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**THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AS AN INTERNATIONAL ACTOR
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA**

1970 – 1980

by

VIRGINIA AUSTIN

Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Kent, Canterbury

February 1991

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The finished product is dedicated to my husband and daughters without whose support it would never have been completed.

ABSTRACT

This thesis considers the Church of England as an International Actor operating in the geographical area of Southern Africa during the period 1970 to 1980.

The central hypothesis, outlined in Section I, is that in a Transnational and Interdependency paradigm the Church of England is capable of operating as an International Actor, that it does so and that environment, history, domestic and foreign social involvement and theology all incline it to particular forms of involvement in particular geographical areas.

Sections II and III, which form the main body of the work, test this hypothesis. They are empirical in that they use archival evidence and, to a lesser extent, the testimony of many of those concerned to examine the Church of England's attitudes towards and attempts to affect outcomes in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South Africa during the 1970's.

In Section IV it is demonstrated that the Church of England does operate as an International Actor, though the form and extent of that action is determined and modified by the factors outlined above. Moreover much of its effort in this respect is directed towards what may loosely be termed 'Establishment'. It is further suggested that though the very fact of its operation depends upon a Transnational paradigm the form of that operation demonstrates the existence of a predominantly Realist view of International Relations amongst those responsible for Church of England foreign policy during the 1970's.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE TEXT

ACCM	Advisory Council for the Church's Ministry (of the BSR)
ANC	African National Congress (both In Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South Africa)
ASCO	Azanian Students Organization
AZAPO	Azanian Peoples' Organization
BCC	British Council of Churches
BMU	Board for Mission and Unity (of the BSR)
BSR	Board of Social Responsibility (of the Church of England)
CBF	Central Board of Finance
CCADD	Council for Christian Approaches to Defence and Disarmament
CCSA	Christian Concern for South Africa
CIIR	Catholic Institute for International Relations
COPEC	Conference on Politics, Economics & Citizenship
COSAS	Congress of South African Students
DIA	Department of International Affairs (of the BCC)
DRC	Dutch Reformed Church
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GS	General Synod (of the Church of England)
IAC	International Affairs Committee (of the BSR)
IDRF	International Disaster Relief Force
ILO	International Labour Organization
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IPA	International Peace Academy
LDC	Less Developed Country
MOD	Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGA	Nedertuitse Gereformeerde Kerk
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NHK	Nederduitse Hervormde Kerk
PAC	Pan African Congress
PDL	Poverty Datum Line
PF	Patriotic Front
PIM	Partners in Mission
SACC	South African Council of Churches
SASO	South African Students Organization
SCM	Student Christian Movement
SCU	Social Christian Union
SPRO-CAS	Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Societies
SSRC	Soweto Students' Representative Council
TNC	Transnational Corporation
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UN	United Nations

UNDRO	United Nations Disaster Relief Organization
WCC	World Council of Churches
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is an empirical study of the Church of England's attitudes towards and activities with regard to Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South Africa during the 1970s. It is based on the proposition that the Church of England is at least capable of playing a role in world affairs outside the confines of its originating society and state. It attempts to substantiate this thesis by empirical research using the records and correspondence of those Church bodies concerned in the formulation and implementation of 'foreign policy'.

It is acknowledged that the question of authority in the Church is an essentially contested one. However it is suggested that discussion on this topic is usually conducted in normative rather than observational terms and, further, that a central decision-making apparatus can be discerned. While this apparatus is incapable of attaching the hearts and minds of the faithful it does, as a matter of fact, form policies and conduct the Church's day to day administration and relations with other bodies. The debate over the location of authority is the reason for the use of inverted commas hitherto around the word 'foreign policy'; the conviction that this debate is not as a matter of fact realistic is the reason why the term is used consistently throughout this work.

In Section I.1 the theoretical basis of the study is explained and a defence made of the logic of including the Church of England as a capable actor under a transnational world view. Inconsistencies between the Church's transnational status and its own view of the ordering of world society are demonstrated.

Section I.2 examines the Church of England's membership of the Anglican Communion, of the World Council of Churches, WCC, and the British Council of Churches, BCC. These affiliations are described as the Church's external environment and this environment, it is suggested, strongly affects both the Church's imperative to act and the geographical and substantive arena in which this activity takes place.

Section I.3 is an examination of the development of the Church's history of social and political involvement. Beginning with the involvement of discrete intra-Church groups or individuals

in discrete areas of social concern the Church has been involved since the mid-nineteenth century in both the amelioration of social hardship and the evolution of a theology of political and social involvement. This, it is suggested, became a centralised activity with the creation of 'centralised Church government' immediately after the First World War. It is further suggested that the First World War and its aftermath also mark the beginning of Church involvement in issues of social, moral and political concern outside England and the colonies.

In Section I.4 the Church's own theoretical base is examined. It is suggested that, not only its central doctrinal core and its accretional theology, but also its recent equation of theology and human rights all push it into involvement in those domestic and foreign affairs where issues of social or political morality are involved. No attempt is made however to look at fundamentally theological issues.

Section I.5 consists of a description and analysis of the Church of England's structure. Its relationships with State, Government and its own Congregation are examined and also the detailed central apparatus which, it is argued, made inevitable the concentration of foreign policy making in a very few hands during the 1970s.

In Section I.6 the role of the Archbishop of Canterbury is briefly considered and the composition and affiliations of the members and executive of the relevant committee are examined in detail. It is suggested that the Church's constitutional affiliations to the State, its increasingly centralised form and the personal histories and connections of those responsible for its foreign policy affected the form that foreign policy took.

Thus Section I consists of a set of interlocking 'histories' all of which, it is claimed, contributed to the background against which the case studies which follow were worked out. Section I is drawn for the most part from secondary sources but retrospective knowledge gained from archive material is used where appropriate and the material in Section I.6, on the workings of the International Affairs Committee, IAC, of the Board of Social Responsibility, BSR, draws almost completely on archive material.

In Section II a detailed record and analysis of the Church's relations with Rhodesia/Zimbabwe during the 1970s is undertaken. This has been done thematically for reasons of clarity and as a result of the way in which the archive material presented itself. Events and attitudes illustrative of the theses outlined above are highlighted in the text.

Section III takes a similar form to Section II but treats the Church's activities with regard to South Africa from 1970 to 1980. In this case the archive material has been treated chronologically because it was felt that historically there was a change of attitude and perspective towards South Africa towards the end of the decade which would be obscured if themes were unravelled and treated separately.

Section II and III draw on archive material, most of it previously unused and some of it unsorted and uncatalogued, from the Church of England Archives, then situated in Church House Westminster. Synod records were also studied and a number of those who appear as actors in the following pages were interviewed.

In Section IV the validity of the original theses is tested against the case studies and general conclusions about the sources, strengths and limitations of the Church's policy are drawn.

TENTATIVE MODELS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHURCH AND NON-CHURCH BODIES

There is nothing inherently difficult to grasp in the relationship between the Church of England and other organisations but the following models are given to illustrate the flow of inter-relationship as clearly as possible.




Figure 1

This model demonstrates the relationship between any major church and pluralist state where government takes a democratic enough form to be responsive to inputs from society as well as itself directive of that society.

Church and Congregation are separated, a device susceptible of theological and spiritual but not of structural and empirical challenge; in all but a handful of churches, as opposed to sects, a discrete decision-making body may be distinguished which determines major policy outlines. The authority of this body may frequently be challenged, and this applies particularly in the case of the Church of England which houses many shades of opinion; but it exists.

A similar model might be drawn for the Roman Catholic Church but it would be impossible in this case to encapsulate it domestically. This is because a major policy determinant in the case of the Roman Catholic Church in any domestic context is a set of broad policy guidelines laid down by an authority outside the state. (The only case where this would not apply of course is the Vatican State but this is hardly an illuminating exception.)

It is understood that the Congregation is a subset of Society. Accordingly input should be indicated from Government to Congregation and vice versa. However it is suggested that a Government seldom influences a Congregation in that capacity but in its members' capacity as members also of Society. Attempts to influence in a reverse form may certainly be motivated by Church or generally Christian considerations, but other members of Society also will be influenced by sub-group or pressure group interests. It is also necessary to highlight by contrast the distinct and important flow of information between Church and Society.

This is particularly important in the case of the Church of England because, despite its small and decreasing regular congregations, the Church is important in the lives of many non-attenders or infrequent attenders for its cultural and historical associations, for its, supposedly, unchanging values, and for its validation of important rites of passage. Thus Church activities are watched, commented upon, criticised and generally regarded as within their own legitimate sphere of interest and activity by many non-Church members. Equally the Church concerns itself with the lives, work, interests and general condition and health of Society in general and of individual

members and groups within that Society. Its leaders claim both a right and a duty to speak on such issues.




Figure 2

In Figure 2 a state of normal relations between two states and their respective national, or at least major, Churches is depicted. No major contentious issue exists between them. Relations which involve the respective Churches are largely inter-Church; there is little but ceremonial reason for one Church to approach the Government and no reason for it to appeal to the Society of the other State.

A particular exception must be made here – the legacy of Empire in the residual connection between the Church of England and other societies, mainly in Africa, in terms of evangelisation and education. However it should be remembered that mission on behalf of the Church of England was undertaken largely by Missionary Societies who were not a part of the Church's central decision-making organisation and so might be seen to function on a less specific and formal level than that of central Church organisation to central Church organisation.

That most channels of interaction between Church in one country and State and Society in a second remain inactivated under normal conditions is substantiated by research findings. These demonstrate that the resources of those bodies within the Church's central organisation charged with responsibility for 'foreign policy' were inadequate to do more than respond to crises as they

arose. Too little in the way of staff or resources was available to initiate or maintain an active foreign policy under normal, non-crisis, conditions. This will be demonstrated in Chapter Five and in the later case studies.




Figure 3

Figure 3 demonstrates a situation where an issue of State policy or a Societal situation in State II is of concern to State and Church I. Examples of such a situation might be perceived attempts by the Government of Ethiopia to resist famine relief in rebel-held areas, the taking of foreign nationals as hostages in situations of complex interethnic and/or inter-religious conflict or the plight of child Aids victims in Rumania. It is suggested that both of the case studies in Sections II and III, the situation in post-UDI Rhodesia and the apartheid society of South Africa during the 1970s, fall into this category.

It is recognised however that there are limitations on the usefulness of this model where Church participation at least is concerned. There can only be communication of an even potentially influential kind between Church and Church and Church I and State and Society II where there is a basis of mutual spiritual, theological and cultural perception. This is not necessarily a complete bar to such effective representation as that by Christian Church in one State to Muslim State and religious leaders in another or vice versa. In such cases there exists a common ethical bed-rock and a regard for things spiritual which may or may not prevail over the often antithetical

historical circumstances in which each organisation is bound up.

The ability of spiritual leaders of the Church of England to understand and sympathise with the outrage of British Muslims over Salman Rushdie's alleged treatment of the prophet Mahommed in his book 'Satanic Verses' is an example of a case where the common experience of spiritual values, whatever the difference between those values, has prevailed. By contrast the affair of the kidnapping of the Archbishop of Canterbury's personal envoy, Terry Waite, demonstrates an inability by state or religious leaders in a number of involved Middle Eastern countries to understand the position and status of the Church of England and the limitations on its ability to influence state policy; or at least it demonstrates the credible assumption of a useful inability to understand.

Another method by which ostensible religious and cultural differences may be overcome is a common recognition of a set of fundamental human rights. This showed some success in dealings between the Church of England and other Christian churches and the erstwhile Communist regimes of Eastern Europe. It has been less successful however in appeals both to perceived violators of individual human rights in South America and of individual and group rights in Muslim countries. Moreover, even in relatively successful relationships of this type, there is a fundamental tension between the association of the Christian Church with the cultural legacy of Western thought – individual rights – and a perception of the importance of community rights emphasised by other cultural traditions.

Lines of communication are shown running in one direction in this model. It is recognised that this might be misleading in that the initial stimulus to action by State I is the perceived crisis in State or Society II. However initiative in activating channels of communication because the crisis is perceived as having transnational or international implications of a security, a political, an ethical or a religious variety lies with State, Society or Church I. Their initiative of course meets with response whether in positive or negative form. But it has been thought useful to stress above all that initiative's location.

It is also recognised that there is no necessary coincidence of interest between State, Society and Church. These may be completely at odds or in agreement to a greater or a lesser degree and it is misleading in any event to represent these as unitary views. The proliferation of view on the subject of apartheid in Society, in Government and in the Church is a good example of the difficulty of isolating an 'official view' for the purpose of analysis. It is also a reinforcement of the national pluralism which underpins the transnational paradigm on which this work is based.

It would also be possible to draw a fourth model which shows the response of two States, two Societies, two Churches to a stimulus external to both. This has not been done because it is not felt to apply in the case of the two studies which make up the empirical bulk of this work. However many co-operative responses to major natural or ecological disasters would be analysed under such a model.

The Church of England is awarded its full title throughout except where the text makes it permissible without confusion to refer to it merely as 'the Church'.

SECTION I

SECTION I.1: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

In terms of international relations theory this work has two elements and rests on two hypotheses.

Firstly it is suggested that within a transnational paradigm the Church of England is as capable of being a world actor as any other nationally-based but transnationally operating organisation, company or charity. It is therefore a study in transnationalism.

Secondly, and less straightforwardly, however it is suggested that the particular terms of operation of the Church of England during the 1970s, despite the Church's transnational status, accepted rather than challenged both state primacy and a hierarchy of international issues chosen within a firmly realist paradigm.

At the first and least complicated theoretical level this work is based on a simple and undifferentiated form of transnationalism as encapsulated for example in the early work of R. Keohane and J. Nye, before they and so many other interdependence theorists moved on to regime analysis. It is concerned therefore with one of the transnational building blocks which enabled the construction of the more comprehensively explanatory theories of interdependence and regime analysis.

No particular claim to original theoretical insight is made for it but, given that transnationalism has been substantiated largely on a 'Look, here's another example!' basis, this work seeks to do something similar but in a largely unresearched area. It is considered that too little attention has yet been paid to the role of churches as organisations in International Relations as distinct from Christianity or Islam as world-wide belief systems.

Only a brief outline of Transnationalism is necessary for few are unfamiliar with its major elements. However the model is notoriously diffuse and has been criticised widely on the basis of its imprecision and lack of clarity; some indeed might suggest that this makes it an ideal prism through which to examine the Church of England which is frequently criticised on similar

grounds.

Transnationalism and Interdependence are frequently written in the same phrase, uttered consecutively and conceptually twinned. However the first is a vehicle for the second and more fundamentally explanatory concept. Both reject the impermeability of states and their sole occupancy of the actor role in world affairs. They refute too the validity of the Realist agenda of high and low politics, of issues of national security and defence being axiomatically of determining significance over commercial and economic issues generally. They postulate numbers, and historically increasing numbers, of non-governmental linkages across state boundaries.

James Rosenau defines the transnationalism of world affairs as ... "the processes whereby international relations conducted by governments have been supplemented by relations among private individuals, groups and societies that can and do have important consequences for the course of events."¹

This is a definition that many of those who occupy the middle ground in the study of transnationalism and interdependence would agree, although it must be born in mind that writers such as John Burton² would deny the prominence still given by such a definition to inter-governmental relations and would see rather a web of interconnected and overlapping relationships; in this construct states are merely an historical and geographical manifestation of the conjunction of a number of important networks.

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye³ agree a Rosenau type of analysis and see transnational relations and the interstate system as affecting one another and both as central to understanding world politics. They define world politics as ... "all political interactions between significant actors in the world system in which a significant actor is any reasonably autonomous individual

¹ James Rosenau, 'The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on the Transnationalism of World Affairs', Frances Pinter (Publishers) Ltd., London, p. 1.

² John Burton, 'The Study of World Society; a London Perspective', Pittsburg, International Studies Association, Pittsburg, 1974; 'Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules', Cambridge University Press, 1972; 'International Relations; a general theory', Cambridge University Press, 1965; 'Deviance, Terrorism and War', Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1979; 'Dear Survivors', Frances Pinter, London, 1982.

³ R. Keohane and J. Nye, 'Power and Interdependence: world politics in transition', Little Brown, Boston, 1977; 'Transnational Relations and World Politics', Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971; 'After Hegemony', Princeton University Press, Princeton, Guildford, 1984.

or organisation that controls substantial resources and participates in political relationships with other actors across state lines; an actor need not be a state."⁴

In the formulation of the theory of Interdependence, 'Complex Interdependence' in Keohane and Nye's terminology, increased and increasing transnational links lead to increased mutual dependencies and to multiple interdependence between states and societies.⁵

This sophisticated model formulated from the simpler insights of Transnationalism stresses not only the existence of multiple contact channels between societies as detailed above but also the absence of an immutable hierarchy of issues and the diminishing use and significance of military force. Thus Complex Interdependence moves on from observation and quantification of multiple linkages to a postulation of their systemic effect. Moreover it postulates a system where, in certain circumstances economic, non-state controlled linkages may be of greater defining importance in the allocation of value and power than states themselves.

The Interdependence paradigm may be seen from two major perspectives: either in terms of specific interrelationships between two or more states or in terms of an over-arching structure which conditions all integral relationships within an international political economy.⁶ It is firmly in the first of these perspectives that this work is anchored, given that the enumeration, elucidation, and examination of transnational linkages are the building bricks of specific interrelationships.

If the thesis that much significant activity is transnational and not government initiated or controlled holds good then the activities of a church, the Church of England, a church which is part of a larger international organisation, the Anglican communion, must be quite as capable of analysis in this light as the more usually quoted examples of transnational activity such as multinational business enterprises, trades unions, scientific and academic networks, air transport cartels and revolutionary movements. Indeed, with regard to the last of these examples, the symbiosis of

⁴ R. Keohane and J. Nye., 'Transnational Relations and World Politics', Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971.

⁵ R. Keohane and J. Nye, 'Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition', Little Brown, Boston, 1977.

⁶ For a discussion of the possible interpretations of Interdependence see R. J. Barry Jones and Peter Willetts, 'Interdependence on Trial: Studies in the Theory and Reality of Contemporary Interdependence', Frances Pinter, London, 1984.

religion (though not the Christian religion) and revolution is one of the more significant transnational elements in contemporary world politics.

One of the ways in which a church, any church, may qualify as a potentially capable significant organisation in a transnational scenario is that it is capable of rivalling a nation-state in terms of winning its members' superior allegiance. Indeed, because its whole ideology is orientated to an expectation of primary allegiance, it may be thought to be considerably more capable of rivalling a nation-state in this respect than a transnational business enterprise whose theoretical ethos is not so grounded. It is recognized however that in reality some such business enterprises are all-demanding and one thinks of certain Japanese firms in this context.

It is recognized too that the comparison above is of limited utility and oversimplistic because neither a church nor a transnational business enterprise exists without national affiliations. Keohane and Nye point out⁷ that companies are seldom geocentric; they have a home state and management is generally drawn from it. Thus company and national loyalty may present no problems of conflicting demand. Equally the Church of England, while in theory representing, indeed embodying, radically different principles from the state in which it operates, identifies with the structure and social composition of that state by its own mirrored structure and social composition, has historically supported that state in times of national crisis and by its established status, and has been to an extent dependent on and intertwined with the state's governmental structure.

The Church of England qualifies on three of the four parameters designated by Keohane and Nye in *Transnational Relations and World Politics*⁸ as typifying global interaction.

Where, their first category, communications and the movement of information, ideas and beliefs are concerned its participation is very evident. It is part of world wide 'Christendom' and thus shares a body of beliefs and preoccupations with Christians everywhere; there are certainly areas of great difference between Christians but it is legitimate to maintain that contentious issues

⁷ R. Keohane and J. Nye, 'Transnational Relations and World Politics', Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971.

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 3.

indicate common preoccupations.

Moreover the Church of England has tended during the twentieth century to see itself spiritually and historically as part of the universal Catholic Church, thus identifying firmly with universalist, rather than the particularist and sectional elements of Protestantism.

There are also many transnational issues such as human rights or aid and development in which the major churches join to act as a transnational pressure group on governments, as spokesman for those they perceive as disadvantaged to international organisations such as the United Nations, and as co-ordinator and go-between in efforts to relieve certain acute situations of hardship.

Most significant perhaps is the Church of England's membership of the Anglican Communion, a world-wide network of Anglican churches whose distribution largely follows the shape of the former British Empire. The significance of this membership will be demonstrated in detail in Section I.2. but it is sufficient to say now that the world-wide network of information-gathering and dissemination to which the Church of England has access is enormous and its access to Church leaders in the Third World who often play a significant social, symbolic or governmental role in their own societies, as well as a spiritual one, is assured.

Where Keohane and Nye's second parameter is concerned, finance and the movement of money and instruments of credit, it should be noted that the Church of England is a significantly wealthy organisation which invests in a wide range of industries, commodities and government bonds. It is true that in this category Keohane and Nye were highly unlikely to have been contemplating directly the activities of a church. However there is no reason why any organisation whose investment portfolio is large enough or symbolically important enough to cause concern over its placement or movement should not be seen as a significant transnational actor in a financial sense. By way of example Section III will demonstrate the efforts made by the South African Embassy in London to convince the Church that complete disinvestment by them from the South African economy or their recommendation that others should disinvest would be an undesirable step. Moreover it was partly an awareness of the Church's own vulnerability to criticism over

South African investment that prompted the campaign to effect economic change in South Africa by means of economic pressure. Once more this is clearly demonstrated in Section III.

One might further suggest that the Keohane and Nye concepts of sensitivity and vulnerability are demonstrated in this context, sensitivity being exposure to externally induced costs before there has been time and opportunity to initiate remedial policies, and vulnerability being the continued exposure to such costs even after remedial policies have been undertaken. The South African Government, in such a scenario, highly aware of the sensitivity of its economy and political structure to external pressure, sought, in this case through its embassy in London, to limit the extent of its vulnerability by persuading a significant and influential actor of the inappropriate nature of disinvestment.

Where links through travel, Keohane and Nye's third category, is concerned the Church of England's claim to transnational status is again clear. Its personnel, both lay and ordained, travel widely and have numerous contacts abroad. Indeed many priests work abroad, particularly in the Third World, for part of their ministry. This builds up a network of contacts which the Church can use to gain information, to give it, to trade it sometimes for advantage. Moreover because of the commonality of spiritual purpose among many, though not all, members of this network there is usually an inherent goodwill which will ensure a level of co-operation and assistance in difficulties and crises.

The only one of Keohane and Nye's categories of global interaction inappropriate in the case of the Church of England is that designated 'transportation of physical objects, such as merchandise, war materials, personal property'.⁹ However the Church's interaction with other churches on the parameters discussed above means that any threat which is perceived to be illegitimate to the property of a contact church is met with protest from the Church of England and from other linked churches, Anglican and non-Anglican, across national boundaries. The case of Alice Seminary in South Africa, described in Section III, is an example of this, as are protests against the closure of churches by the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia and against threats to church

⁹ R. Keohane and J. Nye, *ibid*, p.3.

property by the former regimes in a number of Eastern European states.

This caveat on the Church's exclusion from the category of transportation however may be regarded as a trivial one and it is willingly accepted that the basis of Church protest about property dispossession is the spiritual significance and symbolic importance of open churches and theological teaching establishments, not their monetary value or the material loss they represent to the possessing church.

The Church of England's place within a transnational scenario is also supported by a taxonomy such as that of Mansbach, Ferguson, and Lampert.¹⁰ The authors identify six types of global actor:- interstate government actors, IGOs such as NATO or the UN; interstate non- governmental actors, INGO's, such as the Red Cross or the World Muslim Congress; nation states; governmental non-central actors, such as personnel from regional, parochial or municipal governments within a single state; intra-state non-governmental actors, such as political parties, the IRA, Oxfam; individuals.

The Roman Catholic Church, the Anglican Communion and, indeed, world-wide Christendom in so far as it is able to present a united position in discrete issue areas, may be seen as falling into the second category, that of interstate, non-governmental actors. The Church of England itself may be subsumed under the fifth category, as an intra-state, non-governmental actor. The Archbishop of Canterbury and a few other highly visible bishops, may be regarded as significant individual actors; however their status and platform derive from the organisation to which they belong, although some, such as the present Bishop of Durham, derive their platform largely from their dissent from and maverick status within this body.

It is not necessary however to confine oneself to a transnational paradigm to justify this study. The Church of England would merit detailed examination under a structuralist as well as a transnational rationale. Galtung for example views transnational links as occurring in highly specific patches in a world system characterised by South on North dependence within a

¹⁰ R. Mansbach, Y. Ferguson and D. Lampert, 'The Web of World Politics', Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1976.

centre/periphery paradigm.¹¹

Galtung's work admittedly concentrates on the pattern of contacts and reciprocal interests between North-based owners and managers of multinational corporations and certain elite groups in the South whose interests are linked with those of the Northern elite. There is no reason however why such a perspective should not encompass a network of churches, originating and still centred in the North, and a Southern elite of prominent church leaders, many of whose intellectual and spiritual perspectives are drawn from a culture which is alien to the indigenous peoples of their country.

That this argument is empirically assailable is recognised and can be demonstrated by the difference between the elites in Rhodesia and South Africa which will be described in Sections II and III. In Rhodesia/Zimbabwe the Church leadership could justifiably be described in Galtung's terms and its isolation from majority opinion was a source in turn of much misinformation and misperception to the Church of England to whom its views were passed.

In South Africa however an indigenous leadership had emerged and its points of cultural and spiritual reference were themselves increasingly indigenous; indeed the influence and example of Southern African Christianity has been seen as increasingly important in terms of Anglicanism world-wide during the 1970's and 1980's.

Even in terms of a dominantly realist paradigm analysis of the Church of England's position internationally merits attention. The first paragraph of this chapter set out the research finding that during the 1970s the Church operated, despite its transnational structure, in terms best described as heavily state-centric and unquestioning of a hierarchy of international issues; defence, security and the interests of the West emerged as important issues to those charged with the Church's 'foreign policy'.

If one wished to labour discussion of this finding in terms of state-centricity itself one would of course be presented with the problem that the Church would have no place as an inter-

¹¹ J. Galtung, 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism', *Journal of Peace Research*, 8, 1966, pp. 81-117.

national actor however preoccupied it might be with state primacy and however convinced it might be of the importance of the maintenance and furthering of Western values. This cavil might be circumvented by stressing the structural links between Church and State and the Church's role as validator of state-bestowed value; but this would be to simplify structure and parody a highly complex relationship.

Ultimately more interesting than an attempt to justify study of the Church of England under every conceivable rubric is the Church's undoubted existence at a transnational actor, its undoubted use of transnational links and levers juxtaposed with its close shadowing of government policy, ideas, underlying assumptions and objectives in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South Africa during the 1970s.

This, it will be suggested, was largely due to its structure which has, despite genuine and well-founded intra-Church doubts about what and who is the Church and who may act on its behalf, concentrated executive power in a small central organisation. This process, partly due, as Section I.5 will show, to a loss of confidence and direction amongst the clergy, began with the restoration of the Church Assembly in 1919 but accelerated sharply from 1970 when the General Synod was constituted and the structure became increasingly formalised.

Responsibility for the Church's 'foreign policy' was concentrated in the Board for Social Responsibility whose Janus-quality encompassed both 'foreign policy' and the formulation and pursuit of policy in the domestic, social and political sphere. Responsibility was further concentrated in the hands of a Committee of the Board of Social Responsibility – the International Affairs Committee, whose members were responsible both for the Church's day to day response to events on the international scene and for the formulation of policy options in this sphere.

Their recommendations were then submitted to the Board of Social Responsibility itself, and, if approved, thence to Synod for discussion. Events requiring immediate executive action were handled by the Committee itself under delegated authority; advice and policy recommendations were often given to the Archbishop of Canterbury or to his staff at Lambeth Palace and to other leading bishops.

It is suggested that the diffused and contested nature of spiritual power within the Church of England led to a situation where a fairly new administrative structure concentrated much executive 'power' in relatively few hands. It is further suggested that the preoccupations and career structures of the people concerned were a significant factor in determining the Church's overt preoccupation with 'high politics', security issues and East/West relations in the context of Southern Africa during the 1970s. This structure will be examined in detail in Section I.5 and the working out of the process outlined above will be demonstrated in Sections II and III, on Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South Africa respectively.

SECTION L2: EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

SECTION L2.i: INTRODUCTION

In this chapter the development of the Anglican Communion, a world-wide association of linked Anglican churches, will be examined. It is suggested that this development occurred in conjunction with the evolution of Commonwealth from Empire, is marked by a similar organisational and conceptual change from England as managing head office to equal participation of all members and is equally important in influencing and restricting the policy options of the former head office.

It is further suggested that one can only understand the Church of England in the latter part of the twentieth century by reference to its status within the Anglican Communion, and its membership of the World Council of Churches, WCC, and of the British Council of Churches, BCC. It is not suggested that these order or decree the Church of England's activities, but rather, that the Church is thereby made constantly aware of problems, influences and trends that originate outside its own territorial base. In the light of this awareness it is forced to re-examine its own practice and beliefs in theological, organisational and social terms and to recognise that these aspects are closely interlinked.

This assertion, that environment helps to shape and externalise theology, is a contested one. There is a strong Anglican tradition which has privatised theology and emphasised the importance of the individual in his relationship with God. This view is challenged both by those who emphasise the inevitability of political theology in the sense that theologians are unavoidably conditioned by economic, social and political beliefs and environment, even a personal interpretation of the Gospels being made in a contemporary context, and by such notable figures in the Church of England as F.D. Maurice, William Temple and Michael Ramsey who have stressed the normative aspect of the Church's teaching on social involvement, their stance being that the quality of life and justice are and ought to be legitimate concerns of Christian people.

Thus the ideology of hope which entails the belief that eschatological forces are already

operating in the world can be interpreted both in terms of personal salvation and (or) in collective social and political terms, and those who maintain the inevitability or desirability of theology's political aspect emphasise that it should be both.

In a British context Bishop David Sheppard of Liverpool is an example of one convinced of the Church of England's obligation to display a bias to the poor; but a more fundamentally radical emphasis on the breaking down of existing social and political structures is emphasised in Third World Churches.

In Latin America the theology of hope has developed into a theology of liberation which perceives that injustices in society are perpetuated by a structural violence which, it claims, the European emphasis on an individual Christianity, leading to quietism in the face of manifest injustice, has condoned. In Southern Africa too a different brand of liberation theology has developed, one which stresses the Old Testament saga of a chosen people liberated by God, rather than depending on a Marxist or neo-Marxist economic and social analysis as does the South American model.

In terms of the externally directed activities of the Church of England such theology has great practical influence. With little desire among its leaders to play a role as overtly political as that of some churches and individual priests in the Third World, the Church of England is still forced to a reinterpretation of its own behaviour in terms of the relative stress it lays on the individual and the community, in terms of what a late twentieth century interpretation of the written and traditional sources of Christianity ought to be (bearing in mind it is difficult to credit Christ with a permanently relevant coherent social and economic message)¹ and in terms of whether the post-Reformation emphasis on personal salvation can lead to an acceptance of a status quo which is unjust in social and political terms.

¹ Even if one accepts David Sheppard's analysis of the Gospels as revealing Christ's own bias to the underprivileged, manifested, he claims, in Luke, Chapter 1, vv. 52-53 "... He (the Lord) hath put down the mighty from their seat and hath exalted the humble and meek. He hath filled the hungry with good things: and the rich He hath sent empty away ...", this is surely a strategic rather than tactical recommendation. David Sheppard, 'Bias to the Poor', Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1983.

In a much more simplistic way the Church of England's early relations with Anglican Churches overseas are important as the forerunners of its later foreign policy. Indeed, the Church of England had no foreign policy to speak of before the First World War except its relations with Churches in the British Empire.

Such claims of influence remain generalised contentions unless one examines the history and structure of the Anglican Communion and the actual nature of its influence upon its member Churches.

SECTION L2.ii: HISTORY OF THE ANGLICAN COMMUNION

In the beginning was the Church of England, established Church of a power which was expanding from a small West European territorial base into the Americas, India and Africa from the time of the Tudor establishment of a catholic, reformed Church. Those early American colonists who were not non-Conformist took English Church practice to the New World.

In later expansion missionaries followed, and sometimes preceded, colonisers and traders. In the early years of colonial expansion new areas of Church activity were attached to the Church of England; the American Colonies for example were part of the Diocese of London until the Revolutionary War when, in 1789, they declared their autonomy and independence and drew up their own constitution as the Episcopal Church in America: they maintained their relationship with the Church of England voluntarily however. A similar developmental process, although not initiated by revolution later took place in the older colonies of Canada (1862), India (1928), Australia (1847) and New Zealand (1857).

In the nineteenth century Missionary Societies such as the Church Missionary Society, The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel and Universities' Mission to Central Africa² attached to the Church of England, and, to a much smaller extent, missionary societies attached to the Episcopal Church of the USA, undertook extensive missionary work primarily in Africa, but also

² The SPG and the UMCA later amalgamated into the USPG.

in Asia and South America. This was an entirely different process from the spread of the Church of England into areas which were heavily settled by Britons who often took their religion with them as part of their baggage: this was the introduction of a religion of Judaeo/Greek origin mediated by 1800 years of West European culture into communities which were founded on completely different religious, social and economic principles.³ Much discussion within the Church of England today about theological and social attitudes stems originally from this uprooting of a Western theology and its replanting in a different cultural environment; the independent variable of belief and custom has, by the operation of a new intervening variable, produced a dependent variable of significant difference and its feedback into the Church of England challenges traditional theological and social teaching.

It was in the early 1850's that a desire was first expressed for the vague sense of kinship and fellowship with Canterbury which undoubtedly existed amongst Anglicans to be hardened into some more formal process of communication and Archbishop Longley of Canterbury convened the first Lambeth Conference between the 24th and 27th September 1867.

Substantially this Conference produced little but the very fact of its taking place at all was though significant enough for such meetings to have been repeated about every ten years ever since. This decennial meeting was thus the first formal organisational manifestation of the Anglican Communion, even though common doctrinal and national origins had, despite differences in developed practice, long bound its adherents in a tenuous brotherhood. Numbers of attending bishops have grown from 76 in 1867 to 407 in 1978.

One could formerly suggest that the deliberations and recommendations of the Conference as embodied in the Encyclical Letter and in the widely distributed full report of proceedings had pervasive influence throughout the Anglican Communion, as the Encyclical Letter at least was

³ It should however be borne in mind that there has always been a strong indigenous Christian Church in North Africa. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church dates its foundation to AD 332. Until its recent persecution by the Mengistu regime the position of the Church of Ethiopia was still very strong, and in mid 1980 nearly 17 million of a population of 31.5 millions were affiliated, not merely professing, Christians. The Coptic Orthodox Church of Egypt traditionally claims St. Mark as founder of the Church in Alexandria, and, although modern Egypt is overwhelmingly Muslim in religious affiliation, there were still 7.5 million Christians there in mid 1980, about one sixth of the population. The influence of these indigenous African Churches has modified Christian practice of Western origin in Southern Africa during the modern period.

widely read out in Churches and discussed, though not necessarily implemented, by local priests and laity.

However there has been no Encyclical Letter since 1958; in 1968 there was a Message to the Clergy and Laity of the Anglican Communion, and in 1978 there was neither. This is probably suggestive of changing patterns of communication rather than a perception of Lambeth no longer serving a useful purpose, although it is worth noting that sales of Conference reports have declined by nearly 50% between 1958 and 1978 despite the large rise in attending bishops. It is probably true to say that the Lambeth Conferences are no longer as central to Anglican unity as they were in the days before ease of travel and communication led to swift and varied means of disseminating ideas, and as they were in the days before the real centre of gravity shifted from England and English associations.

During the latter half of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century many overseas dioceses were created, usually in connection with the See of Canterbury. After the Second World War this arrangement was increasingly seen to be reflective of a reality which was dying, for Churches in the Third World which had begun as Western oriented and managed outposts were now indigenous to the areas into which they had been introduced. Millions of new Anglicans could have no meaningful sense of relationship with a white Archbishop of Canterbury thousands of miles away; Anglicanism to them, if they divorced it at all from its immediate and local aspect, was a world Church, not a British one.

Archbishop Fisher (1944-1961) recognised these pressures and on his initiative new Provinces were created out of dioceses in West Africa in 1951, Central Africa in 1955 and East Africa in 1960.⁴ Once the principle was accepted that Churches belong to the place where they are established and to the people who live there, many new Provinces were created.

⁴ One argument by which the Anglican Communion is divorced from the ramifications of Empire is that these Provinces were created before political statehood was granted:- Nigeria in the Anglican Province of West Africa founded 1951 politically independent 1960, Sierra Leone in the Anglican Province of West Africa founded 1951 politically independent 1961, Zambia in the Anglican Province of Central Africa founded 1955 politically independent 1964, Kenya in the Anglican Province of East Africa founded 1960 politically independent 1963. Thus Archbishop Fisher did not merely follow a political trend. This view however, while rightly separating the activities of Church and State, separates the process of development of political and religious maturity and indigenous identity which were in fact closely intertwined.

However the creation of new Provinces, the acceptance of the indigenous nature of all member Churches of the Anglican Communion and their obvious wish to maintain a form of unity in diversity increased the need for regular communication and enabling steps were taken. The Lambeth Consultative Body had been formed at the beginning of the Twentieth Century with the object of encouraging communication between Lambeth Conferences, but the logistic problems of travel were such that it was seldom able to meet. Attempts by the 1930 Lambeth Conference to inject some effective life into it proved abortive, but really effective changes were made at the 1958 Conference; money was voted to finance the Consultative Body, its scope was widened by specifying that its members should consist of the Primates of the 16 named Provinces and a full-time secretary was appointed, which post later evolved into that of Executive Officer of the Anglican Communion: to this post, on 1st January 1960, Bishop Stephen Bayne, Bishop of Olympia, USA was appointed.⁵

Further manifestations of the unity of the Anglican Communion could be seen in the two pan-Anglican Conferences of laity, priests and bishops which were held in 1954 in Minneapolis and in Toronto in 1963. The changing basis of Anglicanism was emphasised by Bishop Walter Gray at the Minneapolis Conference:-

"Today this Church is established on every continent and among people of every race ... The pattern of expansion has been that the new sections of the Church, once fully formed, have been national in their organisation and autonomous in their government. There is no joint central executive or legislative body in the Anglican Communion. No one archbishop or bishop is supreme, and no national Church has authority or jurisdiction over any other ...".⁶

By the 1968 Lambeth Conference the complexities and variety of the Anglican Communion and the enormous demands being made upon one man, the Executive Officer, were thought to call for a consultative council of the whole Anglican world, and accordingly the Committee on 'Renewal in Unity' proposed that such a body be set up: its proposal was accepted and endorsed by Resolution 69 of the Conference and the Anglican Consultative Council met for the first time

⁵ Subsequent holders have been Bishop John Howe who, in 1971, was appointed Secretary-General of the Anglican Consultative Council. He was succeeded in 1982 by the Rev'd Canon Samuel Van Culin of the USA.

⁶ Report of the Minneapolis Conference pp. 1-2: quoted in Bishop J. Howe, 'Highways and Hedges', 1983, his unpublished report on the Anglican Communion.

in February, 1971 at Limuru, Kenya.

SECTION I.2.iii: STRUCTURE OF THE ANGLICAN COMMUNION

The Anglican Communion is commonly held to include those Churches which trace their origin back to the Church of England in the sixth century and to the Celtic Church of the second century; these churches accepted the Roman tradition until 1540 and thereafter a reformed Anglican tradition. The Anglican Communion is a family of regional Churches whose format is well-expressed in the Encyclical Letter of the 1930 Lambeth Conference:

This Communion is a commonwealth of Churches without a central Constitution: it is a federation without a federal government.⁷

Its claim is to be one, holy, catholic and apostolic, and while Anglicanism is in no sense confessional, the irreducible minimum of Anglican belief is generally held to be embodied in the four elements of the Chicago/Lambeth Quadrilateral, drawn up for ecumenical purposes between 1886 and 1888. Briefly these are that the Old and New Testaments are the "ultimate standard of faith", that the Apostles' Creed and the Nicene Creed are a "sufficient statement of the Christian Faith", that the sacraments of baptism and communion are essential elements of worship and that the episcopate is an indispensable feature of Church organisation.

There are now 27 Provinces, more than 400 dioceses and 14,000 congregations within the Anglican Communion, but no attempt is made to comprehensive world-territoriality, rather to a reflection of the actual pattern of Anglican allegiance and the servicing of its spiritual requirement. The Provinces are self-governing and a variety of forms of government are found although their lowest common denominator (or highest common factor) is the Provincial Synod which alone can make canon law and alter Church Constitutions, and which in all cases consists of bishops, clergy and laity. Synods are headed by a Primate such as the Archbishop of Canterbury in the Church of England and the Archbishop of Capetown in South Africa, or by a Presiding Bishop elected by his fellows, as in the Episcopal Church of the USA. There is thus no vertical

⁷ Quoted by Bishop John Howe in "Highways and Hedges", his unpublished report on the Anglican Communion, 1983.

system of authority and administration: contact is lateral, consultative and sometimes co-ordinatory but no element or possibility of compulsion exists either in theology or administration, and indeed great variety is found.

Within the Anglican Communion the Anglican Consultative Council is unique in that it is the only inter-Anglican body with a Constitution and also its creation was unanimously ratified by all member Churches. Its membership includes clergy and laity as well as bishops and derives from all the Anglican Churches, each one choosing between one and three members according to the size of the Church. It meets every two or three years in various parts of the world and its Standing Committee meets annually. Funds are voted to it by member Churches and the Council is thus answerable to them collectively; this too is a unique feature, as is the Council's possession of a small permanent secretariat whose head, the Secretary-General of the Anglican Consultative Council, has evolved out of the post of the Executive Officer.⁸

An even more recent feature of Anglican organisation has been the Primates' Meetings originating in the Primates' Committee which was set up to act in an advisory capacity at the Lambeth Conference in 1978. The Conference itself recommended that the Primates should continue to meet and act in an informal advisory capacity to the Archbishop of Canterbury. With a membership consisting of the principal Bishop of each Anglican Province the first Primates' Meeting chaired by the Archbishop of Canterbury took place in November 1979.

Thus by 1979 the Anglican Communion had three distinguishable pan-Anglican organisations, the Lambeth Conference, the Anglican Consultative Council and the Primates' Meetings. However only one of these, the Anglican Consultative Council, had continuous existence and a funded secretariat – the other two were regular conferences. The usefulness of the Lambeth Conference is diminished to some extent by its size and infrequency of meeting. The Primates' Meetings are still an unknown quantity because of their relatively recent foundation; their potential value however would appear to lie in their more manageable size, their informality and their private character which enables Primates from areas of political tension and sensitivity to speak

⁸ See footnote 5, p. 24 to this chapter.

freely without fear of possible reprisal to themselves or their congregations.

What, one may ask, is the organisational status, if any, of such a body with no central authority,⁹ few central representative structures and great centrifugal tendencies in both practice and belief? The answer must be that, however inadequately manifested in concrete terms, the Anglican Communion feels itself to be exactly that – a Communion. This perception of a unity which transcends the diversity of component churches and the strength that can derive from it was illustrated by Bishop Tutu's sermon in Canterbury Cathedral in December, 1984, when he spoke of thanking his brothers and sisters in the English part of the Anglican Communion for the support that their prayers and fellowship had given to the beleaguered Church in South Africa. This unity which would appear both to derive from and transcend diversity itself derives from a variety of factors.

While one of the Anglican Communion's many diversities is that between High and Low Church practice it is true to say that a common perception of the catholicity of Anglicanism makes a degree of unity not only a reflection but a desirable model of reality. One of the criticisms of an inward-turning emphasis on personal salvation within the Church of England and other Anglican Churches has been that thereby a sectarian and separate character may emerge alien to the catholic nature of Christian teaching which does and should transcend national, cultural, social and economic divisions.

David Sheppard, for example, deprecates the emergence of black churches in Britain, except as a temporary phenomenon, because, while reflecting an understandable desire for social identity, status and security amongst people who have reason to see themselves as disadvantaged, separate development is scripturally contra-indicated.¹⁰ Anglicanism claims to uphold this

⁹ The question of authority within the Anglican Communion has been much discussed and John Howe (*op. cit.*) contends that, although Anglicanism has no universal code or constitution there is authority in the common "Anglican appeal to Christ and the Gospel, and to faith and order in the apostolic and early Church". This would seem a refutable contention because of generally recognised and permissible differences of interpretation, and it would certainly not constitute authority in a recognisable organisational form. The published report of the 1948 Lambeth Conference contains a detailed analysis of authority in the Anglican Communion and in 1982 a booklet "Authority in the Anglican Communion" which contains four papers put to the 1981 Meeting of Primates was published by the ACC and sent for comment to Anglican Churches world-wide.

¹⁰ David Sheppard, "Bias to the Poor", Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1983.

catholic tradition of continuity; at the 1954 Minneapolis Conference Archbishop Philip Carrington of Quebec said:

It becomes clear then that the Anglican Communion refers ... to a historical standard which is larger than itself. It falls back upon the Catholic tradition as a whole, especially in its most primitive phase in the period of the Apostles and their successors, always referring in the last resort to the Holy Scriptures as received and used in the Catholic Church.¹¹

This clear and profound perception of catholicity is certainly not held by all Anglicans however and to judge the Anglican Communion or indeed any of its component Churches as unitary actors is highly over-simplified despite the public pronouncements of prominent and influential Anglicans. A fairly constant feature of all Anglican theology and practice is that Bishops have led from the front. The Lambeth Conference has displayed a constant perception of the unifying elements in the Anglican Communion while, to many of the clergy and laity Anglicanism means that form of worship and Church organisation with which they are most familiar. At this level an impetus to unity has a tendency to appear in the form of a hope (even if unexpressed) that other people will see the error of their ways and fall into line. In other words a clerical elite tends to perceive unity in diversity while the rank and file tend to perceive diversity in unity. As Bishop Howe points out¹² such bodies as the General Convention of the Church in the USA or the General Synods of the Church of England or of Nigeria are very inward looking, and references to the whole Anglican Communion and its view are fairly infrequent in their deliberations.

There is also a residual tradition in the Church of England which identifies catholicity in historical and traditional terms, which bewails the rape of the liturgy, the use of new biblical translations and the ordination of women to the diaconate as well as the priesthood. To those who hold such views the catholic tradition is Euro-centric and time-bound.

In this context it is also necessary to consider how frequently, since individual nation-states emerged from Christendom, religion in all its forms has been used to reinforce nationality and with what regularity national allegiance has transcended pan-national affiliation. Established

¹¹ Report of the Minneapolis Conference, p. 47, quoted in Bishop Howe, *op. cit.*

¹² Bishop Howe, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

Churches, of which the Church of England is the only example in the Anglican Communion, are particularly prone to identification with a set of fairly transient national objectives and attitudes: that such identification can be overcome however is illustrated by the fact that discussion at the 1948 Lambeth Conference about the status of Japanese clergy and bishops who had joined the Japanese government-sponsored amalgamated body of all Christian denominations in 1940 was conducted wholly on theological, not nationalist, lines.

Consideration of the aftermath of the Second World War, when the majority of Anglicans world-wide were identified to a greater or lesser degree with the Allied rather than the Axis cause, leads naturally to a second element in explaining the persistence and burgeoning of the Anglican Communion and one which reinforces a theological sense of catholicity – common origins and early identification with the same "Head Office".

The most common approach among Church leaders now is to stress that the Head Office/Branch Office organisational format disappeared with the acceptance of synodical equality and that the Archbishop of Canterbury's role is not that of Head of the Anglican Communion but ... "would appear to rest on a long-continued historical tradition which has steadily increased in dignity with the expansion of the Anglican Communion".¹³ "The word Anglican ... no longer means English but has come to be a term for the particular embodiment of the historic faith, order and worship of the Catholic Church which is a heritage of this communion".¹⁴

In other words, the English derivation of Anglicanism is recognised but its present importance downplayed. In terms of contemporary perception of what function the Anglican Communion serves for member churches this is undoubtedly realistic but common origin is highly significant still, both in terms of the network of informal relationship which have remained between English Church organisations and individual English churches, and individuals and Churches and individuals abroad, and in terms of its residual effect in strengthening a sense of common identity.

¹³ 1978 Lambeth Conference Preparatory Information, CIO, p. 78.

¹⁴ 1978 Lambeth Conference Preparatory Information, CIO, p. 67.

Personal ties between bishops, clergy and laity in different areas of the Anglican Communion have always been important, though, foreseeably, the diminishingly expatriate nature of both clergy and episcopate in the Third World may ultimately lessen this importance. Until the 1960s the majority of bishops in Africa were white and expatriate: in the early Lambeth Conferences there was a very real, as well as symbolic, sense in which most of them were "coming home".

Until the post-war period graduates of Church of England Theological Colleges were encouraged to include a period of service overseas in their ministry and thus, among older priests, there remain links between those now in England and their former parishes, parishioners and colleagues abroad, and between those who chose to remain overseas and their fellow priests who remained in England. Such links have traditionally been hardened into correspondence between churches in England and the former colonies, and sometimes into visits between the clergy who minister to them, and into financial support by English parishes of projects in their, generally much poorer, contact parishes.

The English Missionary Societies too have maintained an active physical role especially in Africa. Apart from the innumerable personal links which their work developed they act still as a funnel whereby the English become involved in Africa. Their role is now very different from its nineteenth-century one of simple, one-sided mission to spread Christian teaching. Help is now more usually dispatched in the form of management, technical or organisational expertise whose purpose is to enable indigenous Churches to develop skills for themselves.

Moreover mission has become reciprocal with the inception of the "Partners in Mission" initiative in 1973. This is based on the principle that mission can be as much about sharing and receiving as about giving, in other words that the huge diversity of cultural differences and insights in the Anglican Communion can be put to positive use in a complex process which ignores traditional dependency roles. Each Province in which consultation takes place chooses those other Provinces which shall participate, and analysis is attempted of problems which are of concern to the host Province. The scheme is too new to attempt to assess its effect on the unity of the Anglican Communion, but its intention and hope is that unity and genuine equality will be

strengthened by overcoming the traditional relationships and constraints of dependency, and by redefining status in terms of mutuality. The 1975 PIM Consultation on South Africa and the formal and informal reports of those members of the Church of England who participated were an important input to Church thinking on South Africa during the latter part of the 1970s.

In the abbreviated history of Anglican growth which was given earlier in this chapter and in references in the previous section to the role of Missionary Societies and priests in former colonies is demonstrated the parallel development of Anglicanism and the British Empire. That Anglican development took this form has had a considerable effect on the internal and external faces of the Church of England and affects its attitude and activities in the contemporary world.

A letter to *The Times* in December 1984¹⁵ referred to "that faintly ridiculous relic of Empire: the Anglican Communion". Such an opinion is a product of the Euro-centric, catholic view of the Church of England, and is simplistic and one-sided in ignoring the fact that the Church of England's long involvement in a non-European environment has forced it to consider itself in the context of a much wider view than Europe; not only this, but it commits the very real folly of condemning by origin an organisation whose very existence has been a developmental one. It would be possible, but equally unjust, to level such criticism at the Commonwealth, in that both organisations must stand or fall by their present structure and purpose and are not conceptually invalidated by their origin within a time-bound and now popularly discredited historical form.

It is however undeniable that in the Anglican Communion, nearly all of whose 400 dioceses are descended originally from the Church of England in an early or later phase of English imperial expansion, the Church of England does enjoy a position of seniority. Not only were most senior personnel in Third World Churches expatriate English until very recently, but many constitutions of the 27 member Provinces have a recognisably English form. The short form of definition of Anglicanism is that one is an Anglican who is in communion with a bishop who is in communion with the See of Canterbury.

¹⁵ *The Times*, 16/12/84.

While the legacy of Anglicanism's association with Englishness is hard to avoid, however the Anglican Communion has in substance cast off its imperial origins. The number of non-white Anglicans now exceeds that of whites, clergy are increasingly indigenous to their country of ministry as are bishops. The proportion of black bishops from Africa for example has increased significantly since 1948 and over half the dioceses of the Anglican Communion though less than half of its members, lie outside the British Commonwealth.

In many ways the real, as opposed to perceptual balance of power has shifted from England and North America to the Third World generally and Africa in particular. Indeed the history of Anglicanism in the twentieth century has largely been the history of its development from a Head Office/Branch Offices format to that of the synodical equality of indigenous churches.

That it was not easy for the Church of England and individuals within it to make such adjustment is undeniable and perceptual adaptation is undoubtedly still going on. Many of the clergy who were trained and ordained when England was still the Head Office have great difficulty in seeing mission and service in anything but one-sided terms, this often hand in hand with what they were bred and educated to see as England's civilising mission overseas; there is still a strong residual element of paternalism among both older clergy and laity which belies the present structure of the Anglican Communion and which reflects the importance of cultural conditioning and education.

However, while this in no way reflects the attitudes, activities and utterances of the leadership of the Church of England, it is productive of a continued sense of involvement in and service to Anglican Churches overseas: few English congregations, however paternalist their views on Africa and Africans, would fail to collect conscientiously during Lent for the work of the USPG or CMS. Thus commitment to the Church of England's externally oriented activities is rather ironically sustained in the older generation by an attitude to the Anglican Communion which in no way reflects present reality, the attitudes either of Church leaders or of the younger clergy and laity.

A very real influence on the Church of England is the duality of the Archbishop of Canterbury's role as Primate of All England and Spiritual Head of the Anglican Communion.

That the Archbishop is constrained in relation to his role in the Anglican Communion to take a world rather than national view is influential in determining the attitudes and preoccupations he brings to his domestic role, the appointments he makes and the causes he supports.

Within the Anglican Communion the Archbishop's role is very much that of *primus inter pares* and he thereby acts as a focus and reference point for its numerous disparate elements, the geographical and political scope of the Anglican Communion running from the USSR, via South Africa and Australia to the Province of the Southern Cone in Latin America.

This illustrates the political ramifications of the Archbishop of Canterbury's role: as Spiritual Head of the Church of England his appointment is to a significant extent a political one and he is thus uncomfortably close to, though certainly not aligned with, British Government policy. He must also act as a focal point to Anglicans in Eastern Europe whose religion did not until very recently include any article of faith on Western-style democracy, to Anglicans in South Africa who range from tacit supporters of the status quo to advocates of its violent overthrow, to the Anglicans of Argentina whose view on any degree of identification between the Archbishop of Canterbury and the British Government's policy in the Falklands must be ambivalent at best. If he is not called upon to be all things to all men the Archbishop must certainly be many different things to many men, and if Anglicanism can be said to be identified with one man it is with him. He is widely consulted by all member Churches and sometimes asked to form special investigatory commissions or undertake special initiatives, but his position with regard to any Church but the Church of England is advisory not authoritative; however the deference habitually and historically paid to Canterbury lends it the authority of tradition.

The experience and culture of the Anglican Communion especially in the Third World have forced the Church of England to theological reappraisal. It is now exceedingly difficult for the Church of England to stress only the relationship of the individual with God and to ignore the problems of how much weight and emphasis should be accorded to human rights and social

problems that are quite definitely of this and not the next world. This is by no means only a legacy of Third World theological interpretation for the debate over how far the Church of England should involve itself in domestic political issues has long been contentious; but the history of the Anglican Communion and the circumstances of its spread, particularly in Africa, have given immediacy to certain issues.

The experience of the Church of England for example in dealing with racial prejudice and deprivation in England has been symbiotic with the intensification of this problem in Southern Africa not only in forcing the Church of England and the rest of the Anglican Communion to recognise and analyse the theology of apartheid and to reject it on the grounds of its inconsistency with the New Testament, but also to emphasise the importance of equality in Christian teaching.

The experience of South Africa has also highlighted the difficulty of deciding which, if any, contemporary political programme actually accords with a Biblical blueprint. Apart from those few who condone apartheid South African Anglicans appear at various points on a continuum which ranges from those who stress the inevitability and value of suffering and who maintain that the conditions of one's life in this world are of little importance, through those who advocate gradual reform by peaceful means and see religion as supporting them through their present difficulties but not helping them to alter fundamentally the structure of the society in which they live, to those who see the frequent Biblical motif of enslavement and freedom as of direct relevance to the position of black people in South Africa. A case can be made for each of these positions but the development of a coherent and unitary Anglican policy is practically impossible.

Less obvious, but equally fundamental, to a change of theological orientation in the Church of England has been the deep African cultural experience and understanding of the family and community. The importance of the community as against the individual is by no means new in Christian thought: Tawney was of the opinion that the corporateness of Christendom itself was a reality until the Reformation when the significance of the individual, his work, his economic position, his personal worthiness for salvation became major preoccupations of Protestant thought.¹⁶

¹⁶ R.H. Tawney, "Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: an Historical Study", Murray, London, 1927.

But a highly advanced sense of community continues to exist in Africa. There is a sense in which individual existence is impossible outside a complex family structure which encompasses past, present and future generations. Professor John Pobee, who is himself West African, has written:

"I am related by blood therefore I exist, or I exist because I belong to a family".¹⁷

Not only does this perspective throw clearer light on aspects of family and community in the Jewish tribes of the Old Testament, but it counterbalances the Western theological emphasis on individual rather than collective values, and this forces political as well as theological reappraisal. Since, for much reiterated reasons of historical evolution, most Anglican theology has been West European and most post-Reformation West European thought has been predicated on the individual, time-bound interpretations of the social role and stance of Christians and of the Anglican Communion have tended to be predicated on individual rights and needs. To accept the importance of community however is to accept that there are residual communal rights. Hence, through its connection with the wider cultural experience of the Anglican Communion, the Church of England has been brought face to face with that interpretation of human rights more usually associated in the contemporary world with the state socialist tradition, where rights accrue to the community as a community not merely as a collection of individuals.

The Anglican Communion's combination of informality and complexity defies simple analysis and tempts discursive description and endless examination of its various constituent elements.

If one were attempting an analysis of the Anglican Communion as a transnational actor however one would encounter great difficulty in elucidating an underlying objective or objectives; common elements of belief hardly qualify under this categorisation. The word elucidation is used advisedly as there is no authoritative statement of Anglican objectives. This is hardly surprising given the evolution rather than foundation of the Anglican Communion. While Anglicans as

¹⁷ Professor John Pobee, "Towards an African Theology", 1979, p. 49.

Christians can undoubtedly name a number of conventional and indisputable Christian objectives, it is suggested that "objective" is a less useful concept than "significance" in this context, in that, in anything but a totally moribund organisation, objectives must be pursued by purposeful activity, while significance can be bestowed by the fact and form of existence; this is in fact the Anglican Communion's claim, that its geographical spread and great diversity reflect both the intention and practice of the Early Church and thus also reflect Divine intent.

The parenthetic understanding of the Anglican Communion which can be given by comparing it with the Roman Church has long been appreciated. A Committee of the 1930 Lambeth Conference wrote:

There are two prevailing types of ecclesiastical organisation: that of centralised government, and that of regional autonomy within one fellowship. Of the former, the Church of Rome is the great historical example. The latter type, which we share with the Orthodox Churches of the East and others, was that upon which the Church of the first centuries was developing ... The Provinces and Patriarchates of the first four centuries were bound together by no administrative bond: the real nexus was a common life resting upon a common faith, common Sacraments, and a common allegiance to an Unseen Head.¹⁸

The structure, organisation, leadership and patterns of authority within the Anglican Communion are respectively fluid, tenuous and authoritative rather than authoritarian. Moreover it is suggested that, despite the existence of the Anglican Consultative Council with its secretariat, it is impossible to define the Anglican Communion as an international organisation without great contortion. That its member Churches see themselves as a community is significant only to themselves. The relevance of the Anglican Communion is internal to its members, not external to the world although its individual churches may be.

Its importance to the Church of England is great however because it presents a constant stream of information, problems, opinions originating in and enriched by different cultures. These the Church of England must perforce consider.

¹⁸ Encyclical Letter of the 1930 Lambeth Conference, p. 153/3, quoted in Bishop John Howe, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

SECTION 1.2.iv: THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

The Church of England's relationship with the WCC, a world wide affiliation of non-Roman Catholic churches, is important because the WCC claims to speak on behalf of its member churches on a wide range of social and political issues. The Church of England is thus identified with a number of policies which its members and leadership might not, and sometimes do not, approve. Church of England delegates sit on the WCC's General Council and on its committees but they are on occasion overruled; and their personal perspective too is often very different from that of their constituency 'at home'.

The WCC was born out of the ecumenical movement which had grown during the 1920's and 1930's, some suggest as a mirror of the League of Nations. The movement did not decline in line with the League however and indeed seemed strengthened by the deteriorating political situation in Europe into formulating a theology of Church against the world in terms of witness against the various prevalent secular evils.

At the Oxford Conference of Life and Work in 1937 it was resolved to set up a World Council of Churches and in May, 1938 a meeting in Utrecht, chaired by William Temple, Archbishop of York, produced a draft constitutional and doctrinal basis. Temple was elected Chairman of its Provisional Committee and two General Secretaries in addition were appointed; later in the same year the WCC moved to Geneva and there it remained.

While the impetus behind the WCC movement was largely British British influence diminished very quickly due to the death of William Temple in 1944 and to the separation of the British Secretary from the centre of activities in Geneva which was an inevitable result of the war. Archbishop Fisher of Canterbury was Chairman of the WCC's opening conference in Amsterdam in August 1948 and Bishop Bell of Chichester was Chairman of the Central Committee until 1954. However there were thereafter no Anglicans of similar stature to Temple or Bell who were willing or interested enough in the WCC to play a leading role.

Enthusiasm for the WCC amongst members of the Church of England varied. The Church Assembly in 1940 formally welcomed the establishment of the WCC, but after the death of

Temple, an enthusiastic and evangelising ecumenic, and the end of the war enthusiasm waned. However there was a revival of interest in ecumenicism during the 1960's, not just among members of the Church of England but in all British Churches. These were the years of the Second Vatican Council, of the establishment of new independent churches in new independent states, of reunion projects; and the WCC was much involved in all of these.

The beginning of the differences between the Church of England and the WCC which were to be so obvious during the 1970's began in 1968 with the WCC Uppsala Conference whose output might be said to embody the religious radicalism of the 1960's. The delegates, a majority of whom were now from Third World churches, pledged commitment to world justice; their enthusiasm was probably enhanced by the fact that Martin Luther King, who was to have been the keynote preacher, was assassinated just before the Conference. There is no doubt that Uppsala represented a real change of direction; the new Secretary-General was Carson Blake, a North American who had been heavily involved in the Civil Rights Movement, and he later claimed that all the delegates were aware of a new era beginning, of the start of a new radicalism.

