 2018).

In making use of the EU operation's ability to address France's security concerns, Paris argued that the EU operation should also contribute to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on Libya (Die Welt 2016). This was a concern for France not least because the weapons stocks of the Gaddafi regime, which fell after the civil unrest that broke out in the context of the wider 'Arab Spring' in 2011, have reportedly reached to areas of strategic importance for France such as the Sahel and the rest of North Africa by various militia groups (Kaim and Schulz 2020, 2). Arguing that 'there was a political need to implement more thoroughly the arms embargo on Libya', Paris also believed that the EU operation would be a suitable platform to support the enforcement of the arms embargo on Libya (Interview 36: French official). In contrast to other EU activities aimed at external borders protection, such as Triton, France accepted Operation Sophia as 'an operation to combat arms trafficking in the Mediterranean' (Assemblée Nationale 2016a; Assemblée Nationale 2017). At the same time, France was not willing to be involved in issues similar that could lead to a long-term engagement in the region, such as operational commitments that could give France additional responsibilities. For example, Paris argued that the Libyan authority's approval should be

secured for the transfer of captured smugglers to Libyan authorities, rather than prosecuting them in European courts (Sénat 2015).

In addition to a leverage of its security interests, France saw the EU operation as a demonstration of the EU's external action at the time of an increased momentum behind security and defence integration in Europe (Interview 36: French official). It was believed that the EU operation reflected the implementation of the EU's foreign policy vision as laid out in the 2016's Global Strategy by demonstrating that 'Europeans could take responsibility' to ensure 'European strategic autonomy' (Sénat 2016b; Interview 41: EU official).

7.2.4. Deployment of the NATO operation: A welcome addition

In a way similar to its conception of the EU operation, France also approached NATO's involvement in the Mediterranean on the basis of strengthening security in Europe's southern neighbourhood and a leverage for the fight against terrorism (MdA 2017, 58). In addition to counterterrorism, NATO's focus on arms and human trafficking in the region was also in line with France's willingness to be engaged in the region through NATO after the termination of Operation Active Endeavour (Interview 39: French official). Indeed, Operation Sea Guardian introduced an element of 'flexibility' by not limiting itself to a particular area in the Mediterranean and by including tasks such as the protection of critical infrastructure, fight against weapons of mass destruction, and maritime interdiction (Interview 35: NATO official). France thought that the NATO operation's coverage of a wide range of areas and maritime security activities would contribute to its own efforts to achieve stability in the region (Interview 36: French official).

France initially joined Operation Sea Guardian with a frigate. At the same time, shortly before France's participation to the NATO operation, the EU extended the mandate of its own operation until 27 July 2017. While 'retaining the focus on its core mandate', the EU operation's tasks were extended to cover the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya, as well as capacity building, training and information sharing with the Libyan Navy and Coastguard (Council 2016a). Considered with the recently launched NATO operation, Paris saw the EU operation's new mandate as a 'useful development' to contribute to the stability in North Africa and the Sahel (Interview 37: French official).

French decision-makers often justified the EU and NATO operations by referring to these operations' complementary contributions to the fight against arms trafficking networks in the region (Assemblée Nationale 2016e). They thought that the differences between the EU and NATO operations could be seen as potential areas of inter-operational complementarity (Interview 40: NATO official).

In particular, achieving stability in Libya was an important concern for France's contributions to the EU and NATO operations (Interview 36: French official). A particular area for achieving such complementarity was the implementation of the UN arms embargo on Libya (Interview 39: French official). This was also reflected in France's operational practices, which increasingly focused on intelligence and situational awareness aspects (Sénat 2016c; Assemblée Nationale 2020). Planners in both organisations also considered NATO's potential support to the EU in terms of the implementation of the UN arms embargo on Libya (Interview 35: NATO official).

Nonetheless, a National Assembly report found that there was a competition between the EU and NATO operations in terms of force generation, making it difficult for France to take part in both operations simultaneously (Assemblée Nationale 2018). Indeed, France's attempts to foster inter-operational cooperation to accomplish its objectives about its regional policies were challenged by political dynamics within the EU and NATO. France was in disagreement with some EU member states about Eastern Mediterranean politics, particularly about imposing more sanctions against Turkey due to the latter's activities in the Eastern Mediterranean (Interview 23: UK official). French decision-makers argued that 'Sophia will not fulfil the mission for which it was created until its units can act in Libyan territorial waters' (Assemblée Nationale 2017).

Another question mark about the EU operation was whether intercepting the ships carrying weapons to Libya would be a sufficient step given the pressing need for the establishment of a government of national unity in Libya to authorise the EU operation to function in the Libyan territorial waters (Interview 38: French official). The absence of a UNSC resolution to enable the EU operation to operate in Libyan territorial waters made this operational phase increasingly unlikely. In contrast to the EU operation, the NATO operation was 'able to operate in the area where migrant ships depart' (Jopling 2019, 14). Indeed, instead of an explicit UN authorisation, the consent of Libyan authorities and authorisation by the North Atlantic Council would suffice of NATO to operate in Libyan territorial waters (Bundestag 2016g, 2). Furthermore, the EU operation's limited geographical scope led the EU operation to keep an overarching focus on human smuggling and training within 'its own operational box' (Interview 35: NATO official), on the other hand, the NATO operation was undertaking tasks more directly related to stability and deterrence in the Mediterranean and operating in the territorial waters of Libya 'was never

an issue for the NATO operation because [NATO] never wanted to do that' (Interview 35: NATO official).

Key aspects of the EU operation's mandate were also seen as conflicting with each other as deployment of more naval assets for the enforcement of UN arms embargo on Libya would mean more the search and rescue activities (Interview 39: French official). Given the growing dissatisfaction with the EU operation, France decided to withdraw its naval assets to this operation while choosing to extend its mandate for another year in March 2019. Instead of naval assets, France's force contribution to the EU operation focused on aerial surveillance tasks through a maritime patrol aircraft (Assemblée Nationale 2020).

Despite downgrading its operational contribution to the EU, France kept its support to the Operation Sophia and other EU initiatives in the region. The importance monitoring of the UN arms embargo on Libya made France maintained its political and operational support to the EU operation (Interview 36: French official). Another issue of importance for France was the training of Libyan Coast Guard and Navy, included in the EU operation's new mandate. Despite reports that Libyan coastguard were mistreating the migrants, Paris supported this element of the EU operation as the capacity building of the Libyan Navy and Coastguard was seen as an 'offer' to the Libyan authorities in exchange for their invitation to the EU to operate inside the Libyan territory (Trew and Kington 2017; UNSMIL 2016; EEAS 2016). As a penholder of UNSC resolution in support of the EU operation, France also thought that the EU operation's involvement in the implementation of the UN arms embargo was easier to seek approval at UNSC, compared to NATO operation (Interview 38: French official).

Moreover, as aforementioned political and operational challenges made it increasingly untenable for France to use the EU operation to pursue its regional stabilisation efforts, Paris turned to the Union's other initiatives in the region (Interview 39: French official). France thought that the EU's multi-track involvement was in line with its efforts to contain security threats stemming from the region (Interview 37: French official). The French Government argued that more sustainable solutions should be achieved through working with the EU (Assemblée Nationale 2019). For instance, France used the EU's additional instruments security sector reform initiatives in regional countries to address security and migration issues in North Africa and the Mediterranean, whereas NATO's commitment has been limited to a military response to human trafficking (Ruiz-Diaz 2020, 283; Wosolsobe 2016, 7). Another CSDP initiative in the Mediterranean was the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya), which, as stated in the introduction, sought to 'support the Libyan authorities in contributing to efforts to disrupt organised criminal networks involved notably in smuggling migrants, human trafficking and terrorism' (Council 2013a).

Moreover, the EU's migration strategy included 'a partnership framework approach with countries of origin and transit; the delivery of capacity-building programmes to the Libyan Government; and support for the work of the United Nations organisations in the region, including IOM and UNHCR, as well as to other international organisations and non-governmental organisations operating in Libya' (UNSMIL 2016, 7). Hence, though France was concerned with the lack of effective state structures in Libya that constrained the EU's 'comprehensive strategy', it also thought that working through the EU could still address long-term issues such as the lack of state structures in Libya (Interview 36: French official).

France's strategies about the EU and NATO operations also reflected some intragovernmental divisions in Paris. The increasing focus on surveillance tasks were informed mainly by the defence ministry's focus on military engagement in Libya. This policy stance contrasted with the foreign ministry's view, which favoured a diplomatic option supporting the UN, while the Presidency supported a politically proactive engagement rather than military intervention (Interview 23: UK official).

Yet, the French Government managed to minimise potential tensions from these divisions. The political and operational aspects of France's policymaking in the region were shared between the foreign and defence ministries, which prevented substantial divergences during the decision-making processes (Interview 37: French official). Furthermore, when former defence minister Le Drian became the foreign minister in 2017 with a predilection of supporting military engagement in Libya, foreign ministry officials saw their strategy of supporting UN-based options 'completely undermined by their political leader' (Interview 23: UK official). Indeed, the change of leadership in the French foreign ministry limited the chances of potential resistance within the ministry against France's abovementioned change of operational focus. At times, defence minister Le Drian and President Macron dealt directly with France's policies in the Mediterranean (Interview 36: French official). For instance, French Ambassador to Libya was not informed about contacts between conflicting parties in Libya in 2017 (Interview 23: UK official). There was even a perception among the diplomatic community in Libya that France's policies were being 'run by the French Special Forces' informed by the defence ministry's and the President's agenda that was 'completely different from Quai d'Orsay' (Interview 23: UK official; also see Momtaz 2020; Henke 2020). The military-led option advocated by Le Drian was also supported by the Presidency at the time (Interview 36: French official). Furthermore, the parliament's role was also limited to 'controlling' the actions of the

Government without being able to block France's participation to these operations (Interview 36: French official).

Despite withdrawing from NATO's Operation Sea Guardian in June 2020 due to tensions with Turkey over the implementation of UN arms embargo on Libya, France's strategies within the operational overlap in the Mediterranean continued to be based on using the distinct advantages of the EU and NATO to pursue France's own objectives. Indeed, Paris left the door open to re-participate to the NATO operation by suggesting that it could consider returning to the NATO operation if Allies reaffirm their commitments to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on Libya and to better coordinate this task with the EU operation (Irish 2020).

7.2.5. Conclusion

In this chapter I analysed France's strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO in the Mediterranean. I argued that France's strategies were driven by its concerns about the implications of security threats believed to be stemming from North Africa and the Sahel regions as well as the preferences of domestic veto players within the French Government. The overlap between the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean presented France a leverage to accomplish its own objectives about regional stability, which were mainly driven the Presidency and defence establishment in Paris. Defence ministry's preference towards military-led options, which received the support of the Presidency, reinforced French Government's military presence in the region through the EU and NATO operations. However, lack of progress in the EU operation as well as France's tensions with other NATO members limited France's ability to use the overlapping EU and NATO operations to accomplish its regional policies, as evident in France's withdrawal from both operations over time.

Table 10 illustrates France's strategies within the overlap between the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean.

| Drivers of France's strategies | | Type of France's strategies | |
|---|--|-----------------------------|--|
| Security interests | Threat of terrorism that was believed to stem from North Africa and Sahel | Exploitation | Using the EU and NATO operations to pursue France's security objectives; reducing the costs of France's involvement in stabilisation of North Africa and the Sahel |
| Domestic veto players | Defence ministry and the Presidency's support for military-led options; sidelining of the foreign ministry | | |
| Preferences about means of intervention | Using the EU's multitrack engagement | Accommodation | Withdrawal from operations due to political and operational reasons |

Table 10. France's strategies within the operational overlap in the Mediterranean

This case lends mixed support to the threefold argument of the thesis. First, the case of France's engagement with the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean offers a low level of support to the argument that member states make cross-operational strategies by considering their choices in both operations. Despite making the case that the EU and NATO operations should be complementary especially in terms of support to the implementation of the UN arms embargo to Libya, France's strategies about the two operations were somewhat detached from each other. Although France sought to use the comparative advantages of each operation to pursue its objective of eliminating security threats in the region, its ability to use the overlap as a leverage for its own objective of achieving stability in the region was limited due to the EU operation's lack of progress and intra-NATO tensions. As the EU operation failed to operate

within the Libyan territorial waters and France's tensions with Turkey about the implementation of the UN arms embargo on Libya, France withdrew from both operations.

Second, France's changing strategies within the overlap offer support to the argument that member states' forum-shopping behaviour can vary. In line with the exploitation strategy as outlined in Chapter 2, France initially sought to use the EU and NATO operations to implement its regional policy based on preventing security threats. However, France adjusted its preferences by withdrawing most of its force assets from the EU operation, despite continuing to use the EU's other instruments to achieve stability in the region. France also withdrew from the NATO operation due to tensions within the Alliance, though leaving the door open for its re-participation to the NATO operation.