In 1969 the WCC Programme to Combat Racism was set up and, as a consequence, in 1970 the WCC announced that grants would be made to anti-racist liberation movements such as the Patriotic Front in Rhodesia, Frelimo in Mozambique, SWAPO in Namibia, the ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress in South Africa.

It was this radicalism which led not only to differences of opinion between the Church of England and the WCC but to a frequent inability by each even to perceive the other's point of view. The problem was not always as simple as a difference of policy but of different interpretations of professed shared objectives; each claimed a commitment to fight against racism for example, but each was conditioned by constituent membership and custom to a different interpretation of this objective. The working out of this mistrust in the arena of Southern Africa will be seen in Sections II and III.

SECTION 1.2.v: THE BRITISH COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

Disparity between the positions of the Church of England and of the BCC, an association of British Protestant churches was never as great as between the Church and the WCC. However there was some unease in their relationship especially in some areas of foreign policy.

The BCC had been set up as an ecumenical organisation of Protestant Churches in Britain in 1942 as a logical extension of the new WCC with Archbishop Temple as its first President. It symbolised an end to many of the issues which had most divided the Protestant churches and the 1944 Education Act also helped to eradicate the hitherto numerous disputes between the Churches over schools. There remained, and long-remained, however between the Church of England and other members of the BCC the irreconcilable 'difficulty of the Anglicans' non-recognition of non-episcopal ordination; Anglican-Methodist reunion plans were rejected by the Church Assembly in 1969 partly on this ground.

Not very dynamic in its early years – Archbishop Fisher praised it for its reticence and sobriety – the BCC began to gather momentum during the 1960's. The 1964 Faith and Order Conference at Nottingham saw a significant increase in commitment to the BCC and from this time area experiments in ecumenicism increased. A climate more favourable to ecumenicism developed, throughout the WCC as well as in England, Christian Aid for example expanded enormously, hospices were set up, Amnesty International was founded. Most of these organisations were not solely Christian of course; one might suggest that a certain secular involvement in welfare and human rights issues arose out of or at least developed in parallel with Christian interest in these areas.

The 1960's and 1970's saw also the development of a radical theology which challenged some of the central tenets of the Christian faith. It should not be seen however as radical in any social sense, it had nothing to do with liberation theology or the consideration of the inherent justice or lack of it in political structures, which issues have already been seen to inform the thinking and work of the WCC at this time. And it was the legacy of liberation theology and the programme of the WCC which was in fact more influential amongst BCC decision makers than the

contemporary, home-grown re-evaluations of such theologians as Dennis Nineham, Maurice Wiles, Donald Cupitt or John Hick.

The BCC's position was never as radical as that of the WCC. However its emphasis on the social value of justice and its willingness to evaluate social structures against this criterion did lead to tension between BCC and the Church of England particularly in the area of 'foreign policy'. Sections II and III will demonstrate both the grounds and the working out of this difference.

It will thus be seen that the Church of England's membership of organisations much larger geographically and conceptually, much different culturally and experientially than itself led to an awareness of issues beyond the domestic. Not only this but situations and the uncomfortable contemporary working out of perennial theological issues, which might otherwise have remained comfortably outside the consciousness of Church leaders and members, were forced onto the Church of England's agenda.

Section I.3 will demonstrate how not only external influences but also the Church's own internal history created an imperative to and an experience of involvement with secular social issues. This, in conjunction with the developments detailed above, led to the need for a Church view and Church policies in areas of perceived injustice and interest world-wide as well as domestic.

SECTION L3: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

Not only does the Church of England's membership of the Anglican Communion, the WCC and the BCC increase its awareness of the imperative to act in areas outside its own cultural experience but its own history demonstrates a continuing tradition in this respect. This chapter deals with the development of an internally developed tradition of Church of England involvement in social issues, both domestic and foreign.

It is suggested that since the early nineteenth century the Church has been involved continuously in the furtherance of what is now designated human rights, through social and political involvement, although the form that this involvement has taken has varied according to social and political need and has often been domestic in orientation. It is further suggested that during the latter part of the twentieth century this tradition has contributed to the creation of an imperative to involvement in certain categories of foreign policy issues, those issues where a high content of human rights or material deprivation are perceived.

Moreover the history of the Church of England in the last hundred years has been one of development from fragmented and individual effort in social issues to a whole-Church tradition. This latter was made possible by the evolution of a central organisation within the Church of England and has resulted in a matching increase in the Church's ability to pursue whole-Church policies.

The same period of development saw movement from a domestic social orientation, where all overseas activity was confined to missionary work undertaken by missionary societies, to a church with a set of identifiable foreign policies and objectives. This was partly due to the growth of an independent Anglican Communion paralleling the movement from colonial to independent status of the former British Empire and the subsequent impossibility of confining relations with newly independent states to Church and religious affairs alone.

It was also due to the nature of European politics during the 1920's and 1930's which presented acute problems with a significant moral content from which the Church could not stand aloof. The Second World War was treated in a very different fashion from the First with problems

within the framework of a general approval of a war against evil treated on their own merits and no longer justified on the ground that the overall Allied position could itself be justified. Post-war developments continued this trend of involvement in foreign policy issues because of their moral content, the issue of nuclear weapons being perhaps the most significant case in point. It is suggested that the history of the Church of England's involvement in Rhodesia and South Africa is firmly in this tradition.

While theological arguments for and against the Church's involvement in domestic and international politics are examined in Section I.4 it is appropriate to point out here that a principled base of ethical and theological considerations has only ever persuaded a minority at all levels within the church during the last hundred years that such involvement is right. Throughout the period the promise of a better life for all hereafter has been used by many Christians in the Church of England to justify their acquiescence in a societal and world structure where many of their fellow men suffer relative and often absolute want. The polarization within the Church between Low and High churchmen, or Evangelicals and supporters of the Oxford Movement, was much more important to most churchgoers from the mid-nineteenth century to the First World War for example than was the evolution of a coherent Church position on social obligation and involvement.¹ Before 1919 also there was constant preoccupation with the relationship between Church and State and the Church's desire for a measure of self-government. The 1920's saw the attempted revision of the prayer book.² The 1940's and 1950's the complete revision of canon law and the creation of the Anglican Communion. Constant throughout the period too was the concern for falling numbers of ordinands, confirmations and congregations, for the proper role of bishops, for the disparate needs of town and country.³

¹ The Evangelical Movement stressed the importance of the Calvinist elements in the Thirty Nine Articles and preferred great simplicity of form in worship. The Oxford Movement stood for stress on the catholic heritage of the Church of England, systematised devotions and a great preoccupation with improving the relationship and devotion of the individual to God. Such a programme and the loss of one of the earliest and great leaders, Cardinal Newman, to the Roman Catholic Church aroused latent fears of 'popery' amongst those to whom its reformed element was the most significant feature of the Church of England, but the Anglo-Catholic movement, as it became known, was removed from the Roman position by its willingness to absorb new Biblical scholarship and its rejection of claims of papal authority. For the purpose of this thesis however the beliefs and work of this movement are highly significant in that their emphasis on the universality and catholicity of the Church brought them to a position where they had also to emphasise the Church's obligation to the social order.

² The Revised Prayer Book was rejected by Parliament in 1928.

³ See Section I.5.

Thus it would be fallacious to paint a picture of an ever more united Church waking to its social obligations as a result of more enlightened interpretation of its own scriptural sources and tradition. But it is not inaccurate to detail the activities of small groups of theologians, of Christian political thinkers and activists, individual priests and laymen and societies who for a variety of reasons recognised the validity of what the late twentieth century designates 'human rights' and what they would have regarded as social justice. They tied this recognition inextricably to the theology, teaching and work of the Church and influenced the Church to assume an activist role in the field of human rights when, in the twentieth century, it developed a central organisation and administration and a degree of autonomy in the government of its own affairs.

Probably the first important manifestations of social concern by members of the Church were the campaigns of William Wilberforce against the slave trade and Lord Shaftesbury against conditions in the mines and factories. Their work was intrinsically important and also important to the Church as an example and demonstration of the possibility of exerting successful pressure on the government to ameliorate an unacceptable social practice and unacceptable social conditions.

They were followed by the short-lived Christian Socialist Movement which was important because it was the first group of any note formed by Christians for the purpose of the amelioration of social conditions and also because it was the first direct challenge to the Church's underlying assumption, dating from the seventeenth century and perhaps specifically from the ideas of John Locke, that there was no contradiction between the Christian way of life and a competitive form of society. This assumption had been reinforced by the process of industrialisation and was later also to be fuelled by Darwin's work on the origin and reasons for survival of species. This movement lasted only ten years but was the inspiration of many later movements.

As the nineteenth century drew to a close an increasing awareness of the reality of social conditions came about through the systematic research of such men as Charles Booth and Rowntree. This was reflected in the Church's increased involvement in practical ameliorative work and the perceived impossibility of ignoring the widespread nature of social evil; and the inability of

Churchmen to share the widespread secular faith in the essential improvability of the individual, and hence of society, through education and the march of technology, was contributory to the marked contrast between Christian pessimism and secular optimism in the years between the beginning of the twentieth century and the beginning of the First World War. During the whole of this period the Church's interpretation of what would now be called human rights was reflective of the contemporary condition and needs of society, the right to a living wage, the right to a decent education, the right to respectable living conditions.

The intimate relationship within the Church between theology and social thought and activity was demonstrated by the fact that the group of men who formed the Social Christian Union, SCU, in 1889 were also responsible for one of the most influential theological works of the nineteenth century, *Lux Mundi*, which was also published in 1889. This took the form of a symposium of articles edited by Charles Gore and many of these articles demonstrated the centrality of Incarnation, of the immanence of God and the consequent importance of man and therefore of all men. This formed therefore a theological basis of social involvement, taken up in practical terms by the Christian Social Union whose object was to find out by group research what a Christian social order in the twentieth century should be.

The SCU remained small but it was important in that many of its members were leading churchmen and their input to the Lambeth Conferences was so influential that the Anglican Communion as a whole did begin to demonstrate a greater awareness of social issues.

Thus it is not fanciful to suggest that, despite the reactionary image it often projected, the Church of England was part of a movement which led to the founding of the Parliamentary Labour Party in 1906. And at the same time the Church Socialist League, CSL, was formed by a group of Anglo-Catholic clergy from the North of England with the aim of establishing ... "a democratic commonwealth in which the community shall own the land and capital collectively and use them co-operatively for the good of all".⁴

⁴ J. Oliver, *The Church and the Social Order*, A.R. Mowbray and Co. Ltd., 1968, p. 19.

The preoccupation of the socially aware members of the Church with socialism was strong during the early years of the twentieth century and this is well demonstrated by the 1908 Pan-Anglican Congress' report 'The Church and Human Society' where the main question addressed was whether Christianity pointed towards a socialist society and, if so, whether the Church of England ought to be in alliance with the Labour Party. Most speakers replied affirmatively to both questions and capitalism was agreed to be immoral. William Temple.⁵ declared for nationalisation and said that ... "the Christian is called to assent to great steps in the direction of collectivism."⁶

However the diversity of opinion on social involvement in the Church, the strength of non-conformist support for the newly emergent Labour Party, the preoccupation with internal disputes and the struggle to wrest a measure of self-government from Parliament all prevented the Church from making a unified commitment to any political programme to attain socially desirable ends, let alone one as radical as socialism was seen to be by most of the church's strongest supporters. Both at this time and later, when social evils were diagnosed as largely located in industrial areas and derived from an inequitable system of industrial production, the largely rural basis of the Church should be remembered; the Church never managed to be adequately and effectively represented in industrial cities.⁷ and amelioration of the acute problems of the few did not necessarily seem of pressing concern to the many who made up the bulk of Anglican worshippers and who were heavily divided in any case over whether the Church should enter the social and hence the political sphere at all. Thus the group activity described above was very much minority activity. That having been said however it did contribute both to the discovery and publicising of social evils and in some measure to their amelioration.

⁵ William Temple, 1881-1944: Bishop of Manchester 1921-1929; Archbishop of York 1929-1942; Archbishop of Canterbury 1942-1944; 1909 Chairman of Student Christian Movement Matlock Conference; 1924 Chairman of COPEC; 1929 Chairman of Central Council of Broadcast Adult Education; 1908-1924 President of WEA; 1932 give opening sermon at Geneva Disarmament Conference; 1935 Chairman of BBC General Advisory Council; a prolific writer on theological and Christian social issues e.g. his 1934 Gifford Lectures, 'Nature, Man and God' and 'Christianity and the Social Order' 1942; and indefatigable social and educational reformer; member of the SCU and of the Labour Party from 1918- 1925; arguably the most eminent and highly regarded church leader for the past century.

⁶ Report of the Pan-Anglican Congress, Vol. II, CIO, London, pp. 102-103.

⁷ See Section I.5.

While it would be too tidy to suggest that fragmentary effort ended in 1919 and that the beginning of the Church Assembly saw also the beginning of a united voice and stance on social questions, the social activity already documented historically ran parallel to agitation for an increased measure of self-government in the church.

In 1919 the Church gained the apparatus for the formulation of centralised pronouncement and activity in the form of the Church Assembly. This was needed if efforts in the area of identifying and obtaining individual and collective rights were ever to be unified. The awareness of Church leaders of the necessity for effort in this direction, due partly to the pioneering work of the groups already described, was heavily reinforced by the social legacy of the First World War.

Indeed, from this time onwards the social movement became more and more a movement of the whole Church and not merely of societies and individuals within it. However, the euphoric and rather vague espousal of Socialism of so many eminent clerics in the pre-war years was gone. The actuality of social reform, the emergence of the Labour Party as replacement for the Liberals as the party of reform, the realities of the Socialist revolution in Russia, all these made many who before the war had called themselves Socialist recant. Those who persisted in so regarding themselves were however much more committed than they had been before 1914.

District and national missions and conferences emphasised the wider input of personnel and ideas. The first mission in this tradition was the nation-wide Mission of Repentance and Hope held in 1916 in the middle of the First World War. Most English people were far too distracted by the war to feel either repentance or hope at this juncture but the Mission produced five reports and, of these, the Fifth 'Christianity and Industrial Problems', written by Tawney, is notable for its recognition of the logic and obligation of the Church's involvement in industrial life. John Oliver⁸ calls this report ... "one of the finest and most important expressions of Christian opinion on social and industrial affairs ever produced by the Church of England."

The Report is mildly socialist in underlying ethos and deals with unemployment, the control

⁸ J. Oliver, 'The Church and Social Order', A.R. Mowbray & Co. Ltd., London, 1968, p.23.

of industry, national education. It emphasised too the importance of a living wage. Building on the basis it provided the Conference on Politics, Economics and Citizenship, COPEC, at Birmingham in 1924 and the Malvern Conference of 1941 collated and guided the Church's thinking on the relationship between religion and social reality and provided input to the Lambeth Conferences of these years and to debates in the Church Assembly. The role of William Temple in these gatherings was seminal because he combined the two streams of Anglican reformist tradition, Anglo-Catholicism combined with socialism and the more Protestant SCM, and he expressed their consensus.

Church involvement in social and societal issues grew. In 1923 the Church Assembly set up a permanent social and industrial committee; in 1925 the Bureau of Social Research for Tyneside was set up as a result of COPEC; in 1928 a COPEC continuation committee arranged a Conference on the Welfare of Youth; in 1927 COPEC issued a report on Rural Life; in 1929 the Council of Christian Churches in England for Social Questions was set up; the 1938 Pilgrim Trust Report, 'Men Without Work', produced by a team established by a Committee on Unemployment set up by Temple and including Bishop Bell of Chichester, was regarded as a model of its kind, totally professional in its methods and recommendations. Most interesting from the perspective of this work a Council on Foreign Relations was also set up.

It is true that these meetings had little effect in terms of obvious input to government policy but Adrian Hastings.⁹ suggests that they began an educative process whereby Church members at every level, lay and ordained, moved from a largely High Tory attitude to an acceptance of the Christian case for massive social reform and the development of the welfare state. Moreover the meetings themselves, the reports which emanated from them, dissemination of the discussion which took place there were undoubtedly part of the process whereby the ethic and practical details of the Welfare State were formulated.

However John Oliver¹⁰ points out that despite its organisational ability after 1919 to present

⁹ A. Hastings, 'A History of English Christianity 1920-1985', Collins, 1986.

¹⁰ John Oliver, *op. cit.*

a more united front the Church's contribution to Christian social thought was weaker than it might have been because of the profound ignorance of many of those who wrote on social and especially on economic theory, because a number of influential churchmen continued to oppose the Church's social involvement on principle, because the continuing divisions within the Church between High and Low churchmen, Socialists and anti-Socialists, weakened coherent and concerted activity and because during the 1930's the theological climate was hostile to the mildly socialist Protestant outlook of the Fifth Report and COPEC

In this latter regard he suggests that only at the end of the 1930's was a more rigorous and satisfactory basis evolved for the theology of Christian social thought under the external influence of Niebuhr, Berdyaev and Maritain and by the work of the Jeunesses Ouvrières Chrétiennes in Belgium.

It is indeed true that under a variety of outside pressures the basis and scope of the theology of social involvement in England became more aware of parallel movements in other churches during these years, but such a view should not be allowed to underestimate the seminal role played by the quintessentially English figure of William Temple in the years between the two world wars.¹¹ Temple was arguably the single most influential man in the evolution of a specifically Anglican social theology because his methodology provided a specifically theological approach to the problem of creating a servo-mechanism to link Christianity and politics which did not involve direct application of biblical texts or Church doctrine to contemporary political issues or the adoption of some secular analysis of society as the basis of Church policy.

Temple saw the need for professionalism and expertise, an approach which has marked the Church's treatment of social problems ever since. Temple's axioms and the tradition he thereby established for the Church of England were frequently cited in Synod and the Boards and Committees of Synod during the period covered by this present work and not only the Church of England but the Second Vatican Council and the Ecumenical Movement have worked on the basis of

¹¹ That Temple himself, particularly in his later years, was influenced by Niebuhr is undeniable. This is made clear in Alan Suggate's article, 'William Temple and the challenge of Reinhold Niebuhr', *Theology*, November, 1981.

elucidating a highly informed Christian opinion which is an input to a wider, not specifically Christian, constituency. COPEC and the Malvern Conference were demonstrative of his approach and much of the practical work in tackling social evils undertaken between the two wars was based on his pivotal perception that the worth of the individual can be enhanced or diminished by the social institutions and social conditions which, at least partly, determine his existence.¹²

Nothing in the period between the wars illustrates better the influence of such ideas and the more unified whole-Church approach to social questions than the Church's involvement in slum clearance and the provision of new housing in the twenties and thirties.

The St. Pancras House Improvement Society was set up in 1925, a public utility society which sold shares to buy up slum properties for reconditioning. Societies were set up too in Fulham and in Bristol. In 1928 a survey was undertaken in Newcastle of the facts of social life in Tyneside and a housing association was formed there too. Under the influence of the Rev'd Charles Jenkinson, Vicar of St. John and St. Barnabas, Holbeck, Leeds and leader of the Leeds City Council, a municipal housing scheme was undertaken there which changed Leeds between 1933 and 1939 from having some of the worst slums in England to being relatively slum-free.

The bishops formed an organised front in the House of Lords to press housing issues and supported and publicised schemes in their dioceses and in the Church Assembly. Their activities are generally held to have been instrumental in the passing of the Housing Act of 1930. Moreover the fact that as an elite within the Church they appreciated the fact that widespread social problems could only be tackled effectively by the state and constantly emphasised this in the House of Lords and Church Assembly was an input to the enormous changes which occurred in British society after the Second World War.

The late twenties and thirties however are of seminal interest to this study because they

¹² When assessing the Church's input to the formation of social thought and policy between the two wars, particularly to the 1944 Education Act, Temple's lifelong and intimate friendship with Henry Tawney should also be noted: Henry Tawney, Professor at the London School of Economics; writer of the Fifth Report; member of the 1919 Sankey Commission on the Coal Industry which recommended nationalisation; wrote 1921 'The Acquisitive Society', 1924 the Labour Manifesto 'Secondary Education for All', 1926 'Religion and the Rise of Capitalism', 1929 'Labour and the Nation', 1931 'Equality'; highly influential in the mid twentieth century move from individualism to a more socialistic society.¹³

mark a real departure from the Church's habitual view of social responsibility as existing within a domestic context. Europe and its problems now became centrally important to Churchmen and Church thinking. Many leading Churchmen became aware of the needs and abrogation of rights of individuals, often individual Christians, outside England and much effort began to be expended in attempts to influence the British Government in this area.

It was really not until the advent of Communism in the Soviet Union and the rise of Nazism that the Church of England was intimately caught up in international politics outside the British Empire and Anglican Communion. The spiritual, ideological and political challenge of these systems was too great for Church leaders to ignore and the Church of England was not the only church seeking for some appropriate response to these phenomena.¹⁴

Many works have demonstrated the importance of organised religion as enhancer and legitimiser of civil and state ritual.¹⁵ That the Church of England as state church played such a role through the First World War is undeniable, but with the peace its disagreement with much government foreign policy became overt. Many bishops strongly criticised the provisions of the Peace of Versailles, not merely because it stored up problems for the future, but on the grounds of the individual suffering on a vast scale which would be caused by it. Before Hitler's rise to power much was excused Germany because of the Versailles provisions, but after 1933 the leadership of the Church increasingly remonstrated, directly and through the agency of the British Government, about the treatment of the Church in Germany and its forcible unification into one Reichskirche. However it must be said that English Church reaction to the problems of the German Church continued to be complicated by guilt over Versailles and some churchmen were unwilling to pronounce against the activities of the Reichskirche in case this began an anti-German crusade. Many also compared Germany favourably throughout the 1930's with the USSR and this attitude was reinforced by reports of atrocities there.

¹⁴ The position of German Lutheranism *vis-a-vis* the Nazi state and Pope Pius XI's attempts to reach an accommodation with the Dictators demonstrate not only how all European churches were drawn in but also how difficult was the evolution of appropriate response.

¹⁵ For a modern treatment see Robert J. Boccock, 'Ritual: civic and religious'; *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 21, 1970.

Sympathy for Germany amongst Anglicans as well as Roman Catholics developed largely from a right-wing English Christian tradition. Its most unfortunate manifestation was the sympathy of Bishop Headlam of Gloucester, Chairman of the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations, for Naziism and the Nazi Protestant wing; he was apparently greatly impressed by Ribbentrop's assurance that Hitler was profoundly religious.¹⁶

A number of Church leaders however did not hesitate to protest about events in Germany. George Bell, Bishop of Chichester, and Duncan-Jones, Dean of Chichester, were among those who protested not only about the form and speed of unification but also about state attempts to control the German church and, more generally, about the Aryan clauses. So vociferous indeed was the protest in England, as well as in the USA and Scandinavia, that a message from the German embassy in London in September, 1934, told Von Neurath, the German Foreign Minister, that conflict with the Catholic Church and the creation of the Reichskirche was ... "the main bone of contention in Germano-British relations".¹⁷

Archbishop Lang of Canterbury too was involved; he protested to the German Ambassador against coercion in 1934. Moreover the arrest, trial and sending of Martin Niemoller to concentration camp aroused such publicity and outcry in England, including numerous clerical letters of protest to *The Times* and a condemnation by world Church leaders including the Archbishop of Canterbury, that it was, Robbins claims, highly significant in interpreting Hitler's regime to foreign observers.¹⁸

The effect of the Church of England on the Church in Germany too was noteworthy. The attitude which the Church of England had developed to its role as an established church, that it was part of the Establishment but not subject to it and was both free and obliged to criticise from within, was influential in forming the thought and attitude of some of the German Protestants who opposed Hitler such as Pastor Wilhelm Stahlin.¹⁹

¹⁶ *The Guardian*, 2/9/38, quoted by A. Hastings, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

¹⁷ DGFP, Series C, iii, pp. 425-26, quoted in Keith Robbins, 'Martin Niemoller; the German Church struggle and English opinion', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, Vol. XXI, No. 2, April, 1970.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ J. Bentley, 'British and German High Churchmen in the struggle against Hitler', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, July 1972.



It has already been pointed out there was a second reason in addition to residual guilt over the Versailles settlement for the less than unanimous condemnation of the German Government's treatment of the Church there by leaders of the Church of England. This was reports of human rights violations in the USSR and general antipathy to the form of government there. The two regimes could be seen politically as antithetic and the undeniable failings of the Nazi regime were, at least partly, excused by its opposition, until 1938, to the USSR.

Reports of possible religious persecution in the USSR began well before the Nazi takeover in Germany: *The Times* published a series of reports beginning in June, 1929 about the possible persecution of the Orthodox Church and there appeared also in *The Times*, *Morning Post* and *Daily Mail* a series of reports on Soviet policy, designating it 'the anti-God society'. The issue was immediately seized upon by the Conservative opposition as an effective way of undermining the Labour Government's policy of cautious rapprochement with the USSR, but, while this had nuisance value, the situation became serious for the Government when the Archbishops of York and Canterbury issued a statement that "no words can be strong enough to express the indignation with which we have heard day by day news of the revival of persecution such as is incompatible with the elementary principles of civilisation".²⁰

The Archbishop of Canterbury then pressed for a "full enquiry into the real facts of the situation as regards persecution of every form of religion (in the USSR)"²¹ An official Foreign Office enquiry was duly announced led by Ambassador Ovey in Moscow, but, as neither Soviet Government nor private sources would provide information for Ovey's enquiry, this came to nothing.

The situation between Church and State hierarchies was still extremely tense especially when the Archbishop of Canterbury ordered prayers of intercession for Soviet Christians to be said at Sunday parades in the armed services and this order was countermanded by the Prime

²⁰ This was reported in the Daily Herald and read to Anglican meetings in diocesan cities. The statement itself was probably at least partly prompted by the Pope's condemnation of Soviet religious persecution which had been reported in the Daily Herald and *The Times* on 10th February, 1930.

²¹ House of Lords Debates, Vol. 76, 1929-30, cols. 575-578.

Minister, Ramsey MacDonald.²² However the crisis subsided when Ovey sent a report from Moscow discounting the worst of the atrocity stories. Moreover the Archbishop of Canterbury demonstrated an acute awareness of the problems of the Church's becoming involved in transitory political issues, however important, when he wrote to MacDonald in February, 1930 "As to the whole question of dealing with the situation in Russia itself, my difficulties are as great as yours. I cannot but feel the force of much of what you have said about the danger of only provoking the Soviet Government. On the other hand, in a position as more or less a leader of religious opinion in this country it had been, and still may be, impossible for me, to remain silent."²³

It is undeniable in this case that the Church's intervention had no directing influence on Government policy in the sense that no official representations were made to the Soviet Government and diplomatic relations, so recently restored, were maintained; there was not even a full-scale House of Commons debate. But it is equally undeniable that the Church's support of a mass media campaign lent this campaign strength and moral validity and forced the Government to treat seriously an issue which it might otherwise have regarded as yet another piece of opposition trouble-stirring. Not only this, but the ambivalence over Naziism, and the possibility of its accommodation rather than eradication, which characterised British Government policy and much opinion in society at large for so much of the 1930's was immeasurably fuelled by suspicion of atrocities in the USSR which was seen by many as Germany's ideological antithesis. Edward Crankshaw wrote in the 1960's"it was distrust of Russia and fear of Bolshevism on the part of the appeasers which made them soft on the dictators, above all Hitler, who deliberately identified himself with the struggle against Bolshevism."²⁴

A totally different form of influence on the formation of foreign policy opinion was played by the Rev. Dick Sheppard, a Canon of St. Paul's. In 1934 he founded the Peace Pledge Union, PPU, whose members renounced war and to which, at its height, fifty thousand people belonged.

²² The tension was probably exacerbated by the Church's resentment at the House of Commons' rejection in 1928 of the deposited Prayer Book Measure which had been approved by the Church Assembly.

²³ PRO 30/69/1175: information in this section is taken exclusively from the doctoral thesis of Andrew Williams, Geneva University 1985, 'Labour and the Soviet Union, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales.

²⁴ E. Crankshaw, 'When we wanted war', *Observer*, 23/8/64, quoted in D.N. Lammers, 'Explaining Munich', *Hoover Institution Studies* 16, 1966.

It served further to muddy the already murky waters of the 1930's by its encouragement of the view that a renunciation of war on one side was bound to meet with a reciprocity; thus it could be said to have encouraged appeasement generally and, while directed away from government and towards public opinion at large, acted as validator of Neville Chamberlain's position. Indeed Archbishop Lang of Canterbury, in speeches both on the radio and in the House of Lords, seemed unable to decide whether God or the Prime Minister was most to be thanked for the peace settlement at Munich in 1938.²⁵

Thus during the 1930's one sees a variety of Church responses to the developing situation in Europe, concern for fellow churchmen and conversely for the spread of an ideology perceived to be both politically and theologically dangerous; but what one fails to see is any concerted Church action over the fate of the Jews in Germany. Until Kristallnacht, on 19th November, 1938, only the Quakers as a group had joined with British Jewry in assisting Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany. A few Churchmen such as Bishop Bell of Chichester and Viscount Cecil were involved but it was by no means a Church preoccupation. Thus an area which in later years would have been regarded as a natural sphere of Church involvement was ignored while the fate of Christians who were certainly mistreated but only *inter alia* was a predominant issue.

In many ways the coming of the War clarified issues and co-ordinated erstwhile differences about the ethics of the purpose, if not pursuit, of the war. This war also presented fewer difficulties than had the First World War for a Church caught between nation and, supposedly immutable, principle. It was possible credibly to represent the conflict as a battle between absolute evil and at least relative good; and its Established status did not this time force the Church by ceremonial association to the moral contortion of validating the actions of just one player in an international war game.

This is not to suggest however that a unified Church approved automatically any step taken by the allies to achieve victory over Fascism. How, as opposed to why, the war was being pursued was an area of sometimes acrimonious debate. One man stood out in his examination of

²⁵ Adrian Hastings, *op. cit.*, p. 348.

issues within war as moral of themselves; this was George Bell, Bishop of Chichester. He objected to the treatment of enemy aliens in 1940. He campaigned fiercely against obliteration bombing by either side and he particularly condemned the Allied bombing of Dresden.

In 1940 he published 'Christianity and World Order' in which he argued strongly for a negotiated peace, a policy completely out of line with the stated policy of the Allies, unconditional surrender which in Bell's view did nothing to encourage anti-Nazi forces in Germany. He did not only write on this subject however; in May 1942 he spent three weeks in Sweden and met there the dissidents Hans Schönfeld and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. He brought back a message to the British Government that certain highly placed Germans were planning a putsch with the aim of overthrowing the Nazis and obtaining a just peace. They asked whether the British Government would help them by indicating that Germany would be treated differently if they succeeded. Bell had little success with the Government: although he saw Eden and Cripps and asked for such an assurance in the House of Lords he did not obtain it.²⁶

Temple too challenged Government policy when he spoke in the House of Lords on 23rd March, 1943 urging that the Government give temporary asylum to all Jews escaping from Nazi Europe. The Government rejected this idea as it did his other suggestions for saving numerous lives by bombing the railway lines to Auschwitz or the gas chambers themselves or by admitting large numbers of children into Palestine.

It would be totally inaccurate to portray the Church of England during the war years as preoccupied solely or even predominantly with the War. That there were still very strong domestic preoccupations was demonstrated by the appointment in 1943 of an Evangelistic Commission. Its 1945 report 'Towards the Conversion of England' showed little sign of awareness of contemporary and developing issues and, by its sheer irrelevance, produced no significant policy recommendations or innovations.

The same accusation could not be levelled however at the report 'The Church and the Atom'

²⁶ It is likely that he sacrificed more by his outspokenness than anyone else as the general opinion has always been that he was passed over as successor to William Temple as Archbishop of Canterbury in 1944 because of it.

published some years after the War.²⁷ This was one of the most significant reports ever produced by the Church in that it laid the foundation for forty years of official Church pronouncement on the nuclear question. The Commission which produced the report agreed unanimously that the use of the atomic bomb was wrong, though some thought this was an absolute and others a relative wrong: "A majority of the members of this Commission is unconvinced by the plea that the object of the use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not destruction, but the administration of a 'psychological shock' which would end – and in fact did end – the war immediately. The minority is impressed by this plea, but is not prepared to defend the details of what was done."²⁸

The centuries-old theory of the Just War was re-examined to determine its contemporary relevance in mitigating the suffering of those innocently caught up in conflict which the existence of sin in the world made an ever-constant possibility. As a consequence the report condemned the blitzkrieg bombing by both sides in the recent war; also, and significantly for the subject of this thesis, it rejected the validity of any claim to unlimited national sovereignty. "Christians cannot admit unlimited rights of any kind, and must therefore resist all claims that a sovereign state is entitled to do what it pleases."²⁹ This is undoubtedly a foundation of what the Church sees as a right and duty in the modern period to criticise social and political structures it perceives as unjust.

The report however found moral the possession, as opposed to the use, of the atomic bomb on the ground that it is a government's duty as much to prevent war as to resist aggression and the existence of nuclear weapons can be a deterrent; thus was formed the basis for the official, though far from united, Church view that atomic weapons may defend, rather than abrogate, the most basic of individual rights, those to life and its continuation.

The view that nuclear weapon possession could be tolerated and might be regarded as productive in certain circumstances and that possession and use of nuclear weapons should be

²⁷ 'The Church and the Atom', Press and Publications Board of the Church Assembly, London, 1948.

²⁸ Roger Lloyd, 'The Church of England 1900-1965', SCM Press, London, 1966, p. 197.

²⁹ Roger Lloyd, *ibid.*, p. 198.

considered under different criteria meant that Church and State views were basically in line with one another. This is no reason for an automatic assumption that Church policy followed State policy because of structural linkage. It is quite clear that the Commission which produced 'The Church and the Atom' reached its conclusions on fundamentally theological grounds. That theology could support a different view is unarguable but there was at least perceived a lack of dissonance between the position recommended to the Church and theology and Church tradition.³⁰

In the years following 1945 the Church's involvement in social issues and in the interests of the individual in the face of governmental or other institutional oppression continued. Indeed it has already been pointed out that the Church's contribution to the very structure of post-war society in terms of the Attlee reforms was significant.

The 1950's also saw the emergence of highly significant and influential Anglican activity of a non-official kind. Christian Action was set up in 1945, initially to promote the restoration of Germany; its leader was John Collins, from 1948 Canon of St. Paul's. In 1949, with Germany on the road to economic and social recovery it took up the issue of apartheid in South Africa which it tirelessly publicized for twenty years. It also set up the Defence and Aid Fund which financed the defence of many of those arrested in South Africa for their opposition to the regime. Its activities were not approved by the Church hierarchy, the Archbishop of Canterbury as well as the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster ceased to nominate representatives to its council, but it reflected a non-institutional growth of social and political concern among British Christians as did the organisation of Oxfam.

As with other periods of socially-orientated activity however this was not the Church's major preoccupation. Geoffrey Fisher, Archbishop of Canterbury from 1945 to 1963, was preoccupied as much with revision of the Church's canons as with the development of independent

³⁰ Official tolerance of nuclear weapons possession and challenges to this position are themes which have run through the Church's modern history, indeed that of all British churches. The Council on Christian approaches to Defence and Disarmament spokesman, David Edwards, spoke in 1963 of his expectation that nuclear weapons would be in existence for some years to come: in 1963 the BCC called for a "rapid progressive reduction" (not one notes 'abolition') of nuclear weapons even though these were an offence to God and a denial of His purpose for Man. "Future of the British Nuclear Deterrent". BCC, 1979. p. iii: Both examples quoted in Nicholas A. Sims (ed.), 'Explorations in Ethics and International Relations', London, Croom Helm, 1981 in an article by John Habgood, 'Theological Reflections on Compromise.'

Anglican Churches in what had been the British Empire.³¹ The 1960's and early 1970's moreover saw debate on the epistemology and validity of Christian knowledge unparalleled since the work of Schweitzer at the beginning of the century.

What had begun to exist however was a belief that whatever the Church's own internal preoccupations it ought as an institution to comment on areas of social concern both domestically and internationally.³²

R.B. Dugliss³³ suggests that throughout this period there was a consensus within the Church that there should be some sort of Christian comment in such areas as general legislation and administration, defence and foreign policy, colonial affairs, domestic, wage and trade policy, general welfare, criminal law. He suggests however that there was often lack of agreement about the content of such comment. Consequently many topics have only presented themselves as significant Church interests when some consensus has proved possible and has been expressed either through Convocations, the Church Assembly or the Bench of Bishops. (This was of course the period before the setting up of the General Synod)

The activities of the Bishops in the House of Lords were particularly indicative of the existence of a consensual opinion on human rights issues and social welfare during this period, though judgement over the effectiveness of their representations must naturally depend on how far one views as influential the House of Lords. This appearance of consensus is not surprising as the speeches of bishops were, and still are, co-ordinated by the Church's central administration.

Professor, the Rev'd G.R. Dunstan, in an editorial review of Professor P.G. Richards book, 'Parliament and Conscience',³⁴ contrasts the significant part played in House of Lords debates by

³¹ See Section I.2.

³² Section I.5. will demonstrate the narrowing of the traditional role of the clergy by the expansion of the Welfare State; but many individual clergy still followed the older church tradition of individual crusades to right perceived wrongs. One of the most striking examples of success here is the work of Father Jo Williamson, Rector of Stepney in the late 1950's and early 1960's. He undertook a one-man campaign to urge the LCC and the national government to alleviate social conditions in Stepney. The Bishop of London and the London Diocesan Conference supported him in petitioning the Ministry of Housing and Local Government over slum removal, and Butler, then Home Secretary, gave as one of the reasons for his acceding to the proposed revision of the Street Offences Act in 1958 his interview with Father Williamson. Debates of the House of Commons, 1957-8, Vol 598, col. 1287: quoted in R. Dugliss, 'The Church of England as a pressure group in recent British politics, 1950-1960: the effectiveness of Establishment', Doctoral Dissertation, Duke University, 1963. The community relations work in Leicester of Rev'd. EWC Carlile might also be mentioned in this respect.

³³ R.B. Dugliss, *ibid.*

³⁴ Theology, LXXIV, No. 613, July, 1971, No. 613.

the bishops and their support of reform there with the generally negative support for reform of the discernibly Anglican vote in the House of Commons. He suggests that the bishops were closer to the thinking of the Church than were the laymen in the House of Commons and further suggests that their enlightened thinking owed much to the work of the Church of England Moral Welfare Council which, after thirty years of growth, was at the peak of its influence in the 1950's and early 1960's.

This organisation, which Dunstan so commended, became the Board for Social Responsibility in 1963 and its influential journal 'Moral Welfare' became 'The Crucible' with the same emphasis on directing serious Christian attention to the major social and moral problems of the day. This linking of episcopal activity in the House of Lords with the Church's principal organ of social affairs information collection, organisation and dissemination emphasises that it was in the area of consultation that the Church was then, and indeed remains, most effective. Distinguished theologians, priests and laymen have been pressed into the Council's, and later the Board's, service to prepare the sort of expert opinion on a range of social issues that William Temple had advocated. Channels of communication between the Church's central agencies and dioceses, deaneries and parishes were opened up for the collection and dissemination of information.³⁵ Theological Colleges were kept up to date on social issues and much advisory correspondence took place. All this led to the emergence of an elite well-informed enough on a variety of political issues to contribute significantly to national debate.

During the 1970's the Board for Social Responsibility worked with the political parties , though it aligned itself with none, and had contacts in a research context with the Social Research Board of the Labour Party and the Bow group of the Conservatives. It co-ordinated the Church's social workers, had close links with the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labour, the Home Office, and, in the context of foreign affairs, with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The many personal contacts between Church, Civil Service and Government personnel were a valuable source of data and ideas.

³⁵ Section L5 however demonstrates the strains which continue between central and local agencies.

The Council, and later the Board, enjoy(ed) a reputation for avant-garde social ideas. During the 1950's the Council was influential in initiating Church Assembly Debates on such issues as homosexuality and prostitution, and was responsible for a report on the Church in the Welfare State, 'The National Church and the Social Order'. Dugliss³⁶ suggests that as, during the 1950's, the Council's progressive general approach to social and moral questions was not repudiated by the Church the habit of accepting first Council and later Board of Social Responsibility perspectives as the official social policies of the Church became established. This theory would go far to explain the hiatus which existed between the views of the average man in the pew and official church pronouncements on such issues as race, North/South, inner cities. It also offers some element of explanation for the semi-autonomy of the various committees of the Board of Social Responsibility which will be referred to in greater detail in Section I.5 and which will continually be obvious in the detailed examination of the involvement of the Committee for International Affairs in the affairs of Rhodesia and South Africa in Sections II and III.

As far as working with Parliament rather than forming Church opinion is concerned Church activities in the 1950's and 1960's include the Council's evidence to the Younghusband Committee on Social Workers³⁷ to royal commissions on Marriage and divorce and on Capital Punishment, to the Feversham Committee on Human Artificial Insemination. Their recommendations were often incorporated in committee recommendations – the Moral Welfare Council's study group for the Wolfenden Committee for example is widely credited with providing the basic framework for that Committee's recommendations.

With the increasing proliferation of central and delegated legislation during the 1970's the need for the Church to play a multi-faceted role increased. The Church had moved away completely from being an umbrella organisation under whose auspices individuals and small groups involved themselves in social issues. By 1970, when the General Synod was established, the Church was a centralised organisation which formulated and put into practice 'whole Church'

³⁶ Dugliss, *op. cit.*

³⁷ Departmental Working Paper on Social Workers, 1959, publication number 97679, London, HMSO.

policies.

As for the legacy of a hundred years of social and political involvement, G.S. Ecclestone, former Secretary of the Board for Social Responsibility, has suggested that the basis of the Church's type of political involvement, which was laid down in the nineteenth century and exists still, is freedom to warn, to advise, to recommend to civil authority, not to obey it blindly, closeness to the powers that be and a disturbed conscience.³⁸ This would appear to be a reasoned and reasonable assessment of the situation.

It is suggested that this chapter which has traced the domestic roots of the Church's social and political involvement bears out Ecclestone's evaluation and that later chapters will variously illustrate of the facets he identifies, particularly perhaps a 'closeness to the powers that be'.

Section I.2. demonstrated the development of the Anglican Communion out of Empire and the sense of residual loyalty and responsibility that were the legacy of an earlier, paternalist age. This chapter has established the internal grounds and much of the impetus for Church involvement in certain areas of foreign affairs. Both show how unlikely, even unthinkable, would have been Church isolation from the affairs and future development of Rhodesia and South Africa during the 1970's. This chapter has further demonstrated that preoccupation with the justice and conditions of society began in a domestic, British context but spilled over increasingly from the time of the First World War into a European and a world context.

Section I.4 will take the analysis of the motivation for involvement further by examining the theological grounding of the Church's involvement in foreign policy issues, the proximity of human rights to theology and tradition and the interdependent importance of each to other, and the gradual elision of Church and secular view.

³⁸ G.S. Ecclestone, 'The Church of England and Politics', CIO Publishing, London, 1981.

SECTION I.4: THEOLOGY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

SECTION I.4.i: INTRODUCTION

Previous sections have dealt with the Church of England's position as a system within the environment of the Anglican Communion and with its history of social and political involvement. These, it has been suggested, help to form or to modify Church foreign policy.

However the theology by which the Church operates in this respect, that motivation which, arguably, differentiates its activity from the merely political, remains to be examined. A brief history will be undertaken in this Section and the concept of human rights in relation to the Church of England, or more properly to Christianity generally, will also be examined. This is because human rights in a wider context than the Church of England, or, indeed, of any church, is also a major contributor to the 'ought' content of the Church's foreign policy.

SECTION I.4.ii: THEOLOGY

There is no single and simple theological justification for involvement in welfare or rights issues. Various groups in the fissiparous Church of England have stressed different Biblical and theological arguments to explain their involvement, and to excuse it too in the face of the equally long-standing argument that the Church and Churchmen should not be involved in politics.

The fact and circumstances of Creation are a major element. Creation feeds into the theology of social involvement the idea that all men were created in the image of God and are equal in His sight; thus radical disparity of treatment and estate is theologically indefensible.

Redemptive Incarnation is equally important and emphasises that God became man in the person of Jesus Christ to offer a universal, not a selective, redemption; moreover, in this tradition, the idea that in Christ God and humanity are unified emphasises the collective concept of 'mankind' rather than the disparity of individual men.

The importance of this element of Incarnation to a contemporary thinker is demonstrated by the work of Kenneth Leech.¹ He argues that when the Word was made flesh man became the

¹ Kenneth Leech, 'The Social God', Sheldon Press, London, 1981.

centre of all things and, from that time onwards, whatever was done to the most underprivileged was done to Christ. Therefore, as God became involved in human affairs, so also should the Church. To Leech the separation of Church and God from political activity and the essential ordinariness of everyday life is false, escapist, dangerous and untheological because of the Incarnation.

The idea of the Kingdom of God is a particularly interesting element in political theology because it can be, and is, used both to argue a complete separation of the secular and religious, and equally to argue for committed political activism. The dualist position is that the Kingdom of God is another and better world and that the duty of the individual Christian is to develop his own relationship with God and thus to ensure his own access to God's Kingdom: this position was demonstrated in the post-Reformation emphasis on personal salvation, and using the analytic approach of Weber and Durkheim, is a characteristic of a sectarian religion rather than of a universal Church.

The opposing view, that the Kingdom of God refers, at least in part, to the world of history, can be seen in early Christian and in mediaeval thought and has been heavily emphasised in Catholic thought since the nineteenth century. According to this argument the Kingdom of God may, at least in some degree, be established and should be striven for in the physical world of the present; and it is the role of the Church, as the Body of Christ, to work towards this establishment.

This emphasis on the attainability of God's Kingdom is intimately connected with a fourth element – Scriptural authority. It is argued that the desirable characteristics of the earthly Kingdom of God are scripturally delineated; anyone reading Matthew 25 for example ... "The King will answer, I tell you this: anything you did for one of my brothers here, however humble, you did for me ... anything you did not do for one of these, however humble, you did not do for me."² should be in no doubt that concerned involvement with society is mandatory upon Christians.

² Authorised Version of the Bible, Gospel according to St. Matthew, chapter 25, v.40 and v.45.

In addition to this, study of the Old Testament yields knowledge of a God involved with and speaking to tribes, peoples and nations; the importance of community here is inescapable and has yielded contemporary fruit in African theology and liberation thought there where it is very much in accord with a cultural heritage where the identity of the individual is derived largely from his membership of a tribe or people.

The idea of the Church as community and model for society is also an important element because it has been used frequently as an illustrative and desirable antithesis to the fragmentation and individualism of nineteenth and twentieth century capitalist society. The competition and exploitation of men in the labour market, it has frequently been argued, are contrary to the example of how men should live together which is demonstrated by the form of the Church.³

The importance of these various elements of theological justification for social and political activity can be seen in the history of the Church of England's social involvement since the nineteenth century.⁴ They are drawn together, some would say inadequately, in a form which demonstrates the Church's perception of their contemporary relevance in the introduction to the Archbishop's Committee Report on 'The Church and the Inner Cities'.⁵

The view that these apologia for Church involvement in the social and political arena seek to rebut, that the Church has no place in politics, can also be broken down, this time into two basic elements: that held by those who, not generally active members of the Church, resent what they see as Church interference in lay affairs and condemn it as irrelevant and unwarranted, and that of others, committed Christians, who believe that the Church has another and higher mission.

The first group were fairly heavily represented in Parliament and Government during the 1970's and some of the impatience with Church of England suggestions and political participation can be ascribed to this sentiment. The second view was clearly set out by Dr. Edward Norman in his 1978 Reith Lecture⁶ where he summarised the arguments against political involvement

³ That this is a flawed argument in some respects is obvious because of the Church's own internal divisions, but it is argued that at least this has been recognised as a falling away from Divine intention.

⁴ See Section I.3.

⁵ Archbishop's Committee Report, 'The Church and the Inner Cities', CIO Publishing, December 1985.

⁶ This was later published as 'Christianity and the World Order', OUP, Oxford, 1979.

as follows: the Church is, and should be, a centre of purity untainted by a corrupt world; it is essentially concerned with individual salvation and has nothing to say on the structure and organisation of society; politics is a profession like others in which neither the Church nor the average individual is, or should be, involved except at election times.⁷

The exposition above has the obvious and oft-cited flaw that it is not easy to derive what is basically a political agenda from a set of biblically or traditionally based principles. This is true and attempts to do so have led to some of the more outlandish sectarian deviations from main-line Christianity.

Many modern theologians and churchmen of course would claim that direct biblical exhortations to equal treatment of ones fellows are timeless; the Bishop of Liverpool, David Sheppard, uses just this argument for example.⁸ But for many some sort of linking and interpretative mechanism is necessary, and in the Church of England for much of this century this has been supplied by William Temple's concept of Middle Axioms.⁹

Theologically Temple was among those who took the Incarnation as his point of departure and moved from this to a 'primary principle' which was the pre-eminent importance of individuals and of the structures through which they grew to full stature in the community. From primary principle he moved to three derivative principles, freedom, social fellowship and service. Importantly he considered that these were likely to lead to an anti-status quo position because they were eschatologically radical. This distances Temple, and with him a major thread in Church social thought, from the conservatism, the strong emphasis on rules and law and order, traditionally associated with Church of England social attitudes. These derivative principles, Temple considered, might provide a link between general attitudes and detailed policy choices by supplying a set of 'middle axioms' based on their application to the analysis of significant issues and trends

⁷ Whatever one thinks of the earlier arguments, it is suggested that the last one is logically suspect, not merely contentious: it is time-bound to modern western democracy, is predicated on a minimalist definition of democracy that many would deny was sufficient to guarantee democracy at all, and begs the question of whether the voting behaviour of individual Christians at elections is qualitatively different from that of non-Christians and could therefore be seen as constituting a specifically Christian input into politics.

⁸ See David Sheppard, 'Bias to the Poor', Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1983.

⁹ For details of Temple's life and career see Section I.3.

and to the general direction in which society should move; thus Christian 'middle axioms' could provide the basis of enquiry into and prescription for contemporary and seemingly empirical situations.

Lest reference to an Archbishop who died before the end of the Second World War seem irrelevant to the 1970's one should note the number of times during 1970's Synod debates that Temple, and particularly his seminal work 'Christianity and the Social Order' were cited.¹⁰ Moreover Adrian Hastings¹¹ writes of a common mind among English Christians on social and political issues in the mid-1970's which he sees as the end of a line which can be traced back to Temple and to COPEC.¹²

Hastings goes on to define this common mind as a commitment to a 'rather bureaucratic form of social democracy with a human face'.¹³ Trevor Beeson¹⁴ pursues a similar theme when he sees the Churches' line on social issues as the welfare state plus 'a good deal of state intervention and a level of national planning not previously experienced in Britain.'

These arguments raise two interesting points. Firstly it may well be that the increasing disjunction between the activities of the International Affairs Committee, responsible for the Church of England's foreign policy, and other members of the Board of Social Responsibility, with overall responsibility for social issues both domestic and foreign, was due to the IAC's lack of conformity with the general attitude described above. This issue is addressed in further detail in Section I.5. Secondly both Hastings' and Beeson's analyses are couched in secular, not theological or ecclesiastical, form. This explains the considerable criticism which the Church of England's policies attracted for exactly this reason and also strengthens the argument put forward in the introduction to this section that both the concept and practice of human rights were significantly influential in initiating and justifying foreign policy initiatives within the Church. Indeed the numerous arguments against both fact and basis of the Church's social involvement

¹⁰ For example General Synod Report of Proceedings, July 1979 Group of Sessions, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 734.

¹¹ Adrian Hastings, 'A History of English Christianity 1920-1985', Collins, London, 1986.

¹² See Section I.3.

¹³ *op. cit.*, p. 656.

¹⁴ Trevor Beeson, 'Britain Today and Tomorrow', Mowbray, London, 1978, p. 17.

themselves bolster the argument that involvement rested at least partly on a justificatory basis not theological.

Edward Norman, criticises this secularity of approach, and thus, to an extent, confirms its existence.¹⁵ He suggests that the theological ferment so marked in the Church during the 1960's was an intellectual approximation by the academic and leadership elite in the Church to a prevalent secular humanism; not only was society becoming secular, but a very influential and prominent minority in the Church were falling backwards to accommodate Christian theology to this secularity. He suggested that most social issues were examined by the Church in the light of prevalent liberal humanism and, while the radicals did not always succeed in carrying the Church Assembly and later Synod with them to the point of committing the Church to concomitantly radical decisions, many reports of many committees during this period reflected this process clearly

He went further, in 'Christianity and the World Order',¹⁶ in claiming that the content of what is generally termed human rights today is relative to time and circumstance and that its enthusiastic espousal by Western Churches represents, not so much an expression of a carefully worked out theological position, as a definition of Christianity in terms of contemporary secular and political concerns. Indeed all current political involvement is criticised by Norman on the basis that it is merely religious validation of personal preference.

"In the developed western nations the politicisation of Christianity is already very advanced. it takes the form of identifying Christian teaching with the moral outlook and political ideals of liberalism. Christian themselves, of course, only believe that they are endorsing agreed moral truths – providing a religious foundation for the higher principles which liberalism promotes. They see such concepts as democratic pluralism, equality, individualist human rights, the freedom to choose values, and so forth, as basic expressions of Christianity, the modern applications of the moral precepts of Christ. But to an external observer, or to non-liberals, their commitment to these principles looks like ordinary political preference."¹⁷

One does not have to agree with Norman to agree the evidence of the Church's equation of human rights with the timeless theological principles outlined at the beginning of this chapter. And indeed it is argued here that increasingly from 1948 and the UN Declaration of Human

¹⁵ Edward Norman, 'Church and Society in England, 1770-1970', Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976.

¹⁶ Edward Norman, 'Christianity and the World Order', OUP, Oxford, 1979.

¹⁷ Edward Norman, *ibid*, pp. 6-7.

Rights the Church of England view of the theological and philosophical grounding of the equal worth of human lives and the need to promote human dignity has to a large extent been elided with this contemporary consensus.

SECTION 14.iii: HUMAN RIGHTS

In position papers on a wide variety of foreign policy issues during the 1970's the philosophy behind the Church's position was as frequently expressed in terms of the need to fight for or to defend human rights as in overtly theological terms; this would seem to have taken place whether or not the writer or compiler was overtly concerned with human rights issues or involved for example from 1988 with the BCC Human Rights Advisory Committee. Thus, it is argued, the language of human rights provided both a universally understandable rationale and language for intervention in a wide variety of situations. Moreover, and most importantly, the term 'human rights' was frequently used interchangeably with and as a shorthand for theologically grounded arguments for equality of treatment and status.

Examples of interventions on overtly human rights grounds are numerous quite apart from the case studies which follow: Lord Elton was heavily involved in attempting to ameliorate conditions in refugee camps in Cambodia: numerous individuals within the Church as well as its central organisation documented and protested over the abrogation of the individual freedoms of Christians in Central and Eastern Europe: a highly active member of the IAC throughout this period was the Rev. Paul Oestreicher, also for much of this time Chairman of Amnesty International: in the context of Southern Africa, in Uganda which has not fallen within the scope of this work, intelligent and thorough efforts were made by the IAC to secure the freedoms of Christians and other citizens from the arbitrary excesses of the Amin regime.

Where Norman's arguments are concerned it is also simplistic to designate human rights as secular and to divide the concept completely from a discrete theological position. To do this is to deny the origin and development of the concept of human rights from an essentially Judaeo/Christian base and the similarity of some of the arguments for the foundation of human

rights to unimpeachably theological arguments for equality of origin and treatment.

The Jefferson argument for self-evidence ... "that all humans are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights" certainly falls into this category,¹⁸ as does the underpinning principle of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in 1789 ... "Les hommes naissent et demeurent libres et égaux en droits." Equally Article One of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 declares ... " All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights". No reconciling contortion is necessary here to match theological and humanist viewpoint; men may obviously be born free and equal in a theological or an empirical sense.¹⁹

Many of the philosophical grounds of human rights have of course little to do with this view. It is not easy for example to show the faintest shred of theological connection in Feinberg's claim that to have an interest in a particular area is the basis of a justified right there,²⁰ or in Perdam and Frankena's suggestion that people should be treated similarly unless good reason can be shown to treat them differently.²¹ But the suggestion that human needs found human rights,²² that human rights are based on the presupposition of freedom,²³ or that rights are not primary but are derived from duties which are²⁴ all demonstrate certain points of contact with theological arguments and a theological viewpoint.

A, perhaps the, major debate in the context of human rights is whether they are individually or societally and collectively derived. The contemporary Church view emphasises the importance of the individual and, in that sense, tends to elide with a Western orientated political view which also emphasises the primacy of the individual. This will be shown in the case studies which follow.

¹⁸ Preamble to the American Declaration of Independence.

¹⁹ For a full discussion of this grounding of human rights, including its theological aspects, see Jacques Maritain, 'The Rights of Man and Natural Law', trans. D. Anson, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1951.

²⁰ J. Feinberg, 'Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty', Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1980.

²¹ Charles Perdam, 'The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument', Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963 and K. Frankena, 'Freedom and Morality' in the Lindley Lectures ed. J. Bricke, Lawrence, University of Kansas, 1976.

²² See for example John Burton, 'World Society', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1972.

²³ See for example, H.L.A. Hart, 'Are there any Natural Rights?', *Philosophical Review* 64, 1955, no. 175, pp. 189-91.

²⁴ See for example J. Rawls, 'A Theory of Justice', Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971.

According to this view the earliest demonstration of the existence of the rights of the individual as opposed to the rights of the state is indeed a theological one; seventh century Hebrew writing, and a much earlier verbal tradition, about the Creation, Adam created in the image of God. The same source also validates opposition to a tyrannous state.

This theme was continued with the emergence of the concept of natural law as the basis of natural rights, classical in origin but finding some of its greatest later exponents in mediaeval churchmen such as Thomas Aquinas and William Occam. Important too were the religious and political upheavals of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the confrontation of the concept of divine right with that of contract between ruler and ruled, especially in the writings of John Locke, and the changes, both revolutionary and evolutionary, in the mode of government in England during the seventeenth century. Most important was the nexus of seventeenth century religious and political change, the relocation of authority both secular and religious, the philosophical exploration of the grounds of this authority in Europe as well as England; and it is here that Church and polis share a common history. The near-effortless recent adoption of human rights by the Church of England and by other churches is largely due to their share in the conceptual development of ideals of personal and political freedom in an earlier period.

Moreover the pragmatic rather than theoretical grounding of individual human rights, the fact that certain rights exist because they are secured and guaranteed under law, has been a major English contribution to the observance of human rights. Magna Carta, the seventeenth century Habeas Corpus Acts and Bill of Rights, the Act of Settlement are not only important in the establishment of English freedoms but in their antecedent status to the Preamble to the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen; the similarity of the freedoms which are secured is striking. When one looks forward to 1948 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights one is again struck by lineal similarities. This comparison does not seek to establish a singular Euro-Christian source for the Universal Declaration but to demonstrate that its pedigree establishes a logic of elision of objective for the Church of England.

The Church's outlook is less compatible theologically with the concept of human rights founded in the collective and in society. However the European root of this view is generally held to be a divinely ordained social order from which derive all duties, all status and all rights; even the rights of Roman citizens were in fact privileges conferred by the state on a small and highly selective group of people. Because a divinely ordained social order continued to be the source of rights in European society until the Reformation there is a sense in which Church tradition and structure are at home with the concept of societally based human rights. Moreover the utilitarian philosophers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, who denied the possibility of holding rights against that society whose whole purpose is the pursuit of the greatest good of the greatest number of its citizens, were profoundly English.

With the spread of Christianity into cultures predicated on essentially different principles the importance of the societal basis of rights is reinforced for the Church. A strong case can be made for an ordained social order in traditional non-European societies, the tribes for example of Australia, Africa, North and South America, where the individual has no rights outside or against the tribal structure, in Hindu societies where the caste system bestowed highly specific rights on highly selective groups of people, and in Buddhist society because of its reverence for the ruler as the embodiment of preordained order.

The contemporary pervasiveness of the idea that men hold rights because of their membership of society, not against that society, is due to the writings of Hegel and of Marx and to the working out of at least some aspect of Marx's thought in the structure and society of the USSR and of a handful of other countries. Particularly during the 1970's and 1980's the influence of those states whose political ethos was predicated on community, society or group, and whose sense of group identity had often been reinforced by struggle to assert that identity, reinforced the claims of, what the Universal Declaration of Human Rights designates, economic, social and cultural rights. The influence of Marxist thought on the theology of many practising priests, especially Roman Catholic and especially in South America, should not be underestimated but is not specifically relevant to this study.

Yet, in terms of the Church of England's appreciation, through its missionary outreach, of issues of group identity and rights claims, knowledge of the importance in African societies of the group or collectivity is more significant than Marxist thought. As Ifeanyi A. Menkiti²⁵ maintains personhood in Africa is attained by one's belonging to, and fulfilling, one's role in the community.²⁶ This is undoubtedly an indigenous cultural input into attitudes towards post-colonial societal structure in Africa and is influential, not only in modifying Church consciousness, but in the state, rather than individual, centrality of the OAU Human Rights Charter and undoubtedly in the lamentable record of many African governments in the area of individual human rights enforcement.

Moreover the internationalisation of human rights has often been less a matter of principled pursuit of universally recognised freedoms than the spread of common humanitarian concerns. These include the abolition of slavery and the slave trade, the treatment of wounded and prisoners during wars and the protection of minorities; and all of these are areas of traditional Christian concern.

It is not of course argued that humanitarian law can found human rights but rather that habits of co-operation in the humanitarian field, recognising, as tacitly they do, that the domestic politics of one state may be of legitimate concern to another state, have helped to create a climate in which the international codification of human rights legislation can grow.

It is also suggested that, for the Church, a habitual involvement in essentially humanitarian issues has spilt over into related areas of human rights. It is important too to remember that the experiences of 1939 to 1945, which were a catalyst for the emergence of much subsequent human rights legislation and a signpost to the functioning of the United Nations, were also of seminal importance in the Church of England's own development. Section I.3 has already shown how the rationale and content of a Church foreign policy was shaped by the moral issues arising out the inter-war years and the Second World War. It is further suggested that, as expression of human

²⁵ I.A. Menkiti, in R.A. Wright, ed. 'African Philosophy: an introduction', University Press of America, Washington DC, 1979.

²⁶ See also Section I.2.

rights aspirations in the developing world has so often been in terms of independence from colonial rule and post-colonial economic control, the Church of England's extensive experience of Britain's former colonial territories has inclined it to an active interest in contemporary human rights issues there.

SECTION I.4.iv: IMPLEMENTATION

It is in the area of human rights implementation, or rather the inadequacies of it, that one sees an imperative to involvement beyond theology and Church tradition. This is an argument that holds good for most churches, not merely for the Church of England. It is argued that there has always been a considerable gap between the philosophical establishment of human rights and their practical observance and that the major inadequacies of many regional and international bodies in securing sometimes the most basic of rights is the reason for activity in this field by many Non Governmental Organisations, NGO's, including Churches.

There is a large and multi-layered body of instruments which exist to secure human rights. These range in status from multi-lateral treaties which create binding obligations on signatory states and which include the UN Charter and its two Covenants, the European and American Conventions on Human Rights and the Geneva Convention, through international declarations such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, various UN declarations and the Helsinki Accord, to resolutions, decisions and investigations of national and regional bodies and the laws, courts, regulatory bodies and policy decisions of individual states. In addition there are international and governmental organisations which campaign, lobby, legislate and pronounce on human rights issues.

All of this would seem to indicate a pervasiveness of human rights codification but it does not indicate a matching level of implementation. The major division of view about the primacy of individually based or societally based rights has led to a politicisation of these issues.²⁷ In

²⁷ For a full discussion of this issue see T.J. Farer, 'Human Rights and Human Wrongs: is the liberal model sufficient', in *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 2, May 1985, pp. 189-204 and Rhoda Howard 'The full belly thesis: should economic rights take priority over civil and political rights? Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa', *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 4, November 1983, pp. 467-490 and Jack Donnelly 'Recent Trends in UN Human Rights Activity' *International*

addition to this most international human rights legislation is applicable to states not to individuals, and not all states automatically incorporate treaty obligations into their domestic law. Also many treaties only come into force when a minimum number of signatories have signed. Moreover an individual will only be protected if his case is expressly and unambiguously covered by the legislation, if his own state has ratified the relevant treaty and has not made a reservation in cases such as his.

It is undeniable that a high international profile for human rights since the mid 1970's has laid open to general opprobrium states who are guilty of grave violations such as genocide, apartheid, racial discrimination, mass killings, widespread torture and imprisonment without trial; it is agreed that they are not protected by article 2(7) of the UN Charter which reserves domestic jurisdiction, and indeed Sir Humphrey Waldock²⁸ goes further in claiming that "the Universal Declaration has now the character of customary international law."

This has little to say however on the subject of implementation and indeed most observers would agree that all types of human rights instrument are inadequately observed by most state parties to them. Unless he/she lives in Europe and thereby has recourse to the European Court of Human Rights an individual has great difficulty of access to the redress that international courts might give him for abuse of rights within his/her own state; this is because that state's consent is necessary to a recognition of an international court's jurisdiction. Most states are not signatories to the optional protocol to the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which provides for individual petitions or communications to the UN Human Rights Committee.

The ILO and UNESCO have developed some implementational machinery, although this is more successful in the case of the ILO than UNESCO. The American Convention on Human Rights has an individual complaint procedure but the OAU Human Rights Charter does not. Indeed in the latter case it is worth noting that the major emphasis of the OAU Charter is on peo-

Organization 35, Autumn 8, pp. 33-55.

²⁸ Humphrey Waldock, 'Human Rights in contemporary international law and the significance of the European Convention', ICLQ, Supplement no. 11 (1965) p. 11, quoted in A.H. Robertson, 'Human Rights in the World', Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1972.

ples', not individuals, rights and it is a Charter requirement that putative individual complaints be subject to prior approval of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Governments.

The briefest overview of the international community's ability to guarantee human rights demonstrates its inadequacy. The best chance that an individual's rights will be respected lies in his domicile in a country where human rights validity and implementation are embedded in tradition, customary law and legislation; even this is no perfect guarantee. It is demonstrable therefore that the situation internationally leaves great scope for the activities of NGO's; indeed over 700 of them have accredited status with the UN as pressure groups.²⁹

Pressure groups do not content themselves with representations to the UN but involve themselves in numbers of other activities. They issue reports, make public statements, attempt to influence regionally based human rights organisations or the foreign policy of states in respect of their relations with others, make behind the scenes representations, use their good offices or mediate in areas where human rights violations are bound up with political issues.

Organisations which are active in this field include Amnesty International, the Red Cross and the International Committee of Jurists.³⁰ But there are other organisations, not founded with the specific object of defending and pursuing human rights, which devote some part of their time and activity to the securing or defence of such rights. Churches and indeed the Church of England fall into this category.

SECTION I.4.v: CONCLUSION

The Church of England is an organisation nationally based but internationally and transnationally operating by reason of the general internationalisation of Christianity and the Churches, and of its membership of the Anglican Communion. These factors not only prompt but modify

²⁹ 'Non-Governmental Organizations in Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council in 1978', UN Document E/1978/INF/7 (1978), quoted in Wessbrodt and McCarthy, 'Fact-Finding in INGO Human Rights Organizations', *Virginia Journal of International Law*, 22, Fall, 1981.

³⁰ A typology of the activities of these organisations has been undertaken by Scoble and Wiseberg in 'Human Rights and NGO's: notes towards comparative analysis', *Human Rights Journal*, Vol. 9, i, 1976, p. 611 in one of the only attempts so far to deal systematically and comparatively with INGO activity in the human rights field.

involvement and help to shape an orientation in the general area of human rights which is itself largely a product of authoritative Biblical and spiritual sources, of theology, of domestic experience and of a long tradition of community involvement. Structural considerations, dispositions of authority, internal and unresolved tensions over role and resources, responsible personnel all in their turn modify the form, the extent, the quality of the Church's involvement in what may be designated human rights issues, whether domestic or foreign. It is these factors which will be examined in the next section.

SECTION L5: THE STRUCTURE OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING.

(i) INTRODUCTION

Previous chapters have examined the Church of England's external environment and influences, its own history and traditions and the sometimes overlapping, sometimes parallel tradition of human rights, all of which, it is suggested made certain the Church's involvement in foreign policy issues. This chapter will examine the Church's own structure which shaped the form of that involvement and its parameters, and which ultimately concentrated responsibility in the area of foreign policy formation and executive action on one, fairly small, committee and on the chief members of that committee.

It is suggested that, while there was much resistance to centralisation in the Church, centralisation is exactly what had happened. Moreover without adequate resources the central organisation was understaffed and gratefully dependent on the personal expertise of its staff, particularly in situations where urgent decisions had to be made. This led, it is suggested, in the case of the committee responsible for foreign affairs, to an autonomy of action in the expression and pursuit of policy preferences.

Several conceptual and fundamental difficulties must be tackled before the structure of the Church and its workings is further examined. Is the Church an organisation or a loose collection of fairly diverse groups? Where does authority lie in the Church? In what sense can the Church be said to 'do' political acts? Should the Church of England remain an established church?

Is the Church of England, as some suggest, a group of groups held together by a rather basic lowest common denominator, endowed therefore with significance by its traditional forms and by its historical and existential relevance as a branch of the Catholic, and therefore universal, Church? Its diversity is undeniable and was commented on by a speaker in the 1979 Synod debate on authority: "The Church of England ... contains both vegetarians and carnivores, both soldiers and pacifists, both capitalists and socialists and refuses to unchurch or censure any of

them".¹

Or is it, on the other hand, an organisation with purpose and objectives? For the purpose of this work, and to avoid lengthy exploration of Church history, the Church of England will be treated here as a highly complex organisation., although neither its diversity nor its significance as part of the universal Catholic Church are denied. This treatment is considered valid because the Church does have objectives, even if its ultimate purpose is existential rather than tangible; it is legally founded; it has both super and sub-structures; it is a large-scale employer; its opinions and activities are modified by, and themselves modify, the attitudes and behaviour of other institutions, individuals and a larger society; its members have invested in it moral capital of great personal significance and look to it for a considerable return in terms of belief affirmation and of activity which is consistent with that personal belief.

The question of authority within the Church is a disputed one: in November 1979 the Bishop of St. Albans told Synod that ... "There is always a problem of discovering where authority lies in the Anglican Church."² The General Synod was established in November 1970 to represent an equality of all within the Established Church, demonstrated, it was held, in the early church but lost in the elaboration of pre-Reformation Roman form. The report 'Government by Synod'³ stated that "Theology justifies and history demonstrates that the ultimate authority and right of collective action lie with the whole body, the Church, and that the co-operation of clergy and laity in Church government and discipline belongs to the ideal of the Church."⁴ However Paul Welsby⁵ disagrees and denies that the General Synod is intended to be democratic in the usual Western sense of allowing majority opinion to prevail. He suggests that the Synod habitually seeks consensus and avoids over-ruling the view of any one House in favour of that of the other two.

¹ Report of Proceedings of the General Synod, Autumn 1979 Group of Sessions, Vol. 10, No. 3, p. 1043.

² *Ibid.*, p. 1007.

³ *Government by Synod*, CIO, London, 1968.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁵ Paul Welsby, 'A History of the Church of England', 1945-1980, OUP, Oxford, 1984.

On the other side of the location of authority debate are those who maintain the historical claim of the episcopacy. It is the oldest form of government in the Church and, while bishops often wield a modern influence by playing a prominent role in the deliberations of Synod, in committees and commissions, in the affairs of their own dioceses, claims to the primacy of episcopal authority are made on the grounds of the doctrine of Apostolic Succession and Church tradition. Thus an institutionalised charisma attaches to their office though their personal skills may well be those of man or resource manager rather than spiritual giant or theologian. In quite another, a sociological sense, they also form an elite by reason of their origins, education and connections because the family background and education of bishops tend to be atypical of the general population and also of the rest of the clergy.⁶

However, whether in theoretical terms authority is seen to lie with Bishops or with Synod, in practical terms it is undeniable that authority is diffused; indeed it is probably partly as a result of the unresolved debate on the subject that a firm command structure within the Church's central organisation was not set up during this period.

The question of the Church's ability as a Church to 'do' anything has been pin-pointed by Peter Hinchliff. He suggests⁷ four principal ways in which the word Church is used:- as a theological concept, as a congregation of Christian people, as a denomination with an institutional structure and organisation, and as a clergy or ecclesiastical leadership. He suggests that in the first three senses the Church can hardly be expected to 'do' anything political and in the fourth sense the use of the word Church to describe the personnel and leadership of the organisation is strictly improper.

It is suggested that this is inaccurate on observational grounds – the Church of England manifestly 'does' political things and later chapters will demonstrate the extent of its activities alongside and in co-ordination with other decision-making bodies, leaderships and elites. Peter Hinchliff might legitimately ask, as do many others, 'Is and how is the Church of England

⁶ D.H.J. Morgan 'The Social and Educational Background of Anglican Bishops – continuities and changes', *British Journal of Sociology*, 1969; Lesley Paul 'The deployment and payment of the clergy', *CIO*, 1964.

⁷ Peter Hinchliff, 'Can the Church do Politics?', *Theology*, September 1981, Vol. LXXXIV, No. 701.

authorised to 'do' anything political?', but there seems little purpose in enquiring whether the Church can do what it manifestly does, unless one suggests that personnel and organisation are disaggregated with the actions of the former unsanctioned by the latter.

However it is worth commenting on the imprecision of some of the Church's activities and expressed views to which the recurrent debates on authority and political involvement undoubtedly contributed. This was well expressed by the Bishop of Truro, then Chairman of the Board of Social Responsibility,⁸ when he told Synod in 1978 that ... "the Church of England as such, whatever may be the opinion of individual members of it, has never officially adhered to the absolutist view. That means in a sense that what we say is inevitably going to lack sharpness and precision which some people would seek ... the Board is going to try adequately to represent what is the mind of the Church of England while at the same time reflecting the fact that different views are held within the Church of England."⁹

The continuation of the Church's established status has been under discussion for most of this century but the teeth of those in favour of abolition on the grounds that Parliamentary interference in Church affairs is inappropriate and undesirable have been drawn to some extent by the passing of the Church of England (Worship and Doctrine) Measure and by the Appointment of Bishops Measure in 1976 by which the *de facto* choice of new bishops passed to the Crown Appointments Commission, even though the form of Prime Ministerial recommendation to the sovereign was retained. Thus the Church is no longer confined within the parameters which the House of Commons drew for it, a House of Commons most of whose members, if interested in the Church at all, were more attached to the splendours of Church architecture, music, and liturgy than to matching form and function with contemporary religious need.

There is a second and persistently relevant criticism of Establishment however, that it is unrealistic and discriminatory to designate as the National Church and symbol of the nation's Christian-orientated view-point a body which appears to attract the nominal allegiance of less

⁸ See p. 92 of this chapter.

⁹ Report of Proceedings of the General Synod, November 1978 Group of Sessions, Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 968.

than 50% of the population.¹⁰ An examination of actual, rather than nominal, membership makes this criticism even more valid: the 1851 census of Great Britain¹¹ showed nearly a quarter of the population of 18,000,000 attended an Anglican church regularly: on Easter Sunday 1970 1,600,000 Anglicans received communion out of a population of 46,000,000 and on an average Sunday at this time approximately 3.3% of the population was in an Anglican church.¹²

Accordingly during the 1970's there was considerable evidential support for the view that there was nothing but historical reason for the Church of England to be singled out for favourable treatment, whether this took the form of increased access for its leaders and representatives to the nation's decision-makers, its symbolic role on State occasions as legitimiser of the realities of power or its representation by bishops in the House of Lords.

(ii) THE STRUCTURE OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND

The Church of England is 'by law established' and this law is statute law which, beginning with the Submission of the Clergy Act, 1533, took control of Church government out of the hands of popes and Church Councils. The monarch is supreme governor of the Church of England although its spiritual head is the Archbishop of Canterbury, *primus inter pares* amongst the bishops. There are two archbishops, forty three diocesan bishops and a number of suffragans (assistants), a General Synod of three Houses, and synods too at diocesan and deanery levels. The synodical system was set up in 1970.

For a large part of its history, 1533 to 1919, when the Church Assembly was established as an ecclesiastical legislative chamber, the Church of England was governed by Parliament by statute law or by royal injunction. Until the Church of England (Worship and Doctrine Measure) was passed in December, 1974 passing control to the General Synod, all measures passed by the Church Assembly, 1919 to 1970 and the General Synod, post 1970, had to be submitted to Parlia-

¹⁰ TV Survey of popular attitudes to religion in Britain and Northern Ireland, 1970: quoted in P.A. Welsby, 'A History of the Church of England 1945-1980', OUP, Oxford, 1984.

¹¹ 'Religious Worship in England and Wales', Routledge, 1854.

¹² Church of England Year Book, CIO, 1973, Table 1, pp. 174-175.

ment, thence to the Crown for approval.

Since 1974 however the Church has been the creator of its own legislation and arbiter of Canons which, not altering the law of the land, do not need Parliamentary approval. Measures, on the other hand, which do affect the law, must be approved by Parliament; since the Church of England (Worship and Doctrine Measure) the Church can decide matters of doctrine for itself, introduce a new prayer book to be used in parallel with the Book of Common Prayer (though not dispense altogether with the Book of Common Prayer) and alter forms of worship without reference to Parliament.

In structure the General Synod consists of three Houses, Bishops, Clergy and Laity whose most important meetings are together and three times a year, although votes are recorded separately and the three Houses do also meet separately. Total membership of the three Houses of Synod is 560. Its business is a mixture of Church administration, liturgical discussion and the framing of measures to be put to Parliament, and debates on general issues.

Thus the General Synod is not only a law-making body but it also acts as a forum for the airing of issues in the public domain as well as those of Church Government and theology. It oversees also the Church of England's relationship with other churches in England and abroad and with ecumenical bodies such as the BCC, the WCC and the Confederation of European Churches.

It has a secretariat with fewer than ten senior staff and from 1972 its Secretary-General was Derek Pattinson a former Treasury Civil Servant. His responsibilities were very wide: he was Secretary to Synod during its sittings, advised its Chairman whom to call to speak, was Secretary to the Business Sub-Committee of the Standing Committee and therefore drew up the first draft of each Synod agenda; he was Chief Executive to the General Synod, ran Church House and met the heads of all departments there on a weekly basis; he influenced important appointments and sat on important committees as well as representing Synod in public and to other bodies such as the BCC.

The Church is variously administered at parochial, at deanery, at diocesan and at central levels. Its central organisation, consisting of the Councils and Boards of the Synod, was at this time situated geographically at Church House in Westminster except for the Church Commissioners and the Central Board of Finance, who control the Church's investments, income, budgeting and expenditure, who were at Milbank.

The Church's central organisation supervises the Church's corporate involvement in social issues, its relationship with Churches overseas, its responses to foreign policy issues and the selection and training of clergy. The Board of Education needs no explanation; the Board for Mission and Unity, BMU, deals broadly with Churches overseas, relations with Missionary Societies, the promotion of international ecumenical activities and the arrangement of the itineraries of visiting clerics; the Advisory Council for the Church's Ministry, ACCM, with clergy recruitment and training; and the Board for Social Responsibility, BSR, with domestic social issues and foreign policy not connected to overseas churches.

Each of these Boards delegates areas of responsibility to subsidiary committees; thus the BSR is largely responsible for foreign policy issues through its International Relations Committee, IRC, with whose work the following chapters are largely concerned.

(iii) PROBLEMS OF CHURCH ORGANISATION

In the brief outline above the structure of Church Government appears fairly straightforward but closer examination and a study also of the Church of England in the wider context of British society demonstrate serious problems. These, it is suggested, were important factors in a situation which allowed the IAC for much of the 1970's to exercise a marked degree of autonomy and idiosyncrasy.

The general debates over authority, political involvement, the Church's structural status and Establishment have already been discussed. More specific to the period under examination was a serious loss of Church membership and a related loss of clergy confidence, a constant debate over the virtues of centralisation versus de-centralisation and criticism of the Church's central

apparatus on the grounds of cost, efficiency and legitimacy and a related shortage of central organisation resources.

Church membership had been in decline for many years before 1970; indeed it would be true to say that the Church of England had become steadily more marginalised ever since the Industrial Revolution. The editor of Crockfords Clerical Directory suggested in 1980 that there was not merely a diminution but a serious rejection of Christian belief and behaviour in England, and, due to urbanization and the media, English culture was now highly unified but in a way remote from organised religion.¹³

The position was fairly bleak for all churches but particularly so for the Church of England which had never been adequately represented in the inner cities; the Paul report showed that half the livings in the Church covered 10% of the population and 10% of livings covered a third of the population, a structural inheritance at considerable variance with contemporary social reality.¹⁴

Central too to the loss of social relevance has been the assumption by political parties, Trades Unions and other pluralistic institutions of the role of arbiter and definer of moral, ethical and social attitudes. Particularly relevant is the demonstration that, contrary to the traditional Freud/Weber/Nietzsche/Marx analysis of religion as functioning to dull the suffering of the absolutely or comparatively deprived, the working class in England appears to find radical politics a more attractive outlet than religion for their status dissatisfaction.¹⁵ One can make a caveat however that a combination of social radicalism and religion can be an extremely potent combination as with the contribution of socially committed Christians to the legitimization of the Labour Movement and of socialism generally into national life.¹⁶

¹³ Anonymous editor of the Preface to Crockfords Clerical Directory, CIO, 1980-1982 edition.

¹⁴ Leslie Paul, 'The Deployment and Payment of the clergy', CIO, January 1964.

¹⁵ See Rodney Stark, 'Class, Radicalism and Religious Involvement in Great Britain', *American Sociological Review*, 29, pp. 698-706 which is very much in line with H.R. Niebuhr, 'The Social Sources of Denominationalism', Henry Holt, New York, 1929 which demonstrates that although major religious movements during the Christian era developed as solutions to lower-class frustrations they did not meet such needs adequately and were very soon transformed into middle class institutions; moreover, he argued, in Europe since the end of the eighteenth century working class dissatisfactions have mainly been channelled into radical politics: also David J. Cheal, 'Political Radicalism and Religion: competition for commitment', *Social Compass*, 1975, 22, 2, pp. 245-59.

¹⁶ See Chapter Three and also e.g. Robert Bocoock, 'Anglo-Catholic Socialism: a study of a protest movement within a Church', *Social Compass*, XX, 1973, I, pp. 31-48.

Confidence in religion during the latter part of the twentieth century has also been eroded by the advance of natural science and by controversies within the Church over how best to counter scientific arguments. Attempts have been made to express Christianity in terms acceptable to a scientifically-orientated society¹⁷ but these attempts at remedy have themselves presented a two-fold problem. How far can belief and theology be adapted to appear acceptable to a contemporary situation without involving the Church so closely in contemporary affairs that it is incapable of mounting a critique of them from the standpoint of immutable values?¹⁸ A second problem is that much modern theological argument, while used ostensibly to refute attacks on Christianity whether from a natural science, an atheistical, a humanist point of view, has seemed to many whose faith is of a simple and uncomplicated variety to undermine the beliefs it claims to defend. The spread of belief within the Church of England is traditionally wide but the Church has frequently been forced to consider how 'radical' belief can be before it undermines the authority of the position of the person holding that belief and calls into question his fitness to act on behalf of those whose views are widely different from his own.

Associated with and derivative of the problems outlined above is a serious loss of confidence and identity amongst parochial clergy; and it is suggested that during the period under discussion this was a contributory factor to the increasing centralisation of Church affairs in 'expert' hands and to a crisis of recruitment. The extent of the problem is demonstrated by the fact that during the 1970's the number of full-time clergy fell by 2,000 and between 1974 and 1979 the number of annual ordinations fell from 348 to 303.

Loss of confidence was caused by a variety of factors. The change from rural to urban society and the increasing inappropriateness of seeing the parish as the basic ecclesiastical unit of analysis undermined the traditional social authority of the clergyman. Associated with this was the fact that because in 1964 33.7% of the population was grouped in livings of 10,000 or more

¹⁷ See for example, J.A.T. Robinson 'Honest to God', SCM Press, London, 1963; H. Cox 'The Secular City', SCM Press, London, 1965; Dr. Van Buren, 'The Secular Meaning of the Gospel', SCM Press, London, 1965; D. Cupitt 'Taking Leave of God', SPCK, London, 1982.

¹⁸ For a full discussion of this issue see Robert J. Boccock 'The role of the Anglican clergyman', Social Compass, 1970, 17, 4, pp. 533-544.

served by 16% of the available parochial clergy¹⁹ many of the urban clergy were suffering from overwork combined with a low return on their effort.

The assumption both by the state and by trained professionals of many of the social functions previously aggregated to the clergy also contributed to their loss of purpose and personal certainty. One reason for the decrease of ordination candidates it has been suggested²⁰ was the fact that men who, before the introduction of the Welfare State, would have become priests out of a desire to serve the community, took up social or welfare work instead.

Many have suggested that the designation 'the Tory Party at prayer' which is frequently used for the Church of England should with greater accuracy be used only to designate the House of Clergy. They, it is thought, resist change so firmly because it affects what they perceive to be an already threatened status. Towler and Coxon suggest that the clergy's imperfect assumption of a 'professional' role in the nineteenth century and the anomaly of continuing without adaptation so to regard themselves in the twentieth has led to a disparity between the clergyman as he would like to see himself, an independent professional man, and public perception of marginality, inflexibility, elitism and over-identification with the Establishment.²¹

This lack of confidence and a desire to man the barricades against change which might erode status is important in the context of this work in that Synod is thereby less decisive, more given to endless debates which end without decision, perforce leaving great leeway for the Councils and Committees of Synod to take necessary decisions.

Another debate which aggravated the problems of decision-making was that between advocates and opponents of centralisation. There was a persistent body of opinion, frequently vocal in Synod, which believed that the real work of the Church was done in the parishes, which resented a central organisation speaking and acting on behalf of the Church, which resented also the money necessary to maintain that central organisation and which sometimes went so far as to

¹⁹ The Paul Report, *op. cit.*

²⁰ By the retired Archdeacon of Halifax in a personal interview.

²¹ A. Towler and APM Coxon, 'The Fate of the Anglican Clergy: a sociological study, MacMillan, London, 1979: see also A. Russell, 'The Clerical Profession', SPCK, London, 1980.

advocate that all of the Church's functions be returned to diocesan or parish level.

Typical of this view was a Synod speech by the Bishop of Southall in 1978: "... I believe that the Boards and Councils of the Church of England are incapable of running the Church of England. That is done in the dioceses and parishes of our country. Boards and Councils can only be bodies that service the work in the dioceses..."²² It was also pointed out by the Bishop of Manchester that diocesan resentment of the Church's central machine was merely a mirror of the resentful attitude of parishes to dioceses.²³

One should remember moreover Synod's own sense of vulnerability to attack. The problems of the House of Clergy have already been touched on but the House of Laity too was frequently criticised as unrepresentative of Church opinion. In the 1970 Synod two thirds of its members were at least forty years old and nearly a quarter of them over fifty; there were no members of the skilled or un-skilled manual working class and very few women.²⁴ In the 1975 Synod there were 10% more women, even fewer younger members, again no members of the skilled or un-skilled manual working class though rather fewer members educated at public school.²⁵ Kathleen Jones²⁶ commented that the 1975 Synod was more like 'an ecclesiastical British Academy' than a representative body and that there were few members who could 'provide more than a personal anecdote' in debates on such issues as the immigrant population of Britain, trade unionism and the poor and rootless.

Synod as a whole was vulnerable to criticism because of its division into factions. There were (and remain) three coherent parties in Synod, the Evangelicals, the Anglo-Catholics and the Radicals. Their individual views are less important in this context than their consistent tendency to take specific lines on specific issues and thus make difficult the consideration of issues on their own merits and in a particular temporal context.

²² General Synod Report of Proceedings, February 1978 Group of Sessions, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 226.

²³ General Synod Report of Proceedings, July 1979 Group of Sessions, Vol. 10, No. 2.

²⁴ Kathleen Jones, 'The House of Laity in the General Synod', *Crucible*, July/August 1971.

²⁵ Kathleen Jones, 'The House of Laity in the General Synod', *Crucible*, October/November, 1976. The lack of working class members is hardly surprising when one bears in mind that Synod meetings last for four days always during the week because clergymen are otherwise occupied at weekends.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

By the end of the decade, and one must remember that this was the first and trial decade of synodical government, the existence at least of strong feelings of resentment about the cost and the very existence of the Church House apparatus was acknowledged. In 1979 Sir Ronald Harris, Chairman of the Central Board of Finance, spoke in Synod of the urgent need to communicate more effectively to the dioceses and Church members in the parishes the significance and value of the work done at Church House and "to project its human face so that there might be a more willing understanding and acceptance of its necessarily increasing cost."²⁷

Since the clergy and laity from dioceses and parishes were represented in Synod and thus able to participate in Church government why, one must ask, was there so much resentment of the Church's central, and Synod-based, apparatus particularly in social and foreign policy areas? The answer is simply that Synod was responsible for much legislation in the area of liturgy, for a good deal of debate and for the commissioning of many reports, some of them excellent, on contemporary issues; but, as it was not constructed for decisive decision-making on social issues, most members of Synod did not see themselves as participating fully in Church government. Moreover the Board of Social Responsibility frequently set up working parties using non-clerical expertise which produced reports not commissioned by Synod and not, when they were presented, endorsed by Synod. However they were frequently published and further muddied the water of authority and responsibility in the Church.

Synod was certainly involved in the foreign policy issues with which this work is concerned and there were debates on a number of major reports. These included 'Civil Strife' in 1971, 'Investment' in 1972, 'Force in the Modern World' in 1974, 'Religion in Eastern Europe' in 1974, 'Human Rights' in 1977, on the 'Christian Institute in South Africa' and the 'Alleviation of Human Need' in 1977, on 'Defence and Disarmament' in 1979, on 'Political Change in South Africa' and on the 'Church of England and Politics' in 1980, as well as a number of debates on more discrete issues arising out of yearly reports of the IAC to Synod.

²⁷ General Synod Report of Proceedings, July 1979 Group of Sessions, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 754.

However, lest one consider that foreign affairs dominated Synod, one should bear in mind the Queen's speech at the opening of the new General Synod in November 1975 which dwelt overwhelmingly on domestic and liturgical issues and which suggested that the Worship and Doctrine Measure had probably been the most important before the last Synod.²⁸ and her speech at the opening of the 1980 Synod where she designated liturgical revision culminating in the Alternative Service Book as Synod's most conspicuous achievement.²⁹

In other words Synodical interests were overwhelmingly in-house. Domestic social issues occupied more time and discussion than did foreign affairs. Moreover at least half the time which Synod devoted to foreign affairs was in the area which could loosely be described as aid and development – One World Week, Christian Aid, encouragement of the Government to accept the Pearson Commission's proposal that 0.7% GNP be used in official government aid to Less Developed Countries, LDC's. Bearing in mind too how small a minority of Synod debates resulted in recommendations for action – in most cases members were asked to note the various reports and their recommendations, to use them in fact as an information source and an aid to position-forming rather than the basis for concrete decision-making – it is not surprising that the IAC, with day to day responsibility for foreign affairs, should initiate policy and deal with crises as they arose rather than depending on direction from Synod.

There was some resentment too, part of the general resentment of the centre by the periphery, about the difficulty of getting Private Members Motions onto the Synod Agenda which was set in advance by the Secretary to Synod and his Standing Committee. Thus a near monopoly of agenda setting enabled the central organisation to reinforce their semi-autonomy which derived from the nature of the structure and procedure of Synod. While the perceptions of the parties to the conflict may provide unreliable evidence – and the professional staff of the Church's central boards certainly saw things differently when they complained to the 1981 Partners in Mission Consultation that in the last resort they were only advisory, with little initiatory power³⁰ – there is

²⁸ General Synod Report of Proceedings, November 1975 Group of Sessions, Vol. 6, No. 3.

²⁹ General Synod Report of Proceedings, November 1980 Group of Sessions, Vol. 11, No. 3.

³⁰ Anonymous author of the Preface to the 1980 – 82 Crockford's Clerical Directory.

some suggestion that these fears were not without substance. In 1977 Mr. Bulmer Thomas resigned from the CBF because decisions were taken by the Committee of the Board, not the Board itself which only met twice a year to ratify decisions taken elsewhere; diocesan representatives, he said, had no share in CBF decision-making.³¹ Moreover the Rev'd. Paul Oestreicher's criticisms of the IAC³² were essentially of a system which allowed a good deal of autonomy to central organisations but did not take adequate cognizance of opinions and input from below.

Semi-autonomous though the Synod's boards and councils might be of Synod, in some respects they were handicapped throughout the 1970's by lack of money. Resentment in some quarters at their very existence meant not only that the money they did receive was grudged to them but that requests for more were received unsympathetically in Synod. This attitude was pervasive at influential levels as demonstrated by the comments in the Preface to Crockford's in 1980 where the author commented that the Church might still perhaps be seen at its best in parish and diocese rather than national committees and that the £2,250,000 per annum which the General Synod and its committees and services cost might be better spent at lower levels.³³

In the Church Assembly in 1970³⁴ Sir Edmund Compton reported that 1971 estimates of expenditure exceeded revenue estimates by £71,000, in 1972 by £140,000 and in 1973 by £170,000. He saw already that this might curtail the structure and activities of the Church's central organisation and in this he was proved right. In 1971 a 15% cutback in the operating costs of Boards and Councils was announced:³⁵ in 1975 Sir Arnold France of the Central Board of Finance reported that, because of the economic crisis, cuts in central organisation staff would be necessary in 1976:³⁶ in 1977 it was reported that since 1971 the number of posts at Church House had been cut by nearly a third with no matching cut in the amount of work and the stress on staff was now apparent. Sir Arnold France attacked the idea held by many members of Synod that a

³¹ General Synod Report of Proceedings, November 1977 Group of Sessions, Vol. 8. No. 3. p. 613.

³² See Section I.6.iii.

³³ Crockford's Preface 1980-82 Edition, *op. cit.*

³⁴ Church Assembly News, Summer 1970, Vol. IV, No. 2.

³⁵ General Synod Report of Proceedings, Spring 1971 Group of Sessions, Vol. 2, No. 1.

³⁶ General Synod Report of Proceedings, Spring 1975 Group of Sessions, Vol. 6, No. 1.

central organisation was unnecessary and things could be done cheaper in the dioceses. This would, he pointed out, lead to expensive duplication whereas only 0.1% of the Church's income was now spent at the centre.³⁷

However his strictures did not quiet criticism which reappeared in a July, 1979 debate where it was claimed that dioceses were forced to pay for expenditure incurred or sanctioned by the Church's central organisation.³⁸ However it is fair to say that diocesan and parochial fears of a huge central bureaucratic growth were not realized during this decade: in 1971 Church House staff numbered 204 and in 1980 there were 165, of whom 14 were part-time. However this permanently over-stretched situation was undoubtedly contributory not only to the autonomy enjoyed by the IAC but also to its essentially fire-fighting nature; the resources and manpower simply were not there to do more than deal with emergencies as they arose and to concentrate on a limited number of internally generated initiatives. This is clearly demonstrated in the IAC's work in Rhodesia and South Africa where their major bursts of activity matched and appeared responsive to crises or initiatives on the part of others and where their own initiatives were distinctly single-, rather than multi-, stranded.

(iv) THE BOARD FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

The constituted purpose of the BSR is to promote and co-ordinate the thought and action of the Church in matters affecting man's life in society. This is an extremely broad remit and, as Moore, Wilson and Stamp suggest,³⁹ it gives the Board a great deal of freedom by its vagueness. They further suggest that because there is no clear policy over such a wide field the BSR produces its own view rather than reflecting the state of opinion in the Church at large. This criticism might be regarded as, at least partially, unjust however in the sense that this thesis has already demonstrated the difficulty of identifying, let alone acting upon, a Church of England view.

³⁷ General Synod Report of Proceedings, November 1977 Group of Sessions, Vol. 8, No. 3.

³⁸ General Synod Report of Proceedings, July 1979 Group of Sessions, Vol. 10, No. 3.

³⁹ C. Moore, A. Wilson, G. Stamp, 'The Church in Crisis', Hodder and Stoughton, London 1986.

The BSR's specific functions are to provide a service to Synod members in the production of motions and reports on subjects which Synod wishes to debate and preparing briefs for bishops who speak in the House of Lords on social and political topics. It also generates its own work. Its use of working parties made up of non-clerical experts has already been mentioned and will be demonstrated in the following chapters with regard to the work of the IAC. Moore, Wilson and Stamp⁴⁰ suggest very justly that there is often a certain amount of confusion about the status of BSR reports because, though commissioned by the BSR and reported to them, their authors are permitted to publish whether or not the report is accepted by the BSR. This applies too in cases where reports are rejected by Synod.

The question of authority arises in relation to the pronouncements of the BSR and its constituent committees because the basis on which its pronouncements are made is not clear. Is it expressing the Church's view, a Christian view or an informed opinion? How much attention should the Church pay to what it says? Moore, Wilson and Stamp indeed suggest that the whole work of Synod and its related institutions can be questioned in this way.⁴¹

In international relations terms members of the BSR who played a significant role were the Chairman, from the beginning of the decade until 1976 the Bishop of Leicester and for the rest of the decade Graham Leonard, Bishop of Truro, and the Secretary, from 1972 to the end of the relevant period, Giles Ecclestone. Of these the Bishop of Truro appears by and large to have been in sympathy with the IAC's approach, and participated in some of their initiatives; it may well be that the initial interest of the 1979 Conservative Government in the IAC's disaster relief force ideas was at least partly due to the Bishop of Truro's friendship with Margaret Thatcher.⁴² Giles Ecclestone however had serious reservations especially towards the end of the decade. Also at this time Paul Brett, Chairman of the Industrial Relations Committee played some part in that area usually seen as the prerogative of the IAC when he became involved in the question of disinvestment in South Africa.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Interview with Giles Ecclestone, former Secretary to the BSR, Summer 1988.

SECTION 1.6: THE LOCATION AND METHODOLOGY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING

SECTION 1.6.i: INTRODUCTION

This Section will examine in greater detail the location of foreign policy decision making during the 1970's. The not unreasonable expectation that successive Archbishops of Canterbury were heavily involved will be examined and found to be only very partially fulfilled. The location within the Board of Social Responsibility, the structure and the personnel of the International Relations Committee will then be examined, and it is the contribution of certain members of this Committee to foreign policy formation which is found to be defining. As an illustration of the centrality of their position and the nature of their methods a study is then made of a project to set up a Disaster Relief Force which was regarded as highly important by the Committee and which ran for much of the decade under examination.

Much of the material in this Section is taken from files in the archives of the Church of England or from personal interviews with the protagonists.

SECTION 1.6.ii: LAMBETH PALACE

As the Archbishop of Canterbury is Spiritual Head of the Church of England one would be justified in expecting that he would exercise ultimate control and authority over foreign policies. This is probably true in the sense that nothing he actually vetoed would be pursued as official policy, although the factionalism of the Church would allow it to continue to be pushed as an alternative to his preferred option. However it is not true that any of the three incumbent Archbishops during the 1970's were involved in the choice of most of the IAC's policies or their day to day implementation: their responsibilities were too wide and, by and large, their priorities too different for them to do this although, in the case of Ramsey and later of Runcie, their own attitudes and activities were influential in laying down the broad parameters.

On the Archbishop's staff at Lambeth Palace were Councillors on Foreign Relations but

they were largely involved in advising the Archbishop about relations with foreign churches, although this sometimes had a political content. However most genuine foreign policy issues were referred to the IAC for advice at least, and often for action, although it is Maurice Chandler's memory that Archbishop Coggan, because of his great interest in people, sometimes replied personally to individual approaches.¹ The IAC also provided briefs for the Archbishop when he wished to speak on foreign policy issues to the House of Lords.

A Lambeth staff member attended IAC meetings from time to time but not on a regular basis until the appointment of Terry Waite as the Archbishop's Special Advisor in 1980. There were three Archbishops during the 1970's: Michael Ramsey until 1974, Donald Coggan from 1974 to 1980 and Robert Runcie from 1980 and for most of the period the main contact between them and the IAC was the Archbishop's Lay Advisor, Hugh Whitworth. Much of the contact between him and the Secretary to the IAC, for most of the decade Hugh Hanning, was the seeking of information so that the Archbishop could decide between bodies or causes: should the Archbishop sponsor One World Week? Should he endorse UNA in his diocesan newsletter? - No: "The thing has been a mess for years and cuts no ice with governments."² Could Hugh Hanning provide information on napalm? How should the Archbishop's office reply to queries from individual members of the Church on famine, unilateral disarmament, torture in Paraguay and Uganda, the alleged forced marriage of a girl in Zanzibar?

However, despite his good relationship with Hugh Whitworth, Hugh Hanning, Secretary to the IAC, did not succeed in developing close or even regular relations with either Archbishop Ramsey or Archbishop Coggan. Ramsey was willing to accept advice and information on specific issue areas but there was little in the way of personal contact or briefings. In May 1973 for example Hugh Hanning wrote to Hugh Whitworth thanking him for arranging his visit to the Archbishop to discuss the Archbishop's forthcoming visit to the Far East, which would indicate that this was an unusual event.³ And later in 1973 Hanning's suggestion to Whitworth that the

¹ Interview with Maurice Chandler, sometime Chairman of the IAC, Spring 1988.

² BSR/IAC/LAM/3, letter of 18/4/78 from Hugh Hanning to Hugh Whitworth.

³ BSR/IAC/LAM/1, letter of 1/5/73 from Hugh Hanning to Hugh Whitworth.

IAC should give regular briefings on important issues to the Archbishop met with the truly tactful response that, though on principle this was a splendid idea, the Archbishop seldom made foreign affairs speeches outside the House of Lords and when he was questioned on foreign affairs it was difficult to tell what would come up. The Archbishop had certainly spoken recently in Cambridge on violence ... "in a sense it was (a foreign affairs speech) but in the Archbishop's mind it was theology, and on theology he would never accept lay briefing."⁴

An indication of Ramsey's view of the overlapping nature of theology and politics can be seen in his stand, as President of the BCC, on Rhodesia in 1966 and his speeches against apartheid in South Africa in 1970. This normally benevolent cleric, who allegedly had to practice stern faces in a mirror so that he could match his demeanour to his delivery, made it quite clear that his personal view was that Christians had an inescapable duty to regard and to treat all men equally. His condemnation of the creation of Homelands also sprang from this essentially theological condemnation of apartheid, and theological too, was his refusal to endorse the WCC policy of grants to guerilla organisations, not a choice between justice and peace but a refusal to accept violence if any hope remained of peaceful evolution; on a similar basis he condemned any British supply of arms to the South African government. All of this was certainly theologically based to him but seemed essentially political to Mr. Vorster who treated him with great hostility.⁵

Hanning's own memory also provides evidence of the distance between Lambeth and Church House where advice over foreign affairs was concerned; he visited Ramsey when he was first appointed Secretary to the IAC to brief him on the Committee's purpose and activities but found him detached and with the appearance of not really knowing why Hanning had bothered to visit him.⁶

When Coggan became Archbishop Hugh Hanning and Lord Cowley again paid a visit to Lambeth to brief him about the work of the IAC but regular contact was still through an intermediary. However it seems fair to say that Coggan was more receptive to Hugh Hanning's

⁴ BSR/IAC/LAM/1, letter of 28/9/73 from Whitworth to Hanning.

⁵ See Owen Chadwick, 'Michael Ramsey: a life', Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990.

⁶ Interview with Hugh Hanning, January 1988.

general views and initiatives than his predecessor as well as less fundamentally innovative. He chaired an all-day meeting on the Peaceful Uses of Military Forces, sponsored jointly by the IAC and International Peace Academy, IPA, in 1976, several times advocated the Third Party Peace-keeping Force in Rhodesia, for which Hugh Hanning spent so much of his time working, and allowed Hanning to draft his March 1978 contribution to the Canterbury Diocesan Notes on 'UN Peace-Keeping Force needed in the World,' which was basically publicity for the IPA and the forthcoming Coventry Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Military Force.⁷ Coggan also endorsed in the House of Lords the IAC's own, highly questionable, endorsement of the 1978 internal settlement in Rhodesia.⁸

This is not to call into question however Coggan's strong commitment to maintaining links between Canterbury and Anglican Provinces in other parts of the world and his extensive foreign tours to this end. It has been suggested moreover, though the author is not able to substantiate this, that the murder of Archbishop Luwum of Uganda by President Amin in February 1977 provoked him to such personal grief and anger that he approached the Prime Minister of Australia, which country he was visiting at the time, in an attempt to initiate some sort of Commonwealth action against Amin.

Robert Runcie became Archbishop less than a year before the end of the decade. On coming to office he immediately strengthened the team of foreign affairs advisers at Lambeth to create for himself a much greater in-house expertise. The fact that in recent years much high-profile Church activity has been identified with the Archbishop or his own staff is an indication of a real change of approach with a new Archbishop and a newly-constituted set of synodical structures in the 1981 Synod.

SECTION 1.6.iii: THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, IRC

This Committee, which met every two months, advised the BSR on international affairs and

⁷ BSR/IAC/LAM/3.

⁸ See Section II.

migration. From the 1st January 1972 it incorporated the Council for Commonwealth Settlement, although this role dwindled considerably during the 1970's and provided significantly fewer areas of activity. A functional specification of October 1971 described the IAC's role as follows: it was the link between the BSR and the Churches Committee on International Affairs (under the auspices of the WCC), the International Department of the BCC and the Conference of British Missionary Societies, the BCC Community and Race Relations Unit, the Churches Committee on Migrant Workers in Western Europe and Conferences on Christian Approaches to Defence and Disarmament. (CCADD)

It consisted of a Chairman, the Bishop of Chichester until 1972 and Maurice Chandler thereafter, ten members appointed by the Board on the recommendation of the outgoing Committee, five members from the Council for Commonwealth Settlement and a Panel of Parliamentary and Ecumenical Consultants.⁹ On both the 1970 and 1976 IAC there were four MP's two each from the Conservative and Labour Parties, a representative from the Foreign Office, a representative of the BCC's International Department and a representative of CCADD. Some individual members remained for the whole period including Maurice Chandler, a member of Synod with an extensive interest in Commonwealth affairs, a member of the Conservative Commonwealth Council and Chairman of a Conservative Working Party on the future of Dependent Colonial Territories, who became Chairman in 1972; and the Rev. Paul Oestreicher, for part of this time Chairman of Amnesty International and deeply involved in Eastern European Affairs.

The 1976 Committee included a representative of the Conference of Missionary Societies, a member of the BMU, the Secretary of the Roman Catholic Commission for International Justice and Peace, a retired Brigadier and a retired diplomat.

The IAC employed an Executive Secretary; until 1972 this was the Rev. Canon John Oates, who remained a member of the Committee thereafter; from 1972 to 1979 it was Hugh Hanning; and from 1980 it was the Rev. Peter Haynes. There were also two Assistant Secretaries during the decade; Lord Cowley, a former Conservative Junior Minister, expert on Latin American affairs

⁹ See appendix to this chapter for membership.

and Conservative Front Bench spokesman on Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords, was appointed in May 1975; Lord Elton was appointed in 1976 on Cowley's untimely death and stayed until March 1979 when he was given office in the new Conservative Government. They were appointed partly because of Hanning's work with the British Atlantic Association and partly because, after the Bishop of Chichester's retirement from the House of Lords, there was no regular ecclesiastical spokesman there for foreign affairs and a well-informed peer was seen as a good substitute.¹⁰

Of these personnel Hugh Hanning was much the most significant and it was he who set the tone of the IAC's work for most of the 1970's. In 1971 he was 46, educated at Winchester and University College, Oxford. His working experience was largely in the media. He had been Diplomatic Correspondent for the Westminster Press and Glasgow Herald, Defence and Foreign Affairs Correspondent for the Statist, the Observer, The Guardian and the Times. He was also a lecturer and chairman of meetings at Chatham House, a Director of the Intermediate Technology Development Group, a member of CCADD and a long-time associate of General Rikhye, Director of the International Peace Academy, the IPA. He was the author of 'The Peaceful Uses of Military Forces'.¹¹ From the Summer of 1975 to December 1977 he ran the job of Secretary to the IAC in tandem with that of part-time Director of the British Atlantic Committee.

He was appointed because of his experience. In 1979, when a Secretary to replace him was being sought, he was asked what qualities he thought the new Secretary should have and replied: "In 1972, it was considered a positive advantage that I brought with me certain ready-made implements to the Committee, such as the Intermediate Technology Group, the IPA and access to the columns of the Times. I think I would expect this to hold good in 1979."¹² Maurice Chandler's personal memory is also that this is true, that Hugh Hanning seemed "to know everybody" and that this was regarded on his appointment as a distinct asset.¹³

¹⁰ Personal interview with Maurice Chandler, Spring 1988.

¹¹ Hugh Hanning, 'The Peaceful Uses of Military Forces,' Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Public Affairs, Frederick A. Praeger, London, 1967.

¹² BSR/IAC/SEC/1/2, 1979, but otherwise undated memo.

¹³ A personal interview in the Spring of 1988.

Hanning's interests were catholic. The organisations to which he belonged give some indication of their range but a number of documents demonstrate just how far they extended. A memorandum which he prepared for the first IAC Meeting where he acted as Secretary in June 1972 begins by defining the role of the IAC: this was as a forum for visiting experts, for the briefing of speakers in the House of Lords, for the briefing of the General Synod, liaison with the Archbishop of Canterbury, the issuing of occasional public statements and the generation of ideas; this last he regarded as the most important and as permeating all other roles. The ideas which he put forward for consideration to broaden the scope of the IAC's activities included investigation of such areas as preventing an accidental war in the Middle East, hi-jacking, the conventional arms trade, disaster relief, the military confrontation in Europe, winning the hearts and minds of people of the developing world for the West, Ulster, Southern Africa, Scottish nationalism. Appropriate Church activity in all of these areas, he felt, would come under the heading of non-violent action and this would give a focus to IAC activities for the 1970's.

Methodologically he recommended the sort of techniques used at Chatham House, discussions, lectures, seminars, the use of the extensive information sources available to the churches to disseminate accurate information. This in turn might be done by using newspapers and the consultants who were retained by the big television companies to seek out new ideas for programmes. He reported that he had already put the idea of an International Disaster Relief Force and economic action to improve the conditions of black workers in South Africa to the Archbishop of Canterbury who "responded enthusiastically."¹⁴

This summary of possible activities for the IAC is a list also of Hugh Hanning's personal interests and it did not change substantially during the years he remained at the IAC. Nor did his method of disseminating ideas alter – a wide use of the media and the thorough working of all possible personal and professional contacts. It is interesting too that he claimed already to have sold certain ideas to the Archbishop of Canterbury before the IAC Meeting where these same ideas were to be discussed and approved.

¹⁴ IAC Minutes, 14/6/1972, p. 6.

In 1976 Hugh Hanning produced a five-year forecast for Giles Ecclestone on the work of the IAC and this was little changed from his earlier, fuller, exposition.¹⁵ He saw major themes as violence and non-violence in such areas as international disaster relief, close co-operation with the IPA, with BCC and with CCADD, East-West and Third World relations and specific issue areas in, for example, Southern Africa, South America and Europe. Significant however is the specific mention of human rights in relation to these issues. This is a reflection of the higher profile enjoyed by human rights generally and of an increasing awareness in Church circles of human rights in relation to domestic as well as overseas issues. The following chapters will show however that with relation to Rhodesia and South Africa substantive action was little changed by this awareness. Whatever there was of human rights in the policies evolved in 1972 was still, by and large, unchanged at the end of the decade although the appointment of a very different Secretary in Peter Haynes was certainly an indication of a perceived need for a different approach.

At the very end of the decade, in February 1980, Hanning drafted a report on the work of the IAC for the forthcoming Partners in Mission Consultation.¹⁶ The IAC, he claimed, aimed to reconcile man to man on the international front; its functions included advising on questions of war and peace particularly in areas such as help for refugees, international disaster relief, One World Week and development, disarmament. Most of these activities, he said, had been newly undertaken in the last ten years, although they did fit with the Committee's already existing policy of research and action in the cause of peacekeeping.

Hanning was right that before his arrival the IAC had broadly functioned in this way but it had been fairly low-key and, by and large, responsive rather than initiatory. Not that the new model IAC, after 1972, could be initiatory in more than a few specific areas for resources have already been shown to be inadequate. Moreover its world-wide watching brief made it difficult to do more than respond to crises as they arose, and this only in certain geographical areas; the Middle East for example was left to the BCC who were acknowledged to have greater expertise

¹⁵ BSR/IAC/SEC/1/2, memo of 3/3/1976 from Hanning to Ecclestone.

¹⁶ BSR/IAC/SEC/1/2, memo of 15/2/1980 by Hanning.

there. However those persistent themes which did develop and which are outlined above largely matched Hugh Hanning's own interests. His role was an executive one and he was not a voting member of the IAC but the majority of the Committee continually supported his ideas. Indeed Maurice Chandler, Chairman from 1972, and Hanning were very much in accord in approach, interests and methodology and Chandler was often actively involved in Hanning's executive activity.

There were exceptions however to the general approval. Paul Oestreicher's interest in issues of justice and of peace was more fundamental to his thinking and work and more theologically based than most active members of the IAC. He was not happy with either the substantive activities or the working of the Committee. In July 1971, in a debate on the newly set-up Boards and Councils of the Synod Oestreicher demonstrated a sense of disquiet about an autonomous IAC; could its organisation be examined and some way found to involve Synod and the Church of England as a whole in the difficult moral relations of the world of international affairs? Could there be BMU input because so much IAC information came from missionary sources?¹⁷

In 1976 in both Synod and the IAC he criticised the working of the Committee – it appeared that his earlier fears had been substantiated.¹⁸ He claimed that there was no clear definition of the aims and purpose of the IAC, nor of the function and scope of the officers of the Committee; nor were the principles underlying the choice of members clear. The Committee, he also said, hardly ever discussed an issue in depth.

Maurice Chandler would appear to have acknowledged the justice of some of Oestreicher's criticisms at least when he announced that the Committee would continue to meet six times a year despite suggestions that budgetary cutbacks should reduce this frequency, and that at least one all-day meeting in a year would be attempted. As far as providing further information for Synod was concerned, another of Oestreicher's suggestions, Chandler felt that its members did not like too much paper and it was already being said at diocesan and synod level that foreign affairs

¹⁷ General Synod Report of Proceedings, July, Group of Sessions, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 672.

¹⁸ BSR/IAC/SEC/1/2, letter of 16/6/76 from Oestreicher to Chandler.

dominated the agenda.¹⁹

However Oestreicher himself admitted that the situation did improve a little although he felt that this was only cosmetic.²⁰ In 1979 he again initiated criticism of the IAC which was much more serious and fundamental than his earlier complaints and in which he claimed many other members of the Committee shared although they were notably reluctant to voice their views.

His criticisms first arose in the context of the Synod debate on the BSR paper, prepared by an IAC working party, on 'Defence and Disarmament' which could hardly be termed an IAC success. It attracted criticism from practically all quarters for its lack of an adequate theological or ethical basis and its emphasis on military perspectives.²¹

In the Synod debate Paul Oestreicher, in attacking the paper, suggested that it was an almost inevitable product of the Committee from which it emerged: "The Committee in all sorts of ways has been insulted in the way it has been asked to do its work – this is part of a much longer record of misconduct."²² He went on to amplify his criticisms at the Bishop of Birmingham's request, and these were sweeping. He criticised particularly the manipulative chairmanship of Maurice Chandler and his tendency to ignore views which differed from his own. He commented on the long and very general agenda for which prior documentation was seldom provided, on the infrequency of careful and detailed discussion, on the lack of political balance amongst members and officers although "I believe both Hugh Hanning and Lord Elton have always done their best to be scrupulously fair".²³ He praised Hugh Hanning's talents and personal probity but claimed that his interests dictated the nature of the Committee's work to a certain extent. "Hugh did not operate easily in the much wider framework of international concerns and ethical challenges. That does him no discredit. It did however somewhat distort the Committee's work and even more its image."²⁴

¹⁹ IAC Minutes 1/10/76.

²⁰ BSR/BCC/DIA – 'Board' – IAD/BCCA/DIA, letter of 22nd July, 1979 from Paul Oestreicher to the Bishop of Birmingham.

²¹ General Synod Report of Proceedings, July 1979 Group of Sessions, Vol. 10, No. 2.

²² *Ibid* p. 738.

²³ Letter of 22/7/79 from Oestreicher to the Bishop of Birmingham, P. 1, *op. cit.*

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 1.

His criticism of the work and composition of the Defence and Disarmament Working Party is strong but substantiated. He was right in claiming that it was heavily weighted by the military establishment, the final text was not produced or even seen by the Working Party and the inadequacy of the theological and ethical underpinning has already been commented upon. The distinguished Quaker, Sydney Bailey had been invited to join the Working Party by the Chairman of the BSR, the Bishop of Truro, to take part in the review of "the whole Christian tradition regarding peace and war"²⁵ but resigned largely because of the heavy emphasis on military issues and the reluctance of the defence experts there to hear discussion of Christian ethics; after one meeting a Working Party member had told him that he had not joined in order "to be exposed to a monthly theological seminar."²⁶

Paul Oestreicher's own views tended consistently to be more radical than those of the majority of IAC members and he was usually in a minority at meetings.²⁷ While it was agreed to lengthen meetings and send out supporting documentation to Committee members, Oestreicher's criticisms were, by and large, rebutted on the ground that he disagreed with the substance rather than the methodology of IAC decision-making. But he was not alone in his disquiet. The Bishop of Durham turned down an invitation to serve on the IAC ... "I am not entirely happy about the way the IAC is structured, and would like to see a much closer relationship with its opposite number in the BCC"²⁸

In September 1979 Professor J.D. McClean, Professor of Law at the University of Sheffield, wrote to the Bishop of Truro about future co-operation between the IAC and the DIA of the BCC which he felt should be much closer. He reported a conversation with BCC Board members. "They saw our Committee as relying overmuch on ecclesiastical and Whitehall sources, and as failing to develop a sense of how issues have a variable mix of mission/witness content and political context ... the message (very courteously and properly presented) was of encouragement to

²⁵ BSR/BCC/DIA – Board – IAD/BCCA/DIA Enquiry, letter of 21 November 1979 from Sydney Bailey to Maurice Chandler.

²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 1.

²⁷ Interview with Lord Elton, 14/7/88.

²⁸ BSR/IAC/SEC/1/2, letter of 9/6/81 from Bishop of Durham to Chairman of BSR.

press on with the review of our committee's working which we have already agreed to undertake."²⁹

This review resulted in a memorandum to the Board of the BSR by its Secretary, Giles Ecclestone, in which he recommended that changes be made to the IAC when it was next reconstituted in 1980. It was a very large Committee, he said, and its members tended to have other commitments which meant that there was little continuity of attendance from one meeting to another and therefore difficulty in developing a corporate approach; it should be reduced in size and members should be chosen for their ability to work on issues in depth not because they were senior public figures; the representation of MP's and the FCO should be reconsidered.

His description of the qualities which a new Secretary should have were by implication criticisms of some of Hugh Hanning's methods of working; the new man must give IAC work priority over other commitments and contacts, if necessary reducing outside activities; he needed a basic working knowledge of and interest in Christian social ethics and a willingness to modify his judgements. He needed to be willing to spend time developing contact with the Church in the dioceses. He concluded: "... the Committee needs to work harder at its contribution to an ecumenical consensus in the development of justice and peace in international affairs; at present its perspectives are too much those of the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Commons and the Institute of Strategic Studies."³⁰

It is certainly true that the Rev. Peter Haynes who succeeded Hugh Hanning was chosen because of his difference. He was interested in European politics and very knowledgeable about world development as well as being a friend of the new Archbishop, Robert Runcie. Giles Ecclestone comments that he was much more the type of BSR staff member that Ecclestone expected. One might of course be dealing here with problems of political, temperamental and perceptual incompatibility but for the corroborative testimony, some of which is cited above, the more distinctively religious orientation of the BCC and the Catholic Institute of International Relations,

²⁹ BSR/BCC/DIA – "Board" – IAD/BCCA/DIA Enquiry, letter of 27/9/79 from Professor J.D. McClean to the Bishop of Truro.

³⁰ BSR/BCC/DIA-Board-IAD/BCC/DIA Enquiry, memo from Giles Ecclestone 19/11/1979.

CIIR, and the general agreement on a change of direction in the handling of foreign affairs in 1980 both at Church House and at Lambeth.

SECTION 1.6.iv: THE CAMPAIGN TO SET UP A DISASTER RELIEF FUND: IDRF

In the light of foregoing comments and criticism about the working of the IAC it is rewarding to summarize a discrete issue which was central to their work and which Hugh Hanning brought with him as an intense personal concern when he joined the Committee. The IAC campaign to create an IDRF in NATO is a good illustration both of the type of issue area and the methodology and tactics used by Hugh Hanning as Secretary to the IAC. It is interesting moreover in the light of the main plank of IAC policy in Rhodesia – the scheme to set up a Third Party Peacekeeping force. This is because both were viewed by Hanning as deriving from the same concept – that military forces could and should be used for peaceful purposes.

The campaign began in 1972 after Hugh Hanning wrote a paper outlining the function such a force might serve and what form it might take. Frank Judd was one of those who endorsed the project because it would show ... "we were not just a body of philosophers".³¹ There is no suggestion that this idea came out of the blue however because there was a considerable degree of general interest in such an project at the time. Dr. Michaelis for example had outlined something similar in the Daily Telegraph on 10th October 1972.³² Here, as in so many other projects, the IAC was not initiating but responding to an already present interest. That the initial introduction of the idea into the IAC was Hugh Hanning's and a part of the collection of interests he brought with him to the Church of England was also typical.

A Conference was held on the 17th November 1972 to which the Deputy Head of the UN Disaster Relief Office, Mr. Rossborough, came, a report was published and a Continuation Committee set up.³³ This had a fairly heavy representation of retired military and political personnel and Hugh Hanning's right hand on the Committee became Brigadier Michael Blackman. At the

³¹ IAC Minutes, 17/7/72.

³² BSR/IAC/SEC/3/1, letter of 11/10/72 to the Bishop of Leicester.

³³ BSR/IAC/SEC/3/1.

beginning of 1973 he wrote a paper for the Committee on the mechanics of an IDRF and future steps to be taken.³⁴ He was hopeful of wide-ranging and government level support because the Turkish, the Peruvian and the Belgian Governments were said to have endorsed the idea strongly and the Canadians to be studying the papers with interest. It was decided to canvass the project with thirty eight governments – a fairly eclectic collection including Iran, Eire, China, Italy and Yugoslavia – with General Gowon of Nigeria, with the Economic and Social Committee of the EEC, with the German Churches and with the Citoyens du Monde as well as with the three political parties in the United Kingdom. Later chapters will show that there was always an assumption of the acceptability of an IAC approach to the highest levels and this appears to have been a mixture of the special moral position occupied by any Church, of the particular position of the Church of England and of the personal contacts which Hugh Hanning brought with him to the IAC.

Government reactions were largely at Embassy level but several were very interested and a number asked for copies of Blackman's report on logistics. Great interest was reported in May 1973 in West Germany especially from Dr. Karl Mommer, Chairman of the Commission to restructure the German Armed Forces³⁵ and later President of the Atlantic Treaty Association.³⁶

Typical of Hanning's use of the media was the fact that he and Michael Blackman were interviewed about the project on the BBC World Service³⁷ and that Hanning wrote an article in the Guardian and gave a lecture to Chatham House about the need for an IDRF.³⁸

Political contacts were utilized in a meeting with Anthony Kershaw, Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the FCO, and with George Thomson who advised that to get EEC action it was necessary to work through one of the EEC members; Hanning could use Thomson's name in approaching the new Irish Foreign Minister, Garrett Fitzgerald. This was done through Church links in Ireland.

³⁴ IAC Minutes, 23/1/73.

³⁵ The Luftwaffe had been involved in the recent airlift of food to drought-stricken parts of Africa.

³⁶ BSR/IAC/SEC/3/1.

³⁷ BSR/IAC/SEC/3/1.

³⁸ IAC Minutes 21/11/73.