Third, despite its centralised decision-making structure, France had limited ability to use the overlap to pursue its agenda in the Mediterranean. This confirms the point made in Chapter 2 that a centralised organisation of domestic foreign policy coordination does not necessarily translate into effective policy outcomes. To be sure, France's centralised policymaking mechanisms minimised potential divergences within the domestic decision-making environment. However, France's ability to project and defend its interests throughout the operational overlap was considerably limited due to the dynamics within the EU and NATO. This confirms the claim that not only member states' coordination of their domestic policymaking, but also dynamics within the EU and NATO are important determinants of the extent to which they can pursue their aims within the EU and NATO operations.

7.3. Germany: Appeasing others' perceptions

7.3.1. The context of Germany's engagement with the operational overlap in the Mediterranean

Germany focused on a long-term and comprehensive stabilisation approach in the Mediterranean and refrained from military action (Fabbrini 2014; Bundestag 2019c, 7). Since 2015, Germany has provided humanitarian funds totalling more than 40 million euros in support of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Libya (Bundestag 2019c, 7). Furthermore, as part of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), Berlin supported measures to improve the migrants' living conditions in Libya (Bundestag 2019c, 8). At the same time, the Federal Government acknowledged that Germany should take more responsibilities within international community's conflict prevention efforts (Bendiek 2015).

As one of the preferred destinations for refugees and migrants, Germany also had a stake in disrupting smuggling routes departing from Turkey's Aegean coastline (Blockmans 2016, 7). Germany contributed to NATO's Standing Maritime Group 2 (SNMG-2) carrying out reconnaissance and situation mapping activities in the Aegean Sea to support Greek and Turkish authorities in coordination with the EU's Frontex. Throughout its engagement with NATO activities in the Aegean Sea, Germany maintained the emphasis on non-use of force by stating that it would refrain from direct intervention, but only support the Greek and Turkish coast guards, as well as Frontex in undertaking their tasks (Bundestag 2016a, 9). However, with increasing deaths in the Central Mediterranean, the Federal Government was pressed to show that it was 'doing something' to prevent further loss of life in the Mediterranean (Interview 30:

German official). In this vein, German forces began maritime rescue operations in the region in the first half of 2015 (Interview 30: German official)

7.3.2. Domestic decision-making structure

Germany's decision-making instruments and mechanisms related to its strategies within the EU and NATO operations in the Central Mediterranean included a number of governmental agencies. Similar to Germany's policymaking on the previous cases, the Chancellery was generally involved in determining the broader political outlines of Germany's policies (Interview 28: German official). Rather than being directly involved in the decision-making processes, it functioned as a 'guideline' and 'referee' to intervene in cases of disagreements between individual ministries (Interview 29: German official).


Policymaking roles at the working level were shared by a number of ministries. Whilst the Federal Foreign Office (*Auswärtiges Amt*, AA) was the main ministry representing Germany's positions during diplomatic negotiations about the EU and NATO operations in the Central Mediterranean, military aspects of these operations such as rules of engagement and allocation of force assets were implemented by the Federal Ministry of Defence (*Bundesministerium der Verteidigung*, BMVg) (Bundestag 2019). These two ministries also shared roles in determining the negotiating positions of Germany's representations in the EU and NATO in Brussels. While AA set the political parameters of the EU and NATO operations, negotiation instructions related to technical aspects of these operations were shaped by BMVg (interview 28: German official). Instructions to the Permanent Representation of Germany to the EU were sent by AA in coordination with a range of other ministries. In the case of Germany's delegation in NATO, this role was mainly fulfilled by BMVg. Germany's representations to the EU and NATO also influenced decision-making in Berlin especially when there was a 'time pressure', which

allowed German Ambassadors some freedom in negotiations in Brussels (Interview 32: German official).

Because not only military but also police forces and internal structures could be deployed in the fight against crimes related to human smuggling, the Ministry of Interior (*Bundesministerium des Innern*) was also involved in Germany's relevant decision-making processes. Although not involved at the initial decision-making about Germany's participation to operations in the Mediterranean, BMI took part more closely and directly during the discussions on the prolongation of Germany's participation to these operations, dealing with the civilian and migration-related aspects of Germany's response (Interview 29: German official). As the EU and NATO naval operations in the Central Mediterranean were related to the freedom of navigation at sea, another ministry in the process was the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure (*Bundesministerium für Verkehr und Digitale Infrastruktur*) (Interview 32: German official).

Because these EU and NATO operations were categorised as military operations, the national parliament (*Bundestag*) also had an important role throughout the relevant decision-making processes. As will be seen in this case study, the Federal Government's multiple appeals for *Bundestag*'s approval for participation to these operations formed an important part of Germany's engagement with these operations, although the effect of such parliamentary involvement depended on the contingent domestic political context.

Germany's decision-making structure regarding the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean is illustrated in Figure 14.



*Figure 17. Germany's decision-making structure regarding the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean
(Source: Author)*

7.3.3. Initial engagement with the EU operation: A humanitarian effort in a military task force

When the EU's operation Sophia was launched in June 2015, 'migration was a topic that Merkel had a personal interest in' (Interview 32: German official). Indeed, the Chancellor emphasised that recurrent 'tragedies' in the Mediterranean had to be avoided at all costs, stressing that 'everything [...] must be done in order to save lives' (Deutsche Welle 2015). Following what one of the interviewees termed 'the spirit of 2015' in Europe, Germany underlined the importance of a cooperative response to loss of lives at sea (Interview 29: German official). Furthermore, as stated, German forces were already undertaking search and rescue operations in the region. Although search and rescue tasks were not a part of the EU operation's mandate, Berlin was involved in the planning of the operation 'with these activities

in mind', expecting that search and rescue will be a part of operational activities as a result of obligations arising from international law (Interview 32: German official).

At the same time, the Federal Government was initially reluctant about a far-reaching military response. Germany's support to the EU operation received criticism from the domestic opposition. Members from opposition parties in *Bundestag*, for instance, argued that Germany was supporting a military rather than civilian rescue operation that symbolised the EU's 'unilateral military strategy' (Bundestag 2015g, pp. 1-2; Bundestag 2015f, pp. 1-2). Yet, despite not supporting a far-reaching military intervention, the Federal Government still saw the EU operation as a pragmatic instrument. The view in Berlin at the time was that the EU operation would be a part of broader response to long-term issues stemming from North Africa and more particularly Libya (Interview 32: German official). Indeed, replying to aforementioned criticisms, foreign minister Steinmeier stated that the military-led response was an instrumental action before the long-term causes of irregular flows through Libya are addressed: 'Without stabilisation in Libya', he argued 'we will hardly succeed in taking decisive steps against the migration flows from North Africa and the sub-Saharan region' (Brössler 2015). From a similar perspective, in a June 2015 visit to the German frigate operating under the EU operation, defence minister Ursula von der Leyen argued that the EU operation 'gives politics time so that the causes of hardship and migration in the countries of origin can be combated' (Möhle 2015).

In this sense, by framing the military-led EU operation as an instrument of preventing humanitarian crises in the Central Mediterranean, Germany detached the EU operation from broader security issues in the region, instead focusing on disrupting the business model of human smuggling networks (Interview 28: German official). In doing so, Germany followed an essentially civilian crisis management approach. For instance, German forces in the EU

operation used civilian interpreters to gather information from migrants about the business model of smugglers (Interview 30: German official). Furthermore, in its initial appeal to *Bundestag*, the Federal Government highlighted the humanitarian dimension of the EU operation by stating that the military participation in this operation ‘[would] further underline [...] the German participation in the comprehensive approach of the EU in the context of efforts to avert the humanitarian catastrophe of the refugee movements across the Mediterranean’ (Bundestag 2015d, 7). A senior NATO official described these tasks as more suitable with the EU operation, as NATO’s military-led operation in the region (Operation Active Endeavour at the time) would be more difficult to align with such tasks (Interview 33: NATO official).

Statements of key figures from the leading coalition partner CDU/CSU faction also indicated that Germany did not emphasise the EU operation’s military-led approach. For instance, former defence minister Franz Josef Jung, a CDU/CSU member of Bundestag at the time, argued that the issue of human smuggling ‘ha[d] nothing to do with the subject of arms trafficking’ and that the focus ought to be on taking action against criminal activities, ‘some of which make more money than drug trafficking and kill lives’ (Bundestag 2015c, 11645).

Though this made the EU operation a suitable option for Germany, not all actors within the Federal Government were in favour of Germany’s participation to the EU operation. Development minister Gerd Müller argued that the Italian-led “Mare Nostrum” operation in the Mediterranean should be restarted as he believed that ending this operation had cost many lives (FAZ 2015). In contrast, Thomas de Maizière, minister of interior, criticised the Italian operation on the basis that it was aiding the smuggling networks (Braun 2015). Although de Maizière was among the first German ministers to argue for a robust response to irregular migratory flows through the Central Mediterranean (FAZ 2015), the Federal Ministry of

Interior (BMI) thought the operation would function as a pull factor for migrants and in turn create more migratory pressures for Germany (Interview 28: German official).

Therefore, BMI pressed the federal foreign and defence ministries to slow down the launch of the EU operation due to its divergent position on the main tasks of the operation (Interview 28: German official). However, as BMI's involvement during decision-making about Germany's participation to the EU operation did not alter the ultimate decision, the three ministries agreed on a 'general line of policy', namely, contributing to the EU operation and considering other multilateral initiatives in the region, a position that was also reinforced also by the Chancellery (Interviews 28 and 29: German officials). Moreover, rather than changing the Federal Government's determination to join the EU operation, this debate within Berlin reinforced the Federal Government's support for a comprehensive European approach to combat the long-term causes of migration from North Africa and the Middle East through the Central Mediterranean (Bundestag 2015b, 3).

Consequently, Germany had the following main goals in participating to the EU operation: Human rescue at sea, taking action against human smuggling networks, working together with the countries of origin and transit to combat the structural causes of irregular migration, and pursuing a sense of 'European solidarity' (Bundestag 2015e, 12053). To pursue these goals, during the first phase of the operation, Germany provided a frigate and a replenishment ship, which were already carrying out sea rescue operations in the Mediterranean at the time. Germany also sent personnel to the operational headquarters located in Rome (Bundestag 2015a, 21). As stated, a key priority for Germany in the EU operation was to gather information about human smuggling networks in the region. In doing so, German forces in the EU operation operated near the crossing routes, where migrant boats could be interrupted, and migrants be

interviewed by specially trained civilian interpreters to gain information about the smugglers (Interview 30: German official).

With a growing interest in public opinion on issues such as the relocation of refugees rescued at sea (Interview 28: German official), furthermore, the EU's Operation Sophia became the most popular out-of-area deployment of *Bundeswehr* when it was launched (Biehl et al. 2015). Before the expansion of the EU operation's mandate in June 2016, Steinmeier stated that the operation was essentially about what Europe can do to 'prevent refugees crossing the Libyan border towards the Mediterranean' (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2016). Germany's 2016 White Paper on Security Policy and the Future of the *Bundeswehr* also touched on the issue by stressing that 'Germany embraces its responsibility for managing the humanitarian consequences of refugee movements [which] can only be appropriately controlled and managed on the basis of an effective European strategy and practice' (BMVg 2016).

Despite increasing salience of the humanitarian aspect of the EU operation, however, Berlin highlighted that the EU operation also sought 'to promote stability in the countries in the southern neighbourhood of the European Union beyond Libya, to support state structures and conflict resolution in the regions of origin and transit countries, and to preserve the prospects of the people in their home countries' (Bundestag 2016b, 6).

At the same time, Germany's discourse about the humanitarian aspect of the EU operation did not change substantially after the EU operation's additional tasks of implementing the UN arms embargo on Libya and training the Libyan Navy and Coast Guard. Indeed, the Federal Government maintained its argument that a purely military initiative will be insufficient to resolve the issue of human smuggling through the Central Mediterranean. In appealing for

Bundestag approval for the prolongation of Germany's participation to the operation, for instance, the Federal Government's narrative was that supporting the EU operation was 'embedded in a comprehensive approach that aims to promote the development of self-supporting state structures in Libya that contribute to pacification and stabilisation' (Bundestag 2016b, 6). In parallel, German forces in the EU operation were constantly instructed by Berlin that their key focus should remain gaining information on human smuggling networks rather than enforcing the UN arms embargo (Interview 30: German official).