When, in September 1973, Hanning heard that there was to be "a fairly good shake-up" in the Overseas Development Administration of the FCO and that the Minister of Defence had issued an instruction on Disaster Relief within days of his Guardian article as well as announcing that Gurkhas were to drive landrovers across the Sahara to help with the injection of cattle stricken by the West African drought, he was convinced of Church influence. "I doubt", he said, "if the BSR will ever get credit for any of this."³⁹

With the drought in Africa as a spur to the IDRF campaign Hanning sent copies of Blackman's staff study to NATO where the Secretary-General was reported to be interested enough to pass on copies to the Chairman of the Military Committee and the Assistant Secretary-General for Scientific Affairs.⁴⁰

Accordingly Hanning and Blackman visited NATO on 7th January, 1974 and met Secretary-General Luns who was reported to have shown much sympathy with the idea of using defence forces internationally for disaster relief.⁴¹ He agreed to put the idea to a meeting of the Permanent Representatives who would then sound out their respective governments.⁴² So hopeful of positive outcome was the IAC when Luns asked Hanning "What can you do to help us?"⁴³ that it was agreed that the Church would give maximum publicity to the work Luns did in this field, put the IAC Continuation Committee at his disposal and arrange for Hanning and Blackman to be available for consultation whenever necessary at NATO Headquarters. However their hopes misfired on the political unacceptability of the idea.

The campaign however continued to make full use of Hanning's media and establishment contacts as well as of traditional Church channels: a meeting with Jonathan Dimpleby who had just done a programme on Ethiopia and the Sudan ... "we have got it absolutely right: the pressing need is for international transport, now a matter of life and death":⁴⁴ letters to Judith Hart, who

³⁹ BSR/IAC/SEC/3/1, letter of 21/9/73 from Hugh Hanning to the Bishop of Leicester.

⁴⁰ IAC Minutes, 26/9/73.

⁴¹ IAC Minutes, 15/1/74.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ BSR/IAC/SEC/1/7, letter of 15/3/74 from Hugh Hanning to Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker.

later set up a Disaster Relief Unit at the Ministry of Overseas Development, and William Rodgers suggesting that British troops help with transport: an application for support to Frank Judd, a member of the IAC and now Minister for the Navy: the lobbying of MP's: a delegation to David Ennals, Minister of State at the FCO:⁴⁵ a motion in Synod in November 1974 recommending the systematic use of armed forces in disaster relief:⁴⁶ two Parliamentary questions on the subject by Adam Butler, MP:⁴⁷ Douglas Dodds-Parker's visit to the Gulf and Middle East where he canvassed support from governments there:⁴⁸ the WCC Nairobi Conference's being persuaded to include a request that member churches support proposals for the establishment of an IDRF in its final statement:⁴⁹ the dispatch of information to the Prince of Wales who had shown some interest in the subject.⁵⁰

Efforts such as these were thought to have paid off when, in the relief operation after the Italian earthquake in 1976, all Western aid was channelled through NATO and NATO's communications system was used for an inventory of Allied contributions ... "we have scored a breakthrough in disaster relief."⁵¹

It was felt that the impetus should be kept up and a second full-day Conference 'Disaster Relief and the Military' was held in March 1977. The IAC also decided to apply further pressure on NATO, where their earlier initiative had not born the hoped-for fruit, this time to consider the most recent IDRF study by Brigadier Blackman at the level of the NATO Council of Ministers. The British Government was approached to bring pressure to bear, the report of the March Conference was sent to all NATO countries and the US Embassy sent copies to the State Department, the Pentagon and the Federal Agency for Preparedness.⁵²

Even larger in scale was the Coventry Conference on 'The Peaceful Uses of Military

⁴⁵ All reported in IAC Minutes 26/11/74.

⁴⁶ IAC Minutes 26/11/74.

⁴⁷ IAC Minutes 18/3/75.

⁴⁸ IAC Minutes 4/11/75.

⁴⁹ IAC Minutes 13/1/76.

⁵⁰ IAC Minutes 30/3/76.

⁵¹ BSR/IAC/SEC/1/7, letter of 14/5/76 from Hugh Hanning to Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker.

⁵² IAC Minutes 17/5/77.

Forces' in April 1978 where papers were given on what Hugh Hanning considered the three-fold uses:- Peacekeeping, on which General Rikhye of the International Peace Academy spoke, Disaster Relief and Military Aid to the Civil Community. The Conference had a very high profile, indeed seems to have been organised at least partly because Frank Judd, now Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, requested it; he certainly gave a key-note speech there.⁵³ The 750 printed copies of the Conference Report were sent among others to all British Embassies and to the UN Secretary-General as a contribution to the UN Special Session on Disarmament.

The extent of the IAC's network is demonstrated by the reported feedback on the distribution of the Conference Reports.⁵⁴ John Gilbert, MP, Minister of State at the Ministry of Defence, was reported to have said that ... "it would be of great value to the Joint and Single Service Staff Colleges."⁵⁵ A member of the Office of the Chief of Defence Staff said that considerable interest had been expressed in it and he would be interested to pursue the ideas further with Maurice Chandler, Chairman of the IAC, in the near future. Others expressing approval were James Wellbeloved, MP, Minister for the RAF, the Head of the US State Planning Department Staff, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, the Rt. Hon. John Davies, Lord Carrington, Sir Arthur Hockaday, Frank Judd, as well as the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Rev. Brian Duckworth of the BCC.

However it is interesting to note that from the time of the Coventry Conference the emphasis in IAC discussions shifted from Disaster Relief to Peacekeeping which was the major thrust of IAC effort in Rhodesia.⁵⁶ Hugh Hanning's lecture to Chatham House in March 1979 for example centred on British expertise for training a UN Peacekeeping Force.⁵⁷ He had also met with the Secretary of State for Defence, where the holding of a joint MOD/IPA seminar on 'Profiteering from the lessons of Peacekeeping' was discussed, and visited the USA to attend a meeting on peacekeeping equipment and to visit the Pentagon. He and Maurice Chandler visited 10 Downing Street to discuss the constructive use of UK armed forces with the new Conservative

⁵³ From Hugh Hanning's own files and notes of the Conference; no formal reference.

⁵⁴ IAC Minutes 19/7/78.

⁵⁵ *Ibid* p. 2.

⁵⁶ See Section II.

⁵⁷ IAC Minutes, 29/3/79.

Prime Minister.⁵⁸ Douglas Hurd, now Minister of State, wrote to say that he was considering setting up a study of the proposals about peace-keeping and disaster relief which Chandler and Hanning had put to the Government twelve months before.⁵⁹

This change of emphasis appears to have been due to serious reservations in Government circles of a number of NATO members about the involvement of NATO in disaster relief and about the bypassing of the UN Disaster Relief Organization, UNDRO, and duplication of its work.

Reservations about NATO's involvement in such work centred on its unacceptability to non-NATO countries, especially many in the Third World where disaster relief work was most likely to be needed. It had functioned well during the Italian earthquake disaster because there had been no political problems of this sort but Richard Crawshaw, MP, summed up the problem when he said that some governments would rather see people suffer and die than accept help from NATO.⁶⁰

The problem of demarcation between NATO and UNDRO was perceived by the British Labour Government and by NATO officials. In November 1976 Frank Judd said that Government priority was being given to co-operation with UNDRO in current operations in Eastern Turkey and he hoped that an UNDRO representative would be invited to the forthcoming Coventry Conference.⁶¹ In May 1977 D.F. Hawley of the FCO confirmed this position by stressing that the Government's view was that the effectiveness of UNDRO must be strengthened. In July of the same year Hugh Hanning received a letter from the NATO Secretariat confirming that, while no formalised disaster relief group would be set up in NATO at present, much closer relations were being established between NATO and UNDRO.

This did not march at all with Hugh Hanning's view that UNDRO, like many UN agencies, was underfunded and inefficient. In 1974 he cited the Carnegie Endowment for International

⁵⁸ IAC Minutes 14/11/79 and Hugh Hanning's own unreferenced files.

⁵⁹ IAC Minutes 10/7/80.

⁶⁰ IAC Minutes 17/5/77.

⁶¹ IAC Minutes 30/11/76.

Peace's report on the UN's lacklustre handling of the drought in West Africa as a reason why an alternative agency should be involved in disaster relief.⁶² In 1977 he complained of UNDRO inefficiency in the Van earthquake operation.⁶³ His earlier strictures met with a fairly sympathetic response but by 1977 official opinion had moved towards a view that the UN was the most suitable responsible agency for such operations.

This issue area is typical of Hugh Hanning's personal interests, adjacent to the military and with strong strategic overtones which benefitted the West as well as a (generally) unexpressed humanitarian ethos. His contacts in media, academia, politics, the military in the UK and abroad were used extensively, as well as, and more than, traditional Church contacts. It seems just to say that, by his contacts, he gave Church sponsored plans a credibility in quarters where they might normally have counted for little; conversely his status with the Church gave him official entree to organisations where he would otherwise have had to skirmish around the outside seeking entry.

SECTION L6.v: CONCLUSION

This chapter and the previous one have sought to demonstrate the structure of the Church of England in general and of its central apparatus, and the problems which arose in structural terms from certain societal and internal factors. More specifically it has shown how both structure and problems led to a high degree of centralisation, even though this was resented and considered inappropriate in many parochial and diocesan quarters.

This centralisation meant that, in terms of foreign policy, the choice of policies, within certain generally accepted parameters, and effective day to day decision-making was to be found in the IAC, a Committee of the BSR. It is further suggested that the structure of the Committee itself, its fairly infrequent meetings, the preferences of its chairman and the dynamics between its members led to a concentration of effective power in the hands of the Secretary to the Committee, for much of the decade Hugh Hanning. As he came to the IAC with a ready-made menu of per-

⁶² IAC Minutes 12/3/74.

⁶³ IAC Minutes 17/5/77.

sonal preferences amongst possible policies it is suggested that, for most of the 1970's, the Committee was led to a certain preoccupation with strategic, East/West, military perspectives.

Whether this was a suitable set of preoccupations for the Church of England is a question which will be asked in a variety of different contexts and different ways during the next two sections when the Church's attitudes and activities with regard to Rhodesia and South Africa are examined.

SECTION II: THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND RHODESIA 1970-1980

SECTION II.1: INTRODUCTION

The Church of England was involved in Rhodesia¹ during the 1970's for a variety of reasons all of them connected with or arising out of the factors which have already been discussed in Section I.

It was an uncomfortable remnant of the British Empire and thus a necessary arena of involvement for two reasons. There was an Anglican Church and community there, part of the Anglican Communion worldwide; moreover the uncomfortable cocktail of nostalgia, responsibility and guilt, which constituted the Church of England's attitude to former areas of Empire, operated particularly strongly with regard to Rhodesia at this time partly because there were a considerable number of white Anglicans there and partly because of its illegal status. This indicates a further reason for Church involvement – Rhodesia was in crisis for the whole of the decade and it has already been demonstrated that the Church of England's inadequate resources enabled it to maintain a high level of involvement only in areas of crisis and acute need.

Indeed claims of inevitability are generally made only to be refuted but it is arguable that the Church's preoccupation with the problems and future of Rhodesia falls as nearly into this category as anything can. If one had found non-involvement in this area it would be so unexpected as to need detailed explanation.

The Anglican Church in Rhodesia was part of the diocese of Central Africa whose Archbishop at this time was Donald Arden. It had two Archbishops of its own, Matabeleland and Mashonaland who were both white. This was not inappropriate in terms of church allegiance even if it appears so in terms of locale because a larger number of Anglican Church members in Rhodesia were white than in other Christian churches there and the, generally reactionary, wishes of the white community were dominant. Because of this and of its apparent closeness sequentially to

¹ The present Zimbabwe will be designated by whatever was the name customarily used by the British Government; hence it will be Rhodesia until 1978, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe until 1980 and Zimbabwe thereafter.

Ian Smith and then to the Interim Government of Bishop Muzorewa its clergy, its activities and its pronouncements were often mistrusted amongst the black population. The position of the Roman Catholic Church there was very different because it had far more black members, a charismatic leader in Donal Lamont who supported black participation in government, and Robert Mugabe, leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union, ZANU, had been raised as a Roman Catholic and appears always to have retained an affection and respect for the Church of his upbringing.

The section on South Africa which follows this will demonstrate a very different situation, with an Anglican Church increasingly at the interface of Government/Society conflict and adopting an increasingly radical theological interpretation of the position of a church in society. By contrast in Rhodesia there was a real sense in which the Anglican Church there was marginalized by identifying first with an illegal and highly unpopular white regime and then with a coalition government which was itself soon marginalized. Thus it was in many ways irrelevant to the final solution.

There was no reason why this should automatically have marginalized the Church of England also, although it would obviously have made it more difficult to establish its credibility with the two guerilla groups in Rhodesia. Its ability to be active in the Rhodesian situation is amply demonstrated in the following pages but it is suggested that there was a sense in which the Church of England marginalized itself for the majority of Rhodesian people by its over-attentive ear to the Anglican Church there, by its proximity to the fluctuating enthusiasms of the British Government and by its preoccupation with inappropriate, externally devised remedies.

The concentration of planning and executive power over foreign affairs in the hands of the IAC has already been discussed in Section I.6; internal criticisms of this power concentration and the methodology of its use have also been touched on. These, it is suggested, impinged directly on the Church of England's policy towards Rhodesia.

The main plank of the IAC's Rhodesia policy was the installation of a multi-national Peace-keeping Force there and this was a policy which was imported onto the IAC agenda by Hugh

Hanning at the time of his appointment in 1972. Its rationale was never fully explored and it is suggested that not only was it an inadequate response but that also it was largely an unsuitable one for much of the decade in question. The installation of such a force would have frozen the situation in a form short of resolution or justice, put a high value on both the preservation of peace and the preservation of Rhodesia from Communist influence and, for at least the last three years of the decade, paid scant attention to the wishes of a majority of Rhodesians.

It is further suggested that the East/West power political orientation given to the IAC by Hugh Hanning's appointment was the major reason both for the failure to discriminate intelligently among Rhodesian information sources and for giving disproportionate weight to the views of those informants who personally favoured a middle way. This middle way appeared highly desirable because it would have ensured the exclusion of communist influence from the Zimbabwe which came into existence in 1980 but it is suggested that the structure and position of the Anglican Church in Rhodesia were never sufficiently considered when information was sought and received from its leading members.

This unbalanced use of information sources significantly affected the IAC's ability to form a 'Church view' for internal as well as external consumption, although it would be unjust to lay all the blame here. Opinion in the body of the Church was much divided and the IAC's reluctance to believe that a radical, black Marxist was really what the Rhodesian majority wanted echoed much Church opinion and wishful thinking.

In terms of overall objective it is again profitable to compare the situation in Rhodesia with that in South Africa at the same time. There is no doubt that the Church of England, and, as its executive arm, the IAC supported the right of black Rhodesians to share in the government of their country. In writing, speaking of and analyzing the problems of South Africa however there was a recognition of apartheid as an evil and an affront to God and man which is lacking in discussion of the Rhodesian situation.

This is of course explicable by comparing the structural nature of apartheid's evils, of its denial of the possibility of any form of equality, with the less monolithic denial of electoral and

economic equality in Rhodesia. Graduated indignation in such circumstances is perhaps appropriate but it is suggested that there was an excessive degree of pragmatism over rationale, over permissible means, over personnel and over time-scale.

Coupled with this and with the sometimes inappropriate coupling of home-grown pet schemes and unripe situations was the failure to analyze many underlying issues in the theological and philosophical terms which one might justifiably expect from a Church. Was a just solution or a peaceful one a primary aim? Could one be secured without sacrificing the other? If the underlying value of the introduction of a Peacekeeping Force was the maintenance of peace what degree of injustice might this perpetuate for those incapable of participating in the electoral process and equally prevented from alternative action? Was dislike and fear of a Marxist solution a religious or a power-political value?

It is suggested that the various spheres of activity which are described in the following pages should have been analyzed in such terms and were not. It is this lack of thoughtful analysis of the validity and appropriateness of policy and of the status of information sources which is consistently striking and which will be demonstrated again and again.

SECTION II.2: THE SITUATION IN RHODESIA DURING THE 1970's

To preserve white minority rule the Rhodesia Front government of Ian Smith issued an illegal declaration of independence in November 1965. Various talks took place between the British Government and the Smith regime in an attempt to resolve the situation, most notably the Tiger and Fearless talks of 1965 and 1968. These foundered however on the Rhodesia Front's determination to maintain white supremacy. This aim was at odds with the Five Principles formulated by the British Government as a necessary basis for settlement.¹ Briefly these principles were that:-

1. There should be unimpeded progress to majority rule.
2. There should be guarantees against retrogressive amendments to the constitution.
3. There should be immediate improvements in the political status of Africans.
4. There should be progress towards ending racial discrimination.
5. The British Government would have to be satisfied that any proposals would be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.
6. There should be no independence before majority rule.

Before UDI however the British Government, in what President Kaunda referred to as "one of the greatest blunders any government could make"² had already relieved Ian Smith's mind considerably by making it clear that there was no thought of using British troops to put down the rebellion.

Instead it adopted, though not without opposition from fifty Conservative MP's who defied a leadership decision to abstain in the vote, a rather piecemeal set of sanctions which by December, 1965 meant that 95% of Rhodesia's former exports to the United Kingdom were embargoed. The Government also encouraged the UN to adopt a sanctions policy against Rhodesia, and indeed first brought the issue to the Security Council on the day that UDI was declared, 11th November, 1965. A voluntary and selective sanctions policy had first been suggested but in

¹ After the failure of the Tiger talks in December 1965 a Sixth Principle was added.

² Quoted in Robert C. Good, "UDI: International Politics and the Rhodesia Rebellion", Faber and Faber, London, 1973, p. 63.

fact mandatory sanctions were imposed, though initially on a limited number of products. However in 1968 the Security Council passed Resolution 253 which made illegal any UN member's trade and financial transactions with Rhodesia.

Only Portugal and South Africa openly refused to adopt a comprehensive sanctions policy but covert non-compliance was much more widespread and this meant that sanctions could effectively be circumvented. It was quite obvious by 1970 that sanctions were being broken, and this continued extensively throughout the next decade. The most serious infringements were in the area of oil where oil companies, including British ones, sent oil into Rhodesia through South Africa and Mozambique thus largely frustrating the object of a ten year British naval blockade of Beira.

The potential effectiveness of the sanctions policy was naturally vitiated both by evasions of it and by the continued support of Rhodesia by the South African Government. However by the end of 1972 it was generally accepted that, whatever the present state of affairs, the long-term prospects for the Rhodesian economy were seriously damaged by the government's difficulties in raising investment capital on the world market; road and rail systems were badly in need of repair; aircraft were obsolete and spare parts of all types were impossible to obtain. The South African Financial Mail of 20/10/72 referred to a recent drain on Rhodesian foreign exchange reserves and said "Without a settlement the foreign exchange position appears worse than it has ever been."³

By 1975, when an intensive round of Government and NGO attempts began to resolve the situation, sanctions had bitten deeper and the economy was also affected by the increasingly frequent periods of national service, mandatory on all white men in certain age groups, which resulted from the escalation of guerilla activity. Regional pressures too were mounting on Rhodesia with the independence of Mozambique in 1974 and the collapse of resistance to the MPLA in Angola in 1975. This facilitated the emergence of the group of 'Front Line' Presidents.⁴ They,

³ From a Brief by Hugh Hanning for the Bishop of Winchester, 1/11/72: BSR/LAC/BRIEFS.

⁴ This group consisted of the Presidents of Tanzania, Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique.

knowing how radically the internal situation in Rhodesia had worsened from the Rhodesian Government's point of view, began an intensive period of diplomacy. This gathered momentum only slowly with the release by the Smith regime of detainees, including Sithole⁵ and Nkomo⁶ in December 1974 and an ultimately unproductive conference at Victoria Falls in August 1975. This was attended by Messrs Vorster,⁷ Smith, Nkomo, Dr. Kaunda,⁸ Bishop Muzorewa⁹ and the Rev'd. Sithole. Vorster's presence was significant in its indication of a complete change of attitude in the South African Government. They now favoured the emergence of a moderate black regime in Salisbury if this might be effected, although divisions between and among the various black Rhodesian organizations made such a hope a vain one.

In March 1976, after the failure of direct negotiations between Smith and Nkomo, the British Government again called on the Smith regime to settle on the basis of the acceptance of the principle of majority rule, elections for which should take place in eighteen months to two years, agreement that there should be no independence before majority rule and that negotiations would not be unreasonably long-drawn out. Smith rejected these proposals and the tripartite pressure on Rhodesia – internal, regional and international built up still further.

Guerrilla activity increased. Indeed such was the activity of the two clearly delineated groups operating within Rhodesia from bases outside the country, ZANU and ZAPU, that reports from Rhodesian Christians to the BCC indicated the general feeling that "Smith could not last another rainy season."¹⁰ Mozambique closed its land border with Rhodesia. American pressure on the South African Government, transmitted through Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, who viewed Southern Africa now in global terms because of the intervention of Cuban troops in Angola, combined with South Africa's own internal problems had now changed Ian Smith's only

⁵ Original founder of the Zimbabwe African National Union, ZANU, itself a breakaway movement of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union, ZAPU; it was banned in 1964.

⁶ Leader of ZAPU which had been banned in 1962.

⁷ Prime Minister of South Africa

⁸ President of Zambia.

⁹ Leader of both the United Methodist Church of Rhodesia and of the ANC founded in 1971.

¹⁰ "Rhodesia, Namibia and the Transkei", a report of the Department of International Affairs, DIA, of the BCC and the Conference of British Missionary Societies to the Fifth Assembly of the BCC, Autumn 1976, p. 4.

ally into an advocate of settlement.

Consequent on this combination of pressures was Ian Smith's broadcast to the Rhodesian people on 26/9/76, generally known as his "surrender" speech. This bore testimony to the fact that the Rhodesian Government had agreed a package of terms, worked out by Henry Kissinger, but reinforced by South African threats to cut off logistical and sanctions-busting aid. Smith reported that the Rhodesian Government had agreed to majority rule within two years and would meet African leaders immediately to arrange for an interim government to function until the implementation of majority rule. Sanctions would be lifted and guerilla activity cease when the interim government was in place, and an external trust fund would be set up to fund Rhodesia/Zimbabwe's urgent economic needs.

The response of the African Presidents from Lusaka on the same day as Smith's broadcast, indicated clearly that, future majority rule on one side, these arrangements met with little approval from them and from the Zimbabwean freedom fighters who were regarded as having gained a victory by their own exertions. They called for an African majority in the transitional government which would rule until elections under a new constitution could be held. Ian Smith's plan was castigated as "tantamount to legalizing colonialist and racist structures of power".¹¹ The British Government was asked to call a conference outside Rhodesia to discuss the form and membership of the interim government, to plan the convention of a constitutional conference and to establish the basis on which peace and normality might be restored to Zimbabwe.

Nor had the guerilla leaders any intention of laying down their arms for a white dominated interim government; indeed Nkomo and Mugabe buried their differences sufficiently in October, 1976 to form the Patriotic Front. In the event the distance between the expectations and indeed the perception of what had been decided between white and black leaders in Zimbabwe was to vitiate this agreement and lead to three more years of bargaining and civil war.

The conference promised by the British began in Geneva in October, 1976 and was chaired

¹¹ *Ibid*, p.3.

by Ivor Richard, Britain's Ambassador to the UN. However it foundered on the differing expectations of the participants. Smith insisted that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss implementation of the Kissinger proposals while the nationalist leaders refused to accept the Kissinger terms as anything but a point of departure for discussion. An alternative plan formulated by Ivor Richard, to accord more closely with nationalist aspirations and including a British Commissioner to head the transitional government, was rejected by Smith before it could even be put to Nkomo and Mugabe.

To fill this vacuum Smith attempted to create an internal settlement with Bishop Muzorewa. Nothing came of this however nor, more significantly, of the Anglo-American initiative born of the newly-appointed enthusiasms of President Carter of the USA and David Owen, the British Foreign Secretary. Despite some intensive and initially promising shuttle diplomacy by David Owen the new scheme, whereby Britain would take control in Rhodesia for a period of not more than six months over the transition period to an election conducted on the basis of one-man one vote, met with little enthusiasm from any of the protagonists.

Meanwhile the situation inside Rhodesia grew ever more serious. Guerrilla activity was no longer confined to the borders but was sporadic throughout the country. The demands of army service meant that industry was crippled and many one-man businesses failed. The costs of defence rose dramatically¹² as did fuel costs and inflation. Chrome exports to the USA slumped because one of President Carter's first acts had been to ensure the repeal of the Byrd Amendment which had allowed the continued importation to the USA of Rhodesian chrome.

While the situation in Rhodesia deteriorated more or less by the day David Owen continued to work on his plan for British supervision of transition to majority rule. Lord Carver was chosen as resident Commissioner and a UN force, it was now decided, would be responsible for supervising the ceasefire and would assist the police in keeping law and order.

These Owen/Young proposals¹³ were once again greeted with little enthusiasm by all

¹² Defence expenditure in 1977 rose by 44% to take up one quarter of the budget – Martin Meredith, "The Past is Another Country", Andre Deutsch, London, 1979, p. 305.

¹³ Andrew Young was newly appointed by President Carter UN Ambassador.

parties to the conflict. Indeed such was the Smith administration's dismay at the thought of the virtual disappearance of the existing government security forces that they turned again to the idea of an internal settlement. They even accepted the precondition of majority rule which was the only basis on which Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau would accept such a settlement. Thus, by the beginning of March, 1978, the Salisbury Agreement was in place and heralded the setting up of a transitional government. The declared objective of this government was to arrange a ceasefire, to draft a new constitution, to remove racial discrimination and to conduct an election with the object of handing over to a black government elected on the basis of one man/one vote on 31st December, 1978.

Britain and the USA refused to recognise the transitional government without some demonstration of its acceptability to the majority of the population. Nkomo and Mugabe denounced the settlement and black Africans in rural areas, whose support was essential to its success, refused to accept it. The transitional government's call for a ceasefire fell on deaf ears and it became increasingly clear that Muzorewa and Sithole did not command enough support to halt the guerilla war. Indeed Muzorewa's considerable popularity amongst the black population was swiftly eroded by his perceived ineptitude and tendency to be outmanoevred by Smith.

As guerilla activity increased so the daily life of the country was increasingly disrupted with the closure of numerous farms, of schools, of health and veterinary services; malnutrition and disease increased and diseased cattle too died in great numbers. Brutal attempts at guerilla suppression by the security forces further alienated the black population while guerilla atrocities against both white and black populations were frequently reported.

Smith, increasingly desperate for a solution, attempted to give his settlement a greater appearance of legitimacy by recruiting Nkomo but, since this failed, he succeeded only in undermining the position of Muzorewa and Sithole, neither of whom he had consulted about the negotiations. Further negotiations with Nkomo were also ruled out by the wave of outrage which followed the shooting down by guerilla forces of a Rhodesian airliner and their massacre of the survivors. And indeed for a short time it seemed that the position of the transitional government was

improving when Kaunda's economic plight forced him to reopen trade routes through Rhodesia and so compromise his opposition to anything but a black victory in that country. Moreover in October the security forces launched a series of raids on guerilla camps in Zambia and Mozambique which killed over a thousand guerillas and destroyed large quantities of materiel.

This could be nothing but a temporary holding back of inexorable forces however and, recognizing the long-term prognosis, Ian Smith allowed Sithole and Muzorewa to recruit what were termed Auxiliary Forces but what amounted to private armies. Five armies were now effectively fighting over Rhodesia and were set to become highly influential in the projected referendum and general election. Almost inevitably these had been delayed and any residual black confidence in the interim government was eroded by the failure to meet the December 31 deadline for the beginning of black majority rule.

The new constitution was published at the beginning of January, 1979 and provided that only legislative, not executive or judicial, power would be in black hands for many years to come. Many of the whites were unwilling to concede even this limited degree of power but, seeing no viable alternative, did vote overwhelmingly to accept it in a whites-only referendum at the end of January, 1979. This was followed in April by a general election, intended by the Provisional Government to demonstrate the extensive degree of internal support for the settlement. In this Bishop Muzorewa's United African National Congress, UANC, gained 67% of the votes but there was, and long remained, serious doubt about just how free and fair the election was.¹⁴

This factor as well as the non-participation of ZANU and ZAPU and the fear of trade reprisals from Black Africa caused President Carter to continue to withhold recognition from the new Muzorewa Government. Meanwhile at the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka Margaret Thatcher, the new British Prime Minister, operating under similar constraints, took a similar line but decided to make one more attempt to reconcile internal and guerilla nationalist movements.

¹⁴ The reports of Dr. Claire Palley and Lord Chitnis' British All-Party Parliamentary Group who alleged extensive intimidation and corruption should be compared with those of Lord Boyd's Group for the British Conservative Party and that of Freedom House, a private New York based organization, who found the election substantially free and fair.

A new constitution, from which blatant pro-white provisions were expunged, was drawn up and presented to all the parties to the conflict in London at the end of 1979. At these Lancaster House talks a great deal of pressure was brought to bear on the guerilla leaders, with Lord Carrington, the new British Foreign Secretary, threatening to recognise Muzorewa if the Patriotic Front did not accept; the Front Line Presidents too were exerting pressure. The situation in Rhodesia, where the peace which Muzorewa had promised as his election platform seemed as far away as ever, was enough to persuade a reluctant and resentful Muzorewa and Smith.

Lord Soames was sent to Salisbury as British Governor for a period of four months to supervise preparations for a second general election. Ultimately elections, whose freedom and fairness were almost as much debated as the previous ones, brought Robert Mugabe the victory for which his ZANU guerillas had fought for so many years. The new state of Zimbabwe came into being, not so much on Marxist as on tribal lines.

SECTION II.3: MAJOR THEMES IN CHURCH OF ENGLAND INVOLVEMENT

An indication of the parameters of Church of England involvement has already been given in II.1. The values, overt and unexamined, which underlay action have been signposted and a critique made, which later pages of this Section will substantiate.

For ease of analysis however involvement is treated thematically as it is considered that this best demonstrates the different facets of activity and Church policy. There are major and minor themes in this narrative. Minor themes include sanctions, which were overall of little interest to Church policy makers after the first couple of years of the decade: this it is suggested reflects the change of personnel within the IAC in 1972.

The mobilisation of Church resources on behalf of individuals perceived to be unjustly treated by the regime in Rhodesia is also a fairly unprofitable study. Eastern Europe for example is much more fruitful in this respect, lacking as it did governmentally recognised Church structures which might have been expected to safeguard its individual members. There are few instances of significant Church of England pressure or activity in this respect in Rhodesia.

Major themes are the attempts to promote the setting up of a Third Party Peacekeeping Force, facilitation of meetings between parties to the conflict, information gathering and the formation of a 'Church view' for the benefit of Church members and leaders and for the formation and pursuit of policy options, the divergence of Church policy and activity from those of the BCC and WCC.

Central to the Church's involvement in Rhodesia in this period was the campaign to set up a Third Party Peacekeeping Force there and efforts by various members of the IAC to act as facilitators in the evolution of a peaceful settlement.

It is in the area of facilitation that some of the IAC's most interesting work was done and the network of contacts to which its members belonged by nature of the Church's and the Anglican Communion's structure was extensive. One should note however the fairly unbalanced nature of contact patterns.

Great importance too was accorded information gathering and the formation of a 'correct opinion'. This would seem to be in the well established Temple tradition¹ as collecting as much expert information and advice as possible to provide a sound basis for action. Later pages of this chapter will demonstrate however that the information collected in this case was not always sound.

Differences, initially of emphasis and later of policy, marked relations between the Church of England and the BCC which became less cordial on the subject of Rhodesia as the decade wore on. It is here that one sees perhaps a traditional closeness to Government amongst those in the Church responsible for foreign policy and a distaste for a radicalism which they perceived amongst BCC policy makers.

The Church's relations with the WCC and its attitudes to the WCC policy towards Rhodesia are discussed in some detail. Even more than with the BCC differences were marked and disapproval of certain facets of WCC policy provoked not merely an 'in-house' irritation but public disavowal.

All of these threads of position formation and activity, many of them ad hoc and few of them integrated, led to a number of distinct attempts to influence the final settlement in Rhodesia. These will be highlighted in the course of the narrative.

¹ See Section I.3.

SECTION II.4: THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND SANCTIONS

This may very briefly be dismissed as an area in which the Church of England was not heavily involved. This would appear to be a reflection of intimate knowledge of the generally ambivalent Government attitude to sanctions which itself encompassed knowledge of their infringement.¹ There was a similar unwillingness to tackle South Africa's non-compliance with sanctions which was the main factor in undermining their effectiveness. This was because South Africa was a second minefield of Church of England involvement in Southern African.

The Church of England was only briefly involved in the notification of sanction-breaking to the British Government and this was in the opening years of the decade. On 17/4/70 Frank Judd, MP, a member of the IAC, wrote to Maurice Foley, Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, suggesting that BOAC could be contravening sanctions legislation by acting as broking agents for South African Airways flights to and from Salisbury. Foley disagreed but Canon John Oates, then Secretary of the IAC, wrote to Judd on 23/5/70 saying that he would have thought that BOAC were aiding and abetting the breaking of the Security Council Resolution. Oates' letter was forwarded to Foley who replied on 25/5/70 that although he had nothing to add to his previous letter ... "in the light of recent developments we are at present reviewing the whole question of BOAC's activities in relation to Southern Africa."²

This appears to be the sum of the Church's involvement in the area of sanctions and sanctions breaking and it is significant that from 1972 the whole emphasis of church involvement altered. This would appear to coincide with the appointment of Hugh Hanning as Secretary of the IAC and his use of extensive personal contacts to make Church foreign policy co-operative rather than confrontational with the Government's general approach.

The BCC was always more critical of sanctions busting than the Church of England and less wary of pointing out to the Government its less than perfect record in this area. In 1977 the BCC for example documented some of the infringements which had taken place and singled out certain

¹ In 1968 for example the Government was informed that British oil companies were involved in sanctions-breaking but no action was taken against them.

² BSR/IAC/SEC/1/1.

of them for particular mention. In 1972 Rhodesia had raised a loan of R\$63.5 million to expand steel production and this was largely done in Europe. The USA imported significant amounts of chrome from Rhodesia between 1970 and 1972 and subsidiaries of Western oil companies were known to have maintained Rhodesia's oil supplies.³

Until the 1979 settlement BCC reports continually stressed the importance of the non-observance of sanctions as a factor in the maintenance of the Smith regime. However it was not even a major element of BCC policy to strengthen sanctions; rather, as the decade progressed the BCC increasingly came to concentrate on the externally based guerilla groups, ZANU and ZAPU, as central to the future of Rhodesia.

Divergence of BCC and Church of England views on this issue was substantial but not very high profile. The issue demonstrates however a tension between them on the developing situation in Rhodesia which grew worse during the late 1970's and which will be explored in much greater detail in Section II.5.

³ 'Rhodesia Now: the liberation of Zimbabwe', a report of the DIA of the BCC and the Conference of British Missionary Societies, Page 10, October, 1977.

SECTION II.5: DIVERGENCE BETWEEN CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND BCC POLICY

Here one begins to see both the institutional constraint of the Church of England's proximity to the State and the influence of those particularly responsible for the formulation of Church policy. In one case there was an inherent institutional distaste and in the other a personal distaste for anything which might be designated a radical solution. The constraint of congregational and Synodical sympathy for 'our kith and kin' is also evident although it is not always possible to evaluate whether this was a real constraint or a useful reason for the IAC to advocate caution in certain situations. In support of the latter possibility it should be pointed out that situations where the staff of the BSR or IAC were firmly convinced of the desirability of a particular approach saw little deference for Synod, rather plans to defuse its possible interference.

Whatever one's interpretation of such factors the fact remains that the official policy of the Church towards Rhodesia was a clear condemnation of UDI and an intention of furthering the rights of black Africans to share in government there; in other words an unimpeachable upholding of the human rights of all Rhodesians, at least according to a Western and individual orientated view of what constituted human rights.

However a wholehearted commitment to the principle of one man/one vote as soon as it might humanly be achieved was not nearly as obvious in the papers and correspondence of the IAC as it was in those of the BCC which was also heavily involved in the Rhodesian situation. Indeed as the decade progressed real divergence of views and perspective became apparent.

From 1965 the BCC's general line on Rhodesia had been clear, and, in so far as the Church of England did not disassociate itself then from the BCC position, one must presume that at this time their views were reasonably similar. At the BCC's Aberdeen Assembly in November of that year it was resolved that the Council's concern was for ... "the mission of the Church of Jesus Christ in the whole continent of Africa, then and in the future."¹ It was further resolved there that

¹ 'Rhodesia, Namibia and the Transkei', a DIA Report to the BCC's Fifth Assembly, Autumn 1976, Page 1.

... "The Christian Faith demands that the 4,020,000 Africans as well as the 219,000 Europeans should have the opportunity of sharing responsibility in the decisions concerning the government of their country and ordering of their lives."²

The Assembly judged the British Government right to require the acceptance of the Six Principles and suggested that the Fifth of these, on consent, was decisively important. Interestingly they voted that UDI should be opposed, not merely by sanctions, but also by the UK's resumption of responsibility for Rhodesian government, forcibly if necessary. The UK and other members of the Commonwealth, they suggested, should try to guarantee human rights provisions in any new constitution.

Archbishop Ramsey was President of the BCC and made a speech strongly supporting what had been decided including the use of force if necessary. While one could not deny that Archbishops have on occasion been thoughtfully out of step with the rest of their Church's hierarchy and certainly with the body of Church membership, this speech would seem to indicate the Church of England's position at that time.

The BCC maintained its consistency of approach with its comprehensive booklet 'Rhodesia and our Responsibilities' which sought to give Christians enough information, on such esoteric subjects as the 1969 Rhodesia constitution, the Land Tenure Act and the state of education in Rhodesia, to allow informed decision.³

By contrast the Church of England's position had shifted and by 1972 real differences of approach became discernable. 1971 was the year of the Salisbury Proposals, which embodied a gradualist approach to African majority rule to be attained over a period of perhaps thirty years. The Pearce Commission and Report⁴ which followed it in 1972 not surprisingly discovered, as a result of an intensive enquiry into the acceptability of these proposals to Rhodesians, that the whites overwhelmingly approved of them⁵ and the blacks overwhelmingly rejected them⁶

² Resolution of the BCC's Fifth Assembly in Aberdeen, October, 1965, cited in *ibid*, Page 1.

³ 'Rhodesia and our Responsibilities', published on behalf of the DIA of the BCC and the Conference of British Missionary Societies by the Church Army Press, Oxford, 1970.

⁴ Rhodesia: Report of the Commission on Rhodesian Opinion under the Chairmanship of the Rt. Hon. The Lord Pearce, Cmmd. 4964.

⁵ by a majority of 14 to 1.

The DIA of the BCC produced a statement on the Pearce Report in July 1972 which made it clear that they had disliked the proposals from the beginning because they had been produced without any consultation with the African majority in Rhodesia and neither measured up "to the requirements of Justice" nor were compatible with ... "the first four of the Five Principles and were inappropriate for modern Africa as a whole."⁷ Furthermore the statement still identified the problem firmly as one of entrenched white privilege faced with now politicised black Africans set on pursuing human rights at that time denied them. A peaceful and just solution might still be hoped for, but any solution must be arrived at with the participation of the African leadership and on the basis of the Five Principles. Sanctions, though not completely effective should be maintained and more effective implementation sought. "People in Britain must surely seek to avoid the contradiction of trying to work for a peaceful solution in Central Africa and at the same time opposing a stronger sanctions policy, which is the most suitable non-violent means available to the international community."⁸

The BCC's view was based on something more than the internal evidence of the Pearce Report because they had themselves undertaken a complicated survey to assess Christian opinion in and on Rhodesia.⁹ This initiative had been welcomed at the time by the IAC, and as early as their Committee Meeting on the 16th March 1972 they had notice of the investigation's findings when it was reported that African opinion was solidly against the proposals and that the terms were not acceptable to the majority of Rhodesians.¹⁰ But by the time that the Pearce Report was published the in-house IAC approach had become considerably more pragmatic.

An unsigned and confidential IAC memorandum in June 1972¹¹ assessed the post-Pearce situation as 'exhibiting two major positions among the moderates':¹² an extension of sanctions or

⁶ by a majority of 36 to 1: R.C. Good, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

⁷ 'Britain and Rhodesia Now', a statement on the Rhodesian situation following the publication of the Pearce Report, published on behalf of the DIA of the BCC and the Conference of British Missionary Societies by the Church Army Press, Oxford, 1972, p. 1.

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 3.

⁹ They had produced explanatory leaflets some to be distributed by the Churches in Rhodesia and some 9,000 by the Missionary Societies and Churches in the UK; the Guardian published the pamphlet's main points in a leading article on 14/12/71 and copies of the pamphlet were also sent to the religious press: Minutes of the IAC 15/12/71.

¹⁰ IAC Minutes 16/3/72.

¹¹ Its style points to it being the work of Hugh Hanning.

¹² *sic*.

an adjustment of the Pearce Commission's terms to give more African seats more quickly which might mean African rule in less than twenty years. This latter view and its elaborations was attributed to Lord Harlech, a member of the Pearce Commission and generally regarded as a key link between the Conservative Cabinet and the Commission. He apparently considered Ian Smith likely to accept in order to rid the country of sanctions and to gain international recognition. Talks, he thought, should begin in about nine months 'sub-rosa', leading then to genuine negotiations.¹³ Harlech was reportedly so convinced that Africans would not obtain a better deal that he would have liked the Church of England to ask its missionaries to advise acceptance of such terms.

On one level this memorandum is nothing but reportage but it is not unreasonable to comment on what it omits to include which is a critique of the Harlech position. There is no assessment of whether or not these suggestions were in accord with the five Principles, which they manifestly were not, nor is there criticism on the grounds of inadequate commitment to those principles of individual human rights which so obviously underpinned the Five Principles. Equally there was no adverse comment on the lack of consultation with African leaders, to which principle the IAC, like the BCC, had hitherto appeared to be committed. Indeed, not merely was there to be no consultation but¹⁴

"He, (Lord Harlech) doubts whether any future referendum or Pearce-type commission could *ever* induce a majority of Africans to vote for anything less than One man/One vote Tomorrow. But he believes that his proposal could be negotiated between Ian Smith and Her Majesty's Government, and would be the greatest benefit we could in practice bestow on the African in this very difficult situation."

This position is perhaps not particularly surprising when one reflects not only on the strongly paternalist tradition of the Church of England but also on the closeness of IAC members to Establishment information sources and decision-making centres by 1972. Differences in the relative positions of the Rhodesian Front Government and, sequentially, of Douglas-Home's Conservative and Wilson's Labour Administration were not as great as was often represented. Indeed

¹³ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/1, 'Rhodesia after Pearce, a confidential IAC memorandum, June 1972.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

at the time of UDI the British Government would have accepted a settlement which give no more than an improvement in the political status of Africans and a repeal of discriminatory legislation to protect the unenfranchised majority; immediate majority rule was not on the agenda.

Thus the IAC's willingness to contemplate the Salisbury Proposals was within a legitimate tradition of political schemes to resolve the situation, even though the Church's position had appeared hitherto considerably more radical and rights based. One might suggest that from this time onwards one sees a partial elision of Church and Establishment position. A distinct theological and even human rights based position within the Church of England is less discernable.

Another pointer to a change of perspective at this time was a brief prepared for the Bishop of Chichester on the 1st November, 1972.¹⁵ It would have to be described as power-political in its approach to the pros and cons of sanctions and the present situation in Rhodesia. Ian Smith was reported to be disquieted by the recent successes of Frelimo in Mozambique and by the growing threat to Rhodesia's links with Beira and Umtali. He was therefore apparently ready to talk to the Portuguese and South African defence leaders. The Rhodesian economy was reported as being seriously, though not decisively, affected by sanctions. The case for sanctions was made however, not so much on pragmatic success/failure grounds or upon grounds of principle, a tendency to move the country towards a political situation where the rights of the majority might be secured, but upon the effect on British interests in Africa if sanctions were to be removed. "General Gowon's Nigeria takes sanctions extremely seriously, and we have a lot of investment at stake there, not least in oil."¹⁶ The abandonment of sanctions would also probably lead to the triumph of the extremists, the Ugandan situation being cited as an example of the horrors which might triumph if sanctions were lifted.

One can hardly quarrel with this on the grounds of analysis but one might legitimately ask whether political repercussions in the rest of Africa were sufficient to ground a church's principled response?

¹⁵ BSR/IAC/BRIEFS, 1/11/72. Again it was unsigned but again stylistically it would appear to be the work of Hugh Hanning.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

This question will inevitably lead to another, just as legitimate – what grounds should form the foundation of a Church's response? The answer must be that, while the content of response might vary considerably according to milieu, the parameters used to formulate response must be the form and needs of a Christian society and of individual Christians within society. The theological and human rights input to Church of England policy choices has already been outlined¹⁷ and it is now suggested that such issues did not sufficiently inform foreign policy decision making at a conscious level. That the personal views and long term objectives of those involved was imbued unconsciously with such influences is not doubted, but there existed an agenda of questions which should have been used consistently to test possible policies and was not.

That differences between the BCC and the IAC were not completely clear-cut, and also that they were firmly entangled in personal opinion and preference, however was demonstrated by Elliott Kendall's, of the Church Missionary Society, comments at the IAC Meeting on the 5th June 1972. In response to his contentions that Christians should now ... "select their initiatives in an effort to renew dialogues between black and white," and that there were stronger grounds for hope now than there were a year before, he was questioned on whether the BCC knew what Africans would agree to. His view was that the formal ANC position of one man/one vote might look and sound intransigent and certainly caused some irritation in the FCO but he thought they (the Africans) would settle for something much more flexible than this."¹⁸

In the main however the divergence of view remained, indeed it grew greater, to reach its peak perhaps with the publication in June 1977 of the BCC document 'Rhodesia Now: the Liberation of Zimbabwe',¹⁹ This contained only one mention en passant of a pivot of IAC policy, the Peace-keeping Force,²⁰ and this only after "we insisted on at least a reference to a peacekeeping presence".²¹ In its efforts to explain why guerilla forces had resorted to violence it was held

¹⁷ In Section I.4.

¹⁸ IAC Minutes, 5/6/72, p. 2.

¹⁹ 'Rhodesia Now: the Liberation of Zimbabwe', DIA of the BCC and the Conference of British Missionary Societies, Church Army Press, London, 1977.

²⁰ See Section II.8.

²¹ BSR/IAC/SEC/3/2, letter of 24/10/77 from Hugh Hanning to the Bishop of Truro.

by many members of the IAC to be advocating violence itself, and one MP member commented that it was unfortunate that so much attention was paid in the document to freedom fighters and so little to security forces.²²

This criticism was largely unjustified; indeed the document was an infinitely more sophisticated attempt to understand the practical, historical and psychological parameters of the conflict than anything the IAC had produced. Giles Ecclestone took this view when, at the IAC meeting where the failings of the BCC's document were discussed, he suggested that the particular emphasis of the document was an attempt to redress the balance which existed in British public opinion in favour of 'kith and kin'.²³

Perhaps too 'Rhodesia Now' appeared to be preoccupied with the parameters of violence because it attempted to get to grips with the dilemma which underlies so much theological thinking in the domestic and particularly in the international political sphere – can the use of violence ever be justified? Can the demands of a temporal justice over-ride those of peace and the preservation of human life?

"As to whether violence would be used at all, in a situation where all else fails, it must be remembered that the right of armed struggle has been conceded in all the Christian traditions save the pacifist one. And all Christians, including many pacifists, would agree that the distinction between tactical and indiscriminate violence is not a specious one. If it has to be either, let it be the former, despite the fact that the victims will be oblivious of the distinction. But that said, it must also be remembered that for Christians as a body to express support for an armed struggle is a step involving serious consequences ... The fact is that difficulties in the way of outright support for the armed struggle also derive from knowledge of the dreadful toll that war takes, from the example it gives to others who come later, and from the temptation it sets up for those who come to power by force, to rule by force ... there is the fact, recognised by the British Foreign Secretary in a number of speeches ... that many of the leaders of the African political movements, if not of the guerillas themselves, are Christians – "men of peace" in Dr. Owen's phrase. These now support the armed struggle as being the only recourse which holds out any chance of success. Thus it cannot be denied that if we are to keep fellowship with Christians involved in the realities of Rhodesia, we must acknowledge that support for violence is at least compatible with some expressions of Christian conscience."²⁴

It is suggested that these are not the words of an organisation committed to a violent course,

²² IAC Minutes, 14/7/77, page 3.

²³ IAC Minutes, 24/7/77, page 3.

²⁴ 'Rhodesia Now', *op. cit.*, p. 10.

merely one "seeking to understand the use of violence by all those engaged in the armed struggle, remembering that blacks also serve in the security forces of the illegal regime."²⁵ But it is true that the publication did ignore the IAC's attempts to input bias towards Bishop Muzorewa and sought instead to ask what and who the majority of blacks actually wanted ... "Not being deterred by the fact that some uncongenial people also support them".²⁶ This rider being a good definition of the IAC's view of the undesirability of Messrs. Nkomo and Mugabe by nature of their associations with Marxist ideas and Communist governments.²⁷

From 1978 onwards a great deal of the work on Rhodesia and reaction to unfolding events there was undertaken by a group set up under the auspices of the BCC – the Rhodesia Group. This does not appear to have diminished to any significant extent the IAC's view that the BCC was not sound on Rhodesia and, indeed, attendance of Church of England members of this group was spasmodic in the extreme. To add further fuel to the generally uneasy relationship the IAC favoured the interim government of Bishop Muzorewa while the BCC had deep reservations. But from this time onwards events occurred so rapidly that to some extent they overtook considered response and gave too little time for weighty consideration of divergent positions.

The contrast between the theological input to all discussion of the Rhodesia situation which the BCC maintained throughout the 1970's and the pragmatic and increasing power political approach demonstrated by the IAC of the Church of England is marked. It would seem to be a feature both of the Church's closeness, institutionally and through its personnel, to government and of the distinctly Non-conformist nature of much input to the BCC. Indeed for those members of the Church of England who were committed to the ecumenical outlook of the BCC a turning away from the special relationship between Church and State was necessary. It is noticeable that those such as Paul Oestreicher who were highly committed to strengthening Church of England participation in the BCC tended to be critical of the Church of England's 'Established' position.

²⁵ *Ibid*, page 12.

²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 12.

²⁷ See Section II.10.

SECTION IL6: THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WCC

There were distinct differences of approach between the Church of England and the BCC over Rhodesia but the Church's relationship with the WCC was even less harmonious.

The major and continuing source of friction was a decision by the Executive Committee of the WCC in September 1970 to make financial grants to a number of organizations in different parts of the world which they saw as involved in the struggle against racism.¹ While financial contributions to enable this to be done had been received from a number of sources part of the balance had been taken from the WCC's General Reserve Fund. Since general approval had not been sought for this many members of the Church of England had learnt of it from a highly coloured media campaign which fuelled an instinctive disapproval of what they saw as tacit support for the activities of guerilla organizations.

A thoughtful Presidential address by Archbishop Ramsey of Canterbury at the Spring Session of the 1971 Synod took a fairly moderate line. He pointed out the virtues of the gesture as a symbolic act of solidarity with the oppressed but he did ask whether it was right to single out white racism; all harshness of treatment on account of race by any government should be condemned. He referred to Archbishop Temple's distinction between the Church which lays down general principles and points out what is wrong and the individual Christian who acts practically; the Churches, he suggested, should not act in a military or political capacity, they should stand above the battle ready to further the process of reconciliation. During his own recent visits to South Africa and Uganda he had tried to protest against all forms of racism.²

However two motions at the same session of Synod were considerably less compromising and, while they welcomed Christian stands against racism, they regretted the WCC grants to groups openly committed to violence. They suggested that ways in which member churches

¹ See Section I.2: the Assembly of the WCC, meeting at Uppsala in 1968, had declared its implacable opposition to racism and had authorised the setting up of a Special Fund to which all churches were asked to contribute in order to combat what was seen as a fundamental evil.

² Report of Proceedings of the General Synod, Spring Group of Sessions 1971, Vol. 2, No. 1, CIO, London, 1971: Ramsey had spoken out strongly against the hardening of the principles and practice of apartheid during his South African tour.

might exercise greater control over controversial statements and activities of the WCC be explored.³ These motions were not in fact debated through lack of time but they reappeared on the July Agenda as agenda to other items, while an amendment to cut down the Church's contribution to the WCC was only withdrawn on the promise of a full debate on the WCC in the near future. Moreover a report on relations between the Church and Ecumenical Organizations stressed the cause for concern in the wide gap between the thinking of the international Christian leadership and that of ordinary Churchmen amongst whom there had been widespread objection to the use of WCC reserves for these grants even though they had been specified as being for non-military purposes.

The Autumn Group of Sessions saw the controversy continue with a debate on a motion deploring the WCC grants to groups committed to violence. This was ultimately defeated and a more moderate motion carried welcoming the discussion the grants had provoked and recognising the importance of the exploration of the use of power in pursuit of justice also provoked by the grants.⁴ It was not an issue that would die however and it reappeared regularly and just as regularly provoked heated debate which ran the gamut from condemnation of the WCC as "politically lopsided"⁵ to fervent advocacy of the "need to recognise the implications of belonging to a democratically structured world fellowship which was that we should not always like the decisions that were made but we must abide by them."⁶

Anti WCC feeling came to a head in the summer of 1974 when, after a debate on the worth of both the BCC and WCC, where grass-roots attitudes were critical of both, the grant to the WCC was reduced by £1,000 – a symbolic gesture of repudiation of the WCC's policy on grants to guerilla groups. There was seldom thereafter a Synod meeting where the issue was not raised and it was therefore not surprising that considerable controversy arose over the WCC's decision in August 1978 to make a grant of £43,000 for humanitarian purposes to the Patriotic Front in

³ General Synod Agenda for February, 1971 Session, G.S. 16, p. 10, motions 36 and 37, Wickham Press, Sidcup, 1971.

⁴ Report of Proceedings of the General Synod, Autumn Group of Sessions, 1971, Vol. 2, No. 3, CIO, 1971.

⁵ Report of Proceedings of the General Synod, Spring Group of Sessions, 1972, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 73, words spoken by Mr. Gervase Duffield.

⁶ *Ibid*, p. 74, words spoken by Mr. Paul Oestreicher.

Rhodesia.

As far as the Church's central organization was concerned the issue was first raised at the IAC meeting in mid-September when the adverse reaction to this grant in some of the dioceses was discussed and where considerable differences of opinion amongst Committee members was apparent.⁷ In October Derek Pattinson, the Synod's General Secretary, wrote to the Bishops of Matabeleland and Mashonaland on the instructions of the Synod's Standing Committee enclosing the text of the Bishop of Bath and Wells' motion condemning the WCC grant in Rhodesia, and asking for their comments.⁸

The telegram in reply from the Bishop of Matabeleland to Hugh Hanning was hardly restrained: "Judas Iscariot Patron Saint of WCC. British support for WCC motivated by British love of bloodsports."⁹ Mashonaland's reply was somewhat less picturesque but also deplored WCC support for the Patriotic Front which he opposed on the grounds that it opposed free elections and because its members were, he claimed, anti-Christian. He also made clear his support of the 1978 internal settlement.¹⁰ The two bishops also wrote jointly to the Archbishop of Canterbury deploring the BCC's support of the grant to the Patriotic Front and asking the Archbishop to resign from the BCC, whose president he was.¹¹

The opinion of the two bishops was undoubtedly influential, not least because it mirrored the reactions of much grass-roots and a good deal of central Church opinion. Whether it was reflective of more than a minority, and by and large a white minority, opinion in Rhodesia was quite another matter. After their opinions had been circulated to Synod members prior to the November 1978 Session a letter was received by Derek Pattinson from Donald Arden, Archbishop of Central Africa.

The Province of Central Africa, of which he was head, had just become aware of a correspondence between the IAC and two of its bishops; to complete the picture he wished also to

⁷ IAC Minutes 14/9/78, p. 3.

⁸ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5, letter of 23/10/78 from Derek Pattinson to Bishops of Matabeleland and Mashonaland.

⁹ *Ibid*, telegram of 26/10/76 from Bishop of Matabeleland to Hugh Hanning.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, undated letter from Mashonaland to Pattinson.

¹¹ *Ibid*, copy of an undated letter from the two bishops to the Archbishop of Canterbury.

say that the Church of the Province of Central Africa had always supported the WCC Programme Against Racism. The British public and Rhodesian whites were totally ignorant of the acts of brutality committed by forces of the interim government and the interim government now had little support among 95% of the black population. To avoid civil war the British Government should now abandon its divide and rule policy, he suggested, try to keep the Patriotic Front together, become fully involved in the situation and not recognise the interim settlement until it was broadly supported by the black majority.¹²

This view demonstrated how far from being representative of black Rhodesian opinion were the Rhodesian bishops upon whose opinions now and in the past the IAC had chosen to rely. It also demonstrated the reluctance of the Church's central decision makers to change an opinion once formed; the Archbishop's letter was certainly discussed but it was not publicized to anything like the same extent as that of his two Rhodesian diocesan bishops and no attempt was made in the Synod debate which followed to inject a note of caution based on his attitudes and information. A certain sense that over-reliance on the two Rhodesian bishops might prove dangerous did surface at the IAC meeting in November however when it was suggested that, as a result of their attitudes to the various political parties, the Rhodesian Churches might, after independence, be written off as accomplices of former oppressors as had the Roman Catholic Church in Mozambique.¹³

The BCC debate in October on the WCC grant, where it was decided that no new issue of principle was involved merely because the locale was an area of significant British involvement,¹⁴ was in complete contrast to the highly emotional Synod debate in November.¹⁵ Here the motion finally carried noted the amount of disquiet about the grants in the Church of England, considered that the Programme to Combat Racism had political and theological implications which called for urgent debate and urged the Standing Committee to appoint a delegation to take

¹² BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5, letter from Archbishop of Central Africa to General Secretary of Synod, 8/11/78.

¹³ IAC Minutes, 15/11/78.

¹⁴ BSR/IAC/BCC/1/2, BCC background paper of October, 1978.

¹⁵ General Synod Report of Proceedings, Autumn Group of Sessions, 1978, Vol. 9, No. 3.

these matters up with the General Secretary of the WCC in Geneva.

It is easy to criticise the overwhelming distaste in the Church for these grants and for the guerilla activity they appeared to endorse; and it is undeniable that a large measure of reaction was a shrinking from a radical, Marxist-orientated, home grown and black solution to the Rhodesia problem. Also undeniable is the damage done to the formation of a realistic position by over-reliance on the opinions of the two white and thoroughly biased Rhodesian bishops.

One must be fair to the Church of England here however; to designate the Church of England's position vis-a vis that of the WCC as nothing but a vestige of imperialism is to ignore the problem of the divergent, and indeed contradictory, demands of justice and of peace which, if often insufficiently considered by the IAC, were recognised and agonised over at length in Synod debates by men who felt nothing but deep personal antipathy for white domination in Rhodesia. Synod did contain reactionaries whose views were everything that the WCC might justifiably condemn but it contained also men of intellectual rigour and firm principle who refused to simplify issues whose innate complexity they well understood.

Indeed it must be emphasized that in a serious discussion of Church objectives in the light of the multi-stranded code of conduct enjoined on all Christians no perfect solution to this problem exists. It must also be right seriously to ask such questions as whether, even if justice is one's preferred overall objective, it is right to single out particular guerilla groups as the most likely means of obtaining justice. Would the support of such groups intensify and prolong civil war in which many would lose their lives? What relative value had peace as an objective in the particular circumstances of Rhodesia? What value as a confidence building gesture on the other hand would such a grant have in the context of black Africa as a whole? Preoccupation with such fundamental issues is apparent, along, it must be said, with residual imperialism, in the debates of both Synod and the IAC.

The WCC however appears neither at this time nor since to have harboured doubts about where choice should lie in the justice v. peace debate. Giles Ecclestone, Secretary of the BSR, who went to Geneva as part of the delegation referred to above and who was consistently cautious

in IAC and BSR discussions about many of the policies initiated and pursued by Hugh Hanning, reported a complete inability on the part of members of the Executive there to comprehend, let alone to understand, the disquiet felt by many Anglicans in England about the Rhodesian grant in particular, and the grant awarding policy of the WCC in general.¹⁶

There was certainly a visible and vocal residually racist element in Synod and there was also a good deal of paternalism as a hangover from the days when this was an accurate representation of the Church of England's relationship with the Anglican Church abroad. But to dismiss all theologically and intellectually sound doubt as manifestations of post-imperial racism, as the WCC appears to have done, is to accept a one-dimensional analysis of the Church of England's position. It is interesting too that many of those who did argue support for the WCC grants in Synod did so on the basis of the need to demonstrate good faith and solidarity. In other words intrinsic merit was less important than the refutation of a Third World perception of the Church of England's position, even if that perception was ill-founded or, at least, simplistic.

¹⁶ In an personal interview in July, 1988.

SECTION II.7: INTERVENTION ON BEHALF OF INDIVIDUALS

This is an area where traditionally churches are much involved, sometimes on behalf of Christians whose freedom to worship is denied them or who are discriminated against because of their faith and sometimes on the wider basis that an individual's human rights are abrogated. However the Church's intervention in this area in Rhodesia was minimal. Unlike Eastern Europe where, increasingly during the 1970s, the Church monitored the plight of individuals whose human rights were threatened or contravened,¹ Rhodesia was not an arena where the Church of England operated through the championing of the problems of individuals.

This was largely because the Anglican Church in Rhodesia was independent and active and interference by the Church of England would, by and large, have seemed inappropriate. Though all questions of individual hardship were initially referred to the Church in Rhodesia it should be noted that there was some real element of structural unfairness here as the Anglican Church in Rhodesia was overwhelmingly white dominated.

The only significant instance of such intervention was the support given by the IAC in 1976 to the Roman Catholic Bishop Lamont who was sentenced in October to ten years imprisonment for failing to report the presence of guerillas in his diocese. The message of support, sent on 1st October, was copied to Ian Smith. A letter was also sent to Smith asking for the rescinding, or at least the amelioration, of the sentence which would not, the IAC suggested, help the process of achieving a lasting settlement in Rhodesia.²

The campaign on behalf of Lamont and his colleagues was pursued with some tenacity and indeed Lamont was deported rather than imprisoned. However the role that protests like the Church of England's played in the reevaluation of his sentence is difficult to evaluate as a number of organizations were active in working on his behalf. Even before his sentence the BCC had sent a telegram to the Archbishop of Salisbury thanking God for the stand made by the Roman Catholic Church in Rhodesia where some Justice and Peace officials had recently been arrested,

¹ See the work of Keston College for example.