7.3.4. Deployment of the NATO operation: Cautious optimism

During the planning stage of NATO's Operation Sea Guardian, German decision-makers considered a choice between keeping an 'outdated' operation, namely Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), that has proven successful in terms of providing situational awareness on the one hand and putting in place a new, non-Article 5 operation to address the more recent security challenges in the Mediterranean on the other (Interview 29: German official). During this stage, the role Germany afforded to the NATO operation was based on provision of security and stability in the region, in contrast to the aforementioned civilian framing of the EU operation. Berlin argued that a contribution from NATO should be based on the core tasks of OAE and the Alliance's Maritime Strategy laid out in April 2011 (Bundestag 2016c, 12), which stressed taking action against 'the vulnerability of maritime security against transnational criminal activities including illegal trafficking of humans', as well as the importance of developing EU capabilities in conflict prevention and promoting cooperation with NATO (NATO 2011).

Germany sought to create a division of labour between the operations based on each operation's distinct roles. In order to secure the *Bundestag*'s approval for the participation of

German forces in the NATO operation, the Federal Government emphasised the distinct features of the NATO operation compared to its EU counterpart. A characteristic of the NATO operation was its link with broader security issues in the region. Having participated OAE from its onset, Germany thought that the expertise gained in this operation should be used in the new NATO operation (Interview 30: German official). Moreover, as an ‘export nation’, Germany needed to contribute to the protection of one of the world’s most important transport routes (Bundestag 2019b, 9832).

The Federal Government also argued that the NATO operation should be aimed at providing surveillance and capacity building in the Mediterranean, as well as early identification and countering of crises in the region, where a lack of state control was believed to expose large coastal areas in the region to terrorist organisations (Bundestag 2016d, 4; Bundestag 2017d, 5). In this sense, the NATO operation would achieve its goals ‘if the Mediterranean countries were able to independently counter the dangers and threats in the Mediterranean area without the support of [OSG]’ (Bundestag 2018c, 8). Another advantage of the NATO operation for Germany was its geographical coverage that was broader than its EU counterpart. Berlin pointed out that that NATO operation was ‘the only multilateral approach that fulfils [rescue] tasks for the entire Mediterranean region on the basis of resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and international multilateral treaties’ (Bundestag 2019a, 6).

At the same time, because the EU operation’s key task of disrupting human smuggling networks required situational awareness, German decision-makers acknowledged that ‘there was an overlap [between the two operations] in a huge part of Central Mediterranean’ and thought that NATO could in theory assist the EU operation in that respect (Interview 29: German official). In line with the practices of exploitation strategy, therefore, Germany

attempted to foster cooperation between the two operations by acting as a ‘broker’ between the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean. For instance, Germany was a key player behind the finalisation of a memorandum of understanding ‘to establish a process of exchanging information between the two operations’ (Interview 30: German official).

Germany also supported the NATO operation to fill operational gaps the EU operation encountered, such as intelligence gathering needed to trace human traffickers in the Central Mediterranean (Interview 30: German official; also see NATO 2016). Indeed, Operation Sea Guardian supported its EU counterpart by contributing to gaining a more comprehensive picture on smugglers’ networks and hence indirectly to search and rescue operations (Dibenedetto 2017, 12). In this understanding, the Federal Government welcomed the NATO operation’s support to Operation Sophia in the field of sharing situational awareness and operational and security assistance during the EU forces’ escorts to the ships transiting the region (Bundestag 2019a, 6).

While seeing the EU and NATO operations from different lenses, the Federal Government also indicated that both operations were ‘designed to help save lives and disrupt the criminal structures that are behind human trafficking (Bundestag 2018b, 3430). According to Germany’s official discourse, the NATO operation aligned with the EU’s comprehensive approach and that the fight against criminal smuggling networks remained the core of the mission of the operation’, as well as ‘contributing to the training and capacity building of the Libyan coastguard and navy and enforcing the UN arms embargo on Libya on the high seas’ (Bundestag 2017a, pp. 6-7).

At the same time, Berlin was wary of the challenges of a military-led response the NATO operation might entail against human smugglers in the Mediterranean. The first challenge facing the Federal Government about the means of intervention favoured by the NATO operation was related to the criticisms the operation received from human rights organisations on the grounds that a ‘military alliance with no humanitarian mandate’ forms ‘a clear violation of international law which gives refugees the right to have their application for protection assessed in an EU member state’ (Akkerman 2016, 7). In particular, some NGOs expressed that ‘NATO’s involvement in migration control [through OSG] signals a dangerous shift toward militarisation of a humanitarian crisis’ (Rettman 2016).

These criticisms also resonated at *Bundestag*. For *Die Bündnis/Die Grünen* faction, military action against illegal activity in Central Mediterranean would be ‘risky’ and ‘counterproductive’. As a UN approval was not a prerequisite for OSG to operate in Libyan territorial waters (instead, approval of Libyan authorities was sufficient), this faction also criticised the operation, which was believed to circumvent the UN’s ‘decisive authority with legitimacy in matters of international peace and security’ (Bundestag 2016g, 2). This was also the grounds for *Die Bündnis 90/Grünen* claim that OSG is ‘a blank cheque for the Federal Government to deploy the Bundeswehr in the Mediterranean region’ (Bundestag 2016g, pp. 1-2). Similarly, according to *Die Linke* faction, OSG is ‘NATO’s attempt to expand military control over all shipping traffic in the Mediterranean and thus ‘a further step towards a dangerous and conflict-escalating militarisation of the Mediterranean, which not least represents a growing problem for refugees from Africa’ (Bundestag 2016f, pp. 1-2).

Responding to these criticisms, a senior German diplomat stated that the operation was not about ‘being involved in the territorial waters of any country through the back door’ (Bundestag

2016e, 18869). In the words of a German official, deciding whether to work with the EU or NATO ‘was a challenge [for Germany] because [it] did not want to mix the tasks [of the two operations]’ (Interview 30: German official). Despite seeking to mitigate inter-operational gaps, Berlin considered that the NATO operation’s purpose was defence-oriented (Interview 29: German official). On the other hand, the EU operation was a ‘perfect operation for [Germany’s] culture of reticence’ as it is ‘always easier for Germany to participate in naval operations because the chances for collateral damage are far less than a land operation’, which made it easier for the Federal Government to have the operation approved in *Bundestag* (Interview 29: German official).

Germany thus approached the training of the Libyan authorities and the implementation of the UN arms embargo as secondary tasks. Indeed, Germany ran only three courses for the Libyan forces (Interview 32: German official) and it intercepted suspected arms traffickers in only ‘two minor occasions’ (Interview 29: German official). Moreover, within the EU operation, German Navy units did not use force to tackle human smugglers as ‘there was no need for this’ (Interview 30: German official). In contrast to NATO operation’s ‘very robust and high-level’ instruments which was ‘not a needed’, Germany’s emphasis was on specific capabilities to gain a more complete maritime picture to deal with human smugglers (Interview 30: German official).

Although these inter-operational differences challenged Germany’s ability to follow cross-operational strategies to foster complementarity between the EU and NATO task forces, Germany’s active support to both operations continued when the EU operation’s mandate was extended in March 2019, albeit without much reference to each other. During this period, the Federal Government also engaged in an internal debate. On the one hand, the Federal Ministry

of Interior argued that the smugglers' tactic of deliberately sinking their boats to 'create a search and rescue situation' brought about more refugees flowing into Europe and potentially Germany (Interview 29: German official). In contrast, the Federal Foreign Office favoured a continuation of German forces' deployment to the operation as it did not create such a 'pull factor' for refugees (Interview 29: German official). During this intragovernmental debate, Berlin found itself in 'a year of procrastination' where the operational mandate of the EU operation was being extended on three-monthly bases to keep the structures and financial resources intact, without much operational activity (Interviews 29 and 32: German officials). The option to support the expansion of the EU operation's mandate without deploying naval assets was seen by German officials a result of this intragovernmental divergence, which 'pushed the government to the edge of failure' (Interview 29: German official).

The EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean also helped Germany to fulfil its commitment to both organisations. In addition to aligning with Germany's favoured means of intervention, the EU operation was a platform for Germany to show its commitment to CSDP, 'which is basically a key part of Germany's foreign policy and military planning' (Interview 32: German official). In the words of a German diplomat, the Federal Government was 'very happy to make compromises' when it came to furthering the EU integration (Interview 32: German official). Indeed, the Federal Government on numerous occasions stressed that participation to the EU operation helped fulfil Germany's commitment to CSDP (Bundestag 2017c, 24331; Bundestag 2018a, 7).

In parallel, the NATO operation helped Germany to demonstrate its own commitment to NATO when the new US administration was pressuring Germany to increase its defence budget as well as its military commitment to international security. The new administration and

President Trump himself argued that the European allies of the US were not pulling their weight in NATO in terms of defence spending. At various NATO meeting, US representatives were constantly asking its European NATO Allies questions along the lines of ‘what have you done for me?’ (Interview 33: NATO official). Furthermore, President Trump singled out particularly Germany as a ‘free rider’ on the grounds that Berlin had been reluctant to substantially increase its defence budget or to send the Bundeswehr to operations abroad (Gotkowska 2017). These pressures were acknowledged by Berlin, which believed that ‘[Germany’s] efforts within the EU sent wrong signals to Washington’ although Germany was in fact interested in ‘ensuring that its contributions to EU does not send wrong signals to NATO’ (Interview 28: German official). Indeed, a key objective for Germany in the Central Mediterranean was to ensure that its efforts are placed both within NATO and EU at the same time (Interviews 28 and 30: German official). In the words of a German official, ‘in practical terms, you [sic] often find [German] ships deployed to Sea Guardian and then chopped to Sophia and vice versa to appease the perception of others’ (interview 28: German official).

Overall, from a political point of view, Germany was in a ‘win-win situation’ within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO in the Mediterranean, as each operation presented venues for Berlin to support international efforts to deal with human smuggling, broader security issues in Libya, and ‘a perfect way of promoting the EU’ (Interview 28: German official). However, although Germany’s resource allocation strategies were mainly consistent with establishing complementarity between the two operations, Germany was challenged when it came to mitigating the differences and frictions between these operations on the ground (interviews 27 and 30: German officials).

7.3.5. Conclusion

In this section, I discussed Germany's strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO in the Mediterranean. I argued that although all drivers suggested by the multifactor model were observed in Germany's strategies, these strategies were driven primarily by Germany's preferences about means of intervention and the role of veto players within Germany's domestic politics.

Within the EU operation, Germany used an essentially civilian crisis management approach, as seen in Berlin's preference to use civilian in obtaining a better understanding of the human smugglers' business model. In contrast to this civilian approach based on reluctance to use force, Germany justified its contribution to the NATO operation in terms of the necessity of military means as a vehicle of bringing stability to the region. Therefore, in line with the exploitation strategy, Germany ascribed different roles to each operation and sought to make use of them to fulfil different objectives. However, intragovernmental tensions made Germany accommodate its strategies by continuing its support to both operations without substantive force asset contributions. A contributing factor for Germany's continuing support for both operations was the Federal Government's willingness to show Germany's commitment to the EU and NATO.

Germany's strategies within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO in the Mediterranean are summarised in Table 11.

| Drivers of Germany's strategies | | Type of Germany's strategies | |
|---|--|------------------------------|--|
| Security interests | Securing freedom of navigation; contributing to regional stability (mainly through the NATO operation) | Exploitation | Using the EU and NATO operations to for their comparative advantages and symbolic value; fostering inter-operational complementarity |
| Domestic veto players | Intragovernmental divergence about the role of the EU operation; the Federal Government's willingness to demonstrate Germany's commitment to the EU and NATO | | |
| Preferences about means of intervention | Framing the EU operation as fulfilling humanitarian tasks; NATO operation as a complementary and necessary initiative | Accommodation | Withdrawal of force assets from the EU operation despite extending its mandate |

Table 11. Germany's strategies within the operational overlap in the Mediterranean

Evidence from Germany's strategies within the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean offer mixed support to the threefold argument. First, it is difficult to suggest that Germany pursued cross-operational strategies, not least because the Federal Government's preferences within the EU operation, which focused on humanitarian tasks, were discursively and operationally detached from NATO's military-led tasks.

Second, Germany's specific practices across the EU and NATO operations confirms the claim that member states' forum-shopping practices are manifested in different ways, rather than simply choosing the operations that are most favourable to their interests. Initially, Germany attempted to exploit the operational overlap by both taking part in both operations and foster cooperation between them. Over time, however, frictions between the EU and NATO

operations, as well as tensions within policymaking processes in Berlin, such as the Federal Ministry of Interior's objection against prolonging Germany's involvement in the EU operation, made Germany to accommodate its preferences by withdrawing its force assets from the EU operation while supporting the extension of the operational mandate and maintaining its support to the NATO operation.