² IAC Minutes, 1/10/76 and BSR/IAC/AFR/2/1, telegrams and letter of 1/10/76.

and, in a letter at the beginning of October to the Secretary of the Commission for International Justice and Peace in England, Hugh Hanning associated the IAC with this position.³

However this is the only noteworthy example of Church intervention on an individual's behalf and it is not in this area that one must look for extensive Church involvement.

³ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/1, telegram from the BCC to the Archbishop of Salisbury, 7/9/77 and letter from Hanning to the Secretary of the CIJP 14/10/77.

SECTION II.8: THE CAMPAIGN TO SET UP A THIRD PARTY PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

This campaign formed the main focus of IAC activity in the Rhodesia arena. It was undoubtedly a by-product of Hugh Hanning's personal interests which travelled to the IAC with him.¹ There were certain underlying values to this campaign which are significant in terms of the theology or human rights values which underpin Church activity. On the one hand there was a commitment to the value of peace itself, a desire to minimize the unnecessary loss of human life and a belief in the value of mediation. On the other hand there was a failure to ask whether the maintenance of peace might be at the expense of justice and where impartiality appeared in the parameters of mediation. It is suggested that no analysis of these underlying values was undertaken or even considered necessary by those attempting to implement this policy and that this seriously undermined the Church of England's ability to judge the appropriateness and timing of its attempted innovations.

This campaign gathered momentum at the beginning of 1975, although the matter was first raised as a possible contribution to the Rhodesian situation as early as 1972. At the IAC Meeting on 18th March 1975 Hugh Hanning reported that a seminar to consider the possibility and practicability of setting up a Peacekeeping Force in Rhodesia 'pending the transitional period' was to be held on 17th July, 1975.² Apparently Sithole on a recent visit to London, had thought this was a most creative idea.

This confidential seminar was set up under the joint auspices of the Centre for Human Rights and Responsibilities and the International Peace Academy and various members of the IAC attended it. Here one sees again the importance of Hugh Hanning's personal contacts and affiliations in the formation of policy.

The significance of this meeting is difficult to assess as detailed notes are not on file. However, in a brief to the Archbishop of Canterbury for a House of Lords debate on Southern Africa

¹ See Sections I.5 and I.6.

² IAC Minutes 18/3/75, p. 2.

on 14th April 1978 Hugh Hanning claimed that this concept ... "fourteen months before the Kissinger initiative was eventually incorporated into the Owen/Vance proposals in the form of a UN Peacekeeping Force."³ Moreover, at an IAC Meeting in November 1977, Maurice Chandler pointed out that the Church of England's specific contribution to the debate on the future of Rhodesia, an International Peacekeeping Force, was now the policy of Her Majesty's Government.⁴ At a similar meeting in November 1979 it was noted that the current proposal of a Commonwealth Observer Team came very close to ideas put forward in 1975 by an IAC and IPA Committee.⁵ IAC members obviously saw the meeting as the birthplace of a policy which was later adopted by Government.

What is certainly true is that the idea of a Peacekeeping Force was widely disseminated by the IAC. At a meeting on 30th March 1976 Hugh Hanning thanked Adam Butler, MP for circulating a report of a July, 1975 seminar which analyzed the utility of various types of Peacekeeping Force in Rhodesia in his own, Conservative, party. "There was general support for this concept, particularly in the light of the gloomy prospect of starvation, of the resumption of violence, of a new generation of Marxist field commanders who would repudiate Muzorewa and Nkomo, and of a Marxist aligned belt right across Africa threatening the survival of Mr. Kaunda."⁶ At this same meeting Frank Judd was asked whether the Commonwealth Secretariat had undertaken any planning on this subject because, although the UN was unlikely to be of much help, several countries like Canada, India, Botswana, Malawi and Zambia might well contribute to such a force.⁷

Once again one observes the mixture of humanitarian concern and power-political analysis, a complicated cocktail where it would be impossible to know not only which concern predominated but also whether one was observing a desirable or an undesirable phenomenon. Certainly a power-political analysis alone, devoid of considerations of human rights and values, is an inadequate contribution by a church because it ignores the special and discrete dimension which a

³ BSR/IAC/LAM/3.

⁴ IAC Minutes 15/11/77.

⁵ IAC Minutes 14/11/79.

⁶ IAC Minutes 30/3/76, p. 3.

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 3.

religious perspective can bring. Equally however it is unrealistic to ignore every political dimension and to dwell only on a theologically derived or essentially humanitarian analysis. Whatever its virtues however this mixture of motivation and ambiguous response occurs again and again.

The importance within the IAC's programme of activities of the contacts which Hugh Hanning brought with him when he became Secretary was again demonstrated at the IAC Meeting on 16th June 1976. Maurice Chandler reported that at the IPA Meeting that week it had been noted that it was constitutionally impossible for Ian Smith to approach the Secretary General of the UN about a Peacekeeping Force while the British Government had not done so. However he could approach the Secretary General of the Commonwealth, and it was agreed that Maurice Chandler would write to the Secretary General on this subject.

This he did⁸ and on 16th September he wrote again to ask whether Ramphal would meet General Rikhye of the IPA to discuss such plans on 28th or 29th September.⁹ In his reply of 17th September Ramphal said that he would be away then but the Assistant Secretary General would meet Rikhye who was duly escorted to the Commonwealth Secretariat by Maurice Chandler, Hugh Hanning and Rodney Elton to outline plans to examine the feasibility of a Third Party Peacekeeping presence in Rhodesia. It was apparently agreed that this sort of contingency planning might be very sensitive done by an official body but might indeed be useful if undertaken by an unofficial one such as the IPA.¹⁰ It is tempting to read into this bland reaction and into Ramphal's delegation of the meeting itself to his deputy a discounting of the IPA's or the IAC's plans and/or their influence. This is perhaps unjust and there is not enough evidence to support a well-substantiated analysis.

Hugh Hanning also took General Rikhye to visit Ted Rowlands, Minister of State at the FCO, where it was agreed, in another splendidly anodyne phrase, that ... "the highly complex situation in Rhodesia was susceptible of imaginative ideas".¹¹ The Third Party Peacekeeping ini-

⁸ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/1, letter dated 26/7/76.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ IAC Minutes 1/10/76.

¹¹ IAC Minutes 1/10/76.

tiative was further pursued in the latter months of 1976 by a letter printed in *The Times*,¹² by Maurice Chandler, Hugh Hanning and Rodney Elton on the virtues of such a force, and by a second letter on the 20th October on the same subject from Hugh Elliott, a member of the IAC, written at Hugh Hanning's prompting.¹³

At the turn of the year in 1976 the IAC was much concerned with the negotiations which were going on, and apparently about to break down, in Geneva between Smith, Muzorewa, Sithole, Nkomo and Mugabe. The meeting itself was the outcome of the talks in the summer of 1976 between Kissinger and Smith and the problems arose from their very different perceptions of what had been agreed between them; Kissinger appeared to think that this was a transfer of power while Smith insisted that only the sharing of power was on offer. At the IAC Meeting on 30th November.¹⁴ Elliott Kendall reported that Garfield Todd seemed very depressed at the lack of progress and possibility of failure; while the situation was unclear it certainly did not seem hopeful. Hugh Hanning once more reported Rikhye's view that probable disagreement over control of the security forces might be resolved by some form of Commonwealth presence, which view had been passed on to the British delegation in Geneva. It was agreed that Hanning would consult with the Quakers who had a delegation in Geneva as to the best way of informing the various delegations about the researches of the IAC and IPA into the contribution which might be made by the Commonwealth to the situation.

By the beginning of December hopes for a positive outcome of the Geneva negotiations had faded even further as demonstrated by a memorandum from Rodney Elton to Lord Carrington.¹⁵ In this he reported a seminar he had attended with Garfield Todd who had said that the failure of the Geneva negotiations was inevitable within the next few weeks unless an outside initiative was received, preferably from the United Kingdom. Such a failure would almost certainly lead to a period of up to two years of conflict in which the Cubans would be increasingly involved and the

¹² BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5, letter dated 15/10/76.

¹³ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/1.

¹⁴ IAC Minutes, 30/11/76, p. 1.

¹⁵ BSR/IAC/AFR/1, memorandum dated 2/12/76.

possibility of a multiracial democracy would be replaced by the virtual certainty of a Marxist military dictatorship. Garfield Todd was reported to favour the appointment of a British Minister with sole responsibility for the Rhodesian problem and an offer of a British General as Chief of Staff. The Minister should propose to the Geneva Meeting that a small but carefully chosen group of men be appointed to serve on the interim government, and spell out to the reluctant white delegation that the alternative would be the Cubans. Elton's own view was that the Foreign Office appeared to have no strategy to avoid the breakdown of the Conference; "Their approach to the situation seems, throughout, to have been Micawberish."¹⁶ Here one sees the interwoven quality of information gathering and dissemination with Elton plugged into both the Church of England circuit and that of the Conservative Party; and Lord Carrington, it should be remembered, became Foreign Secretary less than three years later.

There is a strong impression that the IAC initiative which followed was designed to remedy the perceived hiatus in official Government policy. In addition the importance which the IPA and the IAC, as the IPA's constant advocate and facilitator, attached to this putative Commonwealth force was demonstrated by the round of visits made by General Rikhye when he was in London at the beginning of 1977. He saw Ted Rowlands at the FCO, Ivor Richard at the Commonwealth Secretariat twice, John Davies, the Conservative Foreign Affairs spokesman, and Jeremy Thorpe, Leader of the Liberal Party. He also attended a meeting organized by the IAC with several distinguished members of Synod where the concept of a Commonwealth presence for Rhodesia during the transition stage to majority rule was discussed in detail. One gains the impression of a man with assured access to the second rank of political influence skirmishing around the inner circle constantly trying to gain access there. Hugh Hanning and the Church of England facilitated this access and thus the idea of a Commonwealth Peacekeeping Force became even more firmly fixed in the rubric of Church policy.

Indeed IAC staff produced a document outlining how such a presence might operate in the areas of defence and policing and in monitoring a referendum. Their analysis of the fundamental

¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 2.

problem at Geneva was that an understandable lack of trust existed between black and white parties to the negotiations and this was most acute in the areas of defence, internal security and law and order. "In each of these areas confidence can be restored by ensuring that sensitive functions are carried out under the control or supervision of a third party mutually agreed by both blacks and whites."¹⁷

It was suggested that the Commonwealth presence be drawn from member countries, amongst whom India, Nigeria, Ghana, Malaysia, New Zealand, Jamaica might be suitable. It would not comprise a single preformed contingent, but a number of small parties or individuals. In the area of defence they might perform such functions as acting with existing staffs, operating training missions to retrain members of the nationalist movements at present under arms to serve in the new national army or acting as field officers to monitor the deployment and role of forces in the field. In the area of policing senior officers might supervise the use of the police forces and be responsible to the Crown; District Officers might monitor local deployment of police forces and ensure their impartiality in law enforcement; and a training role might also be undertaken either in Zimbabwe itself or in Commonwealth training schools. A referendum was desirable because any decision on the form of the interim government should be endorsed by the opinion of all Rhodesians, and the best way of ensuring the necessary impartiality was thought to be an independent Commonwealth presence. This might also be used for the conduct of the first election if that was requested.

The prerequisites of such a scheme were obviously an agreed and total cessation of hostilities, which it would manifestly be extremely difficult to deliver, and the concession by Smith that power would be transferred to, not merely shared with, the majority black population, a concession that he was not yet ready to make. Moreover at a meeting on 10th December Ted Rowlands at the FCO had already spoken to Elton about the unacceptability of the idea of a Commonwealth military force to Commonwealth countries if there were a prospect of their fighting the black population. The IAC scheme was not for a fighting force as such but it would be impossible to

¹⁷ BSR/IAC/AFR/1, undated copy of memorandum.

guarantee that it might not be forced to adopt such a role given the unstable situation in Rhodesia. Moreover Ted Rowlands in his response to the memorandum itself,¹⁸ while recognising that there were various ways in which Commonwealth countries might give assistance, pointed out that there were a number of political and practical problems over such involvement.

However such Government reservations notwithstanding, the IAC memorandum was subsequently sent to the five Geneva Heads of Delegation, to the High Commissioners of Tanzania, Botswana and Zambia, to the Bishops of Mashonaland, Matabeleland and Lebombo, to the Commonwealth Secretariat and to the FCO. As replies were received they were forwarded to Goronwy-Rees at the FCO, to Lord Carrington, to John Davies, MP, a Conservative spokesman on Foreign Affairs, and to Frank Hooley, MP. Most of them could be classified as acknowledgements but a letter from the Bishop of Mashonaland said that as he saw Ian Smith from time to time he would have the Church of England's ideas in mind "if an opportunity presents itself."¹⁹ In itself this is an interesting comment on the Bishop's connections with the Smith regime but one that evinced no recorded comment from the Executive or members of the IAC about his possible lack of impartiality. In his reply the Bishop of Lebombo reported that he had passed a copy of the IAC memorandum and a note on the work of the BSR to the Secretary to the Minister of the Interior in Mozambique.²⁰

There appears to have continued to be very muted enthusiasm for IAC ideas in official circles at this time. This was obvious both from the tenor of replies from Government departments to the IAC's letters and from irritation amongst IAC members about Government inaction. Goronwy-Rees at the FCO appeared to harbour doubts about whether a Commonwealth presence would be enough to reassure both sides during transition²¹ though Elton was reassuring on how much work on viability had already been done and offered to facilitate contact between the FCO and the IPA²². Goronwy-Rees replied rather tepidly that he might well take up this offer at a later

¹⁸ BSR/IAC/AFR/1, letter dated 28/3/77.

¹⁹ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/4, letter dated 24/3/77.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, letter dated 29/3/77.

²¹ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5, letter of 2/5/77 from Goronwy-Rees to Elton.

²² BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5, letter of 6/5/77 from Elton to Goronwy-Rees.

stage as he was aware of the IPA's work; the priority now however was to find out how the parties concerned viewed the problem. The Consultative Group announced by the Secretary of State on 11th May would look, amongst other issues, into the feasibility of a Peacekeeping Force.

Despite this lack of official enthusiasm and perhaps to answer the substance of Government doubts the IAC's media campaign was renewed in the summer of 1977 with a letter to *The Times* on 26th June from Maurice Chandler, Hugh Hanning and Lord Elton stressing that the Peacekeeping Force would be supervisory, not a combatant or an invasion force.²³ Their letter to the *Guardian* on the 1st July followed an article on the subject of a Peacekeeping Force for Rhodesia in that newspaper on 28th June, and stressed the need for an outside presence to guarantee the fairness of elections. As Britain was still the sovereign power this would mean some form of British contribution. They also congratulated the Foreign Secretary, David Owen, for seeing that the machinery for transferring power needed to be agreed before the constitutional procedure and not afterwards.²⁴ In August Hugh Hanning wrote to Alistair Osborne, editor of *The World Tonight* on BBC TV suggesting an interview with Maurice Chandler who would put the IAC's case for a Peacekeeping Force in Rhodesia for a finite period; this did not in fact take place.²⁵

September 1977 saw activity on a different front with a letter on 2nd from Hugh Hanning to Lord Carver, newly appointed to organize the role of the forces in Rhodesia hand in hand with a UN special representative, suggesting that General Rikhye, whose pedigree was enclosed, would be willing to help. He had, Hanning pointed out, some useful contacts already having accompanied Hanning in talks with Ivor Richard and Ted Rowland at the FCO and with opposition leaders.²⁶ Rikhye was apparently unhappy with the plans for Rhodesian defense in the transitional period as detailed in the Owen/Young proposals. The dilemma as he saw it was that the abolition of the existing forces might leave a dangerous vacuum, but that they would be too widely distrusted to be retained.²⁷ Lord Carver's reply is not on record but Rikhye was not appointed.

²³ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5, letter printed in *The Times* on 26/6/77.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/4, letter of 11/8/77 from Hanning to Osborne.

²⁶ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/1, letter of 2/9/77 from Hanning to Carver.

²⁷ IAC Minutes, 15/9/77; an undated letter from General Rikhye to Maurice Chandler was read to the meeting.

Despite lack of official encouragement the idea of a Peacekeeping Force was kept alive for the rest of the decade, indeed until it was overtaken by events. It appeared under a different guise in January 1979 when the threat of serious famine in Rhodesia prompted Maurice Chandler and Hugh Hanning to submit to the DIA of the BCC a suggestion that a major disaster relief exercise be mounted there. They considered the case for it to be unimpeachable because sovereignty still resided in the United Kingdom, though tangentially they suggested that sovereignty issues be ignored in crises of this sort; functionally NATO would be the best agency to undertake this operation; though politically the EEC might be preferable, as an organization it lacked hardware and executive ability; Zambia might provide a base for planes and the cost would be borne by five or six of the richest Western governments.

There was also an interesting suggestion about how this might be used to gain political advantage – if the various factions in Rhodesia did not agree to the recent Anglo-American initiative they might be threatened with a cut-off in aid. This would appear to more of the bizarre mixture of humanitarian impulse and Machiavellian scheming which, it has been noted already, marked much IAC thinking.²⁸ However, and not surprisingly, at the meeting of the BCC's Rhodesia Group in March there was little enthusiasm for this idea largely on the grounds of legitimacy, lack of neutrality and the general unsuitability of the situation.²⁹

In a more familiar form the issue reappeared later that same year and from a source which showed how the IAC's persistence with this issue had influenced others. On the 4th September 1979 the Chairman of the DIA of the BCC wrote to Lord Carrington, now Foreign Secretary in the new Conservative Government, suggesting yet again that a British or Commonwealth Peacekeeping Force be used during the period leading up to majority rule.³⁰ The idea certainly continued to be routinely endorsed as sound in IAC inner circles. In official vein a statement by the IAC, put out over Maurice Chandler's signature on 16th March 1978 which welcomed the internal agreement as a first step to the establishment of a multi-racial Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, reaffirmed

²⁸ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/2, document of 22/1/79.

²⁹ BSR/IAC/BCC/1/4, Minutes dated 20/3/79.

³⁰ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5.

support for both the introduction of specialist personnel from outside the country to assist in the reorganization of the armed forces and police and for the creation of international machinery to supervise and monitor the testing of Rhodesian public opinion.³¹ A comment in a letter from the Archbishop of Canterbury to Eldon Griffiths, MP, on 2nd March 1978, that a Peacekeeping Force could play a useful role in Rhodesia, demonstrates how an idea which had begun within the Church as the personal project of an executive member of the IAC had thoroughly penetrated the hierarchy of the Church of England.³²

It is impossible to judge how far pressure from the Church of England was contributory to the decision in 1979 to send a Commonwealth Monitoring Force to Rhodesia to supervise the elections. Members of the IAC Executive certainly felt that their ideas had been an early and formative influence. And IAC contacts with Government and Opposition figures were significant enough and the pressure exerted was persistent enough for the matter to be kept consistently in the public and Government eye. This however is probably as far as one can go given that some form of Peacekeeping or Monitoring Force was considered at one time or another by a variety of different parties to the conflict and that the situation itself as it had developed by 1979 was the determining factor in the choice of suitable handling device.

Moreover it should be considered how different a solution might have emerged if a Peacekeeping Force had been introduced into Rhodesia in 1975. The situation would have been artificially frozen and an even bloodier struggle might have ensued. The Peacekeeping Force could not, as the IAC supposed, have been seen as a solution of itself but merely as an instrument to the facilitation of a solution; the solution which eventually emerged was, as it had to be, a political one and the Peacekeeping Force was merely an enabling instrument to the establishment of legitimacy.

³¹ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/1.

³² BSR/IAC/LAM/3.

SECTION II.9: THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AS FACILITATOR.

While attempts to further the adoption as official Government policy of a Peacekeeping Force were the IAC's most high-profile activity during these years their role as facilitator of meetings between parties to the conflict was also significant.

Many politicians who passed through London during the 1970's made contact with the Church of England or the BCC. This probably indicated, not a specially assumed role in this crisis, but over a century of custom and conditioning – making contact as it were with the home base. Robert Mugabe and his party were the most notable exceptions here, partly as a result of the Church of England's refusal to accept the strength of their power base in Rhodesia and the legitimacy of their platform and partly for the more simple reason that Mugabe had been brought up as a Roman Catholic and remained considerably closer to the Catholic Church and its information systems.¹

It should also be noted that Church of England contact with Bishop Muzorewa and the ANC was considerably greater than with other parties to the conflict, though the Lancaster House talks in London demonstrated a web of mobilizable contacts across a wide spectrum of Rhodesian opinion. Individual and structural inclination towards a non-extreme solution reinforced by one-sided sources of information inclined the IAC to favour the compromise which Muzorewa appeared to represent.

Thus the IAC's attempts at facilitation were inherently flawed because they were based on a preconceived preferred outcome which in turn was based on an inaccurate evaluation of the strengths and levels of support of the various groups in Rhodesia and a failure also to recognise that these changed over time. These misperceptions were fed by a blinkered view of what constituted legitimate sources of information and an inclination to listen most to information which fitted already formed preferences and preconceptions.

¹ This may well be the reason why the Catholic Institute of International Relations in London made consistently more accurate predictions about likely outcomes in Rhodesia than did the IAC. One should remember too that the experience of 'backing the wrong horse' in Angola and Mozambique had definitely sensitized the Roman Catholic Church to the folly of underestimating indigenous support for Marxist movements in Southern Africa.

Facilitation too was closely bound up with the obtaining and evaluation of information. In March 1976 Lord Elton met Mr. Chinamanu, Vice-President of the ANC, who was visiting London. Elton harboured some legitimate doubts about his judgement because he claimed that there was no animosity between the various groups fighting for freedom in Rhodesia and because he considered him over-sanguine over both the likelihood of all groups accepting a settlement with Smith's regime and over the willingness of guerillas to come in from the bush when a majority rule state had been established.²

Just over a year later came a report of a meeting in London with leading members of the ANC who said that they would welcome a referendum under supervision (British, Commonwealth, US or international) to decide which leader had majority support to lead the interim government. The report could hardly be designated unbiased however because such a referendum was very much Muzorewa's plan and was opposed by Mugabe and Nkomo, whose position within Rhodesia was very much downplayed in this document. Moreover Mr. Kanoderaka, leader of the delegation, was Treasurer to Muzorewa.³

In July 1977 Elton reported on a lunch he had given for Mr. Nyandoro, Treasurer to the ANC, Mr. Mapondera, Permanent Representative of the ANC in London, David Harrison, Assistant Chief Editor of Panorama, and his assistant. The Rhodesians had said that the guerillas could not operate without the aid of the ANC and were therefore effectively its operating arm. Elton observed, somewhat wryly, that they had now heard from each of the nationalist groups that they had exclusive control of the guerilla forces. Elton suggested to them that, as the UK and the UN had both rejected the idea of sending a Peacekeeping Force to Rhodesia, a force drawn from acceptable members of the Commonwealth might be acceptable. This had apparently not been rejected by the Rhodesians and Harrison of Panorama had also noted it. The object of the exercise had obviously been to set up a Panorama programme to publicize the ANC's and Muzorewa's views, and, of course, indirectly those of the IAC, and Harrison had said that although Panorama

² BSR/IAC/SAF/5/1, confidential report of 12/3/76.

³ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/1, report of 30/3/77.

was now finishing for the summer, he would contact Nyandoro and Mapondera again because he thought that a programme on Muzorewa actively promoting the political programme now being prepared by the ANC would be interesting.⁴

More significant than this meeting however was John Mapondera's request to Elton to arrange a meeting between Bishop Muzorewa, the Archbishop of Canterbury and Margaret Thatcher, leader of the Conservative Party.⁵ As this would be a major meeting Elton and Maurice Chandler went with Hugh Whitworth, Assistant to the Archbishop of Canterbury, and Hugh Han-ning on a preliminary visit to Muzorewa to find out what he wanted to talk to Thatcher and the Archbishop about.⁶

This turned out to be a set of independent proposals to the Foreign Secretary which he wished to publicize and also the desire to impress on the Foreign Secretary and the British public the need for urgency. Muzorewa wished for all Zimbabweans (sic) to participate in an election but claimed to know that they did not want a constitution devised by the Front Line Presidents, but rather a democratic constitution democratically approved.

Elton suggested that his proposals⁷ were hardly innovative, but he was also deeply sceptical about the time scale envisaged by Muzorewa. He met again with Muzorewa after the latter had seen the Foreign Secretary on 15th August⁸ and strongly disagreed with Owen's assessment of Muzorewa's hope that a Constitutional Council could report in three months as not over-optimistic.

He, Elton, predicted⁹ that as the Patriotic Front could not hope to win a fair election, and a fair constitution would therefore be a passport to limbo for them, they would resist the new con-

⁴ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5, report of 15/7/77.

⁵ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/4, letter of 9/8/77.

⁶ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/4, visit of 10/8/77.

⁷ A Constitutional Committee to be set up as soon as possible chaired by a constitutional lawyer appointed by the British Government to draft a constitution within two months, the passage by the British Government of legislation to implement the new constitution by January 1978, the formation by the British Government of a caretaker government to organize and supervise a free general election of the first independence parliament, the provision of facilities for all Zimbabweans including the guerillas to take part in the general election and the holding of this general election by March 1978.

⁸ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5.

⁹ *Ibid.*, memo of 16/8/77.

stitution at every stage of its drafting process and perhaps try to discredit it by boycotting elections or by using violence to stop elections taking place. The danger, as he saw it, was that the British Government might be browbeaten into a constitution or franchise which put the Patriotic Front at an unfair advantage or alternatively might 'funk' the consequences of putting a fair constitution into effect. This, to return to the IAC's favourite recipe, was why a Peacekeeping Force for the interim period might prove so useful.

The analysis here of the likely activities of the Patriotic Front proved to be reasonably accurate, but the reasons for their activities, that is the fear of extinction under a fair constitution and franchise, were disproved by events. This miscalculation of the Patriotic Front's strength and the concomitant analysis of Muzorewa's support as considerable was, perhaps unconsciously, the pivot of all IAC miscalculations over Rhodesia. More credence was given too to Muzorewa's information about the situation generally than might sceptically have been sensible; Elton in this same memorandum reports for example Muzorewa's claim that rivalry within the Patriotic Front meant that it did not exist as an entity – a statement with some element of truth in that ZANU and ZAPU had deep and ultimately irreconcilable differences, largely of a tribal nature, but neglectful of the fact that they were individually strong and might prove in the event capable of enough co-ordinated activity to obtain a specified and mutually desired end – as they did.

About a month later Elton reported another meeting, this time with Alfred Mwanuka who apparently knew Nkomo well but who also discounted influence attributed to the Patriotic Front.¹⁰ Once again one sees the reinforcing of misperception, of a position against which so much counter-information existed that one begins to ask whether the IAC, and by extension the Church as a whole, was using information in an unconsciously discriminatory manner to reinforce the scenario and possible future that was most desirable to them.

Thus it is probably inappropriate to describe the Church of England as a facilitator here. It was not neutral and because of its perceived bias stood no chance of being approached for its services by all interested parties to the conflict. What the IAC was attempting to facilitate was its

¹⁰ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/1, report of 19/9/77.

own preferred outcome.

SECTION IL10: INFORMATION GATHERING AND THE FORMATION OF OPINION.

Earlier in this chapter the importance to the IAC of formulating and disseminating a 'correct view' was mentioned, this being one of its major functions within the Church of England's central organization. There was no shortage of information on which to base judgement on the parameters of the situation and the relative merits of the various protagonists to the unfolding conflict – some of the input has been discussed in the previous section. The Church's central organization was in receipt of testimony and literature from every conceivable shade of opinion in Rhodesia itself and from those interested outsiders who visited or even who held strong opinions about the situation. Mention too has already been made of the increasingly overt East/West dimension in IAC thinking on Rhodesia and on its pivotal position in Southern Africa. This was contrasted with the BCC view which remained far more firmly fixed on the Christian parameters of the situation and the obligation of British Christians to their Christian brothers in Rhodesia in terms both of spiritual support and of work and prayer for the furtherance of their human rights. One is forced therefore both to document the development of the IAC's in-house view and to ask why it should so develop.

Early developments and divergence from BCC views have already been noted. From the middle of the decade the strands of thought already present seemed to harden and this was largely a function of the sort of information being fed into the IAC and of the IAC's discrimination amongst this information.

In a letter to Hugh Hanning for example at the beginning of February, 1976 Hugh Elliott reported a recent visit he had made to Rhodesia and his meetings with various political leaders there including several Cabinet Ministers. Towards the end of March he wrote to the Times emphasising the need for 'our kith and kin' to be persuaded to a peaceful transfer of power to the Africans; otherwise the Marxist guerillas would take over.¹

The same theme recurred in a letter to Maurice Chandler from Rodney Elton in July when

¹ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/1, letter of 7/2/76 and letter of 22/3/76.

he reported a lunch with Sir Cyril Hatty, a Rhodesian convinced of the need for moderate change and fearful that the Marxist-backed guerillas might triumph if Britain did not reach a settlement with Rhodesia. Hatty hoped for some outside initiative which might lend credibility to the "significant group of thoughtful men, both black and white in Rhodesia" who might provide a counterweight for Ian Smith against his intransigent right wing and help him to move more easily to a just settlement. He had in mind a land purchase for Africans balanced with compensation for white farmers. Elton reported that he had arranged for Sir Cyril to see Reginald Maudling²

As was so often the case there was both wisdom and blindness in this analysis; wisdom because the unfairness of the Land Apportionment Act was indeed one of the major causes of resentment among the black population; blindness because the position of ZANU particularly was by this time becoming so hardened that the time had passed when a mere liberalization of the Smith regime would satisfy the guerilla movement.

In October Hugh Elliott emphasized the main points of the analysis being formed by the IAC when he wrote to Hanning that he had recently been collecting information on the ANC and Muzorewa was more constructive than Nkomo and had a higher percentage of support. He discounted the influence of Mugabe and the other guerilla leaders.³ This was a month before Elton's report on the seminar he had attended with Garfield Todd over the deadlocked Geneva negotiations⁴ where once again the dangers of Marxist influence in Southern Africa were stressed as well as the existence of moderate white opinion. This latter group was said by Todd to be "open to persuasion" to the benefits of a multiracial policy despite Smith, but was apparently difficult to contact because of government control of the media and large political meetings.⁵

It should be noted however that Elton was prescient enough to suggest that the British Government should identify itself as the protagonist of the African people whose representatives would inevitably come to power in the next few years; this would prevent the alienation of the

² BSR/IAC/AFR/2/1, letter dated 19/7/76.

³ *Ibid*, letter of 20/10/76.

⁴ see Section II.8.

⁵ *Ibid*, memo from Elton to Carrington, 2/12/76.

emergent Zimbabwe. It is perhaps unfortunate that the IAC did not consider the implications of this suggestion more thoroughly in relation to its own policy.

An indication of how close were the IAC's information gathering sources to Government and how overlapping were the various functions of its members was given in a memo from Rodney Elton to Lord Carrington at the end of 1976. In this he passed on information he had gathered on Rhodesia during a meeting with Ted Rowlands, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. This was the time of the deadlocked negotiations on the Kissinger proposals in Geneva and Elton hoped for an initiative from the British Government as suggested by Garfield Todd.⁶ Elton suggested that this take the form of a Third Party Peacekeeping Force and Rowlands raised certain reservations over this. However in addition Rowlands had told him that HMG was holding out for a workable solution in Geneva even though this meant a bad press due to public perception of an instant solution's being rejected. The whole viability of the plan rested on Smith's willingness to co-operate because there was no question of a forcible solution. Voerster, Rowlands suggested, was the key to Smith and after Soweto⁷ Voerster might be willing to ditch the white Rhodesians to ease his own internal problems, but Smith's commitment to these negotiations was in doubt. Rowlands had given the impression that if the Geneva talks broke down the package would be put to the Rhodesian people but he was very vague about how this might be done. He was also apparently non-committal on the question of whether HMG was aware that there was a growing body of white Rhodesian opinion favourable to a settlement in spite of Ian Smith.

This interview is interesting in its mixture of acute analysis – the relationship between Smith and Voerster – and a fairly obvious desire to be as little involved in the situation as possible – vague plans for putting the package to the Rhodesian people. It may be that the correct interpretation of Rowlands' lack of reaction to the suggestion that a section of the white Rhode-

⁶ See Section II.8.

⁷ On 16th June 1976 15,000 children from Soweto marching to object to Bantu education were shot at by the South African police. Over the next few weeks over 600 people died, unrest in South Africa increased considerably and there was considerable international protest.

sian population was ready to negotiate was a realization that the moment had passed when variations on a theme of power sharing might be employed; but equally his obvious unwillingness to commit himself might merely have been a political hesitation in the face of a man, Lord Elton, who played dual roles in the Opposition and in the Church of England, both of which were regarded with some reservation by the Government.

Elton's pivotal role as collector and purveyor of information was well illustrated by the last paragraphs of this memorandum to Carrington when he passed on information from Hanning: "My colleague, Hugh Hanning, says that within the Foreign Office the following points are being considered."⁸ These points included the possibility that the position of Chief Minister might be shared, that a Commission headed by a Briton be appointed to control Law and Order, that secondment of Commonwealth personnel into the police and armed services might be desirable and that the use of Commonwealth units was not ruled out but this would have to be acceptable to Rhodesia's neighbours. This episode demonstrated that the IAC's ability to elicit information and therefore to be in a position to influence events would seem to have been at least partially dependent on its ability to be itself a useful source of information; information could be traded for further information and a listening ear. In view of the sources of information available to him Elton's conclusions about the Rhodesian situation in a position paper written at the end of 1976, and before the failure of the Geneva negotiations, are not surprising.⁹ The time for settlement, he concluded, was now short; at any moment the guerilla leaders might withdraw or use the negotiations as a platform for a propaganda campaign in support of their military activities. However their acceptance of any settlement was now critical and it was no longer the case, as it might have been two years ago, that an agreement might be reached between the white administration in Rhodesia and the British Government with the agreement of the Front Line Presidents. Smith was heavily dependent on Voerster for support but the latter was now, in the aftermath of Soweto, deeply concerned with his own internal situation and much less supportive of Smith. Within Rho-

⁸ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/1, 9/12/76.

⁹ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/1, draft of 13/12/76.

desia itself Smith was still largely seen as the indispensable representative of the white administration but the Church's sources during the last six months had suggested a growing body of informed white opinion, especially among businessmen, who were in favour of a settlement even if this had to be made without Ian Smith. It should, he suggested, be a prime objective of the British Government to support such a movement and to encourage it to become organized and articulate. This however would mean banishing any lingering suspicion in Rhodesia that any influential section of the British Establishment either in the City or Westminster would always put the interests of white Rhodesians before those of black Rhodesians.

If a settlement were not achieved, Elton concluded, the two fold result would be that much blame would attach in African eyes to the British Government and that there would be competition between Moscow and Peking factions to control the guerilla movements.¹⁰ He saw no hope of a ceasefire before a settlement, and the introduction of any external force into Rhodesia without the blessing of the guerilla leaders would be seen as support for Smith against their interests and hence would not stop the war. The case therefore for external intervention would be strongest after a settlement and, as the parties to the talks in Geneva were too paralyzed by fear of compromising themselves to undertake contingency planning, he reported that this was well under way at the IPA.

Contact had been established too between the IPA, the British negotiators in Geneva and the Commonwealth Secretariat. Because there was so much pressure on the British Government to undertake some positive initiative in Geneva there seemed some movement towards a policy of declaring the negotiations abandoned and appointing a Governor and Council. However this scheme was subject to the strong objections that Britain did not have the military or political strength to overcome even token resistance and that, however much the guerilla leaders might seem to agree to such a plan in Geneva, there would probably be serious disagreement between them if such appointments were made.

¹⁰ He reported an authoritative source as saying that there was a build-up of Cuban troops and armour in Mozambique which could be "into Rhodesia by Christmas". *Ibid*, p. 3.

This is a clear and well-informed resume of the position in Rhodesia as it stood at the end of 1976. There is no indication of anything but a clear realization that Smith's position was not only untenable in the long run but that it deserved no support in Britain. It is realistic about the South African situation and about the potential for fission among the guerilla groups. It is however a document which might just as easily have emanated from the Foreign Office, and indeed the Foreign Office might appear to have been a more likely and a more suitable source. There is once again no hint of a principled pre-position on the part of the Church of England, of a standard to which the present situation might be matched, compared, perhaps found wanting. The underlying theme is pragmatism, and, while it would go much too far to suggest that an agnosticism as to outcome was apparent, there is no hint of what the parameters of a just society, which the Church would consider indispensable to an acceptable outcome, would be. There is no use for example of the Six Principles as a benchmark against which any settlement should be compared, equally no presumption that natural justice, in terms of equality of right to participate in government, legislation and society, must be a minimum requirement. This criticism may itself be unjust in that Elton was preparing a position paper not a major statement on the Church's position but in this case, and many others, it seems reasonable to emphasize, not what was said, but what was not said.

Information being received during 1977 did nothing to change the IAC's general position. A letter from John Davies, MP, to Elton in January emphasized how crucial the attitude of the new administration in Washington was perceived to be in the context of Rhodesia.¹¹ The two-way traffic in information exchange continued between these correspondents with Elton later in January recounting a conversation he had had with Alan Savory, Chairman of the Combined Rhodesia Opposition Parties. Savory had told him that white Rhodesians distrusted all British politicians and, if the question of a suitable governor arose, they would prefer a man of action – someone with a good record in the Malaysian insurgency would be ideal.¹² White Rhodesians were also,

¹¹ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/1, letter of 6/1/77.

¹² Elton had previously suggested that Malcolm Macdonald might be approached, indeed had sounded out the ground with MacDonald himself, but Savory reported that he would be no more acceptable than any other politician.

he reported, still loyal to the Crown and the nearer the Governor or Commissioner were seen to be to the Crown the more acceptable he would be; Elton commented that it was a pity that Lord Mountbatten was not a few years younger.¹³

Another memo from Elton to the IAC during the same month correctly pointed out the innate rivalry between ZANU and ZAPU despite their temporary alliance, but significantly misjudged Mugabe who, Elton claimed, "danced to the tune of the guerilla commanders."¹⁴ He also suggested that while the Front Line Presidents supported the guerillas most of the blacks inside Rhodesia preferred Muzorewa, a sustainable analysis at this particular time but one that should have been re-examined in the light of future developments.

Importantly however, in the light of previous criticisms, Elton did pinpoint what humanitarian and Christian concern should be in Rhodesia – the establishment of a just society throughout South Africa by just means. The significance of the juxtaposition of means and ends is significant and has already been discussed. The modification and dilution of each by the other would seem not only inevitable but also one of the major theological and theoretical problems facing this, or any, church. If the desirability of the means employed is to be emphasised is the commitment to ends less than wholehearted? If total commitment is made to such a desired end as a just society can any means, however heavy in cost to human life and its quality, be tolerated? It is arguable that much of the contortion and seeming irresolution in Church thinking and attempts at policy formulation spring from this ultimately unresolvable problem.

Some of the fundamental problems involved were addressed more closely however at the IAC meeting on 26th January, 1977 when Jim Wilkie, Africa Secretary of the BCC, analyzed the post-Kissinger situation. His assessment of Ian Smith was that he had no real intention of handing over power and now probably intended to hang on from year to year, although he no longer enjoyed the same degree of support among whites as formerly. In discussion on possible policy options it was asked whether any purpose would be served in trying to draw attention to the

¹³ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/1, letter of 13/1/77.

¹⁴ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5, memo to IAC of 12/1/77.

reported plan to withdraw guerillas to the Front Line countries for retraining purposes prior to independence – this to be tied in with the IPC's proposals for a Commonwealth peacekeeping role. It was also suggested that an opportunity existed for an internal agreement between Smith and Muzorewa on roughly Kissinger lines with guarantees of fair play over control of the police and security forces; however this was thought likely to founder on Smith's insistence that such control be retained in white hands. Further suggestions ranged over contacting the Front Line Presidents with offers to assist in their attempts to maintain stability in the area, through a change in attitude to the Smith regime, to a public recognition that Smith would never agree to a transfer of power to black Africans and should no longer be negotiated with. While there was general recognition that the key to Salisbury lay in Pretoria there was also the prescient comment that "The churches must be careful to select the right emphases and make human rights, freedom and independence their principal concerns,"¹⁵ It is unfortunate that this was not a truth more constantly born in mind through the whole decade.

The IAC's rather desperate search for a solution, or even a crack in the armour of intransigence shown by the parties to the conflict, was reflective of the Government's situation as well as their own; but, apart from the comment above, there was again no mention in this very full discussion of an irreducible Church of England minimum without which any settlement would lack legitimacy. The situation was very much held over by the agreement that a memo on the Committee Meeting and the meeting on the same subject to be held during Synod week should be drawn up by the Executive Officers and sent to the two Anglican bishops in Rhodesia. Once again a tried and trusted source of information and advice was to be used, one which was predictable and would recommend no unpleasantly radical solutions; one unfortunately which was also inherently biased.

At their meeting in May the IAC had the opportunity to hear a different view of Mugabe, the guerilla leader they most generally distrusted, from Bishop Donal Lamont, Roman Catholic Bishop of Rhodesia, who had recently been deported from the country. In his opinion Mugabe,

¹⁵ IAC Minutes, 26/1/77, p. 3.

¹⁵ Lamont had come to represent Church opposition to the Smith regime whose intransigence he objected to on the basis

with whom he had held several conversations, was a sincere Christian and one who, Lamont felt, would make way if a referendum gave power to a party other than the Patriotic Front. He brought news too of atrocities committed by the security forces who burned and tortured in villages which guerillas had visited without being denounced. His testimony was corroborated at the same meeting by that of a young missionary in Bonda who had witnessed visits to villages from both freedom fighters and security forces. Interestingly she also reported that the freedom fighters regarded the Protestant Churches "as hostile to the cause of liberation and their black clergy as either irrelevant or disloyal."¹⁶

However this meeting, despite what one might have expected to be the uncomfortably destabilizing evidence of two unimpeachable witnesses and at which so much time was spent on discussing the impasse in Rhodesia, still came to the conclusion that in the absence of any more constructive proposals from the British Government it would continue to advocate that panacea for all ills, a Commonwealth peacekeeping presence.

However a new and unusual note amongst IAC members, and one more in sympathy with Lamont's views, was sounded at this meeting by Giles Ecclestone who stressed that, although the Marxist affiliations of the freedom fighters were much dwelt upon, nationalism was just as important to them; and all lines of communication with them should be kept open. Moreover the Committee should look closely at the factors propping up Ian Smith, most important among them the continued supply of fuel.

It is possible to isolate here, by the very infrequency of such urging to the Committee, one of the factors which oversimplified the deliberations of the IAC. The possibility that African Marxism had heavy undertones of nationalism was scarcely considered, and consequently African Marxism was judged in terms of the guiding ideology of the Eastern bloc whose interests were seen as implacably opposed to those of the West on all fronts; not surprisingly it was found

that it would drive the black population towards the promise of Marxism. The Roman Catholic Church in Rhodesia was far more heavily represented amongst the black population than were the Anglican or Methodist Churches. Lamont had been sentenced to ten years imprisonment for failing to report the presence of guerillas on one of his mission stations. He came to the IAC on this occasion largely to express his thanks for their representations on his behalf to the Smith administration at the time of his arrest and trial.

¹⁶ IAC Minutes, 17/5/77, p. 4.

wanting in a scenario which identified good and evil, light and dark, religion and irreligion. That Mugabe and Nkomo would accept help from any quarter whence it was offered was demonstrably clear; that Mugabe indeed had an ideological preference for help from those states with a ruling Marxist ideology was also clear; that either of them were prepared after years of exile and self-sacrifice to head a Soviet or Chinese or Cuban dominated state was far from clear.

However such subtleties of interpretation were not apparent in the official briefing for Robert Runcie, then Bishop of St. Albans, when he attended the Conference of World Religious Workers for Peace, Disarmament and Just Relations between Nations in Moscow in June 1977. Hanning's brief on the Soviet Union and the Developing World contained a special section on Rhodesia:- "The biggest obstacle to a peaceful transfer of power today is the violent policy pursued by Robert Mugabe, and now Joshua Nkomo, supported by Machel and egged on by Russia."¹⁷ Given that the location of the conference might have persuaded Hanning that a firm and unconcessionary line on Soviet intervention in Southern Africa was desirable, this was still a highly contentious and one-dimensional summary of the situation.

The early months of 1978 saw negotiations over the internal settlement and finally the setting up of the interim government of Smith, Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau; and the first half of the year for the IAC was taken up with preparing an official Church reaction. The IAC meeting on 13th March considered letters to the Committee from Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker and to the Archbishop of Canterbury from Eldon Griffiths MP, calling on the Church to adopt a positive attitude to the internal settlement. The Church, Eldon Griffiths suggested, should welcome the "progress made in Salisbury" and appeal to Nkomo "to call off the armed struggle and join in the new unilateral government."¹⁸ The general tenor of his views can be ascertained from his further statement that:- "In my view it was always wrong for any part of the Anglican Communion to be supporting directly or indirectly the so-called 'armed struggle' in Rhodesia."¹⁹ Sir Douglas suggested further that more and more people wondered why the Church remained silent and the

¹⁷ BSR/IAC/LAM/2, brief dated 27/5/77, p. 2.

¹⁸ BSR/IAC/LAM/3, letter of 2/3/78 from Eldon Griffiths, MP, to the Archbishop of Canterbury.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

Government somewhat lukewarm.

There was a very obvious difference of opinion in the discussion which followed between those Committee members who saw the internal settlement as a victory for the ballot box and those who realised that a white dominated black government which excluded Nkomo and Mugabe offered neither the hope of an equitable nor of a peaceful solution. It was finally agreed however that Hugh Hanning as Secretary should draft a four-part statement. This would welcome the internal settlement as a first step, look forward to the speedy implementation of the principles of the agreement, urge a widening of the area of agreement which would include the three other parties – Nkomo, Mugabe and the white extremists – call for international supervision of the referendum and subsequent elections, and, inevitably, propose the inclusion of an international element in the security forces: this position paper would be put before the BCC Rhodesia Group and other interested persons and parties. It was also inevitably agreed that the Secretary should write to the bishops in Rhodesia to seek their opinion.²⁰

An official statement by the IAC signed by Maurice Chandler was put out on 21st March as a CIO press release. It welcomed the settlement as a first step to a multi-racial Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and encouraged those who had stood apart from the agreement to participate.²¹ Generally approving comments on the statement were received from the Bishops of Mashonaland and Matabeleland, the general tenor of whose views and connections has already been indicated. Mashonaland, whose personal chaplain had administered the oath to Muzorewa, Chirau and Sithole, particularly advocated support because ... "the internal settlement has ... the major support of all races here beyond any possible doubt."²²

Matabeleland saw three possible options for the British Government – to persuade the Patriotic Front to accept a fifth share in the interim government and then to take their chances at an election (he claimed that they would be reluctant to do this), hand over Rhodesia to the Patriotic Front now (in which case, in the Bishop's opinion, tribal war and Marxist rule were a possibility)

²⁰ IAC Minutes, 13/3/78, p. 3.

²¹ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/1, official statement of 16/3/77.

²² BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5, letter of 22/3/78 from Bishop of Mashonaland to Hugh Hanning.

or to recognise that complete satisfaction for all parties was impossible and accept the settlement acceptable to most – the internal settlement. This was the option which the Bishop supported, "And I should have thought it was the view most consistent with old-fashioned theology."²³ Matabeleland followed up his first letter by another in April in which he told Hanning that most of the black clergy in the dioceses of Mashona and Matabele favoured the internal settlement, though some Ndebele priests might disapprove.²⁴ One sees yet again the reinforcing of misperception by the soliciting of information from what ought to have been perceived as biased sources.

In April the Archbishop of Canterbury took part in a major House of Lords debate on Rhodesia and spoke to a brief provided by Hanning.²⁵ In this brief Hanning made it clear that the IAC supported the internal settlement in conformity with the advice of the Rhodesian bishops,²⁶ and favoured the introduction of a third party peacekeeping presence in Rhodesia. The Archbishop, using the words of the official statement of 21st March, supported the settlement as a first step to establishing a multi-racial democratic Rhodesia.²⁷

However the IAC statement and the manner of its issue were not received with universal approval. By the BCC they were regarded as highly contentious and some members of the IAC itself were overtly critical of the content and manner of the issue of the press release. It has already been noted that at the IAC meeting on 13th March it was suggested that no statement should be issued before the meeting of the BCC's Rhodesia Group on the following Monday; moreover no mention of a press release appears in the Minutes of the 13th March IAC Meeting. When, at the next meeting on 16th May, Giles Ecclestone pointed out that the urgency of the situation had not been such as to override the obligation to act ecumenically, Maurice Chandler pointed out that the statement had not been *issued* until after the BCC Meeting. Two other members of the Committee expressed similar surprise and were told that it had been important to

²³ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5, letter of 22/3/78 from Bishop of Matabeleland to Hugh Hanning.

²⁴ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5, letter of 16/4/78 from the Bishop of Matabeleland to Hugh Hanning.

²⁵ BSR/IAC/LAM/3, letter of 14/4/78 from Hugh Hanning to Hugh Whitworth, the Archbishop's Personal Assistant.

²⁶ This was received incidentally after the statement had been made.

²⁷ BSR/IAC/LAM/3, extract from, Yesterday in Parliament column in *Daily Telegraph* 17/4/78.

produce a statement ... "not least to advise the Archbishop of Canterbury in his response to questions he had received on the matter."²⁸ The tone of the minutes indicates that the discussion developed into a debate on whether the IAC should have issued a statement as it did.

There is no doubt that the issue of a press release exceeded the agreement as laid down in the Minutes of 13th March. Equally it is clear that, while the statement might not have been issued before the Rhodesia Group Meeting, it had been *prepared* by 16th March and sent out to the Rhodesian Bishops. One must see this as an example of executive action exceeding its Committee-authorized brief. One should remember that there had already been complaint and there would soon be more by Paul Oestreicher about the rubber-stamp quality of the full IAC on the decisions of the Executive members and Chairman, and this would seem to be a good example of the process of which he complained. One should also remember the less than happy state of relations between the BCC's DIA and certain members of the IAC centring on the publication of the 'Rhodesia Now' document in 1977. Maurice Chandler and Hugh Hanning did not regard the BCC as 'sound' on Rhodesia and resented efforts of the more ecumenically minded members of the IAC such as Giles Ecclestone to urge a more co-operative perspective. However their assertion of the Church of England's right to independence was made on very shaky ground and in a cause to which even the British Government, with its overwhelming desire to avoid more than a minimal role in the post-UDI settlement, would not commit itself unless the guerilla leaders were included.

By June the failings of the Interim Government and the poverty of Ian Smith's intentions were becoming clear even to those who had hoped that this middle, comparatively non-radical, way might succeed. After its miscalculation the IAC seems to have turned back to the British Government as the only likely source of a solution and in June issued a joint statement on the situation with the BCC and the Roman Catholic Commission for International Justice and Peace. The tenor of this statement was provided by its title – 'Rhodesia – the deteriorating situation and urgent need for talks' and it called on the British Government to redouble its efforts to bring all

²⁸ IAC Minutes, 16/5/78, p.3.

parties to the conference table.²⁹ By the middle of July the IAC's disillusionment with the internal settlement seemed complete when, in a memo to Elton, Hugh Hanning commented that it had been worth trying ... "but has achieved extraordinarily little."³⁰

In July an emergency meeting of the Rhodesia Group of the BCC took place,³¹ and its findings were reported to the July Meeting of the IAC.³² Jim Wilkie, the BCC's Executive Secretary for Africa, reported on his recent visit to Rhodesia, on the inexorable advance of the Patriotic Front and the breakdown of services there; the morale of the whites was broken and an urgent UK/USA/UN initiative was necessary to devise the handover of the country to the Patriotic Front in the shortest possible time. Inevitably the Committee went on to discuss possible outside intervention which would, of course, have to originate in Britain even if it were international in composition; this, it was felt, would appear highly suspect in the eyes of the world even if the motive were altruistic, and there could, in any case be no intervention without the agreement of the Patriotic Front. No conclusion as to suitable action emerged from this meeting though it was rather generally suspected that Ian Smith hoped for a Conservative election victory which might bring a change of policy over Rhodesia. There also emerged a general consensus that Rhodesia should be 'taken out of politics', whatever that might mean, and this resulted in Maurice Chandler's approach to the Foreign Secretary and to the Conservative Shadow Foreign Secretary.³³

At the September IAC Meeting Chandler reported that from his discussions with the Foreign Secretary and with John Davies of the Conservative Party he had been struck by the closeness of their views; they differed, he suggested, in emphasis and detail only. It was felt that this information might usefully be passed on to Ian Smith who was manifestly hoping that a Conservative Government might take a less intransigent view than a Labour Government on Rhodesia; Chandler agreed to communicate with both the Foreign Secretary and John Davies along these lines.³⁴ Accordingly he wrote to David Owen and to John Davies at the beginning of

²⁹ BSR/IAC/BCC/1/4, statement of 26/6/78.

³⁰ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5, memo of 17/7/78 from Hanning to Elton.

³¹ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5, Minutes of 18/7/78.

³² IAC Minutes of 19/7/78.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ IAC Minutes, 14/9/78.

October saying that the IAC's view was that Rhodesia "should be taken out of politics".³⁵

David Owen's reply was firm and without concession. He had, he said, never made party political capital out of Rhodesia and he subscribed to the objectives supported by the IAC, that is the establishment of a non-racial democratic state with its independence recognised by the international community.³⁶ Richard Luce of the Conservative Party took a rather different line in his reply. There were, he said, fundamental differences between the parties, not in objectives but in the means of obtaining these objectives. The Conservative Party felt that the Government should have given more help and encouragement to Rhodesian leaders to move towards majority rule and free and fair elections.³⁷

This was hardly therefore a successful initiative even in its own terms. David Owen denied that it was a party political issue and thus by extension that a concerted change of approach by Government or Opposition was necessary. All of Richard Luce's comments on the other hand confirmed its status for the Conservative Party as an issue out of which political capital might be made. Yet the IAC's analysis that Smith was hoping that a Conservative victory in the next election would by some unspecified and miraculous means let him off the hook was undeniably acute; and a declaration of common purpose at that stage might have caused movement.

That the IAC had abandoned hope of an internal settlement featuring Muzorewa was demonstrated by a position paper written at this time.³⁸ Here the British Government's policy was stated to be to install Nkomo and then to confirm the appointment by referendum although it was recognised that this would increase hostility between ZANU and ZAPU – Jim Wilkie's suggestion that the country be handed over to the Patriotic Front in the shortest possible time obviously still met with very little enthusiasm. The danger of civil war was discussed and an assessment given of who backed whom among the Patriotic Front.³⁹ There was only a tangential

³⁵ BSR/IAC/SEC/1/5, letters from Maurice Chandler to David Owen and John Davies, 5/10/78.

³⁶ *Ibid*, letter from David Owen to Maurice Chandler, 23/10/78.

³⁷ *Ibid*, letter from Richard Luce to Maurice Chandler, 24/10/78.

³⁸ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/4, undated.

³⁹ Tiny Rowland was thought to be financing Sithole and Muzorewa to recruit their own armies as well as backing Nkomo.

reference to Muzorewa and Sithole; and they were not mentioned in the context of who would control the future of the country.

The early months of 1979 saw the appearance of disquieting reports from Rhodesia about the increasing breakdown of the fabric of society and, most serious, the spread of famine. A report by David Steel, MP, and Tim Sheehy of the Catholic Institute for International Relations who visited the country early in the year detailed the general deterioration and inability of the security forces to keep order, their excesses and those of the auxiliary forces and guerillas; Steel's opinion was that Mugabe was in the ascendent although the government thought that they would win the coming election and referendum.⁴⁰ The IAC Meeting of 29th March brought a further report by Elliott Kendall of the Church Missionary Society of famine and the breakdown of law and order in some areas, of the access to slush funds in South Africa by the Transitional Government; Maurice Chandler corroborated this from information provided by the Red Cross who reported such serious shortcomings on both sides that they threatened to withdraw from the area. This was the information which prompted Hanning and Chandler to suggest to the DIA of the BCC that a Disaster Relief Force be sent to relieve the immediate plight of the Rhodesian people.⁴¹

In April, 1979 elections took place. These were closely observed by a variety of groups and three reports of major importance were produced all of which dealt with the fairness or otherwise of the electoral process. Two of these reports, those of Claire Palley, Professor of Law at the University of Kent,⁴² and Lord Chitnis, who headed the group of observers from the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, concluded that the elections were categorically not free and fair; in fact "The recent election in Rhodesia was nothing but a gigantic confidence trick..."⁴³

The third report was dissenting and is more interesting in terms of the formulation of

⁴⁰ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5, edited version of a confidential report to HMG, 16/1/79.

⁴¹ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/1, 9/12/76, see Section II.8.

⁴² Report on the Rhodesian Election of April 1979 by Professor Claire Palley, published by the Catholic Institute for International Relations, London, April 1979.

⁴³ 'Free and Fair': the 1979 Rhodesian Election', a report by observers on behalf of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, May 1979, publ. by the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, House of Commons, London, p. 52.

Church of England opinion in that Rodney Elton was a member of this group who monitored the election and prepared a report for the Prime Minister.⁴⁴ The group concluded that the election was ... "fairly conducted and above serious reproach".⁴⁵ Lord Colville reported in person to the IAC June meeting⁴⁶ and claimed that the group had been ... "harmonious, vigilant and cynical ...";⁴⁷ not only this but they had travelled widely in the country during the elections and spoken to a wide cross section of participants. Lord Elton's more recent memory of the group's work remains that it honestly reported opinions which were widely canvassed and freely given.⁴⁸ and his opinion of the validity of its findings at the time it was working is unchanged by subsequent events.

It was hardly surprising then that the IAC proceeded to resolve to have ... "sensible and rational discussions ..." with Muzorewa.⁴⁹ The election results revived a hope that had never quite died that Muzorewa's government might deliver an indigenous and non-radical solution. The maintenance of that hope entailed the usual discounting of conflicting evidence.

And the conflicting evidence in this case was strong and highly reputable – the reports of Lord Chitnis and Claire Palley; one might have expected that they would produce hesitation at least in viewing the elections as a clear validation of Muzorewa's regime. Other evidence too was available. The IAC received a report from the Africa Secretary of the Methodist Church's Overseas Division who had seen extensive intimidation during the elections.⁵⁰ Hugh Hanning also attended a meeting of the BCC's Rhodesia Group where a variety of speakers had been invited to attempt to determine the truth of allegations of intimidation; in a memo to Chandler at the beginning of May he said that he had found the speaker who claimed that there had been widespread Interim Government intimidation "very unimpressive".⁵¹

⁴⁴ The group consisted of Viscount Boyd of Merton, Viscount Colville of Culross, Sir Charles Johnston, Miles Hudson and Lord Elton: 'A Report on the recent election in Rhodesia', pub. London April 1979.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p. 2.

⁴⁶ IAC Minutes, 7/6/79, p. 3.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, p. 4.

⁴⁸ A personal interview in July 1988.

⁴⁹ IAC Minutes, 7/6/79, p. 5.

⁵⁰ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5, undated.

⁵¹ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5, memo dated 1/5/79.

The extent to which the Colville Report was out of line, not only with the Chitnis and the Palley reports, but with most Commonwealth thinking on Rhodesia/Zimbabwe might also have given some pause for thought. The Colville group for example claimed that the election had had a two-fold purpose one of which was the endorsement of the 1978 Constitution as a result of the high turnout. The extent of the unacceptability of this view was demonstrated at the Lusaka Conference of Commonwealth Heads of Government in August 1979 where a large majority of them refused to consider the election valid because no referendum had been held among black voters over the 1978 Constitution.

The weight of evidence was certainly enough to convince members of the DIA of the BCC. A position paper drafted by them in June 1979 and put out as a press release at the end of July called on the British Government to work towards an effective ceasefire, to find an interim authority acceptable to all parties to the conflict and to draw up a constitution on the basis of the Six Principles.⁵² There was no suggestion here that the Muzorewa Government's authority should be endorsed.

In the event movement within Rhodesia itself and the ultimate success of international efforts finally to resolve the conflict removed the need for either the IAC or BCC to take up elaborate positions or tentative negotiations with Muzorewa's Government. His position was soon demonstrated to be unviable in the sense that, without the support of the guerillas, he could not deliver peace, and without peace support for the ANC ebbed quickly away; he was therefore dependent on those who would never support him for the commodity without which he could not maintain the support he had.

The Lusaka Conference in August was the turning point, with proposals for a new constitutional conference and the remarkably rapid follow-up of the Lancaster House Conference in September. At the beginning of September a BCC statement welcomed the Lusaka proposals⁵³ and an indication that their hopes for a definitive solution were shared by the IAC was given at the

⁵² BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5, draft of 25/6/79 and press release of 22/7/79.

⁵³ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5, statement of 9/9/79.

IAC Meeting on 10th September when it was decided to hold all further action and statement until the outcome of the Conference was known.⁵⁴

Most interesting at this time was a letter from Hugh Hanning to various friends about the Lancaster House talks on which, as well as asking for their prayers, he reported from a highly informed inside position on a shift in attitude of the Patriotic Front leaders towards accepting elections with conditions.⁵⁵ It shows the Church of England as a genuine facilitator and one moreover who used an inside track unavailable to secular agencies.

There was a meeting at Caux prior to Lancaster House where nine black and seven white Rhodesians had confronted one another and important shifts in attitude had taken place as well as personal rapprochement. The participants had included Denis Walker and Andre Holland, from Ian Smith's party, and George Nyandoro, Ben Mutasa and Louis Gumbo, envoys of Muzorewa. Hanning commented particularly on the remarkable transformation in the relationship between Andre Holland and Byron Hove, later a member of the Mugabe Government, which was effected through their meeting at Caux:-

"Andre Holland changed his plans, accepting Hove's invitation and came to London for a remarkable forty eight hours. The Foreign Office let him in (normally he would have been banned): he and the Zambian High Commissioner spent an evening together which neither will forget; he had an unhurried interview with the Head of the Rhodesia Department in the FO ... ("I really believe I have met a British official I can trust," he said) after three hours with Byron Hove in the Westminster Theatre, he came out saying, "We are thinking of sending a cable to Salisbury: 'Conference unnecessary – we have settled it all.' He told us, "After all these years, for the first time I find I want to pray for Britain, and I will."⁵⁶

Obvious throughout the letter is the facilitating role that Hanning and his colleagues and friends played during the Lancaster House talks; he set up many meetings and meeting opportunities. The following passage gives a sense of the atmosphere of expectation and excitement obvious throughout the letter:-

"During the Conference the delegates have been scattered in different hotels and buried in endless meetings, so as to be almost inaccessible. But in extraordinary ways

⁵⁴ IAC Minutes, 10/9/79.