Third, the case of Germany's engagement with the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean offers support to the argument that member states' own decision-making arrangements are indicative of the degree to which they can use the EU and NATO operations to accomplish their objectives. As seen in the case study, in Germany's sectorised structure of policymaking regarding the EU and NATO crisis management operations, ministries that are not originally foreign and security policy oriented, such as the Federal Ministry of Interior, have been able to project their preferences into relevant decision-making processes. This resulted in intragovernmental divergences during the Federal Government's policymaking regarding the EU and NATO operations. Whilst the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of Defence agreed on Germany's options about the two operations, the Federal Ministry of Interior hesitated about the EU operation on the grounds that it created a pull factor for irregular migration. Although such intragovernmental divergences initially did not prevent the Federal Government from using each operation to accomplish its objectives, the growing concerns of the Federal Ministry of Interior led to Germany's decision to withdraw its force assets from the EU operation, a decision outcome that none of the agencies involved in the policymaking processes initially advocated directly.

7.4. United Kingdom: Constrained pragmatism

7.4.1. The context of the UK's engagement with the operational overlap in the Mediterranean

Addressing potential threats from extremism in North Africa formed a key part of the UK's involvement in the Mediterranean prior to the EU and NATO operations. Although London assessed that terrorist-designated groups in the region were not capable of attacking the UK at the time, it was recognised that these groups posed a threat to 'Western interests in the region and to regional stability' (FCO 2013a). In this understanding, the UK sought to 'achieve a safer, more stable and more prosperous North and West Africa that does not provide a base for serious threats to UK interests by disrupting, degrading and isolating terrorist networks and addressing the drivers of instability' (FCO 2013a).

At the same time, the UK's strategic documents identified migration as a 'global challenge' caused by the 'instability, extremism and conflict in the Middle East and Africa' (HMG 2015f). In order to support efforts to deal with migratory flows from North Africa to Europe, the UK deployed its border force to support search and rescue activities under the EU's Frontex in the Central Mediterranean and Aegean regions (FCO 2014). However, London argued that search and rescue activities created an unintended 'pull factor' by encouraging more migrants to attempt dangerous sea crossings, thereby leading to more deaths (HoL 2015). As a consequence, the UK withdrew its support from search and rescue activities in 2014, choosing instead to assist the countries of origin and transit (HoL 2014). To do so, the UK provided capacity building assistance to regional countries such as Tunisia and Morocco under the EU's external migration policy framework, while at the same time providing border management

assistance to the Libyan authorities through EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) (FCO 2013b). The UK continued operations outside the EU framework, such as ‘Operation Weald’ in May 2015, as an implementation of London’s two-pronged approach to ‘deal, first, with the humanitarian approach and, secondly, break [the] link between travelling on the boat to get here and the certainty of getting settled’ (HMG 2015a).

7.4.2. Domestic decision-making structure

The UK’s policymaking with regards to the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean were articulated on a range of policy spheres in Whitehall. British contributions to naval operations in the region ‘[remained] an important part of a whole-of-government approach to addressing the migration challenge, including humanitarian assistance and action to tackle smugglers’ (FCO 2016a). This required an effective collaboration and coherence across various departments, most notably between the Cabinet Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, Department for International Development and the Home Office.

Cabinet Office coordinated inputs from these departments to ensure a cohesive policymaking, while its involvement in operational details was more limited, as these were left to individual departments. Among these departments, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) focused on diplomatic initiatives related to the EU and NATO operations in the Central Mediterranean, whilst the Ministry of Defence (MoD) dealt with operational aspects. FCO and MOD also sent political and operational instructions as well as staff to the UK’s representations in Brussels, namely the UK’s Permanent Representation of the United Kingdom to the European Union (UKRep) and its Joint Delegation to NATO (UKDel) (Wright 2019, 78).

Another department with key, albeit less direct, decision-making roles and responsibilities was the Department for International Trade (DfID), which worked towards the UK's development aid to improve the social, political and economic conditions in regional countries. As the Government's approach stressed that 'tackling poverty and instability overseas means tackling the root causes of many of the global challenges including migration', DfID also worked with the Home Office (HO) within the UK's migration policies (HMG 2015c). Taking a close interest in Libya, MoD and DfID were able to invest more time and resources than FCO in planning the UK's future activities in Libya (Interview 31: UK official).

This cross-government approach was reinforced with the introduction of the 'Fusion Doctrine' in March 2018, creating a division of labour across thematic and regional areas to ensure cross-departmental engagement in promoting the UK's priorities set by the National Security Council (HMG 2015e). Furthermore, in 2015, the Conflict Prevention Pool of 2001 was replaced with a new cross-government Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), which aimed to facilitate a more holistic decision-making chain by incorporating inputs from a range of different government departments (Curan 2015, 6). CSSF sought to address a range of issues related to the migration crisis in the Mediterranean (HMG 2015d).

In contrast to Germany, where participation to the EU and NATO operations was limited with a parliamentary mandate and regularly voted by the national parliament, neither the initial participation nor the prolongation of the UK forces to the EU and NATO operations were voted by the UK Parliament, reflecting the UK Parliament's lack of constitutionally established roles in foreign policy decisions.

The UK's decision-making structure regarding the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean is illustrated in Figure 15.




Figure 18. The UK's decision-making structure regarding the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean.
(Source: Author)

7.4.3. Initial engagement with the EU operation: Suppressing migration

Although migration through the Central Mediterranean was ‘not directly affecting the UK as there were very few migrants from Libya, the sense of migration was nevertheless a threat’ perceived by British decision-makers (Interview 23: UK official; also see FAC 2019). Indeed, London saw the EU operation as a ‘part of both the UK’s and the EU’s approach to the migrant crisis’ (FCO 2016a). Especially after the death of more than 800 people in the Mediterranean in 2015, the UK recognised an ‘urgent need’ to take action to prevent further loss of life at sea (Interview 34: UK official). Following this incident, Prime Minister David Cameron stated such tragedies marked ‘a dark day for Europe’ (BBC 2015). During the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting on June 22, Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond called for EU-level efforts to identify migrant movements more effectively in source and transit countries (HMG 2015b). Stressing

that ‘stopping this needless suffering [was] a huge international challenge which demands a comprehensive, co-ordinated response’, Hammond argued that the international community needed to tackle the challenge of illegal human trafficking ‘at every stage’ and that ‘Britain [could] make an important contribution to addressing the factors driving migration through [its] aid programme in the key source countries’ (HMG 2015a).

Reflecting the UK’s earlier reluctance to conduct search and rescue activities, which were believed to act as ‘pull factors’ for migratory flows, London’s focus in the EU operation was on tackling human smuggling networks instead of search and rescue activities. As Cameron stated in the immediate aftermath of the aforementioned capsizing of a boat in the Mediterranean, ‘search and rescue is only one part’ and there is a need to ‘go after traffickers, help stabilise these countries’ (BBC 2015). In this sense, the UK forces were did not only conduct search and rescue tasks, but supported attempts to break the business model of human smuggling networks through ‘intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities [through] high-end vessels and aircraft’ (EUC 2015, 3).

While using these force assets in the EU operation, the UK also assessed the option of placing commercial vessels under the EU operation to deal with human smugglers. Yet, this option was considered as insufficient to deter the smuggling networks from operating in international waters compared to military assets (FCO 2016a). Therefore, the UK Government moved ‘very quickly’ to support the deployment Operation Sophia, which was seen as ‘an example where [...] the UK [was] quite instrumental in getting the EU to implement a CSDP operation [...] in response to need where it could not have been done individually or nationally by different nations’ (HoL EU Committee 2016). In this sense, the UK initially deployed HMS Enterprise, HMS Richmond and a Merlin helicopter to the EU operation in its early stages

(HMG 2015b). Apart from operational support, the UK also supported the EU operation on the international stage, as evident in the UK's penholder role for the UNSC resolution 2240, which endorsed the EU operation's actions on the high seas 'to address both the immediate and long-term aspects of migrant smuggling and human trafficking towards Europe' (UNSC 2015; HMG 2015b).

The EU operation offered the UK some advantages. In relation to its potential to limit the irregular migration, for instance, the EU operation was seen aligning with the UK's comprehensive approach to tackle the migration crisis in 2015 (HoL 2016a, 2). Moreover, the UK argued that the EU operation's 'sophisticated assets' such as the provision of situational awareness to identify the areas where the human smuggling networks were operating were 'fundamental' understanding and countering these networks (FCO 2016; HoL 2016a, 4). Therefore, London sought to instrumentalise the EU operation to deploy 'niche' capabilities that were not possessed by other task forces in the region, such as NATO's existing Operation Active Endeavour (Interview 34: UK official).

At the same time, while placing force assets under the EU operation, the UK recognised that fighting against human smuggling networks in the Mediterranean is not a full-fledged combat situation. In the words of foreign secretary Hammond, although the UK's 'principal war-fighting alliance' would be NATO, the situation in the Mediterranean was about 'stabilisation, training and rebuilding' (HoC 2016). Hammond continued that '[this] is not a role of NATO', while 'the European Union and bilateral arrangements delivered by other European countries [were] absolutely the right way to go about achieving that' (HoC 2016).

Indeed, accompanying this pragmatic approach on the functionality of the EU operation was an emphasis on the political stability in Libya. Key British decision-makers believed that the

first pillar of the UK's Libya policy at the time, namely establishing political stability, was a key element not least because fulfilling other components of the UK's strategy such as regulating migration would require a politically stabilised Libya (interview 23: UK official). In this sense, the UK also thought that the EU operation could contribute to establishing stability in Libya, as this operation was to operate in the Libyan territorial waters in its third phase (Interview 23: UK official; EUC 2017a).

Operational concerns as well as a willingness to show the UK's leadership in naval operations also affected the UK's support to the EU operation. British decision-makers thought that the UK's 'adaptable shipping' and '[its] naval teams provided a sound base' for the EU operation and that the UK was 'very much aligned with the EU in terms of maritime security challenges' (Interview 34: UK official). Furthermore, the UK was keen in facilitating the cooperation between the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean by implementing the lessons learnt from the Gulf of Aden where there was a 'seamless cooperation' on the ground (Interviews 33 and 35: NATO officials). Thanks to what a UK official called 'the Atalanta heritage', the UK was already working together with other EU member states' navies, an experience that helped 'bringing together' different states in the run up to the EU operation (Interview 34: UK official).

When the leadership in the UK changed from David Cameron to Theresa May, London began to place its focus on the migration dossier when considering options about the operations in the Mediterranean (Chalmers 2016, 11). As the new prime minister, former Home Secretary Theresa May 'saw migration and counterterrorism as key priorities and therefore, [the UK] had to try and support a political solution' (Interview 23: UK official). During her time, National Security Council discussions increasingly focused on the UK's broader Libya strategy

(Interview 23: UK official). However, the FCO officials' approach to the HO's increasing involvement in the handling of the issue has been marked by suspicion, in part because HO was involved in the decision-making processes 'without really understanding the issue' (Interview 23: UK official). Additionally, there was a sense in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office those efforts for the long-term reconstruction of Libya need to be led by the UN rather than the EU (Interview 31: UK official).

Nonetheless, May did not share her predecessor's interest in addressing the long-term problems in Libya. Libya was the Cameron's 'legacy', who led the UK Government during the uprisings in Libya and accepted it as a duty to deliver a better Libya (Interview 31: UK official). Whilst the government therefore invested much in North Africa under the leadership of David Cameron, there was a change of regional focus in UK foreign policy that was 'in the baking' in the subsequent governments (Interview 31: UK official). Furthermore, the UK's national policy regarding migration was also being 'highly differentiated' from that of the EU (Lain and Nouwens 2017, 16). Thus, rather than a proactive involvement, May took an interest in Libya to 'react when the situation causes problems' (Interview 31: UK official).

Importantly, the UK also revised its role in the EU operation after the Brexit referendum. Being involved in the EU operation raised suspicions about the use of surveillance operations, which were believed to serve as an incentive for migrants to use the Central Mediterranean to cross to southern Europe (Interview 31: UK official). In this vein, July 2017, the UK deployed a landing ship under the EU operation for the purpose of supporting the arms interdiction tasks rather than tasks to disrupt human smuggling networks (FAC 2016). To justify this change of focus, Hammond reverted from its previous position, this time stating that 'the lines between what is a combat mission and what is a training mission could be blurred in situations such as

Libya's' (HoC 2016). As will be shown below, British force assets and total complement concentrated more on the NATO operation between 2016 and 2018²³.