⁵⁵ BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5, letter of 29/9/79.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p. 3.

we have met many of them. Hugh was unexpectedly invited to the opening reception at Lancaster House, where he met most of the ANC delegation and also Sir Antony Duff and Derek Day. Henry bumped into Gary Magadzire who had arrived in London representing the African Farmers' Union. Tom Glen came down from Scotland to have an invaluable hour with his friend David Smith, Minister of Finance, who has fought for personal reconciliation at the conference. Jim Trehane came from Bristol to meet Kona, Chairman of Nkomo's party. Kedmon Hungwe and Sam Pono met one of Mugabe's men whom our men had been seeing in detention in Rhodesia, and who we did not know to be in London. Champion Chigwida (who has now returned to Rhodesia) did great work behind the scenes, meeting many delegates privately. Each day we have met as a team, with Conrad, Don Barnett and others, to seek fresh insights and to pray together.

Gary Magadzire has proved to be a gift from God. His work during the night hours (Often all night, seeing leaders on all sides) has been beyond price. He has presented them with the facts and figures of the terrible suffering in the rural areas, the loss of livestock, the collapse of farming and the imminence of famine – with the rains now starting and people unable to plant. He has fearlessly penetrated the leaders' citadels, often with harassment by the thugs guarding them, and challenged them to consider how to end the suffering as the first priority – and has struck important unexpected responses. His aim has been to get the Bishop, Nkomo and Mugabe to meet together in private (and we believe he has succeeded.)⁵⁷

This letter is an indication of how well a large and informal network of contacts like Hanning's could work when brought to bear with intensity on a finite project. The Lancaster House discussions were brought about by no agency of the IAC, indeed their stated and obvious preference until the very last moment had been for Bishop Muzorewa and the ANC, but their extensive contacts over time and place with many of the participants and their contacts in turn enabled them to play a valuable facilitating role. Their fears of a Marxist dominated successor government to Muzorewa were not removed:- "Tongogara, Mugabe's top guerilla commander ... has shown every sign of being a man who is far more realistic about the cost of the war and more concerned to build an honourable peace than the 'political' leaders in that camp – notably Eddison Zvogbu and Edgar Tekere, who are probably committed Marxists or used by them...";⁵⁸ they were still obviously hoping that the encouragement of pragmatists in Mugabe's party might vitiate a long-perceived Marxist ethos and Communist dominance. But an end to the conflict and the sufferings and increasingly likely starvation of large numbers of rural Rhodesians was now an imperative; there was no doubt at all of the physical and spiritual energy that the Executive

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p.5.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p. 2.

members of the IAC, particularly Hugh Hanning, lavished on the Conference. Nothing, in the opinion of this writer, became the IAC better during the whole decade than its work for this settlement.

In December the Lancaster House Agreement was signed and was warmly welcomed by the BCC, speaking on behalf of all its member churches and praying for ... "an end to bitterness and violence, for a peaceful election campaign, for a just political future based on forgiveness and human rights for all."⁵⁹ The Archbishop of Canterbury, on behalf of the Church of England, wrote to Lord Soames congratulating him on his appointment as Governor.⁶⁰

From now onwards IAC energies were concentrated on the problems which would be faced and the reconstruction that would be necessary in the new Zimbabwe; not only this but the need to educate Anglican opinion to the changes very obviously about to come was recognised. On the practical front Bishop Skelton of Lichfield, who had been a diocesan bishop in Rhodesia, reported to the January IAC Meeting that he had been asked to form part of a BCC team to visit the country and report on what post-Independence help would be needed; Michael Rose, Martin Box of Christian Aid, and he, would advise on the political, relief and pastoral aspects of the problem.⁶¹ The Christian Aid view was that aid should be directed at a total reconstruction of Church life throughout Rhodesia; general priorities were seen to be land reform and education. It was unfortunate that when, later in 1980, the Churches launched a joint appeal for reconstruction in Zimbabwe only £182,000 out of a hoped-for £1 million was raised because of the understandable media attention on and appeals for the starving in the Horn of Africa.⁶²

By this time no illusions appear to have remained about the post-Independence situation facing the Anglican Church; indeed so clear-sighted were the contemporary views of its failings that one is forced to ask why a more realistic assessment of probabilities could not have been made earlier. The main Christian influence in Zimbabwe was recognised as Roman Catholic,

⁵⁹ BSR/IAC/BCC/3/2 and BSR/IAC/AFR/2/5, press release of 19/12/79.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, of the same date.

⁶¹ IAC Minutes, 10/1/80, p. 2.

⁶² IAC Minutes, 16/7/80, p. 5.

especially since they now had a black Archbishop.⁶³ The Anglican Communion was seen to be in special difficulties because of the political stand taken by its two senior bishops who had given consistent support to the Rhodesia Front and the ANC; leadership of the Church was in disarray if not a complete anomaly; the Churches were generally weak and they did not know how to respond to the new situation; there was a desperate need for strategic thinking which was why the BCC had decided to encourage a steady stream of visitors to the country to try to input positive planning.⁶⁴

In terms of tactical understanding of the situation, Maurice Chandler reported to the January IAC Meeting a situation of interim government intimidation and dependence on South Africa which had never been admitted pre-Lancaster House. With new elections pending there was good reason to believe that South African personnel were operating in the Rhodesian Airforce, in armoured units and in Intelligence; Government auxiliaries had moved into areas vacated by freedom fighters and there was evidence that villages were being 'worked over' as during the 1979 election, which was not a view that had held out any appeal to the IAC while those elections were going on – indeed Government intimidation had been denied; rumours were being spread that people might lose their jobs or worse if Muzorewa did not win.⁶⁵

This seems at last to represent a willingness to accept the situation as it was and not how the IAC would like it to have been; the Bishop had backed the wrong side and could no longer be viewed as the legitimate head of the nationalist movement; Mugabe's aims had seriously to be considered. This is clearly demonstrated by Maurice Chandler's suggestion in January that an effort might be made, perhaps by an article in the Church Times, to present the fact that there were good reasons for believing that any government under Mugabe would be sympathetic to Christians in the country.⁶⁶ At the May meeting it was suggested that Maurice Chandler or the Chairman of the BSR should write to the Church Times commending Anglicans to support the

⁶³ IAC Minutes, 10/1/80.

⁶⁴ IAC Minutes, 22/5/80, p. 4.

⁶⁵ IAC Minutes, 10/1/80, p. 3.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

new regime; in July Maurice Chandler reported that he was waiting for an opportunity to commend the new Zimbabwean regime to Christians in this country.⁶⁷

In sum the IAC's stance, once the Lancaster House Agreement had been signed, was clear-sighted acceptance and a desire to minimize the problems looming for the new state of Zimbabwe. However much they had held to the hope of a different solution manned by different personnel they accepted likelihood and reality of Robert Mugabe's electoral success with magnanimity. At the March IAC Meeting Maurice Chandler summed this up by saying that Mugabe had received an overwhelming vote and should now be supported in his efforts to unify the country.

⁶⁷ IAC Minutes, 22/5/80 and 16/7/80.

SECTION IL11: CONCLUSION

The Church of England was throughly and 'inevitably' involved in the Rhodesian situation and throughout the decade their central organization demonstrated an underlying strategic commitment to equal political rights for all citizens of Rhodesia at some time in the future. But there is much evidence to support the contention that decided preferences existed over the personnel, ideology, timing and methodology of majority rule. The official policy of the Church has also to be seen against expressions of real antipathy to African aspirations which surfaced from time to time in the General Synod and which represented both traditional British societal attitudes to race and a reluctance, already discussed, to abandon 'kith and kin'. Such attitudes might not have affected the good faith of the IAC's bottom-line attitude to Rhodesia but they certainly diluted public consciousness over exactly what the Church's attitude was and caused a general sense of bewilderment amongst the public at large over the variety of clashing signals which emanated from what was loosely designated 'The Church'.

It is also true to say that in terms of tactics and possible futures for the country political rather than theological or spiritual bias was generally demonstrated. This was a reflection of the interests and major figures in the IAC. Particularly noticeable was the use of a network of contacts which resulted partly from the history and residual connections of the Church of England but largely from the personal associations of IAC members, especially Hugh Hanning.

Worthy of comment are the correlations between activity and lull in the intensity of the Church's attention to Rhodesia and activity and lull in the peace-making or conflict-resolution activities of governments or other NGO's. This would seem to support the contention that the Church had neither the capacity nor the resources to do more than respond to crises as they arose. The beginning of the decade, the years 1971 to 1972, for example saw reaction to the Pearce Report on the Salisbury Proposals. The Church, apart from fact-finding and accumulation of information, then took no major initiatives and made no further major pronouncements until 1975 when Hugh Hanning began to see Rhodesia clearly as a suitable milieu for a Peacekeeping Force. It is suggested that it is not coincidental that at about this same period the Victoria Falls Meeting

began a new round of fairly high profile attempts to break the deadlock.

Assessment of the extent of Church influence on the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe situation is extremely difficult to make as the Church was merely one amongst many other groups attempting an influential role to some greater or lesser degree. Even a correlation between Church input and British Government action is not enough to presume the Church's a determining influence.

It would be reasonable however to credit the sheer persistence of the campaign to install a Third Party Peacekeeping Force if not with success at least with having kept the idea firmly in the Government's view.

Interesting too in terms of the model of Church, State, International System interaction suggested in the Introduction is that, although some attempts at direct influence were attempted, the Church chose generally to act by pressure on and suggestion to the British Government. It is true however that the situation in Rhodesia was a special one in terms of British residual responsibility and greater attempts to exercise direct influence in South Africa will be seen.

Ultimately however it must be said that as far as 'backing a winner' to embody and achieve the free Zimbabwe was concerned the Church's instinct to support the seemingly moderate and non-Marxist Muzorewa was a mistake. To use the words of Hugh Hanning who more than anyone was responsible for the content and direction of Church of England policy towards Rhodesia during the 1970's :- "We got it wrong over Rhodesia".¹

¹ A personal interview in January 1988.

SECTION III: THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND SOUTH AFRICA 1970-1980

SECTION III.1: REASONS FOR CHURCH OF ENGLAND INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

The Church of England was involved in South Africa for much the same sort of reasons that it was involved in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. These reasons were both pragmatic and theological.

Pragmatically it was impossible to avoid the implications of being there. As in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe the Anglican Church had moved into the country hand in hand with British economic, military and political colonization and though the British Empire had disappeared Anglicanism remained. It was an independent Anglicanism however – the Province of South Africa with its own Primate who was Archbishop of Capetown.

The division of the white races between Afrikaaner and British meant that Anglicanism was never the religion of one single white minority ruling class as it tended to be in other parts of Africa; the position of the Dutch Reformed Church amongst Afrikaaners was unassailable. However Anglicanism became significantly influential amongst blacks as well as white South Africans of English extraction and the contacts between members and leaders of the Church in South Africa and the "mother church" in England were constant.

As in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe the Church of England's association with a past colonial system left a sense of continuing responsibility. The closeness of many Church leaders and executives to government has already been detailed and this too tended to lead to an identification of matters of national concern as matters also of Church concern, especially if, as in this case, there were many indigenous reasons for involvement.

Where the theology of involvement was concerned this also has been examined and need only briefly be restated. Men were created equal in the eyes of God and had been equally redeemed by the death of Christ. Any government or state which treated a particular racial group as constitutionally, politically, intellectually or economically inferior by reason of their member-

ship of this racial group would and should be condemned.

It should be noted however that in the context of South Africa there were two complicating factors. There was in fact a split between churches because the Dutch Reformed Church provided its own 'theology' for apartheid and for the Biblical hallowing of separate development. This was based on what most Christians would regard as a highly questionable interpretation of certain Old Testament texts.

Moreover the South African Government ran a continuous and often successful public relations campaign to represent black aspirations and the organisations which represented them as Communist inspired. Seen in this light the battle in South Africa was not between black majority and white minority but between 'Christianity' and 'Civilization' on the one hand and Communism and the forces of darkness on the other.

Both of these elements muddied the water to a certain extent, the first perhaps minimally, the second more seriously in that it fed into the already existing East/West perspective of those members of the Church's central executive charged with the formulation of tactics.

These problems aside, two quotations sum up well the pragmatic and theological content of the British churches' involvement in and opposition to the apartheid system in South Africa.

In its 1979 report on Britain's responsibilities to South Africa¹ the British Council of Churches said "the notion that a segment of the population amounting to approximately 80% of the whole should systematically be excluded from the rights, duties and privileges that go with being a citizen in a modern state has made South Africa a major focus of international disapproval."²

The IAC report prepared for the BSR at the same time said that "the Churches in this country, committed to a belief in the fundamental equality of all men and women as created in the image of God, cannot but be disturbed by the claim of the leaders of white South Africa to justify

¹ 'Political Change in South Africa: Britain's Responsibility', a Report of the Division of International Affairs of the British Council of Churches, BCC, London, 1979.

² *Ibid*, p. 1.

apartheid (which denies that equality) as a Christian policy essential to the defence of Christian civilization".³

The Church's opposition to the apartheid system in South Africa was thus defined in both political and theological terms. The second was the underlying motivation for the first even though a modern rubric of human, of political, of economic rights was often used to convey credibly sentiments about what were in fact a set of timeless beliefs.

Whatever the fundamental reason for involvement however it is manifestly inadequate to discuss motivation in the sense of options preferred or policies adopted in terms of eternal verities. There are always numerous short-term tactical advantages which Church 'actors' see at various times as signposts or valuable gains 'along the road to universal recognition of Christian beliefs and values and to the establishment of what they could regard as a just society. Their personal preoccupations and personalities incline them also to prefer certain tactical possibilities over others. This has already been discussed.

In such terms a number of possibilities have been suggested to explain the particular stance demonstrated by the Church over South Africa and the policies it pursued there. What values weighed with decision-makers that they embraced a policy of constructive engagement and rejected one of economic disengagement? Is one looking once again at peace as a predominant value? Is one looking at Christian/humanitarian preoccupation with the well-being of the majority black community, arguably those who would suffer worst if sanctions against South Africa were imposed? Is one on the other hand looking at an organisation constitutionally averse to overturning the *status quo* and reluctant to contemplate the complete displacement of South African whites? Is one looking at a policy too uncritically cognizant of the predominant Western power political analysis of the Southern African situation? Is one, in the most self-interested and cynical assessment of the situation, contemplating an organisation which needs to protect its investments and pander to the pro-white sympathies of many of its members? All of these claims

³ 'Political Change in South Africa', a Report by the BSR to the General Synod, GS424, CIO, London, 1979.

have been made in respect of the Church's motivation and this chapter seeks to throw light on the problem.

SECTION III.2: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The reasons for involvement in South Africa were very similar to those for involvement in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe but the problem was infinitely more intransigent. There was a sense in which the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe crisis was finite, an ugly manifestation of a rear-guard action of imperialism, with the economic and political factors which would ultimately bring down the UDI regime present and growing from the beginning.

The situation in South Africa was quite different. The economic basis of apartheid had long existed and, though dependent on Western investment and advanced technology, the State was economically strong with its near monopoly of production of so many of the rare minerals necessary to the West and a major importing and exporting role in world markets. Its economic position was buttressed by an elaborate system of constitutional provisions for ensuring the separate 'development' of black, white and coloured peoples.

The essential features of apartheid, or separate development, are the control of black labour through restrictive legislation and the movement of huge numbers of the black population into areas designated as Homelands from areas designated as white. This is made possible by the monopoly of political, economic and military power in white hands.

All of this has deep historical roots with Dutch settlement in South Africa dating from 1652 and British from 1805. The system of displacing and regarding as culturally inferior the indigenous peoples of the area began from the earliest years of settlement and was particularly applicable to the Dutch Settlers, the Boers, who used black slave labour in the Transvaal to which they 'trekked' during the nineteenth century to escape from British control of Cape Province. Moreover the first Pass Laws were introduced by Royal Proclamation into the first British Cape Settlements as early as 1797.

Disputes between the Boers and the British were resolved in favour of the British during the Second Boer War of 1899 to 1902. The last uprising in Natal against colonial rule by the indigenous people of South Africa was put down in 1906.

The long-existing economic foundation of apartheid, the control by the white population of the most productive land areas, was reinforced by the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 with a franchise limited to the white population. In the mid-1920's the Afrikaaner electorate voted to power the forerunner of the National Party and the colour bar began to be systematized and institutionalized. Policies were aimed at separating black and white in living areas as well as the work place and a differentiated education policy for black and white was instituted. This was largely in response to 'poor white' feelings of threat and their consequent agitation to keep blacks out of all but the lowest paid jobs.

The Nationalist Party Government came to power in 1948 committed to the complete institutionalization of separate development or apartheid. This was manifest in 'petty apartheid' – separate transport, separate entrances to public places, different public and leisure facilities, and in 'grand apartheid' – the provision of different educational systems, living areas, conditions of work and pay. The system was buttressed further in 1958, when Mr. Verwoerd became Prime Minister, by the creation of the Bantustans or native living areas outside which only those who were designated as economically useful were allowed to live. Appendages, that is dependent wives and children, had to remain in rural areas separated for most of every year from their men.

Resistance to the imposition of apartheid and the monopolization of political and economic power by a white minority however dates back to the founding of the African National Congress, ANC, in 1912. For nearly fifty years it led largely peaceful campaigns against the numerous restrictions on the lives of black South Africans, especially the Pass Laws, which restricted the movement of Africans, and against the Land Act, which designated black and white living areas.

Philosophically its members resisted a racial or tribal analysis of South African society and emphasized the racial equality of all citizens of South Africa. Thus its approach was liberal in a racial sense but it was socialist in terms of economic analysis.

In the early 1940's its Youth League was formed and this indicated a degree of heightened militancy and growing organisation. In 1949 its Programme of Action emphasized the right of the people of South Africa to self-determination and the need for black people to play a leading role

in the fight for liberation. During the 1950's the ANC played a leading role in organising mass actions such as strikes, protests and demonstrations against the increasingly severe restrictions of apartheid.

1955 was a turning point and an indication of the growing unity of purpose among black South Africans when the ANC organised a Congress of People with over three thousand delegates who came from all parts of South Africa. The Freedom Charter which resulted set out a programme for a non-racial, unitary and democratic state. The South African Government declared this to be treasonable and charged 156 ANC members with treason. After a mass trial which lasted five years they were all acquitted.

In 1960 mass protests against the Pass Laws took place. In what became known as the Sharpeville Massacre police shot and killed many peaceful demonstrators. This led to further riots and protests and to the Declaration by the Government of a State of Emergency. Under this about 20,000 people were detained and another 2,000 held without trial.

Also as a direct consequence of Sharpeville the ANC was banned which meant that it was no longer allowed to hold meetings. Rather than submit to this the group went underground and many of its leaders went into exile. Its policy of nearly fifty years, of advocating peaceful change, now moved to an assessment of the necessity of armed struggle and to its advocacy. The Government's attempt to stamp out the ANC and its activities culminated in 1962 in the arrest of its President, Nelson Mandela, his trial and conviction on a charge of treason. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. Throughout the 1960's repression continued and all known liberation movement leaders were imprisoned, banned or exiled by the end of the decade.

On the economic front however the South African economy enjoyed a boom until the middle of the 1970's. This led to an increased demand for black labour in urban industrial areas and encouraged also increased migrancy from neighbouring states. This drift from country to town led to higher rates of urban crime and to cramped and increasingly squalid living conditions in the townships in which South Africa's urban black population was housed. Because the economic dynamic was acting in many respects in opposition to apartheid ideology in encouraging

migration from designated Homelands the Government saw it as necessary to impose ever stronger restrictions and to uphold the morality of a society based on apartheid.

All this led to increasing black dissatisfaction and unrest which was infinitely exacerbated in the mid-1970s by an economic recession. Black unemployment increased, with 25% of the black work force out of work by 1980. The Government's answer to this was to accelerate the policy of making the Homelands 'independent' so that the responsibility for a large unemployed black labour pool fell on the 'independent' black politicians, state functionaries by any other name. The 'independent' Homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda were all created during the 1970's and recognized by no state apart from South Africa.

The years 1970 to 1980, the years when the Church of England's activities and attitudes towards South Africa will be examined, saw both white affluence and black poverty increase. Inflation ran at a minimum of 10% throughout the decade and had reached 14% by 1980. The price of maize, the African staple food, rose by 60% from 1975 to 1980 and this badly affected the living standards of those black Africans who were unwaged.¹ By contrast a small black middle class and elite group of workers emerged both in response to the need of multinationals for an increasingly skilled work force and to the attempt by Government to impede the development of black solidarity. By and large however black dissatisfaction increased in direct proportion to black impoverishment.

The townships particularly became the scene of riots and uprisings. Boycotts and strikes increased as did support for guerilla movements. Blacks flooded into the townships in the hope of finding work in such numbers that administrators were unable to keep pace. There was great resistance to the Homelands and 'Independent States' policy and to its basis which was the Government's intention to further an ethnic analysis of black South African society. Increasingly too blacks resented the Bantu education policy, seeing it as a weapon for creating in perpetuity a culturally and educationally disadvantaged work force. As a consequence of all this the years

¹ 'South Africa in the 1980s', Catholic Institute of International Relations Position Paper, CIIR, London, undated.

1969 to about 1977 saw the growth and development of the Black Consciousness Movement.

This differed from the ANC initially in that black identity was seen as the pivotal issue and there was no room for radical white supporters who might possibly blunt the edge of the black thrust for liberation. Black Consciousness was essentially a movement of young, politicized and overwhelmingly urban blacks. Organizations which were set up under its general umbrella included the South African Association of Students, SASO, and a number of trade unions in defiance of the Government's anti-strike laws. In 1973 nationwide strikes took place, particularly severe in Durban.

During these years the Anglican Church in South Africa was not immune from Government harassment. As the scope of political trials and bannings increased Churchmen were drawn into the net although, with certain outstanding exceptions such as Father Trevor Huddleston² and Gonville French-Beytagh,³ the Anglican Church had not previously been in the forefront of the fight against apartheid. However the potential for the development of the Church as champion of the Black underclass was always there by its very structure; it was intrinsically different from the Anglican Church in Rhodesia by reason of its large numbers of black members and by the fact that black priests were increasingly promoted to higher offices in the Church.

The real involvement of the South African Church in the political life of the country came in late 1960 when the Cottesloe Consultation was convened by the WCC to discuss Christian responsibility in race relations. Subsequently the WCC's eight South African member Churches urged racial reform of a fairly moderate type in South Africa. Their position was completely rejected however by the reactionary Nederduitse Hervormde Kerk, NHK, and, after government pressure, by the Dutch Reformed Church, DRC.

Those churches who rejected a Biblical justification of apartheid came together in the Christian Institute led by Beyers Naudé.⁴ The aim of the Institute was a non-violent redistribution of

² Member of the Society of the Resurrection, Priest of Sophiatown, Johannesburg, lifelong campaigner against apartheid.

³ Dean of Johannesburg who spoke out so strongly against apartheid that he was tried for treason and deported in 1972.

⁴ He was thereby forced to abandon his position within the DRC.

power, the rediscovery of the Bible's original message and an identification with the poor. All of these were seen as threatening by the Government, and the Institute and its members were continually harassed. The South African Council of Churches, set up in 1968 as successor to the Christian Council of South Africa, was similarly treated.

Government disapproval deepened with the joint publication by the Christian Institute and SACC of 'Message to the People of South Africa' in 1968 which declared apartheid to be contrary to the spirit of the Gospel. The correspondence which followed between Prime Minister Vorster and Church leaders set out the difference of theological perception in its starkest terms: Church leaders told the Prime Minister that ... "as long as attempts are made to justify the policy of apartheid by appeal to God's word, we will persist in denying their validity," to which Vorster replied that it was "with the utmost despisal (sic) ... that I reject the insolence you display in attacking my Church as you do."⁵

In 1969 the Christian Institute and SACC set up the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society, SPRO-CAS, to help the Churches to move from a theological denunciation of apartheid to significant involvement in its practical manifestations. It pressed for better wages and social security for black workers, the development of black awareness and leadership capacity as well as a change in white attitudes.

These activities were under even graver threat when the WCC, in 1970, announced its grants to non-racist liberation movements. The SACC refused to leave the WCC, as the Government demanded, but it did not support the controversial grants as it still saw the Churches as committed irrevocably to the principle of non-violence.

Many issues led to confrontation between the Churches and the Government in the following years – violence, and its validity, disinvestment, conscientious objection and the role of the Christian in war. The influence and constituency of the SACC widened immeasurably in 1971

⁵ 'Pseudo-Gospels in South Africa', Johannesburg, 1968, quoted in John de Gruchy 'The Church Struggle in South Africa, itself quoted in Shirley du Boulay, 'Tutu: Voice of the Voiceless', Penguin, London, 1989, p. 126.

with the African Independent Churches Association's membership, and in 1975 when the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk in Africa, NGA, the black 'daughter' Church of the DRC, was also admitted. Under the leadership of John Rees⁶ and Desmond Tutu⁷ the SACC came in a very real sense to represent the aspirations of black Christians in South Africa.

In general, and not specifically Christian, terms, conflict between black citizens and the Government came to a head in 1976 in a series of urban uprisings. In the Soweto uprising police fired on and killed hundreds of blacks, including school children, who were protesting against the Bantu Education Acts. This led to a two year wave of protest where hundreds of thousands of workers were mobilized.

Soweto was a water-shed in a variety of ways and a number of lessons were learnt. The black community saw the need to politicize young people who had enough maturity and leadership quality to further their community's aims; they saw the need for some sort of co-ordinated strategy for most of the riots and protests during this period were spontaneous and often not easy to control; they observed the differences which existed between students and workers which the Government was able to exploit. Observers could see that 1976 was the beginning of a new sophistication of approach in the analysis of exploitation, especially of its economic roots, and in the strategies used to achieve political advancement.

Initiatives included the formation of the Soweto Students' Representative Council, SSRC, and the Black People's Convention. The former led a successful campaign against the Soweto Urban Bantu Council which the Government had installed to foster the appearance of increased self-government by the black population. The SSRC prevented the Council from increasing rents and, by constantly demonstrating its collaborationist features, caused it to collapse.

An increased perception developed among Black Consciousness organisations of the importance of the black worker in political change. This was caused by the dialogue which had begun

⁶ 1970-1978, a white Methodist layman.

⁷ 1978-1984, a black Anglican priest, previously Dean of Johannesburg and Bishop of Lesotho and subsequently Bishop of Johannesburg and Archbishop of Capetown.

between politicized young blacks and members of the ANC, several of whose members were released at this time from Robben Island where they had been imprisoned for twelve years after the Rivonia Trial.⁸ There was a new wave of recruitment to the ANC as a result of this dialogue and its importance was reinforced when, in October 1977, the South African Government banned all eighteen Black Consciousness organisations and two newspapers with a black readership. This occurred because of the student boycotts and unrest which had followed the death of Steve Biko, a SASO leader, in detention a month before. The bannings served to convince a new generation of blacks that non-violent, public and open methods of pursuing reform were hopeless.

The Church too was heavily involved in confrontation with the Government. A month after the death of Steve Biko the Christian Institute of South Africa was one of the organisations declared unlawful. Fifty black church leaders and several whites, including Dr. Beyers Naudé, Director of the Institute, were detained or restricted for up to five years⁹ He was refused permission to come to Britain to give a paper to Chatham House. In all fifty three leading churchmen in Johannesburg, including the Bishop and the Dean, were arrested and the Prime Minister accused the South African Council of Churches of using over £1 million to foment unrest. Bishop Desmond Tutu's passport was confiscated.

Attempts to set up a legitimate internal reform organisation were not completely abandoned because the Azanian People's Organization, AZAPO, briefly emerged in May and June 1978. It was an amalgamation of Black Consciousness Activists and members of the Pan African Congress, a breakaway movement of the ANC. However its leadership too was soon banned. It was reformed in September 1979 along with ASCO, the Azanian Students Organization, and COSAS, the Congress of South African Students (schoolchildren). All suffered considerable police harassment.

The authors of the CIIR Position Paper, 'South Africa in the '80s'¹⁰ suggest that in

⁸ So-called after the house in northern Johannesburg which was the headquarters of the armed wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe whose leaders were arrested and sentenced to life-imprisonment for their policy of violence to the installations and fabric of apartheid but not to its personnel.

⁹ Restriction involves being forbidden to speak to more than one person, to write, publish or be quoted.

¹⁰ 'South Africa in the 1980's', CIIR, *op. cit.*

AZAPO's analysis of the role of the black worker and of non-collaborationist tactics towards government it could be seen as in transition from Black Consciousness ideology to an ANC analysis of society. However a distinct difference of view was still distinguishable within AZAPO between those who wanted to exclude all whites in the interests of black solidarity and those who adhered to a rigorous non-racial analysis of society. Moreover its appeal was limited and many workers and few unemployed or Homelands residents supported it.

There is no doubt however of the increased militancy of the majority of black people by the end of the decade. Living conditions in the townships, the level of unemployment, the complete impoverishment in every way of Homelands life continued. Those in work, despite considerable restrictions, organised themselves into unions to press for better wages and working conditions. It was their persistence which resulted in the two Government commissions of 1979. the Wiehahn Commission, which recommended the setting up of official black unions under tight state control, and the Riekert Commission, which recommended that the urban black elite be able to secure tenured housing on long leases. The provisions of these Commissions were represented as considerable concessions to black aspirations by the Government but the reverse side of their motivation was the desire to stifle black initiative in the formation and running of unions and much stiffer sanctions against the employers of illegal migrants. The overall object was restriction of surplus population to the Homelands and the creation of a stable, urban, elite black labour force.

There was one notable exception to the township and student orientated opposition to the State and this was the organisation known as Inkatha which was founded by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi in 1975. It was a cultural organisation of Zulu people based in the Zulu homeland of Kwa Zulu whose life it dominated. Its support was overwhelmingly drawn from Kwa Zulu although some Zulu speakers in Soweto also supported it. By 1980 it had about 300,000 card carrying members. After the banning of the Black Consciousness organisations it was the largest legitimate black political organisation in South Africa but it was anathema to many of the newly radicalised black young people of the townships because of its policy of dialogue and cooperation with the South African Government. Buthelezi, whose personal charisma and political skills dom-

inated the organisation, rejected the growing socialist analysis of the black condition and was willing to co-operate with capitalism by encouraging investment in Kwa Zulu. He had however refused independent status for Kwa Zulu which increased his support amongst educated blacks by favourable comparison with the 'quisling' leaders of other independent Homelands.

His activities in Kwa Zulu were sometimes criticised even within his own party however because Inkatha and the Kwa Zulu government were more or less synonymous, a situation which was abused. An atmosphere of veiled coercion was suggested by some observers. It was also suggested that it was very helpful to hold an Inkatha party card in dealings with the government authorities and that without such a card business life for blacks in Natal was difficult. For such reasons the large nominal membership might not be a good indication of actual support for the party. Buthelezi's autocratic control extended into all areas of Homeland life and Inkatha activities in schools and amongst young people attracted criticism and opposition from some of the local churches. It was undeniable however that during the 1970s Buthelezi regularly attracted 10,000 to 20,000 people to his rallies in Soweto and reached a fairly large public with his newspaper, the Nation.

It was felt by many however that his influence would wane in the wake of the school boycotts in April to July 1980 when he used strong-arm men against students and called on vigilantes to protect property, also condemning ANC agitators. This caused further alienation of black youth in his own country and cut both his prestige abroad and his supply of funds from the same sources. Moreover the ANC publically repudiated his activities. Assessment of him by the end of the decade ranged from those who still saw him as a potential mediator to those who compared him with Bishop Muzorewa.

Some reforms of petty apartheid were made in the last years of the decade. More money was promised for black education and housing and the working practices of some of the multinationals improved. However great unrest and a sense of thwarted expectation was caused in 1980 by the victory of Robert Mugabe in the second Rhodesian election and the creation of the new republic of Zimbabwe.

This victory won by guerilla tactics emphasised the activities of those South Africans who had completely abandoned peaceful means of gaining reform and had themselves been using guerilla tactics against the South African state since the mid 1970's. The organisation most active here was Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC, Its targets tended to be fairly small in scope and symbolic of white state authority, such as police and police property. Until Soweto their activities had been fairly spontaneous and disorganised, but afterwards they were both better organised and more numerous. One of their most spectacular actions was an armed attack on a police station in 1979 in retaliation for the execution of an ANC member, Solomaon Mhlangu, who had been hanged.

Such activities led to the increasing militarization of the South African state and of white South African society. The South African Defence forces grew enormously between 1975 and 1980 to about 480,000 and the State Security Council became the directing Cabinet Committee in these years. In this prevailing ideology of national security, shared at that time by such states as Paraguay, Argentina, Israel, South Korea and Taiwan, all human, civil and political rights were subordinated to the national interest which was seen as the maintenance of the external integrity and internal structure of the state against all perceived threat. The pivotal position and prestige of the military was probably buttressed by the widely held belief that they had developed a nuclear capacity. Uncertainty about its parameters undoubtedly made it a more effective psychological factor than exact knowledge would have done.

This then was the turbulent state of South Africa during the 1970s. It was a decade when each new crisis was seen by commentators as a turning point or as pivotal in the development of the consciousness of one or another part of the population. This latter was undoubtedly true in many instances but few of the perceived turning points proved to be turning points in fact. Few would claim at the end of the decade that the fundamental position of the black population was radically different from their position in 1970. Some 'petty apartheid' provisions had been removed, an elite amongst them was better waged and housed; little more could be said in concrete terms, although the consciousness and analysis of their situation by the black population had

hardened considerably as had the defense mentality of the whites. How adequate then was the Church of England's response to these events?

SECTION III.3: MAJOR THEMES IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND'S RELATIONSHIP WITH SOUTH AFRICA

As in the case of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe certain major themes can be traced in IAC initiated policy towards South Africa during the 1970s.

In a memo on future IAC policy written by Hugh Hanning to Maurice Chandler in April 1974¹ a list of priority areas is given. These were support for Intermediate Technology, support for the Christian Institute and for Chief Buthelezi, the following up of the recommendations of the Rogers Report on the conduct and work practice of British firms with South African subsidiaries and support for the organisation Christian Concern for South Africa (CCSA). For the rest of the decade this was very much the programme that was adhered to.

There would seem however to have been an underlying unity to these activities and indeed to all the initiatives of the Church of England in South Africa during these years which was lacking in the Zimbabwean situation. This was the belief that pressure on economic institutions in South Africa would lead to political change and the matching commitment to a policy which would help to bring this about. In practical terms this meant the espousal of schemes to influence British firms with subsidiaries in South Africa to improve not only the financial lot of their black employees but to involve themselves in some of the problems faced by these employees because of the constitutional and political differentiation from which they suffered.

Because of the underlying theme to so much of the Church's activity in South Africa its initiatives and reactions there have been examined chronologically rather than thematically. The reader will see that not until the very end of the decade did some consciousness of the need for a fundamental assessment of the rationale and theology of the Church's policies appear. Until then there is a constancy of purpose and an assumption of essential rightness which can be traced from year to year.

The parameters of what the IAC hoped to achieve however by recommending such a policy

¹ BSR/IAC/SAF/4, memo of 24/4/74.

were never totally clear. They were manifestly concerned to improve the living, educational and working conditions of black citizens of South Africa but whether one can extrapolate from their disapproval of apartheid and their pursuit of schemes of economic amelioration a belief that a radical political reorientation might be effected by economic means is not evident from the documentary evidence available. Indeed one has the distinct impression that the rationale of the policy was never completely worked out.

What can and should clearly be stated at the outset is that there seems no doubt of the commitment of the leaders and executives of the Church to the disappearance of apartheid. An extract from a memorandum on the Church's investments in South Africa by Hugh Hanning is very typical of the tenor of condemnation found in the records.²

"Another aspect of the situation ... is the monstrous question of the Pass-Law regulations. At present Africans are being herded through the Bantu Commissioners' Courts at a rate of one every three seconds, often for the most trivial offences: There is no pretence of justice ... These Pass- Law regulations could one day prove the last straw, for they are a specific desecration of human self-respect."

A similar note was struck by Sir Ronald Harris, Chairman of the Central Board of Finance, who paid a private visit to South Africa in 1978. His recommendation was that a policy of engagement should be maintained but his distaste for the apparatus of apartheid and concern at the conditions to which so many black people had been reduced was very clear.³ Amongst the best indicators of the Church's official attitude were the speeches and demeanor of Archbishop Ramsey on his visit to Southern Africa in 1970. He left no doubt of his firm condemnation of apartheid and of its irreconcilability with the demands of Christianity whatever the Dutch Reformed Church might claim.

However, even if there was no doubt about the commitment of the central organisation of the Church to the ending of apartheid, this position was sometimes blurred to the perception of those outside the Church by the undoubted sympathy of some individual and vocal churchmembers for the white position in South Africa and also by the fact that the Church

² BSR/IAC/SAF/1, internal memo by Hugh Hanning for the IAC, 13 February, 1973.

³ BSR/IAC/SAF/5/2.

Commissioners retained holdings in companies which operated in South Africa. Most importantly the Church's policy over apartheid for most of this period, that it could be eaten away by the amelioration of the economic position of the black population, was seen by many as an indication of a less than whole-hearted commitment to apartheid's abolition, especially since the World Council of Churches was committed to a policy of disinvestment as the best lever for ending white domination.

Indeed it must be noted here that a thread which ran through the whole decade was the Church of England's increasing lack of agreement with the WCC and the BCC. The W.C.C. embraced the policy of disinvestment in South Africa. The BCC Assembly did not adopt it until November 1979 but the previous years had seen much debate and a gradual moving towards this position and the Church of England and the BCC were increasingly out of step with one another on this issue.

SECTION III.4: CHURCH OF ENGLAND POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA – 1970-1972

The first two years of the decade were not marked by a great deal of IAC activity over South Africa. The Board of Social Responsibility and the IAC itself had only just been set up in their present form and Canon Oates was still the Committee's secretary, Hugh Hanning at this time being the African Consultant of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. At this stage there was certainly no theme; this developed from 1973 onwards after Hugh Hanning became Secretary to the Committee.

Much of the work of these early years appears to have been quite routine. It included the answering of queries from Lambeth Palace about the status of various groups associated with South Africa or its problems and from organisations who felt that the Church of England could disburse some of its wealth to help their South Africa orientated activities. The collection of information, some of it solicited and much of it unsolicited, also went on.

The first initiative of any note came in May 1970 when the Bishop of Chichester, then Chairman of the BSR wrote to the Secretary of the MCC welcoming on behalf of the IAC the Cricket Council's decision not to play against segregated teams during their tour of South Africa, but suggesting that the tour itself should be cancelled.¹

This issue was taken up again at the meeting of the Church Assembly in July of the same year during one of the debates on the value of the BCC which punctuated Assembly and Synod meetings. The Bishop of Peterborough, in denying that the BCC acted for his or for the country's conscience, said that it was often misled by strong-minded leaders especially in its pronouncements on South Africa. The BCC had recently decided to encourage demonstrations against the cricket tour and had issued a report four years before 'The Future of South Africa' which had infuriated South Africans. By contrast Canon Piachaud said that the BCC did act as the conscience of the nation and would be in a good position to speak on the subject of arms for South Africa which would soon arise. The groans from other Assembly members which greeted his

¹ BSR/IAC/SAF/1, letter of 21/5/70.

reference to this topic appalled him. One sees here already a certain polarity, not in terms of the articulation of coherent opinion, but in terms of gut reaction, evinced by the subject of South Africa.²

The change from Assembly to Synod did not affect the form and line up in debates on South Africa, which was one of the most frequently and hotly debated topics in Synod's repertoire. In the Synod held in the spring of 1971, in a report on the document 'Church and State', the Rev. Paul Oestreicher raised the subject once again. In commenting on the state of England he suggested that there was little genuine Christian witness in a nation which, among other things, profited from British investment in a virtual slave economy. Should the Church of England, he asked, be willing to use its wealth perhaps to compensate dockers who might be put out of work if a real stand were taken against South Africa? He suggested too that it was hypocritical to ask whether blacks had a right to use violence when the Church itself had condoned so much violence.³

This was only one of many occasions when Paul Oestreicher urged radical action on a largely conservative Synod. In the IAC too his stand was often out of step with his more cautious colleagues, as on the occasion in October 1971 when he unsuccessfully urged that the question of the Church's setting up a fund, to which individuals who supported the WCC fund for non-military assistance to freedom fighters could contribute, be discussed by Synod in the context of the debate on Civil Strife. Synod too took a cautious line on this issue which was in fact debated in November 1971; despite expressed sympathy for those working for the overthrow of oppressive regimes, it declined to set up such a fund.⁴

In January 1971 the Archbishop of Canterbury spoke to members of the IAC about his recent visit to South Africa and Uganda. Those attending included Nicholas Scott, MP, J.S. Gummer, MP and Sir John Lawrence. At the Archbishop's request no record was kept of this

² Church Assembly, Report of Proceedings, Vol. 50, 1970, CIO London, p. 299.

³ General Synod Report of Sessions, Spring 1971, Vol. 1, CIO London, pp. 64 to 65.

⁴ IAC Minutes of 8/10/71 and 18/11/71.

meeting but he presumably detailed his shock at the unwavering and totally self-righteous stand of the South African President, Mr. Vorster and his conviction of the fundamental evil of apartheid which his visit and this meeting in particular had confirmed. The Archbishop's sentiments were expressed in a lecture he gave in Cambridge on 23rd February, 1972 where he said ...

"We cannot applaud Europeans who resisted the tyranny of a Hitler and then be shocked when Africans want to resist a tyrannical regime today; we can discuss the wisdom or the expediency, but we cannot indulge in facile moral censures. We too easily form a habit of exculpating the violence in our own sphere of history and censuring the violence of other races ... Then, we need to watch the ways in which we can be involved in difficult situations not only by our actions but also by our inactions ... In the matter of the World Council of Churches grants to combat racism I approved generally the act of identifying with oppressed populations, but I did criticize the grants in two or three instances where the organisation assisted was one with a violent purpose. But if I or anyone else shrinks from that, one must not be tacitly helping to uphold a regime which is using violence towards its population. This compels us to ask ourselves questions about our practical relations with such regimes. I agree with those who say that in a world filled with many varieties of evil and injustice it is wrong for us to become obsessed with any one particular country. Yet South Africa is bound to loom large in our consciousness because its regime claims to be a bastion of Christian civilization on the African continent. Then we must realise that any attitude on our part towards either violent or non-violent policies is going to be very costly for us if we try to be Christian. If we say to Africans "do not act rashly, a violent revolution is likely only to bring to yourselves terrible suffering", we are saying in effect "go on accepting your present suffering," and we can say that to any people only if we somehow are ready to suffer with them. Again, we may urge that the best chance for social change lies not through war or the ostracism of any regime, but through contact with all the influence that may come through social and trade relationships. If so we must remember that there are forms of contact which help the situation and forms of contact which do not. It does not help when white immigrants go and fill the jobs which should be filled by skilled Africans. It does not help to make investment, unless investment is designed, as is sometimes possible with difficulty, to help African aid advancement. It does not even help, as some of the churches in southern Africa have found, to subsidise education, unless it is for an educational syllabus which aids advancement, and not downgrading."⁵

This passage has been quoted at length to demonstrate both the pedigree of the policy of engagement with industry which the IAC adopted from 1973 and the range of the Archbishop's awareness of the complicated moral and theological parameters which governed the situation. It is suggested that it was these parameters which were downplayed in the years which followed.

A firm conclusion of this work is that the uncertainties and lack of consensus of IAC and

⁵ BSR/IAC/SAF/1: Speech of Michael Ramsey, Archbishop of Canterbury, at Cambridge on 23rd February, 1972, for further details of Ramsey's visit to South Africa and his interview with Vorster see Owen Chadwick 'Michael Ramsey: a life', Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990.

hence of Church of England policy towards South Africa could have been diminished, if not completely eradicated, by a profound and wideranging analysis of the situation in terms of theological and moral parameters as well as practical ones. It is perfectly possible that a similar policy might still have been adopted, that the arguments both against the use of violence in anything but extremes and against the suffering that a policy of disengagement would cause to the black community might still have prevailed. However the basis of this decision would have been more sound and it would have appeared less the personal preference of a small group of men temperamentally averse to rocking boats. Moreover an analysis of the best theological and political minds would have clearly revealed the dual aspect of violence, direct and institutional and some of the shortcomings of the middle way, in the form of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, which the IAC chose.

Another plank of the policy of engagement was the Board of Social Responsibility's report on Civil Strife, debated by Synod in 1971. One of the axioms of the report was that racism was intrinsically evil and that it was a Christian duty and privilege to help those in distress from this as from other causes. Moreover there could be, in extreme circumstances, such a thing as a 'just revolution'. In this appears the following passage, later quoted by the IAC in conjunction with parts of the Archbishop's speech above to demonstrate the basis of their policy, a policy which in December 1972 was declared to be ... "the active seeking of ways of improving the lot of the African in South Africa without resort to violence." "In South Africa ... it is clear that, in the short run, the chances of successful rebellion, are minimal. Some other way, which might well include non-violent action and much stronger external pressure, must be found; for any encouragement to engage in armed rebellion, in these circumstances, would be highly irresponsible."⁶

Awareness of increasing unrest and a hardening of the South African Government's reaction to it was reflected in the opening proceedings of the first day of the Autumn Synod in 1971 when the Archbishop of Canterbury prayed for the Dean of Johannesburg, Gonville French-Beytagh, who had been sentenced to five years imprisonment under the Terrorism Act and who had just

⁶ BSR/IAC/SAF/1: 'Civil Strife', BSR Report 1971, quoted in an IAC memo of December 1972,

appealed against his conviction.⁷ Similarly in June 1972 a discussion took place between Hugh Hanning, now Secretary of the IAC, and Hugh Whitworth, Personal Assistant to the Archbishop of Canterbury, about the Archbishop's reactions to the recent unrest in Capetown. He had felt it right to make an initial public statement but he did not feel it right to interfere in the Archbishop of Capetown's bailiwick to the extent of speaking on the subject on the World at One as he had been invited to do.⁸

⁷ General Synod Report of Proceedings, Autumn 1971, Vol.2, No. 3.

⁸ BSR/IAC/LAM/1, memo of 7/6/72.

SECTION III.5: CHURCH OF ENGLAND POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA – 1973

The IAC's main preoccupation during this year and for several years thereafter was the development of a policy of bringing pressure to bear on British firms with interests in South Africa, the genesis of which was detailed above. This was not an uncontentious issue and the battle lines were clearly drawn in the Spring 1973 Synod between those, always a minority in Synod, who favoured disinvestment and those who favoured pressure through industry.

The debate brought statements from both the First Church Estates Commissioner and the Chairman of the Central Board of Finance about the respective policies of their organisations with regard to South Africa. Sir Ronald Harris for the Church Commissioners emphasised that the Commissioners were aware of the complicated ethical questions raised by investment in South Africa and the need to balance these with the proper growth of the Commissioners' income. Because of the Commissioners' restraint over investment in South Africa "The overall yield on Commissioners' assets is marginally less than it would otherwise be ... the Commissioners do not pursue profit regardless of other considerations."¹

Policy should be seen in the light of the fact that the Commissioners had never invested substantially in South Africa they said because they regarded mining as too speculative, and until three years before they had not invested in any company registered outside the United Kingdom. When this latter provision was modified it was largely to facilitate investment in the USA. Their policy with regard to South African investment was that the Commissioners did not invest in companies operating wholly or mainly in South Africa. (This was difficult to interpret but after considering capital, turnover, profits, potential profits and work on some sort of percentage formula they might consider that 10% was reasonable while 49% emphatically was not).²

They were kept closely informed of the policies and practices of companies in which they did hold shares and which had South African operations so that they could use their influence as substantial shareholders to encourage and support enlightened and progressive policies.

¹ General Synod Report of Proceedings, Spring Group of Sessions 1973, Vol. 4, No. 1, P. 81.

² *Ibid*, p. 104.

The policy of the Central Board of Finance as articulated by Edmund Compton, its Chairman, was somewhat different. Under the Church Funds Investment Measure of 1958 the Central Board of Finance was not responsible to Synod for the management of its Investment Fund. The law required that this be administered for the benefit of contributors, and financial considerations alone controlled the buying and selling of shares. At the present time the Board did not involve itself in attempting to modify the policies of those South African companies in which it invested.³

Reaction to these statements demonstrated the range of opinion held by individual Synod members over the investment issue. It included those who advocated the acquisition of far more shares so that maximum pressure could be brought to bear on the South African Government, those who claimed on first hand evidence⁴ that black citizens of South Africa did/did not want disinvestment, those who advocated the Church of England's espousal of the WCC line on disinvestment, those who pointed out the particular horrors of companies such as Consolidated Goldfields in which the Central Board of Finance had shares and which, it was claimed, used labour in conditions of near slavery.⁴

Divisions were to remain fairly constant throughout the 1970s with supporters of the WCC line always in a minority in Synod but vociferous in condemnation of what they saw as complaisance in the face of oppression. A prescient delegate asked that the Chairman of the Central Board of Finance convey the disquiet of Synod to the Investment Committee which might act in accordance with statute but whose actions attracted publicity which reflected on Synod itself.⁵

Perhaps he foresaw that the image which the Church's central authorities sought to project of real commitment to the eradication of apartheid albeit by peaceful means was constantly blurred by the issue of Church investments. The niceties of the legal commitments of investing authorities did not modify for some commentators the anomalous position of a church profiting from a regime based on institutionalized inequality.

³ *Ibid*, p. 62.

⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 65-105.

⁵ *Ibid*, p. 71.

The debate which had begun in Synod was also adopted with vigour by the IAC. At its January Committee meeting it was reported that two ecumenical groups and a Methodist group as well as the CCSA and the BCC were looking at the investment issue . To co-ordinate the Church's own activities Canon Gonville French-Beytagh was "invited to undertake a study of matters pertaining to investment and its consequences in South Africa".⁶ Richard Hauser, the sociologist, was to finance this work for three months on the basis that French-Beytagh would investigate ... "what should be done about the situation in South Africa which will be in the long run constructive and hopeful and in the short run defensive and helpful." Hauser saw this project "... as part of a structure on the League of Human Rights which we are trying to build up."⁷

French-Beytagh worked quickly and by early March 1973 had produced articles on Legal Aid for African Employees, the Trades Union Movement and South Africa and Industry and Apartheid. His suggestions were integrated into the publication 'Investment in South Africa: Challenge for the Church' which was published in the Spring of the same year.⁸

His ideas enshrined the notion of amelioration and were wide ranging. There were fairly conventional suggestions such as pressure by shareholders in firms with South African enterprises to improve the working conditions and the pay of their black employees, many of whom still received wages below the Poverty Datum Line. He suggested also that employers could take responsibility for providing aid, legal if necessary, for those of their employees who fell foul of the Pass Laws. Firms should do whatever they could to train individual black employees in labour representation techniques and genuinely representative workers' organisations, rather than 'appointed' works committees, should be set up. As well as improving wages welfare benefits to black workers should be improved, with sick leave funds for workers' families. He suggested too that the British Trade Union Movement could do more to make their members aware of the damage to the employment chances of black South Africans done by British emigration to South Africa. The steady flow of white labour was held to be one of the factors involved in the failure of

⁶ IAC Minutes 23/1/73.

⁷ BSR/IAC/SAF/1, letter of 29/1/73 from Richard Hauser to Hugh Hanning.

⁸ 'Investment in South Africa: Challenge for the Church', BSR publication, CIO, London, 1973.

black South Africans to rise to more skilled and responsible posts.

French-Beytagh's ideas were very much in line with Hugh Hanning's own views. In February 1973 Hanning wrote a short article for the May/June issue of the magazine *Voyage*.⁹ What had been requested was an article on the WCC's attitudes to investment but instead Hanning wrote an apologia for what he called the 'Polaroid' approach. This he saw as one of three possible options:- to "sell out", the policy decided on by the WCC, the Oppenheimer approach, to increase the level of investment in order to raise the standard of living in South Africa, and the Polaroid approach, whereby investor pressure might be used to bring about change. His own opposition to the WCC approach is demonstrated in the following paragraph:-

"The problem here (with disinvestment) is to see just how the Africans will benefit. Are the purchasers of the stock sold by the WCC likely to be any more enlightened than the WCC itself? Would a Japanese or a French investor be any more likely to press for the reforms which the African requires?"¹⁰

Hanning's personal contacts with the media were used to publicize the work that French-Beytagh was doing. On 7th March 1973 he wrote to Charles Douglas-Home, editor of the *Times*, enclosing French-Beytagh's study and asking for comments. Douglas-Home's reply of the 15th was fairly non-committal, suggesting that it was difficult to see how British-owned companies in South Africa could be made to act differently from South African-owned ones.¹¹

Hanning also issued press releases to Baden Hickman, religious Correspondent of the *Guardian*, and Clifford Longley of the *Times* pointing out how active was the Church of England in formulating a programme of action which would "be put squarely to those in a position to act on them, including Members of Parliament, in the coming weeks."¹²

By far his most fruitful contact was with Alistair Hetherington, Editor of the *Guardian*, whose newspaper had run a revelatory article on black wages in South Africa on 12th March.¹³

⁹ BSR/IAC/SAF/1, "The Church's Investments in South Africa", Hugh Hanning, article for May/June issue of *Voyage*,

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 1.

¹¹ BSR/IAC/SAF/1.

¹² *Ibid*, Press release of 20/3/73 by IAC.

¹³ IAC Minutes 13/3/73.

On the 19th Hanning therefore approached Hetherington with copies of ffrench-Beytagh's articles and the suggestion that because of the Guardian's interest in South Africa he might be interested in ffrench-Beytagh's cooperating with one of his regular contributors, such as Adam Raphael. A meeting the following week was suggested.¹⁴

This obviously bore fruit because a full-page article by Adam Raphael and ffrench-Beytagh on conditions of black employment in South Africa and the steps which might be pursued to ameliorate the situation appeared in the Guardian during the first week in April. Hetherington was obviously delighted with it, and told Hanning on the 12th April that any further ideas on South Africa from either himself or ffrench-Beytagh would be very welcome.¹⁵ On 16th Hanning suggested that if Hetherington formed an ad hoc team on South Africa he would like very much to be included and also recommended Gerry Mansell, at the BBC, Hugh Lewin of Christian Action and "Charlie" Douglas-Home.¹⁶ This suggestion came to nothing but the momentum was now considerable and not only in the Church of England. The DIA of the BCC had produced an internal document 'Investment in South Africa' whose approach was different from that of the IAC and showed a readiness to follow the WCC line on disinvestment. On 8th May Hanning sent copies of this to a number of bishops in South and Southern Africa asking for their comments.¹⁷ On the 29th the Bishop of Malawi replied that he supported the work of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and the policy of putting pressure on firms investing in South Africa. Similarly on 30th May Robert Taylor, the Archbishop of Capetown, replied that he was opposed to disinvestment which he thought would bring economic chaos and would benefit no-one.¹⁸

Not that all comment took the ffrench-Beytagh/Hanning line. In June for example Bishop Ambrose Reeves, President of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, wrote to the Rev. John Arnold, General Secretary of the Board for Mission and Unity, asking for Church support for disinvestment and a policy of encouraging British companies in South Africa no longer to import white

¹⁴ BSR/IAC/SAF/1.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ BSR/IAC/SAF/1.

¹⁸ BSR/IAC/SAF/3.

labour. Arnold replied that though this was a matter of great concern to the Church and a motion calling for further study was before Synod at that very time the B.M.U. could not itself make approaches to firms with South African links. Accordingly the letter was passed to Hanning who attempted to convince Reeves of the virtues of French-Beytagh's ideas, although with what success is not recorded.¹⁹

Such was the general interest in this topic that the IAC decided to send copies of its pamphlet, "South Africa: a challenge for the Church", not only to members of Synod but to the Chairmen of forty five large businesses with South African subsidiaries. The covering letter from Maurice Chandler, Chairman of the IAC, stated correctly that the Church of England's attitude, in contrast to that of the WCC, was not clear-cut. "While there are those who would associate themselves with the stand taken by the WCC, there are others who would take a strongly opposed view." The views of the Archbishop of Capetown are reported to be that "economic growth will produce social change and that pressure for reform, through invested capital seems to be one of the few ways of exerting pressure to effect such change." Comments on French-Beytagh's proposals, copies of which were also sent to Sir Geoffrey Howe, Minister of Trade, the two Archbishops of South Africa, the BCC and Adam Butler, MP, were therefore invited.²⁰

Twenty five firms replied and from twenty there was no response. The replies varied enormously. There was anodyne approval, "many stimulating ideas",²¹

"We shall have to think hard about the Canon's recommendations and shall continue to watch with great interest the lead given by the Church in this difficult area."²²

There was firm defense of the operating practices of their own concerns:

"We have no male employee being paid at rates below the P.D.L. There are non-contributory pensions for all staff with more than twenty years' service and scholarships for the university are granted on merit for which the children of all staff are eligible to apply. Scholarships for secondary education are available for the children of non-white staff only. There has been a four-fold increase in numbers of our non-

¹⁹ BSR/IAC/SAF/1.

²⁰ BSR/IAC/SAF/1, letter of 20/6/73.

²¹ Digest of replies, BSR/IAC/SAF/1, extract from reply of Jim Slater, of Slater Walker Securities.

²² *Ibid*, extract from reply of ICI's Chairman, E.J. Callard.

European staff over the last five years ..."²³

There were fears of widespread black unemployment if wages were improved. "... if the wages are pushed up too quickly, it will mean that sackings will take place and less men will be earning money. Is half a loaf better than no bread? We think it is" ... workers in India were ... "far worse off than in South Africa".²⁴

Several replies, not surprisingly, demonstrated total opposition to the WCC recommended policy. Others were thoughtful and showed a pre-existing awareness of the problems of operating in South Africa, even if not wholehearted approval of French-Beytagh's recommendations, although the reply from A. Cohen, cited above, did rather depressingly suggest that "Most UK firms with South African interests would not have known the wages being paid to black or white South Africans before the article about them appeared in the Guardian." One firm with small industrial units in South Africa and only six hundred employees of all races there pointed out the difficulties which these units would face which would be quite out of proportion to their strength if they undertook the sort of programme envisaged in the paper. There was a limit, this respondent suggested, to the ability and resources of even the largest companies to go very far in this respect; ultimately only the resources of government could make much impact on this problem. At the farthest end of the spectrum lay the reply which claimed that "Recruiting is carried out on an entirely voluntary basis and Canon French-Beytagh's suggestion of "forced labour" is thus unfounded ... the migratory system is by no means unacceptable to the Africans ... on pass-laws, we have reservations about some of the proposals ... it would appear that some of the measures suggested could give rise to considerable administrative and personnel problems for large employers of African labour."²⁵

Presumably because Consolidated Goldfields's reply was not particularly sympathetic Hugh Hanning visited the company on 24th July, 1973. His comments were revealing. "I had expected

²³ *Ibid*, extract from reply of Chairman of the Natal Board of Barclays Bank.

²⁴ *Ibid*, extract from the reply of Chairman of A. Cohen & Co.

²⁵ *Ibid*, extract from the reply from a representative of Consolidated Goldfields.

in the Oppenheimer tradition that a very rich and powerful firm would have some liberal leanings. I did not detect any at all ... On the other hand they are clearly very conscious of their image ..." However, largely on the basis of a 25% wage increase for black workers in South African Goldfields in April Hanning thought that there was detectable "movement" and did not personally recommend disinvestment at that time.²⁶

It is difficult to draw generalized conclusions from these replies because of their variety. Over half of the companies approached felt the approach and its source to be legitimate enough to warrant a reply at some length. Conversely almost half felt that they could safely ignore an initiative from the Church of England. Many of them were able to comment on the analysis and suggestions with understanding, although again many had reservations on the grounds of impracticability. There was not one approving response that also announced any intention of consequent action. Only A. Cohen's representative voiced the sentiment "We would not continue in South Africa with a smaller return than 12/15% on capital employed in the business",²⁷ a point of view that they had also put to the Rogers Select Committee on Investment; but it may not be over-cynical to suspect that considerations of just this sort lay behind some of the bland interest and goodwill of some of the other replies.

If one seeks to ask what in concrete terms the Church gained from this exercise it is not easy to say because there is no suggestion of direct behaviour modification as a result. However it is arguable that a heightened awareness was promoted of factors of which companies might have been happy to remain unaware. Moreover the whole debate was made a national one and all input helped to raise its profile. Hugh Hanning's use of his media and political contacts in this context shows a keen awareness of the possibilities of publicity.

In further pursuit of this policy of gaining a high profile for Church ideas Hugh Hanning wrote on 14th June to R.B. Hornby, MP, asking whether, in view of French-Beytagh's Guardian article and his recent book on a similar theme, 'Encountering Darkness', Hornby would like him

²⁶ BSR/IAC/SAF/3, memo of 24/7/73.

²⁷ Digest of replies, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

to appear before the House of Commons Trade and Industry Sub-Committee of the Expenditure Committee which was conducting an enquiry into the working conditions and wage levels in South African firms either owned by or otherwise controlled by companies registered in the U.K. This was followed up on 16th July by a letter from Maurice Chandler to W.R. Rodgers, MP, enclosing a copy of French-Beytagh's memorandum and suggesting that it might be submitted in evidence to the Committee.²⁸

Ultimately both French-Beytagh and Adam Raphael did give evidence to the Committee which reported at the end of 1973 and the document 'South Africa: challenge for the Church' was also submitted to the Committee. When the Committee reported the Guardian campaign to highlight the pay and working conditions of black South Africans was singled out in its report as an important factor in bringing these issues to public notice. One can hardly claim this as an example of Church pressure alone leading to a change in government direction or public awareness, but the IAC worked very effectively here by using a variety of pressure points to heighten the effect of a campaign which it had not begun but with which it was in sympathy. Annotated press cuttings from the Times and Guardian in April 1974 when the Rogers Report was published show that the IAC itself certainly thought that their contribution had been influential.²⁹ French-Beytagh's own reaction was that the suggested code of practice read like a detailed version of the BSR paper 'South Africa: challenge for the Church'.³⁰

Interestingly all the work done until the end of 1973 was done in the name of investigation. In a letter to the Times on 27th June Maurice Chandler sought to correct an impression given by one of the correspondents that the Church of England was moving towards the WCC policy of disinvestment. He did refer to French-Beytagh's report but took pains to stress that the BSR had commissioned this as a contribution to public debate; it had not formally been adopted as a representation of its views.³¹

²⁸ BSR/IAC/SAF/1, letters of 14/6/73 and 16/7/73.