Despite showing flexibility by using the EU and NATO operations to pursue its own objectives, the UK's imminent exit from the EU presented certain implications to the UK's such flexible and pragmatic approach within the operational overlap in the Mediterranean. Although the UK Government confirmed that it will remain committed to the EU in crisis management operations (e.g. FCO 2017), the UK's departure from the EU and increasing divergences between Brussels and London on how to tackle the migratory pressures made London reconsider its commitments to the EU operation (FCO 2016a). In the words of a British officer, 'things have become much more clear from a Brexit point of view that [the UK] would be out [of the EU operation] by 2018' (Interview 34: UK official).

7.4.4. Deployment of the NATO operation: Stabilising the region and supporting the EU

Before the launch of NATO operation, the UK Government maintained its ambition to prevent human smuggling networks, as these networks were believed to be running irregular immigration into Southern Europe (Interview 34: UK official). To this end, the UK supported the use of NATO's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities in support of the EU operation and fostered complementarity between the EU and NATO operations (FCO 2016a). British diplomats were active participants of discussions between the EU and NATO in Brussels about achieving mutually beneficial collaboration across the operations (Interview 40: NATO official). At the same time, the UK argued that the sources of arms trafficking into

²³ Author's email correspondence with MoD.

Libya was ‘difficult to know’ and a ‘full picture’ was needed to get around this difficulty (EUC 2017b, 13).

London argued that NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian was a useful addition to provide such situational awareness due to the experience the NATO forces gained through the Operation Active Endeavour in the region (Interview 34: UK official). This was in line with the UK’s considerations about security risks that were believed to be stemming from North Africa. For example, the UK thought that the Operation Sea Guardian was more focused than its predecessor (Operation Active Endeavour) as it conducted tasks to prevent the flows of arms and fuel through the Central and Eastern Mediterranean (Interview 34: UK official). Seeking to understand the business model of arms trafficking networks in the region and conduct interdictions where possible, these activities were seen essential to contribute to the security awareness in the Mediterranean (Interview 40: NATO official).

Nonetheless, there were also unclarities about the role NATO could play in the Mediterranean. On the one hand, as NATO was withdrawing from Afghanistan, ‘Libya was an obvious choice [for intervention] due to its proximity to Europe, but on the other, NATO couldn’t really work out what this role should be’ (Interview 23: UK official). Therefore, London approached the NATO operation as a multiplier of the existing European naval presence in the region.

This deterrence-led focus on the NATO operation brought MoD’s leadership to the front in the UK’s policymaking in the region (Interview 23: UK official). Despite acknowledging the added value of the NATO operation to complement the efforts of its EU counterpart, however, MoD officials thought that ‘Operation Sea Guardian was not mature at the time compared to

what it is now as a much more focused operation with an interest in Eastern Mediterranean’ (Interview 34: UK official). In contrast, the EU’s capabilities such as its civil-military surveillance coordination capabilities and its expertise were more relevant for a comprehensive approach, an area where NATO officials acknowledged that the EU should lead (Interview 34: UK official; NATO official 3).

Another comparative advantage of the EU operation for the UK was related to the means of intervention, namely, this operation’s mandate to train the Libya coastguard and navy (Interview 34: UK official). Importantly, this training was requested by the Libyan authorities, which was an important consideration for the UK not least because ‘one of the necessary political conditions for any deployment of UK training teams would be a formal request from the Libyan Government, as is the case with the provision of training for the Libyan Coastguard’ (HoL 2015, 12)²⁴. As the EU operation was unable to operate in the Libyan territorial waters, which prevented the operation to act as a more effective deterrent against human smugglers in the region, the UK has been able to provide training to the Libyan coastguard in Libyan territorial waters on the request of Libyan authorities (EUC 2017b, 11; also see HoL 2015, 12). London also saw the EU operation’s training element as a more realistic engagement given the political and security conditions in Libya (EUC 2017a). Furthermore, it was believed that this element of the EU operation could have an impact beyond migration if a coastguard is established with the necessary assets (Interview 31: UK official). Therefore, the UK considered the legitimacy of the training provided by the EU operation as well its practical value.

Yet, the effectiveness of political engagement with Libya through development projects was questioned within Whitehall on the grounds that the UK was not gaining much in this area.

²⁴ Also see Wolff (2018) for the importance of invitations to intervene for the EU and NATO operations.

For instance, officials in the UK Government recognised the risks posed by reports that detention centres in Libya failed to meet human rights standards (Interview 23: UK official). Therefore, London increasingly shifted its attention to a more military-based contribution rather than an outright withdrawal from the operations, despite maintaining a whole-of-government approach to address the migration challenge through enhancing regional countries capabilities (Interview 23: UK official).

Brexit not only challenged the UK's involvement in the EU operation. Whilst issues about defence, security and military received marginal media coverage especially in comparison to two major fault lines of economy and immigration, especially the Vote Leave campaign group argued that a planned 'European army' would duplicate NATO and damage 'the indivisibility of the transatlantic security guarantee' (Vote Leave 2016). At the same time, public opinion's attention on the issue was more limited given a lack of domestic visibility of the two operations. Despite some domestic support in Britain at the time for an EU role in crisis management (Smith 2018, 617), London's communication strategy was based on committing military assets to smaller, less salient operations after the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan (Interview 31: UK official). Therefore, the UK kept a low-profile presence in the operation until 2018.

7.4.5. Conclusion

In this section I assessed the evidence to examine the UK's strategies within the overlap between the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean. I argued that the UK's strategies were driven by its security concerns about stability in North Africa and the role of veto players within its own domestic political environment. The UK Government thought that the EU operation could be used as a leverage for the objective of suppressing human smuggling networks that were believed be a primary cause of irregular crossings from North Africa to

Southern Europe. In doing so, London emphasised the EU operation's sophisticated assets, its potential to operate in the Libyan territorial waters and the EU's naval operation experience from the Gulf of Aden, as well as a willingness to show the UK's leadership in naval operations. The UK also argued that NATO could bring specific operational capabilities such as surveillance and situational awareness not only in support of the EU operation, but also for additional tasks such as supporting the implementation of the UN arms embargo on Libya. Although a lack of clarity about NATO's involvement on related issues made London to use the new NATO operation for military deterrence against human smuggling networks, in line with the exploitation strategy, the UK sought to use the comparative advantage of each operation and foster cooperation between them.

Over time, however, the role of domestic veto players became more prominent drivers of the UK's strategies. The change of leadership in the UK brought about a decreased governmental attention to the region. Despite having a predilection in the migration dossier as a former Home Secretary, Theresa May was not personally invested in the issue to the same extent as her predecessor, David Cameron. During this period, the UK began to scale down its force assets in the EU operation, instead focusing on other tasks such as training the Libyan authorities. These tasks were believed to be more sustainable solutions to prevent irregular crossings through the Central Mediterranean route. However, it was not only a change of leadership in London that led the UK Government to recalculate the UK's role in the Mediterranean. As the UK's departure from the EU became more imminent, it became politically and operationally untenable for London to maintain its force assets in the EU operation. Therefore, the UK's ability to make use of the EU and NATO operations to amplify its own interests were limited.

Table 12 illustrates the UK's strategies within this operational overlap.

| Drivers of the UK's strategies | | Type of the UK's strategies | |
|---|--|-----------------------------|--|
| Security interests | Using operations to prevent irregular crossings through the Mediterranean and a military deterrence to broad security issues in the region | Exploitation | Using the comparative advantages of each operation; flexibility in engaging with the operations in line with changing political and operational conditions |
| Domestic veto players | Change of leadership (Cameron to May) and resulting change of emphasis on migration and the region itself; Brexit making it difficult to justify the UK's presence in the EU operation | | |
| Preferences about means of intervention | Favouring the EU's training tasks as a potentially more sustainable solution | Accommodation | Politics of Brexit and withdrawal from the EU operation |

Table 12. The UK's strategies within the operational overlap in the Mediterranean

The case of UK's engagement with the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean offers mixed support to the threefold argument presented in Chapter 2. First, rather than pursuing cross-operational strategies, the UK afforded disparate roles to the EU and NATO operations in the region. Although it constantly emphasised the two operations could complement each other, this rhetorical emphasis did not translate into active efforts to achieve inter-operational complementarity.

Second, the UK's forum-shopping behaviour between the EU and NATO operations confirms the second element of the threefold argument, namely that member states exhibit particular strategies of choosing operations for different purposes. Initially, the UK displayed a clear preference for using the two operations for their distinct advantages. However, as its policy of making use of the operational overlap to accomplish its own objectives became more difficult with the UK's exit from the EU looming on the horizon, London accommodated its strategies within the operational overlap by withdrawing from the EU operation. During this period, the UK turned to the NATO operation as an ideal framework for intervention.

Evidence from this case study also offers support to the third element of the threefold argument, namely, that member states' institutional arrangements of decision-making in foreign and security policy affects the extent to which they can make use of the operational overlap to pursue their interests. As seen in the change of policies from Cameron to May governments, the UK's foreign policymaking coordination arrangements that relied considerably on contextual factors such as the configuration of the government brought about a decreasing governmental interest in being actively engaged within the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean. In addition, the UK's decision to withdraw from the EU operation was affected by the UK's imminent departure from the EU, which also posed operational difficulties for the British forces in the EU operation. This decision, therefore, also confirms the claim that not only member states' coordination of their domestic policymaking, but also dynamics within the EU and NATO are important determinants of the extent to which member states can pursue their aims through the EU and NATO operations.

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8. Conclusion: Functionality, complementarity, and capabilities

This thesis has set out to examine why and how member states choose to use certain EU and NATO crisis management operations that undertake similar tasks in same places and times, referred to as the operational overlap between the EU and NATO in the field of crisis management. In addressing this question, I started from the assumption that this is an interesting case for the members of both organisations, who exhibits varying kinds and degrees of support to certain EU and NATO operations in the same spaces, although the option exists for them to take part in both or only in one of the operations. An investigation of member states' choices from the overlapping EU and NATO operations therefore presents a useful comparative research setting to explore how member states articulate and pursue their strategies regarding the two organisations as well as their operations.

Despite the puzzle that member states' choices within the overlapping EU and NATO operations present, existing research often used the concept of 'overlap' unsystematically and often through an organisational level perspective, rather than an explanatory or predictive tool to investigate member states' strategies. To the extent that a member state level perspective is implemented, the focus is generally on the processes at the inception of operations, such as planning and launch phases. As a consequence, while it is often assumed that member states choose those operations that are most favourable to their interests, how precisely member states practice these choices remains underspecified. Additionally, there is a lack of systematic attention paid to the ways in which member states organise their foreign and security policymaking structures to accomplish their objectives within the EU and NATO operations. This leaves the question of whether member states' decision-making processes about the EU and NATO operations could be interlinked and, therefore, whether member states might be

articulating cross-operational strategies. Indeed, as officials at national, EU and NATO levels highlight, national decisions about overlapping EU and NATO operations are not made in isolation from one another (interview 35: NATO official; US Mission to the EU 2009a).

As a result, I argued that questions remain as to why member states follow particular strategies within overlapping EU and NATO operations, as well as on how they make and practice these strategies. I then offered a threefold argument to answer these questions. First, member states often articulate and pursue their individual operational strategies, which are driven by multiple factors, by considering the implications of these strategies for both operations in a given theatre. Second, when they face both EU and NATO operations to address cross-cutting or the same issues, member states do not simply choose those operations that are most suitable for their own interests. While member states articulate their strategies according to their expectations of which operation will deliver a better outcome for their interests, these strategies include different and heuristic practices across the operations. Third, member states' own institutional arrangements of decision-making in security and defence policies are strong indicators of the extent to which they can effectively instrumentalise the EU and NATO operations to attain their goals.

In making this argument, this thesis has developed a multifactor model built upon three elements informed by research on EU and NATO crisis management operations, regime complexity, and foreign policy analysis: the driving forces of member states' choices about the EU and NATO operations, the ways in which member states exercise these choices, and member states' organisation of their policymaking instruments and mechanisms. This multifactor model was empirically applied to the qualitative case studies of French, German, and British strategies within the EU and NATO operations in Afghanistan, the Gulf of Aden,

and the Mediterranean. Until the UK's exit from the EU, these three member states are major players within both organisations due to, among other things, the pivotal role they played in the development of the two organisations and their material capabilities. Furthermore, the selected operational theatres vary in their geographical location, their civilian or military nature, as well as the political risks they entailed for member states.

In this concluding chapter, I reconsider the multifactor model presented in Chapter 2 in the light of the evidence from the case studies. To demarcate the strands of evidence from case studies, I divide the discussion in this chapter into three parts: First, I summarise how France, Germany, and the UK engaged with the selected EU and NATO operations from a comparative perspective. Second, I discuss the drivers of member states' strategies observed across the EU and NATO operations analysed in the empirical chapters. This helps provide a comprehensive picture of what motivates member states to articulate and pursue particular strategies within these operations, thereby offering inferences about the *functionality* of operational overlap between the EU and NATO in the field of crisis management. Third, I discuss the particular types of member states' forum-shopping behaviour across the operations of interest to address how precisely member states pursue their strategies. Therefore, this part of the discussion will also help make inferences on *complementarity* between member states' strategies as well as between the EU and NATO operations. Fourth, I will discuss the extent to which member states' organisation of their own policymaking affects their ability to accomplish their objectives through the EU and NATO operations. In this sense, the third part of this discussion will help draw inferences about the importance of member states' *capabilities* to implement their strategies within the operational overlap between the two organisations.

After discussing the evidence around the themes of functionality, complementarity, and capabilities, I will then touch on the contributions and limitations of the thesis, as well as offering avenues for future research.

8.1. Comparative summary of member states' strategies

Case studies suggest that contextual factors such as concerns about containing a given security threat and dynamics within domestic policymaking structures were influential in how each member state engaged with the EU and NATO operations studied in this thesis. For example, in the Gulf of Aden and the Mediterranean, France sought to address security threats arising from North Africa and the Sahel region, and to this end it acted as a pivotal actor through political and military processes within both the EU and NATO operations. On the other hand, Germany's choices were infused with contextual political concerns of governmental agencies in Berlin. That is, Germany's commitment to supporting the EU and NATO operations and its formulation of national mandates and operational restrictions reflected to a great extent the fault lines between actors and agencies within Germany's security and defence policymaking system. The UK's choices from the EU and NATO operations also reflected the political dynamics within its policymaking system, such as the dominant role of the Cabinet Office as the key actor within the foreign policy executive, albeit to a lesser extent compared to Germany. What was more prominent in the case of the UK's strategies is a flexible and pragmatic approach to use the EU and NATO operations to accomplish the UK's operational and political objectives.

Nonetheless, the choices of France, Germany, and the UK of specific EU and NATO operations are not only shaped by these member states' calculations about addressing a given

security threat or the contextual dynamics within national governments. In fact, the historical and broader context of the three member states' security and defence policies, such as their long-standing orientations about the role of the EU and NATO as international security providers, were also important determinants of how they decided through which operation to address a security threat. In Afghanistan, for instance, France's strategies were mainly shaped by its long-standing preference for keeping NATO as a military alliance as opposed to developing it into a security actor that undertakes hybrid crisis management operations, a task for which Paris considered the EU more suitable. By deploying its gendarmerie forces under the NATO mission in Afghanistan, which was in fact a 'last resort' option for Paris, France not only played a prominent role in the NATO mission, but also limited NATO's involvement in Afghanistan to a military domain. Similarly, the EU operation in the Gulf of Aden had a symbolic value for France, which regarded the EU operation as a reflection of French leadership behind the development of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

Similarly, it is also possible to observe the historical context of Germany's security and defence policies in Berlin's choices from the EU and NATO operations. Across all cases studies in this thesis, Germany's long-standing reluctance to use force within crisis management operations was observable. A key feature of Germany's decision-making was a consideration of specific rules of engagement that would be in line with Germany's tendency towards military restraint and civilian crisis management, which often facilitated it for Berlin to assume more prominent roles within the EU rather than NATO operations, because the EU operations had a more comprehensive mandate and supported by the EU's more civilian regional instruments.

The UK dealt with the complexities of operational overlap through a more flexible and somewhat pragmatic approach compared to France and Germany. It used a range of instruments

such as ad hoc meetings to try and circumvent the lack of formal cooperation between the EU and NATO. London's primary aim in doing so was to use the two organisations' operations for the different added values they offered to contain the security threat in question, but also to achieve certain political objectives that reflected the importance of the historical context of the UK's security and defence policies. That is, consideration such as the UK's strategic preference for NATO, limiting the development of EU capabilities that are fully autonomous from NATO, and Britain's 'special relationship' with the US were observable within the UK's strategies across three cases.

As a result, member states used a diverse range of strategies across the three cases. In Afghanistan, France accommodated its preferences by recalculating its role in the Afghan police reform. This led to a particular form of French presence in the NATO mission where France was able to play the role of a leading contributor to the mission with a view to constrain NATO's involvement into a military domain. In the Gulf of Aden, France tolerated the NATO operation while not taking part in it, not least because the NATO task forces in the region provided a force multiplier to tackle a security threat against international trade, namely, piracy and armed robbery. In the Mediterranean, France was more active in using both operations for its preferences: instead of merely tolerating the operational overlap between the EU and NATO, France exploited the parallel existence of two EU and NATO operations to multiply its own stabilisation efforts in North Africa and the Sahel regions.

In contrast, Germany often used the strategy of toleration. In Afghanistan, Berlin was initially hesitant about NATO's involvement in police reform due to its preference to act in line with its own domestic culture of policing. Similarly, in the Gulf of Aden Germany was reluctant to use military force against the threat of piracy and armed robbery. At the same time, it held

off blocking NATO's operational planning processes in both cases, instead lending political support to NATO operations and playing the role of broker through fostering inter-operational cooperation and division of labour.

The UK exhibited the most active presence within the EU and NATO operations studied in this thesis by exploiting the operational overlap. Through a flexible approach to the EU and NATO operations, the UK not only provided operational leadership, but also took active part in a range of instruments such as ad hoc inter-operational cooperation. A significant motivation for the UK to follow this strategy was to circumvent the lack of formal cooperation between the EU and NATO that would be counter-productive for the UK's interests, which covered not only addressing the security threats at hand, but also accomplishing political objectives such as responding to the pressures from the US.

8.2. Functionality: Drivers of national strategies

The first element of the multifactor model set out in Chapter 2 was the assumption that the objectives member states seek to pursue through the EU and NATO crisis management operations are driven by member states' security interests, veto players within their domestic political environments, and their preferences about means of intervention in crisis management. It was then suggested that member states pursue their objectives through cross-operational strategies. If this contention is vindicated by evidence, this would mean that the operational overlap between the EU and NATO in the field of crisis management is a functional one from member states' point of view (Bierman 2008; Galbreath and Gebhard 2010), as it presents member states multiple venues to fulfil their heterogeneous interests.

Evidence from individual cases strongly supports the hypothesis based on domestic veto players, namely that member states' strategies primarily serve to promote specific preferences of actors within their domestic political environments. As a NATO official likens member states' strategies in crisis management operations to a '5,000-kilometre screwdriver', these strategies are often informed by member states' considerations about domestic politics and politics at the Brussels level, rather than operational realities and needs on the ground (interview 40: NATO official). Indeed, in each of the cases, preferences of actors and agencies within member states' governments played key roles in both articulation and pursuit of national strategies. The French Government promoted an independent EU role in the field of crisis management in all three contexts, while attempting to prevent NATO's efforts that could obstruct the EU's independent action. Intragovernmental politics and pressures from the national parliament substantially shaped Germany's strategies, as different ministries involved in relevant decision-making contexts as well as opposition from within the national parliament have been able to shape Germany's strategies within the EU and NATO operations investigated in this thesis. In the UK, the government's motivation to pursue Britain's orientations about the crisis management roles of the two organisations shaped national strategies within the cases of operational overlap. Though this was similar to France's aforementioned strategies, London's political angle was opposite to that of Paris: throughout all of the cases, the UK was reluctant to facilitate an EU presence in the field of crisis management that could duplicate NATO's capabilities.

Another hypothesis was that member states' preferences about means of intervention in crisis management shape their strategies. Accordingly, member states' preferences are informed by their engrained domestic norms about the means of intervention, the legitimacy of the two organisations' operations, or more practical considerations about the suitable

instruments to respond to a crisis situation. The strongest evidence for this hypothesis is found in Germany's strategies across the EU and NATO operations in this thesis. Indeed, Germany's strategies were overarchingly focused on following a domestic culture of avoiding use of force in crisis management operations. In the cases of France and the UK, concerns about means of intervention were related to practical concerns about the conditions on the ground, rather than a normative conception of 'appropriateness' of crisis management instruments.

On the other hand, evidence from case studies offers lower level of support to the hypothesis about member states' security interests, according to which member states' strategies would be driven by a motivation to address a threat against their physical security or their economic benefits. Indeed, the evidence for the hypothesis based on member states' security interests are only found in individual cases that are difficult to extend to other operational contexts examined in this thesis. The significance of security interests was most salient in France's strategies about the EU and NATO operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Mediterranean, where France sought to use the operational overlap to amplify its policies of achieving regional stability. Similarly, the UK also sought to instrumentalise the operational overlap in Afghanistan and the Mediterranean to pursue its security interests, though its ability to do so was constrained due to the UK's imminent exit from the EU. Germany's security interest, on the other hand, were framed around rather vague terms such as the protection of international trade routes.

Therefore, on aggregate, evidence supports the claim that the strategies of France, Germany, and the UK are driven by multiple factors. Moreover, in seeking to accomplish their objectives that are driven by multiple factors, France, Germany, and the UK have used cross-operational strategies. That is, the steps France, Germany, and the UK take about an operation affects their policymaking about the other operation in the same space. These member states sought to *both*

foster inter-operational cooperation within an overlap *and* create rules in an operation to undermine the other operation. Only within the operational overlap in the Mediterranean did the three member states not constantly pursue cross-operational strategies. Yet, a closer inspection of dynamics within this operational theatre suggests that the reason for this is not that member states refrained from doing so. In fact, each member state emphasised inter-operational cooperation in the Mediterranean, but they were restricted by political dynamics at domestic, EU and NATO levels, substantial differences between the two operations, and the lack of progress particularly within the EU operation.

Given the various driving forces of member states' objectives, then, the question is whether the overlap between the EU and NATO operations is a functional one in terms of satisfying member states' heterogeneous interests. Although launching two separate operations to address cross-cutting crises in the same theatres may seem counterintuitive from a rational-choice perspective, France, Germany, and the UK often used the overlap to minimise the political and operational costs of their response to these crises. In this sense, the overlap between EU and NATO operations have been functional from member states' perspective, as it presented member states multiple venues to pursue their interests. Yet, as will be shown below, the extent to which France, Germany, and the UK could effectively use the operational overlap to attain their goals is a different question; one that is substantially related to each of these member state's own coordination and policymaking structures.

8.3. Complementarity: Types of national strategies

The second element of the multifactor model developed particular types of forum-shopping practices through which member states pursue their preferences within the operational overlap

between the EU and NATO, such as the kind of support they offer or the way in which they allocate their resources across the operations. Building on regime complexity research, I identified three types of strategies based on the positions of France, Germany, and the UK within the EU and NATO: exploitation, accommodation, and toleration. The importance of these strategies lies in the central positions these member states hold within the EU and NATO, as well as within both organisations' crisis management operations (interviews 33 and 35: NATO officials; Schmidt 2014; Nováky 2018a). Therefore, if these member states pursue different forum-shopping practices across the EU and NATO operations, this would raise a question as to the complementarity between these strategies as well as between operations.

Evidence from case studies suggest that France, Germany, and the UK indeed followed different and heuristic forum-shopping practices within overlapping EU and NATO operations. In each context of operational overlap between the EU and NATO, at least one of these member states followed a strategy of exploitation by formally taking part in both operations, but also going beyond force commitments through practices such as fostering inter-operational cooperation and creating rules that affect both operations. The three member states followed this forum-shopping practice for different purposes such as amplifying their regional policies and demonstrating their commitments to the EU and NATO.

The second forum-shopping practice, connoted as 'toleration', was only observed in French and German cases. Paris and Berlin lent different kinds of support to NATO operations that they were not willing to formally participate. In such instances, they often represented their own perspectives and those of the EU within NATO's decision-making processes. On the other hand, the UK's practices throughout the EU and NATO operations of interest did not match

this strategy. Instead, for the UK, overlapping operations have been an opportunity to amplify its own preferences where possible and risks to be mitigated when not.

Evidence also shows that the French, German, and British preferences may change over time, in line with the forum-shopping practice described as ‘accommodation’. For instance, the three member states commonly used this strategy within the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean, where they initially sought to instrumentalise the operational differences, but were then constrained by these very differences as well as political dynamics at domestic, EU and NATO levels. Moreover, in line with the predictions of accommodation strategy, the three member states’ recalibration of their preferences did not include a readjustment of their long-term orientations about the roles of the EU and NATO as international security providers. This was particularly the case in France’s strategies within NATO’s mission in Afghanistan and in the UK’s strategies in the Gulf of Aden, as in both cases these member states attempted to control the operations in which they acted as leading contributors, in line with their broad strategic orientations about the roles of the EU and NATO as international security providers.