²⁹ BSR/IAC/SAF/6.

³⁰ *Ibid*, telephone conversation with Hugh Hanning of 29/4/74.

³¹ BSR/IAC/SAF/1.

However Hugh Hanning took a less carefully diplomatic line in his reply to a worried investor seeking advice about the behaviour of South African firms when he wrote that Church House thought that disinvestment should only be a final resort.³² This is certainly true where he and Maurice Chandler were concerned but the suggestion that this was a Church House view was not strictly accurate because it implied a degree of unanimity nor was it technically accurate in that the BSR had not yet adopted the policy nor had Synod officially approved it although a majority of members certainly appeared to prefer an approach which did not involve disinvestment.

South Africa was again a major topic of discussion at Synod in the Summer group of sessions, and although an effective deadlock on action was reached, with the BSR merely being asked to investigate the subject further, the majority of speakers once more took the view that to disinvest would be to opt out of a possible useful influential role; disinvestment should only come if shareholder pressure failed. South African churchmen were quoted as being opposed to disinvestment, although this view appeared to depend largely upon the source of information consulted.

Interestingly the Central Board of Finance took a more conciliatory line on this occasion, probably as a result of the adverse comment which had followed Sir Edmund Compton's pronouncement on policy at the previous Synod. This time he said that the CBF did attempt to reconcile ethical with sound investment considerations but that it was geared and staffed for investment not for investigation of possible areas of positive social engineering.³³

In the summer of 1973 Hugh Hanning had set up a working party on investments in South Africa in response to the July Synod's call to the BSR to investigate the matter. This consisted of Neville Vincent, Adam Raphael of the Guardian, Elliott Kendall of the Church Missionary Society, Dr. Charles Elliott of the School of Development Studies at the University of East Anglia, Gervase Duffield, a member of Synod, A.H. Carnwath of Baring Brothers, John Sackur, an ex-member of the Foreign Office, Tim Sheehy of Christian Concern for South Africa, Canon

³² *Ibid.*

³³ General Synod report of Proceedings, Summer Group of Sessions 1973, Vol. 4. No.2., p. 373.

French-Beytagh, Maurice Chandler, Paul Oestreicher, Giles Ecclestone, Secretary of the BSR, and Hugh Hanning himself. Their remit was to prepare for the debate on South African investments which was scheduled for the November Synod.

The direction in which they would move was indicated by a preliminary letter which was sent to members of the group before the first meeting on 24th September. With this letter was included copies of letters from leading Anglicans in South Africa opposing disinvestment and a digest of the replies received from the forty five firms approached earlier in the year.³⁴ In his covering letter to the issue of papers for the first meeting Hanning said specifically that it was hoped to take French-Beytagh's work a step further and listed concerns which had already been raised by working party members. 'What were the dangers, if any, of raising wages? To what end were supporters of shareholder pressure working, a federal solution in South Africa for example? What were the implications for British investment policy elsewhere?'³⁵

At the Working Party's first meeting on 24th September it was decided to prepare a follow up document to 'South Africa: a challenge for the Church', 'Investment in South Africa: opportunities for the Church,' as an input to the debate at the November meeting of Synod. A.H. Carnwath of Baring Brothers, who was also Chairman of the Church of England Central Board of Finance Investment Management Committee, could not attend this preliminary meeting but sent letters pointing out the difficulties for investment managers of avoiding certain fields of investment on ethical grounds. Given that engagement was the only option which was seriously considered by the Committee this indicated an attempt to limit the sphere of effective operation yet further.³⁶

'Investment in South Africa: Opportunities for the Church' documented the Church's activities so far and suggested "There is evidence that the experience of the last nine months has greatly strengthened the view that shareholder action is a viable policy. This would lead some to con-

³⁴ BSR/IAC/SAF/3.

³⁵ BSR/IAC/SAF/4.

³⁶ BSR/IAC/SAF/4.

clude that the World Council of Churches would do well to think again about their advocacy of disinvestment. Although some African voices support a policy of disinvestment, the overwhelming opinion of those consulted, including the Archbishops of Capetown and Central Africa, is that the WCC proposals would do more harm than good."³⁷

The document's theme was that apartheid was anathema to Christians but that practical help was needed for Africans and much could be done within the context of the South African Government's declared policies. Economic and educational investment was needed in the Homelands. It was "... an urgent humanitarian need"³⁸ and should be made now that possibilities existed for direct negotiation between firms and the Territorial authorities. The needs of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, "probably the most influential and respected of all African leaders ... an Anglican",³⁹ were stressed – funds for payment of a full-time secretary, for the appointment of a secretary for his Development Council and the establishment of a newspaper.⁴⁰

The needs of the Homelands and the Republic of South Africa were listed under different headings, although it is perhaps unjust to read into this an acceptance of a categorization invented by the South African government and rejected by the overwhelming majority of black South Africans. The latter included vocational training, increased wages, improved welfare benefits, help for employees caught up in infringements of the pass laws. It was suggested that the Church of England might initiate the setting up of a central educational fund, might give support to the Christian Institute, might set aside money to help the victims of apartheid and might promote the creation of a 'instrument' common to all churches which would centralize research and information on the whole future of South Africa.

This document was interesting in a number of different ways. It signalled clearly, if signal was still needed, that the Church of England was involved in and deeply concerned for the prob-

³⁷ 'Investment in South Africa: Opportunities for the Church', BSR, G.S. Misc. 23A, November 1973 p.3.

³⁸ *Ibid*, p. 5.

³⁹ *Ibid*, p. 5.

⁴⁰ BSR/IAC/SAF/3: John Sackur visited South Africa in the autumn of 1973 and returned convinced of the need to help Chief Buthelezi, whose needs he detailed to Hugh Hanning in a letter of 20/11/73.

lems of South Africa. It encouraged the thoughtful participation of Christians who were shareholders in an examination and improvement of the working practices of those companies in which they had invested. It admitted that not all Africans were opposed to the WCC policy of disinvestment. However it did this in the context of a document which did not seriously consider any alternative for the Church of England except investor pressure. This may have been a hardheaded evaluation of what the Church's financial institutions and the body of its membership would stand, but if this was the case it would best have been demonstrated by producing a discussion document which examined all options and sending it Synod to evaluate. Within the context of the document's own terms of reference it is revealing to see, after a brief condemnation of the policy of separate development exemplified in the Homelands, an endorsement of investment there and of the policies and status of Chief Buthelezi without mention of alternative views and blueprints of South African development and leadership.

The document was issued to members of Synod preparatory to the Autumn meeting and was sent when Synod was over to the same forty five firms who had been circularized earlier in the year. The twenty two replies which had been received by December indicated a response very similar to that which greeted the previous circularization. Those who replied were by and large the same companies which had replied before. Moreover, as before there was a conspicuous lack of promise of specific performance.⁴¹ However one Chairman did say that he was sending the legal proposals in the document to his South African branch with instructions that something be done about them,⁴² and on 5th February, 1974 Shell International Petroleum Company asked for six copies of the document, presumably for discussion and consultation purposes.⁴³ As before Government Ministers and MP's as well as the quality newspapers were supplied with copies of the document; Adam Butler MP, told Maurice Chandler that it was good to read ... "some sound practical sense on the whole matter."⁴⁴

⁴¹ BSR/IAC/SAF/3.

⁴² IAC Minutes 15/1/71.

⁴³ BSR/IAC/SAF/3.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, letter of 3/11/73.

The long-term status of the document produced by the IAC working party on one side, it was indeed impossible that South Africa could be far from the consciousness of concerned and informed Christian opinion because the summer of 1973 saw the committal for trial of the Rev. Beyers Naudé, head of the Christian Institute there. This multid denominational organisation of individuals was committed to peace and non-violence but equally it identified with the poor and sought a redistribution of power in South Africa. Naudé himself might well have become Moderator of the Dutch Reformed Church, he was already acting Moderator, but when he insisted on maintaining his role in the Christian Institute he was forced to resign from his position, leave his congregation and the Broederbond to which he had belonged for twenty two years. He was harassed, vilified in the media, sent to gaol and banned for seven years.

The Institute's present problems arose from its members' refusal to appear before the Schlebusch Commission in 1972 to answer charges of subversive activity on the grounds that the Commission met in secret. Because of this refusal summonses to appear in court had been received by six members of the Institute's staff including Beyers Naudé. The original charges of subversion were a result of the Institute's support for the Black Consciousness Movement and Beyers Naudé's hope of setting up a Confessing Church in South Africa on the lines of that set up in Germany during the 1930's, a comparison between Nazi Germany and South Africa not being one that appealed deeply to the South African Government. Because of the Commission's findings the Institute was declared an "affected organisation" which meant that it could not receive funds from overseas thus depriving it of most of its financial support.

Accordingly at the November Synod the Archbishop of Canterbury praised the Rev. Beyers Naudé as a Christian of great integrity and one who was devoted to peace and non-violent change. He had both the regard and affection of those in Britain who knew him. Father Bishop of the Community of the Resurrection, a personal friend of Dr. Naudé, reported that a defense fund for those on trial had been opened and invited Synod members to contribute to it.⁴⁵ On 27th November the Fund stood at £2739 against a target of £20000. Trusts and other bodies who

⁴⁵ General Synod Report of Proceedings, Autumn 1973, Vol. 4. No. 3.

might give more considerable sums of money were approached and the Archbishop of Wales and Professor Allott of the School of Oriental and African Studies were being sent to the trial as BCC observers.⁴⁶

This fund itself attracted a good deal of publicity, much of it due to Hanning's input into the media. On 9th November he wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury asking him to write to the Times to publicize the Christian Institute's need for funds and to encourage British Christians to contribute. This the Archbishop did.⁴⁷ On 13th November there was an article in the Guardian about the Christian Institute Fund, although in a letter on the 8th Hanning took no credit for this himself and suggested that it was due to Hugh Whitworth, the Archbishop of Canterbury's Personal Assistant.⁴⁸ On 11th December Hanning approached the Archbishop of Canterbury to be patron of the Christian Institute Trust which had been set up to administer the money which the appeal was attracting. Trustees were Robert Birley, Hanning himself, Paul Oestreicher, the Rev. Brian Duckworth, Father Hugh Bishop and the Rev. Elliott Kendall.⁴⁹ Thus both the Trust and the issue itself were validated by the Church at the highest level.

On a practical level the case was not allowed to disappear from the public eye. A meeting in March 1974 of the trustees of the Fund was told that good publicity had been obtained by an article in the Times by Bernard Levin which ..." was the direct result of efforts by Mr. Hanning who asked to be given any further information which Bernard Levin might use."⁵⁰ When his trial and appeal were won Naudé himself expressed his appreciation for the support he had received in a letter to Elliott Kendall. His case, he said, could not have been won without ... "such substantial spiritual, moral and financial backing..."⁵¹

The Institute's difficulties were thus a backdrop to the debate on investment for which the IAC Working Party had prepared 'Investment in South Africa: opportunities for the Church'. The

⁴⁶ IAC Minutes 21/11/73.

⁴⁷ BSR/IAC/LAM/2.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ BSR/IAC/LAM/2.

⁵⁰ BSR/IAC/SAF/6, Minutes of Meeting of trustees of Christian Institute Fund, 22/3/74.

⁵¹ BSR/IAC/SAF/6.

debate arose from a motion tabled by the Rev. Paul Oestreicher advising members of the Church of England who were shareholders individually or corporately in firms with South African interests to bring whatever pressure was possible to bear on them to work towards closing the gap between their white and black employees. Moreover the motion went on to state that Synod believed that, when the facts had been sufficiently established, no funds controlled by any part of the Church of England would be invested in any firm which disregarded the social and economic interests of any of its South African employees.

This motion received overwhelming support, and indeed the Synod's reaction to the topic as a whole represents perhaps the highpoint of its emotional revulsion for apartheid and everything it stood for. "For once the Synod was not afraid of its emotions. Led by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, virtually every one of the 500 members at one point rose to their feet in loud and prolonged applause as an expression of Christian solidarity with South African Christians suffering harassment by the authorities."⁵²

However two other motions were also carried the first of which might be considered as diluting the message of the main motion. It asked the WCC to reconsider its stated policy on disinvestment and the Church Commissioners to reconsider their stated policy on investment in Southern Africa. The other motion was unambiguous and called for a study of investment ethics in general. The message which was received by the intelligent observer however seemed to be that the Church of England was taking a stand against apartheid. It was summed up in a report on the proceedings of Synod in the Guardian by Baden Hickman on 10th November. This was entitled 'Anglicans deny funds to firms exploiting South African blacks and it stated that ... "The Anglican leaders have rarely been more united or militant. Their denunciation of apartheid was unequivocal ... but it was clear that they acted in sorrow and penitence rather than hatred."⁵³

There was movement too in the financial institutions of the Church. Sir Arnold France, Chairman of the Central Board of Finance, announced at Synod that ... "it would be right to have

⁵² Guardian report of 10/11/73 by Baden Hickman.

⁵³ Extract from a Guardian report of 10/11/73 by Baden Hickman.

a thoroughgoing review of policy in the light of that report⁵⁴ when it was received, and in the light of what is said in this debate in the Synod today. This the Central Board will do."⁵⁵

Sir Ronald Harris, First Church Estates Commissioner, outlined the policy of the Church Commissioners which ... "allows investment in companies with subsidiaries involved in South Africa, but it does preclude investment in companies operating wholly or mainly in this part of the world." The policy also assumed ... "that where the Commissioners do hold shares in a company operating to some extent in South Africa they will make whatever use they properly can of their position as a shareholder to try to influence the company's policies in relation to Southern Africa and indeed on any other moral or ethical issue, as far as this is possible, but realising and recognising that there are limits to the effectiveness of such action ... the Church Commissioners will certainly carry out another of their regular reviews in the light of today's debate ..."⁵⁶

Moreover towards the end of the year Sir Arnold France spoke again of the need for a "thoroughgoing review of CBF practices in relation to investment." Central Church funds should be used "consistent with the objects of the Church of England". Financing such as a visit to the Homelands or staff for Buthelezi might be possible but it must not be political. If Synod wished to contribute to the Christian Institute Fund there was a need to demonstrate that it was not political.⁵⁷ None of this was radical but it did demonstrate an awareness of the Church's, and especially of Synod's sensitization to this issue and the effect of adverse publicity on the Church's image.

Thus by the end of 1973 the IAC had received a positive endorsement of those policies to which the majority of its members were personally inclined. Paul Oestreicher had certainly pointed out in the debate that world opinion through the United Nations might well lead to the point when investment and trade with South Africa became illegal but this was obviously not a consideration which found much sympathy in Synod. This was clearly demonstrated by their call

⁵⁴ 'South Africa: challenge for the church'.

⁵⁵ Report of Proceedings of General Synod, Autumn Group of Sessions 1973, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 672.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ BSR/IAC/SAF/4, undated memo on a conversation between Neville Sabine and Sir Arnold France.

for a WCC change of policy. However the profile of the subject and its serious treatment by Synod had at least been lifted immeasurably from the beginning of the decade when, in a debate in July 1970, groans from members had been the reaction to the raising of the subject of arms for South Africa.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Church Assembly, Report of Proceedings, Vol. 50, 1970, CIO, London.

SECTION III.6: CHURCH OF ENGLAND POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 1974

The early part of 1974 was a consolidation of the previous year's activity, and there was no discussion of South African affairs in the February session of Synod. In a memo to Maurice Chandler on South Africa in April Hugh Hanning stressed already familiar themes for the future: support for the Christian Institute, support for Buthelezi, support for intermediate technology, the aftermath and following up of the Rogers Report.¹

Intermediate technology and support for Chief Buthelezi were in a sense twin themes because Buthelezi's base was the homeland of Kwa Zulu and, in an area where Inkatha and the government of Kwa Zulu were practically synonymous, he encouraged foreign investment. At their March meeting the IAC received a visit from Mr. C.B. Pearce, Chairman of the Productivity and Wage Association of South Africa and Mr. Sam Motsuenyane, National President of the African Chamber of Commerce, both of them visiting the United Kingdom under the auspices of the South African Trade Association. Their address to the Committee was not concerned with the principles of Homelands investment but its practicalities. Motsuenyane spoke of the dangers of unemployment in South Africa and the 70,000 new jobs which were needed in the Homelands alone; there was an urgent need for better training but the South African Government was thought to be beginning a new initiative in this area of which the creation of the Black Bank was part.² By and large, and despite warnings about unemployment, this was a remarkably optimistic and non-radical feed-in. It reinforced pre-existing perceptions of the morality of Homelands investment.

Of Hugh Hanning's own commitment to the introduction of intermediate technology into suitable South African milieux there can be no doubt because of the amount of literature he personally received on the subject and the correspondence he engaged in in relation to it. Charles Tett, for example, Director of Operation of Intermediate Technology, asked him at the beginning of March to write an introduction for the IAC when they considered the subject and the literature

¹ BSR/IAC/SAF/4, memo of 24/4/74.

² IAC Minutes 12/3/74.

which had been provided.³ Moreover he had attended a seminar in Holland in December of the previous year on Homelands investment.

In May, as part of the campaign to bring heightened awareness of the Church's position and their own responsibilities to its members, Hugh Hanning prepared a paper 'South Africa and the Church of England', a summary of the development of the Church's 'leverage' position as he now termed it. This was circulated by the Board of Social Responsibility to 11,000 parishes. In it Hanning referred to the fact that in the Homelands where skills are short a special kind of aid was required, Intermediate Technology.

"This enables communities to produce manufactures, and increase agricultural output with fairly basic skills; and since much of the Homelands' more skilled labour migrates to the white areas, there is general agreement that this is what the African communities most urgently need. The problem is to attract the necessary capital investment, for Intermediate Technology is small business rather than big business, and could not begin to reproduce the dividends obtainable in, say, the mines. There is a strong case for the bigger investors in South Africa, in the interests of a non-violent outcome, to channel some of their resources into the development of the Homelands in this way."⁴

In April 1974 the Rogers Report was published and the Church of England's agenda received secular validation. Its major recommendations were that no British firm in South Africa should pay adult male wages below the appropriate Poverty Datum Line, that all firms should aim within a set timetable to pay minimum wages equal to the Minimum Earnings Level, which was broadly equivalent to the Poverty Datum Line plus 50%. Firms whose working practices were held to fall short of the minimum required standard were named and the need for some sort of continuous monitoring facility became very obvious.

The November 1973 Synod had in fact recommended that consideration be given to the setting up of an ecumenical instrument to monitor progress in this respect and to provide the member churches with a centralized information facility. This ultimately came to nothing largely because of the resistance of the CBF, as usual fearful of the erosion of Church of England auton-

³ BSR/IAC/SAF/7.

³ BSR/IAC/SAF/4, report of seminar at Dr. Visser 'T Hoofcentre, Rotterdam, 6/12/73.

⁴ BSR/IAC/SAF/6, 'South Africa and the Church of England', BSR paper, 1974, CIO, London, p. 4.

omy of action, to its being an executive body and not merely a reservoir and supplier of information.

However it was increasingly considered at this time that an ecumenical pressure group, Churches Concern for South Africa, CCSA, might take over much of the Church of England's follow-up work to its approaches to British firms in conjunction with its own programme of approaching those companies criticized in the Rogers Report to check whether inadequate wage levels had been adjusted. A leader at the beginning of May in the Guardian, which had in very large measure begun the campaign for investigation and amelioration of black wages, promoted the work of the CCSA and stressed the need for continued pressure.⁵ Adam Raphael was still very much involved in this work and sent an article he had written as a foreword to a CCSA book on the Rogers Report to Hugh Hanning ... "to be boiled down for your Committee's consumption." The article evaluated as highly significant the Rogers Report. It "... has now put the debate on to a solid basis. The facts are no longer in dispute, and the guidelines on proper employment practices are a benchmark against which one will be able to judge the future performance of British companies."⁶ On the Committee's recommendations he commented. "They ... are of major importance. If they are put into practice, British companies will no longer be just like all the rest but will be in the vanguard, not only of pay but also in training and African advancement."⁷ The conditional phrase at the beginning of this last sentence proved to be highly prophetic.

Raphael's endorsement of the CCSA by writing an introduction to their book indicated that he saw them as playing an important role in the follow-up to the Rogers Report, the need for such a function having been stressed in the Guardian leader cited above. On the South Africa Working Party too such a need was perceived, John Sackur asking on 11th April, "Can the Church or the BSR provide the continuing lobby and pressure group which is needed?"⁸ Hugh Hanning's response appears to have been that the Church could not undertake this role alone; he referred in

⁵ Guardian leader 2/5/74.

⁶ BSR/IAC/SAF/6, Draft of an article by Adam Raphael April 1974, p. 5.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁸ BSR/IAC/SAF/6.

a letter at the beginning of May to the fact that the Church was now canalising its efforts through the CCSA which was in touch with all the major firms mentioned in the Rogers Report.⁹ In the leaflet he drafted, 'South Africa and the Church' he again commended the CCSA, a body whose purpose was ... "to clarify the role of the institutional and private investor in Southern Africa and to sponsor research to this end."¹⁰ He even made a plea for funds as the CCSA was in urgent need of money.

Indeed so short of money was the CCSA that on 17th June its chairman, Trevor Jepson, wrote to Hugh Hanning asking whether an interim grant of funds might be made by the Church of England because the BCC was taking so long to decide whether to make such a grant.¹¹ It was not long however before the matter of financial support appeared to have been solved by the Summer meeting of Synod which voted without opposition to make a grant of £3000 to the CCSA.

Despite the fact that this money had been voted, not merely discussed, by Synod it soon became clear that the CBF was firmly opposed to paying it. Immediately Synod was over the CBF enquired what priority the IAC and BSR attached to the grant, a discreet method of suggesting that if this was prioritized other expenditure would be sacrificed.¹² The IAC was told at its meeting on 17th July that Sir Arnold France had said that he would consider making this grant but ... "this was a time of financial stringency and almost every new proposal for expenditure was having to be rejected."¹³ It was agreed that the BSR could not find the money by economies and Maurice Chandler undertook to convey to Sir Arnold the degree of importance it attached to the grant; even if £3000 proved to be impossible at least a token sum was necessary, it was decided, as an earnest of Church of England support.

At the beginning of October Trevor Jepson wrote to Sir Arnold France asking for the grant which had been voted; the Methodists, who had also set up a unit to investigate investment in

⁹ BSR/IAC/SAF/1.

¹⁰ 'South Africa and the Church of England', *op. cit.*, p. 5.

¹¹ BSR/IAC/SAF/6.

¹² BSR/IAC/SAF/6, memo of 11/7/74.

¹³ IAC Minutes, 17/7/74.

South Africa, had just voted £3500 towards the CCSA's work.¹⁴ His suspicion that the grant might not materialize was obviously shared because a Guardian article on 22nd October revealed that the financiers were against it partly for economic and partly for procedural reasons. However, if their advice was followed it would leave the Church of England as the only major denomination in England not supporting the CCSA, as the Roman Catholics, Methodists and Quakers were on the verge of committing themselves financially.¹⁵

The Guardian's forecast proved correct when Sir Arnold France announced on the last day of the November Synod meeting that both the CBF and the Standing Committee were against paying this grant from central funds for a variety of reasons. Amongst these figured the difficulty of singling out one good cause from many, the Church of England's shortage of money, oppression in many other parts of the world apart from South Africa and the impossibility of treating this as a one off commitment.¹⁶ Despite arguments that the Church of England was morally obliged to make a commitment already accepted by most British churches, that it should give teeth to the fine sentiments it had uttered in condemnation of South African policies in the previous November's debate and that the importance of doing something to tackle the issue of structural violence should be acknowledged, a motion endorsing the CBF's decision not to bring forward a resolution to enable payment of the grant was carried.

Understandably this attracted a good deal of unfavourable attention – even the *Church Times* was critical.¹⁷ Sir Arnold France attempted to answer critics in a letter to *The Times* on 6th December when he suggested that although the grant could not be met out of budget general funds a special case should perhaps be made with money being raised from Church members.¹⁸

On one level this can be seen as the operation of financial constraint on the expressed objectives of Synod, and at the IAC Meeting on 26th November Maurice Chandler said that he had

¹⁴ BSR/IAC/SAF/6, memo of 11/10/74.

¹⁵ Guardian article by Baden Hickman, 22/10/74.

¹⁶ General Synod Report of Proceedings, Autumn Session 1974, Vol. 5, No. 3.

¹⁷ *Church Times*, November 17th 1974 issue.

¹⁸ BSR/IAC/SAF/6.

seen the CBF figures which proved that money could not be found for the CCSA.¹⁹ Events are suggestive too however that this was a structural constraint by a body whose aversion to any connection with action it regarded as politically radical has already been demonstrated. At the IAC Meeting on 12th March Giles Ecclestone reported on a meeting he had held with Sir Arnold France where the latter made it clear that the CBF were interested in using any Church 'Instrument' on South Africa as an information source and not as a pressure body. Ecclestone considered that the CBF feared that they might be committed to courses of action by a body of which they did not approve.²⁰ Moreover, Sir Arnold France had told Maurice Chandler that he was convinced that the best course of action in the case of South Africa was discreet pressure on companies operating there.²¹ The increasingly high profile activities of the CCSA, with their publications 'Corporate Responsibility and the Institutional Investor' and 'Corporate Responsibility and Church Investment' and their campaign to publicize the activities of offenders against the code of practice suggested by the Rogers Report, did not come under the heading of discreet.

All in all it was not an incident which reflected any credit on the CBF, which manifestly did not regard itself as bound by the resolutions of Synod, on Synod which showed neither consistency of approach nor any realization of the need to put teeth into its deliberations if it was to maintain credibility and the semblance of independent thought, on the IAC who were easily lulled by assurances of economic force majeure, indeed on the Church of England as a whole. It is easy in this case to see why accusations of hypocrisy were levelled at a Church whose governing body rose to its feet to express solidarity with the oppressed in South Africa and a year later failed to make any grant towards a body whose work in this field it warmly approved and which was financially supported by churches much smaller and poorer than itself.

The pathetic post-script to the affair was a resolution at the August 1975 IAC Meeting that the BSR should join the CCSA, which had instituted a new minimum membership fee to church organisations of £50, and would also subscribe £100.²² At the November 1975 Meeting Maurice

¹⁹ IAC Minutes 29/11/74.

²⁰ IAC Minutes 12/3/74.

²¹ IAC Minutes 26/9/74.

²² IAC Minutes 6/8/75.

Chandler reported that the BSR had endorsed membership of the CCSA but would only pay the minimum subscription.²³

Investment and the basis on which investment should be made was an issue which the Church continued to pursue during the latter part of 1974. Their major initiative was a consultation on the Ethics of Investment which they held at St. George's House, Windsor on 22nd September. Thirty five representatives from the City, from academia, the Press and the Churches met to hear four papers on 'Issues facing the corporate investor' by David Hopkins of M & G Investments, 'Theoretical Guidance and practical standards, past and present' by Canon Professor Ronald Preston of the University of Manchester, 'Shareholder Responsibility' by Peregrine Fellows and 'Does the exercise of moral responsibility in individual and corporate development require changes in the law?' by Murray Pickering. In addition those attending were provided with a considerable amount of related literature before the Consultation. This demonstrated just how widely the debate was ranging, with consideration of investment practice and corporate responsibility in the USA,²⁴ a paper by the C.B.I. on developments in the consciousness of public companies of their own responsibilities,²⁵ and a CCSA report on a similar theme.²⁶ From the point of view of formulating an ethical base from which public companies should work the most interesting preparatory paper was 'A Moralist in the City' by Professor G.R. Dunstan which suggested that an investor's claims were contingent on others who have a claim on the company in which he invests. Without profitability these responsibilities cannot be met, but until they are met profits are not morally disposable.²⁷

The unofficial verbatim account of the Consultation shows wide-ranging and thoughtful discussion but it does not demonstrate any concrete recommendation except that the BSR should ini-

²³ IAC Minutes 4/11/75.

²⁴ 'Corporate Responsibility in the USA: the State of the Debate', Tim Sheehy 1974.

²⁵ 'A new look at the responsibilities of the British public company', an interim report for discussion by the C.B.I., January 1973.

²⁶ 'Corporate Responsibility and the Institutional Investor', report of a seminar at the London Graduate School of Business Studies by CCSA 1/11/73.

²⁷ 'A Moralist in the city', Professor. G.R. Dunstan, the 8th Sir George Earle Memorial Lecture on Industry and Government, 28/3/74.

tiate an in-depth study of the subject, a process which it had arguably already set in motion by holding the Consultation in the first place. The IAC Meeting subsequent to the consultation was told of the publicity which the Consultation had attracted in *The Times* and the *Investor's Chronicle* and of the favourable comments of many of the participants, but in the long run there appears to have been little concrete gain. However, the intangible and unquantifiable return of helping to give the issue a high public profile should not be discounted.²⁸

²⁸ IAC Minutes, 26/9/74.

SECTION III.7: CHURCH OF ENGLAND POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA – 1975

1975 saw an intensification of the IAC's preoccupation with employment and suitable technology transfers to the Homelands, a transfer of initiative in the matter of pressure on British firms with South African subsidiaries to the CCSA and the Department of Trade and a diminution of Synod time devoted to South African issues generally. The major exception to this latter trend was a question by the Rev. Paul Oestreicher at the Summer meeting to both the Chairman of the Church Commissioners and the Chairman of the Central Board of Finance about what they had done to promote justice in South Africa and what further they intended to do. Would they publish in detail their research and actions in this field? Their replies brought him no satisfactory answer, being merely a restatement of their previous positions with the rider from the Church Commissioners that it was not their policy to publish the results of enquiries about companies in which they invested.¹ This was an answer which would tend to reinforce an interested observer's belief in the cabal-like and unaccountable handling of affairs by those central organs of the Church charged with managing its finances.

Activity over Homelands affairs and general questions of employment in South Africa began at the January IAC Meeting with a report by Hugh Hanning that he had sent the Church Commissioners a short list of what firms with interests in South Africa could do to help the situation there by setting up vocational training schemes and a detailed legal aid mechanism for their employees, and by contributions to charities such as Intermediate Technology and Health and Welfare in Zululand.²

This list had been produced by Lord Elton and was in many ways a reworking of previous recommendations, with however heavy emphasis on the needs of Chief Buthelezi and of the Zululand churches' Health and Welfare Association whose activities included a literacy programme, the teaching of handcrafts, agricultural projects and construction training. British firms were also recommended to invest 1% of their profits in the new African bank, and the activities of the Inter-

¹ Report of Proceedings of General Synod, Summer 1975 Group of Sessions, Vol. 6, No. 2.

² IAC Minutes 23/1/75.

mediate Technology Group in Botswana and Zambia in setting up light industries and undertaking water conservation projects was singled out as particularly relevant for the Homelands. Investing firms were also urged to contribute more to all varieties of educational project for Africans – an African university was urgently needed as well as technical colleges and vocational training.³

This list of possible initiatives was sent to the BSR of the Church of South Africa and to Chief Buthelezi for comment. In a follow-up letter to Buthelezi in March Hugh Hanning asked for the prompt return of his comments so that the list could be distributed to those forty five firms with which the IAC had been in contact over the previous two years.⁴ At the March meeting of the IAC Hanning reported that Mr. Xolo, Minister of Public Works in Kwa Zulu, had expressed strong interest in the IAC's ideas.⁵ That these ideas were beginning to be more widely discussed was indicated by a request for further information from D.S. Lawn of Union Carbide Africa and Middle East Inc., a UK subsidiary of a New York firm, which had become interested in helping the Homelands as a result of an article about initiatives there, including those by the Church of England, in the Johannesburg *Sunday Times* on 3rd March, 1975.⁶

While many reactions to the IAC's suggestions were approving the reactions of the BSR in Capetown was interesting. Mr. Burton, Secretary of the BSR in Capetown, visited the BSR in London and was provided with information and investment ideas for the Homelands especially Transkei and Ciskei as well as for a Church and Industry Centre at Cape Town Cathedral.⁷ At the beginning of June David Russell, Acting Secretary to the BSR in Capetown, wrote to Maurice Chandler saying how much they valued contact with the BSR in London.⁸

Russell's reply to Hugh Hanning's request for comments on possible Church of England initiatives was illuminating in that it demonstrated the wide constituency of opinion to which the

³ BSR/IAC/SAF/5/1, undated memo.

⁴ BSR/IAC/SAF/6, letter of 12/3/75.

⁵ IAC Minutes 18/3/75.

⁶ BSR/IAC/SAF/6, letter of 10/4/75.

⁷ IAC Minutes 20/5/75.

⁸ BSR/IAC/SAF/7, letter of 10/6/75.

Church had access. He had felt it inappropriate for the BSR in Cape Town to comment without consultation and he had therefore passed the ideas on for comment to the Director of Inter Church Aid at the South African Council of Churches, the Secretary of Black Community Programmes, the Field Officer for the Border Council of Churches in Cape Province, the School of Economics at the University of Cape Town and the Research Officer for the South African Labour and Development Research Unit, also at the University of Capetown.⁹ But despite the value he obviously placed on close links with the BSR in England David Russell was not in fact overwhelmingly enthusiastic about the Church's suggestions, the only one he singled out as worthy of being followed up being legal assistance for employees caught up in Pass Law infringements.

Much more interesting were the comments of Malusi Mthanjiswa Mpumlwana, Research Officer of the Eastern Cape branch of Black Community Programmes Ltd., whose secretary was Steve Biko. He agreed that technical expertise was lacking in African education and therefore assistance in this field would be very welcome, but he suggested that none of the proposals had anything to do with the black organisations which represented ... "the true aspiration of the people your proposals are intended to help. On the contrary they seek to entrench the Bantustans which have been created to tread upon the very dignity of the black man and his claim to human recognition. I hope this is no indication of your attitude to the political situation in this country."¹⁰

Interesting too was criticism of the IAC's schemes which arrived from quite another direction. On 16th April Hugh Hanning wrote to Sir Arthur Snelling, a former British Ambassador to South Africa, after his recent article in the *Financial Times*, asking for his comments on the Church of England's recommendations. Snelling replied that British firms were at that time being approached from many quarters for help with schemes ... "many of which are more convincing and thought out in greater detail than this one."¹¹ He questioned for example why a secretary for Chief Buthelezi had to be trained in London rather than Natal, said that there were already African newspapers and questioned the desirability of asking firms rather than individuals to help the

⁹ BSR/IAC/SAF/7, letter of 12/8/75.

¹⁰ BSR/IAC/SAF/7, letter of 7/10/75.

¹¹ BSR/IAC/SAF/6, letter of 30/4/75.

Christian Institute which often clashed with the South African Government.

Both of these criticisms are important. Mr. Mpumlwana voiced the view of many black, and especially urban black, Africans that ameliorative schemes to improve living standards in the Homelands did nothing to challenge the basis on which the Homelands concept was based. Moreover to choose to work through white and often foreign controlled industry was to choose to ignore those black organisations through which black people saw the working out of their own future, a future which would not be controlled by a white minority government or by multinational industry.

Sir Arthur Snelling's comments demonstrate that even within their own terms of reference the IAC was not succeeding. To be influential with industry a package of suggestions needed to be well-worked out, well-researched and practical. Suggestions that would involve companies in possible clashes with the South African Government obviously held little appeal; a sine qua non of the operation of these companies in the South African Republic was their belief not only that they could co-exist with the Government there but that it was in their interests to do so.

Despite having been told by critics of radically opposed view that their plans were extensively flawed, there is no record of feedback by the executive even as far as the IAC itself, let alone to a wider constituency. Plans once adopted and made operational by bureaucracies, even comparatively small ones such as operated in the BSR, are notoriously difficult to change. Moreover a good deal of personal credibility as well as expression of personal values was involved in the area of Homelands development and its wider hinterland of investment versus withdrawal. The narrowness of appeal of their plans within the context of South African society did not cause any change or even reassessment. One is therefore forced to conclude that the continued activities of the IAC in this field were to a considerable extent internally generated to fit the needs of the Church perceived through the narrow prism of those responsible for executive action and through Synod, rather than externally generated to fit the situation.

A value which certainly did exercise the IAC Executive, although it is difficult to judge whether this was a theological or secular value, an internally cohesive or an externally generated

value, was that of the desirability and possibility of a peaceful solution in South Africa. In July Clifford Longley wrote an article in *The Times* about the forthcoming World Council of Churches Meeting saying that the WCC had been taken over by the condoners of violence. This stricture was caused partly by certain grants made by the Programme to Combat Racism and partly by the WCC's decision, taken in August 1972, to sell existing holdings in South Africa and to urge member Churches, Christian agencies and individual Christians to do likewise.¹² Incidentally, the pamphlet in which the background and reasoning behind this decision is explained, 'Time to Withdraw',¹³ in no way advocates violence.

The IAC's reaction was not to undertake a defence of the WCC and to point out how small a proportion of its activity or funding was in connection with guerilla group/liberation movements. Hugh Hanning drafted a brief for the Archbishop of Canterbury detailing the numerous non-violent solutions to acute societal problems which the IAC had been exploring including economic pressure on South Africa through 'leverage' and investment in the Homelands. This was supplied to all the Anglican delegates to the WCC Meeting in Nairobi,¹⁴ where the Church of England's divergence from most other member churches of the WCC was once again demonstrated by the reaffirmation there of the existing policy of the Programme to Combat Racism and of disinvestment from South Africa.¹⁵

¹² Resolution of the Central Committee of the WCC August 1972, documented in 'Time to Withdraw', pub. by WCC, Geneva, January 1973.

¹³ *Ibid*

¹⁴ IAC Minutes, 6/8/75.

¹⁵ IAC Minutes 13/1/76, report by Maurice Chandler of his visit to Nairobi.

SECTION III.8: CHURCH OF ENGLAND POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA – 1976

The latter months of 1976 saw further illustration of divergence between Church of England and WCC policies when the Central Committee of the WCC in Geneva decided to urge member churches to oppose the Bantustan policy.¹

Thus the IAC's perception of its own and the Church of England's distance from the more radical solutions sometimes advocated by the WCC was illustrated once again. It should be seen in conjunction with the criticism of a black South African detailed above to demonstrate how far from any identification with the Third World analysis of the black dilemma was the Church's Executive. Some difference of perception on cultural and historical grounds was to be expected, but in the area of foreign policy the Church's executive demonstrated a consistent inability to comprehend that the parameters of violence included those imposed by the structure and laws of the South African state as well as guerilla action to bring down that state.

This was not always true of Synod where some speakers in such debates as that on Force in the Modern World and the world food crisis demonstrated a comprehension of the concept of structural violence in a variety of milieux, not only South Africa, and a realization of the need for Churches in the First World to understand the problems of those in the Third. In the debate after the report of the Nairobi WCC Meeting at the February, 1976 Synod Canon Poulton for example spoke of his conviction that English Christians should be more conscious of their need to change in response to the demands of modern Christianity; the Church of England, he said, had no right or reason to give advice to people fighting for freedom, considering their own history. He identified a strong tradition of solidarity with the oppressed in the teaching of Temple, Gore, Tawney, Scott-Holland and it was in this tradition he suggested that the WCC's grants to some African freedom fighters should be judged – they were intended, not to finance revolution, but to express solidarity. The whole issue had become so large because many members of the Church of England did not want their comfortable lives disturbed – the tradition of Barchester.²

¹ BSR/IAC/SAF/5/1.

² Report of Proceedings of General Synod, Spring 1976 Group of Sessions, Vol. 7. No. 2, p. 482.

By contrast with such sentiments a lack of comprehension of the true parameters of violence and an easy equation of black South African needs with no danger to life, no hunger, improving educational standards and better pay and living standards were a feature of Church thinking amongst those charged with executive action in the foreign policy sphere. The 1976 BCC report on the evolving policy of the CCSA posed a totally relevant question in this connection. "... while material standards (in South Africa) have risen there had been no progress on the political or the educational fronts. Can Christians rest content with a view of man which regards him as infinitely satiable by material acquisition?"³ By extension it is suggested that one is entitled to ask how and why a policy directed more or less entirely at the material circumstances of the black citizens of South Africa was adopted by an organisation whose overriding strategic objective was the sustenance of mens' spiritual, rather than, material needs.

It was to such preconceptions as those inherent in the IAC view that Philip Potter, General Secretary of the WCC, addressed himself when he spoke to Synod in the summer of 1976.⁴ He suggested that Britain and the whole of the Anglo-Saxon world had been selective over human rights seeing them only in personal and political terms; the British needed to realize that there were those in other parts of the world who viewed societal rights as more important. It was only within the framework of a realization of the importance of both that Christians of North and South, East and West could engage in genuine conversation. Moreover human rights had to be viewed in terms of racism and sexism as well as of religious liberty and political dissent. In terms of religious liberty it was important to realize that this meant not only freedom to worship but freedom to witness to one's faith; this might well include the need to challenge the system under which one lived.

In uncontroversial areas however the IAC on behalf of the Church maintained an impeccable liberalism. Hugh Hanning and Elliott Kendall as co-sponsors of the Christian Institute Fund had been instrumental in inviting Beyers Naudé to speak to the Royal Institute of International

³ BSR/IAC/SAF/12/1, report by Brian Duckworth 'Christian Concern for South Africa: an evolving policy', February, 1976.

⁴ Report of Proceedings of General Synod, Summer 1976 Group of Sessions, Vol. 7, No. 3.

Affairs at Chatham House on 16th December. At the last moment Naudé was refused permission to leave by the South African Government. His address was therefore read for him by Sir Robert Birley and was later published by the Christian Institute Fund with, on the back page, a letter from the Director of the Institute protesting at the refusal to give Naudé a passport. The IAC through Hugh Hanning, was instrumental in this.⁵

It was in issues such as that detailed above and in its attitude to the persecution of the Christian Institute that the IAC best demonstrated a sense of purpose and a determination to stand against oppression. In late 1976 for example Hugh Hanning signed an ecumenical protest against a recent raid on the Institute's headquarters and that of the South African Council of Churches. The importance of pressure from outside South Africa to keep the Institute open was related by one of its staff, Horst Kleinschmidt, who visited the IAC at the end of 1976 and was convinced that it was only the international standing of the Christian Institute and the efforts of the international community on its behalf which prevented its closure.⁶

In the matter too of the Alice Seminary the IAC's actions were unimpeachably liberal. Alice Seminary was the multiracial Federal Theological Seminary of South Africa and, in December 1974, its land was confiscated with only one month's notice and title granted to neighbouring Fort Hare University. Alice Seminary was forced to move to completely unsuitable premises at Umtata in the Transkei.

A report of this was sent to Hugh Hanning and he orchestrated a campaign of protest by writing to the Secretaries of the Young Conservatives, Young Liberals, National Union of Students, Young Socialists, the Bow Group, the Federation of Conservative Students, the Union of Liberal Students and the National Organization of Socialist Students. Moreover Bernard Levin, who had written a previous article at Hugh Hanning's prompting, quoted in full a letter from Umtata when he wrote about the move and the injustice of awarding this land to a University which had ample room to expand in other directions than that of the Seminary.⁷

⁵ IAC Minutes 4/11/75 and BSR/IAC/SAF/5/1.

⁶ IC Minutes 30/11/76.

⁷ BSR/IAC/SAF/11.

An intervention by the Archbishop of Canterbury on behalf of two black South Africans, who had been sentenced to death in connection with the killing of an Ovambo leader, was also in a liberal, humanitarian tradition. He wrote to the President of South Africa on 17th May 1976 and pleaded for clemency. The Prime Minister's initial response was less than helpful, "... it is noted that you fail to express your abhorrence that the elected leader of the Ovambos was brutally murdered."⁸ However the condemned men were in fact reprieved in October, an outcome which Rodney Elton was convinced was at least partly due to the Archbishop's intervention.⁹

A similarly clear cut impression of resolution and commitment can be detected in the Church of England's participation with other member Churches of the WCC in the matter of loans by the Midland Bank Group to the South African Government. This was of course in line with Church policy which frowned on further investment and also on open-ended political investment in the South African Government itself. At the beginning of February 1976 Philip Potter, General Secretary of the WCC, notified Lord Armstrong at the Midland Bank that because the Europe American Banking Corporation, of which his bank was a member, had refused to halt such loans, no further WCC funds would be deposited there and member Churches would be encouraged to take similar action.¹⁰

During March representations were made to the Midland Bank by the BCC, the Methodist Church and the Church Commissioners but with no effect. Accordingly letters to the press publicized the resolution to be put to the Midland Bank Annual General Meeting requiring an end to such loans and an appeal was made for the hundred shareholders needed to sponsor this resolution. The resolution was supported by the Church Commissioners amongst a group of sponsoring organisations and, although the shareholders rejected it by a majority of 47,400,000 to 2,950,000, the target of 3% in favour of ending the loans had been exceeded. In his report on the affair to Philip Potter Hugh Hanning reported that the press had seen this as the first occasion when a resolution of a moral and political nature had been formally requisitioned and discussed at the Annual

⁸ BSR/IAC/SAF/5/1, letter of 14/7/76.

⁹ BSR/IAC/LAM/2, note of 18/4/77.

¹⁰ BSR/IAC/SAF/6, letter of 4/2/76.

General Meeting of a British company.¹¹

Where Government initiatives were concerned however the Church's stance was much less clearcut. This was perhaps not surprising in the light of what appeared to be a weakening commitment on the part of the Government itself.

A White Paper (Command Paper 5845) had appeared in the wake of the Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on the Wages and Conditions of African Workers employed by British Firms in South Africa. It had asked that all British firms holding more than 10% of the equity of a South African Company publish information on the wages and working conditions of their black African employees. At the end of December 1975 this requirement was modified in the light of the South African Government's Second General Law Amendment Act of 1974 whereby permission for the transmission of such information had to be sought of the South African Government by such firms; this permission would only be granted for British holdings of 50% or over; permission would be refused in respect of minority shareholdings. Consequently, and seemingly recognizing this law as impossible to circumvent, the British Government amended its own requirements, although Mr. Shore, Minister of Trade, assured the House of Commons that "We shall continue to encourage British companies with a minority holding to publish whenever possible similar information acquired in the course of their relationship with their South African affiliate (or published locally by the affiliate) as well as more general information on matters such as African advancement, collective bargaining, fringe benefits etc".¹²

Thus by the end of their first year of operation Government requirements in this area had been diluted. This would not have been too significant if the reporting requirement apparatus had been working well in the first place but this was not so. At the beginning of May the *Methodist Recorder* reported that Mr. Shore's letter to firms asking for progress reports had yielded little, and very little progress had been made in improving black South African working conditions. Job reservation under the legal restraints of the Industrial Conciliation Act remained; a few jobs

¹¹ BSR/IAC/SAF/6, letter of 8/7/76.

¹² BSR/IAC/SAF/12/1, Press Notice from the Department of Trade, 1/12/75.

previously only open to whites might now be available to Coloured workers but there had been no relaxation in respect of Blacks. The attitude of white trades unions was not improved; wages had risen but so had inflation which had diminished the effect of the increases; the gap between the wages of black and white was just as great and the majority of black African workers were still below the Poverty Datum Line.¹³ In its less public moments the IAC inclined to the same view. A memo in April 1976 commented that most of the members of the Rogers Committee were now ministers and the ... "steam seems to have run out."¹⁴

One sees here therefore a campaign begun on the premise that industry could be influenced to improve the pay and living conditions of its black workers in South Africa foundering on one of the fundamental factors of investment there, and one which the Church had considered capable of manipulation: firms with South African interests invested there because conditions yielded a high rate of return which they had no intention of jeopardizing by antagonizing the South African Government. Quite apart from constraints induced by this consideration there appeared little willingness to do what was possible, within the framework of what the system in South Africa permitted, or at least to have activities scrutinized by the British Government.

The flawed working of the system of voluntary disclosure was demonstrated by the CCSA which initiated its own enquiries both into the activities of the subsidiaries of British firms in South Africa and into their record of reporting these activities. The CCSA's activities during 1976 and the later years of the decade led to its fall from favour with the IAC Executive who preferred discreet and unpublicized pressure rather than the public revelation of shortcomings.

Their reservations were demonstrated by the fact that the CCSA subscription had still not been paid in January 1976¹⁵ and by a memo in April which describes how wary were the Church Commissioners of the CCSA despite the latter's desire to be useful to the Commissioners.¹⁶ Moreover Hugh Hanning, himself a member of the CCSA's Executive Committee, refused to

¹³ BSR/IAC/SAF/11, article in the Methodist Recorder, 1/5/75.

¹⁴ BSR/IAC/12/1, unattributed memo to Hugh Hanning.

¹⁵ IAC Minutes 13/1/76.

¹⁶ BSR/IAC/SAF/12/1, unattributed memo to Hugh Hanning of 27/4/76.

sign a document advocating a withdrawal of investment in ICI because of the labour practices of their subsidiary in South Africa; Hanning saw this as contrary to Church of England policy, although indeed this policy encompassed withdrawal as a last resort, and he queried also CCSA's reservations over investment in the Homelands.¹⁷ This reservation was moreover shared by some of the English members of the Partners in Mission consultation in South Africa in July, 1976. In a 'confidential report on the exercise to Giles Ecclestone, Christian Howard, a member of the English delegation, wrote that "The Homelands issue is one of political dynamite. How can we act so that we neither discriminate against Africans in the Homelands nor collude with South African Government policy? I did not feel that the (brief) statement in the BSR Annual Report sufficiently recognised this dilemma."¹⁸

Indeed in this latter respect by the end of 1976 the CCSA had come down in favour of non-investment in the Homelands on the grounds that investment gave moral and psychological support to the present regime in South Africa. Patrick Stuart, Secretary of the organisation, favoured instead direct relief with a political cutting edge to encourage self-organisation amongst those who lived in Bantustans. Outsiders should also work through black-controlled organisations such as the South African Council of Churches or the Black Community Programme.¹⁹ In his reply to the statement of this position Lord Elton suggested that such a policy might perhaps be mistaken because saving the lives of those who were starving in Bantustans was itself laudable.²⁰ This was a fairly mild response to the CCSA's repudiation of Church of England policy but the divergence between the two organisations grew more noticeable and, on the Church's side at least, more deeply imbued with resentment as time went on.

It was not merely over the question of the Bantustans that they differed. The Church's optimistic belief in the efficacy of behind the scenes pressure throughout the South African Republic was also very much at odds with a new CCSA report²¹ Not only did this single out the

¹⁷ BSR/IAC/SAF/12/1, undated memo by Hugh Hanning.

¹⁸ BSR/IAC/SAF/7, letter from Christian Howard to Giles Ecclestone, 13/9/76.

¹⁹ BSR/IAC/SAF/1, letter of 14/10/76 from Patrick Stuart to Rodney Elton.

²⁰ BSR/IAC/SAF/1, letter of 19/10/76 from Elton to Patrick Stuart.

²¹ 'Poverty Wages in South Africa – a Review of the Effectiveness of Self-Regulation and Voluntary Disclosure', CCSA, publ. London, 1976.

activities of individual companies but it concluded that ...

"the majority of UK parent companies are reluctant to expose the affairs of their South African affiliates to public scrutiny. Not only is this completely at odds with the spirit of Government policy but it strongly suggests that they are failing to monitor in any credible way the performance of their affiliates in the areas set out in the White Paper."²²

A deputation of churchmen from the CCSA, not including a Church of England representative however, visited the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Edmund Dell, at the beginning of June to ask that the revelation of wages and conditions of work of the South African subsidiaries of British firms be made statutory.²³

The visit was not successful in the sense that no mandatory disclosure rule was introduced, and some of the activities of Hugh Hanning and Rodney Elton throw light on the reason for this. On 23rd September they visited the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for a meeting about South Africa and the role the Church of England might play there. The Church's 'softly, softly' approach was obviously very much in tune with Foreign Office thinking and they were told that the Church had a most important role in the situation because the Government, ...

"though pressed by the T.U.C. and the National Executive Committee to take a more active economic line ... was unwilling to allow itself to be presented as a "target" to South Africa – i.e. for whatever reason, it is seeking to maintain a low profile. Clearly one reason is the fact that the UK is South Africa's biggest export market, and South Africa is the UK's ninth biggest."²⁴

Results of requests for information under the provisions of the Rogers Committee report were said to be very disappointing and it was suggested that the Church of England might assume the higher profile which the Government was reluctant to do by another approach to those forty five firms first contacted in 1972. As far as specific courses of action to be urged on these firms were concerned the FCO saw the training of black employees in technical and engineering skills as a priority.²⁵ They even provided Hanning and Elton with a "shopping list" of training propo-

²² BSR/IAC/SAF/12/1, summary of argument in 'Poverty Wages in South Africa' *ibid* prepared as a Press release on 7/6/76, p. 3.

²³ BSR/IAC/SAF/12/1, visit of 7/6/76.

²⁴ BSR/IAC/SAF/7, minute of Hanning/Elton meeting at the FCO on 23/9/76, p. 1.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

sals to present to British firms, something which they were not at that time prepared to do themselves. "Any action will have to be on a strictly unattributable basis."²⁶

The IAC's conviction of the rightness of its own approach was reinforced by what its members saw as Foreign Office endorsement of their investment policy over South Africa in general and the Homelands in particular. At the IAC meeting on 1st October Hugh Hanning reported that he had been told there that intermediate, labour intensive technology was exactly appropriate to the Homelands and could do nothing but good.²⁷ Moreover gathering prejudice against the CCSA was reinforced by hearing at the FCO that City firms in particular had responded to CCSA enquiries even less satisfactorily than to Government ones. From this was extrapolated or, at least reinforced, the belief that the Church of England had a unique 'inside track' with many institutions who were reassured by its Establishment image and connections.

Approaches were accordingly made to the Church's chosen forty five firms about the labour practices, training facilities, attitude and practice over Trades Unions, welfare facilities of their South African subsidiaries. At the end of November Maurice Chandler could report that he had received acknowledgements from twenty two firms some with the requested information, some with a promise of a full report in due course and others who said that they were pursuing the matter with their South African subsidiaries.²⁸

This sense of their own special relationship with Government did nothing to strengthen the IAC's respect for the CCSA. They increasingly disagreed with its approach which they saw as ever more radical and divergent from Church of England interests despite its indefatigable collection of information and its high level and well-regarded seminars. Hugh Hanning went so far as to state "There is undoubtedly a new, though small element in CCSA which introduces a new element of risk into the situation."²⁹

²⁶ BSR/IAC/SAF/7, letter of 29/9/76 to Hugh Hanning from P.W. Denison-Edson of the Central and Southern African Department at the FCO.

²⁷ IAC Minutes 1/10/76.

²⁸ IAC Minutes, 30/11/76.

²⁹ BSR/IAC/SAF/12/1, memo of 9/11/76, a reference to the recent change in the management team of the CCSA.

His increasing inability to agree as a member of its Executive Committee with the CCSA's activities and pronouncements, particularly the company profiles it proposed to circulate to shareholders prior to Annual General Meetings, was presumably the reason for Hugh Hanning's intense preoccupation in the Autumn of 1976 with the possibility that he and other members of the Committee might be sued for libel. A voluminous correspondence built up, with the CCSA Executive and other members of the Committee not nearly as exercised over the matter as was Hanning and, on his behalf, Maurice Chandler. They asked that a legal advisor to the CCSA be appointed, which the Executive said that it could not afford; they asked that only unanimously agreed documents be issued or, failing that, that the names of those who had endorsed a document be given, other members thereby avoiding liability, a suggestion of very dubious legal value. Legal advice was sought and the vulnerability of the Church of England to actions for damages in respect of libel, because of a general perception of its wealth, was stressed. Hugh Hanning was assured by the BSR that he would be personally indemnified for any action that might lie against him as a member of the CCSA's Executive Committee.³⁰ It is difficult to explain the intensity of Hanning's expressed fears by anything other than distaste for CCSA policy;³¹ If the danger of action for libel was great then other members of the Committee, even if they did not share his policy preferences, would surely have shared his fears of personal liability.

³⁰ BSR/IAC/SAF/12/1.

³¹ At the beginning of 1977 a summary by Hanning of the advantages and disadvantages of Church of England membership of the CCSA heavily stressed the disadvantages. BSR/IAC/SAF/12/1, memo of 4/1/77.

SECTION III.9: CHURCH OF ENGLAND POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA – 1977.

IAC activity during 1977 continued very much along the same lines as in previous years. Discreet attempts to ensure company accountability were still very much the major theme with replies to the questionnaire on working conditions and pay in South African subsidiaries being passed to the Church Commissioners and the Central Board of Finance.¹

Rodney Elton asked a series of questions in the House of Lords about the failure by companies to disclose information about South African subsidiaries. In February his efforts resulted in a written answer in Hansard on the number of companies complying to date with the request for disclosure.² In November the Department of Trade issued a digest of the reports of British companies from 1st January 1975 to 28th February, 1977, a list sent to Rodney Elton by Lord Oram and to the CCSA by Edmund Dell.³ The fact that of 189 reports only 43 provided all the information requested demonstrated the limitations on the success of the exercise. Moreover a CCSA report in July set out the divergent approaches of constructive engagement and disengagement and commented that ... "it must be recognized that three years of constructive engagement have produced little or no tangible evidence of substantial change."⁴

Highly significant too had been an earlier warning from a man whom the IAC regarded with constant respect and approval. In August 1976 the Rev. Beyers Naudé had given an address at Rhodes University, Grahamstown, where he said that blacks regarded the question of foreign investment as a political, not an economic, one, and they felt that they should be consulted over the policy. Indications were that they were against it and prominent organisations such as the Black Peoples' Convention and SASO seriously questioned whether investment could make any significant change in South Africa. Naudé himself was not against investment but said that pressure on investing companies had made a little, but not nearly enough, progress. Unless they did

¹ IAC Minutes 26/1/77.

² House of Lords Hansard, 15/2/77, p. 113.

³ A 'Brief Assessment of British Firms' Performance' by the Department of Trade and Industry, BSR/IAC/SAF/13.

⁴ BSR/IAC/SAF/BOX/2, CCSA report on Investment in South Africa, 18/7/77.

begin to observe certain minimum standards it would be difficult to avoid a black radical call for complete disinvestment.⁵

The thrust of IAC policy however did not alter, indeed in some ways it hardened. At the beginning of November 1977 the Rev. David Haslam, Secretary of 'End Loans to South Africa, ELTSA, asked the Archbishop of Canterbury to sign a letter calling for increased pressure by British churches to end such loans; the list of those who had already signed was long and drawn from most of the main-stream churches.⁶ Maurice Chandler, consulted about a suitable response by Hugh Whitworth, the Archbishop's Personal Assistant, replied that they could not commit the Church Commissioners because there were so many issues involved including the pay of the clergy and Synod views; "Sir Ronald Harris takes the view that more good can be done behind the scenes than by this method."⁷

The situation and problems of multinational companies in relation to the ethics of investment was a particular preoccupation during 1977 and one that reflected an internationally sharpened awareness. In 1976 for example the OECD Council adopted its own guidelines for TNC's and in 1977 the new UN Commission on Transnational Corporations held its first substantive meeting at Lima where it decided to draw up a TNC code of conduct. Also in 1977 a Commission on Multi-national Enterprises was set up, chaired by an IBM executive and with the Chief Executives of Fiat, General Motors and Unilever as Vice-Chairmen.⁸

In this context Hanning wrote to Sir David Orr, Chairman of Unilever, on 21st May including confidentially a copy of a BCC projected paper critical of the behaviour of multinationals and requesting his comments. "It is a document with which some of us find ourselves in strong disagreement ... as you know it is an axiom of Church of England investment policy that the most productive procedure is private consultation with the leaders of the companies concerned."⁹

⁵ BSR/IAC/SAF/13.

⁶ BSR/IAC/SAF/13, letter of 4/11/77.

⁷ *Ibid*, undated memo from Maurice Chandler to Hugh Whitworth.

⁸ BSR/IAC/SAF/BOX/3.

⁹ BSR/IAC/SAF/BOX/3, letter of 21/5/77.

In September the WCC held an international conference on multinational companies where their position was described as translating a mandate for WCC action in the field of TNC's into a programme of action/reflection by a combination of information gathering and analysis and the prophetic action of the churches. Recommended guidelines in assessing the situation were

"... the demands of two-thirds of the earth's people, the food and ecological problems that threaten present and future generations, the misuse of power and the struggle of the powerless and the questioning of the growth-oriented affluent societies and the consequences of this for the rest of mankind."¹⁰

The IAC's reaction to this was documented at the meeting on 15th September and in its pragmatic and 'view from the boardroom approach' it could not have been in greater contrast to the WCC document. It was reported that Geoffrey Chandler of Shell had spoken strongly against the attitude of the WCC meeting. The Chairmen of the BSR and the IAC were to meet Sir David Orr of Unilever during November and also hoped to establish contact with Tim Belben, Economic Adviser to Unilever, who was a member of the General Synod. There was general approbation for this approach of behind the scenes meetings between individual churchmen and industrialists and it was specifically hoped that the coming BCC consultation on multinationals would enable the churches "... to back away from the confrontational and emotional approach" shown by some organisations and tackle the genuine problems.¹¹

Hugh Hanning certainly felt that the record had been set straight to some extent by the BCC conference held at the beginning of October where businessmen and churchmen met to exchange and discuss views on the ethics of multinational activity.¹² The WCC, he said, had made ... "broad, general and unsubstantiated accusations against the whole principle of TNC's". Since the BCC meeting however church representatives were much better informed.¹³ He by no means whitewashed activities of TNC's however and suggested that illegal behaviour, transfer pricing, transfer of operations and emphasis on capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive investment

¹⁰ BSR/IAC/SAF/BOX/3, the WCC Study/Action Programme on Transnational Corporations", Diego A.N. de Gaspar, 1977.

¹¹ IAC Minutes 15/9/77, p. 3.

¹² BSR/IAC/SAF/BOX/3.