Due to the pivotal role France, Germany, and the UK play in the crisis management operations of the EU and NATO, their heterogenous practices within these operations beg the question of whether their different strategies facilitate complementarity within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO operations. After all, one might suggest that all of the three forum-shopping strategies, namely exploitation, toleration, and accommodation, help sustain the operational overlap between the two organisations, as none of these strategies includes politically blocking the launch of operations.

However, the evidence suggests that France, Germany, and the UK exhibited different levels of ambition in creating inter-operational synergies. While fostering cooperation between the two operations is often used in exploitation strategy, the pursuit of toleration and accommodation strategies were less conducive to complementarity, as these strategies essentially aimed at either one operation or informed by strict national preferences that limit flexibility for member states to readjust their strategies. Furthermore, the three member states followed heuristic forum-shopping practices that helped them accomplish their objectives, but often prevented inter-operational complementarity. For instance, France and the UK created limitations within operations in which they acted as leading contributors, whereas Germany's motivation to follow its domestic culture of military restraint challenged potential synergies between the EU and NATO operations. Thus, heterogenous practices of France, Germany and the UK failed to minimise inter-operational frictions, thereby reducing complementarity between the EU and NATO operations. As a NATO official summarises, 'what nations say in the NATO side of Brussels may not have any relation to what they say on the EU side of Brussels' (interview 40: NATO official).

It is also important to note the limits of what France, Germany, and the UK can do to affect complementarity between the EU and NATO operations. Dynamics beyond member state level, such as politics in Brussels, as well as substantial fragmentations between the two organisations' operations, can limit these member states' ability to foster inter-operational complementarity. While factors beyond national level are discussed below, the role of substantial operational fragmentations was evident in the limitations France, Germany, and the UK faced in terms of exploring synergies between the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean. In this operational context, although each member state sought to use the

different characteristics of each operation to attain their own goals, inter-operational differences limited their ability to foster complementarity between the operations.

8.4. Capabilities: Organisation of decision-making

The third element of the multifactor model was based on the claim that member states' own institutional arrangements of policymaking in security and defence are indicative of their ability to use the operational overlap to attain their goals. As elaborated in Chapter 2, the organisation of member states' policymaking is an important aspect of their strategies, since it indicates both resources and political willingness that will be necessary for member states to co-ordinate their domestic and Brussels-based policymaking instruments in articulating and pursuing their strategies within the EU and NATO operations.

Individual case studies demonstrate that France, Germany, and the UK followed an inter-ministerial or whole-of-government approach that brought together different stakeholders into relevant decision-making processes. At the same time, they demonstrated considerable variation both in coordination of their policymaking instruments to engage with overlapping EU and NATO operations and in the extent to which they have effectively projected their own interests into these operations. This then presents the question of whether effective pursuit of national policy agendas requires appropriate policymaking mechanisms both in national capitals and Brussels.

The evidence suggests that the three member states consider it essential to have an agreed governmental position when engaging EU and NATO operations examined in this thesis. France demonstrated the most centralised policymaking structure where decision-making

authority is restricted to few government actors and agencies. In such a structure, policy adaptations to evolving political and operational factors might be easier due to the lower number of stakeholders involved, which can also facilitate a coherent policy to be followed through the EU and NATO operations. While France's strategies in Afghanistan and the Gulf of Aden showed that a centralised and autonomous core executive can indeed provide considerable flexibility, this was not the case for France in the Mediterranean, where dynamics within the EU and NATO limited the extent to which France can use the operational overlap as a leverage for its regional policies. However, across the cases of France's policymaking, the governmental units articulated and pursued more or less coherent lines of policy within individual operations, though they did not always deliver coherent messages across the operations.

Germany's policymaking arrangements exemplified both a highly sectorised decision-making structure and a core executive that is constrained by legislature's control. In such a structure, domestic political factors are more likely to have a great influence on national strategies not only due to the higher number of stakeholders involved in the policymaking processes, but also as a result of the meaningful chances of these stakeholders to influence policy outcomes. Evidence from Germany's engagement with the EU and NATO operations in this thesis offer strong support to this contention. In all of the cases of operational overlap, intragovernmental divergences across strongly specialised ministries, driven by their own interests, limited Germany's ability to recalibrate its preferences in the light of evolving political and operational circumstances. As a result, with the exception of the Mediterranean case, Germany has not been able to take part in both the EU and NATO operations in a given theatre and to effectively instrumentalise both EU and NATO operations to amplify its objectives.

The UK's policymaking structure is organised around a core executive with notable manoeuvring space from the legislature's scrutiny but without clearly written rules. In a member state with such a policymaking structure, while the core executive's leadership of decision-making processes with autonomy from the scrutiny of the legislature would facilitate flexibility in national strategies, contextual political factors would also determine the extent to which that member state can instrumentalise the EU and NATO operations to accomplish its own objectives. The UK's strategies within the cases of operational overlap between the EU and NATO offer strong support to this claim. Across the EU and NATO operations analysed in this thesis, British governments actively tried to use each operation's comparative advantages by taking part in both operations and sought to manage the overlap in line with the UK's long-term orientations about the roles of the EU and NATO in the field of crisis management. This was facilitated by the policy leadership of the Cabinet Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, even when their preferences were projected at the expense of other departments. As seen in the Gulf of Aden and Mediterranean cases, however, such flexibility can be limited by contextual dynamics, such as the reconsideration of regional policies after changes in government. At the same time, a unique and decisive feature of the UK case was the politics of Brexit that cut across domestic and Brussels-level dynamics. As its imminent departure from the EU substantially affected its position within and relations with the Union, the UK became lesser able to use the operational overlap in line with its preferences and had to recalibrate its policies within the operational overlap.

This discussion offers an answer to the question of whether member states' organisation of decision-making in security and defence policies affects the degree to which they can use the operational overlap to accomplish their objectives. While the evidence does not suggest a linear

relationship between member states' policymaking structures and their ability to successfully instrumentalise the operational overlap in line with their interests, there is evidence to support the claim that a policymaking system with a centralised core executive that is autonomous from the legislature's control facilitates flexibility in member state strategies.

France's centralised organisation of policymaking around the core executive, which is also considerably autonomous from the legislature's control, minimised the impacts of potential resistance on the coherence of policymaking. Consequently, France exhibited flexibility in terms of using the EU and NATO operations to amplify its own interests, as well as in recalculating its policies within these operations when needed. On the other hand, Germany's sectorised policymaking structure and the national parliament's meaningful control over the Federal Government's policies increased divergences across different governmental stakeholders in the decision outcomes. While coordination mechanisms around the Chancellery ensured a broadly coherent line of national policy, the sectorised policymaking system prevented Berlin's flexibility in adapting its policies to the changing political and operational circumstances. In the UK, the coordination of policymaking was centralised, while the core executive was relatively autonomous from the parliament's control. The UK's internal policy coordination was therefore mainly effective in terms of collaboration between different stakeholders to articulate and pursue Britain's strategies within the EU and NATO operations by using each operation for their distinct advantages.

The case studies also showed that although member states constitute a fundamental force in the formation, management, and reorganisation of an operational overlap, member states' ability to use the operational overlap for their own interests also depends on politics at EU and NATO levels. Contestations within the two organisations and operational dysfunctionalities

triggered member states' dissatisfaction with the EU and NATO operations. Examples of organisational contestation within the EU and NATO include the implications of the UK's imminent departure from the EU for the operational overlap in the Gulf of Aden and the Mediterranean, and the consequences of tensions between France and Turkey for French strategies within the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean. Examples of operational dysfunctionalities and uncertainties include the EU operations' lack of progress in tackling issues in Afghanistan and the Mediterranean, as well as the vagueness of NATO's potential role in the Mediterranean. These factors cutting across the EU and NATO levels effected member states' strategies, which were not in full control of member states, but was also subject to dynamics in Brussels.

8.5. Implications

The findings presented above have a number of implications for our understanding of member states' strategies within the EU and NATO crisis management operations that undertook similar tasks in the same times and places. In this section, I group these into implications for the three strands of research in which this thesis is situated: Research on the EU and NATO crisis management operations, regime complexity, and foreign policy analysis.

8.5.1. Implications for research on EU and NATO crisis management operations

Despite few exceptions, member states' preferences within the operational overlap between the EU and NATO are often explained away by national interests, rational calculations, or long-term orientations about the role of the EU and NATO as international security providers. The findings of this thesis undermine these assumptions. Rather than explaining member states'

strategies within the EU and NATO operations by an approach that gives analytical priority to one of these factors, the findings demonstrate that member states' strategies within the EU and NATO operations are concurrently driven by multiple factors. For instance, although the French, German, and British choices about the EU and NATO operations in this thesis are consistent with the arguments highlighting the importance of characteristics of these operations for member states' preferences (e.g. Fahron-Hussey 2019), case studies also show that the EU and NATO operations offer other trade-offs for these member states beyond these operations' potentials to deliver a better outcome to address a given issue. Because such overlap contains several actors with distinct calculations, belief systems and decision-making structures, both political and operational dynamics effect member states' strategies about the overlapping crisis management operations of the EU and NATO. An implication of this thesis for the research on the EU and NATO operations is therefore that a single approach that limits the analysis to one particular explanation would be a rather reductionist perspective.

Another implication of this thesis for the research on the EU and NATO crisis management operations concerns the creation and evolution of intersections between these operations. Whilst an operational overlap between the EU and NATO is not created through formal cross-organisational decision-making, such overlap does not develop naturally or have a life of its own that is independent from the interests of member states. Instead, as individual case studies and cumulative outcomes from each operational theatre demonstrate, member states may deliberately sustain the operational overlap between the EU and NATO, although this is hardly initially planned at the beginning.

The findings also offer some inferences about the division of labour between the EU and NATO in the field of crisis management. In contrast to a commonly held argument in the

literature that the different expertise of the EU and NATO on different aspects of crisis management provide a functional division of labour between the two organisations (e.g. Galbreath and Gebhard 2010; Schleich 2014; Szewczyk 2019), partition of work between the two organisations' crisis management operations is not necessarily an alternative to inter-operational conflicts in terms of dealing with the crisis at hand. Because the operational overlap between the EU and NATO presents additional complexities to political and operational policymaking at member state as well as EU and NATO levels, division of labour between the two organisations' operations can be complicated by the political and operational preferences of member states, as evident in French, German and British preferences throughout the EU and NATO operations of interest in this thesis. Therefore, the more is not always the merrier.

8.5.2. Implications for regime complexity

As the existing work tends to focus on member state preferences during the initial stages of operations, the attention is often paid to member states' resource contributions to the operations, which were seen to fit with a catch-all concept of forum-shopping. On the other hand, the findings showed that member states within elemental operations within an overlap can follow different and heuristic forum-shopping practices. For instance, France, Germany and the UK kept their engagement with both EU and NATO operations to attain their goals through alternative means such as creating boundaries between inter-operational issue areas, even though they were not always contributing resources to these operations. In this way, this thesis has also contributed to the literature on regime complexity by specifying the types of forum-shopping practices states can employ within overlapping structures, jurisdictions, and operations. In other words, a dichotomous conception of states' support to overlapping multilateral frameworks based on concrete resource contributions is inadequate to more completely understand these states' strategies within these frameworks.

Furthermore, contrary to a logic based on effectivity from a rational-choice perspective, overlap does not always help member states in advancing their policy goals. Those member states that are interested in maintaining control of a policy space at the expense of the other operation can be empowered by an overlap. This was most noticeable in France's strategies within the EU and NATO training missions in Afghanistan, as well as in those of the UK within the operations in the Gulf of Aden. On the other hand, member states facing significant domestic political pressure may have to exclusively prioritise one of the operations within the overlap. This appeared to be the case in Germany's strategies across the cases of the EU and NATO operations examined in this thesis. In addition, fragmentation between elemental organisations within an overlap may result in minimal internal coordination within member states' policymaking environments, which may in turn limit member states' abilities to instrumentalise the overlapping capabilities of elemental organisations. The inter-operational difference and fragmentation between the EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean illustrated that overlap could generate such consequences.

8.5.3. Implications for foreign policy analysis

The findings suggest that national policymaking processes regarding international frameworks can become more complex when these frameworks undertook similar tasks in the same spaces and times through separate organisational structures. For instance, as the case studies demonstrated, French, German, and British policymaking processes about each operation involved actors who expressed support and opposition to both operations simultaneously. This undermines an implicit assumption in the literature that because the decision-making stages are separate across the overlapping multilateral frameworks, states' parallel policymaking processes regarding these frameworks are disconnected within

themselves (e.g. Koskeniemi 2012; Morse and Keohane 2014). The majority of officials at member state, EU and NATO levels interviewed for this thesis in fact suggested that they were aware of potential connections between the EU and NATO operations that undertook similar tasks in same places and times. Therefore, studies using empirical perspectives based on foreign policy analysis (FPA) would benefit from examining the added complexities of national policymaking processes when international cooperative frameworks overlap.

Another implication of the findings for FPA is that states' effective foreign policy coordination and resulting coherence in the governmental positions do not necessarily translate into a higher ability to use the international cooperative frameworks to pursue their preferences and interests. In fact, strict national preferences that are in line with a limited number of international cooperative frameworks as well as factors beyond national level such as the politics within international organisations can reduce states' options, even though these states may have the institutional mechanisms in place to concurrently use a wide range of cooperative frameworks. This was the case, for example, in the limited abilities of France and the UK to use the overlapping EU and NATO operations in the Mediterranean, as well as in Germany's reluctance to engage with NATO's military-led instruments in all operational theatres. Therefore, not only states' institutional capacities but also their political commitment is important for effective foreign policy outcomes.

Case studies also showed the practical value of the empirical perspective of this thesis. Using the comparative foreign policy approach as a practical guidance, this thesis examined the ways in which member states articulate and pursue their strategies about the EU and NATO operations. To be sure, it remains a challenge to reconstruct national decision-making processes by accessing classified material. In the context of the EU and NATO operations, despite the

availability of primary data that and the relatively large amount of secondary sources about these operations, some operations, especially civilian ones, receive less scrutiny compared to full-scale military operations that generally garner higher attention from both policymakers and the media. Although this thesis mitigated these issues to a certain extent through extensive analysis of primary sources and interviews with practitioners from individual member states, the EU and NATO, as well as with independent experts, the inherent challenge is still there about reconstructing the whole decision-making processes. At the same time, however, the comparative foreign policy approach as an empirical perspective enabled an in-depth investigation of the dynamics within French, German and British policymaking processes. Although it is not without limitations, when complemented with a wide coverage of primary sources and elite interviews, insights from FPA promise to present reliable empirical perspectives for analysis of states' policymaking processes within overlapping multilateral frameworks, such as the EU and NATO operations.

8.6. Limitations and future research

At the same time, this thesis has some limitations that could be addressed by future research. Having examined the French, German, and British strategies, this thesis cannot claim to have taken into account the considerable differences of all member states of the EU and NATO. While central, these three member states are certainly not the only actors involved within this overlap. As stated in Chapter 3, it should be acknowledged that analysing the strategies of France, Germany, and the UK within a selected but specific range of EU and NATO operations results in a research design with small number of selected countries. For instance, this thesis did not include states with single membership or small member states of the two organisations. As stated previously in this thesis, while member states other than this “Big Three”, such as

those that are smaller in military size and politically less influential, may also play important roles in crisis management operations (e.g. Jakobsen et al. 2018). The role of the “Big Three” can also be diluted by the influence of actors and agencies at the EU and NATO levels, which may in turn provide other member states more particular opportunities to impact decision-making related to crisis management operations (Weiss 2019). Indeed, actors relevant to overlapping EU and NATO operations are not limited to member states – they also include actors at the EU and NATO levels as well as public opinion and NGOs. In this sense, an avenue for future research is how actors other than the ‘Big Three’ can shape the overlap between the EU and NATO in the field of crisis management. Moreover, in addition to member states’ strategies in the overlap between the EU and NATO within the particular area of crisis management operations, another future research opportunity is the broader overlap between the two organisations.

Furthermore, it is important to remember that crisis management operations of the EU and NATO form just one part of the wider instruments member states can use to pursue their objectives through these two organisations. How member states can use the EU and NATO beyond crisis management operations to fulfil their broader foreign policy agendas, such as in issues about defence procurement, public diplomacy, and non-proliferation, are also worth considering for future research. Similar to crisis management operations, the network of formal and informal cooperation arrangements within these alternative instruments could reveal further insights to understand the dynamics of European security across national, subregional, and regional boundaries.

Finally, the multifactor model offered in this thesis does not constitute a standalone theory. While it has analytically separated different motivations of member states’ choices from the

EU and NATO operations as well as different practices through which member states exercise these choices, the lines between member states' strategies may be harder to draw in empirical reality. Therefore, attempts to develop standalone theories on member states' strategies within the overlap between the EU and NATO in areas including, but not limited to, crisis management operations, can help identify causal pathways that are generalisable to the broader spectrum of policy areas member states are involved in concurrently through both the EU and NATO.

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Appendix A: List of interviews

| Designation | Identification | Interview date |
|--------------|--|----------------|
| Interview 1 | Senior NATO official (Former) | 30.01.2020 |
| Interview 2 | Head of EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) (Former) | 11.02.2020 |
| Interview 3 | Desk officer at Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) (Former) | 19.02.2020 |
| Interview 4 | NATO official (in Operations Division) (Former) | 19.02.2020 |
| Interview 5 | Desk officer at German Ministry of Defence (BMVg) | 20.02.2020 |
| Interview 6 | Senior officer at National Gendarmerie | 27.02.2020 |
| Interview 7 | Senior official at International Chamber of Commerce – Commercial Crime Services | 1.05.2020 |
| Interview 8 | Member of the German Parliament (<i>Bundestag</i>) from FDP | 4.05.2020 |
| Interview 9 | Desk officer at UK Ministry of Defence (Former) | 11.05.2020 |
| Interview 10 | Senior officer in Royal Navy (Former) | 15.05.2020 |
| Interview 11 | Expert (Academic) | 29.05.2020 |
| Interview 12 | Senior officer at FCDO | 5.06.2020 |
| Interview 13 | Desk officer at Germany's Federal Foreign Office (<i>Auswärtiges Amt</i>) | 11.06.2020 |
| Interview 14 | Expert (Think-tank) | 22.06.2020 |
| Interview 15 | Desk officer at FCDO (Former) | 29.06.2020 |
| Interview 16 | Senior official at FCDO (Former) | 4.07.2020 |
| Interview 17 | Head of EUPOL (Former) | 8.07.2020 |

| | | |
|--------------|--|------------|
| Interview 18 | Desk officer at FCDO (Former) | 13.07.2020 |
| Interview 19 | Expert (Academic) | 21.07.2020 |
| Interview 20 | Expert (Academic) | 22.07.2020 |
| Interview 21 | Expert (Think-tank) | 30.07.2020 |
| Interview 22 | Desk officer at AA | 31.07.2020 |
| Interview 23 | Former senior official at FCDO | 5.08.2020 |
| Interview 24 | Senior official at FCDO | 17.08.2020 |
| Interview 25 | Senior official at AA and BMVg (Former) | 21.08.2020 |
| Interview 26 | Senior officer in the UK Army (Former) | 3.09.2020 |
| Interview 27 | Expert (Think-tank) | 30.09.2020 |
| Interview 28 | Desk officer at the Permanent Representation of Germany to the EU | 7.10.2020 |
| Interview 29 | Desk officer at BMVg | 30.10.2020 |
| Interview 30 | Senior officer in German Navy | 4.11.2020 |
| Interview 31 | Senior official at FCDO (Former) | 4.11.2020 |
| Interview 32 | Desk officer at AA | 10.11.2020 |
| Interview 33 | Senior official at NATO (Operations Division) (Former) | 12.11.2020 |
| Interview 34 | Senior officer at Royal Navy (Former) | 19.11.2020 |
| Interview 35 | Senior official at NATO (Operations Division) | 14.12.2020 |
| Interview 36 | Desk officer at the Permanent Representation of France to the EU | 20.01.2021 |
| Interview 37 | Desk officer at the French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs (MEAE) | 25.01.2021 |
| Interview 38 | Senior officer at the French Ministry of Armed Forces (MdA) | 04.02.2021 |

| | | |
|--------------|--|------------|
| Interview 39 | Desk officer at MdA | 04.02.2021 |
| Interview 40 | Senior official at NATO (Operations Division) | 16.02.2021 |
| Interview 41 | Desk officer at EU Military Staff | 30.04.2021 |

Appendix B: Participant Information Sheet

Purpose

The purpose of the Participant information sheet (PIS) is to help prospective participants to make an informed choice regarding whether or not to participate in the research project. The following points should be included (as relevant to the research project) and the sheet should be provided to prospective participants allowing them sufficient time to make a decision and ask any questions they may have. Before seeking consent, the researcher should read through the information sheet with the participant to ensure they have understood all points.

Points to include

The points can be included in the form of questions if you feel that this format would be more easily understood and assimilated by the prospective research participants (eg, *What is the project's purpose? Why have I been chosen? Do I have to take part? What will happen to me if I take part?* etc). Care must be taken to ensure that the information sheet is adapted to suit the prospective participant population to ensure optimum comprehension. Researchers should write in plain English (see <http://www.plainenglish.co.uk/free-guides.html> for useful free guides) and avoid using technical terms.

1. Research project title

An analysis of member state engagement with EU and NATO operations through a perspective based on operational overlap

2. Invitation paragraph, explaining that the prospective participant is being asked to take part in a research project, why they have been chosen

The participant has been asked to take part in this research project through an interview. The participant is chosen due to the participant's experience directly or indirectly related to decision-making processes about the EU and NATO operations in this research project.

3. Explanation of the purposes of the research, written in an unbiased way

This research project seeks to analyse the interest and preference formation processes in France, Germany, and the UK in the context of these countries' engagement with the crisis response operations of the EU and NATO. In doing so, it seeks to address why these states determined their positions in particular ways regarding these missions.

4. Expected duration of the subject's participation

60 minutes

5. A description of the procedures to be followed (e.g. involvement in interviews; by whom; estimated time commitment; what kinds of questions; audio-/video-recording of events, etc.)

The participant will be interviewed by the researcher. The interview, which is expected to take approximately 60 minutes, will be based on open-ended questions.

6. A statement that participation is voluntary

Participation is voluntary and consent-based. **Added in Participation Information Sheet v2.1:** Where possible, interviewees express their consent through a consent form. Due to changes to working conditions with the outbreak of COVID-19, however, interviewees are given the option to express their consent via email. This is approved by the School Research Ethics and Governance (REAG) officer.

7. Information about who is organising and funding the research

The research is organised by the researcher himself. The researcher is a holder of the Vice Chancellor's Scholarship at the University of Kent. This research project did not receive any particular external support in terms of funding.

8. A statement giving details of which body has ethically approved the project

The research is approved by the School Research Ethics and Governance (REAG) officer at the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent.

9. A description of any foreseeable risk or disadvantages

Not applicable.

10. A description of any benefits to the subject or to others which may reasonably be expected from the research, avoiding inappropriate expectations

Not applicable.

11. A statement describing the procedures adopted for ensuring data protection/confidentiality/privacy including duration of storage of personal data. A University-level statement which can be given to participants regarding our compliance with EU GDPR legislation can be found here:
<https://research.kent.ac.uk/researchservices/ethics/> (bottom of the page)

The participant is given information about how their responses will be used. Evidence from interviews will be processed fairly and in accordance with the interviewees' rights. The interview data will not be kept for longer than necessary and be transferred abroad without adequate protection. If requested, the relevant parts of the research where interview data will be used will be shared with the participant in advance.

12. A reference to whom to contact for answers to pertinent questions about the research and research subjects' rights, and whom to contact in the event of a complaint, etc. Ensure that a University contact number is provided, rather than a personal one.

School Research Ethics and Governance (REAG) officer Dr Tim Aistrophe (School of Politics and International Relations)

Contact number: +44 (0)1227 824429

13. A statement offering the subject the opportunity to ask questions and to withdraw at any time from the research without consequences, including consideration of what withdrawal means, eg, does withdrawal simply mean that participants will no longer be taking any further active part in the research? Would participants wish that all their data be destroyed? Will it be possible to extract their data and destroy it, if this is what they wish?

The consent procedure for this research project allows the participant to withdraw from the project should they wish. Withdraw means that participants will no longer be taking any further active part in the research, and, should they so wish, their data will be destroyed.

14. An explanation of what will happen with the data at the end of the research period. As best practice, and as a requirement of many funders, researchers are encouraged to make their data available for archive and re-use for further research. Where this is planned, researchers must ensure that ethical and legal obligations are fulfilled by paying attention to the following:

The interview data will not be kept for longer than the requirements of this research project and those of the supplementary research from this research project.

15. Information about what will happen to the results of the research, and an opportunity to be provided with information about the findings, should they so wish (you could ask them to provide their contact details if they would like a copy of the findings in due course).

Opportunity with information about the findings of this research project will be provided to the participant, should they so wish.

16. Any other relevant information as appropriate.


If the participant requires anonymity, the participant will be identified with organisational affiliation rather than the person.

(Source: House of Lords 2010, NATO 2010a)


Afghan National Police Training Sites



Gulf of Aden
(Source: Bundestag 2008i; Allied Maritime Command n.d.)



The Mediterranean
(EUC 2016b; Permanent Delegation of Germany to NATO 2017)



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