¹³ BSR/IAC/SAF/BOX/3, letter of 2/11/77 from Hugh Hanning to the Bishop of Truro, Chairman of the BSR.

were among their most frequent offences.¹⁴

The meeting between the Chairman of Unilever, Maurice Chandler, Hugh Hanning and the Bishop of Truro resulted in a decision to propose that a paper on Transnational Corporations be produced for the BSR. A wide range of transnational corporations based in the UK would be consulted and either Hugh Hanning or an outside academic could write the report which would concentrate on TNC's worldwide and not only in South Africa.¹⁵

The IAC were undoubtedly confirmed in their approach by the decision in September of the EEC Foreign Ministers to implement a tough code of conduct on all European companies with South African subsidiaries. Each parent company was to receive a copy of the code of conduct which would effectively end discrimination against black workers in South Africa and would be asked to send a detailed report each year to its government on how the code was being applied.¹⁶ The Economist reported that the idea had first come from the British Foreign Secretary, David Owen, and the IAC could congratulate itself on its involvement in the initial pressure to institute some voluntary scheme of accountability in the UK¹⁷ *The Times* reported that one of the reasons for British and Dutch pressure to adopt a Europe-wide code was that while they were the only countries in Europe attempting to enforce some sort of accountability their companies had legitimately objected that it put them at a disadvantage commercially against companies without comparable restraint.¹⁸

Pressure to reassess was building up however both through the changing perceptions of other organisations, increasing feedback on policy success and events in South Africa itself.

In July the Roman Catholic Diocese of Westminster announced that it was selling its shares in Consolidated Goldfields Ltd. because it had explored all possible avenues of influencing the Company and could do no more. They also sent a further contribution to the CCSA on whose

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p.2.

¹⁵ IAC Minutes, 15/11/77.

¹⁶ BSR/IAC/SAF/13.

¹⁷ *The Economist*, 24/9/77.

¹⁸ *The Times*, 21/9/77.

work their decision had been based.¹⁹ The contrast here is marked between the two churches' attitudes to the CCSA and to investment in Consolidated Goldfields; this investment was maintained by the Church of England despite an unsatisfactory attitude towards black South African employees manifested in the reply to the 1973 questionnaire and a later interview conducted by Hugh Hanning.²⁰

A demonstration of the consensual view of many Western churches on this issue and the Church of England's increasing isolation from this view was given in May. Rodney Elton attended a conference for Western members of the WCC at Driebergen in the Netherlands on the role of Western churches in bringing economic pressure to bear on South Africa to generate change there. The consensual decision there was that complete economic disengagement was necessary because it had begun to be regarded as the benchmark of goodwill by black Christians. "If it was not adopted, the Black Christians would feel that brotherhood with any Whites, even Christians, had ceased to exist and that the world was divided into two hostile species."²¹

IAC reaction was predictable. While Rodney Elton seems personally to have accepted the force and logic of the argument outlined above it was the lack of official standing of the conference which was emphasised at the IAC Meeting on 15th September. The difficulty with reference to the Church of England's large investment portfolio was stressed; it must, it was suggested, include many holdings in companies active in or dependent on the South African economy. Wholesale disinvestment would remove what little leverage the Church Commissioners had in South Africa, so a policy of selective disinvestment would be wiser. Discussions between IAC staff and the Commissioners were already taking place, though it was pointed out that the Commissioners were in no way responsible to the IAC, to the BSR or to Synod.²²

One might suggest that there was a little movement here in view of the fact that selective disinvestment was mentioned at all. There was certainly disquiet amongst the Commissioners.

¹⁹ BSR/IAC/SAF/5/2, press notice by the Diocese of Westminster, 14/7/77.

²⁰ See Section III.5.

²¹ BSR/IAC/SAF/14, report to the IAC by Lord Elton, 12/7/77.

²² IAC Minutes, 15/9/77.

A.I. McDonald wrote to Rodney Elton about the Driebergen conclusions on 25th July and commented then that attitudes to South Africa seemed to be hardening. In the light of this and of the implications of the Driebergen line he asked for a meeting as soon as possible to learn the IAC's views. Since Hanning and Chandler also attended this meeting, and considering the tenor of the Committee meeting where Driebergen was discussed, it is not surprising that no discernible change was seen in the Commissioners investment policy.

However in August Paul Brett, a member of the BSR's staff concerned with Industrial Relations, was asked to convene a study group on the ethics of investment and also to represent Giles Ecclestone on a Church Commissioners' group dealing with a similar subject.²³ Later in the year he was asked to comment on the WCC Consultation on TNC's and on Geoffrey Chandler of Shell's reaction to it.

His reaction and comments were significantly different from those of the IAC Executive. He agreed that there were genuine opportunities for Third World development in the activities of the TNC's, but suggested also that to attempt to deal with black accusations of Western exploitation by denying them was inadequate. Moreover he considered that the effect of TNC's, as of all large institutions, might be quite uncontrollable by the good intentions of their employees, and that the concept of 'institutional sin' should be explored.²⁴

The remit of this study group was wider than the South African situation but the question of ethics in relation to investment arose most often and most acutely in relation to South Africa. Therefore the appointment of an 'outside' investigator was a challenge to the assumptions which had long underpinned IAC policy. This was presumably a response to the movement towards reevaluation of policy in this area which was going on in the BCC and many of its member Churches, and to events in South Africa itself.

The situation in South Africa itself was not only increasing pressure for reappraisal of overall policy but was forcing reaction to a set of acute crises rather than considered and long-

²³ BSR/IAC/SAF/14, letter from Ecclestone to Elton, 10/8/77.

²⁴ BSR/IAC/SAF/BOX/3, memo from Paul Brett to Ecclestone and Hanning, 3/10/77.

term initiatives from the Church. Recession and urban unemployment and the intensification of the Homelands policy had exacerbated ever-present resentment. This came to a head in 1976 with the Soweto uprising. In September 1977 Steve Biko, a SASO leader, died in police custody and in October eighteen organisations, including the Christian Institute and SASO, and a number of individuals, including Beyers Naudé, were banned.

No record exists on file of Church of England reaction to the deaths at Soweto although there was a BCC statement deploring the circumstances. The BCC also issued a statement over the death of Steve Biko pointing out that he was the twenty first political detainee to die in unexplained circumstances in a South African prison in less than a year.²⁵

The Church of England was individually involved in the issue of Biko's death and not merely as a member of the BCC. Elton wrote on behalf of the Church of England to the Director of Information at the South African Embassy pointing out discrepancies in the Government's press release about Biko's death and asking to be informed of the actual sequence of events and of what form of medical treatment Biko received.²⁶ The Director of Information acknowledged the discrepancies and undertook to inform Elton of the details he had requested when they became available.²⁷

The Archbishop of Canterbury himself was involved in the Christian Institute affair. He sent a telegram to the Prime Minister of South Africa deploring its closure and that of SASO as well as the individual banning orders. In the Archbishop's own words the telegram in acknowledgement from the President of South Africa ... "said exactly nothing."²⁸ However the Synod debate on the issue produced a resolution of support for the Christian Institute and, such was the depth of feeling on the issue, that W.D. Pattinson, Secretary General of Synod, sent the text of the resolution to the South African Ambassador in London who was known to be wary of Church opinion and who regularly bombarded Church House with justificatory literature.²⁹

²⁵ BSR/IAC/SAF/5/2 and BOX 5, press release of 14/9/77.

²⁶ BSR/IAC/SAF/BOX/5, letter of 20/9/77.

²⁷ *ibid.*, letter of 26/9/77.

²⁸ Report of Proceedings of General Synod, Autumn 1977, Vol. 8, No. 3, p. 1043

²⁹ BSR/IAC/SAF/5/2, letter of 16/11/77.

He certainly replied in full. His ingenious justification for the banning orders was that the human rights of the majority of citizens were defended by a government which did not allow them to be subject to intimidation and subversion.³⁰

³⁰ BSR/IAC/SAF/BOX/5, letter of 29/11/77.

SECTION III.10: CHURCH OF ENGLAND POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA – 1978.

This correspondence between the South African Ambassador and Synod's Secretary General continued well into 1978. The Ambassador's reply was held to be so unsatisfactory that Pattinson published the correspondence and wrote to him again refuting his contentions one by one. Stressing the excellent information-gathering system of the Anglican Church he questioned the South African Government's version of Steve Biko's death, the recent banning orders, the real causes of urban violence and the disparity between black and white wages.¹

There is not the slightest sign in this correspondence of illusion as to the real situation of the blacks in South Africa; the Church might have been wedded to a rather ill-defined policy of reform through economic amelioration but disapproval and distaste as well as full and up-to-date information were manifest in Pattinson's letters, the second, and most substantive of which was drafted by the IAC² Moreover the Church's capacity to needle the South African Government, or at least its representatives, is demonstrated by the three subsequent letters sent by the Ambassador as information became available to him with which to refute the points Pattinson made.³

The Church's access to information from numerous sources was well demonstrated in this correspondence which dragged on into the summer of 1978 due to delay in replying by the South African Ambassador who felt the matters raised were so serious they had to be referred to Pretoria.⁴ Numerous members of the BCC were consulted, as well as members of the now banned Christian Institute, members of the Anglican Church in South Africa and a number of secular specialists, by the ad hoc group of the IAC set up to draft replies to the South African Ambassador's letters. The correspondence was printed and circulated to members of the November 1978 Synod and was used moreover by the Archbishop of Canterbury in the House of Lords Debate on Southern Africa which took place in April.⁵

¹ BSR/IAC/SAF/BOX/4, letter of 16/3/78 from Pattinson to the South African Ambassador.

² IAC Minutes, 13/3/78.

³ BSR/IAC/SAF/BOX/5, SAF/BOX/4, SAF/5/2 letters of 9/6/78, 14/7/78 and 18/7/78.

⁴ IAC Minutes, 9/7/78.

⁵ BSR/IAC/LAM/3, letter of 14/4/78 from Hugh Hanning to Hugh Whitworth.

Matters such as this demonstrated the Church's firm views on the immorality of apartheid. Illustrative too of the same views were Sir Ronald Harris's report of his visit to South Africa in January and February 1978, where his distaste for the structure of society there is manifest in every line,⁶ and the IAC's involvement with the Crossroads Action Committee in the protest against the forced removal of the Crossroads community.⁷

None of this however altered the fact that much Church thinking was moving away from constructive engagement towards disinvestment as a suitable policy for Christian organisations, and it was not taking the IAC along with it. Maurice Chandler and Hugh Hanning fought strongly against this trend, particularly against the DIA of the BCC's decision to move towards embracing an official policy of disengagement.

Disquiet was voiced by the Bishop of Guildford at the January meeting of the Synod's Standing Committee about the inadequacy of the Church of England's policy still basically embodied in two documents drawn up in 1973 before Soweto. As the South African Council of Churches itself seemed to be moving towards a belief in disinvestment ... "I hope very much that there is a development in the BSR thinking about this matter and we shall emerge in step with men like Beyers Naudé, whom we acclaim so much".⁸

A similar note was struck by Paul Oestreicher, Head of British Amnesty International as well as a member of the IAC. In his Amnesty role he wrote an open letter to herald the publication of the Amnesty report on Political Imprisonment in South Africa. In this he suggested that ... "the English-speaking churches have made many admirable statements rejecting the ideology of apartheid. Yet it is widely recognized that they present no serious challenge to the continuance of the tyrannous exercise of white power."⁹

The DIA began seriously to question BCC policy in 1978 and devoted a good deal of time to the issue with a visit to South Africa by their Executive Secretary for Africa, a working party

⁶ BSR/IAC/SAF/5/2.

⁷ BSR/IAC/SAF/17.

⁸ BSR/IAC/SAF/BOX/5, letter from the Bishop of Guildford to the Bishop of Truro, 4/1/78.

⁹ BSR/IAC/SAF/5/2, open letter by Paul Oestreicher, Feast of the Epiphany 1978.

and a series of discussion documents. These included 'Economic Relations with South Africa', and 'British Investment in South Africa', which advocated a graduated policy of sanctions.¹⁰ Maurice Chandler objected to this recommendation at the October Committee Meeting, saying that it took no account of the change of premiership in South Africa. Mr. Botha who had recently been appointed might be seen as more liberal because of his attitude to Coloureds and to Namibia; sanctions would therefore not be appropriate.¹¹

At the next DIA Board Meeting it was obvious that Maurice Chandler's views had not prevailed. The Board endorsed section five of the paper 'Economic Relations with South Africa'¹² which called for Britain to support or at least not to oppose calls for sanctions against South Africa in the Security Council of the UN and called on Churches to seek government measures to prevent the flow of capital technology to South Africa. This recommendation would be put to the Executive Committee, hopefully thereafter to Council, early in 1979 and form the basis of an informed debate in the November 1979 BCC Assembly.¹³ Maurice Chandler and Michael Latham, MP, a member of the IAC and a strong opponent of sanctions, were the only members who voted against this decision.¹⁴

Hugh Hanning attempted to modify the emerging BCC position by putting to a November meeting of the DIA major points from his document on the case against sanctions in South Africa. He was convinced that unilateral sanctions would do nothing but damage the British economy because others would step into the investment breach; if the UN wished to impose a sanctions policy some military means of enforcement would be needed and would create major logistic problems; moreover there had been insufficient time to examine the policies of the new South African Government. He saw new possibilities for movement in a perceived greater super-power interest in the area and in opportunities to influence UK firms in relation to their black South Afri-

¹⁰ 'Economic Relations with South Africa', AF/78/60, published Sept. 1978, and 'British Investment in South Africa', AF/78/28, published Oct. 1978, by BCC London.

¹¹ BSR/IAC/BCC/1/4.

¹² 'Economic Relations with South Africa', *op. cit.*

¹³ BSR/IAC/BCC/1/4, meeting of 24 and 25/11/78.

¹⁴ IAC Minutes, 15/11/78 and BSR/IAC/SAF/17.

can employees.¹⁵ After the meeting Hanning reported that his contribution had been taken seriously and would be fed into the next consultation stage.¹⁶ He was disabused of this idea however at the next DIA meeting where there were complaints that none of the opponents of sanctions had produced any alternative policy, and he was obviously irritated that his suggestions did not apparently come under this heading.¹⁷

Efforts to fight against the prevailing tide did not stop here however. At the November IAC meeting it was decided to ask the BCC and the CCSA, who were moving in the same direction, to show the economic consequences of their proposals.¹⁸ This was presumably on the basis of Hanning's belief that if the facts were known ... "the proposal would have the whole country against it ... Seen by ordinary British people, it has the look of a campaign to make Lent compulsory."¹⁹ Hugh Hanning, in his quest for information to refute the case for sanctions, also visited the South African Embassy. He was informed by Mr. Shoeman, the Information Attache there, that the effect of imposing sanctions on South Africa would reverberate through the economies of Zaire, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, and Britain would be affected too.²⁰

¹⁵ BSR/IAC/SAF/17, a memo 'The BCC and Sanctions in South Africa', 16/11/78, Hugh Hanning to James Wilkie.

¹⁶ BSR/IAC/SAF/17, memo from Hanning to Chandler 9/11/78.

¹⁷ BSR/IAC/SAF/17, memo from Hanning to Chandler 11/12/78.

¹⁸ IAC Minutes 15/11/78.

¹⁹ BSR/IAC/SAF/17, memo of 9/11/78 Hanning to Chandler.

²⁰ BSR/IAC/SAF/17, letter to Hanning from Shoeman at the South African Embassy, 23/11/78.

SECTION III.11: CHURCH OF ENGLAND POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA – 1979

The year 1979 saw no change of attitude within the IAC over the question of sanctions but it did see more movement in this direction by almost all British Churches. Accordingly there was a certain polarisation of views with the IAC, the Church Commissioners and, probably, the majority in Synod reluctant to accept the limitations of amelioration through pressure on British firms which were now widely recognised in other church circles.

Most significantly, in terms of the Church of England itself, one sees the clearer emergence of opposition in other parts of the BSR to the line so long pursued by the IAC. By the end of the year this was clearly demonstrated by the fact that the BSR report on 'Political Change in South Africa'¹ was written, after extensive consultations, by Giles Ecclestone, Secretary to the BSR. All previous position papers on the subject had been prepared by the IAC.

In January a BCC paper recommending disinvestment was published and accepted by the BCC Executive Committee.² At the March IAC Meeting where it was discussed³ Sir Ronald Harris, Chairman of the Central Board of Finance, was also invited to put the case against disinvestment and Maurice Chandler argued strongly against the BCC line, suggesting that sanctions were a form of warfare and that, as the BCC document omitted most of the defence aspects, these should be included in the IAC's own report. Discussion was resumed in June⁴ where real differences of opinion within the Committee itself were demonstrated; these were broadly between those, such as Maurice Chandler, Hugh Hanning and Alastair McDonald of the Church Commissioners, who abhorred everything the BCC document suggested and thought that recent changes in South Africa were an indication of real and extensive improvement, and those, including Giles Ecclestone and Richard Crawshaw, who felt that the Church should put forward a moral view whatever the likelihood of its being adopted by the Government.

¹ 1979, CIO, London.

² 'Political Change in South Africa; the Church's Responsibility', *op. cit.*

³ IAC Minutes 29/3/79.

⁴ IAC Minutes, 7/6/79.

Thus Hugh Hanning produced a draft paper to be considered by the September IAC meeting which challenged the need to impose sanctions in the light of what, he suggested, were radical changes in employment law after the report of the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions, of the hardship it would produce inside and outside South Africa and the new willingness which he perceived in the superpowers to involve themselves in South African affairs. He was assisted in this by A.I. McDonald of the Church Commissioners⁵

However on 24th September a BSR consultation on the BCC document was held, an event which Maurice Chandler had attempted to block at the March IAC Meeting.⁶ Not only were the BCC document and Hugh Hanning's response to it considered but also a report of the Industrial Committee under the Chairmanship of Paul Brett.

The difference in tone between this and the IAC's position paper could not have been greater. There was no mention of mineral resources or superpower interests, but instead a dispassionate setting out of the issues with an emphasis upon the specific obligation and input of Christian thought. On the issue of human rights for example it stated. "Human rights issue from a recognition of human worth. The denial of the right to move about freely, to live with one's family, to associate with others of one's choice, to have a job, and, through the vote, to have a say in the ordering of one's country, together with the enforcement of all this by a brutal police force amounts to nothing short of tyranny. Against this the problems of economic breakdown and increased unemployment may be seen in their place. They may turn out to be the lesser evils."⁷

There had already been other indicators too that the IAC was being outflanked by changing opinion within South Africa itself. In January the Christian Institute of South Africa published "The Outlook for South Africa", by the Rev. Dr. Theo Kotze of the Christian Institute Fund in London.⁸ The main arguments of this book were also given as a speech to the Royal Institute of

⁵ 'Sanctions in South Africa', Hugh Hanning, draft of August 1979.

⁶ IAC Minutes 29/3/79.

⁷ 'British Interests in South Africa', Working Paper 8 of the Industrial Committee of the BSR September 1979.

⁸ "The Outlook for South Africa", Rev. Dr. Theo Kotze, Christian Institute London, 1979.

International Affairs at Chatham House on the 7th November 1978. Kotze dismantled the case for investment..."I believe that economic sanctions applied urgently and with sincerity provide the last possible alternative to a ghastly war."⁹

A less unequivocal commitment, but a highly significant one, was that of Bishop Desmond Tutu in August when he commented on the lack of real progress in South Africa and the shortcomings of the Riekert and Wiehahn Commissions.¹⁰ Most importantly in this context he noted that the policies of present and past South African governments had been maintained by overseas investment.¹¹

The British Government never did move to a policy of recommending sanctions but in September it was reported that the Shadow Foreign Secretary, David Owen was looking at the possibility of doing exactly that. The campaign by African and other Third World states was thought to be tilting the balance of the economic argument against South Africa.¹² Moreover, when he gave the Richard Feetham Memorial Lecture at the University of Witwatersrand in September, Owen commented on this growing pressure and warned the South African Government of its likely effects. He condemned them too for statements claiming that South Africa was a lone bastion against communism in Southern Africa.¹³

Even Synod was unusually exercised on the subject of South Africa during 1979 with questions in the first session and the major debate in November. It was hardly surprising in view of this cumulative reassessment that the Church of England's position should be seen as inadequate. The tone of the September consultation set up to determine the Church's approach also reinforced the perception that events had moved on significantly and needed a reordering of response since the days when French-Beytagh's position papers had been drafted.

⁹ *Ibid*, P. 12.

¹⁰ Desmond Tutu, the most charismatic and forceful Anglican Church leader in South Africa, and previously Bishop of Lesotho had been appointed General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches in March, 1978. He has since become successively Bishop of Johannesburg and Archbishop of Capetown.

¹¹ BSR/IAC/SAF/20, notes from a letter or conversation with Desmond Tutu, 27/8/79.

¹² *Daily Telegraph* report, 13/9/79.

¹³ BSR/IAC/SAF/18.

Those attending the Consultation were drawn from a wide constituency of Church, academia, pressure group and industry. Unusual in Church of England deliberations there was a group of black South Africans with a radical and, largely Black Consciousness, perspective. These were Barney Pityana, formerly of SASO, Drake Koka, of the Black Allied Workers' Union, and Martin Mabiletsa of the Black Consciousness Movement. They stated that black organisations called for total disinvestment by foreign companies as foreign investment was part of the capitalist system which was the parent of oppression in South Africa. Codes of conduct were irrelevant because foreign companies were subject to South African law and codes of conduct could not breach that. Moreover foreign investment had little direct effect on the 84% of the black population which was not employed in industry. Buthelezi, who favoured foreign investment, was seen as interested only in Kwa-Zulu; on the wider issue his views varied over time.¹⁴

Claims for recent improvement and for the effectiveness of pressure from industry were also heard as well as assessments of the logistic difficulties involved in imposing effectively a system of sanctions. However Paul Brett, of the BSR's Industrial Committee, produced a set of notes and reflections on the Consultation. These sum up well the increasing unease with the conceptual and theological basis of traditional Church of England policy. He suggested that the difference between grand and petty apartheid should constantly be borne in mind with the fact that there was no evidence that pressure from outside the country had altered the South African Government's determination to pursue a grand apartheid policy of separate development. Therefore the policy of constructive engagement was directed only at lessening the effects of petty apartheid. Black members of the Consultation however had been adamant that they did not want the system eased, they wanted it removed, and it was important to give full weight to their expressed need for black self-determination.

In view of this very different input to the decision-making process it is hardly surprising that the document 'Political Change in South Africa', drafted by Giles Ecclestone and edited by

¹⁴ BSR/IAC/SAF/20, unattributed and undated report of the Consultation. BSR/IAC/SAF/22, undated report of the Consultation by Giles Ecclestone.

the BSR, for discussion at the November meeting of Synod was very different from those formerly produced by the IAC. It did not advocate either constructive engagement or disengagement, seeing it as over simplistic to classify potential action in such terms; the correspondence with the South African Ambassador for example was seen as going far beyond the conventional parameters of constructive engagement under which rubric the recent policy of the Church of England was generally defined. Moreover he identified the basis of the apartheid system as political and legal and incapable of radical alteration except by a combination of many forms of outside as well as internal pressure. He documented the deep divisions of opinion on the significance of recent developments in South Africa, on the interpretation of the effect of external pressure and on the degree to which self-interest should modify policy options. He did recommend however that the Church should encourage the British Government to express opposition to apartheid by pressure of a variety of types, including the range of options set out in the BCC document under the general heading of disengagement, diplomatic pressure and stricter implementation of the British and European Codes of Conduct in relation to South Africa.¹⁵

Together with the BCC report, 'Political Change in South Africa: Britain's Responsibility,'¹⁶ this report was presented to Synod in November. The polarised nature of the debate was predictable, especially in the light of the fact that the opposition of one member of the BSR to the Board's report was so vehement, that his dissenting view was published as an addendum to the main body of the report.¹⁷ He went on, in the debate, to say that he would not have dissented if the report put before Synod had been that prepared by the IAC.¹⁸ The tenor of the debate differed very little from its usual mixture with supporters of increased sporting and industrial links, of the view that white South Africans were also one's Christian brothers, of the opinion that the contribution made by South African soldiers during the war should never be forgotten, at one extreme and supporters of the view that the Church should hear the expressed need of Black South Afri-

¹⁵ 'Political Change in South Africa,' G.S. 424, CIO for the BSR, 1989.

¹⁶ *op. cit.*

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 20, dissenting opinion of Mr. G.E. Duffield.

¹⁸ Report of Proceedings of the General Synod, November 1979, Vol. 10, No. 3, p. 1185.

cans and support a policy which a majority wanted at the other extreme. More moderately were expressed views and doubts which thoughtfully reflected the complexity of the problems involved.

The original BSR motion, no doubt because it was considered that the diversity of views made agreement impossible, was that Synod should merely take note of this report. However some intensification of a sense that the Church ought to be seen to be doing more in South Africa might be inferred from the fact that Synod also passed a motion put by the Bishop of Guildford encouraging "widespread consideration of the proposals for economic disengagement in support of efforts to secure a more just society in South Africa", drawing "attention to the EEC Code of Conduct for Companies with Interests in South Africa", "in view of British involvement in the South African economy", urging the Government "to press the implementation of the Code with vigour" and the Department of Trade and Industry to hold a public hearing annually, after replies were received from British companies with interests in South Africa, so that business, trade unions, the churches and any other interested bodies might make representations about the implementation of the Code.¹⁹ Moreover, on the recommendation of the BSR Chairman, the Bishop of Truro, they rejected a motion whose general import was to welcome the changes recently introduced by the South African Government, on the basis that it might look like an endorsement of that Government's policies.²⁰ One is certainly seeing no radical change of policy here but rather a slow widening of knowledge, an uneasy awareness of the implications of the radicalisation of black South Africans and an attempt to come to terms with the complexity of the issues involved.

At the IAC Meeting on the fourteenth of November Maurice Chandler criticised the BSR paper which had been put to Synod on the grounds that it had given insufficient emphasis to recent changes in South Africa; but amongst the Churches at least opinion seemed to be moving away from the views which he and Hugh Hanning had represented for most of the decade. On the twenty first of November the BCC Assembly formally adopted a policy of disengagement from

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 1192.

²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 1198.

the economy of South Africa and recommended that it should now be the basic approach for all BCC member churches.²¹ The list of proposals published in an appendix to this resolution, whereby disengagement might progressively be effected, were directly opposed to the Hanning/Chandler approach.

²¹ BSR/IAC/SAF/5/2 and BSR/IAC/BCC/1/4, resolution 1D/79/143(a) of the BCC.

SECTION III.12.: CHURCH OF ENGLAND POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA – 1980

1980 was the year when Hugh Hanning ceased to be Secretary of the IAC and after his departure a new fluidity of approach could be observed; his successor, Peter Haynes initiated closer links for example with Quaker and other mediatory organisations in South Africa such as the Centre for Inter Group Studies. However the main thrust of policy in this year, which also saw the enthronement of Robert Runcie as the new Archbishop of Canterbury, remained the same with the preparation of a document to inform the parishes on the various church positions over South Africa, approaches to the Government who were refusing to disclose details of some of the returns made under the EEC code and protests to the Government of South Africa over the confiscation of Archbishop Desmond Tutu's passport.

The traditional IAC line was not abandoned without a fight. In January Hugh Hanning, still acting as Secretary, sent a memo to the Rev. Michael Atkinson, who was drafting 'Britain's Relations with South Africa', to be circulated to Church members, arguing for the inclusion of the IAC paper 'Sanctions in South Africa', which he had drafted in 1979 and which was .."viewed favourably by the Church Commissioners.¹ He also suggested that Atkinson .."might crystallize the difference between the GS and the BCC, which boils down to conjunctions. The BCC is now considering how to promote disengagement, the GS is considering whether to do so."² He considered too that the BCC document was out of date because of the President of South Africa's recent statements that apartheid as the Nationalist Party has always known it was now dead.³

In January also Hanning was asked by Giles Ecclestone to reply to Dr. J.C. Polkinghorne of Trinity College, Cambridge, who had asked for advice on how to bring pressure to bear on British firms operating in South Africa. Despite the balanced approach implication of Ecclestone's request that he mention the work of the CCSA and the BCC study, Hanning told Polkinghorne that ..."the Church of England Synod still believes firmly in constructive engagement as do the

¹ BSR/IAC/SAF/22, memo from Hugh Hanning to Michael Atkinson, 21/1/80.

² *Ibid*, p. 1.

³ *Ibid*, p. 2.

Church Commissioners and as does this Committee. Though agreeing with many of the BCC's complaints I myself would point to extraordinary and quite unpredicted developments in the last two years." As well as approaches to companies he recommended writing to MP's or the Foreign Office ... "which though one often gets a stereotyped reply attracts quite disproportionate notice ... in Whitehall."⁴

At the beginning of February Hanning wrote to the Foreign Office because ... "it is suggested hereabouts that United Nations resolutions about South Africa are usually opposed by Britain or else we abstain. I am contesting this statement";⁵ it was apparently the word 'usually' to which he objected. The reply from M.C.S. Dickson, in the Southern Africa Department, was related more or less verbatim to Michael Atkinson who was preparing 'Britain's Relations with South Africa'.⁶ It contained the fairly predictable information that though the Government was against apartheid it was also against sanctions and therefore had to vote against resolutions supporting sanctions; it usually voted for humanitarian resolutions however. In other words the original contention which Hanning was seeking to refute was substantially correct.

However the leaflet, 'Britain's Relations with South Africa', was finally published at the end of 1980 despite a number of criticisms of bias from members of the IAC. It did not advocate either major view and concluded that the Church's concern was to explore ways in which the conflict, defined as the imposition of the superiority of one race over another, could most peacefully be resolved. It reproduced the text of the BCC resolution as well as a brief history of apartheid and the Church of England's response to it and asked whether the time was now right for the Church of England to revise its traditional position.

At the November 1980 meeting of Synod it was also reported that during the previous year BSR staff had been involved with Christian Aid, the Catholic Fund for Overseas Development, CAFOD, and the Catholic Institute for International Relations, CIIR, in producing a study pack

⁴ BSR/IAC/SAF/22, letter from Hugh Hanning to Dr. J.C. Polkinghorne, 24/1/80.

⁵ BSR/IAC/SAF/22, letter from Hugh Hanning to the FCO, 12/2/80.

⁶ BSR/IAC/SAF/22, letter from Dickson at the FCO to Hanning, 22/2/80, and memo from Hanning to Atkinson 25/2/80.

on Southern Africa ... "to help adult Christians and others here in Britain to enter into the problems of Southern Africa with more knowledge and understanding."⁷ By means of the leaflet and the study pack ... "the Board believes the Church may be enabled to form in the near future its corporate mind on the proper course to be adopted by the Government, and the Church itself, towards South Africa."⁸

Pragmatically, and where present rather than future policy was concerned, the IAC functioned much as usual during 1980. In May a Guardian leader commented on the Government's refusal to publish the names of the thirty three British companies operating in South Africa who, according to a Department of Trade analysis, were paying 2,000 African workers below subsistence levels. This grew into an affair of some political controversy and a Commons debate on the question of British companies' links with South Africa was held in July.⁹

This was a debate in which, under their own terms of reference, the IAC and the Church Commissioners were bound to be involved. Accordingly at the beginning of June Maurice Chandler informed the Minister of State at the Department of Trade, and Sir Donald Kaberry, Chairman of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Trade and Industry, of the IAC's dissatisfaction with the Government's refusal to publish.¹⁰ In the letter to Sir Donald Kaberry he asked that Kaberry's Committee... "press for an early removal of the protection being thus afforded to those firms which are violating the code."¹¹

Criticisms from this quarter were seriously enough regarded to draw a reply from Cecil Parkinson, Minister for Trade himself. His reply, while reiterating the new Government's commitment to the Code, contained the ambiguous statement that .."any such list must, by the nature of the data, be based partly on subjective judgement and interpretation."¹²

⁷ 'Southern Africa', a study pack for British Christians about South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe, and our Christian response, November 1979, p. 1.

⁸ 1979 Annual Report of the BSR to Autumn Group of Sessions of General Synod, Vol. 11, No. 3, p. 56.

⁹ BSR/IAC/SAF/21, Guardian leader, May 1980.

¹⁰ BSR/IAC/SAF/21, letter from Maurice Chandler to the Minister of State at the Department of Trade, 5/6/80, and to Sir Donald Kaberry, Chairman of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Trade and Industry, 27/6/80.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² BSR/IAC/SAF/21, letter from the Minister for Trade to Maurice Chandler, 27/6/80.

The Church Commissioners were equally pressing. A report appeared in the Times at the beginning of July of the Commissioners' challenge to five of the thirty three non-publishing companies in which they had investments to clarify their positions on black African pay and working conditions. The companies involved included British Petroleum and Shell, both of which were among those accused by the Guardian of paying poverty wages to Black Africans in the twelve months to June 1979. Sir Ronald Harris, the First Church Estates Commissioner, was quoted as saying that the Commissioners were on the whole satisfied with the way the EEC Code of Conduct was being implemented, but .."we are not happy with the signs that the Government may be working in a certain way designed to ensure that companies do not observe the code."¹³

At the July IAC Meeting it was generally agreed that Cecil Parkinson's reply was unsatisfactory and it was decided that the Bishop of Truro, Chairman of the BSR, should write to John Nott, Secretary of State for Trade, calling for adequate disclosure.¹⁴ His letter not only did this, but also asked for an assurance that the Government was serious in intending to observe the employment codes.¹⁵ The Bishop could at least congratulate himself on the handwritten nature of his personal reply from John Nott but upon very little else. Nott ascribed the furore, instigated according to him by Raphael of the Observer and .."naturally taken up by the Guardian and particular members of the Labour Party" as merely intended to cause political embarrassment to the Government. He regretted that .."the General Synod should have seen fit to question our procedures."¹⁶

This initiative demonstrates an area in which the Church, or rather its Executive, functioned well. An issue was already in the public domain. No unique or distinctive Church position had to be formulated before action could be initiated with consequent delays and appearance of ambiguity. Members of the IAC were part of a wide-ranging Establishment network and knew their way around Parliament and, more importantly, around Whitehall. Their contribution was only a

¹³ BSR/IAC/SAF/22, cutting from the Times, July 1980.

¹⁴ IAC Minutes, 16/7/80.

¹⁵ BSR/IAC/SAF/21, letter from Bishop of Truro to John Nott, 27/8/80.

¹⁶ BSR/IAC/SAF/21, letter from John Nott to the Bishop of Truro, 11/9/80.

part, but a useful part, of a wider campaign.

Promise of a new and less institutionally-based approach, an approach which characterized much of the IAC's work after Peter Haynes replaced Hugh Hanning as Secretary, however was foreshadowed at the IAC Meeting in November when the Bishop of Swansea and Brecon reported on the working of the Sullivan Code in the USA which was far more effective, he claimed, than the EEC code. The Rev. Leon Sullivan had a team of research officers who constantly sought and evaluated information. The Rev. Sullivan would visit Britain at the beginning of 1981 to help British Churches evolve a policy for making the EEC Code more effective and he would be asked to a special IAC meeting.¹⁷

Where the removal of Bishop Desmond Tutu's passport was concerned the IAC and the Church generally were again on uncontroversial ground and reacted positively and with real anger. It may well be that this was largely due to the sense of legitimacy bestowed by operating in indisputably Church territory, although Tutu's undeniable political prominence, despite his own constant denials of being a politician, also made it important that the Church of England was seen to be unequivocally on his side.

There was no clear answer to the question of why Tutu's passport had been withdrawn, even the South African Embassy did not seem entirely sure and were clearly embarrassed.¹⁸ It was likely however that his plan to travel to Europe had provoked fears of what he might say while abroad as his pronouncements on the immorality of investing in South African industry while in Denmark the previous year had not been at all well received by the South African Government.

The Archbishop of Canterbury asked the IAC for advice and it was decided that the most effective action would be a personal approach from the Archbishop to the President of South Africa.¹⁹ The letter was a very firm one and, in asking for the restoration of Tutu's passport, suggested that this should be done before the Archbishop's enthronement on 25th March which Tutu

¹⁷ IAC Minutes, 25/11/80.

¹⁸ Report of a conversation with the Press Attaché there by Maurice Chandler, IAC Minutes 22/5/80.

¹⁹ IAC Minutes, 10/3/80.

had been invited to attend. All the Primates of the Anglican Communion, the Archbishop suggested,.. "will be in Canterbury and they could be counted on to express their feelings strongly in the context of this public occasion."²⁰ A reply, which Maurice Chandler characterized as "rather helpful",²¹ was indeed received the night before the Archbishop's enthronement. But Tutu was still absent and his absence did indeed provoke a public statement from all the Primates assembled in Canterbury deploring the South African Government's action.

The Archbishop's action on Tutu's behalf was a signal of a theme which was to be constant through the next decade when, under Tutu's leadership and by his example, the Anglican Church of South Africa participated more fully in the political life of the country than it had ever done before. In November 1982 for example Archbishop Runcie sent out a five man Anglican delegation to demonstrate the concern of the Anglican Church world-wide at the Eloff Commission's investigation of the South African Council of Churches. On other occasions he acted in a similar way, an indication of his personal regard and his admiration for Tutu.

Runcie was much more personally involved in all foreign policy issues than his predecessor had been. There were distinct signs in 1980 too that he could not be content to follow a foreign policy largely and independently formulated by a BSR Committee. He appointed a number of personal advisers to enable him to operate more independently of Church House and it was obvious from the beginning that his Primacy would be marked by a far more hands-on approach.

²⁰ BSR/IAC/SAF/15, letter from the Archbishop of Canterbury to the President of South Africa, 4/3/80.

²¹ BSR/ISC/SAF/22, note of a phone message from Maurice Chandler, 25/3/80.

SECTION III.13: CONCLUSION

The end of the 1970s found a very different attitude to South Africa and the resolution of its problems amongst Church of England leaders than had been demonstrated during the earlier part of the decade.

In the early 1970s Archbishop Ramsey had unequivocally condemned apartheid but this had been translated without major debate about fundamental issues into a policy of gradualism; in other words the political situation would be transformed if the economic circumstances of Black workers were themselves transformed. This is not necessarily untrue, although a strong case can be made for the predominant need for political change in a society whose political structure is so bound up with its economic life, but it was not tested, questioned or assessed.

The middle years of the decade saw great changes and much violence of all kinds in South Africa but none of this altered the policy of the IAC or introduced fundamental debate on the nature and parameters of violence, on the legitimate response to structural violence, on the possible legitimate extension of the Christian concept of the Just War to the situation in South Africa. There is no doubt of the genuine distaste for apartheid among IAC members but by and large they were not willing to contemplate radical prescriptions for its removal. Thus much of the decade saw a series of elaborations on the initial strategy of bringing influence to bear on British firms with South African subsidiaries. It was perhaps only in such spontaneous issues as the Alice Seminary affair and the treatment of the Christian Institute or of Bishop Tutu that genuine Christian concern appeared unmediated through the constraints of preordained policy.

It was only at the end of the decade, with the cumulative effect of recent events in South Africa, with a Church of England consistently out of step with most other British and World Churches and with an imminent change of Committee Secretary, that doubts about previous certainties began to surface. One might say, in Giles Ecclestone's words, that the Church's 'troubled conscience' reasserted itself.¹

¹ See Section II.3.

SECTION IV: CONCLUSION

The introduction to this work claims it as an empirical study of the Church of England's activities and attitudes with regard to Rhodesia and South Africa during the 1970's. Section I.1, in which the theoretical foundations of the work are considered, suggests that it is based on two hypotheses; the first of these is that, from the perspective of a Transnational paradigm, the Church of England is capable of functioning as a world actor because, though nationally based, it is internationally operating; the second hypothesis is that despite the only true theoretical foundation of a claim to status as a world actor resting on a Transnational view, the activities of those charged with responsibility for the Church's foreign policy have inclined to the maintenance of a Realist view of the state, power and policy priorities. Sections I.2, 3 and 4 variously stress the conditioning by external environment, by tradition and by theological and philosophical underpinning which would have made it a near impossibility for the Church not to involve itself in the problems of Southern Africa during the 1970's. Sections I.5 and 6 examine the structure, present state and increasing centralization of the Church of England as well as those personnel ultimately responsible for its foreign policy. Sections II and III look in turn at Rhodesia and South Africa and examine what those responsible for foreign policy said and did about the situation.

In drawing all these elements together in some final analysis it is necessary first of all to observe that this work falls into two halves. This stems from the fact that the twin hypotheses offered in Section I.1 do not have the same status.

The first is drawn from the orthodox typology of possible International Relations paradigms – during the past twenty five years Transnationalism has been extensively discussed in a theoretical sense and discrete corners of it have been intensively examined empirically. Thus in this work, which can draw on the work of others, the hypothesis put forward, that the Church of England is capable within a Transnational world view of being a significant international actor, has deductive status.

The second hypothesis however, that the world view and mode of operation of those respon-

sible for Church foreign policy was essentially Realist during the 1970's, is inductive in nature. It is internal to this work and occurred to the author as a possible hypothesis only as the empirical research progressed. Its validation is regarded as no less significant than that of the first hypothesis, and it is in fact considerably more interesting, but its status explains the underlying structure of this thesis.

This structure, a reflection of the research process itself, is based on the author's initial expectation that the Church of England would be found to be an actor, of greater or lesser significance, on the world stage; that certain historical, experiential and theological factors would incline it to participation in issues which, in state terms, could be labelled foreign policy; that these factors would operate particularly strongly in the case of countries which were part of the old British Empire and which remained part of the Anglican Communion. Sections I.2 to 4 demonstrate how far these initial expectations were borne out and can hold as little surprise for the reader as did their research for the writer.

Section I.5 however reflects the questions which began to occur early in the research process about the nature of the Church's involvement and the values which underlay it, values which, it came to be seen, were not simply those of a mediated Biblical or Church authority nor yet of human rights as a commonly used shorthand for these. Both of the latter were present, both of them were important, but they were themselves mediated through an Establishment, power-orientated and balance of power perspective. Section I.5 reveals the constraints of structure, morale and economics which facilitated the emergence of a foreign policy programme which reflected such views. It also reflects a change of expectation in the research process, a change which should perhaps have been unnecessary given even a layman's knowledge about the closeness of the Church of England to State and Government. The author's initial expectation had been however that the manifest antipathy of many Government Ministers for the Church's activities and pronouncements in recent years was occasioned by a resolutely, if often privately expressed and unpublicized, independent stance on most policy issues by the Church. As far as foreign policy was concerned during the 1970s this was not the case at all and this is demonstrated in Section

I.6.

The structure of the IAC, its membership, its relatively infrequent meetings, the lack of continuity of attendance because of its members' other commitments made it near-inevitable that its day to day running would be by its executive staff. Thus the interests and personal orientations of these staff are thrown into prominence and particularly those of the IAC's Secretary, from 1972 to 1980 Hugh Hanning.

There is no doubt whatsoever about Hugh Hanning's personal integrity or devotion to the Church of England. He was appointed because he was what he was; he had a particular sort of experience, particular contacts, a ready-made set of interests. Therefore to attach any blame to him for being and doing what he had always been and done is unjust.

It is not unjust however to ask whether the analysis that his particular interests and expertise were what the Church needed was accurate. It is suggested that it was not. This work certainly rests on the designation of the Church of England as a transnational organization but such a designation is highly simplistic if it does not go on to ask what form this organization takes and what type of contribution is made to the transnational community. It is suggested that there was an essential disfunction between the type of distinctive contribution which a church ought to make, because it is the only type of organization which can do so, and the type of contribution which the Church of England was making. This contribution was in many cases not distinctively Christian and made the Church vulnerable to criticism as a satellite of state policy.

Sections II and III examine the activities and pronouncements of the IAC in Rhodesia and South Africa and it is suggested that they bear out and illustrate the contentions made above while also demonstrating the importance of the factors of history, experience and theology examined in earlier chapters.

Incidents which illustrate the Committee's methods of working have been highlighted. The extent and type of contacts used to facilitate policy or to gain publicity for it have been demonstrated. Assumptions which appear to have underpinned policy decisions have been examined as have the preferences over both personnel and programmes which have frequently been

demonstrated.

Policies have sometimes been questioned. Most important here in the context of Rhodesia was the refusal to recognize the support enjoyed by ZANU and ZAPU, the early preference for influencing Ian Smith to accept internal change and the subsequent support for Bishop Muzorewa. All of these, in conjunction with the reactionary position of the Anglican Church in Rhodesia, contributed to the discrediting of the Church of England's own position there.

In the context of South Africa the pivot of IAC policy on behalf of the Church of England was the assumption of the desirability of evolutionary rather than revolutionary change and, as a vehicle for attaining this, the adoption of a policy of attempting to influence British firms in South Africa to improve the pay, working and living conditions of their black African workers. This policy was preferred to that of disinvestment which the WCC and, ultimately, the BCC supported.

The two situations differ because that in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe is now resolved, indeed was resolved in the last year of the decade under examination. Hindsight can enable an analyst to be unpleasantly selfrighteous but, while wishing to avoid this position, it is thought justifiable to comment critically on certain aspects of the Church's policy and position formation over Rhodesia.

Where Church of England divergence from the previously united BCC line, that any Rhodesian settlement had to encompass the Six Principles is concerned, it is reasonable to ask why and how this divergence took place. The timing, 1972, the use of Establishment contacts and the quoting of Government views all indicate that Hugh Hanning, appointed in that year Secretary of the IAC, was responsible.

Nothing came of the Pearce Proposals or of the initiatives surrounding them and the incident is therefore not important substantively. It is significant however in marking a departure from a hitherto unified BCC line and a beginning of a much closer identification of the IAC, and therefore in some circumstances the Church of England, with the views of Government and of Establishment generally. These developments in turn prevented the presentation of a valid, united British Church view, which would itself have been a useful weapon in foreign affairs issues; they

also alienated the Church of England from much radical thought and opinion.

The Church of England's relationship with the WCC, problematical for some years, was also affected adversely by the situation in Rhodesia. The WCC's decision to make grants to groups involved in the struggle against racism in 1970 had offended many in the Church of England and, such was the resentment, £1000 was deducted from Synod's grant to the WCC in 1974. It was inevitable therefore that the announcement of grants to guerilla groups in Rhodesia in 1978 would cause considerable indignation on grounds of principle as well as of the belief that this was meddling in Britain's affairs.

The arguments used to justify or vilify these grants have already been rehearsed and it is unnecessary to repeat them, but it should be said that more was at issue here than the situation in Rhodesia. As the brief resumé in Section I.2 indicated, the WCC over the past thirty years has moved away from domination by Western and European culture and belief patterns to domination by members from, what may loosely be designated, The Third World.

The Established Church of England does not fit easily into the new system of priorities and politico-religious attitudes; mutual incomprehension of opposing points of view is frequent. This is demonstrated by the frequent difficulty which those who represented the Church of England at the WCC found in conveying WCC views to Synod in acceptable terms. More specifically it was demonstrated by the visit of Synod members to Geneva in 1978 where no understanding at all was found of the difficulties which its own culture and history made for the Church of England in accepting the apparent validation of violence.

In this situation fault attaches to both or to neither party, but it is fair to say that, as ex-colonial status was a common denominator for many members of the WCC the Church of England's closeness to State was a cause of mistrust and incomprehension. As has already been indicated, the IAC at this time was very much part of this Church/State nexus and undoubtedly attracted criticism for its methods of working from those already suspicious of its structural constraints.

Without doubt the main plank of the Church's policy in Rhodesia was the proposal to set up a Third Party Peacekeeping Force there. This was one of the issues which Hugh Hanning brought with him as a ready-made policy option when he joined the IAC in 1972 and was part of his more general interest in the peaceful uses of military forces. It was no worse for such an origin and indeed the similarity of the arrangements which were made in Rhodesia to oversee the period of interim government before the second election in 1980 to those consistently advocated by the IAC might be seen in themselves as justification.

It is possible however to comment on how little reflection took place on the underlying theological and philosophical implications of mobilizing such a force. It would be foolish to advocate such a basis as the only one on which a church can act but it is reasonable to suggest that any situational position should be mediated through that perspective which is particular and perhaps unique to religious organizations.

The underlying conflict of interest under debate here is that between peace and justice, which has already been discussed at some length in the substantive chapter on Rhodesia. It is suggested that this debate underpinned, if not overtly, any decision over whether or not to employ a Peacekeeping Force, particularly when this was suggested as appropriate at a stage in the conflict when it would in fact have served the purpose of preserving the status quo. The decision that a Peacekeeping Force would serve a useful purpose in Rhodesia was taken without any comprehensive debate on the relative value to be laid on justice and peace, on the possibility that the two were incompatible in the circumstances of Rhodesia, on the likelihood that one would have to give way to the other and, if this were the case, which should yield.

It is perfectly possible that if such a debate had taken place a similar policy decision might have been taken. For much of the decade it was not unreasonable to believe that a middle, yet an African, way was possible in the form of Bishop Muzorewa. If he genuinely had been considered the true representative of majority African opinion then a Peacekeeping force to protect his government from unsanctioned violence was a reasonable policy option. Thus it is not the outcome but the lack of consultation and reflection in the decision-making process which should

attract criticism.

It is reasonable also to criticise the IAC's information gathering process as discriminatory according to preferred source. The status and attitudes of the Anglican Church in Rhodesia were known, thus the views of the Bishops of Mashonaland and Matabeleland should have been treated with caution as a partial and unrepresentative view. Instead they were accorded considerable weight, and this was despite the counterview presented by their own Archbishop and despite the alternative and reputable sources of alternative information which were consistently presented to the IAC.

One is here forced to conclude that the IAC was listening to those views which best accorded with its members preferences. A victory for a moderate group was desirable as avoiding both bloodshed and the spread of communism, therefore WCC support for the guerrilla groups was to be deplored as encouraging their victory both materially and psychologically. Hence total condemnation of the WCC grants by figures as reputable as the two Rhodesian bishops was welcomed and not sufficiently questioned.

Much emphasis has been laid on the failure of the IAC and its executive to bring a specifically Church orientated analysis to the situations with which they were faced in Rhodesia. This criticism is thrown into particular relief when one considers the Lancaster House Conference where the contribution of members of the IAC, using a network of well-disposed contacts, was extensive, useful and clearly identifiable as Church originated.

Much of what the IAC had previously labelled mediation had in fact been contact-making and maintenance among preferred politicians in Rhodesia but Lancaster House broke new ground. There seems to have been a genuine agnosticism about outcome, or perhaps this was fatalism, and a desire merely to promote as many cross-party contacts as possible. This was both to facilitate a settlement and to provide a basis for future co-operation in the new state of Zimbabwe. As usual no analysis of underlying principles appears to have been undertaken but it may perhaps be suggested that a theology of compromise as well as a setting aside of power-political considerations might provide such principles.

In conclusion on the subject of Rhodesia it would be totally unfair to give the impression that the IAC was a bastion of reaction in a general climate of progressive Anglican thought. It is true that some members of Synod, of the BSR and even of the IAC itself disapproved of the prevailing line and methodology; it is true that the BCC was consistently more radical and more thoughtful; it is true that the WCCs policy was radically opposed to that of the IAC. But it is also true, and should be remembered when one considers how far distant from rank and file some leadership groups become, that the IAC's views bore a marked similarity to those of many ordinary Church members.

Section I.5 has demonstrated the markedly unradical nature of the Church of England as a whole, both in personnel and membership. Many Church members were, and are, atypical of the population as a whole by both age and class, and among them were concentrated many who had reminiscent views of Empire and its civilizing possibilities, sympathized to varying degrees with 'our kith and kin' and did not like communism. It would have been remarkably difficult for the IAC to welcome the grants to guerrilla groups, even if its members had the slightest personal desire to do so, because of the groundswell of opposition from the rank and file.

Thus it is to an extent difficult to criticize a servant committee of the Church for not being more radical than the Church it served. This is to ignore however the radical nature of much of the social research and recommendation that came from other member committees of the BSR and to also to ignore the perhaps contentious stricture of Peter Haynes, Secretary of the IAC from 1980 (in a personal interview in January 1985) that the central organs of the Church exist not only to serve but to educate.

Unlike the crisis in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe the situation in South Africa remains unresolved and one is not therefore allowed the comfort of using an outcome as the basis of critical analysis. However the recent rapprochement, assailable though it most definitely is, between the President of the Republic of South Africa and the ANC since the freeing of Nelson Mandela might be said to offer some degree of ex-post hoc justification to those, like the IAC, who always resisted comprehensive sanctions as it has come about with a very partial use of sanctions. Others might

well judge this view to be simplistic however in that those selective financial penalties, in terms of denial of investment capital, which the unreformed economy in South Africa increasingly incurred were seminal ones.

Moreover, if one is seeking to judge in terms of recent developments, the more recent outbreak of black on black violence in South Africa and the general position of Inkatha and Chief Buthelezi with reference to this, one might suggest that the IAC's designation of Buthelezi as the best way forward for South African blacks was also somewhat simplistic.

Both of the judgements above are themselves inadequate and may well be superseded but, while it is not legitimate to condemn the Church of England's policy of resisting disinvestment, it is reasonable to criticize it on the same basis as some of the Rhodesian policies. One can ask therefore whether the way in which policy was formulated was consultative enough and representative enough of informed Church thinking. It is suggested that the answer here is no.

No profound analysis of what a distinctively Christian stance should be was undertaken until the end of the decade and by comparison with BCC papers Church of England ones were light on theology and heavy on logistics and power politics. It is not suggested that a different policy should necessarily have been adopted. There is distinctive and long-recognized Christian value in avoiding conflict and promoting peace and it may well be that a multi-faceted study of the situation would still have preferred a policy of evolution and compromise. What is suggested is that, without comprehensive study of possible options, the Church of England's policy was open to criticism as an amalgamation of personal preference, unwillingness to rock the Government boat and a preoccupation with the balance of power consequences of allowing too much Eastern bloc influence to grow in Southern Africa. In other words the distinctive factors which should have distinguished decision making in a church were once again lacking.

In the absence of a thorough, overt analysis of the basis of alternative policy options it is necessary to explore the documentary evidence for signs of underlying belief and motivation. Thus it is clear that not only a preference for a non-violent solution informed Church attitudes and policies but also the conviction that thoroughgoing political and social change could be brought

about by economic means. This may perhaps be the case, though the efforts of the IAC might be thought to have been directed more to the alleviation of the discomforts of petty apartheid than to the removal of apartheid *per se* and to have ignored a fundamental fact of economic life, that firms in South Africa had a vested interest in maintaining reasonable working relations with the Government there.

One is forced to reiterate the argument that the Church should have been enabled to make an honest choice of policy after thorough and informed debate. A Working Party on Investment in South Africa was certainly set up in 1974 but it never considered disinvestment as an option and even the working papers provided for its first meeting presupposed a consensus for influence through investment rather than disinvestment. French-Beytagh's ideas, his co-operation with Adam Raphael in the Guardian exposé of South African wages, the evidence given to the Rogers Committee were all in themselves laudable but the suppositions on which they were based had never been examined. Despite claims that the IAC was merely information seeking on behalf of the Church the Polaroid view, as Hanning himself called it, where existing investments were used to gain leverage, became de facto Church policy. Moreover it was defended vigorously by Hugh Hanning, Maurice Chandler, the Church Commissioners and members of the Central Board of Finance who most definitely did not see it as an information gathering exercise.

The situation produced a number of unfortunate results. It called seriously into question the genuineness of the Church of England's opposition to apartheid; ringing declarations followed by behind the scenes manoeuvring with government departments presented an ambivalent face. This combined in an unfortunate way with a barely hidden sympathy with the white South African position amongst some members of the Church at large which was frequently demonstrated too in Synod debates. If the position of the Church of England had deviated from that of the WCC because exhaustive consultation and thought had produced a distinctive policy behind which the Church could be seen to be united much less mistrust would have been generated. As it was the situation was marked by behind the scenes contacts with government and business, by failure to consider the increasingly numerous calls amongst South African black leaders for a policy of

disinvestment to be considered and by support for the one black leader in South Africa who both maintained a dialogue with the South African Government and encouraged investment.

Support for Chief Buthelezi was tied up with the investment question generally and with the IAC's support for the use of Intermediate Technology in South Africa. This was seen to be particularly applicable to the Homelands and investment of this kind was supported by Buthelezi in Kwa Zulu. A policy of encouraging Homelands investment was frequently defended on the basis that it amounted to humanitarian aid and that no church could stand by while people starved. However this begged the fundamental question of whether economic investment in the Homelands accepted a societal structure imposed by the white Government of South Africa. It ignored the possible solution of alleviating hardship by channelling aid through South African Church organizations, which would have avoided giving aid and comfort to artificial state structures created to maintain and widen the effects of apartheid. Moreover the possibility that the structure of the Homelands, as of the South African state as a whole, imposed a form of structural violence on the black people of South Africa was never raised, let alone explored.

Once again criticism may perhaps be levelled more at the easy assimilation of this policy into the IAC rubric than at the policy itself. Intermediate Technology was part of the package of personal policies which travelled to the IAC with Hugh Hanning and it was placed before the Committee as a valuable aid to development in South Africa, thence uncritically adopted. As a result the Church was yet again vulnerable to criticism for the adoption of a policy whose implications remained unexplored, yet which appeared to some in the outside world to be part of a package which ignored the legitimate aspirations of black people.

It was in its dealings with the Christian Institute of South Africa, in its protests over banning orders and confiscation of passports, in its pleas for the lives of those condemned to death for politically motivated acts of violence that the Church of England was seen at its best. Its activities were unexceptionable and uncriticised here, except of course by the South African Government, because they met expectation of what a church's activities ought to be. Such actions sprang not simply from a theologically based regard for human life and for freedom but from an

instinctive reaction against the abrogation of human rights founded on the freedom of the individual.

It is suggested that dichotomy in human rights thinking between those rights founded on the individual and those founded on community is mirrored in microcosm in the work and thinking of influential members of the IAC. They were instinctively at home in issues which involved the abrogation of the former but uncomprehending of the complications involved in establishing the rights of the latter. A plea that an individual should have freedom of speech and movement restored to him presented no problems, its foundation was so culturally comprehensible as to need not even articulation; the possibility however that the very structure of a state might itself violate the rights of a community within it to an extent which might justify the use of violence against that state and its representatives was culturally alien. This is well illustrated by attitudes to Homeland development where the possibility that individuals might go hungry or individual children lack education of the most rudimentary sort was thought unconscionable; the possibility that long-term community good might entail the denial of these short-term individual benefits was not even considered.

There are a number of factors which draw together the situations in Rhodesia and South Africa. Most fundamentally they both attracted attention for the same reason – both were crises and both were areas of traditional British responsibility.

Section I.1 made clear how historical ties of empire and empire-wide Anglicanism have been transformed into contemporary ties depending on the Anglican Communion. Moreover the numerous personal contacts of clergy and laity, a sense of solidarity with 'kith and kin' and a lingering sense of responsibility and guilt for empire variously maintain a sense of vested interest in Rhodesia and South Africa.

Section I.5 made clear how shortage of money and staff made the activities of the IAC something of a fire-fighting operation; resources did not exist to make wide-ranging policy decisions at leisure but, rather, crises were dealt with as they arose. It may well be that greater available resources would have enabled fuller and earlier planning and the development of a set of

coherent policy responses which transcended individual situations.

Shortage of money was also a major factor in the development of a situation where a Committee like the IAC was able to function so independently of the Church as a whole and even of its central organization. In appointing Hugh Hanning as Secretary they acquired in one man a set of ready-made policies and the contact networks to go with them; this undoubtedly saved time, money and personnel in the development and implementation of ideas, but it did lead, as this thesis has shown, to an uncritical assumption of a set of unconnected and largely unexamined policies. Some of these were a good fit with Church orientations and a Christian viewpoint, some were irrelevant, some were unsuitable.

Money was not the only factor here however because the Church of England's structural and cultural proximity to State led both to the appointment of certain sorts of personnel and to the acceptability of a state-orientated viewpoint which might be thought, on a philosophical or theological level, to have little connection with traditional Christian beliefs. In practical terms this dichotomy is demonstrated well by comparison between the expressed views of Archbishop Ramsey and those consistently advocated by the IAC. In his speech at Cambridge in February 1972 the Archbishop said "... we must realize that any attitude on our part towards either violent or non-violent policies is going to be very costly for us if we try to be Christian. If we say to Africans 'do not act rashly, a violent revolution is likely only to bring to yourselves terrible suffering', we are saying in effect 'go on accepting your present suffering', and we can say that to any people only if we somehow are ready to suffer with them." There is little hint that such self-questioning informed the deliberations of the IAC.

Thus one comes full circle and contemplates again an organization which, if analyzed in a Transnational paradigm, is a world actor, of the supporting variety certainly but fitted to act in a certain way and to articulate certain views effectively amongst other organizations and states. This actor however, by its own structural, cultural and historical constraints, assumed for the most part the role of chorus in a state-centric, status-quo scenario.

APPENDIX TO SECTION I.6: MEMBERSHIP OF THE IAC

The composition of the IAC was as follows:-

Chairman, appointed by the Chairman of the BSR.

10 members appointed by the Board on the recommendation of the outgoing Committee.

5 members of a Migration Committee. This Committee met separately and reported when necessary to the main Committee. Its work, assisting the resettlement of migrant Anglicans, gradually contracted over the decade and it was eventually phased out.

A panel of Parliamentary and Ecumenical Consultants.

In 1972 membership of the IAC was as follows. Members of the Migration Committee are excluded.

Maurice Chandler, Chairman

The Provost of Portsmouth

Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard

The Rev. Paul Oestreicher

L.W. Norwood, FCO

Noel Salter

Kenneth Johnstone

Rev. Canon John Oates

E.L. Mallalieu, QC, MP

John Selwyn Gummer, MP

Frank Judd, MP

Nicholas Scott, MP

Rev. Hugh Wilcox, Secretary BCC International Department

Rev. Cyril Firth

Rev. Elliott Kendall, Community and Race Relations Unit, BCC

Rt. Rev. Cecil John Patterson

The following list of members is at January 1975. Membership altered again from time to time – the representative from the FCO for example moved abroad and was replaced by a colleague. However this particular lineup gives a further indication of the typical professional and occupational composition of the Committee.

Maurice Chandler, Chairman

Hon. Adam Butler, MP

Frank Judd, MP

Rev. Paul Oestreicher

L.W. Norwood, FCO

Rev. Hugh Wilcox, BCC

Miss Ruth Anstey, Conference of British Missionary Societies

Rev. R. Elliott Kendall, Community and Race Relations Unit, BCC

Kenneth Johnstone

Rev. Canon John Oates, Previous Secretary to the Committee

Rev. Canon M.M. Hamond Moore, one of the Archbishop of Canterbury's

Counsellors on Foreign Relations

Sir Douglas Dodds Parker

Rt. Rev. B.N.Y. Vaughan

Giles Ecclestone, Secretary to the BSR

Hugh Hanning, Secretary to the IAC

The Lord Elton, Assistant Secretary to the IAC

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